Queering the Conatus:

Bodies, Desire, and Political Legitimacy in Spinozas The Ethics

Brian Rose
PHIL 260
Davis
1 December 2008

Rose
Queering the Conatus:
Bodies, Desire, and Political Legitimacy in Spinozas The Ethics
In expressing how Spinozist ethology progresses from an examination of
particular things to an examination of compounded, socialized relations, Gilles Deleuze
formulated an intriguing set of questions to articulate the pursuit of many modern
philosophical projects; he writes,
[N]ow it is a question of knowing whether relations (and
which ones?) can compound directly to form a new, more
extensive relation, or whether capacities can compound
directly to constitute a more intensive capacity or power.
It is no longer a matter of utilizations or captures, but of
sociabilities and communities. How do individuals enter
into composition with one another in order to form a higher
individual, ad inifinitum? How can a being take another
being into its world, while preserving or respecting the
others own relations and world? (Deleuze 628)
These questions are particularly relevant to the contemporary philosophical project of
queer theory, certain scholars therein contributing an innovative reanalysis of Spinozas
The Ethics, wherein the ethical scope once applied to particular bodies is now projected
toward identities and political categories. It is the intention of this paper to consider
Spinozas conatus as manifest in the queer production of desire; that the mutualism of
reasoned desire to difference, as well as the positive recognition of its own difference
through the rational aspect, establish the queer political body as a multiple open
system; that the multiplicity of queer identities allows for greater affectivity between
bodies, and thus greater potential for action and power (which, in social context, is a
representation of political legitimacy).
In order to undertake such an examination of queer identity in terms of Spinozist
metaphysics, it is first necessary to understand why Spinoza lends himself to the

Rose

consideration of queer theory. To answer this, we look to the essence of queer oppression,
which is the obstacle that must be surmounted in order to attain political legitimacy.
Scholar Catherine Mary Dale states, Unlike other kinds of oppression that do not
separate a body and its actions . . . homophobia is precisely the oppression that does: it
separates what a body is from what it can do, thus marking a difference between an
ontology and a pragmatics (Dale 2). Indeed, all queer oppression seems to locate the
conflict outside of the individuals concrete identity; whereas racism locates conflict in
the objective identity of the victim, homophobia and similar prejudices locate conflict in
the relations in which the victim partakes.
Dale continues, [Elizabeth] Grosz remains committed to locating both sexual
difference and the sex of the love object as factors that crucially underpin lesbian and gay
political projects. But these factors become a problem when demands for the right to
same-sex relations . . . are susceptible to charges of political illegitimacy (Dale 4). In
consideration of the context of queer oppression, insomuch as it separates a body from its
actions, it is reasonable to assert that any foundation of queer political legitimacy would
necessarily reconcile this synthetic separation (meaning that it would equate identity with
the actions thereof, thereby establishing a firmer defense for said actions, as well as
subject them to the influence of reason. Spinozist metaphysics provide excellent
justification of queer theory in that, for Spinoza, a bodys power is determined by its
actions (i.e. its relation to itself and to other bodies); the conceptualization of a body in
the context of its actions in relations, originally devised in order to establish greater
power within the body itself, will now establish greater power within the queer political
body.

Rose

Spinoza defines a body as a mode which expresses in a certain determinate

manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered an extended thing (Spinoza
216). Each individual body is not substance but a mode; therefore, its existence is
intrinsically derived from affectivities shared with other bodies. He writes: Every
individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot
exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause
other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence (200). All action is
conditioned by external causality; the obvious implication of this being that a body only
exists so long as it acts or is acted upon, and therein lies its identity. This applies to all
particular things, but is applicable on a compounded social level in terms of queer
dynamics, as this paradigm is specific response to the source of its political illegitimacy.
Since queer is subjugated by its relations, it can only transcend this subjugation by
establishing its identity as a relation, therein expanding its affectivity and increasing its
potential for activity, ergo power.
In Part II of The Ethics, Spinoza writes: The ideas of modifications of the human
body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct,
but confused (Spinoza 240). These ideas of modifications are confused because they are
determined by external causes, as perceived after the common order of nature. Spinoza
continues, [A]t such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of
regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and
contrast . . . it regards things clearly and distinctly (241). From this we may suppose that
the only distinct ideas we may possess are those of which our own mind is the cause.
Therefore, if we are to regard queer identity as a relation (which is a modification of the

Rose

body), it must necessarily be regarded in reason so as to emphasize points of agreement,

difference, and contrast between particular identities within the queer arena. Queer
becomes like the vital force of Spinoza's natura naturans, a materiality that is always in
the process of reinventing itself, which William Connolly has described as a world of
diverse energies and strange vitalities that whirls around and through [us] (Bennett 356).
This consideration of difference is intrinsically active, produces the most clearlyunderstood ideas, and therefore enables political cohesion to exist among particular, and
often disparate, identities within queer.
Spinoza writes, The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by
external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the
external body. . . . Hence it follows, first, that the human mind perceives the nature of a
variety of bodies, together with the nature of its own (Spinoza 232). Modal relations of
bodies entail the natures of all involved bodies; in terms of queer, this mutual recognition
of natures is the basic structure of queer dynamics: discarding irrelevant phenomenal
details in order to consider the true nature of the entity with which one is interacting. This
not only determines the nature of the perceiver, but the way in which the perceiver
perceives himself; considering his own nature in a state of confluence with other natures,
the human beings understanding of himself is redefined.
Since queer avoids specific definitions, it is concerned with an indeterminate set.
Dale writes:
As a multiplicity queer is equated with an indeterminate
number of bodies or groups at any given time, and these
appear as aleatory and undetermined potential. In
acknowledging its difference from itself, queer upsets the
usual mechanisms of social recognition: social identity

Rose

implies the division of potential social relations into

designated sets and individuals. (Dale 5)
Rather than another category for which to define oneself, queers identity is not concrete
but modal, wherein [s]olid identities such as gay and lesbian are seen as regimenting the
sexual diversity and singular relations that characterize queer (Dale 3). This dynamic of
difference in queer provides the greatest potential for diverse impressions, and therefore
greater number of perceptions.
Spinozas radical reconsideration of God is indicitave of the reconsideration that
queer identity must necessarily undergo. Spinoza states, The idea of God, from which an
infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one (Spinoza 219). Like
Spinozas revision of God as a pantheistic determinism that manifests as modal relations,
queer must be revised not as a categorical noun, but as a deterministic system which
defines itself by the modal continuity within itself namely, the pluralistic relations of
disparate identities, harmonized only by the recognition of mutual difference. This
emphasis of difference allows the greatest diversity of bodies to affect one another in an
active sense, and therefore establishes greater power. However, it is only through the
rational understanding of these relations that this power is established.
Gilles Deleuze, through his analysis of Spinoza, has attempted to apply such
revisionist ontologies to humanity. Jane Bennett writes, Deleuze and Guattari, in a
similar vein, locate humanity within a single cosmic flow of matter-movement . . . This
is not a world, in the first instance, of subjects and objects, but of various materialities
constantly engaged in a network of relations. It is a world populated less by individuals
than by groupings or compositions that shift over time (Bennett 354). The contingency

Rose

of these groupings is not dissimilar to populations of sexual deviancy that shift over
time; and this contingency is reflected in the relation of queer identity.
For Catherine Mary Dale, the relations within queer occur through Spinozas
account of common notions:
The practical process of forming active affections is
bridged by what Spinoza calls "common notions." . . . This
entails questioning the structure of a body by observing its
relations with other bodies in order to ascertain what is
common between them and thereby to enable their
production of joyful affects . . . Spinoza says that common
notions are able to form even with bodies that do not agree
in nature. In terms of the disparate nature of queer, the
theory of common notions transforms queer as an identity
into queer as a relation. (Dale 8-9)
Because common notions may unite two bodies that do not agree in nature, queer is able
to encompass a variety of regimenting categories, while itself being an alliance of mutual
desire for difference and a state of relations.
The undetermined potential which arises out of the indeterminate set of queer
bodies will necessarily manifest as desire to fulfill itself through the conatus; desire
therefore becomes an inexhaustible resource of the queer identity, which may be
rationally utilized to advance its own power. Spinoza writes, The endeavour [conatus],
wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the
actual essence of the thing in question (Spinoza 271). Since fully engaging reality
necessitates active relations within and without a body, fully engaging the political arena
requires active relations within and without a political body. Queers will to power
(derived through the conatus) necessitates active relations within an identity, and
therefore bolsters political legitimacy.

Rose

Spinoza writes, Desire is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived,

as determined to a particular activity by some modification of itself (Spinoza 308).
Desire determines the particular activity of an identity through its relations with and
modifications by external identities as well as itself. He later states, An emotion, which
is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof
(383). Desire is passive in that it is determined by the modification of a body; it is active
in that it propels a body to persist in its own being; desire can only achieve this status if it
is tempered by reason. Of this, Dale posits, Queer advocates the creative action of desire
advancing the notion of pleasure for its own sake (Dale 10).
Active relations is the key to developing power within a body; namely, the queer
political body. Spinoza writes, I say that we act . . . when through our nature something
takes place within us or externally to us, which through our own nature can be clearly and
distinctly understood (Spinoza 263). Spinoza emphasizes the act of understanding
through our own nature in other words, conceiving identity not in terms of objective
categories, but rather how we act upon and relate to other bodies (i.e. disparate identities).
Modal queer identity is defined by relations of difference and characterized by a rejection
of categorical heteronormativity; by recognizing points of agreement, difference, and
contrast (241) inclusive of our own identities, we provide a foundational structure of
queer political legitimacy; this identity of relations supercedes identities of mere
distinctions (i.e. sexual orientation, fetishisms, and gender ambiguity), which are not
modal relations but rather material categories that are perceived after the common order
of nature and do not constitute the essence of identity. Dale clarifies: Queer, like
Spinoza's unknown body . . . is [because it is an indeterminate system] continuously able

Rose

to increase its relations with bodies, its joyful passions, and therefore, its power of
acting (Dale 9).
Any system of relations is useful to man in proportion to how greatly it
promotes affectivity between human bodies. Spinoza writes, Whatsoever disposes the
human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways,
or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so,
in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or of
affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways (349). Queer, as a modal system
of relations, can promote greatest affectivity with a focus upon its own difference. Dale
writes:
A positive expression of difference is a difference that is
not structured by negation. This pure difference expresses
the immanence of the multiple and the one, rather than the
eminence of this over that, of one or many, of identity or
chaos. Pure difference is the positive play of all events
(effects) and their productions. There is no essential
identity nor loss or lack, only affirmation. Thus queer
denotes the inclusion of its own difference. (Dale 4-5)
Queer relations are founded upon mutual desires of difference. Though many categories
inclusive within queer (i.e. lesbian, transvestite, sadomasochist) contrast in the objects of
desire, their common essence is a desire for difference, the point of reference for which is
heteronormative value structures; the rationalized mutuality of desire is therefore the
essence of queer identity, the implications of which are vast.
In terms of queer, it is reasonable to abstract a contingent concept of difference as
the object of desire for the queer identity, rather than establish identities based on
absolute or concrete objects of desire; these absolute, material desires are less likely to be
subject to the rational aspect as more contingent concepts such as queer, and

Rose

consequently material desire is unable to become active relations between disparate

bodies and increase the power of the inclusive identity. Dale writes, In Spinoza's Ethics,
distinctions between bodies are not hierarchical because the judgment of bodies is no
longer based on a morality of superior and inferior species or genus. . . . Rather, it
apprehends new alliances and irreconcilable differences and treats them as no less than
productive (Dale 5).
Bennett, writing on Spinozist conceptions of bodies and relations, writes, What
Spinoza and Deleuze and Guattari here suggest to me is . . . a (necessarily speculative)
onto-theory that presumes that matter has an inclination to make connections and form
networks of relations with varying degrees of stability (Bennett 354). Speaking of the
conatus, Spinoza states, The more every man endeavours and is able to seek what is
useful to him in other words, to preserve his own being the more is he endowed with
virtue (Spinoza 337). If what is useful man is the greatest possible amount of affectivity
between him and other bodies, then he will necessarily form relations of stability with
those which will provide him the opportunity to undergo the conatus; queer is such a
relation, as its indeterminate nature maximizes the possible relations between bodies.
Dale writes, Queer is an aesthetics of relations intent on securing good encounters by
capitalizing on joyful passions. . . . Queer's own proper object is its movement and
undetectable change, and identity breaks this up (Dale 10).
Reason is the key element in distinguishing queer as a modal identity and
increasing its political power. Spinoza writes, Man, in so far as he is determined to a
particular action because he has inadequate ideas, . . . can only be [said to act in
obedience to virtue] in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands

Rose 10
(Spinoza 338). Desire without reason is passive, and therefore impotent in the context of
power and political legitimacy; to attain virtue, desire must be in accordance with the
dictate of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to ones self (338). Spinoza
writes that harmony is compromised by mens obedience to passions. If queer remains a
relation of passivity (externally, as passive to homophobia; or internally, as passive
within its inner relations), no harmony will exist between the subsistent identities.
Spinoza states, In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always
necessarily agree in nature (343).
As Bennett explains, humans within relation to other modes is a constant,
unavoidable state. Therefore the Spinozist goal to exercise a greater degree of selfdirection regarding one's encounters become more to alter the quality of our encounters
but not our encountering nature; she continues by clarifying that a thing has power by
virtue of its operating in conjunction with other things (Bennett 354). By altering the
quality of our encounters through reason and the production of desire for difference,
queer becomes a new stable, legitimate political force.
Dale writes, The Spinozist accumulation of joyful passions and their conversion
through common notions to active affects and adequate knowledge offers a practical and
ethical definition of queer. The ethics of queer emphasizes the idea that ethics is not a
stand but a way of life (Dale 10). This re-appropriation of ethics into the existential
sphere is necessary not just in terms of queer, but in ethics in general. It is perhaps best
epitomized by Spinoza when he states, Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue
itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise,
because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts (Spinoza 405). Through

Rose 11
appropriating queer desire and tempering through reason, we rejoice in the passions
that affect us, and thereby transcend passivity into activity. As an active force with
constant means of manufacturing desire, queer is thereby able to attain maximized
political legitimacy through a re-working of Spinozist metaphysics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY
Spinoza, Benedict de. The Ethics. Trans. R.H.M. Elwes. The Rationalists. New York:
Anchor Books, 1974. 179-406.

SECONDARY
Bennett, Jane. "The Force of Things: Steps toward an Ecology of Matter." Political
Theory: An International Journal of Political Philosophy 32.3 (01 June 2004):
347-372. Philosopher's Index. EBSCO. Ramsey Library, Asheville, NC. 26 Nov.
2008 <http://0search.ebscohost.com.wncln.wncln.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PH
L1784981&site=ehost-live>.
Dale, Catherine Mary. "A Queer Supplement: Reading Spinoza after Grosz." Hypatia: A
Journal of Feminist Philosophy 14.1 (01 Dec. 1999): 1-12. Philosopher's Index.
EBSCO. Ramsey Library, Asheville, NC. 26 Nov. 2008 <http://0search.ebscohost.com.wncln.wncln.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PH
L1668942&site=ehost-live>.
Deleuze, Gilles. Ethology: Spinoza and Us. Trans. Robert Hurley. Incorporations. Eds.
Jonathan Crary, Sanford Kwinter. New York: ZONE, 1992. 625-633.