Procedure

Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

1.

Overview

1.1. Objective
Sydney Waters maintenance objective is to ensure that assets achieve their design service
requirements within acceptable risk at lowest life cycle costs. The purpose of this procedure is to
document the procedure for undertaking Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis for Sydney
Waters facility assets. The objective is to identify the items where modification to the design or
the operating, inspection, or maintenance strategies may be required to reduce the severity of
the effect of specific failure modes. It can be performed to meet a variety of different objectives,
for example, to identify weak areas in the design, the safety-critical components, or critical
maintenance and test procedures.

1.2. Scope
Failure mode effect and criticality Analysis shall be undertaken at:
Concept stage
Detail design stage
Commissioning stage and
Operational and Maintenance stage when significant changes have taken place in the
operating context or asset component configuration or every ten years whichever is the
lesser.

1.3. Summary
This procedure is based on:
US MIL-STD-1629A, Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
Analysis, It provides a qualitative approach.
British Standard BS 5760, that provides a quantitative approach
Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is generally undertaken to determine
critical maintenance or renewal required for any asset. It can also be used to determine the
critical failure mode and the consequences of a failure for SWC assets. (FMECA) is an
extension of FMEA which aims to rank each potential failure mode according to the combined
influence of its severity classification and probability of failure based on the best available data.
By determining the critical failure mode of an asset it is possible to target and refine
maintenance plans, capital expenditure plans, and investigative activities, to address the
potential failure.
Risk Priority Number (RPN) is obtained by quantifying the severity, probability and detectability
score. This is used to prioritize asset remedial activities.

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2.

Procedure to conduct FMECA

2.1. Basic information required for the FMEA process.

What does the System do? Mission.
What is its function? Function
How could it fail to perform its function? Failure Mode.
What happens if it fails? Effect of Failure.
What is the Likelihood of failure? Occurrence (O)
What is the consequence of failure? Severity (S)
What is the predictability of failure? Detectability (D)
What is the Risk Priority Number (RPN)? RPN = O x S x D

2.2. General requirements for FMECA

FMECA Team shall consist of Designers, Planners, Operators, and Maintainers.
Identify the critical Asset / Maintainable Unit (Top 20 % failures using Pareto principle)
Apply FMECA to develop the most cost effective maintenance for the Asset / Maintainable
Unit. The Asset / Maintainable Unit is regarded as the maintainable unit this is the lowest
level of disaggregation over which we have control over its maintenance.

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2.3. Steps involved in EMECA

1. Define system boundaries for analysis. Identify the Asset / Maintainable Unit or system
being analysed.
2. Understand system/Asset / Maintainable Unit/item requirements and function. Collect
information on the Asset / Maintainable Unit/item, its process disaggregation, failure
history, Manuals, P & I Diagrams etc. Conduct Pareto analysis of the failure frequencies
and select the top 20% failure of the most frequent fail classes.
3. Define failure/success criteria for the system/ Asset / Maintainable Unit/item.
4. Determine each Asset / Maintainable Unit /item potential failure modes,
5. Determine the causes of the failures for each mode
6. Determine the effects and consequence of the failure for each mode.
7. Establish Asset / Maintainable Unit/item failure mode severity Severity (S) score of the
failure consequence.
8. Determine item failure mode (frequency) occurrence (O) score.
9. Determine item failure mode detectability (D) score
10. Assess the risk priority for each failure mode.
11. Risk Priority Number (RPN) Score S x F x D
12. Review actions, currently being taken, for dealing with the failure modes.
13. Develop remedial measures to eliminate or mitigate the potential fault or failure. This may
require:
i. Maintenance method changes including preventive maintenance, tooling,
spares provision, Asset / Maintainable Unit replacement, condition
monitoring.
ii. Changes in operating procedure;
iii. Production process changes
iv. Support procedure changes; and
v. Design changes;
14. Re-assess a revised risk priority for the failure modes.
The template to undertake this FMECA exercise is given in Table-1 below.

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2.4. Ranking of Severity, Probability and Detectability

Severity. Severity is an assessment of the seriousness of the effect of the potential failure
mode to the next component, subsystem, system or customer if it occurs. Severity applies to the
effect only. A reduction in Severity Ranking index can be effected only through a design
change. Severity should be estimated on a 1 to 5 scale. See Severity Rating Table below
Severity Ranking
Severity

Asset /
Maintainable Unit

Definite or presumed
destruction or
degradation of other
functional Asset /
Maintainable Unit

CATASTROPHIC

4
CRITICAL

3
MODERATE

2
MARGINAL
1
MINOR

System /
mission

People

Enterprise

Complete
loss of
capability

Loss of life

Major plant and

production loss Enterprise
survival doubtful

Complete failure of
or damage to
functional Asset /
Maintainable Unit
under consideration

40 % to 80 %
loss of
capability

Severe
injury and
long term
damage

Moderate plant and

production loss

Important
degradation of
functional Asset /
Maintainable Unit
under consideration
or substantial
increase in operator
workload

10 % to 40 %
loss of
capability

Moderate
injury with
full
recovery

Significant production loss

Minor degradation of
functional Asset /
Maintainable Unit
under consideration

Less than 10
% loss of
capability

Minor injury

Minor production loss

Negligible effect on
performance of
functional Asset /
Maintainable Unit
under consideration

No or
negligible
effect on
success

No injury

No or negligible
production loss

Examples of failure effect severity scales (Ref BS 5760)

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Occurrence (Event frequency). Occurrence is how frequently a specific failure

cause/mechanism is projected to occur. The likelihood of occurrence ranking number has a
meaning rather than a value.
Removing or controlling one or more of the causes/mechanisms of the failure mode through a
design change is the only way a reduction in the occurrence ranking can be effected.
Estimate the likelihood of occurrence of potential failure cause/mechanism on a 1 to 5 scale.
Only occurrences resulting in the failure mode should be considered for this ranking; failuredetecting measures are not considered here. See Occurrence Rating Table below
Range Estimates of failure probability can be used to rank probabilities of occurrence or,
alternatively, item failure rates may be employed. Frequency ranges for process Asset /
Maintainable Unit typically:
Rank

Occurrence Criteria

Occurrence
Rates (Cycles,
Hrs etc.) - Ref

Failures per year

in Process
industry Ref Moss

Dodson
Reliability HB

Reliability Assessment

1 - Unlikely

Unlikely Unreasonable to expect this

failure mode to occur

1/100,000

2 -Very Low

Isolated Based on similar designs

having a low number of failures

1/10,000

<0.0l

3- Low

Sporadic Base on similar designs

that have experienced occasional
failures

1/1,000

0.01 to 0.1

4- Medium

Conceivable Based on similar

designs that have caused problems

1/100

0.1 to 1.0

5-High

Recurrent Certain that failures will

ensure

1/10

>1

Examples of failure occurrence scales

If available from a similar process, statistical data should be used to determine the occurrence
ranking.
Detection is the ability to detect the cause/mechanism/weakness of actual or potential failure. In
Design FMEA, this must occur before the component, subsystem, or system is released for
production. In Process/Service FMEA it must occur in time to prevent distribution in case of a
product or catastrophe in case of an Asset / Maintainable Unit. In order to achieve a lower
ranking, generally the planned control (eg, preventative activities) has to be improved. See
Detection Ranking Table below.
When assessing the probability that the current controls will prevent or detect the cause of the
failure mode; do not assume that the detection rating will be low because the occurrence rating
is low.

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Detection Ranking (Ref Dodson Reliability Handbook)

Rank

Detection Criteria

Probability %

Very High Probability of detecting the failure before it

occurs. Almost always preceded by a warning

80 100

High Probability of detecting the failure before it occurs.

Preceded by a warning most of the time

60 80

Moderate Probability of detecting the failure before it occurs.

About 50%chance of getting a warning

40 60

Low Probability of detecting the failure before it occurs.

Always comes with little of no warning

20 40

Remote Probability of detecting the failure before it occurs.

Always without a warning

0 - 20

Examples of failure detection scales

Risk Priority Number (RPN). The Risk Priority Number is the product of the Severity,
Occurrence, and Detection rankings.
Risk Priority Number = Severity x Occurrence x Detection
The RPN, as the product S x O x D, is a measure of design/process risk. This value
should be used to rank order the concerns in the Design/Process (e.g., in Pareto fashion).
The RPN will be between 1 and 125. For higher RPNs the team must undertake efforts to
reduce this calculated risk through corrective action(s). In general practice, regardless of
the resultant RPN, special attention should be given when severity is high.
If the RPN Number is more than 33 you need to investigate the possibility to renew or
replace the asset based on
Condition (Poor grade 4),
Total Maintenance cost in last 5 yrs > than 60 % of replacement value
Remaining Life less than 5 yrs
Spares availability (long lead time, obsolescence)

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2.5. Clarification of Failure modes, problems or symptoms

Example for a Submersible Pump Failure:
Symptom Detected
(Failure Mode) or Problem at Maintainable
unit level

Cause at Hardware or Part level of

maintainable units

Increase in pump down time

Choke

Pump failed to start

Jam

Pump unable to start when called for by level signal

Broken shaft

Pump unable to start when called for by level signal

Bearing failure

Water found in oil chamber

Seal failure

Increase in pump down time

Incorrect seating

Increase in pump down time

Wear Ring Failure

Water found in oil chamber

O-ring fault

Leakage / low pumping rate

Damaged/cracked casing

Noise

Loose impeller

Low pumping rate

Impeller damaged

General Common Problems or Symptoms

Dirt or foreign matter in

mechanism, pipe
Breakage or jamming
due to overloading or
misapplied load
Breakage due to wear
and tear
Lubricant lacking,
deteriorated or dirty
Securing or mounting
nut/bolt/fastener loose or
missing
Foundations not firm or
secure
Corrosion, rust
Balance (vibration)
Filter blocked or dirty
Alignment incorrect
Power supply failure
Fire damage
Design or manufacture
fault

Overheating due to lack of

coolant, or cooling surface
blocked
Fracture of pipe or vessel due
to welding fault, thermal
stress or fatigue
Loss of hydraulic fluid
Incorrect assembly
Part missing, loose or falls off
Seal leaking
Leak in pipe, valve, tap, etc.
Hose damaged
Vermin e.g. rat chews
through insulation, bird makes
nest in air inlet,
Flood / water damage

Drain blocked
Electrical
insulation failure
Electrical
connection failure
Consumable not
replenished, e.g.,
lubricant
Catalyst
regeneration
required
Balance incorrect
(
Vandalism
Water supply
failure
Protective device
failed

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Table 1: Template to undertake FMECA.

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3.

Context

3.1. Definitions
Term

Definition

Current Controls.

Current design or process controls are descriptions of the

controls that either prevent to the extent possible the failure
mode from occurring or detect the failure mode should it occur.

Detection

This is the ability to detect the cause/mechanism/weakness of

actual or potential failure.

Occurrence (Event frequency). Occurrence is how frequently a specific failure

cause/mechanism is projected to occur. The likelihood of
occurrence ranking number has a meaning rather than a value.
Potential Cause(s)/Mechanism Potential Cause of Failure is defined as how the failure could
of Failure
occur, described in terms of something that can be corrected or
can be controlled, or an indication of a design weakness, the
consequence of which is the failure mode.
Potential Effect(s) of Failure

Potential Effects of Failure are defined as the effects of the

failure mode on the function, as perceived by the customer.
The customer in this context could be the next operation,
subsequent operations or locations. Each must be considered
when assessing the potential effect of a failure.

Potential Failure Mode.

A Potential Failure Mode is defined as a manner in which a

component, subsystem, system or process could potentially fail
to meet the design intent and/or the process requirements.

Recommended Action(s)

Corrective action should be first directed at the highest ranked

concerns and critical items.

Revised Risk Analysis

After the corrective actions have been identified, estimate and

record the resulting severity, occurrence and detection ratings.
Calculate and record the resulting RPN.

Risk Priority Number (RPN).

Provides a quantitative measure of risk. The Risk Priority

Number is the product of the Severity, Occurrence, and
Detection rankings.

Severity

Severity is an assessment of the seriousness of the effect of

the potential failure mode to the next component, subsystem,
system or customer if it occurs.

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3.2. Responsibilities
The FMECA procedure shall be conducted at:
Concept stage by the designers and planners
Detail design stage by designers.
Commissioning stage by the contractor.
Operation stage by the operators, planners and maintainers to review the
maintenance requirements

Position

Responsibility

Manager - Strategic Asset Management (SAM)

Procedure owner

Maintenance Strategy Leader SAM

Procedure development and review

Planners, Designers, Contractors & Operators

Procedure implementation

Management System Administrator

Policy publishing (in BMIS); initiating

scheduled policy review cycles and
incorporating of amendments

3.3. References
Document type

Title

Legislation

Occupational Health & Safety Act

Other documents

US MIL-STD-1629A, Procedures for Performing a

Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, It
provides a qualitative approach.
British Standard BS 5760, that provides a quantitative
approach

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4.

Document control

Procedure title: Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) procedure
Effective date: 18-06-2010

Review Period: As Required

Registered file: N/A

BMIS file name: AMQ0006

Procedure Owner

Manager, Strategic Asset Management (SAM)

Prepared by:

SAM - Maintenance Strategy Leader

Approved by:

SAM - Asset Strategy Manager Wastewater

5.

Revision control chart

Please refer to Sydney Waters Business Management Information System (BMIS) for
version control details.

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