SPOUSES PEREZ v.

HERMANO
July 8, 2005 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Joinder
Digester: Santos, Ihna
SUMMARY: Petitioners Aviso and Sps. Hermano filed a complaint
against Zecson Land, Sales-Contreras, Vitan-Ele, and Hermano.
Petitioners presented 3 causes of action in their complaint.
Hermano filed a civil case of judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage against petitioner Aviso and a motion with leave to
dismiss the complaint against him, or order severed for separate
trial. Hermano argued that there was a misjoinder of causes of
action under Rule 2, Sec. 6, ROC in view of the misjoinder of
parties defendants under a different transaction or cause of action.
The trial court granted Hermanos motion and dropped the latter
as a defendant in this case. However, SC held that there was no
misjoinder of causes of action since it is apparent that there are
questions of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and
respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the
same properties subject of the petitioners complaint. Because of
the presence of these questions of fact and law, and bearing in
mind that the joinder of causes of action should be liberally
construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all
matters in controversy involving one subject matter, the SC held
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
severing from the complaint petitioners cause of action against
respondent Hermano.
Hence, the SCs order to reinstate Hermano as one of the
defendants in this case.
DOCTRINE: The joinder of causes of action may involve the same
parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties,
as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common
to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series
of transaction.
FACTS:
April 27, 1998 petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and
spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case for
enforcement of contract and damages with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against Zescon
Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty.
Perlita Vitan-Ele and against respondent herein Antonio
Hermano.
Petitioners presented 3 causes of action in their complaint:

1) for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between

petitioners and Zecson Land, Inc.
2) for annulment or rescission of 2 contracts of mortgage
entered into between petitioners and Hermano
3) for damages against all defendants
1st cause of action: Petitioners allege that they entered into a
contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc. through Zenie SalesContreras for the purchase of 5 parcels of land in the total
amount of P19.1M. As part of their agreement, a portion of the
purchase price would be paid to them as down payment,
another portion to be given to them as cash advance upon the
execution of the contract and another portion to be used by the
buyer, Zescon Land, Inc., to pay for loans earlier contracted by
petitioners which loans were secured by mortgages.
2nd cause of action: Petitioners contend that in a tricky
machination and simultaneous with the execution of the
aforesaid Contract to Sell, they were made to sign other
documents, two of which were Mortgage deeds over the same
five properties in favor of respondent Hermano, whom they had
never met. It was allegedly explained to them by SalesContreras that the mortgage contracts would merely serve to
facilitate the payment of the price as agreed upon in their
Contract to Sell. Petitioners claim that it was never their
intention to mortgage their property to respondent Hermano
and that they have never received a single centavo from
mortgaging their property to him. Petitioners acknowledge,
however, that respondent Hermano was responsible for
discharging their obligations under the first mortgage and for
having the titles over the subject lands released, albeit not to
them but to respondent Hermano. They seek a TRO against
respondent Hermano who had informed them that he would be
foreclosing the subject properties.
3rd cause of action: Damages for being deprived of the
beneficial use of the property and the proceeds the petitioners
stood to lose by way of unearned profits, and for suffering
sleepless nights due to respondents misrepresentations.
Hermano denied petitioners allegations and filed a civil case of
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage against petitioner
Aviso and a motion with leave to dismiss the complaint against
him, or order severed for separate trial. Hermano argued that
there was a misjoinder of causes of action under Rule 2, Sec. 6,
ROC. He argued that the action for the enforcement of contract
and damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or
preliminary injunction against Zescon Land and/or its president

may not, under Rule 2, Sec. 6, ROC, join him as party

defendant to annul and/or rescind the real estate mortgages of
subject properties. Hence, there is a misjoinder of parties
defendants under a different transaction or cause of action;
that under the said Rule 2, Section 6, upon motion of Hermano
in the instant case, the complaint against him can be severed
and tried separately.
The trial court granted Hermanos motion on the justification
that the latter, having filed a special civil action for judicial
foreclosure of mortgage, should be dropped as one of the
defendants in this case and whatever case petitioners may
have against Hermano can be set up by way of an answer to
said judicial foreclosure. Petitioners MR was dismissed by the
trial court.
Petitioners brought up the case to the CA in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. The pivotal issue to be resolved is
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint against Hermano. However, CA
dismissed the case for being filed out of time (see re
reglementary period). Hence, this petition.

RULING: Petition granted. CA resolution reversed and set aside.

Orders of RTC annulled and set aside. RTC is further ordered to
reinstate Hermano as one of the defendants in the civil case.
Whether there was misjoinder of causes of action NO.
As far as can be gathered from the assailed orders, the trial
court deemed the first condition (that the party joining the
causes of actions shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties) on joinder of causes of action under Sec. 5, Rule 2 to
be lacking.
SC: It is well to remember that the joinder of causes of action
may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder
involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a
question of fact or of law common to both parties joined,
arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.
In this case, petitioners have adequately alleged in their
complaint that after they had already agreed to enter into a
contract to sell with Zescon Land, Inc., through SalesContreras, the latter also gave them other documents to sign,
to wit: A Deed of Absolute Sale over the same properties but
for a lower consideration, two mortgage deeds over the same
properties in favor of respondent Hermano with accompanying
notes and acknowledgment receipts for P10M each. Petitioners

claim that Zescon Land, Inc., through Sales-Contreras, misled

them to mortgage their properties, which they had already
agreed to sell to the latter.
From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes
reasonably apparent that there are questions of fact and law
common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano
arising from a series of transaction over the same properties.
o Whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled
petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of
respondent Hermano
o Which of the 4 contracts were validly entered into by the
parties
o Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be
valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, Hermano will
definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that
what was entered into by petitioners and Zescon Land,
Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of
Absolute Sale signed by them) because this would mean
that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners
were no longer the absolute owners of the properties
mortgaged.
o Whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., as represented by
Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed
fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for
damages.
Prescinding from the foregoing, and bearing in mind that the
joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to
effect in one action a complete determination of all matters in
controversy involving one subject matter, the SC held that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in severing
from the complaint petitioners cause of action against
respondent Hermano.

[NOTES]
Rules on joinder of causes of action as discussed in Republic v.
Hernandez:
A joinder of causes of action meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of
more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of
two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made
the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration
or petition.

The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is

permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary
statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from
the same factual setting and might under applicable joinder
rules be joined. Modern statutes and rules governing joinders
are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done
without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these
ends, they are liberally construed.
While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a
party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows
causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon
the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of
action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation
between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the
same nature and character.
The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity
of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be
dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination
of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties
involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of
litigation at minimum cost. Being of a remedial nature, the
provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related
controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at
one time; and it should be made effectual as far as practicable,
with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of
justice.
While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims
as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the
problem presented and a common question of law and fact
involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is
not authorized.
Rule 2, Sec. 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. - Misjoinder of
causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A
misjoined cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the
initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with
separately.
There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for
joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. Section 5 provides:
Joinder of causes of action. - A party may in one pleading assert,

in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he

may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the
rules on joinder of parties
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be
allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies
therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the
test of jurisdiction.

[Re reglementary period]

CA: Rendered the first assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for certiorari for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65.
Subsequently, CA promulgated the second assailed resolution
dismissing petitioners MR, holding that from the time
petitioners received the assailed order and filed their MR, 4
days had elapsed, and when the petitioners received the denial
of their MR and filed a petition, a total of 63 days had elapsed.
o A.M. No. 00-2-03-50 further amending Section 4, Rule 65
of the New Rules on Civil Procedure states that the
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, Order or Resolution and in case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the 60-day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
o Viewed from its light, the assailed Orders had already
attained finality, and are now beyond the power of CA to
review.
SC: Following the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
the petition was filed on the 60th day, thus, within the
reglementary period.
Admittedly, at the time petitioners filed their petition for
certiorari on August 17, 2000, the rule then prevailing was
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as

amended by Circular No. 39-98 effective September 1, 1998,

which provides: The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed If the petitioner had filed a motion for
new trial or reconsideration in due time after notice of said
judgment, order, or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be
interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may
file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall
not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from
notice of such denial.
However, on Sept. 1, 2000, during the pendency of the case
before the CA, Sec. 4 was amended anew by A.M. No. 00-2-03SC which now provides: The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixtyday period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. Under this amendment, the 60-day period within
which to file the petition starts to run from receipt of notice of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if one is filed.
In Narzoles v. NLRC, the SC described this latest amendment
as curative in nature as it remedied the confusion brought
about by Circular No. 39-98 because, historically, i.e., even
before the 1997 revision to the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
party had a fresh period from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration to file a petition for certiorari.

Curative statutes, which are enacted to cure defects in a prior

law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be
void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements, by
their very essence, are retroactive. And, being a procedural
rule, it was held in Sps. Ma. Carmen and Victor Javellana v.
Hon. Presiding Judge Benito Legarda that procedural laws are
construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed
retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
Consequently, petitioners had a fresh period of 60 days from
the time they received the Order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration on June 18, 2000. When they
filed their petition with the Court of Appeals on August 17,
2000, exactly 60 days had elapsed following the rule that in
computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the
last day included. Hence, there can be no doubt that the
petition was filed within the reglementary period for doing so
and it was reversible error on the part of the CA in not giving
said petition due course.
However, instead of remanding the case to the CA, which
would only unduly prolong the disposition of the substantive
issue raised, SC decided to resolve the petition originally filed
therein.