*

G.R. No. 152154. November 18, 2003.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED
BY HIS ESTATE HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA
IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOSMANOTOC, FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOSARANETA), AND
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
Remedial Law Judgments Summary Judgment Summary
judgement is a procedural devise for the prompt disposition of
actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue not a
genuine issue as to any material fact.The issue of the propriety
of summary judgment was painstakingly discussed and settled in
our July 15, 2003 decision: A summary judgment is one granted
upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the
assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either
because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no
genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned
by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action
where there exists no serious controversy. Summary judgment is
a procedural devise for the prompt disposition of actions in which
the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to
any material fact.
Same Due Process Due process of law has two aspects:
substantive and procedural due process.Due process of law has
two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order
that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due
process clause, there must be compliance with both substantive
and the procedural requirements thereof.
Same Same The forfeiture proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
did not violate the substantive rights of respondent Marcoses.A

careful study of the provisions of RA 1379 readily discloses that

the forfeiture proceedings in the Sandiganbayan did not violate
the substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. These proceedings
are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is
penal in character.
_______________
*

EN BANC.

134

134

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Same Same Test to determine whether the proceeding for

forfeiture is civil or criminal Rule is settled that forfeiture
proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil in nature.In
Almeda, Sr., et al. vs. Perez, et al., we suggested a test to
determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil or
criminal: . . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or
criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are
under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they are criminal in
nature, although they may be civil in form and where it must be
gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal
in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the
proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for
the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature and under
statutes which specifically so provide, where the act or omission
for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor,
such forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action.
(37 CJS, Forfeiture, Sec. 5, pp. 1516) In the case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan and Macario Asistio, Jr., this Court categorically
declared that: The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are
actions in rem and therefore civil in nature.
Same The words hearing and trial have different
meanings and connotations.Respondent Marcoses erroneously
understood hearing to be synonymous with trial. The words
hearing and trial have different meanings and connotations.
Trial may refer to the reception of evidence and other processes. It
embraces the period for the introduction of evidence by both
parties. Hearing, as known in law, is not confined to trial but

embraces the several stages of litigation, including the pretrial

stage. A hearing does not necessarily mean presentation of
evidence. It does not necessarily imply the presentation of oral or
documentary evidence in open court but that the parties are
afforded the opportunity to be heard.
Same Due process does not therefore always and in all
situations require a trialtype proceeding What the law prohibits
is not merely the absence of previous notice but the absence thereof
and the lack of opportunity to be heard.Due process, a
constitutional precept, does not therefore always and in all
situations require a trialtype proceeding. The essence of due
process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit ones evidence in support of his defense. What the law
prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice but the
absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. This
opportunity was made completely available to respondents who
participated in all stages of the litigation.

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
135

VOL. 416, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

135

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Robert Sison for Irene M. Araneta.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr. and Ma. Imelda R. Marcos.
Armando M. Marcelo, Francisco J. Rivera and
Maricris B. Pahate and Ponce Enrile, Reyes & Manalastas
for Imelda R. Marcos.
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. and Michelle B.
Lazaro for F.R. Marcos, Jr.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before us are motions dated August 1, 2003, August 2,
2003 and August 25, 2003 of respondents Imelda R.

Marcos, Irene MarcosAraneta, Ma. Imelda Marcos and

Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., respectively, seeking
reconsideration of our decision dated July 15, 2003 which
ordered the forfeiture in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines of the Swiss deposits in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the estimated
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31,
2002.
Respondent Imelda Marcos, in her motion for
reconsideration, asks this Court to set aside the aforesaid
decision dated July 15, 2003, premised on the following
grounds:
I
THE
DECISION
OF
THIS
HONORABLE
COURT
EFFECTIVELY
DEPRIVED
RESPONDENT
OF
HER
CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENSHRINED
RIGHT
TO
DUE
PROCESS ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
A. FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS UNDER R.A. 1379, IN
RELATION TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE
CRIMINAL/PENAL
IN
NATURE,
HENCE,
RESPONDENT HAS ALL THE RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
RESPONDENTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
B. CONSIDERING THE CRIMINAL/PENAL NATURE OF
THE PROCEEDINGS, THE DENIALS RAISED BY
RESPONDENT
136

136

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

IN HER ANSWER WERE SUFFICIENT TO TRAVERSE

THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION FOR
FORFEITURE.
C. THE PROSECUTION HAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH
EVEN A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT,
MUCH LESS PROVEN ITS CASE FOR FORFEITURE
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS

ABLE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE, A

SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE RENDERED IN
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. RESPONDENT HAS
THE RIGHT TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
OVERTHROW THE DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION.
E. THE FACTUAL FINDING THAT THE FOUNDATIONS
INVOLVED
IN
THE
INSTANT
FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS ARE CONSIDERED BUSINESSES,
AND WERE MANAGED BY RESPONDENT TOGETHER
WITH HER LATE HUSBAND, WILL PERNICIOUSLY
AFFECT THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FILED BY
THE REPUBLIC AGAINST RESPONDENT.
II
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH
IMPROPERLY CONVERTED THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
INTO A REGULAR APPEAL, DIVESTED RESPONDENT OF
HER RIGHT TO APPEAL THE CASE ON THE MERITS,
THEREBY DEPRIVING HER OF DUE PROCESS.
A. THE RESOLUTION DATED 31 JANUARY 2002 RAISED
BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT ON A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI, WAS OBVIOUSLY A MERE
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. THE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELVED
ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE, IN DIRECT
VIOLATION OF RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO APPEAL,
WHICH IS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED BY THE RULES.

Respondent Imelda Marcos further alleges that our July

15, 2003 decision will prejudice the criminal cases filed
against her.
Respondents Ferdinand, Jr. and Imee Marcos also pray
that the said decision be set aside and the case be
remanded to the Sandiganbayan to give petitioner Republic
the opportunity to present witnesses and documents and to
afford respondent Marcoses the chance to present
controverting evidence, based on the following:
137

VOL. 416, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

137

I
THE LETTER AND INTENT OF R.A. 1379 FORBID/PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THE PROCESS TO DECIDE
FORFEITURE UNDER R.A. 1379. THUS, IT PROVIDES FOR
SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE
PETITION AND MANDATES A WELLDEFINED PROCEDURE
TO BE STRICTLY OBSERVED BEFORE FORFEITURE
JUDGMENT MAY BE RENDERED.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE DECISION UNDER
RECONSIDERATION DIMINISHES/MODIFIES OR REPEALS
VIA JUDICIAL LEGISLATION SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF
RESPONDENTS GRANTED AND GUARANTEED BY R.A. 1379
AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
III
THE DECISION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID FOR
FAILURE TO EXPRESS CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE
TRUE/GENUINE STATEMENT OF FACTS (ADDUCED AFTER
TRIAL/PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE) ON WHICH IT IS
BASED.
IV
THE LAW(S) ON WHICH THE DECISION IS BASED IS/ARE
NOT APPLICABLE/PROPER AND/OR ARE FORCEFULLY
STRAINED
TO
JUSTIFY
THE
UNWARRANTED
CONCLUSIONS
REACHED,
VIOLATIVE
OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INJUNCTIONS.
V
THERE BEING A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS, THE
COURT
AXIOMATICALLY
OUSTED
ITSELF
OF
JURISDICTION. HENCE, THE DECISION IS VOID.
VI
ASSUMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE AND
PROPER, IT IS NOT WARRANTED UNDER THE PREMISES.
VII
ASSUMING THAT A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER,
THE AVERMENTS OF THE PETITION FORFEITURE ARE

INCOMPLETE AND INCONCLUSIVE TO COMPLY WITH THE

REQUISITE IMPERATIVES. JUDGMENT VIOLATES THE
CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON TO BE OBSERVED TO
RENDER A VALID DECISION OF FORFEITURE UNDER R.A.
1379.
138

138

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
VIII

THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIVE FACTS/FACTUAL

NARRATION AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN
THE DECISION ARE CONTRADICTED OR REFUTED BY THE
PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES, THE JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
OF
PETITIONER,
THE
PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE
SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE ORDERS ISSUED.

Respondent Irene Araneta, in her motion for

reconsideration, merely reiterates the arguments
previously raised in the pleadings she filed in this Court
and prays that the Courts decision dated July 15, 2003 be
set aside.
In its consolidated comment dated September 29, 2003,
the Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
I
THE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION DO NOT RAISE
ANY NEW MATTER AND WERE FILED MANIFESTLY TO
DELAY THE EXECUTION OF THE DECISION DATED JULY
15, 2003.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPLICABLE TO A PETITION
FOR FORFEITURE, AS LONG AS THERE IS NO GENUINE
FACTUAL ISSUE WHICH WOULD CALL FOR TRIAL ON THE
MERITS.
III
THE DECISION DATED JULY 15, 2003 OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT CLEARLY EXPRESSED THE FACTS ON
WHICH IT IS BASED, MOST OF WHICH WERE ADMITTED

BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS

SUBMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND IN THE
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
IV
CERTIORARI IS THE APPROPRIATE AND SPEEDY
REMEDY OF PETITIONER REPUBLIC, GIVEN THE GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN IN TOTALLY REVERSING ITS OWN
DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 AND IN ISSUING
THE SUBJECT RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY 31, 2002,
AND CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE IS IMBUED WITH
IMMENSE PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC POLICY AND DEEP
HISTORICAL REPERCUSSIONS.
V
A FORFEITURE PROCEEDING UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 1379 IS CIVIL AND NOT CRIMINAL IN NATURE.
139

VOL. 416, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

139

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

VI
THE DECISION DATED JULY 15, 2003 OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE CRIMINAL ACTIONS
FILED AGAINST RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS FOR
VIOLATION OF THE ANTIGRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT.

On October 6, 2003, respondents Marcos, Jr. and Imee

Marcos filed a motion for leave to file a reply to petitioner
Republics consolidated comment, which this Court
granted. On October 22, 2003, they filed their reply to the
consolidated comment.
As the aforequoted issues are interwoven, the Court
shall discuss them together.
At the outset, we note that respondents, in their motions
for reconsideration, do not raise any new matters for the
Court to resolve. The arguments in their motions for
reconsideration are mere reiterations of their contentions
fully articulated in their previous pleadings, and

exhaustively probed and passed upon by the Court.

SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
PROCEEDINGS

IN

FORFEITURE

Respondent Marcoses argue that the letter and intent of

R.A. 1379 forbid and preclude summary judgment as the
process to decide forfeiture cases under the law. It provides
for specific jurisdictional allegations in the petition and
mandates a welldefined procedure to be strictly observed
before a judgment of forfeiture may be rendered.
According to respondents, Section 5 of R.A. 1379
requires the court to set a date for hearing during which
respondents shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to
the satisfaction of the court, how they acquired the
property. They contend that the proceedings under R.A.
1379 are criminal in character, thus they have all the
rights of an accused under the Constitution such as the
right to adduce evidence and the right to a hearing. They
claim that it is petitioner which has the burden of proving
respondents guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
forfeiture of property should depend not on the weakness of
their evidence but on the strength of petitioners.
Accordingly, respondents maintain that, due to the
criminal nature of forfeiture proceedings, the denials raised
by them were sufficient to traverse all the allegations in
the petition for forfeiture.
140

140

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

The issue of the propriety of summary judgment was

painstakingly discussed and settled in our July 15, 2003
decision:
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an
expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no
important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the
movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for
summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues
presented need not be tried either because these are patently
devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any
pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for

the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no

serious controversy. Summary judgment is a procedural devise for
the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only
1
a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.

IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FORFEITURE

PROCEEDINGS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS?
The principal contention now of respondent Marcoses is
limited to their argument that our aforementioned decision
effectively deprived them of their constitutionally
enshrined right to due process.
According to respondents, R.A. 1379 is penal in
substance and effect, hence, they are entitled to the
constitutional safeguards enjoyed by an accused.
Respondents further argue that the reinstatement of the
decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 19, 2000,
which ordered the forfeiture of the properties subject of the
instant case by summary judgment, diminished or
repealed, by judicial legislation, respondents rights
guaranteed by R.A. 1379 for failure to set a date for
hearing to benefit respondents.
We disagree.
Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and
procedural due process. In order that a particular act may
not be impugned as violative of the due process clause,
there must be compliance with 2both substantive and the
procedural requirements thereof.
In the present context, substantive due process refers to
the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights
of a person
_______________
1

G.R. No. 152154, Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, July 15, 2003, 406

SCRA 190, 246247.

2

Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 597 (1991).

141

VOL. 416, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

141

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

3

to his property. On the other hand, procedural due process

means compliance with the procedures or steps, even

periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the

standard of fair play and without arbitrariness
on the part
4
of those who are called upon to administer it.
Insofar as substantive due process is concerned, there is
no showing that R.A. 1379 is unfair, unreasonable or
unjust. In other words, respondent Marcoses are not being
deprived of their property through forfeiture for arbitrary
reasons or on flimsy grounds. As meticulously explained
in
5
the July 15, 2003 decision of the Court, EO No. 1 created
the PCGG primarily to assist then President Corazon
Aquino in the recovery, pursuant to R.A. 1379, of vast
government resources amassed and stolen by former
President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, close associates and other cronies. These assets
were stashed away here and abroad.
A careful study of the provisions of R.A. 1379 readily
discloses that the forfeiture proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan did not violate the substantive rights of
respondent Marcoses. These proceedings are civil in
nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is
penal in character.
6
In Almeda, Sr., et al. vs. Perez, et al., we suggested a
test to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is
civil or criminal:
. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in
nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a
statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can
be included in the criminal case they are criminal in nature,
although they may be civil in form and where it must be gathered
from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its
nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense
charged the proceeding is of a civil nature and under statutes
which specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which
the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such
forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action. (37
CJS, Forfeiture, Sec. 5, pp. 1516)
_______________
3

Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659 (1987).

Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, supra Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159

SCRA 70 (1988).
5

Promulgated on February 28,1986.

G.R. No. L18428, August 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 970.

142

142

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

In the case7 of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan and Macario

Asistio, Jr., this Court categorically declared that:
The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem
and therefore civil in nature.

The proceedings under R.A. 1379 do not terminate in the

imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the
properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. Section 6
of said law provides:
x x x If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then
the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the
State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall
become property of the State x x x

The procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is

that provided for in a civil action:
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 3. The petition.The petition shall contain the following
information:
(a) The name and address of the respondent.
(b) The public office or employment he holds and such other
public offices or employments which he has previously
held.
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired
during his incumbency in his past and present offices and
employments.
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been
identified by the Solicitor General.
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other
proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired
property, and
(f) Such other information as may enable the court to
determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully
acquired property during his incumbency.
x x x x x x x x x

Sec. 4. Period for the answer.The respondent shall have a

period of fifteen days within which to present his answer.
_______________
7

200 SCRA 667 (1991).

143

VOL. 416, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

143

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

In short, there is a petition, then an answer and lastly, a

hearing. The preliminary investigation required prior to
the filing of the petition, in accordance with Section 2 of the
Act, is expressly provided to be similar to a preliminary
investigation in a criminal case. The similarity, however,
ends there for, if the investigation were akin to that in a
criminal case but all the other succeeding steps were those
for a civil proceeding, then the process as a whole is
definitely not criminal. Were it a criminal proceeding, there
would be, after preliminary investigation, a reading of the
information, a plea of guilty or not guilty, a trial and a
reading of judgment in the presence of respondents. But
these steps, as above set forth, are clearly not provided for
in the law.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for
legal separation,8 summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.
The proceedings in R.A. 1379 and EO No. 14 were
observed in the prosecution of the petition for forfeiture.
Section 1 of EO No. l4A, dated August 18, 1986, amending
Section 3 of EO No. 14, provides that civil suits to recover
unlawfully acquired property under R.A. 1379 may be
proven by preponderance of evidence. Under R.A. 1379 and
EO Nos. 1 and 2, the Government is required only to state
the known lawful income of respondents for the prima facie
presumption of illegal provenance to attach. As we fully
explained in our July 15, 2003 decision, petitioner Republic
was able to establish this prima facie presumption. Thus,
the burden of proof shifted, by law, to the respondents to
show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss
deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other
legitimate sources of income. This, respondent Marcoses did

not do. They failedor rather, refusedto raise any

genuine issue of fact warranting a trial for the reception of
evidence therefor. For this reason and pursuant to the
State policy to expedite recovery of illgotten wealth,
petitioner Republic moved for summary judgment which
the Sandiganbayan appropriately acted on.
Respondents also claim that summary judgment denies
them their right to a hearing and to present evidence
purposely granted under Section 5 of R.A. 1379.
_______________
8

Articles 48 and 60, Family Code of the Philippines Roque vs.

Encarnacion, 95 Phil. 643 (1954]).

144

144

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to

present their case, their defenses and their pleadings. Not
only did they obstinately refuse to do so. Respondents time
and again tried to confuse the issues and the Court itself,
and to delay the disposition of the case.
Section 5 of R.A. 1379 provides:
The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be open to the
public, and during which the respondent shall be given ample
opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has
acquired the property in question.

And pursuant to Section 6 of the said law, if the respondent

is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he
has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the
State.
Respondent Marcoses erroneously understood hearing
to be synonymous with trial. The words hearing and
trial have different meanings and connotations. Trial may
refer to the reception of evidence and other processes. It
embraces the period for the introduction of evidence by
both parties. Hearing, as known in law, is not confined to
trial but embraces the several stages of litigation, including
the pretrial stage. A hearing does not necessarily mean

presentation of evidence. It does not necessarily imply the

presentation of oral or documentary evidence in open court
but that the parties are afforded the opportunity to be
heard.
A careful analysis of Section 5 of R.A. 1379 readily
discloses that the word hearing does not always require
the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the
parties are given the occasion to participate and explain
how they acquired the property in question. If they are
unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that they
lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court9
shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.
There is no provision in the law that a full blown trial
ought to be conducted before the court declares the
forfeiture of the subject property. Thus, even if the
forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the court is not
precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of
the property in question even in a summary proceeding.
_______________
9

Section 6, RA 1379.
145

VOL. 416, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

145

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Due process, a constitutional precept, does not therefore

always and in all situations require a trialtype proceeding.
The essence of due process is found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit ones evidence in
support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not
merely the absence of previous notice but the absence
10
thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. This
opportunity was made completely available to respondents
who participated in all stages of the litigation.
When the petition for forfeiture was filed at the
Sandiganbayan, respondent Marcoses argued their case
and engaged in all of the lengthy discussions,
argumentation, deliberations and conferences, and
submitted their pleadings, documents and other papers.
When petitioner Republic moved for summary judgment,
respondent Marcoses filed their demurrer to evidence. They
agreed to submit the case for decision with their opposition

to the motion for summary judgment. They moved for the

reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan resolution dated
September 19, 2000 which granted petitioner Republics
motion for summary judgment (which was in fact
subsequently reversed in its January 31, 2002 resolution.)
And when the case finally reached this Court, respondent
Marcoses were given, on every occasion, the chance to file
and submit all the pleadings necessary to defend their case.
And even now that the matter has been finally settled and
adjudicated, their motion for reconsideration is being heard
by this Court.
For twelve long years, respondent Marcoses tried to
stave off this case with nothing but empty claims of lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, or
they were not privy to the transactions, or they could not
remember (because the transactions) happened a long time
ago or that the assets were lawfully acquired. And they
now allege deprivation of their right to be heard and
present evidence in their defense?
It would be repulsive to our basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow respondents to further delay the
adjudication of this case and defeat the judgment of this
Court which was promulgated only after all the facts,
issues and other considerations essential to a fair and just
determination had been judiciously evaluated.
Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition
of this case. It would readily be apparent to a reasonable
mind that re
_______________
10

Mutuc vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 43 (1990).

146

146

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

spondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to

every procedural device to delay the resolution hereof.
There is justice waiting to be done. The people and the
State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the salutary
objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss
deposits to the rightful owner, the Republic of the

Philippines, within the shortest possible time.

The respondent Marcoses cannot deny that the delays in
this case have all been made at their instance. The records
can testify to this incontrovertible fact. It will be a mockery
of justice to allow them to benefit from it. By their own
deliberate actsnot those of the Republic or anybody else
they are deemed to have altogether waived or abandoned
their right to proceed to trial.
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos likewise asserts that the
factual finding that the foundations involved in the instant
forfeiture proceedings were businesses managed by her and
her late husband, will adversely affect the criminal
proceedings filed by the Republic against her. The
contention is bereft of merit. The criminal cases referred to
by said respondent are actions in personam, directed
against her on the basis of her personal liability. In
criminal cases, the law imposes the burden of proving guilt
on the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial
judge in evaluating the evidence must find that all the
elements of the crime charged have been established by
sufficient proof to convict.
But a forfeiture proceeding is an action in rem, against
the thing itself instead of against the person. Being civil in
character,11 it requires no more than a preponderance of
evidence. And by preponderance of evidence is meant that
the evidence as a12 whole adduced by one side is superior to
that of the other. Hence, the factual findings of this Court
in its decision dated July 15, 2003 will, as a consequence,
neither affect nor do away with the requirement of having
to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal
cases against her.
One final note. We take judicial notice of newspaper
accounts that a certain Judge Manuel Real of the US
District Court of Hawaii issued a global freeze order on
the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. We reject
this order outrightly because it is a
_______________
11

Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court, as amended.

12

Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184.

147

VOL. 416, NOVEMBER 18, 2003

147

Alcala vs. Villar

transgression not only of the principle of territoriality in

public international law but also of the jurisdiction of this
Court recognized by the partiesininterest and the Swiss
government itself.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,
Quisumbing,
YnaresSantiago,
SandovalGutierrez,
AustriaMartinez, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and
Tinga, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., No part.
Motions for reconsideration denied with finality.
Note.Settled is the rule that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard. (Sy vs. Court of
Appeals, 313 SCRA 328 [1999])
o0o

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