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Notes
Prolly dont want to read consequentialism or util, but I threw my util/consequences files in
there just in case
I think the straight up Extinction Outweighs route is the strongest

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**Consequentialism
Policymaking Requires Consequentialism
Even if their values are good, policymaking necessitates consequentialism
Brock 87 [Dan W. Brock, Professor of Philosophy and Biomedical Ethics, and Director, Center for Biomedical Ethics at Brown
University, Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4, (Jul., 1987), pp. 786-791, JSTOR]JFS
When philosophers become more or less direct participants in the policy-making process and so are no longer
academics just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the
unconstrained search for the truth-all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead-comes
under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands"
that those who hold political power often face. I emphasize that I do not conceive of the problem as one of pure, untainted
philosophers being corrupted by the dirty business of politics. My point is rather that the different goals of academic scholarship and
public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic
ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption.
Instead, I believe that if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves
often ineffective but will as well often fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly. Why is this so? The central point
of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy is , and ought to be, the consequences of
their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should
not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences-they should; nor that they must be moral
consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions-whether some form of
consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in
the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions
will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people. The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in
an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but
also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other
institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on
people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social
consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their
primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do
this, why did they enter the policy domain? What are they doing there?

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Cards

Policymaking Requires Consequentialism

Even if deontology is right, states must act as consequentialists
Stelzig 98[Tim Stelzig, B.A. 1990, West Virginia University; M.A. 1995, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1998, University
of Pennsylvania, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, March, 1998, L/N]JFS
This Comment seeks to dissipate the tension Blackstone broached when he stated that the "eternal boundaries" provided by our "indelible
rights" sometimes must be "modified" or "narrowed" by the "local or occasional necessities of the state."(n269) Rights,

as trumps
not to be things that may be cast aside. Yet, it is intuitively obvious that the state justifiably
acts in ways impermissible for individuals as it collects taxes, punishes wrongdoers, and the like. Others have offered explanations for
why coercive state action is morally justified. This Comment adds another. This Comment began by adopting deontology as a
against the world, ostensibly ought

foundational theoretic assumption and briefly describing how deontology was to be understood herein. I then examined the characteristics of
two leading theories of rights--Dworkin's theory of legal

rights and Thomson's theory of moral rights. Although

neither Dworkin nor Thomson is an absolutist with respect to rights, neither account explains why the state, but not
individuals, may act in ways seemingly justifiable only on consequentialist grounds: that is, why the state may override
the trumping effect of rights. In attempting to provide an answer to this question, I first noted that deontology does not exhaust moral
discourse. The deontologist is forced to recognize that rights cannot capture everything of moral importance. I then
provided several examples of distinctions recognized in the philosophical literature that delimit areas in which deontology does not apply,
focusing in particular on the Trolley Problem and the distributive exemption from deontological norms that the Trolley Problem illustrates.
The deontological exemption was examined fairly closely in order to enumerate the criteria that trigger the exemption and understand the
principles that guide its application. By applying the distributive exemption to the state, I accomplished two things. First, I was able to

provide a new justification for the existence of the coercive state, both when premised on the traditional assumptions of
social contractarians, and when premised on a more realistic understanding of the modern state. Second, I was able to sketch the relationship
between the constraints of rights and the demands of policy, justifying a state that provides

for the general welfare without

violating rights in a way objectionable to liberals. Libertarians have argued that such a state violates deontologicalnorms, that
governmental intervention going beyond what is minimally necessary to preserve social order is not justified. Deontology
does not require such a timid state and, moreover, finds desirable a state which promotes the general welfare to the fullest extent
possible, even if in so doing it acts in ways deontologically objectionable for anyone other than one filling the government's unique role in
society. More specifically, I argued that the

government must consequentially justify its policy choices. The elegance of

this particular rationale for the contours of permissible governmental action is that it remains a deontological justification at
base. One of the worries of full-blown consequentialism is that it requires too much, that any putative right
may be set aside if doing so would produce greater good. The justification offered here does not suffer that flaw. The
distributive exemption does not permit that any one be sacrificed for the betterment of others; rather, it only
permits a redistribution of inevitable harms, a diversion of an existing threatened harm to many such that it results in harm to
fewer individuals.

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Consequentialism Good Lesser Evil

We must choose the lesser evil. Hard and fast rules about what is right must be made to
limit further atrocities against civilization
Issac 2 (Prof of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, PhD from Yale Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, p.)JFS
WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean
taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism . There is a tendency in some
quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still
deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the
continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the

specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many
innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each
case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and
deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians
work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does
not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11
hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an
ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer
superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race
and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent
conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence.
Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly
acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often
politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends . A just or even a
better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to
respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not

between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the
wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to
oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the
Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in
effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the
incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are
available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate.
Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies.

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Consequentialism Good Not Calculation

No turns consequentialism is more than pure calculation
Ord 5 (Toby, Thesis Paper for Oxford in Philosophy, http://tinyurl.com/2c5456q)JFS
Consequentialism is often charged with being self-defeating, for if a person attempts to apply it, she
may quite predictably produce worse outcomes than if she applied some other moral theory. Many consequentialists have
replied that this criticism rests on a false assumption, confusing consequentialisms criterion of the rightness of an act with its position
on decision procedures. Consequentialism, on this view, does not dictate that we should be always calculating
which of the available acts leads to the most good, but instead advises us to decide what to do in whichever manner
it is that will lead to the best outcome. Whilst it is typically afforded only a small note in any text on consequentialism, this
reply has deep implications for the practical application of consequentialism, perhaps entailing that a

consequentialist should eschew calculation altogether.

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Consequentialism Good Morals

Consequentialism is compatible with morals moralists do things based on whether they
will have moral consequences
Frank 2 (Robert, Cornell University, The Status of Moral Emotions in Consequentialist Moral Reasoning, http://tinyurl.com/22truv3)JFS
The philosopher Bernard Williams describes an example in which a botanist wanders into a village in the
jungle where ten innocent people are about to be shot. He is told that nine of them will be spared if he himself
will shoot the tenth. What should the botanist do? Although most people would prefer to see only one innocent person
die rather than ten, Williams argues that it would be wrong as a matter of principle for the botanist to shoot the innocent villager.2 And
most people seem to agree. The force of the example is its appeal to a widely shared moral intuition. Yet some philosophers
counter that it is the presumed validity of moral intuitions that such examples call into question (Singer, 2002). These

consequentialists insist that whether an action is morally right depends only on its consequences. The
right choice, they argue, is always the one that leads to the best overall consequences. I will argue that
consequentialists make a persuasive case that moral intuitions are best ignored in at least some specific cases. But many
consequentialists appear to take the stronger position that moral intuitions should play no role in moral choice. I will argue against that
position on the grounds that should appeal to their way of thinking. As I will attempt to explain, ignoring moral intuitions would lead to
undesirable consequences. My broader aim is to expand the consequentialist framework to take explicit account of

moral sentiments.

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Cards

Morality Bad International Violence

Morality cannot address international violence we must make sacrifices
Issac 2 (Prof of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, PhD from Yale Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, p.)JFS
As a result, the

most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military
intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is
a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather
terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to
ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the
violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring
criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent
and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how
diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so
would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention
but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics.
Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the
distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary
to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond
morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold
Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political
responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from
three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of
what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties

may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as
serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real
violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in
injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In
categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see
that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action,
rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the
pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be
sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in
pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not
true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

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**Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism Good Public Sphere
Util can be used in the public sphere, and deontology in the private sphere
Goodin 95 (Robert E., Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, Google Books)JFS
My concern in this book, true to the thrust of this introduction, is with utilitarianism as a public philosophy. My main concern is with the
ways in which utilitarianism can be a good guide to public policies without necessarily being a good guide to
private conduct. Nonetheless, in adducing many of its most important implication for public policy it is important to see at leas in
broad outline how it would set about shaping private conduct. Utilitarians, and consequentialists more generally, are outcomeoriented. In sharp contrast to Ten Commandment-style deontological approaches, which specify certain actions to
be done as a matter of duty, utilitarian theories assign people responsibility for producing certain results,
leaving the individuals concerned broad discretion about how to achieve those results. The same basic difference in the two theories'
approaches to assigning moral jobs reappears across all levels of moral agency, from private agency, from private individuals to
collective (especially state) actors. The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to international protection of the
ozone layer is to assign states responsibility for producing certain effects, leaving them broad discretion
in how they accomplish it (Chapter 18). The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to the ethical defense of
nationalism is couched in terms of delimiting state boundaries in such a way as to assign particular organization (Chapter 16). And, at a
more domestic level of analysis, the distinctively utilitarian approach to the allocation of legal liabilities is to assign them to
whomsoever can best discharge them (Chapters 5 through 7). The great advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to

public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures we are able to ensure in the uncertain
world of public policy-making that politics are sensitive to people's interests or desires or preferences. The great
failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realism, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of
duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one's duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even
proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for
public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation of motives makes absolutely no sense in the
public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is
required at all arises form the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain orally desirable
ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are
right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at
the individual level the same thing that relives individuals of responsibility - makes it morally incumber upon individuals to organize
themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize
themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different
forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they
are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. and those special constraints characterizing

the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism
peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus
understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.

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Utilitarianism Good - Inevitable

Utilitarianism inevitable even in deontological frameworks

Green 2 (Asst Prof Department of Psychology Harvard University Joshua, November 2002, 314) JFS
Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If thats
what we mean by 302 balancing rights, then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems

using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same.
However, its likely that when some people talk about balancing competing rights and obligations
they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again,
what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: It doesnt matter
that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!19 That is why angry

protesters say things like, Animals Have Rights, Too! rather than, Animal Testing: The Harms
Outweigh the Benefits! Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and
absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One
thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the rights of those
children. One finds oneself balancing the rights on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is

willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day ones
underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And
whats wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth
that there really are rights, etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the
thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

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Utilitarianism Good Moral

The advent of the nuclear age necessitates utilitarianism absolutist ethics are selfcontradictory
Nye 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs; Nuclear Ethics pg. 18-19) JFS
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are
visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to
shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's
men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to
prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot
one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained
on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but
preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value

and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot.
But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist
burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent
person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity
become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless
others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral
means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a
world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the
eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally
possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a

heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.

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Utilitarianism Good Must Assess All Risks

The recent possibility of extinction requires assessment of all risks despite probability
Yudkowsky 8 (Full-time Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Cofounder Eliezer, January 22

nd

2008,

Circular Altruism)JFS

Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk
and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions
A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because
a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed,
capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this
condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as

well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk
scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate
disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven
events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of
10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many
individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also
considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist
dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years . (Knaup
2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have
occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more
probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive

event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other
cause which none of us fore saw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoeticsounding prophecy.

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Cards

Morality Bad Survival Comes First

Survival comes first there is no point in preserving morality if we all die
Nye 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs; Nuclear Ethics pg. 45-46)JFS

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out
nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are
required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of
mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will
not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give
meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid
the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being
dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one
poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist
contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and
values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a
thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished
freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the
fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in
priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the
enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value.
Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can
give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute
value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance
the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential
and moral reasoning.

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AT: Calculation Bad

Your authors misunderstand utilitarianism link turn utilitarianism is against
calculation
Chappell 5 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Princeton, Philosophy, Et Cetera, http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/06/indirectutilitarianism.html)JFS

Utilitarianism is a much maligned moral theory, in part because it's so easily abused. It's easy for people to
misunderstand the theory, and use it, for example, to argue for totalitarianism. But of course utilitarianism properly
understood recommends no such thing. In fact, it tends to support our common-sense moral intuitions.
Strange as it may seem, utilitarianism recommends that we do not base our everyday moral decision-making on
calculations of utility. Why is this? Well, utilitarianism says that we ought to do whatever would maximize utility.
But attempting to reason in a utilitarian fashion tends to have disastrous consequences, and fails miserably to
maximize utility. Therefore, we ought not to reason in a utilitarian manner. Instead, we should try to
inculcate those dispositions and attitudes, and abide by those principles, that would tend to promote utility. That is, we should be
honest, compassionate, loyal, trustworthy, averse to harming others, partial towards loved ones, and so forth. We should, in other words,
be virtuous rather than scheming. J.L. Mackie (p.91) offers six utilitarian reasons for opposing "the direct use of
utilitarian calculation as a practical working morality": 1. Shortage of time and energy will in general preclude such
calculations. 2. Even if time and energy are available, the relevant information commonly is not. 3. An agent's
judgment on particular issues is likely to be distorted by his own interests and special affections. 4. Even if he were intellectually
able to determine the right choice, weakness of will would be likely to impair his putting of it into effect. 5. Even
decisions that are right in themselves and actions based on them are liable to be misused as precedents, so that they will
encourage and seem to legitimate wrong actions that are superficially similar to them. 6. And, human nature being what it is, a
practical working morality must not be too demanding: it is worse than useless to set standards so high that there is no
real chance that actions will even approximate to them.

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Spurlock

**Extinction
Extinction Outweighs Laundry List
Extinction outweighs no coping mechanisms, no experience, no trial-and-error, future
generations
Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS
Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them
from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our
intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals,
hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World
War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and
our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to
the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things from the perspective of humankind as a whole even
the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They havent significantly
affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the
exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential
risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The
first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that
the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by igniting the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was
physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and
understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that
objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we dont know whether something is objectively risky or
not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2]At any given
time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3]A much greater existential risk
emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial
probability and with consequences that mighthave been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry
among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might
annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used
in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear
arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would
not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to
be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the
existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential
risks is illustrated by the following points: Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-anderror. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach see what happens, limit
damages, and learn from experience is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This
requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the
costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national
security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast.
We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed
such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential
risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for
everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to
take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the
harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we
discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this
area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future
technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably
interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking
seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober

look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of
survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.

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Extinction Outweighs Discussion Key

Discussing existential risks is key to prevent neglectful attitudes toward them
Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS
Existential risks have a cluster of features that make it useful to identify them as a special category : the
extreme magnitude of the harm that would come from an existential disaster; the futility of the trial-and-error
approach; the lack of evolved biological and cultural coping methods; the fact that existential risk dilution is a global public
good; the shared stakeholdership of all future generations; the international nature of many of the required
countermeasures; the necessarily highly speculative and multidisciplinary nature of the topic; the subtle and diverse
methodological problems involved in assessing the probability of existential risks; and the comparative neglect of the whole area.
From our survey of the most important existential risks and their key attributes, we can extract tentative recommendations
for ethics and policy: We need more research into existential risks detailed studies of particular aspects of
specific risks as well as more general investigations of associated ethical, methodological, security and policy issues. Public
awareness should also be built up so that constructive political debate about possible
countermeasures becomes possible. Now, its a commonplace that researchers always conclude that more research
needs to be done in their field. But in this instance it is really true. There is more scholarly work on the life-habits of the
dung fly than on existential risks. Since existential risk reduction is a global public good, there should ideally be an
institutional framework such that the cost and responsibility for providing such goods could be shared fairly by all people. Even if the
costs cant be shared fairly, some system that leads to the provision of existential risk reduction in something
approaching optimal amounts should be attempted. The necessity for international action goes beyond the desirability of costsharing, however. Many existential risks simply cannot be substantially reduced by actions that are internal to one or even most
countries. For example, even if a majority of countries pass and enforce national laws against the creation of some specific destructive
version of nanotechnology, will we really have gained safety if some less scrupulous countries decide to forge ahead regardless? And
strategic bargaining could make it infeasible to bribe all the irresponsible parties into subscribing to a treaty, even if everybody would be
better off if everybody subscribed [14,42].

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Extinction Outweighs - Policymaking

It is our duty to support policy that counters extinction
Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS
Some of the lesser existential risks can be countered fairly cheaply. For example, there are organizations devoted to
mapping potentially threatening near-Earth objects (e.g. NASAs Near Earth Asteroid Tracking Program, and the Space Guard
Foundation). These could be given additional funding. To reduce the probability of a physics disaster, a
public watchdog could be appointed with authority to commission advance peer-review of potentially hazardous
experiments. This is currently done on an ad hoc basis and often in a way that relies on the integrity of researchers who have a personal
stake in the experiments going forth. The existential risks of naturally occurring or genetically engineered pandemics would be reduced
by the same measures that would help prevent and contain more limited epidemics. Thus, efforts in counter-terrorism, civil
defense, epidemiological monitoring and reporting, developing and stockpiling antidotes, rehearsing emergency quarantine
procedures, etc. could be intensified. Even abstracting from existential risks, it would probably be cost-effective to
increase the fraction of defense budgets devoted to such programs.[23] Reducing the risk of a nuclear
Armageddon, whether accidental or intentional, is a well-recognized priority. There is a vast literature on the related strategic
and political issues to which I have nothing to add here. The longer-term dangers of nanotech proliferation or arms race between
nanotechnic powers, as well as the whimper risk of evolution into oblivion, may necessitate, even more than nuclear weapons, the
creation and implementation of a coordinated global strategy. Recognizing these existential risks suggests that it is
advisable to gradually shift the focus of security policy from seeking national security through unilateral strength
to creating an integrated international security system that can prevent arms races and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Which particular policies have the best chance of attaining this long-term goal is a question
beyond the scope of this paper.

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Extinction Outweighs Comparative

Extinction outweighs all other threats life is a prerequisite
Ochs 2 [Richard Ochs, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY, Free From Terror,
http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html, June 9th 2002 ]JFS
Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude

possibilities of human extinction,

"patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanitys survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our
cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is
anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national
debate. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when
they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as
slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in
our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on
earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with
testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival
of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No
government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human
survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If
patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes. There are many people
who believe it is their God-given right to do whatever is deemed necessary to secure their homeland, their religion and their birthright.
Moslems, Jews, Hindus, ultra-patriots (and fundamentalist Christians who believe that Armageddon is Gods prophesy) all have access
to the doomsday vials at Fort Detrick and other labs. Fort Detrick and Dugway employees are US citizens but may also have other
loyalties. One or more of them might have sent the anthrax letters to the media and Congress last year. Are we willing to trust our
security, NO -- trust human survival to people like this? Human frailty, duplicity, greed, zealotry, insanity, intolerance and ignorance, not
to speak of ultra-patriotism, will always be with us. The mere existence of these doomsday weapons is a risk too great for rational people
to tolerate. Unless guards do body crevice searches of lab employees every day, smuggling out a few grams will be a piece of cake.
Basically, THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY. Humanity is at great risk as we speak. All biological weapons
must be destroyed immediately. All genetic engineering of new diseases must be halted. All bioweapons labs must be dismantled. Fort
Detrick and Dugway labs must be decommissioned and torn down. Those who continue this research are potential war criminals of the
highest order. Secret bioweapons research must be outlawed.

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Extinction Outweighs Structural Violence

Extinction will be the greatest moment of suffering in history abject fear of it is selfdefeating rational attempts to prevent it are best
Epstein and Zhao 9 (Richard J. and Y. Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong,
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse)JFS
Human extinction is 100% certainthe only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of Shakespeares As You Like It,
our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we
generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology.
Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly,
death occurring at the level of a speciesextinctionis as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells.
Hence, to regard extinction as catastrophicwhich implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that
we are all well behavedis not only specious, but self-defeating. Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of selfawareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by
more suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by the
getting of wis- dom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, postpone extinction. But the tragedy of our species
is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Mans dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are
unachievable not because of original sinthe doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our free will, thereby
perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universebut rather, in reductionist terms,
because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our
species mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies, could pay dividends in minimizing the

eventual cumulative burden of human suffering.

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Extinction Outweighs Ontology

Extinction precedes ontology existence is a prerequisite for the self
Wapner 3 [Paul Wapner is associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University,
DISSENT / Winter 2003]JFS
All attempts to listen to nature are, indeed, social constructions, except one. Even

the most radical postmodernist

acknowledges the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As mentioned, postmodernists
assume that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world, even if they argue about its different meanings.
This substratum is essential for allowing entities to speak or express themselves. That which doesn't exist,
doesn't speak. That which doesn't exist, manifests no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should
rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And everyone should be wary about those who claim to speak on nature's behalf
(including when environmentalists and students of global environmental politics do so). But we should not doubt the simple-minded
notion that a prerequisite of expression is existence. That which doesn't exist can never express itself . And
this in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a
fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

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**Struc Vio Answers

World Getting Better
Poverty decreasing
DeFazio 3/12/12
http://pilr.blogs.law.pace.edu/2012/03/12/a-surprising-trend-within-global-recession-poverty-reductions-indeveloping-countries/
Pace International Law Review Staff
It is commonly said that those who do not remember the past are doomed to repeat it. In the international
community, this is indeed a severe problem due to the extremely wide range of issues that confronts it just on a day
to day basis. Nevertheless, in terms of the International Economy, it seems that at least one lesson has been learned.
Despite the global depression that has plagued the international community since 2009, the scale of which has not
been seen since the Great Depression, careful planning and effective marketing have managed not only to
prevent the growth of poverty in developing countries, but also to lessen it.
Considering the state the
global economy is in, it seems implausible that the poverty situation in developing is actually improving. In 2008,
the World Bank predicted the recession would bring with it a rise in unemployment and poverty in developing
countries that would greatly deteriorate the living conditions in those countries. Nevertheless, despite the odds and
similar predictions, the number of people living in poverty in these developing nations had decreased since the
global recession began.
While this trend seems rather odd, a closer look at the effects of the 2009 recession
helps to explain why this oddity has occurred. Due to the hard times, major economies like that of the United States
became stagnant and less productive. Resultantly, someone had to rise up and pick up the slack and developing
economies and markets seemed to be the most logical place and investments started pouring in. It is important to
note that while this progression is logical, it is a pattern that has rarely been seen during global recessions and that is
what makes it truly remarkable because it is one of the first times that these untapped resources have been used so
effectively is such a situation. In fact, the typical effect of global recessions on developing countries is an extreme
decline in living conditions which in turn results in increased sickness, malnutrition, and death.
In
concluding, there remains the question of what this trend means. While it may not mean much to powerful yet
stagnant economies, the fact that world poverty is decreasing shows the international community is making
progress in restoring faltering economies and improving basic living conditions. In a sense, this means that the
foundation for stable economies is being paved in these developing countries and hopefully this trend will
continue and help ease the strain on the global economy that goes towards supporting such regions.

Best most current data cap is crushing it

New York Times 3/6/12
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/world/extreme-poverty-down-despite-recession-world-bank-data-show.html?
_r=1&ref=world
A World Bank report shows a broad reduction in extreme poverty and indicates that the global recession,
contrary to economists expectations, did not increase poverty in the developing world. The report shows that for
the first time the proportion of people living in extreme poverty on less than $1.25 a day fell in every
developing region from 2005 to 2008. And the biggest recession since the Great Depression seems not to have
thrown that trend off course, preliminary data from 2010 indicate. The progress is so drastic that the world has
met the United Nations Millennium Development Goals to cut extreme poverty in half five years before its 2015
deadline. This is very good news, said Jeffrey Sachs, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and
the United Nations special adviser on the Millennium Development Goals. There has been broad-based progress
in fighting poverty, and accelerating progress. Theres a lot to be happy about. The report indicates that despite
the world entering a recession in 2009, poverty did not increase in developing nations. That is contrary to the
World Banks own expectations. In a year-end 2008 report, the Washington-based development institution warned,
Unemployment is on the rise in industrial countries and poverty is set to increase across low- and middle-income
countries, bringing with it a substantial deterioration in conditions for the worlds most vulnerable. But that did not
happen. Preliminary surveys for 2010 show that the proportion of people in the developing world living in extreme
poverty fell. That is because of strong growth in countries like Brazil, India and especially China, which helped
buoy economies in Africa and South America. High commodity prices also aided exporting nations. Market
conditions also favored developing countries. Economists had theorized that the credit crunch and recession

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would cause a flight to the safety of developed nations. But shortly after the recession, with growth stagnating in
countries like the United States and in western Europe, the worlds investors plowed money into emerging
markets. In the past, economic crises in the rich world had a big and immediate impact on the developing world,
said Charles Kenny, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a research institution based in
Washington. But this time, the impact was much smaller, and we did not see developing countries follow the
United States and Europe into long recessions and slow recoveries. Thats good news for all concerned, Mr.
Kenny added, because growth in developing countries has helped developed countries as well. The report
contained a raft of statistics showing broad declines in poverty throughout the 2000s. For the first time since the
World Bank started keeping statistics in 1981, poverty fell in every region of the world on a three-year timeframe. In
sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty fell below 50 percent for the first
time. And between 1981 and 2008, poverty fell to just less than a quarter of the developing worlds population from
more than half . Much of the story was about China, which moved nearly 700 million people out of poverty
between 1981 and 2008, with the proportion of its population living in extreme poverty falling to 13 percent from 84
percent during that period. The countrys annual pace of economic growth never dipped below 9 percent, even in
2009, when the worlds economy contracted. But perhaps the most surprising success story is sub-Saharan Africa,
where the proportion of people living in extreme poverty actually increased through the 1990s, before declining in
the 2000s. People used to worry, Is Africa going to be poor forever? said Mr. Kenny of the Center for Global
Development. Well, it doesnt really look like it, does it? Extreme poverty in the Middle East and North
Africa fell to just 2.7 percent in 2008 from 4.2 percent in 2002. And extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa fell to
47.5 percent in 2008 from 55.7 percent in 2002. Long-term changes are really starting to take hold, said Mr.
Sachs, citing favorable market conditions, policies to tackle public health problems and technological change
bringing tools like cellphones and Internet connections to even the most remote and rural areas. Mr. Sachs said
that climate change and its attending droughts and floods, the threat of armed conflict and a persistently high birth
rate among the very poor threatened to reverse the decline in poverty. But he said he most likely saw them getting
better. Looking at the balance of data, this is a very promising time for fighting poverty, Mr. Sachs said.

Every credible measure of study shows violence is down because of everything consistent
with the aff heg, democracy, liberal trade its only a question of sustaining current
dynamics and preventing shocks to the system
Pinker 11 (Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished"
Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html)
On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a
senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world
coming to?" But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?" Believe it or not, the world of the past
was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most
peaceable era in the existence of our species . The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down
to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development , visible on scales from millennia to years,
from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to
estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into
our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill

the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood. Evidence of
our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations
in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled
with their rivals. Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the
course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence. The first was a process of
pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most
of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago. For
centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we
can do better. Forensic archeologya kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of
skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can
tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control. These investigations show that, on average,
about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal
violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana,
Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history. It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their
citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of
raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead lossforgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and
slaves. The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that

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between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of
homicide. The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages , when
highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses
cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back . Historians attribute this
decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce.

Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly
controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors. The third transition, sometimes called the
Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing
nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing
in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, many nations began to
whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just
murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism
and slavery. The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World
War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace. Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will
Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western
European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The clich that the 20th century was "the most violent in
history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the
world's population). Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped

fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international
organizationsall of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising
valuation of human life over national grandeura hard-won lesson of two world wars. The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace,
involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed
conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of
civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.
The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the

cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kindscivil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic
governments, terrorist attackshave declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more
precipitously. The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in
the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account
for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%. The most immediate
cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also
discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the
expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peacenot always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to
fight to the bitter end. Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"a growing revulsion against
aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms,
and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and
girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying,
paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the
developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people.
* * * * Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful
by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or
even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of
them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations
toward violence and inclinations that counteract themsuch as self-control, empathy, fairness and reasonwhat Abraham Lincoln called "the
better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels. The most
obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested
judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that
make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government

in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in
medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the
Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to
resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice. Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which
everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading
partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential
partners in reciprocal altruism. For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to
declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money. A third peacemaker

has been cosmopolitanismthe expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education,
science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective
of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them . These technologies have also powered
an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those

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of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem
to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no
coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights
revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

Our studies are comprehensive they account for the big picture of structural violence
Jervis 11--Robert, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, "Pinker the
Prophet", Nov-December Issue of the National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/pinker-the-prophet6072
The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined [3] WITH THE United States fighting two wars, countries from Tunisia to Syria either in or on the brink of intrastate conflicts,
bloodshed continuing in Sudan and reports that suicide bombers might foil airport security by planting explosives within their bodies, it is hard to be cheerful. But Harvard psychologist

Pinker tells us that we should be, that we are living in the least violent era ever. Whats more, he makes a case that will be
hard to refute. The trends are not subtlemany of the changes involve an order of magnitude or more . Even when his
explanations do not fully convince, they are serious and well-grounded. Pinkers scope is enormous, ranging in time from prehistory to today and
covering wars (both international and civil), crime, torture, abuse of women and children, and even cruelty to animals. This breadth
is central becauseviolence in all of these domains has declined sharply. Students of any one of these areas are familiar
with a narrow slice of the data, but few have stepped back to look at the whole picture. In fact, many scholarsand much of
the educated public simply deny the good news. But prehistoric graves and records from twentieth-century huntergatherers reveal death rates due to warfare five to ten times that of modern Europe, and the homicide rate in Western Europe from
1300 to today has dropped by a factor of between ten and fifty. When we read that after conquering a city the ancient Greeks killed all the men and sold the
Steven

women and children into slavery, we tend to let the phrases pass over us as we move on to admire Greek poetry, plays and civilization. But this kind of slaughter was central to the Greek way of

contemporary attacks on the Enlightenment and modernity are

fundamentally misguided. Critics often argue that material and technical progress has been achieved withoutor even at
the cost ofmoral improvement and human development. Quite the contrary, he argues; we are enormously better than
our ancestors in how we treat one another and in our ability to work together to build better lives. To make such bold and
far-reaching claims, one must draw on an equally vast array of sources. And so Pinker does. The bibliography runs to over thirty pages
set in small type, covering studies from anthropology, archaeology, biology, history, political science, psychology and
sociology. With this range comes the obvious danger of superficiality. Has he understood all this material? Has he selected only those sources that support
his claims? Does he know the limits of the studies he draws on? I cannot answer these questions in all the fields, but in the areas I do knowinternational relations and some psychology
his knowledge holds up very well. With the typical insiders distrust of interlopers, I was ready to catch him stacking the deck or twisting
arguments and evidence about war. While he does miss some nuances, these are not of major consequence. It is true that despite
the enormous toll of World Wars I and II, not only have there been relatively few massive bloody conflicts since
then (and an unprecedented period of peace among the major powers), but the trends going back many centuries reveal a decline in the frequency of war,
albeit not a steady one. The record on intrastate conflicts is muddier because definitions vary and histories are incomplete, but most studies reveal a decline there as
well. In the aftermath of the Cold War, civil wars broke out in many areas, and some still rage (most obviously in Congo), but, contrary to expectations, this wave has subsided. In
life. Implicit throughout and explicit at the very end is Pinkers passionate belief that

parallel, Pinker marshals multiple sources using different methodologies to show that however much we may fear crime, throughout the world the danger is enormously less than it was centuries
ago. When we turn to torture, domestic violence against women, abuse of children and cruelty to animals, the progress over the past two millennia is obvious. Here what is particularly interesting
is not only the decline in the incidence of these behaviors but also that until recently they were the norm in both the sense of being expected and of being approved. In all these diverse areas,

Pinkers argument holds up. Or, to put it more cautiously, the burden is now on those who believe that violence has not
declined to establish their case. (Whether our era sees new and more subtle forms of violence is a different question and I think would have to involve the stretching of this
concept.) We often scorn mere description, but here it is central . The factif it is accepted as a factthat violence has
declined so much in so many forms changes the way we understand our era and the sweep of human history. It shows how
much our behavior has changed and that even if biology is destiny, destiny does not yield constant patterns. It also puts in perspective our current ills and shows that notions
of civilization and progress are not mere stories that we tell ourselves to justify our lives.
then, I think

CKM Debate TOC 2013

Spurlock

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Cards