AA - Vv. Not Worthy

Edited by Lubomyr Luciuk
With a Foreword by Roger Daniels
National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Not worthy : Walter Duranty's Pulitzer Prize and the New York Times / edited by
Lubomyr Luciuk.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-896354-34-3
1. Duranty, Walter, 1884-1957. 2. Foreign correspondents--United
States--Biography. 3. New York times. 4. Pulitzer Prizes. 5. Soviet
Union--History--1917-1936--Sources. I. Luciuk, Lubomyr Y., 1953PN4798.N68 2004
070.4'332'092
C2004-900808-0
The provenance of photographic evidence of the Great Famine is

difficult to determine. Illustrations included in this publication are
drawn from Dr. Ewald Amende, Human Life in Russia (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936) and others reportedly taken
by Otto Weinerberger in Kharkiv, 1933
Published for the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association by
The Kashtan Press, 22 Gretna Green, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7M 3J2
Graphic Design by G. Locklin & Associates
Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times
Contents
Foreword by Roger Daniels..................................................................
Introduction - Not Worthy? by Lubomyr Lucuik.................................
Acknowledgements ...............................................................................
xiii
Americas Red Decade

Myron B. Kuropas................................................................................
Malcolm Muggeridge on Stalins famine

Marco Carynnyk ..................................................................................
12
The liar who won a Pulitzer

Ian Hunter............................................................................................
25
Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?

Yaroslav Bilinsky ..................................................................................
27
How Liberals Funked It

Robert Conquest ..................................................................................
42
A Pulitzer-winning offense
Editorial, The Ukrainian Weekly ..........................................................
54
Modernization from the Other Shore

David C. Engerman .............................................................................
56
Ukrainians demand Pulitzer be revoked

Victor Malarek .................................................................................... 108
Not Worthy
Undoing history, or righting a wrong?

Editorial, The Ukrainian Weekly,......................................................... 111
Pulitzer Prize Board begins review
Andrew Nynka .................................................................................... 113
Resolution on the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide
Senator Raynell Andreychuk ................................................................ 116
A Tale of Two Journalists
James Mace .......................................................................................... 118
A Report to The New York Times
Mark von Hagen ................................................................................. 130
Resolution on 1932-1933 Man-Made Famine in Ukraine
US House of Representatives ................................................................ 142
Revoke Durantys Pulitzer
Editorial, The National Post ................................................................ 146
Why honour a shill for Stalin?
Lubomyr Luciuk................................................................................... 147
Durantys award: Pulitzer Board should not revoke the award
Editorial, The Globe and Mail ............................................................. 148
Doubts over a Pulitzer
Lubomyr Luciuk................................................................................... 150
For undistinguished reporting
Lubomyr Luciuk................................................................................... 151
Sauce for the gander
David Matas ........................................................................................ 154
Should This Pulitzer Be Pulled?

Douglas McCollam .............................................................................. 156
If Ukraine forgets
James Mace .......................................................................................... 168
Statement by His Excellency Mr. Valeriy P. Kuchinsky ......................... 174
Gareth Jones - A Voice Crying in the Wilderness
Margaret Siriol Colley .......................................................................... 179
Seven million died in the forgotten holocaust
Eric Margolis........................................................................................ 188
Statement on Walter Durantys 1932 Prize
Pulitzer Prize Board .............................................................................. 192
Ukraine marks Soviet-era famine
Anna Melnichuk................................................................................... 195
Times lied, millions died
Andrew Stuttaford................................................................................ 198
Duranty was Stalins spin doctor
Robert Fulford ..................................................................................... 202
The worlds greatest liar?
Lubomyr Luciuk................................................................................... 205
Waste is unthinkable for survivors
Carol Sanders ....................................................................................... 209
No shortage of monsters in the world
John Gleeson ........................................................................................ 212
Not Worthy
Revoking Durantys Prize

Duncan M. Currie ................................................................................ 215
An Open Letter to Mr. Bill Keller
Margaret Siriol Colley .......................................................................... 219
The New York Times re: Gareth Jones ................................................. 222
Durantys Pulitzer: A reflection
James Crowl ......................................................................................... 223
Select Bibliography ............................................................................... 230
Other Sources ....................................................................................... 234
Index .................................................................................................... 235
Appendix 1: Letter from Gareth Jones to his parents
(26 August 1930) ................................................................................. 247
Appendix 2- A.W. Kliefoth,
Embassy of the United States re: Walter Duranty (4 June 1931)......... 253
Appendix 3: William Strang, British Embassy, Moscow,
re Tour by Mr. Duranty in North Caucasus
and the Ukraine (26 September 1933) .................................................. 257
Appendix 4: Famine proves potent weapon,
Christian Science Monitor, (29 May 1934)
by William Henry Chamberlin ............................................................. 263
About the Contibutors ......................................................................... 268
Foreword
ROGER DANIELS
This book bears witness to a small crusade, which, like most crusades, failed
in its proximate goal: Walter Duranty is still the holder of record for the
Pulitzer Prize for foreign reporting in 1932 even though it is now all but
universally acknowledged that his reports from the USSR in the early 1930s
were essentially a whitewash of Joseph Stalin and his regime. Some of the
details of this misreporting are related within. But the crusade had a larger
goal: to make the world in general and North Americans in particular, more
aware of the special horrors that were inflicted on the people of Ukraine by the
Stalin and his henchmen. This larger goal, it seems to me, has been achieved.
Hundreds of column inches of newsprint in some of the continents leading
newspapers and abroad have been devoted to describing the anti-Duranty
campaign. In the process more was published about the sufferings of the
Ukrainian people in the early 1930s then in seventy odd years since they should
have been, but were not, front page news in those outlets.
What massive public relations effort produced this latter result and at what
cost? The crusade was born in the fertile brain of a Canadian academic,
Professor Lubomyr Luciuk, of Canadas Royal Military College. The son of
Ukrainian political refugees granted asylum in Canada, he is the leading
historian of the injustices done to Ukrainian immigrants interned under
intolerable conditions by Canada during the First World War and he is
concerned with the past and present of ethnic Ukrainians everywhere. His total
effort on the anti-Duranty matter did not cost more than a few thousand
dollars. To be sure he had allies, most of them in Ukrainian Canadian and
Ukrainian American communities, but the initial push and most of the drive
flowed out of Luciuks Kingston, Ontario base.
Not Worthy
How did he do it and why was he successful? An attempt to get space in

North American newspapers of general circulation about the Ukrainian
horrors in the 1930s would have been a bootless quest. Making Duranty the
primary focus was a shrewd stroke. He was not a household word. As the
crusade was starting I ran Durantys name by a number of my fellow American
historians and only a small percentage could identify him. But Duranty plus the
Pulitzer Prize plus The New York Times was irresistible. Journalists, like most
of us, are narcissistic and like to write about their kind, and, of course, it was
a scandal, and scandal is meat and drink to those folks.
In addition, and I am not sure if Luciuk was aware of this, The Times was
trying to deal with a current scandal. A Times reporter, who quickly became a
former Times reporter, named Jayson Blair had recently been caught faking
stories that The Times had published. Thus, Luciuks attack on past
fraudulence by a Times reporter resonated to recent embarrassment: without
the Blair scandal The Times might well have been able to ignore Luciuks
charges and demands. Because of Blair, they were irresistible. Timing is often
everything. And once The Times had made Luciuks charges fit to print,
newspapers all across the continent, egged on by press releases from Luciuk
and his allies, took up the story.
For a while both The Times and the Pulitzer Prize committee tried to
stonewall, but there was too much heat from the rest of the media. The Times
publisher, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Jr., whose major credentials for getting his
job were genetic, commissioned Columbia University Professor Mark von
Hagen, a respected scholar of early Soviet history, to investigate and report on
Durantys stories for 1931 on which the Prize was based. Perhaps the publisher
hoped that von Hagens Columbia ties would influence him to be soft on the
Board, the Pulitzer Prizes are an appanage of Columbia University, and, as
American historians have noted over the years, a statistically disproportionate
number of Prizes in history have gone to Columbia historians.
If such were his hopes, von Hagens damning report, printed in this volume,
could have given him no satisfaction and provided a rationale for revoking the
Prize. And before the report was published the Pulitzer Prize Board announced
that it would review the awarding of the 1932 prize to Duranty, who had been,
............ ii ............
as von Hagens report notes, thoroughly discredited well before Luciuk began
his campaign. Neither Sulzberger nor the Board claimed that Duranty was an
unbiased and accurate reporter as shown by the Boards eventual response on
21 November, included here. Yet the Board refused to revoke the Prize and
Sulzberger supported that decision. That support was important: had
Sulzberger asked the Board to revoke the award it is difficult to believe that the
Board would have failed to comply.
The decision ran against the run of play in Western culture. While, as I have
argued elsewhere, it is too much to speak, as Elazar Barkan has in his The Guilt
of Nations (New York, 2000) that there was a kind of age of apology as the
new millennium opened, nevertheless there have been a number of apologies
for all sorts of past injustices in the Western world, including in North
America, formal apologies to Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians for
their mass exile and incarceration during the Second World War.
The Board refused to revoke its Prize to Duranty by inventing a standard
which it knew that the advocates for withdrawal could not meet. It judged that
there was not clear and convincing evidence of deliberate deception, the
relevant standard in this case. Sulzbergers support of the Board was based on
even less judicious reasoning: he acknowledged in the columns of The Times
that Durantys work had been slovenly and went on to argue, incredibly, that
revoking Durantys prize would be akin to the Stalinist practice to airbrush
purged figures out of official records and histories. This nonsence, supported
by Times executive editor Bill Keller, simply will not wash. None of those
supporting the revocation had suggested any such thing: some, perhaps most,
assumed that rather than a blank space, which the Pulitzer uses when it awards
no Prize in a given category, the listing of the Prize for foreign reporting might
have read something like this:
1932 : Walter Duranty, New York Times;
revoked for gross inaccuracy, 2003.
That, as we know, was not to be. But both Durantys mendacity, and the
greater issue of the outrages perpetrated on the Ukrainian people by what was
supposed to be its own government, are now much better known than they
............ iii ............
Not Worthy
were. And, in many eyes at least, the lustre of both The Times and the Pulitzer
Prizes have been diminished.
Walter Duranty, circa 1935

............ iv ............
Not Worthy?
Presented here is an admittedly incomplete record of an international campaign
symbolically launched on May Day 2003, whose aim was to have the 1932
Pulitzer Prize of Walter Duranty revoked by the Pulitzer Prize Committee or
returned by The New York Times. 1
That did not happen. The Committee did not rescind the award and The Times
continues to associate its name with the much-discredited Duranty, 2 even
though the evidence shows he shilled for the Soviets, before, during, and after
the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine.
As troubling as what happened in the early decades of the last century is what
went on early in this one, behind the closed doors of the Pulitzer Prize
Committee and The New York Times. How was the decision not to revoke
Durantys Pulitzer made? Was this conclusion reached unanimously, or were
there, as is rumoured, dissenters who urged the Board to restore the reputation
of the Pulitzer Prize by disassociating it from a man who prostituted the
fundamental principles of journalism? Who were the women and men who
finally decided this issue? Answers to these questions remain secreted and so
the seeds of future controversy are already germinating. This should leave
those who hold, or have yet to achieve, the distinction of a Pulitzer to consider
whether being in the company of Mr. Duranty is salutary or soiling.
This project was launched with very modest resources by a small group of
activists who were able to remind the world of what arguably was the single
greatest act of mass murder to take place in Europe during the 20th century.
Even the administrator of the Pulitzer Prize Board, Sig Gissler, would write,
While you are disappointed in the Boards decision, I think you are correct in
saying that you have significantly increased awareness of the famine of 1932-
............ v ............
Not Worthy
1933. 3 That alone helped hallow the memory of the murdered millions, the
very same men, women and children whom Walter Duranty considered not
worthy of his sympathy, not worthy even to be described as who they truly
were Ukrainians and not Russians. 4
Whether one considers the Great Famine (Holodomor) to have been an act of
genocide or an instrument of terror deployed to impose collectivization on a
resisting population - and there is legitimate debate on such issues,
appropriately reflected in the scholarly contributions reprinted here - no
serious student of European history would now dispute that many millions of
Ukrainians were deliberately starved to death in 1932-1933. 5 Exactly how
many no one is certain, but the losses were certainly on a scale comparable to,
perhaps even surpassing, those of the Holocaust. 6
Yet Ukraines Holodomor remains relatively unknown, whereas few have not
heard of the Holocaust. That is a testament to the considerable success of the
Soviet disinformation campaign ratcheted into place in 1932-1933, whose
dean was none other than Walter Duranty. Awarded a prestigious Pulitzer Prize
he would use the status it brought him to traduce and try to mute those
journalists who dared expose the Stalinist regime for what it was.
Duranty was neither the only, nor the last, of his ilk. His legacy is detectable
among those who still strive to deny or dismiss all accounts of the Great
Famine as anti-Soviet propaganda, 7 or who marginalize the victims of this
politically engineered human catastrophe by suggesting that how they were
killed was somehow less horrific than how death subsequently came to the
unfortunates shot or gassed by the Nazis during the Second World War. 8
Whatever the intent of their tormentors may have been, it is indisputable that
many millions of Ukrainians and others perished during the Holodomor. Their
needless deaths represent no less a crime against humanity than what the Nazis
did to millions of Jews and others. Yet while questioning the Holocaust is
denounced as a hate crime, Holodomor denial is regarded as an acceptable
form of historical revisionism.
The contributors to this volume certainly do suggest differing interpretations
of what happened in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-1933, and their contrasting
............ vi ............
opinions assuredly will precipitate serious debate. Even so they all agree that
millions of Ukrainians died as a consequence of a deliberate policy put into
place by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under the leadership of
Joseph Stalin. Given what we now know about the nature of the Soviet
experiment one might well ask whether all those lives taken, or sacrificed, were
given up in vain. Whatever ones answer might be, it is certain that they died,
horribly.
What makes the Holodomor unique, however, is not so much the number of
those who died, or the continuing debate among historians and demographers
over how large that number might be, or the exchanges about who was
responsible or the intent of the Soviet leadership. Not even the continuing naysaying of famine-deniers is as puzzling as the fact that while the civilized world
brought those who engineered the Holocaust to justice, those who harvested
Ukrainians during the Great Famine have never been pursued, even though
some live amongst us. 9 That Walter Duranty was not worthy of his Pulitzer
Prize is certain. Why the Holdomors murdered millions are not worthy of
justice remains unexplained.
LYL
1 May 2004
Kingston, Ontario
Canada
Endnotes:
1.
The May Day campaign directed toward the Pulitzer Prize Committee was launched by
the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association (UCCLA) with the support of other
Ukrainian organizations around the world. It was continued with a Red October appeal
to Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., publisher of The New York Times. Both postcards are reproduced
in this volume (see pages 107 and 155). Certainly this initiative had its antecedents, as do
most things. A few authors whose articles are included here called for the revocation of
............ vii ............
Not Worthy
Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize years ago. And the latters mendacious role in covering up
the Great Famine has been well understood, for decades. No doubt efforts to have the
Duranty Pulitzer revoked or returned will continue. By placing on record what was
attempted, and accomplished, this publication may help chart out what still must be done.
2.
Several authors in this collection refer to a disclaimer installed beside the plaque that
recognizes the 1932 Pulitzer Prize Walter Duranty received, found on a commemorative
wall on the 11th floor of The New York Times building. Repeated requests addressed to
Catherine J. Mathis requesting permission to photograph and publish an image of that
notice were declined. Intriguingly, Jayson Blair, a former New York Times reporter exposed
as a fraud in 2003, writes in his recently released book, Burning Down My Masters House,
that while touring The Times building as an intern he spotted the notice stating that
Durantys reporting had been discredited and remarked, All I know is that I dont want to
be that guy. Perhaps a new word, Durantyism, should be introduced into the English
language and used to describe journalists exposed as liars. See Gerry Braun, A Master of
Manipulation, San Diego Union-Tribune, 18 March 2004.
3.
E-mail correspondence with Sig Gissler, 22 November 2003.
4.
Certainly the majority of those who perished during the Great Famine were Ukrainians by
nationality, although many other ethnic and religious groups living in Ukraine likewise
suffered, including Poles, Germans, Greeks, Russians, Jews and Mennonites, a situation
akin to the Holocaust, during which millions of non-Jews were enslaved or killed alongside
Jews. For a personal reminiscence on the Holocaust by a concentration camp survivor and
Ukrainian nationalist, see Stefan Petelycky, Into Auschwitz, For Ukraine (Kingston: Kashtan
Press, 1999).
5.
The distinguished British historian, Norman Davies, has recently commented on Ukrainian
losses in the 20th century as follows: The estimated 6-7 million Ukrainians who perished
at German hands in 1941-1944 matched the 6-7 million Ukrainians who had perished ten
years earlier on Stalins orders during the artificial Terror-Famine. The Ukrainians must be
regarded as the nationality which suffered the largest total of civilian war dead during the
war. Norman Davies, Rising 44: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Macmillan, 2003), page
138.
6.
See, for example, R. J. Rummell, Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder Since
1917 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1990) and Was 1932 Ukraine
famine genocide? by Lubomyr Luciuk and Ron Vastokas, The Toronto Star, 2 June 1988.
............ viii ............
7.
The best-known example of famine-denial is a polemic by Douglas Tottle, Fraud, Famine

and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (Toronto: Progress
Books, 1987). Reiterating many of the same themes raised by Tottle is an article in the 8
December 2003 issue of Modern Communism, (Volume 4, No. 38), published by the
Manitoba Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist),
edited by Ken Kalturnyk. Entitled The Famine That Never Was, this article begins: A
lot of noise has been made in the past few weeks about the 70th anniversary of the so-called
Ukrainian famine of 1933-34. The media has been full of stories about the millions of
Ukrainians who supposedly died in this famine and the Asper family has agreed to include
a section on the Ukrainian famine in the planned Museum of Human Rights to be built in
Winnipeg. However, the Ukrainian famine is an event which never happened. It was
entirely the creation of the Hearst newspaper chain and was exposed as a hoax at the time.
While not mentioning Duranty, the article suggests that efforts to recall the famine were
intended to tarnish Stalins memory. Allegedly dozens of American and British newspaper
reporters spent weeks crisscrossing Ukraine during the height of the alleged famine and
found no evidence of widespread hunger or deaths. What did happen, the author alleges,
was a civil war precipitated by the collectivization of agriculture, pitting kulaks, armed
and financed by Nazi Germany and various Nazi sympathizers in the West, including
William Randolph Hearst and Henry Ford, against Moscow. Supposedly it was the kulaks
who called for an agricultural strike in the spring of 1933, urging supporters not to plant
crops and to destroy existing stocks of food, their hope being to create food shortages in
the cities and undermine support for the Soviet government. In some areas where large
numbers of peasants took up this call, localized food shortages did result but the vast
majority of the Soviet peasantry, including the Ukrainian peasants, supported
collectivization and produced bumper crops in those years, so widespread hunger was
avoided.
It was only with the unleashing of the Cold War in the late 1940s [that] all of the Nazi
propaganda of the 1930s was dredged up once again with the objective of discrediting
communism. In North America, fertile ground for this was found among the million
or so Ukrainian refugees and war criminals who had collaborated with the Nazis during the
Second World War and who were given safe haven in the United States and Canada.
As for those who claim more Ukrainians died in Joseph Stalins engineered famine than
Jews murdered by the Nazis this was explained away as an attempt to tarnish
Communism, and minimize the Holocaust. Not only is there a total absence of credible
eye-witness testimony about the Ukrainian famine, but, supposedly, no corroborating
evidence was uncovered in Soviet archives, which the author claims were fully opened
after the USSRs collapse. Concluding, he writes that the myth of the Ukrainian famine
was created by the most reactionary sections of American society, was later resurrected
by a cabal of former Nazis, Nazi collaborators and Holocaust deniers supported by
............ ix ............
Not Worthy
some sections of the Left to justify their own anti-communism, along with the main
apologists for the Israeli genocide against the Palestinian people.
For a somewhat different perspective, again from the Left, see Bill Vann, Durantys
Pulitzer and the hypocrisy of The New York Times, World Socialism, 1 November 2003.
An earlier commentary on such opinions is provided by Taras Kuzio, Denial of FamineTerror Continues Unabated, RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report, Volume 4,
#23, 12 June 2002.
8.
For example, in commenting on Mel Gibsons film, The Passion of The Christ, Calev BenDavid wrote: To describe the genocide of European Jews as simply another atrocity that
occurred during the war, or even to place it on the same level as Stalins deliberate famine
policies in the Ukraine, is itself a form of Holocaust revisionism. See Calev Ben-David,
Snap Judgement: Whos the Real Braveheart? Jerusalem Post, 2 March 2004. On this film
and its critics see Lubomyr Luciuk, Mel Gibson and The Passion: Critics Have It Wrong,
The Kingston Whig-Standard, 26 February 2004.
9.
On the inclusive commemoration of all victims of genocide and mass murder see Lubomyr
Luciuk, Unique museum comes with a price, Winnipeg Sun, 6 February 2004. Whether
or not such persons would be found guilty of war crimes, it is undeniable that veterans of
various Soviet secret police formations such as the NKVD and SMERSH are living in
Canada, an issue raised previously in: A war crime is a war crime, The Montreal Gazette,
2 July 2002; Go after the real culprits, The Kingston Whig-Standard, 19 January 2004;
Selective outrage, The Ottawa Citizen, 19 February 2004.
............ x ............
............ xi ............
Not Worthy
............ xii ............
Acknowledgements
Thanks are due to a number of individuals, organizations and foundations
whose contributions made this publication possible, including the Australian
Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, Association of Ukrainians in Great
Britain, Heritage Foundation (First Security Federal Savings Bank, Chicago),
League of Ukrainian Canadians, League of Ukrainian Canadian Women,
Metropolitan Ilarion Centre for Ukrainian Orthodox Studies of St. Mary the
Protectress Ukrainian Orthodox Cathedral (Winnipeg), Petro Jacyk
Educational Foundation, Ukrainian American Freedom Foundation, Ukrainian
Congress Committee of America & Southeast Michigan Chapter (UCCA),
Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Ukrainian Canadian Club of
Kingston, Ukrainian Canadian Congress (Justice Committee) and the
Ukrainian American Justice Committee.
Permission to reprint articles and documents was kindly granted by The
Associated Press, The Christian Science Monitor, Columbia Journalism
Review, The Day, The Journal of Genocide Research, The Globe and Mail,
The Harvard Crimson, Hoover Digest, The National Post, The National
Review, The New Criterion, The Ottawa Citizen, The Pulitzer Prize Board,
The San Francisco Chronicle, The Toronto Sun, The Ukrainian Weekly, The
Winnipeg Free Press and The Winnipeg Sun.
Thanks are also due to Stephen Bandera, Professor Yaroslav Bilinsky, Borys
Potapenko, Father Jaroslaw Buciora, Marco Carynnyk, Dr. Margaret Siriol
Colley, Nigel L. Colley, Professor Robert Conquest, Professor James Crowl,
Duncan M. Currie, Professor Roger Daniels, Nina Dejneha, Robert Fulford,
John Gleeson, Sig Gissler, John B. Gregorovich, Professor Mark von Hagen,
Roma Hadzewycz, Maria Hluschuk, Professor Ian Hunter, Terry Hutchinson,
Professor Henry R. Huttenbach, Dr. Julian Kulas, Dr. Myron Kuropas,
............ xiii ............
Not Worthy
Dr. Leonard Leshuk, Gerry Locklin, Professor James Mace, Professor P. R.

Magocsi, Victor Malarek, Eric Margolis, David Matas, Dr. Lubomyr Mazur,
Douglas McCollam, Andrew Nynka, Olya Odynsky, Dr. R. A. Pierce, Stefan
Romaniw, Dr. Oleh Romanyshyn, Carol Sanders, Michael Sawkiw, Julia
Stashuk, Andrew Stuttaford, Borys Sydoruk, Sally Taylor and E. Morgan
Williams for their assistance with various aspects of this project.
Only minor editorial changes have been made to the articles that follow,
otherwise they are reproduced as published originally.
The opinions expressed are those of their authors, not necessarily those of the
editor or of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
............ xiv ............
The Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine:

Americas Red Decade and the Great Famine Cover-Up
MYRON B. KUROPAS
The Ukrainian Weekly, 20 March 1983
Reprinted with permission of The Ukrainian Weekly and the author
In 1933 Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany. Before his death, in 1945, more
than 10 million civilians, including 6 million Jews and 4 million Gypsies, Poles,
Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other untermenschen (subhumans) were slaughtered
to fulfill a diabolical dream.1
When the Second World War ended and the full extent of Hitlers horrors was
finally revealed, the civilized world demanded justice. Thousands of Nazis and Nazi
collaborators were hunted down, tried and executed for crimes against humanity.
The criminals were punished, but the Nazi nightmare lingered on in hundreds of
books, magazine articles, films and TV documentaries. Even today, Nazi
collaborators are being brought to trial to demonstrate that no matter how long it
takes, no matter what the price, genocide shall not go unpunished. It is in
remembering that we assure ourselves that nothing like the Holocaust shall ever
again become the policy of a state.
For Ukrainians, however, the Nazi Holocaust is only half of the genocide story. The
other half is the Great Famine, a crime orchestrated by Joseph Stalin in the same
year Hitler came to power. No one has ever been hunted down for that crime. No
one has ever been brought to trial. No one has ever been executed. On the contrary,
many of those who willingly and diligently participated in the wanton destruction
of some 7 million innocent human beings are alive and well and living in the
countries of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere around the world.
Not Worthy
There is little likelihood that any of these individuals will ever have to face an
international tribunal for their barbarism. Nor is there any reason to believe
that Communists have eschewed genocide as one of their strategies. Cambodia
and Afghanistan proved that.
While the Free World has not punished Bolshevik criminals, the past can teach
us to be wary of those contemporary religious and intellectual leaders who urge
us to trust them.2 One of the forgotten aspects of the Great Famine story is
the role played by respected American clergy, diplomats, journalists and writers
who, by defending Stalin in 1933, indirectly prolonged his reign of terror. Some
were innocent dupes. Others were unconscionable conspirators. Almost all
went on to pursue distinguished careers in their chosen professions without so
much as a backward glance at the incredible human misery they helped conceal
from the worlds view. It is in remembering their actions that we can best assure
ourselves that in America, at least, genocide shall never again go unnoticed.
The Red Decade
During the 1930s, the United States found itself in the throes of the worst
depression in its history. Banks failed. Businesses collapsed. Factories closed.
Homes and farms were repossessed. Unemployment reached 40 percent in
some of Americas larger cities. Bread lines and soup kitchens multiplied. The
American Dream, so real and vibrant during the 1920s, was shattered.
While America suffered, the radical Left reveled. Exploiting the economic
turmoil and uncertainty which plagued the nation, Communists and their
fellow travellers pointed to the success of the great Soviet experiment.
Suddenly, thousands of despairing clerics, college professors, movie stars,
poets, writers and other well-known moulders of public opinion began to look
to Moscow for inspiration and guidance. As millions of jobless war veterans
demonstrated in the streets and workers seized factories in sit-down strikes,
the 1930s became what Eugene Lyons has called Americas Red Decade, 3 a
time when romanticized Bolshevism represented the future, bankrupt
capitalism the past.4
............ 2 ............
In the forefront of the campaign to popularize the Soviet way were American
intellectuals, correspondents and even government officials who grossly
exaggerated Bolshevik achievements, ignored or rationalized myriad failures,
and, when necessary, conspired to cover up Bolshevik crimes. Especially
impressed were those who traveled to the USSR during the 1930s, almost all of
whom, it seems, found something to admire.
Some found a Judaeo-Christian spirit. Sherwood Eddy, an American
churchman and YMCA leader, wrote: The Communist philosophy seeks a
new order, a classless society of unbroken brotherhood, what the Hebrew
prophets would have called a reign of righteousness on earth. A similar theme
was struck by the American Quaker, Henry Hodgkin: As we look at Russias
great experiment in brotherhood, he wrote, it may seem to us that some dim
perception of Jesus way, all unbeknown, is inspiring it... 5
Others discovered a sense of purpose and cohesive values. Corliss and
Margaret Lamont concluded that the Soviet people were happy because they
were making constructive sacrifices with a splendid purpose held
continuously in mind despite some stresses and strains in the system. 6
Still others found humane prisons. Soviet justice, wrote Anna Louise Strong,
aims to give the criminal a new environment in which he will begin to act in
a normal way as a responsible Soviet citizen. The less confinement the better;
the less he feels himself in prison the better...the labour camps have won high
reputation throughout the Soviet Union as places where tens of thousands of
men have been reclaimed. 7
The Soviet Union had something for everyone. Liberals found social equality,
wise and caring leaders, reconstructed institutions and intellectual stimulation.
Rebels found support for their causes: birth control, sexual equality,
progressive education, futuristic dancing, Esperanto. Even hard-boiled
capitalists, wrote Lyons, from Moscow, found the spectacle to their taste: no
strikes, no lip, hard work... 8
Contributing to the liberal chorus of solicitous praise for Stalins new society
were American diplomats such as Ambassador Joseph E. Davies who argued
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that Stalin was a stubborn democrat who insisted on a Constitution which

protected basic human rights even though it hazarded his power and Party
control. 9
Like most liberals, Davies never accepted the notion that Stalins Show Trials
were staged. To assume that, he wrote, ...would be to presuppose the creative
genius of Shakespeare and the genius of Belasco in stage production. 10 Nor did
he believe Stalin - whom he described as clean-living, modest, retiring - was
personally involved in the elimination of his former colleagues. 11 Even though
he had personally met and dined with many of the purge victims, Davies later
concluded that their execution was justified because it eliminated Russias Fifth
Column which, in keeping with Hitlers designs upon the Ukraine, had
conspired to dismember the Union... 12
In the United States, meanwhile, the liberal press was equally enamoured of
Stalin. Writing in Soviet Russia Today, a monthly journal, Upton Sinclair, Max
Lerner and Robert M. Lovett wrote glowing accounts of Moscows important
role in defending democratic principles. 13 In the words of Professor Frederick
L. Schuman, a charter member of the Soviet defense team:
The great cleavage between contemporary societies is not between

capitalism (democratic or fascist) and communism but between
those (whether in Manchester, Moscow, Marseilles or Minneapolis)
who believe in the mind and in the government of, by and for the
people, and those (whether in Munich, Milan or Mukden) who
believe in might and in government of, by and for a self-appointed
oligarchy of property and privilege. 14
For the Nation, Russia was the worlds first true democracy and anyone who
didnt believe it was either malicious or ignorant. 15 For the New Republic,
communism was a false bogey. 16 When a group of 140 American
intellectuals associated with the Committee for Cultural Freedom included the
USSR in their list of countries which denied civil liberties and cultural
independence, some 400 liberal Americans - including university presidents,
professors and such prominent intellectuals as Langston Hughes, Clifford
Odets, Richard Wright, Max Weber, Granville Hicks, Louis Untermeyer and
............ 4 ............
James Thurber - signed and agreed to have published an Open Letter

branding as Fascists all those who dared suggest the fantastic falsehood
that the USSR and the totalitarian states are basically alike. Joining the
condemnation with pointed editorial comments were the Nation and the New
Republic. 17
How the press corps concealed a famine
In January 1928, Eugene Lyons, the newly hired correspondent for United
Press, arrived to take up his duties in Moscow. Although he had never actually
joined the Communist Party in America, Lyons came with impeccable Leftist
credentials. The son of a Jewish labourer on New Yorks Lower East Side, he
joined the Young Peoples Socialist League in his youth. Beginning his
professional career as a writer for various radical publications, Lyons
eventually became the editor of Soviet Russia Pictorial, the first popular
American magazine about the wonders of Soviet life, and a New York
correspondent for TASS, the Soviet news bureau. 18
My entire social environment in those years, he later wrote, was
Communist and Soviet. 19 If anyone ever went to the Soviet realm with a deep
and earnest determination to understand the Revolution it was this newly
appointed United Press correspondent. I was not deserting the direct service
of the cause for the fleshpots of capitalism, he reasoned, I was accepting,
rather, a post of immense strategic importance in the further service of that
cause, and doing so with the wholehearted agreement and understanding of my
chiefs in TASS and therefore, presumably, of the Soviet Foreign Office. 20
As an enthusiastic member of Stalins defense team, Lyons consistently penned
dispatches which glorified the Soviet Union. Every present-tense difficulty
that I was obliged to report, he wrote, I proceeded to dwarf by posing it
against a great future-tense vision. 21
The longer Lyons remained in the USSR, however, the more disillusioned he
became with Soviet reality. Eventually, his reports began to expose the sham of
Bolshevik propaganda, and Moscow demanded his recall. Returning to the
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United States in 1934, 22 he wrote about his experiences in Assignment in

Utopia, a book published by Harcourt-Brace in 1937. In a chapter titled The
Press Corps Conceals a Famine, Lyons described how he and other American
correspondents conspired with Soviet authorities to deny the existence of the
worlds only human engineered famine. The most diligent collaborators in this
sordid affair were Walter Duranty, head of The New York Times Moscow
bureau, and Louis Fischer, Moscow correspondent for the Nation.
The first reliable report of the catastrophe to reach the outside world was
written by Gareth Jones, an English journalist who visited Ukraine in 1933 and
then left the Soviet Union to write about what he had witnessed. When his
story broke, the American press corps in Moscow - whose members had seen
pictures of the horrors, taken by German consular officers in Ukraine was
besieged by their home offices for more information. Angered as much by
Jones scoop as by his unflattering portrayal of Soviet life, a group of American
correspondents met with Comrade Konstantine Umansky, the Soviet press
censor, to determine how best to handle the story. A statement was drafted,
following which vodka and zakuski were ordered, and everyone sat down to
celebrate with a smiling Umansky.
The agreed upon format was followed faithfully by Duranty. There is no
actual starvation, he reported in The New York Times on 30 March 1933,
but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition. When
the famine reports persisted over the next few months, Duranty finally
admitted food shortages but insisted that any report of famine is today an
exaggeration or malignant propaganda. 23
Duranty, of course, was aware of the situation in Ukraine and confessed as
much to The New York Times book critic John Chamberlain, himself a
Communist sympathizer. Believing, as he later wrote, that the Russian
Revolution, while admittedly imperfect, needed time to work itself out,
Chamberlain was distressed by Durantys casual admission that 3 million
people had died...in what amounted to a man-made famine. What struck
Chamberlain most of all was the double inequity of Durantys
performance. He was not only heartless about the famine, Chamberlain
concluded, he had betrayed his calling as a journalist by failing to report
it. 24
............ 6 ............
Fortunately, not all members of the American press crops in Moscow were
involved with the cover-up. A notable exception was William Henry
Chamberlin, staff correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor, who
traveled to Ukraine in the winter of 1933 and reported that more than 4
million peasants are found to have perished... 25 In a book titled Russias Iron
Age, published that same year, Chamberlain estimated that some 10 percent of
the population had been annihilated by Stalin during the collectivization
campaign. 26 In describing his journey to Ukraine, he later wrote:
No one, I am sure, could have made such a trip with an honest

desire to learn the truth and escaped the conclusion that the
Ukrainian countryside had experienced a gigantic tragedy. What
had happened was not hardship, or privation, or distress, or food
shortage, to mention the deceptively euphemistic words that were
allowed to pass the soviet censorship, but stark, outright famine,
with its victims counted in millions. No one will probably ever
know the exact toll of death, because the Soviet government
preserved the strictest secrecy about the whole question, officially
denied that there was any famine, and rebuffed all attempts to
organize relief abroad. 27
First to provide extensive coverage of the Great Famine in the American press
was the Hearst newspaper chain which, unfortunately, placed the event in 1934
rather than 1932-1933. 28
By that time, however, Stalins American defense team was already busily
denying the Chamberlin and Hearst reports. An example was Louis Fischer
who in the 13 March 1935 issue of the Nation reported that he had visited
Ukraine in 1934 and had witnessed no famine. Even though he was aware of
it, Fischer made no mention that the famine had occurred a year earlier.
Problems with collectivization could not be denied, however. In his book Soviet
Journey, Fischer later described the process in the following simple terms:
History can be cruel...The peasants wanted to destroy

collectivization. The government wanted to retain collectivization.
The peasants used the best means at their disposal. The government
used the best means at their disposal. The government won. 29
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With help from certain members of the American press corps, the Bolsheviks
succeeded in their efforts to shield the truth about Ukraines Great Famine
from the worlds eyes. Concealing the barbarism until it was over, they
generated doubt, confusion and disbelief. Years after the event, wrote Lyons
in 1937, when no Russian Communist in his senses any longer concealed the
magnitude of the famine - the question whether there had been a famine at all
was still being disputed in the outside world! 30
The need for a famine
The famine story, however, would not die. None of this bothered Stalins
American apologists. In a 1933 publication titled The Great Offensive,
Maurice Hindus wrote that if the growing food shortage brought distress
and privation to certain parts of the Soviet Union, the fault was not of
Russia but of the people. Recalling a conversation he had with an American
businessman, Hindus proudly wrote:
And supposing there is a famine...continued my interlocutor...what

will happen? People will die, of course, I answered. And
supposing 3 or 4 million people die? The Revolution will go on. 31
If a famine was needed to preserve the Revolution, so be it. Maybe it
cost a million lives, wrote Pulitzer Prize novelist Upton Sinclair, maybe it
cost 5 million - but you cannot think intelligently about it unless you ask
yourself how many millions it might have cost if the changes had not been
made...Some people will say that this looks like condoning wholesale murder.
That is not true; it is merely trying to evaluate a Revolution. There has never
been a great social change in history without killing... 32
The legacy of the Red Decade
Although the Ukrainian American daily newspaper Svoboda reported on the
famine, 33 and thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets in New York City,
Chicago, Detroit and other cities to protest Stalins terrorism, 34 the White
............ 8 ............
House remained indifferent. On 16 November 1933, President Franklin D.

Roosevelt formally recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and the
Bolshevik regime.
Commenting on Americas decision to establish diplomatic relations with
the USSR, The Ukrainian Weekly reported that some 8,000 Ukrainians had
participated in a New York City march protesting FDRs decision, adding that
while the protest was not intended to hinder the policies...of the United States
government we Ukrainians are as anxious as anyone else to cooperate with
our beloved president - nevertheless, we look dubiously upon the value of
any benefits which America may obtain from having official relations with a
government whose rule is based on direct force alone, a government which is
unable to provide for its subjects even the most ordinary necessities of life,
and which has shown itself capable of the most barbaric cruelty, as evidenced
by its reign of terror and the present Bolshevik-fostered famine in Ukraine. 35
Fifty years later, The Ukrainian Weekly was still warning a largely indifferent
America about the perils of trusting Soviet Communists. If docudramas such as
The Holocaust, in which the USSR was portrayed as a haven for Jews fleeing
Nazi annihilation, and The Winds of War, in which Stalin was depicted as a
tough but benevolent leader whose loyal troops sang his raises in three-part
harmony, are any indication of media perceptions of the Stalinist era, then the
legacy of the Red Decade lives on.
The world has been inundated with a plethora of authoritative information
regarding Hitlers villainy and has become ever vigilant in its efforts to prevent
a repetition of his terror. This is good. But it is not enough. Hitler was not this
centurys only international barbarian, and it is time we recognized this fact lest
we, in our single-minded endeavour to protect ourselves from another Hitler,
find ourselves with another Stalin.
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Endnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
See Bohdan Wytwycky, The Other Holocaust (Washington: The Novak Report, 1980).
See Sydney Lens, We Must Trust the Russians, Chicago Sun-Times, 10 January 1983 and
Myron B. Kuropas, Trust the Russians? Cmon! Chicago Sun-Times, (26 January 1983).
Sydney Lens, Radicalism in America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), page
297.
Arthur M. Schlesigner, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval, (Boston: HoughtonMiflin Company, 1960), pages 183-185.
Cited in Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union,
China and Cuba, 1928-1978, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), page 124.
ibid, page 127.
ibid, pages 144-145.
ibid, page 106.
ibid, page 106.
ibid, page 164.
Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941), pages 191-192.
ibid, page 262.
Frank A. Warren, Liberals and Communism: The Red Decade Revisited, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1966), page 105.
ibid, page 109.
ibid, page 105.
ibid, page 149.
Eugene Lyons, The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America, (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill Company, 1941), pp 342-351.
Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1937), pages
3-49.
ibid, page 37.
ibid, page 48.
ibid, page 197.
ibid, page 607.
ibid, pages 572-580.
John Chamberlain, A Life With the Printed Word, (Chicago: Regnery, 1982), pages 54-55.
William H. Chamberlin, Famine proves potent weapon in Soviet policy, Christian Science
Monitor (29 May 1934).
............ 10 ............
26. William H. Chamberlin, Russias Iron Age, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1934),
pages 66-67.
27. W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine: A Submerged Nation (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1944), page 60.
28. See Villages Depopulated by Hunger in Ukraine as Soviet Punish Their Opponents,
Chicago American (1 March, 4 March and 6 March, 1935).
29. Cited in Lyons, The Red Decade, page 118.
30. Cited in Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, pages 577-578.
31. Cited in Hollander, page 120.
32. ibid, page 162.
33. See Svoboda (6 February, 25 May, 11June, 11 July, 14 July 1932).
34. See The Golgotha of Ukraine (New York: the Ukrainian Congress Committee, 1935),
page 5.
35. The Ukrainian Weekly (23 November 1933).
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Deliberate, diabolical, starvation: Malcolm Muggeridge on Stalins

famine
MARCO CARYNNYK
The Ukrainian Weekly, 29 May and 5 June 1983
Reprinted with permission of The Ukrainian Weekly and the author
The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical, is that it was
the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind, ... without any consideration
whatever of the consequences in human suffering, Malcolm Muggeridge
said. He was talking about the genocidal famine that swept Ukraine and the
adjacent North Caucasus, two of the most abundant lands in all of Europe, in
the winter of 1932 and the spring and summer of 1933.
The harvest of 1932 had been a fair one, no worse than the average during
the previous decade, when life had seemed a bit easier again after three years
of world war and Five-Years of revolution and famine. But then, as the
Ukrainian peasants were bringing in their wheat and rye, an army of men
advanced like locusts into every barn and shed, and swept away all the grain.
The few stores that the peasants managed to put away were soon gone, and
they began eating leaves, bark, cornhusks, dogs, cats and rodents.
When that food was gone and the people had puffed up with watery edema,
they shuffled off to the cities, begging for bits of bread and dying like flies in the
streets. In the spring of 1933, when the previous year s supplies were gone and
before the new vegetation brought some relief, the peasants were dying at the
rate of 25,000 a day, or 1,000 an hour, or 17 a minute. (In World War II, by
comparison, about 6,000 people were killed every day.) Corpses could be seen
............ 12 ............
in every country lane and city street, and mass graves were hastily dug in remote
areas. By the time the famine tapered off in the autumn of 1933, some 6 million
men, women and children had starved to death.
Malcolm Muggeridge was there that terrible winter and spring. As a

correspondent for The Manchester Guardian in Moscow, he was one of the few
Western journalists who circumvented Soviet restrictions and visited the famine
regions - and then honestly reported what he had seen.
Shortly before Mr. Muggeridge s articles appeared in The Guardian, the Soviet
authorities declared Ukraine out of bounds to reporters and set about concealing
the destruction they had wreaked. Prominent statesmen, writers and journalists among them French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, George Bernard Shaw and
Walter Duranty of The New York Times - were enlisted in the campaign of
misinformation.
The conspiracy of silence was largely successful. For years to come Stalinists and
anti-Stalinists argued whether a famine had occurred and, if so, whether it was
not the fault of the Ukrainian peasants themselves. Today, as Ukrainians
throughout the world (except in the Soviet Union, of course, where the subject
cannot even be mentioned) commemorate the 50th anniversary of the famine,
the events of 1933 are still largely unknown.
Mr. Muggeridge and I talked at his cottage in Sussex, England. I was

particularly anxious to know why he, unlike other foreign correspondents in
Moscow in 1933, took the trouble to investigate the famine.
***
Q: Why did you decide to write about the famine?

A: It was the big story in all our talks in Moscow, everybody knew
about it. There was no question about that. Anyone you were
talking to knew that there was a terrible famine going on. Even in
the Soviets own pieces there were somewhat disguised
............ 13 ............
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acknowledgements of great difficulties there: the attacks on the

kulaks, the admission that the people were eating the seed grain
and cattle.
You didnt have to be very bright to ask why they were eating
them. Because they were very hungry, otherwise they wouldnt. So
there was no possible doubt. I realized that that was the big story.
I could also see that all the correspondents in Moscow were
distorting it.
Without making any kind of plans or asking for permission I just
went and got a ticket for Kiev and then went on to Rostov. The
Soviet security is not as good as people think it is. If you once duck
it, you can go quite a long way. At least you could in those days.
Having all those rubles, I could afford to travel in the Pullman
train. They had these old-fashioned international trains - very
comfortable, with endless glasses of hot tea and so on. It was quite
pleasant.
But even going through the countryside by train one could sense
the state of affairs. Ukraine was starving, and you only had to
venture out to smaller places to see derelict fields and abandoned
villages.
On one occasion, I was changing trains, and I went wandering
around, and in one of the trains in the station, the kulaks were
being loaded onto the train, and there were military men all along
the platform. They soon pushed me off. Fortunately, they didnt do
more. They could have easily hauled me in and asked, What the
hell are you doing here? But they didnt. I just cleared off. But I
got the sense of what it was like.
Ill tell you another thing thats more difficult to convey, but it
impressed me enormously. It was on a Sunday in Kiev, and I went
into the church there for the Orthodox mass. I could understand
very little of it, but there was some spirit in it that I have never
............ 14 ............
come across before or after. Human beings at the end of their

tether were saying to God: We come to You, were in trouble,
nobody but You can help us. Their faces were quite radiant
because of this tremendous sense they had. As no man would help
them, no government, there was nowhere that they could turn.
And they turned to their Creator. Wherever I went it was the same
thing.
Then when I got to Rostov I went on to the North Caucasus. The
person who had advised me to go there was the Norwegian
minister in Moscow, a very nice man, very well-informed, who
said, Youll find that this German agricultural concession is still
working there. Go and see them, because they know more about it
than anybody, and itll be an interesting experience. So I went
there. It was called the Drusag concession.
Q: What difference did you see between Drusag and the collective farms in
Ukraine and the North Caucasus?
A: The difference was simply that the agriculture in the concession
was enormously flourishing, extremely efficient. You didnt have
to be an agronome, which God knows Im not, to see that there the
crops, the cattle, everything, was completely different from the
surrounding countryside.
Moreover, there were hordes of people, literally hordes of people
trying to get in, because there was food there, which gave a more
poignant sense to the thing than anything except that service in the
church. The German agronomes themselves were telling me about
it. Theyd been absolutely bombarded with people trying to come
there to work, do anything if they could get in, because there was
food there.
............ 15 ............
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Q: I have read in a British Foreign Office dispatch that Drusag employed five
people simply to pick up bodies of peasants who had come in and died of
hunger.
A: Yes, thats what Id heard too, if not more. The peasants
staggered in and dropped dead.
Q: Were the Germans able to do anything for the peasants?
A: They could help them with a little food - they were quite
charitable in their attitude - but of course they couldnt do more
than that flea-bit.
Q: What were you thinking and, more importantly perhaps, what were you
feeling when you saw those scenes of starvation and privation in Ukraine?
How does one respond in such a situation?
A: First of all, one feels a deep, deep, deep sympathy with and pity
for the sufferers. Human beings look very tragic when they are
starving. And remember that I wasnt unaware of what things were
like because in India, for instance, Ive been in a village during a
cholera epidemic and seen people similarly placed. So it wasnt a
complete novelty.
The novelty of this particular famine, what made it so diabolical,
is that it was not the result of some catastrophe like a drought or
an epidemic. It was the deliberate creation of a bureaucratic mind
which demanded the collectivization of agriculture, immediately,
as a purely theoretical proposition, without any consideration
whatever of the consequences in human suffering.
That was what I found so terrifying. Think of a man in an office
who has been ordered to collectivize agriculture and get rid of the
kulaks without any clear notion or definition of what a kulak is,
and who has in what was then the GPU and is now the KGB the
............ 16 ............
instrument for doing this, and who then announces it in the slavish
press as one of the great triumphs of the regime.
And even when the horrors of it have become fully apparent,
modifying it only on the ground that theyre dizzy with success, that
this has been such a wonderful success, these starving people, that they
must hold themselves in a bit because otherwise theyd go mad with
excitement over their stupendous success. Thats a macabre story.
Q: There were kulaks throughout the Soviet Union, and they were liquidated
as an entire class. Collectivization also took place throughout the Soviet Union.
And yet the famine occurred at the point when collectivization had been
completed, and it occurred not throughout the Soviet Union, but largely in
Ukraine and the North Caucasus. How do you explain that?
A: Those were the worst places. They were also the richest
agricultural areas, so that the dropping of productivity would show
more dramatically there. But they were also places, as you as a
Ukrainian know better than I, of maximum dissent. The Ukrainians
hated the Russians. And they do now. Therefore, insofar as people
could have any heart in working in a collective farm, that would be
least likely to occur in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.
Q: Given the deliberate nature of the famine in Ukraine, the decision on Stalins
part to proceed with collectivization and to eliminate resistance at any cost and
to get rid of the kulak, vaguely defined as that category was, and given the fact
that food continued to be stockpiled and exported even as people dropped dead
on the streets, is it accurate to talk about this as a famine? Is it perhaps something
else? How does one describe an event of such magnitude?
A: Perhaps you do need another word. I dont know what it would
be. The word famine means people have nothing whatsoever to
eat and consume things that are not normally consumed. Of course
there were stories of cannibalism there. I dont know whether they
were true, but they were very widely believed. Certainly the eating
............ 17 ............
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of cattle and the consequent complete destruction of whatever

economy the farms still had was true.
I remember someone telling me how all manners and finesse
disappeared. When youre in the grip of a thing like this and you
know that someones got food, you go and steal it. Youll even
murder to get it. Thats all part of the horror.
Q: How does one rank the famine of 1933 with other great catastrophes?
A: I think its very difficult to make a table of comparison. What I
would say with complete truth and sincerity is that as a journalist
over the last half century I have seen some pretty awful things,
including Berlin when it was completely flat and the people were
living in little huts theyd made of the rubble and the exchange was
cigarettes and Spam.
But the famine is the most terrible thing I have ever seen, precisely
because of the deliberation with which it was done and the total
absence of any sympathy with the people. To mention it or to
sympathize with the people would mean to go to the Gulag,
because then you were criticizing the great Stalins project and
indicating that you thought it a failure, when allegedly it was a
stupendous success and enormously strengthened the Soviet
Union.
Q: What sort of response did you encounter when you came back from the
Soviet Union and published your findings, particularly from people close to
you, like the Webbs?
A: The Webbs were furious about it. Mrs. Webb in her diary puts
in a sentence which gives the whole show away. She says,
Malcolm has come back with stories about a terrible famine in
the USSR. I have been to see Mr. Maisky [the Soviet ambassador
in Britain] about it, and I realize that hes got it absolutely wrong.
............ 18 ............
Who would suppose that Mr. Maisky would say, No, no, of
course hes right?
Q: This is precisely the attitude that the British government was taking at
that time. L.B. Golden, the secretary of the Save the Children Fund, which
had been very active during the famine of 1921-1922 in Russia and Ukraine,
approached the Foreign Office in August 1933. Hed received disturbing
information about famine in Ukraine and the North Caucasus, but the first
secretary of the Soviet embassy had assured him that the harvest was a
bumper one, and so Golden asked the Foreign Office whether a public
appeal should be put out. The Foreign Office told him not to do anything,
and he did not. The Soviet authorities were not admitting to a famine, and
therefore it was agreed that nothing should be said.
A: Absolutely true. The other day I had occasion to meet Lord
March, the representative of the laity on the World Council of
Churches. Why is it that youre always putting out your World
Council complaints about South Africa or Chile? I asked. I
never hear a word about anything to do with whats going on in
the Gulag or with the invasion of Afghanistan. Why is that?
He said, Whenever we frame any resolution of that sort, its
always made clear to us that if we bring in that resolution, then the
Russian Orthodox Church and all the satellite countries will
withdraw from the World Council of Churches.
Then do you not pursue the matter? I asked. And he said, Oh
yes, we dont pursue it because of that. I was amazed that the
man could say that. But there it was, and its exactly true of the
Foreign Office.
Q: You published Winter in Moscow when you got back from the Soviet
Union, and you were attacked in the press for your views.
A: Very strongly. And I couldnt get a job.
............ 19 ............
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Q: Why was that? Because people found your reports hard to believe?
A: No, the press was not overtly pro-Soviet, but it was, as it is now,
essentially sympathetic with that side and distrustful of any serious
attack on it.
Q: How do you explain this sympathy?
A: Its something Ive written and thought about a great deal, and
I think that the liberal mind is attracted by this sort of regime. My
wifes aunt was Beatrice Webb, and she and Sidney Webb wrote the
classic pro-Soviet book, Soviet Communism: A New Civilization.
And so, one saw close at hand the degree to which they all knew
about the regime, knew all about the Cheka [the secret police] and
everything, but they liked it.
I think that those people believe in power. It was put to me very
succinctly when we were taken down to Kharkiv for the opening
of the Dnieper dam. There was an American colonel who was
running it, building the dam in effect. How do you like it here?
I asked him, thinking that Id get a wonderful blast of him saying
how he absolutely hated it. I think its wonderful, he said. You
never get any labour trouble.
This will be one of the great puzzles of posterity in looking back
on this age, to understand why the liberal mind, The Manchester
Guardian mind, the New Republic mind, should feel such
enormous sympathy with this authoritarian regime.
Q: You are implying that the liberal intelligentsia did not simply overlook the
regimes brutality, but actually admired and liked it.
A: Yes, Im saying that, although they wouldnt have admitted it,
perhaps not even to themselves. I remember Mrs. Webb, who after
all was a very cultivated upper-class liberal-minded person, an
early member of the Fabian Society and so on, saying to me, Yes,
............ 20 ............
its true, people disappear in Russia. She said it with such great
satisfaction that I couldnt help thinking that there were a lot of
people in England whose disappearance she would have liked to
organize.
No, its an everlasting mystery to me how one after the other, the
intelligentsia of the Western world, the Americans, the Germans,
even the French, fell for this thing to such an extraordinary degree.
Q: One man who didnt fall for it was George Orwell. Did you discuss your
experiences in the Soviet Union with him? I ask because Orwell mentioned the
famine in his essay Notes on Nationalism. Huge events like the Ukraine
famine of 1933, involving the deaths of millions of people, he wrote, have
actually escaped the attention of the majority of English Russophiles.
A: We discussed the whole question. George had gone to the
Spanish Civil War as an ardent champion of the Republican side.
In Catalonia he could not but realize what a disgraceful doublefaced game the Communists were playing there. He was in a thing
called POUM [Partido Obrero de Unification Marxista, the
United Marxist Workers Party], which was allegedly Trotskyist.
Those people were not being knocked off by the Franco armies,
they were being knocked off by the Communists. And he was
deeply disillusioned. He then wrote what I think is one of his best
books, Homage to Catalonia.
And so what brought us together was that we were in the same
dilemma. People assumed that because he had attacked the
Communists, he must be on the Franco side. Just as people thought
that because Id attacked the Communist side, I must be an ardent
member of the Right wing of the Conservatives. And so we had
that in common, and we became friends. He had a feeling that I
also had strongly, that the Western world is sleepwalking into
becoming a collectivist, authoritarian society. And thats really
what his novel 1984 is about.
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Q: Where do you think that Orwell got the idea for Animal Farm? His fable of
the Revolution betrayed is so accurate that it even portrays the famine. Food
falls short, and the animals have only chaff and mangels to eat. Napoleon
(Stalin) conceals the facts and orders the hens to surrender their eggs so that he
can procure grain to keep the farm going. The hens rebel and Napoleon orders
their rations to be stopped, decreeing that any animal giving so much as a
grain of corn to a hen shall he punished by death.
A: Its his masterpiece. It is one of the few books written in the 20th
century that I would say will always be read. Its a beautiful piece
of writing. If you show it to children, they love it and dont
understand the other part of it. I think that he had a deep hatred
of intellectuals as people. He felt that they were fortunate, and in
Animal Farm he was illustrating how a Revolution can be twisted
into its opposite. It is a superb allegory of the whole thing.
But its difficult to explain. He wasnt a man who discussed
political theories. He had an instinct that these intellectuals were
somehow double-faced, and he never tired of railing against them.
If you had asked him about the Soviet Union, he would have just
said, Its a dictatorship, and they behaved disgracefully in Spain.
So hed write the whole thing off in that way. He still called himself
a socialist.
Q: To the very end.

A: To the very end of his life. He actually went canvassing for
Anuerin Bevin, and Ive always wondered what particular line of
talk he would have fallen into. He wasnt a person with whom you
could exchange ideas as such. He was kind of impressionistic in his
mind.
Q: Absorbed things without actually analyzing them.
A: Thats right. And in 1984, all that business about newspeak
............ 22 ............
and doublethink is beautifully done. And it is the kernel of the

whole thing. And the terrorism and the fact that you drift into a
situation in which people are in power with no program except to
remain in power, which is very much the state of affairs thats
come to pass. The people in the Kremlin at this moment are not
in power because theyve got plans to do this or the other thing.
All they want is a policy which will enable them to stay in power.
Q: All that youve said about the image of the world that liberals have and
about reporting, in this case from the Soviet Union, leads to a rather large and
difficult question about the reliability of the image of the world that we are
given.
A: Yes, indeed. I believe that this is how posterity will see it. We are
a generation of men who have become completely captivated and
caught up in false images. Television and all these things are
splendid instruments for keeping them going. Splendid. And I
would say that the collapse of Western Civilization will be much
more due to that than to anything else.
Q: False images?
A: False images. And its enormously difficult to correct them.
Children who grow up now have been looking at television and
hearing the voice of the consensus, and they know nothing else. So
I cant myself believe that theres any escape from this, except that
the whole show will blow up sometime or other. But I think that
Orwells position was rather different. He looked back on the past
with nostalgia, which is peculiar in a man of his attitude of mind
and temperament.
Q: He was very conservative and very English in many ways.
A: Deeply conservative. The most conservative mind Ive ever
encountered. But lets take this much more sinister thing we were
talking about now, this complete imprisonment of people at all
............ 23 ............
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levels into images which are fantasy, bringing about in them a kind
of unanimity, a consensus, which is very dangerous and which is
really the Party line. For instance, I know a great many people in
the BBC. I would have the greatest difficulty in finding any people
there, more than a handful, who would have other than the
consensus views on things like abortion, euthanasia or
overpopulation. Theres a consensus, and the consensus seems to
be true, and the images over which people spend a high proportion
of their lives shape, color and dominate all their thoughts.
Q: What is your way to overcome these images?

A: As a Christian, I believe that you can, if you want to, find
reality, which is what people call God. You can relate yourself to
that reality, and as a person belonging to whats called Western
Civilization you can find in the drama of the Incarnation
everything thats come there from, you can recover contact with
reality. That is in fact the only way. The ordinary man gets up and
spends four, five or six hours of his day looking into these pictures
and being subjected to his fantasy view. I often think that like
Calibans island, full of sounds and sweet airs, when we wake, we
cry to sleep again. But if people ever do wake, and I dont believe
they wake much anymore, they cry to sleep again. And crying to
sleep again is turning on the apparatus.
............ 24 ............
The liar who won a Pulitzer

IAN HUNTER
Walter Duranty
The 1932 Pulitzer Prize in Journalism was awarded to The New York Times
Moscow correspondent, Water Duranty, whom Malcolm Muggeridge called
the greatest liar I ever knew. Likewise correspondent Joseph Alsop said:
Lying was Durantys stock in trade.
Yet for two decades Duranty was the most influential foreign correspondent in
Russia. His dispatches were regarded as authoritative; indeed Duranty helped
to shape US foreign policy. His biographer, Sally Taylor (see Stalins Apologist,
Oxford University Press, 1990) has demonstrated that Durantys reporting was
a critical factor in President Roosevelts 1933 decision to grant official
recognition to the Soviet Union.
Duranty, an unattractive, oversexed little man, with a wooden leg, falsified facts,
spread lies and half truths, invented occurrences that never happened, and turned
a blind eye to the man-made famine that starved to death more than 14 million
people (according to an International Commission of Jurists which examined this
tragedy in 1988-1990). When snippets of the truth began to leak out, Duranty
coined the phrase: You cant make am omelette without breaking eggs. This
phrase, or a variant thereof, has since proved useful to a rich variety of ideologues
who contend that a worthy end justifies base means. Yet when the Pulitzer
Committee conferred its Prize on Duranty, they cited his scholarship, profundity,
impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity.
In the spring of 1933 Muggeridge, newly arrived in Moscow as correspondent for
The Manchester Guardian, did an audacious thing; without permission he set off
............ 25 ............
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on a train journey through what had formerly been the breadbasket of the Soviet
Union, Ukraine and the North Caucasus. What Muggeridge witnessed, he never
forgot. In a series of articles smuggled out in the diplomatic pouch, he described
a man-made famine that had become a holocaust: peasants, millions of them,
dying like famished cattle, sometimes within sight of full granaries, guarded by
the army and police. At a railway station early one morning, I saw a line of
people with their hands tied behind them, being herded into cattle into trucks at
gunpoint - all so silent and mysterious and horrible in the half light, like some
macabre ballet. At a German co-operative farm, an oasis of prosperity in the
collectivized wilderness, he saw peasants kneeling down in the snow, begging for
a crust of bread. In his diary, Muggeridge wrote: Whatever else I may do or
think in the future, I must never pretend that I havent seen this. Ideas will come
and go; but this is more than an idea. It is peasants kneeling down in the snow
and asking for bread. Something that I have seen and understood.
But few believed him. His dispatches were cut. He was sacked and forced to
leave Russia. Muggeridge was vilified, slandered and abused, not least in the
pages of The Manchester Guardian, where sympathy to what was called the
great Soviet experiment was de rigueur. Walter Durantys voice led the chorus
of denunciation and denial, although privately Duranty told a British Foreign
Office acquaintance that at least 10 million people had been starved to death adding, characteristically, but theyre only Russians (see appendix 3).
If vindication was a long time coming, it cannot have been sweeter than when
Durantys biographer, Sally Taylor, wrote in 1990: But for Muggeridges
eyewitness accounts of the famine in the spring of 1933 and his stubborn
chronicle of the event, the effects of the crime upon those who suffered might
well have remained as hidden from scrutiny as its perpetrators intended. Little
thanks he has received for it over the years, although there is a growing number
who realize what a singular act of honest and courage his reportage
constituted.
Alas, when these words came to be written, Muggeridge had died. Still, they
are worth remembering.
............ 26 ............
Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?

YAROSLAV BILINSKY
Journal of Genocide Research (1999), 1(2), pages 147-156
Reprinted with permission of the Journal of Genocide Research and the author
A distinguished Holocaust scholar, Michael R. Marrus, in his Foreword to a 1988

book The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the
Great Famine of 1932-1933 wrote: In my view, formal classification of the
famine [as a genocidal attack upon Ukrainians] matters less at this point than the
appreciation of the limitless cruelty and anguish it entailed (Marrus, 1988, page
xv). Some 10 years after Ukraine has become independent, I would respectfully
disagree. For both intellectual and political reasons it does matter whether the
man-made Soviet famine was a central act in a campaign of genocide, or whether
it was designed to simply cow Ukrainian peasants into submission, drive them into
the collectives and ensure a steady supply of grain for Soviet industrialization.
There is, to be sure, honest disagreement in the literature on the Ukrainian famine
whether it was genocidal or not. I, however, would argue that the preponderance
of the evidence shows that it was, even if a more restrictive definition of genocide
be adopted as, for instance, that by Henry R. Huttenbach, to wit: Genocide is the
destruction of a specific group within a given national or even international
population...Genocide is any act that puts the very existence of a group in
jeopardy (Huttenbach, 1988, pages 295, 297). To help resolve the problem, a
review of the literature might be in order.
***
............ 27 ............
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The first book, edited by Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko, which is
based on a 1983 conference held at the Universit du Qubec Montral, in
essence does not find that the man-made famine of 1932-1933 was genocidal
(Serbyn and Krawchenko, 1986), even though at least one contributor, in the
lead-contribution, implicitly suggested that it be so designated, James E. Mace,
a Ukrainian historian of American-Irish origin wrote:
For the Ukrainians the famine must be understood as the most

terrible part of a consistent policy carried out against them: the
destruction of their cultural and spiritual elite which began with
the trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, the
destruction of the official Ukrainian wing of the Communist Party,
and the destruction of their social basis in the countryside. Against
them the famine seems to have been designed as part of a
campaign to destroy them as a political factor and as a social
organism. (Mace, 1986, page 12; emphasis added)
Maces conclusion begs the question: is this not a policy of genocide?
The main reason why the Serbyn & Krawchenko volume does not find that the
famine was genocidal appears to lie in their acceptance of the conceptual scheme
of Holocaust scholars Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, who have become
increasingly uncomfortable with the term genocide, as coined by Raphael
Lemkin in 1944 and particularly with the political use and abuse to which
it has been put (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1986, page 179). They prefer the term
mass extermination and emphasize that there must be an intent to destroy a
whole group of people (ibid, page 181; emphasis in original). Leaving aside the
unfortunate nuance contained in the term extermination, which perfectly
captures the thinking of a Hitler or a Stalin, to whom hostile human beings were
just vermin, and granted that in their later book Chalk and Jonassohn
changed their definition of genocide to one-sided mass killing, which is less
insulting to the victims (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990, page 23), their 1986
position in denying genocidal character to the Ukrainian famine is arguably a
reasonable one. In their words:
............ 28 ............
Considering the inaccessibility of the archives in the USSR, it will

probably remain impossible to document the intent of the
perpetrator. But whatever the actual intent, it would have been
impossible to implement the mass extermination of the entire
Ukrainian population. In terms of our typology, we think that the
case of the Ukrainian famine is a rather late occurrence of type
two, where the intent is to terrorize a people conquered by a
colonizing power. It seems to have achieved this aim, albeit in
enormous cost in human lives and suffering. (Chalk and
Jonassohn, 1986, page 189; emphasis added)
Another book, a solid documentary study edited by Canadian poet, translator
and publicist Marco Carynnyk, Canadian geographer Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, and
American political scientist Bohdan S. Kordan, with the brief, but important
Foreword by Marrus, documents with persuasive detail what the British
Foreign Office knew about the Ukrainian famine and when. It avoids, however,
except in the Foreword, any explicit discussion whether the famine was
genocidal. Even worse, by implication, the book presents in its long
introduction the economic factor as the decisive one, without weighing possible
alternative interpretations. The last operative sentence of the substantive
introduction, before the table on the Rates of Decline in the Rural Female
Cohort of 1929-1933 and before the technical remarks and
acknowledgments, reads:
... The areas of greatest [demographic] decline coincide with the

fertile chernozem belt. The famine was less severe in the
podzolized soil regions of the forest steppe, the intrazonal regions
and the chestnut soil regions along the Black Sea. This suggests
that the famine was the result of a decision to extract from the
most fertile regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus the
maximum amount of grain in order to finance the
industrialization. The famine, in other words, was not a natural
phenomenon but a politically engineered cataclysm. (Carynnyk et
al, 1988, page xlix; emphasis added)
............ 29 ............
Not Worthy
What about the political content of that politically engineered cataclysm?

Only in the foreword does Marrus raise and partly answer the question. He
graciously allows that some horrified witnesses suggest that it was genocide of
Ukrainians. He even points to a venomous detestation of Ukrainians among
Communist Party officials in Moscow at the time [of the famine] (Marrus,
1988, page xv). He then hints that he himself would not consider the famine
genocidal, pending a conclusive evaluation of motivations ... of the Soviet
officials who presided over this catastrophe. That would call for a release of
materials in Soviet archives-if that ever is to happen (ibid). But then he
diplomatically turns the question aside by saying that the presentation of the
evidence of the famine at the time of writing (1988) was more important than
its formal classification (ibid).
A smaller preceding volume by Luciuk & Kordan, with a Foreword by Hugh
A. Macdonald, deals with American and British documents on the Ukrainian
Question from 1938 to 1951, that is, not directly with the famine. But in the
introductory material, the two editors could have talked about the nature of
what they call the Great Famine of 1932-1933, but do not. Instead, they
quickly turn to the pale euphemism of denationalization in Soviet Ukraine,
which paralleled to a lesser [sic] degree developments in Polish East Galicia
... (Luciuk & Kordan, 1987, page 3).
On the other hand the famine is evaluated differentlyas genocidein the
small 1983 volume by the Ukrainian scholar and publicist Vasyl Hryshko
(Hryshko, 1983), the magisterial work by Robert Conquest (Conquest, 1986),
and the publications of the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine ([US]
Commission on the Ukraine Famine, 1988, 1990). Hryshkos slim volume,
edited and translated by Marco Carynnyk, above all, wants to pay tribute to
the victims of 1932-1933 on the fiftieth anniversary of the famine. It is also
another appeal to the conscience of the West. But in his documentation and his
arguments, Hryshko in some ways anticipates the broader approach by
Conquest.
Hryshko not only finds that genocide, in which more than six million
Ukrainians perished, had been committed in terms of the UN General
............ 30 ............
Assembly resolution of 11 December 1946, but that during the discussions of

genocide in the General Assembly the Soviet representatives even proposed to
include the linguistic and cultural aspects (what I would call cultural genocide)
(Hryshko, 1983, pages vii, 1-2). Not only was collectivization pushed faster
and more ruthlessly in Ukraine than in Russia, in Ukraine it was linked to the
persecution of Ukrainian elites. In Russia, the collectivization was limited to
the liquidation of the peasantry as a social class independent of the state. In
Ukraine, however, it was the starting point for the liquidation of the Ukrainian
national question as such, based on the destruction of the peasantry as the
principal source of Ukrainian nationalism (ibid, page 114; emphasis added).
Hryshko and Conquest after him allude to what I would call the gun that
Stalin fired, more of which later in this article (Hryshko, 1983, page 66;
Conquest, 1986, page 219). Hryshkos treatise is also very interesting in that
he argues that Brezhnev continued Stalins genocide on a less murderous scale:
The contemporary policy of merging the non-Russian peoples of

the USSR on the basis of the international Russian language,
which amounts to eliminating them through merciless
Russification, makes clear, as never before, the aim of Moscows
genocide in 1933 and the consequences of that genocide for
Ukraine. In the present Ukrainian situation in the USSR we have
nothing less than a continuation and intensification of the
nationalities course that Stalin applied so savagely to Ukraine in
1933. (Hryshko, 1983, page 117; emphasis added.)
Robert Conquest, the British-born poet, master historian and political analyst,
has entitled his minor masterpiece The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet
Collectivization and the Terror Famine. There is even no entry for genocide in
the index of the book. Does he imply with Serbyn & Krawchenko, and Chalk
& Jonassohn, that the Ukrainian famine had been either sui generis or an effort
to create terror? Not really. At the very end of Chapter 13, A land laid
waste, there is a brief but somewhat inconclusive discussion of
genocide, as defined by Articles I and II of the Genocide Convention, which
Conquest cites in full without, however, analyzing what particular clauses
apply to the Ukraine famine. Conquest then writes: It certainly appears that
............ 31 ............
Not Worthy
a charge of genocide lies against the Soviet Union for its actions in the Ukraine.
Such, at least, was the view of Professor Raphael Lemkin who drafted the
Convention. The substantiating note is an account in The New York Times
about a manifestation of Ukrainian-Americans in September 1953 to
commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the famine, mentioning that Dr.
Lemkin was a featured speaker at the gathering. Conquest continues in a
somewhat puzzling vein, possibly anticipating the statement by Professor
Marrus: But whether these events are to be formally defined as genocide is
scarcely the point [?]. It would hardly be denied that a crime had been
committed against the Ukrainian nation; and whether in the execution cellars,
the forced labour camps, or the starving villages, crime after crime against the
millions of individuals forming that nation. The chapter ends with a partironical, part-polemical counterpoint: The Large Soviet Encyclopaedia has an
article on Genocide, which it characterizes as an offshoot of decaying
imperialism (Conquest, 1986, pages 272-273).
It is difficult to avoid the impression that Conquest was not particularly
concerned with elucidating whether the famine could formally be defined as
genocide, especially given the rhetorical abuse of the term. His main concern
was to establish the facts. But through poetic allusion, the testimony of
witnesses who had analyzed genocide and through somewhat understated
historical analysis Conquest strongly implied that the famine was genocidal.
The two opening paragraphs of the book are particularly effective in linking
the terror-famine to the Holocaust:
Fifty years ago as I write these words, the Ukraine and the
Ukrainian, Cossack and other areas to its east a great stretch of
territory with some forty million inhabitants was like one vast
Belsen. A quarter of the rural population, men, women and
children, lay dead and dying, the rest in various stages of
debilitation with no strength to bury their families or neighbours.
At the same time (as at Belsen), well-fed squads of police or Party
officials supervised the victims.
............ 32 ............
This was the climax of the Revolution from above, as Stalin

put it, in which he and his associates crushed two elements seen
as irremediably hostile to the regime: the peasantry of the USSR
as a whole, and the Ukrainian nation. (Conquest, 1986, page 3).
As did Hryshko, Conquest cites the late Jewish Ukrainian writer and
Holocaust researcher Vasily Grossman (Conquest, 1986, page 9 and especially
pages 129, 286), though Grossman describes both the preceding
dekulakization (deportation of kulaks) and the terror-famine itself. Most
clearly in Chapter 11 (Assault on the Ukraine, 1930-1932), Conquest links
the famine of 1932-1933, to the preceding wholesale attacks on the Ukrainian
intelligentsia and, in a tantalizing way, alludes to Stalins ideas about the
connection between nationality and the peasantry (ibid, pages 217-224,
especially page 219), of which more later in this article. Did Conquest find that
the famine was genocide? Yes, but it was more by allusion and implication than
by extended analysis, despite his three explicit paragraphs on pages 272-273.
Conquests collaborator and later Staff Director of the US Commission on the
Ukraine Famine, James E. Mace, has repeatedly, though not exhaustively,
addressed himself to the question whether the Ukraine famine was genocidal.
For instance, in his well-known article in Problems of Communism, he wrote:
... The famine seemed to represent a means used by Stalin to impose a final
solution on the most pressing nationality problem in the Soviet Union.
According to internationally accepted definitions [such as the UN Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide], this constitutes an
act of genocide (Mace, 1984b, page 37). In the same article, Mace calculates
the number of victims as almost 7.5 million Ukrainians (Mace, 1984b, page
39). This is also included in the authoritative Executive Summary of the Report
of the US Commission on the Ukraine Famine to Congress. The Commission
accepted the conclusion that one or more of the actions specified in the
Genocide Convention was taken against the Ukrainians in order to destroy a
substantial part of the Ukrainian people and thus to neutralize them politically
in the Soviet Union ([US] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, 1988, page xxiii
[emphasis added], see also point 16 on page vii). The Commission, however, is
more cautious in assessing the precise number of victims: there are millions of
............ 33 ............
Not Worthy
them ... Various scholars have given estimates ranging from three million to
over 8,000,000 Ukrainians who perished in the Famine ([US] Commission on
the Ukraine Famine, 1988, pages vi [point 2], ix). For a more nuanced view of
Mace, in the context of genocide studies, we have to turn to an earlier piece of
his. At the 1982 International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, Mace
wrote:
What Ukrainians call shtuchnyi holod (the man-made famine) or

even the Ukrainian holocaust claimed an estimated five to seven
million lives. Purely in terms of mortality, it was thus of the same
order of magnitude as the Jewish Holocaust. It was, however, a very
different kind of genocide in that it was neither motivated by any
quest for racial purity, nor was it an attempt to physically murder
every single Ukrainian. The purpose, insofar as we may discern it,
was to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor and social
organism, a goal which could be attained far short of complete
extermination. (Mace, 1984a, page 67; underlined text in the
original)
Writing in 1988 by himself, Mace repeats some of his earlier reservations
against calling the famine genocidal. He writes: The famine of 1932-1933
poses particular problems from the standpoint of internationally accepted
definitions of genocide, since its focus was geographic, rather than
discriminatory against specific groups within a given area, and it was clearly
not an attempt to destroy all members of a given group (Mace, 1988, page
117; emphasis added). The genocidal nature of the famine, according to him;
must be inferred from the clarity with which it was geographically focused
against areas containing target populations and the combination of
particularly harsh nationality policies against the Ukrainian target group (ibid).
The area was clearly limited to the ethnically mixed Kuban region in the
Northern Caucasus and all of Ukraine. In commenting on a much earlier
version of this article, Robert Conquest shared with the author a top secret
instruction by Party Central Committee Secretary Stalin and Soviet Prime
Minister Molotov of 22 January 1933, in which the Kuban and all of Ukraine
were to be subjected to a strict blockade and all peasants were to be prevented
............ 34 ............
by the secret police from traveling into neighbouring areas in search of food.
The peasants efforts to leave the Kuban and Ukraine were allegedly organized
by enemies of the Soviet authority, by Social Revolutionaries and Polish
agents with the purpose of conducting agitation by means of peasants against
the collective farms and Soviet authority in general in the northern districts of
the USSR. The instruction was ominous in blaming the local Party, Soviet and
secret police organs for not noticing that counterrevolutionary conspiracy in
the previous year [1932]. It was as if war had been declared against the Kuban
region and all of Ukraine, but not against the neighbouring Volga region and
against Belarus.
***
I believe that the famine clearly fits the somewhat loose UN Genocide
Convention. Lyman H. Legters put it best in his contribution at the 1982
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, when he wrote:
... From Lemkins campaign forward, and including the final

phrasing of the Genocide Convention, the crime in question is a
crime against identifiable groupsnational, ethnic, religious-of
sufficient scope and import as to threaten the survival of that
group in recognizable form. (I take this to be the intended
implication of the ambiguous in whole or in part of the
Convention ... ) (Legters, 1984, page 62)
The famine would also fit the narrower definition of Huttenbach
(... Genocide is any act that puts the very existence of a group in jeopardy).
Let us also disentangle the question of the Ukrainian terror-famine as genocide
from the psychological impediments of some Ukrainians participating in the
Jewish pogroms in Ukraine in 1919, or of those helping the Nazis to carry out
the Holocaust in World War II, and then claiming that the famine was
equivalent to the Holocaust. The question of Ukrainian guilt towards the Jews
is logically separate from that of the genocidal terror-famine and it should be
best addressed by a joint Jewish-Ukrainian Commission of Scholars (Bilinsky,
1988, page 374). I also do believe that it is logically inappropriate to call the
............ 35 ............
Not Worthy
Ukrainian terror-famine a Holocaust. In the words of Yehuda Bauer: ... There

may be no difference between Holocaust and genocide for the victim of either.
But there are gradations of evil, unfortunately. Holocaust was the policy of the
total, sacral act of mass murder of all Jews they could lay hands on. Genocide
was horrible enough, but it did not entail total murder if only because the
subject peoples were needed as slaves. They were indeed subhumans in Nazi
terminology. The Jews were not human at all (Bauer, 1978; first italics added,
second in the original).
What is the case for considering the terror-famine a near successful genocide?
Stalin was known as a Ukrainophobe, as seen in the matter-of-fact statements
by the liberal ethnic Russian leader Academician Andrei D. Sakharov
(Sakharov, 1968, page 54). At the same time, unlike Hitler, Stalin was not a
braggart who would shout his true feelings from the rooftops; beside expert
witness testimony, we have to draw inferences from his public and confidential
statements to arrive at his true intentions toward Ukrainians. The depth of his
hatred toward autonomy-minded Ukrainian leaders appears clearly from his
telegram of 4 April 1918, to Ukrainian Communist Volodymyr Zatonsky, who
at that time was the Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Central Executive
Committee: You have been playing long enough those [childish] games of a
government and a republic. Enough is enough, stop it (Kopelev, 1982, page
61). With this outburst, it is not difficult to imagine Stalins feelings toward
Lenins former associate Mykola Skrypnyk, who together with dissident
Georgian Communists torpedoed Stalins favourite project informally to
resurrect the Russian Empire at the 12th Party Congress in 1923 (the question
of so-called autonomization, which was, on Lenins insistence, transformed
into the creation of the federal Soviet Union). In 1925, at the height of the
Ukrainization policy in Ukraine, Stalin possibly unwittingly issued a
declaration of war against the Ukrainians fired his gun. He also very
cogently established the link between the peasant problem and the nationality
policy. In that year he publicly attacked the Yugoslav Communist Semich for
attempting to reduce the national [i.e. nationality] question to a constitutional
issue ...
............ 36 ............
Stalin continued:
That mistake leads him to another, namely his refusal to regard the
national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. Not an
agrarian but a peasant question, for these are two different things.
It is quite true that the national question must not be identified
with the peasant question, for, in addition to peasant questions, the
national question includes such questions as national culture,
national statehood, etc. That explains the fact that the peasantry
constitutes the main army of the national movement, that there is
no powerful national movement without the peasant army, nor
can there be. (Stalin, 1954, pages 71-72; emphasis added)
Judging from Stalins subsequent policy toward Yugoslavia in 1948, he was not
very knowledgeable about Yugoslav political conditions. But the public rebuke
of Semich in 1925 shows Stalin as fully appreciating the political significance
of the Ukrainian peasantry. As a realist, he also knew that he could not kill all
the 30 million Eastern Ukrainians: Khrushchev in addressing the 1956
Congress said that Stalin wanted to deport all Ukrainians but he could not find
an area for resettling them (Khrushchev, 1970, page 596). (Being a determined
anti-Semite as well as a Ukrainophobe, Stalin thought that he had solved the
logistic problem of how to deport all the Soviet Jews in early 1953, when death
overtook him and saved many Soviet Jews.) In 1932, Stalin had no illusion that
he would exterminate all the Ukrainians at once, but by killing approximately
one-fifth of all the Eastern Ukrainians he made a good start of turning them
into a more submissive, denationalized people of sowers of millet (hrechkosiiv
in Ukrainian, with its pejorative connotation) and hewers of wood. Is this not
genocide, even in narrower, post-Lemkin definition?
Finally a few words about contemporary political usage in Ukraine. On the
fiftieth anniversary of the massacre of Jews at Babi Yar, in September 1991,
then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine and soon to be elected first
President of Ukraine, Leonid M. Kravchuk, organized a week-long
commemorative ceremony. One of its highlights was Kravchuks public
apology to the Jews for any misdeeds that Ukrainians had committed toward
............ 37 ............
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them. This cleared the air, even though Kravchuks speech was ignored by The
New York Times, but not by The Washington Post. In his first foreign
interview as president, Kravchuk touched upon the problem of the terrorfamine as genocide, though as translated from Russian and printed in German,
he may not have used the Latin term, but the German word Vlkermord or
killing of peoples. He put the number of people killed in the famine as five
million (possibly, Conquests figure) and he added that two more million had
been killed during Stalinist purges (Repressalien). For our purpose, the key
sentence in the interview was: I received some other information which
showed that Vlkermord (genocide?) had been constantly and systematically
committed against Ukraine and that this people had suffered more than any
other under the Stalinist machine as well as after his death (Kravchuk, 1992,
page 160). For a number of reasons, which may not all be due to the economic
depression, but could also touch on the political advisability of attacking
Ukraines Communist past, the problem of genocide has not been fully
explored in independent Ukraine. But Kravchuk did in September 1993
publicly commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the genocidal famine, and
beginning with November 1998 (the sixty-fifth anniversary) the fourth Sunday
in November is to be devoted to a public commemoration of the famine, which
has been officially defined as genocide, similar to the Jewish Holocaust and the
Armenian genocide, with an estimated 7.5 million victims. On the other hand,
for whatever reason, the US House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution
295, commemorating the famine in 1995, studiously avoids the word genocide
(The Ukrainian Weekly, 1998; America, 1998).
Political usage should not override scholarly logic, especially political usage
which is just being established in independent Ukraine, arguably seven years
late. My argument, however, is that both logic and political usage in Ukraine
point in one direction, that of the terror-famine being genocidal. Stalin hated
the Ukrainians, as accepted as a fact by Sakharov, revealed in the telegram to
Zatonsky and inferred from his polemics with the Yugoslav Communist
Semich. Stalin decided to collectivize Soviet agriculture and under the cover of
collectivization teach the Ukrainians a bloody lesson. Had it not been for
Stalinist hubris and the incorporation of the more nationalistlcally minded and
less physically decimated Western Ukrainians after 1939, the Ukrainian nation
............ 38 ............
might have never recovered from the Stalinist offensive against the main army
of the Ukrainian national movement, the peasants.
Endnotes
1.
America (1998) Ukraine famine resolution passes in US Congress, 24 October, page 3.
2.
Y. Bauer, Holocaust in Historical Perspective (Seattle: University of Washington Press,

1978).
3.
Y. Bilinsky, Methodological problems and philosophical issues in the study of JewishUkrainian relations during the Second World War, in P.J. Potichnyj and H. Aster, eds,
Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of
Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1988).
4.
M. Carynnyk, L.Y. Luciuk, and B.S. Kordan, eds, The Foreign Office and the Famine:
British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933 (Kingston, Ontario:
Limestone Press, 1988).
5.
F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, Conceptualizations of genocide and ethnocide, in R. Serbyn

and B. Krawchenko, eds, Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of
6.
F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case
Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
7.
R. Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
8.
V. I. Hryshko, The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933, edited and translated by M. Carynnyk

(Toronto: Bahriany Foundation, Suzhero, Dobras, 1983).
9.
H. R. Huttenbach, Locating the Holocaust on the genocide spectrum: towards a

methodology of definition and categorization, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Volume
3, No. 3, pages 389-403, 1988.
10. N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little Brown, 1970).
............ 39 ............
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11. L. Kopelev, Derzhava i narod: Zametki na knizhnykh polyakh [State and Nation: Notes
from the books] (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1982).
12. L. M. Kravchuk, Habt keine Angst vor uns: Der ukrainische Praesident Leonid
Makarowitsch Krawtschuk uber seinen neuen Staat [You need not fear us: The
Ukrainian President Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk about his new state], Der Spiegel,
Volume 46, No. 6, 3February 1982, page 155.
13. L. H. Legters, The Soviet Gulag: is it genocidal?, in I. W. Charny, ed, Toward the
Understanding and Prevention of Genocide: Proceedings of the International Conference
on the Holocaust and Genocide (Boulder: Westview, 1984).
14. L.Y. Luciuk and B. S. Kordan, eds, Anglo-American Perspectives on the Ukrainian
Question 1938-1951: A Documentary Collection (Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press,
1987).
15. J. E. Mace, The man-made famine of 1933 in the Soviet Ukraine: what happened and
why? in I. W. Charny, ed, Toward the Understanding and Prevention of Genocide:
Proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide (Boulder:
Westview, 1984).
16. J. E. Mace, Famine and nationalism in Soviet Ukraine, Problems of Communism,
Volume 33, No 3, pages 37-50, 1984.
17. J. E. Mace, The man-made famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine, in R. Serbyn and B.
Krawchenko, eds, Famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933 (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of
18. J. E. Mace, Genocide in the USSR, in I. W. Chamy, ed, Genocide: A Critical
Bibliographic Review (New York: Facts on File, 1988).
19. M.R. Marrus, Foreword, in M. Carynnyk, L. Y. Luciuk and B. S. Kordan, eds, The
Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of
1932-1933 (Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press, 1988).
20. A. D. Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (New York: Norton,
1968).
............ 40 ............
21. R. Serbyn and B. Krawchenko, eds, Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933 (Edmonton: Canadian
Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta Press, 1986).
22. J. V. Stalin, Concerning the National [Nationality] Question in Yugoslavia: Speech
Delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the E[xecutive] C[ommittee of the]
C[ommunist] I[ntemational], March 30, 1925, in J. V. Stalin, Works, Volume LXVI , No.
39, page 7, 1956.
23. The Ukrainian Weekly Concurrent resolution on Great Famine, 27 September 1998,
pages 3, 13.
24. [US] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 19321933: Report to Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988).
25. [US] Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine 19321933: Oral History Project, 3 volumes, J. E. Mace and L. Heretz, eds, (Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office, 1990).
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How Liberals Funked It

ROBERT CONQUEST
Hoover Digest, No. 3, 1999
Adapted from the New Criterion, February 1999, Liberals and Totalitarianism. Reprinted with permission
of the New Criterion, the Hoover Digest and the author
A liberal is, by definition, one whose aim is the furtherance of ever greater
political liberty, freedom of thought, and social justice. A number of those
who thought of themselves as, and were thought of as, liberals became
apologists for Stalinist or similar regimes whose most notable
characteristics were extreme terror, narrow dogmatism, social oppression,
and economic failure. That is, they were all that the liberal tradition
opposed. How, and why, did a number of liberals explicitly, and a large
swath of liberaldom implicitly, overcome this objection? How did this
apparent paradox come to pass? Why in the 1930s and later do we find a
sort of general infection of the atmosphere in which much of the
intelligentsia moved? Even apart from those who became more or less
addicted to communism, there was also a stratum that usually gave the
Soviet Union and such regimes some moral advantage over the West.
First, of course, we should say that there were many liberalsand in general
many on the leftwho kept their principles unsullied and were often among
the strongest opponents of the communist despotisms. Liberal is, indeed, a
vague term. Many of us would take a liberal position on some issues, a
conservative one on othersas most of the American or British people in
fact do (an attitude shared by the present writer).
............ 42 ............
These two vaguely differentiated attitudes are the poles within the normal
development, or balance, of a civic or consensual society. But all those with a
reasonably critical intelligence, whether conservative or liberal on other
issues, were hostile to the USSR. Those who supported it unreservedly were
Communists; those who excused it may have thought of themselves as liberals,
but to that extent they degraded the term. The phenomenon we deal with here
is what Orwell called renegade liberalism. He defined these renegade liberals
with characteristic felicity, in the unused preface to Animal Farm, as those who
hold that democracy can only be defended by discouraging or suppressing
independent thought. His immediate concern was that where the USSR and its
policies are concerned one cannot expect intelligent criticism or even, in many
cases, plain honesty from liberal writers and journalists who are under no direct
pressure to falsify their opinions. Elsewhere (in The Prevention of Literature),
he comments, When one sees highly educated men looking on indifferently at
oppression and persecution, one wonders which to despise more, their cynicism
or their shortsightedness. And, he felt obliged to add, it is the liberals who fear
liberty and intellectuals who want to do dirt on the intellect.
THE SLIPPERY CONCEPT OF EQUALITY
We can trace the roots of this aberration a long way back. Even before the First
World War, L. T. Hobhouse in his classic Liberalism had written, liberty
without equality is a name of noble sound and squalid meaning. Equality
is a slippery word. In a general sense we may allow that genuine liberalsand
othersare committed to a society of equal citizens. The liberal state may have
a legitimate role in redressing poverty, making health care available, and so
forth, but after a point we find that the libert and egalit that proved
incompatible in the 1790s are still awkward companions. And, as the liberal
attitude became more and more concerned with the use of political power to
promote equality, it tended to become less and less concerned with the liberty
side; even domestically (in Thomas Sowells words), the grand delusion of
contemporary liberals is that they have both the right and the ability to move
their fellow creatures around like blocks of woodand that the end results will
be no different than if people had voluntarily chosen the same actions.
............ 43 ............
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And when these liberals looked abroad they found a regime that claimed to
have the same aimsand used the same, or much the same, vocabulary. If
anything, from a skeptics point of view, the Communists overdid it (with the
result that any country nowadays calling itself a Peoples Republic or a
Democratic Republic is known at once to be a ruthless dictatorship).
ROTTEN LIBERALSAND THE VAST KLEPTOCRACY
Communists in fact despised liberals, even if not quite as much as they despised
social-democrats. It was in his procommunist period that
W. H. Auden wrote:
Because you saw but were not indignant

The invasion of the great malignant
Cambridge ulcer
That army intellectual
Of every kind of liberal,
Smarmy with friendship but of all
There are none falser.
Rotten liberalism was, of course, the conventional charge made by the Soviet
Communists against those insufficiently ruthless in the repression of enemies of
the people.
Moreover, Lenins own interest in the overthrow of the existing order was so
intense that he did not spread his progressivism into any other fields and had
nothing but contempt for modern art, free love, unorthodox medicine, and all
the other paraphernalia. Communist artistic principlessocialist realism and
so forthremained overtly hostile to all the modernisms dear to many liberal
hearts. The Communists attitude to homosexuality, at least after its
criminalization in the USSR in 1935, was contrary to an important component
of the liberal worldviewbut Moscow did not lose the allegiance even of
homosexuals such as Guy Burgess. The Soviets suppressed and maligned all the
psychological views, Freudian and other, dear to Western intellectuals. And
............ 44 ............
Stalins extreme anti-Semitism in the postWorld War II years ran against

anything describable as liberal.
But, some liberals felt, at least the Stalinists were not capitalists, not motivated
by greed, which, taken as the defining quality of the economic system in the
West, was thus the most detested of all vices for certain liberals. These were, in
general, those who gained their income (and were highly competitive with
rivals for it) in academic or media spheres, that is, money derived from, but not
directly dependent on, capitalism.
Greed, it might be argued, is not as bad as mass murder. But in any case greed
was equally prevalent in the mass murder societies. Corruption of every
possible type has flourished in all the communist countries. It is not only that
the USSR, for example, became a vast kleptocracy but also that even the
supposedly pristine early revolutionaries were anything but immune. In fact,
with few exceptions the victorious Bolsheviks lived comfortably through the
deprivations of the post-revolutionary period. Milovan Djilas, then a Yugoslav
communist leader, was shocked at how his victorious partisans, on entering
Belgrade, seized villas, cars, women, and so on. The same was noted of the
Sandinistas when they entered Managua.
THE SWING IN LEFTISH OPINION
The phenomenon of renegade liberalism arose in the early days of the Soviet
regime. Lincoln Steffens, the fearless journalist exposer of American
corruption, famously said of the USSR, I have seen the future and it works.
He had seen nothing and that future didnt work. But until the 1930s the
Sovietophiles were a minority among liberals. It is in 1933 that we see a real
swing in Leftish opinion. The terror-famine early that year, in which millions
died, had been widely and accurately reported in much of the Western press.
But the Soviet government simply denied that any famine had taken place.
President Kalinin, speaking of political cheats who offer to help the starving
Ukraine, commented that, only the most decadent classes are capable of
producing such cynical elements.
............ 45 ............
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The Soviet story was supportedas we now know for disreputable reasons
by reporters such as Walter Duranty. Thus two versions were available to the
American liberals. But it was Duranty who received the Pulitzer Prizefor
dispassionate, interpretive reporting of the news from Russia. The
announcement of the prize added that Durantys dispatches were marked by
scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and exceptional clarity,
being excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence. The
Nation, citing him in its annual honour roll, described his as the most
enlightening, dispassionate and readable dispatches from a great nation in the
making which appeared in any newspaper in the world.
A banquet was given at the Waldorf Astoria in 1933 to celebrate the recognition
of the USSR by the United States. A list of names was read, each politely
applauded by the guests until Walter Durantys was reached; then, Alexander
Woollcott wrote in the New Yorker, the only really prolonged pandemonium was
evoked. . . . Indeed, one got the impression that America, in a spasm of
discernment, was recognizing both Russia and Walter Duranty. This scene in the
Waldorf was clearly a full-dress appearance of the liberal establishment. And all
this was before Stalin and his Comintern had given up their overt hostility to social
democrats and liberals and moved over to a popular front.
THE ACADEMIC FRONDE
From the start, it was not only the occasional corrupt journalist such as Walter
Duranty but also a veritable Fronde of academics who were at least equally
responsible for mediating the Soviet phenomena for the Western liberal
intelligentsia. It would be supererogatory to present all the horrors of expert
academe. Most notorious, of course, were the deans of Western social science,
Sidney and Beatrice Webb, who went to Russia, saw the system, and produced
what purported to be a learned tome on the subjectSoviet Communism: A
New Civilisation?which in its second edition, at the height of the terror,
dropped the question mark.
Their massive exercise in drivel was largely based on believing Soviet official
documents. They were, in effect, taken in above all by Potemkin paperwork
............ 46 ............
of elections, trade unions, cooperatives, statistics, all the documents of the

phantom USSR.
Many others followed, such as Harold Laski, professor of political science at
the London School of Economics and at one point chairman of the Labour
Party. When Sir Bernard Pares, the Wests leading Russianist, arrived in
Russia, his previous anti-Soviet feelings evaporated. As his son admiringly put
it, he had not left the Moscow railway station before his mind was flooded
with the realization that the Bolsheviks were, after all, Russia. He, Laski, the
Webbs, and others all pronounced the Show Trials genuine exercises in truth
and legality.
These were, indeed, individuals. The academic world, though liberal in a
general way, was not as yet a scene of organized error on the communist
regime. That came later and in particular in the last quarter of the 20th century.
THE POTEMKIN PHENOMENON
The Potemkin phenomenon properthe presentation of faked appearances of
prosperity or social triumphswas, of course, widespread in all the communist
countries. Anyone who ever visited the Exhibition of Economic Achievements
in Moscow will know the score. Similarly, when Vice President Henry Wallace,
on a flight from America to China, was for a few days in the midst of the
frightful Kolyma labour camps, the guard towers and barbed wires were torn
down, the miserable prisoners replaced by strong and healthy NKVD men, and
so on.
Many such stories could be told. Yet the most extraordinary are those
representing the Soviet penal system as humane and progressive. The facts
about the Gulag were already available in a number of firsthand accounts. But,
entirely for deceiving the Western liberals, the Stalinists maintained some
model prisonsin particular one at Bolshevo where J. L. Gillin, a former
president of the American Sociological Society, noted that:
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In accordance with the spirit of the Revolution the terms current

in capitalist penology are discarded. There are no crimes; there
are wrongs. . . . There is no punishment, only measures of
social defence.
One liberal visitor, Jerzy Gliksman, a progressive member of the Warsaw City
Council, was thus deceived but later experienced the real Soviet penal
behaviordescribed in his striking memoirs of the Gulag. As Hans Magnus
Enzensberger writes of Havana two generations later, there were delegates
living in the hotels for foreigners who had no idea that the energy and water
supply in the working quarters had broken down during the afternoon, that
bread was rationed, and that the population had to stand for two hours in line
for a slice of pizza; meanwhile the tourists in their hotel rooms were arguing
about Lukacs.
Even the actual optic nerves of Western viewers seem to have become distorted,
with falsehood coming from both outside and inside. As Malcolm Muggeridge
noted:
There were earnest advocates of the humane killing of cattle who

looked up at the massive headquarters of the OGPU with tears of
gratitude in their eyes, earnest advocates of proportional
representation who eagerly assented when the necessity for a
Dictatorship of the Proletariat was explained to them, earnest
clergymen who walked reverently through anti-God museums and
reverently turned the pages of atheistic literature, earnest pacifists
who watched delightedly tanks rattle across the Red Square and
bombing planes darken the sky, earnest town planning specialists
who stood outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements and
muttered: If only we had something like this in England! The
almost unbelievable credulity of these mostly university-educated
tourists astonished even Soviet officals used to handling foreign
visitors.
............ 48 ............
GOGHDZE IS A FINE MAN

It was not only the facts about communist regimes that received such treatment
but even Stalinist personalities. The French progressive novelist Romain
Rolland described secret police chief Genrikh Yagoda (later shot) as sensitive
and intellectual. Harold Laski had a long discussion with Vyshinsky, faker of
Show Trials, whom he found a man whose passion was law reform. . . . He
was doing what an ideal Minister of Justice would do if we had such a person
in Great Britain. Vice President Henry Wallace later described Berias terror
henchman in the Soviet Far East, Goghdze, as a very fine man, very efficient,
gentle and understanding with people. Owen Lattimore saw I. F. Nikishov,
the head of the most murderous camp system in the Gulag, as having a
trained and sensitive interest in art and music and also a deep sense of civic
responsibility.
H. G. Wells arrived in Moscow in 1934 full of hostility to communism and to
Stalin. An interview changed that. Stalin, it is true, looked past me rather than
at me but not evasively. He asked Wellss permission to smoke his pipe and
in this and other ways soon allayed Wellss hostility:
I have never met a man more candid, fair and honest, and to these
qualities it is, and nothing occult and sinister, that he owes his
tremendous undisputed ascendancy in Russia. I had thought
before I saw him that he might be where he was because men were
afraid of him but I realize that he owes his position to the fact that
no one is afraid of him and everybody trusts him.
Even Franklin Rooseveltdeceived indeed by Harold Ickeswas charmed by
Stalin into speaking of his being above all getatable: the great British
Russianist Ronald Hingley commented that ungetatability was one of
Stalins central characteristics.
Among the most egregious of what I hope I may be excused as calling the
Kremlin creepers was a number of those who would have been called liberal
Christians. One might have expected a certain alienation from communism by
............ 49 ............
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any of them that had read Lenins virulent condemnation of all religion but
particularly of sophisticated religion. The active persecution of religion in the
communist countries might, you would also think, have also had an effect. But
to take only one examplethe World Council of Churches Central
Committees meeting in 1973 passed a resolution deploring oppression in the
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the United States, and elsewhere. An
attempt by a Swedish clergyman to add the communist countries was defeated
ninety-one to three, with twenty-six abstentions.
WE MIGHT SAY THAT THERE ARE TWO SORTS OF LIBERAL, AS THERE
ARE TWO SORTS OF CHOLESTEROL, ONE GOOD AND ONE BAD.
Here again, the commitment has often been so strong that it is hard to imagine
that complete conversion to communism has not taken place. A Communist
once told me his method. First you explain to a Christian sympathizer that
communism is compatible with Christianity. That accomplished, you explain
that Christianity is not compatible with communism.
BUT WHY?
I started by advancing a general reason, or context, for these phenomena. I
argued that they arose from an excessive regard for equality as against liberty.
That is, people thought they saw a system, superior to our own, in which the
abhorrent profit motive had been eliminated (in a sense so it had, but there are
other ways of robbing the population). It was rather as if they would rejoice to
find that a slum landlord had been replaced by a gangster extortionist. But even
this is hardly enough to explain how the mind of the liberal intelligentsia
became so much a subject of deception and self-deception. We must inquire
further.
That is so even when we consider the attraction of anything noncapitalist
even when we consider domestic resentment against conservatives on home
soilfor, as Macaulay writes of British politicians in the eighteenth century, it
is the nature of parties to retain their original enmities far more firmly than
............ 50 ............
their original principles. But pas dennemi gauchethe idea that the far
Left, even if wrong in some respects, when it came down to essentials was
against the real enemy, the rightcannot sustain the procommunist liberal
case. For not all on the far Left were covered: Trotskyites, the POUM in Spain,
Anarchists. If we ask why this did not affect some liberal minds, it seems that
in the first two cases, at least, the Stalinist version (that these were not Left
at all but secret agencies of Hitler) had some distractive effect. Then again, the
Trotskyites lacked the huge propaganda funding available to Stalinists
everywhere, though the pervasiveness of a notion has traditionally not been the
key point for critical minds. Where issues of fact were in question, the antiStalinist Left was not only truer but also far more plausible.
We can list, in addition to utopianism and parochial partisanship, a number of
other characteristics to be found, if not in all, than in many of the Stalinophiles
(and Mao-ophiles, Castrophiles, and Ho-ophiles): in some cases vanity, in
others pleasure at adulation, in others yet an adolescent romanticism about
revolution as such. Nor should mere boredom be omitted, as Simone de
Beauvoir once confessed, which may remind us of the attitudes of a certain type
of French intellectual, different, but not all that different, from his American or
British counterparts, as given by Herbert Luthy in the early 1960s:
For ten years the French intellectuals have discussed the big issues
of the day so to speak in front of the looking-glass, in search less
of facts and knowledge than of an attitude befitting their
traditional roleof the correct pose.
THE HEROES OF THE ARGUMENT
Nevertheless, it might be argued that the true heroes of the long argument were
not so much the committed anti-Communist conservatives (who were, of
course, right, and fully deserve the verdict in their favor as against the
procommunist liberals) as those within the liberal intelligentsia who not only
were not deceived but also fought for the truth over years of slander and
discouragement. We might in fact say that there are two sorts of liberal, as
there are two sorts of cholesterol, one good and one bad. The difficulty is, or
has been, that good liberalism implies a good deal of mental self-control.
............ 51 ............
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AND NOWADAYS?
Kenneth Minogue, the Anglo-Australian political scientist, has observed that
as radicals have lost plausible utopias of one kind or anotherfrom the
Soviet Union to Cubathey have become more ferociously intolerant of the
society in which they live. There are plenty of up-to-date insane absurdities,
such as John Le Carr writing (in a letter to The Washington Post) that
capitalism was today killing many more than communism ever had; such as
Nigel Nicolson in Britain saying that Solzhenitsyn had betrayed his country
just as Anthony Blunt had his. And in academe we still find noisy cliques
working to lower the Soviet death roll, to prove the West as the villain of the
Cold War, and to call for dispassionate study of Stalin and Mao.
Such notions are, of course, not confined to campuses. We now get an allegedly
historical film series sponsored by Ted Turner, which, with some concessions to
reality, in effect tilts the balance against the West, Stalin offset by McCarthy,
Castro better than Kennedy.
A WORD TO YOUNG LIBERALS
Can one offer any advice to the current generation of liberals? Well, one can
advise them not to let passions provoked by the internal politics of their
homelands go too far. Rhetoric of Party faction is part of democratic life, but
do not project it into your assessment of alien regimes and mentalities and do
not accept accounts of these cultures provided by partisan sources without a
critical assessment (a point that applies, indeed, to the acceptance of supposed
facts in any field in which strong emotions prevail).
As to the academics criticized above, it seems that nothing is to be done. They
are committed to their misconceptions. One can only urge their younger
colleagues (even if hardly able to speak out frankly in an atmosphere of
academic persecution, denial of tenure, and so on) that they should work at
least at thinking independently, while biding their time.
............ 52 ............
Above all, as Granville Hicks, himself temporarily deceived, put it: It is no

defence whatever for an intellectual to say that he was duped, since that is
what, as an intellectual, he should never allow to happen to him.
............ 53 ............
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A Pulitzer-winning offense
Editorial, The Ukrainian Weekly, 18 April 1999

Reprinted with permission of The Ukrainian Weekly
In Bloopers of the Century, an article about blunders, hoaxes, goofs, flubs,

boo-boos, screw-ups, fakes published in the January-February issue of
Columbia Journalism Review (CJR), John Leo, a syndicated columnist and a
contributing editor of US News & World Report, writes that the worst
reportorial sins always involve getting it wrong on purpose. That is his leadin to one particularly egregious example: coverage of the USSR by The New
York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, perhaps the only Pulitzer winner
that The Paper of Record would fervently like to forget. Mr. Leo is referring,
of course, to Durantys role in concealing the Great Famine of 1932-1933. The
article reports: When Stalin engineered massive famine in the [sic] Ukraine to
help break resistance to Soviet control, Duranty told Times readers that any
report of a famine in Russia today is an exaggeration or malignant
propaganda. In 1933, at the height of the famine, he wrote of abundant grain,
plump babies, fat calves, and village markets flowing with eggs, fruit, poultry,
vegetables, milk and butter at prices far lower than in Moscow. He added that
a child can see this is not famine but abundance.
Furthermore, Mr. Leo emphasizes: In fact, the death toll was enormous and
Duranty knew it. He told colleagues privately it was in the range of 10 million.
British journalist Malcolm Muggeridge said Duranty was the biggest liar of
any journalist I ever met. But the Pulitzer committee praised Durantys reports
for their scholarship, profundity, impartiality, sound judgment, and clarity...
Eventually, Durantys Soviet coverage provoked debate among his editors and
readers. To its credit, The Times editorial page challenged his accounts. But in
............ 54 ............
the genteel journalistic world of that era his reporting was never odious enough
to get him recalled or fired. And the clincher, as pointed out in CJR: The
embarrassing Pulitzer has never been withdrawn or returned.
This week, as the major news media reported on the winners of this years
Pulitzer Prizes, our thoughts turned, once again, to Durantys ill-gotten Prize.
In previous years, when The Times won a new Pulitzer it had trotted out all its
Pulitzer winners, from the year 1918 on, as a reminder of its distinguished
record through the decades. For Ukrainians, seeing Walter Durantys name on
that list was akin to rubbing salt into a wound. But no longer does The Times
boast about Duranty.
A major turnaround came on 24 June 1990, when Karl A. Meyer of The Times,
in a feature on its editorial page called The Editorial Notebook, wrote about
the infamous Moscow correspondent and acknowledged that what Duranty
wrote from his post constituted some of the worst reporting to appear in this
newspaper. (The item also noted that Durantys misdeeds are detailed in a
new book, Stalins Apologist by S. J. Taylor. A review of that biography
appeared in the very same issue in The New York Times Book Review.)
Nonetheless, more than six decades after Stalins artificially created Famine
killed between 7 million and 10 million people, The Times has not relinquished
Durantys Pulitzer Prize. Nor has the Pulitzer committee done the right thing.
Isnt it clear that, in order to achieve just a measure of justice, there must be no
Pulitzer Prize associated with Walter Durantys name?
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Modernization from the Other Shore: American Observers

and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development
DAVID C. ENGERMAN
Reprinted with permission of the American Historical Review (April 2000) and the author
The specter of Communism haunted not just nineteenth-century Europe but most
of the world in the twentieth century. The specter of Soviet Communism haunting
this century, however, was as much a blueprint for rapid industrialization as an
ideology of proletarian revolution, national liberation, or totalitarian control. At
the same time, the Soviet specter often bore little resemblance to actually existing
circumstances in the Soviet Union itself. In spite of the tremendous costs,
including a catastrophic famine in 19321933, domestic and foreign
commentators widely praised Soviet efforts at economic modernization,
especially in the early years of the Five-Year Plans (19281937).1 What American
diplomat George F. Kennan termed the "romance of economic development"
captivated a wide range of foreign observers of all political persuasions.2 These
interwar observers valued the fruits of rapid industrialization above its costs
even when these costs included not only repression and privation but also
starvation. Many Western observers, ranging from fellow-travelers to
anticommunists, summed up their balance sheets on the Soviet Five-Year Plans
with the frequently repeated canard that the USSR was "starving itself great"a
phrase that appeared well before the devastating 19321933 famine. In Europe's
colonies, political leaders as well as intellectuals enthusiastically endorsed the
Soviet goal of rapid industrialization as a shortcut to economic modernity. Indian
leader Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, drew inspiration for India's planning
efforts from the Soviet Union. As early as 1936, he recognized the costs of Soviet
industrialization but stressed instead its benefits: despite its "defects, mistakes,
............ 56 ............
and ruthlessness," Nehru wrote, Soviet industrialization is "stumbling

occasionally but ever marching forward."3
Nehru's later encomium that the Soviet Union beckoned as a "bright and
heartening phenomenon in a dark and dismal world" suggests that the
enthusiasm for Soviet economic planning was a result of the depression of the
1930s. The economic crisis that shook the global economy heightened the
perception of differences between the Western and Soviet economiesand
undoubtedly brought more kind words for the latter. But Western interest in
Soviet economic policy predated the 1929 Wall Street crash and the widespread
acknowledgement (two years later) of a serious economic downturn.4
This essay argues that a wide range of interwar Russia experts in the United
States, irrespective of their attitude toward the Soviet Union (or toward
communism), shared a fervent belief in rapid economic development. These
experts, furthermore, deployed longstanding national-character stereotypes in
support of their beliefs: claims of Russians' "innate" passivity and
conservatism pervaded Western reports on Soviet economic events. Later, faith
in economic development combined with national-character stereotypes to
contribute to Western misunderstandings of China's Great Leap Forward
(19581960), which bear eerie similarities to earlier views of the Soviet FiveYear Plans. And in less obvious but nevertheless significant ways, the calculus
of ends and means embedded in the sentiment that Russia was "starving itself
great" undergirded Western theories of modernization and development in the
1950s and 1960s.
The famine of 19321933 looms large in any calculations of the costs of the
rapid industrialization in the USSR. Leaving perhaps as many as 8 million
dead, the famine devastated the principal breadbaskets of the Soviet Union:
Ukraine, the Volga valley, the North Caucasus region, and Kazakhstan.5 The
famine's legacy exceeded even its gruesome death toll. It marked the final
victory of central Soviet authorities over the peasantry.6 Yet, for decades, only
Ukrainian migr groups devoted significant attention to the famine. In official
Soviet histories, meanwhile, the famine remained a "blank spot," described
blandly as "difficulties on the grain-requisition front."7
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What explains this silence? How could such a massive catastrophe provoke
only ripples of concern among Western observers? Soviet efforts to cover up
the famine come as no great surprise. Yet Western observers, in spite of
widespread interest in the Soviet Union, wrote little of the famine. Many
explanations for the lack of Western coverage focus on the ideological
inclinations of two American journalists who denied the extent of the famine:
Walter Duranty of The New York Times and Louis Fischer of the Nation. Two
fellow journalistsWilliam Henry Chamberlin (Christian Science Monitor and
Manchester Guardian) and Eugene Lyons (United Press wire service)were
among the first to blame this pair of reporters. With all the vitriol of exbelievers, Chamberlin and Lyons attributed the lack of news about the famine
to what one called "the Stalinist Penetration of America."8 Writers following
Chamberlin and Lyons typically assert that Duranty and Fischer were
accomplices in genocide who denied the famine for ideological reasons. Later
critics have also made more explicit assertions that Soviet payoffs ensured the
reporters' cooperation.9
This ideological critique of famine coverage is typically linked to a political
interpretation of the famine itself. Politics infused the migr Ukrainians'
writings on the famine, as well as the first widely read history of the famine,
Robert Conquest's Harvest of Sorrow (1986). These works blamed the famine
on politics, typically claiming that Soviet leaders planned the famine to satisfy
genocidal desires to punish the Ukrainians for their nationalist aspirations.10
More recent works on the famine, however, have explained the famine in
economic terms, as the final battle in a drawn-out war over grain harvests.
Based on masses of newly available materials from both local and central
archives, these new writings in no way excuse central government officials. Yet
they place less emphasis on advance planning.11 Such well-researched local
studies, primarily by historians in post-Soviet states, have come to shape a new
paradigm for understanding the famine.12 According to this emerging
paradigm, the famine marked a major battle in a drawn-out war between the
Soviet government and the peasants for control of the grain grown by the
peasantry. The government's plans for rapid industrialization required grain
for exports (to purchase foreign machinery) and domestic consumption (to feed
industrial workers). The impressive evidence unearthed by these scholars
............ 58 ............
demonstrates the importance of both economic and political factors, as well as

the extraordinary efforts of the peasants to stand up for their own interests. No
similarly compelling evidence exists, by contrast, to support political
interpretations focusing on ethnic genocide. The 19321933 famine was not a
process driven primarily by desires to carry out ethnic genocide. Rather, the
catastrophe resulted from the Soviet leadership's larger struggle to transform
an agrarian empire into an industrial power.
Contrary to political interpretations of the famine coverage, contemporary
accounts often recognized that rapid modernization was a core element of the
famine itself. The fact that the famine did not provoke a major response in the
West had less to do with individual politics and individual perfidy than with
well-worn Western understandings of Russia. Some reputable American
newspapers, after all, printed accurate and disturbing reports of the famine. To
answer the questions about the weak American response to the famine, then,
involves consideration of broader issues than political beliefs alone. Duranty
and Fischer used language and conceptual frameworks similar to their
accusers'. "National-character" stereotypes, first, led many experts to expect
little from the Russian peasantslittle, that is, aside from passivity,
conservatism, and apathy.13 Many experts, secondly, expressed their
appreciation of the Soviet Union's program to modernize rapidly and develop
its long-"backward" economy.14 Finally, the widespread belief that Russian
industrialization would entail high human costs drew on notions of Russian
and/or "Asiatic" character traits.15
Previously unexamined documents, from both Soviet and American sources,
reveal how much Duranty's and Fischer's writings and activities had in
common with those of their principal accusers, Lyons and Chamberlin. The
accusers wrote their angriest works, sharply condemning Duranty and Fischer,
shortly after their respective breaks with Soviet Communism, coming on the
heels of the 19321933 famine. Most subsequent attacks on the famine
coverage have taken their evidence, tone, and even their book titles from these
early works.16 But all four journalistic protagonists-cum-antagonists
(Chamberlin, Duranty, Fischer, and Lyons) invoked stereotypes of Russian
character and expressed their belief in economic development. Carefully
............ 59 ............
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tracing the actions and private writings of these journalists in 1932 and 1933
necessitates examining a wider range of evidence than the few frequently cited
pieces for which each journalist is best known. These materials reveal that
Chamberlin and Lyons shared with their nemeses Duranty and Fischer
common assumptions about the need for "modernization" as well as notions
of Russian "national character." This statement should not in any way
exonerate any of the journalists for disingenuous and even dishonest reporting.
While Duranty and Fischer have been rightly attacked for their misleading
coverage of the famine, the assumptions underlying their articles bore many
similarities to those of their critics. Uncovering these common aspects does not
free any reporters from blame, but it does allow a consideration of the mental
frameworks behind American understandings of the Soviet Union.
Before examining the intellectual issues shaping reports of the famine, however,
more concrete limits on coverage deserve brief mention. The Press Office of the
People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (known by its Russian acronym,
NKID ) worked assiduously to restrict foreign coverage of Soviet events. The
four censors who staffed the Press Office had excellent credentials. They all
spoke and read English (as well as French and/or German) well enough to
prevent foreign reporters from carrying off many linguistic sleights-of-hand.
Censors had to approve every dispatch that journalists wished to telegraph to
their home offices. Such direct censorship did not apply to reports sent out by
mail, however, and the time-honored tradition of sending letters out of Russia
with westward-bound travelers provided yet another avenue to get dispatches
to the United States.17 Yet such maneuvers did not escape the Press Office's
powers of surveillance. Thanks to detailed analyses of press reports conducted
by Soviet embassies in London, Paris, and Berlin, as well as the "information
office" in Washington (not an embassy until 1934), the Press Office staff
received summaries of news articles that had not been vetted through their
office. If these reports sufficiently concerned the NKID , it intervened either
directly or indirectly to discipline the offending journalist. Soviet officials also
exploited their contacts with American editors, including those at The New
York Times and the United Press, to lobby for a different slant on coverage or,
on at least one occasion, for a change of reporters.18 The Press Office could
also delay or deny outright a journalist's request for a visa.19
............ 60 ............
In spite of all of these tools to control foreign journalists, however, Westerners

spread rumors about an impending famine through Moscow's journalistic
community in the summer of 1932. One Harvard political scientist well
acquainted with the Moscow-based journalists wrote a friend in the State
Department that "there is definite famine" in Ukraine.20 Other information
about rural conditions arrived overseas without first passing through the
Moscow colony. German embassy officials reported famine conditions in
grain-growing regions of the USSR in the summer of 1932. One published
report, based more on Soviet statistics than on firsthand experience, referred to
"famine [Hungersnot] in the fullest sense of the word" in Ukraine, the Lower
Volga, western Siberia, and Kazakhstan.21 German agricultural attach Otto
Schiller, one of the best-informed foreigners in Moscow, spent much of 1932
touring the Soviet countryside. Traveling with Canadian Andrew Cairns,
Schiller detailed the dire conditions in the Soviet countryside in an article that
appeared in Germany in February 1933. Cairns's reports reached the British
Foreign Office even earlier.22
More details about rural conditions reached Moscow in the fall of 1932. One
British diplomat reported in late October that Duranty "ha[d] at last awakened
to the agricultural situation," blaming the severe problems on shortages of
labor and draft-power. The diplomat summarized Duranty's analysis: "There
are millions of . . . peasants whom it is fairly safe to leave in want . . . [But] is
there no limit to people's endurance?" Yet Duranty did not foresee any
organized resistance. His articles typically came across as somewhat sanguine,
noting that the USSR was "in better shape than most of the world," in spite of
serious supply problems that had sapped "peasant energy and initiative." Even
an otherwise celebratory article on the fifteenth anniversary of Bolshevik rule
closed with mixed optimism: "Times are hard and will not be easy in the near
future." The ultimate victory of "socialist building," though, was assured.23
Duranty's later reports took a markedly less optimistic tone about the situation
in Russia. At the end of November, he published a six-part series on the food
shortage, carried out of Moscow to evade censorship. This series established
the parameters for Duranty's subsequent writings on the situation. While he
dismissed the predictions of famine ("there is no famine or actual starvation,
............ 61 ............
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nor is there likely to be"), Duranty did write of the "great and growing food
shortage in town and country alike," which was having "ever graver" effects.
Only bread was available in reasonable amounts. Dairy products were never
seen. Meat and fish appeared only rarely and in quantities "below the people's
wants and probably below their needs." The Russians' capacity for sacrifice,
however, would carry them through: "Russians have tightened their belts before
to a far greater extent than is likely to be needed this Winter." Duranty seemed
impressed with Soviet leaders who were "not in the least trying to minimize [the
food shortage's] gravity, its widespread character and its harmful effects" but
were not "much alarmed by it." Finally, perhaps to explain his own reluctance
to stray from Moscow, Duranty dismissed the need for a foreign observer to
tour the villages, "where it commonly happens that disgruntled or disaffected
elements talk loudest while others are busy working."24
The series served Duranty well in New York, where editors praised it as "one
of the best stories current." Yet it served him less well in Moscow, as a British
diplomat reported: "Shortly [after the series appeared], Duranty was visited
by emissaries from governing circles here (not from the Censorship
Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs but from higher
spheres) who reproached him with unfaithfulness . . . Did he not realize that
the consequences for himself might be serious. Let him take this warning.
Duranty, who was to have left for a short visit to Paris that day, put off his
departure to wait further developments . . . He affects to think it possible that
. . . he may not be allowed to return."25 Duranty postponed his departure,
but left in early December.
Among his other activities in Paris, Duranty spoke to the Travellers Club. An
American diplomat in attendance summarized Duranty's views as follows:
"The chief reason for his pessimism was the growing seriousness of the food
shortage. This he ascribed to difficulties which the Government was having
with its scheme of collective farming . . . He described the situation in Russia
to-day as comparable to that which existed in Germany during the latter part
of the war, when . . . the civil population was living on practically starvation
rations." According to internal reports, the Paris speech angered Soviet
authorities.26
............ 62 ............
By the end of 1932, then, Duranty had set a pattern for describing the rural
crisis. He frequently employed military terminology, implying the need to stay
above the fray. He issued critical and pessimistic reports on the food situation
accompanied by denials that "famine conditions" existed. This pattern would
continue throughout the famine and beyond.
As Walter Duranty published his November series on the food shortage in the
Soviet Union, Louis Fischer voiced few worries about Soviet conditions: "I feel
as if this were the beginning of the end of a long Soviet winter which has lasted
several years. Now the earth commences to smell of spring." Perhaps the new
springtime provoked Fischer's allergies, since he left Moscow for an extended
American tourDecember until the following June. His final article from
Moscow called for easing the pressure on Soviet peasants. It also noted a
decline in grain collections in the North Caucasus region, blaming "bad
organization, slack guidance by party members [and] insufficient loyalty to
Moscow's instructions." The problems might extend even farther, as
"important grain-growing areas like the Ukraine, North Caucasus, the Volga
region and the central black-earth district" had no grain for open sale. Fischer
thus identified food shortages but only in cryptic phrases containing gross
understatements.27
Like Fischer, journalist William Henry Chamberlin also left Moscow for an
extended trip to the United States, perhaps spurred by the rumors about food
shortages. Chamberlin predicted food supply problems for the fall and winter
of 19321933. In early October, he recommended to his replacement that
foreigners should consider hoarding nonperishable food for what promised to
be a tough winter.28 Traveling through London en route to the United States,
Chamberlin gave a standing-room-only talk at the Royal Institute of
International Affairs. The overall tone of the speech was quite positive.
Chamberlin lauded the growing strength of the Red Army and criticized those
who opposed American recognition of the Soviet Union. He sounded decidedly
optimistic about the economic prospects for the Soviet Union: collectivization
had exacted a substantial toll but was making progress. In any case, he
concluded, it could no longer be reversed. He hesitated to predict the future in
the Soviet countryside but suggested that recent Soviet measures with regard to
............ 63 ............
Not Worthy
trade and consumer goods would determine the success or failure of the effort.
On the other hand, Chamberlin also warned that a "dual agrarian and food
crisis" would be costly in human and financial terms. He shrank from
calculating the bottom line on the Five-Year Plan's impact: "It is very difficult
to make any sort of arithmetical balance sheet of how much happiness and
unhappiness this period of violent and great change has brought in Russia." A
Soviet report summarized the talk with apparent relief: Chamberlin "behaved
entirely favorably for the USSR. In fact, in a few cases he resorted to quite
original forms of defense of the USSR." Chamberlin also submitted an article
to a British magazine; that article praised the "impressive addition to the
national industrial capital" but noted that it "has been purchased at an
extremely high price in the standard of living."29
By New Year's Day 1933, then, both Chamberlin and Duranty had given
mixed reports on Soviet conditions. They both remained optimistic about
Soviet industrialization efforts while also describing the costs involved. Fischer,
by contrast, expressed nothing but optimism and enthusiasm for the coming
year. While talk of a "crisis" appeared in Chamberlin's and Duranty's writings,
neither journalist considered the situation a famine per se.
Indications of actual famine first appeared in the mainstream Western press in
early 1933, spurred by two reports from the countryside. One set of reports
came from Malcolm Muggeridge, a Briton then working as Chamberlin's
substitute for Manchester Guardian coverage. Muggeridge arrived in Moscow
in the fall of 1932, full of enthusiasm for Soviet ideals. It quickly dissipated. In
spite of his dislike of most foreign journalists in Moscow, Muggeridge repeated
their national-character clichs. After hearing of starvation in Kiev, for
instance, Muggeridge remarked in his diary that "starvation is in the nature of
things" for a Russian. He also attempted to use his "Eastern" experiencesin
Indiato understand Russia. In both places, he wrote, "mere brutality . . . [is]
not in and of [itself] a condemnation" of either British colonial or Soviet
government policy.30
Muggeridge sent reports on famine conditions to The Manchester Guardian in
early 1933. His first leads on the famine came from an anonymous visitor who
............ 64 ............
deposited articles from provincial newspapers on the reporter's doorstep and

also from Dr. Joseph Rosen, an American organizing Jewish agricultural
settlements in the USSR. At the end of January, the reporter traveled to Ukraine
and the North Caucasus to observe conditions firsthand. The Manchester
Guardian did not print Muggeridge's dispatches until late March 1933,
perhaps because they jarred so sharply with the newspaper's generally
favorable editorial stance toward the USSR. The Guardian's three-part series
reported on "famine conditions" in the North Caucasus, conditions that
Muggeridge contended would last at least three to five more months. It also
described "hunger in the Ukraine" and the author's pessimistic predictions for
the future. Muggeridge blamed heavy grain requisitions for the precarious
situation: they had left the population with a "characteristic peasant look
half resignation and half cunning." While Western journalists in Moscow may
follow attentively the experiment of collectivization, Muggeridge concluded,
"for the participants, [it was] often more disagreeable than interesting."31
Eugene Lyons set into motion a second set of articles on the famine, this time
appearing in American newspapers. His secretary first read of potential
problems in the North Caucasus, in a local Soviet newspaper article about a
secret-police "rampage" in a village near Rostov. This information set the tone
for Lyons's dispatches of January and February 1933, which emphasized the
food question and the harshness of government grain demands. Yet Lyons also
characterized government repression as a response to peasant laziness. One
undated dispatch adopted the Soviet government's viewpoint, applauding
improved grain collections, while other dispatches noted the "intense struggle
to extract seed grain . . . developing nationwide as the first act of the drama of
spring sowing." Lyons reported dire conditions in Ukraine, the North
Caucasus, and parts of the Lower Volga, but he maintained optimistically that
these conditions were "not typical of the entire country." Soviet economic
policy, Lyons wrote later that year, amounted to various efforts to "overcome
peasant apathy."32 Lyons's view of peasant character traitsin which apathy
played a central rolethus explained the hardships in the Soviet countryside.
While Lyons apparently did not write a dispatch on the Rostov news item, he
did alert two American journalists, William Stoneman of the Chicago Daily
............ 65 ............
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News and Ralph Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune. Stoneman and
Barnes quickly hired a translator and bought train tickets to Rostov to "view
the performance," as Stoneman later worded it.33 Stoneman's dispatch of 6
February described "virtual martial law" and increased activity of armed
forces in the region despite the lack of collective resistance. He blamed the lack
of grain in "one of Russia's richest grain regions" on the central authorities'
"taking revenge on the peasants." After a few days of observing conditions in
Rostov and environs, the journalists were picked up by the local secret police
and shipped back to Moscow. They nevertheless succeeded in smuggling
reports to their newspapers. Ralph Barnes's article focused on the terror in the
Kuban', mentioning the dire food situation there. Perhaps building on
Duranty's November reports, Barnes mentioned "only a limited number of
cases of deaths due strictly to starvation" but admitted that there were "many
deaths resulting from disease attacking constitutions seriously undermined by
lack of sufficient food."34
After the first of these accounts appeared in February 1933, senior Soviet
officials banned foreigners' travel within the USSR. Foreign journalists learned
of the measure at the end of February. While the Press Office was charged with
primary enforcement of the new ban, its censors unsuccessfully opposed a
blanket prohibition, arguing confidently that they could keep foreigners out of
the problem areas without calling attention to the situation by announcing a
formal prohibition. In a letter written to Premier Viacheslav Molotov, the
censors argued against the travel ban:
The decision on a new arrangement for foreign correspondents'

movement in the territory of the Union [the USSR] without the
permission of the militia will without any doubt be interpreted by
Moscow-based correspondents, and also by the international press,
as the denial of freedom of movement for foreigners/journalists for
the purpose of hiding from them the "true situation" in the
localities . . . The negative consequences of a general ban on the free
movement of foreign correspondents might be averted if the NKID
Press Office, together with some general measures, could in each
individual case try to obtain voluntary rejections of this or that trip
............ 66 ............
which is undesirable to us. In precisely this way, two trips to

Ukraine by foreign correspondents were recently prevented.35
The Press Office staff protested the implementation of a full-fledged
prohibition on travel, arguing that they could be just as effective in one-to-one
conversations, convincing journalists not to visit afflicted areas without raising
suspicions of a new policy.
Soviet officials, however, grossly overestimated their powers of persuasion.
Stoneman (one of the two reporters alluded to in the final sentence quoted
above) recounted his conversation with a censor in a manner that suggests the
censors were heavy-handed, did much to arouse journalists' suspicions, and in
no way succeeded in obtaining a "voluntary" change of itinerary from
Stoneman. The censor first questioned Stoneman's need to visit Ukraine as
opposed to some other rural region. He then pleaded with the reporter "as a
friend" before finally declaring that "you had better postpone your trip."36
News of the travel ban spread quickly through the foreign colony in Moscow.
The New York Times and other major newspapers, however, printed nothing
on either the Stoneman/Barnes reports or the new travel restrictions for
foreigners. Duranty, perhaps chastened by his troubles with Soviet authorities
in December, changed the focus of his reportage. He shifted toward coverage
of political events, stopping on economic conditions only long enough to
predict a "decisive struggle on the agrarian front" in the spring. Duranty
accentuated the poverty and "backwardness" of Russian peasants, comparing
peasants not to farmers but to "farm-cattle" because of their passivity and
servile mentality. He also framed the rural conflicts in military terms. "I am
inclined to think," he concluded, that the Bolsheviks will defeat the peasants
"in the long run, but it won't be easy." By constantly focusing on the future,
Duranty did not deny peasants' hardshipsin fact, he rather relished them
but he attributed them to peasant character. According to Duranty, the
Bolsheviks needed to "swing all the forces in their command into an effort to
overcome peasant apathy, individualism, dislike of novel collective methods
and the previous mismanagement of collective farms." Prospects for the
current harvest were poor, and the food shortage, "already widespread and
............ 67 ............
Not Worthy
serious," would only get worse. The picture looked bleak, especially given the
peasants' degree of "degeneration and apathy."37 Like Lyons, Duranty blamed
peasant character, primarily apathy, for the problems with collectivization.
Chamberlin, whose November speech in London seemed relatively sanguine,
apparently suffered a mood change while at sea. Once in the United States, he
emphasized both the rising inequalities and the "food shortage and falling off
in agricultural production" that were plaguing Russia. He did, however, find
some reason for optimism: the most recent government policies, he believed,
would alleviate the food situation.38 He also published an article in The New
Republic (a magazine at that time sympathetic to the Soviet cause) describing
the Five-Year Plan as a "forced, concentrated drive for high speed
industrialization, regardless of the cost to the daily standard of living." The
article mentioned both domestic food shortages and rising grain exports. But
prospects were good, Chamberlin claimed, because the Soviet leaders had
realized that "the process which someone wittily described as 'starving itself
great' can be and indeed has been pushed to a point where it is distinctly
subject to a law of diminishing returns." In another article, Chamberlin noted
the "considerable strides" the USSR had made "toward its goal of becoming a
powerful industrial country." In spite of the hardships, especially for those
groups targeted by the Soviets, the Five-Year Plan represented "Russia's
extraordinary contribution to economic history." Chamberlin, like Duranty,
described the high costs of Russian collectivization and industrialization but
nevertheless endorsed the lessons it offered and the achievements it promised.39
While Chamberlin and Fischer remained outside the reach of Soviet censors,
Duranty and Lyons continued to report on poor living conditions in the Soviet
Union from Moscow, and were thus prevented from explicitly mentioning
famine. Duranty headed for another European vacation in early March,
however, and filed dispatches not subject to direct Soviet censorship. These
reports noted the "gloomy picture" in Ukraine as well as the North Caucasus
and Lower Volga regions. The New York Times reporter saw a "brighter side."
Upon learning of new repressive organs (political departments of MachineTractor Stations located throughout the countryside), Duranty extolled them as
"the greatest constructive step toward the efficient socialization of
............ 68 ............
agriculture." He blamed a familiar culprit for the food crisis. After one
particularly critical assessment of Russian national character, Duranty
concluded that "what is wrong with Russian agriculture is chiefly Russians."40
Muggeridge's Manchester Guardian series was quickly followed by a report on

the famine from Gareth Jones. Jones, a Russian-speaking assistant to former
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, obtained his information during
brief travels through Ukraine. The articles described how starvation and
disease had laid waste to whole villages in the region.41 These reports appeared
within days of the stories by Stoneman and Barnes. Perhaps because Jones was
not a permanent Moscow correspondent, the NKID singled him out for special
treatment. The Press Office enlisted the help of the Moscow regulars in
discrediting him. Lyons's version of how Press Office chief Constantine
Oumansky recruited the foreign journalists to "throw down Jones" has
reached the status of a classiceven a clichin writings about famine
coverage. As Lyons wrote in Assignment in Utopia (1937):
There was much bargaining in a spirit of gentlemanly give-andtake, under the effulgence of Umansky's [sic] gilded smile, before
a formula of denial was worked out. We admitted enough to
soothe our consciences, but in roundabout phrases that damned
Jones as a liar. The filthy business having been disposed of,
someone ordered vodka and zakuski [snacks], Umansky joined in
the celebration and the party did not break up until the early
morning hours . . . He had done a big bit for Bolshevik firmness
that night.42
This text appears in almost every writing on the "famine cover-up" as proof
positive of the journalists' craven willingness to serve the Soviets. Yet outside
evidence contradicts Lyons's oft-told tale. First, there is some reason to doubt
Lyons's chronology. The meeting with the censors, he reported, took place after
Jones's Manchester Guardian article appearedtherefore, after 30 March
1933. Lyons follows up his description of the gathering for "Bolshevik
firmness" with a description of how each journalist was summoned to the Press
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Office and told not to leave Moscow without official permission. But
Stoneman's accountcorroborated by documents from American, British, and
Russian archivesindicates that news of the ban circulated in late February.43
Furthermore, no other Western correspondentsincluding both Duranty's
assistant and Stoneman, who were present in Moscow and were later
interviewed about the famineever mentioned this party. Lyons himself was
rather sketchy on the details when asked about it years later. As his
recollections were summarized by one historian:
Lyons remembers little more about the meeting with Oumansky

than the description of it in Assignment in Utopia. It was not a
"general session" of the foreign correspondents, he recalls, nor did
Oumansky have to do more than "hint" as to what should be
done. Lyons cannot remember who attended or even more
specifically where the meeting was held. He adds, however, that
"presumably" Duranty was there.44
Whether or not this evening affair took place as Lyons described it, Duranty
indeed did "throw down" fellow Briton Jones. In an article that remains a
textbook example of double-speak, Duranty criticized Jones's judgment as
"somewhat hasty" and based only on minimal travels in Ukraine. (Jones, it
might be noted, undertook more travel than Duranty himself.) Duranty's
article, published under the headline "Russians Hungry, but Not Starving,"
cynically noted the number of times that foreigners have prematurely
"composed the Soviet Union's epitaph." Duranty derided Jones's most recent
epitaph, claiming that Jones had "seen no dead or dying human beings" and
therefore had little direct evidence of famine. Duranty did not deny the
"deplorable" conditions, but he blamed the problems on the "novelty and
mismanagement of collective farming." In a justly infamous paragraph,
Duranty then relied on his stock phrase and his usual military analogies:
"Butto put it brutallyyou can't make an omelette without breaking eggs,
and the Bolshevist leaders are [like military commanders] . . . indifferent to the
casualties that may be involved." And a phrase just as infamous if less
evocative, Duranty continued with his odd denial: "There is a serious food
shortage throughout the country . . . There is no actual starvation or deaths
............ 70 ............
from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from diseases due to

malnutrition . . . In short, conditions are definitely bad in certain sectionsthe
Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Lower Volga. The rest of the country is on short
rations but nothing worse. These conditions are bad, but there is no famine."45
While the criticisms of Jones included new concepts, Duranty's basic formula
(shortages, even malnutrition, but no famine) carried over from his November
series.
Fischer, then touring the United States, needed little official encouragement to
rail against famine reports. He spent the spring of 1933 campaigning for
American diplomatic recognition of the USSR. As rumors of a famine there
reached American shores, Fischer vociferously denied the reports. He agreed
that Russians were "hungrydesperately hungry" but attributed this to
Russia's "turning over from agriculturalism to industrialism." In each city he
visited, Fischer flatly denied that mass starvation existed in Russia. Arguing
that there were shortages but no famine, Fischer declared in another speech
that the Russian peasant would endure such hardships "as long as the
fulfillment of his objective is visible to the naked eye, in the form of industrial
achievement." Upon his return to Russia later that summer, Fischer's story
changed only slightly. His first article from Moscow, entitled "Russia's Last
Hard Year," stated, "The first half of 1933 was very difficult indeed. Many
people simply did not have sufficient nourishment." Fischer blamed poor
weather and the refusal of peasants to harvest the grain, which then rotted in
the fields. Government requisitions drained the countryside of food, he
admitted, but military needs (a potential conflict with Japan) explained the
need for such deadly thoroughness in grain collections.46
While Fischer used the threat of war as a justification for hardships, Duranty
continued to employ war in a metaphorical sense. Perhaps inspired by the
Soviets' own rhetoric, he continued to compare collectivization to a battle
between the modernizing Bolsheviks and backward peasants. Off on another
vacation in Aprilthis time to GreeceDuranty organized the trip so that he
could travel through Ukraine. Gazing out the windows and speaking with
peasants at the stations along the way, Duranty concluded that the rumors
about a famine were unsubstantiatedalways attributed to the next village.
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Duranty still maintained his optimism for the future: "an end has been made
of the muddle and mismanagement of the past two years, and . . . Moscow is
taking an interest" in the peasants.47
By late spring, Gareth Jones rebutted Duranty in a stinging counterattack.
Jones reiterated his assessment of famine conditions, claiming it was based on
conversations with numerous foreign diplomats in addition to peasants in
more than twenty villages. He also cited Muggeridge's late March series in the
Manchester Guardian as corroboration. Lashing out against the Moscowbased journalists, Jones called them "masters of euphemism and
understatement," thanks to ever-stricter censorship. The letter closed on a
bitter congratulatory note: the Soviets' combination of food distribution policy
(so that Moscow remained "well-fed") and censorship had managed to "hide
the real Russia."48
By June, Duranty pleaded to travel abroad again. Until the midsummer
harvest, he told his editor, things in Moscow would be "dull." The New York
Times editors scotched the trip, so Duranty redirected his complaints to a
friend and fellow journalist. As for food supplies, he wrote his friend: "The
'famine' is mostly bunk as I told you except maybe Kazakhstan and the Altai
where they wouldn't let you go . . . The [NKID ] in particular is rather
crotchety about reporters travelling these days." Stuck in Moscow, bored,
Duranty returned to one of his favorite themes, Russian suffering. He referred
to Bolsheviks as "fanatics [who] do not care about the costs in blood or
money." Suffering in Russia, he stressed, was not strictly a Soviet phenomenon:
"It is cruel . . . but the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is near to cruel Asia,
and the proverb 'One Life, One Kopeck' was a century-old expression of
human values in Czarist Russia." The article closed with the acknowledgment
that "life here is hard and menaced by malnutrition and diseases that arise
therefrom," but it once again underlined the ultimate goal justifying these
sacrifices: the leadership's "fanatic fervor" for industrialization.49
An early August dispatch dealt once more with rumors about the famine.
Duranty attributed them to the anti-Bolshevik migr "rumor factories" in
neighboring states. Soviet authorities, Duranty wrote, had inadvertently
............ 72 ............
abetted these factories by adopting an "ostrich policy . . . in trying to hide it

[the food shortage] and some of its consequences." Such shortages had taken
"a heavy toll of Soviet fortitude and even Soviet lives," reducing the food
supply "below what are generally regarded as the minimum requirements."
Shortly thereafter, Duranty cabled his editor that, in spite of these persistent
rumors, the word "famine" should be avoided in news coveragein favor of
the above formulation about minimum requirements. He maintained his
silence about the travel ban. When The New York Times published an article
about restrictions on travel, it came from the Associated Press rather than the
newspaper's own correspondent. Below the AP story, though, Duranty wrote
an article, "Famine Report Scorned," praising the new harvest without denying
past problems: "Until this harvest the picture was dark enough. The Kremlin
had ruthlessly carried through the agrarian revolution of collective farming,
and the costs had been heavy for the Russian people, but it looks now as if the
revolution is complete because the harvest is really good."50
Duranty seemed genuinely confused about the continuation of the travel ban,
given the improved conditions. His letter to the foreign editor complained:
"The poor goofs [in the NKID Press Office] have chosen this moment, when
the harvest REALLY IS GOOD, to forbid foreign correspondents to travel."
He once again denied that there was a famine per se, "but there was a heavy
loss of life and much suffering and now of course is the moment to see and say
that things are better. But the [NKID ] doesn't seem to understand that."
Ignoring Duranty's repeated injunctions against the word "famine," The New
York Times editors printed articles from Vienna and Berlin that used the word.
They even printed one of Duranty's own articles under the headline "Famine
Toll Heavy in South Russia." That article continued his usual themes: there
was loss of life, not from starvation but from diseases "due to lower
resistance"; the death rate was three times higher than normal in Ukraine,
North Caucasus, and the Lower Volgabut no "famine" existed.51
Poor conditions in the USSR seemed to affect Duranty's mood if not his
reporting. He complained to his editors that he had tired of working overseas,
especially in Moscow. Duranty distinguished himself from those whose bright
future justified present hardships: the USSR "may someday be a paradise for a
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future generation of Russians, but I am not a future generation, nor, thank

God, a Russian." He proposed working only part-time in Moscow, writing
primarily feature articles. The Times senior editors, all dissatisfied with
Duranty's frequent absences from Moscow, were happy to accept this
arrangement.52
The NKID gave Duranty one last scoop before he stepped down. The Press
Office informed him in late August that he could travel through the Ukrainian
countryside. Permission to travel, however, did not imply the right to travel
freely. The restrictions on his itinerary perplexed Duranty. According to one
British diplomat, "Mr. Duranty professed to be much irritated by this action,
which he felt had cut the ground from under his feet by obliging him to
recognize a ban upon his movements."53
Yet Duranty did not mention the restrictions to his editors. He instead boasted
that he and AP correspondent Stanley Richardson soon would be taking a trip
to Ukraine and the North Caucasus to challenge the "campaign about the
alleged famine." The editors received this news enthusiastically, urging him to
leave as soon as possible. This trip earned these two reporters no little
resentment in the foreign colonya problem for the NKID as well as for
Duranty. As the foreign-policy chief wrote to the head of the secret police:
After foreign correspondents Duranty and Richardson set out, with

our permission and your agreement, on their trip to Ukraine, many
other foreign correspondents asked for permission for trips to the
south . . . Since I cannot be up-to-date [v kurse] on conditions in the
various regions to which the foreign correspondents would like to
go, I am asking you to give us your conclusions after weighing all of
the circumstances. Personally, it seems to me that the moment has
come when we can be more liberal on the issue of foreign
correspondents' movements, that is, on the extremely irritating strict
application of the rules about their trips outside Moscow.54
Once under way, Duranty and Richardson traveled first to Rostov and then
Kharkov. Duranty's reports contained the same set of contradictions as his
............ 74 ............
series on food shortages from the previous November. The first report began
by asserting, "The use of the word 'famine' in connection with the North
Caucasus is a sheer absurdity." After gloating that "even a child can see that
this is not famine but abundance," Duranty revised downward his earlier
estimate that mortality had tripled. Upon reaching Ukraine, Duranty's
evaluation was far more bleak, resorting again to his wartime analogies: the
Kremlin "has won the battle with the peasants," although "the cost has
been heavy." The whole episode could be summed up briefly, Duranty
wrote: "Hunger had broken [Ukrainians'] passive resistancethere in one
phrase is the grim story of the Ukrainian Verdun." Here, Duranty wrote
more explicitly about the costs: "hard conditions . . . had decimated the
peasantry."55
In his private conversations, Duranty described the famine's results more
graphically. In an oft-cited incident reported by Eugene Lyons, Duranty
apparently stopped by Lyons's apartment upon returning from his travels.
Lyons recalled:
He gave us his fresh impressions in brutally frank terms and they

added up to a picture of ghastly horror. His estimate of the dead
from the famine was the most startling I had as yet heard from
anyone.
"But, Walter, you don't mean that literally?" Mrs. McCormick
exclaimed.
"Hell I don'tI'm being conservative," he replied, and as if by
way of consolation he added his famous truism: "But they're only
Russians."
While Lyons did not repeat Duranty's mortality figure in this 1937
recollection, other sources suggest that, upon returning from Ukraine, Duranty
estimated that between 7 and 10 million had died "directly or indirectly from
lack of food."56
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William Henry Chamberlin also petitioned to travel into the famine areas in
late August, but the NKID Press Office denied his initial request. The Christian
Science Monitor printed an Associated Press story about this denial, referring
to its desire to report on the impact of the food shortage "last winter."57
Shortly afterward, Chamberlin wrote a casual letter to a friend that explained
the travel ban as related to "what has happened rather than . . . what is
happening now" in the countryside. He went on in an optimistic tone,
predicting that "this year's crop . . . is exceptionally good, and, while there are
familiar difficulties in harvesting and transporting it, the signs seem to point to
an easier winter. Everything in this world is, of course, highly relative." At the
same time, Chamberlin also submitted a signed opinion piece to the Monitor,
part of an occasional series called "Diary of an Onlooker." Chamberlin
reported on contradictory rumors floating around Moscow about the situation
in the Soviet countryside. Based on a report from "a foreign agricultural expert
with a knowledge of the Russian language and long experience in various parts
of the country" (perhaps his friend Otto Schiller?), Chamberlin announced that
events in Russia gave "some measure of confirmation to both the optimistic
and the pessimistic reports." This unnamed expert "confirmed the prevalent
stories of widespread acute distress and hunger in the southern and
southeastern parts of the country." Still, Chamberlin optimistically insisted
that "there would be some increase in the agricultural production, measured
by the extremely low level it touched last year." Better weather fueled
Chamberlin's hope for improvement, as did the "fear of hunger" and the
effectiveness of new repressive machinery. The section closed with the
observation that Muscovites were choosing vacation spots far from Ukraine, in
part because of the reports of poor conditions there.58
After the Duranty/Richardson trip, Chamberlin finally received permission to
travel with his wife through the afflicted regions in late September. Journalist
William Stoneman sent the first word back to the States about their travels:
"Chamberlin says after a two week trip . . . that 30% of the people in some
villages died of typhus & famine. It must have been a ghastly spring in the
villages." Stoneman did report one note of optimism, though: central
authorities "have plenty [of grain] to support the cities, to replenish the army
stores and to give more to the villages." Shortly after returning to Moscow,
............ 76 ............
Chamberlin visited his friend William Strang in the British Embassy. According
to Strang, Chamberlin "often asked himself why the population did not flee en
masse from the famine areas. He could only attribute their immobility to the
characteristic Russian passivity of temperament. In the Ukraine he had the
impression that the population could find nothing better to do than die as a
protest."59 Chamberlin thus explained the course (if not the cause) of the
famine in terms of peasant passivity.
While the Monitor did not print Chamberlin's reports from Ukraine, The
Manchester Guardian ran them as a five-part series under the rubric "The
Soviet Countryside: A Tour of Inquiry." The early articles referred to "famine"
conditions, and actions that were "no less ruthless than those of war," but also
noted the "excellent crop" for 1933 and closed with a familiar statement about
Russia as a "land of paradoxes." In the final article, Chamberlin mused about
peasant inaction, searching for a "psychological explanation of this curious
fatalism." He concluded that "those who died were . . . old-fashioned peasants
who simply could not conceive of life without their individual farm." Even
though Chamberlin discussed famine conditions openly, his reporting placed
ample blame on the peasants' conservatism and recalcitrance.60
Reports filed by Duranty and Chamberlin in the autumn of 1933 sounded
quite similar. The New York Times reporter, for instance, tallied the results of
the Five-Year Plan in an article entitled "Russia's Ledger." The costs of
industrialization had been "prodigious, not only in lowered standard of living
but in human suffering, even in human lives." Yet Duranty did not blame
Soviet policy; the fault lay instead with the "innate conservatism of the
farmer." Political liberties had been trampled by the "attempt of the Bolsheviks
to submerge the individual in the state"but such should be expected of
Russia's political tradition, which so closely resembled the "despotism of
Asia." Russian characterin this instance, at both individual and societal
levelsexplained Russian conditions. Duranty did not dwell on his recent trip,
but he did assess Russian suffering as Chamberlin had: the previous year had
"tightened the belts of the Russian people to an almost, but not quite,
intolerable degree."61 In reports based on their respective trips through the
famine regions, Duranty and Chamberlin both emphasized the human costs.
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Both remained optimistic that the worst had passed. And, most strikingly, both
blamed peasants' hardships on their own passivity as much as on Soviet policy.
In the long run, their travels led Duranty and Chamberlin toward sharply
divergent views of the Soviet Union. Chamberlin's trip into the countryside
marked the most important event in his once-gradual estrangement from the
Soviets. While most of his reports filed before the tripand even immediately
afterwardshared much with Duranty's and Fischer's, Chamberlin
subsequently altered his view of collectivization as a result of these travels.
Whereas Chamberlin had earlier considered peasant "backwardness" an
impediment to collectivization, he later came to believe the opposite, as
evidenced by this observation: "It was not the more backward peasants, but
the more progressive and well-to-do, who usually showed the greatest
resistance to collectivization, and this not because they did not understand
what the new policy would portend, but because they understood too well."62
This view, appearing in his articles and books published in 1934, amounted to
a recantation of his earlier ideas.
But in other articles appearing in the months after his harrowing trip through
the devastated countryside, Chamberlin still expressed ambivalence about
collectivization. After detailing, in one widely circulated article, the destruction
wrought by famine, Chamberlin sounded a note of optimism: the "tenacious
vitality [of] the semi-Asiatic peasantry" ensured that "recovery comes more
easily than might be the case in a softer country." National character remained
a crucial factor in Chamberlin's explanations of Soviet events, even as his
political position began to shift. Reviewing a book of Duranty's collected
dispatches, furthermore, Chamberlin defended the legitimacy of The New York
Times reporter's claims: "Duranty consistently takes the line, a perfectly logical
and defensible one, that the sufferings which, as he recognizes, have been and
are being imposed on the Russian people in the name of socialism,
industrialization, and collectivization are of small account by comparison with
the bigness of the objectives at which the Soviet leaders are aiming." Similarly,
in one 1934 article containing his estimate of 4 million famine-related deaths,
Chamberlin repeated his earlier argument that "the poor harvest of 1932 was
attributable in some degree to the apathy and discouragement of the
peasants."63
............ 78 ............
Unlike Chamberlin or Duranty, Fischer did not write, either publicly or privately,
about living conditions through the remainder of 1933. A November letter to a
friend promised only that he would give him the "lowdown" when they next
met. Fischer's first mention of "the Ukrainian famine of 1933"in a 1934
article from and about Spainconnected the famine to "prodigious efforts, now
already crowned with considerable success, to give the country a new and
permanently healthy agrarian base." Fischer did not directly address the
"difficulties" of 1933 until well after the factin a 1934 Nation article, "In
Russia Life Grows Easier." Those articles focused on Russia's "bright
prospects," and improved supplies of clothing and food in major Soviet cities.
These economic improvements had led to a decline in political opposition, which
Fischer hoped would lead, in turn, to a curtailment of secret-police activities.64
Fischer maintained his general optimism about the Soviet Union through the
publication of his Soviet Journey in 1935. The book devoted three pages to a
discussion of the famine of 19321933, in which Fischer described his October
travels through Ukraine. He told of food left rotting in the fields as the result
of peasants' "passive resistance." Fischer blamed the peasants directly for
having "brought the calamity upon themselves," and History itself provided
the explanation:
It was a terrible lesson at a terrific cost. History can be cruel. The

Bolsheviks were carrying out a major policy on which the strength
and character of their regime depended. The peasants were
reacting as normal human beings would. Let no one minimize the
sadness of the phenomenon. But from the larger point of view the
effect was the final entrenchment of collectivization. The peasantry
will never again undertake passive resistance.65
Like Duranty and Chamberlin, Fischer stressed the positive results ensuing
from Bolshevik victory in the countryside and connected the famine to peasant
action (or inaction).
The issues resurfaced in 1935, when Chamberlin and Fischer traded blows over
their reporting in 1933. After a week-long series on a famine raging in the
............ 79 ............
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USSR appeared in Hearst newspapers, Fischer published a rebuttal of these

claims in The Nation.66 Fischer, Lyons, and Chamberlin all agreed that there
was no famine in Russia in 1935; Lyons, for one, called the Hearst series
"patently doctored." But Chamberlin used the occasion to blast Fischer,
sarcastically arguing that Fischer's denial of a 1935 famine made no mention
of the famine of 19321933, which affected (in Chamberlin's words) "Ukraina
[sic], the North Caucasus, considerable districts of the Lower and Middle
Volga, and Turkestan." Claiming that Fischer had yet to make any "single,
forthright unequivocal recognition of the famine," Chamberlin accused Fischer
of using "misleading euphemistic terms" to describe Soviet events. Fischer's
reply to Chamberlin, published in the same issue, defended his treatment of the
famine and then turned the tables, accusing Chamberlin of one-sidedness for
blaming only the Soviet government. If the famine was "man-made," as
Chamberlin had charged, then "the peasants were the men who made it,"
wrote Fischer.67
By the time of this dispute over the famine hoax, the four protagonists had
parted ways. While all had started the decade positively inclined (to greater or
lesser degrees) toward the Soviets, Lyons and Chamberlin had grown
disenchanted with and even disgusted by the "Soviet experiment" by 1935.
After the mid-1930s, these latter writers began writing slashing criticisms of
both the Soviet Union and its American supporters. Duranty and Fischer
quickly became targets, especially for their writings on the famine of
19321933. Fischer eventually did reconsider his views about the Soviet
Union, writing about his new perspective with more thoughtfulness and
considerably less acid than Lyons and Chamberlin had. Fischer's essay in the
widely read The God That Failed (1949) attributed the famine to "Bolshevik
haste and dogmatism." Reflecting on his fifteen years of enthusiastic support
for the USSR, Fischer concluded that he had been "glorifying steel and
kilowatts and forgetting the human being."68 Duranty, unlike the others, never
recanted his earlier views outright. Later writings mentioned the famine, calling
it "man-made" but wavering as to its origins. By 1949, Duranty's final book
offered an apology of sorts: "Whatever Stalin's apologists may say, 1932 was
a year of famine." While it may have appeared unintentional to those "on the
spot," he explained, he now believed that authorities should be blamed for
............ 80 ............
their actions. The section closed by quoting Stalin: "Why blame the peasant? .
. . For we [the Communist Party] are at the helm."69
Lyons's and Chamberlin's rancor covered up their own actions and writings
during the famine yearsome of which bore marked similarities to those of
their targets, Duranty and Fischer. In 19321933, all four authors portrayed
the battle between the party and the countryside as one between determined
modernizers and recalcitrant, fatalistic peasants. While reportingand
regrettingthe loss of peasant lives, all four authors framed the loss of life as
a necessary cost in the struggle for economic progress. All four journalists,
furthermore, deployed stereotypes about Russian peasants in order to explain
peasant actions (or ostensible inaction). Fischer and Chamberlin explicitly
linked the horrible fate of the Soviet peasantry to visions of a modern,
industrial society. The expression, repeated by these two as well as other
journalists and scholars, that the Five-Year Plan represented Russia's attempt
to "starve itself great" emphasized the hoped-for ends of industrialization over
the brutal means.70
Enthusiasm for Soviet economic development led American Russia-watchers of
all political persuasions to support or at least withhold judgment on Soviet
Five-Year Plans. This "romance of economic development" explains the
widespread American support for the USSR far better than Lyons's harangues
about "the Stalinist penetration of America."71 Many commentators approved
of Soviet-style industrialization while denouncing communism. Their support
for Soviet efforts to modernize a "backward" nation came in spite of their
recognition of the tremendous human costs entailed. Even though they had
some information about rural conditions during the famine, American
observers had an easier time finding the sacrifices worthy because they
considered the people sacrificed so unworthy. Common stereotypes about
Russians served to explain their struggles and suffering. Conservative and
apathetic peasants could be trusted to resist (but only passively) Soviet plans.
To bring about important changes, so the logic went, would entail extreme
hardships and even significant loss of lifewhich the peasants, fatalistic and
inured to suffering, were especially well suited to endure. National-character
stereotypes thus combined with enthusiasm for economic development to
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resolve the tensions between ends and means in American writings on the
USSR. As anticommunist economist Calvin Hoover put it, Russian peasants
would not rise from their "Asiatic" laziness unless prompted by the
"immediate stimulus of hunger."72 The worthy goal of modernization, Hoover
and others implied, could be reached only through difficult if not violent means.
This dilemma of ends and means persisted through Soviet and post-Soviet
Russia. Writers in Mikhail Gorbachev's Russia (and other parts of the
collapsing Soviet Union) wrestled with the historical meaning of the tragedies
of the 1930s. A plaintive assessment by two journalists in 1990 stands out in
this often nasty debate. Concluding a newspaper article on new research on
the famine of 19321933, these writers struggled to sum up the Soviet period
in a single paragraph: "It is not true," they wrote, "that nothing good was
created [under the Soviets]. It is true that everything good came at too high
a price."73
Most Western journalists in Stalin's Moscow, spared the high price paid by the
Russians, reached less poignant conclusions. Chamberlin noted the great loss
of life but placed it in the context of Soviet goals: the villages he visited in the
famine's aftermath, he wrote at the time, stood as "grim symbols of progress."
Duranty, for his part, insisted that the peasants who died in the battle for
control of the countryside had become "victims on the march toward
progress."74 That the march was a forced one, prodded by Soviet bayonets,
concerned these journalists less than the ostensible destination.
The Soviet pattern of the early 1930sa devastating famine, the very existence
of which was contested abroadreappeared with alarming precision during
China's Great Leap Forward (19581960).75 The all-out Chinese attempt at
collectivization (like the Soviet case, designed to funnel resources to the
industrial sector) led to chaos in the Chinese countryside. Government
authorities instituted collectivization and political repression to gather
whatever food they could to further economic and political goals. The
breadbaskets of China, stripped of all food, became home to mass starvation,
with death toll estimates as high as 26 million.76
............ 82 ............
Western observers denied the existence of the famine in terms strikingly similar
to those used by Moscow-based reporters in the 1930s. Edgar Snow, whose
Red Star Over China (1938) introduced Mao Zedong to the English-speaking
world, returned to China in 1960. Rumors of famine clearly weighed on
Snow's mind, but he denied them outright: "I saw no starving people in China,
nothing that looked like old-time famine." His travelogue later repeated the
line of argument used by Duranty, Fischer, and Ralph Barnes regarding the
Soviet famine: "Considerable malnutrition undoubtedly existed. Mass
starvation? No."77 Snow's earlier writings on Chinese famine, based on his
travels through northwest China in 19291931, furthermore, shared much
with the Moscow correspondents. In that analysis, he complained that
residents of the famine region did not take any steps to prevent or even delay
their deaths: "I was profoundly puzzled by their passivity. For a while I thought
nothing would make a Chinese fight."78 Peasant inaction, as much as
government action, had been a central factor in Snow's Chinese famines.
While Snow's case is the most famous because he was granted permission to
travel through the famine regions, other Western specialists came to the same
conclusions without firsthand experience. Like those Western experts who
stressed the global significance of the "Soviet experiment" in the 1930s, some
China specialists of the 1960s trumpeted the achievements rather than the costs
of the Great Leap Forward.79 The Hong Kongbased Far Eastern Economic
Review, for instance, editorialized that "what is happening in China is of
momentous importance . . . [as] a new model for human society and a new
method of overcoming poverty."80 Scholars such as Gunnar Myrdal and John
King Fairbank, the dean of American Sinology, downplayed or dismissed
rumors of famine conditions.81
Debates about foreign coverage of the Chinese famine have resurfaced in recent
years, with increasing acrimoniousness. Some Western Sinologists who had
once been more sympathetic to the People's Republic of Chinarecapitulating
the trajectory of Eugene Lyons and William Henry Chamberlin vis--vis the
USSRrenounced their earlier views and criticized those with whom they once
agreed. Ross Terrill, a onetime colleague of Fairbank's at Harvard, recently
accused American Sinology of soft-peddling Maoist "social engineering" as
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well as Mao himselfwhom Terrill calls "pathological" and a "borderline

personality."82
Yet broader insights from the Soviet famine of 19321933 extend well beyond
the parallels in China three decades later. The Soviet famine also revealed
assumptions about modernization that came to stand at the center of American
intellectual life in the decades after World War II. The concepts shaping
Western responses to the Soviet famineenthusiasm for development, reliance
on national-character stereotypes, and ideas about "Asia"operated in
various combinations through 1950s and 1960s scholarship in the United
States. They appeared at a moment when many intellectuals resolved to
grapple with two central problems in the postwar global order: the Soviet
Union on the one hand and economic development in the newly independent
states of Asia and Africa on the other. The intellectual traffic between scholars
of the Soviet Union and of the Third World was heavy, as scholars applied their
understanding of Russian/Soviet history to the "battle for the hearts and minds
of the Third World."83
Many scholars made the trip themselves, working in both development studies
and Russian/Soviet history. Important figures here include two of the scholars
responsible for promoting modernization theory within and outside the
academy, Walt Whitman Rostow and Cyril Black, as well as one of the earliest
and most incisive critics of modernization, the economic historian Alexander
Gerschenkron. All three writers' works focused on economic aspects of
modernization and revolved, to a great degree, around the question of the costs
of development. All three drew lessons about such costs from the Soviet case.
And in quite different ways, all three scholars employed parts of the logic used
by those journalists covering the Soviet famine of 19321933.84
The three scholars derived from the Russian experience lessons for Third
World development. Gerschenkron first discussed his theory of "economic
backwardness" at a 1951 conference called "The Progress of Underdeveloped
Areas." He originally submitted his contribution as "Historical Bases of
Appraising Economic Development in a Bipolar World," a title that
emphasized the connection between Third World development and Soviet-
............ 84 ............
American antagonisms. The conference organizer, wary of promoting a paper

with such a wordy title, proposed an alternative, which was later to earn
Gerschenkron his reputation: "Economic Backwardness in Historical
Perspective." That article drew lessons from Russia's "extreme relative
backwardness" to show how such economies required significant levels of state
intervention in order to industrialize.85
Rostow, like Gerschenkron, drew lessons from the Russian experience for
former colonies just beginning the process of development. Rostow's Stages of
Economic Growth (1960)subtitled "A Non-Communist Manifesto"aimed
to discredit the Soviet approach to industrialization. Yet the Russian experience
was a touchstone throughout the book. His description of the role of the
agricultural sector in industrialization fit the Soviet experience especially well:
the rural sector provided foreign exchange (via the export of primary
commodities) and government funds to promote industry (via taxes).86
Black's transit between the Russian past and the Third World present was even
more frequent. Starting in 1960, he promoted the application of modernization
theory to the study of Russian history by editing a conference volume, The
Transformation of Russian Society. It included contributions by Gerschenkron,
Talcott Parsons, and an impressive array of present and future leaders in
Russian/Soviet studies. By the mid-1960s, he had expanded his field of inquiry
dramatically, publishing a world-history primer called The Dynamics of
Modernization (1966); its opening pages asserted that modernization was the
third fundamental transformation of life on earth, on par with the rise of
human life and the shift to settled agricultural societies.87
Of these three postwar scholars, Black had by far the most in common with the
journalists of the 1930s. First, he employed national-character traits with a
frequency similar to Duranty, Chamberlin, Fischer, and Lyons. His
introductory essay to the Russian-history volume stressed Russians' passivity,
patience, and submissiveness. Like the earlier journalists, Black deployed these
traits in the interests of economic development. The traits explained the
combination of economic hardship and political coercion that defined the
Soviet era. Russians' traditional fatalismwhich, Black claimed, began to
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wane only after World War IIexplained the ease with which Soviet
authorities could maintain their rule.88 Finally, Black shared the journalists'
argument that progress would be costly, even fatal, but was ultimately
necessary. Considering modernization "simultaneously creative and
destructive," Black hardly hid the costs, arguing that violence in modernization
was primarily the result of the "radical character of the changes inherent in
modernization." Twenty years later, only months after Gorbachev took power
in the Soviet Union, Black described economic change as a worthy justification
for despotic rule: "We think autocracy is a bad thing. It crushes individuals. Yet
in real life you have to get things done. You have to get organized. And the
Russians from that point of view had a good government, an effective
government, with all its shortcomingsand still [do]."89 Black envisioned
modernization as a process through which all societies must pass; the degree of
violence varied by political circumstances and especially "national character."
The universalism of this vision is perhaps best exemplified by his conjecture
that the process of modernization might eventually lead to a world so
homogeneous that a "single world state" would emerge.90
Rostow shared Black's universalism; his Stages insisted that all nations went
through a similar process of modernization, differing primarily in timing. He
had even less room for variation than did Black. Rostow agreed with Black
about the sacrifices and even violence that could accompany the social
transformations they both described. By the late 1950s, Rostow had worked
out foreign-policy applications of his theory, centered on the costs of
modernization. Economic change, he argued, "create[d] potential unrest by
dislodging convictions and habit patterns which have in the past insured
stability." Such instability would make developing nations vulnerable to
propagandizing by communists, whom Rostow called "scavengers of the
modernization process." He devoted a significant portion of his political
career, as a foreign-affairs adviser to presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
Baines Johnson, to establishing and implementing aid programs that would
help prevent communist "scavengers" from taking advantage of the turmoil.
This was a significant and explicit goal of the international "Economic
Development Decade" he spearheaded in the 1960s.91
............ 86 ............
Gerschenkron's dissent from Rostow's and Black's universalism would

eventually reveal an important application of cultural particularism.
Gerschenkron's theory of economic backwardness combined a heuristic for
understanding industrialization with a method for explaining differences based
on the degree of "relative backwardness." The state role necessary for the most
backward nations would eventually wither away, Gerschenkron believed, as
once-backward nations began to lessen the gap between "what is" and "what
could be." Not prone to the national-character stereotyping so common among
the 1930s journalists, the economic historian nevertheless incorporated one of
their most important themes: the notion that Russian development was
"Asian." While Rostow and Black saw modernization as a universal process
oftentimes indistinguishable from westernization (in Rostow's case,
Americanization), Gerschenkron instead insisted on the separability of
economic from political progress. The emergence of an industrial economy
the process he called westernizationcould happen through the most
"unwestern" means. Russia, to Gerschenkron, provided an excellent case: the
Soviets' "westernization of the economy," he wrote, was accompanied by its
political "orientalization." "Asia" thus took on different meanings: in the
political sphere, it implied repression and despotism; in the economic sphere, it
suggested stagnation and resistance to development. The result, what he saw as
Russia's combination of economic advancement and political retrogression,
nevertheless met its desired aims. While disparaging the Soviet "dictatorship,"
Gerschenkron conceded that it "no doubt has contributed to the course of
industrialization more than any other single factor."92
Comparing Gerschenkron to Rostow and Black thus reveals interesting points
of intersection and difference. Those endorsing the universalism of
modernization theory argued that all nations undergo a similar process of
social transformation and end up in a similar state: as an "integrated society"
(Black) or in the "age of high-mass consumption" (Rostow). Like the
journalists covering the Soviet famine of 19321933, Black and Rostow
recognized the costs entailed but called for further modernization. Black
carried the parallel with the journalists of the 1930s further, stressing that such
costs relate to national-character traits. Rostow was swayed more by national
interest than national character; he called for American aid to prevent the virus
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of communism from affecting those paying the costs. Gerschenkron, on the

other hand, did not universalize the process of modernization, insisting instead
on significant variations in national experiences. He also defined progress as
divisibleunlike Rostow and Blackand proposed that the Soviet Union
represented economic progress enacted through political retrogression.
Gerschenkron characterized such cases by employing the language of "Asia" so
central to both Chamberlin and Duranty. To Gerschenkron, "Asia" defined a
particular form of social change, a form found in early Soviet Russia.93 None
of these three postwar scholars went as far as the 1930s journalists in offering
justifications for Soviet economic policy in the era of the first Five-Year Plans.
Yet all of them incorporated one or another aspect of American journalists'
explanation of causes and consequences of the famine. That such usage entered
mainstream intellectual life, as a central project of Western social science in the
1960s, suggests the durability of combining "national character" and
economic development. Even though modernization theory fell out of academic
favor in the late 1960s and beyond, the issues have hardly faded away.
The idea of a uniquely Asian variant of economic development was
reappropriated by political leaders behind Asia's "economic miracle" of the
early 1990s, including Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Indonesia's Raden
Suharto. These leaders saw rapid industrialization under political
authoritarianism as the expression of "Asian values," thus turning "Oriental
despotism" from a criticism to a compliment. Critics of Singapore and
Indonesia, however, had a different name: "development dictatorships."
Differences in terminology expressed radically different resolutions of the
tension between the goal of economic development and the methods used to
attain that goala central tension for the field of development economics.94
Notions of the "Asiatic" eased this tension for many Western experts on
economic change. Observers used the appellation to imply individuals'
passivity, fatalism, and general unsuitability for modern economic life.
Centuries-old conceptions of "Oriental despotism"like more recent claims
about "Asian values"offered a ready explanation for economic development
under strict political regimes. Interwar Russia experts, many of whom saw
Russia as an "Asiatic" society, applied a similar logic. Their responses to the
............ 88 ............
Soviet famine of 19321933 reveal the potency of combining such nationalcharacter stereotypes with a belief in economic development at all costs. Walter
Duranty and Louis Fischer, so often blamed for the lack of major coverage of
the famine, shared most of these ideas with their chief critics, Eugene Lyons
and William Henry Chamberlin. These four reporters invoked peasant
"passivity" and "apathy" as innate personal characteristics, not just responses
to circumstances of collectivization, to explain and perhaps even justify the
devastation of the Soviet countryside.
Thirty years later, Western academics turned their attention to economic
modernization of the former colonies and once again considered the
relationship between "national character" and economic development. Cyril
Black used individual Russian traits such as passivity to explain the nation's
economic and political trajectories. Alexander Gerschenkron applied notions
of "Asiatic" Russia to suggest the separability of economic and political
development. While recognizing the human costs of economic change, Walt
Rostow insisted on its ultimate benefits, revealing the continuing power of
what George F. Kennan called "the romance of economic development."
Kennan coined that phrase in 1932 to explain why Soviet youths were willing
to tolerate great sacrifices during the first Five-Year Plan. Yet the romance held
people of all nations under its swayobservers trying to explain
industrialization's high costs as well as activists willing to endure those costs
(and inflict them on others). Echoing Kennan's words a quarter-century later,
future US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that university
youths and other intellectuals "appear to be hypnotized by the image of largescale industry."95 Although both Kennan and Brzezinski focused on young
people (their seduction by economic development or their hypnosis by large
factories), such affairs of the heart were not mere teen infatuations. Economic
development in the twentieth century was both made and understood by
political leaders and intellectuals under a similar spell.
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Endnotes
Special thanks to Ethan Pollock and Paul Sabin for reading this essay in
multiple incarnations over four years, making innumerable suggestions and
improvements. I am grateful to Nils Gilman and D'Ann Penner for sharing
with me their respective areas of expertise. A preliminary version was
presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
meeting in November 1996, with Lars Lih as commentator; Stephan Merl and
Viktor Kondrashin also offered useful commentary on this and other
occasions. Finally, I am grateful to Stanley Engerman, Michael Grossberg,
Michael Willrich, and the anonymous AHR readers for their comments.
1.
On "bourgeois" professionals' support for the early Five-Year Plans in the USSR see
David R. Shearer, Industry, State and Society in Stalin's Russia, 19281934 (Ithaca, New
York, 1996). On Americans' attractions to the Soviet Union in this era see Peter G. Filene,
Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 19171933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967),
especially chapters 79, Marcello Flores, "The American Attitude toward the First Soviet
Five-Year Plan," Storia nordamericana 1 (1984): 7298 and Lewis S. Feuer, "American
Travelers to the Soviet Union, 191732: The Formation of a Component of New Deal
Ideology," American Quarterly 14 (Summer 1962): 11949. More cosmopolitan
perspectives are offered in David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the
Enlightenment (New York, 1973) and Joog Bachmann, Zwischen Paris und Moskau:
Deutsche burgerliche Linksintellektuelle und die stalinistische Sowjetunion, 19331939
(Mannheim, 1995).
2.
"Memorandum for the Minister," 19 August 1932, enclosed in Robert Skinner to

Secretary of State, 19 August 1932, 861.5017 Living Conditions/510, State Department
Decimal File, Record Group 59, US National Archives. (Decimal file documents hereafter
referred to as SDDF).
3.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Introduction to M. R. Masani, Soviet Sidelights (1936), reprinted in

Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi, 1972), 7: 12829.
4.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of J. Nehru (New York, 1941),
23031. On recognitionin 1931of the seriousness of the economic downturn see
Christina D. Romer, "The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (August 1990): 597624. One Moscow-based
journalist noted widespread business confidence while on an American lecture tour in
1931; Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia (New York, 1937), 399. On the Depression's
impacts on global agriculture see Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression,
19291939 (Berkeley, California, 1973), chapter 4 and Vladimir P. Timoshenko, World
............ 90 ............
Agriculture and the Depression, Michigan Business Studies 5, No. 5 (1933).

On American attractions to Soviet economic organization in this era see Filene, Americans
and the Soviet Experiment, chapters 39 and Deborah Fitzgerald, "Blinded by
Technology: American Agriculture in the Soviet Union, 19281932," Agricultural History
70 (Summer 1996): 45987 .
5.
On the demographic impact of the famine see E. A. Osokina, "Zhertvy goloda 1933 g.
Skol'ko ikh?" Istoriia SSSR (1991), No. 5: 1826; N. A. Ivnitskii, "Golod 193233
godov: Kto vinovat?" Golod 193233 godov: Sbornik statei, Iu. N. Afanas'ev, ed,
(Moscow, 1995), 6465. A summary of early estimates is available in an exceptionally
useful bibliographic article: Dana Dalrymple, "The Soviet Famine of 193234," Soviet
Studies 14 (January 1964): 25084. For the famine in the context of the demographic
turmoil of the 1930s see S. G. Wheatcroft and R. W. Davies, "Population," in The
Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 19131945, Davies, Mark Harrison, and
Wheatcroft, eds, (Cambridge, 1994), 6769. Disease typically accounts for a large share
of famine-related deaths; see Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on
Entitlements (Oxford, 1981), 20306. For physiological and epidemiological perspectives
see Helen Young, "Nutrition, Disease and Death in Times of Famine," Disasters 19
(1995): 94109; and Ancel Keys et al, The Biology of Human Starvation, 2 volumes,
(Minneapolis, 1951), 2: 100250.
6.
On this point see especially D'Ann Penner, "The Agrarian 'Strike' of 19321933,"
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Occasional Papers, No. 269 (1998)this
is the most important English-language work on the causes, course, and consequences of
the famine. See also Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the
Russian Village after Collectivization (Oxford, 1994); Moshe Lewin, "'Taking Grain':
Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurement before the War" (1974), and "The Kolkhoz
and the Russian Muzhik" (1980), both in Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System:
Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia (New York, 1985); and Lynne Viola,
Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance
(Oxford, 1996).
7.
Books by Ukrainian migrs include The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, 2
volumes (Detroit, 195355); The Great Famine in Ukraine: The Unknown Holocaust
(Jersey City, N.J., 1983); and Walter Dushnyk, 50 Years Ago: The Famine Holocaust in
Ukraine; Terror and Human Misery as Instruments of Soviet Russian Imperialism (New
York, 1983). Distinguished Russian historian I. E. Zelenin applied the term blank spots
(belye piatna, literally "white spots") specifically to collectivization efforts (192833) and
the ensuing famine; see Zelenin, "O nekotorykh 'belykh piatnakh' zavershaiu-shchego
etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii," Istoriia SSSR (1989), No. 2: 319.
8.
Eugene Lyons, The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America (1941; reprinted
edition, New Rochelle, New York, 1971), 12224. Lyons arrived in Moscow in 1927,
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fresh from an assignment from TASS, the official Soviet news bureau, and determined to
"bore from within" the capitalist system by working for a "bourgeois" news agency.
Chamberlin's interest in Russia dated back to a stay in Greenwich Village in the early
1920s, when many Village radicals followed Russian events enthusiastically. The
transformation from radical to conservative was common among interwar intellectuals in
America; see, for example, John P. Diggins, Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys
in American Intellectual History (New York, 1975); and, with more simpatico, Judy
Kutulas, The Long War: The Intellectual People's Front and Anti-Stalinism, 19301940
(Durham, North Carolina, 1995).
9 . James E. Mace, "The American Press and the Ukrainian Famine," in Genocide Watch,
Helen Fein, ed, (New Haven, Connecticut, 1992), 121; Mace, "The Politics of Famine:
American Government and Press Response to the Ukrainian Famine, 193233,"
Holocaust and Genocide Studies 3 (1988): 7594; M. Wayne Morris, Stalin's Famine and
Roosevelt's Recognition of Russia (Lanham, Md., 1994), 9495; James William Crowl,
Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, 1917 to 1937, a Case
Study of Louis Fischer and Walter Duranty (Lanham, 1982), 142, 158.
10. The most widely read work by those arguing genocide is Robert Conquest, The Harvest
of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (Oxford, 1986). See also US
Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine,
19321933: Report to Congress (Washington, DC, 1988), which was staffed by James E.
Mace, who had served as Conquest's "junior collaborator" on Harvest of Sorrow; and
Conquest et al, Man-Made Famine in Ukraine (Washington, 1984).
11. My emphasis on economic issues has been informed by Shtefan [Stephan] Merl, "Golod
19321933 godovGenotsid ukraintsev dlia osushchestvleniia politiki rusifikatsii?"
Otechestvennaia istoriia (1995), No. 1: 4961; and Stephan Merl, "War die Hungersnot
von 19321933 eine Folge der Zwangskollektivierung der Landwirtschaft oder wurde sie
bewusst im Rahmen der Nationalitataetenpolitik herbeigefuehrt?" Ukraine: Gegenwart
und Geschichte eines neuen Staates, Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler, eds, (BadenBaden, 1993). Merl's detailed critiques are in basic agreement with Russia's leading
agricultural historian of the Soviet period, Viktor Petrovich Danilov, and his students and
colleagues. See, for instance, V. P. Danilov and N. V. Teptsova, "Kollektivizatsiia: Kak eto
bylo," Pravda, 26 August 1988, and 15 September 1988; Ivnitskii, "Golod 193233
godov"; and I. E. Zelenin, N. A. Ivnitskii, V. V. Kondrashin, and E. N. Oskolkov, "O
golode 193233 godov i ego otsenke na Ukraine," Otechestvennaia istoriia (1994), no. 6:
25662. Other scholars have explained the famine as the result of poor weather and
military needs. See Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933," Slavic
Review 50 (Spring 1991): 7089; see also the bitter exchange between Conquest and
Tauger in Slavic Review 51 (Spring 1992): 19294. Also R. W. Davies, M. B. Tauger, and
S. G. Wheatcroft, "Stalin, Grain Stocks, and the Famine of 19321933," Slavic Review 54
(Fall 1995): 64257.
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12. The overall scope of the famine is discussed in E. A. Osokina, Ierarkhiia potrebleniia: O
zhizni liudei v usloviiakh stalinskogo snabzheniia 19281935 gg. (Moscow, 1993),
chapter 2. On Russia see V. V. Kondrashin, "Golod 193233 godov v derevne Povolzh'ia"
(Candidate's dissertation, Institute of Soviet History, Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1991)
summarized in an article with a similar title in Voprosy istorii (1991), No. 6: 17681; E.
N. Oskol'kov, Golod 1932/1933: Khlebozagotovki i golod 1932/33 goda v Severnokavkaznom krae (Rostov, 1991); and Penner, "Agrarian 'Strike' of 193233." Work on
the famine in Ukraine is more voluminous; see especially Kolektyvizatsiia i holod na
Ukraini, 19291933: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materiialiv, H. M. Mykhailychenko and E. P.
Shatalina, compilers, S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi et al, eds, (Kiev, 1992); and Holodomor 193233
rr. v Ukraini: Prychyny i naslidky, S. V. Kul'chyts'kyi, ed, (Kiev, 1995). On Kazakhstan,
where the famine was connected with "sedentarization" of nomad groups see Zh. B.
Abylkhozin, M. K. Kozybaev, and M. B. Tatimov, "Kazakhstanskaia tragediia," Voprosy
istorii (1989), No. 7: 5371. Excellent overviews on the peasant war are D'Ann Rose
Penner, "Pride, Power and Pitchforks: A Study of Farmer-Party Interactions on the Don,
19201928" (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1995); Penner, "Stalin
and the Ital'ianka of 193233 in the Don Region," Cahiers du monde russe 39 (1998):
2767; and Andrea Graziosi, "The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants,
19171933," Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies (1996).
13. Especially given the prevalence of ethnic interpretations of this famine it is worth noting
in passing that few of the observers in the 1920s and 1930s distinguished between
Ukrainian and Russian "character traits." On Russian stereotypes of the peasantry, see
especially Cathy A. Frierson, Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Late 19th
Century Russia (Oxford, 1993). The origins of Western stereotypes of Russians are
beyond the scope of this articlesee Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of
Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, California, 1994), for early uses
of these categories. Such stereotypes were dominant in late 19th century French
scholarship on Russia, scholarship widely read in the United States in both French and
English; most influential in the United States were Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, The Empire of
the Tsars and the Russians, Zenaide A. Ragozin, translator, 2 volumes (New York,
189396); and Alfred Rambaud, The History of Russia from the Earliest Times to 1877,
Leonora B. Lang, translator (New York, 1878). For these authors in context see Martha
Helms Cooley, "Nineteenth-Century French Historical Research on RussiaLouis Leger,
Alfred Rambaud, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu" (PhD dissertation, Indiana University, 1971).
British authors making similar claims were also widely read in the United States: E. B.
Lanin [pseudonym of E. J. Dillon], Russian Traits and Terrors: A Faithful Picture of the
Russia of To-day (Boston, 1891); and Donald MacKenzie Wallace, Russia, 2 volumes
(New York, 1877). On American reception see Norman E. Saul, Concord and Conflict:
The United States and Russia, 18671914 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1996), especially pages
18384. Important connections between "racial" stereotypes and development are
outlined in Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Man: Science, Technology and
Ideologies of Domination (Ithaca, New York, 1989).
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14. Once again, the literature on this topic is huge. On Russian visions of economic
transformation see especially Esther Kingston-Mann, In Search of the True West: Culture,
Economics, and Problems of Russian Development (Princeton, New Jersey, 1999); George
Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia, 18611930 (Urbana, Illinois,
1982). On American notions see especially John M. Jordan, Machine-Age Ideology: Social
Engineering and American Liberalism, 19111939 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1994).
Social transformation in the name of modernization is the subject of an ambitious and
provocative work that examines key moments of "authoritarian high modernism": James
Scott, Seeing Like a State: Why Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition May
Fail (New Haven, Conneticut, 1998).
15. While many historians have noted (primarily in passing) the prevalence of Western claims
of Russia's "non-European" or "Asiatic" nature, fewer have explored the political and
intellectual implications of these claims; see Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe; Anders
Stephanson, Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989),
chapter 1. The literature around Edward Said, Orientalism (New York, 1979), is of
course relevant here.
16. Crowl's title (Angels in Stalin's Paradise), for instance, is quoted from Lyons, Red Decade,
93. S. J. Taylor, Stalin's Apologist: Walter Duranty, the New York Times's Man in
Moscow (Oxford, 1990) uses some of the same language, but incorporates much more
research and a somewhat more balanced tone than Crowl.
17. These general comments about Soviet press censorship are based primarily on the
materials in the foreign-ministry archive, scattered throughout various collections.
Archival staff indicated in the spring of 1995 that the earliest documents in the Press
Office collection date only to 1943. Other context comes from the discussions in memoirs
and other writings by the office's principal "clientele," Western journalists themselves. A
thorough, though dated, list of reporters is available in US Department of State, Division
of Library and Reference Services, American Correspondents and Journalists in Moscow,
19171952: A Bibliography of Their Books on the USSR, Bibliography No. 73 (27 March
1953).
18. For example, memoranda of conversation with Edwin James of The New York Times and
Karl A. Bickel of the United Press are in (respectively) Podol'skii diary, 3 November 1930,
Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter, AVPRF), fond 0129 (Referantura
po SShA), opis' 13, papka 127, delo 319, list'ia 67 (hereafter, f./op./pap./d./ll.);
Oumansky to NKID Collegium, 1 January 1933, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 16, pap. 128a, d.
335, ll. 2122. Bickel, the director of the United Press (UP ) syndicate, was in Moscow to
renegotiate the UP agreement with TASS; see Joe Alex Morris, Deadline Every Minute:
The Story of the United Press (Garden City, New Jersey, 1947), 189.
............ 94 ............
19. Two prominent cases familiar to the subjects of this article were Paul Scheffer of Berliner
Tageblatt and freelancer Maurice Hindus. On Scheffer see Louis Fischer, "The Case of
Paul Scheffer," Nation 132 (31 August 1932): 19596; Scheffer, Seven Years in Soviet
Russia (With a Retrospect), Arthur Livingston, translator (London, 1933), viixvi;
Bogdanov to Stomoniakov, 25 September 1930, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 13, pap. 127, d. 13,
l. 1; and Kagan diary excerpt, July 16, 1932, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 15, pap. 128, d. 328, l.
41. On Hindus see Gnedin to Oumansky, 23 October 1937 and 27 November 1937; also
Astakhov to Oumansky, 2 April 1937all in AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 20, pap. 133a, del.
342, ll. 5, 20, 2424ob., 32.
20. Bruce C. Hopper to Robert F. Kelley, 24 July 1932, in Box 5, Division of East European
Affairs Records, State Department Records, Record Group 59, US National Archives; a
similar letter appears in Box 35, Hamilton Fish Armstrong Papers, Mudd Library,
Princeton University.
21. Otto Auhagen, "Wirtschaftslage der Sowjetunion im Sommer 1932," Osteuropa 7
(August 1932): 64455 (quoted at page 645). The American "listening post" in Riga
reported this article to Washington in Skinner to Secretary of State, 15 November 1932,
861.6131/261, SDDF. Auhagen was a former agricultural adviser at the German embassy
in Moscow who left to direct the Osteuropa Institut in Breslau, under whose auspices
Osteuropa was published; see Red Economics, Gerhard Dobbert, ed, (Boston, 1932), iii;
Jutta Unser, "'Osteuropa'Biographie einer Zeitschrift," Osteuropa 25 (September 1975):
56263.
22. Otto Schiller, "Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion," Berichte
ber Landwirstchaft 79, Sonderheft (1933). The Soviets viewed Schiller's and Auhagen's
writings as "impudent and undisguised espionage": Vinograd to D. G. Shtern, n.d.,
AVPRF, f. 05 (Sekretariat Litvinova), op. 13, pap. 90, d. 14, ll. 8787ob. Cairns's reports
are reprinted in full as Andrew Cairns, The Soviet Famine, 193233: An Eye-witness
Account of Conditions in the Spring and Summer of 1932, Tony Kuz, ed, (Edmonton,
1989). German information was also available from the consulates in Kiev and
Kharkovsee the reports filed in Der ukrainischer Hunger-Holocaust: Stalins
verschwiegener Vlkermord 1932/33 an 7 Millionen ukrainischer Bauern im Spiegel
geheimgehaltener Akten des deutschen Auswrtigen Amtes, D. Zlepko, ed, (Sonnenbhl,
1988). Other reports reached Western Europe via the Italian consulates; see Andrea
Graziosi, "'Lettres de Kharkov': La famine en Ukraine et dans le Caucase du Nord
travers les rapports des diplomates italiens, 19321934," Cahiers du monde russe et
sovietique 30 (1989): 5106; a selection is also published in US Commission on the
Ukrainian Famine, Investigation of the Ukrainian Famine, appendix 2.
23. Conversation between William Strang and Walter Duranty, 31 October 1932 in The
Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of
19321933, Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, and Bohdan S. Kordan, eds,
............ 95 ............
Not Worthy
(Kingston, Ontario, 1988), 204. On British diplomats' distant attitude toward the famine,
see Michael Hughes, Inside the Enigma: British Officials in Russia, 19001939 (London,
1997), 24345. Walter Duranty, "Soviet in 16th Year; Calm and Hopeful," The New
York Times (hereafter, NYT), 13 November 1932; Duranty, "Fifteen Stern Years of Soviet
Rule," NYT Magazine, 6 November 1932.
24. Walter Duranty, "All Russia Suffers Shortage of Food," NYT, 25 November 1932;
Duranty, "Food Shortage Laid to Soviet Peasants," NYT, 26 November 1932; Duranty,
"Soviet Press Lays Shortages to Foes," NYT, 27 November 1932; Duranty, "Soviet Not
Alarmed over Food Shortage," NYT, 28 November 1932; Duranty, "Soviet Industries
Hurt Agriculture," NYT, 29 November 1932; Duranty, "Bolsheviki United on Socialist
Goal," NYT, 30 November 1932.
25. Markel to Edwin L. James, 18 November 1932, and 22 November 1932, both on reel 32,
Edwin L. James Papers, New York Times Archive. William Strang to Laurence Collier, 6
December 1932, in Carynnyk, Foreign Office and the Famine, 20910.
26. Enclosure 1 with Walter Edge to Secretary of State, 10 December 1932, 861.5017
Living Conditions/572, SDDF. The NKID Press Office was already wary of Duranty
prior to his Paris trip, presumably because of his articles on the food shortages:
Podol'skii to Rozenberg, 29 November 1932, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 15, pap. 128, d.
328, l. 82. A Latvian diplomat in Moscow later reported that Duranty was "no longer
regarded as a friend of the Bolsheviks" in the fall of 1932; Felix Cole to Secretary of
State, 8 April 1933, 861.5017 Living Conditions/671, SDDF. Duranty frequently
compared even the most dire Soviet circumstances favorably to what he saw as a
reporter during World War I; see, for instance, "About the Author" in Walter Duranty,
One Life, One Kopeck (New York, 1937), which records that Duranty's wartime
service was "such a baptism of fire that nothing he saw afterwards in the Soviet Union
made him turn a hair."
27 Louis Fischer, "Fifteen Years of the Soviets," Nation 135 (23 November 1932): 495;
Fischer, "Stalin Faces the Peasant," Nation 136 (11 January 1933): 3941.
28. Diary entry, 4 October 1932, Malcolm Muggeridge Diary, Hoover Institution Archives,
Stanford University. Chamberlin may have heard from German attach Otto Schiller,
whom he called, in a 1968 interview, one of his four closest friends in Moscow; see
Robert H. Myers, "William Henry Chamberlin: His Views of the Soviet Union" (PhD
dissertation, Indiana University, 1973), 5455. On the speaking tour, see William Henry
Chamberlin, Confessions of an Individualist (New York, 1940), 154. One biographer
speculates that perhaps his "aversion to carnage" led him to leave Moscow: Michael
Samerdyke, "Explaining the Soviet Enigma: William Henry Chamberlin and the Soviet
Union, 19221945" (MA thesis, Ohio University, 1989), 72.
............ 96 ............
29. The Royal Institute talk appeared as William H. Chamberlin, "What Is Happening in
Russia?" International Affairs (London) 12 (March 1933): 187205. Soviet impressions
of the talk seem slightly optimistic in comparison with the published version: "Vypiska iz
dnevnika press-attashe polpredstva SSSR v Anglii Tolokonskogo," 23 November 1932,
AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 15, pap. 128, d. 328, ll. 1112; and Tolokonskii to Otdel Pechati, 3
December 1932, AVPRF, f. 05, op. 12, pap. 82, d. 15, ll. 99103. See also Chamberlin,
"Impending Change in Russia," Fortnightly Review, n.s. 139 (January 1, 1933): 10.
30. Diary entries for 16 and 28 September 1932, Muggeridge Diary; John Bright-Holmes,
introduction, Like It Was: The Diaries of Malcolm Muggeridge (London, 1981), 13.
31. Diary entries, 1 December 1932, 4 and 11 January 1933, Muggeridge Diary. On his trip
to the countryside see Muggeridge to Crozier [his editor at The Manchester Guardian], 14
January 1933, cited in Richard Ingrams, MuggeridgeThe Biography (New York, 1995),
64. The articles were published in The Manchester Guardian: "Famine in North
Caucasus," 25 March 1933; "Hunger in the Ukraine," 27 March 1933; and "Poor
Prospects for Harvest," 28 March 1933. His reports were apparently delayed and toned
down (he used the word "mangled") by his editors; see Marco Carynnyk, "The Famine
The Times Couldn't Find," Commentary 76 (November 1983): 33. See also Ingrams,
Muggeridge, 6269; and David Ayerst, The Guardian: Biography of a Newspaper
(London, 1971), 51113.
32. Improvementtelegram 24142, folder 4, Box 28, Henry Shapiro Papers, Library of
Congress; dramatelegram 10120, folder 7, Box 28; not hopelesstelegram 15134,
folder 7, Box 28; apathytelegram 12152, folder 8, Box 28. Shapiro was Lyons's
successor with the United Press syndicate in Moscow. Unfortunately, none of the
telegrams in these folders is dated.
33. This narrative is reconstructed from chapter 5 of Stoneman's autobiography (dated 1
March 1967), Box 1, William Stoneman Papers, Bentley Library, University of Michigan;
Stoneman interview with Whitman Bassow, 10 November 1984, Box 2, Whitman Bassow
Papers, Library of Congress. Also see Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 54546 and
Stoneman to Harrison Salisbury, 16 May 1979, cited in Taylor, Stalin's Apologist, 202,
235. Stoneman had always taken an interest in rural food supply, ending his first tour in
Russia (in 1932) with reflections on localized shortages; see Edward Brodie to Secretary of
State, 24 February 1932, 761.00/221, SDDF.
34. William Stoneman, "Russia Clamps Merciless Rule on Peasantry," Chicago Daily News
[dispatch filed 6 February 1933], found after page 16 of Stoneman's "Autobiography,"
Box 1, Stoneman Papers. See also Stoneman, "Little Liberty Permitted Foreigner in Kuban
Area," Chicago Daily News, 28 March 1933; Stoneman, "Communists Find It Easy to
Justify Peasant Exile," Chicago Daily News, 30 March 1933; Ralph Barnes, "Soviet
Terrorizes Famine Region by Night Raids for Hidden Grain," New York Herald-Tribune,
............ 97 ............
Not Worthy
6 February 1933. Barnes's high regard for Duranty's work might well suggest that Barnes
may have adopted Duranty's argument as his own; see Ralph Barnes to Joseph Barnes [no
relation], 4 June 1932, Box 6, Joseph Barnes Papers, Columbia University Library.
35. "Zapiska otdela pechati, poslannaia t. Molotovu," 25 February 1933, AVPRF, f. 05, op.
13, pap. 90, d. 13, ll. 4647.
36. "Conversation with Comrade Podolskii, chief Censor of Moscow Foreign office
Tuesday, 23 February 1933," Box 1, Stoneman Papers.
37. Walter Duranty, Duranty Reports Russia, selected and arranged by Gustavus Tuckerman,
Jr. (New York, 1934), 295 (dispatch dated 29 January 1933) [future citations will be page
number (dispatch date)]. Duranty, "Russia's Peasant: The Hub of a Vast Drama,"
Duranty Reports Russia, 265, 274 (2 February 1933), 304, 306 (27 February 1933).
38. "Russia Offers Inducements to Increase Farmer Output," Christian Science Monitor, 21
December 1932.
39. William H. Chamberlin, "Russia between Two Plans," New Republic 74 (15 February
1933): 78; Chamberlin, "Balance Sheet of the Five-Year Plan," Foreign Affairs (11 April
1933): 458, 466.
40. Duranty, Duranty Reports Russia, 31012 (2 March 1933). On the political departments,
see I. E. Zelenin, "Politotdely MTSProdolzhenie politiki 'chrezvychaishchiny'
(19331934 gg.)," Otechestvennaia istoriia (1992), No. 6: 4261.
41. "Famine in RussiaEnglishman's StoryWhat He Saw on a Walking Tour," Manchester
Guardian, 30 March 1933; Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "Russian Famine Now as Great as
Starvation of 1921, Says Secretary to Lloyd George," Chicago Daily News, 29 March
1933. Jones had worked with the leading British scholar of the Soviet Union, Bernard
Pares; see Sir Bernard Pares, A Wandering Student (Syracuse, New York, 1948), 30911.
42. Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 576. While the Press Office chief's name would today be
transliterated as Konstantin Umanskii, he wrote his name as used in the text above.
43. Sir Esmond Ovey to Foreign Office, 5 March 1933, in Carynnyk, Foreign Office and the
Famine, 215; Sackett to Secretary of State, 1 March 1933, 861.5017 Living
Conditions/595, SDDF, reprinted in M. Morris, Stalin's Famine, 17081; "Zapiska otdela
pechati, poslannaia t. Molotovu," 25 February 1933, AVPRF, f. 05, op. 13, pap. 90, d.
13, ll. 4647.
44. The party is not mentioned in Stoneman's "Autobiography" (Box 1, Stoneman Papers) or
in Robin Kincaid's recollections (interview, 18 February 1985, in unnumbered box,
............ 98 ............
Whitman Bassow Papers, Library of Congress). Lyons's later recollections are quoted
from Crowl, Angels in Stalin's Paradise, 161, citing letters from Lyons (20 June 1977) and
from Armand Paul Ginsberg for Lyons (2 July 1977). Duranty biographer S. J. Taylor
shares some of my doubts: Stalin's Apologist, 207, 23536.
45. Walter Duranty, "Russians Hungry, but Not Starving," NYT, 31 March 1933. He used
the phrase earlier, in a poetic effort: Duranty, "Red Square," NYT Magazine, 18
September 1932.
46. Fischer, Men and Politics, 20609; reports on Fischer's lectures appear in "'New Deal'
Needed for Entire World, Says Visiting Author," Denver Post, 1 April 1933, cited in
Crowl, Angels in Stalin's Paradise, 157; "Too Much Freedom Given to Russia's Women,
Says Writer," San Francisco News, 11 April 1933; and "New Economic Society Coming
out of Russia," Milwaukee Leader, 14 March 1933, both in Box 60, Louis Fischer Papers,
Mudd Library, Princeton University; Fischer, "Russia's Last Hard Year," Nation 137
(9 August 1933): 154.
47. Duranty, Duranty Reports Russia, 313 (6 April 1933); Walter Duranty, "Soviet Peasants
Are More Helpful," NYT, 14 May 1933 (dateline Odessa, by mail to Paris, 26 April
1933). On the trip routing, see Duranty to James, n.d. [mid-April 1933?]; and James to
Duranty, 21 April 1933, both on reel 32, James Papers; Duranty, I Write As I Please
(New York, 1935), 61.
48. "Mr. Jones Replies" [letter to the editor], NYT, 13 May 1933.
49. Duranty to New York Times, 17 June 1933, and James to Arthur Sulzberger, 17 June
1933, both on reel 33, James Papers. Duranty to H. R. Knickerbocker, 27 June 1933,
catalogued correspondence, H. R. Knickerbocker Papers, Columbia University Library.
Walter Duranty, Russian Suffering Justified by Reds," NYT, 9 July 1933. One Life, One
Kopeckthe title of Duranty's first novelis a translation of the phrase zhizn' kopeika.
50. Walter Duranty, "Russian Emigres Push Fight on Reds," NYT, 12 August 1933. Duranty
to James, 19, 20 and 22 August 1933, James to Duranty, 22 August 1933, all on reel 33,
James Papers. "Moscow Doubles Price of Bread" [AP ], NYT, 21 August 1933; Duranty,
"Famine Report Scorned," NYT, 27 August 1933.
51. Duranty to Frederick Birchall, 23 August 1933, reel 63, James Papers. "Cardinal Asks Aid
in Russian Famine," NYT, 20 August 1933; Birchall, "Famine in Russia Held Equal of
1921," NYT, 25 August 1933.
52. On Duranty's dissatisfaction see Duranty to James, 15 August 1933, Adolph Ochs Papers,
New York Times Archive; Duranty to Birchall, 15 August 1933, reel 63, James Papers;
and Whitman Bassow, The Moscow Correspondents: Reporting Russia from the
............ 99 ............
Not Worthy
Revolution to Glasnost (New York, 1988), 88. His editors' complaints are contained in
James to Sulzberger, 2 August 1933, Birchall to James, 16 August 1933, both in personnel
files, Arthur Hays Sulzberger Papers, New York Times Archive; James to Sulzberger, 23
August 1933, reel 63, James Papers; James to Adolph Ochs, 5 September 1933, Ochs
Papers. The NKID Press Office was well aware of these tensions; see Podol'skii diary, 31
December 1933, AVPRF, f. 0129, op. 15, pap. 128a, d. 335, l. 16.
53. Edward Coote to Sir John Simon, 12 September 1933, in Carynnyk, Foreign Office and
the Famine, 307.
54. Duranty to James, 28 August 1933, James to Duranty, 29 August 1933, Birchall to James,
31 August 1933, all on reel 33, James Papers. Litvinov to Iagoda, 13 September 1933,
AVPRF, f. 05, op. 13, pap. 90, d. 14, l. 73.
55. Walter Duranty, "Soviet Is Winning Faith of Peasants," NYT, 11 September 1933;
Duranty, "Abundance Found in North Caucasus," NYT, 16 September 1933; Duranty,
"Big Soviet Crop Follows Famine," NYT, 16 September 1933; Duranty, "Soviet's Progress
Marked in a Year," NYT, 21 September 1933.
56. Lyons, Assignment in Utopia, 57980. "Mrs. McCormick" refers to distinguished New
York Times foreign correspondent Anne O'Hare McCormick, then visiting the Lyonses. A
similar story appears in Malcolm Muggeridge, Chronicles of Wasted Time (London,
1972), 1: 25455; Strang to Simon, 26 September 1933, in Carynnyk, Foreign Office and
the Famine, 31013.
57. Chamberlin, Confessions of an Individualist, 15455; "Soviet Restricts Alien Reports as
Food Wanes," Christian Science Monitor, 21 August 1933.
58. Chamberlin to Calvin Hoover, 25 September 1933, Addition to Calvin Hoover Papers,
Duke University Archives; William H. Chamberlin, "Diary of an Onlooker in Moscow,"
Christian Science Monitor, 17 August 1933.
59. Stoneman to Samuel Harper, 12 October 1933, Box 18, Samuel Northrop Harper Papers,
University of Chicago; Strang to Simon, 14 October 1933, in Carynnyk, Foreign Office and
the Famine, 334. The Chamberlin-Strang friendship (mentioned in a 1968 interview) is
reported in Myers, "William Henry Chamberlin," 5455though Strang makes no mention
of Chamberlin in his memoir, William Strang, Home and Abroad (London, 1956).
60. All Manchester Guardian: "Second Agrarian Revolution," 17 October 1933; "Some
Cossack Villages," 18 October 1933; "Ukrainian District's Good Harvest," 19 October
1933; "New Russian AgricultureTwo Main Types," 20 October 1933; "Villages around
KievFinal Impressions," 21 October 1933.
............ 100 ............
61. Walter Duranty, "Russia's Ledger: Gain and Cost," Duranty Reports Russia, 32941 (1
October 1933).
62. Chamberlin discussed the famine (quoted above) in William Henry Chamberlin, Russia's
Iron Age (Boston, 1934), 7677. Recollections that place the famine as a central event in
Chamberlin's Russian career include Chamberlin, "My Russian Education," in We Cover
the World by Sixteen Foreign Correspondents (New York, 1937), 238; Chamberlin,
Confessions of an Individualist, 143; Chamberlin, Evolution of a Conservative (Chicago,
1959), 11. Thanks to D'Ann Penner for stressing the nature of Chamberlin's later views.
63. William Henry Chamberlin, "Ordeal of the Russian Peasantry," Foreign Affairs 12 (April
1934): 503, 505; Chamberlin, "The Balance Sheet of the Five-Year Plan," Foreign Affairs
11 (April 1933): 458, 466; Chamberlin, "As One Foreign Correspondent to Another,"
Christian Science Monitor Magazine, 2 May 1934. While many critics of Duranty and
Fischer have cited the chapter in Chamberlin's Russia's Iron Age entitled "The Ordeal of
the Russian Peasantry," fewer have cited his article with the same title in Foreign Affairs.
Although the materials appear to have been written within a month of each otherand
many paragraphs appear in both piecesthey differ substantially in tone. The stand-alone
article focuses on character traits such as apathy and tenacity far more than the book
does. One intermediate argument connects peasant apathy to the economic and extraeconomic measures of the Soviet state. See Chamberlin, "Russia without the Benefit of a
Censor: Famine Proves Strong Weapon in Soviet Policy," Christian Science Monitor, 29
May 1934.
64. Fischer to Alexander Gumberg, 5 November 1933, folder 2, Box 7, Alexander Gumberg
Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison. Louis Fischer, "Class War in
Spain," Nation 138 (18 April 1934): 437; Fischer, "In Russia Life Grows Easier," Nation
138 (13 June 1934): 667, 668; Fischer, "Moscow Reports Progress," Fortnightly Review,
n.s., 135 (June 1934): 65157.
65. Louis Fischer, Soviet Journey (New York, 1935), 174, 108, 17072 (on famine). The trip
through Ukraine is described in Fischer, "Soviet Progress and Poverty," Nation 135 (7
December 1932): 55255.
66. The articles appeared under the byline "Thomas Walker" in the New York Evening
Journal, 18, 19, 21, 25 and 27 February 1935, as cited in Dalrymple, "Soviet Famine of
19321934," 256 n. 46. Louis Fischer, "Hearst's Russian 'Famine,'" Nation 140 (13
March 1935): 29697.
67. William Henry Chamberlin, "The Ukrainian Famine" [letter to the editor], Nation 140
(29 May 1935): 629; Fischer, "Louis Fischer's Interpretation" [reply], ibid, 62930;
Lyons, Red Decade, 141. See also Freda Kirchwey's letters to Fischer, 14 and 22 March
1935, and June 1935, folder 168, Box 10, Freda Kirchwey Papers, Schlesinger Library,
............ 101 ............
Not Worthy
Radcliffe College. This last letter noted the extensive controversy about the ChamberlinFischer exchange and celebrated the resulting increase in newsstand sales.
68. Louis Fischer, untitled essay in The God That Failed: Six Studies in Communism, Richard
Crossman, ed, (1949; reprinted edition., New York, 1959), 18889.
69. Walter Duranty, Stalin and Co.: The PolitburoThe Men Who Run Russia (London,
1949), 6869; Taylor, Stalin's Apologist, 23637. Duranty is loosely translating Stalin's
speech of 11J January 1933, "O rabote v derevne," Sochineniia, 13 volumes (Moscow,
1952), 13: 233, italics in original.
70. Fischer is quoted in Experiences in Russia1931: A Diary (Pittsburgh, 1931), 85. Other
instances include H. R. Knickerbocker (a journalist and close friend of Duranty's),
"Everyday Russia," in The New Russia: Eight Talks Broadcast by the BBC (London,
1931), 21; Bruce Hopper to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, 18 January 1930, Box 35,
Armstrong Papers; and Boris Brutzkus, Economic Planning in Soviet Russia (London,
1935), 226.
71. See, for instance, Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and
Social Thought in the Depression Years (New York, 1973); Paul Hollander, Political
Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba (1984;
reprinted edition, Lanham, Md., 1991), chapter 3; Frank A. Warren, Liberals and
Communism: The "Red Decade" Reconsidered (New York, 1966); John P. Diggins,
"Limping after Reality: American Intellectuals, the Six Myths of the USSR, and the
Precursors of Anti-Stalinism," in Il mito dell'URSS: La cultura occidentale e l'Unione
Sovietica, Marcello Flores, ed, (Milan, 1990); and Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor?
Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United
States, 19271947," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 93762.
72. Calvin B. Hoover, Economic Life in Soviet Russia (New York, 1931), 85.
73. S. and P. P. Zavorotnyi, "Operatsiia Golod: Vosem' mesiatsev 193233 goda unesla
milliony krest'ianskhikh zhiznei," Komsomol'skaia pravda, 3 February 1990.
74. William Henry Chamberlin, "Some Cossack Villages," Manchester Guardian, 18 October
1933; Duranty, I Write As I Please, 288.
75. While finding many commonalities in the Soviet and Chinese famines Thomas P. Bernstein
also notes differences, most notably that Soviet authorities (unlike the Chinese twenty-five
years later) saw the peasants as the enemy of the state; see Bernstein, "Stalinism, Famine
and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great Leap Forward," Theory and
Society 13 (May 1984): 33978. I am also indebted to D'Ann Penner's published
("Agrarian 'Strike'") and unpublished work for comparisons of the Soviet and Chinese
............ 102 ............
famines. General background on the origins and operations of the Great Leap Forward
can be gleaned from Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution,
Volume 2, The Great Leap Forward, 195860 (New York, 1983), especially chapters 5, 8;
and David Bachman, Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional
Origins of the Great Leap Forward (Cambridge, 1991).
76. Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine (New York, 1996), chapter 18. More
careful analyses are found in Penny Kane, Famine in China, 195861: Demographic and
Social Implications (New York, 1988), 8490.
77. Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today (New York, 1962), 61920;
also chapter 81, "Facts about Food"; S. Bernard Thomas, Season of High Adventure:
Edgar Snow in China (Berkeley, California, 1996), 30608.
78. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, revised and enlarged edition (New York, 1968), 216.
79. On the USSR in the 1930s see, for example, Sir Bernard Pares, "The New Crisis in
Russia," Slavonic and East European Review 11 (1933): 490; Hans Kohn, "The
Europeanization of the Orient," Political Science Quarterly 52 (1937): 264. On China in
the 1950s see two retrospectives by American development economists: George Rosen,
Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Change in South Asia (Baltimore,
1985); and W. W. Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Foreign Aid (Austin, Texas, 1985),
chapters 46.
80. "Wheat and Chaff" [editorial], Far Eastern Economic Review 29 (29 September 1960):
691. While Becker cites this article disapprovingly (Hungry Ghosts, 299), he does not put
it in the context of that magazine's rather pessimistic view of the Chinese economic plan;
the remainder of the editorial, in fact, is a complaint about China's press policies.
81. On Western responses to the famine of 19581960 see Becker, Hungry Ghosts, chapter
20; Steven W. Mosher, China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality (New
York, 1990), 11018 and Article 19, Starving in Silence: A Report on Censorship and
Famine (London, 1990).
82. Ross Terrill, "Mao in History," National Interest 52 (Summer 1998): 5463. For brief
analyses of this shift, see Mosher, China Misperceived, 12438, 17786; Andrew J.
Nathan, "Setting the Scene: Confessions of a China Specialist," in Nathan, China's Crisis:
Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy (New York, 1990) and Harry
Harding, "The Evolution of Scholarship on Contemporary China," in American Studies
of Contemporary China, David Shambaugh, (Washington, DC, 1993).
83. Nobel laureate W. Arthur Lewis was among those calling attention to this relationship;
see The Theory of Economic Growth (London, 1955), 431. For more detailed discussions
............ 103 ............
Not Worthy
of the Soviet model in development economics, see Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of
Communism to the Peoples of Underdeveloped Areas," Economic Development and
Cultural Change 1 (1952): 2236. Also see Francis Seton, "Planning and Economic
Growth: Asia, Africa, and the Soviet Model," Soviet Survey 31 (JanuaryMarch 1960):
4854; W. Donald Bowles, "Soviet Russia as a Model for Underdeveloped Countries,"
World Politics 14 (March 1962): 483504; and Charles K. Wilber, The Soviet Model and
Underdeveloped Countries (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1969). On the origins and
implications of the term "Third World" see Martin W. Lewis and Kren E. Wigen, The
Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley, California, 1997), 19093;
and especially Carl E. Pletsch, "The Three Worlds and the Division of Social-Scientific
Labor, circa 195075," Comparative Studies in Society and History 23 (October 1981):
56590.
84. Rostow and Black represent important, economically oriented, strands of modernization
theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s, though far from the only ones. Other scholars
associated with "modernization" concepts, such as Alex Inkeles, also undertook studies of
the Soviet Union. Though Rostow's original training was in economic historyhis PhD
dissertation analyzed economic growth in nineteenth-century Englandhe also wrote a
widely circulated book on the Soviet Union (The Dynamics of Soviet Society [New York,
1953]); see also W. W. Rostow, "Marx Was a City Boy, or Why Communism May Fail,"
Harper's Magazine 210 (February 1955): 2530. For biographical details on Rostow see
his reminiscences, "Development: The Political Economy of the Marshallian Long
Period," in Pioneers in Development, Gerald M. Meiers and Dudley Sears, eds, (Oxford,
1984). Critiques of modernization theory have been a growth industry in recent years; see
Adas, Machines as the Measure of Man, 40218; Ian Roxborough, "Modernization
Theory Revisited: A Review Article," Comparative Studies in Society and History 30
(1988): 75361; and especially Michael Edward Latham, "Modernization as Ideology:
Social Science Theory, National Identity, and American Foreign Policy, 19611963" (PhD
dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1996, forthcoming, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina., 2000). I have also learned much about the meanings of modernization theory
from ongoing discussions and disagreements with Nils Gilman, who is currently
completing his dissertation on the topic.
85. On the paper's title see the exchanges between Gerschenkron and conference organizer
Bert Hoselitz in Box 8, series HUG 45.10, Alexander Gerschenkron Papers, Pusey Library,
Harvard University. The article appeared originally in The Progress of Underdeveloped
Areas, Bert F. Hoselitz, ed, (Chicago, 1952), and was later reprinted in Gerschenkron,
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1962), and in many other collections. An excellent summary and critique
of Gerschenkron's scholarship is offered by a former student: D. N. McCloskey, "Kinks,
Tools, Spurts, and Substitutes: Gerschenkron's Rhetoric of Relative Backwardness," in
Patterns of Industrialization: The Nineteenth Century, Richard Sylla and Gianni Toniolo,
eds, (London, 1991), 92107.
............ 104 ............
86. W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto

(Cambridge, 1960), especially 2224; this relationship between agriculture and industry,
of course, did not fit only the USSR. Rostow began working out these stages in a more
abstract work, The Process of Economic Growth (New York, 1952).
87. Cyril E. Black, "The Modernization of Russia," in Black, ed, The Transformation of
Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change since 1861 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960);
see also Black's essay, "The Nature of Imperial Russian Society," along with commentary
by Hugh Seton-Watson and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky in Slavic Review 20 (December
1961): 565600. Black's key work on modernization theory is The Dynamics of
Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New York, 1966). A similarly ambitious
claim for modernization theory, that every problem in the world is related to
modernization, is made in Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors
(New York, 1972), 1.
88. Cyril E. Black, "The Modernization of Russia," in Black, Transformation of Russian
Society, 667, 672, 679. See also Black, "Russian History and Soviet Politics," testimony
to the Subcommittee on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the Committee on Armed
Services, March 18, 1970, reprinted in Black, Understanding Soviet Politics: The
Perspective of Russian History (Boulder, Colorado, 1986), 1415.
89. Black, Dynamics, 27, 33, 159. "Tradition and Modernity," lecture to the Summer
Institute on "Global Interdependence and New Jersey Education," 15 July 1985, Box 4,
Cyril E. Black Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University.
90. Black, Dynamics, 164. In that work, Black outlined a taxonomy of seven types of
modernization based primarily on timing and political systems. See 10628.
91. W. W. Rostow and Max F. Millikan, A Proposal: A Key to an Effective Foreign Policy
(New York, 1957), 22. This book represented Rostow's first major effort to apply his
development theories to foreign policy. For the connections between Rostow's economic
scholarship and foreign policies (especially in the Kennedy White House), see John
Lodewijks, "Rostow, Developing Economies, and National Security Policy," in History
and Political Economy, Annual Supplement, 23 (1991): 285310; and Latham,
"Modernization as Ideology".
92. Alexander Gerschenkron, "The Early Phases of Industrialization in Russia: Afterthoughts
and Counterthoughts," in The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth:
Proceedings of a Conference Held by the International Economic Association, W. W.
Rostow, ed, (London, 1963), 15556; Gerschenkron, "Problems and Patterns of Russian
Economic Development," in Black, Transformation of Russian Society, 71; Gerschenkron,
Economic Backwardness, 186; Gerschenkron, review of The Socialized Agriculture of the
USSR, by Naum Jasny (1950), in Gerschenkron, Continuity in History and Other Essays
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968), 481.
............ 105 ............
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93. The frequent application of "oriental despotism" to Russia and the Soviet Union deserves
a fuller discussion than can be provided here. See, of course, Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental
Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, Connecticut, 1957) and
the rebuttal of sorts in Lewis and Wigen, Myth of Continents, 9397. The connections
between Wittfogel's writings and Russian discourses of "Asia" are explored in detail in G.
L. Ulmen, The Science of Society: Toward an Understanding of the Life and Work of Karl
August Wittfogel (The Hague, 1978), 24561, 35254. For longer-term historical roots
see Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe; and Donald M. Lowe, The Function of "China" in
Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Berkeley, California, 1966).
94. Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Le Peng Don't
Understand about Asia," New Republic 217 (July 14, 1997): 3340; Sen, "Freedom
Favors Development (Elections after the End of History)," New Perspectives Quarterly 13
(Fall 1996): 2327; Sen, "Liberty and Poverty: Political Rights and Economics," Current
(May 1994): 2228. See also a special issue of Journal of Democracy (8 [April 1997])
devoted to the topic "Hong Kong, Singapore, and 'Asian Values.'" The Asian financial
crisis of the winter of 19971998 prompted other criticisms of "Asian values": Francis
Fukuyama, "Asian Values and the Asian Crisis," Commentary 105 (February 1998):
2327; Milton Friedman, "Asian Values: Real Lesson of Hong Kong," National Review
49 (December 31, 1997): 3637. Among the best summaries of development economics
are those by participants; see especially Albert O. Hirschman, "The Rise and Decline of
Development Economics," in his Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond
(Cambridge, 1981); and H. W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea
(Chicago, 1987). For recent works, see, for instance, Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of
Development Theory (Bloomington, Indiana, 1996); and especially the contributions in
International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of
Knowledge, Frederick Cooper and Randall Packer, eds, (Berkeley, 1997).
95. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Politics of Underdevelopment," World Politics 9 (October
1956): 60.
............ 106 ............
............ 107 ............
Not Worthy
Ukrainians demand Pulitzer be revoked

VICTOR MALAREK
The Globe and Mail, 2 May 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Globe and Mail
More than 45,000 postcards were mailed yesterday to the Pulitzer Prize
Committee demanding that it posthumously revoke a New York Times
journalists award because of his reports that a man-made famine that killed
millions of peasants in Ukraine in 1932-1933 never happened.
The postcard campaign, spearheaded by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil
Liberties Association in Toronto, points out that New York Times
correspondent Walter Duranty lied about the famine in his dispatches from
Russia, saying that any report of a famine is today an exaggeration or
malignant propaganda.
The campaign was launched to mark the 70th anniversary of the Ukrainian
famine.
Lubomyr Luciuk, research director for the association, said Mr. Duranty was
a consummate liar whose reports covered up a brutal genocide. The Pulitzer
Prize committee should maintain its integrity by revoking posthumously the
Prize it awarded to a man who lied.
Mr. Duranty, who was The Timess Moscow correspondent from 1921 to
1934, on the Pulitzer for a series of reports in 1931 about Soviet dictator
Joseph Stalins Five-Year Plan to reform the economy.
............ 108 ............
However, archives turned up years later reveal that Mr. Duranty admitted
privately to a high-ranking diplomat at the British embassy in Moscow in
September, 1933, that it is quite possible that as many as 10 million people
may have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union
during the past year.
Sig Gissler, administrator for the Pulitzer Prizes, said that the Board is aware of
the complaints. Theyve come up from time to time through the years. He
noted that the Board gave the issue substantial consideration in 1990 and
after careful consideration of the issue, it decided not to withdraw the Prize
that was given over 70 years ago in a different time under different
circumstances. He added that the Board is not considering reversing its stand.
Mr. Gissler also pointed out that Mr. Duranty, who died in 1957, received the
award for his reporting in 1931 on Stalins Five-Year Plan. It is inaccurate to
say the Prize was given for his reporting on the famine, which occurred in
1932-1933.
Mr. Luciuk countered that throughout his stint in Moscow, Mr. Duranty was
nothing more than a propagandist for Stalin. How can he be honest one year
and a liar the very next? He is a stain on the Pulitzer Prize and he should not
be honoured as an outstanding journalist in any way.
Mr. Luciuk said Mr. Duranty betrayed the most fundamental principle of
journalism by not truthfully reporting on what he witnessed. Over many
years, in fact, he did just the opposite, and viciously smeared as
propagandists those honest journalists who dared tell the truth. He said the
Prize should be revoked to preserve the integrity of journalism and the
stature of the Pulitzer Prize. Those who say that his Prize was earned for
what he wrote before 1932 are being disingenuous, he said. Duranty was
used as a shill for the Soviets before, during and after the Great Famine.
Perhaps those who honoured him with a Pulitzer in 1932 did not fully know
just how dishonest he was. Now we, and the jurors of the Pulitzer Prize
committee, and the editors, writers and owners of The New York Times,
know better.
............ 109 ............
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In his dispatches, Mr. Duranty, one of the first Western journalists allowed to
interview Stalin, repeatedly dismissed reports of the famine in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, peasants in the countryside were starving to death by the millions
while Soviet authorities confiscated crops, grain and livestock in an effort to
force collectivization on the independence-minded farmers. British writer
Malcolm Muggeridge, who reported on the famine for The Manchester
Guardian, once called Mr. Duranty the greatest liar of any journalist I have
ever met in 50 years of journalism.
Catherine Mathis, vice-president of corporate communications for The New
York Times, said the newspaper has criticized Mr. Durantys reporting. In a
display of its Pulitzer Prize winners, The Times points out that other writers
in The Times and elsewhere have discredited this coverage.
............ 110 ............
Undoing history, or righting a wrong?

Editorial, The Ukrainian Weekly, 4 May 2003
Earlier this year, the call went out to Ukrainian Americans to write letters
to the Pulitzer Prize Board seeking the revocation of the Pulitzer Prize
awarded in 1932 to Walter Duranty of The New York Times. That action
was meant to attract the attention of the Board just before its
deliberations about this years crop of Pulitzer Prizes. We have no way of
knowing how many letters were sent, but we do know that Sig Gissler,
administrator of the Pulitzer Prizes, sent out form letters responding that
complaints about the Prize for Mr. Duranty have been raised on and off
through the years. However, to date, the Pulitzer Board has not seen fit to
reverse a previous Boards decision that now stretches back 70 years.
Furthermore, he noted that Durantys Prize in 1932 was for a specific set
of stories in the previous year - namely, 1931 - not the years of the
Famine of 1932-1933.
What he neglected to mention, however, was the Durantys Prize was given
for a series of articles - especially the working out of the Five-Year Plan.
That Five-Year Plan, as we all know, called for the forced collectivization of
farms, which led to the Great Famine in Ukraine. Duranty effusively praised
Stalins Five-Year Plan. His subsequent stories denied the Famine at the
same time that he told others that millions - perhaps as many as 10 million
- had perished. Indeed Durantys role in Moscow was more that of a
propagandist for Stalin than a correspondent.
............ 111 ............
Not Worthy
In 1986, Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, when asked if the newspaper
would return Durantys Pulitzer, replied: what we report has to stand, for
better or worse, as our best contemporary effort. ... That contemporary
Pulitzer jurors thought him worthy of a Prize for the things he did write from
Moscow is a judgment I am neither equipped nor entitled to second-guess at
this date. ... it is not a Prize The Times can take back.
In 1987, Times executive editor Max Frankel - reacting to the revelation in a
recently declassified State Department document that in agreement with The
New York Times and the Soviet authorities, the dispatches of Duranty always
reflect(ed) the official opinion of the Soviet regime and not his own - said
this doesnt seem to qualify as news. Its really history, and belongs in history
books.
In 1990, Karl A. Meyer of The Times, in a feature on its editorial page called
The Editorial Notebook, acknowledged that what Duranty wrote from his
post in Moscow constituted some of the worst reporting to appear in this
newspaper.
In 2001, in the book Written into History, which contains Pulitzer reporting of
the 20th century from The Times, there is a parenthetical notation after
Durantys name: Other writers in The Times and elsewhere have discredited
this coverage. Elsewhere it is noted that Durantys Prize has come under a
cloud; his reporting ignored the reality of Stalins mass murder.
Earlier this year, contacted by The Washington Times about the campaign to
revoke Durantys Pulitzer, Catherine Mathis, vice-president of corporate
communications for The New York Times Company, was quoted as saying:
The Pulitzer Board has reviewed the Duranty Prize several times over the
years, and the Board has never seen fit to revoke it. In that situation, The Times
has not seen merit in trying to undo history.
But this campaign is not about undoing history. Its about righting a wrong. If
The Times does not want to do the right thing - as it has demonstrated over and
over again - and voluntarily relinquish Durantys ill-gotten Pulitzer, then the
Pulitzer Prize Board must act to undo this injustice. No other response will do.
............ 112 ............
Pulitzer Prize Board begins review of Durantys award

ANDREW NYNKA
The Ukrainian Weekly, 25 May 2003
In response to an international campaign, The Pulitzer Prize Board has begun

an appropriate and serious review of the award given to Walter Duranty
of The New York Times, an administrator of the Pulitzer Prizes said on May
20. The Boards administrator said in a telephone interview that the review
began as a result of the thousands of letters and e-mails the Board received
in early May. A confidential review by the 18-member Pulitzer Prize Board is
intended to seriously consider all relevant information regarding Mr.
Durantys award, said Sig Gissler, administrator for the Pulitzer Prizes.
There are no written procedures regarding Prize revocation. There are no
standards or precedents for revoking the Prize. We look at what would be
reasonable and analyze the factors that would have to be considered, Mr.
Gissler said, referring to the fact that since the creation of the Pulitzer Prizes
in 1917 the Board has never revoked an award. Complaints regarding a
particular Pulitzer winner are not uncommon, Mr. Gissler said. However, he
did say that in this case, the Board received an unusually large number of
letters and postcards. The letters, postcards and e-mails the Pulitzer office
received since the campaign began this spring have not yet been accurately
counted, but Mr. Gissler did say that the number was in the thousands. Most
of the correspondence has come from the United States and Canada, Mr.
Gissler said, although he did remember seeing return mailing addresses from
England and Australia as well.
............ 113 ............
Not Worthy
The campaign to posthumously strip Mr. Duranty of his award was initiated
by Dr. Lubomyr Luciuk, director of research for the Ukrainian Canadian Civil
Liberties Association, as a way to call further attention to the 70th anniversary
commemoration of the Great Famine of 1932-1933. While the issue recently
gained steam, Mr. Durantys Pulitzer Prize has always been contentious within
the Ukrainian community. Many are angered that The New York Times
correspondent is still honoured with one of journalisms most prestigious
awards even though information shows he repeatedly lied to and knowingly
misled his readers about the situation in Ukraine in order to curry favour with
the Soviet regime then in power. Mr. Gissler pointed out that the awards are
given for a specific story or set of stories in the year prior to when the award
is announced. In Mr. Durantys case, he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for
Correspondence for a series of dispatches that occurred in 1931 - a year before
the Famine began.
According to the Pulitzer website, The New York Times correspondent won the
award in 1932 for his series of dispatches on Russia, especially the working
out of the Five-Year Plan.
However, in a letter sent to Mr. Gissler on 26 April, Dr. Luciuk wrote: To try
and dodge this issue by suggesting that his Prize was given for what [Mr.
Duranty] wrote before the Great Famine is a sophistry, for Duranty was
already serving Soviet interests by 1931, and would continue doing so for
many years thereafter. Duranty prostituted his calling for personal gain and, as
such, his continuing grasp on a Pulitzer Prize soils all Pulitzer Prizes.
The campaign asked that the Pulitzer Prize Board revoke Mr. Durantys Prize
for a series of knowingly erroneous reports he made from the former Soviet
Union, including the Ukrainian countryside, while a famine was happening
there.
The campaign - which was supported by the Association of Ukrainians of
Great Britain, the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations, the
Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the Ukrainian American Justice Committee, the
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America and the Ukrainian World Congress
............ 114 ............
- was meant to attract the Pulitzer Boards attention to the issue at a time when
the Board comes together to discuss candidates for the award. Mr. Gissler did
not say when such a review would be completed and would not speculate on
whether there were any circumstances under which a Pulitzer would be
revoked.
............ 115 ............
Not Worthy
Resolution on the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide

Senate of Canada
Moved by the Honourable Senator Raynell Andreychuk

19 June 2003
That this House calls upon the Government of Canada:
to recognize the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 and

to condemn any attempt to deny or distort this historical truth as
being anything less than genocide;
to designate the fourth Saturday in November of every year
throughout Canada as a day of remembrance of the more than
seven million Ukrainians who fell victim to the Ukrainian
Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933; and
to call on all Canadians, particularly historians, educators and
parliamentarians, to include the true facts of the Ukrainian
Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 in the records of Canada and in
future educational material.
GIVEN THAT the Genocide of Ukrainians (now commonly referred to as the
Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 and referred to as such in this
Motion) engineered and executed by the Soviet regime under Stalin to destroy
all opposition to its imperialist policies, caused the deaths of over seven million
Ukrainians in 1932 and 1933;
THAT on 26 November 1998, the President of Ukraine issued a Presidential
Decree establishing that the fourth Saturday in November be a National Day
of Remembrance for the victims of this mass atrocity;
............ 116 ............
THAT the fourth Saturday in November has been recognized by Ukrainian

communities throughout the world as a day to remember the victims of the
Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 and to promote the fundamental
freedoms of a democratic society;
THAT it is recognized that information about the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide
of 1932-1933 was suppressed, distorted, or wiped out by Soviet authorities;
THAT it is only now that some proper and accurate information is emerging
from the former Soviet Union about the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 19321933;
THAT many survivors of the Ukrainian Famine/Genocide of 1932-1933 have
immigrated to Canada and contributed to its positive development;
THAT Canada condemns all war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocides;
AND THAT Canadians cherish and defend human rights, and value the
diversity and multicultural nature of Canadian society.
............ 117 ............
Not Worthy
A Tale of Two Journalists:

Walter Duranty, Gareth Jones, and the Pulitzer Prize
JAMES MACE
The Day, 15 July 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Day (Kyiv) and the author
On 24 June the Pulitzer Prize Committee was sent an open letter by Dr. Margaret
Siriol Colley and Nigel Linsan Colley, too long to be recounted here in full. The
lady is the niece of one Gareth Jones (1905-1935), a journalist who had had the
courage to tell the truth about the despicable things he had seen in Ukraine in
the spring of 1933. For his courage he paid with his professional reputation and
being long all but forgotten. The hatchet man in this tale was one Walter
Duranty, winner of the 1932 Pulitzer Prize for writing stories from the Soviet
Union, reportage that he had already freely confessed always reflected the
official Soviet point of view and not his own. And here begins a tale of one
journalist being crushed for his honesty and another rewarded for his mendacity.
It is a tale that touches directly both on the ethics of journalism and the history
of Ukraine.
Journalists often like to think of themselves as fearless fighters for the publics
right to know the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. To reward
those who actually did so an extremely successful Hungarian-born American
journalist named Joseph Pulitzer willed that his legacy be used in part to fund
Prizes in his name for outstanding achievements in drama, letters, music, and
journalism. The Prizes, modest in money but tremendous in terms of the
honour they convey on their recipients, have been awarded annually since
............ 118 ............
1917. In reality, journalists, like everyone else, are rarely completely faithful to
the ideals they profess. And Prizes, even prestigious ones like the Pulitzer,
sometimes go to scoundrels. Dr. Colley demands the revocation of the Pulitzer
Prize from the scoundrel that led a campaign for Stalins Soviet Union from the
most prestigious newspaper in the United States, The New York Times, to
discredit her uncle for honestly trying to do what journalists are supposed to
do, for telling people the truth.
Walter Duranty, born in Liverpool (England) in 1884, was always something
of a scoundrel and openly relished in being able to get away with it. In S. J.
Taylors excellent biography, Stalins Apologist, he is seen lying even about his
own family origins, claiming in his autobiography to have been an only child
orphaned at ten, neither of which was true: his mother died in 1916 and his
sister fourteen years later, a spinster; when his father died in 1933, he left an
estate of only 430 British pounds sterling.
After finishing his university studies, he drifted to Paris, where he dabbled in
Satanism, opium, and sex on both sides of the bed-sheets. By the time World
War I broke out, he had a job as a reporter for The New York Times and could
thus avoid actual combat. Duranty seems to have known that the key to
success in journalism can often be in first determining what the readers want
and then gauging how the facts might fit in with it. His reportage was always
lively, eminently readable, and usually but by no means always had some
relationship to the facts. Still, he realized that in the American free press,
newspapers are made to make money for their owners, and the reporters job
is to write something people would want to read enough that they would go
out and buy his employers newspaper. It is the classic relationship between
labour and management in a market economy: the more effective a worker is
at helping his employer make more money, the better chance he stands of
getting higher pay, a better job, or other attributes of worldly success.
For Duranty, this system seems to have worked quite well. After the war, he
was sent to the newly independent Baltic States and in 1921 was among the
first foreign reporters allowed into the Soviet Union. This latter achievement
was a major one, for the Soviet Union was never shy about exercising control
............ 119 ............
Not Worthy
over who could come or leave. A Western reporter in the Soviet Union always
knew that if one wrote something offensive enough to the Soviet authorities,
he would be expelled and never allowed to return.
There was thus a strong professional incentive not to be that person. Duranty
understood this better than anyone else, but just in case someone among the
journalists forgot this simple truth, there was a Soviet press officer to remind
him. During the First Five-Year Plan, the head of the Soviet Press Office was
Konstantin Umansky (or Oumansky: he liked it better the French way). Eugene
Lyons, who had known Umansky at a distance since he had been a TASS
correspondent in the United States and the latter chief of its Foreign Bureau,
probably knew this little man with black curly hair and gold teeth as well as
any of the foreign correspondents. He described the system as more one of
give- and-take, with the foreign correspondents sometimes backing the censor
down through a show of professional solidarity (it would have been, after all,
too much of an embarrassment for the Soviets to expel all the foreign
correspondents), often in a spirit of give-and-take and compromise. But the
telegraph office would simply not send cables without Umanskys permission.
Moreover, convinced that the Soviet experiment was so much superior to the
all too evident evils of capitalism, a huge segment of the Wests intellectuals
wanted desperately to look with hope on the Soviet experiment, which, for all
its failures, seemed to offer a beacon. And in a world where access to
newsmakers is often the only thing between having something to print or not,
access to power itself becomes a commodity. As Lyons himself put it his
memoir, Assignment in Utopia (1937):
The real medium of exchange in Moscow, buying that which neither

rubles nor dollars can touch, was power. And power meant Comrade
Stalin, Comrade Umansky, the virtuoso of kombinatsya, the fellow
whos uncles best friend has a cousin on the collegium of the GPU.
To be invited to exclusive social functions, to play bridge with the
big-bugs, to be patted on the back editorially by Pravda, to have the
social ambitions of ones wife flattered: such inducements are more
effective in bridling a correspondents tongue than any threats...
Whether in Moscow or Berlin, Tokyo or Rome, all the temptations
............ 120 ............
for a practicing reporter are in the direction of conformity. It is more

comfortable and in the long run more profitable to soft-pedal a
dispatch for readers thousands of miles away than to face an irate
censor and closed official doors.
Both Lyons and Duranty knew the rules of this game so well that both had
been rewarded before the Holodomor by being granted an interview with
Stalin himself, the Holy Grail of the Moscow foreign press corps. Umansky
knew how to award and punish foreigners. Perhaps this is why he would later
move on into the diplomatic beau monde of Washington, DC Lyons, who came
to Russia as an American Communist sycophant, then becoming a
disillusioned anti-Communist, paid the price. His lady translator, it seems,
brought to his attention an item in Molot, a newspaper from Rostov-on-theDon, designed to cow the local inhabitants but not for foreign consumption,
announcing the mass deportation of three Ukrainian Cossack stanitsas from
the Kuban. Nine months after he broke the story, he was gone from the Soviet
Union, for good.
Into this world walked a young English socialist, Malcolm Muggeridge, who
had married the niece of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, then icons in the Soviet
Union for their work to turn the Soviet experiment into an icon for socialist
intellectuals in the West. Coming from such a background, young Malcolm and
his wife even sold their furniture, convinced that they would remain in the
Soviet Union, as he reported for The Manchester Guardian. Yet, when he
arrived, he quickly saw that the Five-Year Plan was not quite all it was cracked
up to be. Perhaps the first inkling of the panoply of characters he happened
onto was at a reception at the British Embassy in Moscow in the fall of 1932
when he found himself sitting between old Soviet apologist Anna Louise Strong
and the great Duranty, the most famous foreign correspondent of his day and
fresh from his Pulitzer Prize. Miss Strong, he wrote in his memoirs, Chronicles
of Wasted Time (1972), was an enormous woman with a very red face, a lot
of white hair, and an expression of stupidity so overwhelming that it amounted
to a strange kind of beauty, adding:
Duranty, a little sharp-witted energetic man, was a much more

controversial person; I should say there was more talk about him in
............ 121 ............
Not Worthy
Moscow than anyone else, certainly among foreigners. His

household, where I visited him once or twice, included a Russian
woman named Katya, by whom I believe he had a son. I always
enjoyed his company; there was something vigorous, vivacious,
preposterous, about his unscrupulousness which made his persistent
lying somehow absorbing. I suppose no one not even Louis
Fischer followed the Party Line, every shift and change, as
assiduously as he did. In Oumanskys eyes he was perfect, and was
constantly held up to the rest of us as an example of what we should
be. It, of course, suited his material interests thus to write everything
the Soviet authorities wanted him to that the collectivisation of
agriculture was working well, with no famine conditions anywhere;
that the purges were justified, the confessions genuine, and the
judicial procedure impeccable. Because of these acquiescent
attitudes so ludicrously false that they were a subject of derision
among the other correspondents and even [the Soviet censor]
Podolsky had been known to make jokes about them Duranty
never had any trouble getting a visa, or a house, or interviews with
whomever he wanted.
Such subservience to a regime that was one of two truly evil systems of the 20th
century, for which the term totalitarianism is most often applied, was marked
by a veneer of objective analysis and certainly not without insight he was
the first to have put his money on Stalin, as he put it, and is even credited
with having first coined the word Stalinism to describe the evolving System
and he was always fascinating to read, even more to talk to. He was the most
famed foreign correspondent of the time; a nice apartment in Moscow
complete with a live-in lover, by whom he did indeed beget a son, and an
oriental servant to do the cooking and cleaning; was the social center of the life
of foreigners in Moscow; and took frequent trips abroad, as he put it, to retain
his sense of what was news.
Simultaneously, there was a strange sort of honesty to his privately admitting
that he was indeed an apologist. In the 1980s, during the course of my own
research on the Ukrainian Holodomor, I came across a most interesting
............ 122 ............
document in the US National Archives, a memorandum from one A. W. Kliefoth

of the US Embassy in Berlin, dated 4 June 1931 (see appendix 2). Duranty
dropped in to renew his passport. Mr. Kliefoth thought it might be of possible
interest to the State Department that this journalist, in whose reporting so much
credence was placed, had told him that in agreement with The New York
Times and the Soviet authorities, his official dispatches always reflect the
official opinion of the Soviet government and not his own. Note that the
American consular official thought it particularly important for his superiors
that the phrase, in agreement with The New York Times and the Soviet
authorities, was a direct quotation. This was precisely the sort of journalistic
integrity that was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1932.
Into the world of Moscow journalism, a world where everybody had to make
his own decision on the moral dilemma Lyons framed as to tell or not to
tell, came one Gareth Jones, a brilliant young man who had studied Russian
and graduated with honours from Cambridge and became an adviser on
foreign policy to former British prime minister, David Lloyd George. At the age
of 25, in 1930, he went to the Soviet Union to inform his employer about what
was happening there. His reports were considered so straightforward that they
were then published in London in The Times as An Observers Notes. The
following year he returned and published some of the materials under his own
name. Having gained a reputation for integrity in honestly trying to get to the
bottom of things, in 1932 he wrote with foreboding about the food situation
as people asked, Will there be soup?
By the early spring of 1933, the fact that famine was raging in Ukraine and the
Kuban, two-thirds of the population of which happened to be Ukrainian, was
common knowledge in Moscow among foreign diplomats, foreign
correspondents, and even the man in the street. In response to Lyons
revelations from the regional official Soviet press, a ban had been imposed
on foreign journalists traveling to the areas in question. Upon checking with
his colleagues in Moscow as to what they knew on the understanding, of
course, that their names would never be mentioned Jones decided it was
worth defying the prohibition and bought a ticket at the train station to the
places affected as a private person, which was not forbidden. Once there, he
............ 123 ............
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employed his simple but logical method of getting off the train and walking for
several hours until he was certain he was off the beaten track and start talking
to the locals.
He spent a couple of weeks, walked about forty miles, talked to people, slept
in their huts, and was appalled at what he saw. Rushing back to Moscow and
out of the Soviet Union, Jones stopped off first in Berlin, where he gave a press
conference, and fired off a score of articles about the tragedy he had seen
firsthand. I walked alone through villages and twelve collective farms.
Everywhere was the cry, There is no bread; we are dying.... (The Manchester
Guardian, 30 March 1933).
Young Muggeridge, who would live to a ripe old age and become one of the
most revered journalists of the 20th century, had done much the same. He sent
his dispatches out through the British diplomatic pouch, and published much
the same earlier, under the anonymous byline of An Observers Notes. These
created barely a ripple because his story was the unconfirmed report of some
unknown observer. Yet, now stood young Mr. Jones, the confidant of prime
ministers and millionaires, a young man who was able to get interviews with
Hitler and Mussolini. Here Mr. Umansky and his superiors in the Soviet
hierarchy encountered a problem that could not be ignored. But Soviet
officialdom already had a trump up its sleeve, one certain to bring into line any
recalcitrant members of the Moscow press corps infected by an excess of
integrity, at least for the duration of their stay.
A couple of weeks earlier, the GPU had arrested six British citizens and several
Russians on charges of industrial espionage. Announcement was made that
public trial was in preparation. This was news. Putting their own people in the
dock was one thing, but accusing white men, Englishmen, of skullduggery was
something else. This promised to be the trial of the century, and every
journalist working for a newspaper in the English-speaking world knew that
this was precisely the type of story that their editors were paying them to cover.
To be locked out would have been equivalent to professional suicide. The
dilemma of to tell or not to tell was never put more brutally.
............ 124 ............
Umansky read the situation perfectly, and Lyons summed up what happened in
a way that needs no retelling:
On emerging from Russia, Jones made a statement which, startling

though it sounded, was little more than a summary of what the
correspondents and foreign diplomats had told him. To protect us,
and perhaps with some idea of heightening the authenticity of his
reports, he emphasized his Ukrainian foray rather than our
conversation as the chief source of his information... Throwing
down Jones was as unpleasant a chore as fell to any of us in the
years of juggling facts in order to please dictatorial regimes-but
throw him down we did, unanimously and in almost identical
formulas of equivocation. Poor Gareth Jones must have been the
most surprised human being alive when the facts he so
painstakingly garnered from our mouths were snowed under by
our denials. The scene in which the American press corps
combined to repudiate Jones is fresh in my mind. It was in the
evening and Constantine Umansky, the soul of graciousness,
consented to meet us in the hotel room of a correspondent. He
knew that he had a strategic advantage over us because of the
Metro-Vickers story. He could afford to be gracious. Forced by
competitive journalism to jockey for the inside track with officials,
it would have been professional suicide to make an issue of the
famine at that time. There was much bargaining in the spirit of
gentlemanly give-and-take, under the effluence of Umanskys
gilded smile, before a formula of denial was worked out. We
admitted enough to sooth our consciences, but in roundabout
phrases that damned Jones as a liar. The filthy business having
been disposed of, someone ordered vodka and zakuski, Umansky
joined the celebration, and the Party did not break up until the
early morning hours. The head censor was in a mellower mood
than I had ever seen before or since. He had done a big bit for
Bolshevik firmness that night.
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Not Worthy
Duranty took the point position in the campaign against Jones. On 31 March
1933, The New York Times carried, on page 13, an article that might well be
studied in schools of journalism as an example of how to walk the tightrope
between truth and lie so masterfully that the two seem to exchange places
under the acrobats feet. It is called Russians Hungry, But Not Starving and
begins by placing Jones revelations in a context that seems to make everything
quite clear:
In the middle of the diplomatic duel between Great Britain and the
Soviet Union over the accused British engineers, there appears
from a British source a big scare story in the American press about
famine in the Soviet Union, with thousands already dead and
millions menaced by death from starvation.
Of course, this put everything in its proper place, at least enough for the United
States to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in November of
that year. So much so that when a dinner was given in honour of Soviet Foreign
Minister Maksim Litvinov in New Yorks posh Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, when it
came time to pay tribute to Duranty, the cheers were so thunderous that
American critic and bon vivant Alexander Woolcott wrote, Indeed, one quite
got the impression that America, in a spasm of discernment, was recognizing
both Russia and Walter Duranty.
At the same time that Duranty was so actively denying the existence of the
famine in public, he was quite open in admitting it in private. On 26 September
1933 in a private conversation with William Strang of the British Embassy in
Moscow, he stated, it is quite possible that as many as ten million people may
have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during
the past year.
The little Englishman indeed seemed to have gotten away with it. But his
further career was a gradual sinking into obscurity and penury, his Katya in
Moscow berating him for taking no interest in the education of their son and
asking that he send more money, that is, of course, when he could. He married
on his deathbed in late September 1957. A week later, on 3 October 1957, he
............ 126 ............
died from an internal hemorrhage complicated by pulmonary emphysema at

the age of seventy-three. Nothing further of his son is known.
Jones had attempted to defend himself in a letter to The New York Times and
Malcolm Muggeridge, once out of the Soviet Union declined to write a letter
in support of Jones, although Jones had publicly commended Muggeridges
unsigned articles in The Manchester Guardian. Various organizations, mostly
on the Right, took up the cause of the telling the world about the Great Famine
of 1932-1933, but within two or three years the issue faded into the
background and was largely forgotten.
Gareth Jones was himself nonplussed. In a letter to a friend who intended to
visit the Soviet Union, Gareth wrote:
Alas! You will be very amused to hear that the inoffensive little
Joneski has achieved the dignity of being a marked man on the
black list of the OGPU and is barred from entering the Soviet
Union. I hear that there is a long list of crimes which I have
committed under my name in the secret police file in Moscow and
funnily enough espionage is said to be among them. As a matter of
fact Litvinoff [Soviet Foreign Minister] sent a special cable from
Moscow to the Soviet Embassy in London to tell them to make the
strongest of complaints to Mr. Lloyd George about me.
Jones and those who sided with him were snowed under a blanket of denials.
When one by one the American journalists left the Soviet Union, they wrote
books about what they had seen. Muggeridge wrote a thinly disguised novel,
Winter in Moscow (1934), in which the names were changed, but it was clear
who everybody was. Only Jones, it seems, was really concealed in the fact that
the character of such integrity, given the name of Pye by the author, was older,
a smoker, a drinker, none of which the real Jones was. In his memoirs,
Muggeridge seems to have forgotten altogether the man who actually broke the
story of the Ukrainian Holodomor Famine-Genocide under his own name.
Perhaps he felt a little guilty that his courage in this situation was not quite as
great as the Welshman who had the bad luck to have been murdered in China
............ 127 ............
Not Worthy
in 1935, probably to prevent him from telling the world that the new state of
Manchukuo was not nearly as nice a place as its Japanese sponsors wanted the
world to believe.
There is perhaps something of a parallel to the story of Gareth Jones. There
was also in 1981 another young man, then twenty-nine years old and a newly
minted PhD from the University of Michigan, hired by the Harvard Ukrainian
Research Institute to study the Holodomor. After nearly a decade, when the
Commission on the Ukraine Famine was wrapping up, he was informed that
the fellowship he had been offered for an academic year had been cut back to
a semester. Having nowhere else to turn, he settled for that. We expected hed
refuse, but he accepted, a colleague was told. The next year he was invited for
a yearlong fellowship to the University of Illinois. A fund of well-meaning
Ukrainian-Americans was ready to donate a million dollars to endow a chair
for this man. Those who taught Russian and East European history led him to
understand, however, that, while they would be quite happy to take the money,
whoever might get the chair, it would certainly not be he.
It is unknown who exactly played the role of Umansky in this particular tale
or whether vodka was served afterward, but the carrot and stick are fairly
obvious: access to scholarly resources in Moscow vs the veto of any research
projects. In a world where a number of scholars slanted their journal articles
and monographs as adroitly as Duranty did his press coverage, I am tempted
to someday venture my own counterpart to Winter in Moscow, based on the
published works that make the players all too easy to discern. For I was that
once young man. But in contrast to Jones, I have found a place to live, married
the woman I love, teach, and have and a forum from which I can, from time
to time, be heard.
Despite Durantys prophesies, Ukrainians did not forget what had happened to
them in 1933, and seventy years later the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties
Association and the Ukrainian World Congress, with support from a number of
other leading Ukrainian Diaspora organizations, have organized a campaign to
reopen the issue of Walter Durantys 1932 Pulitzer Prize with a view to stripping
him of it. They have sent thousands of postcards and letters to the Pulitzer Prize
............ 128 ............
Committee at Columbia University. We invite our readers who might have any
thoughts on the matter to join them in so doing
The whole story of denying the crimes of a regime that cost millions of lives is
one of the saddest in the history of the American free press, just as the
Holodomor is certainly the saddest page in the history of a nation whose
appearance on the world state was so unexpected that there is, in fact, a quite
successful book in English, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. Still, it would
be only appropriate if that nation, which was for so long so safe to ignore and
then appeared so unexpectedly, expressed itself on the fate of a man who also
was victimized so unexpectedly, simply for trying honestly to find out and then
tell the truth. Ukrainians abroad want justice done by stripping that young
mans chief victimizer of a Pulitzer Prize that makes a mockery of any
conceivable ideals of journalism. They have been joined by a host of respected
journalists in the West. Is it not only right that the people most affected by the
events in which the struggle between truth and falsehood, idealism and
cynicism, were so blatant that it reads almost like a melodrama, also make its
collective voice heard? By asserting justice in the past, we help attain it for
ourselves.
............ 129 ............
Not Worthy
A Report to The New York Times: Walter Duranty and his

reporting from Moscow
MARK von HAGEN
24 July 2003
Ive chosen to organize my comments below by sharing the kinds of questions

about Durantys reporting that I, as a historian who has studied this period,
might reasonably ask. What is the focus of his reporting? What appear to be
his sources? Does he get out of Moscow (to other parts of the USSR) very
often? What sources might he have tapped on his frequent trips to Berlin, Paris,
and other European capitals? How strict were Soviet press censors at this
point? What sort of story was he telling about the Soviet Union and to what
end, if any? I also thought of comparing what Duranty wrote with other
correspondents work, but decided to try to appraise his work on its own
merits and in the context of the historical period in which he was writing. I also
tried to keep an open mind about the writing, specially after having read the
two biographies-denunciations of Duranty by S. J. Taylor (Stalins Apologist:
Walter Duranty, the New York Timess Man in Moscow) and James Crowl
(Angels in Stalins Paradise). Both of these books appear to have been
conceived as virtual character assassinations and rely heavily on innuendo,
insinuation and hostile speculation by Durantys enemies in the press corps
above all, particularly Eugene Lyons (in Assignment in Utopia) and Malcolm
Muggeridge (in his fictionalized memoir Winter in Moscow). The two authors
own grasp of Soviet, American and European history leaves much to be
desired. Moreover, Taylor conflates material from memoirs, interviews, and
fictional accounts and suggests these are all equivalent sources. Still, they
provide some useful historical background and context of the Moscow
reporting scene during these years.
............ 130 ............
Durantys Reporting on the First Five-Year Plan: Themes, Sources, Biases,

Constraints
The reporting that the Pulitzer Prize Committee cites in support of its
nomination of Duranty was for the first Five-Year Plan, curiously, some of his
driest stories for the year 1931. Most of the reports are long discussions of
Soviet production statistics, either projected ones or achieved ones. All of this
material comes from official Soviet sources, either newspapers or speeches by
the leadership. Duranty learned Russian well enough to read the Soviet
newspapers on his own, and appeared to be invited to all important officially
designated newsworthy events. Not surprisingly, most of the stories on the
economic front have the level of interest and excitement of Pravda, Izvestiia,
or Promyshlennaia and Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, his favourite sources. He
frequently writes in the enthusiastically propagandistic language of his sources,
again without any ironic distance or critical commentary: rural revolution
flamed like a fiery beacon across Russia (2/16/31). In what is perhaps an
extreme case of this socialist realist vision of reality, Duranty describes Soviet
children as the freest, most upstanding and intelligent children the NYT
correspondent has ever met anywhere. They are clean which Russians used not
be, they play games for fun and think their country is the greatest everThey
do not care a rap about what Americans call comfort, but they know the job
of united effort and have an opportunity to take part in national life in drives
or campaigns or investigations or what-not to a degree enjoyed by no other
children in the world (5/31/31).
Even the shortcomings that Duranty highlights in the Soviet campaigns in the
countryside and industrial worlds come most often from the same Soviet
sourcesthat, for example, production was behind target at one or another
plant, or that the harvest would be lower in wheat than anticipated (1/3/31,
1/6/31, 3/26/31, 5/12/31). Generally, however, the Plan is being fulfilled and
overfulfilled with a great degree of rational planning, according to Duranty
(6/1/31). He does pose the question for his readers about the reliability of
Soviet statistics, to conclude that they are generally within a margin of error of
3 to 5 percent (2/7/31). (Given the thorough purges of the Soviet statistical
administration already in the mid-1920s, this seems very generous indeed.)
Perhaps more remarkable is that Duranty is convinced that the new Russia
............ 131 ............
Not Worthy
finds its newspapers interesting, and even blas foreign correspondents find
themselves unexpectedly interested (5/6/31). As someone who has read quite
a bit in the Soviet newspapers and leadership speeches of the 1920s and early
1930s, I find this taste very bizarre. And we also know from the contemporary
press that they attracted regular readership only with great difficulty because
of their insistence on making their new conform to the desired outcome of
the current political or economic campaign. The only occasional additional
source he cites are conversations with foreign diplomats, engineers and
workers who either come through Moscow on their way into or out of the
country or who work on projects in Moscow (5/27/31). There is little evidence
that Duranty traveled much around the country or talked to many ordinary
Russians or other Soviet citizens; all his stories have Moscow datelines (though
that might not be the accurate conclusion to draw from that practice).
To Durantys credit, however, he recognized that this period of collectivization
and industrialization marked a qualitatively new stage in Soviet history,
something he would call Stalinism and which, while emerging somehow
logically from Lenins achievements, made 1930 perhaps the most critical
year in all its checkered history. (1/1/31, 6/14/31) Moreover, he recognized
some of the peculiar features of the Plan and its role in the Soviet economy,
that it was not just a set of economic targets but a mythical mobilizational tool
for the population (1/2/31). Duranty does not seem to be much interested in
internal political developments at the Kremlin, but focuses on the very
narrowly economic side of the war against backwardness. He reports on the
Menshevik Trial and another engineers trial in Moscow, but virtually
reproduces the charges of wrecking and sabotage brought by the prosecution
without any serious scrutiny of the evidence (3/4/31).
By this time, of course, overly positive mention of Trotsky or other opposition
figures would likely provoke censor reactions. Beginning in the late 1920s,
foreign reporters began feeling new pressures on what they could and couldnt
send out of Moscow. In 1929 a German reporter for the Berliner Tagesblatt
was denied a re-entry visa after he made a home trip. Still, other reporters were
getting around the country much more and appeared to have a wider range of
sources they could interview and cite than Duranty. And Duranty himself
............ 132 ............
acknowledges that the censorship was relatively mild, if somewhat selfdefeating for the Soviet cause (6/23/31); he described the wartime censorship
in France as stricter than the regime the Press Officer enforced in Moscow. On
the whole, your correspondent is inclined to regard the censorship as a help no
less than a hindrance, because it takes the responsibility off a reporters
shoulders should there be subsequent complaints from any quarter. (3/1/31)
Advocate of US Recognition of the USSR
Within the general range of this reporting, Duranty pursued a couple of
missions, if thats not too strong a characterization of his tone and line of
argument. One was US recognition of the USSR. Accordingly, he made a
determined effort to explain to his readers the injustice of the charges made
by many, including in America, of Soviet dumping and forced labour (1/12/31).
To use the words `conscription or `drafting of labour gives an unfair picture
of what is happening, he writes (2/1/31, 2/13/31) and proceeds to compare
the Soviet first Five-Year Plan mobilizations to the United States after it entered
the Great War. Duranty offered this sort of explanation repeatedly in the
context of the debate in the United States over recognition of the USSR, an
issue that was also part of presidential campaign politics. (A separate story in
the NYT, not written by Duranty, reports that Representative Fish of New
York sought means to prevent convict-made goods from Russian from entering
the United States and asked the Treasury Department to have agents go into
Russia to see if their lumber and pulpwood exports were produced by forced
labour (2/3/31). Most often, Duranty concludes his explanation with insisting
that the charges are not serious obstacles to good relations with the USSR and
that Soviet practice, given the historical circumstances and great historical
tasks that the Stalinist leadership has undertaken, are little different than the
behaviour of any number of Great Powers during the recent World War I. In a
story about tens of thousands of forced labourers, Duranty wrote, The great
majority of exiles are not convicts, or even prisoners, but can be compared to
Cromwells colonization of Virginian and the West Indies (2/3/31). He reminds
his readers that the Soviet market is a large and unsatisfied one and that the
potential is there for a great economic success story in the not too distant
future. He also insisted that despite a certain Soviet Schadenfreude about the
............ 133 ............
Not Worthy
Great Depression and their general expectation of new world war breaking out
over the contradictions of global capitalism (4/22/31, 5/18/31, 10/24/31), they
were relatively self-absorbed and had abandoned their plans for global conquest,
if, as he puts it, they ever had such plans. The Stalinist leadership and the society
at large was overwhelmed by the tasks of building socialism, consolidating the
collective and state farm sectors in agriculture and building the foundations for
modern industry. Their interests were in peace with their neighbours and trading
partners for their primary commodities (4/12/31, 6/18/31, 11/29/31). The Red
Army existed entirely for the purpose of defense and was no menace to peace
(6/25/31), he wrote, repeating War Commissar Voroshilov. After all, the
capitalist powers did also continue to entertain fantasies of overthrowing the
one, proletarian dictatorship to have seized power, so such defensive precautions
were only necessary (11/25/31, 11/29/31). Again, many, if not most, of these
stories read as translated press conferences with the Soviet Foreign Minister or
Foreign Trade Minister with minimal or no commentary or analysis. In several
pieces, Duranty makes a special effort to refute or explain away reports coming
from White Russian migr circles in Riga and elsewhere as clearly out of
touch and so hostile as to have no credibility whatsoever (2/1/31, 2/3/31).
Finally, in his apparent effort to win US recognition for the USSR, Duranty wrote
occasional stories about how other countries, notably Germany, Austria, even
England, might beat the US to the vast Soviet markets (2/23/31, 2/24/31,
3/11/31, 3/24/31, 4/4/31, 6/19/31, 9/28/31).
It is not clear to me what precise role Duranty played in the politics of
recognition (the USA recognized USSR in 1933 after Franklin Delano
Roosevelt was elected President; Duranty was received by the President after
the recognition ceremony and returned to Moscow with the newly appointed
US Ambassador; in Moscow he was feted by Stalin for his role in the
recognition campaign) but I cant help feeling it wasnt insignificant. What this
raises, then, is his complicity in the diplomacy of the US-Soviet relationship.
And, though these are separate issues, the Ukrainian famine denial is
inextricably part of this moral responsibility and part of a broader problem
outlined below. Might not the US been able to insist on different recognition
terms, including, possibly, the admission of famine relief workers to the
afflicted regions? Or, in the rush to recognition, was the business and political
............ 134 ............
elite eager to overlook any evidence of troubling behaviour on the part of the
Soviet Union at this time?
Durantys Theories about Russia and the Soviet Union

When he wasnt reporting straight economic news or discussing international
trade issues, Duranty indulged in his theories about Russia, which are a bit
more disturbing from the viewpoint of objectivity, a balanced picture, and the
tremendous influence of the NYT. Throughout 1931 Duranty proclaimed that
Stalin was a progressive historical figure on the order of Oliver Cromwell
(2/3/31, 2/15/31) or Napoleon (1/18/31), who was fighting a war against his
own Slavic peoples Asiatic backwardness. (In the 1/18/31 long feature on
Stalin, Duranty opens with comparisons to Chinese emperors and then
proceeds to Mohammed.) That Asiatic backwardness he characterized
alternately as passivity, fatalism, collectivism, proclivity to mass behaviour (as
opposed to the individualism of the liberal west), fanatic religiosity and
superstition, ant heap morality (5/4/31, 5/10/31, 7/5/31, 11/22/31, 12/20/31)
Somehow Stalin was able to escape this Slavic fatalism because he was a
Caucasian who can hold fast to the thread of his own free will in the labyrinth
where Slavs are lost. (1/81/31) (How Caucasians are less Asian than Slavs
Duranty doesnt muse about.) Incidentally, Duranty was by no means unique
in holding these views; one can cite the very influential biography of Stalin by
Isaac Deutscher, an ostensible follower of Trotsky, as perhaps the most well
known purveyor of a version of this Orientalist interpretation. And softer
versions of this explanation are widespread among the historians and other
social scientists who wrote under the influence of modernization theory as
well. The conclusion we are meant to draw from this analysis, however, is
that Russians need and deserve this kind of harsh, autocratic regime because
thats the way they are; they might even unconsciously long for autocracy
(6/14/31).
Of course, this preferred narrative of Russians as backward Asiatics was one
that the Stalinist dictatorship favoured itself as justification for its brutal
regime (as so many Asian dictatorships have offered in recent times under the
............ 135 ............
Not Worthy
guise of Asian values), although it would never have put it in so many

words. I suppose its this near identity of Durantys analysis with the official
Soviet version of events that is most disturbing for me as a historian. His near
total reliance on official Soviet sources went hand in hand with this
understanding of Soviet politics and Russian history. When this myth of
Slavic backwardness is repeated often enough as news, especially when no
challenge to it is ever offered from another point of view, it takes on the
character of a natural truth, when it is clearly an ideological construction that
is playing a nefarious role inside the country, but, in Durantys translation, also
in international affairs. I shall devote most of the rest of this review of
Durantys work to this one-sided presentation of the Stalinist project; I have
also tried to suggest some of the contexts that allowed Duranty to be able to
see the Soviet world in such blatantly positive light. Above all, these contexts
are the Great Depression in the West and Durantys own experience of World
War I in France and on other fronts.
Whatever the causes for Durantys so thoroughly identifying with the Stalinist
position, the consequences are perhaps most apparent in his treatment ofor
rather down pedaling ofresistance to collectivization and industrialization.
During 1931 the official Stalinist view of society was one of harmony and
conciliation in line with the remarkable successes on the economic front
(8/31/31). Similar to the regimes own self-understanding, Duranty
downplayed the significance of the widespread and violent resistance to
collectivization that had taken place across the Soviet Union during 1929-30
and again 1930-1931, in fact a virtual civil war in the countryside which would
have been hard for Duranty to remain ignorant of. He does mention kulak
friction or opposition as much diminished over the previous year and
apparently a thing of the past (4/22/31, 11/19/31) and, importantly, a sign of
peasant backwardness. For Duranty to attribute the difficulties of
collectivization to peasant backwardness is particularly distorting; in fact,
collectivization wrought the greatest damage in those regions where the
peasants had the most modern skills, had the longest history of voluntary rural
cooperation, and were most productive, namely Ukraine, the Kuban, the areas
cultivated by the Volga Germans. To pronounce the destruction of that
independent peasantry and its replacement by what the peasants themselves
............ 136 ............
referred to as the second serfdom as progressive and a triumph over Slavic

fatalism and backwardness lends weight to the Stalinist dictatorships own
justification for its violent and murderous assault on its own countryside.
Similarly, Duranty dismissed the political opposition to aspects of
collectivization and industrialization policy within the ruling Bolshevik Party,
an opposition that unleashed a series of purges and expulsions (5/20/31).
Because these acts of resistance and opposition had been crushed by a ruthless
Stalinist state, it was now the Russian condition to be eternally fatalistic,
passive, inclined to backward anarchistic outbursts in infantile, monolithic
fashion. There were constant Show Trials since 1928 at least which featured
Soviet or foreign engineers or professors charged with some sort of sabotage,
wrecking, or other crimes against the Revolution. If Duranty wasnt aware
of this powerful opposition from sources inside the Soviet Union, something
that is frankly hard to imagine, he would have had plenty of opportunity to
learn more about this when he made his regular trips out of Moscow to Berlin,
Paris, Warsaw, and Prague. In all four capitals there were very politically
engaged and well-informed Russian migr organizations and institutions that
met regularly and clandestinely even at this late date with visiting Soviet
bureaucrats, diplomats, and other agents and developed rather sophisticated
understanding of the political life of the USSR. Among the best informed were
the Mensheviks abroad, who published Sostialisticheskii vestnik. In Prague
during the interwar years, there were whole universities of migr Russian and
Ukrainian liberals and some conservatives who would also have offered
alternate narratives of modern and more ancient Russian history. In Warsaw,
too, there were several very good scholars and specialized institutes that made
it their business to understand the history and contemporary affairs of the
Soviet Union (and Duranty did make occasional trips to Poland).
When he wrote another characteristic piece about why the Communists only
allowed voting for Communist Party candidates, Duranty condescendingly
explained that Russians were so uneducated in self-government that they
needed to be taught this fundamental truth by the all-wise Party (1/26/31),
again ignoring the history of early 20th century Russia and well into the civil
war years when political parties and public organizations mobilized millions of
............ 137 ............
Not Worthy
voters in a series of doomed democratic and revolutionary governments. To say

that Russians had no and especially no recent memory of a more genuine
electoral politics is extremely distorting. For someone who was an adultas
was Durantyduring the Russian Revolution and a correspondent in France
during the First World War, there is another story about the Russian people that
he ought to have known, that the subjects of the Russian Empire were among
the most oppositionist and revolutionary and even anarchistic people on the
earths surface for several years running until they had the will to fight killed in
them by so many invading armies, famines, and a few other natural and manmade disasters. This is not to argue, by contrast, that Russia had become a
model European parliamentary democracy during the early 20th century or even
that its genuine workers Revolution had been betrayed by the Bolshevik
dictatorship. But to insist on the power of eternal Slavic fatalism, as Duranty so
frequently invokes, is to ignore the tremendous transformations that had
occurred in the early decades of the 20th century. It is very present-bound and
short-sighted and, more importantly, it conveys precisely the anti-democratic
justification for the creation of a dictatorship that was mastered by the Stalinist
propaganda apparatus.
In another characteristic vein, Duranty devotes several pieces to the decline in
religious services at Easter and Christmas (12/26/31), and above all the razing
of the Cathedral of Christ the Redeemer, again as signs of progress and triumph
over traditional Russian religious obscurantism (8/3/31, 12/26/31). There is
little hint here of the concerted antireligious campaigns, including outright
repression and not just the League of the Militant Godless anti-Christmas and
anti-Easter demonstrations. Instead, he describes how Soviet citizens are
joyously celebrating their new Soviet holidays through increasing output and
other achievements (18/8/31). One waits in vain for some signal of ever so
slight tongue in cheek.
Duranty warned his American readers again and again not to try to judge
Soviet life by their own comfortable standards. Besides Cromwell, Napoleon,
Ivan the Terrible and other more distant historical parallels, another device he
frequently deployed to explain for his American readers how the Soviet
regime could be so apparently indifferent to the comfort and freedoms of its
............ 138 ............
citizens was to appeal to his own World War I experience. Knowing what we
know about the traumatic impact that the Great War had on so many
intellectuals and ordinary combatants and appreciating the proximity of the
shared experience he could appeal to, he tries again and again to contextualize
the Soviet hardships against the backdrop of that suicidal European civil war.
Certainly in its own self-image, the Soviet leadership was engaged in a war to
defeat its own backwardness. But Duranty never seems to question the logic of
a country putatively at peace waging war against its own population and
erecting the entire panoply of internal enemies and enemy aliens that seem to
come straight out of a more strictly military experience; he never questions the
normalcy of a militarizing society and the tremendous assaults on what
fragile liberties Soviet citizens still enjoyed during the NEP years. He, I think,
therefore misleadingly, compares Stalin occasionally to Marshall Foch of the
French (1/8/31). One additional comparison he frequently makes for American
audiences is Tammany Hall and Charles Murphy, suggesting Stalin is to be
understood in the context of American machine politics of the late nineteenth
and early 20th century. Again, by 1931 Stalin had certainly transcended the
scale of American machine politics by any stretch of the imagination. By 1931
the Stalinist dictatorship had murdered hundreds of thousands of its own
peasant citizens as they refused to submit to Moscows dictates to collectivize.
The Tammany Hall parallel is, once again, distorting because of its relativizing
and familiarizing effects, suggesting that Stalin is really not much worse or
more threatening than a New York City boss.
Any Conclusions?
Duranty was neither unique among reporters nor even many scholars of the
time in sharing these unbalanced and, ultimately, condescending, views of
Russian history and the Soviet people. Moreover, several foreign
correspondents fell under Stalins spell to a certain extent, as Duranty clearly
did, especially if they had been granted the privilege of an interview with the
great man. And, after all, he certainly did turn out to be one of the most
important political leaders of the 20th century. Unfortunately, however, such
views do not make his reporting distinguished or particularly unusual, let alone
............ 139 ............
Not Worthy
profound; I would not judge that his reporting has stood an even minimal test
of time given the criteria I tried to outline in my critique of his theories.
After reading through a good portion of Durantys reporting for 1931, I was
disappointed and disturbed by the overall picture he painted of the Soviet
Union for that period. Much of the factual material is dull and largely
uncritical recitation of Soviet sources, whereas his efforts at analysis are very
effective renditions of the Stalinist leaderships self-understanding of their
murderous and progressive project to defeat the backwardness of Slavic,
Asiatic peasant Russia. That hundreds, if not thousands, of well-intentioned
and intelligent European and American Leftist intellectuals shared much of this
Stalinist understanding of might making for right and a sort of Hegelian
acceptance of historical outcomes, especially against the backdrop of the Great
Depression in the West, does not make his writing any more profound or
original. But after reading so much Duranty in 1931 it is far less surprising to
me that he would deny in print the famine of 1932-1933 and later defend the
prosecutors charges during the Show Trials of 1937.
I believe there is room in international reporting for an effort to convey the
Soviet point of view, meaning the official one, without leaving it, however at
that; instead, he would seem to have some obligation to take the analysis to a
different level by suggesting alternate plausible explanations and motivations
for events and actions. In other words, there is a serious lack of balance in his
writing. Instead, Duranty is very insistent by this time in his own authority and
understanding of the reality of Stalinist Russia. He prided himself on his
independent judgments that went at odds with the conventional wisdom in
Moscow. He even acknowledged earlier misunderstandings of Soviet
political culture to reinforce his hard won expertise and current level of
understanding (10/11/31). It is a clever rhetorical device but adds nothing to
the overall analysis.
That lack of balance and uncritical acceptance of the Soviet self-justification
for its cruel and wasteful regime was a disservice to the American readers of
The New York Times and the liberal values they subscribe to and to the
historical experience of the peoples of the Russian and Soviet empires and their
struggle for a better life.
............ 140 ............
***
[Reports on Professor von Hagens analysis received considerable international
attention, including Jacques Steinberg, Times should lose Pulitzer from 30s,
consultant to paper says, The New York Times, 23 October 2003. It was
noted that Professor von Hagen had told The New York Sun, on 22 October:
They should take it [the Pulitzer Prize] away for the greater honour and glory
of The New York Times for he [Duranty] really was kind of a disgrace in the
history of The New York Times.]
............ 141 ............
Not Worthy
Resolution on 1932-1933 Man-Made Famine in Ukraine

US House of Representatives, 21 October 2003
The US House of Representatives on 20 October adopted the following H.

RES. 356 Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the
man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932-1933 by a vote of 382 0. The resolution was introduced by Henry Hyde (R-IL), Chairman of the
House International Relations Committee (with Christopher Smith (R-NJ),
Helsinki Commission Chairman and Tom Lantos (D-CA), Ranking Member,
House International Relations Committee as original cosponsors.
Congressional Record Statement for The Honorable Christopher H. Smith on
H.Res.356, Regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine 19321933:
Mr. Speaker, I am proud to be an original cosponsor of H. Res.
356. I thank and commend Mr. Hyde for introducing this
resolution commemorating and honouring the memory of victims
of an abominable act perpetrated against the people of Ukraine in
1932-1933. Seventy years ago, millions of men, women and
children were murdered by starvation so that one man, Soviet
dictator Joseph Stalin, could consolidate control over Ukraine. The
Ukrainian people resisted the Soviet policy of forced
collectivization. The innocent died a horrific death at the hands of
a tyrannical dictatorship which had crushed their freedom. In an
attempt to break the spirit of an independent-minded Ukrainian
peasantry, and ultimately to secure collectivization, Stalin ordered
the expropriation of all foodstuffs in the hands of the rural
............ 142 ............
population. The grain was shipped to other areas of the Soviet

Union or sold on the international market. Peasants who refused
to turn over grain to the state were deported or executed. Without
food or grain, mass starvation ensued. This manmade famine was
the consequence of deliberate policies which aimed to destroy the
political, cultural and human rights of the Ukrainian people.
In short, food was used as a weapon in what can only be described as an
organized act of terrorism designed to suppress a peoples love of their land and
the basic liberty to live as they choose. Mr. Chairman, I recall back in the 1980s
seeing the unforgettable movie, Harvest of Despair, which depicted the horrors
of the Famine, as well as the fine work of the Congressionally-created Ukraine
Famine Commission, which issued its seminal report in 1988. Their work
helped expose the truth about this horrific event. I am pleased that the
resolution notes that there were those in the West, including The New York
Times correspondent Walter Duranty, who knowingly and deliberately falsified
their reports to cover up the Famine because they wanted to curry favour with
one of the most evil regimes in the history of mankind. The fact that this denial
of the Famine took place then, and even much later by many scholars in the
West is a shameful chapter in our own history.
Mr. Chairman, this is an important resolution which will help give recognition
to one of the most horrific events in the last century in the hopes that massmurders of this kind truly become unthinkable.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION
WHEREAS 2003 marks the 70th anniversary of the height of the famine in
Ukraine that was deliberately initiated and enforced by the Soviet regime
through the seizure of grain and the blockade of food shipments into the
affected areas, as well as by forcibly preventing the starving population from
leaving the region, for the purposes of eliminating resistance to the forced
collectivization of agriculture and destroying Ukraines national identity;
WHEREAS this man-made famine resulted in the deaths of at least 5,000,000
men, women, and children in Ukraine and an estimated 1-2 million people in
other regions;
............ 143 ............
Not Worthy
WHEREAS the famine took place in the most productive agricultural area of
the former Soviet Union while food stocks throughout the country remained
sufficient to prevent the famine and while the Soviet regime continued to
export large quantities of grain;
WHEREAS as many Western observers with first-hand knowledge of the
famine, including The New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, who
was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1932 for his reporting from the Soviet Union,
knowingly and deliberately falsified their reports to cover up and refute
evidence of the famine in order to suppress criticism of the Soviet regime;
WHEREAS Western observers and scholars who reported accurately on the
existence of the famine were subjected to disparagement and criticism in the
West for their reporting of the famine;
WHEREAS the Soviet regime and many scholars in the West continued to deny
the existence of the famine until the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991
resulted in many of its archives being made accessible, thereby making possible
the documentation of the premeditated nature of the famine and its harsh
enforcement;
WHEREAS the final report of the United States Governments Commission on
the Ukraine Famine, established on December 13, 1985, concluded that the
victims were `starved to death in a man-made famine and that Joseph Stalin and
those around him committed genocide against Ukrainians in 1932-1933; and
WHEREAS, although the Ukraine famine was one of the greatest losses of
human life in the 20th century, it remains insufficiently known in the United
States and in the world:
............ 144 ............
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED , That it is the sense of the House

of Representatives that
(1) the millions of victims of the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in
1932-1933 should be solemnly remembered and honoured in the 70th year
marking the height of the famine;
(2) this man-made famine was designed and implemented by the Soviet regime
as a deliberate act of terror and mass murder against the Ukrainian people;
(3) the decision of the Government of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada (the
Ukrainian parliament) to give official recognition to the famine and its victims,
as well as their efforts to secure greater international awareness and
understanding of the famine, should be supported; and
(4) the official recognition of the famine by the Government of Ukraine and the
Verkhovna Rada represents a significant step in the reestablishment of
Ukraines national identity, the elimination of the legacy of the Soviet
dictatorship, and the advancement of efforts to establish a democratic and free
Ukraine that is fully integrated into the Western community of nations.
............ 145 ............
Not Worthy
Revoke Durantys Pulitzer
Editorial, The National Post, 23 October 2003

Reprinted with permission of The National Post
Few journalists have disgraced the fourth estate more than Walter Duranty, the
Pulitzer-winning New York Times correspondent who covered up the Stalininduced famine that killed as many as seven million Ukrainians in 1932-1933.
Now, a Columbia University history professor commissioned by The Times to
investigate Duranty has confirmed his work was flawed, and is recommending
that his Pulitzer be revoked.
The Pulitzer Board has been reviewing the Duranty case, and The Times has
forwarded the professors report to them with an undisclosed recommendation.
For the sake of The Times reputation, we hope it urged revocation.
............ 146 ............
Why honour a shill for Stalin?

LUBOMYR LUCIUK
The National Post, 24 October 2003
To the Editor: Re: Revoke Duranty s Prize, The National Post, 23 November
2003:
Canadians should take pride in learning that the international campaign to have
Walter Duranty s Pulitzer Prize revoked or returned originated in this country,
with the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Our goal was never to
erase Duranty s record or the man himself from history. Quite to the contrary,
we want Duranty known for all time for what he truly was: a shill for Stalin,
before, during and after the genocidal Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet
Ukraine.
Of course, we have no way of predicting whether the Pulitzer committee will do

the right thing and revoke or return his Prize. We hope so, otherwise future
Pulitzer recipients will have to accept this distinction knowing their company is
polluted by the spectre of a man who buried the truth about the mass murder of
millions of people.
............ 147 ............
Not Worthy
Durantys award: Pulitzer Board should not revoke the award

Editorial, The Globe and Mail, 25 October 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Globe and Mail
Walter Duranty, who reported from the Soviet Union for The New York Times
between 1922 and 1941, is probably the most tainted scribe in that
newspapers long history. In fact, such is the enormity of the correspondents
misreporting of events in Stalins Russia in the 1930s, and so great was his
influence, that he probably would qualify for worst reporter of all time were
there such an award. No picayune plagiarist he, Mr. Duranty helped cover up
a genocide: Stalins deliberate killing by starvation of as many as seven million
Ukrainians in 1932-1933. There is plenty of evidence to suggest Mr. Duranty
did this deliberately. According to one credible first-hand account, The Times
correspondent once, in the depths of the famine, breezily remarked that a few
million dead Russians were unimportant, given the sweeping historical
changes then underway in the country. In August of 1933, he dismissed
reports of mass starvation as malignant propaganda. Earlier that year, on 14
May, he had coined the monstrously cynical phrase for which he is probably
best remembered: You cant make an omelette without breaking eggs. Small
wonder, then, that Mark von Hagen, a Columbia University history professor
hired by The Times last summer to reassess Mr. Durantys work, has declared
it egregiously biased and distorted, and called its author a disgrace to the
history of The Times. Its also understandable that in 2003, the 70th
anniversary of the famine, Ukrainian groups worldwide have lobbied to have
Mr. Duranty posthumously stripped of his 1932 Pulitzer Prize, awarded for
articles published in 1931. With hindsight, it is hard to conceive of anyone less
worthy of US print journalisms most prestigious award. But thats the heart of
............ 148 ............
the matter, isnt it? Hindsight. The Pulitzer Prize Board should think long and
carefully. For there is no new information here. And there is a whiff of
historical revisionism. It has been common knowledge for nearly two decades
that Mr. Duranty was a propagandist for Stalin. The Times began apologizing
for his dispatches as early as 1986, with the publication of Robert Conquests
noted history of the Ukrainian famine, The Harvest of Sorrow. Moreover, Mr.
Duranty was not given the Prize for stories in which he denied the famine.
Those came later. In 1931, he was writing effusively about Stalins economic
Plan. As New York Times executive editor Bill Keller put it this week, The
stuff he wrote in 31 was awful. The stuff he wrote in 33 was shameful. That
means Mr. Duranty would be stripped of his award for later misdeeds. How
many other prestigious Prizewinners would then be in similar straits? History
should not be airbrushed to suit current political tastes. That smacks of, well,
Stalin. It makes far more sense to try to understand the context in which
historical events occurred. In 1932 America, socialist ideas were fashionable.
Mr. Duranty was not the eras only apologist for the Soviet dictator. Hes just
the best known. In 1990, S. J. Taylor published Stalins Apologist, a biography
of Mr. Duranty that excoriated his reportage. The Pulitzer Board considered
revoking the award at the time, but opted not to because of the precedent such
a move would set. That was the right decision then. As now.
............ 149 ............
Not Worthy
Doubts over a Pulitzer

LUBOMYR LUCIUK
The New York Times, 28 October 2003
To the Editor: Re: Times Should Lose Pulitzer From 30 s, Consultant Says
The international campaign to have Walter Duranty s Pulitzer Prize either

revoked or returned was initiated by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties
Association. Our initiative has never been aimed at airbrushing Mr. Duranty
out of history. On the contrary, we insist on remembering him for what he truly
was, Stalin s apologist and a shill who helped cover up the genocidal Great
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine. We just don t want Mr. Duranty to be
distinguished with a Pulitzer Prize for having so served the Soviets. Nor should
anyone else.
***
[A second letter was published under the same heading on the

same date, from Justin Kaplan, of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Mr.
Kaplan noted how Duranty was far from alone in misreporting
Stalins crimes and failures during the early 1930s so rescinding
his Pulitzer Prize would be precisely the same sort of appalling
abuse of the historical record that Mr. Duranty himself and the
Soviet regime were guilty of. Mr. Kaplan concluded: were lucky
enough to be able to acknowledge and live with our blunders.]
............ 150 ............
For undistinguished reporting

LUBOMYR LUCIUK
The Globe and Mail, 29 October 2003

Clever in crafting words, a bon vivant, ever engaging as a dinner companion,
Walter Duranty was much in demand in certain circles. He was The New York
Timess man in Moscow in the early 1930s, and for supposedly distinguished
reporting from there, he was awarded the 1932 Pulitzer Prize for
Correspondence. What Mr. Duranty really was however, was Joseph Stalins
apologist, a libertine prepared to prostitute accuracy for access.
Much of this was known at the time, hence the deprecating references to him
as Walter Obscuranty. More tellingly, writer Malcolm Muggeridge, a
contemporary, said that Mr. Duranty was the greatest liar of any journalist I
have met in fifty years of journalism.
Despite being one of the few eyewitnesses to the politically engineered Great
Famine of 1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine, in which millions were deliberately
starved to death on the orders of Stalin, Mr. Duranty nevertheless spun stories
for The New York Times dismissing all accounts of that horror as nothing
more than bunk, or malicious anti-Soviet propaganda.
He knew otherwise. On 26 September 1933, at the British Embassy in
Moscow, Mr. Duranty privately confided to William Strang, the embassys
charg daffaires, that as many as 10 million people had died directly or
indirectly of famine conditions in the USSR during the past year. Meanwhile,
publicly, Mr. Duranty orchestrated a vicious ostracizing of those journalists
............ 151 ............
Not Worthy
who risked much by reporting on the brutalities of forced collectivization and

the ensuing catastrophe, Mr. Muggeridge among them.
Even as the fertile Ukraine, once the breadbasket of Europe, became a modernday Golgotha, a place of skulls, Mr. Duranty plowed the truth under.
Occasionally pressed on the human costs of the Soviet experiment with
communism he did, however, evolve a dismissive dodge, canting the infamous
words, you cant make an omelette without breaking eggs.
To honour the memory of the many millions of victims of this crime against
humanity, an international campaign was initiated on May Day this year,
calling upon the Pulitzer Prize Board to posthumously revoke Mr. Durantys
award. This month, a second phase of the effort began with a letter-writing
campaign to Arthur Sulzberger Jr., publisher of The New York Times, asking
him return Mr. Durantys Prize regardless of what the Pulitzer Prize Board
decides.
From around the world, tens of thousands of postcards, letters and e-mails
have now been sent, recalling the 70th anniversary of the famine, underscoring
Mr. Durantys perfidiousness and how his duplicitous reports helped cover up
one of the greatest acts of genocide in 20th century Europe. This crusades
momentum was enhanced by an independent report penned by Columbia
University historian, Mark von Hagen. He concluded that Mr. Duranty had
knowingly distorted the news, before, during and after his particularly odious
bout of famine denial.
There are sophists who retort that Mr. Duranty was recognized for what he
wrote before he bore false witness about the Holodomor, as Ukrainians refer
to this genocide. Those willing to be so indulgent with Mr. Duranty seem oddly
comfortable with ignoring how he betrayed that most fundamental principle of
journalism: the obligation of reporting truthfully on what is observed.
Others argue that we are engaged in an exercise in revisionism. They miss the
point entirely. No one wants Mr. Duranty to be deleted from history. He must
be remembered for exactly what he was a shill for the Soviets.
............ 152 ............
No matter how good a scribbler Mr. Duranty may have been, he was,
foremost, a teller of lies, who helped Moscow cover up reality as millions
starved to death. The Great Famine of 1932-1933 was Ukraines holocaust.
That this fact is only now being understood has much to do with the
determined efforts of scoundrels like Mr. Duranty. Certainly, others also served
Stalinism, out of conviction, for profit, for perks. But none of those others
came to be distinguished with a Pulitzer Prize, regarded as print journalisms
most prestigious award.
The men and women whose principled labours have earned them the honour
and distinction of a Pulitzer Prize, or those who might aspire to that select
company, should be revolted at knowing that within their ranks there remains
a blackguard who, Janus-like, turned a blind eye to one of historys greatest
atrocities while casting the other about in wrath against journalists who
reported that truth. Quite simply, Mr. Durantys continuing grasp on a Pulitzer
Prize soils all Pulitzer Prizes. It must be returned or revoked.
I have not always seen eye-to-eye with David Matas, a BNai Brith Canada
advocate. And so, when he informed me of his disagreement with the
exculpatory editorial stand of The Globe and Mail (Mr. Durantys Award 25
October 2003), I found his message not only welcome, but remarkable,
evidencing just how inclusive is revulsion at the thought of Mr. Duranty
continuing to hold this Prize. Mr. Matas wrote If hindsight is indeed 20/20,
why should we continue to insist on being blind?
In truth, I have no idea.
............ 153 ............
Not Worthy
Sauce for the gander

DAVID MATAS
The Globe and Mail, 4 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of the The Globe and Mail and the author
To The Editor: Re: Duranty s Award, The Globe and Mail, 25 October 2003
The Globe and Mail wrote in an editorial that Canada should strip David
Ahenakew of his Order of Canada because of his remarks attempting to justify
the Holocaust [ To Repair The Damage Ahenakew Has Done, 17 December
2002]. The reason the paper gave was that allowing him to keep the award
would bring the order into disrepute. We commend that reasoning. Yet the same
Globe and Mail editorial Board writes that Walter Duranty should keep his
Pulitzer Prize in journalism for articles apologizing for, and covering up, the
crimes of Stalin ( Duranty s Award, 25 October 2003). There are many
reasons why Mr. Duranty should not keep his award, but surely one is the reason
that The Globe itself has given in its Ahenakew editorial. To allow Mr. Duranty to
keep his award brings the Pulitzer Prize itself into disrepute. Allowing Mr.
Duranty to keep his Prize is an insult to every other Pulitzer Prize winner.
............ 154 ............
............ 155 ............
Not Worthy
Should This Pulitzer Be Pulled?

DOUGLAS MCCOLLAM
Columbia Journalism Review (Issue 6, November-December 2003)
Reprinted with the permission of the Columbia Journalism Review and the author
Seventy years after a government-engineered famine killed millions

in Ukraine, a New York Times correspondent who failed to sound
the alarm is under attack
If you get off the elevator on the eleventh floor of the New York Times
building, and head down a long hall leading toward the executive dining
rooms, you pass under the fixed gaze of some of the finest journalists in
American history. Along the walls hang portraits commemorating all eightynine Pulitzer Prizes awarded to The Times to date, including those given to
such notable lights as Thomas Friedman, Anthony Lewis, J. Anthony Lukas,
and David Halberstam.
As you enter the hall, just past the portrait of Russell Owen, whose dispatches
from Admiral Byrds 1928 Antarctic expedition riveted the nation, you come
to the picture of Walter Duranty, a balding Englishman who served as The
Times Moscow correspondent from 1922 to 1934. In 1932, at the age of fortyseven, Duranty was awarded the Pulitzer for a series of stories that the Board
thought showed a profound and intimate comprehension of conditions in
Russia, consistent with the best type of foreign correspondence. Next to
Durantys portrait appears the following note: Other writers in The Times
and elsewhere have discredited this coverage.
............ 156 ............
Revoking a vintage Pulitzer seems a tricky matter

Indeed they have, and this year, more than seventy years after Duranty won the
Prize, both Arthur Sulzberger Jr., publisher of The New York Times, and
members of the Pulitzer Board have found themselves inundated with letters,
postcards, faxes, e-mails, and phone calls demanding that Durantys Prize be
returned or revoked. The campaign has left some of its targets mystified. The
whole thing is just odd, says Andrew Barnes, chairman and chief executive
officer of the St. Petersburg Times, who has served on the Pulitzer Board for
seven years. David Klatell, who was on the Board for a year as interim dean of
Columbias Graduate School of Journalism, also was a bit stumped when he
began receiving the letters last fall. Its been a fairly massive writing
campaign, says Klatell, who estimates that he and Sig Gissler, administrator
of the Prizes, have received tens of thousands of cards and letters. Whoever
funded it has spent a good deal of money, Klatell says.
The ongoing effort is actually a joint project of several Ukrainian groups
worldwide, spearheaded by Lubomyr Luciuk of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil
Liberties Association. A principal architect of the campaign in America is
thirty-five-year-old Michael Sawkiw Jr., president of the Ukrainian Congress
Committee of America, a nonprofit advocacy group based in Washington, DC,
Sawkiw, an American whose parents emigrated from Ukraine after World War
II, says he recommended the campaign to his Board of directors as a way to
commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the 1932-1933 Ukrainian famine,
an event some historians consider the greatest man-made disaster in history.
When we met for drinks in Washington (vodka, of course), Sawkiw was
adamant that Duranty and The Times were coconspirators in what he calls the
Ukrainian famine-genocide. Well-groomed and affable, Sawkiw nonetheless
exuded intensity when he spoke of his determination to see Duranty stripped
of his honour. Its a cop-out just to say others dispute Durantys reporting,
Sawkiw said with just a hint of a Ukrainian accent. That doesnt get The
Times off the hook! Other Ukrainian activists I spoke with were even more
blunt: Duranty and The Times have blood on their hands and the only way
they can wash it off is to return that Prize and apologize for what they did,
says Peter Borisow, whose parents survived the famine.
............ 157 ............
Not Worthy
Both Arthur Sulzberger Jr., and his father, Arthur Sulzberger Sr., the previous
publisher, declined to be interviewed for this article, but a Times spokesman,
Toby Usnik, did e-mail a statement, saying, in part, that The Times has
reported often and thoroughly on the defects in Durantys journalism, as
viewed through the lens of later events. Among The Timess reports on
Durantys failings was a 1990 editorial that chided him for his indifference to
the catastrophic famine . . . when millions perished in the Ukraine. Max
Frankel, who was the executive editor when that editorial ran, recalls
consulting with the senior Sulzberger, then the publisher, on returning
Durantys Prize, but says the feeling was it was history and what was done
cant be undone, but if the evidence was he didnt deserve the Prize or was
wrong with his coverage wed give it back. In the end, Frankel says, the
decision was made to put the disclaimer on Durantys portrait in the Pulitzer
gallery and leave it at that. In its statement The Times seems to put the onus
for revoking the Prize on the Pulitzer Board, noting that it has reviewed the
Duranty award in the past and taken no action.
In April the Board voted to consider the question again, forming a special
committee to investigate, a step it hasnt taken in the past. Gissler, who became
administrator of the Prizes in 2002, says the committee was not formed in
response to the letter-writing campaign, which he says didnt start in earnest
until around May of this year, but because the Board views the allegations
against Duranty as serious enough to merit an in-depth inquiry. The special
committee is scheduled to make a report to the full Board at its November
meeting. The committees preliminary findings were being circulated as I
worked on this article, but Gissler declined to make it available, nor would he
comment on the substance of the controversy.
Most of the twenty-two other present and past Board members I contacted
were similarly mum, including William Safire, The Times columnist who
currently co-chairs the Pulitzer Board, and Richard Oppel, the editor of the
Austin American-Statesman, who heads the special investigative committee.
Rena Pederson, editor at large of The Dallas Morning News, who co-chairs the
Pulitzer Board with Safire, would say only that the Duranty controversy is a
serious issue that we are looking at in the most thoughtful way possible.
............ 158 ............
Nicholas Lemann, who joined the Board in September as a nonvoting member

by virtue of his new position as dean of Columbias journalism school, said he
has definite views about the Duranty matter, but couldnt comment because the
Board, in its private deliberations, might ask for his opinion.
Not everyone was reticent. Barnes of The St. Petersburg Times said he feels
strongly that reopening the Duranty case is a bad idea. There have been many
Prizes during my tenure where you could look back and ask Is that the best we
could do? says Barnes. I cant imagine what good this will do. In the
eighty-seven-year history of the Pulitzer Prizes, no award has ever been
revoked. In 1981 The Washington Post declined to accept a Pulitzer that had
been awarded to reporter Janet Cooke after it became clear that her story
about an eight-year-old heroin addict had been made up. The Pulitzer Board
then withdrew the Prize. But revoking a vintage Pulitzer seems a trickier matter.
Its an extraordinarily difficult thing to recreate the historical and intellectual
context in which many of the Pulitzer jurors were working, says David Klatell.
To get a clearer idea of the issues facing the Board, I spent some time at the
Library of Congress researching Duranty and his work. In addition to the
thirteen stories he wrote in 1931 that were the basis for his 1932 Pulitzer, I also
read dozens of other dispatches he filed before, during, and after the Ukrainian
famine, as well as accounts of Duranty by colleagues and historians, and a
good deal of his autobiographical writing. The picture that emerged was
sufficiently complex to make me not envy the Pulitzer Boards task. While its
clear that much of Durantys reporting was suspect, its also clear that he and
other correspondents in Moscow operated under censorship rules akin to those
governing reporters at the front lines of a war which was exactly how the
Soviets viewed their revolutionary struggle. Later Times Moscow
correspondents, such as Harrison Salisbury (who resides in Pulitzer Hall with
Duranty), would defy Communist minders and be barred from the country for
their trouble. Duranty worked within the system, trading softer coverage for
continuing access. Deciding whether that exchange ended up with The Times
substantially whitewashing Soviet atrocities requires a closer examination of
Durantys work.
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Not Worthy
When Walter Duranty left The Times and Russia in 1934, the paper said his
twelve-year stint in Moscow had perhaps been the most important assignment
ever entrusted by a newspaper to a single correspondent over a considerable
period of time. By that time, Duranty was a journalistic celebrity an
absentia member of the Algonquin Roundtable, a confidant of Isadora
Duncan, George Bernard Shaw, and Sinclair Lewis. He was held in such esteem
that the presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt brought him in for
consultations on whether the Soviet Union should be officially recognized.
When recognition was granted in 1934, Duranty traveled with the Soviet
foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov, to the signing ceremony and spoke privately
with FDR. At a banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York held to celebrate
the event, Duranty was introduced as one of the great foreign correspondents
of modern times, and 1,500 dignitaries gave him a standing ovation.
In Moscow, Duranty was known as the dean of foreign correspondents, and
was renowned for his lavish hospitality. In an austere city, he enjoyed generous
living quarters and food rations, as well as the use of assistants, a chauffeur,
and a cook/secretary/mistress named Katya, who bore him a son named
Michael. Duranty, who had a wooden left leg caused by a train accident, was
driven through the streets in a giant Buick outfitted with the Klaxon horn used
by the Soviet secret police. His competitors gossiped that these perks were
allowed because of his cozy relationship with the Soviet government. Eugene
Lyons, a United Press correspondent, even suspected that Duranty might be on
the Soviet payroll, but no evidence of that seems to exist. Still, many then and
later wondered if the status Duranty enjoyed in Moscow led him to curtail his
coverage of the Soviets. Malcolm Muggeridge, a correspondent for The
Manchester Guardian, would later call Duranty the greatest liar of any
journalist I have met in fifty years of journalism. Joseph Alsop would tab him
a fashionable prostitute, in the service of Communists. And S. J. Taylors
1990 biography of him would be titled Stalins Apologist.
This was all a long way from where Duranty started. Before going to Russia
as he later wrote he was viciously anti-Bolshevik. In fact, when he arrived
in Moscow in 1921 (to cover a famine, ironically enough), the Soviets almost
denied Duranty a visa because of his record of antagonizing them in print. But
............ 160 ............
soon after his arrival, Durantys attitude changed. He came to see the Soviets
as sincere enthusiasts trying to regenerate a people who had been shockingly
misgoverned. He was hardly alone in this view. In the early 1930s, capitalism
was at a low ebb, with depression-era unemployment in most industrialized
countries approaching 25 percent. For many, especially among the educated
elite, communism became a fashionable alternative to capitalism, as well as a
bulwark against the rising tide of fascism. The nascent Soviet Union was seen
as a grand, romantic experiment, one that carried the best hopes for the mass
of humanity. Unlike many writers and journalists who went to Moscow at the
time, Duranty was not a Communist or even blind to the Soviet excesses; he
simply excused the forced labour camps, property seizures, and political purges
as measures necessary to drive a backward country into the 20th century. You
cant make an omelet without breaking some eggs, was a phrase many
remembered Duranty using to excuse Soviet tactics, but in his 1935 book I
Write As I Please, he gave a fuller account of his thinking: Even to a reporter
who prides himself on having no bowels of compassion to weep over ruined
homes and broken hearts, it is not always easy or pleasant to describe such
wreckage, however excellent may be the purpose But what matters to me is
the facts, that is to say whether the Soviet drive to Socialism is or is not
successful irrespective of the cost. When, as often happens, it makes me sick to
see the cost, I say to myself, Well, I saw the War and that cost was worse and
greater and the result in terms of human hope or happiness was completely
nil.
This perspective is evident in the 1931 series of articles that won him the
Pulitzer. The stories sought to explain the impact of the first five years of
Stalinism (a term Duranty is credited with inventing). In the series, Duranty
explained that Stalin was focused on domestic progress, as opposed to Lenins
earlier emphasis on achieving a world worker revolution. Stalinism, Duranty
wrote, was marked by unprecedented invasion into every aspect of life in the
country. The Stalinist machine is better organized for the formation and
control of public opinion than anything history has hitherto known, Duranty
wrote in one piece. In another, about the forced collectivization movement in
agriculture, he noted that while it was based in theory on producing more food
to feed a hungry nation, the reality is that 5,000,000 human beings, and
............ 161 ............
Not Worthy
1,000,000 families of the best and most energetic farmers are to be

dispossessed, dispersed and demolished, to be literally melted or liquidated
into the rising flood of classless proletarians. In general, Duranty wrote,
Stalinism was not unlike the iron rule of the tsars, and was an ugly, harsh, and
cruel creedflattening and beating down with, so far, no more than a hope or
promise of a subsequent raising up. Perhaps this hope is vain and the promise
a lie. That is a secret of the future.
Taken together the thirteen articles (eleven were part of a series, datelined from
Paris, that ran in June of 1931; the two others were separate stories) are a
sometimes prescient exploration of a kind of totalitarian government the world
had never seen before. Durantys writing style is often stilted, and the stories
are flawed in many respects, but overall seem sound, and even include notes of
moral condemnation rarely found elsewhere in his work.
The same cannot be said about Durantys coverage or lack of coverage
of the 1932-1933 famine in Ukraine. After five years of brutal agricultural
collectivization, Stalin increased the grain quotas due from Ukraine despite a
poor harvest year. When it became evident that the quotas would not be met,
Soviet troops and Party activists swept through Ukraine tearing apart peasant
farms looking for secret grain hordes. They stripped the people clean and the
result was catastrophic. Though no reliable census data are available, most
historians now estimate at least 5 million people starved to death. Ukrainian
groups put the figure at 7 million to 10 million and passionately believe it
reflects a deliberate campaign by Stalin to break resistance to the Soviets in
Ukraine and obliterate the Ukrainian identity, though not all historians agree
with that interpretation.
Durantys stories begin to describe the food problem in August 1932. By
October, he reported that Ukraines harvest was coming in at only 55 percent
of 1931 levels, and in November he wrote a series on the food shortage
crisis. But the articles largely parroted the government line about lazy
peasants and kulak class enemies in the provinces being the cause of the
problem. All the stories are datelined in Moscow, and Duranty goes to some
lengths to play down the crisis. There is no famine or actual starvation, nor
............ 162 ............
is there likely to be, Duranty wrote in words that are now used against him.
But just a couple of lines later in the same story he notes, but it is a gloomy
picture, and as far as the writer can see, there is small sign or hope of
improvement in the near future.
Even these toned-down reports, however, were apparently enough to draw the
ire of the Soviet government. In a meeting with the British ambassador to
Moscow, William Strang, Duranty said government officials had threatened
that his food shortage stories could result in serious consequences for him
because they endangered recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States.
Duranty told Strang he was afraid his visa would not be renewed. About a
week after the series ran in November, Duranty filed a story from Paris about
the censorship issue, saying his position had grown delicate and difficult.
But, he hastened to add, the censors were generally reasonable. Its clear he was
trying to serve two masters.
By early 1933 word of the famine in Ukraine was leaking into the Western press.
In March Malcolm Muggeridge bought a train ticket from Moscow to Kiev
(without informing the Soviet press office) to check out famine rumors. There he
found the population starving to death. I mean starving in its absolute sense;
not undernourished, he wrote in reports that were smuggled past the censors.
Worse, Muggeridge found grain supplies that did exist were being given to army
units brought in to keep starving peasants from revolting. Upon his return to
Moscow, Muggeridge informed the British embassy that the situation was so bad
he wouldnt have believed it if he had not seen it in person. Embittered, the
idealistic Muggeridge left the Soviet Union, convinced he had witnessed one of
the most monstrous crimes in history, so terrible that people in the future will
scarcely be able to believe it ever happened.
Confined to Moscow and perhaps alarmed at being scooped, Duranty began to
openly criticize the famine reports. Muggeridges stories were followed by a
similar one from Gareth Jones, a secretary to the former British prime minister
David Lloyd George, who had made a three-week walking tour of Ukraine.
Duranty attacked Jones in The New York Times as naive and dismissed his
article as another in a long line of failed predictions of doom for the Soviets.
............ 163 ............
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Duranty wrote that he had made his own exhaustive inquiries around
Moscow. Based on those he could report there was a serious food shortage but
no actual starvation or deaths from starvation, but there is widespread
mortality from diseases due to malnutrition. While conditions were bad,
Duranty went on to write, there was no famine. As S. J. Taylor notes in Stalins
Apologist, the Timesman was cutting semantic distinction pretty slim and
his downplaying of the famine was the most outrageous equivocation of the
period one that Gareth Jones did not let Duranty get away with. In a long
letter to The Times published in May 1933 Jones wrote that during his weeks
in the countryside he visited twenty villages and talked with hundreds of
peasants. In Moscow, he discussed the tragedy with consuls from twenty or
thirty countries, all of whom supported his view that a massive famine was
under way. Further, Jones said, censorship in the Soviet Union had turned
correspondents into masters of euphemism and understatement so that
famine became food shortage and death from starvation became
widespread mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.
When travel restrictions were eased, Duranty finally made his own tour of
Ukraine. In late August of 1933, at the start of a bumper harvest, he was able
to report that any report of a famine in Russia is today an exaggeration or
malignant propaganda. In the same story, however, he noted that the food
shortage had previously caused heavy loss of life in the region, at least
trebling the normal death rate. In an editorial the next day, The Times noted
that Durantys figures suggested that the famine must have taken at least
5,000,000 lives and perhaps twice as many, an estimate very much in line
with what historians would later conclude. The editorial goes on to note that
the United States in 1933, despite the Depression, had a surplus of 350 million
bushels of wheat that could be used to offset the famine. But it was already too
late.
Do these failings mean that Duranty should be stripped of the Pulitzer? That
was certainly the conclusion of Mark von Hagen, a Columbia University
history professor The Times hired to analyze Durantys work. In an eight-page
report that leaked to The New York Sun in late October he blasts Durantys
reporting as uncritical and unbalanced. In a July 29 letter to the Pulitzer Board,
............ 164 ............
forwarding the report, Arthur Sulzberger Jr. wrote that The Times had often
acknowledged Durantys slovenly work, but argued that the Board might set a
bad precedent by revoking the award. Sulzberger wrote that The Times would
respect whatever decision the Board made, but cautioned that revoking the
award was somewhat akin to the Stalinist urge to airbrush purged figures out
of official records and histories.
Von Hagens report examined the totality of Durantys reporting in 1931, and
found that he frequently hewed to the Party line and excused or explained
away Soviet excess. In this, von Hagen notes, Duranty was not unique. But his
report does not focus on the thirteen stories cited by the Pulitzer committee as
the basis for the Prize (he cites only six of the thirteen and one of them
favourably).
If the case for revoking the Prize is based solely on the series that Duranty won
for, then it is less compelling. If it is based instead on the totality of his
reporting, then the Prize should probably be revoked.
Duranty did not simply write watered-down stories about the famine. Others,
including later critics like William Henry Chamberlin of The Christian Science
Monitor and Eugene Lyons of UP , filed similarly bland reports, correcting the
record only after they were out of the country. No one, it appears, both
reported the depths of the famine and managed to stay inside the Soviet Union.
But Duranty did more than equivocate; he repeatedly cast doubt on whether
the famine was taking place, relying on scarcely more than official Soviet press
reports. In so doing he allowed himself to become a vehicle of Soviet
propaganda. When he was finally allowed to tour the region in September of
1933, Duranty played up the big harvest that was by then under way, and
wrote that the populace, from the babies to the old folks, looks healthy and
well nourished. But writing of the same trip years later, in 1949, Duranty
recalled that he had driven nearly two hundred miles across the country
between Rostov and Krasnodar through land that was lost to the weeds and
through villages that were empty. That was also the image Duranty gave to
the British ambassador, Strang, and others shortly after his return to Moscow.
............ 165 ............
Not Worthy
The Ukraine has been bled white, Duranty is reported as saying to Strang in
a diplomatic dispatch to London dated 30 September 1933. Duranty ventured
to Strang that it was quite possible that as many as 10 million people may
have died directly or indirectly from lack of food in the Soviet Union during
the past year. These sentiments, needless to say, never appeared under
Durantys byline.
Researchers who have investigated Durantys career have found that certain
editors at The New York Times did have doubts about his coverage of the
Soviet Union, but never acted to recall him. Times editors were aware of
famine reports in other newspapers, and even ran editorials and stories
contrary to Durantys coverage in The Times. Those who wish to see Durantys
Pulitzer revoked point to a 1931 State Department memo from the American
ambassador to Germany on a meeting he had with Duranty in which Duranty
supposedly said that by agreement between The Times and the Soviet
government, all his dispatches reflected the Soviets official position. Though
the report appears genuine, its hard to know how much weight to give it given
the lack of other supporting evidence and the tone of The Times coverage.
Certainly Durantys dispatches were contorted to get past the censors, but The
Times headlines on his stories were often harsher in tone than the articles under
them. The paper had a long record of anti-Soviet coverage and took a much
harder editorial line against the Soviets than Duranty did, leading to a
somewhat inconsistent picture during Durantys tenure.
That tenure ended in early 1934, when Duranty stepped down as The Times
Moscow correspondent, just months after his triumphal trip with Litvinov to
the White House. He continued as special correspondent for The Times
through 1940 and wrote several books on the Soviet Union, never altering his
view of Stalin as a cruel but necessary figure in Russian history. He died in
Florida in 1957 with both his bank account and his reputation severely
diminished. Given his cynical world view, Duranty might be mystified by the
outrage still surrounding his career.
Then again, perhaps he anticipated the questions to come about his reporting
from the Soviet Union. In his best selling 1935 memoir, I Write As I Please, he
............ 166 ............
discusses whether the noble objectives of the Soviets justified the harsh
means they employed. In deciding, he recounts an incident that occurred while
he was a cub reporter for The Timess Paris desk in 1917 during World War I.
George Creel, the head of the US militarys public information office, had
relayed a tale about how American sailors on their maiden voyage to Europe
sank a pack of German submarines. Duranty believed the story to be war
propaganda meant to bolster flagging morale, but he filed the story anyway.
Did the end justify the means, a troubled Duranty wondered? His answer took
the form of a poem written in the style of e.e. cummings. In long stanzas he
tells of the sailors heroic tale and his decision to write about it despite
doubting its truth. The final stanza concludes:
well i ask you does a reporter not mean someone who reports
reports exactly what he sees verbatim what he hears
and did I not report it to my full two thousand words
and did it LEAD THE PAPER or not
and if Saint Peter asks unpleasant questions about it i shall
appeal to Saint Athanasius
and if Saint Athanasius lets me down ill shout for citizen Creel
and if they cant
find him in heaven then I fear well meet in HELL
............ 167 ............
Not Worthy
If Ukraine forgets about who brought it so much misery, it will

never be free
JAMES MACE interviews LUBOMYR LUCIUK
The Day, 4 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Day
Recently The Day wrote about the important achievement in the campaign to
rescind Walter Duranty s Pulitzer Prize The New York Times has published an
article saying that Professor Mark van Hagen, who conducted an independent
research on the newspaper s request, came to a conclusion that the Prize
should be returned. Today we publish an exclusive interview with Professor
Lubomyr Luciuk, research director of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties
Association, initiator of this campaign in which our newspaper took an active
part. Professor Luciuk doesn t intend to stop on this and shares with The Day his
view of what Ukrainians throughout the world could and should do to
commemorate the Holodomor victims
Q: Professor Luciuk, the campaign you began to rescind the 1932 Pulitzer Prize
awarded to Walter Duranty of The New York Times, essentially for reporting
what many people in the West wanted to hear about Stalins Soviet Union
instead of the horrors, which that period entailed, has inspired Ukrainians the
world over. Why did you begin the campaign to remove from Stalins most
famous and successful apologist the laurels he was then awarded for denying,
among other things, the Ukrainian Holodomor in Ukraine?
A: To hallow the memory of the many millions of Ukrainians who
were victims of the genocidal Great Famine of 1932-1933.
............ 168 ............
Q: You are research director of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties

Association. What can you tell us about its relation to civil liberties and with
specific reference to the national indignities from which your own ancestors
fled and issues in Ukraine such as the freedom of the press and of the issues
of national language and the coexistence of Ukrainians in a nation state with
its own national minorities that have their own national rights that the
Ukrainian state has responsibility for?
A: The UCCLA has been in existence since the mid-1980s as a
voluntary, nonpartisan organization dedicated to articulating and
defending the interests of the Ukrainian Canadian community and,
more recently, of the Ukrainian Diaspora and even Ukraine. We
have launched major campaigns on several fronts. For example, we
have attempted to correct distorted reporting about what
happened in Ukraine during the Second World War. Ukraine lost
more of its people than any other nation in Nazi occupied Europe,
a fact still not appreciated in the world. We have advocated that all
war criminals should be brought to justice in criminal courts,
regardless of their ethnic, religious, racial backgrounds or political
beliefs, or when or where their alleged wrong doings were
committed. We have stood up for the rights of Canadian citizens
who have been, in our view, falsely accused of having participated
in war crimes and subjected to denaturalization and deportation
hearings. We have also championed the notion of recognition and
reconciliation between the government of Canada and our
community for the wrongs done during Canadas first national
internment operations, when thousands of Ukrainians were
branded as enemy aliens, lost their freedoms and what little
wealth they had, lost their right to vote, and were forced to do
heavy labour in frontier areas of this country, for the profit of
government and big business. We are also beginning a campaign to
alert the world to the horrors befalling Ukrainian and other east
European women, a modern-day holocaust orchestrated by
criminal elements who suck these innocents into international
prostitution and slavery. We are astounded that the government of
Ukraine has done so little to protect its women from these
............ 169 ............
Not Worthy
transnational rapists and whoremongers. We do whatever we can

to support democratic forces in Ukraine, hoping that, sooner
rather than later, an expectoration of all those who once served the
Soviet regime will take place. They have no role to play in civil
society. While former Communists and their collaborators hang
onto the reins of power and influence in Ukraine our ancestral
homeland can not be truly free.
Q: Everybody in Ukraine or concerned about it says that it is important to

understand and recognize that Ukraine was the victim was genocide, but they
sometimes differ in explaining why. Why do you think so?
A: To date the government of Ukraine has not done enough to ensure
that the archival evidence about the genocidal Great Famine in
Ukraine is made readily available for scholars around the world.
Releasing some documents, but apparently not all, is insufficient. As
well, Ukraine should be launching investigations into who
perpetrated the Holodomor and bringing those responsible, from the
top down, to justice before the criminal courts of the country. Today
there still are many former servants of the Soviets living on pensions
in Ukraine. These collaborators have, to date, gotten away with mass
murder. No one would argue that aged Nazi war criminals and
collaborators should escape justice. Neither should Soviet war
criminals or those who collaborated in Communist crimes against
humanity. Of course, one cannot blame Ukraine alone in this regard.
We have alleged Soviet war criminals and collaborators in Canada,
and others are alive and enjoying their pensions in Israel, the USA
and throughout Western Europe. The world has simply not done
enough to bring these villains to justice. Ukraine could lead the way.
And, most certainly, Ukraine needs a major Great Famine Memorial
complex in Kyiv and perhaps also in Kharkiv, educational, research
and commemorative centers that would ensure that all Ukrainians
and all visitors to Ukraine are forever reminded of the horrors that
befell the country under Soviet and Nazi rule.
............ 170 ............
Q: Which organizations were most helpful in supporting your efforts in the

Duranty campaign?
A: We have been very fortunate in securing the support of
individuals and groups from around the world. The Ukrainian
World Congress, the Ukrainian American Justice Committee, the
Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the Australian Federation of
Ukrainian Organizations, the Association of Ukrainians in Great
Britain and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America have
been particularly helpful. But it was the Ukrainian Canadian Civil
Liberties Association that initiated and orchestrated this effort,
which has now received so much international attention. I would
like, in this context, to also personally thank Dr. Myron Kuropas,
of Chicago, who came up with the idea of a second postcard
campaign, directed at The New York Times, asking them to return
the Duranty Pulitzer Prize, regardless of whether or not the
Pulitzer Prize Committee does the right thing and revokes it, as we
have called for. It is a pity that the Government of Ukraine has yet
to come forward and lend its moral support and weight to this
international campaign. It certainly is odd that the government of
a country that fell victim to genocide is relatively unengaged in this
process. No one can imagine Israel being indifferent to Nazi war
criminals or calls for bringing them to justice, or uninterested in
commemorating the victims, or uninvolved when it comes to
seeing justice done by exposing a major famine denier. Yet, to date,
Kyiv is silent. That is very troubling, inexplicable, embarrassing.
Q: Your work on the issue of rescinding the Pulitzer Prize of Walter Duranty
has won a victory with Mark von Hagens report to The New York Times that
the award should be rescinded, while the recent editorial in Canadas Globe
and Mail that defending the 1990 decision not to pull his Pulitzer was the
correct one in not wanting to airbrush history? Who has airbrushed history
here? Duranty or those who want to preserve an award that was won for
something everyone, including The Globe and Mail, recognize as a disgrace to
journalism?
............ 171 ............
Not Worthy
A: We have no desire to airbrush Mr. Duranty from history. We

want him remembered for exactly what he was, a shill for the
Soviets, Stalins apologist, a man who knowingly covered up a
genocide. Professor von Hagen has confirmed that Duranty was a
liar before, during and after the Great Famine. We know that he
used his status as a Pulitzer Prize winner to attack those
journalists, like Gareth Jones and Malcolm Muggeridge, who
risked a great deal to tell the truth, only to then become victims of
Durantys poisoned pen. We want all of that recalled, remembered,
inscribed into the historical record for all time. Perhaps some
Ukrainians, being Christians, can forgive Duranty, knowing that
God will have judged him. But we have a duty to remember. No
ones wants to forget Duranty or erase him. Quite the contrary. I
think these kinds of rebuttals from The New York Times and
Pulitzer Prize Committee representatives are very feeble. They
should do the right thing and revoke Durantys Prize, and do so
this November, to mark the 70th anniversary of this famine
genocide. That would help bring closure to this matter and hallow
the memory of the many millions of victims.
Q: What do you in general think about the von Hagen report to The Times?
A: Most welcome for confirming what we have always said.
Professor von Hagen is to be commended for his forthright
statement and for then going on to say that he recommends that
The New York Times return Durantys Pulitzer. His statement
helped a great deal by securing even more coverage internationally
for our efforts, from Kenya to Canada to Russia to the USA and
Ukraine. This story is all over the media, worldwide.
Q: You have asked the question of why we should stop here. Where should we
go from here and how?
A: Ukraine needs to fund and create a Great Famine Memorial in
Kyiv and probably in Kharkiv (capital of Soviet Ukraine during the
Famine), with a commemorative and educational function, and
............ 172 ............
funding sufficient to make it unequaled as a center for the study of

Soviet war crimes and crimes against humanity, not only during
1932-1933 but before, during and after that particularly horrific
tragedy. And the government of Ukraine must also move forward
with identifying, locating and bringing to criminal prosecution
those who orchestrated the genocide or served the Soviets as
collaborators in other crimes against humanity and war crimes.
There should be no statute of limitations that would allow mass
murderers to escape justice. And, regardless of where they might
now live, be it in Russia, Israel, Canada, England or elsewhere, the
government of Ukraine should locate such persons and call for
their extradition to face justice. If Ukraine forgets about who
brought so much misery, physically and spiritually, to our
homeland then Ukraine will never be free. This will be a painful
process but it is an essential one.
............ 173 ............
Not Worthy
Statement by His Excellency Mr. Valeriy P. Kuchinsky

Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations
10 November 2003
Mr. Chairman,
At the outset I wish to thank the Secretary-General for the documents under
this agenda item and the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Mr.
Bertrand Ramcharan for his brilliant presentation. My delegation would also
like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the memory of the late High
Commissioner for Human Rights, outstanding Brazilian diplomat Sergio Vieira
de Mello, an excellent peacemaker and a strong advocate for human rights. We
will miss Sergio and will never forget other people who perished in Baghdad.
In connection with this tragedy as well as a number of others in many parts of
the world we ask ourselves again and again: how can we save and promote the
most fundamental and inalienable right of every person the right to life?
There is no doubt that we should combat new threats like terrorism in all their
forms. And we need to respond to them not only by legislative and security
measures but with the armoury of common values, common standards and
common commitments on universal rights. A comprehensive strategy to
establish global security must be grounded on promoting respect for human
rights through upholding the rule of law, fostering social justice and enhancing
democracy. Raising public awareness of human rights and fundamental
freedoms is among the most important tasks we are facing today. Just a year
ago, in his first and last report as the High Commissioner before the General
Assembly Mr. de Mello rightly pointed out that nations had the right to know
the truth about past events. Full and effective exercise of this right to truth is
essential to avoid any recurrence of violations in the future. Guided by this
............ 174 ............
principle my delegation together with the delegations of Argentina, the

Republic of Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Canada, Egypt, Georgia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nauru,
Pakistan, Qatar, the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, the
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Timor-Leste, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America and
Uzbekistan have issued the joint statement on one of the most tragic events in
the history of Ukraine, and I believe, in the history of humankind the Great
Famine of 1932-1933 (Holodomor). This statement will be circulated as an
official document (A/C.3/58/9) of the 58th session under agenda item 117(b),
and Ukraine would like to thank once again all delegations who have signed
this statement for their valuable support. We also thank those countries who
expressed support for the declaration. We, in Ukraine, are also very grateful to
the Senates of Argentina, Australia, Canada and the US House of
Representatives for adopting this year respective documents on the Great
Famine. Some of them clearly pointed out that the Holodomor was one of the
most terrible expressions of genocide in the history of humankind. The Great
Famine engineered by the totalitarian Soviet regime claimed the lives of 7 to 10
million of our compatriots, the figure that can be compared with the
population of an average European country. The dreadful Famine that engulfed
Ukraine in 1932-1933 was the result of Joseph Stalins policy of forced
collectivization. This Famine was accompanied by a devastating purges of the
Ukrainian intelligentsia, religious leaders and politicians. It broke the peasants
will to resist collectivization and left Ukraine politically, socially and
psychologically traumatized. Unfortunately, back in 1933 the world did not
respond to our tragedy. The international community believed the cynical
propaganda of the Soviet Union, which was selling bread abroad while in
Ukraine the hunger was killing 17 people each minute. In other words, a
number of people equal to the number of people present in this Conference
room was perishing every 20 minutes. During this week the delegation of
Ukraine together with a number of NGOs organize scores of events in
observance of the 70th anniversary of the Great Famine, and invites all the
delegations, their families and friends to attend them and to learn more about
the Ukrainian Holodomor. As the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma stated
in his address at the general debate of the 58th session of the General Assembly,
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and as was clearly expressed in the joint document of our delegations, we do

not want to settle scores with the past. We just want that as many people as
possible know about our tragedy and that this knowledge help all of us to
avoid similar catastrophes in the future. I thank you.
............ 176 ............
United Nations
General Assembly
Distr.: General
7 November 2003
Original: English
Fifty-eighth session
Third Committee
Agenda item 117 (b)
Human rights questions: human rights questions,

including alternative approaches for improving
the effective enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms
Letter dated 7 November 2003 from the Permanent

Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General
On behalf of the delegations listed in the annex to the present letter, I have the
honour to transmit herewith the statement on the seventieth anniversary of the Great
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor).
I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex
circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 117 (b).
(Signed) Valeriy Kuchinsky

Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations
............ 177 ............
A/C.3/58/9
A/C.3/58/9
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Annex to the letter dated 7 November 2003 from the Permanent

Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General
Joint statement by the delegations of Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Egypt, Georgia, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Nauru, Pakistan, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, the
Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic,
Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and the United
States of America on the seventieth anniversary of the Great Famine of

1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor)
In the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victims
to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime. The Great Famine of
1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), which took from 7 million to 10 million
innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people. In this regard
we note activities in observance of the seventieth anniversary of this Famine, in
particular organized by the Government of Ukraine.
Honouring the seventieth anniversary of the Ukrainian tragedy, we also

commemorate the memory of millions of Russians, Kazakhs and representatives of
other nationalities who died of starvation in the Volga River region, Northern
Caucasus, Kazakhstan and in other parts of the former Soviet Union, as a result of
civil war and forced collectivization, leaving deep scars in the consciousness of
future generations.
Expressing sympathy to the victims of the Great Famine, we call upon all
Member States, the United Nations and its special agencies, international and
regional organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, foundations and
associations to pay tribute to the memory of those who perished during that tragic
period of history.
Recognizing the importance of raising public awareness on the tragic events

in the history of mankind for their prevention in future, we deplore the acts and
policies that brought about mass starvation and death of millions of people. We do
not want to settle scores with the past, it could not be changed, but we are convinced
that exposing violations of human rights, preserving historical records and restoring
the dignity of victims through acknowledgement of their suffering, will guide future
societies and help to avoid similar catastrophes in the future. We need that as many
people as possible learn about this tragedy and consider that this knowledge will
strengthen effectiveness of the rule of law and enhance respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
............ 178 ............
Gareth Jones - A Voice Crying in the Wilderness

MARGARET SIRIOL COLLEY
10 November 2003
Gareth Jones
For almost seventy years, my uncle, Gareth Jones, the first journalist to expose
the 1932-1933 famine genocide has been conveniently airbrushed out of
history, the first and main casualty in the politics of acknowledgement of the
Holodomor.
His only crime was his journalistic pursuit of the truth. Sticking his head above
the parapet, he refused to be silenced, on righting the moral injustices of the
Soviet famine, which from first hand knowledge he clearly knew to be true.
Tragically, he paid the same ultimate price as many others who displeased the
Stalinist regime.
Gareth Jones was kidnapped and murdered under mysterious circumstances by
bandits in North China, just over six months after his last series of articles for
Randolph Hearst in 1935, where he again, repeated his famine observations of
March 1933.
You may ask who was Gareth Jones? Well, he was born in 1905 in Barry, South
Wales, and educated first in his fathers school. Afterwards he attained two first
class degrees, at the Universities of Wales, Aberystwyth, and Trinity College,
Cambridge in French, German, and Russian.
In 1930, he became a foreign affairs advisor to former wartime Prime Minister
David Lloyd George and first visited Russia and Ukraine in August 1930. On
leaving Moscow, 26 August 1930 he wrote to his parents from Berlin (see
appendix 1):
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Hurray! It is wonderful to be in Germany again, absolutely

wonderful. Russia is in a very bad state; rotten, no food, only
bread; oppression, injustice, misery among the workers and 90%
discontented. The winter is going to be one of great suffering there
and there is starvation. The government is the most brutal in the
world. This year thousands and thousands of the best men in
Russia have been sent to Siberia and the prison island of Solovki.
In the Donetz Basin conditions are unbearable. Many Russians are
too weak to work1.
One should note that the convention of the time meant that the word Russia
was used in the West to describe all parts of the Soviet Union.
On his return to Britain, he was summoned to David Lloyd Georges
country home in Churt where he met Lord Lothian. Lothian impressed
with Gareths diary notes, introduced him to the editor of The Times, who
subsequently published three unsigned articles entitled the Real Russia.
Gareth wrote in the Cardiff Western Mail:
The success of the Five-Year Plan would strengthen the hands of

the Communists throughout the world. It might make the 20th
century a century of strugg1e between Capitalism and
Communism.2
Soon after Gareth s return from the Soviet Union, Ivy Lee of Wall Street, New
York, the then renowned Public Relations Advisor to big business, engaged
Gareth Jones services, especially for his in-depth knowledge of the Soviet
Union.
Gareth arrived in New York in May 1931, and shortly after his arrival, was
invited to accompany a young Jack Heinz II, of Heinz Ketchup fame, for an
extensive six weeks tour of Russia and Ukraine in the late summer. Gareth had
kept a very extensive diary of their visit, which Jack Heinz later transcribed
into a small book, entitled Experiences in Russia 1931: A Diary for which
Gareth wrote the foreword:
............ 180 ............
With knowledge of Russia and the Russian language, it was

possible to get off the beaten path, to talk with grimy workers and
rough peasants, as well as such leaders as Lenins widow and Karl
Radek. We visited vast engineering projects and factories, slept on
the bug-infested floors of peasants huts, shared black bread and
cabbage soup with the villagers - in short, got into direct touch
with the Russian people in their struggle for existence and were
thus able to test their reactions to the Soviet Governments
dramatic moves.3
Time does not permit me to quote from the book, but there are several
references to starvation and deaths where peasants had been sent away in
thousands to starve.
After a year in the employ of Ivy Lee and due the fact that the United States
was suffering from severe financial depression, Gareth returned to David Lloyd
George for another year and unbeknown to many, assisted the former prime
minister in writing his War Memoirs.
In London, in September 1932, Gareth learnt through several informed
sources, including Malcolm Muggeridge, of reports emanating from Moscow
of a severe famine crisis in the Soviet Union. Professor Jules Menken (of the
London School of Economics), an eminent economist of the time, told Gareth
that he dreaded this winter, when he thought millions would die of hunger
and finally stated that There was already famine in Ukraine.4
In light of this information, on 15 and 17 October, Gareth wrote two prophetic
articles for the Cardiff Western Mail entitled: Will There be Soup? where he
painted a very bleak picture of the coming Soviet winter.5
Before returning to the Soviet Union, on 23 February, Gareth through his
connections with Lloyd George, became the first foreign journalist to be invited
to fly with Adolf Hitler to a Frankfurt rally, just four days before the burning
of the Reichstag. Describing that trip he wrote:
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If this aeroplane should crash the whole history of Europe would

be changed. For a few feet away sits Adolf Hitler, Chancellor of
Germany and leader of the most volcanic nationalist awakening
which the world has seen.6
Before leaving Germany he wrote in the Western Mail: The Europe of 1933
has seen the birth of the Hitler dictatorship in Germany. What will it see in the
Soviet Union?7 Then, on 1 March 1933, with his usual frenetic lifestyle,
Gareth was in Moscow, from where he embarked on a tour of Ukraine.
On his way to Kharkiv, he narrowly escaped being arrested at a small railway
station when he entered into conversation with some peasants. They were
bewailing their hunger to him, and were gathering as a crowd, all murmuring,
There is no bread, when a militiaman appeared. Stop that growling, he
had shouted to the peasants; while to Gareth he said, Come along; where are
your documents? An OGPU (secret police) man appeared from nowhere, and
he was submitted to a thorough grueling of questions. After his fate had been
decided the fortunate Gareth was allowed to proceed on his way. 8
He had piled his rucksack with many loaves of white bread, with butter, cheese,
meat and chocolate, which he had bought at the foreign currency stores.
Gareth believed that, To see Russia one must travel hard class, and go by
a slow train. Those tourists who travel soft class. and by express trains, get
only impression, and do not see the real Russia. 9
About that trip Gareth was to write in The Daily Express in April 1933:
In every little station the train stopped, and during one of these
halts a man came up to me and whispered in German: Tell them
in England that we are starving, and that we are getting swollen.10
In one of the peasants cottages in which I stayed we slept nine in
the room. It was pitiful to see that two out of the three children had
swollen stomachs. All there was to eat in the hut was a very dirty
watery soup, with a slice or two of potato, which all the family
including myself, ate from a common bowl with wooden spoons.
............ 182 ............
Fear of death loomed over the cottage, for they had not enough
potatoes to last until the next crop. When I shared my white bread
and butter and cheese one of the peasant women said, Now I
have eaten such wonderful things, I can die happy. I set forth
again further towards the south and heard the villagers say, We
are waiting for death. Many also said, It is terrible here and
many are dying, but further south it is much worse. 11
On 29 March 1933, in Berlin, immediately on Gareths return from the Soviet
Union, he issued a press release, which the 1931 Pulitzer Prize winner, H. R.
Knickerbocker reported through the New York Evening Post Foreign Service. 12
Similar statements then appeared in the British press including the then
Sovietsympathetic Manchester Guardian, which quoted Gareth: I walked
alone through villages and twelve collective farms. Everywhere was the cry,
There is no bread; we are dying.
Knickerbocker commented that: the Jones report, because of his position,
because of his reputation for reliability and impartiality and because he was the
only first-hand observer who had visited the Russian countryside since it was
officially closed to foreigners, was bound to receive widespread attention in
official England as well as among the public of the country.
On 31 March, Walter Duranty made his outrageous and prompt rebuttal to
Gareths press release:
Since I talked with Mr. Jones I have made exhaustive inquiries

about this alleged famine situation. . . . There is serious food
shortage throughout the country with occasional cases of wellmanaged state or collective farms. The big cities and the army are
adequately supplied with food. There is no actual starvation or
death from starvation, but there is widespread is mortality from
diseases due to malnutrition . . .But - to put it brutally - you cant
make an omelette without breaking eggs.13
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Gareth immediately on his return to Britain wrote at least 20 articles. In fact

over the previous four years he had published between forty to fifty articles in
Britain, the USA and other countries.
On 13 May 1933 The New York Times printed a letter of reply from Mr.
Jones to Walter Durantys article of 31 March, in which Gareth said: he stood
by his statement that the Soviet Union was suffering from a severe famine.14
The censors had turned the journalists into masters of euphemism and
understatement and hence they gave famine the polite name of food
shortage and starving to death was softened to read as widespread
mortality from diseases due to malnutrition.
Countering Walter Durantys rebuttal in The New York Times, Gareth Jones
concluded by congratulating the Soviet Foreign Office on its skill in concealing
the true situation in the USSR: Moscow is not Russia, and the sight of wellfed people there, tends to hide the real Russia.
On 8 May 1933, Gareth wrote a long letter to the editor of The Manchester
Guardian in support Muggeridge series, of three articles in which he
concluded:
I hope fellow liberals, who boil at any injustices in Germany, or

Italy, or Poland, will express just one word of sympathy, with the
millions of peasants, who are the victims of persecution and
famine, in the Soviet Union.15
After Gareths visit to the Soviet Union in 1933, he was banned from returning.
In a letter to a friend he wrote:
Alas! You will be very amused to hear that the inoffensive little
Joneski has achieved the dignity of being a marked man on the
black list of the OGPU and is barred from entering the Soviet
Union. I hear that there is a long list of crimes which I have
committed under my name in the secret police file in Moscow and
funnily enough espionage is said to be among them. As a matter of
............ 184 ............
fact Litvinoff [the Soviet Foreign Minister] sent a special cable

from Moscow, to the Soviet Embassy in London, to tell them to
make the strongest of complaints to Mr. Lloyd George about me.16
Whilst working at The Western Mail and unable to return to the Soviet Union,
Gareth gave many public lectures entitled: The Enigma of Bolshevik Russia
throughout Britain and Ireland in 1933, and then across the United States in
late 1934.
In October 1934, after one year in the wilderness, Gareth embarked on a
World Wide Fact-Finding Tour, with his eventual destination to be
Manchukuo. otherwise known as Japanese controlled Manchuria. He
wanted to find out what the Japanese were intending to do, in the light of their
desire to expand territorially.
Following an earlier interview with Randolph Hearst in Wales, during the
previous July, Gareth was invited to be a guest at St Simeons, Hearsts
American Estate, on 1 January 1935. Here he was commissioned to write a
series articles for Hearsts New York American. These were printed on 12 and
13 January 1935, in which he was given a further platform to reassert his
previous 1933 observations of famine in Ukraine.
Leaving America on 18 January, he spent six weeks in Japan where he
interviewed a number of very influential politicians, one being General Araki
Sadao, who had designs on expanding northwards into Soviet Siberia. After
traveling extensively around the Pacific basin, Gareth had some transport laid at
his disposal for an extensive trip into the wilds of Inner Mongolia by the German
Wostwag Company - now known to be a trading front for the OGPU .
On his journey, he discovered a Chinese town that had been newly infiltrated
by the Japanese and where troops were massing. Apprehended for a number of
hours he and his German companion were advised to take one of three routes
back to the town of Kalgan. One was safe and the others infested by bad
bandits. Despite taking the recommended route, they were both captured two
days later. His companion was released, but Gareth was held for 8,000
............ 185 ............
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ransom. Tragically, he was killed on 12 August 1935, after 14 days in captivity,

and on the eve of his thirtieth birthday.17
Paul Scheffer, the well-respected editor-in-chief of the non-Nazi Berliner
Tageblatt and who was previously, the first journalist banned by the Soviets
in 1929 for his negative reporting of the Five-Year Plan was a close friend of
Gareths. He wrote a front-page editorial on 16 August 1935:
The number of journalists with Gareth Jones initiative, and style,

is nowadays, throughout the world, quickly falling, and, for this
reason, the tragic death of this splendid man is a particularly big
loss. The International Press is abandoning its colours - in some
countries more quickly than in others - but it is a fact. Instead of
independent minds, inspired by genuine feeling, there appear more
and more men of routine, crippled journalists of widely different
stamp who shoot from behind safe cover, and thereby sacrifice
their consciences. The causes of this tendency are many. Today is
not the time to speak of them. 18
For almost seventy years Gareths articles have almost, but not quite, been
forgotten. Now is the time to speak again of the truthful reporting of my uncle,
rediscovered and vindicated for its original accuracy, despite his 1933 spat with
Walter Duranty within the columns of The New York Times.
It is also fitting that it is here at Columbia University, the home of excellence
for American journalism, that Gareths ghost has come back to haunt those
who stopped at nothing to silence his conscience. So, to end, I would like to
thank Professor von Hagen for the honour of speaking from this prestigious
platform, which has allowed me to finally put my uncles soul to rest by
recognizing at this conference his courageous role in exposing one of the
greatest and most barbaric episodes in human history. I would like but one
final word. Allow me to point out that the Welsh are not English. Like
Ukrainians we were somewhat of an oppressed minority and so I would like to
think that Gareth Jones, who very much appreciated his Welsh ancestry, took
an added pleasure in helping the Ukrainians.
............ 186 ............
Endnotes
1
Gareth Jones to his parents, Edgar & Annie Jones, 26 August 1930. Private collection of
Margaret Siriol Colley, Nottingham, England.
Gareth Jones, Communists Five-Year Plan Mixture of Successes & Failures, The
[Cardiff] Western Mail, 11 April 1931, page 12.
Anonymous [Howard J. Heinz II], Experiences in Russia 1931: A Diary (Alton:

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1932).
Private papers of Gareth Jones. Private collection of Margaret Siriol Colley, Nottingham,
England.
Gareth Jones, Will There be Soup? The [Cardiff] Western Mail, 15 & 17 October 1932,
page 6.
Gareth Jones, With Hitler across Germany, The [Cardiff] Western Mail, 28 February
1933, page 6.
Gareth Jones, Primitive Worship of Hitler, The [Cardiff] Western Mail, 2 March 1933,
page 13.
Gareth Jones, Starving Russians Seething with Discontent, The [Cardiff] Western Mail, 4
April 1933, pages 1-2.
Gareth Jones, Soviet Confiscate Part of Workers Wages, The [London] Daily Express, 5
April 1933, page 8.
10 ibid.
11 Gareth Jones, Nine to a Room in Slums of Russia, The [London] Daily Express, 6 April
1933, page 11.
12 H. R. Knickerbocker, Famine Grips Russia, Millions Dying," New York Evening Post,
Foreign Service Dispatch, 29 March 1933.
13 Walter Duranty, Russians, Hungry But Not Starving, The New York Times, 31 March
1933, page 13.
14 Gareth Jones, Gareth Jones Replies, Letter to the Editor, The New York Times, 13 May
1933.
15 Gareth Jones, The Peasants in Russia. Exhausted Supplies, letter to the Editor, The
Manchester Guardian, 8 May 1933.
16 Gareth Jones to Margaret [a friend, surname unknown] dated 26 August 1933, The Welsh
Political Archive, National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, Wales.
17 Margaret Siriol Colley, Gareth Jones: A Manchukuo Incident (Nigel Colley: Newark,
Nottinghamshire, 2001).
18 Paul Scheffer, Gareth Jones Ermordet, Berliner Tageblatt, 16 August 1935, page 1.
............ 187 ............
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Seven million died in the forgotten holocaust

ERIC MARGOLIS
The Toronto Sun, 16 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Toronto Sun and the author
Five years ago, I wrote about the unknown Holocaust in Ukraine. I was
shocked to receive a flood of mail from young Americans and Canadians of
Ukrainian descent telling me that until they read my column, they knew
nothing of the 1932-1933 genocide in which Josef Stalins Soviet regime
murdered seven million Ukrainians and sent two million more to concentration
camps.
How, I wondered, could such historical amnesia afflict so many? For Jews and
Armenians, the genocides their people suffered are vivid, living memories that
influence their daily lives. Yet today, on the 70th anniversary of the destruction
of a quarter of Ukraines population, this titanic crime has almost vanished into
historys black hole.
So has the extermination of the Don Cossacks by the Communists in the
1920s, the Volga Germans in 1941 and mass executions and deportations to
concentration camps of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and Poles. At the end
of World War II, Stalins Gulag held 5.5 million prisoners, 23% of them
Ukrainians and 6% Baltic peoples.
Almost unknown is the genocide of two million of the USSRs Muslim peoples:
Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Tajiks, Bashkirs and Kazaks. The Chechen
independence fighters who today are branded as terrorists by the USA and
Russia are the grandchildren of survivors of Soviet concentration camps.
............ 188 ............
Add to this list of forgotten atrocities the murder in Eastern Europe from 19451947 of at least two million ethnic Germans, mostly women and children, and
the violent expulsion of 15 million more Germans, during which two million
German girls and women were raped.
Among these monstrous crimes, Ukraine stands out as the worst in terms of
numbers. Stalin declared war on his own people in 1932, sending Commissars
V. Molotov and Lazar Kaganovitch and NKVD secret police chief Genrikh
Yagoda to crush the resistance of Ukrainian farmers to forced collectivization.
Ukraine was sealed off. All food supplies and livestock were confiscated.
NKVD death squads executed anti-Party elements. Furious that insufficient
Ukrainians were being shot, Kaganovitch - virtually the Soviet Unions Adolf
Eichmann - set a quota of 10,000 executions a week. Eighty percent of
Ukrainian intellectuals were shot.
During the bitter winter of 1932-1933, 25,000 Ukrainians per day were being
shot or died of starvation and cold. Cannibalism became common. Ukraine,
writes historian Robert Conquest, looked like a giant version of the future
Bergen-Belsen death camp.
The mass murder of seven million Ukrainians, three million of them children,
and deportation to the Gulag of two million more (where most died) was
hidden by Soviet propaganda. Pro-Communist Westerners, like The New York
Times Walter Duranty, British writers Sidney and Beatrice Webb and French
Prime Minister Edouard Herriot, toured Ukraine, denied reports of genocide,
and applauded what they called Soviet agrarian reform. Those who spoke
out against the genocide were branded fascist agents.
The US, British, and Canadian governments, however, were well aware of the
genocide, but closed their eyes, even blocking aid groups from going to
Ukraine.
The only European leaders to raise a cry over Soviet industrialized murder
were, ironically and for their own cynical and self-serving reasons, Hitler and
Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Because Kaganovitch, Yagoda and some
............ 189 ............
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other senior Communist Party and NKVD officials were Jewish, Hitlers
absurd claim that communism was a Jewish plot to destroy Christian
civilization became widely believed across a fearful Europe.
When war came, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill allied themselves closely to Stalin, though they
were well aware his regime had murdered at least 30 million people long before
Hitlers extermination of Jews and Gypsies began. Yet in the strange moral
calculus of mass murder, only Germans were guilty. Though Stalin murdered
three times more people than Hitler, to Roosevelt he remained Uncle Joe.
The British-US alliance with Stalin made them his partners in crime. Roosevelt
and Churchill helped preserve historys most murderous regime, to which they
handed over half of Europe in 1945. After the war, the Left tried to cover up
Soviet genocide. Jean-Paul Sartre denied the Gulag even existed.
For the Western Allies, Nazism was the only evil; they could not admit being
allied to mass murderers. For the Soviets, promoting the Jewish Holocaust
perpetuated anti-fascism and masked their own crimes. The Jewish people,
understandably, saw their Holocaust as a unique event. It was Israels raison
detre. Raising other genocides at that time would, they feared, diminish their
own. This was only human nature. While today, academia, the media and
Hollywood rightly keep attention focused on the Jewish Holocaust, they
mostly ignore Ukraine. We still hunt Nazi killers, but not Communist killers.
There are few photos of the Ukraine genocide or Stalins Gulag, and fewer
living survivors. Dead men tell no tales.
Russia never prosecuted any of its mass murderers, as Germany did. We know
all about the crimes of Nazis Adolf Eichmann and Heinrich Himmler, about
Babi Yar and Auschwitz. But who remembers Soviet mass murderers
Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovitch, Yagoda, Yezhov and Beria? Were it not for writer
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, we might never know of Soviet death camps like
Magadan, Kolyma and Vorkuta. Movie after movie appears about Nazi evil,
while the evil of the Soviet era vanishes from view or dissolves into nostalgia.
The souls of Stalins millions of victims still cry out for justice.
............ 190 ............
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Statement on Walter Durantys 1932 Prize

Pulitzer Prize Board, 21 November 2003
After more than six months of study and deliberation, the Pulitzer Prize Board
has decided it will not revoke the foreign reporting Prize awarded in 1932 to
Walter Duranty of The New York Times.
In recent months, much attention has been paid to Mr. Durantys dispatches
regarding the famine in the Soviet Union in 1932-1933, which have been
criticized as gravely defective. However, a Pulitzer Prize for reporting is
awarded not for the authors body of work or for the authors character but for
the specific pieces entered in the competition. Therefore, the Board focused its
attention on the 13 articles that actually won the Prize, articles written and
published during 1931. [A complete list of the articles, with dates and
headlines, is attached below.]
In its review of the 13 articles, the Board determined that Mr. Durantys1931
work, measured by todays standards for foreign reporting, falls seriously
short. In that regard, the Boards view is similar to that of The New York Times
itself and of some scholars who have examined his 1931 reports. However, the
Board concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence of deliberate
deception, the relevant standard in this case. Revoking a Prize 71 years after it
was awarded under different circumstances, when all principals are dead and
unable to respond, would be a momentous step and therefore would have to
rise to that threshold.
The famine of 1932-1933 was horrific and has not received the international
attention it deserves. By its decision, the Board in no way wishes to diminish
............ 192 ............
the gravity of that loss. The Board extends its sympathy to Ukrainians and
others in the United States and throughout the world who still mourn the
suffering and deaths brought on by Josef Stalin.
Walter Durantys 13 articles in 1931 submitted for 1932 Pulitzer Prize: Elevenpart series in The New York Times
6/14/1931 Red Russia of Today Ruled by Stalinism, Not

Communism
6/16/1931 Socialism First Aim in Soviets Program; Trade Gains
Second
6/18/1931 Stalinism Shelves World Revolt Idea; To Win Russia
First
6/19/1931 Industrial Success Emboldens Soviet in New World
Policy
6/20/1931 Trade Equilibrium is New Soviet Goal
6/22/1931 Soviet Fixes Opinion by Widest Control
6/23/1931 Soviet Censorship Hurts Russia Most
6/24/1931 Stalinism Smashes Foes in Marxs Name
6/25/1931 Red Army is Held No Menace to Peace
6/26/1931 Stalinism Solving Minorities Problem
6/27/1931 Stalinisms Mark is Party Discipline
Two articles in The New York Times magazine
3/29/1931 The Russian Looks at the World
12/20/1931 Stalins Russia Is An Echo of Iron Ivans
............ 193 ............
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***
[See also David D. Kirkpatrick, Pulitzer Board wont void 32
award to Times writer, The New York Times, 22 November 2003
which cites Mr. Sulzberger acknowledging that Durantys work
had been slovenly but adding that a revocation of the Prize
might evoke the Stalinist practice to airbrush purged figures out
of official records and histories. Mr. Sulzberger also wrote that
the Board would be setting a precedent for revisiting its
judgments over many decades.]
............ 194 ............
Ukraine marks Soviet-era famine that killed millions amid

increased awareness of the deaths
ANNA MELNICHUK
Associated Press, San Francisco Chronicle, 22 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Associated Press
Increased international recognition of a forced famine that killed up to10

million Ukrainians brought bittersweet relief Saturday to elderly survivors
marking the 70th anniversary of a dark chapter in the history of Soviet
communism.
Gathering at a cathedral in the now independent Ukraine, survivors recalled
their desperation during a famine historians say was provoked by Soviet
dictator Josef Stalin as part of his campaign to force peasants to give up their
land and join collective farms.
This year is of particular significance for Ukraine, because the world has
recognized the crime against the Ukrainian people, said E. Morgan Williams,
senior adviser of the US-Ukraine Foundation. Two weeks ago, some 30
countries signed a joint statement to commemorate the memory of the millions
of men, women and children who suffered because of the cruel actions and
policies of the totalitarian regime in the former Soviet Union. The UN
statement became the first, significant international recognition of the famine,
which was denied by the Soviets for decades.
Marking the day set by the government as an annual memorial for the famine,
some 2,000 people gathered at the golden-domed St. Michael Cathedral in the
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capital, Kiev to light candles at a memorial dedicated to the victims, estimated

at between 7 and 10 million.
Dozens of elderly survivors, many leaning on crutches, were helped by younger
relatives as they shuffled under flags with black ribbons and the cathedrals
bells chimed in mourning.
My grandfather cut and dried loafs of bread and hid them in sacks to his
dying day many years after the famine, said Lidia Kolysnichenko, 67, from
the village of Irpin near Kiev.
Historians say that Stalin deliberately provoked the famine by having harvests
taken out of Ukraine and having secret police confiscate whatever scarce grain
reserves farmers tried to hide.
Even according to the most conservative figures, some 25,000 people died
every day in Ukraine, or 17 people every minute, in 1933. Cases of cannibalism
were widespread.
Our neighbour killed his wife, dismembered her body and was seen to make
soup of her, said 82-year old Volodymyr Pianov, his hand trembling. It was
not the only case when people ate each other in our village. His village of
Kriuchki in the eastern Kharkiv region, one of areas most devastated by the
famine, died out almost entirely.
Earlier this year, Ukraine declassified more than 1,000 files documenting the
famine, and Ukraines President Leonid Kuchma signed a law establishing a
day of remembrance for famine victims.
In a related development, the Pulitzer Prize Board said Friday it would not
revoke a Prize awarded in 1932 to a reporter for The New York Times who
was accused of deliberately ignoring the famine in Ukraine to preserve his
access to Stalin. The Pulitzer Board said there was not clear evidence of
deliberate deception.
Walter Duranty covered the Soviet Union for The Times from 1922 to 1941,
earning acclaim for an exclusive 1929 interview with Stalin. Duranty was later
criticized for reporting the Communist line rather than the facts.
............ 196 ............
The Boards decision was immediately criticized by Ukrainian groups, who sent
more than 15,000 letters and postcards to the Pulitzer committee demanding
the Prize be withdrawn.
We certainly will continue to press for revocation, said Victoria Hubska of
the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Duranty misled the
international community. The lie should be punished.
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Times lied, millions died: The paper of records Cold War record
ANDREW STUTTAFORD
National Review Online, 24 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of the National Review Online and the author
So thats it then. Despite all the protests, the Pulitzer Prize Board has decided
that it will not revoke the award won by Walter Duranty of The New York
Times for his reporting in Stalins Soviet Union. This was not a decision that it
took lightly, mind you. The Boards members want everyone to understand that
they only took their decision after more than six months of study and
deliberation. Six months thats around one month, perhaps less, for each
million who died in the Holodomor, the man-made famine that Duranty tried
so hard to deny.
Heres how Petro Solovyschuk from the Ukraines Vinnytsia region remembers
that time:
I no longer lived in my house. I slept in patches of clover, in

haystacks; I was swollen from hunger, my clothes were in shreds.
Our house was torn down and they took everything to the
collective farm. Only a pile of clay remained. And there is no trace
of my family not a grave, nor a cross. There are only these
names: my father Makar Solovyschuk, died May 1933; my
mother Oliana Solovyschuk, died March 1933; my brother
Ivan Solovyschuk, died April 1933; my sister Motrya
Solovyschuk, died April 1933.
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Heres what Walter Duranty said in June of that year: The famine is mostly
bunk.
To be fair, the Boards argument is not without some logic:
In recent months, much attention has been paid to Mr. Durantys

dispatches regarding the famine in the Soviet Union in 1932-1933,
which have been criticized as gravely defective. However, a Pulitzer
Prize for reporting is awarded not for the authors body of work
or for the authors character but for the specific pieces entered in
the competition. Therefore, the Board focused its attention on the
13 articles that actually won the Prize, articles written and
published during 1931...In its review of the 13 articles, the Board
determined that Mr. Durantys 1931 work, measured by todays
standards for foreign reporting, fall seriously short....
But what can the Board mean by todays standards? The distortions, cursory
research, and rehashed propaganda that characterized so much of Durantys
work even prior to the famine were a disgrace to journalism then just as
much as now.
The Board adds that there was not clear and convincing evidence of deliberate
deception, the relevant standard in this case. Revoking a Prize 71 years after it
was awarded under different circumstances, when all principals are dead and
unable to respond, would be a momentous step and therefore would have to
rise to that standard.
Quite how those circumstances are different isnt explained. Are we meant
to believe that it was perhaps reasonable in those days to expect that the FiveYear Plan would be buttressed by a Pulitzer Prize-winning lie or two? The
Board does not say. As for trying to justify its inaction on the grounds that all
the principals are dead and unable to respond, lets just say thats an
unfortunate choice of words in the context of a horror that left five, six or
seven million (Khrushchev: No one was counting) dead and, thus, one might
agree, unable to respond. But the argument (with which I have some
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sympathy) that, however repellent they were, the events of 1932-1933 should
be irrelevant in considering a Prize won for writings that predate them, can
only be taken so far. Durantys behavior in those later years is certainly relevant
in coming to an assessment as to whether the flaws in his Prize winning work
were the product of a deliberate piece of deception. And the evidence from
1933 is clear. Duranty was a liar. And if he was a liar in 1933, its probable that
he was a liar in 1931.
To make things worse, not only may Duranty have been lying, but also The
New York Times may have known that he was lying. One historian has pointed
to State Department papers recording a 1931 (note the date) conversation
between Duranty and a US diplomat in Berlin suggesting that there was an
understanding between The New York Times and the Soviet authorities that
Durantys dispatches always reflected the official opinion of the Soviet regime
rather than his own point of view.
Now, Duranty could have been lying about that too, or the diplomat could
have misunderstood what he was being told, but, like so much of this story, it
raises issues that need airing in something more than one brief press release. As
the body responsible for administering journalisms most prestigious Prize, the
Pulitzer Board ought to be advocates of openness and disclosure. We are told
that it considered this matter for over six months of study and deliberation.
Assuming this is true, the Board should publish its findings in full.
But if the Pulitzer Prize Board can, in theory at least, make a respectable case
for leaving the Prize in Hell with Durantys ghost, The New York Times,
usually so exquisitely sensitive to the injustices of the past, is on less certain
ground. To be sure, over time it has distanced itself from its former Moscow
correspondent, but not (apart for some rather feeble cosmetic gestures) from
his Pulitzer.
In response to the latest campaign to revoke the Prize, earlier this year The
New York Times commissioned Columbia University history professor Mark
von Hagen to review Durantys work. He turned out to be no fan of a man
who, The New York Times once said, had been on perhaps the most
............ 200 ............
important assignment ever entrusted by a newspaper to a single correspondent

over a considerable period of time. In the report, von Hagen describes
Durantys work from 1931, for example, as a dull and largely uncritical
recitation of Soviet sources, but the report itself contains no final
recommendation. Subsequently, however, von Hagen has argued that the Prize
should be withdrawn for the sake of the gray ladys honour.
Honor? Well, when it comes to accepting responsibility for Duranty, The New
York Times (usually so eager to be seen as being on the side of the angels) has
always tended to be a little reticent, so perhaps it is no surprise that its
publisher, Arthur Sulzberger Jr., seemed a touch unwilling to go quite as far as
his historian. Oh yes, he did what he had to. He dutifully forwarded von
Hagens report to the Pulitzer Board. He even sent a cover letter with it in
which he condescended to respect whatever the Board might choose to
decide, but he just couldnt resist adding the thought that rescinding Durantys
Prize evoked the old Stalinist practice of airbrush[ing] purged figures out of
official records and histories, a view, interestingly, that von Hagen does not
share. Sadly for Pinch and his paper, any airbrushing would likely to be
ineffective anyway. Whatever was finally decided, the controversies of recent
years have ensured that the historical record will always be clear. The 1932
Pulitzer, the Prize about which The New York Times was so proud for so long,
was won by a liar and a fraud, won by a journalist to whom genocide was not
news that was fit to print, won by a journalist who by his silence made his
newspaper an accomplice to mass murder.
If I were Arthur Sulzberger Jr., I would have begged them to take that Prize
away.
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Duranty was Stalins spin doctor

ROBERT FULFORD
The National Post, 25 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of The National Post and the author
Walter Duranty, famous seventy years ago as a distinguished reporter for The
New York Times, has slowly turned into a symbol of the willfully deceptive
reporting on the Soviet Union that misled the West about the nature of
Stalinism for many years. This week Duranty appeared in the news again when
the Pulitzer Prize Board announced its decision not to strip him posthumously
of the award he won in 1932 for persistently dishonest reporting from
Moscow.
Duranty served as Moscow correspondent from 1921 to 1934, wrote several
books on Soviet politics, and won an admiring public in America. Meanwhile, he
and the Soviets developed a mutually beneficial arrangement. They let him live
like a commissar in a big apartment stocked with caviar and vodka. He had
assistants, a chauffeur, and a cook-mistress who became the mother of his son. In
return he followed the Soviet line. Sometimes he criticized the Bolsheviks, but on
crucial issues he echoed their opinions and praised their plans.
Duranty depicted Stalinist dictatorship as a version of what Russians
considered proper government: Absolute authority, unmellowed by the
democracy or liberalism of the West. He accepted outright the new Soviet spin
of the early 1930s: No longer interested in exporting revolution, they desired
nothing but co-operation and trade with the West. By selling this approach to
Times readers, Duranty helped win public approval for the American decision
to recognize Stalins government. When recognition was granted in 1934 a
............ 202 ............
banquet was held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York to celebrate. Duranty,

introduced as one of the great foreign correspondents of modern times, was
given a standing ovation.
Elsewhere, his mendacity was noticed. Malcolm Muggeridge, reporting from
Moscow for The Manchester Guardian, considered him the worst liar he ever
encountered in journalism. But Durantys most passionate critics have been
Ukrainians, for excellent reasons. When Ukrainian farmers resisted
collectivization, Soviet soldiers seized their crops at gunpoint, leaving the
people to starve while the government sold the grain abroad for hard-currency
credits. As a result, at least 5-million and possibly even 10-million Ukrainians
died.
This man-made famine, at that time the greatest act of genocide in history, was
reported by newspapers in several Western countries, including the US But even
at its peak in 1933, Duranty denied that it existed: There is no famine or
actual starvation, nor is there likely to be. Russians Hungry, But Not
Starving said the heading on his 31 March 1933 report. Later, when Stalin
sent old colleagues to prison or death on false charges of treason, Duranty
reported that justice was being served. Stalin is not an arrogant man, he
wrote. In fact, he was remarkably long-suffering in his treatment of various
oppositions.
The evidence against Duranty piled up over the years, often in memoirs like
Muggeridges and in Robert Conquests books on Soviet terror. In 1990 Sally
J. Taylor wrote in Stalins Apologist: Walter Duranty, The New York Timess
Man in Moscow (Oxford University Press) that he knew the truth all along and
admitted to British diplomats that possibly 10-million had died. The New York
Times editors, never eager to admit such a stain on their papers honour, finally
assigned Karl Meyer to review Durantys work. He called it some of the worst
reporting to appear in this newspaper.
Ukrainians now mark the history of the famine as Jews mark the Holocaust;
this year their day of remembrance fell on Saturday, the same day as the
Pulitzer announcement. Led by the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties
Association in Toronto, they have been petitioning the Pulitzer Board to cancel
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Durantys award. Mark von Hagen, a Columbia University historian hired by

The Times to judge the Prize-winning articles, reported that they were a
largely uncritical recitation of Soviet sources. He argued for withdrawing the
Prize but the publisher, Arthur Sulzberger Jr., disagreed. Sulzberger said it
would resemble the Stalinist practice of airbrushing purged figures from
official photographs. All to the contrary: It would acknowledge a dreadful
mistake. But the Pulitzer Board saw it Sulzbergers way. Ukrainian groups,
unsatisfied, have vowed to continue their campaign.
Underlying the Pulitzer committees decision we can detect lingering traces of
respect for Communist dictatorship as a noble endeavour that turned
barbarous because its leadership fell into the wrong hands. Theres still a belief
abroad that communism contained an ethical core, the search for social justice,
and therefore its supporters need never apologize. Its doubtful that we would
extend this generosity to anyone who once embraced fascism. Had Duranty
knowingly published something similar about the Nazis, such as a false denial
that death camps existed, his Pulitzer would have been retracted decades ago,
perhaps even before his death in 1957.
In our standard agreed-upon history of the 20th century, communism still
stands morally above fascism, even though communism lasted much longer
and killed many more. Meanwhile, in the place on the 11th floor of The Times
that displays the framed citations of its 89 Pulitzer Prizes, theres a notice
appended to Durantys citation: Other writers in The Times and elsewhere
have discredited this coverage.
............ 204 ............
The worlds greatest liar?

LUBOMYR LUCIUK
Ottawa Citizen, 26 November 2003

It was just by chance, at the end of a very rough week. I was hurrying home,
hungry, tired, stressed. It was getting dark but somehow I spotted her, sitting
at a Brock Street bus stop, alone, resigned to a wait. I havent seen very much
of her in recent years. Her husband has been ill and the Ukrainian community
of Kingston, at least the part of it that I grew up in, never large to start with,
has shrunk, an inevitability with the passage of time. Yet I almost drove by.
What changed my mind? Im not sure. But I pulled over and offered a lift. She
was grateful. The half hour or so she would have spent in transit would now
pass in a few minutes. I dropped her off and went on my way, a little delayed
but no matter, good deed done.
I was barely through my front door when the telephone rang. A man in
Alabama, whom I do not know, wanted my reaction to the news that the
Pulitzer Prize Committee had just announced that it would not revoke the 1932
award given to Walter Duranty. He was The New York Times correspondent
who served Soviet interests before, during, and after the Great Famine of 19321933 in Soviet Ukraine, arguably one of the greatest acts of genocide in 20th
century Europe. Publicly, Duranty dismissed all accounts of this man-made
famine, going out of his way to denigrate those who risked much by reporting
the unfolding horrors. Privately he admitted, at the British Embassy in
Moscow, 26 September 1933, that as many as 10 million people had died of
hunger in the past year.
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Officially, the fourth Saturday of every November, 22 November this year, is

set aside in Ukraine to hallow the memory of the many millions of innocent
victims of the Terror-Famine. So the timing of the Pulitzer Prize Committees
announcement could not have been more base, whether intentional or an
example of profound obtuseness. Granted a unique chance to champion truth,
the Committees grandees instead rallied around a liar, casting themselves as
the vindicators of Stalins apologist. That they larded their manifesto with
expressions of sympathy for those who suffered made their missive even
more execrable. Shedding crocodile tears for the murdered places Durantys
contemporary apologists in his company, forever. They may warrant some pity
for its a foul congregation they have joined.
Duranty knew but didnt care that millions were deliberately starved. This
Pulitzer Committee didnt care either. Instead they worried over setting a
precedent that might require reviewing whether other awards were as illdeserved as Durantys. Are there more like him in the ranks of Pulitzer
winners? And what would be wrong with establishing such a model? If Dr.
Joseph Goebbels had secured a Pulitzer in 1932 for eloquent prose about the
New Order in Europe does anyone believe his Prize would still stand? Is this
reluctance to do whats right grounded in the fact that the victims were
peasants, and Ukrainians?
When, on May Day, the campaign began to have Walter Durantys Pulitzer
Prize either revoked by the Pulitzer Committee or returned by The New York
Times, our intent was to draw attention to the Holodomor, as the Great
Famine is called in Ukraine. What we sowed now allows us to reap dozens of
stories about the Famine-Genocide and Durantys mendaciousness, found in
mainstream newspapers published from Moscow to Montreal, Prague to
London, Wichita to Kingston. This bountiful harvest seems to discomfort some
folks. Columbia University professor David Klattel alleged in the current issue
of the Columbia Journalism Review: Whoever funded [this campaign] spent
a good deal of money. Wrong. A few thousand dollars in printing costs,
certainly, but those who signed and sent in our cards paid their own postage.
The remarkable volume of mail signals an unambiguous expression of
international revulsion at the thought that Duranty might be left grasping his
............ 206 ............
unmerited Pulitzer. It is not evidence of a well-endowed global conspiracy of

the sort some paranoiacs mutter about.
Sig Gissler, administrator of the Pulitzer Committee, has acknowledged how
our efforts significantly increased awareness of the famine of 1932-1933.
True, and we have done just as much to further expose the greatest of the
famine deniers, although there was nothing new in underscoring just how
perverse a scoundrel Duranty was. Everyone admits the latter, although, oddly,
Durantys willful prostitution of the most fundamental principle of journalism,
the duty to accurately report on what one observes rather than just
regurgitating Party propaganda, seems not to have troubled those charged with
shepherding journalisms most prestigious award.
What our initiative never tried to do was airbrush Duranty out of history, as
Bill Keller of The New York Times pleaded recently. Quite to the contrary, we
want Duranty remembered for exactly what he was, a shill for the Soviets, a
man whom his contemporary, Malcolm Muggeridge, described as the greatest
liar of any journalist I have ever met. Why the Pulitzer Committee would
want to keep such a scamp on their honour role defies explanation. Durantys
continuing hold on a Pulitzer soils all Pulitzers, past, present, and future.
Those who made the unconscionable decision not to revoke Durantys award
will have to live with their choice. Perhaps Arthur Sulzberger Jr., publisher of
The New York Times, will still return this Prize, or at least instruct his editors
to stop listing Duranty in their annual paean to that newspapers Pulitzer
recipients, for surely no decent journalist can feel comfortable sharing this
distinction with the reprobate in their midst. Or was it just nave of us to
assume that those on the receiving ends of our epistles would be capable of
rendering anything other than the Pharisaical findings they did?
The crippling legacy of this unparalleled horror for Ukraine, described as a
post-genocidal society by Professor James Mace, needs to be analyzed
thoroughly. And bringing to justice those responsible for this Communist crime
against humanity, and others, must become a priority. Canada could help for
some perpetrators are not only alive but here amongst us, enjoying their
pensions.
............ 207 ............
Not Worthy
As I reflect on the events of this past weekend I am comforted by knowing that

in the early evening of the day on which the Pulitzer Committee soiled itself
with sophistries I slowed down to give an elderly lady a ride. In doing so I
showed a small kindness, perhaps the best thing I could have done on that day
for a survivor of Stalinism, my godmother.
............ 208 ............
Waste is unthinkable for survivors: Lessons learned from horror

havent been forgotten
CAROL SANDERS
Winnipeg Free Press, 28 November 2003
Reprinted with permission of the Winnipeg Free Press and the author
I remember going to a friends house after school when I was a kid and her
quiet, smiling Baba pinched my cheeks and offered me freshly baked cookies
and bread. The only time I ever heard her Ukrainian grandma raise her voice
was when I took a big piece of bread, had one bite and threw the rest in the
garbage.
At the time, it seemed like an overreaction.
With so much food, whats the big deal?
Thirty years later, I found out. This week I met some of the survivors of the
Ukrainian famine-genocide of 1932-1933.
When we were children, my friends and I played with Barbies and wasted
food; 70 years ago in southern Ukraine, kids were scrounging for scraps of
anything edible and were surrounded by people starving to death.
Id heard about the famine orchestrated by Communist dictator Joseph
Stalin, but didnt feel it until I listened to the people who lived through it. I
saw how their experiences shaped them. And how years of official denials,
the apathy of other governments and a cover up at the time by a New York
Times reporter in Stalins back pocket kept them from talking about it.
............ 209 ............
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Not long after Stalin succeeded in the collectivization of their farms, closure
of their churches and the killing of nearly one-quarter of the population, the
young Ukrainians who made it through the famine had to deal with
Hitler. They were rounded up and sent to work camps in Germany. If they
survived till the end of the Second World War, they were placed in displaced
persons camps before coming to Canada. In a new country they had to find
their way, start their own families and learn to speak English. There was no
time to dwell on the past.
And for decades, no one believed them, so what was the point in discussing
it?
Now in their 70s, 80s, and 90s, they can finally take a breath and tell their
stories. Some, like 92-year-old Peter Trimpolis of Winnipeg, have written
about the famine of 1932-1933. Trimpoliss book, My Rocky Road of Life,
documents his first-hand account of collectivization of the farms in Ukraine
and the adventures and hardships that followed.
Edith Friesen, another Winnipegger, wrote Journey Into Freedom about her
mothers experience as one of the many Mennonites living in southern
Ukraine who survived the artificial famine.
The man-made disaster isnt an event thats buried in the past. The
thriftiness, devotion to family and strong ties to the church as the cultural
centre of the community have been passed down through the generations.
And the importance of sharing when theres not much to share is another.
Friesen goes back to that part of Ukraine every year and is struck by the
kindness of the people, most of whom are living in poverty.
Its amazing they can still be so generous having experienced that.
This weekend, the Ukrainian community is hosting a symposium on the
famine-genocide of 1932-1933 at the St. Mary the Protectress Ukrainian
Orthodox Cathedral in Winnipeg. Its their chance to tell their story and for
us to listen.
............ 210 ............
For anyone whos wondered about their friends quiet Baba who loves to
cook and hates to waste, its a big deal.
............ 211 ............
Not Worthy
No shortage of monsters in the world

JOHN GLEESON
The Winnipeg Sun, 28 November 2003,
Reprinted with permission of The Winnipeg Sun and the author
The overall tone of the 70th anniversary of the Ukrainian Holodomor has
been one of reconciliation, respect and shared sadness for the seven million
victims of Stalins inhuman regime. But when youre talking about genocide
and especially comparing one genocide with another some bad bloods
bound to resurface, and sure enough it did. Responding to last Fridays
column (Genocide survivors end silence), T. Ranisgu of Toronto didnt just
rewrite history to make his point he turned it upside-down. Maybe the
Ukrainian people kept quiet because of their complicity with the Nazis in
WW2, Ranisgu wrote. I have Jewish relatives who have told me of
atrocities committed by Ukrainian citizens. They helped the Nazis round up
and kill Jews during the war and in return they got their property and
belongings. The Ukrainians helped the Nazis also because they figured it
would make them independent from the Soviets. What Stalin did was pay
them back for siding with the Nazis. There you go. The Holodomor of the
early 1930s was payback for the Holocaust of the 1940s. Now it all makes
sense, right? n fact, ethnic conflict between Jews and Ukrainians in the old
country is well-documented and since it was a factor in both genocides, it
should be exposed to the light of day and then hopefully laid to rest. After
the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Ukraine was occupied in turn by Red
Russians, White Russians and Poles. In just three years, Kiev was liberated
15 times. When the Reds re-invaded Ukraine in late 1918 they outraged the
peasants by taking their grain and starting the process of consolidating
............ 212 ............
individual holdings into state farms. Ukrainians, their culture and livelihoods
now under attack, rose up against the Bolsheviks, some of whom were Jews.
To these angry mobs anti-Bolshevism automatically meant anti-Semitism,
Lionel Kochan and John Keep wrote in The Making of Modern Russia: Fifty
pogroms occurred at that time in three provinces and by 1921 the total had
reached 2,000. Overall ethnic violence cost some 30,000 Jews their lives. A
dozen years later, when Stalins minions went about the monstrous business
of exterminating at least seven million Ukrainians, some of the Soviets
involved (including the chief of the secret police and other senior Communist
officials) were Jewish. A decade later, when the Nazis invaded Ukraine and
started rounding up Jews as part of Hitlers Final Solution, some
Ukrainians collaborated (and many, many more became victims of the
Nazis). So yes, Jewish blood was on Ukrainian hands and Ukrainian blood
was on Jewish hands. Still, a few racist murderers being among the millions
killed in both holocausts does not render the overwhelming majority of
victims any less innocent, nor the genocide carried out by the Bolsheviks and
Nazis any less depraved. Even T. Ranisgu acknowledges as much, ending his
letter: Theres no shortage of monsters in the world and Stalin may have
been just as evil as Hitler. Ukrainians should have their peace of mind and
maybe the governments can acknowledge their pain. Acknowledging the
pain is what this weekends Holodomor symposium is all about. Along with
a noon-hour ceremony on Saturday by the Famine monument at City Hall,
one of the highlights will be a memorial luncheon for the approximately 30
survivors now living in the Winnipeg area.
Speaking at the Sunday luncheon will be Asper Foundation executive director
Moe Levy, who is spearheading the late Israel Aspers Canadian Museum of
Human Rights, slated to open by the summer of 2008 at The Forks.
Although the museum will have a strong Canadian focus, Levy says the
Holodomor will not be forgotten this time. The Ukrainian genocide was
always one of the stories we wanted to tell in this museum, Levy says. We
intend to tell the whole story and tell it accurately. To ensure this, he says,
Ukrainian Canadians will appoint their own historians and representatives to
the committee overseeing the museum exhibits. Levy is aware of the
historical bad blood between Ukrainians and Jews but says both
communities have come a long way since the genocides of the last century,
............ 213 ............
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adding he hopes any lingering acrimony will be replaced by the spirit of

reconciliation thats driving the museum project.
Eugene Hyworon, parish president of St. Mary the Protectress Ukrainian
Orthodox Cathedral, where the symposium is being held, says the historic
conflict between Ukrainians and Jews was the result of misunderstanding, but
he feels it shouldnt be swept under the rug. The cycle of violence is not going
to stop until people recognize the mistakes they made in the past and correct
past injustices, Hyworon says. Most of the survivors were small children
when the Holodomor occurred; they know little of the ethnic politics or
genocidal justifications behind it. They remember hunger and death.
Symposium organizer Father Jaroslaw Buciora notes many survivors did not
want to be given special recognition or feted at this weekends event. So
instead, a symbolic famine meal is planned and 30 icons will be blessed and
presented to the survivors individually after the Sunday morning liturgy. The
survivors are quite humble people, he says. For some of these people God
was their only source of life its because of God they survived. Thank God
they did.
............ 214 ............
Revoking Durantys Prize

DUNCAN M. CURRIE
The Harvard Crimson, 3 December 2003
Reprinted with permission of The Harvard Crimson and the author
In the annals of 20th century journalism, few names are more ignominious
than Walter Duranty. The New York Timess Moscow correspondent during
the 1920s and 1930s, Duranty was by all accounts a liar, a recycler of
propaganda and a willful apologist for one of historys bloodiest tyrants,
Joseph Stalin.
Back in 1932, however, he was the toast of Western elites, having won a
Pulitzer Prize for 13 articles filed from Russia the previous year. According to
the selection committee, his dispatches were excellent examples of the best
type of foreign correspondence.
Durantys Prize has long been the subject of intense controversy. Last spring the
Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association (UCCLA) initiated a campaign
to urge its revocation by the Pulitzer Prize Board. After six months of
consideration, the Board decided on 21 November not to rescind the Prize. It
concluded that the pieces in question, while they fell well below todays
standards for foreign reporting, showed no clear and convincing evidence of
deliberate deception.
The Board tacitly acknowledged that Duranty covered up the widespread
Soviet famine of 1932-1933, which claimed the lives of several million in
Ukraine alone.
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But it isolated Durantys famine-denying articles from his Pulitzer articles on

Stalins Five-Year Plan. A Pulitzer Prize for reporting is awarded not for the
authors body of work or for the authors character, the Board explained,
but for the specific pieces entered in the competition.
This argument is understandable. No matter how odious Durantys morals
and reprehensible his treatment of the faminewhile denying it in print, he
privately told British diplomats in September 1933 that as many as 10
million people had starved to deaththe fate of his 1932 Prize should
ultimately rest upon the strength of the writing for which it was won.
Yet by any conceivable measure, Durantys reporting in 1931 was an utter
failure. It reads like Pravda and Izvestiya in English, historian Mark von
Hagen tells me, citing two of the leading Kremlin press organs of the time.
Von Hagen, Professor of Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian History at
Columbia, was commissioned by The Times this summer to conduct an
independent study of Durantys 1931 coverage of the Soviet Union.
Much of the factual material is dull and largely uncritical recitation of
Soviet sources, he wrote in his subsequent eight-page report, whereas his
efforts at analysis are very effective renditions of the Stalinist leaderships
self-understanding of their murderous and progressive project to defeat the
backwardness of Slavic, Asiatic peasant Russia.
Was this propagandizing unintentional, as the Pulitzer Board seemed to
imply? No one can say for sure. But its hard to imagine that a man who
would spend the next two years deliberately concealing a genocidal famine
was a paragon of integrity in 1931. Moreover, Durantys sources were almost
exclusively Soviet authorities. Would he really have been naive enough to
trust their veracity so blindly?
In the early 1930s there were few Western correspondents in Russia, and
members of the Pulitzer committee, like most other Americans, would have
deferred to The Times as somewhat authoritative on all matters Soviet. Many
have speculated whether Durantys editors were aware of the gross deficiencies
in his journalism. Again, its tough to tell, although Sally J. Taylors 1990 book,
............ 216 ............
Stalins Apologist, alleged that several editors considered Duranty a Soviet

stooge.
Since the publication of Taylors book, The Times has distanced itself from
Durantys work. In a review of the book, then-editorial Board member Karl
Meyer wrote that Durantys Soviet pieces represented some of the worst
reporting to appear in this newspaper. That same year (1990), The Times
placed a disclaimer next to Durantys framed picture in its Pulitzer hallway,
noting: Other writers in The Times and elsewhere have discredited this
coverage. Executive editor Bill Keller recently told The Washington Post that
the 1931 articles were awful, a parroting of propaganda and clearly not
Prizeworthy.
Even still, in an interview with his own newspaper Keller expressed unease at
the idea of Durantys Pulitzer being revoked. As someone who spent time in
the Soviet Union while it still existed, he said, the notion of airbrushing
history kind of gives me the creeps. Publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr. also
warned the Pulitzer Board against evoking such a Stalinist practice. (Neither
he nor Keller specified how the Boards rescinding a journalism Prize on
account of documented fraud was at all comparable to a Stalinist purge.)
Sulzberger added that the Board should avoid setting a precedent for
revisiting its judgments over many decades. Yet the slippery-slope argument is
not very compelling here. Consider that in December 2002, Columbia
University rescinded Michael Bellesiless Bancroft Prize after it was discovered
that his award-winning book, Arming America, relied on fabricated sources.
Were the Pulitzer Board to revoke Durantys Prize, it would not threaten past
Pulitzer winners any more than the rescinding of Bellesiless award threatened
previous Bancroft winners.
Bottom line: Durantys is an extraordinary case of second-hand propaganda
masquerading as real journalism. Rarely, if ever, has a Western reporter so
consistently trumpeted the Party line of a brutal dictatorship. It is perhaps too
much to hope that The Times would voluntarily return Durantys Prize, as
The Washington Post returned Janet Cookes Prize in 1981. And yes, no
............ 217 ............
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Pulitzer has ever been outright revoked. But its hard to fathom another
instance where the Pulitzer Board has made, or will make, such an egregious,
indisputable error in judgment.
By passing up a chance to right a seven-decade-old wrong, the Board tarnishes
its image. As Canadian academic Lubomyr Luciuk, the UCCLAs research
director, tells me, its members have effectively become apologists for Stalins
apologist.
But hey, at least thats better than airbrushing, right?
............ 218 ............
An Open Letter to Mr. Bill Keller, The New York Times,

re: Gareth Jones
MARGARET SIRIOL COLLEY
9 December 2003
Dear Mr. Keller:
Surely, you must now agree that on 31 March 1933, your Moscow
correspondent, Walter Duranty, denigrated my uncle, Gareth Jones, when he
wrote:
Since I talked with Mr. Jones I have made exhaustive inquiries

about this alleged famine situation...There is no actual starvation
or death from starvation, but there is widespread mortality from
diseases due to malnutrition.
My uncle was a fluent Russian linguist from Cambridge University and an
experienced Foreign Affairs Advisor to former British Prime Minister, Lloyd
George. After three independent journeys along the off-beaten track of the
Soviet Union in 1930, 1931 and 1933, his published articles for the London
Times, the Daily Express and Cardiff Western Mail, still represent the most
truthful contemporary reporting of the Five-Year-Plan.
Even your readers benefited from his poignant insights when on 13 May 1933,
your paper published Jones incisive understanding of Soviet influences exerted
upon your correspondent:
The censors have turned the [Moscow] journalists into masters of

euphemism and understatement and hence they gave famine the
............ 219 ............
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polite name of food shortage and starving to death was

softened to read as widespread mortality from diseases due to
malnutrition.
Disgracefully, bolstered by the huge prestige of his recently awarded Pulitzer,
Duranty clearly violated the role expected of trustworthy reporting, something
which your esteemed paper willingly supported. By effectively silencing Jones
lone voice of truth, Duranty was irrefutably guilty of facilitating Stalins
inhumanity. By professional association, you must readily appreciate that your
paper is tarnished by this same historical airbrush.
As many as ten million Ukrainians became innocent victims of Stalins enforced
terror-famine: one third of these were children. The events in question began
to unfold as early as 1930, when Gareth Jones first forewarned of an inevitable
course of starvation, death and destruction. On 24 June 2003, I wrote to the
Pulitzer Administrator outlining Jones contribution to this revocation debate,
and after having had no response, in October, I personally airmailed each
individual member of the current Pulitzer Board. Herein, I requested that they
consider in their deliberations the unbiased reporting of my uncle, but, to date,
I have received not a single reply. This makes me seriously doubt their sincerity
in every aspect of their role in this brutal atrocity.
The original 1932 Pulitzer Board declared that Durantys Prize-winning articles
were an intimate comprehension of conditions. Incredibly, he did not visit
one single collective farm or one factory, and never once ventured outside of
Moscow for his Soviet reporting throughout the whole year in question. This
will always remain a very sad indictment upon the prestige of these awards and
upon the journalistic standards of your paper.
I recently read the Pulitzer Board statement apologising for its non-revocation
of Durantys Prize, claiming there was not clear and convincing evidence of
deliberate deception, the relevant standard in this case. According to James
Crowls definitive 1982 book on the subject, Angels in Stalins Paradise,
Herbert Knickerbockers articles for The New York Evening Post were singled
out as some of the best articles of the year, but the Jury recommended that he
............ 220 ............
not be selected, as the 1931 award had gone to him. This to me indicates a
distinct possibility of deliberate deception, and deliberate self-deception in the
justification of Durantys award.
Your publisher recently wrote to the Pulitzer Board expressing his concerns
regarding the possible airbrushing of Duranty out of history an opinion,
which you are known to concur. Perhaps, the question which should now
rightfully be asked, is whether Duranty ever warranted being worthy of either
competition entry or even subsequent Jury deliberation for such a
prestigious award?
Jones, on the other hand, was literally airbrushed out of existence in the true
Stalinist meaning of the word. By daring to expose the horrific truth of this
famine, he paid the ultimate price. In August 1935, just seven months after
repeating his observations of famine in Hearsts New York American, Jones
was kidnapped and murdered by politically-controlled bandits in Inner
Mongolia. Nevertheless, his conscience still stands above all others. I suggest
that until your paper bows to reason and returns Durantys (allegedly lost)
Prize, you can rest assured that the spectre of Jones and those of countless
Ukrainian victims will continue to loom over your publishers ill-considered
support of your former correspondents undeniably shoddy reporting and
unforgivable deceit.
In any event, it is within your remit to rightfully, though belatedly, publish a
public and posthumous apology to Gareth Jones, the true liberal hero in this
tragic saga. This, to every fair-minded person, is the only way to undo some of
the wrongs meted out to a truthful and honest man. Had he lived he would
have been applauded as one of the 20th centurys most astute and courageous
journalists.
Yours sincerely.
Dr. Margaret Siriol Colley
Nottinghamshire, England
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The New York Times Office of the Public Editor

re: Gareth Jones
18 December 2003
Dear Mr. Colley,

Here is a copy of the recent article published by The Times on the Pulitzer
Boards decision not to retract the award (Pulitzer Board Wont Void 32
Award to Times Writer, by David D. Kirkpatrick, 22 November 2003). The
Times has no plans to return the Pulitzer for Durantys reporting.
Cheers,
Arthur Bovino
............ 222 ............
Durantys Pulitzer: A reflection

JAMES CROWL
As one who has studied and taught the history of the Soviet Union for nearly
four decades, I must note my disappointment with the Pulitzer Prize
Committees decision to allow Walter Duranty to remain as its 1932 recipient
for excellence in journalism. Duranty, of course, was The New York Times
reporter whose denials of a famine in the Soviet countryside in 1932 and 1933
were critical in enabling Stalin to conceal the deaths of millions of its citizens
while continuing to export grain to the outside world. To its credit, the current
Pulitzer Committee has acknowledged Durantys role in this massive famine
cover-up, though such a concession is hardly noteworthy. Any who still believe
that Duranty was somehow ignorant of Soviet conditions or an innocent dupe
need only check British Foreign Office records for those years. While Duranty
was telling readers that reports of a famine were greatly exaggerated, the
British embassy in Moscow was told by him in confidence that as many as ten
million had died. It was the most accurate figure the outside world had yet
received.
The Pulitzer Committee, however, has chosen not to revoke Durantys award,
explaining that it was based on his 1931 reports, which it still views as free
from the lies and deceit which characterize his more infamous dispatches of the
next several years. Such a finding is, in my opinion, a cover-up worthy of
Duranty himself. I have carefully re-read those 1931 articles and remain
convinced that the conclusions I reached more than twenty years ago in my
book, Angels in Stalins Paradise, are sound. Duranty was aware of the
suffering of the Soviet people well before 1932, and chose to conceal that
suffering in part because he viewed Soviet citizens as backward and lazy. His
trademark quips to friends were, Theyre only Russians, and You cant
............ 223 ............
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make an omelet without breaking eggs. But if Duranty felt that the Soviet
people needed something to stir them from their lethargy, self-interest played
an even more significant role in his attitude. What many Western journalists
later remembered as a special deal existed between the Kremlin and Duranty
that permitted him to become the Harun al-Rashid of Moscow, after the 9th
century luxury-loving caliph of Baghdad. Correspondents such as William
Henry Chamberlin, Eugene Lyons, and Malcolm Muggeridge, to name but a
few, later recalled Duranty as favoured with the best of apartments, a mistress,
and possibly money, all provided by the authorities. As early as 1922, Duranty
was allowed a car with a horn like that used by the GPU , and the freedom to
race through Moscows streets with his drivers hand against the horn, while
Muscovites fled in terror.
Yet, in fairness to the Pulitzer Committee and to Duranty, we need to examine
his reports from 1931 in hopes of finding them free of duplicity, and,
presumably, so chock-full of insight and understanding that they still warrant
his award. We need to be aware that Stalin by this point had unleashed a
savage program of industrialization and agricultural collectivization. This
program was so ill-conceived that the human cost was great, even well before
1932. Yet Duranty consistently kept his readers ignorant of the conditions. In
his 1935 autobiography, I Write As I Please, Duranty came close to an
admission that poor journalism had marked his reports for years. As he put it:
In 1928 there began for me a period which lasted nearly four years
upon which I look back with mingled regret and pride. During
much of that time I was in the position of seeing the woods so well
that I did not distinguish the trees well enough. What I mean is that
I gauged the Party Line with too much accuracy and when my
opinions and expectations were justified by events as they
frequently were, I was so pleased with my own judgment that I
allowed my critical faculty to lapse and failed to pay proper
attention to the cost and immediate consequences of the policies
that I had foreseen. I had no intention of being an apologist for the
Stalin administration; all that I was thinking was that I had doped
out the line that the administration must follow, and when it did
follow that line I naturally felt that it was right.
............ 224 ............
One might feel a twinge of sympathy for Duranty if this admission had been
followed by a full account of the suffering that he had helped the Soviets
conceal, or an acknowledgement that the Pulitzer rightfully belonged to a more
forthright correspondent.
In May of 1932 when Duranty was named as the Pulitzer Committees
recipient of its award for foreign correspondents, it had this to say of his work:
Mr. Durantys dispatches show profundity and intimate

comprehension of conditions in Russia and of the causes of those
conditions. They are marked by scholarship, profundity,
impartiality, sound judgment and exceptional clarity, and are
excellent examples of the best type of foreign correspondence.
That the Committee should suggest that Duranty deserved recognition for his
scholarship seems, in retrospect, almost laughable. During 1931 Duranty
never even claimed to visit a collective farm, a factory, or a workers apartment.
He never traveled to another Soviet city or another section of the country
during the whole year for which he received the award. In truth, his articles
relied so completely on official sources of information that they could have
been written by anyone who cared to subscribe to a Soviet newspaper or read
a Kremlin press release.
If Durantys lack of research could scarcely have stirred the hearts of the
Pulitzer Committee, a more likely reason for their choice would seem to have
been his Soviet sympathies. At a time when America was in the throes of
depression and many had lost hope in Western values, the Soviet Union seemed
like a noble experiment. Yet in looking back on his 1931 articles Duranty
clearly went beyond sympathy for the Soviets and was blatantly an apologist
for Kremlin policies. In January of 1931, a New York Times reporter, Marcus
A. Tollett, interviewed an OGPU official who had fled to the West and told of
Soviet labour camps where millions of kulaks worked and died under frightful
conditions. Duranty responded with perhaps his most duplicitous articles of
the year. In an early February piece his seemingly sensational title, Million Are
Held in Russian Camps, 200,000 in Forests, was followed by the comforting
assurance that conditions in the camps were far from difficult since the
............ 225 ............
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Kremlin has a spark of softness in its heart for politicals. The camps offered
life in communes that were comparatively free. He added that kulaks
were paid trade union wages to do work that was for the good of the
community, and allowed to win back their civil rights. Two weeks later,
Duranty insisted that the Soviets were exiling malignants to labour camps in
much the way that Oliver Cromwell had shipped them to Virginia. He
concluded that Stalin and Cromwell were much alike in their desire to teach
their people a work ethic and a sense of personal responsibility. Duranty
returned to the topic of the kulaks later in the year, and at last referred to their
persecution and physical extermination. Yet he denied that such terms
meant that they were being killed. He insisted that labour camps gave the
kulaks an opportunity to earn admission back into civil society. As he put it:
They take a kulak [and] tell him. You outcast! You man that was
and is not! You can get back your civic rights; can be reborn a
proletarian; can become a free member of our ant heap by working
for and with us for our communal purpose. If you dont, we wont
actually kill you, but you wont eat much, wont be happy, will
remain forever an outsider, as an enemy, as we consider it, even if
you ultimately return from exile and rejoin your family.
Other correspondents noted that Duranty liked to scatter words and phrases
such as persecution and physical extermination in his reports so that he
could later claim that they had been accurate.
If Duranty concealed and distorted conditions in the labour camps, he was
silent about the major story in the Soviet Union early in 1931, the tumultuous
drive to collectivize the peasants and the suffering that resulted. Duranty
instead continued his reassurances about a progressive Soviet leadership and its
commendable efforts to get peasants to abandon centuries of backwardness
and lethargy. In a February piece called Russian Peasants Gain in
Collectives, written at a particularly brutal time in the countryside, he asked
readers to remember that the Russian masses today are in the position of
children at school who personally might sooner be out at play and do not
realize that they are being taught for their own good. From Paris in mid-year
he added that the economic Five-Year Plan was a necessary measure for a
............ 226 ............
people locked in the past. He explained, The whole purpose of the Plan is to
get the Russians goingthis is, to make a nation of eager, conscious workers
out of a nation that was a lump of sodden, driven slaves. In another dispatch
from Paris he added that:
Everyone who has employed Russians or worked with Russians or

knows Russians finds that if he wants them to jump on a chair, he
must tell them to jump on a table, and aiming at the table they will
reach the chair. The important thing is that they have something to
jump at and make an effortwhether they actually get there all at
once or not does not really matter.
Behind this modernization effort Duranty offered a picture of Stalin as a bold
Tamerlane with his impressive Asian face, and his willingness to rip away
Russias European veneer. Stalin, he assures us, has:
Re-established the semi-divine supreme autocracy of the imperial

idea and has placed itself on the Kremlin throne as a ruler whose
lightest word is all and all and whose frown spells death. Try that
on free-born Americans or the British with their tough loyalty to
old things or on Frances consciousness of self. But it suits the
Russians and is as familiar to the Russian mind as it is
abominable to Western nations.
It was a theme to which he returned consistently during the year, and seems
clearly designed to keep his Western audience from fretting about Stalins
brutal measures. In December he argued that Bolshevism has given back to
Russia something the Russian people have always understoodabsolute
authority, unmellowed by the democracy or liberalism of the West. He added
the masses of the Russian peopleonly two generations removed from
virtual slaveryare being taught a regime of joint interest, effort and sacrifice
whose roots strike deep into their history.
Though Durantys time in Russia was spent exclusively in Moscow, his reports
were no more perceptive or revealing of conditions there than in the
............ 227 ............
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countryside. In late summer he offered his first real comments on life in the city,
where he insisted the divide has been crossed, better days are coming, and the
promised land is already dimly visible far away. If far away perplexed some
readers, Duranty insisted that Moscows shabbiness was fast disappearing.
Hundreds of new buildings and highways had re-made the city in the image
of other European capitals. Reports that the city was overwhelmed with
refugees from the countryside only made Duranty scoff. It was Russias ant
heap mentality that was responsible, not wrenching conditions in the rural
areas. Muscovites delighted in inviting friends and relatives until twelve or
more were stuffed happily into a two-room flat.
Todays readers can see, then, that the lies and deception that were so much a
part of Durantys record in 1932 and 1933 were just as ingrained in his 1931
pieces. And for an America weary of the Depression, such duplicity won
Duranty many admirers and likely played a role in earning his award. Indeed
the Pulitzer Committee had been loath to select a reporter with Soviet
sympathies in the past. Malcolm Cowley, editor of The New Republic and
himself a Soviet enthusiast, regularly blasted the Pulitzer committees for their
conservative choices. In one editorial Cowley urged the Pulitzer to go out of
business since it was afraid of ideas, afraid of blood, revolution, and, of
course, language. The 1932 committee simply may have bowed to such
pressure.
It is worth noting, too, that for over a year in the 1920s Duranty had shared
an apartment in Moscow with Herbert Pulitzer, the youngest of Joseph
Pulitzers three sons. Herbert Pulitzer and the amiable Duranty seem to have
become good friends, and both of Pulitzers brothers were part of the thirteenmember Advisory Board which made the final choice. Yet, Leland Stowe, then
a New York Herald-Tribune foreign correspondent and himself the 1931
Pulitzer choice, cites another possible reason for Durantys selection. In a 1977
letter to this author he suspects that one big reason for the choice was The
New York Times had its representatives on Pulitzer committeesor others
influential. If there was any single reason for the regrettable choice of
Duranty, according to Stowe, it was pro-Times rather than a concession to the
political Left.
............ 228 ............
Whatever the reason for the Pulitzer Committees choice, it is clear that the
selection was an egregious error. Duranty represented the worst rather than the
best in journalism. For a variety of reasons he had slanted, distorted, misled
and lied to readers as consistently as he would in 1932 and 1933. How much
Soviet citizens suffered as a result is difficult to judge. But in all likelihood their
lot was the worse because of the cover-up in which he was a key element. To
continue to honour his memory through the Pulitzer Award is unconscionable.
............ 229 ............
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Select Bibliography
Martin Amis, Koba The Dread: Laughter and the Twenty Million (Toronto:
Random House of Canada, 2002)
Ewald Ammende, Human Life in Russia (London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd, 1936)
Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan, eds, The
Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the
Great Famine of 1932-1933 (Kingston: The Limestone Press, 1988)
Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the
Terror-Famine (Oxford University Press, 1986)
, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (Oxford University
Press, 1990)
, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, 1999)
James William Crowl, Angels in Stalins Paradise: Western Reporters in
Soviet Russia, 1917 to 1937, a Case Study of Louis Fischer and Walter
Duranty, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1982)
Robert W. Davies, Mark Harrison and Stephen Wheatcroft, eds, The
Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 19131945 (Cambridge
University Press, 1993)
Robert W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft, The Industrialization of Soviet
Russia: The Years of Hunger, Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
............ 230 ............
Miron Dolot, Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust (New York:

W.W. Norton & Company, 1985)
David C. Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: American
Observers and the Costs of Soviet Economic Development (Harvard
University Press, 2003)
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalins Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian
Village after Collectivization (Oxford University Press, 1994)
J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party
Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge University Press, 1985)
J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning, eds, Stalinist Terror: New
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1993)
Roma Hadzewycz, George B. Zarycky and Marta Kolomayets, eds, The
Great Famine: The Unknown Holocaust: In Solemn Observance of the
50th Anniversary of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33 (Ukrainian
National Association, 1983)
John E. Haynes and Harvey Klehr, In Denial: Historians, Communism and
Espionage (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003)
Wasyl Hryshko, The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933 (Toronto: Bahriany
Foundation, Suzhero and Dobrus, 1983)
Ian A. Hunter, Putting History On Trial: The Ukrainian Famine Of 193233, Gazette, The Law Society of Upper Canada, Volume XXVI , No. 2,
June 1992, pages 138-162
International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine,

Proceedings [transcript], 23-27 May 1988, Brussels, Belgium, [Jakob W.F.
Sundberg, president; legal counsel, World Congress of Free Ukrainians,
John Sopinka with Alexandra Chyczij; legal counsel for the Commission,
Ian A. Hunter]
............ 231 ............
Not Worthy
International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine.

Proceedings [transcript], 21 October to 5 November 1988, New York
City, [Jakob W.F. Sundberg, president; counsel for the petitioner, William
Liber; general counsel, Ian A. Hunter]
International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine:
Final Report, [Jacob W.F. Sundberg, president], 1990, 6 volumes
\Wsevolod W. Isajiw, ed, Famine-Genocide in Ukraine, 1932-1933: Western
Archives, Testimonies and New Research (Toronto: Ukrainian Canadian
Research and Documentation Centre, 2003)
Bohdan Krawchenko, Social change and national consciouness in twentiethcentury Ukraine, (London: Macmillam, 1985)
Leonard Leshuk, ed, Days of Famine, Nights of Terror: Firsthand Accounts
of Soviet Collectivization, 1928-1934 (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1995)
Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, Searching For Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons,
Canada and the Migration of Memory (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2000)
James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation:
National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Harvard University
Press, 1983)
Simon S. Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (London: Weidenfeld
& Nicholson, 2003)
S. O. Pidhainy, ed, The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, 2
volumes, (Toronto: Ukrainian Association of Victims of RussianCommunist Terror, 1953)
Rudoph J. Rummel, Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocide and Mass Murder Since
1917 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1996)
............ 232 ............
Roman Serbyn & Bohdan Krawchenko, eds, Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933

(Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986)
S. J. Taylor, Stalins Apologist: Walter Duranty, The New York Times Man in
Moscow (Oxford University Press, 1990)
United States Commission on the Ukraine Famine, Investigation of the
Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Report to Congress / Commission on the
Ukraine Famine, Daniel E. Mica, chairman, James E. Mace, staff director
(Washington, 1988)
United States Commission on the Ukrainian Famine, Oral history Project of
Commission on the Ukraine Famine, James E. Mace and Leonid Heretz,
eds, (Washington, 1990)
Lynne Viola, The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of
Soviet Collectivization (Oxford University Press, 1987)
Olex Woropay, The Ninth Circle: In Commemoration of the Victims of the
Famine of 1933 (Ukrainian Studies Fund: Harvard University, 1983)
............ 233 ............
Not Worthy
Other sources:
Additional documents and articles on the Great Famine can be found on the
website of The Ukrainian Weekly
http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/Great_Famine/index.shtml
and at the website of Artukraine.com
http://www.artukraine.com/famineart/index.htm
For information about Gareth Jone, his reports on the Great Famine, those of
Malcolm Muggeridge, and correspondence with Walter Duranty and others,
go to
http://colley.co.uk/garethjones/soviet_articles/soviet_articles.htm
Information about the campaign to have Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize

revoked is available on the website of the Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties
Association:
http://www.uccla.ca
A documentary film, Harvest of Despair, by Slavko Nowytski and Yuri

Luhovy (1984) is available from the Ukrainian Canadian Research and
Documentation Centre, 620 Spadina Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada,
M5S 2H4, tel: (416) 966-1819 or email: ucrdc@interlog.com
............ 234 ............
Index
A Wandering Student (see B. Pares), 98 n41
Ahenakew, David, 154

Algonquin Roundtable, 160
Alsop, Joseph, 25, 160
America, 38
America (United States of America), 2, 6,
56, 71;
Red Decade in, 2, 9, 63, 91 n8,
102 n71;
and United Nations resolution on
Holodomor, 175
American Historical Review, 56, 102 n71
Andreychuk, Raynell (Senator), 116
Angels in Stalins Paradise (see J. Crowl),
92 n9, 94 n16, 99 n46, 130, 220, 223
Anglo-American Perspectives on the
Ukrainian Question (see L. Luciuk &
B. Kordan), 30
American Sociological Society, 47-48
Animal Farm (see G. Orwell), 22, 43
Armenian genocide, 38, 188
Arming America, 217
Asper, Israel, 213
Assignment in Utopia (see Eugene
Lyons), 6, 69, 90 n4, 97 n33, 98 n42,
100 n56, 120, 130
Associated Press (AP ), 73, 74, 76, 195
Association of Ukrainians in Great
Britain, 114, 171
Auden, W. H., 44
Austin-American Statesman, 158
Australia, and campaign to revoke W.
Durantys Pulitzer Prize, 113;
and UN resolution on Holodomor, 175
Australian Federation of Ukrainian
Organizations, 114, 171
Babyn Yar (Babi Yar), 37

Baltic States, 119, 188
Bancroft Prize, 217
Barnes, Andrews, 157, 159
Barnes, Ralph, 66, 67, 69, 83, 97-98 n34
Bauer, Yehuda, 36
Bassow, Whitman, 99-100, n52
Becker, Jasper, 103 n76, 103 n81
Bellesiles, Michael, (see Arming
America), 217
Beria, Lavrenty, 190
Berliner Tageblatt, 95 n19, 132, 186
Bevin, Anuerin, 22
Bickel, Karl A., 94 n18
Bilinsky, Yaroslav, 27
Black, Cyril, and modernization theory,
84, 85, 86, 87, 88,105 n87, 105 n88,
105 n89, 105 n92
Blunt, Anthony, 52
BNai Brith Canada, 153, 154
Borisow, Peter, 157
Bovino, Arthur (Office of the Public
Editor, New York Times), 222
BBC (British Broadcasting Service), 24
Brezhnev, Leonid, 31
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 89, 106 n95
Buciora, Jaroslaw (Father), 214
Burgess, Guy, 44
Byelorussians, Belarus (Belarussians), 1, 35
Cairns, Andrew, 61, 95 n22
campaign to revoke W. Durantys
Pulitzer Prize, 108, 111, 113, 114,
128-129, 146, 148-149, 150, 152,
157, 168, 171,172, 197, 203, 204, 206
............ 235 ............
Not Worthy
Canada, denaturalization and

deportation hearings, 169;
internment of Ukrainians in, 169;
Senate resolution on famine, 116;
and United Nations resolution on
Holodomor, 175
Canadian Museum of Human Rights,
213
cannabalism, in Ukraine, 17, 189, 196
Carynnyk, Marco, 12, 29, 30, 95 n23,
97 n31, 98 n43
Cathedral of Christ The Redeemer,
destroyed, 138
censorship (in USSR), 60, 68, 72, 73,
120, 130, 132, 164, 166, 184, 186, 219
Chalk, Frank, 28, 31
Chamberlain, John, 6
Chamberlin, Sonia, 261
Chamberlin, William Henry, 7, 58-60,
63, 64, 68, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81,
82, 83, 85, 88, 89, 91 n8, 96 n28, 97
n29, 98 n39, 100 n58, 101 n62, 101
n63, 165, 224, 261 (see appendix 4)
Chicago Daily News, 66, 97n34, 98 n41,
101 n67, 102 n74
Churchill, Winston (British Prime
Minister), 190
Christian Science Monitor, 7, 58, 76, 77,
98 n38, 100 n57, 100 n58, 101 n63,
165
Chronicles of Wasted Time (see M.
Muggeridge), 100 n56, 121
Colley, Margaret Siriol, 118-119, 179;
letter to B. Keller, 219-221;
letter to Pulitzer Board, 220
Colley, Nigel Linsan, 118; letter from A.
Bovino (New York Times), 222
Collier, Laurence, 96 n25

Columbia Journalism Review, 54-55,
156, 206
Columbia University (New York), 129,
146,148, 152, 157, 159, 164, 186,
200, 206, 216, 217
Comintern, 46
Commentary, 97 n31
Committee for Cultural Freedom, 4
Confessions of an Individualist (see W.
Chamberlin), 96 n28, 100 n57, 101 n62
Conquest, Robert, 30-33, 34, 38, 42, 58,
92 n9, 92 nf10, 92 n11, 149, 189
Cooke, Janet (see Washington Post and
Pulitzer Prize), 159, 217
Cowley, Malcolm, 228
Creel, George, 167
Crowl, James William, 92 n9, 94 n16,
99 n46, 130, 220, 223
cummings, e.e., 167
Currie, Duncan M., 215
Daily Express, 219

Dallas Morning News, 158
Davies, Joseph E., 3, 4
Davies, R. W., 92 n11
de Beauvoir, Simone, 51
dekulakization, 33
Denver Post, 99 n46
Derzhinsky, Felix, 190
Displaced Persons, Ukrainians as, 210
Duncan, Isadora, 160
Djilas, Milovan, 34
Drusag, 15, 26
Duranty Reports Russia (see
W. Duranty), 98 n37, 99 n47, 101 n61
............ 236 ............
Duranty, Walter, iv, 59, 60, 61, 67-68,

70, 72, 75, 77, 78, 79, 85, 88, 89, 92
n9, 94 n16, 96 n24, 96 n26, 98 n34,
98 n37, 99 n45, 99 n47, 100 n54, 100
n55, 101 n61, 102 n69, 102 n74, 119,
121, 122, 123, 126, 135, 136, 146,
151-153, 156, 157, 159,160, 161, 162,
163, 166, 167, 183, 186, 197, 202,
203, 207, 215, 216, 219, 220;
J. Crowl on, 223-229;
death of in 1957, 109, 127, 166, 204;
as famine denier, 6, 13, 25, 46, 54,
58, 61-64, 70-71, 83, 108, 111,
118,134, 137, 139, 140, 143, 144,
146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 154, 164,
171,184, 189, 199, 204, 206, 229;
as the greatest liar, 25, 54, 160, 200;
said at least 10 million people have
been starved to death, 26, 95 n23,
109, 111, 126,166, 205, 216, 223
(see appendix 3);
New York Times disclaimers re, 55,
110, 112, 156, 165, 204;
Pulitzer Prize Board on, 192-193,
194, 196, 198, 205, 220-221, 223;
von Hagen report on, 130-141
Economic development, an Asian
variant of, 88, 106 n94, 135-136
Eddy, Sherwood, 3
Eichmann, Adolf, 189, 190
enemy aliens, see Canada, internment
operations, 169
Engerman, David C., 56
Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, 48
Experiences in Russia A Diary, 102 n70,
180
Fabian Society, 20
Fairbank, John King, 83
famine of 1921-1922, 19;
and Duranty, 160
famine in China, comparison with Soviet
famine, 102 n75, 103 n76;
denial of, 82-83
famine monument (Winnipeg), 213
Far Eastern Economic Review, 83, 103 n80
Fischer, Louis, and famine denial, 6, 7,
58, 59, 63, 71, 79, 80, 81, 82,
85, 89, 92 n 9, 95 n 19, 96 n 27,
99 n 46, 101 n 64, 101 n 65, 101
n 66, 101 n 67, 102 n 68, 102 n 70,
122, 261
Five-Year Plan (USSR), 12, 56, 64, 68,
77, 81, 88, 89, 90 n1, 101 n63, 108109, 111, 120, 131, 133, 180, 186,
216, 219, 226-227
forced collectivization, 7, 16-17, 31, 63,
65, 68, 78, 79, 82, 91 n6, 91 n7,
110, 122, 136, 139, 142, 143, 161162, 175, 203, 210, 224, 226
Foreign Affairs, 98 n39, 98 n43, 101 n63
Foreign Office (Great Britain), 16, 19,
26, 29, 61, 95 n23, 223, (see
appendix 3)
Fortnightly Review, 97 n29
Frankel, Max, 112, 158
Friedman, Thomas, 156
Friesen, Edith, (see Journey into
Freedom), 210
Fulford, Robert, 202
Galicia, 30
Gareth Jones: A Manchukuo Incident
(see M. S. Colley), 187 n17
............ 237 ............
Not Worthy
Gerschenkron, Alexander, and

modernization theory, 84, 85, 87, 88,
89, 104 n85, 105 n92
Gillen, J. L., 47
Gleeson, John, 212
Gliksman, Jerzy, 48
Globe and Mail, 108, 148, 151, 153,
154, 171
Gissler, Sig, 109, 111, 113, 114, 115,
157, 158, 207
Goebbels, Joseph, 206
Goghdze, S. A., 49
Golden, L.B. (Save The Children Fund),
19
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 82, 86
Great Famine (Holodomor / terrorfamine), 56, 61, 76, 79, 80, 84, 88,
93 n12, 108, 111, 121, 142, 146,
147, 152, 162, 168, 198, 206, 209,
210, 212, 213, 214;
commemoration of in Ukraine, 38,
116, 145, 170, 174, 175, 196, 206
denial of, 6, 7, 8, 25-26, 58, 72-73,
140, 144, 151, 162;
economic versus ethnic
interpretations of, 58-59, 92 n11;
as genocide, 12, 16, 26, 27, 28-29,
30-32, 34, 36-37, 45, 54, 80, 91 n7,
144-145, 148, 150, 152-153, 168,
201, 203, 213;
in Kuban and North Caucasus, 12,
14, 17, 26, 29, 34-35, 57, 61, 63, 6566, 68, 71, 73, 75, 80, 100 n55, 123,
136;
population losses during, 1, 6, 7, 8, 9,
12-13, 18, 21, 25, 33-34, 38, 55, 57,
75, 78, 91 n5, 109, 111, 116-117,
143, 151, 162, 163, 164, 175, 188,

189, 195,196, 203, 213, 215;
Pulitzer Prize Board on, 192-193, 215
Great Leap Forward (Peoples Republic
of China), 82-83, 102-03 n75
Grossman, Vasily, 33
Gulag, 18, 47-49, 188, 189, 190
Halberstam, David, 156
Harvard Crimson, 215
Harvest of Despair (documentary film),
143, 234
Hearst newspapers, reporting on the
famine, 7, 80, 101 n67, 179
Hearst, Randolph, 179, 185, 221
Heinz, Jack, (see Experiences in Russia),
180
Herriot, Edouard (French Prime
Minister), 13, 189
Hicks, Granville, 4, 53
Himmler, Heinrich, 190
Hindus, Maurice, 8, 95 n19
Hingley, Ronald, 49
Hitler, Adolf, 1,4, 9, 28, 36, 51, 124,
181, 182, 189, 190, 210, 213
Hobhouse, L. T., 43
Hodgkin, Henry, 3
Holocaust, 1, 9, 27, 32, 35-37, 38, 154,
190, 203, 212
Holodomor (see Great Famine)
Homage To Catalonia (see G. Orwell), 21
Hoover, Calvin, 82
Hoover Digest, 42
Hubska, Victor, 197
Hughes, Langston, 4
Hungry Ghosts, 103 n76, 103 n80
Hryshko, Vasyl, 30-31, 33
............ 238 ............
Hunter, Ian, 25
Huttenbach, Henry R., 27, 35
Hyde, Henry, 142
Hyworon, Eugne, 214
Ickes, Harold, 49
International Affairs, 97 n29
International Commission of Jurists, 25
Israel, 170, 171, 172, 190
I Write As I Please (see W. Duranty), 99
n47, 102 n74, 161, 166, 224
James, Edwin, 94 n18
Jews, 1, 9, 35, 37, 188, 212, 213;
in Soviet secret police, 189-190, 213
Johnson, Lyndon Baines (US President), 86
Jonassohn, Kurt, 28, 31
Jones, Gareth, 6, 69, 70-72, 118, 123125, 127, 163,164,172, 179 , 183,
184, 185, 186, 219, 220-221,
234;
letter from Berlin, (see appendix 1);
meets Hitler, 181-182;
murder of in Manchukuo, 128, 179,
180, 185-186, 221
Journal of Genocide Research, 27
Journey into Freedom, 210
Kaganovich, Lazar, 189, 190
Kalinin, Mikhail, 45
Kaplan, Justin, 150
Kazakhstan, famine in, 57, 61
Keep, John, (see The Making of Modern
Russia), 213
Keller, Bill, 149, 207, 217, 219
Kennan, George F., 56, 89
Kennedy, John F. (US President), 86
Kharkiv (Kharkov), 20, 74, 95 n22, 170,

172, 182, 196
Kingston (Ontario), 205, 206
Kirkpatrick, David D., 194, 222
Klatell, David, 157, 159, 206
Kliefoth, A.W., reports conversation with
W. Duranty to US State Department,
123 (see appendix 2)
Knickerbocker, H. R., 102, n70, 183, 220
Kochan, Lionel, (see The Making of
Modern Russia), 213
Kolysnichenko, Lidia, 196
Kordan, Bohdan S., 29, 30, 95 n23
Kuchinsky, Valeriy, statement to the
United Nations, 174-178
Kuropas, Myron B., 1, 171
Kuz, Tony, 95 n22
Krasnodar, 165
Kravchuk, Leonid M. (President of
Ukraine) 37-38
Krawchenko, Bohdan, 28, 31
Khrushchev, Nikita, 37,199
Kuchma, Leonid (President of Ukraine),
175, 196
Kyiv (Kiev), 14, 64, 95 n22, 163, 170,
171, 172, 195, 196, 212
Lamont, Corliss, 3
Lamont, Margaret, 3
Lantos, Tom, 142
Laski, Harold, 47, 49
Lattimore, Owen, 49
League of the Militant Godless, 138
Le Carr, John, 52
Lee, Ivy, 180, 181
Legters, Lyman, 35
Leman, Nicholas, 159
............ 239 ............
Not Worthy
Lemkin, Raphael, 28, 32, 35, 37

Lenin, Vladimir, 36, 44, 161, 181
Leo, John, 54
Lerner, Max, 4
Levy, Moe, on the Ukrainian genocide, 213
Lewis, Anthony, 156
Lewis, Sinclair, 160
Liberalism (see L. T. Hobhouse), 43
Library of Congress, 159
Like It Was (see M. Muggeridge), 97 n30
Litvinov, Maksim, 126, 127, 160, 166, 185
Lloyd George, David (British Prime
Minister) 69, 98 n41, 123, 127, 163,
179, 180, 181, 185, 219
London School of Economics, 47, 181
Lovett, Robert M., 4
Luciuk, Lubomyr Y., 29, 30, 93 n23,
108-109, 114, 147, 150, 151,
157,168, 205, 218
Lukas, J. Anthony, 156
Luthy, Herbert, 51
Lyons, Eugene, 2, 3, 5, 8, 58-60, 65, 68,
69, 75, 80, 81, 83, 85, 90 n4, 91 n8,
97 n32, 97 n33,
98 n42, 100 n56, 120, 121, 130,160,
165, 224, 261
Macdonald, Hugh A., 30
Mace, James E., 28, 33-34, 92 n9, 92 n10,
118, 168, 207
Machine Tractor Stations, 68
Maisky, Ivan, 18-19
Manchester Guardian, 13, 20, 25, 26,
58, 64, 65, 69, 77, 97 n31, 98 n41,
100 n60, 102 n74, 110, 121, 124,
127, 160, 183, 184, 203
Margolis, Eric, 188
Matas, David, 153

criticizes Globe and Mail editorial on
W. Duranty, 154
Mathis, Catherine, 110, 112
McCollam, Douglas, 156
McCormick , Anne OHare, 75, 100 n56
Melnichuk, Anna, 195
Menken, Jules, 181
Mennonites, in southern Ukraine, 210
Metro-Vickers Trial, 124-125
Meyer, Karl A., 55, 112, 203
Milwaukee Leader, 99 n46
Minogue, Kenneth, 52
Muggeridge, Malcolm, 12-13, 25-26, 48,
54, 64, 65, 72, 96 n28, 97 n30, 97 n31,
100 n56, 110, 121, 127, 130, 151,
152, 160, 163, 172,184, 203, 207,
224, 234, 261
Molot, 121
Molotov, Viacheslav, 34, 66, 189
Mussolini, Benito, 124, 189
Myrdal, Gunnar, 83
My Rocky Road of Life, 210
National Post, 146, 147, 202

Nation, 4, 5, 6, 46, 58, 79, 96 n27, 101 n65
National Review Online, 198
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 56-57, 90 n3, 90 n4
NEP (New Economic Program), 139
New Criterion, 42
New Republic, 5, 68, 98 n39, 228
New York American, 185, 221
New Yorker, 46
New York Evening Journal, 101 n66
New York Evening Post, 183, 220
New York Herald-Tribune, 66, 97n34, 228
New York Sun, 141, 164
............ 240 ............
Nicholson, Nigel, 52
Nikishov, I. F., 49
1984 (see G. Orwell), 21-22
Nynka, Andrew, 113
Odessa (Odesa), 99 n47
Odets, Clifford, 4
One Life, One Kopek (see W. Duranty),
96 n26, 99 n49
Oppel, Richard, 158
Order of Canada, 154
Oriental Despotism, 88, 106 n93
Orientalism, 94 n15
Orwell, George, 21-23, 43
Ottawa Citizen, 205
Owen, Russell, 156
Pares, Bernard (Sir), 47, 98 n41, 103 n79
Parsons, Talcott, 85
Pederson, Rada, 158
Pianov, Volodymyr, 196
Poland, Poles, 1, 137, 188, 212
POUM (United Marxist Workers Party),
21, 51
Press Office (Peoples Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs, NKID ), 60, 62, 6667, 69-70, 72, 73, 74, 76, 96 n26,
100 n52,
Problems of Communism, 33
protests against Stalinism, 8, 9
Pulitzer, Herbert, friend of
W. Duranty, 228
Pulitzer, Joseph, 118, 228
Pulitzer Prize, Pulitzer Prize Committee,
8, 25, 46, 54-55, 108-110, 111112, 113, 114, 115, 118-119,
121, 128-129, 131, 146, 147
148,150, 151-153, 154, 156,157,

158, 159, 161, 164, 171, 172,
183, 204, 207, 208, 215, 217,
218, 219, 22, 228;
statement on W. Durantys Prize,
192-193, 194, 196, 198, 199,
201, 202, 205, 206, 215, 220,
225, 229
Radek, Karl, 181
Ranisgu, T., 212, 213
Red Star Over China (see E. Snow), 83,
103 n78
Reichstag, burning of, 181
Richardson, Stanley, 74, 76
Riga, (Latvia), White Russian migr
circles in, 134
Rolland, Romain, 49
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (US President), 9,
25, 49, 134, 160, 190
Rosen, Joseph (Dr.), 65
Rostov, 14-15, 65, 74, 121, 165
Rostow, Walt Whitman, and
modernization theory, 84, 85, 86, 88,
103 n79, 104 n84, 105 n86, 105 n91
Royal Institute of International Affairs,
63, 97 n29
Russia, Russians, alleged national
character (Asiatic) of, 57, 59-60,
69, 77-78, 81-82, 85, 88, 93 n13,
135, 138, 226-227
Russias Iron Age (see W. H.
Chamberlin), 7, 101 n62, 101 n63
Sadao, Araki (General), 185
Said, Edward, 94
Safire, William, 158
............ 241 ............
Not Worthy
St. Mary the Protectress Ukrainian

Orthodox Cathedral, 210, 214
St. Petersburg Times, 157, 159
Sakharov, Andrei D., 36, 38
Salisbury, Harrison, 159
Sanders, Carol, 209
San Francisco Chronicle, 195
San Francisco News, 99 n46
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 190
Sawkiw, Michael, 157
Scheffer, Paul, 95, n19, 186
Schiller, Otto, 76, 95 n22
Schuman, Frederick L., 4
Season of High Adventure, 103 n77
Second World War, alleged Ukrainian
collaboration with Nazis in, 212;
expulsions of Germans after, 189;
population losses in Ukraine during,
1, 169, 170, 210
Serbyn, Roman, 28, 31
Seven Years in Soviet Russia (see P.
Scheffer), 95 n19
Shapiro, Henry, 97 n32
Shaw, George Bernard, 13, 160
Show Trials, 49, 137, 140
Sinclair, Upton, 4, 8
Skrypnyk, Mykola, 36
Slavic Review, 92 n11
Smith, Christopher H., 142
Snow, Edgar, 83, 103 n77, 103 n78
Solovyschuk, Petro, 198
Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 52, 190
Soviet Communism, A New Civilization
(see B. & S. Webb), 20, 46
Soviet Journey (see L. Fischer), 7, 79,
101 n65
Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics), apologists for, 2, 3,

4, 7, 8, 42, 51-52, 121, 161, 172,
189, 190, 198, 225;
labour camps in, 3, 47, 225, 226;
persecution of Muslims in, 188;
secret police of, 16, 20, 47-49,
120, 124, 182,184, 185, 189, 190,
224, 225
US recognition of, 9, 25, 71, 126,
133-134, 160, 163, 202
Soviet Russia Pictorial, 5
Soviet Russia Today, 4
Soviet (communist) war criminals, 2,
170, 172,190, 207
Sowell, Thomas, 43
Spanish Civil War, 21
Stages of Economic Growth (see W.
Rostow), 85
Stalin and Company (see W. Duranty),
102 n69
Stalins Apologist:Walter Duranty, (see S.
Taylor), 25, 55, 94 n16, 97 n33, 9899 n44, 102 n69, 119, 130,149, 160,
164, 203, 217
Stalin, Joseph, 1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 18, 22, 28,
31, 33, 36-38, 45, 46, 49, 52, 54, 81,
108, 110, 119, 139, 142, 144, 147,
149, 151, 188, 190, 203, 209, 210,
212, 226;
Duranty coins term Stalinism, 132,
161, 196
Steffens, Lincoln, 45
Steinberg, Jacques, 141
Stoneman, William, 65-67, 69, 76, 97
n33, 97 n34, 261
Strang, William, 77, 95 n23, 96 n25,
100 n59, 126, 151, 163, 165
............ 242 ............
Strong, Anna Louise, 3, 121, 261

Stowe, LeLand, 228
Stuttaford, Andrew, 198
Suharto, Raden (Indonesia), 88
Sulzberger, Arthur Hays, 99-100, n52
Sulzberger, Arthur Ochs, 112, 158
Sulzberger, Jr, Arthur, 152, 157, 158,
165, 194, 201, 204, 207, 217
Svoboda, 8
Tammany Hall (New York), 139
Tauger, Mark B., 92 n11
Taylor, Sally (biographer of W. Duranty),
25-26, 55, 94 n16, 98 n44, 102 n69,
119, 130, 149, 160, 164, 203, 216
TASS, 5, 90 n8, 94 n18, 120
Terrill, Ross, 83, 84
The Day, 118, 168
The Dynamics of Modernization (see A
Gerschenkron), 85
The Foreign Office and the Famine (see
M. Carynnyk, L. Luciuk & B.
Kordan), 27, 95 n23, 96 n25, 98
n43, 100 n53, 100 n56
The God That Failed, 80, 102 n68
The Great Offensive (see M. Hindus), 8
The Harvest of Sorrow (see R.
Conquest), 31, 58 92 n9, 149
The Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, 32
The Making of Modern Russia, 213
The Moscow Correspondents (see W.
Basslow), 99-100, n52
The New Russia, 102 n70
The New York Times, 6, 13, 25, 32,
38, 54-55, 58, 60, 67, 72, 73,
74, 77, 78, 94 n 18, 96 n 24, 96
n 25, 97 n 31, 99 n 45, 99 n 47, 99
n 49, 99 n 50, 99 n 51, 99 n 52,

100 n 52, 100 n 55, 108-110,
111-112, 113, 114, 119, 123,
125, 127, 133, 135, 140, 141,
143, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151,
152, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160,
163, 164,165, 166, 167, 168,
171, 172, 184, 186, 192, 200,
202, 204, 209, 215, 216, 217,
219, 225, 228;
decision re Durantys Prize, 194,
196,198, 200-201,202, 205,
207, 222;
Office of the Public Editor, 222
The Prevention of Literature (see G.
Orwell), 43
The Red Decade (see E. Lyons), 91 n8
The Times (London), 123, 180, 219
The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 129
Thomas, S. Bernard, 103 n77
Thurber, James, 5
Trimpolis, Peter, (see My Rocky Road of
Life), 210
Tollett, Marcus A., 225
Toronto Sun, 188
Travellers Club, 62
Trotsky, Leon, 132, 135
Turner, Ted, 52
Ukraine, Ukrainians, Hitlers designs
upon, 4;
restrictions on travel to, 13-14, 26,
66-67, 74, 76,101 n65, 164;
trafficking in women from, 170-171
Ukrainian American Justice Committee,
114, 171
............ 243 ............
Not Worthy
Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties

Association (UCCLA), 169, 170;
initiated campaign to have W.
Durantys Pulitzer Prize revoked, 108,
114, 128, 147, 150, 157, 168, 171,
203, 215, 218, 234;
Ukrainian Canadian Congress, 114, 171
Ukrainian Congress Committee of
America, 114, 157, 171, 197
Ukrainian Weekly, 1, 9, 12 38, 54, 111,
113, 234
Ukrainian World Congress, 114, 128,
171
Ukrainophobe (Ukrainophobia), 36, 37
Umansky, Konstantine, (Oumansky,
Constantine) 6, 69, 70, 98 n42, 120,
121, 122, 124, 125, 128
Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, 28
United Nations (UN), 30-31, 33, 35,
174, 175-176, 177, 195
United Press (UP ), 5, 58, 60, 94 n18,
97 n32, 160, 165
untermenschen (subhumans), 1
Untermeyer, Louis, 4
US Commission on the Ukraine Famine,
30, 33-34, 92 n9, 95 n22, 128, 143,
144
US Department of State, report on
apparent collusion between Soviet
government and New York Times,
112, 123, 166, 200 (see appendix 2)
US House of Representatives, 38
resolution on famine, 142-145, 175
US News & World Report, 54
US-Ukraine Foundation, 195
Uznik, Toby, 158
Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of

Ukraine), 145
Vinnytisia (region), 198
Volga Germans, 136, 188
von Hagen, Mark, 186, 200, 201, 216
report to The New York Times, 130141, 164, 165, 168, 171, 172, 204;
international reaction to report, 141,
148, 152, 172;
recommends revocation of W.
Durantys Pulitzer Prize, 141, 146,
164, 165, 201, 204
Vyshinsky, Andrei, 49
Waldorf Astoria (New York), 46, 126,
160, 203
Wallace, Henry, 47, 49
War Memoirs (see David Lloyd George),
181
Washington Post, 38, 52, 159, 217
Washington Times, 112
Weber, Max, 4
Webb, Beatrice and Sidney, 18, 20, 46,
121, 189, 251 [?]
We Cover The World (see W. Chamberlin),
101 n62
Wells, H. G., 49,
Western Mail (Cardiff), 180, 181, 182,
185, 219
Wheatcroft, S. G., 92 n11
White House, 8, 9, 166
William Strang-Home and Abroad (see
W. Strang), 100 n59
Williams, E. Morgan, 195
Winnipeg (Manitoba), 210, 213
Winnipeg Free Press, 209
Winnipeg Sun, 212
............ 244 ............
Winter in Moscow (see M. Muggeridge),

19, 127, 128, 130
Wittfogel, Karl A., 106 n93
Woollcott, Alexander, 46, 126
World Council of Churches, 19, 50
Wright, Richard, 4
Written into History, 112
Yagoda, Genrikh, 49, 189, 190

Yezhov, Nikolai, 190
Yew, Lee Kuan (Singapore), 88
Young Peoples Socialist League, 5
Zedong, Mao, 42, 83, 84, 103 n76
Zlepko, D., 95 n22
............ 245 ............
Appendix 1: Letter from Gareth Jones to his parents, 26 August 1930
............ 247 ............
............ 248 ............
............ 249 ............
............ 250 ............
urray! It is wonderful to be in Germany again, absolutely wonderful. Russia is in

a very bad state; rotten, no food, only bread; oppression, injustice, misery among
the workers and 90% discontented. I saw some very bad things, which made me mad
to think that people like [the Webbs?] go there and come back, after having been led
round by the nose and had enough to eat, and say that Russia is a paradise. In the South
there is talk of a new revolution, but it will never come off, because the Army and the
O.G.P.U. (Soviet Police) are too strong. The winter is going to be one of great suffering
there and there is starvation. The government is the most brutal in the world. The
peasants hate the Communists. This year thousands and thousands of the best men in
Russia have been sent to Siberia and the prison island of Solovki. People are now
speaking openly against the Government.
In the Donetz Basin conditions are unbearable. Thousands are leaving. I shall never
forget the night I spent in a railway station on the way to Hughesovka. One reason why
I left Hughesovska so quickly was that all I could get to eat was a roll of bread and
that is all I had up to 7 oclock. Many Russians are too weak to work. I am terribly
sorry for them. They cannot strike or they are shot or sent to Siberia. There are heaps
of enemies of the Communist within the country.
Nevertheless great strides have been made in many industries and there is a good
chance that when the Five-Year Plan is over Russia may become prosperous. But before
that there will be great suffering, many riots and many deaths.
The Communists are doing excellent work in education, hygiene and against alcohol.
Butter is 16/- a pound in Moscow; prices are terrific, boots etc. cannot be had. There
is nothing in the shops. The Communists were remarkably kind to me and gave me an
excellent time.
Last Sunday I flew from Rostov to Moscow as their guest. You will get this letter
probably before my Sunday letter. Germany is a fine place. I am looking forward so
much to seeing the Haferkorns and getting your letters there, because I have had very
little news. Thank goodness I am not a Consul in Russia not even in Taganrog!
Just had a fine lunch. When I come back I shall appreciate Auntie Winnies [Gareth's
'live-in' aunt at his parent's home] dinner more than ever.
Cariad cynhesaf
Gareth
source: http://www.uanews.tv/mirror/jones.htm
............ 251 ............
Appendix 2- A.W. Kliefoth, Embassy of the United States re:Walter Duranty
............ 253 ............
............ 254 ............
............ 255 ............
............ 256 ............
Appendix 3: William Strang, British Embassy, Moscow, re Tour by Mr. Duranty
............ 257 ............
............ 258 ............
............ 259 ............
............ 260 ............
............ 261 ............
............ 262 ............
Appendix 4: Famine proves potent weapon
Famine proves potent weapon in Soviet policy

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN
29 May 1934, Christian Science Monitor

The collective farmers this year have passed through a good school. For some,
this school was quite ruthless.
This was how President Kalinin, in a speech delivered early last summer,
referred to the food situation in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. When the
prohibition on travel by foreign correspondents in the rural districts was
relaxed in the autumn, I had an opportunity to find out what this "ruthless
school" had meant in concrete practice.
I shall never forget a scene which I witnessed in a Ukrainian village named
Zhuke, which lies some 15 miles to the north of Poltava. The president of the
local collective farm and a state agronome, or agricultural expert, were
accompanying me on visits to a number of peasant houses. So long as my
companions chose the houses to be visited I found myself invariably meeting
local Communist or "udarniki" (shock brigade workers), with pictures of
Lenin, Stalin and Kalinin on the walls and a fairly contented tale of their
experiences.
I suddenly picked out a house at random and went into it with my companions.
It was a typical Ukrainian peasant hut, with thatched roof, earth floors,
benches running around the walls, an oven and rickety-looking bed as the chief
article of furniture. The sole occupant was a girl of 15, huddled up on the
bench. She answered a few simple questions briefly, in a flat dull voice.
............ 263 ............
"Where is your mother?"

"She died of hunger last winter."
"Have you any brothers or sisters?"
"I had four. They all died, too."
"When?"
"Last winter and spring."
"And your father?"
"He is working in the fields."
"Does he belong to the collective farm?"
"No, he is an individual peasant."
So here was one man - his name was Savchenko - whose passive stubbornness
defied even Kalinin's "ruthless school," who refused to go into a collective
farm, even after almost all the members of his family had perished.
My companions, the president of the collective farm and the state agronome,
had nothing to say. Smooth-tongued officials in Moscow might assure
inquiring visitors that there had been no famine, only little food difficulties
here and there, due to the wicked machinations of the kulaks. Here on the spot
in Zhuke, as in a dozen other Ukrainian and North Caucasian villages which I
visited, the evidence of large-scale famine was so overwhelming, was so
unanimously confirmed by the peasants that the most "hard-boiled" local
officials could say nothing in denial.
Everywhere a tale of famine
............ 264 ............
Some idea of the scope of the famine, the very existence of which was
stubbornly and not unsuccessfully concealed from the outside world by the
Soviet authorities, may be gauged from the fact that in three widely separated
regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus which I visited - Poltava and
Byelaya Tserkov and Kropotkin in the North Caucasus - mortality, according
to the estimates of such responsible local authorities as Soviet and collective
farm presidents ranged around 10 percent. Among individual peasants and in
villages far away from the railroad it was often much higher.
I crossed Ukraine from the southeast to the northwest by train, and at every
station where I made inquiries the peasants told the same story of major famine
during the winter and spring of 1932-33.
If one considers that the population of Ukraine is about 35 million and that of
the North Caucasus about 10 million and that credible reports of similar
famine came from part of the country which I did not visit, some regions of the
Middle and Lower Volga and Kazakhstan, in Central Asia, it would seem
highly probable that between 4 million and 5 million people over and above
the normal mortality rate, lost their lives from hunger and related causes. This
is in reality behind the innocuous phrases, tolerated by the Soviet censorship,
about food stringency, strained food situation, etc.
What lay behind this major human catastrophe? It was very definitely not a
result of any natural disaster, such as exceptional drought or flood, because it
was the general testimony of the peasants that the harvest of 1932, although
not satisfactory, would have left them enough for nourishment, if the state had
not swooped down on them with heavy requisitions.
Hidden stocks of grain which the despairing peasants had buried in the ground
were dug up and confiscated; where resistance to the state measures was
specially strong, as in some stanitsas, or Cossack towns, in the Western Kuban,
whole communities were driven from their homes and exiled en masse, to the
frozen wastes of Siberia.
State had its "squeeze"
............ 265 ............
Unquestionably, the poor harvest of 1932 was attributable in some degree to

the apathy and discouragement of the peasants, subjected, as they were at the
time, to constant requisitions, at inequitable fixed prices - the state was
practically compelled, by the necessity for raising capital for its grandiose, new
industrial enterprises, to squeeze out of the peasants a good deal more than it
could give them in return - of their grain and other produce by the authorities,
and driven against their will into an unfamiliar and distasteful system.
The Communists saw in this apathy and discouragement, sabotage and
counter-revolution and with the ruthlessness peculiar to self-righteous idealists,
they decided to let the famine run its course with the idea that it would teach
the peasants a lesson.
Relief was doled out to the collective farms, but on an inadequate scale and so
late that many lives had already been lost. The individual peasants were left to
shift for themselves; and the much higher mortality rate among the individual
peasants proved a most potent argument in favor of joining collective farms.
War is war, but The Soviet government, along with the other powers which adhered to the
Kellogg pact, has renounced war as an instrument of national policy. But there
are no humanitarian restrictions in the ruthless class war which, in the name of
socialism, it has been waging on a considerable part of its own peasant
population; and it has employed famine as an instrument of national policy on
an unprecedented scale and in an unprecedented way.
At the moment it looks as if the famine method may have succeeded in finally
breaking down the peasant resistance to collectivization. In 1921 the peasants
were strong enough, acting no less effectively because they had no conscious
union or organization, to force the government to give up its requisitioning and
to introduce the "NEP," or New Economic Policy, with its security of
individual farming and freedom of private trade, by withholding their grain
and bringing the towns close to starvation.
............ 266 ............
Now the tide of revolution has rolled beyond the NEP stage, and in 1933 the
Soviet government, quite conscious of what it was doing, was strong enough
to wring out of the peasants enough foodstuffs to provide at least minimum
rations for the towns and to turn the starvation weapon against the peasants
themselves.
***
Foreign correspondents in Kharkiv en route to Dniepropetrovsk, Ukraine.

Fortune magazine photographer Margaret Bourke-White (in railroad car
entrance); author Louis Fischer; Anna Louise Strong (centre, light coat); at her
left, William Henry Chamberlin (Christian Science Monitor) and his wife, Sonia.
At her left, in trench coat and fedora is Eugene Lyons (United Press). Behind him
is William Stoneman (Chicago Daily News). Malcolm Muggeridge stands center
right, bare headed, just behind Sonia Chamberlin.
............ 267 ............
Not Worthy
About the Contributors

Raynell Andreychuk, a lawyer by profession, is a Senator and chair of the
Senate of Canadas Human Rights Committee.
Yaroslav Bilinsky is Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International
Relations at the University of Delaware.
Marco Carynnyk is a writer, editor, translator and historical researcher in
Toronto, Ontario.
William Henry Chamberlin was a journalist for The Christian Science Monitor.
Dr. Margaret Siriol Colley is the author of Gareth Jones: A Manchukuo
Incident.
Robert Conquest is senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution on War,
Revolution and Peace, Stanford University.
Duncan M. Currie studies history at Harvard University and is a columnist for
The Harvard Crimson.
James Crowl is the author of Angels in Stalins Paradise and an associate
professor of history and political science at Longwood University, Virginia.
Roger Daniels is Charles Phelps Taft Professor Emeritus of History at the
University of Cincinnati. His most recent book is Guarding the Golden Door:
American Immigration Policy and Immigrants Since 1882.
David Engerman is a professor in the Department of History at Brandeis
University.
............ 268 ............
Robert Fulford is a columnist for The National Post and Toronto Life
magazine, where he often writes about media ethics.
John Gleeson is the editor of The Winnipeg Sun.
Mark von Hagen is a professor of history at Columbia University, New York.
Roma Hadzewycz is editor-in-chief of The Ukrainian Weekly.
Ian Hunter is a writer and Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Law, University
of Western Ontario.
Valeriy P. Kuchinsky is an Ambassador and has been the Permanent
Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations, since 1999.
Myron B. Kuropas is an adjunct professor at Northern Illinois University and
a columnist with The Ukrainian Weekly.
Lubomyr Luciuk is a professor of political geography at the Royal Military
College of Canada and director of research for the Ukrainian Canadian Civil
Liberties Association.
James Mace is professor of history at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy University
and a regular contributor to The Day.
Victor Malarek, an author and investigative journalist with The Globe and
Mail, is currently with CTVs W5.
Eric Margolis is a columnist with The Toronto Sun.
David Matas is senior counsel, BNai Brith Canada.
Douglas McCollam is a contributing editor to the Columbia Journalism Review.
Anna Melnichuk is an Associated Press reporter.
............ 269 ............
Not Worthy
Andrew Nynka is an editor at The Ukrainian Weekly.

Carol Sanders is a reporter with The Winnipeg Free Press.
Andrew Stuttaford is a contributing editor to the National Review Online.
***
Holodomor commemorative stamp issued by Ukraine, 21 November 2003
............ 270 ............

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Edited by Lubomyr Luciuk

With a Foreword by Roger Daniels

National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication

The provenance of photographic evidence of the Great Famine is

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

Introduction - Not Worthy? by Lubomyr Lucuik.................................

Americas Red Decade

Malcolm Muggeridge on Stalins famine

The liar who won a Pulitzer

Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?

How Liberals Funked It

Modernization from the Other Shore

Ukrainians demand Pulitzer be revoked

Undoing history, or righting a wrong?

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

Should This Pulitzer Be Pulled?

Revoking Durantys Prize

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

How did he do it and why was he successful? An attempt to get space in

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

............ iii ............

Walter Duranty, circa 1935

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

............ vii ............

E-mail correspondence with Sig Gissler, 22 November 2003.

............ viii ............

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

The best-known example of famine-denial is a polemic by Douglas Tottle, Fraud, Famine

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

............ xii ............

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

............ xiii ............

Dr. Leonard Leshuk, Gerry Locklin, Professor James Mace, Professor P. R.

............ xiv ............

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

The Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine:

The Ukrainian Weekly, 20 March 1983

Reprinted with permission of The Ukrainian Weekly and the author

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

that Stalin was a stubborn democrat who insisted on a Constitution which

The great cleavage between contemporary societies is not between

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

James Thurber - signed and agreed to have published an Open Letter

United States in 1934, 22 he wrote about his experiences in Assignment in

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

No one, I am sure, could have made such a trip with an honest

History can be cruel...The peasants wanted to destroy

And supposing there is a famine...continued my interlocutor...what

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

House remained indifferent. On 16 November 1933, President Franklin D.

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

Deliberate, diabolical, starvation: Malcolm Muggeridge on Stalins

The Ukrainian Weekly, 29 May and 5 June 1983

Reprinted with permission of The Ukrainian Weekly and the author

Walter Durantys Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times

Malcolm Muggeridge was there that terrible winter and spring. As a

Mr. Muggeridge and I talked at his cottage in Sussex, England. I was