Roundtree v. Apfel, 10th Cir. (1999)
Roundtree v. Apfel, 10th Cir. (1999)
Roundtree v. Apfel, 10th Cir. (1999)
AUG 27 1999
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PALECIA R. ROUNDTREE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
No. 98-6365
(D.C. No. CIV-96-1857-T)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
See
1991).
Claimant alleges disability due to pain in her back, neck, and shoulder
resulting from strains and sprains suffered at work. Claims for disability benefits
are evaluated according to the five-step sequential process set out in 20 C.F.R.
404.1520. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988). At step
five of this process, the ALJ found that claimant had the RFC to perform
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sedentary work that allowed for alternate sitting and standing. He discredited
claimants subjective complaints of disabling pain, analyzing them in accordance
with Luna v. Bowen , 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987).
Claimant maintains that the ALJ discussed only one factor in making his
credibility determinations--her daily activities. This assertion is clearly belied by
the written decision. There, the ALJ noted that claimants complaints of
disabling pain were not consistent with the amount or type of pain medication she
was taking; that she had been discharged from physical therapy for failure to
attend the sessions; that her treating neurosurgeon had determined that she could
resume work; that her diagnoses were of mild cervical and lower back strains;
that she regularly drove, did laundry, and cooked, and that she had not sought
treatment for pain in almost two years.
Diaz v.
Claimant next asserts that the ALJ erroneously concluded that claimants
testimony regarding her back impairment was credible but her testimony
regarding her cervical impairment was not. Appellants Br. at 6. We have
carefully reviewed the ALJs decision and can find no such conclusion. Claimant
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also argues that the ALJs analysis is internally inconsistent because he concluded
that she had a severe cervical impairment and then accorded no limitations to it
when assessing her RFC.
neck impairment had improved and was no longer her primary impairment, that
she suffered from some muscle spasms two or three times a week, when she held
her neck in one place for a long time, such as when reading or watching TV, and
that the spasms were relieved by doing neck exercises or using a heating pad.
See
Appellants App. Vol. II at 173-74. Thus, claimant did not allege that her neck
and shoulder pain were constant or severe. Complaints of pain are considered to
be nonexertional limitations only when they
perform the full range of work in a particular RFC category on a sustained basis.
Williams , 844 F.2d at 752 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). The ALJ gave
claimants complaints of pain some credence in that he determined that pain
limited her to doing sedentary work with the additional limitation of being
allowed to move around. He ultimately concluded, however, that her pain was not
disabling. This conclusion comports with the applicable social security law. A
finding of disability based on complaints of pain requires more than mere
inability to work without pain. . . . [The] pain must be so severe . . . as to
preclude any substantial gainful employment.
Chater , 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that ALJ must consider
all evidence and must discuss any significantly probative evidence he rejects or
uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely on, but does not have to discuss
every piece of evidence). Dr. Miller was a consultative physician hired by
claimant to examine her on April 15, 1993, for preparation of a report for her
workers compensation claim.
A review of the medical records shows that Dr. Millers report is not
consistent with the reports of claimants treating physicians or even with the facts
of her injury, which occurred on December 24, 1992. It is difficult to see how
there could be six months of documented muscle spasm, pain, and rigidity arising
from an injury that had occurred only four months previously. Further, Dr.
Harvey, who initially treated claimant for two weeks, reported no muscle
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136-37.
Dr. Miller reported a 20% impairment based on left arm radiculopathy, but
Dr. Rice, an orthopedic specialist who also had examined her, found that she had
no true radicular type symptoms. Dr. Miller found an impairment of 12% based
on left shoulder injury, but Dr. Rice determined that she had no symptoms
suggesting rotator cuff injury, that her problem sounded mainly muscular, and
that she had normal range of motion in her shoulder, no loss of strength, and no
crepitation. Compare id. at 160 with id. at 143. We agree with the district court
that claimant has failed to show that Dr. Millers findings were either
uncontroverted or significantly probative as to require specific discussion.
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See id. Vol. I at 12 (quoting Clifton , 79 F.3d at 1009-10). The ALJ did not err in
failing to discuss Dr. Millers report.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED .
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