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SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF FELINO M. TIMBOL, JR.,

namely, MICHAEL JOHN JORGE
TIMBOL, FELINO JAMES JORGE
TIMBOL, and MARILOU TIMBOL,
Petitioners,

- versus -

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 207408

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
MENDOZA, and
LEONEN, JJ.

Promulgated:
APR 1 8 2016

x------------------------------------------DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review 1 on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated 26 September 2012 and
Resolution3 dated 31 May 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84649. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the 5 January 2005
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 150, in
Civil Case No. 00-946.

The Facts
Civil Case No. 00-946 stems from a Complaint5 for annulment of real
estate mortgage, foreclosure of mortgage, and auction sale; accounting and
1
2

3
4

Rollo, pp. 3-16.

Id. at 18-30. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, with Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and
Stephen C. Cruz concurring.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 34-46. Penned by Judge Reinato G. Quilala.
Records (Vol. I), pp. 1-15.

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunction filed
by Felino M. Timbol, Jr. and his wife Emmanuela R. Laguardia (Spouses
Timbol) against the Philippine National Bank (PNB), Atty. Ricardo M.
Espina, in his capacity as notary public of Makati, and the Register of Deeds
of Makati.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in December 1996, Karrich Holdings Ltd. [KHL],
based in Hong Kong and owned by Felino M. Timbol, Jr. [Timbol]
applied with Philippine National Bank [PNB]s wholly-owned Hong
Kong-based subsidiary, PNB International Finance Limited [PNB-IFL]
for credit facilities. Karrich Auto Exchange [KAE], then named
Superkinis Auto Sales, a sole proprietorship based in the Philippines and
also owned by Timbol, acted as co-borrower. The credit facilities were
granted in the total amount of USD 850,000.00, or PhP 22,796,200.00.
As security, Timbol executed real estate mortgages on his behalf
and on behalf of Emmanuela Laguardia [Laguardia], over nine (9)
different parcels of real estate registered in the name of Mr. and Mrs.
Felino M. Timbol, Jr. Timbol was supposedly made to sign the real estate
mortgage forms and Promissory Note forms in blank, among other
documents, and thereafter returned the same to PNB. Timbol was
allegedly never furnished with copies of the finished forms, a statement
PNB would later categorically deny.
The first Real Estate Mortgage was in consideration of credit
accommodations in the amount of Thirteen Million Fifty Three Thousand
Six Hundred Pesos (Php 13,053,600.00, Philippine currency) and further
read pertinently as follows:
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration of credit
accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee and to
secure the payment of the same x x x the Mortgagors
hereby transfer and convey by way of mortgage unto the
Mortgagee its successors or assigns, the following:
Seven (7) real estate properties covered by TCT Nos.
196111, 196112, 196113, 196114, 196115, 196116 and
196117 with their technical descriptions detailed in the
attached Annex A.
xxx
The consideration for the second Real Estate Mortgage amounted
to Seven Million Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred
Fifty Pesos and 0/100 (PhP 7,598,850.00, Philippine currency). The
mortgage was constituted over a 293-sq.m. parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 177564. The third Real Estate Mortgage secured an obligation
amounting to Two Million One Hundred Forty-Three Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty Pesos and 0/100 (Php 2,143,750.00, Philippine currency)
and covered an 87.5 sq.m. parcel of land under TCT No. 207636.

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

The real estate mortgages were annotated on the aforementioned

transfer certificates of title. On later perusal of the transfer certificates of
title, however, Timbol supposedly discovered that the amounts annotated
as mortgaged added up to One Hundred One Million One Hundred
Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos and 0/100 (PhP
101,117,800.00). Over time, Timbol signed several Promissory Notes,
attesting to availments under the credit line amounting to Eight Hundred
Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Five US Dollars and 7/100
(USD 849,595.07). On April 1, 1998, the credit facilities were reduced to
Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Three Hundred US Dollars and
0/100 (USD 848,300.00), pursuant to the letter sent by PNB-IFL to
KAE/KHL.
When Timbol, KAE, and KHL defaulted on the payment of their
loan obligation, PNB, on behalf of PNB-IFL, sent a demand letter dated
September 2, 1999, advising them that their total outstanding obligation
stood at Thirty-Eight Million, Eighty-Eight Thousand One Hundred
Seventy-Three Pesos and 59/100 (PhP 38,088,173.59), inclusive of
penalties and interests. In a response apparently dated October 19, 1999,
Timbol, signing in representation of KHL, manifested that he was well
aware of the P33 Million outstanding obligation and that he was
awaiting the outcome of a pending application for another loan. Timbol
thus requested for additional time to settle the obligation with PNB-IFL
and for the conversion of the same to Philippine currency.
On November 15, 1999, PNB caused the foreclosure of the
mortgaged properties, claiming that Timbol/KAE/KHL had violated the
terms of the real estate mortgage by defaulting on the payment of the loan
obligation despite demands. As of the date of the foreclosure, the
outstanding obligation already amounted to One Million Twenty-One
Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-Three US Dollars and 40/100 (USD
1,021,743.40) or Forty-Two Million Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Six
Hundred Eleven Pesos and 62/100 (PhP 42,320,611.62). Atty. Ricardo M.
Espina [Espina] notarized the Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale.
PNB was allegedly the highest bidder at the public auction sale
with a bid price of Thirty-Five Million Six Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand
Pesos and 0/100 (PhP 35,669,000.00). Espina issued the corresponding
Certificate of Sale dated December 10, 1999.
On August 4, 2000, Timbol and Laguardia filed suit against PNB,
Espina, and the Register of Deeds of Makati City for annulment of the real
estate mortgage, of the foreclosure and auction sale, for accounting and
damages, and for a temporary restraining order and/or injunction. They
accused PNB of deliberately bloating the amount of the obligation.
They furthermore assailed the foreclosure proceedings as highly irregular,
invalid, and illegal, because the petition for the extra-judicial foreclosure
had not been filed in accordance with Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3; the Notice of Notary Publics Sale did not specify the
newspaper in which the Notice of Sale would be published, and was
neither raffled for this purpose nor properly posted; and the Notary did not
conduct an actual public bidding. They moreover faulted Defendant
Espina for refusing to furnish Timbol with copies of documents relative to

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

the supposed auction sale. Meanwhile, the Makati City Register of Deeds
gave plaintiff Timbol a Certification that no December 11, 1996 Deed of
Mortgage in favor of PNB-IFL covering the transfer certificates of title in
question was located in the records. Nor had any certificate of sale been
registered on the titles. Plaintiffs thus prayed that the mortgage and
Promissory Notes, and the extra-judicial foreclosure, the foreclosure sale,
and any subsequent Certificate of Sale, be declared null and void; that the
mortgage liens annotated on the transfer certificates of title be cancelled;
that PNB be directed to render an accounting of plaintiffs true and actual
obligation; and that damages and attorneys fees be awarded. Plaintiffs
also prayed for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to restrain
PNB from consolidating its title to and ownership over the real properties,
and to restrain the Makati City Registry of Deeds from canceling
plaintiffs titles and issuing new ones in lieu thereof.
During the hearings on his prayer for a temporary restraining order
or writ of preliminary injunction, Timbol affirmed the Affidavit he
executed for that purpose.
By Order dated September 8, 2000, the RTC granted the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. The RTC denied PNBs
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, while granting the plaintiffs Motion to Reduce Bond.
PNB elevated the RTCs Order all the way to the Supreme Court which
would ultimately nullify and set aside the same in its February 11, 2005
Decision in G.R. No. 157535.
Meanwhile, in his Answer, Espina defended the validity of the
foreclosure sale proceedings and explained that it was PNBs Atty.
Geromo who rejected Plaintiff Timbols request for copies of the
mortgage documents and promissory notes. Espina pointed out that the
alleged Special Power of Attorney supposedly authorizing plaintiff
Timbol to represent Laguardia had already been revoked by a July 20,
1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, where a
petition for legal separation was already pending. Espina further accused
Plaintiff Timbol of coming to court with unclean hands, having also
breached his obligations to PNB-IFL. Espina made crossclaims for
indemnification as well as counterclaims for moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
For its part, PNB insisted that the Real Estate Mortgage contracts
had been already in printed form at the time Timbol signed the same,
and that it was not PNB-IFLs practice that these be signed in blank. PNB
also argued that the total amount of Timbol/KAE/KHLs obligation
already included interest at agreed-upon rates and that the foreclosure
proceedings had been proper and valid. Thus PNB asserted that any
damage that might result to plaintiffs were merely damnum absque
injuria. PNB added that the proceedings were governed by Act No. 3135,
not Administrative Order No. 3, as stipulated in the mortgage contracts
themselves. PNB moreover explained that the mortgage over seven (7)
properties covered by TCT Nos. 196111 thru 196117, all of the Register
of Deeds of Makati, altogether secured an obligation of only Thirteen
Million Fifty-Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos and 0/100 (PhP

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

13,053,600.00), with each of the other mortgages over two (2) properties
securing obligations of only Two Million One Hundred Forty-Three
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Pesos and 0/100 (PhP 2,143,750.00) and
Seven Million Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty
Pesos and 0/100 (PhP 7,598,850.00), rendering plaintiffs computation
erroneous. PNB advanced counterclaims for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as litigation expenses and attorneys fees.6

The Ruling of the RTC

On 5 January 2005, the RTC issued its assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foreclosure of mortgage made by the
defendant bank on November 15, 1999 is hereby declared null and void
over the properties covered by TCTs Nos. 196111, 196112, 196113,
196114, 196115, 196116, 196117, 207636 and 177564 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.
SO ORDERED.7

The RTC found that [t]he mortgage loan annotated at the back of the
titles did not reflect the actual amount of the loan obtained by the plaintiffs.
This, the RTC held, vitiated the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage
initiated by the defendant bank.8
The RTC also held that there was an obviously deliberate act of the
defendant bank in refusing to furnish the plaintiff copies of the loan
documents which, the RTC stated strengthens the claim of the [Spouses
Timbol] that they were virtually led by the defendant bank to sign blank loan
documents by merely affixing their signatures thereto.9 Further, the RTC
interpreted PNBs actions as an attempt to hide the correct amount of the
obligation, confirming the Spouses Timbols claim that PNB bloated the
amount of their obligation.10
The RTC further held that PNB failed to show proof that when it
filed the petition for foreclosure with defendant notary public, [it] was duly
empowered by a board resolution, as evidenced by a secretarys certificate
x x x to foreclose the mortgage constituted over the subject properties.11
There was no evidence, the RTC said, that this subsidiary, obviously a
partnership entity, was duly authorized by a resolution that empowered it to

6
7
8
9
10
11

Rollo, pp. 19-22.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id.

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

assign all its rights and interest in the mortgage in favor of defendant
bank.12
Lastly, the RTC found no basis to grant the claim for damages and
attorneys fees.13
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, PNB
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending,
Timbol died14 and was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.15
In its 26 September 2012 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTCs decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
January 5, 2005 Decision of Branch 150 of the Makati City RTC is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, Defendant-Appellants plea for
moral and exemplary damages, together with attorneys fees and costs, is
DENIED. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint.
SO ORDERED.16

The Court of Appeals held that factual issues raised by PNB have
been definitively laid to rest by this Courts decision in PNB v. Timbol17
where it was found that respondents never denied that they defaulted in the
payment of the obligation.18 In the same decision, this Court upheld PNBs
argument that Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3 does not apply,
the extrajudicial foreclosure having been conducted by a notary public to
which mode of foreclosure respondents agreed in the REMs, hence, proper.
As to the allegation that PNB bloated the amount of the obligation, the
same decision found as follows:
x x x the 7 titles collectively secured the amount of P13,053,600.00. Such
claim despite respondent Timbols admission in his October 27, 1999
letter to petitioners counsel that he and his companys outstanding
obligation was P33,000,000.00 is grossly misleading and is a gross
[mis]representation.19

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id.
Id.
CA rollo, pp. 122-124.
Id. at 130-131.
Rollo, p. 28.
491 Phil. 352 (2005).
Id. at 367.
Rollo, p. 26.

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

The Court of Appeals noted that the Courts pronouncements in PNB

v. Timbol settle the question on PNBs attempt to hide something and the
alleged bloating of the amounts in the mortgage documents.20 On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals held that PNB sufficiently demonstrated
plaintiffs-appellees satisfaction with the loan transaction, proving that
Timbol never questioned his obligation and even repeatedly made partial
payments on his principal obligations and the interests accruing thereon.21
The Court of Appeals also found that the Real Estate Mortgage
contracts themselves amply provide for x x x PNBs authority to foreclose
the mortgage as PNB-IFLs agent and attorney-in-fact.22 Moreover, the
Court of Appeals said that Spouses Timbol never disputed the authority of
x x x PNB in instituting foreclosure proceedings. This implicit admission
binds them.23
Finally, as to the claim for moral and exemplary damages, the Court
of Appeals denied the same for lack of basis.24
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in the
assailed Resolution dated 31 May 2013.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners are now before this Court on a petition for review on
certiorari praying for the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals committed the following
errors:
A.
The court a quo erred in not dismissing the appeal outright because PNB
did not even bother filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTC
Decision.
B.
The court a quo erred in applying the Decision of the Honorable [Court] in
G.R. No. 157535 as the issue on that case is on the injunction only.

20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

C.
The court a quo erred in not holding that PNB deliberately did not provide
Felino M. Timbol, Jr. with copies of the loan and mortgage documents.
D.
The court a quo erred in not sustaining the factual findings of the RTC that
PNB deliberately failed to provide Timbol with the documents.
E.
The court a quo erred in not holding that there was an absence of a proper
authority coming from PNB-IFL as to the assignment of its rights and
interest in favor of PNB.25

Petitioners contend that [PNB] should have first filed a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC Decision before interposing its appeal.26
Likewise, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals application of
the ruling in PNB v. Timbol27 is misplaced. They emphasize that the earlier
case dealt only with the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, and not the validity of the mortgage.28
Petitioners also insist that the RTCs findings on PNBs alleged
refusal to furnish the Spouses Timbol with copies of the mortgage
documents and the lack of evidence to show PNB-IFLs authority to assign
its rights and interests to PNB should have been upheld by the Court of
Appeals.29
Respondents Arguments
PNB, in its Comment, counters that the petition for review must be
dismissed for failing to show special and important reasons warranting the
exercise of this Honorable Courts discretionary reviewing power.30 PNB
points out that petitioners are raising factual issues that have already been
exhaustively discussed and resolved by this Court in PNB v. Timbol.31
PNB also argues that the Court of Appeals correctly cited the Courts
decision in PNB v. Timbol.32

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Supra note 17.
Rollo, p. 8.
Id. at 9-11.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

Moreover, PNB argues that the Court of Appeals did not commit
reversible error when it found that the PNB did not bloat the loan
obligations of petitioners and as such, had no reason to refuse petitioners
request that they be furnished copies of the loan documents.33 As further
proof, PNB notes that petitioners, in the proceedings at the RTC, expressly
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the [real estate mortgage]
and the subject Promissory Notes.34
Next, PNB asserts that it did not err in filing a Notice of Appeal
without first filing a motion for reconsideration of the RTCs decision. PNB
argues that [t]here is absolutely nothing in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that requires a party-litigant to first file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse decision before it can file a Notice of Appeal.
PNB claims that the provisions in the Rules of Civil Procedure on motions
for reconsideration are merely directory, and not mandatory.35
As to the alleged absence of a proper authority from PNB-IFL to give
PNB the right to foreclose on the real estate mortgage, PNB agrees with the
Court of Appeals ruling and underscores the terms of the mortgage contract
as the basis for such authority.36 Specifically, PNB points to Paragraph 21,
which states:
21. APPOINTMENT OF AGENT; ASSIGNMENT. - The
Mortgagee hereby appoints the Philippine National Bank (Head Office,
Pasay City) as its attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to exercise
all its rights and obligations under this Agreement, such as but not limited
to foreclosure of the Mortgaged Properties, taking possession and selling
of the mortgaged/foreclosed properties, and execution of covering
documents. x x x.37

Thus, PNB concludes that the petition must be dismissed for failure of
petitioners to present a valid and legitimate question of law x x x that
would warrant the exercise of [the Courts] discretionary power of review.38
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.

33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 72.
Id. at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 75.
Id.

Decision

10

G.R. No. 207408

Non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration

Petitioners assail the Court of Appeals ruling for failing to dismiss
the appeal outright because PNB did not file a motion for reconsideration of
the RTCs decision.
Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules on Civil Procedure states:
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration.Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved
party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and
grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially
affecting the substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which
ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by
reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been
impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for
reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are
excessive, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final
order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. (Emphasis
supplied)

The use of the term may in the provision means that the same is
permissive and not mandatory. As such, a party aggrieved by the trial courts
decision may either move for reconsideration or appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
On the other hand, Rule 41, Section 3 provides as follows:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal, appeal in habeas corpus cases.The
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal
in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)

This means that, within 15 days from notice of judgment, a party may
file either an appeal or a motion for reconsideration.

Decision

11

G.R. No. 207408

Moreover, appeal is a matter of discretion. The Court has the

prerogative under the law to determine whether or not it shall consent to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction in any given case.39 In this case, the Court
of Appeals exercised its prerogative and accepted the appeal.
Petitioners had the chance to question the Court of Appeals exercise
of jurisdiction. However, they lost such opportunity because they failed to
file their Appellees Brief40 without any explanation for such failure, despite
acknowledging that they received a copy of the Appellants Brief,41 and
despite filing their counsels formal entry of appearance,42 and filing a
manifestation informing the court of their fathers death.43 In other words,
petitioners had the opportunity to raise their opposition to PNBs appeal, but
they did not.
Even in their motion for reconsideration44 of the Court of Appeals
decision, the only issues that petitioners raised were on the RTCs findings
on the deliberate failure on the part of the PNB to furnish Timbol with the
loan documents and on the lack of evidence of PNB-IFLs resolution
assigning its rights on the mortgage to PNB.45 It is now too late to delve into
this issue considering petitioners participation in the proceedings.
Application of the Law of the Case Doctrine
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the law of the case doctrine.
In PNB v. Timbol,46 PNB brought a petition for certiorari to set aside
the order of Judge Zeus L. Abrogar that issued a writ of preliminary
injunction in Civil Case No. 00-946. The Court struck down this order,
holding that the order was attended with grave abuse of discretion.47
The Court found that the Spouses Timbol never denied that they
defaulted in the payment of the obligation.48 In fact, they even
acknowledged that they had an outstanding obligation with PNB, and
simply requested for more time to pay.
The Court also held that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage
was proper, since it was done in accordance with the terms of the Real Estate
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Chua Giok Ong v. Court of Appeals, 233 Phil. 110, 116 (1987).
CA rollo, pp. 106, 110.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 157-160.
Id. at 159.
Supra note 17.
Supra note 17, at 369.
Supra note 17, at 367.

Decision

12

G.R. No. 207408

Mortgage, which was also the Courts basis in finding that Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 3 does not apply in that case.49
The Court also found that the Spouses Timbols claim that PNB
bloated the amount of their obligation was grossly misleading and a gross
misinterpretation by the Spouses Timbol. The Court noted the Spouses
Timbols letter to PNB50 that acknowledged they had an outstanding
obligation to PNB, as well as affirmed that they received the demand letter
directing them to pay, contrary to their claim. Thus, the Court in PNB v.
Timbol concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
No doubt, this Court is bound by its earlier pronouncements in PNB v.
Timbol.
The term law of the case has been held to mean that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be
the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of
the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.51
The doctrine applies when (1) a question is passed upon by an
appellate court, and (2) the appellate court remands the case to the lower
court for further proceedings; the lower court and even the appellate courts
on subsequent appeal of the case are, thus, bound by how such question had
been previously settled.52
This must be so for reasons of practicality and the orderly
adjudication of cases. The doctrine of the law of the case is necessary to
enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently,
which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it,
were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal.53 It is founded on the policy of ending litigation.54 The need for
judicial orderliness and economy require such stability in the final
judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.55
49
50
51

52
53

54

55

Supra note 17, at 368-369.

Supra note 17, at 369.
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 522 Phil. 267, 273 (2006), citing
Padillo v. Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 334 (2001). (Emphasis in the original)
Lopez v. Esquivel, Jr., 604 Phil. 437, 456 (2009).
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 51, citing Padillo v.
Court of Appeals, 422 Phil. 334, 351 (2001).
Banco de Oro-EPCI , Inc. v. Tansipek, 611 Phil. 90, 99 (2009), citing People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992,
1000 (1958).
Escobar v. Luna, 547 Phil. 661, 669 (2007), citing Kabankalan Catholic College v. Kabankalan

Decision

13

G.R. No. 207408

The Court is bound by its earlier ruling in PNB v. Timbol finding the
extrajudicial foreclosure to be proper. The Court therein thoroughly and
thoughtfully examined the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure in order to
determine whether the writ of preliminary injunction was proper. To allow a
reexamination of this conclusion will disturb what has already been settled
and only create confusion if the Court now makes a contrary finding.
Thus, [q]uestions necessarily involved in the decision on a former
appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal,
although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court,
as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point
decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are
mentioned in the opinion.56
The Court of Appeals was correct to abide by the Courts ruling in
PNB v. Timbol, for once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on
a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of
the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine
other issues of the case.57
Other Issues
Further, the Court of Appeals itself found ample reason to reverse and
set aside the RTCs decision. These findings, the Court now finds, are
supported by the evidence on record.
The Court cannot sustain the claim that the Spouses Timbol were kept
in the dark by PNB on the real terms of the contract the Spouses Timbol
signed.
It is difficult to imagine that an experienced businessman like Timbol
will sign documents, especially a mortgage contract that potentially involves
multi-million peso liabilities, without knowing its terms and conditions.
Moreover, the records are replete with evidence that the Spouses Timbol had
already partially complied with their obligation under the mortgage contract.
Replying to PNBs demand letter dated 2 September 1999, Felino
Timbol himself acknowledged that he and his wife were well aware of our
total outstanding obligation to PNB, which he pegged at P33 million. The
same letter bears no indication that the Spouses Timbol were impugning the
56
57

Catholic College Union-PACIWU-TUCP, 500 Phil. 254, 266 (2005).

Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc. v. Tansipek, supra note 54.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Guaria Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 160758, 15 January 2014, 713 SCRA 292, citing Bachrach Motor Co.v. Esteva, 67 Phil. 16
(1938).

Decision

14

G.R. No. 207408

terms of their agreement. On the contrary, they acknowledged their

obligation and merely pleaded for more time to comply.58 They further
amplified their assent in another undated letter where they informed PNB
that they can deliver a partial payment of at least 10% of [their] total
obligation.59 Likewise, in a letter dated 2 October 2000, Felino Timbol
acknowledged the amount of his obligation based on the Statement of
Account prepared by PNB-IFL, and even laid down his proposal on how
the Spouses Timbol would settle the same.60
As to the claim that there is no proper authority from PNB-IFL
assigning its rights and interest in the mortgage contract to PNB, the Court
finds that the same is easily controverted by the Real Estate Mortgage itself.
Paragraph 21 of the Real Estate Mortgage states:
21. APPOINTMENT OF AGENT; ASSIGNMENT. The Mortgagee
hereby appoints the Philippine National Bank (Head Office, Pasay
City) as its attorney-in-fact with full power and authority to exercise
all its rights and obligations under this Agreement, such as but not
limited to foreclosure of the Mortgaged Properties, taking possession
and selling of the mortgaged/foreclosed properties, and execution of
covering documents. The Mortgagee may also assign its rights and interest
under this Agreement even without need of prior notice to, or consent of,
the Mortgagors.61 (Emphasis supplied)

The terms of the contract are clear and should end any further
discussion on this issue.
In addition, petitioners never raised the authority of PNB to foreclose
the mortgage on behalf of PNB-IFL in their Complaint62 before the trial
court or in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals.
It is now too late for petitioners to raise these issues before the Court.
It is noteworthy that all these could have been ventilated in the proceedings
before the Court of Appeals had petitioners not neglected to file their
Appellees Brief.
Thus, the foregoing discussion puts to rest the issues raised by
petitioners. Consequently, the real estate mortgage, the subsequent
foreclosure and auction sale are held to be valid. No irregularity attended the
execution of the mortgage contract, the foreclosure, and the auction sale, the
same being within the terms agreed upon by petitioners predecessor-ininterest and PNB.
58
59
60
61
62

Records (Vol. II), p. 883.

Id. at 960.
Id. at 965-966.
Id. at 840.
Records (Vol. I), pp. 1-15.

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated 26 September 2012 and Resolution dated 31 May 2013 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 84649 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

oz=-~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

a
Associate Justice

,;If

~v
ARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

NDOZA

Decision

G.R. No. 207408

16

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice