Terrell DG, Battle of Mantinea (Scribd)
Terrell DG, Battle of Mantinea (Scribd)
Terrell DG, Battle of Mantinea (Scribd)
David G. Terrell
03 June 2009
The Battle of Mantinea in 418 BC, described by Thucydides, is notable because it reestablished
the military primacy of Sparta and showed a variation in the set form battles that characterized hoplite
In October 422 BC, two able generals, Cleon the Athenian and Brasidas the Spartan were killed at
Amphipolis, after which the Spartans and Athenians negotiated a 50-year peace treaty, the Peace of
Nicias. Spartan allies Corinth, Megara and Elis rejected the treaty and seceded from the Peloponnesian
Sparta and Athens thus ended hostilities and became nominal allies but, during the peace, Athens
began to discern the Spartans’ most fundamental weakness; the threat posed by Helot rebellion. Some
Athenian leaders began to consider the benefits accruing from surrounding Sparta with a buffer of
democratic poleis, perhaps putting Sparta at a disadvantage. During the same period, Beotia, Corinth, and
In the summer of 420, a young, influential Athenian named Alcibiades successfully facilitated the
creation of an anti-Spartan, pro-democratic coalition that included Athens and several Peloponnesian
poleis bordering Sparta (Argos, Mantinea and Elis) spread in an arc to the north and east of the Spartan
homeland and straddling the isthmus connecting the Peloponnese to Attica and northern Greece. The
alliance essentially surrounded Sparta by land, threatening them through the ability to cut them off from
1
F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 88.
2
Victor Davis Hanson, A war like no other: how the Athenians and Spartans fought the Peloponnesian War, (New
York: Random House, 2006), 33.
Thucycides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, Translated by Richard Crawley and Donald Lateiner, (New
York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006), 5:25, 48.
3
Thucycides, 5:23.
Hanson, 33, 152.
2
David G. Terrell
Attica and by promoting other Spartan satellites, especially Thebes and Corinth—who were not happy
A cold war continued between 420 and 418 and the Spartans succeeded in bringing Megara and
Corinth back into their sphere and intimidating Elis into silence. The war almost turned hot when a
Spartan force cornered a combined opposing force and, imposing terms, forced them to return to Argos
without a fight. However, immediately upon returning to Argos, the city-states repudiated the terms and
renewed the threat to Sparta. The significance of the threat stemmed from the involvement of Argos, Elis
and Mantinea in the coalition. They were the most powerful states in the Peloponnese—outside of
Spartan high command rebuked the commander who released the force and, in response to the
renewed threat, sent King Agis, in the early summer of 418 BC, to Mantinea with a sizeable force to
relieve the threat, to protect a Spartan outpost at Tegea, and reopen land communications with Attica.6
There were several abortive attempts by the Spartans to engage the coalition forces and, finally, in
August—the hottest, most humid time of the year—the Spartan forces, emerging from a forest after being
observed by coalition scouts, came unexpectedly upon a prepared coalition battle front.7
The Mantinean Plain is perfect terrain for hoplite warfare—fields surrounded by mountainous
terrain. Tactically, it was open, spacious, level, and accessible. Logistically, it had ready fertile land that
provided food and ample supplies of good water. Strategically, it was a chokepoint along the route of
4
Hanson 33, 152.
Thucycides, 5:43-4, 49.
5
Hanson, 152.
6
Alfred S. Bradford, With Arrow, Sword, and Spear, (New York: Fall River Press, 2001), 87.
7
Hanson, 152.
Thucycides, 5:57.
Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 235.
3
David G. Terrell
travel between Sparta and Attica and the nearby mountainous terrain provided a ready refuge to which a
Spartan infantry forces: The Spartan battle line (Table 1) was hastily improvised after being
surprised by coalition forces. On the Spartan left, the Sciritae were placed. They were a mountain people
granted limited citizenship rights by the Spartans who usually acted as scouts. Also on the left were the
Brasidians, nationalized Helot troops loyal to the late general killed at Amphipolis and another class of
nationalized troops, neodamodians. In the center were the main Spartan units and some Arcadian allies.
The Spartan right was granted to local Tegeans troops and a division of Spartans.9
Coalition Infantry Forces: The coalition forces had already prepared their line of battle (Table
1). On the coalition right, opposite the Sciritae, were at least 2,000 skilled Mantinean troops, fighting for
their immediate homeland, plus about 1000 picked men and some mixed units. This wing was meant to
fight the decisive, offensive part of the battle. The rest of the Peloponnesians and smaller contingents
were placed in the middle. The Athenians manned the left of the coalition line, intending to hold firm.
The troops of the coalition center, facing an almost equal number of Spartiates, were screwed. Their only
hope was to hold until the superior numbers of Mantineans could push through on the coalition right and
8
Hanson, 153-4.
9
Hanson, 155-6.
Thucycides, 5:67
Kagan, 235.
Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to Crisis and
Collapse, (Woodstock, New York: Overlook Press, 2002), 188.
10
Hanson, 155-6.
Thucycides, 5:67.
Kagan, 235.
Cartledge, 188.
4
David G. Terrell
Athenians – 1000 men Peloponnesian units – over 4000 men Mantineans – 2000 men
300 Athenian horse Cleonaeans & Orneate – 500 men Mixed Arcadians – 500 men
300 other horse Peloponnesian elite – 1000 men
<(left) Athenian Forces (right)>
As the two lines approached each other (Figure 1), their right wings shifted to the right, as men
worked to shield their unprotected sides with their neighbor’s shield. As the forces took their alignment
Figure 1.
The tendency for forces to drift caused the flank of the Mantineans, on the coalition right, to
extend beyond the left of the Spartan line of battle by time of contact (Figure 2). The Spartans were also
extended beyond the Athenians on their right. King Agis, observing the shift, worried that the coalition
might be able to turn his left flank. Just before contact, he attempted to correct the problem by first
11
Bradford, 88.
5
David G. Terrell
ordering the Sciritae to shift left; forming a gap in his line, but refusing the flanking maneuver. He then
ordered two Spartan units on his far right to break off and redeploy to the left, into the gap. The
commanders of the units refused this unprecedented attempt at tactical redeployment, saying they were
already on the march. They were later convicted of cowardice and exiled. The two lines met with the gap
intact. 12
Figure 2.
The right wings of both sides pushed through their respective opponents. (Figure 3) The Spartan
right pushed the Athenians back and into the rough ground. The Spartan center shattered the units of the
coalition center, pushing a gap in the line. The Mantineans pushed the Sciritae and free Helots back and
acted as if they had won the war, pursing them relentlessly. Had they stopped at this point, while the
Sciritae were fleeing, and turned on the Spartan center, the result of the battle may have been different.
As each right wing succeeded, the advantage would go to the side that could pivot and take
advantage soonest. The Spartan discipline told. The Spartans on their right, facing the fleeing Athenians
12
Bradford, 88.
Kagan, 236-7.
6
David G. Terrell
and Peloponnesian forces, allowed them to depart the scene, though the Athenian cavalry may have
contributed by screening the Athenian withdrawal. In addition to the pressing tactical need to turn the
coalition flank, the lack of pursuit may be due to two political considerations. The Athenians were,
technically, still at peace with Sparta and the other fleeing forces were from poleis Sparta was once, and
Figure 3.
Regardless, the Spartans turned upon the coalition flanks. (Figure 4) Advancing on the
Mantineans, the Spartans destroyed them as a fighting force, rather than letting them flee. This
determined targeting probably arose from their democratic activism in the region. It worked, as Mantinea
13
Hanson, 156-7, 159, 228.
Kagan, 238.
Bradford, 88.
14
Hanson, 160.
7
David G. Terrell
Figure 4
Spartan losses were about 300 men and the coalition force losses were about 1,100 men. After the
battle, Sparta and Argos concluded a 50-year peace treaty. By November, Argos and Mantinea return to
Not long, after the battle, 3,000 coalition troops from Elis and another 1,000 from Athens arrived.
Had they been present to stiffen the coalition center, a different outcome may have occurred.16
There are several notable aspects to this battle, perhaps due to the hasty preparations after the
coalition forces achieved tactical surprise on the Spartans. This was the first time the Spartiates had
fought in a major action in mixed regiments alongside allied hoplites. This is the first mention, in the
literature, of the Sciritae, coming from a northern Laconian province. Cartledge conjectures that their
recruitment might indicate Sparta was becoming worried about their mountainous frontiers. This battle
also saw the first use of ex-Helot hoplites in regular line of battle.17
15
Hanson, 33, 152.
Bradford, 88.
16
Kagan, 241.
17
Cartledge, 195.
8
David G. Terrell
The Spartan victory restored their confidence and erased some bad luck. A coalition win would
have most certainly increased the resolve of Argos, Elis and Mantinea to continue down a democratically-
oriented path and may have encouraged an overall revolt by the Helots.18
By March of 417 BC, the Spartans had shattered the coalition and adverted catastrophe. However,
Athens’ power was unaffected and Alcibiades, though somewhat tarnished in reputation, continued to
David G. Terrell
Herndon, VA
18
Kagan, 241.
Thucycides, 5:75.
19
Kagan, 243.
9
David G. Terrell
Works Cited
Adcock, F.E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957.
Bradford, Alfred S. With Arrow, Sword, and Spear. New York: Fall River Press, 2001.
Cartledge, Paul. The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to
Crisis and Collapse. Woodstock, New York: Overlook Press, 2002.
Hanson, Victor Davis. A war like no other: how the Athenians and Spartans fought the Peloponnesian
War. New York: Random House, 2006.
Kagan, Donald. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.
Martin, Thomas R. Ancient Greece: From Prehistoric to Hellenistic Times. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996.
Thucycides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley and Donald Lateiner.
New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2006.
© David G. Terrell, 2009-2010, except where otherwise noted, content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. For permission to reprint under terms outside the license, contact
davidterrell80@hotmail.com.