Article 8 RPC
Article 8 RPC
Article 8 RPC
]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
MICHAEL U. PAGALASAN alias "Mike," RONNIE
CABALO alias "Romy", ALADIN CABALO,
FERDINAND CORTEZ, a JOHN DOE identified
only as FERNANDO, and a PETER DOE
identified only as "Bong," accused, MICHAEL
U. PAGALASAN alias "Mike,"appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant was convicted of two counts of kidnapping for ransom
He was sentenced to double death and hence, this automatic
review.
Appellant and his co-accused wrongfully entered the house of the
Lims and dragged George and his son Christopher out of their
bedroom into the victim's car. They drove out of the house and
cruised along the highway. Later, the police were able to rescue
George, while Christopher remained in the company of the other
kidnappers. Christopher was rescued several days after. The
Court ruled that appellant, in conspiracy with his cohorts, was
guilty of kidnapping Christopher and slight illegal detention of
George. The death penalty imposed for the crime of kidnapping,
however, was not proper as the motive of extortion of ransom
was not established. The death penalty was reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
SYLLABUS
the trial court with their testimonies. It is true that the appellate
court is not bound by the findings and conclusions of the trial
court if the latter ignored, misunderstood, misapplied or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances, which, if
considered, would change the outcome of the case. This ruling,
however, is inapplicable in the case at bar, since the appellant
failed to establish that the trial court erred in this wise.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IMPAIRED BY INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN
AFFIDAVIT AND TESTIMONY IN COURT. The seeming
inconsistency between the two statements (in affidavit and in
testimony) of the kidnap victim does not discredit his testimony
nor his credibility for the following reasons: (a) it is of judicial
knowledge that affidavits being taken ex parte are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the
testimony of a witness in open court; (b) the credibility of
George's testimony cannot be impeached by the inconsistent
statements contained in his sworn statement because the said
statement was not admitted in evidence; and Section 34, Rule
132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that the Court shall
not consider evidence which has not been formally offered;
besides, George was not confronted with his sworn statement and
accorded an opportunity to explain the inconsistency; (c) the
inconsistency refers to trivial, minor and collateral matters and
not to the substance of his testimony. Such minor inconsistency
even enhances its veracity as the variances erase any suspicion
of a rehearsed testimony. A truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of
time and the treachery of human memory.
occasion and from the same situs, the appellant is guilty of two
separate crimes: kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, and slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code. The appellant and his co-conspirators were
animated by two sets of separate criminal intents and criminal
resolutions in kidnapping and illegally detaining the two victims.
The criminal intent in kidnapping Christopher was separate from
and independent of the criminal intent and resolution in
kidnapping and detaining George for less than three days. In the
mind and conscience of the appellant, he had committed two
separate felonies; hence, should be meted two separate penalties
for the said crimes: one for kidnapping under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code and another for slight illegal detention under
Article 268 of the same code. The felony of slight illegal detention
is necessarily included in the crime of kidnapping for ransom;
thus, the appellant may be convicted of the former crime under
an Information for kidnapping for ransom.
12. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; NOT APPRECIATED IN
DETERMINING PROPER PENALTIES WHEN NOT ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION. The crimes committed by the appellant were
aggravated by dwelling, the victims having been kidnapped in
their house; by the use of motor vehicle, the victims having been
transported by the appellant from their house with the use of
George's car; and by a band, the crime having been committed
by the appellant and three co-conspirators. However, the Court
cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in determining
the proper penalties for the said crimes because the same were
not alleged in the Information as mandated by Sections 8 and 9,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the
said rules took effect after the commission of the crimes by the
appellant, the same is favorable to the appellant; hence, should
be applied retroactively.
13. ID.; KIDNAPPING; PROPER PENALTY. The prescribed penalty
for kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 isreclusion perpetua to death.
There being no aggravating circumstance or modifying
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the proper penalty
4
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
This is an automatic review of the Decisions 1 of the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Branch 35, convicting appellant
Michael U. Pagalasan of two counts of kidnapping for ransom of
George Lim and his 10-year-old son Christopher Neal Lim and
sentencing him to double death.
The Antecedents
The Spouses George and Desiree Lim and their three young
children, one of whom was 10-year-old Christopher Neal Lim,
resided at Villa Consuelo Subdivision, General Santos City. The
spouses hired a security guard, Ferdinand Cortez, from the Valiant
Security Agency to provide security services to the family. On
September 4, 1994, at 11:00 p.m., the spouses and their children
were in the master's bedroom watching television. The couple's
housemaid, Julita Sarno, was in the kitchen. She heard knocks on
the kitchen door. Thinking that it was Ferdinand, she opened the
door. Four men, about 5'5" to 5'6" tall, each armed with
handguns, two of whom were holding hand grenades, barged into
the kitchen. The four intruders wore bonnets over their faces.
With them was Ferdinand, whose hands were tied behind his
back. When asked by the masked men where her employers
were, Julita responded that they were in their bedroom. On orders
of the intruders, she knocked on the bedroom door. When
George's daughter opened the door, three of the masked men
barged into the room, while the fourth masked man remained in
the sala of the house. 2 The three masked men shouted to
George and Desiree: "Walang mangyayari sa inyo basta ibigay
ninyo ang kailangan namin." (Nothing will happen to you provided
you give us what we want.) 3 They ransacked the house, getting
cash and valuables. The masked men gave Desiree a handwritten
note, 4 and dragged George and Christopher Neal Lim out of the
bedroom through the sala to the garage, where George's Nissan
car was parked for the night. George saw Ferdinand in the sala
with his hands tied behind his back. One of the masked men
ordered George to hand over the key to his vehicle, to board the
car and occupy the back seat along with Christopher. Father and
5
son did as they were told. Two of the masked men positioned
themselves on either side of George and Christopher. The third
man drove the car, while the fourth sat on the passenger's seat
beside the driver. The car cruised along the national highway.
When the car was nearing the Gambalan Kitchenette, George and
Christopher were blindfolded. The masked men told them that
they would be brought to Polomolok. After about fifteen minutes,
the car stopped at Sitio Tupi. The two men who were seated at
the back and the masked man seated beside the driver alighted
from the car, bringing Christopher with them. George was
transferred to the front seat beside the driver. George was told
that he would be transported to Maasim.
The trial court ruled in Criminal Case No. 11098 that with or
without the confession of Michael, the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that he, in conspiracy with three others,
kidnapped George and Christopher. It found the testimony of
George straightforward and positive, credible and entitled to full
probative weight. The trial court sentenced Michael to double
death on its finding that he and his cohorts kidnapped George
and Christopher for the purpose of extorting ransom. It
disbelieved Michael's confession implicating Ferdinand Cortez,
and acquitted the latter for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court likewise acquitted
Michael in Criminal Case No. 11062.
Michael, now the appellant, asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF CHRISTOPHER NEAL
LIM DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM OF ONE GEORGE LIM
WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF GEORGE LIM. 34
The appellant is guilty of kidnapping Christopher under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the first assignment of error, the appellant avers that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond cavil of doubt for the
10
the three arresting officers. Besides, case law has it that the
testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient
to sustain a judgment of conviction. 67 The law does not require
the testimonies of at least two witnesses for the conviction of an
accused for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
prosecution has the discretion to decide on who to call as witness
during the trial, and its failure to present a particular witness does
not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if withheld, where the evidence is
at the disposal of the appellant and is merely cumulative or
corroborative. 68 In this case, the testimony of George is, by
itself, independently of Christopher's testimony, sufficient proof of
the guilt of the appellant. George had personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances of the kidnapping, as he himself had
been kidnapped along with his young son. His failure to testify on
where Christopher was detained after the three cohorts of the
appellant had alighted from the car with Christopher, and the
circumstances surrounding the rescue do not weaken the case of
the prosecution, as the said facts and circumstances had occurred
after the crime of kidnapping had already been a fait accompli.
itself does not give rise to the presumption that the appellant and
his co-conspirators' purpose is to extort ransom from the victims
or any other person.
The only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the
element of extorting ransom are the three handwritten letters:
the first was received by Desiree on September 4, 1994, while the
second and third letters were received by George on September 6
and 9, 1994, respectively.
The handwritten letter received by Desiree on September 4,
1994, "first letter" for brevity, reads:
Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,
Una wag na wag kayong gumawa ng hakbang na
hindi namin alam o gusto, lalong-lalo na sa
pakikipag-usap sa militar o magkoordinate sa
militar ay hindi namin gustong mangyari ang
ganon mga sistem. Ang pangalawa, wag na wag
kayong tumanggap ng negotiator na walang
palatandaan na galing sa amin, pakiusap lang yon
na dapat ninyong sundin, madidisgrasya ang
aming dala kung kayo'y magkakamali ng hakbang.
Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.
Note . . .
Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito
MR. MUBARAK II or 2
Sulat man o telephone 73
The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, "second
letter" for brevity, reads:
Ronie Puntuan
Michael Pagalasan
Mr. G. Lim palayain ninyo ang suspek ninyo. Wala
silang kasalanan bago natin tapusin ang usapan
14
Even if it is assumed for the nonce that the second letter came
from a co-conspirator, the same is not binding on the appellant,
absent evidence aliunde that he knew of and concurred with the
said ransom demand. It bears stressing that when George
received the second letter on September 6, 1994, the appellant
had already been arrested and detained. The conspiracy forged
by the appellant and his cohorts on or before September 4, 1994
had already ceased, when on the said date, the appellant was
arrested by the policemen and detained. 77
Neither is the third letter admissible in evidence against the
appellant to prove that he conspired with others to demand the
release of Ronie Puntuan in consideration for Christopher's
freedom. The appellant and his cohorts could not have planned to
demand ransom for the release of Ronie Puntuan as early as
September 4, 1994, the date of the kidnapping: Ronie had not yet
been arrested on this date. The appellant was arrested first, and
Ronie's detention was only to follow. Furthermore, thethird
letter was sent to George on September 9, 1994. At that point,
the appellant had already been arrested by the policemen, and
was already in jail. There is no evidence that while in jail, the
appellant had knowledge of and concurred with the said ransom
demand. It may be reasonably inferred that the appellant's coconspirators could have decided to demand Ronie Puntuan's
release as a consideration for Christopher's liberty, while the
appellant was already languishing in jail. The said demand for
ransom was a new and independent project of the appellant's coconspirators, growing out of their own malice, without any a
priori knowledge on the part of the appellant or his post
facto concurrence therewith. Indeed, the records show that on
September 9, 1994, the very day the co-conspirators sent
the third letter to George, Ronie Puntuan through counsel Atty.
Jose Jerry L. Fulgar, also the counsel for the appellant, filed a
motion with the MTC, praying that he be detained at the General
Santos City Jail:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed that an order be please issued
directing that accused Ronie Puntuan be please
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Pagalasan, G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991, [June 18,
2003], 452 PHIL 341-380)
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO";
JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN
PAHAK";
ARIEL
BALANSAG;
DAVIDSON
VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG";
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
For most of the Cebuanos, the proceedings in these cases will
always be remembered as the "trial of the century." A reading of
the voluminous records readily explains why the unraveling of the
facts during the hearing before the court below proved transfixing
and horrifying and why it resulted in unusual media coverage.
These cases involve the kidnapping and illegal detention of a
college beauty queen along with her comely and courageous
sister. An intriguing tale of ribaldry and gang-rape was followed
by the murder of the beauty queen. She was thrown off a cliff into
a deep forested ravine where she was left to die. Her sister was
subjected to heartless indignities before she was also gang-raped.
In the aftermath of the kidnapping and rape, the sister was made
to disappear. Where she is and what further crimes were inflicted
upon her remain unknown and unsolved up to the present.
Before us in an appeal from the Decision 1 dated May 5, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases
Nos. CBU 45303-45304, finding Rowen Adlawan alias "Wesley,"
Josman Aznar, Ariel Balansag, Alberto Cao alias "Allan Pahak,"
Francisco Juan Larraaga alias "Paco," James Andrew Uy alias
"MM," and James Anthony Uy alias "Wang Wang," appellants
herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentencing each of
them to suffer the penalties of "two (2) reclusiones perpetua" and
to indemnify the heirs of the victims, sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline Chiong, jointly and severally, the amount of
P200,000.00 as actual damages and P5,000,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.
The Fourth Amended Informations 2 for kidnapping and illegal
detention dated May 12, 1998 filed against appellants and
Davidson Rusia alias "Tisoy Tagalog," the discharged state
witness, read as follows:
1) For Criminal Case No. CBU-45303: 3
"xxx xxx xxx
19
hence, the trial court entered for him the plea of "not
guilty." 6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
In the main, the prosecution evidence centered on the testimony
of Rusia. 7 Twenty-one witnesses 8 corroborated his testimony on
major points. For the defense, appellants James Anthony Uy and
Alberto Cao took the witness stand. Appellant Francisco Juan
Larraaga was supposed to testify on his defense of alibi but the
prosecution and the defense, through a stipulation approved by
the trial court, dispensed with his testimony. Nineteen witnesses
testified for the appellants, corroborating their respective
defenses of alibi.
The version of the prosecution is narrated as follows:
On the night of July 16, 1997, sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline
Chiong, who lived in Cebu City, failed to come home on the
expected time. It was raining hard and Mrs. Thelma Chiong
thought her daughters were simply having difficulty getting a
ride. Thus, she instructed her sons, Bruce and Dennis, to fetch
their sisters. They returned home without Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Mrs. Chiong was not able to sleep that night. Immediately, at 5:00
o'clock in the morning, her entire family started the search for her
daughters, but there was no trace of them. Thus, the family
sought the assistance of the police who continued the search. But
still, they could not find Marijoy and Jacqueline. 9
Meanwhile, in the morning of July 18, 1997, a certain Rudy Lasaga
reported to the police that a young woman was found dead at the
foot of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar, Cebu. 10 Officer-in-Charge
Arturo Unabia and three other policemen proceeded to Tan-awan
and there, they found a dead woman lying on the ground.
Attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. 11 Her pants were torn,
her orange t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was
pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking
tape. 12
On July 19, 1996, upon hearing the news about the dead woman,
Mrs. Chiong's son Dennis and other relatives proceeded to the
Tupaz Funeral Parlor at Carcar, Cebu to see the body. It was
20
Marijoy dressed in the same orange shirt and maong pants she
wore when she left home on July 16, 1997. Upon learning of the
tragic reality, Mrs. Chiong became frantic and hysterical. She
could not accept that her daughter would meet such a gruesome
fate. 13
On May 8, 1998, or after almost ten months, the mystery that
engulfed the disappearance of Marijoy and Jacqueline was
resolved. Rusia, bothered by his conscience and recurrent
nightmares, 14 admitted before the police having participated in
the abduction of the sisters. 15 He agreed to re-enact the
commission of the crimes. 16
On August 12, 1998, Rusia testified before the trial court how the
crimes were committed and identified all the appellants as the
perpetrators. He declared that his conduit to Francisco Juan
Larraaga was Rowen Adlawan whom he met together with
brothers James Anthony and James Andrew Uy five months before
the commission of the crimes charged. 17 He has known Josman
Aznar since 1991. He met Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag only in
the evening of July 16, 1997. IDCHTE
On July 15, 1997, while Rusia was loafing around at the Cebu
Plaza Hotel, Cebu City, Rowen approached him and arranged that
they meet the following day at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. 18 When they saw each other the next day, Rowen
told him to stay put at the Ayala Mall because they would have a
"big happening" in the evening. All the while, he thought that
Rowen's "big happening" meant group partying or scrounging. He
thus lingered at the Ayala Mall until the appointed time came.19
At 10:30 in the evening, Rowen returned with Josman. They met
Rusia at the back exit of the Ayala Mall and told him to ride with
them in a white car. Rusia noticed that a red car was following
them. Upon reaching Archbishop Reyes Avenue, same city, he
saw two women standing at the waiting shed. 20 Rusia did not
know yet that their names were Marijoy and Jacqueline.
Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed and he
and Rowen approached and invited Marijoy and Jacqueline to join
they were with him at the R & R Bar on the night of July 16, 1997.
The celebration was a "despedida" for him as he was leaving the
next day for Cebu and a "bienvenida" for another friend.
Larraaga's classmate Carmina Esguerra 51 testified that he was
in school on July 16, 1997 taking his mid-term examinations. His
teacher Rowena Bautista, 52 on the other hand, testified that he
attended her lecture in Applied Mathematics. Also, some of his
neighbors at the Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City,
including the security guard, Salvador Boton, testified that he was
in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997. Representatives
of the four airline companies plying the route of Manila-CebuManila presented proofs showing that the name Francisco Juan
Larraaga does not appear in the list of preflight and post-flight
manifests from July 15, 1997 to about noontime of July 17, 1997.
Meanwhile, James Anthony Uy testified that on July 16, 1997, he
and his brother James Andrew were at home in Cebu City because
it was their father's 50th birthday and they were celebrating the
occasion with a small party which ended at 11:30 in the
evening. 53 He only left his house the next day, July 17, 1997 at
about 7:00 o'clock in the morning to go to school. 54 The boys'
mother, Marlyn Uy, corroborated his testimony and declared that
when she woke up at 2:00 o'clock in the morning to check on her
sons, she found them sleeping in their bedrooms. They went to
school the next day at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. 55
Clotilde Soterol testified for Alberto and Ariel. She narrated that
on July 16, 1997, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Alberto
brought the white Toyota van with Plate No. GGC-491 to her shop
to have its aircon repaired. Alberto was accompanied by his wife
Gina Cao, co-appellant Ariel, and spouses Catalina and Simplicio
Paghinayan, owners of the vehicle. Since her (Clotildes') husband
was not yet around, Alberto just left the vehicle and promised to
return the next morning. Her husband arrived at 8:30 in the
evening and started to repair the aircon at 9:00 o'clock of the
same evening. He finished the work at 10:00 o'clock the following
morning. At 11:00 o'clock, Alberto and his wife Gina, Ariel and
Catalina
returned
to
the
shop
to
retrieve
the
Catalina 59 corroborated
In the Order dated August 25, 1998, the trial court denied the
motion for inhibition of the defense lawyers and ordered them to
continue representing their respective clients so that the cases
may undergo the mandatory continuous trial. The trial court
likewise denied their motion to withdraw as appellants' counsel
because of their failure to secure a prior written consent from
their clients. On August 26, 1998, appellants filed their written
consent to the withdrawal of their counsel. ASHICc
Thereafter, Larraaga, Josman and brothers James Anthony and
James Andrew moved for the postponement of the hearing for
several weeks to enable them to hire the services of new
counsel. 68 On August 31, 1998, the trial court denied appellants'
motions on the ground that it could no longer delay the hearing of
the cases. On September 2, 1998, the trial court directed the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to act as counsel de oficio for all the
appellants. 69
27
more
aptly
and
specifically
to
a
person
under
investigation 75 rather than an accused in a criminal
prosecution. 76 And even if we are to extend the application of
the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an
accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion is
not absolute as would enable him to choose a particular counsel
to the exclusion of others equally capable. We stated the reason
for this ruling in an earlier case:
"Withal, the word 'preferably' under Section 12 (1),
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey
the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial
investigation, will be solely in the hands of the
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a
lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest. This absurd
scenario could not have been contemplated by the
framers of the charter." 77
In the same breath, the choice of counsel by the accused in a
criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If the chosen counsel
deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded
from appointing a de oficio counsel whom it considers competent
and independent to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel
of choice enters his appearance. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal
prosecution will be entirely dictated by the accused to the
detriment of the eventual resolution of the case. 78
Neither is there a violation of appellants' right to counsel just
because the trial court did not grant their request for suspension
of the hearing pending their search for new counsel. An
application for a continuance in order to secure the services of
counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court, and
the denial thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the
accused's right to counsel. 79 The right of the accused to select
28
shall
be
Still, in its Order dated October 8, 1998, the trial court gave
appellants' new counsel de parte a period until October 12, 1998
to manifest whether they are refusing to cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses concerned; if so, then the court shall
consider them to have waived their right to cross-examine those
witnesses. During the hearing on October 12, 1998, Larraaga's
new counsel de parte, Atty. Villarmia, manifested that he would
not cross-examine the prosecution witnesses who testified on
direct examination when Larraaga was assisted by counsel de
oficio only. The next day, the counsel de parte of Josman, and
brothers James Anthony and James Andrew adopted Atty.
Villarmia's manifestation. Counsel for Rowen, Alberto and Ariel
likewise refused to cross-examine the same witnesses. Thus, in its
Order dated October 14, 1998, the trial court deemed appellants
to have waived their right to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses.
It appears, therefore, that if some of the prosecution witnesses
were not subjected to cross-examination, it was not because
appellants were not given the opportunity to do so. The fact
remains that their new counsel de parte refused to cross-examine
them. Thus, appellants waived their right "to confront and cross
examine the witnesses" against them.
C. Right to Impartial Trial
Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he
asked questions and made comments when the defense
witnesses were testifying.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may
properly intervene during trial to promote expeditious proceeding,
prevent unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or
clear up obscurities. The test is whether the intervention of the
judge tends to prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the
ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he interposes his
questions or comments.
Soterol,
COURT:
That was her purpose. It is proper." 96
Appellants consider as violation of their right to due process Judge
Ocampo's remarks labeling Rebecca Seno's and Catalina
Paghinayan's testimony as "incredible;" 97Clotilde Soterol as a
"totally confused person who appears to be mentally
imbalanced;" 98 and Salvador Boton and Paulo Celso as
"liars." 99
Suffice it to state that after going over the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes, we are convinced that Judge Ocampo's
comments were just honest observations intended to warn the
witnesses to be candid to the court. He made it clear that he
merely wanted to ascertain the veracity of their testimonies in
order
to
determine
the
truth
of
the
matter
in
controversy. 100 That such was his purpose is evident from his
probing questions which gave them the chance to correct or
clarify their contradictory statements. Even appellants'
counsel de parte acknowledged that Judge Ocampo's statements
were mere "honest observations." 101 If Judge Ocampo uttered
harsh words against those defense witnesses, it was because
they made a mockery of the court's proceedings by their
deliberate lies. The frequency with which they changed their
answers to Judge Ocampo's clarificatory questions was indeed a
challenge to his patience.
A trial judge is not a wallflower during trial. It is proper for him to
caution and admonish witnesses when necessary and he may
rebuke a witness for levity or for other improper
conduct. 102 This is because he is called upon to ascertain the
truth of the controversy before him. 103
It bears stressing at this point that the perceived harshness and
impatience exhibited by Judge Ocampo did not at all prevent the
defense from presenting adequately its side of the cases. IcHAaS
D. Right to Produce Evidence
In the same way, we cannot fault the trial court for not allowing
the defense to continue with the tedious process of presenting
additional witnesses to prove Larraaga's enrollment at the
Center for Culinary Arts, located at Quezon City, from June 18,
1997 to July 30, 1997 considering that it would not also prove that
he was not in Cebu on July 16 to 17, 1997. It is a known practice
of students who are temporarily residing in Metro Manila to return
to their provinces once in a while to spend time with their
families. To prove that Larraaga was enrolled during a certain
period of time does not negate the possibility that he went home
to Cebu City sometime in July 1997 and stayed there for a while.
Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an
incompetent witness. 105 It is not error to refuse evidence which
although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the
purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it. 106
To repeat, due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides
of the controversy. 107 In the present case, there is no showing
of violation of due process which justifies the reversal or setting
aside of the trial court's findings.
33
joined the group upon Rowen's promise that there would be a "big
happening" on the night of July 16, 1997. All along, he thought
the "big happening" was just another "group partying or
scrounging." In other words, he had no inkling then of appellants'
plan to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. Rusia retained his
passive stance as Rowen and Josman grabbed Marijoy and
Jacqueline at the waiting shed of Ayala Center. He just remained
seated beside the driver's seat, not aiding Rowen and Josman in
abducting the Chiong sisters. When Jacqueline attempted to
escape 14 meters away from the waiting shed, it was Josman who
chased her and not Rusia. Inside the car, it was Rowen who
punched and handcuffed the Chiong sisters. At the safehouse of
the "Josman Aznar Group," Rusia stayed at the living room while
Larraaga, James Anthony, Rowen, and Josman molested Marijoy
and Jacqueline on separate rooms. At Tan-awan, it was Josman
who ordered Rowen and Ariel to pushed Marijoy into the deep
ravine. And Rusia did not even know what ultimately happened to
Jacqueline as he was the first to leave the group. Clearly, the
extent of Rusia's participation in the crimes charged does not
make him the "most guilty."
The fact that Rusia was convicted of third degree burglary in
Minnesota
does
not
render
his
testimony
inadmissible. 108 In People vs. De Guzman, 109 we held that
although the trial court may have erred in discharging the
accused, such error would not affect the competency and the
quality of the testimony of the defendant. InMangubat vs.
Sandiganbayan, 110 we ruled:
"Anent the contention that Delia Preagido should
not have been discharged as a state witness
because of a 'previous final conviction' of crimes
involving moral turpitude, suffice it to say that 'this
Court has time and again declared that even if the
discharged state witness should lack some of the
qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for
that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded. In
the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may
34
him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at
the time of its commission. 116 These requirements of time and
place must be strictly met. 117 A thorough examination of the
evidence for the defense shows that the appellants failed to meet
these settled requirements. They failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to
be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were
abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman,
Ariel, Alberto. James Anthony and James Andrew were all within
the vicinity, of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.
later date when all the spaces in the logbook were already filled
up and thus, the only remaining spot was the uppermost portion.
Surprisingly, the alleged arrival of Larraaga and his friend
Richard Antonio at the Loyola Heights Condominium in the early
evening of July 16, 1997 was not recorded in the logbook.
Rowena Bautista, a teacher at the Center for Culinary Arts,
Quezon City, testified that Larraaga attended her lecture on
Applied Mathematics on July 16, 1997 from 8:00 o'clock to 11:30
in the morning. 119 This runs counter to Larraaga's
affidavit 120 stating that on the said date, he took his mid-term
examinations in the subject Fundamentals of Cookery from 8:00
o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
With respect to Larraaga's friends, the contradictions in their
testimonies, painstakingly outlined by the Solicitor General in the
appellee's brief, reveal their unreliability. To our mind, while it
may be possible that Larraaga took the mid-term examinations
in Fundamentals of Cookery and that he and his friends attended
a party at the R and R Bar and Restaurant, also in Quezon City,
however it could be that those events occurred on a date other
than July 16, 1997.
Clotilde Soterol, in defense of Ariel and Alberto (the driver and the
conductor of the van) attempted to discredit Rusia's testimony by
testifying that the white van with plate no. GGC-491 could not
have been used in the commission of the crimes on the night of
July 16, 1997 because it was parked in her shop from 7:00 o'clock
in the evening of the same date until 11:00 o'clock in the morning
of July 17, 1997. What makes Soterol's testimony doubtful is her
contradicting affidavits. In the first affidavit dated July 28, 1997,
or twelve (12) days from the occurrence of the crime, she stated
that Alberto took the van from her shop at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 16, 1997 and returned it for repair only on July
22, 1997. 121 But in her second affidavit dated October 1, 1997,
she declared that Alberto left the van in her shop at 7:00 o'clock
in the evening of July 16, 1997 until 11:00 o'clock in the morning
of July 17, 1997. 122 Surely, we cannot simply brush aside the
discrepancy and accept the second affidavit as gospel truth.
raped, that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were
subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the death
penalty on the appellants is in order.
Thus, we hold that all the appellants are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45303 wherein Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304
wherein Jacqueline is the victim.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
For automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00765 which affirmed an earlier
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan City, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. 9440-B, finding accused-appellants Arnold
Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. "Junior", Joey Pamplona, a.k.a.
"Nato", and Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of
death and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P16,700.00 as actual damages, P408,000.00 for loss of earning
capacity and to pay the costs of the suit.
The conviction of accused-appellants stemmed from an
Information 3 dated January 22, 1996, filed with the RTC for the
crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 22, 1995, in the
Municipality of Binan, Province of Laguna,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Arnold Garchitorena y
Gamba, alias "Junior", Joey Pamplona alias "Nato"
42
A: Yes sir.
Interpreter:
A: Yes sir.
Fiscal:
Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name
of a person in longsleeves polo shirtscheckered?
A: Yes sir.
Interpreter:
Atty. Pajares:
Fiscal:
52
the heirs, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of
the victim cannot be denied. 32 The trial court's award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall, however,
be reduced to P30,000.00, also pursuant to the latest
jurisprudence on the matter. 33
As to the award of actual damages amounting to P16,700.00, we
modify the same. In People v. Villanueva, 34 this Court declared
that ". . . when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of
temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount". In the light of such ruling, the
victim's heirs in the present case should, therefore, be awarded
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. AECacS
The award of P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is justified.
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1)
the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work
no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws. 35 It cannot be disputed that the
victim, at the time of his death, was self-employed and earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. The
computation arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with
the formula for computing the award for loss of earning
capacity. 36 Thus,
Award for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross
annual income - 50% (GAI)]
lost earnings
= 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 - P12,000.00
= (34) x (P12,000.00)
= P408,000.00
55
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Garchitorena y Camba, G.R. No. 175605, [August 28,
2009], 614 PHIL 66-94)
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
This is an appeal by Henry Milan and Jackman Chua from the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934
dated May 10, 2006. Said Decision affirmed that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) convicting them and one Restituto Carandang for
two counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061, Q-01-100062 and Q-01-100063,
the Informations for which read:
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100061
That on or about the 5th day of April 2001, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength
and with treachery and evident premeditation,
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO Y SALGO, by
then and there shooting the latter several times
with the use of a firearm of unknown caliber hitting
him on the different parts of the body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot
wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the immediate heirs of said PO2 DIONISIO ALONZO
Y SALGO.
That the crime was committed in contempt of or
with insult to the public authorities. 2
Criminal Case No. Q-01-100062
That on or about the 5th day of April, 2001, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
56
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it to fall
and
propelling
them
inside
the
room.
PO2
Alonzo
shouted "Walang gagalaw!" Suddenly, gunshots rang, hitting PO2
Alonzo and SPO2 Red who dropped to the floor one after the
other. Due to the suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2
Red were not able to return fire and were instantly killed by the
barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right behind
SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the assailants when
Carandang shot and hit him. SPO1 Montecalvo fell to the ground.
SPO1 Estores heard Chua say to Milan, "Sugurin mo na!" Milan
lunged towards SPO1 Montecalvo, but the latter was able to fire
his gun and hit Milan. SPO1 Estores went inside the house and
pulled SPO1 Montecalvo out. 8
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival of P/Sr.
Insp. Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La Loma Police
Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy Station Commander of
Police Station 1 at the time of the incident. 9 SPO1 Montecalvo
was brought to the Chinese General Hospital. Milan stepped out
of the house and was also brought to a hospital, 10 but
Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house for
several hours. There was a lengthy negotiation for the surrender
of Carandang and Chua, during which they requested for the
presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media man Ramon
Tulfo. 11 It was around 11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight when
Carandang and Chua surrendered. 12 SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo
were found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on the
floor with broken legs and gunshot and grenade shrapnel
wounds. 13
Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem
examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo. He found
that the gunshot wounds of Red and Alonzo were the cause of
their deaths. 14
According to SPO1 Montecalvo's account, Dr. Bu Castro of the
Chinese General Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet
from the right portion of his nape. SPO1 Montecalvo's
hospitalization expenses amounted to P14,324.48. He testified
II.
fire, Alonzo and Red did not even have the chance
to touch their firearms at that instant. 31
In affirming this ruling, the Court of Appeals further expounded on
the acts of Milan and Chua showing that they acted in concert
with Carandang, to wit:
In the present case, when appellants were alerted
of the presence of the police officers, Milan
immediately closed the door. Thereafter, when the
police officers were finally able to break open said
door, Carandang peppered them with bullets. PO2
Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result
while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded.
Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on
the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered
Milan to attack the police officers. Following the
order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the
latter, however, was able to shoot him.
At first glance, Milan's act of closing the door may
seem a trivial contribution in the furtherance of the
crime. On second look, however, that act actually
facilitated the commission of the crime. The brief
moment during which the police officers were
trying to open the door paved the way for the
appellants to take strategic positions which gave
them a vantage point in staging their assault. Thus,
when SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo were finally able to
get inside, they were instantly killed by the sudden
barrage of gunfire. In fact, because of the
suddenness of the attack, said police officers were
not able to return fire.
Insofar as Chua is concerned, his participation in
the
conspiracy
consisted
of
lending
encouragement and moral ascendancy to his coconspirators as evidenced by the fact that he
ordered Milan to attack the already fallen police
officers with the obvious intention to finish them
Chua
SPO1
44 on
Chua.
iii.P139,910.00
as
actual
damages to be solidarily borne
by Carandang, Milan and Chua;
v.P30,000.00
as
exemplary
damages to be solidarily borne
by Milan and Chua only;
2.In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants
Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are held
solidarily liable for the amount of P20,000.00
as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages to SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo, in addition to the amounts to
which they are solidarily liable with Restituto
Carandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the
lower courts and this Court, SPO1 Wilfredo
Montecalvo is entitled to the following
amounts: aHIDAE
i.P14,000.00 as actual damages to be
solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan
and Chua;
ii.P40,000.00
as
moral
damages,
P20,000.00 of which shall be solidarily
borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua,
while P20,000.00 shall be the solidary
liability of Milan and Chua only;
iii.P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to
be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua
only; and
64
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
This is an appeal from a Decision 1 dated May 16, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00364, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie
Malogsi and Alfemio Malogsi, which affirmed with modifications
the Decision 2 dated January 31, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Branch 11 that convicted appellants
Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and
Alfemio Malogsi for the felony of murder under Article 248 of
all damages at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment; and
(4) Criminal Case No. 93-1272 is DISMISSED with respect to Eddie
Malogsi in view of his death during the pendency of this case.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Dadao, G.R. No. 201860, [January 22, 2014], 725
PHIL 298-317)
DECISION
SERENO, C.J p:
Before us is a Notice of Appeal 1 dated 30 July 2010
from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated 19 July 2010
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03490, affirming the Decision 3 dated
15 May 2008 in Criminal Case No. 04-224073 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 48, Manila, convicting
accused-appellant Estanly Octa y Bas, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. aDSIHc
As culled from the records, the prosecution's version is
herein quoted:
In the morning of September 25, 2003,
around 6:40 A.M., Johnny Corpuz (Johnny) and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS
VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL
BELTRAN ALVIR, accused-appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students,
faculty, and research personnel should feel safest. After all, this is
where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this
world are peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities produce
hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade
misplaced concepts of perverse brotherhood for these hopes.
Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has
resulted in a senseless death whose justice is now the subject
matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted. It is
even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who
present themselves courageously before an able and experienced
trial court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this
society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles. The
perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of
their actions. They must do so for there is an individual who now
lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family.
Excruciating grief for them will never be enough. EScIAa
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to
1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho
fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near
the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
(10) men, wearing either masks of red and black bonnets or with
shirts covering their faces, came from a red car parked nearby. He
also saw three (3) men being hit with lead pipes by the masked
men. Two (2) of the men fell after being hit. One of the victims
was lifting the other to help him, but the attackers overtook him.
Afterwards, the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping
those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying one of the
injured victims, which he later found out to be Arnel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu Sorority, Eda
Panganiban, 90 testified that she and her friends were in line to
order lunch at the Beach House Canteen when a commotion
happened. She saw around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked
men attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any mask
fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P. student, Luz
Perez, 91 corroborated her story that the masked men were
unrecognizable because of their masks. Perez, however, admitted
that a member of Scintilla Juris approached her to make a
statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon, 92 testified on
substantially the same matters as Panganiban and Perez. She also
stated that she saw a person lying on the ground who was being
beaten up by about three (3) to five (5) masked men. She also
stated that some of the men were wearing black masks while
some were wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any
mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano, 93 accused-appellant Danilo
Feliciano, Jr.'s mother, her son was in Pampanga to visit his sick
grandfather at the time of the incident. She alleged that her son
went to Pampanga before lunch that day and visited the school
where she teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, 94 he had not been
feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that he could not
have possibly been in U.P. on December 8, 1994 since he was
absent even from work. He also testified that he wore glasses
and, thus, could not have possibly been the person identified by
81
sufficient
fully
against
prepare
trial
by
are
court,
the
entitled
were
the
sufficiently
witnesses
for
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found the
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. In
its decision, the trial court stated that:
. . . . Although each victim had a very strong
motive to place his fraternity rivals permanently
behind bars, not one testified against all of them. If
the prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all
Sigma Rhoans,
were
simply
bent
on
convicting Scintilla Juris members for that
matter, they could have easily tagged each
and every accused as a participant in the
atrocious and barbaric assault to make sure
no one would escape conviction. Instead,
each eyewitness named only one or two and
some were candid enough to say that they
did not see who delivered the blows against
them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan,
Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have
seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose
any name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he
did not have the opportunity to see and identify
the person who hit him in the back and inflicted a
prefabricated
supplied)
and
Despite this, the court still did not impute doubt in their
testimonies that Zingapan was present at the scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court further
prove that its decision was brought about only upon a thorough
examination of the evidence presented. It accepted that there
were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victims but that
these were minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that
"[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not unusual
'for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.'" 138
Evidence
as
gestae may
have
little
this case
part
be
of
admissible
persuasive
value
the res
but
in
According
to
the
testimony
of
U.P.
Police
Officer
Salvador, 139 when he arrived at the scene, he interviewed the
bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the
attackers since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be
evidence that could be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the facts he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from
his own perception, . . . ." 140 All other kinds of testimony are
hearsay and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of
Court,however, provide several exceptions to the general rule,
and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. Statements
made by a person while a starting occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an
equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae. 141
belated
victims
do
identification
not
detract
by
from
their
positive
the appellants
identification
of
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent about the
incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon City Police but instead
executed affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation four
(4) days after the incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their
testimonies. CaEATI
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera 146 testified that on their way
to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the victims who all told him
they could not recognize the attackers because they were all
wearing masks. Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang 147 testified to the effect
that when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio
answered that he did not know because they were masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in this case
belong to rival fraternities. While this court does not condone
their archaic and oftentimes barbaric traditions, it is conceded
that there are certain practices that are unique to fraternal
organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew the
identities of their attackers but chose not to disclose it without
first conferring with their other fraternity brothers. This probability
is bolstered by the actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which
showed that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in SM
North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival fraternities, it
would not have been prudent for Sigma Rho to retaliate against
the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to the U.P.
Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the police officer or the
doctor's testimonies more credible than that of the victims. It
should not be forgotten that the victims actually witnessed the
entire incident, while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr.
Mislang were merely relaying second-hand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of Investigation
four (4) days after the incident also does not affect their
credibility since most of them had been hospitalized from their
88
III
Alibi
positive
victim
cannot
prevail
identification
over
of
the
the
charged
there
the
were
with
was
commission
have fought back or that the people in the canteen could have
helped the victims." 156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were
eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they
would be reasonably expected to be on guard for any sudden
attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead
pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows
was with their arms. In a situation where they were unarmed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back
against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a
minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders
being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no
opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to defend
themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this
case. DAEcIS
The
presence
makes
all
of
appellants
liable
and attempted murder
of
the
for
conspiracy
accusedmurder
Murder
in
Criminal
Case
No.
Q95-61133
with
the MODIFICATION that
they
be
found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case Nos. Q9561136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, [May 5, 2014])
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J p:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier
Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his co-accused
Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing
them 2 to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P10,000,000.00 each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang)
and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal
information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay
Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province of Quezon,
Court's Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed. HSDaTC
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he
may be convicted for conspiracy to commit the offense charged
sans allegation of conspiracy in the Information, and (2) whether
the prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged in the
Information. 15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1 (b), Rule 115 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure 16 to substantiate his argument
that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information
itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the
statement "the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent
mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all
belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they all help
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously transport . . . ." He argued that conspiracy was only
inferred from the words used in the Information. 17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in
the information, at this point, is deemed to have been waived due
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
For review is the Amended Decision 1 dated 14
November 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00658, finding appellants Michael Bokingco 2(Bokingco) and
Reynante Col (Col) guilty as conspirators beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. DIEcHa
On 31 July 2000, an Information 3 was filed against
appellants charging them of the crime of murder committed as
follows:
That on or about the 29th day of February, 2000 in
the City of Angeles, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, armed
with a claw hammer and with intent to kill by
means of treachery, evident premeditation, abuse
of confidence, and nighttime, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
97
conspired with Col to kill Pasion and that they planned the
killing several days before because they got "fed up" with
Pasion. 14
The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Joven G. Esguerra (Dr.
Esguerra), contained the following findings: DaACIH
1. Marked pallor of lips and nailbeds
2. Body in rigor mortis
3. Contusion with hematoma, right medial
infraorbital region extending to the right of
the root of the nose.
4. Contusion with hematoma, left post-auricular
region.
5. Contusion with hematoma, right angle of
mandible.
6. Contusion with hematoma, right mandibular
region.
7. Contusion with hematoma, left occipital region.
A: By Reynante Col.
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 260, National Capital Judicial
Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86, finding appellants Elizabeth
Castillo ("Castillo") and Evangeline Padayhag ("Padayhag") guilty
of Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention 2 and
sentencing them to death.
The Information 3 charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda
Wenceslao with the crime of kidnapping, reads:
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused
ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG,
conspiring together, confederating, and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, carry away, and
112
A Yes.
COURT
Where did you go?
A I do not know.
PROS. FONACIER
Your Honor, please, may we request that the rule
on evidence be not strict on this boy. The
witness is of tender age.
ATTY. SOLUREN
There is no strict implementation as to what the
Honorable Prosecutor stated. There is no
strict implementation of the rules of court. In
fact, we are very lenient but the fact is, the
child said he does not know. But the
question is he was giving the answer to
this witness.
COURT
Ask another question.
Q Rocky, nang sumakay kayo ni Vangie sa tricycle,
nakita mo ba si Beth Castillo?
A Yes.
Q Rocky, noong magkasama na kayong tatlo, saan
kayo nagpunta?
A Nasundo namin si Beth.
A Yes.
S Opo.
COURT
not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam
around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation
of liberty. For under such a situation, the child's freedom remains
at the mercy and control of the abductor.
Next, Castillo explains that she called Mr. Cebrero not to ask for
ransom but to tell him that Rocky was with her and unharmed.
Castillo admitted that Mr. Cebrero pleaded with her not to harm
Rocky. Castillo failed to explain, however, why she did not inform
Mr. Cebrero of their exact whereabouts so that Mr. Cebrero could
fetch Rocky. Her failure to inform Mr. Cebrero clearly shows she
kept Rocky in detention considering she called Mr. Cebrero several
times while she had physical control over Rocky.
Castillo's explanation that she decided to return Rocky only when
he was no longer sick is also implausible. In the first place, she
failed to explain why she did not return the child the moment she
found out he was sick. That would have been the more prudent
course of action at that time. However, one day after the "payoff" on 4 March 1995, Rocky suddenly appeared by himself at the
Cebreros' home on 5 March 1995. Any reasonable person would
conclude that the pay-off and the return of the child were related
events. Castillo would have us attribute this to coincidence.
Castillo would also have us believe that what prompted her
sudden departure for Dipolog, where she was eventually
captured, was her inability to find employment in Manila. And yet
Castillo does not explain why she tried to bring Padayhag along
with her to Dipolog.
Finally, Castillo points out that the prosecution coached Rocky's
testimony. True, Rocky admitted he did not know the contents of
the document he signed in front of the fiscal. 23 Rocky also
stated that he was told to testify that Padayhag forced him to go
with her, and finally, that he must accuse both appellants as his
abductors. 24These admissions, damaging as they may sound,
are of little use to appellants. The reason is simple. The facts to
which Rocky's testimony pertains to are the very same facts
Castillo herself admitted on the witness stand. Even if we were to
discredit Rocky's testimony entirely, the facts of his kidnapping
119
COURT
Q So, you did not come to find out what was the
sickness of your boyfriend?
COURT
A Hindi na po sir.
A Opo, sir. 29
COURT
Q Sa Caloocan?
A Opo, Your Honor.
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The instant petition under Rule 45 originated from 119 criminal
cases 2 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) involving no less than
36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public
Highways (MPH) and several suppliers of construction materials
for defalcation of public funds arising from numerous transactions
in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977. Because of
the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions, the number of
people involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in
defrauding the government, this infamous 86 million highway
scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in the
country. SAcCIH
The Case
DECISION
Petitioner Fernan, Jr. disputes the adverse judgment in only six (6)
cases, namely: 2879, 2880, 2881, 2885, 2914, and 2918; while
petitioner Torrevillas seeks exoneration in nine (9) cases, namely:
125
accused knew, the same were not true and correct; by making it
appear in the voucher that funds were available and that there
were appropriate requests for allotments (ROA) to pay the
aforesaid purchase; that a requisition for said item was made and
approved; that a regular bidding was held; that a corresponding
purchase order was issued in favor of the winning bidder; that the
road construction materials were delivered, inspected and used in
the supposed project and that the alleged supplier was entitled to
payment when in truth and in fact, as all the accused know, all of
the foregoing were false and incorrect and because of the
foregoing falsifications, the above-named accused were able to
collect from the Cebu I HED the total amount of TWENTY
EIGHTTHOUSAND PESOS (P28,000.00), Philippine Currency,
in payment of the non-existing deliveries; that the said amount
of P28,000.00 was not reflected in the monthly trial balance
submitted to the Central Office by Region VII showing its financial
condition as the same was negated thru the journal voucher, as a
designed means to cover-up the fraud; and the accused, once in
possession of the said amount, misappropriated, converted and
misapplied the same for their personal needs, to the damage and
prejudice of the Philippine Government in the total amount
of TWENTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS
(P28,000.00), Philippine Currency.
2880
3.
2881
Dates of
Commission
Falsified
2879
December 1, 1976
up to January 31,
1977
Purchased 2914
General
1,400 cu. m. of
Voucher No. B-15; item 108 for use in
Check No.
9933064;
1.
3.
Criminal
Case
No.
2.
January 2, 1977 up
to February 28,
1977
2.
The Informations in the six (6) cases involving Fernan, Jr. were
essentially identical save for the details as highlighted in boldface
above. For ease of reference, Fernan, Jr.'s criminal cases are
detailed below:
1.
1.
2.
2885
CONTRARY TO LAW.
December 1, 1976
up to January 31,
1977
January 2, 1977 up
1.
to January 31,
1977
2.
3.
October 1, 1977 up
to November 30,
1977
1.
2.
2918
January 2, 1977 up
to February 28,
1977
1.
General
Voucher No. B107;
Check No.
9933157;
1,500 cu. m. of
item 108 for the
rehabilitation of the
2.
Cebu North
Hagnaya Wharf
road from Km. 71
to Km. 76
On the other hand, petitioner Torrevillas was one of the accused
in Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, 2859, 2909, 2910, 2914,
2919, and 2932.
The Information against Torrevillas in SB Criminal Case
No. 2855 reads as follows: TSHIDa
The undersigned accuses Rocilo Neis, Rolando
Mangubat, Adventor Fernandez, Angelina Escao,
Delia Preagido, Camilo de Letran, Manuel de Veyra,
Heracleo Faelnar, Basilisa Galvan, Matilde Jabalde,
Josefina Luna, Jose Sayson, Edgardo Cruz, Leonila
del Rosario, Engracia Escobar, Abelardo Cardona,
Leonardo Tordecilla, Agripino Pagdanganan, Ramon
Quirante, Jorge de la Pea, Leo Villagonzalo, Asterio
Buqueron, Expedito Torrevillas, Mariano Montera
and Rufino V. Nuez for estafa thru falsification of
public and commercial documents, committed as
follows: EaSCAH
That on, about and during the period
from June 1, 1977 up to June 30, 1977,
both dates inclusive, in the City of Cebu and
in Cebu Province, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused Rocilo
Neis, Assistant District Engineer of Cebu HED
I; Rolando Mangubat, the Chief Accountant
of Region VII of the Ministry of Public
Highways and Adventor Fernandez, Regional
Highway Engineer of same Regional Office,
conniving with each other to defraud the
Philippine Government with the
indispensable cooperation and assistance of
Dates of
Commission
Falsified
Purchased
2855
June 1, 1977 up to
June 30, 1977
Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-10186-76; 10-19076; 10-192-76; 10188-76; 10-18076;
General
Voucher No. B613;
Check No.
9403099;
153.63 m. t. o
item 310 for u
asphalting of
Toledo-Tabuela
road from Km
108.34 to Km.
109.52
2.
3.
134
2856
June 1, 1977 up to
June 30, 1977
1.
2.
3.
2858
June 1, 1977 up to
July 31, 1977
1.
2.
3.
2859
June 1, 1977 up to
June 31, 1977
1.
2.
3.
2909
September 1, 1977
up to November
30, 1977
1.
2.
Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-1015-76; 9-201-76;
8-152-76; 8-15376; 9-181-76; 9184-76
General
Voucher No. B619;
Check No.
9403105;
Request for
Allocation
Allotment 101-6234-76; 6-237-76;
6-239-76; 6-24176; 6-240-76
General
Voucher No. B629;
Check No.
9403115;
Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-763-76; 8-102-76;
8-121-76
General
Voucher No. B631;
Check No.
9403117;
General
Voucher No. B928;
Check No.
9403426;
153.76 m. t. of
item 310 for use
2910
in
the asphalting of
the ToledoTabuelan road
from Km 108.34 to
Km. 109.52
2914
September 1, 1977
up to November
30, 1977
1.
2.
October 1, 1977
up to November 30,
1977
1.
2.
151.35 m. t. of
item 310 for use in
the asphalting2919
of
the ToledoTabuelan road
from Km. 108.34
to Km. 109.52
110.01 m. t. of
2932
item 310 for use in
asphalting of the
Toledo-Tabuelan
road from Km.
108.34 to
Km.109.52
January 2, 1977 up
to February 28,
1977
1.
2.
June 1, 1977 up to
July 31, 1977
1.
2.
3.
barangay road
1,200 cu. m. o
item 108 for u
the rehabilitat
of the MagayCanamukan,
Compostela
barangay road
General
1,200 cu. m. o
Voucher No. Bitem 108 for u
927;
the rehabilitat
Check No.
of the Cajel-Lu
9403425;
Barbon baran
road
General
1,550 cu. m. o
Voucher No. Bitem 108 for u
244;
the repair and
Check No.
rehabilitation
9933293;
damaged road
bridges at the
Toledo-Tabuela
national road
Km. 71 to Km
Request for
250 gals of
Allocation of
aluminum pai
Allotment 101-7- 324 gals of re
83-76; 7-84-76; 7- lead paint for
124-76; 8-153-76; in the mainten
8-170-76;
of national roa
General
and bridges
Voucher B-643;
Check No.
9403130;
General
Voucher No. B929;
Check No.
9403427;
I
140
For falsification
1.That the offender is a public officer, employee, or
notary public;
2.That he takes advantage of his official position;
3.That he falsifies a document by committing any
of the acts defined under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code. 26
Before the SB, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated
September 1, 1988 was entered into between the State and the
accused with the following stipulations and admissions:
(1)To expedite the early termination of the instant
cases and abbreviate the testimony of Mrs. Delia
Preagido, the prosecution and the accused have
agreed to reproduce and adopt as the testimony of
Preagido in the instant cases, her previous
testimonies in Criminal Cases Nos. 889, etc.
141
Exhibits
Main
Documents
Falsified
that au
142
No.
purchase
2879
T-86-f-1, etc.
(Tally Sheets)
1.
2.
2880
T-87-f-1, etc.
(Tally Sheets)
1.
2.
3.
2881
T-104-g-1, etc. 1.
(Tally Sheets)
2.
3.
2885
T-89-f-1, etc.
(Tally Sheets)
1.
2.
General Voucher
No. B-15;
Check No.
9933064;
1,400 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the repair of
the Cebu
Hagnaya Wharf
road from Km.
50.30 to Km.
60.00
Request for
1,400 cu. m. of
Allocation of
item 108 for use
Allotment
in the repair of
101-12the Bogo-Curva105-76;
Medellon road
General Voucher from Km. 110.00
No. B-55;
to Km. 119.00
Check No.
9933104;
Request for
Approximately
Allocation of
1,500 cu. m. of
Allotment 101-2- item 108 for use
56-77;
in the repair and
General Voucher rehabilitation of
No. B-245;
damaged roads
Check No.
and bridges by
9933294;
Typhoon Aring at
the TabogonBogo provincial
road from Km. 92
to Km. 98
Request for
Materials for use
Allocation of
in the repair and
Allotment 101rehabilitation of
12112-76;
the DaanGeneral Voucher Bantayan road
3.
Not numbered
2914
contrary to
official
procedure
T-115-g-1, etc. 1.
(Tally Sheets)
2.
2918
Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure
T-116-f-1, etc. 1.
(Tally Sheets)
2.
No. B-76;
Check No.
9933125;
General Voucher
No. B-927;
Check No.
9403425;
1,200 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the
rehabilitation of
the Cajel-Lugo,
Barbon barangay
road
General Voucher 1,500 cu. m. of
No. B-107;
item 108 for the
Check No.
rehabilitation of
9933157;
the Cebu North
Hagnaya Wharf
road from Km. 71
to Km. 76
Not num
contrar
official
procedu
Petitioner Torrevillas
Criminal Specific
Not numbered
Case
Exhibits
contrary
to
official No.
procedure
2855
T-33-f
(Delivery
Receipt); T-
1.
33-f-1 (Daily
Tally Sheet);
Not numbered
contrary
to official
2.
procedure
3.
2856
T-34-f
1.
Main
Documents
Falsified
that
author
purcha
Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 10110186-76; 10-19076;
10-192-76; 1018876; 10-180-76;
General Voucher
No. B-613;
Check No.
9403099;
Request for
153.63 m. t. of
item 310 for use
in asphalting of
Not num
contrar
official
the Toledo-
procedu
Tabuelan road
from Km.
108.34 to Km.
109.52
153.76 m. t. of
Not num
143
(Delivery
Receipt); T34-f-1 (Daily
Tally Sheet);
2.
3.
2858
T-35-f
(Delivery
Receipt); T35-f-1 (Daily
1.
Tally Sheet);
2.
2859
T-36-f
(Delivery
Receipt); T36-f-1 (Daily
1.
Tally Sheet);
2.
3.
2909
T-113-b
(Request for
Supplies and
Equipment);
T-113-d
1.
Allocation of
Allotment 1011015-76; 9-201-76;
8152-76; 8-15376; 9-181-76; 9184-76
General Voucher
No. B-619;
Check No.
9403105;
Request for
Allocation
Allotment 101-6234-76; 6-23776;
6-239-76; 6-24176; 6-240-76
General Voucher
No. B-629;
3. Check No.
9403115;
Request for
Allocation of
Allotment 101-763-76; 8-102-76;
8121-76
General Voucher
No. B-631;
Check No.
9403117;
General Voucher
No. B-928;
2. Check No.
9403426;
procedure
Tabuelan road
from Km 108.34
to Km. 109.52
151.35 m. t. of
item 310 for use
in the asphalting
of the Toledo-
Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure
Tabuelan road
from Km.
108.34 to Km.
109.52
110.01 m. t. of
item 310 for use
in asphalting of
the Toledo-
Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure
Tabuelan road
from Km.
108.34 to
Km. 109.52
1,200 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the
rehabilitation of
the Buanoy-
Not numbered
contrary to
official
procedure
144
145
2910
2914
2919
(Report of
Inspection); T113-c
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
T-114-c
(Request for
Supplies and
Equipment);
T-114-e
(Report of
Inspection); T114-f
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
T-115-c
(Request for
Supplies and
Equipment);
T-115-e
(Report of
Inspection); T115-f
(Abstract of
Sealed
Quotation)
T-117-g
(Delivery
Receipt); T117-g-1, etc.
(Daily Tally
Sheets)
Cantibas,
Balaban
barangay road
1.
2.
1.
2.
1.
2.
Km. 83
Request for
250 gals of
Allocation of
aluminum paint
Allotment 101-7- 324 gals of red
83-76; 7-84-76; lead paint for
7General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of
Not numbered
124-76; 8-153use in the
No. B-929;
item 108 for use contrary to
76;
Check No.
in the
official
8-170-76;
maintenance of
9403427;
rehabilitation of procedure
2. General Voucher national roads
the MagayB-643;
and bridges
Canamukan,
3. Check No.
Compostela
9403130;
barangay road
On the part of petitioners, they readily admitted that they either
signed the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other related
documents which became part of the supporting documents that
General Voucher 1,200 cu. m. of
Not numbered
led to the issuance of general vouchers and eventually the
No. B-927;
item 108 for use contrary
disbursement
to
of public funds. 29 The tally sheets are statements
Check No.
in the
official of delivery that purportedly indicated the specified quantities of
9403425;
rehabilitation of procedure
materials for the construction and maintenance of roads that
the Cajel-Lugo,
have been delivered on supposed project sites on given dates at
Barbon barangay
specific places.
road
General Voucher
No. B-244;
Check No.
9933293;
1,550 cu. m. of
item 108 for use
in the repair and
rehabilitation of
damaged roads
and bridges at
the ToledoTabuelan
national road
from Km. 71 to
2932
1.
Not num
contrar
official
procedu
Criminal Case No. 2914 where petitioner Fernan, Jr. was among
the co-accused. 48 These documents signed by petitioner
Torrevillas were likewise attached as supporting papers to fake
general vouchers which facilitated the release of check payments
to suppliers. DISHEA
These checks were allegedly paid to suppliers Rufino V. Nuez
(Criminal Case Nos. 2855, 2856, 2858, and 2859), Juliana de los
Angeles (Criminal Case Nos. 2909, 2910, and 2914), Ismael Sabio,
Jr. (Criminal Case No. 2919), and Manuel Mascardo (Criminal Case
No. 2932). 49
These general vouchers and checks could not be traced to
genuine LAAs. Ergo, there were no actual deliveries of supplies
and materials for the road repair and rehabilitation in Region VII,
which were the subjects of the criminal cases where petitioners
were charged.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that
all the essential elements of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents were present. There is no
question that petitioners, at the time of the commission of the
crime, were public officers civil engineers assigned to the
MPH. Their signing of tally sheets and related documents
pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road repair and
construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of
their official positions, especially considering that they had the
duty to inspect the purported deliveries and ascertain the
veracity of the documents and the statements contained in
them. ISHaCD
The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals
of material facts which the petitioners had the duty to verify and
confirm. These tally sheets were attached as supporting
documents to fake LAAs and subsequently became the bases for
the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of
the government. Indubitably, there exists not even an iota of
doubt as to petitioners' guilt.
No. of
Vouchers
Kind of
Materials
Measurement
Rufino Nuez
J. delos Angeles
Iluminada Vega
Florencio
Gacayan
Ismael Sabio, Jr.
FBS Marketing
Cebu Hollow
Blocks
Bienvenido
Presillas
T.R. Eustaquio
Ent.
Santrade Mktg.
29
21
11
10
Item
Item
Item
Item
4,640,275 mt
22,290 cu.m.
8,325 cu.m.
7,800 cu.m.
6
3
2
Item 108
6,198 cu.m.
Lumber
Hollow Blocks
Equip. Rental
Office Supplies
310
108
108
108
Johnson
Products
Pelagia Gomez
1
Item 108
2,000 cu.m.
M & M Ent.
1
Paints
Freent Ind.
1
Office Supplies
Total
The NBI also discovered that there were purchases
of materials in 1977 that were charged to current
obligations but paid out of spurious LAAs, to
wit: caSEAH
Supplier
No. of
Vouchers
Kind of
Materials
Measurement
Rufino Nuez
11
Juliana delos
Angeles
Iluminada Vega
Florencio
Gacayan
Vicon Ent.
Ismael Sabio, Jr.
Jabcyl Mktg.
16
Item 310
Item 108
Item 108
162,549 m.t.
5,000 cu.m.
13,280 cu.m.
3
2
Item
Item
Item
Item
1,000 cu.m.
307 cu.m.
3,600 cu.m.
2,400.00 cu.m.
1
5
3
111
200
108
108
Steel Frame
Item 108
Bridge
Materials
6,950 cu.m.
Total
Grand Total
A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from
fake LAAs and ACDCs, were traced back to Rolando
Mangubat, Regional Accountant of Region VII and
Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer,
also of Region VII. Those LAAs and ACDCs became
the vehicles in the disbursement of funds
amounting to P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers
purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of
the aforementioned materials allegedly used for
the maintenance and repair of the national
highways within the Cebu First HED. Despite the
enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74,
the roads and bridges in the district, as found out
by the NBI, did not show any improvement (Exhibit
II). As testified to by several barangay captains, the
road maintenance consisted merely of spreading
anapog or limestone on potholes of the national
Highway.
Obviously, the vouchers for payments of alleged
maintenance of roads and bridges in the additional
amount of P3,839,810.74 were prepared for no
other purpose than to siphon off the said amount
from the government coffer into the pockets of
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The district office will advertise the invitation to bid and award
the contract to the lowest bidder. The Purchase Order (PO) is
prepared and addressed to the winning bidder. Upon delivery of
the supplies and materials, the supplier bills the district office for
payment. Consequently, the requisitioning officer will prepare the
general voucher which must be accompanied by the following
documents:
a.The ROA;
b.The PO;
c.The abstract of Bid together with the Bid quotations;
d.The delivery receipts together with the tally sheets; and
e.The tax clearance and tax certificate of the supplier.
After the preparation and submission of the general voucher and
the supporting documents, the disbursing officer shall prepare
and draw a check based on said voucher. The check is
countersigned by an officer of the district office and/or the COA
Regional Director based on the amount of the check.
Thus, it is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts,
the general voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without
the general voucher, the check for the payment of the supply
cannot be made and issued to the supplier. Without the check
payment, the defraudation cannot be committed and successfully
consummated. Thus, petitioners' acts in signing the false tally
sheets and/or delivery receipts are indispensable to the
consummation of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents. Surely, there were ghost or false deliveries of
supplies and materials as convincingly shown by the testimonies
of the barangay captains, officials, and residents of the areas
where the materials were allegedly used. More importantly, if
there were actual deliveries of materials made, then there would
be no need to fake the LAAs because the suppliers will have to be
paid the cost of said materials plus a reasonable profit. As a
result, there is nothing or not much to share with the more than
30 or so co-conspirators, for the suppliers would not be too dim154
witted to part with even their cost in buying the materials they
allegedly supplied. Moreover, the fake delivery receipts and tally
sheets signed by petitioners were linked to the general vouchers
upon which check payments were made to the suppliers who
were found guilty of participating in the fraud. With respect to
petitioner Fernan, Jr., he signed tally sheets on the ghost
deliveries of Juliana de los Angeles and Ismael Sabio, Jr. On the
part of petitioner Torrevillas, he signed false tally sheets and
delivery receipts on supplies allegedly delivered by Rufino V.
Nuez, Juliana de los Angeles, Ismael Sabio, Jr., and Manuel
Mascardo. Lastly, the checks issued to these suppliers based on
general vouchers supported by the false tally sheets and general
vouchers signed by petitioners cannot be traced to any genuine
LAAs, resulting in the inescapable conclusion that these LAAs
were unauthorized; hence, fake or fabricated. These are
undisputed tell-tale signs of the complicity by petitioners with the
Mangubat syndicate.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution 1 dated March 7,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution 2 dated July 11,
2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for
Reconsideration.aDHCAE
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