Competitive Marketing Strategy: Porter Revisited: Marketing Intelligence & Planning December 1991
Competitive Marketing Strategy: Porter Revisited: Marketing Intelligence & Planning December 1991
Competitive Marketing Strategy: Porter Revisited: Marketing Intelligence & Planning December 1991
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Competitive
Marketing
Strategy:
Porter
Revisited
Byron Sharp
Introduction
In 1980 Michael Porter's Competitive Strategy: Techniques for
Analysing Industries and Competitors was published[1]. The
result of research on industrial economics Porter examined
why certain industries had higher average profit levels than
others and why certain firms within each industry earned
profits above that industry average. He developed a theory
of competitive pressure which determined the profitability
of firms in an industry and he categorised the activities of
firms who earned above-average profits in their respective
industries as following three generic stratgies. Porter formulated a piece of marketing theory, his analysis of industry
structure was certainly economic work, but its outcome
competitive strategy is theory which describes marketing
decisions, a fact which was quickly appreciated by marketing
academics and practitioners worldwide.
It appears, however, that those academics and practitioners
made no real attempt to apply critique and integrate Porter's
Figure 1.
Broad
target
Differentiation
1. Cost leadership
2. Differentiation
3 A . Cost focus
3B. Differentiation
focus
Competitive
scope
Narrow
Target
A Fourth Strategy
Kotler et al.[6] quite rightly pointed out that Porter actually
developed a fourth competitive strategy, which is unlike the
others in that it is a strategy for failure. Porter[l] described
this as stuck-in-the-middle, where a firm attempts to
implement more than one strategy and therefore does not
achieve any of the competitive advantages since "each
generic strategy is a fundamentally different approach to
creating and sustaining a competitive advantage". There have
been a number of critiques of this statement (e.g. [10]).
Porter himself has softened his stance to say that low cost
and differentiation are merely "usually inconsistent, because
differentiation is usually costly"[3]. Differentiation and low
cost are not incompatible under Porter's original definitions,
which made no distinction between having lowest costs of
production and implementing a low cost strategy. (For an
example of how this concept has been embraced see [11,
p. 113].) Under the new definitions in this article these two
strategies are clearly at odds.
Peter Wright and A. Parsina[7] cite several examples of
corporations implementing both focus and differentiation
strategies. Since these strategies are not at odds in that
2.
Risks of
differentiation
Risks of focus
Cost leadership is
not sustained
Ability to gain
proximity, then
excel in the
provision of one
benefit, is not
sustained
Understanding of
the segment's
unique
characteristics is
lost
Level of proximity
drops. Bases for
differentiation
become very
pronounced,
allowing
differentiators and
focusers to
increase share.
Level of
proximity rises,
Bases for
differentiation
become less
important to
consumers.
Target segment
becomes
unattractive.
Target segment's
differences from
other segments
disappear.
Market becomes
fragmented.
Proximity level is
very low.
Proximity is very
low. Market
becomes
fragmented to
the point that
focusers steal
the w h o l e
market, segment
by segment.
New focusers
sub-segment the
market.
10