SECOND DIVISION

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 177931

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

DEANG MARKETING
CORPORATION and BERLITA
DEANG,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
December 8, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Philippine National Bank (petitioner) assails the February 26, 2007
Decision[1] and the May 16, 2007 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals, which set
aside the Orders of May 16, 2006 and August 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, and consequently declared petitioner in default.
Respondents Deang Marketing Corporation and Berlita Deang filed before
the RTC of Angeles City a Complaint[3] against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case
No. 12686, for reformation of contract and specific performance, claiming that
a dacion en pago arrangement in the February 21, 2005 Consolidation and
Restructuring Agreement[4]forged by them transformed respondents outstanding
loan obligations into a 7-year term loan of P36,483,699.45.
Summons was served on petitioner on April 20, 2006.[5]
On May 15, 2006, respondents filed a Motion to Declare Defendant[-herein
petitioner] in Default,[6] which they set for hearing on May 24, 2006. On even date,
the trial court received petitioners Motion for Extension of Time [30 days up
to June 11, 2006] to File Answer[7] dated May 5, 2006.

The following day, May 16, 2006 or eight days prior to the slated hearing of
respondents Motion to Declare [Petitioner] in Default, the trial court issued an
Order denying said motion and granting petitioners Motion for Extension of Time
to File Answer. To the trial courts Order respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.
In the meantime, petitioner filed its Answer to the Complaint on May 25,
2006.
The trial court, by Order of August 9, 2006,[8] denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration of its May 16, 2006 Order denying their Motion to Declare
petitioner in default and granting the latters Motion for Extension.
Respondents subsequently assailed the trial courts Orders of May 16,
2006 and August 9, 2006 via certiorari to the Court of Appeals which, by the
challenged Decision ofFebruary 26, 2007, annulled the trial courts orders,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated May 16, 2006 and August 9, 2006 issued by the Hon. Omar T. Viola
are hereby ANNULLED andSET ASIDE. Accordingly, private respondent is
declared IN DEFAULT and the Answer filed by private respondent is
ordered EXPUNGED from the records of the case. The case isREMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution

of May 16, 2007, it filed the present Petition for Review (with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction) which ascribes
error to the Court of Appeals in:
. . . DECLARING PNB IN DEFAULT AND ORDERING THAT THE ANSWER
FILED IN THE RTC BE EXPUNGED FROM THE RECORDS OF THE CASE
[AND]
. . . ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDERS DATED MAY 16,
2006 AND AUGUST 9, 2006 OF THE RTC.[10]

The petition fails.

Petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer was laden with
glaring lapses.
Petitioner had, following the reglementary 15-day period after service of
summons (unless a different period is fixed by the court), [11] until May 5,
2006 within which to file an Answer or appropriate pleading. It filed the Motion
for Extension, however, via a private courier on May 14, 2006, which was received
by the trial court on May 15, 2006or ten days late.
It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended.
[12]
The courts discretion to grant a motion for extension is conditioned upon such
motions timeliness, the passing of which renders the court powerless to entertain or
grant it.[13] Since the motion for extension was filed after the lapse of the prescribed
period, there was no more period to extend.
Petitioner was not candid enough to aver in the Motion for Extension that
the period had lapsed, as it still toyed with the idea that it could get away with
it. The allegations therein were crafted as if the said motion was timely
filed. Notably, the May 16, 2006 Order expressed no inkling that the motion was
filed out of time. The trial court either was deceived by or it casually disregarded
the apparent falsity foisted by petitioner. Lest this Court be similarly deceived, it is
imperative to carefully examine the facts.
By petitioners allegation in its Motion for Extension, it received the
summons on April 24, 2006. This is belied by the Process Servers Return, which
indicates that petitioner received the summons on April 20, 2006. Petitioners
counsel was to later clarify that it was only on April 24, 2006 that she received
copies of the summons and complaint which were faxed from petitioners main
office.

In requesting for a 30-day extension or until June 11, 2006 to file answer,
petitioner apparently reckoned the date from which the extension would start on
May 12, 2006, which was not the last day of the 15-day period sought to be
extended, it being May 5, 2006. By computation, petitioner actually sought more
than 30 days, contrary to the period of extension it purportedly requested. The
counting of the period was erroneous, even if one uses the material dates alleged
by petitioner.[14] Petitioner clearly disregarded elementary rules[15] and
jurisprudence[16] on the matter.
The flaws in petitioners moves/representations reinforce respondents claim
that the Motion for Extension was cunningly dated May 5, 2006 (the last day to file
a responsive pleading) to make it appear that it was timely filed, although it was
transmitted only on May 14, 2006. Petitioners allegation that the Motion it filed
was the one actually prepared and signed on May 5, 2006 [17] contradicts its earlier
claim in its Opposition to the Motion to Declare [It] in Default that [s]hort of time
in coming up with [herein petitioners] Answer on April 28, 2006, its counsel
caused to be prepared a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer which was,
however, misplaced, and upon discovery thereof another motion for extension was
immediately caused to be prepared and filed.[18]
More. Petitioner served and filed the Motion for Extension through a private
courier, LBC, a mode not recognized by the rules.[19] Explanation for availing such
mode was not stated in the Motion.[20] The mode was, nonetheless, clearly
unjustifiable, considering that (a) petitioners handling counsel was based in nearby
San Fernando; (b) postal registry service is, for lack of explanation to the contrary,
available in Pampanga;[21] (c) urgency is out of the equation because the official
date of filing done via private messengerial service is the date of actual receipt of
the court,[22] and had the motion been personally filed the following day (May 15,
2006), it would have reached the court earlier. It thus shows that the mode was
utilized to obscure any indication that the motion was filed out of time.
In denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration of its grant of petitioners
Motion for Extension, the trial court ruled that it was inclined to reconsider or lift
an order of default.[23] By such ruling, the trial court preempted the dictates of
orderly procedure by unduly anticipating and signifying a slant toward the
remedies and arguments yet to be availed of and raised by petitioner.

Petitioner can not harp on Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on Higher

Educ.[24] which it cites. In that case, the Answer had already been filed albeit after
the 15-day period, but before the defendants were declared in default. In the
present case, had the hearing on the Motion to Declare Petitioner in Default pushed
through on May 24, 2006, the trial court would have readily noticed that no
Answer had yet been filed on said date, the Answer having been filed, as earlier
stated, only on May 25, 2006.
Neither can petitioner harp on Sps. Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,
for the Court therein held that it is within the discretion of the trial court to
permit the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period, provided
that there is justification for the belated action and there is no showing that the
defendant intended to delay the case.Thus, in that case, the therein defendantrespondent deferred the submission of a prepared Answer as it awaited the trial
courts resolution on its motion to dismiss, which resolution had, it turned out, been
priorly issued, a copy of which was, however, mistakenly addressed to another
counsel.
[25]

In the present case, no satisfactory reason was adduced to justify the

tardiness of the Answer and no compelling reason was given to justify its
admission. The intention to delay was rather obvious.
It is not amiss to mention at this juncture that the Courts attention has been
drawn to the fact that petitioners counsel even notarized the Verification
of respondentsComplaint as well as the Corporate Secretarys Certificate as early
as April 10, 2006. By such act, which is irregular, to say the least, petitioners
counsel was even made aware in advance of the impending filing of the case
against her client-herein petitioner.
Moreover, petitioners handling counsel belongs to its Legal Department which
monitors its pending cases and oversees a network of lawyers.
On petitioners counsels belated and trite allegation of heavy volume of work
which called for the filing of the Motion for Extension, nowhere is it therein
claimed that there was heavy volume of work in other equally important cases.

[26]

With the implication that petitioner had been all the while preparing an Answer,
it defies comprehension how petitioner still attributes the delay to inadvertence,
honest oversight and simple remission in its having allegedly misplaced the Motion
for Extension.[27]
The Court thus finds petitioners negligence inexcusable, as the
circumstances behind and the reasons for the delay are detestable.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
business. The bare invocation of the interest of substantial justice is not a magic
wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.[28]
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction
of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on
technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored
or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own
rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.
Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are
contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural
rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the substantive
rights of the litigants.
Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented
and justly resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except
only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide
by the rules.[29] (Underscoring supplied)

Given the foregoing circumstances, Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr., in his

Dissenting Opinion, still finds exceptional circumstances that warrant this Court to
suspend its rules and accord liberality to petitioner, citing Section 11, Rule 11 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:

Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend
the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to
be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

From the foregoing discussion, it is unimaginable how such terms as may be

just may be applied in petitioners favor. Under the stated premises, to grant the
petition along the lines of liberality is to countenance the context of fibs and flaws.
Obviously grasping straws in its final pitch to win the courts leniency,
petitioner employed a ploy to conceal not just the lapse of time but also the serious
lapses of non-compliance with basic rules. The scheme insults the intelligence of
the Court. While the Court frowns upon default judgments, it does not condone
gross transgressions of the rules and perceptible vestiges of bad faith.
Good faith is central to the concept of excusable neglect justifying failure to
answer.[30] An attempt to cover up the procedural lapses and obscure the technical
imperfections negates good faith on the part of the party imploring the
accommodating arm of the court.
In his Dissenting Opinion, Justice Velasco proffers that the complaint centers
on the interpretation of a contract which can only be determined if the parties are
heard in the course of trial.
There is no arguing that all complaints of whatever nature can only be determined
if the parties are heard. There is, however, a standing rule set in place for a
declaration of default, in cases where there is no justification for the belated action,
and there is showing that the defendant intended to delay the case. In this case, the
party lackadaisically squandered its opportunity to file a responsive pleading and,
worse, made deceptive moves in an obvious attempt to redeem itself.
The Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures and uphold the noble
purpose behind their issuance. Rules are laid down for the benefit of all and should
not be made dependent upon a suitors sweet time and own bidding.[31]

In preliminarily assessing the merits of the case, the Court is merely tasked to
consider whether the reception of defendants evidence would serve a practical
purpose, considering that respondents had, during the pendency of the case,
concluded the ex-parte presentation of evidence.[32]
Accordingly, after carefully reviewing petitioners Answer and Pre-Trial Brief, the
Court finds that to re-open the presentation of evidence just to ventilate the defense
of mere denial that there exists no dacion en pago and to present the written
agreement, the existence of which is already admitted by respondents, would serve
no practical purpose.

If petitioner is confident that the complaint lacks merit, then it need not worry
because once the defendant is declared in default, the plaintiff is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. Favorable relief can be granted only after it has
been ascertained that it is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven
by the presenting party.[33] In any event, petitioner, even if declared in default, is
not deprived of his right to appeal the decision of the trial court.[34]
To emphasize, the case does not involve any outright deprivation of life,
liberty or property. Contrary to what is being depicted, intimated or romanticized,
petitioner does not stand to lose P36,483,699.45 regardless of the characterization
of the commercial transaction entered into by the parties. The amount is secured by
mortgages over prime real properties, which is precisely the subject of the
alleged dacion en pago.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, pp. 10-16, penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Marlene GonzalesSison, concurring.
[2]
Id. at 18-20, penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso and Ricardo R. Rosario,
concurring.

[3]

Id. at 80-94.
Id. at 70-75.
[5]
Id. at 217-218.
[6]
Id. at 214-216.
[7]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 49-53.
[8]
Id. at 138-141.
[9]
Rollo, p. 16.
[10]
Id. at 36.
[11]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 11, Sec. 2; vide Rule 16, Sec. 1.
[12]
Vda. de Victoria v. Court of Appeals, G.R.. No. 147550, January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 319, 320.
[13]
Vide Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57079, September 29, 1989, 178
SCRA 94, 95.
[14]
Even if the original 15-day period to file pleading were to begin on April 24, 2006 in which case it would expire
on May 9, 2006, the 30-day requested extension would be up to June 8, 2006, not June 11, 2006. The
erroneously indicated due date presumes that the summons was received on April 27, 2006.
[15]
A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC (February 29, 2000) which provides that any extension of time to file the required pleading
should be counted from the expiration of the period.
[16]
Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 166980, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 332, 340 citing Luz v. National Amnesty
Commission, G.R. No. 159708, September 24, 2004, 439 SCRA 111, which states that the extension should be
tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after the expiration of such period. The court has no
discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the expiration of such period,
not even if the expiry date is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.
[17]
CA rollo, p. 112.
[18]
Vide Opposition to the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, records, Vol. 1, p. 71.
[19]
Vide RULES OF COURT, Rule 13, Secs. 3, 5 & 7.
[20]
Records, Vol. 1, p. 51. The written explanation in the motion erroneously indicates that petitioner availed of the
mode of registered mail.
[21]
While distance is an acceptable explanation why the motion was not served personally upon respondents counsel
in Pasig City, no credible justification has been offered as to why the motion was not instead served by
registered mail.
[22]
Industrial Timber Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111985, June 30, 1994, 233 SCRA 597, 602; Bank of the
Philippine Islands v. Far East Molasses Corp., G.R. No. 89125, July 2, 1991, 198 SCRA 689, 702.
[23]
Rollo, p. 129.
[24]
408 Phil. 483 (2001).
[25]
389 Phil. 13 (2000).
[26]
Records, Vol. 1, pp. 49-50.
[27]
Vide id. at 70-71, 133; The November 29, 2006 Affidavit of Atty. Elenita G.C. Quinsay (rollo, pp. 97-98) reads:
xxxx
5. That due to heavy volume of work vis--vis the need to coordinate with the PNB branch concerned
regarding the history of the accounts, the undersigned found it imperative to ask for an extension
of time to file answer, thus, she instructed her secretary to prepare a motion for Extension of time
to file answer, intended to be filed in court before the reglementary period within which to file
answer would elapsed;
6. The Motion was prepared earlier but due to the afore-stated stated reasons, the same was signed by
the undersigned in the late hours of 5 May 2006, the last day of filing an answer;
7. That in order to expedite the mailing of the said Motion, undersigned volunteered to use her car in
carrying the motion to the post office for mailing, however, the post office closed earlier than 5:00
PM, so undersigned has no recourse but to send it via LBC;
8. That on her way to the LBC, the motion placed at the dashboard of the car, slipped and fell off the
dash board, together with the other records she is bringing along with her;
9. While driving, undersigned hastily picked up the Motion and inserted the same in one of the folders
she is bringing along with records of Civil Case No. 12868;
10. When she reached the LBC Office, she did not notice the motion as it was inserted in a different
folder, thus she inadvertently failed to include the motion among the pleadings that she sent
via LBC;
xxxx
[4]

The Court notes petitioners allegation that it was not until May 14, 2006, a Sunday, when its
counsel realized that the motion was not filed when her secretary asked from her the proof of service of
the motion. (vide CA rollo, pp. 148-149).
[28]
Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000).
[29]
Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 605 (2003).
[30]
Villareal v. CA, 356 Phil. 826, 846 (1998).
[31]
Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, G.R. No. 148739, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 218.
[32]
Vide records, Vol. 2.
[33]
Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006, 485 SCRA 108.
[34]
Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc., G.R. No. 167631, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 433.