External factors and monetary policy: Indian evidence

Subir Gokarn and Bhupal Singh1

1.

Introduction

Two decades ago, when the Indian economy was less open and only moderately integrated
with the global economy, monetary policy had a relatively simple task in assessing growth
and inflation. Since then, with significant trade and capital account openness, the domestic
economy has become considerably more integrated with the global economy and domestic
financial markets reflect global developments very quickly. The transmission channels
through which global factors impact the domestic economy and financial markets are
numerous and complex. In India, it appears that all four channels of transmission (the trade,
financial, commodity price and expectations channels) operated and adversely affected real
activity during the recent global crisis. However, the strengths of the different channels of
transmission varied. Given this, monetary policy had to carefully gauge global risks so as to
inform its assessment of the growth and inflation outlook.
The concerns of monetary policy about external developments or shocks revolve around the
objectives of ensuring price and output stability, and also financial stability to the extent it
affects price and output stability. Output stability concerns may emanate from the impact of
external shocks on the domestic economy mainly through the trade and financial channels.
The intensity of impact would to a large extent depend on reliance on external demand
(trade) as a driver of growth, the degree of cyclicality of certain export-dependent sectors and
the dependence on external savings to finance growth. Price stability would be affected
mainly through commodity price shocks and the import intensity of the production process,
and through exchange rate developments. The financial stability objective may be impacted
by the degree of openness of the financial sector, the asset-liability mix, volatility in capital
flows with sudden stops and reversals, and foreign inflows leading to overshooting of
domestic asset prices such as equities and real estate. This paper sets out briefly why
monetary policy has become more sensitive to global developments and the key challenges
from global factors for monetary management.

2.

How globalised and integrated is the Indian economy?

Before examining how monetary policy formulation in India has been shaped by external
factors, it is pertinent to understand how and to what extent the Indian economy is integrated
with the global economy. The globalisation process in India was reinforced during the 1990s
and 2000s due to several important developments.
First, despite the dominance of domestic demand, the role of trade in conditioning the growth
process in India has become important over time. Trade openness increased substantially,
with the trade/GDP ratio doubling during the last decade. Second, services, which were
largely considered non-tradable, became increasingly tradable mainly due to offshoring led

Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, and Executive Assistant to the Deputy Governor, respectively. The
authors are grateful to Dr Abhiman Das, Jeevan Khundrakpam, Muneesh Kapur and Dr A B Chakraborty for
their useful comments.

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by rapid innovations in information technology, labelled as information technology-enabled

services (ITES) and business process outsourcing (BPO). A significant boost to global
integration thus came through rapid growth in Indias international trade in services in the
2000s, enabled by the expansion in information technology that facilitated the cross-border
delivery of services. Third, the trade channel of global integration has been, concomitantly,
supported by workers remittances, in both the unskilled and skilled market segments.
Fourth, the economy became more open to external capital flows. The gross capital
account/GDP ratio witnessed a more than threefold increase during the period. Progressive
liberalisation of the capital account was initiated in the 1990s and continued through the
2000s, contributing to the process of financial integration. The financial channel emerged as
a dominant factor with gross capital flows (inflows plus outflows) rising to nearly 50% of GDP
in 200910 from an average of about 5% in the 1980s (Table 1). Fifth, higher capital account
openness also strengthened the integration of domestic markets with global markets, as
reflected in the stronger correlations of equity and commodity prices with their global
counterparts. These developments also facilitated the role of expectations in transmitting
global shocks to the domestic economy. Sixth, even in commodity-producing sectors, global
integration also occurred through prices and not necessarily through physical trade, as global
price movements have an important expectations impact on domestic prices.
Table 1
Openness indicators of the Indian economy
(In percentages of GDP)

Goods trade

Services
trade

Gross
current
account

1970s

10.0

1.3

12.7

4.2

16.9

1980s

12.7

2.5

17.2

5.4

22.6

1990s

18.8

4.1

26.8

15.1

41.9

2000s

29.7

9.7

45.4

33.8

79.2

Gross
capital
account

Gross current
and capital
account

Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Monograph on Indias Balance
of Payments.

With increased global integration, the Indian economy has been subject to greater influence
of global business cycles. The degree of co-movement between the Indian and global
business cycles has significantly increased since the liberalisation of Indian economy
(Figures 1a and 1b). The correlation between the cyclical component of the index of
industrial production (IIP) of the advanced economies and that of India rose to 0.62 during
the period 19932010 from 0.18 in during 197092. The greater cyclical synchronisation of
the business cycle during recent periods is indicative of the growing global integration of the
Indian economy.

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Figure 1a

Figure 1b

Business cycles of advanced economies

and India: 197092

Business cycles of advanced economies

and India: 19932010

0.06

0.06

0.04

0.04
0.02

0.02

-0.02
-0.02

-0.04

-0.04
Cyclical industrial production of India
-0.06

Cyclical industrial production of India

-0.08

Cyclical industrial production of

advanced economies

Cyclical industrial production of

advanced economies

1993M01
1994M01
1995M01
1996M01
1997M01
1998M01
1999M01
2000M01
2001M01
2002M01
2003M01
2004M01
2005M01
2006M01
2007M01
2008M01
2009M01
2010M01
2011M01

-0.1

1970M09
1971M09
1972M09
1973M09
1974M09
1975M09
1976M09
1977M09
1978M09
1979M09
1980M09
1981M09
1982M09
1983M09
1984M09
1985M09
1986M09
1987M09
1988M09
1989M09
1990M09
1991M09
1992M09

-0.08

-0.06

Indias financial integration with the world has been as deep as, if not deeper than, its trade
globalisation (Subbarao (2010)). The deceleration in Indias growth associated with the
current global slowdown is also testimony to the increased global integration of the domestic
economy. Besides the synchronisation of trade cycles, the financial channel to integration
has also become prominent during the recent period. A causal analysis between the cyclical
component of Indian (BSE) and US stock prices (S&P 500 Index and Nasdaq index)
empirically validates the influence of global stock price movements on domestic stock prices
(Table 2).
Table 2
Causality between the Indian and US stock prices
Sample period: January 1993December 2010
Null hypothesis
BSE index does not Granger cause Nasdaq
Nasdaq does not Granger cause BSE index
BSE index does not Granger cause S&P 500
S&P 500 does not Granger cause BSE index

F-statistic

Result

0.23

Accept

8.00

***

0.94
7.37

***

Reject
Accept
Reject

*** Significant at the 1% level. Variables are seasonally adjusted.

These shifts in the degree of synchronisation of the Indian trade and business cycles with the
global cycles and increased correlation of financial asset prices in the past two decades
indicate that India cannot remain impervious to the global shocks. Empirically, it has been
established that financial channels have assumed a more dominant role in transmitting the
global shocks. Monetary policy thus has to take due account of risks arising from external
factors in its assessment of the inflation and growth outlook.

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3.

Capital flows, exchange rates and financial stability

An external stability objective of monetary policy entails minimising the risks associated with
financing a current account deficit with volatile capital inflows, which may disrupt economic
activity. Volatile and excessive capital flows have the potential to destabilise the exchange
rate and may have implications for domestic liquidity and asset price volatility. Sharp
appreciation of the exchange rate, regardless of fundamentals, adversely impacts the relative
global competitiveness of low value added manufactured exports of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), akin to Dutch disease. As the Reserve Bank is concerned not only about
output and price stability but also financial stability, it attaches paramount importance to
ensuring stability of the financial markets and institutions against adverse external shocks.
Since the initiation of the reform process in the early 1990s, India has encouraged all major
forms of capital flows, though with caution from the viewpoint of macroeconomic stability.
There have been occasional sharp swings (Figure 2a), which have engendered appropriate
policy responses. These include changes in reserve requirements for financial entities,
variations in the pace and sequencing of the reform measures and revisions in conditions
governing the end use of external funds. A widening current account deficit (CAD) in India
amidst volatile capital flows has also raised concerns about its sustainable financing and the
impact of such flows on domestic asset prices. Portfolio inflows are closely associated with
movements in stock prices (Figure 2b). There is, however, a bidirectional causal relationship
between the two, indicating that they reinforce each other. Nevertheless, the role of capital
flows in an asset price build-up cannot be ignored. While excessive volatility in the exchange
rate induced by volatile capital flows poses problems for exporters and importers in making
assessments about their future business decisions, capital flow-induced volatility in asset
prices may adversely affect the investment climate and have an adverse impact on growth.
Figure 2a

Figure 2b

Capital flows to India (net)

FII inflows and stock prices in India

300

120000

250
20000
200

80000

150

60000
40000

15000

100

Index

Rs. Billion

US $ million

100000

50

10000

0
-50

20000

5000

-100

0
Feb-04
Sep-04
Apr-05
Nov-05
Jun-06
Jan-07
Aug-07
Mar-08
Oct-08
May-09
Dec-09
Jul-10
Feb-11

0
Jan-00
Aug-00
Mar-01
Oct-01
May-02
Dec-02
Jul-03

2009-10

2007-08

2005-06

2003-04

2001-02

1999-00

1997-98

1995-96

1993-94

1991-92

1989-90

1987-88

1985-86

-150

Net FII flows

Sensex (RHS)

FII = foreign institutional investors.

There are both long-term and short-term issues in relation to the central banks role in
external management. Should the exchange rate be a policy instrument for long-term
growth? Are the choices and trade-offs different between large and small economies? These
are important questions in the current global economic debate. However, in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis, a major concern has emerged with respect to the possibility of large
capital inflows into emerging market economies (EMEs). This reflects the unevenness of the
strength of the recovery in advanced economies and EMEs and the attempts by the former to
find ways to continue to provide stimulus. EMEs are worried that a surge would destabilise

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their domestic economies through exchange rate appreciation or excess liquidity in a

situation where central banks are fighting with demand pressures.
What should central banks be doing to deal with this situation? While the justification for
capital controls is subject to several conditions, clearly, many countries that do not meet all
those conditions would be equally tempted to use controls as a way of protecting themselves
against the threats to stability from volatile capital flows and exchange rates and domestic
liquidity conditions. Is this an argument for capital controls? One may agree with this to a
limited extent, reflecting the conditions during the crisis and how different groups of countries
have emerged from it. However, the specific conditions, both domestic and global, that would
determine the desirability of capital controls for specific countries need to be thought through
(Gokarn (2010b)).
Intervention to manage the exchange rate is another way in which a central bank may
contribute to external stability. From a short-term perspective, the decision to intervene in
order to avoid destabilising both exporting and import-competing domestic producers needs
to be viewed in the overall context of domestic conditions. Masaaki Shirakawa, Governor,
Bank of Japan, argues that in a situation in which policy rates are already at the zero
boundary, exchange rate appreciation, which helps dampen inflationary pressures, would
allow the low interest rate scenario to persist, thereby raising the risks of an asset price
bubble (Shirakawa (2010)).
The Reserve Banks policy on exchange rates has been articulated as broadly
non-interventionist, except when confronted with excessively volatile, lumpy or disruptive
flows. This is an approach consistent with the notions of flexibility or constrained
discretion used in the context of boundary conditions for traditional approaches to monetary
policy. Essentially, these are conditions that would presumably trigger some deviation from
normal policy if abnormal circumstances were to arise. What would constitute abnormal
conditions, of course, cannot be explicitly indicated but will presumably be defined by specific
circumstances in which actions are taken.
From the standpoint of financial stability, shocks to domestic asset prices led by uneven
capital flows (ie sudden spurts and sporadic reversals) become a concern for central banks.
Such pressures on asset prices can cause capital losses for entities which have large
exposure to such assets and can be a source of instability. In India, however, these adverse
spillovers of volatile capital flows are minimised through prudential sectoral exposure limits
on bank lending, risk weights and provisioning norms.

4.

Pass-through of global shocks to domestic inflation in India

External shocks to domestic prices can come mainly through two channels: commodity
prices and the exchange rate. The pass-through takes place in two stages. First, export
prices of trading partners at global and regional levels percolate to import prices of India.
Second, changes in import prices affect costs of production and domestic supply of goods
and services, thus affecting aggregate domestic inflation measured by producers prices,
which, in India, are represented by wholesale prices. The most direct impact of global prices
on the domestic economy comes through the prices of primary commodities.
The impact of exchange rate movements on prices of imported commodities depends on the
extent to which the exchange rates are transmitted to import prices denominated in the
domestic currency. The literature suggests that some of the important determinants of passthrough are low global inflation and its lower volatility, the volatility of the exchange rate, the
share of imports in domestic consumption, the trade/GDP ratio, the composition of imports,
the invoicing pattern of trade, and tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Various empirical
estimates of the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices in India suggest that a
10 per cent change in the exchange rate could lead to a change in domestic prices in the
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range of 12 per cent in the long run (RBI (2004); Khundrakpam (2007); Mihaljek and Klau
(2008)).
It is evident that, except in the 1970s, Indias import price inflation remained higher than
domestic inflation through the 1980s to the 2000s (Figure 3). Higher imported inflation during
the 2000s was mainly led by the categories crude materials, mineral fuels, lubricants,
animal and vegetable oil, fats and waxes and chemicals and related products,
underscoring the role of global commodity price shocks in domestic inflation process. Higher
imported inflation relative to domestic inflation, particularly since the 1990s, thus suggests
the following. First, global commodity price shocks have become more dominant, particularly
mineral oil and metals, led by rising demand from the emerging market economies. Second,
the pass-through of imported input prices may have been limited due to either the public
policy interventions or the ability of producers of final consumption goods to absorb the rising
costs by improving productivity in the usage of such inputs or by adjusting profit margins in
the face of higher market competition, both internal and external.
Figure 3
Imported and domestic inflation in India

The results from causal analysis reveal that in agricultural commodities such as rice,
soybean oil, sugar, tea and cotton, global prices cause changes in domestic prices. Since in
this bivariate analysis we are not controlling for domestic production shocks or expectations,
the results imply that apart from domestic production, external supply shocks play an
important role in the evolution of prices of such agricultural commodities in India. In the case
of wheat and peanut oil, the causality is found to be reverse, implying that domestic prices
significantly influence the movement in global prices (Table 3).

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Table 3
Causal relationship between global and
domestic prices of agricultural commodities
Sample period: January 1994March 2011

F-statistic

Null
hypothesis
rejected

Lag
(months)

2.57***

Yes

Changes in rice prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world rice prices

0.44

No

Changes in world wheat prices do not Granger cause

changes in wheat prices in India

0.34

No

3.93***

Yes

Changes in world maize prices do not Granger cause

changes in maize prices in India

1.39

No

Changes in maize prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world maize prices

0.73

No

Changes in world groundnut oil prices do not Granger

cause changes in groundnut oil prices in India

0.27

No

Changes in groundnut oil prices in India do not

Granger cause changes in world groundnut oil prices

3.90**

Yes

Changes in world soybean oil prices do not Granger

cause changes in soybean oil prices in India

2.01**

Yes

Changes in soybean oil prices in India do not Granger

cause changes in world soybean oil prices

0.87

No

Changes in world sugar prices do not Granger cause

changes in sugar prices in India

2.08**

Yes

0.32

No

3.26**

Yes

0.98

No

6.12***

Yes

0.47

No

Null hypothesis:
Changes in world rice prices do not Granger cause
changes in rice prices in India

Changes in wheat prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world wheat prices

Changes in sugar prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world sugar prices
Changes in world tea prices do not Granger cause
changes in tea prices in India
Changes in tea prices in India do not Granger cause
changes in world tea prices
Changes in world cotton prices do not Granger cause
changes in cotton prices in India
Changes in cotton prices in India do not Granger
cause changes in world cotton prices

***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Test results from Granger causality in the case of non-agricultural commodities also provide
some important insights into the impact of global shocks on the inflation process in India.
There is significant causality from global crude oil prices to domestic prices of petroleum with
a six-month lag. The lag in the transmission can be attributed mainly to an administered price
mechanism, which does not allow an immediate pass-through of global price changes to

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domestic price changes. Apart from oil, there is evidence of significant causality from world
prices to domestic prices in commodities such as coal, iron ore and aluminium, which are
important inputs for the manufacturing sector and can potentially cause shocks to
manufactured product price inflation (Table 4).
Table 4
Causal relationship between global and
domestic prices of non-agricultural commodities
Sample period: January 1994March 2011

F-statistic

Null
hypothesis
rejected

Lag
(months)

8.96***

Yes

Changes in oil prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world oil prices

1.96*

Yes

Changes in world coal prices do not Granger cause

changes in coal prices in India

3.46**

Yes

0.01

No

8.96***

Yes

0.13

No

18.17***

Yes

Changes in aluminium prices in India do not Granger

cause changes in world aluminium prices

0.93

No

Changes in world copper prices do not Granger cause

changes in copper prices in India

0.45

No

Changes in copper prices in India do not Granger

cause changes in world copper prices

0.16

No

Changes in world silver prices do not Granger cause

changes in silver prices in India

2.31**

Yes

Changes in silver prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world silver prices

2.83**

Yes

Changes in world urea prices do not Granger cause

changes in urea prices in India

1.00

No

Changes in urea prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world urea prices

1.73*

Yes

Null hypothesis:
Changes in world oil prices do not Granger cause
changes in oil prices in India

Changes in coal prices in India do not Granger cause

changes in world coal prices
Changes in world iron ore prices do not Granger cause
changes in iron ore prices in India
Changes in iron ore prices in India do not Granger
cause changes in world iron ore prices
Changes in world aluminium prices do not Granger
cause changes in aluminium prices in India

13

***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

An analysis of two broad global commodity price cycles 2002 to early 2009 and the current
one beginning April 2009 suggests that the pass-through of global commodity prices to
domestic prices does not seem to be complete (Table 5). Pass-through seems to be higher
in the case of metals as compared with food items. This could be attributed to several
factors. First, there are restrictions on trade in food grains. Second, food grain prices may be
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conditioned more by domestic supply conditions and low dependence on imports to meet
domestic demand. Third, there is a larger dependence on imports for minerals and metals
and strong procyclicality in prices such commodities. Fourth, due to trading in minerals and
metals on both domestic and global exchanges, prices of such commodities seem to be
more correlated with global prices as compared with agricultural commodities, where a
number of regulatory restrictions are in place. Thus, risks to domestic inflation from external
shocks seem to emanate more from mineral and metal prices, which generally exhibit strong
procyclical movement.
Table 5
Increase in international and domestic commodity prices
(Year-on-year average, in per cent)
2002:042008:08

2008:092009:03

2009:042011:05

World

India

World

India

World

India

Aluminium

11.8

5.2

31.5

0.4

10.5

2.8

Coal

33.4

5.1

7.8

4.6

9.6

6.6

Copper

32.5

2.1

45.0

0.0

31.9

5.5

Gold

19.8

16.1

1.9

24.2

22.9

22.6

Iron ore

26.5

55.7

48.3

29.1

57.9

26.7

Petroleum

28.7

9.7

34.0

8.1

16.2

7.0

Silver

24.0

20.0

25.0

3.6

40.5

40.7

Urea

32.4

0.8

0.6

0.0

4.0

4.3

Cotton

10.7

6.2

18.1

21.0

54.5

22.3

Edible oil groundnut

24.7

9.9

2.4

4.9

3.0

6.9

Edible oil soybean

15.8

10.2

19.6

3.7

7.5

2.1

Maize

17.1

5.7

4.3

12.3

13.8

14.0

Rice

24.4

2.7

55.7

13.3

13.3

9.1

Sugar

13.2

1.9

12.9

17.1

38.0

21.4

6.0

5.4

16.2

47.4

9.6

7.8

20.7

4.6

34.0

5.4

7.3

6.5

Commodities
Minerals and metals

Agricultural commodities

Tea
Wheat

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Despite the incomplete pass-through of international price shocks to domestic prices in India,
there could be potential pressures arising from global demand-supply imbalances in certain
commodities. Moderation in the projected global stocks of cereals and non-cereals for
201011 suggests that global price pressures on these commodities may persist, which may
then impact on the domestic inflation outlook (Table 6).

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Table 6
Global commodity stock position
(Ending stocks in million metric tons)
200809

200910

2010111

2011122

Wheat

167

198

190

182

Coarse grains

194

195

157

149

Rice

92

94

96

96

Cotton3

61

44

44

51

Oilseeds

57

71

76

71

Oil meals

14

13

11

10

144

121

116

Vegetable oils
Corn
1

Estimated.

Projected.

In million 480 lb bales.

Source: US Department of Agriculture, World Demand and Supply Estimates.

Energy became a significant external risk to domestic inflation in India during the 1970s,
following the first oil shock, and has persisted in its contribution since then. One of the
fundamental drivers of high oil prices is increasing demand in EMEs, whose rising affluence
is resulting in the relatively rapid growth of energy-intensive activities. As relatively low-cost
reserves of fossil fuels are exhausted, rising global demand is being met by exploiting highercost sources. The cost differential between petroleum and alternative sources makes such
sources viable even at their relatively high costs. Steadily rising costs of production, in turn,
exert inflationary pressures on the global economy, which hits those economies hardest
whose energy intensity is increasing most rapidly (Gokarn (2010a)). In recent years, the
prices of petroleum, as well as other commodities, are perceived to have been further
impacted by their emergence as an attractive asset class. However, as significant as the
contribution of this factor may have been for price increases, the underlying fundamentals
(demand-supply) are what will continue to drive prices in the coming years. While demanddriven inflation shocks can be avoided by prudent monetary and fiscal policies, the
vulnerability of the domestic price process to supply shocks emanating from international
commodity prices is likely to persist.

5.

Conclusion

Over the past two decades, financial linkages have become stronger, resulting in a higher
degree of business cycle co-movement, which has also led to faster transmission of shocks
across countries. In India, too, trade openness has significantly increased, along with higher
capital account openness, which is reflected in greater synchronisation of domestic business
cycles with those of advanced and other emerging market economies. Further, among the
trade and financial channels, the latter seems to be more significant during the recent period
in transmitting the effects of global developments to the domestic economy, evident in the
faster and significant impact on domestic asset prices. Concomitantly, with the growing
global integration of domestic financial markets, regulatory and prudential policies have to
ensure that domestic financial markets and market participants are in a position to absorb
unanticipated and large shocks that can emanate from global developments so that the
financial stability objective is not compromised.
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While larger capital flows in the past reflected higher growth differentials, strong domestic
macroeconomic fundamentals, growing investor confidence and liberalisation of the capital
account, there have also been associated costs in terms of the inherent volatility of portfolio
flows and their implications for exchange rate volatility, asset price pressures and domestic
liquidity management. Although some countries have had recourse to direct capital controls
in the form of variants of Tobin taxes to overcome these challenges, the Indian approach so
far has been to abstain from such measures. Nevertheless, risks from volatile flows remain
an important concern in India.
Another important manifestation of the globalisation of monetary policy is challenges faced in
maintaining price stability due to global supply shocks. Empirical tests suggest that there is a
significant causal effect from global commodity prices to domestic prices in India. This
imparts some degree of exogeneity to the price formation process. It is often believed that
monetary policy cannot do much about supply shocks such as rising food and energy prices,
which may be true to some extent. Nevertheless, monetary policy in India is concerned about
global commodity price shocks, given their spillover effects on core inflation through input
cost increases and wage-price spirals, which could ultimately unsettle inflation expectations
and lead to generalised price pressures. The trend in imported inflation for India indicates
that it remained above domestic inflation, mainly due to elevated price pressures from
minerals, fuel, edible oil and chemical products. Given the tight global demand-supply
balance in most commodities, global developments may have a significant impact on
domestic prices. Monetary policy thus has to be vigilant against global price shocks to
safeguard domestic price stability.

References
Gokarn, S (2010a): Managing the growth-inflation balance in India: current considerations
and long-term perspectives, keynote address at the Private Equity International India Forum,
5 October.
Gokarn, S (2010b): Monetary policy considerations after the crisis: practitioners
perspectives, plenary lecture at the Conference on Economic Policies for Inclusive
Development organised by Ministry of Finance, Government of India, and National Institute
of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, 1 December.
Khundrakpam, J (2007): Economic reforms and exchange rate pass-through to domestic
prices in India, BIS Working Papers, no 225.
Mihaljek, D and M Klau (2008): Exchange rate pass-through in emerging market economies:
what has changed and why?, BIS Papers, no 35.
Reserve Bank of India (2004): Report on Currency and Finance 200304.
Shirakawa, M (2010): Advanced and emerging economies: two-speed recovery, Bauhinia
Distinguished Talk, Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre, Hong Kong SAR.
Subbarao, D (2010): Financial crisis some old questions and maybe some new answers,
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