Case Digest Rule 122
Case Digest Rule 122
Case Digest Rule 122
APPEAL
4.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages. Simultaneously,
on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court
gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal.On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the
Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused
from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on
appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution ofMay 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private
prosecutor filed the instant motion to dismiss.
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
Held:
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so only if the
accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.[9]Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that
the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the
judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the
offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them. [11
Issue: The question of whether or not the civil award in a criminal case may be appealed
Held: The petitioners are urging that the civil award in the sum of only P500.00 be increased because the accused should
not have been found guilty of only less serious physical injuries but of homicide. They are not confining themselves to the
civil aspect of the challenged decision. In their own words, their appeal involves "both the criminal aspect and the civil
liabilities in the criminal cases." 10 This is not permitted under the rule on double jeopardy.11
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would
be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. United States, 12 where the U.S.
Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place
him in double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction.
3. Appeal of civil aspectby accused
EFREN SALVAN y PRESENES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Facts: Petitioner Efren Salvan, a bus driver, was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide for the death of
John Barry Abogado, in Criminal Case No. 718-M-00 before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13. [3] At his
arraignment, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court then proceeded to receive evidence to determine the civil
liability of petitioner. During the course of the hearing, petitioner and private complainant Edna Abogado, the mother of the
accused, agreed to amicably settle the civil aspect of the case.
Issue: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED GIVING DUE COURSE TO ACCUSEDS NOTICE OF PARTIAL
APPEAL EXCLUSIVELY ON THE AWARD OF DAMAGES
HELD: Thus, we rule that, in an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the criminal liability and the civil liability ex
delicto should be considered independently, each with its own corresponding effects. In the present case, the law that bars
an appeal of the judgment of conviction, as well as its corresponding criminal liability, should not bar an appeal of the civil
aspect of the same judgment.
2.
3.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and any other rule insofar as they provide for
direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life, imprisonment. As well as the resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated September 19, 1995
in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in case similarly involving the death penalty are to be deemed modified
accordingly. Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, more particularly section 3 and
section 4 of the Rule 122, section 13 of Rule 124, section 3 of rule 125, and anyother rule insofar as they provide
for direct appeals from the RTC to the SC in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.
People v. Ochoa
Facts:Convicting appellant Rosario Rose Ochoa of illegal recruitment in large scale. The accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Robert Gubat, Junior Agustin, Cesar Aquino, Richard Luciano,
Fernando Rivera, Mariano R. Mislang, Helen B. Palogo, Jeobert Decolongon, Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A.
Bermejo, Letecia D. Londonio, Alma Borromeo, Francisco Pascual, Raymundo A. Bermejo and Rosemarie A.
Bermejo, for a consideration ranging from P2,000.00 to P32,000.00 or a total amount of P124,000.00 as placement
fee which the complainants paid to herein accused without the accused having secured the necessary license from
the Department of Labor and Employment.
Held: As Held in People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo,where it was held that appeals from decisions of the
RTC, wherein the accused is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, should be made to the
CA. Moreover, in Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the Court resolved to revise Rule 122, Section 3(c) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to read as follows:
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. - (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be by notice of appeal filed with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court
is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment or where a lesser penalty is imposed for offenses committed on
the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense
for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Rule.
4.
Facts: Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for
importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897 before the RTC of Pasay
City, Br. 114.After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995, the trial
court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.As the accused remains at large.
Issue: whether or not will proceed to automatically review her death sentence.
Held: The issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna, et al.,[1] we already held
thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot
be waived either by the accused or by the courts.
5.
Appeal of interlocutory
Basa v People
Facts:On January 12, 2000, Francisco C. Basa, Manuel H. Omea, Mark Philip L. Basa and Renato H. Uy, herein
petitioners, were charged with swindling under paragraph 2, Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code; and
falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the same Code, before the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
Issue: only issue for our resolution is whether petitioners appeal is proper.
Held:To tolerate the practice of allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would unduly delay the administration of
justice but also would unduly burden the courts.It is axiomatic that an order denying a motion to quash on the
ground that the allegations in the Informations do not constitute an offense cannot be challenged by an
appeal. This Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. The evident
reason for such rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. [11] To tolerate the practice of allowing
appeals from interlocutory orders would not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden
the courts.In Latican vs. Vergara, this Court defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash.
The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law
6.
Held: Neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Criminal Procedure exclusively vests in the Supreme Court the
power to hear cases on appeal in which only an error of law is involved. [7] Indeed, the Court of Appeals, under Rule
42 and 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, is authorized to determine errors of fact, of law, or both. [8] These rules
are expressly adopted to apply to appeals in criminal cases, [9] and they do not thereby divest the Supreme Court of
its ultimate jurisdiction over such questions.
claim the plane tickets in December 1993, but when they went to the Japanese Embassy, they were told that
nothing was filed with their office then informed the accused.
Issue: whether or not the jumped of bail by petitioner waived his right to be present at the trial
Held:The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he
has been duly notified and his failure to appear unjustifiable. In fact, in People vs. Tabag,[7] the Court even
admonished the trial court for failing to proceed with the trial of some accused who escaped from preventive
detention, to wit:
Finally, the trial court also erred in not proceeding with the case against Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod after their
successful escape on 19 October 1989 while in preventive detention. They had already been
arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the
Constitution, trial against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered
against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both accused have died and the fact of
such death is sufficiently established. Conformably with our decision in People v.Salas, their escape
should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court
to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to
be deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified
because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, then
pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been
brought to its ultimate conclusion.Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by
the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the
fugitives re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on
their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them.
2.
a.
b.
accused) pleaded not guilty and was thereafter accordingly tried and finally convicted in a decision promulgated on
October 5, 1970, a copy of which was served on and duly received by his counsel on October 13, 1970. On
October 28, 1970 or 23 days after promulgation but only 15 days from service of the aforesaid decision upon
counsel, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that "errors of law and irregularities have been committed
during the trial prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused." The said errors or irregularities consist of the
alleged failure of respondent judge to consider the defense of insanity in favor of the petitioner. On November 13,
1970, petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion wherein he emphasized the alleged irregularities attendant to the
promulgation of the decision. December 16, 1970, petitioner appealed by filing a notice of appeal, which appeal
was dismissed by respondent Judge, for having been filed out of time.
Issue: whether or not the notice of appeal on December 16, 1970, was seasonably interposed.
Held: under Rule 122, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides;
"When appeal to be taken An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion
for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his
attorney."cralaw virtua1aw library
In this case, since the decision was validly promulgated on October 5, 1970, when petitioners counsel filed a
Motion for New Trial on October 28, 1970, the period for perfecting the appeal had already expired, the last day
being October 20, 1970, the 15th day from promulgation. Even if We are to count the period of fifteen days to
appeal from the date when petitioners counsel received a copy of the decision (October 13, 1970) the last day of
the fifteen day period was October 28, 1970. His notice of appeal filed on December 16, 1970 was out of time. The
filing of the Motion for New Trial on October 28, 1970, suspended the running of the appeal period. This left
petitioners counsel only one (1) day to perfect appeal in the event his Motion for New Trial was denied. On
November 30, 1970, petitioners counsel received the order denying his Motion for New Trial. Therefore, he had
only up to December 1, 1970 within which to perfect his appeal. Needless to state, the motion for reconsideration
filed on December 1, 1970 being merely pro-forma, did not suspend the running of the period of appeal.
3.
declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing
the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since
then in this jurisdiction.
4.
b.
Waiver of appeal
Cal v. CA
Facts:After an information for illegal recruitment was filed with the aforementioned trial court on September 5,
1990, petitioner posted bail for his provisional liberty. On June 8, 1992, a decision was rendered in the
aforesaid criminal case wherein the petitioner herein was found guilty of violation of Article 36(a) of the Labor
Code as amended [illegal recruitment], and sentenced to, among other things, suffer imprisonment of four
years and pay a fine of P20,000. The decision was promulgated on July 15, 1992, in the presence of the
petitioner, after which he was committed to jail by virtue of an order of commitment issued the same day. The
following day, July 16, Petitioner, assisted by his counsel, filed with the court a quo an application for
probation, an affidavit of recognizance, and an application for release on recognizance. Also on the same day,
the trial court issued an order directing the petitioner to report to the Provincial Probation and Parole Officer,
and for the latter to conduct an investigation of the applicant and submit his report and recommendation within
sixty days.
issue: whether or not the application for probation instead of challenging the legality of the trial courts actof
issuing such commitment order to forecloses his right to appeal.
Held: yes. With respect to the first issue, there is no dispute that, as a rule, and unless the trial court directs
otherwise, the bail bond posted by an accused remains in force at all stages of the case until its final
determination. Now, in this case, since the trial court, immediately after the promulgation of judgment (and
without waiting for the finality thereof), issued a commitment order despite petitioners being out on bail,
petitioner should have challenged the legality of such commitment order. However, instead of doing
so, Petitioner, after having been properly advised by counsel on the effects and consequences of probation,
voluntarily and with the assistance of counsel filed an application for probation, along with an affidavit of
recognizance and an application for release on recognizance of his counsel. Petitioners actuations thus
foreclosed his right to appeal
Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, pertaining to the grant of probation, was amended by P.D. 1990 in order to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies 3 . Thus. Sec. 4 provides specifically that" (T)he filing of the
application (for probation) shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal"
"The purpose of the amendment [of Sec. 4 of P.D. 968 by P.D. 1990] was, precisely, to prohibit an application
for probation if the accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction [and vice versa].
Facts:In a letter-complaint dated April 4, 1994, Eteria T. Tan charged respondent Judge and Branch Clerk of Court of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of "obviously intentional deferment and delaying tactics" in the transmission to the Regional Trial
Court of the original records of Criminal Case No. 10781-R (People v. Alfonso Tan, et al.) for concubinage which she had
filed against her husband, Alfonso Uy Tan, and the latter's supposed paramour, Audita Laurente.cralaw
issue: whether or not respondent judge is liable for the delay of transmission of record.
Held. No. Rule 122, 8 provides that the clerk or judge of the court with whom the notice of appeal has been filed must,
within five (5) days after filing of the notice, transmit to the clerk of court to which the appeal is taken, the complete record in
the case together with the notice of appeal.cralaw
As far as Judge Coliflores is concerned, we find him not liable for the year-long delay in the transmission of the records.
While he has supervision of respondent Legaspi, respondent Judge cannot be expected to constantly check on the latter's
performance of his duties since respondent Legaspi is presumed to be a responsible employee. To the contrary, respondent
Judge had a right to expect that the Branch Clerk of Court would enforce his order.cralaw
Sec. 9 Appeal to Regional Trial Court
Sec.10 Transmission of Records in any Case of Death Penalty
1.
28,2000 decision of this court on appeal inposed by his co-accused is applicable and favorable to hi, and entitles
him to an acquittal pursuant to section 11 (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect
those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter.
Escao argues that the Decision of this Court is applicable and favorable to him in that "the factual findings therein
equally support the conclusion that not all the elements of the offense charged have been prove[d] and that no
criminal liability can, thus, be imputed to [him]." 3
After evaluating the issue and arguments raised by Escao, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested no
objection to his Manifestation and Motion and recommended that the same be given due course.
We find merit in the instant Manifestation and Motion. Consistent with our ruling in a number of cases, 4 the
acquittal of Usana and Lopez based on reasonable doubt should benefit movant Escao notwithstanding the fact
that he withdrew his appeal.
2.
3.
issue: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE HEREIN ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS WERE PREJUDICED AND PREVENTED FROM FAIRLY PRESENTING THEIR DEFENSE DUE TO THE
SERIOUS ERROR ON THE PART OF THEIR ATTORNEY WHO FAILED TO EXERT SUFFICIENT EFFORTS TO BRING
THE VITAL WITNESS TO TESTIFY IN COURT.
hELD.; NOTICE OF APPEAL; ONCE FILED, CANNOT BE VALIDLY WITHDRAWN. A notice of appeal, once filed, cannot
be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration or a petition for new trial since, as above stated, the filing of
the notice perfected the appeal and the court thereby lost its jurisdiction over the case; hence, it can no longer act on either
the motion or the petition. The only valid withdrawal of an appeal would be one where an accused decides to serve the
sentence.
3. Where withdrawal should be denied
People v. GatwardG.R. Nos. 119772-73 February 7, 1997
Facts: "That on or about the 30th day of August 1994, at the arrival area of Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay
City, . . ., the above-named accused not being authorized by law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
import and bring into the Philippines 5579.80 grams of heroin which is legally considered as a prohibited drug." (Information
also dated Sept. 14, 1994)Accused Nigel Richard Gatward in Criminal Case No. 94-6268 pleaded not guilty of the charge
when arraigned.
On the other hand, Accused U Aung Win in Criminal Case No. 94-6269, assisted by Atty. Willy Chan of the Public Attorneys
Office of the Department of Justice, entered a plea of guilty of the crime charged upon his arraignment. Since it is a capital
offense, the Court asked searching questions to determine the voluntariness and the full comprehension by the accused of
the consequences of his plea. The accused manifested that he was entering a plea of guilty voluntarily without having been
forced or intimidated into doing it. The nature of the charge was explained to him, with emphasis that the offense carries with
it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and his pleading guilty of it might subject him to the penalty of death. The
accused answered that he understood fully the charge against him and the consequences of his entering a plea of guilty.
The defense counsel likewise made an assurance in open court that he had explained to U Aung Win the nature of the
charge and the consequences of his pleading guilty of it.
her, inserting his penis into her vagina and having sexual intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, the accused released
Wilma and allowed her to leave the bathroom. Only after the departure of the accused did Wilma report to her mother the
fact that she had been raped by the accused four (4) times between the months of February and March of that year (1984).
Issue: whether or not the court may appoint counsel de oficio for the accused?
Held: Yes. DUTY OF THE COURT TO ASSIGN ONE DE OFFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED IF HE SO DESIRES AND HE IS
POOR. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an
accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own.Mandate provided in section 11 of Article III of the constitution.