Rule 118 Pre Trial Digest

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

May 6, 2021

RULE 118 - PRE-TRIAL

2. G.R. No. 226679

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for having illegally have in
his possession 0.084 gram of shabu.  Under Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165,
plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases.

On June 15, 2016, he filed a M otion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and be allowed
to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12 of R.A.
No. 9165 (for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia).

The trial court denied his Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
expressly prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Arguing that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional for it encroaches upon


the Supreme Court's rule-making power and therefore violative of the equal
protection clause, he filed a Petition before the SC to declare Sec. 23
unconstitutional.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that:

(1) Congress was not impleaded;

(2) the constitutionality of the law cannot be attached collaterally;

(3) the proper action should have been a petition for relief before the RTC,
and
(4) the petition fails to satisfy the requisites for judicial review. 

ISSUES: Whether Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165, which prohibits plea
bargaining in all violations of the said law, is unconstitutional for being
violative of the constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

RULING:

The SC ruled:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is


substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for


the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule


violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all
courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of
disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is
considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and
“legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby


the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining.  The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.
Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief
virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on


plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested
right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights


are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.  Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but
depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged.  The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to
always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on
what the evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to


the point when the prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s


exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a


bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former
plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence
on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness
of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea
is improper and irregular.

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