Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No.

113092 September 1, 1994

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
G.R. No. 113092
September 1, 1994

KTA: Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in
the exercise of police power. The State has authority under the exercise of its police power
to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons
or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. Certainly the solicitation of contributions
in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged
the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the unworthy.
Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for
violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for
the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a
fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.
The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of
Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint
against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from
the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in
the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term religious purpose is
not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include,
it excludes.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in the broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose.

Held/Ratio:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words charitable and religious
separately and independently of each other.
In P.D. 1564, it merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes which means that it
was not the intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes.
The world religious purpose is not interchangeable with the expression charitable
purpose.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended
for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as
earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is
acquitted of the offense charged.

NPC v. Cabanatuan City

Action:
A petition for review of the Decision and the Resolution of the CA finding NPC liable to pay
franchise tax to City of Cabanatuan.
Fact:
NAPOCOR, the petitioner, is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under
Commonwealth Act 120. It is tasked to undertake the development of hydroelectric
generations of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal, and other
sources, as well as, the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis.
For many years now, NAPOCOR sells electric power to the resident Cabanatuan City.
Pursuant to Sec. 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92, the respondent assessed the petitioner a
franchise tax representing 75% of 1% of the formers gross receipts for the preceding year.
Petitioner, whose capital stock was subscribed and wholly paid by the Philippine
Government, refused to pay the tax assessment. It argued that the respondent has no
authority to impose tax on government entities. Petitioner also contend that as a non-profit
organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees
in accordance with Sec. 13 of RA 6395, as amended.
Issue:
(1) Is the NAPOCOR excluded from the coverage of the franchise tax simply because its
stocks are wholly owned by the National Government and its charter characterized is as a
non-profit organization?
(2) Is the NAPOCORs exemption from all forms of taxes repealed by the provisions of the
Local Government Code (LGC)?
Held:
(1) NO. To stress, a franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but on the exercise
by the corporation of a privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the corporation which
exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. By virtue of its charter,
petitioner was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National Government. It
can sue and be sued under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Code.
To be sure, the ownership by the National Government of its entire capital stock does not
necessarily imply that petitioner is not engaged in business.

(2) YES. One of the most significant provisions of the LGC is the removal of the blanket
exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the National Government from the coverage
of local taxation. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees, or charges of
any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now
admits an exception, i.e. when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose
taxes, fees, or charges on the aforementioned entities. The legislative purpose to withdraw
tax privileges enjoyed under existing laws or charter is clearly manifested by the language
used on Sec. 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the
exceptions enumerated. Since it would be tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate
all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided
for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges. No more
unequivocal language could have been used.
G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing
mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1.
Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2.
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.
Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other
remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and
in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections
subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the
statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in
relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble
purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents
in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which
was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and
the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the

Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be
remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel
(MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITTSheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila
Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a
letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of
51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila
Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are selfexecuting.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
Held:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise
of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to
or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a
constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon
a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to
operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and
the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative

body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs
no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words
the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts,
sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various
significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights,
privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a
choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter
shall be chosen over the former.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on
Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from
selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of
Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and
document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and
deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and
Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee
on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House
in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four
months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October
23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided
in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is
clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief
Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended
to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are
two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not
truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by
virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.