Succession Aug 25

SUCCESSION | August 25|1
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND
BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE
JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas
de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated
"FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both
recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature.
They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language in
which the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when
said Will was executed by their mother.
Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate"

assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not
executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation
and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged
testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will
to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the
probate of the holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed in
accordance with law.
Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.

Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C.
Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the
probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia
that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as
required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the
Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be
strictly complied with.
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special
Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de
Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother
of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and
disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated" has
generally been held to include the month, day, and year. The dispositive portion of the
order reads:
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After
Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower
court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus. On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the
probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.
WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will of

Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not having been
executed as required by the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is
hereby set aside.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he

found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21,
22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely written and
signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is
dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be respected although it
is not written by a lawyer. ...
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will
of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of
the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688
of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year,
month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Ao mes y
dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners
submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic Will
is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must
contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent contends that Article
810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and
Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that
the required date includes the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is
wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further contends that the
petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code because
statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills
are strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application
of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not
overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the
purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy
The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the
provisions of the law on wigs in this Project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but
with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission
of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the testator.
This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to
the formalities in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 103)
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos (27
SCRA 327) he emphasized that:
xxx xxx xxx
... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed
in his last will and testament on the ground that any disposition
made by the testator is better than that which the law can make. For
this reason, intestate succession is nothing more than a disposition

based upon the presumed will of the decedent.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order
to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of
testamentary privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed
in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith
and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate
(Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,
xxx xxx xxx
... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are
to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the
surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the wilt
and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should,
in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean
towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer
from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential
defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites,
although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to
be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the
testator.
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded
by this Court in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that
of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on
the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such
contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith
and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments.
There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus
was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language
known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All

the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their
mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said
Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the
holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This
objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and
year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of
fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the
holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the
holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the
holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand,
Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of
sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was
in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's
body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations
and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES
ROBERTO
AND
THELMA
AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.
Montilla Law Office for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
This
is
an
appeal
by certiorari from
the
Decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19,
1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic
will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide
only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no
reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply
with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question
is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only
objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not
written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to
the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity
of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the
testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of
the evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate
must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed
to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx

While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners,
however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will
in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have
convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix
have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified
the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was
written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix.
Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that
the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix,
(private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court
that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited
her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time
the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be
of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making
the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper object of her bounty, and thecharacter of the testamentary
act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed
knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot
number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The
objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And
considering that she had even written a nursing book which
contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is
more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the
testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and
the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor
of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the
disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the
said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence
adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or
influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent)
Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the
time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her
birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that
she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her
independence of character and to some extent, her sense of
superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the
unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured
to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence
or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a
will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which
is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the
circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the
disallowance of the will herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on
succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be
preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing
grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the
holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted
herein must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will
was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles
813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic
will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a
signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it,
whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full
signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or
signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations
made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of
the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to
make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,
on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his
benefit;
law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time
the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were
the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was
not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles
813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed
the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick,

and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the
time of fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise
mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of
its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under
duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not
intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a
petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1)
whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to

close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So
when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and
806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance
of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132
SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of
the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is
correct and must be affirmed.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and

interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not
been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical
commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances,
courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon
certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably
stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late
father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of
the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on

the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of
such changes.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and
lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting
to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with
the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing
and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from
that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will
(Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil
Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They
read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it
himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full
age.
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper
corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by
the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its execution.
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the
testator must identify them over his signature.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles
813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA
A.
VDA.
DE
ENRIQUEZ,
ET
AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed
a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A".
Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of
Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in
value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A",
filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed
opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified
without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses,
Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke
and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of
each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered
the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at
the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that
it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last
page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.

The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it
was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed
and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law
still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new
Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic
wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which
according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in
form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A",
as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing
from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the
case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a
person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and
signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at
the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died
in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not
folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the
three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A"
because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one,
not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they
were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of
Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses
to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough
that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or
leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of
them should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her
witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement,
this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left
margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto.
The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses
who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five
pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect
that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the
new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions
were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795
of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above
provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that
the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's
death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
This ruling has been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil.,
23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and
controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be
resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the
execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required
by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to
validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of
execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the
testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a
vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills
which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will
which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of
its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law
with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to
execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of
their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied
probate. With costs.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72
November 27, 2006
DY
YIENG
SEANGIO,
BARBARA
D.
SEANGIO
and
VIRGINIA
D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS
and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders,
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition,
in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v.
Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C.
Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of
the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio
Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left
a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They
likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc.
No. 9890870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as
follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko
at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na
ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay
nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r]
ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan
kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko
siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No.
9993396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the

deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee,
hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on
the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of
the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of
the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally,
the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic
validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic
validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a
decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does
not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio,
et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are
Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code
thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854
does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount
to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for
respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress
when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an
exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated
October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE
TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION,
WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY
TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS
INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON
EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID;
AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the

appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said
notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as
its title clearly states,Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance
of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will
since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is
both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed
with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was
dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of
preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of
the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a
form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a
sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the
Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children
and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against
the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which
the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has
been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage
with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant
who disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; 8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo
can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does
not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who
would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as
the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones

drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is
convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion,
Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the
sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of
his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her
name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his
son, Alfredo.1wphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the
law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic
will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside.
Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings.
No costs.

Katigbak in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the first will dated
March 19, 1943. On the same day, the court issued an order approving the stipulation
and directing the parties to comply with the terms and conditions thereof.
On September 11, 1945, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
August 30, 1945. After due hearing held on September 21, 1946, the court denied the
motion in an order dated September 22, 1945. The order of August 30, became final.
Victor Katigbak presented a project of partition in pursuance of the stipulation dated
August 30, 1945. The project of partition was approved with modification in an order
dated December 20, 1945. Petitioner was notified of the order on January 3, 1946. The
order also became final. On March 28, 1946, the court ordered Victor Katigbak to
render final accounts of administration and to distribute the estate in accordance with
the order of December 20,1945.
G.R. No. L-363
August 5, 1946
GREGORIO
K.
KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
IIGO S. DAZA, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, VICTOR KATIGBAK and
GUILLERMO KATIGBAK,respondents.
Gregorio
K.
Kalaw
Ruben D. Hilario and Conrado
No appearance for respondent Judge.
in
V.
Sanchez
his
for
own
respondents
behalf.
Katigbak.
PERFECTO, J.:
Two separate proceedings were started in the Court of First Instance of Batangas for
the settlement of the testate estate of Lorenza Katigbak: No. 59, initiated by Paz Kalaw
for the probate of a will dated March 19, 1943; and No. 60, began by respondent
Victor Katigbak for the probate of another will executed on August 6, 1944.
Petitioner Gregorio K. Kalaw filed on July 20, 1945, in case No. 60, an opposition both
to the probate of the second will and to the appointment of Victor Katigbak as special
administrator, praying that he and Andres Luz be appointed as special administrators.
He prayed also that cases Nos. 59 and 60 be joined. After the hearing on July 27,
1945, the lower court appointed Victor Katigbak as special administrator.
On August 30, 1945, all the parties submitted to the court a written stipulation in
special proceedings Nos. 59 and 60, signed by all the parties, including petitioner,
agreeing, among other things, to partition the properties left by the deceased Lorenza
Petitioner complains because on August 3, 1945, the lower court denied his petition
dated July 20, 1945, praying that special administrator Victor Katigbak be cited and
required to produce in court, for the inspection of all the heirs, the jewelries and
money left by the deceased. Petitioner alleges that on August 5, 1945, he moved for
reconsideration of the order of denial dated August 3, 1945, and his motion was denied
on August 17, 1945, without prejudice to its being considered and acted upon at the
hearing of the case on the merits. The lower court did not err in not acting on said
motion, because petitioner's failure to insist that it be acted on at the time the court
approved the project of partition in accordance with the stipulation signed and agreed
upon by him constitutes an implied waiver of his right, if he has any, to insist on said
motion.
In respondent's answer, and under the oath of Victor Katigbak, it is alleged that at the
time of the filing of his motion of July 20, 1945, petitioner knew fully well that since
November 1, 1944, petitioner's own sister, Paz Kalaw, had distributed all the jewels of
the deceased and respondent Guillermo Katigbak all the cash in Philippine money to all
the legatees in pursuance of the will dated March 19, 1943, and that the order of
December 20, 1945, approving the project of partition in accordance with the
stipulation of August 30, 1945, constituted a confirmation and ratification of the prior
distribution made by Paz Kalaw and Guillermo Katigbak of the jewels and cash left by
the deceased Lorenza Katigbak, the distribution having been made long before
respondent Victor Katigbak's appointment as special administrator. Petitioner did not
deny this allegation by reason of which his motion dated July 20, 1945, appears to be
groundless. If it had any ground to stand upon, petitioner's inaction since his motion
for reconsideration was denied on August 17, 1945, and his having signed the
stipulation dated August 30, 1945, for the final and complete settlement of the estate
of the deceased Lorenza Katigbak, preclude him from seeking relief against
proceedings which appear not to have affected him adversely in any way.
Petition dismissed with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will
executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:
My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of
sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and
testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In
accordance with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named
provide and erect at the expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my
memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as
her sole heir. Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed
probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of
the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

ROSA
K.
KALAW, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration

in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his
full signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect
and probated so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.

Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the
sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3,
reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting,
the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were
made by one and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit "C" was
the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only
question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to
probate although the alterations and/or insertions or additions

above-mentioned were not authenticated by the full signature of the
testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil Code. The petitioner
contends that the oppositors are estopped to assert the provision of
Art. 814 on the ground that they themselves agreed thru their
counsel to submit the Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS.
This is untenable. The parties did not agree, nor was it impliedly
understood, that the oppositors would be in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the
Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions,
alterations and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by
the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will
deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic
will of Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the
alterations and/or insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her
holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition.
Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that
"Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for
interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated
November 2, 1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on
certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not theoriginal unaltered text after
subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her
as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words
erased, corrected or interlined.1 Manresa gave an Identical commentary when he said
"la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial
provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which
alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the
testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple
reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state
that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming
change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations,
erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the
altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is,
with the erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real
intention cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had stated in his
commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new
Civil Code was derived:
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la
sentencia que no declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que
contenga palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre renglones no
salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo
tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision solo puede
afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al
testamento mismo, ya por estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de
aquel que determine las condiciones necesarias para la validez del
testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al
absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en nada
afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a
anular este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha
de entenderse en perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de la
ley del Notariado que declara nulas las adiciones apostillas
entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las escrituras matrices,
siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro no el
documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando las
palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan
importancia ni susciten duda alguna acerca del pensamiento del
testador, o constituyan meros accidentes de ortografia o de purez
escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l).
Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en
este ultimo fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o
entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4
alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la express voluntad del
testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia de
29 de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo
por no estar salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo
del ao en que fue extendido 3(Emphasis ours).

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge,
dated September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123486
August 12, 1999
EUGENIA
RAMONAL
CODOY,
and
MANUEL
RAMONAL, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINE
R.
CALUGAY,
JOSEPHINE
SALCEDO,
and
UEFEMIA
PATIGAS, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 and its resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:
Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has
been established and the handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are
hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal of the judgment appealed from
and the probate of the holographic will in question be called for. The rule is
that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the
defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground
that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the
motion is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the
movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35
Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for appellant
in the instant case.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered
allowing the probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal.2
The facts are as follows:
On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees
and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition 3 for probate
of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.
In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal,
was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that
there was no fraud, undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the
testator, and will was written voluntarily.

The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property
was about P400,000.00, at the time of her death.4
basis for comparison of the handwriting of the testatrix, with the writing treated or
admitted as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition 5 to
the petition for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the
same is even illegible. This gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested
party other than the "true hand" of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal executed the
holographic will.
Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and
identify the voter's affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not
produced for the same was already destroyed and no longer available.
Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after
every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the
will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after
the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that
the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud
and trickery.1wphi1.nt
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal
was her aunt, and that after the death of Matilde's husband, the latter lived with her in
her parent's house for eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11)
years of close association the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and
handwriting as she used to accompany her (deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal)
in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings, and deceased
always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde Binanay) assisted the
deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters of the
deceased to her creditors.
Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence.

Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer 6 to evidence, claiming
that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of
the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda.
de Ramonal, she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally
and entirely written, dated and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions
therein, the dates, and the signatures in said will, were that of the deceased.
On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro, he was a practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed
by the deceased in connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a result of
which he is familiar with the handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was similar to that of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to

Evidence having being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for
probate of the document (Exhibit "S") on the purported Holographic Will of the
late Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for insufficiency of evidence and
lack of merits.7
On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in support of their
appeal, the respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses,
namely: (1) Augusto Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4)
Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.
To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account
of their testimonies.
Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the
special proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed.
He produced and identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear the
signature of the deceased, Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the
The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the
application of the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of
the deceased, since the signed documents in her presence, when the latter was
applying for pasture permit.
Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with
the deceased since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period
of time she became familiar with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the
signature appearing in the holographic will is the true and genuine signature of Matilde
Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:
Instruction

August 30, 1978
6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.
1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal
August 30, 1978

August 30, 1978
Gene and Manuel:
2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.

August 30, 1978
Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.

Mama
Matilde Vda de Ramonal
3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:

1. Eufemia Patigas
2. Josefina Salcedo
3. Evangeline Calugay
August 30, 1978
4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R.
Calugay
August 30, 1978
5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of
Evangeline R. Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no
longer around.
On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision 9 ruling that the appeal
was meritorious. Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102,
penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of
Appeals held:
. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of
the opinion that Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as
to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since
no witness may have been present at the execution of the holographic will,
none being required by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious that
the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding
and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of
course, even if the law does not express) "that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness
acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness
maybe unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of
paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is evidently
the reason why the second paragraph of article 811 prescribes that
in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding
paragraph, and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be
resorted to.

August 30, 1978
As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be
found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be
willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to
expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be
presented if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was
derived from the rule established for ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs.
Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57 PHIL 742). But it can not
be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in case of
ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three
witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their
validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness need be present
(art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be
deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.
Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the
words "if the court deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems
essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where
the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by
their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call
for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available,
or none of those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in fact it
should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to
exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.
Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to
require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting of the testator, under penalty of the having the probate denied.
No witness need be present in the execution of the holographic will. And the
rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What
the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of
the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as
much interested in the proponent that the true intention of the testator be
carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if
experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party's
failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses. 10
According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and
other witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and
signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.
Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the
holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and allowed the will to
probate.
Hence, this petition.

The petitioners raise the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102,
relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private
respondents had been able to present credible evidence to that the date, text,
and signature on the holographic will written entirely in the hand of the
testatrix.
(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures
in the holographic will of Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil
Code are permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the
probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare
that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator.1wphi1.nt
We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in
a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea
of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute
is mandatory.11
Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief
that aims to prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the
wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous
individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine
the true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the
evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator.
It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified
explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of testator. In the case of
Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely
identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said court. He was not
presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that
of the deceased.

Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to
identify the signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was not even
produced as it was no longer available.
A.
I am familiar with her signature.
Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de
Ramonal kept records of the accounts of her tenants?
Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with
your parents at Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what
was your occupation or how did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy
that time?
A.
Collecting rentals.
Q.
From where?
A.
From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez
streets.12
xxx
xxx
xxx
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Why do you say so?
A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda.

De Ramonal.
Q.
How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?
A.
In handwritten.14
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
Who sometime accompany her?
Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants

and deed of sale which you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of
the signature of Matilde Vda De Ramonal?
A.
I sometimes accompany her.
A.
Posting records.
Q.
In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?
Q.
Aside from that?
A.
Yes, sir.13
A.
Carrying letters.
Q.
Letters of whom?
A.
Matilde.
Q.
To whom?
A.
To her creditors.15
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you
are referring to as one of the receipts which she issued to them?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature

is that Mrs. Binanay?
A.
Matilde vda. De Ramonal.
Q.
Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you
a document with its title "tugon" is this the document you are referring to?
A.
Yes, sir.

Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose
handwriting is this?
Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left
that will to you and therefore you have that in your possession?
A.
My Aunt.
A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when

she died.
Q.
Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?
A.
Because I am familiar with her signature.
Q.
After taking that document you kept it with you?
A.
I presented it to the fiscal.
Q.
For what purpose?
A.
Just to seek advice.
Q.
Advice of what?
A.
About the will.18
16
What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which
she either mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the
deceased sign a document or write a note.
Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that
the will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of Ms. Binanay. She testified that:
Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the
late Matilde Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?
In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from
petitioners, the legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her
motive of keeping the will a secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal.
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
Who was in possession of that will?
A.
I.
Q.
Since when did you have the possession of the will?
Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is
that correct?
A.
It was in my mother's possession.
A.
Q.
So, it was not in your possession?
Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely
and she could go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?
A.
Sorry, yes.
In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:
A.
Q.
And when did you come into possession since as you said this was
originally in the possession of your mother?
A.
1985.17
xxx
Yes, sir.
Yes, sir.19
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know

that there are retracings in the word Vda.?
xxx
xxx
A.
Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.

Q.
And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde
is continued towards letter D.
Yes, sir.
Q.
And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?
A.
Yes, sir.20
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic
will. Now, you identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated
January 8, 1978 which is only about eight months from August 30, 1978. Do
you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal is beautifully written
and legible?
A.
A.
Yes, sir.21
Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in
the handwriting of the testator. She testified that:
A.
xxx
Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned
signature appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in
the handwriting themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors,
do you notice that?
Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.
Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and
Justo Ramonal for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services
if any which you rendered to Matilde Ramonal?
A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to
her transactions.
Q.
What else? What services that you rendered?
A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes
and to her lawyer.
Q.
What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?
Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was
healthy was not sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?
A.
I used to be her personal driver.
A.
Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the
handwriting of Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
In writing.
Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present
and you just tried to explain yourself out because of the apparent
inconsistencies?
A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
How come that you acquired familiarity?
A.
Because I lived with her since birth.22
That was I think. (sic).
Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as
the alleged holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no
retracing; there is no hesitancy and the signature was written on a fluid
movement. . . . And in fact, the name Eufemia R. Patigas here refers to one of
the petitioners?
A.
A.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated

Agosto 30, 1978 there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this
court whose signature is this?
Yes, sir.
A.
Yes, sir, that is her signature.

Q.
Why do you say that is her signature?
xxx
A.
I am familiar with her signature.23
Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which

is marked as exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a
signature over the type written word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose
signature is this?
So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the
handwriting of the deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never
declared that she saw the deceased write a note or sign a document.
xxx
xxx
A.
That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.
Q.
Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?
A.
This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal. 27
The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:

Q.
Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my

godfather. Actually I am related to the husband by consanguinity.
Q.
Can you tell the name of the husband?
A.
The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde
Ramonal have legitimate children?
A.
As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A.
Here in Cagayan de Oro City.
Q.
Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de
Ramonal?
A.
I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.
Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as
in what case is that, Fiscal?
A.
It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was
under the court before.26
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427
what were the other assistance wherein you were rendering professional
service to the deceased Matilde Vda de Ramonal?
A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are
documents to show that I have assisted then I can recall. 28
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over

this document, Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with
the handwriting contained in that document marked as exhibit "S"?
A.
I am not familiar with the handwriting.
Q.
This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?
A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda
de Ramonal.
Q.
Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de
Ramonal, can you tell the court whose signature is this?
A.
Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.
Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can
you tell the court whose signature is that?

A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de
Ramonal.
Q.
Why do you say that?
A.
Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.
Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose
signature is this?
A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are
similar.29
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde
Vda de Ramonal Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde
vda de Ramonal?
A.
Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.
Q.
So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de
Ramonal. You are merely supposing that it seems to be her signature because
it is similar to the signature of the project of partition which you have made?
A.
That is true.30
From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to
probate and disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested
holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31ruling that the requirement
is merely directory and not mandatory.
The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the
respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of
Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five
years before the death of the deceased.
There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting
of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime.
The only chance at comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when
the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which
contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not
a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to
the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different
when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the
testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will.
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33 and the
signatures in several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated
December 30, 1980,34 and a letter dated June 16, 1978, 35 the strokes are different. In
the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no
hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain
that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered
remanded to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce
evidence in support of their opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seo vda. de Ramonal.1wphi1.nt
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the
will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires
three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

3617, for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel
Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow
and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of
residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It
is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago and
petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private
respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters
residence prior an- d up to the time of her death.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog,
appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two
(2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including
the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public
were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the
will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which
is found on page four, reads as follows:
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

RIZALINA
GABRIEL
GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
Francisco D. Rilloraza, Jr. for petitioners.
Angel A. Sison for private respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, First
Division, 1 promulgated on May 4, 1973 in CA G.R. No. 36523-R which reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated December 15, 1964 and allowed
the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel. *
It appears that on June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Special Proceedings No.
Kaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga

tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga
pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at
ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na
binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na
siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng
Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel
ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika
apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin
of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at
kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora,
at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng
mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng
testamentong ito.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of
Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same,
under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54,
Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas.
Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is
paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)",
"Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each
page.

The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery
of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all
expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that
legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago,
her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina
(herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline,
Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein
private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as
"aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng
isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all
properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her
testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the
document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:
1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative
2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the
decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
and in the second alternative
4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or
of some other person for her benefit.
Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial,
the court a quo rendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which
read:
Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor,
this Court finds:
1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the
purported will of the deceased was procured through undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of
some other person for her benefit;
2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at
the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased
lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;
3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the

fact that the purported will of the deceased was not executed and
attested as required by law;
4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document
presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win allegedly
dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested
by her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.
WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the
last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by
DISALLOWED.
From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court,
hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was
executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of
the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding
that the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on
April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso
Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of
the deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.
Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration 3 of the aforesaid
decision and such motion was opposed 4 by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago.
Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda, 5 and on August 28, 1973,
respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution 6 denied the motion for
reconsideration stating that:
The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence
shows that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel
was not executed in accordance with law because the same was
signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in
the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in
the presence of each other.
The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for
reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have
carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record,
There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this
Court sought to be set aside. 7
In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that
respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The

Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the
Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon, which
comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues
raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment 8 of private
respondent thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973, 9 the
question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the findings of fact by
respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.
VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and
misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner
had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies.
Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for
Reconsideration 10 which private respondent answered by way of her Comment or
Opposition 11 filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed.
Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.
X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting
to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Isabel
Gabriel.
The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:

I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was
executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the
three instrumental witnesses were credible witness
II. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the
preparation and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously
furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him
to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines
under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows
beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible
that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or
document, to Atty. Paraiso.
VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde
Orobia was not physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on
April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya
and Maria Gimpaya.
VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance
to the picture takings as proof that the win was improperly executed.
IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an
exercise of the power of supervision.
It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially
factual in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the
oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this
Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated
in Chan vs. CA (L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743) 12 and Tapas vs. CA (L22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393), 13 and in the more recent cases of Baptisia
vs. Carillo and CA (L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) and Vda. de Catindig
vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque (L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the
case of Chan vs. CA, this Court said:
... from Guico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then
Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases
brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors
of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision
exactly a month later, this Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held
that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement
with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its
findings of fact ...
Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by
substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the
appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its
premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is
more, when such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues
cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because only
legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify
the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed.
Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a
minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence
becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some
recognized exceptions.

Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to
consider petitioner's assignments of errors.
Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by
law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were
credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that
the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied
with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to
be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good
standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the
witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner
contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness
may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible
as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term
"credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and well- known
meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with
the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.
We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code
provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets
forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years
or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write,
may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806
of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being
witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document,
perjury or false testimony.
Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at
any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his
testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the
qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that
the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is
not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the
Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.
We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good
standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the
witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.
We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used
in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law
where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by
two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community,
reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two
witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens
of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and
morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications
necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473
as amended).
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for
they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid
down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization
proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental
witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent
and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent
Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon.
Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said
witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age,
of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a
holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits that Article
820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of the competency of a witness due to his
qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second
Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible
witnesses, petitioner concludes that the term credible requires something more than
just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under
Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.

Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are
not synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible
one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the
instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good
standing in the community since one was a family driver by profession and the second
the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of
the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde
Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer
and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify
him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs.
Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941,
p. 788).
Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible
witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820
of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may
be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites
authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply
means " competent." Thus, in the case of Suntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the
Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in
existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the
provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
witnesses. 'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to
facts from or upon hearsay. " emphasissupplied).
In Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court
held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of
sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb
and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same
provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of
employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does not
disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the
attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are
present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be
entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we
may cite:
A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental
incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin County
vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and
Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means
a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann.
Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).
Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means

'competent witness that is, one competent under the law to testify to
fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283. Moos vs.
First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889.
(Ibid, p. 342)
The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will
shall be attested by two credible witnesses means competent;
witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent
to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing
the will, the competency being determined as of the date of the
execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for
probate,Smith vs. Goodell 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)
Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means
competent witnesses that is, such persons as are not legally
disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental
incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause
excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them
incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the
particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546,
322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)
In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will
is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his
credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case ofVda.
de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the
Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is
another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says.
Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he
is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his
testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be
competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code
and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be
credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that
evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the
community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established
otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their
testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have
attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not
to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were
"credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.

Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors,
petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the
preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that
Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of
the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in
holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words
"pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting
witnesses were all present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel
could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that
Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by
the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings
as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave
contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and
notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.
Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down
that the findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling which We
cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss
hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently
justified and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness
characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the
witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win
and that it was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns
the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of
Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as
there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for
any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him
to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the
testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day
that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him
that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria
Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel
Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the
lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.
The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his
wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was
executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas,
Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was
issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly
observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of
these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of
the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the
spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel
Gabriel's will.
We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of
Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from
the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of
the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by
car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all
the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel
stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they
proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.
It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the
day that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to
help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted to
execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a
Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate
from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and
disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is,
therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of Atty.
Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel
herself."
As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with
the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such
data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and
irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list
(containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates)
immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was
corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion
that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's
contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held that on the
occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty.
Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date
prior to April 15, 1961.
But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence
certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in
April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in
the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn
to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed
and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will
duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same
is a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary
public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal
manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To
contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than

merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence
pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.
Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three
typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left
blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the
same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out
by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath
the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only
name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on
February 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names,
residence tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said certificates
pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso.
Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives;
and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will
without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F
was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty.
Paraiso. "
It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties
disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty.
Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it
was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any
note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly
woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a brain injury
caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after
the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is
within the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise
and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals
that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to be
fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel
Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively
managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas
herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late
Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the
Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in
Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the
circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will
without any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three
attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.
Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both
testimonial and documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming that
Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by
the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such
factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is
replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed
by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and
Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano
lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15,
1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present
to witness the will on that day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit
having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday
without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave
no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution
of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to
make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in
the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano
lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that
Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the
will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary
evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial
acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia
was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing
her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano
P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as
to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the
material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the
attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a
record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the
memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved.
(Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).
As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding
that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win
was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that:
"Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to
what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that
the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to
lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and
attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer
as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the
will was signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph
taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. "
Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to
the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly
executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution
of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya

and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they
spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all
appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."
Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking
was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by
Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel
Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was
wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly
executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with
the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not
require picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a
will.
Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of
witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the
respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and
misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description
of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him
meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was
Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the
name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was
Benjamin Cifra, Jr. these are indeed unimportant details which could have been
affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by
themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true
execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be
expected that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each
other with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to
remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses
generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings,
and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith.
In as much as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is
but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor
details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).
It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have
been disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a
better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial.
As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions.
The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial
court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and
circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the
significance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed.
Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based on conflicting
evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses
hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court
should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals
found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and
circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that
"Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated
her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion
that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that
she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that
she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on
inferences; that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping
therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed and that there is
nothing in the entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will
signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment
only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of
the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.
Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions
are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as
required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel
Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and
a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of
P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel
obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso
upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be
made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written
in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a
language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he
wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will
and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright;
that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of
the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the
left-hand margin of each and every page of the document in the presence also of the
said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her
name at the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3
and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses,
Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the
bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the
document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that
Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the attestation clause and
at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia
and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94,

Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the execution
and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting
Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty.
Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H",
showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to
bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses
for he did not know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the
latter showed up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's
claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date
appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and
ratified the will on the date in question."
It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that
Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document
to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling
of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the
decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief
that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On
the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel
dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed
to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact jibes with the evidence which
the trial court itself believed was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel was of sound
disposing memory when she executed her will.
Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite
simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the
second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for
P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her
brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces
including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth
was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir
mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the
remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but
prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R.
No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).
Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within
any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of
the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The
conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion
and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact

are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed
by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect,
without qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesize the
resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments
of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.
The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We
find the respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals
did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit
"F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.
We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation
of the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented,
we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the
presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing
the same in the the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then
delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and
notarial register. A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso
Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the
lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out
good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed
but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was
performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and
contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute
the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will.
So has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice
thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand
to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the
testatrix have been identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by
anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final
analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme
Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of
Appeals.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
the testatrix. Adriana Maloto, and thus, denied the petition. The petitioners appealed
the trial court's decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court which, on June 7, 1985,
affirmed the order. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the adverse decision
proved to be of no avail, hence, this petition.
For a better understanding of the controversy, a factual account would be a great help.
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO,
CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH
OF
MOLO,
AND
ASILO
DE
MOLO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is not the first time that the parties to this case come to us. In fact, two other
cases directly related to the present one and involving the same parties had already
been decided by us in the past. In G.R. No. L-30479, 1which was a petition for
certiorari and mandamus instituted by the petitioners herein, we dismissed the petition
ruling that the more appropriate remedy of the petitioners is a separate proceeding for
the probate of the will in question. Pursuant to the said ruling, the petitioners
commenced in the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Special Proceeding No. 2176,
for the probate of the disputed will, which was opposed by the private respondents
presently, Panfilo and Felino both surnamed Maloto. The trial court dismissed the
petition on April 30, 1970. Complaining against the dismissal, again, the petitioners
came to this Court on a petition for review by certiorari. 2 Acting on the said petition,
we set aside the trial court's order and directed it to proceed to hear the case on the
merits. The trial court, after hearing, found the will to have already been revoked by
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a
last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. The case was instituted in the then
Court of First Instance of Iloilo and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736.
However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the
parties Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of
extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. The agreement provided for the division of
the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the
extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did
on March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the controversy, but,
unfortunately, it had not.
Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate
of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled
"KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and
purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have
found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials
inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted
to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April 1, 1967.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and
Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of
Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement
they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties,
among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo,
and Purificacion Miraflor.
Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and
legatees named in the will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for
reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the
will When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner came to us by way of a
petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court . 3 As we
stated earlier, we dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for
the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the
matters raised by the petitioners.

Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or
not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe
Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will,
contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court
stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had,
nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the
facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the
testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the
latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new
will drawn up. For reasons shortly to be explained, we do not view such facts, even
considered collectively, as sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will
had been effectively revoked.
There is no doubt as to the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and the due
execution of the will. The heart of the case lies on the issue as to whether or not the
will was revoked by Adriana.
The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in
case of wills: or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the
intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn
cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the
estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due
execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation,
or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis Supplied.)
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does
not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled
with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical
destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person
but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes
without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for
that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is
only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or
papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a
will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the
burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in
stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably
in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the private
respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the two
witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive." We share
the same view. Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two
witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were
unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only
because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his
information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so,
thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
At this juncture, we reiterate that "(it) is an important matter of public interest that a
purported win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations ...." 4
The private respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the present action for probate
instituted by the petitioners argue that the same is already barred by res
adjudicata. They claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to
appeal timely from the order dated November 16, 1968 of the trial court in the
intestate proceeding (Special Proceeding No. 1736) denying their (petitioners') motion
to reopen the case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to
allow the last will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This is untenable.
The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy. For a
judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the
second action, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. 5 We do
not find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites.

For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the
probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special
Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the
estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be
final with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent.
Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably
so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule
on the probate of the contested will . 6 After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is
founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution
and validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of
estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will.
Thus, there is likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding
and that in an action for probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it
was precisely because of our ruling in G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted
this separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these
grounds alone, the position of the private respondents on this score can not be
sustained.
One last note. The private respondents point out that revocation could be inferred from
the fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of the properties mentioned in the will had
been disposed of: while an insignificant portion of the properties remained at the time
of death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore, more valuable properties have been
acquired after the execution of the will on January 3,1940." 7 Suffice it to state here
that as these additional matters raised by the private respondents are extraneous to
this special proceeding, they could only be appropriately taken up after the will has
been duly probated and a certificate of its allowance issued.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision dated June 7, 1985 and the Resolution dated October 22, 1986, of the
respondent Court of Appeals, and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of Adriana
Maloto's last will and testament. Costs against the private respondents.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47305
July 31, 1942
In
the
matter
of
the
estate
of
Rufina
BUSTAMANTE, administrator-appellant,
vs.
PETRONA AREVALO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Nicasio
Yatco
Ventura and Belmonte for appellees.
for
Arevalo.
ARISTON
appellant.
BOCOBO, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether or not Exhibit C, presented by appellant for
allowance as the last will and testament of the deceased Rufina Arevalo, is a forgery.
The Court of First Instance of Manila held that it was a forged document, and allowed
an earlier will, Exhibit 6, whose authenticity was unquestioned. The value of the estate
is over P50,000.
The questioned document was prepared and signed in duplicate. It consists of two
pages and is dated October 2, 1937. It appears to be signed by Rufina Arevalo and by
three witnesses, Manuel M. Cruz, Remigo Colina and Angel Sanchez. The formal
requisites of a will have been complied with.
An initial fact that arrests the attention is the formulation by the appellees of the
allegation of forgery even before seeing the questioned document. Said charge of
forgery was signed on April 22, 1938, although Exhibit C, which had been in a sealed
envelop, was not opened by order of the court till the next day, April 23, 1938. It is
true that the opposition by the appellees was not actually filed in court till April 23, but
it was signed by appellees' attorneys on April 22, was subscribed and sworn to by
Amando Clemente on April 22, and a copy thereof was sent by registered mail to
Attorney Nicasio Yatco on April 22. Moreover, in the morning of April 23, appellees
attorneys Messrs. Jose Belmonte and Vicente Delgado, announced their opposition to
the will Exhibit C in open court, before said documents was opened by order of the
court on that day.
One of the principal reasons of the court a quo for believing Exhibit C to be a forgery is
that in the genuine signatures the terminal stroke of the capital "R" in "Rufina" is not
joined with the letter "u," while in Exhibit C such ending is united with the letter "u" in
the two marginal signatures, although in the central signature appearing on page 2,
the two letters are separated. The probate court believes that this difference between
the marginal and the central signatures is due to the fact that the forger first used the
check of "La Previsora" (Exhibit I) as the model in falsifying the marginal signatures,
but having been shown another signature with the characteristic already mentioned
separation of the two letters he tried to imitate said peculiarity in making central
signature.

We believe the probate court over looked the well-established principle that in passing
upon questioned documents, the test is the general character of the writing rather than
any minute and precise comparison of individual letters or lines. In People vs.
Bustos (45 Phil., 30) , this Court held:
It is a first principle in writing that exact coincidence between two signatures
is absolute proof that one or the other is a forgery. There must be some
different before authenticity reposes upon a general characteristics
resemblance, coupled with specific differences, such as naturally result from
the infinite variety of conditions controlling the muscles of the writer at each
separate
effort
in
forming
his
signature.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, a careful scrutiny of all the questioned and the standard
signatures has convinced us that they have been written by the same person because
they show the same general type, quality and characteristics, with natural variations.
We are, therefore, inclined to give credence to the expert testimony to that effect
presented by the appellant.
Moreover, a forger who has to make two or more signatures usually sees to it that all
the signatures are uniform for fear that any difference might arouse suspicion. In this
case, however, in some questioned signatures the letters "R" and "u" are separated,
but in others, they are united. Osborne in "Questioned Documents" (pp. 368, 369)
says:
Another indication of genuineness in a holographic document or a
considerable amount of writing, or in two or more disputed signatures, are
certain natural variations in the details of the writing. It is difficult for the
inexperienced or unthinking examiner to understand that a certain extent of
variation in a group of several signatures and variation in repeated words and
letters in a continuous holographic document can be evidence of
genuineness. The forger does not understand this necessity for natural
variation and, as nearly as he can, makes words and letters just alike.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It necessarily follows, therefore, that if the several lines of a disputed

document, or several signatures under investigation, show these natural
variations of writing of the same word or letter, all of course within the scope
of variation of the genuine writing, this variation itself, surprising and
paradoxical as it may appear, is as strong evidence of genuineness as the
opposite condition is evidence of forgery. (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, it is to be noted that the document in question was prepared and signed
in duplicate, so that there are six signatures of Rufina Arevalo, instead of only three. It
is reasonable to believe that a forger would reduce the number of signatures to be
forged so as to lessen the danger of detection. In this case, Attorney Nicasio Yatco,
who supervised the execution of Exhibit C, must have known that it was not necessary
to make a signed duplicate of the will.
As for the probate court's opinion that the forger must have used Exhibit I (a check
issued by "La Previsora" to Rufina Arevalo) as a model in falsifying the marginal
signatures, it is highly improbable that said check was in the hands of Rufina Arevalo
or of her attorney, Nicasio Yatco, on or about October 2, 1937, when the document in
question was signed. The check had been issued on June 30, 1936, or over a year
before, and it must have been returned by the bank concerned to "La Previsora" in the
ordinary course of business, because it was produced by the Manager of "La
Previsora." It should likewise be observed that the signature on the first page of the
duplicate will (Exhibit C-3) does not have the supposed peculiarity of the standard
signatures, that is the separation between "R" and "u." If, as the lower court states,
the forger upon being shown a model other than Exhibit I, imitated said characteristic
separation in making the central or body signature on the original will Exhibit C, it is
indeed strange that he should not do the same immediately thereafter on the first page
of the duplicate will but that he should, instead, repeat the mistake he had made on
the marginal signatures on the original will.
Finally, to conclude that a forgery has been committed, the evidence should be
forcefully persuasive. Before we are disposed to find that an attorney-at-law has so
debased himself as to aid and abet the forgery of a will, which would not only send him
to jail for many years but would ruin his future, we must require proof sufficiently
strong to prevail against every fair and thoughtful hesitancy and doubt. And the
instrumental witnesses have testified that Rufina Arevalo signed the will in their
presence. It is hard to believe they would commit perjury as it has not been shown
they had any interest in this case.
Therefore, we find that the will of Rufina Arevalo, dated October 2, 1937 and marked
Exhibit C, is genuine and should be allowed.
It is unnecessary to discuss the incidental issues of fact so ably presented by counsel
and examined in detail by the probate court, inasmuch as the foregoing disposes of the
basic question raised. The relative position of the contending devisees in the affection
of the deceased; whether Rufina Arevalo could go alone to the law office of Attorney
Yatco on October 2, 1937 to sign the will Exhibit C; the alleged resentment of the
testatrix toward Amando Clemente when she signed the second will, and similar
questions are not of sufficient significance to alter the conclusion herein arrived at. In
fact, they merely tend to becloud the main issue.

The next question to be inquired into is whether or not the later will (Exhibit C) dated
October 2, 1937, whose probate is herein approved, has entirely revoked the earlier
will, Exhibit 6, dated January 9, 1936. Though both partes admit that the first will has
been revoked by the second, yet we deem it necessary to discuss the question because
a member of this Court thinks the earlier will can stand in part. It appears that the
undivided interest of Rufina Arevalo in two parcels of land and the improvements
thereon which belonged to the conjugal partnership between Bernabe Bustamante,
who had died before the making of the two wills, and Rufina Arevalo, was expressly
devised to Amando Clemente in the earlier will but was not specifically mentioned in
the later will. In the first will, Exhibit 6, Rufina Arevalo, who had no forcible heirs, gave
to Ariston Bustamante, her nephew, three lots and the buildings thereon; devised a
parcel of land and the houses standing thereon to her cousin, Petrona Arevalo Viuda de
Zacarias, and to her niece, Carmen Papa de Delgado; and finally disposed, in favor of
Amando Clemente, another cousin, of a piece of land and the houses thereon, and of
her undivided interest in the two parcels of land and the improvements thereon, which
belonged to the conjugal partnership, also making said Amando Clemente the
residuary legatee. But in the second will, Exhibit C, she designates Ariston Bustamante
her only heir in these terms:
Segundo Nombro como mi unico heredero, Ariston Bustamante, de todas
mis propiedades dejadas ya mueble o inmueble que se describen mas abajo:
(a) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 5059
(b) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 4681
(c) Transfer Certificate of Title of Manila No. 19961
(d) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 5066
(e) Original Certificate of Title of Manila No. 4682.
Her undivided interest in the two pieces of land of the conjugal partnership, with
Torrens titles No. 4887 and No. 15628, devised to Amando Clemente in the earlier will,
is not specifically mentioned in the later will, Exhibit C. Moreover, the second will has
no revocation clause.
At first sight, it would seem that the earlier will can stand with respect to Rufina
Arevalo's share in said two parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership. But a
closer examination of the later will counter-acts such initial reaction.
In the first place, the testatrix in the second will names Ariston Bustamante her only
heir to all her property, both personal and real, her words in Spanish being: "Nombro
como mi unico heredero, Ariston Bustamante, de todas mis propiedades dejadas ya
mueble o inmueble." (Italics supplied.) It is true that in enumerating her parcels of

land, she did not specify her interest in the two lots of the conjugal partnership. But
this omission must have been due either to an oversight or to the belief that it was
premature to name said two parcels as the conjugal partnership was still being
liquidated. In either case, the testatrix must have thought that her comprehensive
words "mi unico heredero de todas mis propiedades dejadas ya mueble o inmueble"
would be sufficient to cover all her property, whether specially listed or not.
Secondly, in the opening paragraph of the second will, the following words appear:
"hago constar a todos este miultimo testamento y voluntad expresado en Castellano
lenguaje que conozco y poseo, y queriendo disponer de mis bienes por virtud de este
mi testamento." (Emphasis supplied.) Though she knew that she had made a first will,
she nevertheless said that the second will was her last one. This would seem to signify
that her last will, cancelling her previously expressed wish, was to make Ariston
Bustamante her only heir. Furthermore, when she said she wanted to dispose of her
property by means of the second will ("queriendo disponer de mis bienes por virtud de
este mi testamento"), it would appear to be her intention that no property of hers
should be left undisposed of in the second will. This fact is corroborated in the second
clause wherein she names Ariston Bustamante as her only heir to all her property
whether personal or real.
We believe, therefore, that the first will has been entirely revoked. Though it might
appear right that Amando Clemente should receive something from the estate because
he, together with Ariston Bustamante, has been raised by the testatrix, and both are
her relatives, nevertheless it would be venturesome for us to advance our own idea of
a just distribution of the property in the face of a different mode of disposition so
clearly expressed by the testatrix in the later will. As she had no forcible heirs, she was
absolutely free to give her estate to whomsoever she choose, subject of course to the
payment of her debts. It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of
a will in order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable division of the estate
of a deceased person. The only function of the courts in these cases is to carry out the
intention of the deceased as manifested in the will. Once that intention has been
determined through a careful reading of the will or wills, and provided the law on
legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the pale of judicial cognizance to inquire
into the fairness or unfairness of any devise or bequest. It might be said that it is hard
to understand how, in a temporary anger at Amando Clemente, the testatrix would
entirely cut him off from the inheritance. We should not, however, sit in judgment upon
her motives and sentiments, first because, as already stated, nothing in the law
restrained her from disposing of her property in any manner she desired, and secondly,
because there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward processes of her
conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward those who expected her
bounty.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from, declaring the second will Exhibit
C a forgery and allowing the first will Exhibit 6, should be and is hereby reversed, and

another judgment shall be entered allowing the later will Exhibit C, which has entirely
revoked the earlier will Exhibit 6. No special pronouncement on costs is made. Let the
record of this case be returned to the court of origin for further proceedings. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-2538
September 21, 1951
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA.
DE
MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
Claro
M.
Recto
and
Delgado & Flores for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Serafin
C.
Dizon
for
appellants.

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal admitting to
probate the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed
on August 17, 1918. The oppositors-appellants brought the case on appeal to this
Court for the reason that the value of the properties involved exceeds P50,000.
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay,
province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending
line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de
Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and
Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of Candido Molo y
Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939.
(Exhibit I). The later will executed in 1918.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition, which was docketed as special proceeding No. 8022 seeking the
probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no
opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein
oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the
case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the
court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the
petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on
February 24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on August 17, 1918, which was docketed as special proceeding No. 56, in the
same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on
three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will
of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and
(3) that the will has been subsequently revoked. But before the second petition could
be heard, the battle for liberation came and the records of the case were destroyed.
Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be
impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the copies required
for its reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14,
1946, similar to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based
on the same grounds as those contained in their former opposition. Then, the case was
set for trial, and on May 28, 1948, the court issued an order admitting the will to
probate already stated in the early part of this decision. From this order the oppositors
appealed assigning six errors, to wit.
I. The probate court erred in not holding that the present petitioner voluntarily
and deliberately frustrated the probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in
special proceeding No. 8022, in order to enable her to obtain the probate of
another alleged will of Molo dated 191.
II. The court a quo erred in not holding that the petitioner is now estopped
from seeking the probate of Molo's alleged will of 1918.
III. The lower court erred in not holding that petitioner herein has come to
court with "unclean hands" and as such is not entitled to relief.
IV. The probate court erred in not holding that Molo's alleged will of August
17, 1918 was not executed in the manner required by law.
V. The probate court erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was
deliberately revoked by Molo himself.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that Molo's will of 1918 was
subsequently revoked by the decedent's will of 1939.
In their first assignment of error, counsel for oppositors contend that the probate court
erred in not holding that the petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the
probate of the will dated June 20, 1939, in order to enable her to obtain the probate of
the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, pointing out certain facts and
circumstances with their opinion indicate that petitioner connived with the witness
Canuto Perez in an effort to defeat and frustrate the probate of the 1939 will because
of her knowledge that said will intrinsically defective in that "the one and only
testamentory disposition thereof was a "disposicion captatoria". These circumstances,
counsel for the appellants contend, constitute a series of steps deliberately taken by
petitioner with a view to insuring the realization of her plan of securing the probate of
the 1918 will which she believed would better safeguard her right to inherit from the
decease.
These imputations of fraud and bad faith allegedly committed in connection with
special proceedings No. 8022, now closed and terminated, are vigorously met by
counsel for petitioner who contends that to raise them in these proceedings which are
entirely new and distinct and completely independent from the other is improper and
unfair as they find no support whatsoever in any evidence submitted by the parties in
this case. They are merely based on the presumptions and conjectures not supported
by any proof. For this reason, counsel, contends, the lower court was justified in
disregarding them and in passing them sub silentio in its decision.
A careful examination of the evidence available in this case seems to justify this
contention. There is indeed no evidence which may justify the insinuation that
petitioner had deliberately intended to frustrate the probate of the 1939 will of the
deceased to enable her to seek the probate of another will other than a mere
conjecture drawn from the apparently unexpected testimony of Canuto Perez that he
went out of the room to answer an urgent call of nature when Artemio Reyes was
signing the will and the failure of petitioner later to impeach the character of said

witness in spite of the opportunity given her by the court to do so. Apart from this
insufficiency of evidence, the record discloses that this failure has been explained by
petitioner when she informed the court that she was unable to impeach the character
of her witness Canuto Perez because of her inability to find witnesses who may
impeach him, and this explanation stands uncontradicted. Whether this explanation is
satisfactory or not, it is not now, for us to determine. It is an incident that comes
within the province of the former case. The failure of petitioner to present the
testimony of Artemio Reyes at the hearing has also been explained, and it appears that
petitioner has filed because his whereabouts could not be found. Whether this is true
or not is also for this Court to determine. It is likewise within the province and function
of the court in the former case. And the unfairness of this imputation becomes more
glaring when we stock of the developments that had taken place in these proceedings
which show in bold relief the true nature of the conduct, behavior and character of the
petitioner so bitterly assailed and held in disrepute by the oppositors.
It should be recalled that the first petition for the probate of the will executed on June
20, 1939, was filed on February 7, 1941, by the petitioner. There being no opposition,
the will was probated. Subsequently, however, upon petition of the herein oppositors,
the order of the court admitting said will to probate was set aside, over the vigorous
opposition of the herein petitioner, and the case was reopened. The reopening was
ordered because of the strong opposition of the oppositors who contended that he will
had not been executed as required by law. After the evidence of both parties had been
presented, the oppositors filed an extensive memorandum wherein they reiterated
their view that the will should be denied probate. And on the strenght of this
opposition, the court disallowed the will.
If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would make the
testamentary disposition in her favor invalid and ineffective, because it is a "disposicion
captatoria", which knowledge she may easily acquire through consultation with a
lawyer, there was no need her to go through the order of filing the petition for the
probate of the will. She could accomplish her desire by merely suppressing the will or
tearing or destroying it, and then take steps leading to the probate of the will executed
in 1918. But for her conscience was clear and bade her to take the only proper step
possible under the circumstances, which is to institute the necessary proceedings for
the probate of the 1939 will. This she did and the will was admitted to probate. But
then the unexpected happened. Over her vigorous opposition, the herein appellants
filed a petition for reopening, and over her vigorous objection, the same was granted
and the case was reopened. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. Is it her fault
that the case was reopened? Is it her fault that the order admitting the will to probate
was set aside? That was a contingency which petitioner never expected. Had appellants
not filed their opposition to the probate of the will and had they limited their objection
to the intrinsic validity of said will, their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy
of the deceased would have perhaps been accomplished. But they failed in their
strategy. If said will was denied probate it is due to their own effort. It is now unfair to
impute bad faith petitioner simply because she exerted every effort to protect her own
interest and prevent the intestacy of the deceased to happen.
Having reached the foregoing conclusions, it is obvious that the court did not commit
the second and third errors imputed to it by the counsel for appellants. Indeed,
petitioner cannot be considered guilty or estoppel which would prevent her from
seeking the probate of the 1918 will simply because of her effort to obtain the
allowance of the 1939 will has failed considering that in both the 1918 and 1939 wills
she was in by her husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be charged with bad faith
far having done so because of her desire to prevent the intestacy of her husband. She
cannot be blamed being zealous in protecting her interest.
The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will
of the deceased which was denied probate. They contend that, notwithstanding the
disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of
nullifying the prior of 1918.
Counsel for petitioner meets this argument by invoking the doctrine laid down in the
case of Samson vs. Naval, (41 Phil., 838). He contends that the facts involved in that
case are on all fours with the facts of this case. Hence, the doctrine is that case is here
controlling.
There is merit in this contention. We have carefully read the facts involved in the
Samson case we are indeed impressed by their striking similarity with the facts of this
case. We do not need to recite here what those facts are; it is enough to point out that
they contain many points and circumstances in common. No reason, therefore, is seen
by the doctrine laid down in that case (which we quote hereunder) should not apply
and control the present case.
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the
provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of
wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as
said revocatory clause is void. (41 Phil., 838.)
Apropos of this question, counsel for oppositors make the remark that, while they do
not disagree with the soundness of the ruling laid down in the Samson case, there is
reason to abandon said ruling because it is archaic or antiquated and runs counter to
the modern trend prevailing in American jurisprudence. They maintain that said ruling
is no longer controlling but merely represents the point of view of the minority and
should, therefore, be abandoned, more so if we consider the fact that section 623 of
our Code of Civil Procedure, which governs the revocation of wills, is of American origin
and as such should follow the prevailing trend of the majority view in the United
States. A long line of authorities is cited in support of this contention. And these
authorities hold the view, that "an express revocation is immediately effective upon the
execution of the subsequent will, and does not require that it first undergo the
formality of a probate proceeding". (p. 63, appellants' brief .

While they are many cases which uphold the view entertained by counsel for
oppositors, and that view appears to be in controlling the states where the decisions
had been promulgated, however, we are reluctant to fall in line with the assertion that
is now the prevailing view in the United States. In the search we have made of
American authorities on the subject, we found ourselves in a pool of conflicting
opinions perhaps because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted
by each State in the subject of revocation of wills. But the impression we gathered
from a review and the study of the pertinent authorities is that the doctrine laid down
in the Samson case is still a good law. On page 328 of the American Jurisprudence Vol.
57, which is a revision Published in 1948, we found the following passages which in our
opinion truly reflect the present trend of American jurisprudence on this matter
affecting the revocation of wills:
SEC. 471. Observance of Formalities in Execution of Instrument. Ordinarily,
statutes which permit the revocation of a will by another writing provide that
to be effective as a revocation, the writing must be executed with the same
formalities which are required to be observed in the execution of a will.
Accordingly, where, under the statutes, attestation is necessary to the making
of a valid will, an unattested non testamentary writing is not effective to
revoke a prior will. It has been held that a writing fails as a revoking
instrument where it is not executed with the formalities requisite for the
execution of a will, even though it is inscribed on the will itself, although it
may effect a revocation by cancellation or obliteration of the words of the will.
A testator cannot reserve to himself the power to modify a will by a written
instrument subsequently prepared but not executed in the manner required
for a will.
SEC, 472. Subsequent Unexecuted, Invalid, or Ineffective Will or Codicil. A
will which is invalid because of the incapacity of the testator, or of undue
influence can have no effect whatever as a revoking will. Moreover, a will is
not revoked by the unexecuted draft of a later one. Nor is a will revoked by a
defectively executed will or codicil, even though the latter contains a clause
expressly revoking the former will, in a jurisdiction where it is provided by a
controlling statute that no writing other than a testamentary instrument is
sufficient to revoke a will, for the simple reason that there is no revoking will.
Similarly where the statute provides that a will may be revoked by a
subsequent will or other writing executed with the same formalities as are
required in the execution of wills, a defectively executed will does not revoke
a prior will, since it cannot be said that there is a writing which complies with
the statute. Moreover, a will or codicil which, on account of the manner in
which it is executed, is sufficient to pass only personally does not affect
dispositions of real estate made by a former will, even though it may
expressly purport to do so. The intent of the testator to revoke is immaterial,
if he has not complied with the statute. (57 Am. Jur., 328, 329.)
We find the same opinion in the American Law Reports, Annotated, edited in 1939. On
page 1400, Volume 123, there appear many authorities on the "application of rules
where second will is invalid", among which a typical one is the following:
It is universally agreed that where the second will is invalid on account of not
being executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, or where the
testator who has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will is
procured through undue influence, or the such, in other words, where the
second will is really no will, it does not revoke the first will or affect it in any
manner. Mort vs. Baker University (193-5) 229 Mo. App., 632, 78 S.W. (2d),
498.
These treaties cannot be mistaken. They uphold the view on which the ruling in the
Samson case is predicated. They reflect the opinion that this ruling is sound and good
and for this reason, we see no justification for abondoning it as now suggested by
counsel for the oppositors.
It is true that our law on the matter (sec. 623, Code Civil Procedure) provides that a
will may be some will, codicil, or other writing executed as proved in case of wills" but
it cannot be said that the 1939 will should be regarded, not as a will within the
meaning of said word, but as "other writing executed as provided in the case of wills",
simply because it was denied probate. And even if it be regarded as any other
writing within the meaning of said clause, there is authority for holding that unless said
writing is admitted to probate, it cannot have the effect of revocation. (See 57 Am. Jur.
pp. 329-330).
But counsel for oppositors contemned that, regardless of said revocatory clause, said
will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the presumption that it was
deliberately revoked by the testator himself. The oppositors contend that the testator,
after executing the 1939 will, and with full knowledge of the recovatory clause
contained said will, himself deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for
that reason the will submitted by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is only a
duplicate of said original.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that
when the first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the
original and copies to the testator himself and apparently they remained in his
possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was
denied probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to
look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or
files of the testator. She did not find the original.

If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of
his knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a
duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner, the most logical step for the
testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that it may likewise be
destroyed. But this was not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy
remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of
twenty-one (21) years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had
been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed it
wise to execute another will containing exactly the same testamentary dispositions.
Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of circumstances, the
stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction
of the first will by the testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the
testator after the execution of the second will, which revoked the first, could there be
any doubt, under this theory, that said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the
honest belief that it was no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in
his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will
was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory clause
contained in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect? If such
is the case, then it is our opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate
under the principle of "dependent relative revocation".
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually
applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is
not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine is n limited
to the existence of some other document, however, and has been applied
where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a mistake of law. . . . (68
C.J.P. 799).
The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the
making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and
dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the
new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation
fails and the original will remains in full force. (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new
testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at
some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid
execution of a new will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will
by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in
court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918
because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has
been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this principle
is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is
clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted
his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of
dying testate.
The remaining question to be determined refers to the sufficiency of the evidence to
prove the due execution of the will.
The will in question was attested, as required by law, by three witnesses, Lorenzo
Morales, Rufino Enriquez, and Angel Cuenca. The first two witnesses died before the
commencement of the present proceedings. So the only instrumental witness available
was Angel Cuenca and under our law and precedents, his testimony is sufficient to
prove the due execution of the will. However, petitioner presented not only the
testimony of Cuenca but placed on the witness stand Juan Salcedo, the notary public
who prepared and notarized the will upon the express desire and instruction of the
testator, The testimony of these witnesses shows that the will had been executed in the
manner required by law. We have read their testimony and we were impressed by their
readiness and sincerity. We are convinced that they told the truth.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.1wphl.nt

As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by
the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes
Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a
will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of
the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death and was not intended to take
effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as
held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA
deceased,
MARCELA
RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO
ARANZA,
ET
AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY.
LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with
another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the
court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the
appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an
instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools
and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied
by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.

The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and
rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of
February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the
will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the
original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court
held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable
to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of
authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May
13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time
of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that
the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that
the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of
Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to
law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that
the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed
the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT
HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC
WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found
can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil
Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due
execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at
least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if
the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will
can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the
testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic
copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL.
509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen
and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic
or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means,
if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited
and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the
lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's
motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979,
dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

LOURDES
L.
DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact
of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that
arose from the following antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died
thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have
taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the
latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting
Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In
1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted
the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued
declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro
Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente
Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only
heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes,
whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed
according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other
taxes due to the government. 1
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they
were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to
file
appellant's
brief
within
the
extended
period
granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May
16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and
executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles
(TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to
surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles
and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the
final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the
issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely
"interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive
portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased
spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an
Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990
and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by
private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in
issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction
because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the
Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order
which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to
probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late
Alejandro and to maintain thestatus quo or lease of the premises thereon to third
parties. 3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no
interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January
30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of
judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to
negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that
a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or
order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order
can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion.
The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the
character ofres judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order
makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due
execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity
of the will sought to be probated, 7 particularly on three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is

indeed, the decedent's last will
and testament;
n compliance with the prescribed
formalities for the execution of
wills;
n the testamentary capacity of
the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the
last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely
executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence
and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper
testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making
a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow
that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the
will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or
impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This
is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that
character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that
this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision
of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must
stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by
law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its
belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have
fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been
declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium the
very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more
or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only instance where a
party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or

inadvertence not imputable to negligence,
herein.
17
which circumstances do not concur
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of
the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the
final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were
declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the
alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect
to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise
those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It
should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had
already been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear from the executory
order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to
the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can
still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order
merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot
be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another
particularly when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in
the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose
only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it
nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said
that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy.
Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and
not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional
rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law
considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness
of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in
nature and that no one is presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No
intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to
pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of
intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the
next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will
are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the
will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void.
Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal
properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a
valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of
properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the
conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the
properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly
ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and
that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that
she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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SUCCESSION | August 25|1

G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985

Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate"

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will of

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he

SUCCESSION | August 25|2

this reason, intestate succession is nothing more than a disposition

SUCCESSION | August 25|3

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SUCCESSION | August 25|4

SUCCESSION | August 25|5

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick,

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to

SUCCESSION | August 25|6

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on

SUCCESSION | August 25|7

G.R. No. L-7188

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SUCCESSION | August 25|8

SUCCESSION | August 25|9

G.R. Nos. 140371-72

November 27, 2006

SUCCESSION | August 25|10

SUCCESSION | August 25|11

SUCCESSION | August 25|12

SUCCESSION | August 25|13

SUCCESSION | August 25|14

G.R. No. L-363

SUCCESSION | August 25|15

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration

Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.

SUCCESSION | August 25|16

SUCCESSION | August 25|17

August 12, 1999

SUCCESSION | August 25|18

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to

SUCCESSION | August 25|19

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.

1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.

Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.

3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

SUCCESSION | August 25|20

Hence, this petition.

SUCCESSION | August 25|21

I am familiar with her signature.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Why do you say so?

A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda.

How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?

Who sometime accompany her?