Deferra CV PDF
Deferra CV PDF
Deferra CV PDF
Department of Economics
s.tenreyro@lse.ac.uk
j.curtis@lse.ac.uk
GENDER: Male
DOCTORAL STUDIES:
CITIZENSHIP: Italian
SERGIO DE FERRA
PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:
2010-2011 MRes in Economics (with Distinction), London School of Economics
2009-2010 MSc in Economics (with Distinction), London School of Economics
2006-2009 Laurea in Economia Politica (110 cum laude/110), Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
TEACHING EXPERIENCE:
2014 2015
2013 2014
2013 2014
2013 2014
2013
2012 2013
2012
2011 2012
SERGIO DE FERRA
COMPLETED PAPERS
Job Market Paper:
External Imbalances, Gross Capital Flows and Sovereign Debt Crises
Abstract: The experience of the European monetary union has been characterized by three distinctive
facts. First, core and periphery countries ran widening current account surplus and deficit positions, after
the inception of the union. Second, core countries intermediated gross capital flows from the rest of the
world, which in turn financed deficits in the periphery. Finally, a sovereign debt crisis took place, affecting
multiple countries and causing severe recessions. I argue that institutional features of the European
Economic and Monetary Union are responsible for the observation of imbalances, intermediation and
pervasive crises. First, I show in a theoretical model that subsidies on holdings of euro-denominated
assets contribute to all three phenomena. Second, I build a dynamic model of an economic union with
trade in goods and financial assets. In the model, the introduction of a subsidy on cross-border asset
holdings generates predictions for net and gross asset flows that quantitatively replicate the euro area
experience. The model features a novel theoretical mechanism magnifying the severity of a debt crisis in
an economic union, due to the joint presence of financial and trade linkages among union members. This
mechanism is likely to have exacerbated the recent recession in the euro area periphery.
Presentations: EEA Annual Congress 2015, University of Mannheim; Third Workshop in Macro, Banking
and Finance, University of Pavia; Econometric Society European Winter Meeting 2015 (scheduled); 14th
Workshop on Macroeconomic Dynamics, Universit Bocconi (scheduled).
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Working Paper:
Sovereign Debt and the Corporate Sector: Firms and Fiscal Austerity during Sovereign Debt
Crises
Abstract: Sovereign debt crises typically lead to a contraction in credit to the corporate sector. What is the
role of fiscal policy in creating linkages between sovereign and corporate borrowing costs? I introduce a
model of endogenous sovereign default, featuring default risk in the corporate sector. A two-way
contagion channel emerges: Sovereign risk is transmitted to the corporate sector, and firm-level financial
frictions limit the ability of the government to issue sovereign debt. Government and firms are linked by
their joint reliance on domestic households, whose labor supply constitutes both the tax base for the
government and an input in production for firms. In a crisis, the government resorts to domestic taxation,
to limit exposure to international financial markets. Firms profits deteriorate, their borrowing costs rise and
a recession ensues, as firms contract employment and output. Firms in the non-tradable sector face a
more severe contraction, due to a deterioration in domestic demand. Predictions of the model for the
impact of a crisis on corporate credit replicate recent observation for Italy.
Presentations: Sveriges Riksbank; Spring 2014 Midwest Macro Meeting, University of Missouri; EEA
Annual Congress 2014, Toulouse; Cambridge CFM Workshop December 2014; Royal Economic Society
Conference 2015, University of Manchester.
SERGIO DE FERRA
Sovereign Default and Fluctuations in Uncertainty
Gross capital flows in the world economy display strong correlation with global measures of risk and
uncertainty. What is the impact of external uncertainty shocks on default incentives for a small open
economy? I develop a model of endogenous sovereign default where I allow for fluctuations in the level
and volatility of world interest rates. Exogenous shocks on international financial markets can strengthen
default incentives for an economy with high debt. An increase in volatility reduces the ability of
international financial markets to provide insurance against domestic shocks. Similarly, a rise in world
interest rates reduces the benefit from repaying debt, without affecting the value of financial autarky.
Allowing for large shocks on international financial markets in models of endogenous sovereign default
can help improve quantitative predictions of this class of models.