Jayson James B.

Bentayao

October 21,

2016
Advanced Epistemology
Rex T. Rola

The Epistemic Regress Problem

The Epistemic Project
Let us start with a question what is knowledge? or how do we know?. According
to Zagzebski Knowledge is a highly valued state in which a person is in cognitive
contact with reality. In other words, it is a relationship between the subject that is
conscious and the portion of reality to which the conscious subject is directly or
indirectly related. Hence, knowledge is the acquaintance with reality. The two
components of such relationship are often called as knowledge by acquaintance and
propositional knowledge. Knowledge by acquaintance means that the subject has an
experiential contact or being acquainted with the with the known or the portion of reality.
Propositional knowledge means that what the subject knows is a true proposition about
the known.
However, knowledge by acquaintance cannot be communicated to another subject
compared to propositional knowledge, since propositions are needed to communicate
knowledge. For this reason, propositional knowledge is exhaustively discussed
compared to knowledge by acquaintance. Thus, knowledge, in this case, is a
proposition

about

the

acquainted

reality.

Propositions are either true or false and only true proposition can only make sense
to the subject. So the object of knowledge that could interest the philosopher is usually
taken to be the true propositions. So, knowledge is a true proposition about the
acquainted reality. However, according to Zagszebski, the nature of truth, propositions,
and reality are all metaphysical questions. For this reason, epistemologists generally do
not direct their major effort to these questions when writing as epistemologists, and so
discussions of knowledge normally do not center on the object of knowledge, but rather
on the properties of the state itself that make it a state of knowing.
Knowledge has been understood as a relationship of the conscious object and
some portion of reality and mediated to the subject through true propositions. If
knowledge is indeed a relationship between the conscious object and some portion of
reality that is known, then what connects them in order for the said relationship to be
made possible? The answer is belief. The knower must be in this state of belief . In
order for us to understand better why belief is the bridge that connects the gap between
the two, lets us delve in the objections to this claim and how does Zagszebski replied to
them. The first objection is that belief and knowledge are mutually exclusive epistemic
states because of having distinct objects. The reply of Zagszebski is that propositions
are objects of belief as well as of knowledge, and in fact, the same proposition can be
either known or believed. Another objection is that belief and knowledge are mutually
exclusive epistemic states because to restrict the range of belief to epistemic states
evaluatively inferior to the state of knowledge. The reply of Zagszebski for this objection
is based on what St. Augustine said that to believe is to think with assent. Meaning,

knowing is also a form believing. Hence, in this case, knowledge is a state of believing
true propositions about the acquainted reality.
Another thing that should be considered as we try to define knowledge is that
knowledge is a good state. This good here means at least it is desirable or perhaps
good in a sense of praiseworthy. But we have lots of things to be considered as both
desirable and praiseworthy, such as good looks, good taste of food and a good teacher.
So to make it clear, the traditional proposal that knowledge is true belief based upon
good reasons is associated with the ethical concepts of responsibility, praise, and
blame. One is praised for believing the truth upon good reasons and blamed for not
doing so. Thus, in this sense, knowledge is good true belief.
However, a problem arises from the latter claim about knowledge. Some of the
epistemologists might see this definition not acceptable since it only serves as
theoretical or practical sense. Though believing is what a subject does, it doesnt mean
that it should be treated just like actions, which are subject to the category such as right
or wrong. For instance, if the learner misinterpreted the teachers instructions wrong due
to his poor hearing, then the learner must not be accused to be wrong or to be blamed,
its the defect of the senses. On the other hand, right believing has traditionally been
identified with justified believing. Sometimes, but not always, this has been understood,
to mean true belief for the right reasons. Therefore, as part of the revised conclusion,
knowledge is justified true belief.
What is not true is not known. There are times that it seems we know something
but eventually we are proven wrong and what is left is the belief that we know it. For
instance, I knew that he loved me, but until now, I cant believe that he doesnt love me

anymore. When truth is being eradicated with the things that we know, what only
remains is not knowledge but only belief. Therefore, knowledge implies belief
Does it mean that believing is everything that when we believe, it means that we
know it? Definitely not. When we say I believe that she is innocent is misleading when
you actually know that you know it. There is a big difference between believing and
knowing. Knowing is not just a mere belief, however, it has to be at least a true belief.
What makes a belief at least a true belief? In order for a belief to be proven as
true, it needs to be justified. For instance, I believe that Cheche is angry with me since
she never responded to my phone calls. Just believing that she is angry with me is
never justified, thus I really never know it since I only believe it. Suddenly I ask her why
didnt she answering my phone calls, and eventually I just discovered that she really is
angry with me. In that case, my belief has been proven and it does not just dwell in the
belief state. In the case of guessing, whether it turns out to be true or not, cannot be
qualified as knowledge not unless it is being justified. Hence, knowledge is at least a
justified true belief; that we know something only when we believe it; it is true; and our
belief of it is justified.

The Epistemic Regress

Following the trend that knowledge is a justified true belief, the question now is
that, where will this lead us? If beliefs need to be justified, then is the knowledge that
we have is direct (knowledge came from direct experience through the senses) or
indirect (knowledge mediated by another knowledge). If this is possible, therefore this
will lead to epistemic regress, an infinite series of knowing each based on the next. To
better understand this, for instance, if I am being asked, how do you know that she is

angry with you? perhaps my answer will be, I know that shes angry with me because I
ask her and she affirms it". However, this answer will still be put into question, "Why are
you sure that she is telling the truth?" Well, perhaps, this questioning seems to be that it
will never end.
In the case of an indirect knowledge which is also based on knowledge of
something else or a further belief, this will somehow lead to an epistemic chain. The
epistemic chain is a further knowledge or belief might be based on knowledge of, or
belief about, something still further, and so on. It is a chain of beliefs with first
constituting knowledge which is composed of many beliefs being related to the first
constituting beliefs.
There are actually four types of epistemic chain and we can generally classify the
into two based on their general characteristics. The first two is unanchored and seems
that they never end. On the other hand, the other two is anchored and do end.

The first type of epistemic chain is also known as an Infinite epistemic chain,
which is infinite and entirely unanchored. The second type, also known as the circular
epistemic chain, is circular by nature which is also unanchored. The third type is also
known as coherentism, which might end in belief but not constituting knowledge, thus
might be anchored in a porous foundation. The fourth type is also known as
foundationalism, which might end in a belief that constitutes knowledge and thus be
anchored in a sturdy foundation.

Infinite Epistemic Chains

The first type of epistemic chain is seemed to be problematic and absurd.

Provided that I could have an infinite number of beliefs, how could I ever be certain of
the things that I know if in the first place it requires me to have an infinite set of
justifications? Even if I claim that I breathe the air, it would be complicated for me to
justify my knowledge of that obvious and simple fact since it needs an infinite set of
justification.
Just to think and only imagine the idea that we need to have an infinite set of
justification is very impossible for us to provide since we cannot know and believe
infinite thigs. It could be possible with in terms of arithmetic. For instance, 2 is larger
than 1, 3 is larger than 4 so on and so forth. However, it is not applicable in providing
justification for knowledge.as Audi would put it:
One would be unable to remember enough about the first part of it when
one gets to the end; one could thus never understand the whole thing. What we
cannot understand we cannot believe; and what we cannot believe we cannot
know.
At the end of this, though we may have been provided with infinite sets of reason,
the epistemic chains could nit just account all of our knowledge. It is even hard for us to
find and have a grasp of a belief that could yield to another. We might have lots of
sources of justification, anything goes, however, nothing is accomplished.

Circular Epistemic Chains

It might seem that if there cannot be a circular causal chain of indirect beliefs,
each based on the next, then there cannot be a circular epistemic chain either. To better

understand this what we called circular epistemic chains, let us consider this example. I
know that he loves me. I know it because he always has time for me. Now I know that
he loves me because I can feel it by giving his time to me. However, this will go into
circles since the love that I can feel is only a causal basis for my belief that he shows his
love by giving his time for me and this will be my basis of the knowledge that he loves
me.
The problem with this epistemic chains is that we lack that missing link. For
instance, I know that he loves me because I can feel it by giving his time for me. May I
just know the latter based on the knowledge that he loves me? How would my
knowledge that he loves me justifies my belief that it seems to me that I feel that he
loves me by giving his time for me? After all, I just know by virtue of introspection and
not just by perception and reason that I feeling that he loves me. Still circular epistemic
chain, just like the Infinitism, is also vague.
Coherentism: Epistemic chains terminating in belief not constituting knowledge
The third possibility offers a solution to the epistemic regress by claiming that
knowledge could be born base on a belief of a premise which is not known. In other
words, I could just have a knowledge of something without grounding them on reason or
experience.
This issue is just the same with the guessing. Remember, as discussed in the earlier
part of this paper, guessing is not and should not be the credited as knowledge. Since
just believing something without any justification will lose its title as knowledge. Though
the third type has perhaps a substantial degree of justification, the anchor is still not that

sturdy, something is still missing. At least, it close enough to support knowledge.

Foundationalism: epistemic chains terminating in knowledge

The fourth type of possibility ends the epistemic chain in direct knowledge which
is also their last link. That knowledge, in turn, is apparently grounded in experience or in
reason, and this non-inferential grounding explains how it is (epistemically) direct: it
arises, directly, from perception, memory, introspection, or reason (or indeed from
testimony, provided this has an appropriate ultimate grounding in at least one of the first
four)
This kind of ground level knowledge being described is not just inferential or
reasoned or else their objective to end the epistemic chain will never be realized. Going
back to my example, I know that he loves me because he always has time for me. My
knowledge that I know (that he loves me) is based on what I feel, on my perception.
This type of epistemic chain differs based on four characteristics of the
foundational knowledge. First, they could differ in composition. Second, the
transmission they exhibit could also differ. It could be deductive, inductive or both. Third,
the anchor being used could be experiential or rational. Fourth, the strength of or the
degree of justification to the initial belief.
Different proponents of the fourth possibility have held various views about the
character of the foundational knowledge, that is, of the beliefs constituting the
knowledge that makes up the final link of the epistemic chain that is anchored in
experience or reason. All the four bases of the difference of the foundational knowledge

will only need a direct knowledge, a knowledge-based not on other beliefs and this kind
of knowledge doesn't need to be self-evident or came from indefeasibly justified belief.
In the end, our challenge is to assess these chains as possible sources of
knowledge or justification. Eventually, the assessment for these chains actually gave
birth to what we call, the epistemic regress problem.

The Epistemic Regress Problem

Whether the things that we know needs further justification is the problem that
every knowledge that we know is facing. Does our reason that justifies such knowledge
need another reason in order for it to be justified and call it as knowledge? If not, then
the things that we consider as knowledge is nothing but unjustified. If yes, is there any
end point to this all since our primary reason that justifies the things that we know needs
another reason, and the recent reason needs another reason, so on and so forth which
results in the indefinite regress problem? Or is it possible that we could provide a
justification for those reasons? In spite of the threats against knowledge, this paper
would like to affirm that there is a justification that could solve the regress problem.
According to Klein, there are two types of justifications: doxastic justification
and propositional justification. Doxastic justification is a belief-state and it claims that
epistemic justification is only a function of such a state. We can determine what to
believe on the basis of the overall beliefs we possess, without needing to take into
account anything else, including perceptual states. On the other hand, the doxastic

proposition is the justification of a proposition in the perspective of the subject

regardless

of

believing

it

or

not.

Some epistemologist claims that these two types of justification can be

connected by saying that one's belief in the proposition as its content is doxastically
justified as long as the belief state with the proposition is based on whatever the
proposition is justified. Regarding with the inferential knowledge, ones belief is at least,
at some part is doxastically justified when ones belief deploys a good reason in virtue of
which the content of the belief-state is propositionally justified. In other words, a belief
state with a given propositional content with the required etiology in which we could
provide good reasons is more respectable than a belief state with the same
propositional content and required etiology but without or cannot provide a good reason.

However, these two types of justification can be distinguished based on the

distinction between reason and reasoning. The word reason doesnt mean the cause.
However, it means that they are propositions that could be true or false, and
propositions, needless to say, cannot be a cause. One's belief possessing a good
reason for believing that proposition and deploying it provides a warrant or justification
for the belief-state with the proposition as its content. Thats just what good reasons do,
they make propositions likely to be true and they provide a basis for believing the
proposition. On the other hand, reasoning refers to the process. The process of ones
deployment of reasons for his belief.
In relation to the infinitist claim that there is no final end sight, it only refers to the
structure of reasons and not the process of reasoning. Reasons do not just end with

basic propositions as what the foundationalist claim. However, it doesnt mean that the
infinitist is saying that reasoning will not end. Thus, this paper is a humble attempt to
explain that there is a justification that solves the regress and the solution needs an
infinite set of reasons.
Alternative Solutions and Why They Fail
Agrippan skepticism
How it solves the epistemic regress problem?
Before I proceed to explain how they solve the regress problem, let us start first
with their solution to the said problem. Agrippan skeptics would claim that all so-called
knowledge is a groundless belief. Thus, they will claim that there is no solution or
justification that solves the regress problem. They defended their claim by providing
criticisms against the hypothesis, infinite regress, and circular reasoning also known as
the

Agrippan

Trilemma

which

aims

to

solve

the

regress

problem.

For some, they are just making assumptions without providing an argument for it.
According to Sextus Empiricus, a dogmatist, if thrown back into an infinite regress of
arguments, just assumes something as a starting point, without providing an argument
(anapodeikts). We suspend over mere hypotheses they could be false, opposite
hypotheses could be formulated, and so on. However, the skeptic's response to such
claim is that justification should not be based on mere assumptions for statements
made out of initial justifications must need to be justified in themselves.

Infinite regress opens us to an unending possibility by keeping us to try

something new to say until we will be led to new questions. As Sextus Empiricus puts it:

Arguments that throw one into an infinite regress. That which is brought forward to
make a given matter credible needs yet something else to make it credible, and so on
ad infinitum. Since we thus have no starting point for our argument, suspension of
judgment follows. However, according to the skeptics, the regress is vicious. The
skeptics never claimed that justifications have always to be questioned though they may
be acceptable for the time being. Rather, is that no claim is ever justified to the slightest
degree unless, per impossible, we first run through a series of justifications.
Foundationalist theory of knowledge says that if knowledge is possible, there
must be such beliefs. However, this does not mean that there any. This only means that
beliefs and judgment requesting for justification is lame because though they are not
just ere assumptions, they actually dont need to be justified further since these beliefs
or judgments, needless to say, are innately credible in themselves. For instance, in
mathematical facts, 1+1 is equivalent to 2 and it is true, no need for further justifications.
The skeptics will still a skeptic to this one since to grasp mathematical judgments, we
need to understand the whole of the system of arithmetic. Just the same with sensation.
Though you can feel and eventually know that you are in pain, skeptics will still be
critical about this since sensations are still subject to doubt and cannot, therefore,
constitute the foundation of knowledge. Sensations as well lack propositional content,
thus they cannot stand a logical relation to beliefs and so can neither support nor falsify
them.
Circular reasoning is used for confirming an investigated matter which requires
confirmation from that matter. In other words, it just like repeating something that was

said. However, for the skeptics, reasoning in a circular manner is a poor type of
reasoning since a statement cannot itself or justify itself.
Objections to the Agrippan skepticism
To have an objection to the Agrippan skepticism, let us define generally what is
philosophical and Agrippan skepticism. Afterwards, we will answer if Agrippan
skepticism is a form of philosophical skepticism based on the characteristics of
philosophical skepticism.
Philosophical skepticism is a general view about human knowledge and human
cognitive capacities: holds, or at least finds irrefutable, the view that knowledge is
impossible.

On the other hand, Agrippan skepticism claims that justification is an

illusion and because of this, knowledge can never be achieved. Philosophical

skepticism has three characteristics and these are intuitive, radical in strength and
general in scope.
The first characteristic of philosophical skepticism is that it is intuitive. The
arguments that a skeptic philosopher is raising came from the arguments not based on
theories that involve a lot of augmentations. Thus, they don't really dismiss something or
holding something, they are just being a skeptic. However, the Agrippan skepticism
exploits the idea of knowing and claims it. Thus, Agrippan skepticism is not really a
philosophical skepticism since it is not prepositionless, for it claims and holds
something.
The second characteristic of philosophical skepticism is a radical strength. Based
on this characteristic, philosophical skepticism does not concede that there are good
reasons for what we believe, but they are questioning, opening to the possibility whether

we have the slightest reason for believing rather than another. On another hand,
Agrippan skepticism claims, thus concluded that nobody knows anything at all. Hence,
unlike philosophical skepticism, it is not open to any possibilities that one could have the
slightest

reason

to

accept

one

thing

rather

than

another.

The third characteristic is general in scope. This characteristic states that the real
concern of philosophical skepticism is to know what we cannot know and not to claim
that we really don't have the capacity to know. However, the Agrippan skepticism, as
Williams puts it: is not clear on its generality: the problem of justification arises only with
respect to
claims where there is actual disagreement or which seem to reflect a particular
perspective.

Finitism
How it solves the epistemic problem?
Infinitism solves the regress problem by insisting that inferential justification
ramifies or break up without end or beginning and that if justification is possible then
non- inferential justification must be possible.
Ginet, one of the proponents of finitism, agrees to the available reasons of Klein.
However, he wants to have an additional requirement regarding with this available

reasons. He even called this as the strengthening of available reasons. As stated by

Ginet:

The notion of an available reason for a belief might be strengthened in such a

way as to make it plausible that, if the belief is, in that stronger way, available to S as a
reason for
believing, then it is a reason of his for believing.
Hence, the additional requirement is that the belief of S which also available as a
reason must be placed upon accepting an entertaining that to belief, to believe that the
fact that the belief was among his reasons for believing.

Objections to Finitism
Ginet and other epistemologists would disagree to the infinitist that all warrant
comes from inferences. As stated:
A more important, deeper problem for infinitism is this: inference cannot
originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it
cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, it is all inferential. (Ginet, p.
290)
However, this objection will be true if inferential justification is correctly used as par as
instrumental value. Infinitism, like the plausible versions of coherentism, depicts
justification as emerging when the set of propositions that are appropriately adduced as
reasons expands. Of course, were the foundationalist to insist on thinking of warrant as
originating in some propositions and then being transferred by inference to other
propositions, he or she would be begging the question at hand. For it is that very
concept of warrant that infinitism is challenging.

Coherentism
How it solves the epistemic problem?
Coherentist claims that there is no such thing as basic or foundational belief. Tus
for them, Knowledge and justification are structured like a web where the strength of
any given area depends on the strength of the surrounding areas. This coherentist claim
will be our basis on how do they solve the regress problem. So basically, in order for us
to better understand how they provide the solution to the regress problem, we must
know

first

about

their

denial

of

basic

belief.

The coherentist, they have what we called us Doxastic coherentism. Meaning,

every justified belief receives its justification from other beliefs in its epistemic
neighborhood. To better understand this let us have an illustration. For instance, let us
agree that the hat is blue. The idea that hat is blue has been justified from other beliefs
in the epistemic vicinity of the said proposition and they will be considered as evidence
for taking the said proposition to be true. Now the question is this, which beliefs might
make up this set of justification-conferring neighborhood beliefs?
Upon answering the said question, lets consider the inference to the best explanation
will lead us to explanatory coherence. This approach assumes that, your belief that the
hat is blue came from your perceptual experiences and second belief the way the hat
appears to you in your perceptual experiences, and a second belief to the effect that
your perceptual experience, the hat's looking blue to you, is best explained by the
assumption that the hat is blue. Hence: (1) I am having a visual experience: the hat

looks blue to me. (2) My having an experience is best explained by assuming that the
hat is blue is true.

Objections to coherentism
Coherentism can be understood in different ways, and yet we can provide one
objection to this refuting all the possible versions of coherentism. Doxastic coherentism
is seemed to be vulnerable in the foundationalist camp. One of these we considered
already: It would seem that doxastic coherentism makes excessive intellectual
demands on believers. In our normal living, in the mundane world, we don't normally
bother to form beliefs about the explanatory coherence of our beliefs or the reliability of
our belief sources. According to a second objection, doxastic coherentism fails by being
insensitive to the epistemic relevance of perceptual experiences. For instance, I have a
crush and I keep on observing him. A moment ago I just saw him wearing a polo and it
made me have an impression that he is so handsome but later, he changes his clothes
and changed my impression, that he is not that handsome. However, I still believe that
he is still handsome and my belief is now unjustified since in the present, he is not
wearing his polo which actually changed my impression. And now he wears again his
polo and it seems that my belief has been justified since he is wearing it again. Since
doxastic coherentism does not attribute epistemic relevance to perceptual experiences
by themselves, it cannot explain why Kim's belief is first justified, then unjustified, and
eventually justified again.

The effective solution: How Infinitism Solves the Epistemic Regress Problem?

Before to proceed on how Infinitism solves the epistemic regress problem let us
know first of what account of warrant do we seek which is vital as we answer the said
concern.
Infinitism could also be compared with warrant emerged form of coherentism
because it holds that warrant for a question proposition becomes embedded in a set of
propositions. It could also be compared with foundationalism because it holds that
some propositions are prior to the other. However, we need to be careful with the
coherentism intuition which states that some of the propositions mutually supports each
other. For instance, the claim all burgers are delicious is actually the foundation for
believing that this burger is delicious. Whats wrong with this, according to Klein is that:
Some have thought that the universal generalization is always
epistemically prior to the particular, and others have thought that the particular is
always epistemically prior to the generalization. Each view runs afoul of our
reasoning practice.
Meaning to say, there ae times that we offer a solution to the particular using the
general idea when the particular is being questioned and vice versa. However, we
cannot just use the general idea as a reason to the particular and vice versa in the
course of one reasoning session. As stated, that would be to fall into circular, questionbegging reasoning.
To answer the question being asked in the first paragraph of this part, the warrant
that we are seeking is not a warrant transfer view or warrant-emergent finite
coherentism. Rather, what we are looking for is the is a warrant-emergent Infinitism. It

can solve the regress problem because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of

reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengthens.
In line with this, the Infinitism will adopt the following two principles and these are
the:

The principle of Avoiding Circularity (PAC): for all propositions, x, if x is warranted

for a person, S, at t, then for all y, if y is in the reason-ancestry of x for S at t, then
x is not in the reason-ancestry of y for S at t.
Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness (PAA): for all propositions, x, if x is warranted
for a person, S, at t, then there is some reason, r1, available to S for x at t; and
there is some reason, r2, available to S for r1 at t, etc., and there is no last
reason in the series.
In other words, these two speaks that warrant transfer view cannot solve the regress
problem by endorsing circular reasoning and available reasons should be taken into
account respectively.
Therefore, there must be two conditions that need to be satisfied in order for the
proposition available to S as a reason for all proposition which is x. the proposition itself
must be available first for S. It must be attached to S belief. Endorsements and belief
are not necessary in order for the propositions be available for S. for instance, 1+1=2 is
always available even without our consciousness entertaining it.
The proposition needs to be a reason for S at t is the second condition that
needs to be satisfied. When we say that propositions need to be a reason for S, it
doesn't mean that we need to substantiate or expand it. This would somehow make our

work easy since we could have lots of alternative accounts that could be employed by
the infinitist. There are other possible accounts. The point is that whatever the proper
account of reasons is, coherentists, foundationalists, and infinitists will have to employ it
because each view holds that there are reasons for at least some of our beliefs.
These two conditions that need to be satisfied makes a clear statement of what
is and isn't the aim of Infinitism. Infinite set of propositions which entail next in the series
is not enough since there has to be an appropriate series of reasons that could provide
the missing credibility. Thus, not just any infinite series of propositions will do though
there should be an infinite series of propositions each entailed by the previous one in
the series of every proposition. After all, the propositions must be available and they
must

be

reasons.

Why The Objections to the Effective Solutions Fail?

Objection 1 and infinitist reply
The first objection will be all about the finite mind objection by John Williams
which he puts this way:
The [proposed] regress of justification of S's belief that p would certainly
require that he holds an infinite number of beliefs. This is psychological, if not
logically, impossible. If a man can believe an infinite number of things, then there
seems to be no reason why he cannot know an infinite number of things. Both
possibilities contradict the common intuition that the human mind is finite. Only
God could entertain an infinite number of beliefs. But surely God is not the only
justified believer. (Williams, 1981, p. 85)

As claimed by Williams, it is very impossible for a human mind to have an infinite set of
reasons since human minds are finite. Human minds cannot hold a lot of information
and even beliefs.
On the other hand, the infinitist would like to defend that Infinitism doesnt require
or even hold an infinite number of beliefs or requiring an infinite non-repeating set of
propositions each of which is an available reason for preceding one.
Objection 2 and infinitist reply
The second that will be presented will state that it is not clear on how infinite
epistemic chains could account for any knowledge. As Audi would say it:
Let me suggest one reason to doubt that human beings are even capable
of having infinite sets of beliefs. Consider the claim that we can have an infinite
set of arithmetical beliefs say the 2 is twice 1, the 4 is twice 2, etc. Surely for a
finite mind, there will be some point or other at which the relevant proposition
cannot be grasped and what we cannot grasp we cannot believe. I doubt that
any other lines of argument show that we can have infinite sets of beliefs; nor, if
we can, is it clear how infinite epistemic chains could account for any of our
knowledge.

(Audi,

1993,

pp.

127128)

The point of Audi is that infinite epistemic chains are very absurd to be accounted for
any knowledge. For how can we know if in the first we there are set of reasons that
cannot

grasp,

which

means

we

cannot

believe.

However, in the perspective of the infinitist, a finite mind can have an access to
an infinite number of beliefs. For instance, we can only believe on the objects that are

red. Assuming that we also have an infinite number of red objects and we could only
believe of each objects that are red. Those are different beliefs because the truth
conditions of the propositions affirmed in the beliefs are distinct.
Another argument of Audi that should be given attention would be: it is not clear
how infinite epistemic chains could account for any of our knowledge. As part of the
infinitist defense, if knowledge required a complete series of justification, knowledge
would be impossible to achieve. The reason behind why do knowledge the highest
possible degree of the warrant or absolutely credible belief because as the series
lengthens
warrant and credibility increase. Nothing prevents it increasing to the degree required
for knowledge.