G.R. No. 81123 Digest
G.R. No. 81123 Digest
G.R. No. 81123 Digest
Held:1. Yes. A real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right
while a real party in interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal
obligation whose act or omission violates the legal rights of the former.
For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real
party in interest-defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only
because it is the registered owner of the truck involved but also because,
when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a corporation
and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another.
Also, the law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has
ceased can still be made a party to a suit. Under paragraph 1, Section 122 of
the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation: xxx shall nevertheless be
continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time
when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to
settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and
to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the
business for which it was established.xxx
2. Yes. Section 13, Rule 14 mandates:
Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. - If
the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made
on the president, manager, secretary , cashier, agent or any of its
directors.
Therefore, service upon a dissolved corporation may be made through
any of the persons enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14. Whomsoever Miss
Sison was acting for in receiving the summons there is no question that the
notice of the action was promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or PEPSICO
with whom she is admittedly connected. We rule, as in G & G Trading
Corporation v. Court of Appeals (supra), that there was substantial
compliance with Section 13, Rule 14 because the purpose of notice was
satisfied. Contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals, we therefore, hold
that there was proper service of summons to bind Pepsi Cola and that the
decision of the lower court against Pepsi Cola rendered on June 24, 1985 is
valid and enforceable against the private respondent.
Therefore, we rule that the private respondent is bound to satisfy the
judgment by default which has become final and executory. The lower court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of the private respondent
to vacate judgment.
Motion GRANTED and CA is REVERSE