Cycle 6, Sexual Offences, Indicative Answer - Essay
Cycle 6, Sexual Offences, Indicative Answer - Essay
Cycle 6, Sexual Offences, Indicative Answer - Essay
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 raises serious difficulties and confusions
concerning consent. Discuss with reference to examples and case law.
Certainly the 2003 Act improves the law: previously D was guilty only if he was
reckless as to Vs consent, whereas now he can be guilty for behaving
unreasonably. But to repeat, when could D ever reasonably mistake Vs consent?
When would V ever say yes but mean no? Perhaps when she is under pressure or
being exploited or unduly influenced but why should that ever benefit D?
Instead it should trigger yet further protection of V.
And yet we are bombarded with images of real men taking sex, without ever a
discussion about consent. Witness the new James Bond film. He has sex twice.
The first time is with a widow, the day of her husbands funeral, after she has
consumed alcohol and been threatened with death, after she has slapped him,
his response being to smash her property and grab her. The second time is with
a younger girl he has promised to look after, and is supposed to be protecting
from death by hiding her away, alone with him, and occurs again just after an
attempt on her life. And his behaviour is supposed to be heroic?
Perhaps some men fear that a woman, free of any pressure or exploitation or
influence, might say yes but secretly mean no, deliberately. Why would a woman
ever deliberately procure her own rape against her wishes? First, that very
proposition is a logical paradox (and so factually impossible). Second, if any
person says yes, if they later claim that they did not consent, that simply raises
questions of credibility. Their denial of consent might not be believed. The law
already protects people from this logically paradoxical position.
s 75 of the 2003 Act makes it rebuttably presumed that V did not consent, and
that D did not reasonably believe otherwise, including such situations as: V was
threatened with violence, or unconscious, or had been administered drugs. How
is this only a rebuttable assumption? For example, how could it ever be
reasonable to assume an unconscious person consents to sex at the time? How
could it ever be unacceptable to require D first to wake V up? There are
conclusive presumptions in s 76, like impersonating someone known to V how
often do these ever happen? And anyway, even if these sections dont apply, still
we fall back on the general question of whether V consented: see Assange v
Swedish Prosecution Authority, so really they dont short-circuit the process
anyway.
Consent is defined as the freedom and capacity to make a choice (s 74), capacity
being the ability to understand the facts and weigh them in the balance: Cooper.
That seems about right. Yet we erode that freedom, and deny that capacity,
when we allow D to mistake Vs lack of consent.