Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the

basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. It would
seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners inclusion as
co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name
their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the
case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should
exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.

Same; Same; An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant because he possesses
special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.In modern day
perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his
client. A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are
entirely different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney
also occupies what may be considered as a quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer
of the Court and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken
favorable to his client.

Same; Same; In the creation of lawyer-client relationship there are rules, ethical conduct
and duties that breathe life into it.Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there
are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary
duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a
very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public
interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause
is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.

124

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

4 ANNOTATED

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division

Same; Same; Generally, a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client.As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in
the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client.

Same; Same; Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that
revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyers advice.Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists
that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyers advice.

Same; Same; Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability his identity is
privileged.Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is
privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation, prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyers claim to the effect
that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.

Same; Same; The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks
legal assistance.Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which
could qualify as exceptions to the general rule. For example, the content of any client
communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of
the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where thenature of
the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since
such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.

Same; Same; The lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyers loyalty to his client
extends even after the termination of the relationship.The utmost zeal given by Courts to
the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyers loyalty to his client
is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship,
but extends even after the termination of the relationship.

125

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 125

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; It is unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to

compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised
threat of incrimination.I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances
already detailed in the ponencia, a situation of the Republic attempting to establish a case
not on what it perceives to be the strength of its own evidence but on what it could elicit
from a counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for the Sandiganbayan to compel
petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised threat of
incrimination.

DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:

Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The prerogative to determine who shall be made

defendant in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff.The prerogative to determine
who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG
in this case. The control of the Court comes in only when the issue of interest (2, Rule 3,
Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an indispensable party has not been joined, or whether
there is a misjoinder of parties (7, 8, and 9, Id.), is raised.

Same; Same; The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a
cause to exclude a party.In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners did not,
therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco. They cannot claim the same treatment, much
less compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for nothing whatsoever. They have no
right to make such a demand for until they shall have complied with the conditions imposed
for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss based on
the grounds allowed by law (e.g., those enumerated in 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). The rule
of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is
merely a ground for disqualification of a witness (24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may
only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as
witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to such confidential
communication or advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to produce,
throughsubpoenae duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other documents containing the
same privileged matter.

126

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

6 ANNOTATED
 Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division

But none of the lawyers in this case is being required to testify about or otherwise
reveal any [confidential] communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment.

PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Attorneys; Lawyer-Client Relationship; The relation of attorney and client cannot exist
for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes.Communications to an attorney having for
their object the commission of a crime x x x partake the nature of a conspiracy, and it is not
only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain circumstances it might
become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of public justice require that no such
shield from merited exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how
he can safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the
purpose of counsel in concocting crimes. In the well chosen words of retired Justice
Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Same; Same; As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not include the right of
non-disclosure of client identity.Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-
client privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against them as co-conspirators in
crimes, we should focus on the more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege
includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as contended by the petitioners. As
a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of
client identity. The general rule, however, admits of well-etched exceptions which
theSandiganbayan failed to recognize.

Same; Same; The person claiming the privilege or its exceptions has the obligation to
present the underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege.Be that as it may,
I part ways with the majority when it ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall within
the exceptions to the general rule. I respectfully submit that the attorney-client privilege is
not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso factoand ipso jure drape he who invokes it
with its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. The person claiming
the privilege or its exceptions has the obligation to present the underlying
facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege.

127
 VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 127

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, First Division

When these facts can be presented only by revealing the very information sought to be
protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the lawyer to move for an inspection of the
evidence in an in camera hearing. The hearing can even be in camera and ex-parte.

Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Intestate Estate; Declara tion of heirs void, it
having been already resolved with finality by the probate court, whose order had already
become final absent an appeal therefrom.The declaration of heirs made by Judge Estenzo
is void said matter ha ving been already resolved with finality by the probate court, whose
order of November 24,1962 has not been appealed and is therefore final insofar as said
declaration is concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Res judicata, not a case of; Probate court has no right
to determine with finality the ownership of a parcel of land.But of course the ownership of
the disputed parcel cannot be said to be res judicata, for a probate court has no right to
determine with finality the ownership thereof.

Same; Same; Same, Same; Same, Supreme Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot
order an unqualified and final exclusion non-exclusion of the property involved from the
estate of the deceased; Remand of case to trial court for trial only on the question of
ownership over the disputed parcel of land.For now, the issue of ownership cannot be
determined by Us with finality. The resolution of the issue is better left to the trial court
where Civil Case No. 1184-0 is now instituted. The resolution of this issue will need a full
dress hearing where the parties will exchange various pleadings between themselves. This
Court not being a trier of facts, it is clear that we

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SECOND DIVISION

97

VOL. 153, AUGUST 14, 1987 97

 Ortega vs. Court of Appeals

cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property

involved from the estate of Joaquin Ortega. x x x The petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
This case is REMANDED to the trial court for a full hearing only on the question of
ownership of the 174,496 square meters of land in Sta.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Immorality;Adultery; Pleadings and

Practice; Negative Pregnant;Words and Phrases; Adultery is defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void; A negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse partyit is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the plead-ing.From respondents ANSWER,
he does not deny carrying on an

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*
EN BANC.

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Guevarra vs. Eala

adulterous relationship with Irene, adultery being defined under Art. 333 of the
Revised Penal Code as that committed by any married woman who shall have sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void. (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that
it was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families.
In other words, respondents denial is a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise,
a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or
at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged
with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence;Quantum of Evidence; Clearly

preponderant evidencethat evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and
credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the otherwhich
is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.Without
doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently
proven by more than clearly preponderant evidencethat evidence adduced by one party
which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has
greater weight than the otherwhich is the quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class
of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and
criminal cases. . . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension,
clearly preponderant evidence is all that is required.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase grossly
immoral conduct,

VOL. 529, AUGUST 1, 2007 3

Guevarra vs. Eala

not under scandalous circumstances.The immediately-quoted Rule which provides

the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase grossly immoral conduct,
not under scandalous circumstances. Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances
is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading: ART. 334.Concubinage.Any
husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. x x x x, an element of the crime of concubinage when a
married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wifeit is immaterial whether the
affair was carried out discreetly.Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not
his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral
conduct depends on the surrounding circumstances. The case at bar involves a relationship
between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A lawyer, in carrying on an extra-marital affair with
a married woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void, and
despite such lawyer himself being married, showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the lawhe betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.That the marriage between
complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts
complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void. As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration
that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Guevarra vs. Eala

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio; Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own
they are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. It
bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and
thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainants motion to withdraw his petition
for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if
the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the
present administrative complaint. Citing the ruling inPangan v. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1
(1981), viz.: x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to
these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover,
this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that
which courts assume in trying criminal case (Italics in the original), this Court
in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406 (1999), held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they mayproceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Freedom of Expression; Contempt of Court; Direct

and Indirect Contempt; In convicting respondent Gonzalez of contempt of court in facie
curiae, the Court did not use the phrase in facie curiae as a technical equivalent of direct
contempt.In respondents point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court to charge
respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct contempt. In the per
curiam Resolution, the Court concluded that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of
contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. The Court did not use the phrase in facie curiae as a technical
equivalent of direct contempt, though we are

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EN BANC.

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan

aware that courts in the United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of
direct contempts as contempts in the face of the courts. Rather, the Court sought to
convey that it regarded the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a
pleading filed before the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of
respondent Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting
a frontal assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial
system. What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated
2 May 1988, to explain why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions and in respect of which, respondent was heard and
given the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he
wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did notsummarily impose
punishment upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondents acts as constituting direct
contempt.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Ethics; Lawyers;Complaints against lawyers; Referral
of a complaint filed against an attorney to the Solicitor General for investigation is not
required where the Supreme Court itself has initiated the charges against the respondent
lawyer.In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised
Rules of Court pointing out that: [R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139 (b) of the
Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the
Supreme Court. x x x Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which
referral is made for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with
the prosecution of the respondent (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
charges against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor
General if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In the
present case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court, there was no need
for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed
by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him and
that in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense: his
defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 1, 1989 3

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan

him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in
the exercise of his freedom of speech.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Clear and present danger rule; The clear and present danger
test is not the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts for making out the
appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly.The clear and present danger
doctrine invoked by respondents counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all
problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of
claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the
doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present danger
doctrine has been an accepted method for making out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. In Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales,this Court, speaking
through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said: x x x The prevailing doctrine is that the clear
and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test (Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando of the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle requires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation(Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales
v. Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). Under either the clear and present danger
test or the balancing-of-interest test, we believe that the statements here made by
respondent Gonzalez are of such nature and were made in such a manner and under such
circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was
implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the
substantive evil which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in
the instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar
disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to
confront and prevent a substantive evil consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and
fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of
professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The
substantive evil here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public
disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its
implications for society.

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Cruel and Unusual Punishments; The imposition of the
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law against respondent is not cruel,
degrading and inhuman.In his point J, respondents counsel pleads that the imposition of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. The Court finds it difficult to consider this a substantial constitutional
argument. The indefiniteness of the respondents suspension, far from being cruel or
degrading or inhuman, has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of
his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving
respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and
misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct
rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.