Ac 25.1701-1 A

U.S.
Department
of Transportation
Advisory
Federal Aviation
Administration Circular
Subject: Certification of Electrical Date: 12/4/07 AC No. 25.1701-1
Wiring Interconnection Systems on Initiated by: ANM-100
Transport Category Airplanes
1. PURPOSE. This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance for certification of electrical
wiring interconnection systems (EWIS) on transport category airplanes in accordance with 14
CFR part 25, subpart H, sections 25.1701 through 25.1733 and sections H25.4 and H25.5 of
Appendix H to part 25.
2. APPLICABILITY.
a. The guidance provided in this document is applicable to transport category airplane

manufacturers, modifiers, foreign civil aviation authorities, Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) transport airplane type certification engineers, designees, and FAA Flight Standards
personnel.
b. This guidance can be used to meet the regulatory requirements for development of
EWIS maintenance and inspection procedures as required by 14 CFR sections 25.1729 and
26.11. These maintenance and inspection procedures are required to be part of the
instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA) specified by 14 CFR part 25, section
H25.5(a)(1).
c. This material is neither mandatory nor regulatory in nature and does not constitute a
regulation. It describes acceptable means, but not the only means, for demonstrating
compliance with the applicable regulations. We will consider other methods of
demonstrating compliance that an applicant may elect to present. While these guidelines are
not mandatory, they are derived from extensive FAA and industry experience in
determining compliance with the relevant regulations. On the other hand, if we become
aware of circumstances that convince us that following this AC would not result in
compliance with the applicable regulations, we will not be bound by the terms of this AC,
and we may require additional substantiation or design changes as a basis for finding
compliance.
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
d. This material does not change or create any additional regulatory requirements nor does
it authorize changes in or permit deviations from existing regulatory requirements.
e. Terms such as shall or must are used in this AC only in the sense of ensuring
applicability of this particular method of compliance when the acceptable method of
compliance described herein is used.
3. HOW THIS INFORMATION WAS DERIVED.
a. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommended that we address all
wiring issues identified in our Aging Systems Plan, either through rulemaking or
through other means. To accomplish this we established, in 1998, the Aging Transport
Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ATSRAC). The ATSRAC provides a forum
for airlines, manufacturers, and other regulatory authorities to make recommendations to
us based on the Aging Systems Plan. Recommendations have addressed EWIS
certification issues, development of standard wiring practices manuals, enhanced EWIS
maintenance requirements, and EWIS training.
b. The guidance in this AC is based on recommendations submitted to us by the

ATSRAC and by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC). It is derived
from best practices identified through extensive research by ATSRAC Industry Working
Groups 6, 7, and 9, the ARAC Electrical Systems Harmonization Working Group,
United States and European standard aircraft industry practice, and the results of various
EWIS-related research and development programs. These recommendations and best
practices are based on treating EWIS as an aircraft system, and the belief that EWIS
should be designed and installed with the same level of diligence as any other essential
or critical system in the aircraft. We endorse these best practices.
4. COMPLIANCE METHODS.
a. The guidance in this AC describes means of compliance with subpart H of part 25

and supplements similar guidance provided in other advisory material and policy
memoranda concerning EWIS requirements for airplane systems. A list of related
regulations, ACs, and policy memoranda is in Appendix A of this AC.
b. To fully realize the objectives of the guidance contained in this AC, type certificate
(TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, maintenance providers, repair
stations, and persons performing modifications or repairs may need to adjust their
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approach to designing and modifying EWIS. They may need to be aware of the history
of the EWIS in a particular aircraft and the role it plays in the safe operation of that
aircraft. People who design and modify aircraft EWIS should be aware that it should be
designed and installed with the same level of diligence given to any other essential or
critical system in the aircraft.
c. The guidance in this AC is organized by subpart H section.
/s/Ali Bahrami
Ali Bahrami
Manager
Transport Airplane Directorate
Aircraft Certification Service
iii
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
CONTENTS
25.1701 Definition ........................................................................................ 3

25.1703 Function and installation: EWIS............................................................. 4
25.1705 Systems and functions: EWIS ...............................................................14
25.1707 System separation: EWIS......................................................................14
25.1709 System safety: EWIS.............................................................................20
25.1711 Component Identification: EWIS ...........................................................33
25.1713 Fire protection: EWIS ............................................................................38
25.1715 Electrical bonding and protection against static electricity: EWIS..........39
25.1717 Circuit protective devices: EWIS ...........................................................40
25.1719 Accessibility provisions: EWIS...............................................................40
25.1721 Protection of EWIS .................................................................................41
25.1723 Flammable fluid fire protection: EWIS ...................................................42
25.1725 Powerplants: EWIS ...............................................................................43
25.1727 Flammable fluid shutoff means: EWIS ..................................................43
25.1729 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS ....................................43
25.1731 Powerplant and APU fire detector system: EWIS..................................43
25.1733 Fire detector systems, general: EWIS ...................................................43
H25.4 & H25.5 - Instructions for Continued Airworthiness ......................................44
Appendix A Related Regulations and Documents

Appendix B NPRM Subpart H and Appendix H Preamble Discussion
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5. SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE BY SUBPART H SECTION
a. 25.1701 DEFINITION.
(1) 25.1701(a).
(a) Section 25.1701 defines EWIS for the purposes of complying with the
subpart H requirements and other EWIS-related requirements of part 25.
Section 25.1701 identifies which wires and components these requirements
apply to. Although this definition is located in subpart H to part 25, it applies to
all EWIS requirements regardless of location within part 25.
(b) Section 25.1701(a) defines EWIS as any wire, wiring device, or

combination of these, including termination devices, installed in any area of the
airplane for the purpose of transmitting electrical energy, including data and
signals, between two or more intended termination points. The term wire
means bare or insulated wire used for the purpose of electrical energy
transmission, grounding, or bonding. This includes electrical cables, coaxial
cables, ribbon cables, power feeders, and databuses.
(c) Paragraph (a) of this rule provides a listing of the component types that are
considered part of the EWIS. These component types are listed as items
25.1701(a)(1) through 25.1701(a)(14). While these are the most widely
used EWIS components, this is not an all inclusive list. There may be
components used by an applicant to support transmission of electrical energy
that are not listed in 25.1701(a) but still meet the EWIS definition. These
components will be considered as EWIS components and are subject to EWIS-
related regulatory requirements.
(2) 25.1701(a)(14).
(a) Section 25.1701(a)(14) says that EWIS components located inside

shelves, panels, racks, junction boxes, distribution panels, and back-planes of
equipment racks (e.g., circuit board back-planes and wire integration units) are
covered by the EWIS definition.
(b) These components are included in the EWIS definition because the
equipment they are inside of, or part of, is typically designed and made for a
particular airplane model or series of models. So the requirements that apply to
airplane EWIS components must be applied to the components inside that
equipment. These contrast with avionics components that must be sent back to
their manufacturer or a specialized repair shop for service. Components inside
shelves, panels, racks, junction boxes, distribution panels, and back-planes of
equipment racks are maintained, repaired, and modified by the same personnel
who maintain, repair, and modify the EWIS in the rest of the airplane. For
example, in an electrical distribution panel, system separation must be designed
and maintained within the panel just like it must be designed and maintained for
the EWIS leading up to that panel. Identification of components inside the
panel is just as important as it is outside the panel since the wiring inside the
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panel is treated much the same. Also, while this type of equipment is designed
for its intended function and is manufactured and installed to the same standards
as other EWIS, it is typically not qualified to an environmental standard such as
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) document number DO-
160.
(3) 25.1701(b).
(a) There are some exceptions to the EWIS definitions and those are given in
25.1701(b). This paragraph excepts EWIS components inside the following
equipment, and the external connectors that are part of that equipment:
1 Electrical equipment or avionics that are qualified to environmental

conditions and testing procedures when those conditions and procedures
are
(aa) appropriate for the intended function and operating environment,
and
(bb) acceptable to the FAA.
2 Portable electrical devices that are not part of the type design of the
airplane including personal entertainment devices and laptop computers.
3 Fiber optics.
(b) The first exception means EWIS components located inside avionic or
electrical equipment such as, for example, flight management system
computers, flight data recorders, VHF radios, primary flight displays,
navigation displays, generator control units, integrated drive generators, and
galley ovens, if this equipment has been tested to industry-accepted
environmental testing standards. Examples of acceptable standards are RTCA
DO-160 and the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment
(EUROCAE) ED 14, and equipment qualified to an FAA Technical Standard
Order (TSO).
(c) An applicant may use any environmental testing standard if the applicant
can demonstrate that the testing methods and pass/fail criteria are at least
equivalent to the widely accepted standards of DO-160, EUROCAE ED 14, or a
specific TSO. Applicants should submit details of the environmental testing
standards and results of the testing that demonstrate the equipment is suited for
use in the environment in which it will operate.
b. 25.1703 FUNCTION AND INSTALLATION: EWIS. Section 25.1703 requires

that applicants select EWIS components that are of a kind and design appropriate to their
intended function just as 25.1301 requires this for other pieces of equipment installed on
the airplane. Factors such as component design limitations, functionality, and susceptibility
to arc tracking and moisture or other known characteristics of the particular component must
be considered. The following paragraphs, 5.b.(1) through 5.b.(7), provide guidance in
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showing compliance with the specific provisions of 25.1703 (a) through (d). Paragraph
5.b.(8) deals with EWIS component selection and paragraph 5.b.(9) has specific guidance
on wire selection. Paragraph 5.b.(10) discusses EWIS component selection for future
modifications.
(1) 25.1703(a)(1). This section requires that each EWIS component be of a kind
and design appropriate to its intended function. In this context, the requirement means
that components must be qualified for airborne use, or otherwise specifically assessed as
acceptable for their intended use. To be appropriate means that the equipment is used
in a manner for which it was designed. For example, a wire rated at 150 degrees Celsius
would not be appropriate for installation if that installation would cause the wire to
operate at a temperature higher than 150 degrees Celsius. Wire and other components
made for household or consumer products use may not be appropriate for airborne use
because they are manufactured for the consumer market and not for use in an airborne
environment. Other factors that must be considered for EWIS component selection are
mechanical strength, voltage drop, required bend radius, and expected service life.
Refer to paragraph 5.b.(8)(a) for further explanation of expected service life.
(2) 25.1703(a)(2). This section requires that EWIS components be installed

according to their limitations. As used here, limitations means the design and
installation requirements of the particular EWIS component. Examples of EWIS
component limitations are maximum operating temperature, degree of moisture
resistance, voltage drop, maximum current-carrying capability, and tensile strength.
EWIS component selection and installation design must take into account various
environmental factors including, but not limited to, vibration, temperature, moisture,
exposure to the elements or chemicals (de-icing fluid, for instance), insulation type, and
type of clamp. In addition, characteristics of both conductor and insulation for wires
and cables that are required to regularly flex, such as those in doors and hatches, should
also be considered when selecting them for such applications.
(3) 25.1703(a)(3). This section requires that EWIS function properly when
installed. The key word in understanding the intent of this section is properly, as that
relates to airworthiness of the airplane. For an EWIS component to function properly
means that it must be capable of safely performing the function for which it was
designed. For example, the fact that an in-flight entertainment (IFE) system fails to
deliver satisfactory picture or sound quality is not what the term properly refers to, is
not a safety issue, and thus is not a certification issue. Failure of an EWIS component
has the potential for being a safety hazard whether it is part of a safety-related system or
an IFE system. Therefore, EWIS components must always function properly (safely)
when installed, no matter what system they are part of, and any malfunction of the
EWIS must not degrade the airworthiness of the airplane (refer to 25.1705 for
terminology relating to failure classifications).
(4) 25.1703(a)(4). This section requires that EWIS components be designed and
installed so mechanical strain is minimized. This means the EWIS installation must be
designed so that strain on wires would not be so great as to cause the wire or other
components to fail. This section requires that adequate consideration be given to
mechanical strain when selecting wire and cables, clamps, strain reliefs, stand-offs, and
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other devices used to route and support the wire bundle when designing the installation
of these components.
(5) 25.1703(b). This section requires that selection of wires takes into account
known characteristics of different wire types in relation to each specific application, to
minimize risk of damage. It is important to select the aircraft wire type whose
construction matches the application environment. The wire type selected should be
constructed for the most severe environment likely to be encountered in service. This
means, for example, that insulation types susceptible to arc tracking should not be used
in areas exposed to high vibration and constant flexing in a moisture-prone environment.
(6) 25.1703(c). This section contains the requirement formerly located

in 25.869(a)(3) that design and installation of the main power cables allow for a
reasonable degree of deformation and stretching without failure. Although now located
in 25.1703(c), the meaning of the requirement has not changed. The reason for this
requirement is the same as for 25.993(f), which requires that each fuel line within the
fuselage be designed and installed to allow a reasonable degree of deformation and
stretching without leakage. The idea is that the fuselage can be damaged with partial
separation or other structural damage without the fuel lines or electrical power cables
breaking apart. Allowing for a certain amount of stretching will help to minimize the
probability of a fuel-fed fire inside the fuselage. As it is used in this requirement, a
reasonable degree of deformation and stretching should be about 10% of the length of
the electrical cable.
(7) 25.1703(d). This section requires that EWIS components located in areas of
known moisture build-up be adequately protected to minimize moistures hazardous
effects. This is to ensure that all practical means be considered and the most appropriate
method used to address potential damage from fluid contact with EWIS components.
Wires routed near a lavatory, galley, hydraulic lines, severe wind and moisture problem
areas such as wheel wells and wing trailing edges, and any other area of the airplane
where moisture collection could be a concern must be adequately protected from
possible adverse effects of exposure to moisture.
(8) EWIS component selection.
(a) Expected service life. Expected service life should be considered in

selecting EWIS components to use. Expected service life means the expected
service lifetime of the EWIS. This is not normally less than the expected
service life of the aircraft structure. If the expected service life requires that all
or some of the EWIS components be replaced at certain intervals, then these
intervals must be specified in the ICA as required by 25.1529.
(b) Qualified components. EWIS components should be qualified for

airborne use or specifically assessed as acceptable for the intended use and be
appropriate for the environment in which they are installed. Aircraft
manufacturers list approved components in their manuals, such as the standard
wiring practices manual (ATA Chapter 20). Only the components listed in the
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applicable manual or approved substitutes should be used for the maintenance,

repair, or modification of the aircraft. EWIS modifications to the original type
design should be designed and installed to the same standards used by the
original aircraft manufacturer or other equivalent standards acceptable to the
FAA. This is because the manufacturers technical choice of an EWIS
component is not always driven by regulatory requirements alone. In some
cases, specific technical constraints would result in the choice of a component
that exceeds the minimum level required by the regulations.
(c) Mechanical strength. EWIS components should have sufficient

mechanical strength for their service conditions.
1 The EWIS should be installed with sufficient slack so that bundles and
individual wires are not under undue tension.
2 Wires connected to movable or shock-mounted equipment should have

sufficient length to allow full travel without tension on the bundle to the
point where failure of the EWIS could occur.
3 Wiring at terminal lugs or connectors should have sufficient slack to

allow for two re-terminations without replacement of wires, unless other
design considerations apply. This slack should be in addition to the drip
loop and the allowance for movable equipment.
4 In order to prevent mechanical damage, wires should be supported by

suitable clamps or other devices at suitable intervals. The supporting
devices should be of a suitable size and type, with the wires and cables held
securely in place without damage to the insulation as per Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) AS50881 or equivalent standard. In-service
experience has revealed abrasion and chafing of wires contained in troughs,
ducts, or conduits, so the design should mitigate possibilities for this
occurring. This may require additional support or other design strategies.
(d) Minimum bend radius. To avoid damage to wire insulation, the

minimum radius of bends in single wires or bundles should be in accordance
with the wire manufacturers specifications. Guidance on the minimum bend
radius can be found in the airplane manufacturers standard wiring practices
manual. Other industry standards such as the European Association of
Aerospace Industries document AECMA EN3197 or SAE AS50881 also
contain guidance on minimum bend radius. For example, SAE AS50881b
states:
For wiring groups, bundles, or harnesses, and single wires and

electrical cables individually routed and supported, the minimum
bend radius shall be ten times the outside diameter of the largest
included wire or electrical cable. At the point where wiring
breaks out from a group, harness or bundle, the minimum bend
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radius shall be ten times the diameter of the largest included wire
or electrical cable, provided the wiring is suitably supported at
the breakout point. If wires used as shield terminators or jumpers
are required to reverse direction in a harness, the minimum bend
radius of the wire shall be three times the diameter at the point of
reversal providing the wire is adequately supported.
(e) Coaxial cable damage. Damage to coaxial cable can occur when the cable
is clamped too tightly or bent sharply (normally at or near connectors). Damage
can also be incurred during unrelated maintenance actions around the coaxial cable.
Coaxial cable can be severely damaged on the inside without any evidence of
damage on the outside. Installation design should minimize the possibility of such
damage. Coaxial cables have a minimum bend radius. SAE AS50881b states:
The minimum radius of bend shall not adversely affect the characteristics of the
cable. For flexible type coaxial cables, the radius of bend shall not be less than six
times the outside diameter. For semi-rigid types, the radius shall not be less than
ten times the outside diameter.
(f) Wire bundle adhesive clamp selection. Certain designs use adhesive
means to fasten bundle supports to the aircraft structure. Service history shows
that these can become loose during aircraft operation, either as a result of
improper design, or because of inadequate surface preparation. You should pay
particular attention to the selection of such means and to the methods used for
affixing this type of wire bundle support.
(g) Wire bundle routing. Following are some considerations that should go
into the design of an EWIS installation.
1 Wire bundles should be routed in accessible areas that are protected

from damage from personnel, cargo, and maintenance activity. As far as
practicable they should not be routed in areas where they are likely to be
used as handholds or as support for personal equipment or where they
could become damaged during removal of aircraft equipment (reference
25.1719 and 25.1721).
2 Wiring should be clamped so that contact with equipment and structure

is avoided. Where this cannot be accomplished, extra protection, in the
form of grommets, chafe strips, etc., should be provided. Wherever wires
cannot be clamped, protective grommets should be used, in a way that
ensures clearance from structure at penetrations. Wire should not have a
preload against the corners or edges of chafing strips or grommets.
3 As far as practicable, wiring should be routed away from high-

temperature equipment and lines to prevent deterioration of insulation
(reference 25.1707(j)).
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4 Wiring routed across hinged panels should be routed and clamped so

that the bundle will twist, rather than bend, when the panel is moved.
When this is not possible, the bending radius must be in accordance with
the acceptable minimum bundle radius.
(h) Conduits. Conduits should be designed and manufactured so that potential

for chafing between the wiring and the conduit internal walls is minimized.
1 Non-metallic conduit. Insulating tubing (or sleeving) is sometimes

used to provide additional electrical, environmental, and limited additional
mechanical protection or to increase the external wire dimension.
Insulating tubing should not be considered as the sole mechanical
protection against external abrasion of wire because it does not prevent
external abrasion. At best, it provides only a delaying action against the
abrasion. The electrical and mechanical properties of the tubing should be
appropriate for the type of protection the designer intends it to be used for.
Additional guidance on the use of tubing or sleeving is given in paragraph
5. d(2)(c) of this AC.
2 Metallic conduit. The ends of metallic conduits should be flared and

the interior surface treated to reduce the possibility of abrasion.
(i) Connector selection. The connector used for each application should be
selected only after a careful determination of the electrical and environmental
requirements.
1 Additional scrutiny should be given to any use of components with

dissimilar metals, because this may cause electrolytic corrosion.
2 Environment-resistant connectors should be used in applications that

will be subject to fluids, vibration, temperature extremes, mechanical
shock, corrosive elements, etc.
3 You should use sealing plugs and contacts in unused connector cavities.
In addition, firewall class connectors incorporating sealing plugs should be
able to prevent the penetration of fire through the aircraft firewall
connector opening and continue to function without failure for the period
of time that the connector is designed to function when exposed to fire.
4 When electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interference

(EMI and RFI) protection is required, you should give special attention to
the termination of individual and overall shields. Back shell adapters
designed for shield termination, connectors with conductive finishes, and
EMI grounding fingers are available for this purpose.
(j) Splice selection. Environmentally sealed splices should be used in

accordance with the requirements of the airframe manufacturers standard
wiring practices or SAE AS81824/1, or equivalent specification, particularly in
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un-pressurized and severe wind and moisture prone (SWAMP) areas. However,
the possibility of fluid contamination in any installation needs to be considered.
1 Splices in pressurized areas. In pressurized areas, pre-insulated

splices conforming to SAE AS7928 or equivalent specification may be
used if these types of splices are listed as acceptable for use by the
manufacturer in its standard wiring practices manual. If these are not
included in the standard wiring practices manual, then you should get
approval from your Aircraft Certification Office to use them. In any case,
you need to show that the possibility of fluid contamination has been
adequately considered.
2 Mechanically protected splices. Mechanical splices give

maintenance personnel an alternative to using a heat gun for splices in fuel
vapor areas on post-delivery aircraft. The generally available
environmental splices use heat shrink material that require heat application.
Most of these heat sources cannot be used in flammable vapor areas of an
aircraft without proper precautions. Mechanical splices are acceptable for
use in high temperature and fuel vapor areas, provided the splice is covered
with a suitable plastic sleeve, such as a dual wall shrink sleeve or high
temperature tape, such as Teflon, wrapped around the splice and tied at
both ends. If high temperature tape is used, it should be permanently
secured at both ends. Mechanical splices should be installed according to
the airframe manufacturers standard practices, or equivalent specification.
The manufacturers standard wiring practices manual should provide part
number detail and best practices procedures for mechanical splices. It
should also detail the applicability of each of the recommended splices for
all required critical airplane installations.
3 Aluminum wire splice. Splices

for aluminum wires should be in
accordance with the requirements of NOTE: To avoid
the airframe manufacturers standard contamination from
practices or SAE AS70991, foreign particles, the crimp
MS25439, or equivalent tool should be dedicated to
specification. You should avoid aluminum wire crimping.
conditions that result in excessive
voltage drop and high resistance at
junctions that may ultimately lead to failure of the junction. The preferable
location for aluminum splices is in pressurized areas.
(9) Wire selection.
(a) Installation environment.
1 Careful attention should be applied when deciding on the type of wire

needed for a specific application. You should consider whether the wires
construction properly matches the application environment. For each
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installation, you should select wire construction type suitable for the most
severe environment likely to be encountered in service. As examples, use a
wire type suitable for flexing for installations involving movement; and a
wire type with a high temperature rating for higher temperature
installations.
2 When considering the acceptability of wire, you should refer to the

industry standards defining acceptable test methods for aircraft wire,
including arc tracking test methods (e.g. European Norm
(EN) 3475, SAE AS4373, or alternative manufacturer standards).
3 Wires in such systems as fire detection, fire extinguishing, fuel shutoff,

and fly-by-wire flight control that must operate during and after a fire must
be selected from wire types qualified to provide circuit integrity after
exposure to fire for a specified period.
(b) Wire insulation selection. Wire insulation type should be chosen

according to the environmental characteristics of wire routing areas. One wire
insulation characteristic of particular concern is arc tracking. Arc tracking is a
phenomenon in which a conductive carbon path forms across an insulating
surface. A breach in the insulation allows arcing and carbonizes the insulation.
The resulting carbon residue is electrically conductive. The carbon then
provides a short circuit path through which current can flow. This can occur on
either dry or wet wires. Certain types of wire insulation, such as wire insulated
with aromatic polyimide, are more susceptible to arc tracking than others.
Although there are new types of aromatic polyimide insulated wire, such as
hybrid constructions (e.g., the aromatic polyimide tape is the middle layer, and
the top and bottom layer is another type of insulation such as Teflon tape) wire
insulated with only aromatic polyimide tape is more susceptible to arc tracking
than other types of commonly used wire insulation. Therefore, its use should be
limited to applications where it will not be subjected to high moisture, high
vibration levels, or abrasion, and where flexing of the wire will not occur.
(c) Mechanical strength of wire. Wires should be sufficiently robust to

withstand all movement, flexing, vibration, abrasion, and other mechanical hazards
to which they may be subjected on the airplane. Generally, conductor wire should
be stranded to minimize fatigue breakage. Refer to AS50881 and
European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA) EN3197 for additional
guidance. Additionally, wires should be robust enough to withstand the mechanical
hazards they may be subjected to during installation into the aircraft.
(d) Mixing of different wire insulation types. Different wire types

installed in the same bundle should withstand the wire-to-wire abrasion they
will be subject to. Consideration should be given to the types of insulation
mixed within wire bundles, especially if mixing a hard insulation type with a
relatively softer type, and particularly when relative motion could occur
between the wires. Such relative motion between varying wire insulation types
could lead to accelerated abrasion and subsequent wire failure.
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(e) Tin plated conductors. Tin plated conductors may be difficult to solder
if not treated properly, so preparation of the conductor is necessary to ensure a
good connection is made.
(f) Wire gage selection. To select the correct size of electrical wire, the
following should be considered:
1 The wire size should be matched with the circuit protective device with
regard to the required current.
2 The wire size should be sufficient to carry the required current without
overheating.
3 The wire size should be sufficient to carry the required current over the
required distance without excessive voltage drop (based on system
requirements).
4 Particular attention should be given to the mechanical strength and

installation handling of wire sizes smaller than AWG 22 (e.g.,
consideration of vibration, flexing, and termination). Use of high-strength
alloy conductors should be considered in small gauge wires to increase
mechanical strength.
NOTE: Additional guidance for

selecting wire and other EWIS
components can be found in SAE
AS50881 and AECMA EN2853 as well
as in AC 43-13.1B.
(g) Wire temperature rating. Selection of a temperature rating for wire

should include consideration of the worst-case requirements of the application.
You should use caution when locating wires in areas where heat is generated
oxygen generators or lighting ballast units, for example.
1 Wires have a specified maximum continuous operating temperature. For

many types, this may be reached by any combination of maximum ambient
temperature and the temperature rise due to current flow.
2 In general, it is undesirable to contribute more than 40oC rise to the

operating temperature by electrical heating.
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3 Other factors to be considered are altitude de-rating, bundle size de-

rating, and use of conduits and other enclosures.
4 Particular note should be taken of the specified voltage of any wire

where higher than normal potentials may be used. Examples are discharge
lamp circuits and windscreen heating systems.
(h) EWIS components in moisture areas.
1 Severe wind and moisture prone areas. Areas designated as

severe wind and moisture prone (SWAMP) areas are different from aircraft
to aircraft, but they are generally considered to be such areas as wheel
wells, wing folds, pylons, areas near wing flaps, and other exterior areas
that may have a harsh environment. Wires for these applications should
incorporate design features that address these severe environments.
2 Silver plated conductors. Many high-strength copper alloy

conductors and coaxial cables use silver plating. Contamination of silver-
plated conductors with glycol (de-icing fluid) can result in electrical fire.
Accordingly, you should not use silver-plated conductors in areas where
de-icing fluid can be present unless suitable protection features are
employed. Silver plated conductors and shields can exhibit a corrosive
condition (also known as Red Plague) if the plating is damaged or of poor
quality and is exposed to moisture. Designers should be aware of these
conditions.
3 Fluid contamination of EWIS components. Fluid contamination

of EWIS components should be avoided as far as practicable. But EWIS
components should be designed and installed with the appropriate
assumptions about fluid contamination, either from the normal
environment or from accidental leaks or spills. Industry standards, such as
RTCA DO-160/EUROCAE ED-14, contain information regarding typical
aircraft fluids. It is particularly important to appreciate that certain
contaminants, notably from toilet waste systems, galleys, and fluids
containing sugar, such as sweetened drinks, can induce electrical tracking
in already degraded electrical wires and unsealed electrical components.
The only cleaning fluids that should be used are those recommended by the
airplane manufacturer in its standard practices manual.
(10) EWIS component selection for future modifications. If a TC

includes subpart H in its certification basis, future modifiers of those TCs would be
able to substantiate compliance with the subpart H requirements by using the same
or equivalent standards and design practices as those used by the TC holder. If
modifiers choose to deviate from those standards and design practices, they will
have to substantiate compliance independently. They will also have to consider the
standards and design practices used by the TC holder in order to justify their own
choice of components. However, this does not mean that the airplane manufacturer
is required to divulge intellectual property to future modifiers. It is incumbent
13
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
upon the modifiers to determine what constitutes equivalent standards and design
practices.
c. 25.1705 SYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS: EWIS. This section requires

consideration of EWIS components in showing compliance with the certification
requirements for specific airplane systems. Although not all part 25 certification
requirements directly address EWIS, many address EWIS in an indirect way. The EWIS
associated with such systems play an integral role in ensuring the safe operation of the
system and of the airplane. If a system is required by type certification or by operating
rules, EWIS associated with that system must be evaluated as part of showing compliance of
the system. Section 25.1705(a) and (b) may seem redundant. Section 25.1705(a) has the
general requirement. Section 25.1705(b) identifies specific regulations to which this
requirement applies. These specific sections contain requirements that do not lend
themselves to creating a separate EWIS-based subpart H requirement. But this is not an
exclusive list. If a regulation is absent from 25.1705(b) it must still be considered under the
general terms of 25.1705(a). The general requirement of (a) is necessary because there may
be other regulations where EWIS must be considered. It also ensures that EWIS is given
full consideration for any system-related regulation adopted in the future.
d. 25.1707 SYSTEM SEPARATION: EWIS.
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR 25.1707
(1) Summary. The continuing safe operation of an airplane depends on the safe
transfer of electrical energy by the EWIS. If an EWIS failure occurs, the separation that
the EWIS has from other EWIS, systems, or structure plays an important role in
ensuring that hazardous effects of the failure are mitigated to an acceptable level.
Section 25.1707 requires applicants to design EWIS with appropriate separation to
minimize the possibility of hazardous effects upon the airplane or its systems. As used
in 25.1707, the term separation is a measure of physical distance. The purpose of
separation is to prevent hazards of arcing between wires in a single bundle, between two
or more bundles, or between an electrical bundle and a non-electrical system or
structure.
(2) Separation by physical distances versus separation by barrier. Section

25.1707 states that adequate physical separation must be achieved by separation
distance or by a barrier that provides protection equivalent to that separation distance.
The following should be considered when designing and installing EWIS:
(a) In most cases, physical distance is the preferred method of achieving the
required separation. This is because barriers themselves can be the cause of EWIS
component damage (e.g., chafing inside of conduits) and can lead to maintenance
errors, such as barriers removed during maintenance and inadvertently left off.
They can also interfere with visual inspections of the EWIS.
14
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(b) If a barrier is used to achieve the required separation, 25.1707 requires that it
provide at least the same level of protection that would be achieved with physical
distance. That means that when deciding on the choice of the barrier, factors such
as dielectric strength, maximum and minimum operating temperatures, chemical
resistivity, and mechanical strength should be taken into account.
(c) In addition to the considerations given in paragraph (b) above, when wire
bundle sleeving (or tubing) is used to provide separation, designers should consider
that the sleeving itself is susceptible to the same types of damage as wire insulation.
The appropriate type of sleeving must be selected for each specific application and
design consideration must be given to ensuring that the sleeving is not subjected to
damage that would reduce the separation it provides.
(3) Determination of separation. Determining the necessary amount of physical

separation distance is essential. But because each system design and airplane model can
be unique, and because manufacturers have differing design standards and installation
techniques, 25.1707 does not mandate specific separation distances. Instead it
requires that the chosen separation be adequate so that an EWIS component failure will
not create hazardous effects on the airplane or its systems. The following factors should
be considered when determining the separation distance:
(a) The electrical characteristics, amount of power, and severity of failure

condition of the system functions performed by the signals in the EWIS and
adjacent EWIS.
(b) Installation design features, including the number, type, and location of
support devices along the wire path.
(c) The maximum amount of slack wire resulting from wire bundle build
tolerances and other wire bundle manufacturing variabilities.
(d) Probable variations in the installation of the wiring and adjacent wiring,
including position of wire support devices and amount of wire slack possible.
(e) The intended operating environment, including amount of deflection or relative

movement possible and the effect of failure of a wire support or other separation
means.
(f) Maintenance practices as defined by the airplane manufacturers standard

wiring practices manual and the ICA required by 25.1529 and 25.1729.
(g) The maximum temperature generated by adjacent wire/wire bundles during

normal and fault conditions.
(h) Possible EMI, HIRF, or induced lightning effects.
(4) Cases of inadequate separation. Some areas of an airplane may have

localized areas where maintaining the minimum physical separation distance is not
15
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
feasible. This is especially true in smaller transport category airplanes. In those cases,
other means of ensuring equivalent minimum physical separation may be acceptable, if
testing or analysis demonstrates that safe operation of the airplane is not jeopardized.
The testing or analysis program should be conservative and consider the worst possible
condition not shown to be extremely improbable. The applicant should substantiate to
the ACO that the means to achieve the necessary separation provides the necessary level
of protection for wire related failures. Electro-magnetic interference (EMI) protection
must also be verified.
(5) Meaning of the term hazardous condition as used in 25.1707.
(a) The term hazardous condition in 25.1707 is used in a different context

than it is used in 25.1709. In the EWIS System Safety rule, 25.1709, the
applicant must show that each EWIS system is designed and installed so that each
hazardous failure condition is extremely remote. The definition of a hazardous
failure condition is the same as it is for section 25.1707 (see Table 1). In
25.1709, however, a numerical probability is required to demonstrate that the
possibility for such an occurrence is extremely remote.
(b) In the System Separation rule, 25.1707, separation distances or a barrier

that provides protection equivalent to the separation distance must be used to
ensure that none of the types of failures described in the rule will create a
situation that would fit the definition of a hazardous condition. The operative
term in this rule is that such failures will not create a hazardous condition. To
show that a given failure will not create a hazardous condition, the applicant must
perform a qualitative design assessment of the installed EWIS. This assessment
involves the use of reasonable engineering and manufacturing judgment and
assessment of relevant service history to decide whether an EWIS, system, or
structural component could fail in such a way as to create a condition that would
affect the airplanes ability to continue safe operation. However, the requirements
of 25.1707 do not preclude the use of valid component failure rates if the
applicant chooses to use a probability argument in addition to the design
assessment to demonstrate compliance. It also does not preclude the FAA from
requiring such an analysis if the applicant cannot adequately demonstrate that
hazardous conditions will be prevented solely by using the qualitative design
assessment. Also note that a numerical probability assessment may still be
required by 25.1709 if the airplane-level functional hazard assessment identifies
EWIS failures that could affect safe operation of the airplane.
(c) To illustrate the type of assessment required by 25.1707, consider the

following simple example involving the use of wire bundle clamps. Clamps are
used to secure a wire bundle to structure in order to hold the bundle in place and
route it from one location to another along a predetermined path. An airplane
manufacturer, using the criteria contained in paragraph 5.d.(3) above, determines
that a 2-inch separation between a certain wire bundle and some hydraulic lines is
necessary. The manufacturer further decides that one clamp every 10 inches is
needed to maintain that separation. However, there is one localized area where a
single clamp failure would potentially create a hazard. This is because the area in
16
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
question is a high vibration, high temperature area, subject to exposure to

moisture. So the clamp in this particular area is exposed to severe environmental
conditions that could lead to accelerated degradation. The manufacturer decides
that using just a single clamp every 10 inches in this area would not suffice to
preclude a hazardous event. The manufacturer prescribes use of double clamps
every 10 inches in that area.
SECTION-BY-SECTION GUIDANCE FOR 25.1707
(6) Specific guidance by section of 25.1707
(a) 25.1707(a). Paragraph 25.1707(a) requires that adequate physical

separation be achieved by separation distance or by a barrier that provides
protection equivalent to that separation distance. Refer to paragraphs 5.(d)(2), (3),
and (4) for further guidance regarding separation distances and the use of barriers.
(b) 25.1707(b).
1 This section requires that each EWIS be designed and installed so that any
electrical interference likely to be present in the airplane will not result in
hazardous effects on the airplane or its systems.
2 One type of electrical interference is electromagnetic interference (EMI).

Electromagnetic interference can be introduced into airplane systems and
wiring by coupling between electrical cables or between cables and coaxial
lines or other airplane systems. The design should not allow system function
to be affected by EMI generated by adjacent wire. EMI between its source
wiring and wire susceptible to it increases in proportion to the length of
parallel runs. It decreases with greater separation. Wiring of sensitive circuits
that may be affected by EMI should be routed away from other wiring that
may cause such interference, or it should be provided with sufficient shielding
to avoid system malfunctions under operating conditions. The design should
limit EMI to negligible levels in wiring related to systems necessary for
continued safe flight, landing, and egress. The following sources of
interference should be considered:
(aa) Conducted and radiated interference caused by electrical noise

generation from apparatus connected to the bus bars.
(bb) Coupling between electrical cables or between cables and aerial

feeders.
(cc) Malfunctioning of electrically-powered apparatus.
17
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(dd) Parasitic currents and voltages in the electrical distribution and

grounding systems, including the effects of lightning currents or static
discharge.
(ee) Different frequencies between electrical generating systems and

other systems.
(c) 25.1707(c). This section contains the wire-related requirements formerly

located in 25.1353(b). Coverage is expanded beyond wires and cable carrying
heavy current to include their associated EWIS components as well. This means
that all EWIS components, as defined by 25.1701, that are associated with wires
and cables carrying heavy current must be installed in the airplane in such a way
that damage to essential circuits will be minimized under fault conditions.
(d) 25.1707(d). Section 25.1707(d) contains wire-related requirements from

25.1351(b)(1) and (b)(2) and introduces additional requirements. As used in
this section, independent airplane power source means a general source of power
for the whole of the airplane or for major subsystems (such as flight controls as,
for instance, permanent magnet generators on the engines for the fly-by-wire
system). Examples include engine- or APU-driven generators, batteries, and ram
air turbines.
1 Paragraph (d) requires that EWIS components associated with the

generating system receive the same degree of attention as other components of
the system, such as the electrical generators.
2 Paragraph (d)(1) prohibits airplane independent electrical power sources

from sharing a common ground terminating location. Paragraph (d)(2)
prohibits airplane static grounds from sharing a common ground terminating
location with any airplane independent electrical power sources. The reason
for these paragraphs is twofold:
to help ensure the independence of separate electrical power sources
so that a single ground failure will not disable multiple power
sources; and
to prevent introduction of unwanted interference into airplane
electrical power systems from other airplane systems.
(e) 25.1707(e), (f), (g), (h). These paragraphs contain specific separation
requirements for the fuel, hydraulic, oxygen, and waste/water systems. They
require adequate EWIS separation from those systems except to the extent
necessary to provide any required electrical connection to them. EWIS must be
designed and installed with adequate separation so a failure of an EWIS component
will not create a hazardous condition and any leakage from those systems (i.e., fuel,
hydraulic, oxygen, waste/water) onto EWIS components will not create a
hazardous situation.
18
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
1 Under fault conditions and without adequate EWIS separation, a potential

catastrophic hazard could occur if an arcing fault ignited a flammable fluid
like fuel or hydraulic fluid. Also, an arcing fault has the potential to puncture
a line associated with those systems if adequate separation is not maintained.
If there is leakage from one of those systems and an arcing event occurs, fire
or explosion could result. Similarly, leakage from the water/waste system can
damage EWIS components and adversely affect their integrity. An EWIS
arcing event that punctures a water or waste line could also introduce fluids
into other airplane systems and create a hazardous condition.
2 In addition to the required separation distance, the use of other protection

means such as drip shields should be considered to prevent fluids from leaking
onto EWIS.
(f) 25.1707(i). To prevent chafing, jamming, or other types of interference, or

other failures that may lead to loss of control of the airplane, EWIS in general and
wiring in particular must be physically separated from flight control or other types
of control cables. Mechanical cables have the potential to cause chafing of
electrical wire if the two come into contact. This can occur either through vibration
of the EWIS and/or mechanical cable or because of cable movement in response to
a system command. A mechanical cable could also damage other EWIS
components, such as a wire bundle support, in a way that would cause failure of
that component. Also, if not properly designed and installed, a wire bundle or other
EWIS component could interfere with movement of a mechanical control cable by
jamming or otherwise restricting the cables movement. Without adequate
separation, an arcing fault could damage or sever a control cable. A control cable
failure could damage EWIS. Therefore, paragraph (i) requires an adequate
separation distance or barrier between EWIS and flight or other mechanical control
systems cables and their associated system components. It also requires that failure
of an EWIS component must not create a hazardous condition and that the failure
of any flight or other mechanical control systems cables or systems components
must not damage EWIS and create a hazardous condition. Clamps for wires routed
near moveable flight controls should be attached and spaced so that failure of a
single attachment point cannot interfere with flight controls or their cables,
components, or other moveable flight control surfaces or moveable equipment.
(g) 25.1707(j). This section requires that EWIS design and installation provide
adequate physical separation between the EWIS components and heated equipment,
hot air ducts, and lines. Adequate separation distance is necessary to prevent EWIS
damage from extreme temperatures and to prevent an EWIS failure from damaging
equipment, ducts, or lines. High temperatures can deteriorate wire insulation and
other parts of EWIS components, and if the wire or component type is not carefully
selected, this deterioration could lead to wire or component failure. Similarly,
should an arcing event occur, the arc could penetrate a hot air duct or line and allow
the release of high pressure, high temperature air. Such a release could damage
surrounding components associated with various airplane systems and potentially
lead to a hazardous situation.
19
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(h) 25.1707(k). Reliability for some airplane systems is so critical that

independent, redundant systems are required. The autoland system is an example.
If one channel of a redundant autoland system is lost, the airplane can continue to
operate safely. But if both channels of a two-channel system were lost because of a
common failure, the results could be catastrophic. To maintain the independence of
redundant systems and equipment so that safety functions are maintained, adequate
separation and electrical isolation between these systems must be ensured.
Paragraph (k) requires that EWIS associated with any system requiring redundancy
to meet certification requirements have an adequate separation distance or barrier.
1 EWIS of redundant aircraft systems, as required by certification rules,

operating rules, or as a result of the assessment required by 25.1709, should
be routed in separate bundles and through separate connectors to prevent a
single fault from disabling multiple redundant systems. Separation of
functionally similar EWIS components is necessary to prevent degradation of
their ability to perform their required functions.
2 Power feeders from separate power sources should be routed in bundles

separate from each other and from other aircraft wiring in order to prevent a
single fault from disabling more than one power source.
3 Wiring that is part of electro-explosive subsystems, such as cartridge-

actuated fire extinguishers and emergency jettison devices, should be routed in
shielded and jacketed twisted-pair cables, shielded without discontinuities, and
kept separate from other wiring at connectors.
(i) 25.1707(l). This section requires that EWIS be designed and installed so
they are adequately separated from aircraft structure and protected from sharp
edges and corners. This is to minimize the potential for abrasion and chafing,
vibration damage, and other types of mechanical damage. This protection is
necessary because over time the insulation on a wire that is touching a rigid object,
such as an equipment support bracket, will fail and expose bare wire. This can lead
to arcing that could destroy that wire and other wires in its bundle. Structural
damage could also occur, depending on the amount of electrical energy the failed
wire carries.
e. 25.1709 SYSTEM SAFETY: EWIS. Section 25.1709 requires applicants to

perform a system safety assessment of the EWIS. The analysis required for compliance
with 25.1709 is based on a qualitative and quantitative approach to assessing EWIS
safety, as opposed to a purely numerical, probability-based quantitative analysis. The safety
assessment must consider the effects that both physical and functional failures of EWIS
would have on airplane safety. That safety assessment must show that each EWIS failure
considered hazardous is extremely remote. It must show that each EWIS failure considered
to be catastrophic is extremely improbable and will not result from a single failure.
(1) Objective. The objective of 25.1709 is to use the concepts of 25.1309 to

provide a thorough and structured analysis of aircraft wiring and its associated
20
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
components. As in 25.1309, the fail-safe design concept applies. Any single failure
condition, such as an arc fault, should be assumed to occur regardless of probability.
(2) Inadequacies of 25.1309 in relation to EWIS safety assessments.

Section 25.1309 requires the applicant to perform system safety assessments. But
current 25.1309 practice has not led to the type of analysis that fully ensures all EWIS
failure conditions affecting airplane level safety are considered. This is because the
current 25.1309(a) only covers systems and equipment that are required by this
subchapter, and wiring for nonrequired systems is sometimes ignored. Even for
systems covered by 25.1309(b) and (d), the safety analysis requirements have not
always been applied to the associated wire. When they are, there is evidence of
inadequate and inconsistent application. Traditional thinking about nonrequired
systems, such as in-flight entertainment systems, has been that, since they are not
required, and the function they provide is not necessary for the safety of the airplane,
their failure could not affect the safety of the airplane. This is not a valid assumption.
Failure of an electrical wire, regardless of the system it is associated with, can cause
serious physical and functional damage to the airplane, resulting in hazardous or even
catastrophic failure conditions. An example of this is arcing from a shorted wire cutting
through and damaging flight control cables. There are more failure modes than have
been addressed with traditional analyses. Some further examples are arcing events that
occur without tripping circuit breakers, resulting in complete wire bundle failures and
fire, or wire bundle failures that lead to structural damage.
(3) Integrated nature of EWIS. The integrated nature of wiring and the potential
severity of failures demand a more structured safety analysis approach than that
traditionally used in showing compliance with 25.1309. Section 25.1309 system
safety assessments typically evaluate effects of wire failures on system functions. But
they have not considered physical wire failure as a cause of the failure of other wires
within the EWIS. Traditional assessments look at external factors like rotor burst,
lightning, and hydraulic line rupture, but not at internal factors, like a single wire
chafing or arcing event, as the cause of the failure of functions supported by the EWIS.
Compliance with 25.1709 requires addressing those failure modes at the airplane
level. This means that EWIS failures need to be analyzed to determine what effect they
could have on the safe operation of the airplane.
(4) Compliance summary. As specified above, the analysis required for

compliance with 25.1709 is based on a qualitative approach to assessing EWIS safety
as opposed to numerical, probability-based quantitative analysis. The intent is not to
examine each individual wire and its relation to other wires. Rather, it is to ensure that
there are no hazardous combinations. However, in case the top down analysis process
described in this AC determines that a failure in a given bundle may lead to a
catastrophic failure condition, the mitigation process may lead to performing a complete
analysis of each wire in the relevant bundle.
(5) Qualitative probability terms. When using qualitative analyses to determine

compliance with 25.1709, the following descriptions of the probability terms have
become commonly accepted as aids to engineering judgment:
21
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(a) Extremely remote failure conditions. These are failure conditions that
are not anticipated to occur to an individual airplane during its total life but which
may occur a few times when considering the total operational life of all airplanes of
the type.
(b) Extremely improbable failure conditions. These are failure conditions

so unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of
all airplanes of one type.
(6) Relationship to other part 25 system safety assessments. The analysis

described may be accomplished in conjunction with the required aircraft system safety
assessments of 25.1309, 25.671, etc.
(7) Classification of failure terms. The classification of failure conditions is given

in Table 1. These failure conditions are identical to those proposed by the Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee for the draft (Arsenal) version of AC 25.1309-1b,
dated June 10, 2002.
Table 1: Classification of Failure Conditions
Term Explanation
Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety, for example failure
No Safety Effect conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the airplane or
increase flightcrew workload.
Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce airplane safety, and
involve flightcrew actions that are well within their capabilities. For
example, minor failure conditions may include:
Minor a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;

a slight increase in flightcrew workload, such as routine flight plan
changes; or
some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew.
Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the
ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the
extent that there would be, for example:
a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
Major a significant increase in flightcrew workload or in conditions impairing
flightcrew efficiency;
discomfort to the flightcrew; or
physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including
injuries.
22
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
Hazardous
physical distress or excessive workload such that the flightcrew cannot
be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or
serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of persons other
than the flightcrew.
Failure conditions that would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the
loss of the airplane. (NOTE: A catastrophic failure condition was defined
Catastrophic differently in previous versions of 25.1309 and in accompanying advisory
material as a failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and
landing.)
(8) Flowcharts depicting the analysis process. Flowcharts 1 and 2, which

follow, outline one method of complying with the requirements of 25.1709. The
processes in both Flowcharts 1 and 2 identify two aspects of the analysis: physical
failures and functional failures. The analysis processes described in both flowcharts
begin by using the aircraft level functional hazard analysis developed for demonstrating
compliance with 25.1309 to identify catastrophic and hazardous failure events. A
step-by-step explanation of the analysis depicted in the flowcharts is given in this AC in
paragraphs 5.e.(11) (for Flowchart 1) and 5.e.(12) (for Flowchart 2).
(a) Flowchart 1. This flowchart applies to applicants for pre-TC work and for
amended TCs, and STCs when the applicant has all data necessary to perform the
analysis per Flowchart 1. If Flowchart 1 is used for post-TC modifications, the
available data must include identification of the systems in the EWIS under
consideration for modification and the system functions associated with that EWIS.
(b) Flowchart 2. This flowchart applies to applicants for post-TC modifications

when the applicant cannot identify the systems or systems functions contained in
EWIS under consideration for modification.
(9) Definitions applicable to 25.1709. For this discussion the following

definitions apply:
(a) Validation. Determination that requirements for a product are sufficiently

correct and complete.
(b) Verification. Evaluation to determine that requirements have been met.
(c) Mitigation. Elimination of a hazard entirely or minimization of its severity

and probability to an acceptable level. In the case of this rule, an EWIS failure
must be mitigated to a point where the probability of a hazardous failure must be at
23
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
least extremely remote and the probability of a catastrophic failure at least

extremely improbable
(10) Physical failure analysis.
(a) Only single common cause events or failures need to be addressed during the
physical failure analysis as described in this AC and shown on the left hand sides of
Flowcharts 1 and 2. Multiple common cause events or failures need not be
addressed.
(b) In relation to physical effects, it should be assumed that wires are carrying
electrical energy and that, in the case of an EWIS failure, as defined in paragraph
5.e.(10)(a), this energy may result in hazardous or catastrophic effects directly or
when combined with other factors, for example fuel, oxygen, hydraulic fluid, or
damage by passengers. These failures may result in fire, smoke, emission of toxic
gases, damage to co-located systems and structural elements, or injury to personnel.
This analysis considers all EWIS from all systems (autopilot, auto throttle, PA
system, IFE systems, etc.) regardless of the system criticality.
24
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Flowchart 1: Pre- and Post-Type Certification Safety Analysis Concept

A 4 cases are considered :
Aircraft Functional Total failure
Hazard Assessm ent Partial failure
Inadvertent operation
Physical Malfunction
Functional
Failures Failures
J
FHA, PSSA, CCA, and SSA*
B
for each system :
EW IS Characteristics:
- Capture, detail, update
- Installation criteria
and refine the A/C FHA.
(separation, etc)
- Perform com plete system
- EW IS com ponents
failure analysis.
(design, selection)
- Include EW IS failure
effects.
C
Identify the EW IS that
is to be analyzed and K
its routing. Identify the EW IS that
causes the failure
condition under analysis.
D
Analyze possible physical
failures of EW IS that can cause
dam age to co-located EW IS or
other surrounding system s or L M
structural elem ents or injury to
personnel, etc. ( e.g. 1 st article Com plete the
inspection, design review , Does the EW IS contributing NO appropriate safety
particular risks, zonal safety factor to the failure need to be assessm ents.
assessm ents, zonal inspections, m itigated? 2
com m on m ode analysis, as
applicable).
E YES
Determ ine airplane level effects N

of physical failures (e.g., Develop necessary m itigation Check for possible
collateral dam age, localized fire, strategies 1 for hazardous (not adverse effects
sm oke in cabin, etc.) and their shown to be extrem ely rem ote) and introduced and
criticality as defined in Table 1 catastrophic (not shown to be update A/C FHA and
of this AC. Check for possible extrem ely im probable and does not other system safety
adverse effects result from a single failure) airplane assessm ents as
introduced level effects identified in BOX J for
necessary
F functional failures.
Develop necessary m itigation
strategies 1 for hazardous (not NO
shown to be extrem ely rem ote)
and catastrophic airplane level
effects identified in BOX E for O
physical failures.
Validate and verify that
m itigation strategies are
adequate.
G
NO
m itigation strategies are
YES
adequate.
P
Docum ent results Update
of the EW IS safety A/C FHA and other
YES analysis. system safety
I assessm ents
EW IS physical as necessary
H
Update design failure analysis
installation guidelines results
(BO X B) based on
m itigation strategies. 1
e.g., re-route, change clam ping, add sleeving, add barrier, etc
2
Contributing m eans the EW IS causes the failure in whole or in part
* FHA: Functional Hazard Assessm ent
PSSA: Prelim inary System Safety Assessm ent
CCA: Com m on Cause Analysis
SSA: System Safety Assessm ent
Mitigation as used in this flowchart means to eliminate the hazard entirely or minimize its severity and
probability to an acceptable level. In the case of 25.1709, the EWIS failure must be mitigated to a point
where the probability of a hazardous failure is at least extremely remote and the probability of a
catastrophic failure is at least extremely improbable
25
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(11) Descriptive text for Flowchart 1
(a) BOX A Aircraft functional hazard assessment.
1 The functional failure analysis assumes that electrical wires are carrying
power, signal, or information data. Failure of EWIS under these
circumstances may lead to aircraft system degradation effects.
2 The functional hazard assessment (FHA) referred to in this box is not a

stand-alone separate document specifically created to show compliance with
25.1709. It is the aircraft level FHA that the applicant will have developed
in compliance with 25.1309 to help demonstrate acceptability of a design
concept, identify potential problem areas or desirable design changes, or
determine the need for and scope of any additional analyses (refer to AC
25.1309-1B).
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE PHYSICAL FAILURES
(b) BOX B EWIS characteristics. Use the results of the FHA (BOX A)
and the preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA), common cause analysis
(CCA), and system safety assessment (SSA) (BOX J) to identify EWIS installation
criteria and definitions of component characteristics. Results from BOX B are fed
into the preliminary system safety analysis (PSSA) and system safety analysis
(SSA) of BOX J.
(c) BOXES C, D, and E Validation and verification of installation

criteria.
1 Ensure that the EWIS component qualification satisfies the design

requirements and that components are selected, installed, and used according
to their qualification characteristics and the aircraft constraints linked to their
location (refer to the requirements of 25.1703 and 25.1707).
2 Use available information (digital mockup, physical mockup, airplane data,

and historical data) to perform inspections and analyses to validate that design
and installation criteria are adequate to the zone/function, including
considerations of multi-systems impact. Such inspections and analyses may
include a 1st article inspection, design review, particular risk assessment, zonal
safety assessment, zonal inspection, and common mode analysis, as
applicable. Use such assessments and inspections to ascertain whether design
and installation criteria were correctly applied. You should give special
consideration to known problem areas identified by service history and
historical data (areas of arcing, smoke, loose clamps, chafing, arc tracking,
interference with other systems, wires and cables that are required to regularly
flex, such as those in doors and hatches, etc.). Regardless of probability, any
26
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
single arcing failure should be assumed for any power-carrying wire. The
intensity and consequence of the arc and its mitigation should be substantiated.
Give special consideration to cases where new (previously unused) material or
technologies are used. In any case 25.1703(b) requires that the selection of
wires must take into account known characteristics in relation to each
installation and application to minimize the risk of wire damage, including any
arc tracking phenomena.
3 You should evaluate deviations from installation and component selection

criteria identified by these activities. A determination can then be made about
their acceptability. Develop alternative mitigation strategies as necessary.
(d) BOXES F & G Development and validation of mitigation

strategy. Identify and develop a mitigation strategy for the physical failures and
their adverse effects identified in Boxes D and E. Validation and verification of
the mitigation solution should ensure that:
1 Hazardous failure conditions are extremely remote.
2 Catastrophic failure conditions are extremely improbable and do not result
from a single common cause event or failure.
3 This mitigation solution does not introduce any new potential failure
conditions.
(e) BOX H Incorporation of applicable mitigation strategies.

Incorporate newly developed mitigation strategies (BOX F) into guidelines (BOX
B) for further design and inspection and analysis processes.
(f) BOX I Physical failure analysis results. From the EWIS physical
failure analysis, document:
Physical failures addressed.
Effects of those physical failures.
Mitigation strategies developed.
This information supports the final analysis documentation (BOX P).
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FUNCTIONAL FAILURES
(g) BOX J System safety assessments. Use the results of the airplane
level FHA (BOX A) to guide the system level FHA (BOX J). Incorporate EWIS
failures identified by 25.1709 into the system level and aircraft level FHA, as
necessary, the PSSA, the CCA, and the SSA. These analyses are performed to
satisfy requirements of 25.1309. Use results of these analyses to update the
EWIS definition (BOX B).
27
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(h) BOXES K, L, and M Hazardous and catastrophic failure

conditions.
Use the analyses in BOX J
to determine if the EWIS NOTE: If the EWIS was the failure cause,
associated with the system the subsequent mitigation strategy developed
under analysis can may introduce new adverse effects not
contribute (in whole or in previously identified by the analysis. Check
part) to the failure for any new adverse effects and update the
condition under study. aircraft level FHA and other system safety
Determine whether the assessments as necessary.
EWIS failure needs to be
mitigated. If so, develop,
validate, and verify a mitigation strategy. If no mitigation is needed, complete the
appropriate safety assessment per 25.1309, 25.671, etc..
(i) BOXES N and O Development and validation of mitigation

strategy. Identify and develop a mitigation strategy for the functional failures
and adverse effects identified in BOX J. Validation and verification of the
mitigation solution should -
Determine if initial objective is fully reached.
Confirm that this mitigation solution is compatible with existing
installations and installation criteria.
(j) BOX P Documentation of EWIS safety analysis results. After

mitigation strategies have been validated and verified, document the results of
the 25.1709 analysis. Update as necessary the aircraft level FHA that has been
developed in support of certification of the proposed modification, in compliance
with 25.1309 (BOX A).
28
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Flowchart 2: Post-TC Safety Analysis Concept
A
4 cases are considered:
Aircraft Functional Hazard
( Total failure
Assessment based on the
proposed modification ( Partial failure
( Inadvertent operation
( Malfunction
Physical Functional
Failures Failures
J
FHA, PSSA, CCA, and SSA*
B
for each system:
EWIS Characteristics:
- Capture, detail, update
- Installation criteria
and refine the A/C FHA.
(separation, etc)
- Perform complete system
- EWIS components
failure analysis.
(design, selection)
- Include the EWIS failure
effects.
C K
Physically separate
the new EWIS from Identify the EWIS that
other existing EWIS causes the failure
to preclude collateral condition under analysis.
EWIS damage.
L M
D
Complete the
Identify the EWIS to be NO appropriate safety
Does the EWIS contributing
analyzed and its assessments.
factor to the failure need to be
routing.
mitigated? 2
E YES
Determine airplane level effects
of physical failures (e.g., N
collateral damage, localized fire, Develop necessary mitigation Check for possible
smoke in cabin, etc.) and their strategies 1 for hazardous (not
criticality as defined in Table 1 adverse effects
shown to be extremely remote) and introduced and
of this AC. catastrophic (not shown to be
Check for possible extremely improbable and does not update A/C FHA and
adverse effects result from a single failure) airplane other system safety
introduced level effects identified in BOX J for assessments as
functional failures. necessary
F
Develop necessary mitigation
strategies 1 for hazardous (not NO
shown to be extremely remote)
and catastrophic airplane level O
effects identified in BOX E for
physical failures.
mitigation strategies are
adequate.
G
NO
mitigation strategies are YES
adequate.
P
Document results Update
of the EWIS safety A/C FHA and other
analysis. system safety
YES, I assessments
EWIS physical as necessary
H failure analysis
Update design results
installation guidelines
(BOX B) based on 1
mitigation strategies. e.g., re-route, change clamping, add sleeving, add barrier, etc
2
Contributing means the EWIS causes the failure in whole or in
part
* FHA: Functional Hazard Assessment
PSSA: Preliminary System Safety Assessment
CCA: Common Cause Analysis
SSA: System Safety Assessment
Mitigation as used in this flowchart means to eliminate the hazard entirely or minimize its severity
and probability to an acceptable level. In the case of 25.1709, the EWIS failure must be
mitigated to a point where the probability of a hazardous failure is at least extremely remote and
the probability of a catastrophic failure is at least extremely improbable
29
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(12) Descriptive Text for Flowchart 2.
(a) Applicants for post-TC modifications should use the analysis depicted
in Flowchart 2 when the applicant cannot identify the systems or systems
functions contained in existing aircraft EWIS that may be utilized as part of
the modification. An applicant should not add EWIS to an existing EWIS if
the systems or systems functions contained in the existing EWIS are
unknown. To do so could introduce unacceptable hazards. For example,
IFE power wires could inadvertently be routed with aircraft autoland EWIS.
(b) The main objectives are to ensure that the proposed modification
Will be correctly designed and installed.
Will not introduce unacceptable hazards either through its own
failure or by adversely affecting existing aircraft systems.
As far as EWIS is concerned, correct incorporation of the modification

should be ensured by both good knowledge of original aircraft manufacturer
installation practices and their correct implementation or by adequate
separation of the added EWIS from existing EWIS. In either case, physical
analyses should be performed (similar to the physical failures part of
Flowchart 1).
(c) BOX A Aircraft functional hazard assessment. Airplane

level effects must be considered for modified systems or systems added to
the aircraft. If the airplane level FHA is available, the applicant should
examine it to determine the airplane level effect of the proposed
modification. If the airplane level FHA is not available, then the applicant
must generate an airplane level FHA based on the proposed modification.
This airplane level FHA would be limited to just those airplane systems
affected by the proposed modification. If it is determined that no airplane
level functional effects are introduced, a statement to this effect and the
supporting data is sufficient to satisfy BOX A.
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE PHYSICAL FAILURES
(d) BOX B EWIS characteristics. Use results of the airplane level

FHA (BOX A) to identify EWIS installation criteria and definitions of
component characteristics. Results of BOX B are fed into the PSSA and
SSA of BOX J.
(e) BOX C Physical separation of new EWIS from existing

EWIS.
30
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
1 Separate the EWIS to be added from existing airplane EWIS since

the systems or system functions contained in the existing EWIS are
unknown. Establish physical separation between the new and existing
EWIS either by separation distance or by an appropriate barrier or
other means shown to be at least equivalent to the physical separation
distance when allowed by 25.1707. Methods given in the advisory
material for 25.1707 provide an acceptable way to determine
adequate separation.
2 In cases where separation cannot be maintained because of physical

constraints (e.g., terminal strips and connectors), the applicant should
accomplish the appropriate analysis to show that no adverse failure
conditions result from sharing the common device. This analysis
requires knowledge of the systems or system functions sharing the
common device (e.g., terminal strips and connectors).
(f) BOXES D and E Validation and verification of installation

criteria.
1 Ensure that the EWIS component qualification satisfies the design

requirements and that components are selected, installed, and used
according to their qualification characteristics and the airplane
constraints linked to their location (refer to the requirements of
25.1703 and 25.1707).
2 Use available information (digital mockup, physical mockup,

airplane data, and historical data) to perform inspections and analyses
to validate that design and installation criteria are adequate to the
zone/function, including considerations of multi-systems impact. Such
inspections and analyses may include a 1st article inspection, design
review, particular risk assessment, zonal safety assessment, zonal
inspection, and common mode analysis, as applicable. Use such
assessments and inspections to ascertain whether design and
installation criteria were correctly applied. You should give special
consideration to known problem areas identified by service history and
historical data (areas of arcing, smoke, loose clamps, chafing, arc
tracking, interference with other systems, etc.). Regardless of
probability, any single arcing failure should be assumed for any power-
carrying wire. The intensity and consequence of the arc and its
mitigation should be substantiated. You should give special
consideration to cases where new (previously unused) material or
technologies are used. Evaluate deviations from installation and
component selection criteria identified by these activities and
determine their acceptability.
3 Alternative mitigation strategies should be developed as necessary.
31
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(g) BOXES F & G Development and validation of mitigation

strategy. Identify and develop a mitigation strategy for the physical
failures identified in BOXES D and E and resulting adverse effects.
Validation and verification of a mitigation solution should ensure that:
1 Hazardous failure conditions are extremely remote.
2 Catastrophic failure conditions are extremely improbable and do not
result from a single common cause event or failure.
3 This mitigation solution does not introduce any new potential failure
conditions.
h) BOX H Incorporation of Applicable Mitigation Strategies.

Incorporate newly developed mitigation strategies (BOX F) into guidelines
(BOX B) for further design and inspection and analysis process.
(i) BOX I Physical failure analysis documentation. From the

EWIS physical failure analysis, document:
Physical failures addressed.
Effects of those physical failures.
Mitigation strategies developed.
This information supports the final analysis documentation (BOX P).
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE FUNCTIONAL FAILURES
(j) BOX J System safety assessments. Use the results of the

airplane level FHA (BOX A) to guide the system level FHA (BOX J).
Incorporate EWIS failures identified by 25.1709 into the system level and
aircraft level FHA, as necessary, the PSSA, the CCA, and the SSA. These
analyses are performed to satisfy requirements of 25.1309. Use results of
these analyses to update the EWIS definition (BOX B).
(k) BOXES K, L, and M Hazardous and catastrophic failure

conditions. Use the analyses in BOX J to determine if the EWIS
associated with the system under analysis can contribute (in whole or in
part) to the failure condition under study. Determine whether the EWIS
failure needs to be mitigated. If so, develop, validate, and verify a
mitigation strategy. If no mitigation is needed, complete the appropriate
safety assessment (e.g., per 25.1309, 25.671, etc.).
32
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(l) BOXES N and O Development and validation of mitigation

strategy. Identify and
develop a mitigation strategy
for the functional failures and NOTE: If the EWIS was the
adverse effects identified in failure cause, the subsequent
BOX J. Validation and mitigation strategy developed may
verification of the mitigation introduce new adverse effects not
solution should: previously identified by the
Determine if initial analysis. Check for any new
objective is fully reached. adverse effects and update the
Confirm that this aircraft level FHA and other system
mitigation solution is safety assessments as necessary.
compatible with existing
installations and
installation criteria.
(m) BOX P Documentation of EWIS safety analysis results.

After mitigation strategies have been validated and verified, document the
results of the 25.1709 analysis. Update as necessary the aircraft level
FHA that has been developed in support of certification of the proposed
modification, in compliance with 25.1309, (BOX A).
f. 25.1711 COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION: EWIS. Section 25.1711

requires applicants to identify EWIS components using consistent methods that
facilitate easy identification of the component, its function, and its design
limitations. For EWIS associated with flight-essential functions where specific
certification requirements are met by redundancy, identification of the EWIS must
also include separation requirements. This section requires that the identifying
markings remain legible throughout the expected service life of the EWIS
component, and that the method used to identify components have no adverse effect
on their performance.
(1) 25.1711(a). This section requires a consistent method of EWIS

identification to avoid confusion and mistakes during airplane manufacturing,
modification, and maintenance. This means we expect airplane manufacturers to
develop an EWIS identification method that facilitates easy identification of the
systems that any specific EWIS component supports and use that identification
method in a consistent manner throughout the airplane. This consistent
identification method must be used for new type certifications and changes to
those designs.
(2) 25.1711(b). Certain airplane systems are installed with redundancy

because of certification rules or operating rules or in order to meet the reliability
requirements of 25.1709. For EWIS components associated with these
systems, paragraph (b) requires specific identification indicating component part
number, function, and separation requirement. This is necessary to prevent
33
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
modifiers from unintentionally introducing unsafe design or installation features

on previously certified airplanes when they install new or modified systems.
Such identification will aid the designers and installers of the new system by
alerting them to the presence of these systems. It will enable them to make
appropriate design and installation decisions. Component identification will also
make those performing maintenance and inspections more aware of what
systems are associated with specific EWIS in the areas undergoing maintenance
or inspection.
(3) 25.1711(c). Paragraph (c) requires that identifying markings required by

25.1711(a) and (b) remain legible throughout the design life of the component.
As most wire installations are designed to remain on the airplane throughout the
airplanes service life, this means the identification marks must be able to be
read for the life of the airplane. The method of marking must take into account
the environment in which the EWIS component will be installed. The Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) documents ARP 5607, Legibility of Print on
Aerospace Wire and Cables, and AS 5942, Marking of Electrical Insulating
Materials, provide guidance on this subject. Dot matrix and ink-jet marking
should only be used when there is no strong need for chemical or mechanical
resistance of the ink. The color used for identification should contrast with the
wire insulation, sleeve, support material, or other EWIS components.
(4) 25.1711(d). Paragraph (d) requires that the means used to identify an
EWIS component may not have an adverse effect on component performance
throughout its design life. The preferred method of EWIS component
identification is with dot matrix, ink-jet, or laser marking.
(a) Certain wire marking methods have potential to damage wire

insulation. Hot-stamp marking is one such method. According to SAE
aerospace information report AIR5575, Hot Stamp Wire Marking
Concerns for Aerospace Vehicle Applications, the hot-stamp marking
method is not well suited for todays generation of aircraft wiring. As noted
in that document, wire insulation has become markedly thinner over the
years since the procedure was first introduced in the 1940s. Because of this,
problems have arisen over wire damage from excessive penetration by the
hot stamp process. The document further states: The frequent need for
adjustments in temperature, pressure, and dwell time inherent to achieving
legible hot stamp wire marking provides many opportunities for error. The
controls, methods, and guidance necessary to achieve satisfactory
performance with hot stamp marking are often not made available to
operators in smaller wire shops.
(b) If damage to the insulation occurs during the marking process, it may
fail later in service after exposure to the sometimes-harsh environmental
conditions of aircraft use. While 25.1711(d) does not prohibit use of hot-
stamp marking, its use is not encouraged. To comply with this paragraph, if
34
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
the hot-stamp marking process is used, the guidelines of SAE recommended

practice ARP5369, Guidelines for Wire Identification Marking Using the
Hot Stamp Process or equivalent should be followed. Other information
related to the use of the hot-stamp marking process can be found in SAE
AIR 5575 and European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA)
EN3197.
(c) In some cases it may not be practical to mark an EWIS component

directly because of component size or identification requirements. In this
case other methods of identification, such as a label or sleeve, should be
used.
(5) 25.1711(e). Paragraph (e) requires that EWIS modifications to the type
design take into consideration the identification scheme of the original type
design. This is to ensure that the consistency required by 25.1711(a) is
maintained when a modification is installed. The intent of this requirement is to
provide continuity for EWIS identification on a particular model. It is not the
intent of the requirement to impose on the modifier the exact wire identification
methods of the airplane manufacturer. However, since the purpose of 25.1711
is to make it easy to identify those airplane systems essential to safe operation of
the airplane, it is in the best interest of safety that designers of any modifications
to the original design consider the approved type design identification methods.
For example it would not be appropriate for a modifier to use purple wire to
identify a specific flight critical system when the approved type design used the
color green, especially if the type design already uses purple wire to identify
non-essential systems. Such a scheme could cause confusion and lead future
modifiers or maintainers to believe that the routing of purple wires with green
wires (and thus critical systems with non-essential systems) is acceptable. The
regulation does not prescribe a particular method for identification but is meant
to ensure that consistent identification is maintained throughout the life of the
airplane.
(6) Visible Identification of Critical Design Configuration

Limitations. Section 25.981(b) states that "...visible means to identify critical
features of the design must be placed in areas of the airplane where maintenance
actions, repairs, or alterations may be apt to violate the critical design
configuration limitations (e.g., color-coding of wire to identify separation
limitation)." The design approval holder should define a method of ensuring that
this essential information will:
be communicated by statements in appropriate manuals, such as wiring
diagram manuals, and
be evident to those who may perform and approve such repairs and
alterations.
An example of a critical design configuration control limitation that would result

in a requirement for visible identification means would be a requirement to
35
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
maintain wire separation between FQIS (fuel quantity indication system) wiring
and other electrical circuits that could introduce unsafe levels of energy into the
FQIS wires. Acceptable means of providing visible identification for this
limitation would include color-coding of the wiring or, for retrofit, placement of
identification tabs at specific intervals along the wiring.
(7) Types of EWIS component identification. There are at least four

types of EWIS component identification that are accomplished at different
stages. They are listed and described below.
(a) Component manufacturer part number. EWIS components

should be identified by their manufacturer in accordance with the
International Organization for Standardization document ISO 2574,
Aircraft Electrical Cables Identification Marking, or similar
specifications. This identification comprises product part number,
manufacturer identification, and, when possible or specifically required,
batch identification or year of manufacture. This helps ensure:
Identification and traceability of the component.
Verification of compliance with the aircraft certification basis.
Accuracy in manufacture, maintenance, quality control, storage,
and delivery.
Verification of the use of approved/qualified sourcing.
Monitoring of the aircraft configuration during the aircraft life.
1 EWIS component manufacturer identification. It is common

practice to use the five-digit/letter C.A.G.E. (commercial and
government entity) code for manufacturer identification, particularly
for wires. Alternatively, for small components whose size may make it
difficult to use other forms of clear identification, a logo may be used.
2 Identification intervals. Wires and cables should be identified at
intervals of not more than 15 inches (380mm). Exceptions can be
made for short runs of wires or cables or when the majority of the wire
or cable is installed in a manner that facilitates easy reading of the
identification markings.
3 Manufacturer markings. Wire manufacturer markings should

generally be green to differentiate them from the black marking
typically used by the airplane manufacturer, but other contrasting
colors are also acceptable.
4 The component technical specification should include methods used

for identification and legibility during the design life of the component.
36
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
(b) Airframe manufacturer component function identification

number. In addition to the type identification imprinted by the original
wire manufacturer, aircraft wire should also contain a unique circuit
identification coding that is accomplished at time of harness assembly. This
allows existing installed wire to be identified as to its performance
capabilities when considering replacement. Inadvertent use of a lower
performance and unsuitable replacement wire can thus be avoided.
Identification of EWIS components by the airframe manufacturer helps
ensure:
Identification and inspection of cable runs.
Accuracy of manufacture, maintenance, quality control, storage, and
delivery.
Verification of the system to which the component belongs.
Identification of components related to systems required for safe
flight, landing, or egress or that have the potential to impact the
flightcrews ability to cope with adverse operating conditions.
Identification of EWIS components should clearly correspond to aircraft

wiring manuals.
(c) Airframe manufacturer routing identification and

modification. Electrical drawings should describe wire routings through
the entire airplane indicating, for example, incompatibility between routes,
minimum distance between routes, and absolute bans on combining
bundles. Electrical drawings should be available in the maintenance
documentation as required by paragraph H25.5 of Appendix H to part 25.
This information ensures that modification designers and maintenance
personnel are aware of the defined physical separation of the different
routes of the aircraft model they are working on. Coding for identification
of routes or bundles used on aircraft should be displayed by adequate means
such as labels, tags, placards, colored ties, or bar-codes. This type of
component identification helps insure:
Identification and inspection of bundles.
Accuracy of manufacture, maintenance, quality control,
storage, and delivery.
Determination of the type of route, or route function, (feeder
power, radio etc.).
Clear identification of systems that require physical separation
(to detect the possible mix of different routes/bundles, the
misrouting of a system in an area, etc.).
Identification of routes taken by systems required for safe
flight, landing, egress, or those that have the potential to
37
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
impact the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse

operating conditions.
1 Modification and repairs identification, in a form that helps ensure

the original airplane manufacturers identification scheme, should be
maintained throughout the service life of the airplane.
2 Wire and cable routing information should be identified at intervals

of preferably not more than 18 inches (460mm) and should not obscure
the identification markings of the EWIS component manufacturer or
airframe manufacturer component function identification numbers
described in paragraphs 5.f.(7)(a) and 5.f.(7)(b). Also, exceptions can
be made for short runs of wires or cables or when the majority of the
wire or cable is installed in a manner that facilitates easy reading of the
identification markings. Coaxial cables may be identified at both ends
of the coax if marking the cable at regular intervals would cause
crushing of the cable and potentially damage the foam insulation.
Applicants should provide justification for why the chosen
identification method would damage the cable.
(d) Identification of user EWIS modification or repair (operators

identification coding). Repairs or modifications to EWIS should follow
the identification guidance given in the above paragraphs for airplane
manufacturers. This helps ensure that the original airplane manufacturers
identification scheme is not compromised by future modifications or repairs
and is maintained throughout the service life of the airplane. A temporary
repair identification with a non-hydraulic-resistant material could remain in
a hydraulic bay for some days, but such material would not be a suitable
marking method for the long term.
g. 25.1713 FIRE PROTECTION: EWIS. The intent of this requirement is to

help ensure that the EWIS does not propagate fire and produce hazardous quantities
of smoke and toxic fumes.
(1) 25.1713(a). This paragraph requires that all EWIS components meet
the applicable fire and smoke protection requirements of 25.831(c). This
requirement was formerly located in 25.869(a)(1). After reasonably
probable failures or malfunctions, EWIS components should not cause
harmful or hazardous concentrations of gases or vapors in excess of the
levels prescribed in 25.831(b)(1) and (2).
(2) 25.1713(b). This requirement was formerly located in

25.869(a)(2). It requires that EWIS components that are located in
designated fire zones and used during emergency procedures must be at least
38
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
fire resistant. This requirement is intended to help ensure that emergency

services are available in the event of a fire.
(a) The definition of fire resistant is found in 14 CFR 1.1 General

definitions. As applied to EWIS components it is defined as
follows:
To be fire resistant means that EWIS components must have the capacity
to perform the intended functions under the heat and other conditions
likely to occur when there is a fire at the place concerned.
(b) EWIS components in regions immediately outside fire zones and in

engine pod attachment structures should be made of such materials and
installed at such a distance from the firewall that they will not suffer
damage that could hazard the airplane if the surface of the firewall
adjacent to the fire is heated to 1100 C (2012 F) for 15 minutes.
(3) 25.1713(c). This section was formerly located in 25.869(a)(4). It

requires that insulation on electrical wire and electrical cable installed
anywhere in the airplane be self-extinguishing when tested in accordance
with the applicable portions of part I Appendix F of part 25.
(a) In addition, to protect against propagation of a fire, EWIS

components other than wire and cable should be designed using non-
flammable and self-extinguishing materials as tested to the equivalent of
part I Appendix F or equivalent.
(b) Maximum physical or spatial separation is especially important

above the component, or downstream of any consistent, known airflow.
See paragraph 5.d., System Separation EWIS, of this advisory circular,
for guidance on demonstrating compliance with the separation
requirements of 25.1707.
h. 25.1715 ELECTRICAL BONDING AND PROTECTION AGAINST

STATIC ELECTRICITY: EWIS. The build-up and subsequent discharge of static
electricity has the potential to create hazardous conditions for both airplane systems
and people. It can injure people, interfere with installed electrical/electronic
equipment, and cause ignition of flammable vapors. All EWIS components used for
bonding and protection against static electricity play a vital role in ensuring the
integrity of the bonds.
(1) 25.1715(a). This section requires that EWIS used for electrical bonding
and protection against static electricity meet the requirements of 25.899. To
minimize the hazardous effects of static discharge, EWIS components should be
selected, designed, and installed so that the cross-sectional area of bonding paths
39
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
used for primary and secondary bonding ensure that an appropriately low
electrical impedance is obtained and maintained throughout the expected service
life of the components.
(a) The maximum resistance for electrical bonds varies depending on the
type of bond, e.g., ground stud, between connector shell and structure. A
typical value is 1 milliohm, but this can vary from .01 milliohms to 3
milliohms. The airplane manufacturers standard wiring practices manual
(SWPM) provides guidance on maximum bonding resistance.
(b) The airplane manufacturers SWPM provides guidance on proper

surface preparation, materials, tooling, maximum torque values, and other
variables important to ensuring an adequate bond. One airplane
manufacturers SWPM, for example, states that steel washers, dyed
washers, and other washers with a non-conductive surface should not be
used in the conductive path of a bond.
(2) 25.1715(b). This section requires that EWIS components used for any
electrical bonding purposes (not just those used for protection against static
electricity) provide an adequate electrical return path under both normal and
fault conditions. EWIS components should be selected, designed, and installed
so that the cross-sectional area of bonding paths used for primary and secondary
bonding paths ensure that an appropriately low electrical impedance is obtained
and maintained throughout the expected service life of the components.
j. 25.1717 CIRCUIT PROTECTIVE DEVICES: EWIS. This section

requires that electrical wires and cable be compatible with the circuit protective
devices required by 25.1357. This means that when selecting wire and cables for a
specific application, care must be taken to ensure selection of the proper type and
rating of the circuit protective device (e.g., circuit breaker) so that the wire and
cables are adequately protected from over-current situations. This section is based
on the requirements that were formerly found in 25.1353(d)(1).
k. 25.1719 ACCESSIBILITY PROVISIONS: EWIS. This section requires

that means be provided to allow for inspection of EWIS and replacement of their
components as necessary for continued airworthiness.
(1) The intent of 25.1719 is to ensure that EWIS components are installed so
that inspections, tests, repairs, and replacements can be undertaken with a
minimum of aircraft disassembly. When adjacent structures and aircraft systems
components must be removed to allow access to wire installations, new
possibilities for contamination, chafing, and other types of damage are
introduced.
(2) As far as practicable, EWIS components should be installed so that

inspections, tests, repair, and replacements can be done without undue
40
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
disturbance to the EWIS installation or to surrounding aircraft systems. During

the design phase, consider minimizing the amount of aircraft disassembly
required to perform such tasks. For example, wiring inside conduit may incur
damage from chafing against the sides of the conduit. If failure of wiring inside
a conduit can lead to a hazardous or catastrophic condition, a means should be
provided for inspection of those wires. As in the example, there may be other
areas of the airplane where human physical access is not possible. In those
situations, other types of inspection techniques should be developed. These
other types of inspection may be by testing or other means acceptable to the
Administrator and should be included in the maintenance requirements that are
part of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
l. 25.1721 PROTECTION OF EWIS. The requirements of this section are

intended to prevent damage to EWIS by passengers, crew members, baggage or
cargo handlers, or maintenance and service personnel, or by movement of cargo or
baggage. Section 25.1721(a) is applicable to EWIS located in cargo or baggage
compartments, and 25.1721(b) and (c) apply to EWIS located anywhere in the
airplane.
(1) 25.1721(a). The requirements of this paragraph, as they pertain to EWIS,

were formerly located in 25.855(e). Under section 25.1721(a), EWIS cannot
be located in cargo or baggage compartments if its damage or failure may affect
safe operation unless it cannot be damaged by movement of cargo or baggage in
the compartment and unless its breakage or failure will not create a fire hazard.
This means that any EWIS located in a cargo or baggage compartment must be
protected against damage. It further means that EWIS must be designed and
installed so that if it fails or breaks, for whatever reason, such as failed wire
bundle support devices, damage to cargo liners, or chafed wires, such failure will
not create a fire hazard. It does not matter if the EWIS located in the
compartment is associated with a flight critical or essential system or a passenger
convenience system, such as an IFE system. Failure of an EWIS component, no
matter what system it is associated with, could cause a fire or other type of
damage to aircraft systems or structure. EWIS in general and wiring in
particular should be installed so the structure affords protection against its use as
a handhold and damage from cargo. Wires and wire bundles should be routed or
otherwise protected to minimize the potential for maintenance personnel
stepping, walking, or climbing on them. Wire bundles should be routed along
heavier structural members whenever possible. If the structure does not afford
adequate protection, other protection means such as a mechanical guard should
be provided. When EWIS is close to sharp metal edges, the edges should be
protected by grommets to prevent chafing. Additionally, wires should not be
routed between aircraft skin and fuel lines within the same plane.
(2) 25.1721(b). This paragraph requires that EWIS be designed and installed
to minimize its damage and risk of damage by movement of people in the
airplane during all phases of flight, maintenance, and servicing. Some examples
41
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
of areas of concern are the flight deck, passenger compartment, crew rest area,
wheel wells, and wing leading and trailing edges.
(a) Special consideration should be given to EWIS that are routed to and
on passenger seats. It should be protected so that passengers cannot damage
it with their feet or access it with their hands.
(b) EWIS located in the lavatories should not be readily accessible by

passengers or aircraft cleaners. It should be designed and installed so that it
cannot be damaged by the removal and replacement of items such as trash
containers.
(c) EWIS located in the galleys should not be readily accessible by cabin
crew, aircraft cleaners, or passengers. It should be designed and installed so
that galley equipment, including galley carts, cannot come into contact with
it and cause damage. The design and installation of EWIS around and in
galley areas should be such that galley equipment, such as chiller units, can
be removed and reinstalled without coming into contact with EWIS
components and damaging them.
(d) As with EWIS located in baggage and cargo compartments, EWIS in

areas such as landing gear bays, the APU compartment, and electrical and
electronic bays should be designed and installed to minimize potential for
maintenance personnel stepping, walking, or climbing on them. Where the
structure does not afford adequate protection, other protection such as a
mechanical guard should be provided.
(3) 25.1721(c). This paragraph requires that EWIS be designed and installed
to minimize its damage and risk of damage by items carried onto the aircraft by
passengers or cabin crew. This is intended to protect EWIS from items such as
baggage that is carried on board by passengers and cabin crew and stowed
beneath passenger seats or other places where luggage is likely to be stowed.
m. 25.1723 FLAMMABLE FLUID FIRE PROTECTION: EWIS.
(1) This section requires that EWIS located in areas where flammable fluid or
vapors might escape must be considered to be a potential ignition source. As a
result, these EWIS components must meet the requirements of 25.863. Section
25.863 requires that efforts be made to minimize the probability of ignition of
fluids and vapors, and the hazards if ignition does occur. See 25.1707 for the
separation requirements between EWIS and flammable fluids. Paragraph 5d of
this AC contains the advisory material for 25.1707.
(2) The airplane manufacturer defines fuel vapor zones. EWIS components
located in fuel vapor zones should be qualified as explosion proof (when
applicable OR when appropriate) in accordance with Section 9 of RTCA
42
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Document DO160 or EUROCAE ED-14, "Environmental Conditions and Test

Procedures for Airborne Equipment," latest approved revision, or other
equivalent approved industry standard.
(3) The possibility of contamination with flammable fluids due to spillage

during maintenance action should also be considered.
n. 25.1725 Powerplants: EWIS.
(1) 25.1725(a). This paragraph requires that the failure of EWIS

components must be considered when demonstrating compliance with the
requirements of 25.903(b). That means that when a powerplant fails or
malfunctions, an EWIS component may not fail in such a way as to prevent
continued safe operation of the remaining powerplants or require immediate
action by any crewmember for continued safe operation.
(2) 25.1725(b). This paragraph requires that design of EWIS must consider
their damage from a powerplant rotor failure or from a fire originating in the
powerplant that burns through the powerplant case. The design of EWIS must
minimize hazards to the airplane when these events occur.
o. 25.1727 Flammable fluid shutoff means: EWIS. This section requires

that EWIS associated with each flammable fluid shutoff means and control be
fireproof or be located and protected so that any fire in a fire zone will not affect
operation of the flammable fluid shutoff means, in accordance with the requirements
of 25.1189.
p. 25.1729 INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS:

EWIS. Section 25.1729 requires applicants to prepare Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness (ICA) in accordance with sections H25.4(a)(3) and H25.5. The
guidance for those sections of Appendix H applicable to EWIS ICA are contained in
paragraph 5.s. of this AC.
q. 25.1731 POWERPLANT AND APU FIRE DETECTOR SYSTEMS:

EWIS. To minimize occurrences of nuisance fire warnings, consider separately
routing fire detection system wiring within the fire zone to allow optimal routing and
ease of replacement. Exercise particular care regarding the environmental
qualification of the system connectors (fire resistance, resistance to moisture and
fluids, etc.).
r. 25.1733 FIRE DETECTOR SYSTEMS, GENERAL: EWIS. The

environmental qualification of the fire detector system components should include
the use of fire resistant EWIS components and/or design to ensure that the system
will detect fire if exposed to it.
43
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
s. APPENDIX H TO PART 25 INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED

AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS FOR EWIS. Following is a discussion
of the requirements for incorporating EWIS component information in the ICA for
aircraft. Including EWIS in the ICA will promote proper maintenance, repair, and
modification of EWIS components. Improper maintenance, repair, and modification
often hastens the aging of EWIS. To properly maintain, repair, and modify
airplane EWIS, certain information needs to be available to people who design,
modify, install, and maintain it. Sections H25.4(a)(3) and H25.5 require applicants
for both type certificates and supplemental type certificates to prepare ICA for
EWIS. The EWIS-related ICA must be approved by the cognizant FAA office and
be in the form of a document easily recognizable as EWIS ICA. The following
paragraphs, 5.s.(1) through 5.s.(7), provide specific guidance on acceptable
compliance methods for EWIS ICA.
(1) H25.4(a)(3). This section requires the applicant to include in the

Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness any mandatory replacement times for EWIS components. EWIS
components are those defined by 25.1701. Generally, EWIS components are
designed and selected to last for the service life of the airplane. Any EWIS
component that must be replaced at regular intervals to maintain the
airworthiness of the associated system or airplane must be specified, with its
required replacement interval, in the Airworthiness Limitations section of the
ICA.
(2) H25.5(a). This section requires applicants to prepare ICA applicable to

EWIS. The ICA must cover all EWIS components as defined in 25.1701. The
rule requires that the FAA approve the EWIS ICA.
(3) H25.5(a)(1). This paragraph requires applicants to prepare EWIS

maintenance and inspection requirements using an enhanced zonal analysis
procedure (EZAP). An EZAP is a specifically wire-focused version of the zonal
analysis procedure widely used to analyze an airplanes physical areas or zones.
It is used for developing maintenance tasks. One version of an EZAP is
described in AC 25-27 Development of Transport Category Airplane Electrical
Wiring Interconnection Systems Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Using
an Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure
(4) H25.5(a)(2). This paragraph requires applicants to document EWIS

maintenance practices in a standard format. This is typically accomplished with
publication of a standard wiring practices manual (SWPM). The rule is not
intended to require that every manufacturers SWPM be identical. The intent is
to enable people performing EWIS maintenance and repairs to find needed
information in the SWPM more quickly and easily, regardless of what airplane
model they are currently working on. Standard wiring practices include
procedures and practices for the installation, repair, and removal of EWIS
components, including information about wire splices, methods of bundle
44
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
attachment, connectors and electrical terminal connections, bonding, and

grounding. A SWPM is not a design manual, and designers of EWIS
modifications for specific airplane models should not use it as such. But it does
provide the designer with insight into the types of EWIS components used by the
TC holder and the procedures recommended by the manufacturer for
maintenance or repair that supports continued airworthiness of the components.
Advisory Circular 25-26, Development of Standard Wiring Practices
Documentation, provides guidance on how to comply with the requirements of
paragraph H25.5(a)(2) of Appendix H to part 25.
(5) H25.5(a)(3). This section requires applicants to include EWIS separation

requirements in the ICA. EWIS separation requirements are important for
maintaining the safe operation of the airplane. Maintenance and repair personnel
need to be aware of the type certificate holders separation requirements so they
do not compromise separation in previously certified systems. This requirement
will help maintenance, repair, and modification personnel easily determine
EWIS separation requirements.
(a) Determination of EWIS separation requirements is required by

25.1707. To comply with H25.5(a)(3), the applicant needs to develop a
way to convey these separation requirements and place them in the ICA.
For example, if an airplane has a fly-by-wire flight control system and a
minimum of 2 inches of physical separation is needed between the EWIS
associated with the flight control system and other EWIS, this information
must to be available in the ICA. Similarly, the separation of certain wires in
fuel tank systems may be critical design configuration control items and
therefore qualify as an airworthiness limitation. Maintenance personnel
need these separation requirements and limitations because many times wire
bundles must be moved or removed to perform maintenance.
(b) The separation data included in the ICA can take many forms. If a
particular airplane model has fly-by-wire flight controls, the manufacturer
may designate the EWIS associated with the flight control systems by a
certain identification scheme (as required by 25.1711), and in the ICA
state that EWIS so designated must be maintained with XX amount of
separation from all other EWIS and YY amount of separation from other
airplane systems and structure. The manufacturer can then repeat this
information for other EWIS associated with other airplane systems. The
ICA could indicate how EWIS associated with IFE and other passenger
convenience systems is identified, and that this EWIS must be maintained
XX inches from other categories of EWIS or structure.
(c) It is not the intent of the regulation to require a design approval holder
or an applicant to divulge proprietary information in order to comply.
Certain information, however, needs to be made available to modifiers and
45
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
maintainers to ensure that future modifications and repairs do not invalidate

previously certified designs.
(6) H25.5(a)(4). This paragraph requires that the ICA contain information
explaining the EWIS identification method and requirements for identifying any
changes to EWIS. This requirement is intended to ensure that future
modifications adding EWIS identify those added EWIS with the same type of
identification scheme used by the original airplane manufacturer. This
information will help modification designers and modification personnel avoid
improper modification and repair of existing EWIS or improper installation of
new EWIS. These personnel need to review the applicable standard wiring
practices, EWIS identification requirements, and electrical load data for the
airplane they are modifying.
(7) H25.5(a)(5).
(a) This paragraph requires that the ICA contain electrical load data and
instructions for updating that data. Electrical load data and the instructions
for updating it are necessary to help ensure that future modifications or
additions of equipment that consume electrical power do not exceed the
generating capacity of the onboard electrical generation and distribution
system. Maintaining a record of actual airplane electrical loads is important
to ensure that modifications to the original design do not impose electrical
loads on the electrical generating system in excess of the systems
capability to provide the necessary power and maintain necessary margins.
To comply with the requirements of this paragraph applicants need to
provide:
1 Electrical generating capacity of each source of normal electrical

power generation.
2 Electrical generating capacity of each source of emergency power

generation.
3 Electrical load capacity of each electrical bus.
4 Actual electrical loading of each electrical bus.
(b) The airplane manufacturer is responsible for preparing, and including in

the ICA, the electrical load data as required by this section for the as-
delivered airplane. It is then the responsibility of subsequent modifiers to
update the electrical load data when the proposed modification requires the
data to be revised (i.e., when required by 25.1351(a)).
46
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
The airplane manufacturer is responsible for preparing, and

including in the ICA, the electrical load data as required by
this section for the as-delivered airplane. It is then the
responsibility of subsequent modifiers to update the
electrical load data when the proposed modification
requires the data to be revised (i.e., when required by
25.1351(a)).
47
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix A
APPENDIX A
RELATED REGULATIONS AND DOCUMENTS
REGULATIONS. You can download an electronic copy of 14 CFR from the Internet at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cfr/. A paper copy can be ordered by sending a request to
the U.S. Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C. 20402-0001, or by calling telephone number (202) 512-1800; or by sending a
request by facsimile to (202) 512-2250.
25.773 Pilot compartment view.

25.831 Ventilation.
25.863 Flammable fluid fire protection.
25.869 Fire protection: systems.
25.899 Electrical bonding and protection against static electricity.
25.903 Engines.
25.981 Fuel tank ignition prevention.
25.1165 Engine ignition systems.
25.1189 Shutoff means.
25.1203 Fire detector system.
25.1301 Function and installation.
25.1303 Flight and navigation instruments.
25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations.
25.1310 Power source capacity and distribution.
25.1316 System lightning protection.
25.1331 Instruments using a power supply.
25.1351 General.
25.1353 Electrical equipment and installations.
25.1355 Distribution system.
25.1357 Circuit protective devices.
25.1360 Precautions against injury.
25.1362 Electrical supplies for emergency conditions.
25.1365 Electrical appliances, motors, and transformers.
25.1431 Electronic equipment.
25.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
A-1
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix A
OTHER RELATED CFR PARTS.
Part 21 Certification Procedures for Products and Parts
Part 43 Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration
Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules
Part 121 Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental

Operations
Part 125 Certification and Operations: Airplanes having a Seating Capacity of

20 or More Passengers or a Maximum Payload Capacity of 6,000
Pounds or More: and Rules Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft
Part 129 Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.-
Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage
Part 145 Repair Stations
ADVISORY CIRCULARS. You can download an electronic copy of the latest version of
the following ACs from the FAA Internet at http://rgl.faa.gov.
25-10 Guidance for Installation of Miscellaneous, Nonrequired

Electrical Equipment
25-16 Electrical Fault and Fire Protection and Prevention
43-13.1B Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices Aircraft
Inspection and Repair
25.773-1 Pilot Compartment View Design Considerations
25-869-1 Electrical Smoke and Fire Protection
25.981-1B Fuel Tank Ignition Source Prevention Guidelines
25.1309-1A System Design and Analysis
25.1310-1 Power Source Capacity and Distribution
25.1353-1 Electrical Requirements and Installations
25-1357-1 Circuit Protective Device Accessibility
25-1360-1 Electric Shock and Burns
25-1362 Electrical Supply for Emergency Service
25.1363-1 Electrical System Tests
25-26 Development of Standard Wiring Practices Documentation
25-27 Development of Transport Category Airplane Electrical Wiring
Interconnection Systems Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness Using an Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure
A-2
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix A
POLICY MEMORANDA. You can download an electronic copy of the latest version
of the following policy memoranda from the FAA Internet at http://rgl.faa.gov.
PS-ANM100-1999-0021 Requirements of FAR 25.1357(e)
PS-ANM100-2000-00105 Interim Policy Guidance for Certification of In-Flight

Entertainment Systems on Title 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft
PS-ANM100-2001-00113 Interim Summary of Policy and Advisory Material

Available for Use in the Certification of Cabin Mounted
Video Camera Systems with Flight Deck Displays on
Title 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft
PS-ANM111-2002-01-04 System Wiring Policy for Certification of Part 25

Airplanes
REPORTS.
Task 6 Final Report Aging Transport Systems Rulemaking Advisory Committee,

dated October 29, 2002.
(http://www.mitrecaasd.org/atsrac/final_reports/Task_6_Final_Report-10-29-
2002.pdf)
SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS (SAE) DOCUMENTS.

(http://www.sae.org/servlets/index)
NOTE: AS = Aerospace Standard

AIR = Aerospace Information Report
ARP = Aerospace Recommended Practice
AS4373 Test Methods for Insulated Electric Wire
AS50881 Wiring Aerospace Vehicle
AS70991 Terminals: Lug and Splice, Crimp Style, Aluminum, For Aluminum
Aircraft Wire
AS7928 Terminals, Lug: Splices, Conductor: Crimp Style, Copper, General

Specification For
AS81824 Splices, Electric, Permanent, Crimp Style Copper, Insulated,

Environment Resistant
A-3
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix A
AIR5575 Hot Stamp Wire Marking Concerns for Aerospace Vehicle
Applications
ARP5369 Guidelines for Wire Identification Marking Using the Hot Stamp
Process
ARP4404 Aircraft Electrical Installations
EUROPEAN NORMS.
EN 34375 Aerospace Series Cables, Electrical, Aircraft Use

(http://en-standards.standardsdirect.org/EN-Sheet124_list_48.html)
prEN 2853 Current Ratings for Electrical Cables to be Installed on Aircraft (in
development)
prEN 3197 Aerospace Series Installation of Aircraft Electrical and Optical

Interconnection Systems (in development)
OTHER DOCUMENTS.
RTCA DO-160 Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne

Equipment
(http://www.rtca.org/downloads/DEC%202004%20-%2005-01-
06.htm#_Toc92863870)
Eurocae ED-14 Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne

Equipment
(http://www.eurocae.org/cgi-
bin/home.pl?Target=va/documents/documents_general.html&Num
=4)
International Organization for Standardization Document ISO 2574

Aircraft Electrical Cables Identification Marking
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnu
mber=7536&ICS1=1&ICS2=70)
A-4
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
APPENDIX B
NPRM PART 25 SUBPART H AND APPENDIX H DISCUSSION
Following are the discussions of the Part 25, Subpart H and

Appendix H requirements published in the Federal Register on
October 6, 2005, (70 FR 58508) in Notice of Proposed Rulemaking No
05-08, Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel
Tank Safety (EAPAS/FTS), at the time these rules were proposed.
NOTE: Some of the section numbers of the final rule are different than
those proposed in the NPRM. Most of the proposed advisory circulars
(AC) have been given final numbers. For ease of reference, the proposed
section numbers have been replaced with the final section numbers, and
the proposed ACs are identified with their final numbers, when available.
Other than that, no other changes have been made to the preamble
discussion that follows.
Part 25 Subpart HElectrical Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS)
The proposed subpart H consists of relocated, revised, and new

regulations about EWIS. Unless we say otherwise, our purpose in
moving requirements to subpart H is to ensure their application to
EWIS. We do not intend to change their legal effect in any other
way.
Section 25.1701 Definition.
Proposed 25.1701 would define what constitutes an EWIS for

the purposes of complying with the proposed subpart H requirements
and other EWIS-related requirements of parts 25, 121, and 129.
Current regulations do not provide a definition of a wiring

system. Without this definition, the proposed rules could be
inconsistently applied to various wire-related components. To
completely address the safety issues associated with wiring systems,
requirements must address not only the wiring itself, but also
components and devices that are required to adequately install and
identify each wire. Various components and devices needed to route
and identify wires are critical in ensuring that a proper electrical
interconnection is made and maintained.
For the purposes of this NPRM, the term wire means bare
and/or insulated wire used for the purpose of electrical energy
transmission, grounding, or bonding. This includes electrical cables,
coaxial cables, ribbon cables, power feeders, and databuses.
B-1
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
A proper electrical interconnection between two or more points

requires more than just wire. Making the connection in a manner
that ensures both functionality and safety requires various types of
components, of which wire is one. Therefore, a clear definition of an
electrical interconnection is necessary. The proposed regulation
provides this and at the same time introduces the term electrical
wiring interconnection system (EWIS) to describe that
interconnection. The term EWIS means any wire, wiring device, or
combination of these, including termination devices, installed in the
airplane for transmitting electrical energy between two or more
termination points. The proposed regulation expands on this basic
statement to clearly identify which wire-related components are
included in the EWIS definition and which are not. Most wires are
routed with other wires that make up wire bundles and cable
assemblies (or looms, as they are sometimes called). A single wire
may also be routed separately. The same definition of an EWIS is
applied to a single wire or to a bundle containing hundreds of wires.
To complete an electrical connection, various types of connectors

are necessary. Examples are MS connectors (MS means military
specification), D-subminiature connectors, and rack and panel
connectors. Any connector used to complete an electrical
connection is included in the EWIS definition. The exception to this
is the mating connection on those devices that are excluded from the
proposed definition. The excepted devices are addressed later in this
discussion.
Connector accessories fall under the definition of EWIS. Such

accessories include, but are not limited to, backshells, strain reliefs,
grommets, and sealing plugs. Electrical connections to devices such
as relays, interrupters, switches, contactors, terminal blocks, and
feed-through connectors are parts of an EWIS. For example, the
connection device on a relay is considered part of the EWIS, but the
relay mechanism is not, because it is a termination point. A splice
can be considered an electrical connector because it performs the
same role as other connection devices by providing an electrical
connection between two or more wires. The failure of a splice or
relay connection could create a hazardous situation by exposing bare
conductors or impairing system functionality.
Although a bus bar is not a connector in the traditional sense, it

is a collector and distribution device for electrical energy and thus
must be treated as part of an EWIS.
B-2
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Wire or wire bundles require devices to physically route and
support them, such as clamps, brackets, standoffs, and other such
components. These are included in the EWIS definition. Cable ties
are included because they are used to hold multiple wires together
and in place. The failure of one or more of these EWIS components
could affect the ability of the wire to perform its intended function.
It could cause collateral damage to other wires in the same or
adjacent bundles or cause the bundle to fail in a way that would
cause structural damage or ignite flammable material, fluid, or
vapors in the area.
Some wires must pass through pressure bulkheads, so a pressure

seal is needed. Failure of a pressure seal could cause damage to the
wires in the wire bundle and affect the functioning of the system
they support. Some wire bundles use shields or braids to protect
them from electromagnetic radiation, lightning, abrasion, and other
types of physical damage. Failure of the shields or braid could
cause, or allow, the wires to be damaged. It could also allow
unwanted electrical energy to be coupled into systems and cause
system malfunction. Thus, shields, braids, and pressure seals must
be considered part of the EWIS and treated as such.
Sometimes adequate physical separation distance is not possible,

and some sort of protective sleeving may be used. Since the sleeving
is used to achieve separation, it must be considered part of the
EWIS.
Conduits are included in the proposal because they are used to

provide protection for wires as well as provide physical separation.
Conduits that have electrical termination for bonding are considered
part of an EWIS because the failure of the bonding could create a
hazardous situation.
The definition of an EWIS includes labels or other means used for

identification. This supports the proposed 25.1711 requiring new
identification criteria for wires and other EWIS components.
Discussion of the proposed labeling requirements appears under the
heading for 25.1711.
The proposed regulation does not cover portable, carry-on, or

other electrical equipment not certified for installation on the
airplane under part 25. Examples of items not included are laptop
computers and portable audio and/or video or other consumer
devices typically carried on-board by passengers for personal use.
Increasingly, flight and cabin crew are using laptop computers in the
performance of their duties. As stated, laptops are not part of the
B-3
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
EWIS definition, but any electrical connection used to support power
and/or signal transmission that is part of the airplane TC, and that is
used for the laptop or other carry-on items, is covered by the
proposed definition.
The proposed EWIS definition does not cover fiber optic cable
because fiber optic cable does not transmit electrical energy. But
since fiber optics can provide functions (for example, data
transmission) similar to those provided by wire, it is being expressly
eliminated from the EWIS definition to avoid confusion.
The proposed definition excludes electrical wiring

interconnection system components inside avionics equipment (high-
frequency communication radio or flight data recorder, for instance),
or the mating electrical connectors mounted on that equipment.
Such equipment is produced by various manufacturers for use on a
broad range of airplane models and is designed and built to various
performance and environmental specifications. Environmental
testing, either by means of RTCA (Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics) Document No. RTCA DO-160, EUROCAE 55
specification (specification of the European Organization for Civil
Aviation Equipment), or other environmental qualification
procedures approved by the FAA, ensures that the EWIS contained
within avionics equipment is robust and well suited for the airborne
environments in which it will be operated.
This proposal also does not apply to miscellaneous electrical

equipment if that equipment has been adequately qualified to
environmental conditions and testing procedures approved by the
FAA, unless that equipment is specifically included in the proposed
25.1701 as discussed in the following paragraph.
The definition of EWIS includes electrical wiring interconnection

system components inside shelves, panels, racks, junction boxes,
distribution panels, back-planes of equipment racks including circuit
board back-planes, and wire integration units. We have included the
components in this type of equipment because it, unlike avionics
equipment, is typically designed and made for a particular airplane
model or series of models. The same requirements that apply to
airplane EWIS components must also be applied to the components
inside that equipment. Avionics components must be sent back to
their manufacturer or a specialized repair shop for service. But this
type of equipment is maintained, repaired, and modified by the same
personnel who maintain, repair, and modify the EWIS in the rest of
the airplane. In an electrical distribution panel system, for example,
separation must be designed and maintained within the panel just as
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Appendix B
in the EWIS leading up to that panel. Identification of components
inside the panel is just as important as for those outside the panel
since the wiring inside the panel is treated much the same. Also,
while this type of equipment is designed for its intended function and
is manufactured and installed to the same standards as other EWIS, it
is typically not qualified to an environmental standard such as RTCA
DO-160.
Section 25.1703 Function and installation: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1703 would require that applicants select EWIS

components that are of a kind and design appropriate to their
intended function. Factors such as the components design
limitations, functionality, and susceptibility to arc tracking and
moisture must be considered when selecting EWIS components.
Section 25.1301 requires that each item of installed equipment be

of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function, be labeled
(identified), be installed according to any limitations specified for it,
and function properly when installed. This is a general catch-all
regulation applicable to equipment and systems certified under
subpart F. Because of its generality and the fact that the FAA has
not published any advisory circular for this rule, 25.1301 has not
been applied in a standardized way. Currently, 25.1301 is
applicable to wire and its associated components but it does not
provide sufficient wire-specific requirements to ensure proper
function and installation of EWIS. It does not adequately cover all
factors that need to be considered when selecting, identifying, and
installing wiring components.
The requirements of 25.1301 are the basis for the new

25.1703, but those requirements are supplemented by new ones.
Requirements from other existing sections are also moved into the
new regulation, so that the proposed rule would specifically apply to
EWIS components. Adoption would ensure that the selection of
wires and other EWIS components, and their installation, are carried
out in a safe, consistent, and standardized manner.
Section 25.1703(a)(1) would require that each EWIS component

be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function. While
25.1301(a) contains the same requirements, 25.1703(a)(1) is
specific to EWIS components. In this context, the requirement
means that components must be qualified for airborne use, or
otherwise specifically assessed as acceptable for their intended use.
To be appropriate means that the equipment is used in a manner
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Appendix B
for which it was designed. For example, a wire rated at 150 degrees
Celsius would not be appropriate for installation in an airplane zone
where the temperature exceeds 150 degrees Celsius. Wire and other
components made for household or consumer products use would
not be appropriate for airborne use because they are manufactured
for the consumer market and not for use in an airborne environment.
Exceptions to this would be wire or other consumer components
shown to comply with all the applicable airworthiness requirements
of part 25. In the past this showing of compliance has proven to be
difficult because manufacturers of consumer products have been
reluctant to modify their designs to accommodate aviation use.
Aviation use of consumer products represents too small a market.
Other factors that must be considered for EWIS component

selection are mechanical strength, voltage drop, required bend
radius, and expected service life. Expected service life means the
expected service lifetime of the EWIS. This is not normally less
than the expected service life of the aircraft structure. If the
expected service life requires that all or some of the EWIS
components be replaced at certain intervals, then these intervals must
be specified in the ICA as required by 25.1529.
Section 25.1703(a)(2) requires that EWIS components be

installed according to their limitations. As used here, limitations
means the design and installation requirements of the particular
EWIS component. Examples of EWIS component limitations are
maximum operating temperature, degree of moisture resistance,
voltage drop, maximum current-carrying capability, and tensile
strength. Section 25.1301(c) contains that requirement, but fails to
specifically address the unique characteristics of EWIS. EWIS
component selection and installation design must take into account
various environmental factors including, but not limited to, vibration,
temperature, moisture, exposure to the elements or chemicals (de-
icing fluid, for instance), insulation type, and type of clamp. For
example, wire bundle adhesive clamps are known to work loose
during aircraft operation. Attention must be given to the selection of
and methods of affixing this type of wire bundle support and it must
be shown that this type of clamp is appropriate for the environment
in which it will be used.
Section 25.1703(a)(3) would require that EWIS function properly

when installed. This is the same requirement as 25.1301(d).
However, the 25.1301(d) requirement is so general that it is
applied in a nonstandardized manner. Sometimes the term function
properly when installed has been interpreted to mean that even non-
safety-related functions of a given system must function in the
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Appendix B
manner for which it was designed. The key word in understanding
the intent of this proposed section is properly, as that relates to
airworthiness of the airplane in which the electrical wiring
interconnection systems are installed. For an EWIS component to
function properly means that it must be capable of safely performing
the function for which it was designed. For example, the fact that an
airplanes in-flight entertainment (IFE) system fails to deliver
satisfactory picture or sound quality is not what the term properly
refers to and is not a certification issue. However, the failure of an
EWIS component has the potential for being a safety hazard whether
it is part of a safety-related system or an IFE system. Therefore,
EWIS components must always function properly when installed, no
matter what system they are part of. The guidance material being
prepared to accompany the subpart H AC 25.1701-1, Certification
of Electrical Wiring Interconnection Systems on Transport Category
Airplanes, will clarify these distinctions.
Section 25.1703(a)(4) is a new requirement to ensure that EWIS

components be designed and installed so mechanical strain is
minimized. This means the EWIS installation must be designed such
that strain on the wires would not be so great as to cause wire or
other components to fail. This requirement would ensure that
adequate consideration is given to mechanical strain when selecting
wire and cables, clamps, strain reliefs, stand-offs, and other devices
used to route and support the wire bundle.
Proposed 25.1703(b) would require that selection of wires for

installation takes into account known characteristics of different wire
types in relation to each specific application, to minimize risk of
damage. It is important to select the aircraft wire type whose
construction matches the application environment. The wire type
selected must be constructed for the most severe environment likely
to be encountered in service. Among other things, the proposed
section would ensure that insulation types susceptible to arc tracking
be used only in environments that will minimize the likelihood of
that phenomenon. Arc tracking is a phenomenon in which a
conductive carbon path forms across an insulating surface. A breach
in the insulation allows arcing. The arcing carbonizes the insulation.
The carbon residue is electrically conductive. The carbon path then
provides a short circuit path through which current can flow. This
can occur on either dry or wet wires. Certain types of wire
insulation are more susceptible to arc tracking than others. Wire
insulated with aromatic polyimide is one type that is susceptible to
arc tracking. While this type of insulation is well suited for use in
very low or high temperature environments, it generally should not
be used in areas of an airplane prone to excessive moisture or
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Appendix B
vibration, such as those areas designated as severe wind and
moisture problem (SWAMP) areas without taking into account this
insulation propertys unique characteristics. Installations exposed to
vibration and constant flexing in a moisture-prone area would need
wire type suitable for that environment. Proposed 25.1703(c)
would require that design and installation of the main power cables
allow for a reasonable degree of deformation and stretching without
failure. This requirement now resides in 25.869(a)(3).
Proposed 25.1703(d) requires that EWIS components located in

areas of known moisture build-up be adequately protected to
minimize moistures hazardous effects. This is to ensure that all
practical means are used to ensure damage from fluid contact with
components does not occur. Wires routed near a lavatory, galley
area, hydraulic lines, severe wind and moisture problem areas such
as wheel wells and wing trailing edges, and any other area of the
airplane where moisture collection could be a concern must be
adequately protected from possible adverse effects of exposure to the
types of moisture in these areas.
If a TC includes subpart H in its certification basis, the TC holder

would have to show compliance with the proposed EWIS
requirements. For future modifications of those TCs, use of the
same design practices as those used by the TC holder will enable the
modifier to substantiate compliance with the subpart H requirements
based on a comparison with the TC holders methods. If modifiers
choose to deviate from those design practices, they would have to
substantiate compliance independently. They would also have to
consider the design practices used by the TC holder in order to
justify their own choice of components.
In summary, these new rules would require the designer and

installer to be careful in wire type choices, system design, and
installation design. The existing 25.1301 would be amended to
contain a reference to 25.1703 for EWIS component requirements.
Section 25.1709 System safety: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1705 would require applicants to perform a system

safety assessment of the EWIS. The safety assessment must
consider the effects that both physical and functional failures of
EWIS would have on the airplanes safety. Based on that safety
assessment, it must be shown that each EWIS failure considered to
be hazardous is extremely remote. Each EWIS failure considered to
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Appendix B
be catastrophic must be shown to be extremely improbable and not
result from a single failure.
The current regulation requiring system safety assessments is

25.1309. But current 25.1309 practice does not lead to the type
of analysis that fully ensures all EWIS failure conditions affecting
airplane-level safety are considered. This is because the current
25.1309(a) only covers systems and equipment that are required
by this subchapter, and wiring for nonrequired systems is
sometimes ignored. The current safety analysis requirements of
25.1309(b) and (d) have not always been applied to wire associated
with the airplane systems that are covered by the same rule. When
they are, there is evidence of inadequate and inconsistent application.
This is especially true for miscellaneous electrical equipment that is
not required, such as IFE systems. Traditional thinking about these
nonrequired systems has been that, since they are not required, and
the function they provide is not necessary for the safety of the
airplane, their failure could not affect the safety of the airplane. This
is not a valid assumption because failure of an electrical wire can
have hazardous or even catastrophic results regardless of the system
it is associated with. Wire failure can cause serious physical and
functional damage whether the wire or other EWIS components are
associated with an autoland system or an IFE system. An example
of this is arcing from a shorted wire cutting through flight control
cables.
The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC), based

on the work of its System Design and Analysis Harmonization
Working Group, has made recommendations to the FAA for changes
to the current 25.1309. We are evaluating those recommendations.
(A copy of those recommendations has been placed in the docket for
reference.) We have considered the ARAC recommendations in
developing the proposed 25.1705.
One of the factors we considered in developing the proposed

25.1705 is that the proposed ARAC revisions to 25.1309 would
exempt certain airplane systems, including the EWIS components
associated with those systems, from having to comply with its
requirements. Specifically, ARAC recommends that jamming of
flight control surfaces or pilot controls covered by 25.671(c)(3) be
exempt from the requirements of 25.1309. Single failures covered
by 25.735(b)(1) and the failure effects covered by
25.810(a)(1)(v) and 25.812 would also be excepted from the
revision to 25.1309(b) recommended by ARAC. This includes
wiring or other EWIS components associated with those systems. In
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Appendix B
part, proposed 25.1705 would ensure coverage of the EWIS
associated with those systems.
There are many examples of inadequate EWIS designs that have

later been determined to be unsafe. Adoption of proposed 25.1705
would help ensure that those unsafe design practices are not repeated
in the future by requiring that EWIS failure conditions affecting
airplane-level safety are fully considered. The current 25.1309
does not provide that assurance.
The FAA has issued over 100 wire-related airworthiness

directives (AD) since 1998. Over 50 of those were issued since 1999
to correct wiring deficiencies on the Model MD-11 airplane as
delivered by the manufacturer. Airplanes as delivered from all
transport category airplane manufacturers have been the subject of
mandatory corrective action to correct safety-related wiring
problems.
Similarly, the FAA has issued many ADs to correct unsafe EWIS
installations because of postdelivery modifications. One example of
this involves the IFE system installed on the Swissair MD-11
airplane that crashed off the coast of Nova Scotia and was discussed
previously in this document. That modification is a clear case of not
considering the effect that EWIS failures can have on airplane safety.
The airplane was modified using the supplemental type certification
process to add the IFE system. That system contained roughly 750
separate electronic boxes and was installed without an adequate
safety assessment per 25.1309. Although this IFE system
consumed relatively large amounts of electrical power and its
components and wiring were distributed throughout, below, and
above the entire passenger cabin, the applicant did not thoroughly
address the safety implications of routing the system wire in the
same bundles as wire from other airplane systems, thus raising a
concern for common cause failure to multiple essential systems. In
many instances the applicant could not identify what airplane
systems were associated with the wire in the bundles modified to
route the IFE wiring. With the adoption of the proposed 25.1705,
this IFE system, as designed and installed on an airplane with the
proposed subpart H in its type certification basis, would be subjected
to a more rigorous safety assessment that would identify any
inappropriate routing and force a design change.
Many other examples of type design modifications provide evidence that

modifiers do not always give due consideration to the impact on safety that
installation of a new or modified system may have. Modifiers continue to
route the EWIS needed for modifications with, or in close proximity to,
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
wiring from other airplane systems without identifying protection
mechanisms for those systems. The current 25.1309 and revisions to it
recommended by ARAC do not contain sufficient requirements to ensure
such modifications maintain the level of safety intended by the regulation.
Accordingly, a more comprehensive and specific safety assessment

regulation for EWIS is necessary. The objective of the proposed 25.1705
is to focus attention on EWIS and the safety issues associated with them by
using the concepts of 25.1309 to provide for consistent use of a more
thorough and structured analysis of aircraft wiring and its associated
components.
The integrated nature of wiring and the potential severity of failures

demand a more structured safety analysis approach than that traditionally
used under the current, or the ARACs proposed revision to, 25.1309.
There are more failure modes that need to be addressed than have been
addressed previously with traditional analyses (arcing events that occur
without tripping circuit breakers, resulting in complete wire bundle failures
and fire; or wire bundle failures that lead to structural damage, for example).
Current 25.1309 system safety assessments typically evaluate effects of
wire failures on system functions. But they have not considered physical
wire failure as a cause of the failure of other wires within the EWIS. The
traditional assessments look at external factors like rotor burst, lightning,
and hydraulic line rupture, but not at internal factors, like a single wire
chafing or arcing event, as the cause of the failure of functions supported by
the EWIS. Compliance with the proposed 25.1705 would require
addressing those failure modes at the airplane level. This means that EWIS
failures would need to be analyzed to determine what effect they would
have on the safe operation of the airplane.
The proposed rule language is consistent with 25.1309 and is meant to

work in conjunction with the 25.1309 assessments performed on airplane
systems. It would require that the probability of a hazardous failure
condition be extremely remote and that the probability of a catastrophic
failure condition be extremely improbable and not result from a single
failure. The terminology and meaning of the classifications of EWIS failure
conditions are identical to those proposed by ARAC in August 2002. The
proposed AC produced by that working group discussing this, titled System
Design and Analysis, is in the docket for this NPRM. The following table
identifies and explains the failure condition terms.
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Classification of Failure Conditions
Term Explanation
No Safety Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety; for example failure
Effect conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the airplane
or increase flightcrew workload.
Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce airplane safety, and
involve flightcrew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor
failure conditions may include, for example:
a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
Minor
a slight increase in flightcrew workload, such as routine flight plan
changes; or
some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew.
a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities;
Major a significant increase in flightcrew workload or in conditions
impairing flightcrew efficiency;
discomfort to the flightcrew; or
physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including
injuries.
a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; or
Hazardous
physical distress or excessive workload such that the flightcrew cannot
be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or
serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of persons other
than the flightcrew.
Failure conditions that would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the
loss of the airplane. (NOTE: A catastrophic failure condition was defined
Catastrophic differently in previous versions of 25.1309 and in accompanying
advisory material as a failure condition that would prevent continued safe
flight and landing.)
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Appendix B
The proposed 25.1705 would complement the 25.1309 assessments
by raising the quality of the safety assessment with respect to EWIS failures
that would not be identified using the traditional methods of compliance
with 25.1309. The analysis required to show compliance with the
proposed regulation is based on a qualitative approach to assessing EWIS
safety as opposed to a numerical probability-based quantitative analysis.
The intent is not to examine each individual wire and its relation to other
wires, but rather to ensure that there are no unacceptable hazards to the
airplane. This does not preclude the possibility that, should the analysis
identify a failure in a given wire bundle or component(s) that may lead to a
catastrophic failure condition, the design mitigation process may lead to
performing a complete analysis of each wire in the relevant bundle.
The type of analysis used to show compliance with the proposed

25.1705 can vary depending on the knowledge of the designers or
modifiers of an EWIS. As stated earlier, it is important that there is
thorough knowledge of what systems and functions the other wires in the
same and surrounding bundles support. In the case of a post-TC
modification, without this information it would be impossible to state that
the modified system could not fail in a way that would cause a hazardous or
catastrophic event. If this information is not available to the modifier, then
the EWIS system must be designed to accommodate this lack of knowledge.
This would typically mean that wire being added for the modification would
need to be routed separately from existing airplane wiring.
Flowchart 1 and Flowchart 2, contained in Appendix E of this notice,

illustrate the type of analysis necessary to show compliance with the
proposed 25.1705. Two separate cases are considered. Flowchart 1 is
applicable to pre-type-certification work and to TCs and STCs when the
modifier has all the data necessary to perform the analysis. If the analysis is
conducted according to this flowchart, the available data must include
identification of systems supported by the EWIS under consideration for
modification and the functions associated with them. The original aircraft
manufacturer has most of this data and would normally follow the Flowchart
1 method. However, this may not always be the case when the manufacturer
modifies an airplane that has been previously modified by another party.
The analysis depicted in Flowchart 2 would apply to modifiers for post-

TC modification who cannot identify the systems or functions contained in
EWIS being considered for modification.
In both analyses, EWIS functional and physical failures are addressed. It

is the physical portion that has been neglected in past system safety analyses.
The proposed regulation would require an applicant to identify any physical
failure of EWIS that can cause damage to co-located EWIS or other
surrounding systems or structure, or injury to people. Once those physical
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
failures are identified, their severity can be determined and design mitigation
strategies can be developed and applied. The process is repeated until all
known unsafe features are eliminated. The difference between the processes
identified in the two flowcharts is that in Flowchart 1, all the systems and
associated functions whose wires are in a bundle are known. In Flowchart 2,
new wire is routed separately from existing wire. Otherwise, the analysis is
the same.
In summary, the need for this new regulation is shown by experience on

the part of the FAA and other governmental regulatory authorities and by
service histories. Many wire-related incidents and accidents have occurred.
Post-TC modifications have repeatedly introduced wiring safety problems.
Airplane manufacturers have delivered airplanes that have wiring problems
when they leave the factory, or such problems have later developed in
service, as evidenced by resulting mandatory corrective actions. Adoption of
this proposal would ensure that such problems are fully considered and
addressed as part of the type certification process.
Section 25.1709 System separation: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1709 would require applicants to design EWIS with

appropriate separation to minimize the possibility of hazardous effects upon
the airplane or its systems.
Safe operation of airplanes depends in part on the safe transfer of

electrical energy, a function provided by airplane EWIS. If an EWIS failure
should occur, the separation between the failed EWIS and other EWIS and
airplane systems plays an important role in ensuring that any hazardous
effects of the failure are mitigated to an acceptable level. Thus, it is vital to
design and install wiring systems with adequate separation from those
systems whose interaction with the wire could create hazardous effects.
Currently, part 25 certification rules do not adequately address wire system
separation. The rules currently used to require system separation are
25.1353(a), (b), and (c), but service experience has shown that compliance
with these requirements, with regard to wiring systems, has not always been
adequate. This is due in part to their lack of specific wording about which
wiring systems are covered and which systems those wires are meant to be
separated from. The proposed rule corrects these inadequacies by stating
specifically that it applies to each EWIS on the airplane, and mandating
specific separation requirements for certain airplane systems known to have
potential for creating a hazardous condition. The term hazardous condition
in this proposed rule is used in a different context than it is used in the
proposed 25.1705. Proposed 25.1705 uses the terms hazardous and
catastrophic in the context of assigning a numerical probability to failures
that can cause a failure condition. Hazardous failure conditions and
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
catastrophic failure conditions are defined in the discussion of the proposed
25.1705. In proposed 25.1709, the term hazardous condition means that
the applicant must perform a qualitative design assessment of the installed
EWIS. This assessment would involve using reasonable engineering and
manufacturing judgment and assessing relevant service history to decide
whether an EWIS, any other type of system, or any structural component
could fail in such a way that a condition affecting the airplanes ability to
continue safe operation could result. A numerical probability assessment
may still be required under the requirements of the proposed 25.1705 if the
airplane-level functional hazard assessment identifies failures that could
affect safe operation of the airplane.
To illustrate the type of assessment required by proposed 25.1709,

consider the following simple example involving the use of wire bundle
clamps. Clamps are used to secure a wire bundle to structure in order to hold
the bundle in place and route the bundle from one location to another along a
predetermined path. An airplane manufacturer, using the criteria contained
in the proposed advisory material for 25.1709, determines that a 2-inch
separation from hydraulic lines is necessary. The manufacturer further
decides that one clamp every 10 inches is needed to maintain that separation.
However, there is one localized area where a single clamp failure would
potentially create a hazard. This is because the area in question is a high
vibration, high temperature area, subject to exposure to moisture. So the
clamp in this particular area is exposed to severe environmental conditions
that could lead to its accelerated degradation. The manufacturer decides that
using just a single clamp every 10 inches in this area would not suffice to
preclude a hazardous event. The manufacturer prescribes use of double
clamps every 10 inches in that area.
The requirements of proposed 25.1709 do not preclude use of valid

component failure rates if the applicant chooses to use a probability argument
in addition to the design assessment to demonstrate compliance. It also does
not preclude the FAA from requiring such an analysis if the applicant cannot
adequately demonstrate that hazardous conditions will be prevented solely by
using the qualitative design assessment.
As used in the proposed rule, the term separation is a measure of

physical distance. The purpose of separation is to prevent hazards of arcing
between wires in a single bundle, between two or more bundles, or between
an electrical bundle and a non-electrical system or structure. In some cases,
the proposal would allow separation to be achieved with a barrier or other
means shown to be at least equivalent to the necessary physical distance.
However, distance separation is preferred because service experience shows
that use of barriers such as conduits can cause wire damage or lead to
maintenance errors. In some cases, wire bundle sleeving is used to provide
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
separation, although the sleeving itself is susceptible to the same types of
damage as wire insulation.
Determining the necessary amount of physical separation distance is

essential. However, the proposed rule does not mandate specific separation
distances because each system design and airplane model can be unique, and
because manufacturers have differing design standards and installation
techniques. Instead it requires that the chosen separation be adequate so that
an EWIS component failure will not create a hazardous condition. The
following factors must be considered when determining the separation
distance:
(1) The electrical characteristics, amount of power, and severity of failure

condition of the system functions performed by the signals in the
EWIS and adjacent EWIS.
(2) Installation design features, including the number, type, and location of
support devices along the wire path.
(3) The maximum amount of slack wire resulting from wire bundle build
tolerances and other wire bundle manufacturing variabilities.
(4) Probable variations in the installation of the wiring and adjacent
wiring, including position of wire support devices and amount of wire
slack possible.
(5) The intended operating environment, including amount of deflection or
relative movement possible and the effect of failure of a wire support
or other separation means.
(6) Maintenance practices as defined by the airplane manufacturers
standard wiring practices manual and the ICA required by 25.1529
and proposed 25.1739.
(7) The maximum temperature generated by adjacent wire/wire bundles
during normal and fault conditions.
The FAA recognizes that some airplane models may have localized areas
where maintaining the minimum physical separation distance is not feasible.
In those cases, other means of ensuring equivalent minimum physical
separation may be acceptable, if testing or analysis demonstrates that safe
operation of the airplane is not jeopardized. The testing or analysis program
must be conservative and consider the worst possible conditions.
Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of proposed 25.1709 contain EWIS-
related requirements derived from the existing regulations applying to
electrical power generation systems and electrical equipment and
installations ( 25.1351 and 25.1353). Section 25.1351 does not need any
revision to support the proposed 25.1709, but 25.1353 is amended to
reference 25.1709.
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Appendix B
The proposed requirements of 25.1709(a) were derived from existing

25.1353(a). While the requirements of 25.1353(a) are retained, the
portion of that requirement applicable to wiring has been moved to the
proposed 25.1709(a). Further clarification of the requirement is also
included in the proposal. Section 25.1353(a) states wiring must be
installed so that operation of any one unit or system of units. Proposed
section 25.1709(a) expands on the term operation to state that it means
operation under normal and failure conditions as defined by 25.1309.
Proposed section 25.1709(b) would require that each EWIS be designed

and installed so that any electrical interference likely to be present in the
airplane will not result in hazardous effects on the airplane or its systems.
This proposed requirement is based on new text recently added to
25.1353(a) to harmonize part 25 with the existing text of the JAA JAR
25.1353(a)1. The text of JAR 25.1353(a) requires that any electrical
interference likely to be present in the airplane must not result in hazardous
effects on the airplane or its systems except under extremely remote
conditions. The proposed 25.1709(b) is recognition of the fact that
electrical interference can be introduced into airplane systems and wiring by
coupling between electrical cables or between cables and coaxial lines, as
well as by the other equipment that is the subject of 25.1353(a). The
proposed requirement does not adopt the JAR clause except under
extremely remote conditions. This is because the intent of the requirement
is not to require a numerical probability assessment of the likelihood of
electrical interference or its consequences as described previously. Rather it
is meant to convey that under failure conditions that may be caused by
electrical inference, the resultant effects should not be such as to prevent
continued safe flight of the airplane.
Proposed section 25.1709(c) contains the wire-related requirements of

the current 25.1353(b). These requirements have been expanded to add
that not only wires and cable carrying heavy current are covered, but their
associated EWIS components are covered as well. The proposal prescribes
that any required physical separation must be achieved either by separation
distance or by barrier or other means shown to be at least equivalent to an
adequate separation distance.
1
The JAA is the Joint Aviation Authority of Europe and the JAR is its Joint Aviation
Requirements, the equivalent of our Federal Aviation Regulations. In the time since these
proposals were developed, in 2003, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was formed.
EASA is now the principal aviation regulatory agency in Europe, and we intend to continue to
work with them to ensure our proposal is also harmonized with its Certification Specifications
(CS). But since the harmonization efforts involved in developing this proposal occurred before
EASA was formed, it was the JAA that was involved with them. So while the JAR and CS are
essentially equivalent, and in the future we will be focusing on the CS, it is the JAR that will be
referred to in the historical background discussions in this proposal.
B-17
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Proposed section 25.1709(d) contains wire-related requirements of

existing 25.1351(b)(1) and (b)(2) and would introduce additional
requirements. To show compliance with 25.1709(d), EWIS components
associated with the generating system must be considered with the same
degree of attention as other components of the system, such as the electrical
generators. The proposal prescribes that any required physical separation
must be achieved either by separation distance or by a barrier or other means
shown to be at least equivalent to an adequate separation distance. Paragraph
(d)(1) would introduce a requirement to prohibit the airplanes independent
electrical power sources from sharing a common ground terminating
location. Paragraph (d)(2) would prohibit the airplanes static grounds from
sharing a common ground terminating location with any of the airplanes
independent electrical power sources. These two new requirements would
help to ensure the independence of separate electrical power sources and to
prevent introduction of unwanted interference into airplane electrical power
systems from other airplane systems.
Paragraphs (e), (f), (g), and (h) of proposed 25.1709 contain EWIS-
related requirements from 25.1353(d)(3). These paragraphs contain
specific separation requirements for the airplanes fuel, hydraulic, oxygen,
and waste/water systems. They require that EWIS have adequate separation
from those systems except to the extent necessary to provide any required
electrical connection to them. These paragraphs require that EWIS be
designed and installed with adequate separation so a failure of an EWIS
component will not create a hazardous condition and any leakage from those
systems (i.e., fuel, hydraulic, oxygen, waste/water) onto EWIS components
will not create a hazardous condition. The proposed requirements recognize
the potential catastrophic hazard that could occur should an arcing fault
ignite a flammable fluid like fuel or hydraulic fluid. An arcing fault has the
potential to puncture a line associated with those systems if adequate
separation is not maintained. If there is leakage from one of those systems
and an arcing event occurs, fire or explosion could result. Similarly, leakage
from the water/waste system can cause damage to EWIS components and
adversely affect their integrity. An EWIS arcing event that punctures a water
or waste line could also introduce fluids into other airplane systems and
create a hazardous condition.
To prevent chafing, jamming, or other types of interference or other

failures that may lead to loss of control of the airplane, EWIS in general and
wiring in particular must be physically separated from flight or other control
cables. Mechanical cables have the potential to cause chafing of electrical
wire if the two come into contact. This can occur either through vibration of
the EWIS and/or mechanical cable or because of cable movement in response
to a system command. A mechanical cable could also damage other EWIS
components, such as a wire bundle support, in a way that would cause failure
B-18
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Appendix B
of that component. Also, if not properly designed and installed, a wire
bundle or other EWIS component could interfere with movement of a
mechanical control cable by causing jamming or otherwise restricting the
cables movement. An arcing fault could damage or sever a control cable, or
a control cable failure could cause damage to EWIS if not adequately
separated. Therefore, proposed paragraph (i) would require an adequate
separation distance or barrier between EWIS and flight or other mechanical
control systems cables and their associated system components. It would
further require that failure of an EWIS component must not create a
hazardous condition and that the failure of any flight or other mechanical
control systems cables or systems components must not damage EWIS and
create a hazardous condition.
EWIS in general and wiring in particular must be routed away from high-
temperature equipment, hot air ducts, and hydraulic, fuel, water, and other
lines. There must be adequate separation distance in order to prevent damage
to the EWIS caused by extreme temperatures and so that an EWIS failure
will not damage the equipment, ducts, or lines. High temperatures can
deteriorate wire insulation and other parts of EWIS components, and if the
wire or component type is not carefully selected, this deterioration could lead
to wire or component failure. Similarly, should an arcing event occur, the
arc could penetrate a hot air duct or line and allow the release of high
pressure, high temperature air. Such a release could damage surrounding
components associated with various airplane systems and potentially lead to
a hazardous situation. Paragraph (j) would require that EWIS be designed
and installed with an adequate separation distance or barrier between the
EWIS components and heated equipment, hot air ducts, and lines.
The needed reliability of some airplane systems, such as an autoland

system, requires that independent, redundant systems be used. Loss of one
channel of a redundant system would not decrease the ability to continue safe
operation. However, if both channels of a two-channel system were lost
because of a common failure, the results could be catastrophic. To maintain
the independence of redundant systems and equipment so that safety
functions required for safe operation are maintained, adequate separation and
electrical isolation between these systems must be ensured. Paragraph (k)
would require that EWIS associated with any system that requires
redundancy to meet certification requirements be separated with an adequate
separation distance or barrier.
Paragraph (l) of proposed 25.1709 would require that EWIS be

designed and installed so they are adequately separated from aircraft
structure and protected from sharp edges and corners. The purpose of this
proposal is to minimize the potential for abrasion/chafing, vibration damage,
and other types of mechanical damage. Such protection is necessary because
over time the insulation on a wire that is touching a rigid object, such as an
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
equipment support bracket, will fail and expose bare wire. This can
potentially lead to arcing that could destroy that wire and other wires in its
bundle. Depending on the amount of electrical energy being carried by the
failed wire, structural damage may also occur.
Section 25.1711 Component identification: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1711 would require applicants to identify EWIS

components using consistent methods that facilitate easy identification of the
component, its function, and its design limitations. For EWIS associated
with flight-essential functions, identification of the EWIS separation
requirement would also be required.
An important aspect of ensuring safe operation of airplanes is making

sure that EWIS components are properly identified. This is necessary so that
modification designers, maintenance personnel, and inspectors can easily
determine the function of the associated system, together with any associated
separation requirements and design limitations. Clear labeling of EWIS
components and easy-to-understand identification aids allow installers,
inspectors, and maintainers to readily ascertain that correct system
components are installed as designed, and allow modifiers to add systems
with due regard to the existing protection and separation requirements.
The current part 25 certification requirement for equipment identification

is 25.1301(b) and it is applicable to each item of installed equipment.
This rule is inadequate for EWIS because it does not provide the specific
requirements that have been determined necessary for identifying EWIS
components. Specific EWIS component identification needs to be done to
prevent modifiers from unintentionally introducing unsafe design or
installation features on previously certified airplanes when they install new
or modified systems. Component identification would also make those
performing maintenance and inspections more aware of what systems are
associated with specific EWIS in the areas undergoing maintenance or
inspection.
When the FAA first certifies an airplane type design, its systems are
designed and installed to ensure safe operation of the airplane. Systems
essential to that safe operation are often designed and installed to ensure
redundancy of the system function. They have two or more circuits, or
channels, that can perform the same function in case one of them
malfunctions. Separate circuits (channels) typically have their own sensors,
wiring, and equipment. This helps ensure that a common failure cannot
cause failure of the entire system.
B-20
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
An example of this is the autoland system on modern transport category
airplanes. The autoland system allows airplanes to land during adverse
weather conditions that would otherwise prevent landing with manual
techniques that rely on the flightcrews ability to see the runway. Typically
the autoland system has three channels that are physically separated and
electrically segregated, so if one channel fails, the airplane can safely
continue the autoland procedure. The failure of an autoland system at a
critical phase of flight can be catastrophic to the airplane and its passengers.
The integrity of an autoland systems design could be compromised by
systems installed after certification of the autoland system. One way to
prevent this is to clearly identify EWIS associated with the autoland in a way
that makes it easy to see that it is associated with a critical system. Such
identification would aid the designers and installers of the new system by
alerting them to the presence of the critical system and allow appropriate
design and installation decisions, preventing degradation of the safety of the
autoland system.
The reverse is also true. For example, suppose an in-flight entertainment

system is installed on an airplane and, after that installation, an autoland
system is to be installed. The designers and installers of the autoland system
would need to be able to identify EWIS associated with the IFE system so
they do not mix IFE system EWIS with the autoland system EWIS. The IFE
system is a passenger convenience item and its functionality is not important
to the continued safe operation of the airplane. When the zone containing the
autoland system EWIS is undergoing inspections or maintenance, easy
identification of the EWIS will alert inspection or maintenance personnel to
use extra caution in the area.
Proposed 25.1711(a) uses language that is similar to existing

25.1301(b) but is specifically applicable to EWIS components. The
proposal adds the word consistent to stress the need for consistency in
EWIS identification to avoid confusion and mistakes during airplane
manufacturing, modification, and maintenance. This means the FAA expects
airplane manufacturers to develop an EWIS identification method that
facilitates easy identification of the systems that any specific EWIS
component supports and use that identification method in a consistent
manner throughout the airplane. The consistent identification method must
be used for new type certifications and changes to those designs. Proposed
25.1711(e) would require that modifications to type designs use EWIS
identification methods that are consistent with the identification method of
the original type design. The proposed requirements of paragraph (e) are
discussed later in this document.
Paragraph (b) would impose additional requirements for identification

detail, when assessed in accordance with the proposed requirements of
25.1705, for EWIS components associated with:
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Systems required for safe flight and landing.

Systems required for egress.
Systems with potential to affect the flightcrews ability to cope
with adverse operating conditions.
Paragraph (c) would require that identifying markings required by

paragraphs (a) and (b) of the proposal remain legible throughout the design
life of the component. As most wire installations are designed to remain on
the airplane throughout the airplanes service life, this means the
identification marks must be able to be read to support the intended purpose
of the markings for the life of the airplane. The method of marking must
take into account the environment in which the EWIS component will be
installed.
Paragraph (d) would require that the means used to identify an EWIS
component does not have an adverse effect on the components performance
throughout its design life. Certain wire marking methods have the potential
to damage the wires insulation. Hot-stamp marking is one such method.
According to SAE (Society of Automotive Engineers) aerospace information
report AIR5575, Hot Stamp Wire Marking Concerns for Aerospace Vehicle
Applications, a copy of which is included in the docket, the hot-stamp
marking method is not well suited for todays generation of aircraft wiring.
As noted in the SAE document, wire insulation has become markedly thinner
over the years since the procedure was first introduced in the 1940s. Because
of this, problems have arisen over wire damage from excessive penetration
by the hot-stamp process. The document further states: The frequent need
for adjustments in temperature, pressure, and swell time inherent to
achieving legible hot stamp wire marking provides many opportunities for
error. The controls, methods, and guidance necessary to achieve satisfactory
performance with hot stamp marking are often not made available to
operators in smaller wire shops.
The FAA concurs with this assessment. If damage to the insulation

occurs during the marking process, it may fail later in service after it has
been exposed to the sometimes-harsh environmental conditions of aircraft
use. While the proposed regulation does not prohibit use of hot-stamp
marking, its use is not encouraged. To comply with this paragraph, if the hot
stamp marking process is used, the guidelines of SAE recommended practice
ARP5369, Guidelines for Wire Identification Marking Using the Hot Stamp
Process or equivalent must be followed. A copy of this document is in the
docket.
In some cases it may not be practicable to mark an EWIS component

directly, because of component size or identification requirements. In this
case other methods of identification such as a label or sleeve must be used.
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Paragraph (e) would require that EWIS modifications to the type design
take into consideration the identification scheme of the original type design.
This is to ensure that the consistency required by proposed 25.1711(a) is
maintained when a modification is installed. The intent of this requirement is
to provide continuity in the methods used for EWIS identification on a
particular model. It is not the intent of the requirement to impose on the
modifier the exact wire identification methods of the airplane manufacturer.
However, since the purpose of proposed 25.1711 is to make it easy to
identify those airplane systems essential to the safe operation of the airplane,
it is in the best interest of safety that designers of any modifications to the
original design consider the approved type design identification methods.
For example it would not be appropriate for a modifier to use purple wire to
identify a specific flight critical system when the approved type design used
the color green, especially if the type design already uses purple wire to
identify non-essential systems. Such a scheme could cause confusion and
lead future modifiers or maintainers to believe that the routing of purple
wires with green wires is acceptable. This is just an example and should not
be construed to say that flight critical systems should use green wire or non-
essential systems purple wire. The regulation does not prescribe a particular
method for identification, but is meant to ensure that the consistency of the
identification method required by paragraph (a) is maintained throughout the
life of the airplane.
Section 25.1713 Fire protection: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1713 would require that EWIS components meet the

applicable fire and smoke protection requirements of 25.831(c). It would
further require that EWIS located in designated fire zones be at least fire
resistant. Insulation on electrical wires and cables would also be required to
be self-extinguishing when tested in accordance with the applicable portions
of Appendix F, Part I, of part 25.
During an emergency situation it is important that airplane systems

needed by the flightcrew to effectively deal with the emergency be operative.
To help ensure this, 25.869 requires that electrical systems components
meet certain flammability requirements and be designed and installed to
minimize probability of ignition of flammable fluids and vapors. Currently,
25.869(a) is applicable to wiring. The proposal is to move the
requirements of 25.869(a) related to protection of wiring from fire and put
them into the proposed 25.1713. This will allow easy identification of the
requirements for fire protection of EWIS, because they will be found in the
proposed new subpart H, which is dedicated to EWIS regulations.
Requirements of 25.869 dealing with isolation from flammable fluid lines
have been moved to the new 25.1709 and requirements for allowance for
B-23
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
deformation and stretching have been moved to 25.1703. As a result, we
are amending 25.869 to accommodate this change.
Section 25.1717 Electrical bonding and protection against static electricity:

EWIS.
Proposed 25.1717(a) would require that EWIS used for electrical

bonding and protection against static electricity meet the requirements of
25.899. Proposed 25.1717(b) would require that EWIS components used
for any electrical bonding purposes (not just that used for protection against
static electricity) provide an adequate electrical return path under both
normal and fault conditions.
The buildup and subsequent discharge of static electricity has the

potential to create hazardous conditions for both airplane systems and people.
Static electricity can injure people. It can also interfere with installed
electrical/electronic equipment and cause ignition of flammable vapors. We
are proposing to adopt 25.899 (as discussed in the section headed
Electrical System Harmonization Rules) to highlight the importance of
considering electrical bonding and static electricity as a full aircraft
requirement and to prevent hazardous effects of static electricity. The proper
design and installation of EWIS components used to accomplish such
protection is critical to ensure the hazardous effects of static discharge are
minimized. For example, the cross-sectional area of bonding paths used for
primary bonding paths is important in ensuring that a low electrical
impedance is obtained, as is the method in which the bonding connection is
made to the airplane structure. Thus, EWIS must be fully considered when
designing and installing protection from the adverse effects of static
electricity. The proposed 25.1717 highlights the importance EWIS has in
providing this protection and requires that EWIS components meet the same
requirements as other components used to show compliance with 25.899.
The ARAC Electrical Systems Harmonization Working Group

recommended the adoption of JAR 25.1353(e) as paragraph (e) of 25.1353.
The JAR requires that electrical bonding provide an adequate electrical
return path under both normal and fault conditions on airplanes with
grounded electrical systems. ATSRAC recommended that the requirements
of JAR 25.1353(e) be moved in their entirety to the proposed subpart H. We
agree with that recommendation and, instead of adopting JAR 25.1353(e) as
25.1353(e), we are proposing to adopt it as 25.1717(b).
B-24
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Section 25.1719 Systems and functions: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1719 would require that EWIS components be considered

in showing compliance with the certification requirements of specific
airplane systems. Many of the current part 25 sections contain system
specific requirements that apply to EWIS in an indirect way. The EWIS
associated with such systems play an integral role in ensuring the safe
operation of the system and of the airplane. In general, the EWIS associated
with any airplane system needs to be considered an integral part of that
system and must be given the same design and installation attention as the
rest of the system. The proposed 25.1719(a) contains this general
requirement, while paragraph (b) of the proposal identifies specific sections
of part 25 that are associated with airplane systems where wire and its
associated components play an important part in ensuring safety. These
specific part 25 sections contain requirements that do not lend themselves to
creating a separate EWIS-based Subpart H requirement.
It is the intent of the proposed 25.1719 to require that EWIS be

designed and installed to support systems required for type certification or by
operating rules, including those systems addressed by the regulations
specifically listed in paragraph (b) of the proposal. They must be considered
part of those systems, and be given the same design and installation
considerations as the rest of the system. While paragraphs (a) and (b) may
seem redundant, we have listed specific sections in (b) to ensure that
applicants are aware of the need to give EWIS associated with those systems
the same consideration as the other components of those systems. We
consider the general requirements of (a) necessary because there may be
other regulations where EWIS must be considered in showing compliance
with those regulations. It also ensures that EWIS is given full consideration
for any system-related regulation adopted in the future.
Section 25.1721 Circuit protective devices: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1721 would require that electrical wires and cable be

compatible with the circuit protective devices required by 25.1357.
We recently adopted 25.1353(d)(1) based on recommendations of

ARAC, as part of the effort to harmonize the requirements of JAA JAR 25
and FAA 14 CFR part 25. Paragraph (d)(1) requires that electrical cables be
compatible with the circuit protection devices required by 25.1357, so that
a fire or smoke hazard cannot be created under temporary or continuous fault
conditions. That requirement would be moved from 25.1353(d)(1) into the
proposed 25.1721 in its entirety. The proposal also adds the word wire
to the requirement. This is because this requirement applies to all sizes of
wire, not just heavy-current-carrying cables.
B-25
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Section 25.1723 Instruments using a power supply: EWIS.
The proposed 25.1723 would require that EWIS components associated

with flight and navigation instruments using a power supply be designed and
installed so that compliance with 25.1331 is ensured.
Section 25.1331 requires that flight and navigation instruments using a

power supply must, in the event of the failure of one power source, be
supplied by another power source. No change is proposed to the wording of
that section.
Section 25.1725 Accessibility provisions: EWIS.
The proposed new 25.1725 would require that means be provided to

allow for inspection of EWIS and replacement of their components as
necessary for continued airworthiness.
Currently, 25.611 requires that means must be provided to allow

inspection, replacement of parts, adjustment, and lubrication as necessary for
principal structural elements and control systems. While wiring systems are
not specifically referred to in the existing rule, the accessibility concept is
easily applied to EWIS. Many of the wiring systems on airplanes today are
very difficult to access and inspect. We now have an increased awareness of
the importance of inspecting wiring for separation and for contamination and
damage in order to ensure proper functioning, maintenance, and safety. We
also know that when adjacent structures must be removed to allow access to
wire installations, new possibilities for contamination, chafing, and other
types of damage are introduced. Section 25.611 would be amended to
specify that EWIS must meet the accessibility requirements of 25.1725.
The intent of proposed 25.1725 is to ensure that EWIS components be

installed so that inspections, tests, repairs, and replacements can be
undertaken, and that these can be carried out with a minimum of aircraft
disassembly. This proposal would facilitate the proposed implementation of
the new wiring inspection programs developed under proposed 25.1739
and the operating rules contained in this proposal.
Section 25.1727 Protection of EWIS.
Proposed 25.1727 would require that cargo or baggage compartments

not contain any EWIS whose failure would adversely affect safe operation.
B-26
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
It would also require that all EWIS be protected from damage by movement
of people.
Section 25.855(e) requires that no cargo or baggage compartments may

contain any controls, wiring, lines, equipment, or accessories whose damage
or failure would affect safe operation of the airplane unless they are protected
so that they cannot be damaged by movement of cargo in the compartment
and their breakage or failure will not create a fire hazard. The proposed
regulations would remove the word wiring from the current language and
move those requirements, as they apply to EWIS, to the proposed
25.1727(a). Proposed 25.855(j) would mandate that cargo or baggage
compartment EWIS components must meet the requirements of 25.1727(a).
The proposed 25.1727(b) and (c) are new EWIS requirements that
currently dont exist in part 25. Paragraph (b) would require that EWIS be
designed so that damage and risk of damage from movement of people in the
airplane during all phases of flight, maintenance, and service, be minimized.
Paragraph (c) would require designers to minimize damage and risk of
damage to EWIS by items carried onto the airplane by passengers, cabin
crew, and flightcrew. These two new requirements are justified by service
experience that shows wires can easily be damaged by movement of people
on the airplane and by items carried on board.
Paragraph (b) would require that EWIS designers and installers consider
such things as the routing of wires that could be damaged by personnel in the
cargo compartments. For example, EWIS would have to be designed and
installed in ways that prevent their use as hand- or footholds as much as
practicable. It would further require that EWIS be protected from damage by
people in the cabin or flight deck. More and more wiring is being routed to
passenger seats to support increasingly complex passenger convenience
features. If an airplane is equipped with seat-back monitors, for example, the
electronic components necessary to support the monitor are typically
mounted underneath the seat. This requires wire routing to the seats, usually
through the seat tracks (structural channels used to fasten the seats to the
floor) or from the side wall directly next to the seat. Many wires mounted on
or under the seats have been damaged by passengers. In one case an airplane
was operated with wires lying on the floor in the area where a passenger
would put his feet. The wires had become dislodged from the seat track.
This not only exposed the wires to damage but also posed a potential
electrical shock risk to the passenger. In other cases, wires have been routed
to the seats through holes cut into the cabin side wall, exposing them to
damage from both passengers and carry-on items stored beneath the seat or
between the side wall and seat.
B-27
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Section 25.1729 Flammable fluid fire protection: EWIS.
The proposed 25.1729 would require that EWIS components be

considered a potential ignition source in each area where flammable fluid or
vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid system and must meet the
requirements of 25.863.
The current 25.863 mandates that, in each area where flammable fluids
or vapors might escape by leakage of a fluid system, there must be means to
minimize the probability of ignition, and resultant hazards if ignition does
occur. Possible ignition sources, including overheating of equipment,
malfunctioning of protective devices, and electrical faults must be considered
in showing compliance with this rule. Many types of electrical faults could
cause ignition. Among them are sparks emitting from an avionics
component, overheated electrical component surfaces, and arcing from
electrical wiring. The wording of 25.863 would not change.
Section 25.1731 Powerplants: EWIS.
The proposed 25.1731 specifies that EWIS associated with any

powerplant must be designed and installed so that failure of an EWIS
component will not prevent continued safe operation of the remaining
powerplants or require immediate action by any crewmember for continued
safe operation, in accordance with 25.903(b). It would also mandate that
design precautions be taken to minimize hazards to the airplane because of
EWIS damage in the event of a powerplant rotor failure or a fire originating
in the powerplant that burns through the powerplant case, in accordance with
25.903(d)(1). The purpose of this section is to ensure proper consideration
of EWIS in evaluating powerplant installation designs.
The current 25.903(b) requires, among other things, that powerplants

be arranged and isolated from each other to allow operation, in at least one
configuration, so that failure or malfunction of any engine, or of any system
that can affect the engine, will not prevent continued safe operation of the
remaining engines or require immediate action by any crewmember for
continued safe operation. Section 25.901(d)(1) requires that design
precautions be taken to minimize hazards to the airplane in the event of an
engine rotor failure or a fire originating within the engine that burns through
the engine case.
B-28
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Section 25.1733 Flammable fluid shutoff means: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1733 would require that EWIS associated with each

flammable fluid shutoff means and control be fireproof (as defined in
1.1) or located and protected so that any fire in a fire zone will not affect
operation of the flammable fluid shutoff means, in accordance with
25.1189.
Section 25.1189 requires that each engine installation and fire zone have
a means to shut off or otherwise prevent hazardous quantities of fuel, oil,
deicer, and other flammable fluids from flowing into or through any
designated fire zone. No change is proposed for that section.
Section 25.1735 Fire detector systems, general: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1735 would require that EWIS associated with any

installed fire protection system be considered in showing compliance with
the applicable requirements for that particular system. This would be a new
requirement. It does not currently exist in part 25. The current part 25
regulations contain fire detection system requirements for powerplants
( 25.1203), lavatories ( 25.854), and cargo compartments ( 25.855,
25.857 and 25.858). Each fire detection system requires electrical wire.
Failure of this wire could lead to inability of the detection system to function
properly. The wire and other associated EWIS components must be
considered an integral part of the fire detection system and meet the
requirements of the applicable regulation. The proposal would apply to all
required fire protection systems with the exception of powerplants and
APUs. Requirements for EWIS associated with powerplant and APU fire
detection systems are contained in proposed 25.1737.
Section 25.1737 Powerplant and APU fire detector system: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1737 would require that EWIS that are part of a fire or
overheat detector system located in a fire zone be at least fire-resistant, as
defined in 1.1. It would also require that EWIS components of any fire or
overheat detector system for any fire zone may not pass through another fire
zone unless:
they are protected against the possibility of false warning caused

by fire in the zone through which they pass, or
each zone involved is simultaneously protected by the same
detector or extinguishing system.
B-29
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
In addition, the proposal would require that EWIS that are part of a fire or
overheat detector system in a fire zone meet the requirements of 25.1203.
The current 25.1203 requires approved, quick acting fire or overheat

detectors in each designated fire zone, and in the combustion, turbine, and
tailpipe sections of turbine engine installations, to provide prompt indication
of fire in those zones. The present rule does contain requirements for wire
used in the fire detection systems. But to increase visibility of the related
EWIS requirements and to gather them into one central place, a new rule
devoted specifically to fire detector system EWIS is proposed.
Existing 25.1203 would be amended to reference the new 25.1737,

thus effectively closing the loop on requirements.
Section 25.1739 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS.
Proposed 25.1739 would require that applicants prepare EWIS ICA in

accordance with the requirements of Appendix H to part 25. The proposed
EWIS ICA requirements are discussed in the next section of this document.
Appendix H to Part 25 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
As previously noted, improper maintenance, repair, and modifications

often hasten the aging of EWIS. To properly maintain, repair, and modify
airplane EWIS, certain information must be available to the designer,
modifier, and installer. This information should be part of the ICA as
required by current 25.1529 and the proposed 25.1739.
This proposal would amend Appendix H by adding a new section, H25.5,

to require TC applicants to develop maintenance information for EWIS as
part of the ICA as a requirement for getting a design approval. The proposed
rule would also apply to applicants for design change approvals
(supplemental TCs and amended TCs).
The proposal would require applicants for TCs to prepare ICA for EWIS
that are approved by the FAA Oversight Office, in the form of a document
that is easily recognizable as an EWIS ICA. To prepare these instructions,
they must use an EZAP such as the one described in AC 25-27
Development of Transport Category Airplane Electrical Wiring
Interconnection Systems Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Using an
Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure to perform a review of their
representative airplane covering all areas, including the flightdeck (also
known as the cockpit), electrical power center, fuel tank wiring and
powerfeeder cables, as well as the engine. Applicants for design change
B-30
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
approvals would have to perform a similar review for their proposed design
changes.
A zonal analysis procedure is an assessment of the structures and systems

within each physical zone of the airplane. It is used to develop an inspection
program to assess the general condition and security of attachment of all
system components and structures items contained in the zone, using general
visual inspections (GVI). An enhanced zonal analysis procedure (EZAP) is
an enhanced version of the zonal analysis procedure. It focuses on EWIS
components. An EZAP-generated inspection program might call for the use
of stand-alone GVI and detailed inspections (DET). A stand-alone GVI is
one that is performed separately from the regularly scheduled GVI (typically
more frequently) and is focused on a particular area or component. In this
case, the focus would be wiring. So while the zonal analysis procedure
would result in a regularly scheduled GVI for the entire zone, in which each
of its systems and structures are inspected at the same time, the EZAP could
result in additional GVIs or DETs for the EWIS in that zone, which occur
more frequently. These inspection techniques are discussed later in this
section.
An EZAP identifies the physical and environmental conditions contained

in each zone of an airplane, analyzes their effects on electrical wiring, and
assesses the possibilities for smoke and fire. From such an analysis,
maintenance tasks can be developed to prevent ignition sources and to
minimize the possibilities for combustion by minimizing the accumulation of
combustible materials. Such a procedure would involve dividing the airplane
into physical areas, or zones, including actual physical boundaries such as
wing spars, bulkheads, and cabin floor, and access provisions for the zone,
and identifying which of those zones contain EWIS components. For those
zones with EWIS components, characteristics and components of all systems
installed in the zone would be listed. The EWIS in the zone would be
described, including information on the full range of power levels carried in
the zone. And the presence or possibilities for ignition sources or
accumulation of combustibles would be noted.
Combustibles are any materials that could cause a fire to be sustained in

the event of an ignition source. Examples of combustible materials would be
dust or lint accumulation, contaminated insulation blankets, and fuel or other
combustible liquids or vapors. Wire contaminants are foreign materials that
are likely to cause degradation of wiring. Wire contaminants can also be
combustibles. Some commonly used airplane liquids, like engine oils,
hydraulic fluids, and corrosion prevention compounds, might be readily
combustible, but only in vapor or mist form. In that case, an assessment
must be made of conditions that could exist within the zone that would
convert the liquid to that form. Combustibles appearing as a result of any
single failure must be considered. An example would be leaks from
B-31
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
connection sites of unshrouded pipes. For the purposes of this new
requirement, the term combustible does not refer to material that will burn
when subjected to a continuous source of heat as occurs when a fire
develops. Combustibles, as used here, will sustain a fire without a
continuous ignition source.
An EZAP must address:
Ventilation conditions in the zone and the density of the installations

that would affect the presence and build-up of combustibles and the
possibilities for combustion. Avionics and instruments located in the
flightdeck and equipment bays, which generate heat and have
relatively tightly packed installations, require cooling air flow. The
air blown into the area for that cooling tends to deposit dust and lint
on the equipment and EWIS components.
Liquid contamination on wiring. Most synthetic oils and hydraulic

fluids, while they might not be combustibles by themselves, could be
an aggravating factor for accumulation of dust or lint. This
accumulation could then present fuel for fire. Moisture on wiring
may increase the probability of arcing from small breaches in the
insulation, which could cause a fire. Moisture on wires that contain
insulation breaches can also lead to arc tracking. As discussed
previously, arc tracking is a phenomenon in which an electrical arc
forms a conductive carbon path across an insulating surface. The
carbon path then provides a short circuit path through which current
can flow. Short circuit current flow from arc tracking can lead to loss
of multiple airplane systems, structural damage, and fire.
EWIS in close proximity to both primary and back-up hydraulic,

mechanical, or electrical flight controls.
The type of wiring discrepancies that must be addressed if they are

identified by general visual or detailed inspections. A listing of
typical wiring discrepancies that should be detectable during EZAP-
derived EWIS inspections is given in AC 25-27 Development of
Transport Category Airplane Electrical Wiring Interconnection
Systems Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Using an Enhanced
Zonal Analysis Procedure"
Proper cleaning methods for EWIS components.
Once information about such contaminants and combustibles within an

airplane zone is collected, each identified possibility for combustion would
then be addressed to determine whether a specific task could be performed to
reduce that possibility. An example of a specific task to reduce build-up of
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
combustibles on EWIS components is the use of temporary protective covers
(such as plastic sheeting) over EWIS components in a zone where corrosion
prevention fluids are being used. This would minimize the amount of fluid
contamination of the EWIS components. Preventing fluid contamination
reduces the probability of other contaminants, like dust and dirt,
accumulating on the EWIS components. If no task can be developed to
prevent accumulation of combustibles in a zone, such as the dust blown
through the air by cooler fans, then tasks must be developed to minimize
their buildup, such as scheduled cleaning.
Developing an ICA to define such tasks would include assessing whether

particular methods of cleaning would actually damage the EWIS
components. Although regular cleaning to prevent potential combustible
build-up would be the most obvious task for an EWIS ICA, other procedures
might also be called for. A detailed inspection of a hydraulic pipe might be
appropriate, for instance, if high-pressure mist from a pinhole caused by
corrosion could accumulate on a wire bundle in a low ventilation area,
creating a possibility for electrical arcing.
Proximity of EWIS to both primary and back-up hydraulic, mechanical,

or electrical flight controls within a zone would affect the criticality of
inspections needed, their level of detail, and their frequency. Even in the
absence of combustible material, wire arcing could adversely affect
continued safe flight and landing if hydraulic pipes, mechanical cables, or
wiring for fly-by-wire controls are routed close to other wiring.
The EZAP-generated ICA must be produced in the form of a single

document, easily recognizable as EWIS ICA for that specific airplane model.
The single document is relevant to the maintenance and inspection aspects of
the ICA, and not the standard wiring practices manual or electrical load
analysis, etc.
The ICA must define applicable and effective tasks, and the intervals for
performing them, to:
Minimize accumulation of combustible materials.
Detect wire contaminants.
Detect wiring discrepancies that may not otherwise be reliably

detected by inspections contained in existing maintenance programs.
As noted earlier, among the types of tasks to be developed from an EZAP are
general visual inspections (GVI) and detailed inspections (DET). A GVI is
defined as a visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation, or
assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or irregularity. This level of
B-33
12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
inspection is made from within touching distance of the inspected object
unless otherwise specified. It is made under normally available lighting
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or droplight and may
require removal or opening of access panels or doors. It may be necessary to
use a mirror to improve visual access to all exposed surfaces in the inspection
area. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain proximity to the
area being checked. It is expected that the area to be inspected is clean
enough to minimize the possibility that accumulated dirt, grease, or other
contaminants might hide unsatisfactory conditions that would otherwise be
obvious. It is also expected, as an outcome of the EZAP applied to EWIS,
that any cleaning considered necessary would be performed in accordance
with procedures that minimize the possibility of the cleaning process itself
introducing anomalies. The EZAP must identify guidelines to assist
personnel performing a GVI in identifying wiring discrepancies and in
assessing what effect such discrepancies, if found, could have on adjacent
systems, particularly if these include wiring. As discussed previously, a list
of typical wiring discrepancies that should be addressed is contained in AC
25-27 Development of Transport Category Airplane Electrical Wiring
Interconnection Systems Instructions for Continued Airworthiness Using an
Enhanced Zonal Analysis Procedure."
A DET is an intensive examination of a specific item, installation, or

assembly to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is
normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity
considered appropriate. Inspection aids, such as mirrors, magnifying lenses,
or other means, may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate access
procedures may be required. A DET can be more than just a visual
inspection. It may include tactile assessment to check a component or
assembly for tightness and security. Such an inspection may be needed to
ensure the continued integrity of installations such as bonding jumpers,
terminal connectors, etc.
A DET would be required when the developer of the EZAP determines

that a GVI is inadequate to reliably detect anomalies or degradation of EWIS
components. Any detected discrepancies must be corrected according to the
operators approved maintenance procedures. It is not intended that the
EZAP ICA identify how to correct detected discrepancies.
To prevent improper modification and repair of existing EWIS or the

improper installation of a new EWIS, modification designers and
modification personnel must know the applicable standard wiring practices,
EWIS identification requirements, and electrical load data for the airplane
undergoing modification. The proposed Appendix H 25.5 would also require
that the following information be included in ICA applicable to EWIS:
Standard wiring practices data.
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
Wire separation design guidelines.
Information to explain the airplanes EWIS identification

method required by the proposed 25.1711.
Electrical load data and instructions for updating that data. Such
information will help ensure that those modifying, repairing, or
installing new EWIS will not perform any action that will
adversely affect previously certified systems and unintentionally
introduce potential hazards.
Standard wiring practices are defined as standards developed by the

specific airplane manufacturer or industry-wide standards for the repair and
maintenance of EWIS. They include procedures and practices for the
installation, repair, and removal of EWIS components, including information
about wire splices, methods of bundle attachment, connectors and electrical
terminal connections, bonding, and grounding. Although a standard wiring
practices manual is not a design manual, and those designing a new EWIS
modification for a specific model airplane should not use it as such, it does
provide the designer with insight into the types of EWIS components used by
the TC holder and the procedures recommended by the manufacturer for
maintenance or repair that supports continued airworthiness of the
components.
EWIS separation guidelines are important for maintaining the safe

operation of the airplane. Maintenance and repair personnel need to be
aware of the type certificate holders separation requirements so they do not
compromise separation in previously certified systems. In fuel tank systems,
the separation of certain wires may be critical design configuration control
items and therefore qualify as an airworthiness limitation. Maintenance
personnel need to be aware of these guidelines and limitations because many
times wire bundles must be moved or removed to perform necessary
maintenance. They must be able to readily identify EWIS associated with
systems essential to the safe operation of the airplane.
Similarly, those who design and install new EWIS need to be aware of
separation requirements so they can use the same methods to develop the
required separation for the EWIS they are adding to the airplane. This would
help to ensure both that newly added EWIS is adequately separated from
other EWIS, airplane system components, and structure so they do not
damage the added EWIS, and that the addition of the new EWIS does not
invalidate separation for previously certified EWIS.
Electrical load data and the instructions for updating that data are
necessary to help ensure that future modifications or additions of equipment
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12/4/07 AC 25.1701-1
Appendix B
that consume electrical power do not exceed the generating capacity of the
onboard electrical generation and distribution system. The existing
25.1351(a)(1) mandates that the required generating capacity, and the
number and kinds of power sources, must be determined by an electrical load
analysis. Typically, after an airplane is delivered and enters service, it is
modified numerous times throughout its service life. Each addition or
deletion of an electrical-power-consuming system changes the electrical load
requirements. The only way to ensure that the capacity of the overall
generating and distribution system, as well as individual electrical buses, is
not exceeded is to have an up-to-date electrical load analysis. The best way
to ensure that an up-to-date electrical load analysis is maintained is for the
type certificate holder to include such data in the ICA provided with the
airplane when it is first delivered to a customer, along with recommended
practices for keeping it updated as electrical loads are deleted and added.
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What is the purpose of this advisory circular?

What is the purpose of this advisory circular?

What recommendations were made to address EWIS issues?

What recommendations were made to address EWIS issues?

U.S.

a. The guidance provided in this document is applicable to transport category airplane

3. HOW THIS INFORMATION WAS DERIVED.

b. The guidance in this AC is based on recommendations submitted to us by the

a. The guidance in this AC describes means of compliance with subpart H of part 25

c. The guidance in this AC is organized by subpart H section.

25.1701 Definition ........................................................................................ 3

Appendix A Related Regulations and Documents

(b) Section 25.1701(a) defines EWIS as any wire, wiring device, or

(a) Section 25.1701(a)(14) says that EWIS components located inside

1 Electrical equipment or avionics that are qualified to environmental

b. 25.1703 FUNCTION AND INSTALLATION: EWIS. Section 25.1703 requires

(2) 25.1703(a)(2). This section requires that EWIS components be installed

(6) 25.1703(c). This section contains the requirement formerly located

(8) EWIS component selection.

(a) Expected service life. Expected service life should be considered in

(b) Qualified components. EWIS components should be qualified for

applicable manual or approved substitutes should be used for the maintenance,

(c) Mechanical strength. EWIS components should have sufficient

2 Wires connected to movable or shock-mounted equipment should have

3 Wiring at terminal lugs or connectors should have sufficient slack to

4 In order to prevent mechanical damage, wires should be supported by

(d) Minimum bend radius. To avoid damage to wire insulation, the

For wiring groups, bundles, or harnesses, and single wires and

1 Wire bundles should be routed in accessible areas that are protected

2 Wiring should be clamped so that contact with equipment and structure

3 As far as practicable, wiring should be routed away from high-

4 Wiring routed across hinged panels should be routed and clamped so

(h) Conduits. Conduits should be designed and manufactured so that potential

1 Non-metallic conduit. Insulating tubing (or sleeving) is sometimes

2 Metallic conduit. The ends of metallic conduits should be flared and

1 Additional scrutiny should be given to any use of components with

2 Environment-resistant connectors should be used in applications that

4 When electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interference

(j) Splice selection. Environmentally sealed splices should be used in

1 Splices in pressurized areas. In pressurized areas, pre-insulated

2 Mechanically protected splices. Mechanical splices give

3 Aluminum wire splice. Splices

(9) Wire selection.

(a) Installation environment.

1 Careful attention should be applied when deciding on the type of wire

2 When considering the acceptability of wire, you should refer to the

3 Wires in such systems as fire detection, fire extinguishing, fuel shutoff,

(b) Wire insulation selection. Wire insulation type should be chosen

(c) Mechanical strength of wire. Wires should be sufficiently robust to

(d) Mixing of different wire insulation types. Different wire types

4 Particular attention should be given to the mechanical strength and

NOTE: Additional guidance for

(g) Wire temperature rating. Selection of a temperature rating for wire

1 Wires have a specified maximum continuous operating temperature. For

2 In general, it is undesirable to contribute more than 40oC rise to the

3 Other factors to be considered are altitude de-rating, bundle size de-

4 Particular note should be taken of the specified voltage of any wire

(h) EWIS components in moisture areas.