3rd DU Mock Indian Parliament

BACKGROUND GUIDE
-CRISIS COMMITTEE-

AGENDA - ATTACK BY ISIS ON INDIA

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 Letter from the Moderators
Respected Delegates,

At the outset the Executive Board wishes you Luck. It is our utmost pleasure to invite you all to the

3rd DUMIP-2016. The reason why this agenda was chosen by the Executive Board was that in the

light of the events happening in the World there may be a possibility when such event may actually

happen in India. We therefore thought of taking up this crucial issue for discussion. In this

Background Guide we have tried our best to include every aspect of the agenda. You all are requested

to go through it and research further and come fully prepared. We expect a healthy and a sensible

debate considering the seriousness of the concern. Given the nature of the committee, it is imperative

that members are extremely solution-oriented in their responses. At the same point of time, it is

important to understand that foresightedness is essential. Solutions that do not fit into long-term plans

are often solutions that do not work. Therefore, it is important to take a holistic view of the situation

and decide for the country, what is best for it in long-term. Brace yourselves up for a committee that

will be fast-paced, and will challenge you to think on your feet, again and again.

Mandate of the Committee:

The delegates have to be very well researched with their portfolios and also come prepared with the

suggestion which shall be put up before the committee and discussed and based on which the Prime

Minister with the advice of the National Security advisor and in Consultation of IB Chief shall take

the final decision.

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We will also be providing you with individual handbooks on portfolios as to what we expect from

you in the committee and what your role is. Together, we will protect the unity and integrity of our

motherland- that is, Bharat.

Jai Hind

In Case of any query or doubt feel free to contact us.

With Regards,

Anuj Sinha Harsh Jaitak Vedansh Sharma

Prime Minister of India National Security Advisor IB Chief

Ph. 9304690122,963490589 Ph. 9810513431 Ph. 9537365771

Email:anuj17apr@gmail.com Email:hjaitak63@gmail.com Email: ved.mps@gmail.com

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 History of ISIS
In order to understand the dynamics of the conflicts between ISIS and their enemies, it is important to

first understand how ISIS came to existence, and what factors enabled it to rise to power. In 2004, Abu

Musab al Zarqawi and his band of Salafi jihadist militants pledged loyalty to Osama bin Laden. This

act formally established al-Qaedas Iraqi franchise, which would later be referred to as AQI, or al-

Qaeda in Iraq. AQI operated primarily as a terrorist and insurgent organization, which mainly targeted

coalition military personnel, and the Iraqi Shia population.

In an effort to unify the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, Zarqawi and the AQI implemented the Mujahideen

Shura Council, or MSC. The MSC operated as an umbrella organization, overseeing multiple Sunni

insurgency groups in Iraq. The creation of the MSC was one of the most vital organizational steps that

Zarqawi took towards the transition of AQI as an insurgency group, to the militant group today known

as ISIS, or the Islamic State (among multiple other titles). This coalition operated against U.S. forces

under the MSC title until 2006, when they formally disbanded or rebranded into the ISI, or the Islamic

State in Iraq.

In 2011, in an effort to rejuvenate their dwindling forces, newly appointed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-

Baghdadi sent fighters to Syria in order to take advantage of the civil war. By early 2012, ISIS had

locally grown an insurgency group known as Al-Nusrah Front, who were popular among those who

were at odds with Bashar al-Assad, Syrias leader. ISIS and their newly created group found

immediately success, seizing many towns and strategic locations throughout much of Syria. By 2014,

they had reestablished themselves, and were ready to forcefully reintroduce themselves to Iraq. They

quickly and masterfully seized the Iraqi towns of Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit, as well as Raqqah in

Syria. In summary, ISIS evolved from an insurgent group of guerilla fighters acting against U.S.

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occupation, to a powerful militant organization that boldly fought and won battles against Syrian and

Iraqi security forces. It masterfully took advantage of environmental situations, including the Syrian

Civil War and the marginalization and brutality against the Iraqi Sunni population.

Ideology and Strategy

There is one ideological difference that sets ISIS apart from all other terrorist or militant groups. This

difference lies in the scope of their goals. The supreme goal of ISIS is to establish a worldwide Islamic

Caliphate, a vast Islamist state, and their actions demonstrate that this goal is taken seriously. However,

ISIS also shares much in common with many Islamic terrorist groups. Like many groups before it, it is

rooted in Salafi and Wahabi Jihadism. While establishing an Islamic Caliphate could be considered

one of pinnacle goals of Salafi Jihad, no modern group has achieved the level of success that ISIS has.

Another ideological difference is the zealousness of ISIS, from the top down. Even al-Qaeda, once

known for their brutality, aggression, and sophistication, has cut ties with and denounced ISIS. Osama

bin Laden believed that an Islamic Caliphate should be established, but he did not believe that it would

be feasible during his lifetime. They have consistently demonstrated their brutality against all people,

regularly uploading videos of the executions and beheadings of innocents.

The size and scope of ISIS has required the execution of many strategies. As noted above, their

zealousness acts as one of their primary strategies. Their ability to strike fear into their opponents has

allowed them to win tactically disadvantaged battles, and conscript the men and boys in seized lands.

They are versatile fighters; they are able to successfully fight as guerillas, or fight openly at battalion

or regimental strength. Their conquests in Iraq and Syria have given them access to U.S. weapons and

vehicles that consistently tip the scales in their favor.

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Finally, recruitment and public-affairs are of utmost importance to ISIS leadership. Their constant

and widespread social media efforts have attracted not just extremists from around the world, but all

disenfranchised persons. The CIA has estimated that ISIS fighters have originated from at least 26

different countries, including even the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and

Australia.

The U.S. Response

Initially, Obamas leadership did not consider ISIS as a legitimate threat. In fact Obama himself

publically stated that he considered them to be the junior varsity team of al-Qaeda. As described

above, ISIS has far surpassed the scope and success that al-Qaeda has. If the Obama administration

truly felt this way, it should be considered a massive failure to assess the threat.

...Obamas solution to the danger was, as he put it, to ramp up support for those in the Syrian

opposition who offer the best alternative to terrorists. By June he was asking Congress for

$500 million to train and equip appropriately vetted members of the Syrian opposition. It is

here that there was a real intention to deceive, because, as Biden was to admit five months later,

the Syrian military opposition is dominated by ISIS and by Jabhat al-Nusra (Cockburn)

Today, however, president Obamas strategies to halt and destroy ISIS do have the potential to be

successful. U.S. leadership has properly identified that stopping ISIS will require political solutions,

including the building of a coalition of nations, especially those located in the Middle East. The

problem with this requirement, is that there are currently numerous relevant state and non-state actors

with a broad range of motivations. Saudi Arabia is known to be the primary source of money to Wahabi

Jihadists. Iran has fueled the flames by arming, training, and funding Shia militias. Turkey has been

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accused of funding ISIS by purchasing black market oil seized from Syria and Iraq, as well as allowing

the free flow of fighters across the border. Most importantly, competent and fair political leadership

must be secured in Iraq. The U.S. must rally support from all of these nations by properly applying the

use of incentives and sanctions.

Militarily, U.S. and allied air power have been engaged in a bombing campaign against ISIS targets in

both Syria and Iraq. Bombing can be successful against strategic targets, but less effective against

guerilla fighters. Recently, Obama has approved the use of special forces operating as advisors, on the

ground in Syria. This approach is dangerous, as many larger scale ground operations start with such

phases (Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam). Large scale operations in Syria would likely upset relations

with Russia, as a Syrian ally. Also, troops on the ground would likely cause an increased surge of

foreign fighters coming to fight for ISIS.

The ideal strategy would be to starve ISIS of recruits, money, and supplies. This can only be

accomplished with the cooperation of the aforementioned states (especially Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi

Arabia), and by the continued strikes against strategic targets. It is hard to envision a lasting military

solution to this complex political problem.

Critical Comment

In hindsight, blundering U.S. and Iraqi policies are largely at fault for the emergence and success of

ISIS. The first blunder was the U.S. appointment of Nouri al-Malaki as the Prime Minister of Iraq. His

marginalization and use of force against Sunni opponents directly fostered Sunni unrest. This reached

a flashpoint when Iraqi police and security forces opened fire on a camp full of Sunni protesters.

The U.S. did not have a sufficient plan in place for their withdrawal from Iraq. It did not take long for

the situation in Iraq to deteriorate following their departure, and the power/security vacuum created

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horrible scenarios. Furthermore, withdrawing from Iraq during a period of unsettled regional conflicts

was unwise. Cockburn touches on this in The Rise of the Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni

Revolution:

...It was the U.S., Europe, and their regional allies in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait,

and [UAE] that created conditions for the rise of ISIS. (Cockburn)

The solution to this problem will be a difficult one, perhaps the hardest since the war on terror began

in 2001. While ISIS continues to demand reactions from the west by executing terrorist attacks, such

as the attacks in Paris, they must be met with a measured response. Successfully removing this threat

will take a calculated global effort to not only forcefully eliminate Jihadists from Iraq and Syria, but to

instill lasting peace and moderation in the region. Only then can we hope to begin to curb the growing

dangers of Salafism and Wahabism.

Understanding Arab Spring

in the Middle East and North Africa. The term was defined as the challenging time of transition, anti-

governmental movements, and many political uprisings. The revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring

in late 2010 gave a strong impetus to long process of socio-economic and political transformations.

The trend occurred overtime and had provoked significant changes in the domestic enviroments of the

Arab League countries, from regime change to the rise of new actors, and to rearrangement of economic

and political elites.The revolutionary waves started with demonstrations and protests in the Arab world

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on 17 December 2010. During the Arab Spring four of the worlds most recalcitrant dictators Zine

el Abadine Bel Ali of Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi of Lybia, Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, and Hosni

Mubarak of Egypt fell after decades of power. They lost power as the result of unparalleled levels of

social protest. Some experts see the analogy between the Arab Spring and the revolutions of 1848

(known as the Springtime of Nations), and the Prague spring in 1968, some even call it the Arab

Awaking. The term first was used by the political journal Foreign Policy by Marc Lynch. (KEATING,

2011)Widely believed numerous factors have led to civil engagements, including issues like

dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations, political corruption, economic stagnations,

sharp rise of unemployment, extreme poverty and a number of demographic structural factors.

(Muasher, 2014)The international relations experts have different ideas about the causes of the Arab

Spring. The revolutions have shared same techniques. Protests have faced violations from the ruling

governments and included rallies, sit-ins, 1strikes and hundreds of arrests. Cascading democracy

movements began in Tunisia, inspired Egypt, and consequently animated other movements across the

region. Several autocrats have had to dismiss their cabinets. The protests have started with the uprising

of the ideological movement, which tried to popularize democratization; because of this some

international commentators think that it was the Fourth Wave of Democratization.(Philip N. Howard,

2013)Though, there is no clarified explanation of the fundamental causes of the Arab Spring. One

cannot argue that the demonstrations were the reflections of the political corruption or absolute

monarchy or dictatorship, because the massive collapses of the governments were not opposed until

the social medias rising role in the lives of the populations throughout the Arab League countries.

1(Mohammed el-Nawawy, 2013)

emphasized the role played by the social media, some of them defined the events as the social media

revolutions, but they only focused only on its organizational aspects and information spread. Others

opposed this perspective and argued that only a minority of people in the Arab countries had internet

access, they even suggested that social media may have represented an important tool for secret services

to identify and localize activists. The public debate arose and, by the time, gained more and more

aggressively. Early in the debate, there was no empirical research to support their assumptions, there

were two abruptly opposed views, either they maximized the role of media during the revolutions or

minimized it. But, undoubtedly, more accurate picture was needed. Social medias one of the most

popular platform FACEBOOK was the trigger, organizational representatives have planned their

demonstrations with this platform (Nine of the ten in Egypt and Tunisia have said that their role in the

process was organized with FACEBOOK). (Mohammed el-Nawawy, 2013)

One can not only argue that the main cause of the Arab Spring processes was the social media

influence, nor it can be argued that social media was sharply uninfluential. To produce the proper

analysis of the reality we must take in mind perspectives, the approaches of the International Relations

theories and use statistics to provide widely covered informations from Egypt to other Arab league

countries and its surroundings.

My goal is to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the role of social media in the Arab

Spring, considering three different International Relations theories (criticism of Realism; criticism of

Liberalism and proving that Constructivism is yet the best approach for studying this phenomenon).

More specifically it relies on literature on Middle Eastern political systems analyses and different

political experts analyses of the conflicts. It also refers to literature that examines the relationship

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between social media engagement and civic engagement. Building on this foundation, the essay

analyses the main attempts to evaluate the Impact of social media on the Arab Spring from the specific

perspectives. This essay will argue that Arab Spring was evoked by the change of the mode of

thinking among the populations of the Middle East and that social media platforms such as Facebook

and twitter played the roles of defiant factors before the conflict actually started. The second goal of

this essay is to prove that Constructivism is the best and the most complex approach for studying the

phenomenon.

Before the massive protesters have gathered to demonstrate their position they were not engaged in

civil or political processes so dramatically, they were united by the idea of democratization, which was

absolutely acknowledged, shared and pursued with help of social media. The autocrats such as Zine el

Abadine Bel Ali of Tunisia, Muammar Gaddafi of Lybia, Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, and Hosni

Mubarak of Egypt led Arab league countries. Economical, political and social processes definitely were

collapsing: Unprecedented increase in food prices, concentration of wealth in few hands, lack of space

for political participation, lack of freedom, dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations,

political corruption and unemployment and extreme poverty. These patters have occurred more and

more throughout the countries of Arab League, though people havent stood up to change the reality,

but one of the social medias platform served as trigger, FACEBOOK was used as the way of

communication, people reached other representatives of their countries with the help of this platform,

they shared information, ideas and were acknowledging the cruelties that was caused by the forms of

governing. (Philip N. Howard, 2013)The speed of communication through digital channels gave

activists unprecedented agility during street operations. They organized, debated, planned, and

broadcasted at a level of coordination that was unavailable, indeed unimaginable, in the past. The

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second edition of the Arab Social Media Report by the Dubai School of Government stated that;

Nearly 9 in 10 Egyptians and Tunisians surveyed in March said they were using Facebook to organize

protests or spread awareness about them. Social media its rise and its new activist uses have

played a critical role in mobilization, empowerment, shaping opinions and influencing change, the

report said. Just how integral its role was has been debated, it said, with some camps labeling them

the main instigators and others relegating them to mere tools. Regardless, it can be stated that many

of the calls to protest in the Arab region were initially made on Facebook, it said. As the initial

platform for these calls, it cannot be denied that they were factor in mobilizing movements. Facebook

usage swelled in the Arab region between January and April and sometimes more than doubled, the

report found. Overall, the number of users jumped by 30 per cent to 27.7m, compared with 18 per cent

growth during the same period in 2010. In the past year, the number of users has nearly doubled from

14.8m.Usage in Bahrain grew 15 per cent in the first three months of the year, compared with 6 per

cent over the same period last year. Egypt saw 29 per cent growth compared to 12 per cent last year.

Tunisia had 17 per cent growth compared to 10 per cent last year. The exception was Libya, where

usage fell by 76 per cent. One possible reason is that many there have fled amidst fierce fighting

between the regime and rebels. During the protests in Egypt and Tunisia, the vast majority of 200-plus

people surveyed over three weeks in March said they were getting their information from social media

sites (88 per cent in Egypt and 94 per cent in Tunisia). This outnumbered those who turned to non-

government local media (63 per cent in Egypt and 86 per cent in Tunisia) and to foreign media (57 per

cent in Egypt and 48 per cent in Tunisia). These statistics prove that FACEBOOK accompanied with

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twitter have played major role to initiate, 2organize, debate, pursue and share ideas to oppose the

government.(Government, 2011) (Bank, 2013)

The reasones by which the vast majority of the Realism scholars try to explain the phenomenon, that

the proccesses have erupted ,mainly covered the power rearrangement in the domestic politics.This

approach argues,that the main cause of the revolutions fulled up, because of rulers gaining more

and more (overdosed) power, they controlled economic field . Main causes for Realist scholars:

poverty. (Hoffman, 2012)With a population of 355 million and the vast majority of people living in

middle-income countries (Arab League) the absolute poverty was low with approximately four

percent of the population living under US$1.25 a day, but vulnerability was high and the benefits of

growth were not shared equally. Economic opportunities were monopolized by a privileged, few

which led to social frustration and widespread protests that culminated in numerous governments

being overthrown between 2010 and 2012. (World Bank, 2013). Hence, Realists are trying to justify

that people have dark side, which will surely occur by time. This approach cannot provide a

complex understanding of the process; just to take in mind the neopatrimonial state (Realists

conception that tries to suggest that governors should gain more power to successfully rule and

empower their countries) led by the so-called sultan. The neopatrimonial state is based on the

systematic expansion of the power of an authoritarian leader; sultan is able to control the fate of the

country for a prolonged period of time, at the expanse of formal institution.(ILKHAMOV, 2007). In

neopatrimonial power authoritarian leader takes control of administrative apparatus and gains marked

economic power through which the loyalty of the elite is earned by guaranteeing privileges and

2(Philip N. Howard, 2013)(Polin, 2013)

mans hand was the trigger, sultan couldnt satisfy all the elite representatives, and so the conflicts

would arise in domestic politics. And, lastly, sultan would become the prototype of

dictator/tyrant; so to say the dark side would come from the shadow. To sum up Realism states that

international system is governance, so the actors (sovereign governments) should help-themselves, at

democratic states. Specifically referring for this case DPT explains that lack of space for political

participation, lack of freedom, dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations and

political corruption have caused the conflict. Just like the Realism, Liberalism also is unable to

provide the complex understanding (they just create the GAP) of the Arab Spring, nor it can

predict the future. (DeLong-Bas, 2013)Both theories have interpreted their own beliefs, but we can

unite all of the causes/reasons mentioned above as determinants of the massive conflict, because they

represent the indicators which had a major influence on the populations reaction. And whats most

important both theories mentioned above do not acknowledge the role of media.(HARLOW, 2011)

The Arab Springs fundament was built with the help of social media. The very first step towards the

change or overthrowing leaders was taken with the help of Facebook, and with help of other media

platforms protesters gained enthusiasm to fight against cruelty for the sake of democracy. The Arab

Spring is also known as the Arab awakening, which refers to the civil engagement in politics,

people, mainly youth, stood up to change the system, this argument makes a strong belief that such

enthusiasm couldnt have been reached only by the reasons that Realism and Liberalism try to

explain the phenomenon. (ILKHAMOV, 2007) Hence, we can argue that the population gained self-

acknowledgement and started to fight with their mindset changed, for instance they no longer were

loyal to their leaders and had an incredible desire to fight for their rights. The key to understanding

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and explaining the Arab Spring in through the constructivist approach as it recognizes that ideas,

values and cultural norms are the fundamental elements in domestic and international political

decision-making. Many theories of International Relations fail to clarify and foresee events in the

international realm including the Arab Spring. This is because they assume that states have a certain

level of generality. However, Social Constructivism places greater value on norms, rules, identities

and other social dimensions. Social Constructivism, therefore teaches that the international realm is a

continuous course of construction and interaction, where structures are influenced by state identity as

well as identities being influenced by structures; these processes cannot be explained by the

application of generalizations. Social Constructivism vies the world as being under ongoing

construction, it is continually transforming according to ideas, values and cultural norms. It is

particularly the states elites and leaders that possess the capacity to fully transform and build national

identity this can explain the relationship and interaction of nations with one another and the

consideration of enemies and friends. In turn, constructivists believe that states are susceptible to

regular change, and that the nations values and norms can be socially reconstructed provided that

these changes are in harmony with their cultural values and norms. Social constructivism argues that

Arab Spring was inspired and determined by norms and values, which have been minimized and

even brought to destruction by the statesmen. Social Constructivism explains that the conflicts were

results of various violations of populations rights, which affected their social identities, due to this

social groups started to fight for democratization, which could save their cultural norms as well as

their values. During the events these social groups were trying to form new types of governing, the

type that would transform and raise their role throughout the country. In the process western media

also played a major role to inspire protesters and to give them courage to fight till the end. (Hoffman,

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2012)

To summarize, Social Constructivism provides an effective explanation of the Arab Spring as the

propagation of Western norms within the Middle East through globalization, the utilization of social

networking and media tools causing transformations and change. Social interaction is believed to be

the driving force in the occurrence of the Arab Spring.

What ISIS Wants?

contradictory goals, which it labels options. The first is to spread a totalitarian caliphate throughout

the region and, ultimately, the world. The second is to polarize Muslims against one another, to incite

internal divisions within the West, and to turn the West against Islam, with the ultimate goal of

goad[ing] the West into launching an all-out ground attack, thereby setting the scene for the battle

between Muslims and the crusaders prophesized to be held at Dabiq in Syria.

Helpfully, ISIS has described for us those steps it regards as necessary to achieve the second option.

As an ISIS authorwriting under the name of British hostage John Cantlie observes, option two

would likely require an operation overseas that is so destructive that America and its allies will have

no alternative but to send in an army. This would have to be something on the scale, if not bigger, than

9/11. Then again Im just guessing, American hawks may very well come to Dabiq on their own

without the Islamic State needing to blow up any dirty bombs in Manhattan. Mohammed al-Adnani,

official spokesperson of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has repeatedly urged Muslims to carry out

a jihad at home. The goal of attacking the West, ISIS says, is to eliminate the grayzone of moderate

Islam and to force Muslims living in the West to either join ISIS or apostatize and adopt the kufri

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religion. To date, the majority of these attacks have been carried out by self-starters, or lone wolves,

with little direction from central leadership. But it was only a matter of time before ISIS would attempt

to coordinate attacks outside its territory. Indeed, U.S. and European officials say that Abu Mohammed

al-Adnanis role is to now oversee ISIS-directed attacks outside of Iraq and Syria. Sophisticated attacks

outside ISIS-controlled territory require trained fighters, as evidenced in the November 2015 attack in

Paris. But such attacks are significantly easier to carry out with operational assistance of local

personnel. For ISIS, lending labor is less taxing when they can recruit from an existing pool of

disenfranchised Muslims. In examining ISIS recruitment, many of my colleagues have focused on

ISISs winners narrative and the carefully choreographed branding whereby ISIS advertisesand

attempts to createa MENU - utopian state. This line of argument suggests that ISISs defense of its

territory is critical to its ability to recruit Westerners. But I would suggest that ISIS attempts to create

a somewhat different narrativethe redemption of the oppressed. The narrative of victory most appeals

to those who feel they have lost something. And ISIS deliberately appeals to disenfranchised Muslims,

as well as to potential converts, around the world; to thoseas ISIS puts itdrowning in oceans of

disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people. To those

oppressed, ISIS promises the opportunity to remove the garments of dishonor, and shake off the dust

of humiliation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has gone and the dawn of honor has

emerged anew. ISIS proclaims that [t]he sun of jihad has risen. In the current issue of Dabiq, ISIS

refers to its followers as the brothers who have refused to live a life of humiliation. An essay in Dabiq

Issue 9 further underscores the promised reversal of fortunes. There, the author admonishes those who

cognate having sex with a slave with rape or prostitution and notes that taking slaves through war is

a great prophetic Sunnah [tradition] containing many divine wisdoms and religious benefits, regardless

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of whether the people are aware of this. The author gloats that ISIS has established a true caliphate,

with honor and pride for the Muslim and humiliation and degradation for the kafir. The victory ISIS

speaks of is the victory of the formerly oppressed. Civilizational humiliation at the hands of the West

is a central theme for jihadists. This narrative of humiliation reverberates among some Muslims, who

recognize that Islamic civilization was once the greatest on earth. That is no longer the case, and

jihadists blame the West. The leader of a Pakistani jihadi group once told me he founded his group

because he wanted to reclaim the golden period of Islam and "to recover what we lost. He lamented

that Muslims have been overpowered by the West. Our ego hurts. We are not able to live up to our

own standards for ourselves." Borrowing from the secular anti-colonialist Franz Fanon, jihadi

ideologues argue that violence is a way to cure the pernicious effects of centuries of humiliation, and a

cleansing force that frees an oppressed youth from his inferiority complex, despair and

inaction, and restores his self-respect. To be clear, ISIS is a populist organization. It is seeking to

seduce anyone and everyone who might be willing to join. One of the unique features of the group is

that it tailors its narrative to individual recruits. But the overarching victory narrative, in my view, is

meant to seduce those who feel the need to rise up against the oppressors. ISIS and the jihadi movement

are in some ways similar to the revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 70s, although its goals and

the values it represents are far different. Jihadis express their dissatisfaction with the status quo by

making war, not love. They are seduced by Thanatos rather than Eros. They love death as much as

you [in the West] love life, in Osama bin Ladens famous and often-paraphrased words. There are

many reasons why this narrative of humiliation and redemption resonates, sociopolitical among others.

According to the Arab Development Challenges Report, issued by the United Nations Development

Program (UNDP) in 2011, Arab countries show a lower level of human development over the last

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quarter century than would normally be expected based on GDP. That report concludes that adopting

a social contract of mutual accountability in which citizens play a more active role in societal affairs

and shedding rentier-based political economies is essential to improving Arab state economies and

governance. Furthermore, according to a study by the Carnegie Middle East Center, Arab youth are not

being adequately prepared to compete in a globalized society. And the Middle East Policy Council

nods that labor markets in many Arab states are incapable of producing enough jobs to sustain their

growing youth populations. Poor governance creates the conditions under which extremist groups to

thrive and are able to spread their message that the West is responsible for Arab plight. Weak or

authoritarian governments, extremist religious groups, poverty, rage, and alienation work in concert to

create segments of populations that are furiousand often rightly sothat the West supports the status

quo in Arab states. Most Muslim-majority states are ruled by non-democratic regimes. Only two

Muslim majority countriesSenegal and Tunisiaare classified as totally free in Freedom Houses

2015 Freedom in the World Report. The more democratic-leaning states of the Islamic world tend to

be fragile and are as plagued by cronyism and corruption as any autocratic government. Many

economists believe that a natural-resource curse prevents oil-rich countries from achieving viable

democracies. But, as demonstrated by the U.S. attempt to impose Iraqi democracy, democratization is

not necessarily the best way to fight Islamic extremism. To the contrary, where there is an absence of

institutions to protect minorities, majoritarian rule can actually lead to an increase in violence.

According to Marwan Muasher, in many cases, people join ISIS not because of its ideology, but rather

because it represents to them a rallying force against establishments that have failed them, or against

the West. I hypothesize that the theme of civilization humiliation resonates most deeply with

individuals who have been subject to personal humiliations, such as torture, pederasty, and rape. The

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topic of personal victimization as a risk factor in recruitment is one I hope to explore by examining

cultural practices and individuals cases in future scholarship.

For now, Western recruits represent the principal threat to the West. ISIS would very much like to turn

Western Muslims against their homelands, and this has proven more easily accomplished in Europe

than in the United States. One primary explanation may be that the pool of disenfranchised Muslim

youth is simply larger in Europe. European Muslim youth describe themselves, often accurately, as

victims of prejudice in the workplace and in society more generally. In the most recent European Union

Minorities and Discrimination Survey, one in three Muslim respondents reported experiencing

discrimination, with the effect greatest among Muslims aged sixteen to twenty-four (overall

discrimination rates decline with age). Muslims in Europe are far more likely to be unemployed and to

receive lower pay for the same work than "native" Europeans. Consequently, Muslim immigrants in

Europe are disproportionately impoverished. While ten percent of native Belgians live below the

poverty line, that number is 59 percent for Turks and 56 percent for Moroccans in Belgium. There are

4.7 million Muslims living in France, many of them in poverty. An estimated 1,550 French citizens

have left for Syria or Iraq; some 11,400 citizens have been identified as radical Islamists in French

surveillance data. By contrast, a majority of American Muslims are deeply integrated into American

society. A 2011 Pew poll found that in the Muslim Americans feel happier with their lives than does

the general population in the United States. That sentiment could change, however, with growing talk

of imposing Nuremburg-style laws and requiring Muslims to register with the US government, that

type of political speech could actually facilitate ISISs goals of American Muslim alienation.

Stephen Walt has argued that ISIS, though smaller, has much in common with other revolutionary

states throughout history. In his famous article The Sources of Soviet Conduct, George Kennan,

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writing under the pseudonym X, described the difficulties faced by the Marxists in attempting to

spread their revolutionary movement in Russia, and urged that the West should contain the Soviets

rather than attempt to defeat them. There, he wrote [L]acking wide popular support for the choice of

bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly

convenient rationalization of their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudoscientic

justicationfor their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the

pursuit of it. If we exchange Salafi jihadist theory for Marxist theory, this description might equally

apply to ISIS. Kennen argues that the establishment of dictatorial power becomes a necessity when the

broader population does not share in the revolutionaries zeal. And it is for this reason, that ISIS has

imposed dictatorial powers, as described by some who have managed to escape. Many hope thatas

with Communist rule in the Soviet Unionthe Sala jihadists controlling the Islamic State will

crumble beneath the weight of their own bad ideas and savage rule. However, it is unclear to what

extent the international community has the patience to just wait ISIS out.

How should we respond? Given enough political will and ground forces, the West can defeat the

Islamic State in the territory it controls. This would require a massive military commitment, though the

West certainly has the means. One problem, of course, is that many of the millions of people living

under ISIS rule do not support ISIS and desperately wish to leave. These innocent people will, almost

certainly, become collateral causalities and the West must grapple with this moral dilemma. In that

regard, even attacks aimed at the ISIS economy prove problematic; many truckers smuggling oil out

of ISIS-held territory are not ideologically motivated, but trying to feed their families. These are the

types of people we would count on to rise up against the Islamic State given the opportunity. Still,

many argue that, with the stakes so high, the right approach is the merciless war French President

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Francois Hollande has called for in the wake of the Paris attacks. But even this merciless approach

is only a temporary x. Defeating ISIS in Syria requires ending the civil war therea tall order,

indeedand for our troops to remain in the region until Sunni safety is assured. Even if the United

States and allied forces were prepared to occupy Iraq and Syria for the next thirty yearsas General

Powell once argued for with regard to the war in Iraqthere is no guarantee of success. And ISIS has

now spread into wilayat or provinces in some eight countries, where, there too, it capitalizes on poor

governance. Importantly, Sala jihadists are not known to sit idle after their refuges are destroyed.

They simply seek out new ones. One example is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded the predecessor

organization to ISIS. Zarqawi had been running an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan when the United

States invaded. He was wounded in a U.S. bombing raid, and ed to Iran, and from there to Iraq where

he joined an organization fascinated by chemical weapons. Zarqawi would later try, unsuccessfully, to

carry out a chemical attack in Jordan. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is now the mascot for ISIS. For these

reasons, among others, many have argued for an approach of military containment over an all-out war

aimed at defeating ISIS on the territory it controls. Although President Obama claims to support a

strategy of defeat, he does not appear to be pursuing the kind of war calculated to obliterate the Islamic

State from the map. And the precise contours of the two sides in this the debate are difficult to define.

In an Intelligence Squared debate in August 2015, those in favor of containment proposed employing

every possible militarily tool to keep ISIS from expanding, and those in favor of defeat viewed a

political strategy as primary. Notably, neither side supported a full-scale military invasion, nor the

narrator even complained that he was having difficulty finding areas of disagreement between the two

sides. But whatever the unifying strategy, as President Obama has said, ISIS is currently being

contained militarily on the territory it controls and it has lost a signicant fraction of its sanctuary since

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Operation Inherent Resolve began. But the most difficult task ahead is not containing ISIS militarily.

Rather, it is to contain ISISs appeal among the global downtrodden, or those who imagine themselves

to be fighting on their behalf. This will require, in the words of Bernard Haykels, engaging in cultural

and educational efforts to defeat ISISs ideology that sancties violence as the only means for Sunni

empowerment and glory. And Western governments are not equipped to do this alone. He notes, [i]t

is an effort that must emerge from within the Arab and Muslim communities. Saudi Arabia, as the

source of the untamed Wahhabism that underlies ISIS ideology, has an important role to play moving

forward. Far more than we need their military support, we need the Arab states to lead the containment

of ISIS ideology and to model alternative narratives. What is to be expected going forward? ISIS will

continue to pursue its two goals simultaneously, though those objectives are clearly antithetical. To one

end, ISIS will continue to recruit foreign citizens for the creation of its caliphate. And to the other, it

will continue to recruit volunteers to conduct attacks in the West aimed at triggering the all-out ground

attack and prophesied nal battle. We can expect that attacks in the West will grow more sophisticated

and become more common. As an intermediate step, while ISIS exercises both of its antithetical

options, the group will do its best to increase tensions between the crusaders and ordinary Muslims,

to polarize Muslims against one another, and to incite internal divisions within the West. This is what

ISIS wants. We know, because theyve told us.

Future Strategy

The last terrorist attacks and ISIS threats for worldwide security remind old and forgotten theories

defined and described by jihadist strategists like Abu Muab al-Suri or Saif al-Adel.

Their theories include 7 important points regarding current and future activities of jihadist groups like

al-Qaeda.

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 1. ,,Awakening '' - (2001-2003). The purpose of this stage was to provoke the West, including the

US attack on Muslim countries in order to increase protests and violent reactions of local

communities, which in turn would serve the regional overthrowing of dictatorships and bringing

demands proclaimed by jihadists. For example, the result of the plan concerned attacks on the

US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 as well as the attacks of September 11, 2001.

Military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq became a consequence of the plan.

2. ,, The opening of the eyes '' - (2003-2006) - The goal was to transform al-Qaeda into military

organization conducting their activities in different countries around the world. This resulted in

further terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2003 and London in 2005.

3. ,, The development and mobilization '- (2007-2010) - Further strengthening of the position of

individual jihadi groups in the world.

4. ,, The collapse of Arab regimes '' - (2010-2013) - a consequence of the previous points aimed

at collapse of governments in the Middle East and North Africa. The activities focused

primarily on economic instability of Gulf countries and their resources, as well as political and

economic situation in Turkey and Israel.

5. ,, Declaration of the Caliphate '' - (2013-2016) - a natural consequence of the fall of the regimes

in the Arab countries.

6. ,, Total confrontation '- (2016-2020) - the struggle with other countries governed by secular

forces in the Arab world, including secular authorities in Western countries.

7. ,, Final victory '' - in 2020 - the implementation of a global caliphate.

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So far al-Qaeda accomplished or predicted the first 4 points. In some cases political and social unrests

or events like the Arab Spring in 2011 enabled to follow the strategy. The collapse of local regimes in

the Middle East and North Africa is a good example in that context.

Moreover, ISIS took over the strategy of al-Qaeda's mentors, especially after the death of Osama bin

Laden in 2011 and decrease of operational and financial capacities of the organization. In this regard,

2011 became a new step and a challenge for jihadist groups in the world.

Timeline of Events

2016

January Notification for Building RAM MUSEUM in Ayodhya is issued by Tourism Department

February ISIS has captured areas of Afghanistan

March- It has been revealed that Turkey was involved in capturing Afghanistan

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April In its manifesto 'Black Flags from the Islamic State, it is warned they would now expand

beyond Iraq and Syria and mentions India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.

May- Communal Riots happen again in Godhra.

June-Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif has been assassinated.

July- Indian Defense Ministry website was hacked.

August ISIS declares they have full support of China and Pakistan in their manifesto.

September There have 45 ceasefire violations since august at Kashmir Border

October- IB warns activation of Sleeper Cells all over India

November Shri Mohan Bhagwat along with Mr. Arun Jaitley puts a foundation stone of Ayodhya

Museum

December There have been Bomb blasts in Bhagalpur, Amritsar, Godhra, Kanpur and Mujaffarnagar.

2017

January- Imran Khan Becomes new Prime Minister of Pakistan.

February- There have been reports of serious Communal Riots in Ayodhya.

March- IB reports that ISIS has recruited 50 ex Indian Defense Personnel.

April- IS has captured Pakistan Completely.

May- Infiltrations of IS are reported in Nepal.

June- India has asked Russia, United States and France for help in combating situation in Nepal

July- Russia and France has agreed whereas U.S.A. has refused any intervention .

August IB reports planning of an attack on Parliament, C link in Mumbai and on Red Fort.

September- IB reports ISI helping IS in its planning.

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October Yogi Adityanath says People opposing Ram Museum should join their brothers in

Afghanistan

November NDA government tables Uniform Civil Code in Lok Sabha.

December In a secret mission, India has been able to bring back Dawood Ibrahim from Pakistan

The current date is 26th January, 2018

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