G.R. No. 164457. April 11, 2012.

*
ANNA LERIMA PATULA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to be Informed; The Bill of Rights guarantees some
rights to every person accused of a crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation.The Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to every person accused of a
crime, among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.: Section
14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Same; Same; Same; An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in
the complaint or information.The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and
cause of the accusation in the information should never be taken for granted by the State. An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information
would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the
crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised
Penal Code.The elements of the
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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offense charged were as follows: (a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (b) That the offender misappropriated or
converted such money, goods or other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt; (c) That
the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of another; and (d) That the
offended party made a demand on the offender for the delivery or return of such money, goods or
other personal property.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; The rule against hearsay testimony rests
mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.It is apparent,
too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any
question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to
remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told
so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against hearsay
testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is
offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay
just the same.
 Same; Same; Same; If an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the
matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply.The theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of
the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject
to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted,
the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies
that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not
to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those
words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in
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character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the
statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Same; Same; Right to Cross-Examination; The right to cross-examine the adverse partys
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential
to the administration of justice.Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not
the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If
hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to
be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys witness, being the only means of
testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of
justice.
Same; Same; Public Documents; Private Documents; Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
distinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose of their
presentation in evidence.Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public
document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz.: Section
19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private. Public documents are: (a) The written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public
except last wills and testaments, and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are private.
Same; Same; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Entries in the Course of Business; Requisites before
Entries in the Course of Business Could be Excepted from the Hearsay Rule.The terse yet
sweeping manner of justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to
show the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business could be
excepted from the hearsay
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 rule. The requisites are as follows: (a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable
to testify; (b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer; (c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (d) The entries were
made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral,
or religious; (e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Temistocles B. Diez for petitioner.
Manolo Zerna for private respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
In the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt
in order to ensure that such evidence adheres to the basic rules of admissibility before
pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. Nothing less is
demanded of the judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due process of law is nullified. The
accused need not adduce anything to rebut evidence that is discredited for failing the test.
Acquittal should then follow.
Antecedents
Petitioner was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City that averred:
That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for sometime prior
thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, being then a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City,
having collected and received the total
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sum of P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the express obligation to
account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from
complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands
therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did, then and
there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of
the sale to her own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the
aforesaid amount of P131,286.97.
Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.1
Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in the information. At pre-trial, no
stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea bargaining.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch
manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in Dumaguete City since
October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting as a saleslady
in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales representative she was
authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming from different towns (like
Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and
Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that she could issue and sign official receipts
of Footluckers for the payments, which she would then remit; that she would then submit
the receipts for the payments for tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of
sales was quite high, but later on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she responded
that business was slow; that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the
accounting clerk discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject
her to an audit by com-
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 22.
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pany auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of petitioners that the
customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid although that balance
appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night later on, petitioner and her
parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated any money of Footluckers and
to plead for him not to push through with a case against her, promising to settle her
account on a monthly basis; and that she did not settle after that, but stopped reporting to
work.2
On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination and re-
crossexamination were completed.
The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers
employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March 31,
2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had
told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected
outstanding balances for them; that she first conducted her audit by going to the customers
in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguita in Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; that
she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies
of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on
the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon completing
her audit, she submitted to Go a written report denominated as List of Customers Covered
by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly Verified
March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had
misappropriated the total amount of P131,286.92.3
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2 TSN, September 15, 2000; March 7 and 30, 2001.
3 TSN, April 4, 2002; August 13, 2002; September 11, 2002; September 12, 2002; and November 20, 2002.
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During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of
petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that contained the dates of
the entries, a second that identified the invoices by the number, a third that stated the
debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that summed the
balances (debit minus credit). Only 49 of the ledgers were formally offered and admitted
by the RTC because the 50th ledger could no longer be found.
In the course of Guivencans direct-examination, petitioners counsel interposed a
continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were
not themselves presented in court.4With that, petitioners counsel did not anymore cross-
examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be irrelevant because she
thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.
The Prosecution then formally offered its documentary exhibits, including Exhibits B to
YY and their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the receipts supposedly
executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan
in auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencans so-called Summary (Final
Report) of Discrepancies.5
After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a demurrer to
evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead rested its case.The
Prosecution and Defense submitted their respective memoranda, and submitted the case
for decision.6
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4 TSN, September 11, 2002, pp. 3-7
5 Rollo, p. 23-27.
6 Id., p. 27.
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On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted not to
present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained unrefuted and
uncontroverted,7rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, to wit:
Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the Court finds ANNA
LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b)
of the Revised Penal Code and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE
PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to
indemnify private complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum until
fully paid and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the cash bail put up
by the accused shall be effective only until the promulgation of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion on May 7,
2004.9
Issues
 Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her] Constitutional and statutory
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her because, while
the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, the
evidence presented against her and upon which her conviction was based, was falsification,
an offense not alleged or included in the Information under which she was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty, and that
_______________
7 Id., p. 40.
8 Id., p. 43.
9 Id., pp. 45-46.
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said judgment likewise blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on
admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court were
all private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not proved in
accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, petitioner has
directly appealed to the Court viapetition for review on certiorari, positing the following
issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT MATTER, CHARGED
OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE
CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS
VIOLATED WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION
CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST HER IS ESTAFA THROUGH
MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE,
EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-2, ALL PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND
AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE
132 OF THE SAID REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT SAID
EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED, A CRIME NEITHER
CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY
OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE THE OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH
TRIED TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-2
INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF
THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING
IRRELEVANT AND IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.144
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Patula vs. People
 5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION REMAINS UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED
DESPITE ACCUSEDS OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL AND
IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT CROSS-EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN
FOR THE REASON THAT HER TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT
TENDED TO PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION RESULTED IN THE
ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED,
AND WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT EXHIBIT A,
WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA
WITH DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-SERVING.10
The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:
1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts
issued by petitioner to her customers violated petitioners right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation;
2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the falsification of the duplicate receipts
despite the information not alleging the falsification;
3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible
as evidence of petitioners guilt for estafaas charged despite their not being duly authenticated; and
4. Whether or not Guivencans testimony on the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive) to prove petitioners misappropriation or conversion was inadmissible for being hearsay.
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10 Id., p. 10.
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Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation
Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that the information
did not have to allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b) when it convicted
her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code by relying on the
evidence on falsification.
The contention of petitioner cannot be sustained.
The Bill of Rights guarantees some rights to every person accused of a crime, among
them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
 (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the information was
filed in the RTC, contained the following provisions on the proper manner of alleging the
nature and cause of the accusation in the information, to wit:146
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Patula vs. People
Section 8. Designation of the offense.Whenever possible, a complaint or information should
state the designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or
omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (7)
Section 9. Cause of accusation.The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the
terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation
in the information should never be taken for granted by the State. An accused cannot be
convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would
be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.11 Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless
the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.
The crime of estafa charged against petitioner was defined and penalized by Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa).Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
_______________
11 People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 121671, August 14, 1998, 294 SCRA 220, 252; People v. Ortega, Jr., G.R. No. 116736,
July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 166, 187; People v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 66437, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 740, 751; Matilde,
Jr. v. Jabson, No. L-38392, December 29, 1975, 68 SCRA 456, 261; United States v. Campo, No. 7321, 23 Phil. 368, 371-
372 (1912).
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1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
xxx
The elements of the offense charged were as follows:
(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for admini-
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stration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods or other personal property, or denied his
part in its receipt;
(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the prejudice of another; and
(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the delivery or return of such money, goods or
other personal property.12
According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or
converted the sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the receipts
before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers had paid less
than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously, she committed the
falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or conversion. Considering that the
falsification was not an offense separate and distinct from the estafa charged against her,
the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts of falsification as its means of
establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an essential ingredient of the crime
duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her was not infringed or denied to her.
We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely pleaded
the estafadefined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal
Code within the context of the substantive law and the rules. Verily, there was no necessity
for the information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner because falsification was
not an element of the estafa charged.
_______________
 12 Barrameda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96428, September 2, 1999, 313 SCRA 477, 484.
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Not surprisingly, the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioners concern
thuswise:
In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the] prosecutions evidence
utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According to the defense, the essence of Karen Guivencans
testimony is that the accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers served by her by
changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and therefore, her testimony is
immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the
Revised Penal Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any falsification or alteration of
amounts in the [i]nformation under which the accused was arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY.
Accused, thus, maintains that the testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be
considered at all as it tended to prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation and
would violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her. The Court is not in accord with such posture of the accused.
It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the
[i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the
prosecution could not prove falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the
information charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of
the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no necessity of alleging the
falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and Falsification will
constitute as one complex crime and when they are considered as two separate offenses.
The complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is committed when
one has to falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another
person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa.
However, if the falsification is committed to conceal the misappropriation, two separate
offenses of estafa and falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused
collected payments from the customers, said collection which was in her possession was
at her disposal. The falsified
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or erroneous entries which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were
contrived to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to the
company xxx.13
II
Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the
Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein.14 The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in
the commission of the offense.15 In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence
of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has
guaranteed.16 Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof,17 that he
must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption
of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused
is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its
burden of
_______________
13 Rollo, pp. 41-42 (bold emphasis supplied).
14 Andaya v. People, G.R. No. 168486, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 539, 556-557.
15 People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981-82, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 578, 592.
16 Section 14, (2), Article III (Bill of Rights).
17 People v. Arapok, G.R. No. 134974, December 8, 2000, 347 SCRA 479, 498.
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proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused
as the malefactor responsible for it.
Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?
To establish the elements of estafa earlier mentioned, the Prosecution presented the
testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documents consisting of: (a) the receipts
allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their payment, (b) the ledgers
listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the corresponding notations of the
receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the confirmation sheets accomplished by
Guivencan herself.18 The ledgers and receipts were marked and formally offered as
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive.
On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner
as Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal
knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted
by petitioner to Footluckers. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based her testimony
on the entries found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held
by Footluckers corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of
some of the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity
and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion
through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered theentire
proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and untrust-
_______________
 18 Supra, at note 1.
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worthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy,
and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of
Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as
otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded
to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the
extrajudicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person
say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information
on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined.
The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon
the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The
information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness
and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any
particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions,
to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in
the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or
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absent author.19 Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that
there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.20 The testimony may have been
given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is
afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the
witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference
to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the
complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant
was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words.22This kind of
utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.23 The distinction is, therefore,
between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not
apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule
applies.24
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding
_______________
19 5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Edition, pp. 267-268; citing Coleman v. Southwick, 9
Johnson (N.Y.), 45, 50, 6 Am. Dec. 253.
20 Id., citing Minea v. St. Louis Corp., 179 Mo. A., 705, 716, 162 S.W. 741.
21 Id., p. 268.
22 Wigmore, Sec. 1766; Tracys Handbook, 62 Ed., pp. 220-221.
23 Id.
24 20 Am Jur 404.
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hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine
the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or
occurrence.25 If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is
not in court.26 It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse partys
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies,
is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the
truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a partys right to cross-examine her adversarys
witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that all the
witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz.:
Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.The examination of witnesses presented
in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness
is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a)
The second solution is to require that allwitnesses be subject to the cross-examination
by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly:
Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.Upon the termination of the direct
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
_______________
25 People v. Pagkaliwagan, 76 Phil. 457, 460 (1946).
26 Donnelly v. United States, 228 US 243.
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 Patula vs. People
Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to
criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees
that: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the
witnesses face to face xxx, the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party
equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.
We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being
given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the
out-of-court statement depends.27
Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well as Exhibits B to
YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of petitioners
misappropriation or conversion.
III
Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence
Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence Exhibits
B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private documents that were
not duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document and
a private document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz.:
_______________
27 Gulam v. Santos, G.R. No. 151458, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 463, 473.
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Patula vs. People
Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.
All other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may
be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial
will) or a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a
public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no
further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private
document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without
the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition
or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only
in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context
of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b)
_______________
28 Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary.Where a private
document is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be
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when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;29 (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being
offered as genuine.31
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents
because private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes
or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they
could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the
Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided in Section 20
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 20. Proof of private documents.Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
_______________
found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
authenticity need be given. (22 a)
29 Section 8, Rule 8, Rules of Court, which states:
Section 8. How to contest such documents.When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due
execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them,
and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does
not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument
is refused. (8a)
30 Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
31 Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
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 Patula vs. People
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner in
various receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the original receipts, do you have copies of
these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present this, or offer the same as soon as
the original receipts can be presented, but for purposes only of your testimony, Im going to point to
you a certain signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila Askin, kindly
go over the
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signature and tell the Honorable Court whether you are familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word collector.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the accused in this case
appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original receipts Your Honor,
because its quite voluminous, so we will just forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just
present the same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of identifying the signature
of the accused. We will request that this signature which has been identified to by the witness in this case
be marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present the original copy and present the same to offer as
our exhibits but for the meantime, this is only for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request
the same, the receipt which has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit A You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A.
ATTY. ABIERA:
 And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit A-1.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature & mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the number of that receipt?160

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patula vs. People
ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from Cirila Askin.32
x x x

As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner

on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked as
Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as Exhibit A-
1) immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the document was a
mere machine copy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the
Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the originals of the receipt with
serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that promise was not even true,
because almost in the same breath the Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature
of petitioner on the receipts through a different witness (though then still unnamed). As
matters turned out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both the machine copy of
the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that
receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicably forgotten and was no
longer even included in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 was
subsequently presented as Exhibit B through Guivencan. However, the Prosecution did
not establish that the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go
had earlier sought to identify to be the signature of petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine
copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A
as the marking nomenclature for the machine copy of the receipt bearing serial number
FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same
nomenclature to refer instead to an en-
_______________
32 TSN, September 15, 2000, pp. 13-16.
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tirely different document entitled List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA
w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997.
In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two receipts based
alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of Patula was
ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary evidence against
petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the
receipts either because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not
seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from her
testimony bear out:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet, will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The other receipt is the one showing her
payment prior to the last payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit B-3, receipt number 20441.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector, are your familiar with that
signature?(shown to witness)
A. Yes.162

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patula vs. People
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit B-3-a.
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 and the signature as Exhibit B-4-a.
COURT:
Mark it.33
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to one Divina Cadilig. Will you please
identify this receipt if this is the receipt of your office?
A. Yes.
Q. There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is this?
A. Ms. Patula.
Q. How do you know that this is her signature?
 A. Because we can read the Patula.34

We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers the
Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the amounts petitioner had
allegedly received from the customers and the amounts she had
_______________
33 TSN, August 13, 2002, pp. 15-16.
34 TSN, September 11, 2002, p. 9.
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Patula vs. People
actually remitted to Footluckers. Guivencan exclusively relied on the entries of the
unauthenticated ledgers to support her audit report on petitioners supposed
misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the
veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony show:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that this Cecilia Askin has an
account of P10,791.75?
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and showed it to the customers for
confirmation.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. What about the receipts?
COURT:
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that amount in the ledger and you had it
confirmed by the customers, what was the result when you had it confirmed by the customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance of P10,971.75.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Do you have a- whats the basis of saying that the balance of this customer is still P10,971.75
(Next Page)164

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patula vs. People
ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):
[i]n your office?
COURT:
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Maam.35
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)
 ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the duplicate, will you please enlighten
the Honorable Court on that discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her ledger shows a zero balance she has
fully paid while in the original
(Next page)
WITNESS (continuing):
[r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one Pesos and Seventy-five
Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original receipt she has still a balance.
_______________
35 TSN, April 4, 2002, pp. 20-21.
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Patula vs. People
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---
COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that what
you referred to as the receipts, the original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that particular customer still has a
balance of Ten Thousand something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the ledger?
A. Yes.36

In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should come as
no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC
mysteriously overruled the objections and allowed the Prosecution to present the
unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
(Continuation of the Direct Examination of
Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers. Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much is her account in your office?
_______________
36 TSN, August 13, 2002, pp. 10-14.
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166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 Patula vs. People
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the question, let me interpose our
objection on the ground that this ledger has not been duly identified to by the person who made
the same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because the supposed ledger was
not identified to by the person who made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were already duly identified by this
witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who brought them to court
(Next Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not this witness, Your Honor.
How do we know that the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries were taken. So, you answer the
query of counsel.
x x x167

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Patula vs. People
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing objection to the questions
profounded(sic) on those ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the entries on those ledgers, is she
still connected with Footluckers?
A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So, exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.37

The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed
presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules
earlier quoted, as well as with Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains
instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial proceeding, as
follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness
or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is
_______________
37 TSN, September 11, 2002, pp. 3-7.
168

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Patula vs. People
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or
signing of the documents, the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY
and their derivatives conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY,
and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.
That was the only fair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:38
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings
testimony was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the
documents supporting respondents cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice,
packing list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even
though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails
and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the
facts which gave rise to respondents cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she
personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent, she did not have
personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is founded on breach of insurance
contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent
has to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer,
namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondents
importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel
billets being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay,
as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. However,
_______________
38 G.R. No. 138084, April 10, 2002, 380 SCRA 374, 378-379.
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Patula vs. People
she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets.
She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though
she prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on
the receipts prepared by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was
hearsay. It has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondents
documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private
document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who
was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously
confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that King was none of the
aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets
based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of
steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on this
point could not be taken at face value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are
those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting
of the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private documents. They are
not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity
need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence. With the exception
concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they
cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the
imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove
petitioners liability.
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That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to
subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary evidence was
inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the seasonable objections to
Guivencans testimony by petitioners counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be
denied that hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value.39 Verily,
the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and substantive, not merely
technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse partys waiver of her cross-
examination or failure to rebut could not set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts
overruling of petitioners objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and
value.Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of the
hearsay rule by also tersely stating that the ledgers were prepared in the regular course
of business.40Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business.Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the
entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC. The terse yet sweeping manner of justifying
the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show the concurrence of
the severalrequisites before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the
hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:
_______________
39 Id., citing Eugenio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103737, December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 207, 220.
40 Rollo, p. 42.
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(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral, or religious;
(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.41

The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case, a judge must
rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to
the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged
upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due
of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her innocence. Her
acquittal should follow.
IV
No reliable evidence on damage
Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court declares that the
disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footluckers in the amount of
P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet shown to be
factually founded. Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on that basis. Her
acquittal has to be declared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil
_______________
41 II Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Ninth Edition, p. 652.
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Patula vs. People
action against her for the recovery of any amount that she may still owe to Footluckers.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE AND REVERSES the decision convicting
ANNA LERIMA PATULA of estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her for failure of the
Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without prejudice to a civil action
brought against her for the recovery of any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers
Chain of Stores, Inc.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo and Villarama, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Judgment set aside, Anna Lerima Patula acquitted.
Notes.Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own
perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying persons
declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of
inquiry in the case. (People vs. Salcedo, 645 SCRA 248 [2011])
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused
cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. (People vs. Pangilinan, 660 SCRA 16 [2011])
o0o
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