The Market for Online Poker

Ingo Fiedler
Ann-Christin Wilcke

Abstract
The recent events of the Black Friday the biggest online poker networks in
the USA were shut down demonstrated the necessity to make decisions about the
regulation of online poker. But although online poker is a gold mine of data, until
now nobody knows where the players and their money come from. It seems that the
knowledge about the online poker market has not been able to keep up with the speed
of its evolution in the past years. This paper is the first to shed light on this matter. We
use data of 4,591,298 poker identities from the Online Poker Database of the University
of Hamburg (OPD-UHH) collected over a six months period from 09/2009 to 03/2010.
We find that the worldwide 6 million players paid 3.61 billion US$ rake to the operators
in 2010. USA is still by far the biggest market with 1,429,943 active players and 973.3
million US$ net revenues in 2010. With regard to the number of internet users in a
country, Hungary is the biggest relative market: One out of 50 Hungarians with internet
access plays online poker for real money. The two main drivers of the relative market size
in a country are GDP per capita and culture. Using the data from the OPD-UHH, future
research will be able to break down the market also on a regional level within countries
and to examine inter and intra country differences in the playing habits of online poker
players.
Keywords: online, poker, market, gambling, data, habits.

Introduction
Online gambling and online poker in particular is a relatively new phenomenon
nearly nonexistent in 2003. During the past years it has grown extraordinarily so that it is
now an important factor in the whole gambling market. However, even today it is often
neglected by the old industry, the legislators and the researchers as an unwelcome black
market just as if denying would cease its existence. But the economic reality is different.
Online gambling has tremendous cost advantages due to electronic instead of brick and
mortar operation and, even more important, its operators do not have to pay (high) taxes
and license fees. In the case of poker, large player pools and the corresponding network
effects have also helped the game to grow to a size not to be matched in the offline world.
From an academic perspective, most research in the field of poker has focused on
playing strategy (e.g. Chen & Ankenman, 2006) and especially the question whether
poker is a game of skill or a game of chance (see e.g. Dreef et al. 2003, Cabot & Hannum
2005, Dedonno & Detterman 2008, or Turner 2008 and for an empirical point of view see
Fiedler & Rock 2009). The answer to this question is especially important from a legal
perspective as most jurisdictions legalize games of skill while they regulate games of
chance. However, the skill/chance debate has not yet come to an end, and also skill does
not seem to be the best criterion for the distinction between harmful and non-harmful
Ingo Fiedler games (Rock & Fiedler 2008).
Research Associate The recent events of the Black Friday the biggest online poker networks in
Institute of Law &
Economics
the USA were shut down demonstrated the necessity to make decisions about the
University of Hamburg regulation of online poker. Should it be prohibited? If so, what are the best instruments
to enforce a prohibition? Or should online poker be legalized like Italy and France
Ann-Christin Wilcke
Research Associate
have chosen lately? If so, what is the optimal tax and how could player protection be
Institute of Law & implemented? Before answering these questions it may be worthwhile to gather more
Economics information about the national markets as information about them is practically non-
University of Hamb

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1 7

existent.
We use data from the Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-
UHH), a database including information on the origin and playing habits of 4,591,298
poker identities over a six months period. Before describing the
data in the OPD-UHH we analyze the worldwide online poker
market and the market shares of the various poker operators. We The recent events of the Black
then present the results about the size of the whole market and for Friday the biggest online
the ten biggest markets in dollar terms. Afterwards we analyze poker networks in the USA were
the prevalence of online poker in absolute terms in relation to the
internet users. We also identify the main drivers of the relative shut down demonstrated the
market size of a country. Both sections provide new and important necessity to make decisions about
insights into the online gambling market especially for legislators. the regulation of online poker.
We continue by highlighting the limitations of this study before we
summarize the results and give an outlook on further research in the
last section.

Market Size and Market Shares by Operators

With the exception of an analysis of poker marke ts in the European Union (Fiedler
& Wilcke 2012) academic research on the prevalence and size of online poker markets
thestill
is observation
missing.of the industry by
However, duePokerScout which tacks the
to the observation of active players atby
the industry thePokerScout
different operators
whichat
tacks themoment
any given active the
players
marketatshares
the different operators
of the operators at any
are known. given
Table moment
1 shows the market
the market shares forshares
the
of
ninethe operators
biggest are inknown.
poker sites Table
2008, 2009 and12010
shows
(untilthe market
August). Theshares
marketfor theare
shares nine biggest
computed in poker
sites in 2008, 2009 and 2010 (until August). The market shares are computed in
relation to the monthly average players of the total market: 53,121 in 2008, 68,483 in 2009 and 71,441 in
relation
to the monthly average players of the total market: 53,121 in 2008, 68,483 in 2009 and
2010. Note that a player is not counted in this statistic unless he is playing at the moment of the scan by
71,441 in 2010. Note that a player is not counted in this statistic unless he is playing at
PokerScout. The average number accounts for all differences in active players per daytime, week days
the moment of the scan by PokerScout. The average number accounts for all differences
andactive
in months.players per daytime, week days and months.

Table 1

Market shares in the online poker industry in 2008, 2009, and 2010

2008 2009 2010a Data recorded for

Site/Network
Market share Market share Market share OPD-UHH
Pokerstars 30.53% 36.05% 40.96% Yes
Full Tilt Poker 14.65% 19.45% 21.73% Yes
iPoker Network 9.82% 8.40% 5.77% No
Party Poker 8.72% 7.22% 6.12% No
Cereus Networkb 2.35% 3.40% 3.03% No
Everest Poker 4.85% 3.36% 1.80% Yes
Microgamingc 1.84% 2.71% 2.66% No
IPN (Boss Media)d 2.81% 2.80% 2.88% Yes
Cake Poker Network 2.18% 2.45% 1.97% Yes
Ongame (bwin)e 6.86% 3.96% 3.55% No
Other 15.39% 10.20% 9.53% No
a
: 2010 includes only data from January to August.
b
: Cereus merged with Ultimate Bet in 12/2008.
c
: Microgaming merged with Ladbrokes in 03/2009.
d
: IPN (Boss Media) merged with Cryptologic 04/2009.
e
: Ongame (bwin) merged with Betfair in 08/2010.

Theonline
The online poker
poker industry
industry is dominated
is highly highly dominated by theproviders:
by the two biggest two biggest providers:
Pokerstars and Full Tilt
Pokerstars and Full Tilt Poker, and their importance has increased over the past years.
Poker, and their importance has increased over the past years. In 2008 they had a combined market share
In 2008 they had a combined market share of 45.18% while in 2010 they already
of 45.18% while in 2010 they already accounted for nearly two thirds (62.69%) of the whole playing
accounted for nearly two thirds (62.69%) of the whole playing volume in the market.
volume in the market. the
Correspondingly, Correspondingly, the smaller
smaller operators lostoperators lost significance
significance and dwindled
and dwindled not only
not only in
in relative
relative size but also in absolute size. While in 2008 on the average 29,121 players were actively playing
8on smaller UNLV Gaming
networks Research
at any given & Review
moment, Journal
the number Volume
decreased 16 Issue
to 26,655 1
in 2010.

3
size but also in absolute size. While in 2008 on the average 29,121 players were actively
playing on smaller networks at any given moment, the number decreased to 26,655 in
2010.
This development shows the power of positive network effects in the online poker
market. The bigger the player pool, the more players are attracted to it just by its mere
size. As a player, you will more likely find (weak) opponents on a large network for
your favorite game type, betting structure and limit. This is even more true for players
who play multiple tables at the same time (multitabling) and therefore generate
significantly more traffic than players who only play at one table. Another important
factor reason for the large and increasing market share of PokerStars is the price of the
product in form of the rake structure, which is cheapest for the players at Pokerstars. But
this only applies to the gross costs without considering rakeback or promotions which
are used to set incentives for players to play more often and stick to one site. Rakeback
andThis
bonuses effectively reduce the costs for the players and are, hence, also an important
development shows the power of positive network effects in the online poker market. The bigger
factor which drives market shares. Other factors include the quality of the software,
the player pool, the more players are attracted to it just by its mere size. As a player, you will more likely
security, reputation, ease of deposits and withdrawals, and also interactions between
find online
the (weak) opponents on a large
site and offline network(e.g.
casinos for your favoriteinto
satellites game type,
live betting
events structure
like the Wordand limit. Thisofis
Series
Poker).
even more true for players who play multiple tables at the same time (multitabling) and therefore
Knowing
generate the market
significantly shares
more traffic ofplayers
than the different
who onlyoperators,
play at one the
table.next step important
Another is to lookfactor
at the
revenue which is generated in the market. The gambling consultant company
reason for the large and increasing market share of PokerStars is the price of the product in form of the
H2GC
estimated the size of the online poker market in 2009 to be 2.4 billion US$ (H2GC
rake structure, which is cheapest for the players at Pokerstars. But this only applies to the gross costs
2009). Another way to determine the revenues is to look at the revenues stated in
without considering
financial reports of rakeback
stock or promotions
listed which and
companies are used to set incentives
extrapolate for players
it in relation to to
itsplay more
market
share.
often andFor example,
stick PartyGaming
to one site. Rakeback andreported to have earned
bonuses effectively reduce thetogether
costs forwith its subsidiary
the players and are,
PartyPoker, 196.7 million US$ net revenues in 2009 (Partygaming 2010).
hence, also an important factor which drives market shares. Other factors include the quality of the Extrapolated
with the 7.22% average market share of PartyPoker in 2009, the total market for online
software, security, reputation, ease of deposits and withdrawals, and also interactions between the online
poker was 2.7 billion US$, close to the estimate of H2GC.
site and offline casinos (e.g. satellites into live events like the Word Series of Poker).
But these figures are only estimates. They also do not answer where the money
comes from and which the biggest national markets with the most players are. What
Knowing the market shares of the different operators, the next step is to look at the revenue which is
was the size of the US-market before the Black Friday? Was it still the largest market
generated in the market. The gambling consultant company H2GC estimated the size of the online poker
although the legislator tried to enforce a prohibition of online gambling with the
market in 2009
Unlawful to be 2.4
Internet billion US$
Gambling (H2GC 2009).Act
Enforcement Another
(UIGEA)way tosince
determine
2006?the revenues
These are is to look at
questions
we address stated
the revenues with in thefinancial
data from theofOPD-UHH
reports which we
stock listed companies anddescribe
extrapolatenext.
it in relation to its
market share. For example, PartyGaming reported to have earned together with its subsidiary PartyPoker,
The Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH)
196.7 million US$ net revenues in 2009 (Partygaming 2010).1 Extrapolated with the 7.22% average
Online poker is a goldmine of data as all operators show in their lobby a lot of
market share of PartyPoker in 2009, the total market for online poker was 2.7 billion US$, close to the
information about the people playing at their tables. It is easy to observe the origin
2
estimate
of of H2GC.
a player (city or country ), the game type, betting structure and limit of the table
they play at, and, of course, the date and time. Financed by the city of Hamburg, the
But these figures are only estimates. They also do not answer where the money comes from and which
Institute of Law & Economics at the University of Hamburg collected these data in
the biggest national
collaboration withmarkets with the mostmarket
the independent players are. What was
spectator the size of the
PokerScout in US-market before the
the OPD-UHH. A
software electronically
Black Friday? gathered
Was it still the the data
largest market of the
although theplayers
legislatorfor thetofollowing
tried poker networks:
enforce a prohibition of online
Pokerstars,
gambling3 withFull
the Tilt Poker,
Unlawful Everest
Internet Poker,Enforcement
Gambling IPN (BossAct Media)
(UIGEA) andsince
Cake Poker.
2006? TheseThis
are
software scanned each cash game table of the mentioned poker
questions we address with the data from the OPD-UHH which we describe next.
sites and wrote the
displayed information into a SQL database.
The data collection was conducted for each poker site during a period of six months.
It took about ten minutes to scan all tables of an operator and collect the information
about the players sitting at the tables. This implies about 6 data points per hour or 25,920
in the course of six months and allows not only to determine the session lengths of the
players but also to analyze differences in time. The main period of the data collection

1
The gross revenue was 250.9 million US$. 54.2 million US$ were paid in bonuses to the players (so called
rakeback), meaning that the players got an average effective discount on the price of 21.6%.
2
Note that the extrapolation assumes that the revenues per player of PartyPoker are representative for the industry.
3
As the UIGEA applies to the definition of remote gambling in the Wire Act it does not necessarily include poker.

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1 94

 The data collection was conducted for each poker site during a period of six months. It took about ten
minutes to scan all tables of an operator and collect the information about the players sitting at the tables.
This implies about 6 data points per hour or 25,920 in the course of six months and allows not only to
determine the session lengths of the players but also to analyze differences in time. The main period of
the data collection took place during September 2009 and March 2010. Table 2 depicts the exact starting
took place during September 2009 and March 2010. Table 2 depicts the exact starting and
and ending
ending points
points forforeach
each site.
site. Note
Notethat
thatthethe
period of data
period collection
of data had to be
collection extended
had due to technical
to be extended due
to technical
problems suchproblems
as downs ofsuch as downs
the server, of the
software server,
updates andsoftware updates and disconnections.
disconnections.

Table 2

Starting and ending points of the data collection for each site

Poker site Start End

PokerStars 09/10/2009 03/11/2010
Full Tilt Poker 09/06/2009 03/11/2010
Everest Poker 08/13/2009 03/11/2010
IPN (Boss Media) 07/27/2009 02/02/2010
Cake Poker 11/01/2009 07/02/2010
The Online Poker Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH)
In
Online the poker 6 months is a goldmine of the data of data collection we obtained
as all operators data
show in their for a4,591,298
lobby pokerabout
lot of information identities
the
including In the 6 their months
people playing at their tables. It is easy to observe the origin of a player (city or country ), the game type,
country of the data of origin
collection andwetheir playing
obtained habits.
data for Regarding
4,591,298 the market
poker identities
4 shares
including of
their
the observed
country of origin and their playing habits. Regarding the market shares of the observed poker sites these poker sites these are 64.72% of all poker players worldwide (88.27% of the
betting structure and limit of the table they play at, and, of course, the date and time. Financed by the city
US-players and 57.4% of the players from all other countries) who were playing during
of Hamburg,
the period of thethe Institute data of collection. Law & Economics at the University
If this number of Hamburg
is extrapolated tocollected
the totalthese data inwe
market,
get
collaboration a number with ofthe 7,094,095 independent different

player identities.
market spectator PokerScout Note that one real
in the OPD-UHH. person can have
A software
multiple
electronically
4
The poker sites player gathered Full Tiltthe identities Poker, data Everest if he
of the players opens accounts
for IPN
Poker and with
the following more
poker
(Boss Media) than one
networks:
quote operator
of originand
Pokerstars,
the country Full
whilemany
Tilt
Poker Stars
players
and Cake have
Poker,
5
Poker tried specifyout
Everest Poker, IPN (Boss Media) and Cake Poker. This software scanned each cash game table of
the city more of origin than one
of the poker
player. site and therefore have multiple accounts.5
Play money tables have not been taken into consideration.
However,
6
For a more detailed
to be counted multiple times in theapproach
OPD-UHH he collection
has to have 6 played with these
the mentioned pokerdescription sites and wrote regarding the technical
the displayed informationofinto
the adata
SQL database. see Sakai/Haruyoshi 2005.
accounts actively during the data collection period. This may be true for three groups of
players: 1) High volume players (professional and addicted gamblers), 2) Players on the 5
The data collection was conducted for each poker site during a period of six months. It took about ten
high limits as they may need more than one site to find opponents and 3) People trying
minutes to scan all tables of an operator and collect the information about the players sitting at the tables.
out different sites to see which one suits them best. The high volume players have a huge
This impliestoabout
incentive play6at data just points oneper network hour or 25,920
as the in the course of six months
bonuses/rebates they can andget
allows not onlywith
increase to
determine
their playing the session volume. lengths Players of the on players
highbutlimits
also toare
analyze
quitedifferences
rare (which in time. Thereason
is the main period
whyofthey
may
the data have collection to switch took sites place during to findSeptember enough competition).
2009 and March The 2010.data
Tablereveals
2 depictsthat
the for
exactexample
starting
only 0.36% of
and ending points for each site. Note that the period of data collection had to be extended due to technical the No Limit Holdem players are on high stakes (see table 11 in the
appendix).
problems such as downs of the server, software updates and disconnections.
We therefore reason that most people with multiple player identities in our
sample come from the third group. We estimate that for 100 player identities about 85
real
Table 2
players exist. This results in 6,029,980 people with a 6-months prevalence rate of
participating in online poker cash games for real money.
Starting and ending points of the data collection for each site
Results: Market Sizes, Prevalence, and Drivers of Online Poker
The data in the OPD-UHH allows us to specify how many players in each country in
Poker
the site play online poker for real moneyStart
world and how much rake they paidEnd to the operators
PokerStars 09/10/2009
while playing. Using these data we determined the market sizes of the 03/11/2010
different countries
Fulldollar
in Tilt Poker
terms and also the absolute and09/06/2009
relative prevalence of online03/11/2010
poker in a country.
Everest Poker 08/13/2009 03/11/2010
IPN (Boss Media) 07/27/2009 02/02/2010
Market Sizes
Cake Poker 11/01/2009 07/02/2010
The OPD-UHH covers how often and how long a poker player played and if he
played multiple tables at the same time. We linked this information to data about the
average
In the US$ rakeofpaid
6 months percollection
the data player, hour, and table
we obtained for4,591,298
data for the different poker variants
poker identities includingand
their
stakes. This allowed us to determine how much US$ rake a player paid to the operator
country of origin and their playing habits. Regarding the market shares of the observed poker sites these
over the course of 6 months. As we also obtained the origin of the players, we could
aggregate the rake paid for all observed players of each country. We then extrapolated

4
The poker sites Full Tilt Poker, Everest Poker and IPN (Boss Media) quote the country of origin while Poker Stars
and Cake Poker specify the city of origin of the player.
5
Play money tables have not been taken into consideration.
6
For a more detailed description regarding the technical approach of the data collection see Sakai/Haruyoshi 2005.

10 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1 5

 this data to the whole market of each country by considering the market share of the
observed operators in each country (88.4% in the USA, 57.4% in all other countries,
resulting in 64.72% of the whole market). Multiplied by 2 we got the market size
for online poker cash games for each country in 2010. Given that the operators earn
about 70% of their revenues with cash games and 30% with tournaments we further
extrapolated the market size to include the tournament revenues. The resulting gross
market size is the rake paid by all online poker players in a given country. This is not
identical with the players net losses: 1) Players get about 25-30% of
Despite the prohibition of online their rake back in form of rakeback deals or bonuses and 2) players
can win and lose money from other players, a cash flow we did not
gambling and the introduction observe. To obtain the net losses, it is only necessary to account for
of the Unlawful Internet the former point, which can be easily done be deducting 30% of the
Gambling Enforcement Act gross market size. The latter point does not matter much for whole
countries, because cash flows between the players converge to zero if
(UIGEA) in 2006 the US was
The OPD-UHH covers
the how often andplayer
observed how long a poker
pool player (without
are large played andrake,
if he played
pokermultiple
is a zero tables
sum
still by far the biggest
at the samemarket
time. We linkedgame).this information to data about the average US$ rake paid per player, hour,

with 973.3 million US$and tableinfor2010.

the different poker Table 3 shows
variants the ten
and stakes. 10
biggest
This allowedpoker
us to markets
determinein how themuch
world US$inrake
dollar
a
terms of their gross market size and their share of the
player paid to the operator over the course of 6 months. As we also obtained the origin of the players, we total market.
Despite the prohibition of online gambling and the introduction of
could aggregate the rake paid for all observed players of each country. We then extrapolated this data to
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) in 2006 the US was still by
the whole market of each country by considering the market share of the observed operators in each
far the biggest market with 973.3 million US$ in 2010. After the Black Friday, when the
country
US sites(88.4% in the USA, 57.4%
of Pokerstars, Full Tiltin all other Absolute
Poker countries, resulting
Poker andin 64.72% of theBet
Ultimate whole market).
were shut down,
the US market
Multiplied by 2 wesize hasmarket
got the dropped dramatically.
size for The games
online poker cash remaining
for eachoperators
country inlike2010. Cake
11
Poker
Given that
or Bodog Poker which still accept US-players had a market share of
the operators earn about 70% of their revenues with cash games and 30% with tournaments we further less that
12 10% before

the Black Friday. It will be interesting to see if these operators now rise and which level
extrapolated the market size to include the tournament revenues.13 The resulting gross market size is the
the US market will settle on.
rake paid by all online poker players in a given country. This is not identical with the players net losses:
The second largest market is Germany with a market size of 392 million US$. Other
14
1) Players
big get about
markets 25-30% of
are France, their rake
Russia, back in and
Canada formGreat
of rakeback dealsAlthough
Britain. or bonusesthe and 2) players
French marketcan
may
win andnow
loselook
money different
from other after online
players, poker
a cash flow was
we didlegalized, license,
not observe. To obtaintaxed,
the netand insulated
losses, it is only
necessary to account for the former point, which can be easily done be deducting 30% of the grossthe
from
online the
pokerother
was markets
legalized, in
license, 2010.
taxed, In
and total, the
insulated fromplayers
the otherpaid 3.6
markets in billion
2010. In US$
total, rake
the to market
operators
size. in point
players paid 3.6
The latter 2010does
billion or 599
US$ US$
rake to per player.
the operators
not matter much
in 2010 or 599 US$ per player.
for whole countries, because cash flows between the players
converge
Table 3 to zero if the observed player pool are large (without rake, poker is a zero sum game).

Table 3 shows the ten biggest poker markets in the world in dollar terms of their gross market size and
Number of active online poker players, market share and market size per country
their share of the total market. Despite the prohibition of online gambling and the introduction of the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) in 2006 the US was still by far the biggest
Gross Market size 2010
Rank Country
market with 973.3 million US$ in 2010. After theSize
Black Friday,
in mil. when
US$ per the US sites of Pokerstars,
year Share Full Tilt
1 USA 973.30 26.95%
Poker Absolute Poker and Ultimate Bet were shut down, the US market size has dropped dramatically.
2 Germany 391.94 10.85%
The remaining
3 operatorsRussia
like Cake Poker or Bodog Poker235.12
which still accept US-players had a market
6.51%
4 Canada 219.63 6.08%
share of less that 10% before the Black Friday. It will be interesting to see if these operators now rise and
5 France 187.35 5.19%
which level the US market will settle on. 4.42%
6 Great Britain 159.72
7 Netherlands 152.80 4.23%
The8 second largest market
Spain is Germany with a market size of 392 million US$. Other
117.07 big markets are
3.24%
France,9Russia, Canada Sweden 2.75%
99.25 market may now look different after
and Great Britain. Although the French
10 Finland 80.93 2.24%
Total 3,611.59 100%

10
For a more detailed description of this procedure, see main report of the research project: Fiedler/Wilcke, 2011.
11
Prevalence of from
Our data were Online Poker
09/09 to 03/10, but we assumed that these data are representative for 2010. Probably the
market grew a little in this time, but we neglected this and conservatively decided that it did not so we can give a
number for the
Besides thewhole
marketyear
size2010.
the prevalence of online poker is a key figure for describing the market for
12
According to PokerScout, the revenue of a poker site approximately consists of 70% cash games and 30% poker
online poker in a country. Prevalence can be measured in absolute terms (how many people play poker in
tournaments.
13
a This
14
assumes
country) that
and in the share
relative of(how
terms revenues
manyofpeople
the operators is 70%
play poker in every
in relation to,country.
for example, the population).
The exact amount differs from operator to operator and also depends on the playing volume of the player. The
higher the playing volume, the higher the rakeback.
We derived the number of poker players in a country as follows: First, we used the country data 15 for
the observed player identities UNLV Gaming
and added Research identities
the non identifiable & Review Journal 16Volume
proportionally. Then, we16 Issue 1 11
7
extrapolated the number by the market share of the observed sites during the data collection period. In a
last step we calculated the number of active players by assuming that per 100 player identities 85 real
persons exist (see reasoning above). The market shares are derived from the players in a country in
relation to the total number of players.
Prevalence of Online Poker
Besides the market size the prevalence of online poker is a key figure for describing
the market for online poker in a country. Prevalence can be measured in
absolute terms (how many people play poker in a country) and in relative
terms (how many people play poker in relation to, for example, the
. . . there is a huge growth
population). potential of the US market
We derived the number of poker players in a country as follows: First, should online poker be
we used the country data for the observed player identities and added
the non identifiable identities proportionally. Then, we extrapolated
legalized.
the number by the market share of the observed sites during the data
collection period. In a last step we calculated the number of active players by assuming
that per 100 player identities 85 real persons exist (see reasoning above). The market
shares are derived from the players in a country in relation to the total number of
players.
Table
online 4 lists
poker the number license,
of active pokerandplayers for the tenthe
countriesmarkets
with theinmost online poker
Table 4 was
listslegalized,
the number oftaxed, active pokerinsulated from
players for other
the ten countries 2010. In total,
with the the
most
players and
players paid their share
3.6players of all
billion US$ players in the world. Concerning the market size the USA is by far the
online poker andrake to the
their operators
share of allinplayers
2010 or in599the
US$ per player.
world. Concerning the market
biggest
size themarket.
USA Moreis bythan
far 1.4
themillion
biggest people played
market. onlinethan
More poker formillion
1.4 real money duringplayed
people our dataonline
Table 3forperiod
poker
collection real money
from 09/09during ourNearly
to 03/10. data collection
every fourthperiod fromis09/09
poker player to 03/10.
an American Nearly
(23.71%). On the
every fourth poker player is an American (23.71%). On the second place is
second place is the German market with 581 thousand players, or 9.64% of all players worldwide. On the the German
market
Number
next
with 581
ranksoffollow
active thousand
online
France pokerplayers,
(445,860 players, or7.39%),
9.64%
players, market
of all(401,701
share
Russiaand
players
market worldwide.
size per
players,
On
country
6.66%)
the next ranks
and Canada
follow France (445,860 players, 7.39%), Russia (401,701 players, 6.66%) and Canada
(401,701 players, 5.74%). Together, the ten countries with the highest number of poker players account
(401,701 players, 5.74%). Together, the ten countries with the highest number of poker
for 73.92%
players of all players
account worldwide.
for 73.92% Gross Market size 2010
Rank Country of all players worldwide.
Size in mil. US$ per year Share
Table 14 USA 973.30 26.95%
2 Germany 391.94 10.85%
6.51%
10 countries with the highest number of active poker players 235.12
3 Russia
4 Canada 219.63 6.08%
5 France 187.35 5.19%
Rank
6 Country
Great Britain Active players
159.72 4.42%
Share
71 Netherlands
USA 152.80
1,429,943 4.23%
23.71%
82 Spain
Germany 117.07
581,350 3.24%
9.64%
93 Sweden 99.25 2.75%
7.39%
France 445,860
104 Finland
Russia 80.93
401,701 2.24%
6.66%
Total
5 Canada 3,611.59
345,971 100%
5.74%
6 Great Britain 269,247 4.47%
7 Spain 253,043 4.20%
Prevalence of Online Poker 3.98%
8 Netherlands 239,700
9 Brazil 153,889 2.55%
Besides the market size the prevalence of online poker is a key figure for describing the market for
10 Australia 129,714 2.15%
online poker in a country. Prevalence
Other can be measured in absolute
1,571,389terms (how many people26.06%play poker in
TOTAL
a country) and in relative terms (how many people play poker in relation to, for example, the100%
5,490,908 population).

15
We Thederived absolute the number prevalence of poker of players
online inpoker
a country as follows:
disregards theFirst, we used the country
information dataof for
The absolute prevalence of online poker disregards the information of the size of aof the size
country. To know a
16
the observed
country. To player know identities how large and added the the non identifiable
proportion of onlineidentities
poker proportionally.
players is in aThen,
givenwecountry,
how large the proportion of online poker players is in a given country, the number of players has to be
the
extrapolated numberthe ofnumber players byhas the market to be related share of tothethe population
observed of the
sites during the country. But period.
data collection as not In a
related to the population of the country. But as not everybody has access to the internet, it is more
everybody
last step we calculated the number of active players by assuming that per 100 player identities 85to
has access to the internet, it is more meaningful to relate the number the
real
meaningful
number oftointernet relate theusers number in toa the numberTable
country. of internet users inthe
5 depicts a country. Table of
proportion 5 depicts
onlinethepoker
persons exist (see reasoning above). The market shares are derived from the players in a country in
proportioninofaonline
players country poker perplayers internet in a country per internet
users. 0.307% (1users.
out of0.307%
326) (1 ofout
allofpeople
326) ofworldwide
all people
relation to the total number of players.
with
worldwide with internet access have played online poker for real money during the 6 months of the of
internet access have played online poker for real money during the 6 months data
collection.
Accounting
for
the
information
of the internet users in a country changes the ranking of the
15
For the players on Pokerstars and Cake Poker we obtained the city of origin. We used the city data base World
countries.
Cities fromAmong
MaxMindthetocountries withplayers
assign these more to than 100,000 internet users the proportion of online poker
countries.
16
For 11.38% of all observed player identities we could not determine their country of origin. Adding them
players is highest for Hungary with 1.983%. One out of 50 Hungarians with internet access plays online
proportionally to the observed player identities of each country implies that they are equally distributed among all
countries.
poker for This may not For
real money. be true
the as people
USA, it isfrom countries
striking that itwith stricter
is by laws
far the against
biggest onlineingambling
market absolutehave a higher
terms, but
incentive to hide their identity.
12 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1 9
8

 the data collection. Accounting for the information of the internet users in a country
changes the ranking of the countries. Among the countries with more than 100,000
internet
rank only 36 users
th the proportion
considering the number of online poker
of internet usersplayers is highest
in a country. 0.596% forof Hungary
all American with 1.983%.
internet
One out
rank onlyof3650 th Hungarians with internet access plays online poker for real money. For
considering the number of internet users in a country. 0.596% of all American internet
users (1 out of 168) are online poker players. On the one hand that means that the restrictions of the
theusers
USA, it is
(1 out of striking that poker
168) are online it is by far the
players. biggest
On the one handmarket in absolute
that means terms, but
that the restrictions rank
of the
UIGEA
rank only
only were
36th
th
effective
36considering
considering to the
some
the extentofeven
number
number before
internet
of usersthe
internet Black
in users Friday.
a country.
in a On of
0.596%
country.theallother handof
American
0.596% that means
internet
all that
American
UIGEA
rank only 36 were
th effective tothesome
considering extent
number of even before
internet theinBlack
users Friday.
a country. On theofother
0.596% hand thatinternet
all American means that
there
usersis(1aout
internet huge
users growth
of 168) outpotential
(1are of 168)
online ofare
poker the US market
online
players. should
poker
On the one online
players.
hand poker
On the
that means be one
that legalized.
the hand that
restrictions of means
the that the
there
users (1 is
outa of
huge168) growth potential
are online pokerofplayers.
the US market
On the should
one hand online poker be
that means legalized.
that the restrictions of the
restrictions of the UIGEA
UIGEA were effective wereeven
to some extent effective toBlack
before the some extent
Friday. On even
the otherbefore themeans
hand that Blackthat Friday. On
UIGEA
Table
the 5 awere
other handeffective tomeans
some extent
thatpotential even before the Black Friday. potential
On the otherofhand thethat
USmeans that should
there is
Table 5huge growth ofthat there
the US is ashould
market huge growth
online poker be legalized. market
there is apoker
online huge growth potential of the US market should online poker be legalized.
be legalized.
Table
10 5
countries with thethe
highest
10 countries
Table 5 with highestproportion
proportion of
of online pokerplayers
online poker playersper
perinternet
internet users
users (only
(only countries
countries withwith

more than
10 more 100,000
than
countries theinternet
100,000
with internetusers)
highest users)inin2010
proportion 2010
of online poker players per internet users (only countries with
10 countries with the highest proportion of online poker players per internet users (only countries with
more
rank than 100,000
only 36thCountry internet users)
considering in 2010of internet users in a country. 0.596% of all American internet
the number
Rank
more Rank
than 100,000 Country Active
internet users) inActive players
2010 players Internet
Internetuser
user Players/internet useruser
Players/internet
1 1(1 out ofHungary
users Hungary
168) 122,482On the one hand
are online poker players.
122,482 6,176,400 1.983%
that means that the restrictions
6,176,400 1.983%of the
Rank
2 2 were Country Estonia Active players
19,212 Internet user
969,700 Players/internet
1.981% user
UIGEA
Rank Estonia
effective
Country to some extent
Active 19,212
even
playersbefore the Black
Internet 969,700
Friday.
user On the Players/internet 1.981%
other hand that means that
user
1 3 Hungary
Portugal 122,482
100,075 6,176,400
5,168,800 1.983%
1.936%
31 Portugal 100,075 5,168,800 1.936%
there2 is4 a hugeHungary
growth
Denmark
Estonia potential of the US
122,482 market
90,532
19,212 should online
6,176,400poker
4,750,500
969,700 be legalized.1.983%
1.906%
1.981%
42 Denmark
Estonia 90,532
19,212 4,750,500
969,700 1.981% 1.906%
3 5 Iceland
Portugal 4,996
100,075 301,600
5,168,800 1.657%
1.936%
53 Iceland
Portugal 4,996
100,075 301,600
5,168,800 1.936% 1.657%
Table4 65 Netherlands
Denmark 239,700
90,532 14,872,200
4,750,500 1.612%
1.906%
654 7 Netherlands
Denmark 239,700
90,532 14,872,200
4,750,500 1.906% 1.612%
Finland
Iceland 71,543
4,996 4,480,900
301,600 1.597%
1.657%
765 8 Finland
Iceland
Netherlands
Cyprus 71,543
4,996
239,700
6,445 4,480,900
301,600
14,872,200
433,800 1.657%
1.612% 1.597%
1.486%
10876countries
9 with
Cyprus the highest proportion
Netherlands
Norway
Finland 239,700of online poker 14,872,200
6,445
64,535
71,543
players per internet users1.597%
433,800
4,431,100
4,480,900
(only
1.612% countries with
1.486%
1.456%
987 10 Finland
Norway
Slovenia
Cyprus 71,543
64,535
18.899
6,445 4,480,900
4,431,100
1,298,500
433,800 1.597% 1.456%
1.455%
1.486%
more than 100,000 internet users) in6,445 2010
1098 Cyprus
Slovenia
Norway 18.899
64,535 433,800
1,298,500
4,431,100 1.486%
1.456%1.455%
109 36 NorwayUSA
Slovenia 64,535
1,429,943
18.899 4,431,100
239,893,600
1,298,500 1.456%
0.596%
1.455%
10
36
Rank Slovenia

Country 18.899

Active players 1,298,500
user
Internet 1.455%

Players/internet
USA 1,429,943 239,893,600 0.596% user
361
TOTAL
USA
6,029,930
1,429,943
1,965,162,316
239,893,600
0.307%
0.596%
Hungary 122,482 6,176,400 1.983%
36 internet user:
Source USA
Internet World Stats,1,429,943

for June 2010. 239,893,600
0.596%

2 TOTAL
Estonia 6,029,930
19,212 1,965,162,316
969,700 0.307%
1.981%
TOTAL
6,029,930
1,965,162,316
0.307%
Source3internet user: Internet World Stats, for
Portugal June 2010.
100,075 5,168,800 1.936%
Drivers
Source ofTOTAL
the
internet user: prevalence
Internet of6,029,930
World Stats, for Online
June 2010. Poker 1,965,162,316 0.307%
Source4 internet user:Denmark
Internet World Stats, for June 90,532
2010. 4,750,500 1.906%
Drivers of theIceland
5 To understandprevalence of Online 4,996Poker
Drivers
Drivers of
of the
theprevalence
the drivers of
prevalence ofofOnline
the Online
market Poker online poker, it is301,600
Poker
for most useful to analyze the 1.657% relative size
Drivers
To6 of the
understand prevalence
Netherlands
the of
drivers Online
of the Poker
239,700
market for online 14,872,200
poker, it is most useful1.612%toonanalyze
of
To the markets because the absolute numbersfor mostly depend on the size ofuseful
a country. We focused the size
To7 understand
understand thedrivers
Finland
the drivers ofofthe
themarket
market
71,543 online
for online poker,poker,
it is itmost
is most
4,480,900
useful tomostly to analyze
analyze the relative
1.597%
the relative size
therelative
relative size
prevalence
ofof
the markets
online poker
because
and
the
identified that
absolute
the two
numbers
main drivers for this
depend
number are
on
GDP
the
per
size
To understand
8markets the drivers
Cyprus of the market for online
6,445 poker, it ison
most useful to aanalyze theWerelative size on the
ofofthe
of a country.
the because
We
markets because theabsolute
focused
the absolute numbers
on numbers
the relative mostly
mostly depend
prevalence
depend on the of433,800
the size
online
size of ofpoker
a country.country.
andfocused
We
1.486%
focused
identified
on the that
of the9 markets
capita and culture.
Norway
because Athe
simple regression
absolute numbers model
64,535 withdepend
mostly the proportion of of
on the4,431,100
size poker playersWe
a country. perfocused
internet users
1.456%
on the per
relative
the twoprevalence
relative ofonline
main Slovenia
driversonline poker
forpoker
thisand and
number identified
arethatthat
the the
GDP per two main
capita drivers
and fornumber
forculture. thisA number
simple areper
GDP per
regression
10 prevalence
country
of
and its GDP per capita yielded
identified
18.899
a significant
two
influence:
main
If
drivers
1,298,500
the GDP per
this
capita
are
risesare
GDP
by1.455%
1,000perUS$,
relative
model prevalence
with the of online
proportion poker and
of identified
poker that
players thepertwo main
internet drivers
usersfor this
per number
country GDP
and its GDPper
capita
capita and
and culture.
culture. AA simpleregression
simple regression model
model withwith
the the proportion
proportion of poker
of poker
players players per internet
per internet users
per
17
users
the
capita proportion
and culture.of online
A simple poker players increases
regression influence:
model with theby 0.009 percentage
proportion ofper points
poker (t=5.786,
players p<.001).
per internet usersUS$,
per
per
country
capita
36 and
country yielded
and its GDP
GDPUSA a
per significant
percapita
capitayielded
yieldeda1,429,943
significant If the
influence:
a significant
GDP
influence:If 239,893,600
theIfGDP capita
per capita
the GDP
rises by
rises by
per capita
1,000
0.596%
1,000
rises by US$,
1,000 US$,
the
the
proportion
country and its GDP
proportion of
ofper
online
online
capitapoker
poker
yielded players
players by
increases
increases
a significant influence:by
0.009 percentage
0.009
If the percentage
GDP
points
per capita risespoints
(t=5.786, 17 (t=5.786,
by 1,000
p<.001). US$,17
Table 6
the proportion of online poker players increases by 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001).
p<.001).
the proportion ofTOTAL
online poker players increases 6,029,930by 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001).17
1,965,162,316 0.307%
Source internet user: Internet World Stats, for June 2010.
Table 6
Table Table 6 6 of a simple linear regression
Results regarding the influence of GDP per capita on the relative
Results
Drivers 17
See of appendix a simple
of theforprevalence the operationalization
linear regression regarding
of Online Poker
of the simple
thelinear regression.
influence of GDP per capita on the relative
prevalence
of online poker 10
17 See
To
appendix
understand
for
the
the
operationalization
drivers
of
theofmarket
the simple
for linear
onlineregression.
poker, it is most useful to analyze the relative size
17 prevalence
17
of online poker
See
Seeappendix for the
appendix for theoperationalization
operationalizationof of
thethe simple
simple linear
linear regression.
regression.
of the markets because the absolute numbers mostly depend on the size of a country. We focused 10
on the
Sample (n=161) 10 10

relative prevalence of online poker and identified that the
Sample (n=161) two main drivers for this number are GDP per
Regression
Variable
capita and culture. A simple regression t-valueof poker players perSignificance
model with the proportion
coefficient
Regression internet users per
Variable coefficient t-value Significance
country and its GDP per capita yielded a significant influence: If the GDP per capita rises by 1,000 US$,
Constant .192 4.123 .000
the proportion of online poker players increases by 0.009 percentage points (t=5.786, p<.001).17
GDP
Constant per capita in .192 4.123 .000
1000
GDP US$ per capita in .009 5.786 .000
1000Table US$ 6 .009 5.786 .000
Goodness of fit R = .177; adjusted R = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000)
Goodness of fit R = .177; adjusted R = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000)

17
See appendix We were foralso the operationalization able to find evidence of thethat
simple
thelinear regression.
culture 18
has a significant influence on the proportion
of poker players per internetUNLV We were also able to find
users Gaming evidence that the
Research
in a country. culture 18
& Review
An analysis has
of aJournal
significant
variance influence
Volume
(ANOVA) 16 on
with 13
the 1proportion
Issue
a F-Value of 10
of poker(p<.001)
14.114 players confirmed
per internetthat
users in aare
there country. An analysis
significant of variance
differences (ANOVA) with
in the mean-values a F-Value
of each culturalofgroup
14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant differences in the mean-values of each
(see table 7). We controlled the effect for GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F =12.753, cultural group
p<.001).
(see
GDPtable 7). Weand
per capita controlled the effect
culture explain for GDPof
R=50.4% perthecapita by using
variation it as the
between a covariate
relative (F =12.753,
poker p<.001).
prevalence in
Constant .192 4.123 .000
GDP per capita in
1000 US$ .009 5.786 .000

Goodness of fit R = .177; adjusted R = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000)

18
WeWe werewere alsoable
also able to
to find
findevidence
evidencethatthat
the culture has a has
the culture significant influenceinfluence
a significant on the proportion
on
the proportion
of poker of internet
players per poker players
users in aper internet
country. users in
An analysis a country.
of variance An analysis
(ANOVA) of variance
with a F-Value of
(ANOVA) with a F-Value of 14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant
14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant differences in the mean-values of each cultural group
differences in the mean-values of each cultural group (see table 7). We controlled the
(see table 7). We controlled the effect for GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F =12.753, p<.001).
effect for GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F =12.753, p<.001). GDP per capita
GDP per capita and culture explain R=50.4% of the variation between the relative poker prevalence in
and culture explain R=50.4% of the variation between the relative poker prevalence in
the countries.
the countries.
Table 7

Results of the ANOVA regarding the influence of culture on the relative prevalence of online poker

Sample (n=161)
Sum of
Results of a simple linear regression
Squares regarding
dfthe influence
MeanofSquare
GDP per capita on
F the relative
Sig.

prevalence of online poker

Between Groups 17.974 8 2.247 19.324 .000
Constant 2.136 1 2.136 18.375 .000
GDP per capita 1.483 1
Sample (n=161)1.483 12.753 .000
Cultural group 11.512 Regression7 1.645 14.114 .000
Within
VariableGroups 17.673 coefficient
152 .116
t-value Significance
TOTAL 35.647 161
Constant .192 4.123 .000
GDP
Fit of per
the capita
modelin R = .504; adjusted R = .478
1000 US$ .009 5.786 .000
The results implyonline that onlineis poker is only a factor in western and orthodox
The
Goodness results
of imply
fit that
poker only a factor in western and orthodox countries. With the
R = .177; adjusted Rfrom = .171; F-value= 33.477 (p<.000)
countries.
18
We operationalized With the cultureexception of the countries Latin America,
1996:the markets in all
exception of the countries fromaccording Latin America, to the the
classification
markets inofallHuntington
other countries 1=Western,
are negligible2=Orthodox,
(see table
other
3=Islamic, countries 4=African, are 5= negligible Latin American, (see table7=Hindu,
6=Sinic, 8). That8=Buddhist,
can either mean see
0=Others; that these markets have
appendix.
8). That
an enormous can either mean that these markets or thathave an enormous 18 growth potential or that
arepeople of these
We weregrowth also ablepotential to find evidence people
that of these
the culture has cultural groups
a significant influence nottheinterested
on proportion11
in
cultural online groups poker
poker players per internet users in a country. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) with a F-Value
of
are at not all. interested The directions in online of
poker these
at all.results
The could
directions be
of confirmed
these results in
coulda Turkey-test
be confirmed
of
which
in a Turkey-test compares which thecompares mean values the mean(for detailed
values information
(for detailed see see
information table
table1212ininthe
the appendix).
appendix).
14.114 (p<.001) confirmed that there are significant differences in the mean-values of each cultural group
(see table 7). We controlled the effect for GDP per capita by using it as a covariate (F =12.753, p<.001).
Table 8
GDP per capita and culture explain R=50.4% of the variation between the relative poker prevalence in
the countries.statistics of the ANOVA regarding the influence of culture on the relative prevalence of
Descriptive

online7poker
Table

Results of the ANOVA regardingSample (n=161)

the influence of culture on the relative prevalence of online poker
95%-confidence
interval
Standard Sample
Standard (n=161)
Lower Upper
Culture N Mean Sumdeviation
of error bound bound
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Western 47 .638 .452 .040 .558 .718
OrthodoxGroups
Between 13 .450 17.974.326 8 .077 .348
2.247 .651 19.324 .000
Islamic 41 .076 .108 .043 -.009 .161
Constant 2.136 1 2.136 18.375 .000
African 23 .079 .059 .058 -.035 .193
GDP
Latin per capita 1.483 1 1.483 12.753 .000
Cultural
Americangroup20 .185 11.512.100 7 .062 1.645
.063 .308 14.114 .000
Sinic Groups
Within 6 .019 17.673.018 152.113 -.204
.116 .242
Hindu
TOTAL 5 .112 35.647.196 161.124 -.132 .356
Buddhist 6 .128 .157 .113 -.095 .351
Fit of the model
TOTAL 161 .289 .369 R = .504; adjusted R = .478

An
analysis
of
the
influence
of
the law on the prevalence on online poker yielded no significant
18
We operationalized culture according to the classification of Huntington 1996: 1=Western, 2=Orthodox,
results. But
3=Islamic, as law and
4=African, 5= the enforcement
Latin of law are
American, 6=Sinic, hard to8=Buddhist,
7=Hindu, quantify this result may
0=Others; not be taken for full
see appendix.

14
value. In our eyes Gaming
UNLV it mainly Research
says that law which prohibits
& Review Journalonline poker16
Volume was not enforced
Issue 1 at the time of the
11
data collection.

Limitations
 An analysis of the influence of the law on the prevalence on online poker yielded no
significant results. But as law and the enforcement of law are hard to quantify this result
may not be taken for full value. In our eyes it mainly says that law which prohibits online
poker was not enforced at the time of the data collection.

Limitations
Although the study yields many findings there are some limitations. First, we
only collected data about cash games, poker tournaments have not been taken into
consideration. As mentioned in footnote 12 the revenue of a poker site approximately
consists of 70% cash games and 30% poker tournaments. The market size calculations of
this study assume that this relation is identical for every operator, which might not be true
as the tournaments require a larger player pool and the smaller poker networks probably
earn a lesser percentage with them. The OPD-UHH also excludes pure tournament
players and, hence, the numbers of poker players in the different countries we derived in
The
thismarket
studysize calculations ofthe
underestimate thistrue
studyvalue.
assumeHowever,
that this relation is identical for
it is reasonable every
that operator,
there which
are just a very
might not be true
few players as the tournaments
playing require a larger
only tournaments player pool
and whom we do andnot
the smaller
have any poker networks
data on. probably
earn Second, the datawith
a lesser percentage on the
them.origin is self reported
The OPD-UHH by thepure
also excludes players. It isplayers
tournament therefore
and, possible
hence, the
numbers of poker players in the different countries we derived in this study underestimate the true possible
that not all players stated their correct country. But as withdrawing funds is only value.
if the correct personal data are submitted, we reason that the cases of wrong information
However, it is reasonable that there are just a very few players playing only tournaments and whom we do
are rare.
not have any data on.
Third, as PokerStars and Cake Poker do not give information about the country of a
player but only of their city. To assign the players to countries we used the city database
Second, the data on the origin is self reported by the players. It is therefore possible that not all players
World Cities by Maxmind. In doing so we faced two general challenges: 1) Many city
stated their correct country. But as withdrawing funds is only possible if the correct personal data are
names in the world exist multiple times. 2) The city data base only lists cities having a
submitted,
population weofreason that the
at least cases of
50,000. Towrong
solveinformation are rare.
these issues we developed an algorithm to assign
player identities to countries by taking the size of the cities into consideration. In the end,
weThird,
wereasable
PokerStars and Cake Poker do not give information about the country of a player but only of
to successfully assign 92% of the poker players stating a city of origin to
their
theircity. To assign
country the players
of origin. 8%toremained
countries we asused
not the city database World Cities by Maxmind.19 In
assignable.
doingFinally, we faced
so we faced the problem
two general challenges:that one player
1) Many city namescaninhave moreexist
the world than one poker
multiple times. identity
2) The
by registering at multiple sites. It may also be possible that more than one person
city data base only lists cities having a population of at least 50,000. To solve these issues we developed use the
same player identity (for example family members). Considering different qualitative
an algorithm to assign player identities to countries by taking the size of the cities into consideration. In
arguments (see footnote 8), we estimate that for 100 poker identities 85 real persons
the end, we were able to successfully assign 92% of the poker players stating a city of origin to their
exist. We admit this number is not an exact empirical value but an estimation and
country
therefore of origin.
open 8% remained as interpretation.
to subjective not assignable.

Finally, we faced the problem that one player can have more than one poker identity by registering at
Summary and Perspectives
multiple
Thesites. It may
online also market
poker be possible
hasthat more rapidly
grown than one person
in the use
pasttheyears.
same player identity
But until now (forthere
example
have only
family beenConsidering
members). estimates different
about the total market
qualitative size(see
arguments andfootnote
nobody 8),knew how where
we estimate the
that for 100
players
poker and their
identities money
85 real personscome
exist. from, which
We admit countries
this number are
is not an the
exactbiggest markets,
empirical value butand
an where
the proportion of people gambling online on
estimation and therefore open to subjective interpretation. poker games in relation to the internet users
is highest. We were first to answer these questions by using data from the Online Poker
Database of the University of Hamburg (OPD-UHH) which includes information about
approximately 4.6 million online Summary and Perspectives
poker players and their countries of origin.
This study is able to shed light on the online poker market. It is the first time that
The online poker market has grown rapidly in the past years. But until now there have only been
the market can be broken down to countries which provides important insights for local
estimates about
legislators the total
who, market sizewant
for example, and nobody knew how
to evaluate where
their the players
regulation ofand their gambling.
online money comeWe
from, whichan
first gave countries are the
overview ofbiggest markets, of
the structure andthe
where the proportion
online poker and of the
people gambling
market online
shares ofon
the
different
poker poker
games sitestointhethe
in relation yearsusers
internet 2008-2010.
is highest.We
We then described
were first to answerthe data
these in the OPD-
questions by using
UHH
data and
from thethe methodology
Online Poker Database of gathering it. Weofwere
of the University able(OPD-UHH)
Hamburg to identifywhich
4,591,298
includespoker
identities and extrapolated this number to 6,029,980 different players who
information about approximately 4.6 million online poker players and their countries of origin.
paid 3.6
billion US$ rake to the operators in 2010 (on average 599 US$ per player). Hence, online
poker has evolved to become a huge market. This is especially true for western and

19
For further information about this database see: http://www.maxmind.com/app/worldcities.

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1 15

13

orthodox countries where most of the business takes place even when controlling for
GDP per capita.
We also assigned the observed poker identities to their country of origin and derived
the market size of the most important poker countries: Even though the USA had been
the biggest market with 1.4 million players paying 973 million US$ rake in 2010 (before
Black Friday), there are 35 countries with a higher prevalence of online poker in relation
to the number of internet users in that country. For example, Hungary has the highest
proportion of online poker players in relation to the number of internet users (1.98%).
The relatively low prevalence of players in the USA could be seen as evidence that
the regulation of online poker and the UIGEA deterred at least some
of the potential players even before Black Friday. On the other hand
this comparison with the prevalence of online poker in other countries But the most important cause
means that there is a lot of potential in the American online poker for a regulated market being
market. However, these numbers are mostly generated from totally free a smaller market is a fenced
(black) markets. However, a regulated market will probably not yield
the full potential of the market. One reason is taxes, which increase the market, which excludes non-
rake, make the product more expensive, and lead to reduced demand. residents from the player pool
Another reason might be player protection which helps addicted (e.g. Italy or France).
gamblers to stay away from the game as addicts tend to play longer
sessions, more often and more intensely than non-addicts (e.g. see
Productivity Commission 2010) and, hence, are an important source of
revenue (Williams & Wood 2004). But the most important cause for a regulated market
being a smaller market is a fenced market, which excludes non-residents from the player
pool (e.g. Italy or France). This sharply reduces the player pools and, hence, the positive
network effects of large player pools where it is possible to find enough people to play
with for every game type, every limit and at any daytime.
The results presented in this paper did not include information on the market after
the Black Friday when the most important poker operators in the USA were shut down.
Further research has to determine the effects of this event and clarify if the players from
the USA stopped playing, switched to other operators still accepting US players, or even
avoid the country identification and log in to Pokerstars or Full Tilt Poker with a proxy-
IP and deposit with an international credit card.
This study only scratches on the surface of the possibilities the detailed data in
the ODP-UHH allow. It is possible not only to break down the market on a national
level but also to regions within countries. Future studies will also be able to analyze
the playing habits and to determine for example the session lengths and the playing
frequency of a player and which limits and how many tables the player plays
simultaneously. This information can then be used for further analyses regarding inter
and intra country differences. By conducting time series analyses it is also be possible
to identify how many players tend to play more often and more intensively over time
and how many decrease the intensity of play and what kind of factors may give a hint at
which group a player belongs to. This may not only be interesting for the industry but
also from the viewpoint of excessive and compulsive gambling.

16 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1

play more often and more intensively over time and how many decrease the intensity of play and what
kind of factors may give a hint at which group a player belongs to. This may not only be interesting for
the industry but also from the viewpoint of excessive and compulsive gambling.

Measurement Appendix
Measurement Appendix

Table 9

Operationalization of s variables of the simple linear regression regarding relative market size and GDP

per capita

Variable Description
independent variable
GDP per Capita
in thousand US-Dollar

dependent variable
Proportion of poker players proportion of poker players in a country
per internet users in percentage

Table 10

Operationalization of variables of ANOVA

Variable Description
dependent variable
Proportion of poker players proportion of poker players in a country
per internet users in percentage

factor
Cultural group 1=Western, 2=Orthodox, 3=Islamic,
4=African, 5= Latin American, 6=Sinic,
7=Hindu, 8=Buddhist, 0=Others

Covariate 15
GDP per capita
In thousand US-Dollar

Table 11

Players per Stake for No Limit Holdem

Limit (Small Blind/Big Blind in $) Stakes % of players

0,01/0,02-0,05/0,10 Micro 48.43%
0,10/0,20- 0,5/1 Low 41.24%
0,75/1,50-5/10 Mid 9.97%
8/16-500/1000 High 0.36%

Table 12

Influence of Culture Results of Turkey-Test

Sample (n=161)
Average Standard 95%-confidence interval
Culture (I) Culture (J) difference (I-J) error p-value Lower bound Upper bound

Orthodox .176 .111 .760 -.165 .516

Islamic .717* .076 .000 .484 .949
African .713* .090 .000 .436 .990
Western Latin American .577* .094 .000 .287 .867
Sinic .789* .153 .000 .318 1.261
Hindu .670* .166 .002 .159 1.182
Buddhist .649* .153 .001 .178 1.121
Western -.176 .111 .759 -.516 .165
Islamic
African
.541*
UNLV
.538*
Gaming.113
.123
.000
Research
.001
& .195
Review
.160
Journal .887
Volume
.915
16 Issue 1 17
Orthodox Latin American .401* .126 .037 .014 .789
Sinic .614* .175 .013 .077 1.150
Hindu .495 .186 .144 -.077 1.067
Buddhist .474 .175 .127 -.063 1.011
Western -.717* .076 .000 -.949 -.484
Orthodox -.541* .113 .000 -.887 -.195
 0,01/0,02-0,05/0,10 Micro 48.43%
0,10/0,20- 0,5/1 Low 41.24%
0,75/1,50-5/10 Mid 9.97%
8/16-500/1000 High 0.36%

Table 12

Influence of Culture Results of Turkey-Test

Sample (n=161)
Average Standard 95%-confidence interval
Culture (I) Culture (J) difference (I-J) error p-value Lower bound Upper bound

Orthodox .176 .111 .760 -.165 .516

Islamic .717* .076 .000 .484 .949
African .713* .090 .000 .436 .990
Western Latin American .577* .094 .000 .287 .867
Sinic .789* .153 .000 .318 1.261
Hindu .670* .166 .002 .159 1.182
Buddhist .649* .153 .001 .178 1.121
Western -.176 .111 .759 -.516 .165
Islamic .541* .113 .000 .195 .887
African .538* .123 .001 .160 .915
Orthodox Latin American .401* .126 .037 .014 .789
Sinic .614* .175 .013 .077 1.150
Hindu .495 .186 .144 -.077 1.067
Buddhist .474 .175 .127 -.063 1.011
Western -.717* .076 .000 -.949 -.484
Orthodox -.541* .113 .000 -.887 -.195
African -.003 .092 1.000 -.287 .280
Islamic Latin American -.140 .097 .833 -.436 .157
Sinic .073 .155 1.000 -.403 .548
Hindu -.046 .168 1.000 -.561 .469
Buddhist -.067 .155 1.000 -.542 .408
Western -.713* .090 .000 -.990 -.436
Orthodox -.538* .123 .001 -.915 -.160
Islamic .003 .092 1.000 -.280 .287
African Latin American -.136 .108 .912 -.469 .196
Sinic .076 .162 1.000 -.423 .574
Hindu -.043 .175 1.000 -.579 .494
Buddhist -.064 .162 1.000 -.562 .435
Western -.577* .094 .000 -.867 -.287
Orthodox -.401* .126 .037 -.789 -.014 16
Islamic .140 .097 .833 -.157 .436
Latin- African .136 .108 .912 -.196 .469
American Sinic .212 .165 .902 -.294 .718
Hindu .094 .177 .999 -.450 .637
Buddhist .073 .165 1.000 -.434 .579
Western -.789* .153 .000 -1.261 -.318
Orthodox -.614* .175 .013 -1.150 -.077
Islamic -.073 .155 1.000 -.548 .403
Sinic African -.076 .162 1.000 -.574 .423
Latin American -.212 .165 .902 -.718 .294
Hindu -.119 .214 .999 -.777 .540
Buddhist -.140 .204 .997 -.768 .488
Western -.670* .166 .002 -1.182 -.159
Orthodox -.495 .186 .144 -1.067 .077
Islamic .046 .168 1.000 -.469 .561
Hindu African .043 .175 1.000 -.494 .579
Latin American -.094 .177 .999 -.637 .450
Sinic .119 .214 .999 -.540 .777
Buddhist -.021 .214 1.000 -.679 .638
Western -.649* .153 .001 -1.121 -.178
Orthodox -.474 .175 .127 -1.011 .063
Islamic .067 .155 1.000 -.408 .542
Buddhist African .064 .162 1.000 -.435 .562
Latin American -.073 .165 1.000 -.579 .434
Sinic .140 .204 .997 -.488 .768
Hindu .021 .214 1.000 -.638 .679
Table 12: Results of Turkey-Test.
*: p < .05.

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20 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal Volume 16 Issue 1