GSM Association

UNRESTRICTED
Official Document IR.70

SMS SS7 Fraud

3.1
16 February 2005

This is a non-binding permanent reference document of the GSM Association.

Security Classification Category (see next page)

This is an UNRESTRICTED official document
GSM Association
RESTRICTED
Official Document IR.70

Security Classification (Unrestricted)

This document is subject to copyright protection. The GSM Association (Association) makes no
representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept
any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or
timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this
document may be subject to change without prior notice. Access to and distribution of this
document by the Association is made pursuant to the Regulations of the Association.

Copyright Information
This document is property of the GSM Association 2005.
This document and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association.

GSM Association References

IR.71 SMS SS7 Fraud Prevention
BA.43 SMS Handbook
AA.50 SMS Fraud Criteria

Document History

Version Date Brief Description

Produced by Matthieu FOUQUET Bouygues Telecom (France) and T-Mobile
1.0.0 December 15th, 2003
Group
1.1.0 Mach 29th, 2004 First remarks added.
th
2.0.0 July, 19 2004 Rename as IR.71 document
2.1.0 July, 20th 2004 Title modification
th
2.2.0 July, 20 2004 Final version for approval
3.0.0 August, 4th 2004 Version approved
th
3.1 February, 16 2005 GT Scanning case added
NOTE 11 July 2005 This document has been declassified from RESTRICTED to
UNRESTRICTED. This was approved by GSMA/CTO.

Other Information

Item Description
Document Owner IREG
Editor / Company Matthieu Fouquet / Bouygues Telecom
Revision Schedule Semi-annual
Key words Fraud

Feedback
This document is designed to help GSMA members in their work. If you find any errors in this
document, or wish to suggest changes to this document, please contact (mailto:prd@gsm.org)
with your comments.

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Executive Summary

Many Mobile operators are facing with SMS problems (Spamming, Fraud or illegal use of their
SMS-C addresses).

The document:
Defines each SMS Fraud case
Describes technical aspects for each case

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Table of Contents

1 Introduction 5
2 Spamming Case 7
2.1 Definition ............................................................................................ 7
3 Flooding case 8
3.1 Definition ............................................................................................ 8
3.2 Technical Aspect ................................................................................ 8
4 Faking Case 9
4.1 Definition ............................................................................................ 9
4.2 Technical Aspect ................................................................................ 9
5 Spoofing Case 12
5.1 Definition .......................................................................................... 12
5.2 Technical Aspect .............................................................................. 12
6 GT Scanning 14
6.1 Definition .......................................................................................... 14
6.2 Technical aspect .............................................................................. 14

Appendix A: Abbreviations 15

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1 Introduction

C7 CARRIER

International C7 Network
HLR

IGP

IGP STP
SMSC STP

C7 CARRIER
SMSC

MSC / VLR Mobile Network B

BSS
SMSC : Short Message Service Center
STP : Signalling Transfert Point
Non Mobile Operator / HLR : Home Location Register
IGP : International Gateway Point
Third Party VLR : Visited Location Register
Mobile Network A BSS : Base Station Subsystem
SS7 : Signalling System N7

First, you will find in this figure the C7 architecture with all the necessary nodes.

The International Gateway Point (IGP) is the gate to the C7 Network for roaming or SMS
interworking services.

Below, the message flow related to the normal SMS sending:

Step one: the mobile sends the SMS to the SMS-C:

BSS
STP SMS-C
MSC / VLR

Subscriber A
MA P Forward Short Message / SMS Submit

Called SCCP Party Address = @ SMS-C,

MSISDN A / MSISDN B

T CAP End Forw ard Short Messag e / SMS Submit

Step two: the SMS-C recovers the VLR address and the IMSI of the recipient subscriber:

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International C7
Network

SMS-C STP IGP IGP STP HLR

MAP Send R ou ting Info for Short Message

Called SCCP Party Addr ess = MSISDN B

TCAP End Send Routing Info for Shor t Message

IMSI Subscriber B, VLR ad dress of Subscriber B

Step three: the SMS-C sends the SMS to the subscriber B:

Inte rnatio nal C7

Network
BSS
SMS-C STP IGP IGP STP MSC / VLR

Subscriber B
MAP Fo rward Short Message / SMS Deliver

Called SCCP Party Address = @ VLR,

IMSI B / MSISDN A

TCAP End Forw ard Short Message / SMS Deliver

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2 Spamming Case
2.1 Definition
Spamming is an action where the subscriber receives an unsolicited SMS. As an unsolicited
SMS, the subscriber did not request to receive this message.
The act of spamming does not define the content but only the fact that the SMS was received
without solicitation. The content of the spam SMS is incidental to the act. The spam SMS may
take on various forms of content to include: commercial information, bogus contest and other
message generally intended to invite a response from the receiver.

It is important to note that the SMS could be sent from a valid originator and may be correctly
billed to the sender.
Technical Aspect
In the Spamming case, there are no specific technical aspects. The spamming Originator could
be a single person, a commercial company or a mobile operator.

A normal way of sending could be used through the SMSC like described below:

Non Mobile Operator /

Third Party

SMSC

STP

MSC / VLR

BSS

Mobile Network A

The SMS is submitted by a mobile phone or by a third party connected to the SMS-C (Content
provider for example).

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3 Flooding case
3.1 Definition
The act of flooding is when a large number of messages are sent to one or more destinations.
These messages may be either valid or invalid. The value or parameter used to define flooding is
the extraordinary number of messages sent.

The flooding parameter is compared to the average or normally expected load, and the expected
peak value of a selected message flow. When the parameter is unusually high, without other
explanation, then this is considered flooding.
3.2 Technical Aspect
The sending of the messages in a case of flooding is within the normal methods of sending
messages. Consequently, there is no specific technical aspect for this case.

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4 Faking Case
4.1 Definition
A fake SMS is originated from the international C7 Network and is terminated to a mobile
network. This is a specific case when SCCP or MAP addresses are manipulated. The SCCP or
MAP originator (for example: SMSC Global Title, or A_MSISDN) is wrong or is taken from a valid
originator.
4.2 Technical Aspect
In general, a SM-SC is used to send mobile terminated SMs to a PLMN user but in a manner that
hides the true identity of the source SM-SC. Typically, this is done by substituting a valid address
with another PLMN address. When the faking case technique is used in conjunction with spam
content, the complaints are then sent to the incorrect, that is, the innocent PLMN. Furthermore,
any protective escalation actions by the receiving PLMN, such as suspension of MT-SMS service
from the apparent-source PLMN are both ineffective and damaging to proper users of SMS
between the two PLMNs.

An example of commercial model for Spammers using the Faking Case for PRS (Premium rate
service) fraud is described below:

The spammer leases Premium rate lines 0906from a fixed-line carrier in the country of PLMN
A. The spammer arranges for an overseas SM-SC to send messages to customers of PLMN A
that read like: This is the 2nd attempt to contact U. You have won this week s top prize of either
1000 cash or a holiday in Bahamas. Just call 0906xxxxx TcsBox6017 1.50ppm.

PLMN A customers call the number but discover after some expensive minutes that there is no
prize. The spammer collects the premium rate revenue from PLMN A, pays off the access
charges to the fixed line carrier and disappears with the profit.

Subsequently the mobile customers complain to their network operator or mobile service
provider, in this case PLMN A. PLMN A raises the issue with the Regulatory Authority, but the
fraudster has disappeared. PLMN A contacts the source of the SMs (owner of the SM-SC), who
denies any knowledge of the SMS-Spam messages.

The delivery of a Mobile Terminated SM is in two parts:

1. The SM-SC uses the destination MSISDN to address a MAP message <Send Routing
Information for Short Message>, to the Home Location Register (HLR) for that customer
to find out whether the MSISDN is valid, can receive SMs, and if so, to determine the
current switch (MSC) that the destination user is registered on. The HLR responds to the
SM-SC with the information.

2. The SMSC sends the actual text of the SM to the currently registered MSC and a MAP
message <Forward Short Message>. The MSC responds to confirm the message was
delivered, and generates a CDR containing all relevant information including the SM-SC
address.

In the faking case, the first part is done exactly as described above. However, the second part is
changed so that the source address in the MAP message <Forward Short Message> is changed,
often to someone elses SM-SC address. The manipulation of the SM-SC address causes any
inter-PLMN SM accounting to be in error, and means that any policing against the apparent
Spam generator harms innocent parties and is ineffective against the real Spam generator.
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The faking of the source address in the SCCP called party Global Title and the Service Centre
Address in the MAP message <Forward Short Message> whilst having the correct equivalent
address in the MAP message <Send Routing Information for Short Message> is impossible
without considerable efforts by the technical staff running the SM-SC. In other words, it does not
happen either by accident, faulty configuration data or as the result of raw text messages
received from the Internet. It happens because in most cases it requires a software patch on the
SM-SC. Therefore; any instances of this happening are as the result of direct action by SM-SC
staff, and probably in conjunction with assistance from the staff of the Associated PLMN.

Consequently, it is fair to state that the Faking Case can only be caused by deliberate activities
by a Spam-generating PLMN, a Spam-sponsoring PLMN, or a Spam-generating SM-SC operator
acting in conspiracy with a PLMN.

The figure below describes the example of a third party using the real SMSC address from
another mobile network. The SMS is sent to a real subscriber of mobile network B (The originator
must have the correct IMSI) or could be sent to a wrong IMSI (Just to generate C7 Overload).

The IMSI can be recovered by detecting the Send Routing Information for Short Message". In
this case, the third party must use their own real SCCP / MAP SMSC address.

: Forward Short Message SMS Deliver

: Forward Short Message SMS Deliver Ack

Non Mobile Operator /
Third Party

International C7 Network

IGP

IGP

Mobile Network B

SMSC

HLR
STP

STP

MSC / VLR

BSS MSC / VLR

BSS

Su bscriber B
Mobil e Network A

The third party could send the SMS to all VLRs of mobile network B if he cannot recover the
location of the subscriber (SRI for SM blocked by Mobile Network B).

The A_MSISDN could be wrong or manipulated.

Below displays the transaction flow, for the SMS delivery:

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International C7
Network
SMS-C MSC / VLR
STP
THIRD PARTY
TCAP Begin, MAP Forward Short Message SMS Deliver, Called Party Address = GT of VLR B

Calling Party Address = GT of real SMSC from another Network, IMSI B = real or fake one

International C7
Network
TCAP End, MAP Forward Short Message SMS Deliver, Called Party Address = GT of the real SMSC

SMS-C A

The acknowledgement is sent to the real SMSC.

Billing Impact associated with Faking
If MSISDN B is roaming, when the message is delivered, and if, the visited network has a
charging agreement in place with MSISDN Bs HPLMN. In this scenario, faking would impact
inter-operator accounting (or would at least give rise to discrepancies in the number of messages
the HPLMN and VPLMN believe were sent from one to another).

If MSISDN B is on its own, HPLMN when it receives the message, if this HPLMN has an SMS
inter-working agreement with the network whose SMSC is faked then once again there could be
inter-operator accounting issues.

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5 Spoofing Case
5.1 Definition
The spoofing case is related to an illegal use of the HPLMN SMS-C by a third party.

In this case, a SMS MO with a manipulated A-MSISDN (real or wrong) is coming into the HPLMN
network from a foreign VLR (real or wrong SCCP Address).
5.2 Technical Aspect
To a HPLMN point of view, one subscriber is roaming and sending a SMS. In fact, this is not a
real subscriber; the message is not sent by a real mobile but is generated from a specific system
with a C7 application.

The A-MSISDN being used may in fact be real or not depending on the screening in place in the
HPLMN SMS-C (Screening on CC+NDC or No A-MSISDN screening in place).

The figure below describes the case with a real A-MSISDN and real VLR SCCP address from
another Mobile Network.

: Forward Short Message SMS Submit

: Forward Short Message SMS Submit Ack

Non Mobile Operato r /
Third Party

International C7 Network

IGP

IGP

Mobile Network B

SMSC

HLR
STP

STP

MSC / VLR

BSS MSC / VLR

BSS

Mobile Network A

The Map message "Forward Short Message / SMS Submit acknowledge" is sent to the real VLR.

If the billing is made from the SMS-C data, the real subscriber will be invoiced. If the Billing is
made from the TAP file, no one will be invoiced.

Below the message flow for the SMS Delivery:

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International C7
Network
THIRD PART Y STP
SMS-C

TCAP Begin, MAP For ward Short Message SMS Subm it, Calling Party Address = GT of another VLR

Called Party Address = SMSC GT, A-MSISDN = real or f ake one

International C7
Network
TCAP End, MAP Forward Short Message SMS Submit, Called Part y Address = GT of the real VLR

MSC / VLR

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6 GT Scanning
6.1 Definition

The GT scanning is the fact to send SMS MO to all Global Title address from one mobile
operator in order to find unsecured SMS-C (SMS-C that are not controlling the A number).

6.2 Technical aspect

Multiple SMS Forward SM Submits are received, generally, from the same mobile MSISDN with
the Called SCCP Address and Service Centre Address incremented on each attempt.

It would appear that individuals using a mobile with a computer connection are instigating these
scans.

The easiest of these scans to spot are sequential in nature scanning 10,000 GT at a time. It has
also been seen randomised scans, though on sorting the data it is clear that blocks are being
scanned.

This type of messaging is picked up in normal statistics in monitoring expected and unexpected
combinations of direction, GT and message type.

There can be no valid reason for such scanning of networks other than locating unsecured
SMSC. With simpler computer integration with mobiles and SMS emulation software readily
available this type of activity is likely only to increase. It would be desirable for such activities to
be reported to the Home PLMN of the originating MSISDN in order to have service removed.

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Appendix A: Abbreviations
Term Definition
MAP Mobile Application Part
SMS Short Message Service
SMS-C SMS Centre
VPLMN Visited PLMN
C7 SS7
SS7 Signalling System N 7
STP Signalling Transfer Point
HLR Home Location Register
IGP International Gateway Point
VLR Visitor Location Register
BSS Base Station Subsystem
SCCP Signalling Connection Control Part
GT Global Title
MSU Message Signalling Unit
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
TCAP Transaction Capabilities Application Part
MSISDN Mobile Subscriber ISDN

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