SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34395. May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALEZ, Petitioner,
vs
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V),
BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L. VALDES, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO
LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ,
FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y
HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,
BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DOA
FILOMENA ROCES DE LEGARDA, Respondents.
PONENTE: AQUINO, J.

Facts:
The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions by his two daughters and
the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De La Paz who
was survived by his widow, Filomena Roces y Legarda and
their seven children: four daughters named, Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa and Filomena and their three sons, named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.

Meanwhile one of the daughters, Filomena, died intestate and

without an issue and her mother Filomena Roces y Legarda
who became her sole heir, partitioned their one-third share in
the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason with her six surviving
children and then conveyed the properties she inherited from
her deceased daughter by holographic will to her 16
grandchildren. In opposition thereto, one of the daughters
Beatriz Legarda Gonzales filed a motion in the testate
proceeding and an ordinary civil action in the lower court
contending that the disputed properties are resersable
properties. The lower court dismissed the complaint. Hence,
the appeal by certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the share of Filomena [granddaughter] from
the 1/3 of Benito Tuasons estate, which was transmitted to
her mother Filomena upon the formers death is a reservable
property. [YES]

Ruling:
Trial Court Decision is Set Aside.

The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable

properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article
811, and whether Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda could
dispose of them in her will in favor of her grandchildren to the
exclusion of her six children.

Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what
she inherited from her daughter Filomena to the reservees
within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the
second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to
the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs.
Legarda?

As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a

question of first impression. It was resolved in Florentino v.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to
this case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other
pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on
the nature of reserva troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria o semi-troncal.

Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their
five briefs in descanting on the nature of reserva troncal,
which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal,
was abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the
decedents estate from being entailed, to eliminate the
uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which
uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable
property) and to discourage the confinement of property
within a certain family for generations which situation
allegedly leads to economic oligarchy and is incompatible with
the socialization of ownership.

The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of

feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest. Moreover, the
reservas, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
considered unjust and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the

Code Commission, restored the reserva troncal, a legal
institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobeas,
has provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.

Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish

Civil Code, now article 891, which reads:

"ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente

bienes que ste hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrativo de otro
ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado reservar los
que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los
parientes que esten dentro del tercer grado y pertenezcan a la
linea de donde los bienes proceden."cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant

any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged
to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and who belong to the line from which said
property came."cralaw virtua1aw library

In reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by

gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the
said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve
the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and
who belong to the line from which the said property came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (1) a first transmission

by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant
or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a
posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate
succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant
(causante de la reserva) in favor of another ascendant, the
reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the
reservation, and (3) a third transmission of the same property
(in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the
reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third
degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of
the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant (6 Castan Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part I, 1960,
6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserva. Thus,

where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her properties were
inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan,
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the
exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna
v. Vda. de Corcino, 111 Phil. 872).

The persons involved in reserva troncal are (1) the ascendant

or brother or sister from whom the property was received by
the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the
descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant
who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of
law and (4) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea
o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the
property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez v.

Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua v. Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412).
Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin v. Villamayor,
72 Phil. 392).

The rationale of reserva troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que

bienes poseidos secularmente por una familia pasen
bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de
los enlaces y muertes prematuras", or "impedir que, por un
azar de la vida, personas extraas a una familia puedan
adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella" (6
Castan Tobeas, Derecho Civil, Part 1, 6th Ed., 1960, p. 203;
Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

An illustration of reserva troncal is found in Edroso v. Sablan,

25 Phil. 295. In that case, Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels
of land from his father Victoriano. Pedro died in 1902, single
and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited
from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands
of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo Sablan and Basilio
Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus.
Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in
her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in
favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her,
should be noted in the title.

In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in

1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of conjugal land was
inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died
intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her
father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half
portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife
and their six children. It was held that the said one-half
portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto
Maalac and, upon his death, should be inherited by Leona
Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and maternal
aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which
said one-half portion came (Aglibot v. Maalac, 114 Phil. 964).

Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino v.

Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala v. Alcala and
Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez v. Balcita,
46 Phil. 551; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon v. Galang,
48 Phil. 601; Riosa v. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno v. Centeno,
52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of
Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina v. Abille, CA 39 O.G.
1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the

descendant, or the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 190).

In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property

from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her
estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. In his hands, the
property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo,
the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a
maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within
the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are
not reservees. They cannot even represent their parents
because representation is confined to relatives within the third
degree (Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).

Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the

more remote subject to the rule of representation. But the
representative should be within the third degree from the
prepositus (Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship.

Illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are
excluded.

Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission

wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donation
and succession (Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186-189-190,
citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 360).

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the

death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came (Sienes v.
Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).

The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title
is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The
reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may
alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The
transferees rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become
indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
(Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso v. Sablan, 25
Phil. 295; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino v.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Director of Lands v. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279.)

The reservors title has been compared with that of the vendee
a retro in a pacto de retro sale or to a fideicomiso condicional.

The reservors alienation of the reservable property is subject

to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at the time of the
reservors death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. If there are no
reservees at the time of the reservors death, the transferees
title would become absolute (Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;
Gueco v. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Nono v. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate,

expectant or contingent right. His expectant right would
disappear if he predeceased the reservor. It would become
absolute should the reservor predecease the reservee.

The reservee cannot impugn any conveyance made by the

reservor but he can require that the reservable character of
the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa v. Rocha,
48 Phil. 737; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco v.
Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservees right

to the reservable property is illegal for being a contract
regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89, 96).

And there is a dictum that the reservees right is a real right

which he may alienate and dispose of conditionally. The
condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the reservor
(Sienes v. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).

"The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of

the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting
to the line of origin from which it had temporarily and
accidentally strayed during the reservistas lifetime. The
authorities are all agreed that there being reservatarios that
survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have
enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable
property." (J. J.B.L. Reyes in Cano v. Director of Lands, 105
Phil. 1, 5.)
"Even during the reservistas lifetime, the reservatarios, who
are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert
the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that
might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose,
they can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of
property even while the reservista is alive" (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that

corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise
clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long
as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo v. Gerona, 58 Phil.
226, 237).

"The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but

from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios
are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they
must survive the reservista." (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo
2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274,
310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura v. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

Hence, upon the reservistas death, the reservatario nearest

to the prepositus becomes, "automatically and by operation of
law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cano v. Director
of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 5.)

In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably

reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as

reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or
mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the
second degree, her three daughters and three sons.

As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or

cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic

will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties
which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because
the reservable properties did not form part of her estate
(Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the

reservees inherit the reservable properties from the
prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties

should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to
whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the
other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary

disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the
reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of
article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the

doctrine of Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, a similar case,
where it was ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the

death of ascendant (reservista) together with his own
property in favor of another of his descendants as forced heir,
forms no part of the latters lawful inheritance nor of the
legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be
reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from
his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in
interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the heir
to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time
the right of a reservatario" (reservee).

In the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II

and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon begot two children,
Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties
from their father. Upon Apolonio IIIs death in 1891, his
properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in
1908. In her will she instituted her daughter Mercedes as
heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her
deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.

The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first

wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the descendants of the deceased
children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which
Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III, which the
latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which
Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.

Plaintiffs theory was that the said properties, as reservable

properties, could not be disposed of in Severinas will in favor
of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable

properties, did not form part of Severinas estate and could
not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.

As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a

reservee, to one-seventh of the properties. The other
six-sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six
reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are
bound to follow in this case the doctrine of the Florentino case.
That doctrine means that as long as during the reservors
lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third
degree of the prepositus, regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the
ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains
its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest
reservees. The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose
the reservee to whom the reservable property should be
awarded.

The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva

troncal when the only relatives within the third degree are the
common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and
sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino
case.

It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in

question are not reservable properties because only relatives
within the third degree from the paternal line have survived
and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her
sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda who belong to the paternal line, the reason
for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons
outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein."cralaw
virtua1aw library

That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case

where the reservor willed the reservable properties to her
daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the
other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the
prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the

reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her
daughter does not form part of the reservors estate nor of the
daughters estate but should be given to all the seven
reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the
third degree.

This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the

reservable property to only one reservee it did not pass into
the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that
the heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and
there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other
reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable
property (pp. 894-5).

Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda

could not dispose of in her will the properties in question even
if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third
degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by
operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legardas six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena
Legarda.

It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from

the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees
are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they
must survive the reservor (Padura v. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).

The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their
reservable character due to the non-existence of third degree
relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family,
"except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the
Legarda and Roces lines.

That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been

extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of
Mrs. Legardas death. Since at the time of her death, there
were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties
should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on
reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservors
holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legardas estate (Cano v. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. 1, 4).