BOD Docket Final

California College Republicans
Board of Directors Meeting
Chairmans Letter to the Board:
California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 1

This years the Board of Directors will tackle several important issues. These range from
tackling issues of procedural ambiguity, to appointing an Executive Director.
It is important that delegates take note of the important constitutional authority set out for the
board. Pursuant to the constitution, this board constitutes the legislative representative body of
CCR:
The affairs of this organization shall be governed in compliance with this Constitution by
a Board of Directors.
Article V 1.
Finally, I do personally understand the political divisiveness of the past few months. Choices
have been made. Words said. Actions taken. But now is the time of unity, and ultimately, a time
to correct wrongs.
Thus, before us today, while rather lengthy, is the document that will solve many of the technical
aspects of this organization. While many more to come, this docket constitute the framework for
future procedural reform. Read carefully, and read well.
Best,
Board of Directors Agenda

1. Call to order
2. Roll Call
3. Approve Prior Minutes (N.A.)
4. Approve the Agenda
5. Officer Reports
6. New Business
a. Appointment of Christian Chacon to Executive Director
b. Reform Report approval
c. Bylaws approval
d. Committee Appointments
i. Approval of the Judiciary Committee Charter
ii. Approval of a Chairman for the Judiciary Committee
iii. Approval of a Chairman for the Constitutional Review Committee
iv. Approval of a Chairman for the Finance Committee
v. Approval of a Chairman for the Resolutions Committee
vi. Approval of a Chairman for the Platform Committee
vii. Approval of a Chairman for the Credentials Committee
viii. A Resolution to Publish Applications for Committee Decisions
e. Budget approval
f. CCR 2018 Convention
g. Leadership Retreat Working Papers
7. Old Business
8. Committee Breakout1
9. Announcements
ITEM 1
1
Note: If Bylaws pass, this takes effect.

A Resolution to Appoint Christian Chacon as Executive Director
WHEREAS, CCR does not currently have an Executive Director; and
WHEREAS, Ariana Rowlands has officially appointed the Christian Chacon to be Executive
Director; and
WHEREAS, Article V 2 of the CCR constitution specifies that the appoint of the Executive
Director must be ratified by the Board of Directors; and
WHEREAS, Executive Directors are important to the functional nature of CCR; and
Therefore be it resolved, the California College Republican Board of Directors approve the
appointment of Christian Chacon as the Executive Director of CCR.

ITEM 2
REPORT ON THE STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL
AMENDMENTS FOR THE CALIFORNIA COLLEGE
REPUBLICANS
Office of the Parliamentarian
Department of the Chairman
To the California College Republican Board of Directors

Parliamentarian Gandall
Decision Requested:
I request that the Board of Directors to determine the following 5 facts, and then pursue a policy
option based on the details provided:
(1). Are their constitutional and or structural problems with the status quo CCR constitution?
(2). Are the harms solved by the procedure, policy, or a mixture of both?
(3). Is procedure necessary? Can precedent create adequate tenants without constitutional
reform?
(4). Is structural reform necessary to maintain organizational efficiency?
(5). Which actors are needed for the policy options? What can be solved without the General
Assembly?

I. Important Definitions
This paper will seek to explain events and policies using several key terms unique to
organizational theory and practice. The following are the definitions to be used in this paper:
Charisma: attainment of an identifiable pinnacle position of responsibility where the ability to

effect profound change in organizations and organizational members can be exhibited.2
Charismatic Authority: Leadership that relies on devotion to the individual leader, either through
normative patterns created by him, or by exceptional perceived heroism.
Traditional Authority: A form of leadership in which authority is based on tradition or customs.

These customs are existing prior to the leader. Simply put, authority granted because it has
always been that way.
Bureaucratic Authority: Leadership in which authority is derived from set jurisdictions dictated
by rules. Associated with a strong legal order.
Framework: A generalized model that can be used to apply contexts and understand the impact
of the given context.
II. Abstract
2
Oconnor, Jennifer, et al. Charismatic leaders and destructiveness: A historiometric study. The Leadership Quarterly, vol. 6,
no. 4, 1995, pp. 529555.

The California College Republicans (CCR) remains an influential political actor in California;
indeed, with over 50 chapters, a large number of deployments around the state, and chartership
with the California GOP, the organization remains one of the largest groups in the state. The
organization, however, has suffered from several harms, including the mismanagement of
procedure, funds, and management.
The California College Republicans (CCR) have faced a myriad of problems in the last year;
indeed, with no bylaws, almost no acting parliamentarian, disarray has resulted. The Millennial
Review noted that not only was the election extremely contentious, but multiple seats, including
the San Diego Regional Vice Chair, are still disputed.3 The LA Times reported this election as
the takeover of an insurgency, an unexpected overthrow of the status quo,4 but rather, I will
suggest in this report that this was an inevitable reactionary movement to social decay. This
social decay is empirically seen in a multitude of interactions that have links to both distrust to
the status quo and procedural confusion to the function and jurisdiction of the organization.
This report will create a theoretical framework using organizational theory to describe CCRs
functionality. Specifically, Webers bureaucracy, in which the organization was defined by fixed
jurisdictional areas,5 will be contrasted to craft administration, a form of organization that
functions by appropriation of jurisdictions rather the bureaucratic orders.6 Next, the prevailing
framework will be nuanced with Williamsons transactional theory, which will determine the
extent of CCRs pragmatic opportunities by operationalizing the coordination costs and
transactional costs of CCR policy.7 Additionally, the framework will prescribe the necessary
foundations for tangible policy to be implemented to resolve the social, political, or procedural
decay within the organization. Finally, this report shall hypothesize that the ability to arbitrate
conflict in relation to crisis is both positively related to institutionalized rules and negatively
related to power failures. This report, therefore, will seek to understand how organizations,
specifically CCR, have failed to adequately respond to crisis.
III. Analysis and Harms

3
Lendrum, Eric . "The People Won:" Contentious CCR Election Finally Reaches Conclusion. The Millennial
Review, The Millennial Review. themilreview.com/real-time-updates/2017/10/23/the-people-won-contentious-ccr-
election-finally-reaches-conclusion
4
Watanabe, Teresa, and Rosanna Xia. Trump sparks revival for college Republicans, along with battle over 'future
and soul' of movement. Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 20 Oct. 2017, www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-conservative-college-students-20171020-story.html.
5
Weber, Max. 2005 (1922) Bureaucracy.
6
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. Bureaucratic and craft administration of production: a comparative study. Stratification
and Organization, pp. 177195.
7
Williamson, Oliver E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach.

These problems consolidated harms, and became most evident in the election cycle. During such
a cycle, the organization significantly suffered.
The report finds there to be 3 areas that need to be addressed:
(1). The Status Quo and Arbitration;

(2). Organization, and how structure affects responses to crisis;
(3). Chapters and governance;
Therefore, by analyzing these features, this report shall hypothesize that the ability to arbitrate
conflict in relation to crisis is both positively related to institutionalized rules and negatively
related to power failures
The Status Quo and Arbitration

The prior election, as indicated in the background, was engorged in controversy. However,
despite the seeming chaos surrounding it, some semblance of resolution was occurring, at least
prior to the chairmanship of Danzek. Specifically, Chairman Allen submitted a request to CRNC
parliamentarian Burke, a Professional Registered Parliamentarian.8
At this point, in the mid-summer, two questions were at hand. First, on electronic voting.
Second, on the procedure to reconvene the election. In an email sent by prior Chairman Allen
(appendix F), Burke provided three clear responses: electronic voting was illegal, to reconvene
required no notice, and a simple quorum of the prior meeting was sufficient to end the recess. At
the very least, this then provided the interpretation of the rules to move forward.
Unfortunately, this policy never fully came to fruit under prior Chairman Allen. This was for a
multitude of reasons; first, the long summer prevented many CRs from attending. This argument
was strongly held by Chairman Rowlands, who feared poor turout. Second, was the resignation
of Chairman Allen. During this time, the next Chairman, Danzek, was appointed per the CCR
line of succession. It is during this time crisis began to erupt; indeed, not only did Chairman
Danzek lack a permanent parliamentarian, and thus an accurate interpretation of the rules, but
Danzek refused to interact and govern individuals either inside or outside the organization. As a
result, confusion within the organization continued to spread, and by the time the CCR election
occurred, most delegates were confused about the specific procedures implemented by the
Danzek administration.
These occurrences can be better summed in the model they existed in. Indeed, the appointment
of Danzek represented a form of traditionalism, as while the rules dictated the line of succession,
8
Note: This is the highest rank approved by the National Association of Parliamentarians.

the transition of power occurred as a shift of power through customs rather than a legal-rational
bureaucratic authority. No ceremony was held. No formal exchange of power. Simply put,
Danzek earned her seat through an expected transition.
Even more unfortunately, the Danzek administration had several abuses of authority. As outlined
in both California College Republicans v. Leibiwitz and Sacramento State College Republicans
v. Mason Daniels there are empirical examples of Danzek erroneously interpreting procedure,
superseding lawfully constructed rules, and ignoring the constitution. For instance, the position
of the San Diego Regional Vice Chair, an artificially constructed position that does not exist in
the constitution, was created by Danzek to overhaul voting on the Executive Committee. The
ruling in Leibiwitz noted that:
Chairman Danzek indicated at the convention that an amendment [adding in a San Diego
Vice Chair] had been made. At approximately one hour, forty minutes, and fifty five
seconds through proceedings pursuit to the livestream posted on the Rebuild CCR
facebook group, Chairman Danzek announced that Joshua Leibiwitz, unopposed due to
an alleged lack of paperwork filed for his opponent, Gregory Lu, had won the seat of San
Diego Vice Chair. A member of the committee proceeded to make a point of order
against the constitutionality of the case, which was rejected by Chairman Danzek as they
had, already voted, and the committee was now closed, thus making any point of order
unavailable.
Supporters of the decision retorted that an amendment had been drafted during the 2014
conference. Not only was there no active proof of this amendment, but a decision in favor of this
would create a sort of internal constitution, i.e. discretionary authority to make rules without
alerting the society of them. However, the findings in Leibiwitz ruled this action expressly
illegal; indeed, the parliamentarian ruled :
Firstmost, as previously argued, it is poor practice to have internal constitutions, as their

is no end to unregulated power. Secondmost, even should it be assumed that this power
for internal constitutions is acceptable, it violates the ability of members to equitably
participate. As prior acknowledged RONR already provides this intent, arguing that
members ought to be given bylaws so as to uphold the rules. RONR (11th ed.) p. 14, ll. 25
- 30. Indeed, there is common sense to this citation: there is no reason the board should
withhold valuable information in the form of an internal constitution, unless that said
board held vindictive values about electing members, i.e. cronyism. Rules are created to
mitigate these abuses, of which an internal constitution serves to exacerbate. Finally, it
is a direct violation of parliamentary procedure for the credentials process. RONR, in
fact, makes clear that the rules for elections and election eligibility must be disclosed.
Specifically, the rules stipulate that information must be disclosed relevant to, ...the time

and manner of [an officer] election. RONR (11th ed.) p.610 , ll. 5 - 10. Therefore, even
should it be found that an internal constitution was both moral and legally acceptable, it
must be disclosed to the applicants for any position. For this did not occur. Therefore,
opponents to the chair are in a legal double bind: either an internal constitution exists
and the credentials committee did not disclose it, thus making the officer's election for
San Diego illegal, or the credentials committee did not register this amendment, and
upon acceptance by the committee, adopted its procedure that there was no San Diego
region. In either the case, whether the credentials committee actually had the document
in question or not, the election was illegal.
It seems common sense that the Chairman has no authority to artificially construct new regions.
This, in the end, turned out to be false. Of course, this begs another question. To what extent can
the Chair actually care about the rules? It seems that the Chair, having a monopoly on force for
CCR, thus controls the workings of the organization. In essence, there is no third party, no check,
on the authority of the Chair. Simply put, even if the General Session is to check the authority
of the Chair, what is to stop the Chair from dissolving the assembly? Or similar to prior
Chairman Danzek, threaten to remove delegates? Simply put, these questions are answered by
their historical implementation: there is no restriction.
Of course, while no practical restriction exists, political implications do. Indeed, the Chair is
restrained in her political authority by the willingness of her followers to comply with orders.
This prevents, ultimately, a total dictatorship. However, to what ends then is there to be an
equitable distribution of representative authority to the Executive Committee? The Chair,
controlling not the only the bureaucracy, which controls everything from advertising, to
credentialing, functions almost independently of the regions. And the regions themselves, liable
to the Chair, and deriving their authority from the Chair, are required to oblige. However, the
actual check, as prior noted, is the cost of transaction to implementing an action. Danzek herself,
for instance, while ordering the removal of Shawn Steel from the General Session floor, was
unable to implement the action, as it exceeded her authority. It is unwise, however, to force the
organization to regulate on market forces; indeed, with every failed action, traditional authority
deteriorates by its nature, to the point where the threat of removal becomes meaningless to the
crowd, who by custom (the same venue of power used for traditionalism) learns to disobey. This
in turn, promotes charismatic leaders, whom transformational by nature ignore the traditional
procedural structures.
While the election did not devolve into this hypothetical scenario necessarily, it did present a
chilling recount of a possible occurrence. At the current time, Chairman Rowlands has appointed
a parliamentarian and similar assistants in preventing this same occurrence. Chairman Rowlands,
by some nature is indeed charismatic, ignoring the traditional methods of obtaining office by
virtue, and emerging not from a rules based construct, but a vote of the society. It is possible,

however, for equally charismatic, but incompetent leaders, to arise, and with no check on
authority, the damage potential of these individuals is nearly unlimited.
This short analysis of the status quo portrays the need for institutional rules and rule interpreting
bodies. Indeed, without such, the organization will eventually fail to arbitrate a conflict, and
when that time emerges, the hierarchy will collapse. The last election, in which this collapse
almost occurred, in indicative of the necessity for clear, concise, and pronounced institutional
rules and effective institutional bodies.
Organization
The explicit organization of CCR fits under a classic Weberian bureaucracy; CCR, for instance,
has fixed jurisdictions, an explicit hierarchy, and rules to guide actions. On the outset this makes
sense; after all, the foundation of American organizations relies on legal-rational structures to
define who is in charge. Simply put: for the state organization, rules govern actions.
Indeed, CCRs constitution heavily favors such a legal-rational order. Article XII, section 3 of
the constitution stipulates that Roberts Rules of Order Newly Revised, 2nd edition (RONR) is
the guiding authority on parliamentary procedure. A vague procedure on interpretations is also
available, provided under both the bylaws and article XII section 2, which allows the General
Assembly to appeal the rulings of the executive committee (a power already inherited to them
under RONR). Such a guide is commonly associated with a strictly legal approach to structure.
Both of these structures provide the necessary context to form the bureaucracy; this, combined
with defined leadership positions, create the classical hierarchy noted in most organizations, and
in this case, CCR.
However, the apparent structure of CCR does not align with the actual implementation of the
approach implied by the constitution. More specifically, the election displayed several of these
instances; Leesa, for instance superseded the standing rules interpreted by the General Session,
took the position of both the Parliamentarian and the Executive Board in defining procedures,
and ignored the rules for Point of Orders and Removals dictated in RONR.
I find there to be three primary conflicting underlying principles behind this contradiction: (a)
that traditional authority has usurped parliamentary procedure, leading to contradicting or
ambiguous legal disputes; (b) that traditions and norms have delegated authority to individuals
that is not procedurally inherent; and (c) that the reliance on a charismatic leader, combined with
a lack of a competitive marketplace of ideas, has resulted in incompetence.
(A). Charismatic Authority vs. RONR

Anecdotally, I have seen strong backlash to the citation and use of parliamentary
procedure around both CCR locally and statewide. Locally, I have personally observed

and documented serious flaws in most CCR constitutions, including, but not limited to:
the lack of membership lists used in elections, the lack of election procedures, and
constitutional provisions that limit and reduce the ability of the governing chapter
coalitions to operate properly. However, most of these chapters, such as EEEEEE,9 have
proceeded without delay to elect leaders, form groups, and formally institutionalize their
roles as the dominant Republicans on campus. More recently, very similar events, albeit
with more flare and opposition, have occurred at Sacramento State, accumulating the
following of many as an organizational constitution crisis brews, with the establishment
authorities refusing to leave power after a lawful election.10 Yet, despite outcries, these
individuals proceeded to attempt to institutionalize their roles as Republicans.11 These
events have gone almost untouched by the state organization for a myriad of reasons;
from anecdotal interviews, the majority of respondents noted that the state organization
simply didnt have the capacity to enforce proceedings, either via resources or
enforcement power. Others, perhaps not completely incorrectly, cited the tenets of
federalism, contending that the separation was necessary. This is not to say that my
advocacy is for the state organization to necessarily lead these chapters, but to an extent it
is notable that without an arbitration authority, it is easy for governing coalitions to
overlook inconvenient rules.
Of course, charisma is a necessary element to an effective organization. Charisma, by its

very definition, is the willingness to engage in transformational activity, hold a vision,
and effectively communicate that vision.12 The power of charisma, however, must be
tempered by the procedure to ensure fairness and transparency; otherwise there is
empirical evidence to suggest abuse is probable. However, by the difficult nature to
record this behavior, empirical data is rare. Despite this, several academic sources have
attempted to do so; indeed, evidence indicates that abuse largely originates out of
traditionally negative behaviors, such as greed, ambition, or sloth, that have no tempered
authority, i.e. a judicial authority, namely code.13 Moreover, conceptual analysis of the
theoretical implications of judicial independence suggests that tempered can act as not
just a prohibitor to abuse, but also a deterrent. More specifically, in an analysis of 82
world leaders, evidence was found that the most indicative variable to describing a
9
Note: This organization was redacted, as the crisis is potentially ongoing and or has been resolved in private.
10
See also: Sacramento College Republicans v. Daniels.
11
Note: There are individuals, such as Arthur Schaper, who have acted as Republicans without any institutional
authority. They have been associated negatively as externalities to the party, and regularly disturb meetings. These
individuals, while relatively impactful in their individual regions, are exceptions rather than norms. Being outside of
the CCR, their reference in this report will be minimal.
12
House, R.J. (1977). A 1976 theory of charismatic leadership. In J.G. Hunt & L.L. Larson (Eds.),
Zeadership: T&e cutting edge (pp. 189207). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University
Press.
13
Mumford, M.D., Gessner, T.E., Connelly, M.S., OConnor, J.A., & Clifton, T.C. (1993).
Leadership and destructive acts: Individual and situational influences. Leadership
Quarterly, 4(2), 115-147.

probable leader was self-regulation, namely the ability to rationally work within a legal
and social framework to accomplish necessary goals, while maintaining personalized
composure attributes (such as remaining mentally vigilant).14 This explains the
observation of that judicial independence lends to democratic movements, as dictators
and authoritarian leaders are often pressured into violations to maintain power. On the
contrary, for leaders in a democratic society, it is necessary to remain within legal
frameworks to retain power, thus explaining the power of judicial, or as I make the case,
procedural, independence from a unitary power.15
Applying this pattern to CCR is quite simple: indeed, with evidence from the convention
shows the necessity of having a branch to enforce adjudication. For instance, prior
Chairman Danzek attempted to remove delegates several times, in violation of
procedures found in RONR. Specifically, RONR stipulates that applying a penalty to a
member requires a motion.16 However, it is difficult to prevent abuse when the Chair
solely controls the monopoly on violence, i.e. security. This confrontation escalated when
Ariana Rowlands, at the time candidate for Chairman, was ordered to be removed for a
lawful point of order.17 Had Shawn Steel, a representative of the National Republican
Committee, not entered earlier, it is unknown what could have occurred during the
ensuing confrontation. Additionally, at the time of the crisis, it is important to note that
Chairman Danzek did not have a parliamentarian, nor did she attempt to recruit one from
the audience.18 Thus, CCR at this point lacked either an impartial interpreter for the rules,
i.e. a judiciary, or an advisor for the rules, i.e. a parliamentarian. The ensuing procedures
were chaos: video evidence indicates that even proxy votes, vital to proceed with the
General Session, had to be enforced by a seizure of documents by candidate Rowlands.
Of course, these actions, while necessary to distribute materials, was in contrast to the
Credentials Committee's mandate, as only the, The Sergeant-at-Arms and his Deputies
are to allow delegates or proxies into the convention.19
Thus, it seems then that there is a conflict between the status quos maintenance of power
and the interpretation of the law, either for through enforcement or symbolic. This is
evident by the actions (or lack thereof) taken by the prior Danzek administration, with not
a single member of the administration communicating with members outside the social
14
OConnor, Jennifer, et al. Charismatic Leaders and Destructiveness: An Historiometric Study. Leadership
Quarterly , vol. 6, no. 4, 1995, pp. 529555.
15
Larkins, Christopher M. Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis.
The American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 44, no. 4, 1996, p. 605., doi:10.2307/840623.
16
RONR (11th ed.) p. 647, ll. 5- 25.
17
Note: This argument is explained more thoroughly in Sacramento College Republicans v. Daniels.
18
Note: Candidates were clearly available. Both Jerry Sirotnak, a Registered Parliamentarian, and Sebastian
Rothstein, the administrations prior parliamentarian, were in attendance.
19
CCR Constitution, art. X 3.

cliche that constitutes the current executive board.20 With the new administration in
charge it may be important to resolve these issues, which have undermined the capacity
of operation through personalized abuses, to minimize the probability of future problems.
For instance, occurrences involving what has become colloquially referred to as the,
talking phone, reflect the disillusionment with the interpretation of procedure, making
the foundation of any judiciary shaky at its fundamental core (see also: a note on memes).
(B). Charisma and Transactional Costs

It is vital to also account for the reactionary (or perhaps preemptive) elements working
CCR to interact with externalities. Within the context of this organization, the report
references an externality as anything outside of CCR, the state organization. For instance,
work with local politicians, which requires resources. Simple observation of these
interactions would yield two conclusions: first, that CCR only works effectively with
these entities when it has the resources to do so, and second, that CCR only works
effectively with these entities when internal governance has relative control. To represent
these interactions, a simple model is provided. Working off Williamsons approach to
transactional theory, we can simply understand our organization and its corresponding
actions by the following function:
= 0
Whereas = (), with represents the production cost difference between the
organization and the market, and whereas = f(A) represents the internal cost of
governing. When these achieve a positive value, the organization is at an advantage, and
when at a negative value, the organization is at a disadvantage. Of course, this model
doesnt represent the intrinsic value CCR produces from our very existence; indeed,
unlike a factory or company that produces a tangible good, the goods and services
provided by CCR are rather intangible. Our very existence, for instance, may offer hope
to Republicans. I cannot measure this, and even though studies have attempted to
operationalize hope, it is outside the scope of this report to do so. Of course,
disillusionment can also occur based on our organization's transactions with externalities,
such as open support for politicians like Chad Mayes, but often I have anecdotally
viewed this in context to ineffective governance.
This abstraction is useful in contextual and policy analysis for two reasons.
First, it provides a framework for understanding the success of any given policy. If, for
instance, the number of precinct walks have decreased, we can imply a negative outcome
20
Note: While there is no strong empirical evidence necessarily proving the executive board has social bonds, this is
implied by the loyalty they have portrayed to Chairwoman Danzek despite her failure to retain democratic power.

of any given policy. Of course, this presumes correlation, and can be caused by a
multitude of factors, such as the time of year, the weather, etc.
Second, this model provides the grounds to understand the efficient boundaries of our
organization. I suggested earlier in this report that CCR failed to govern effectively. It is
possible that this isnt as much a policy problem, as an inherent cost to expanding into the
political marketplace. Control, management, and supervision all take a significant amount
of time and resources, to which this model would contend that CCR has begun to
effectively reach a limitation of effective value. It is unknown whether this value has yet
been reached, as the majority of data has been suppressed by the prior administration.21
Finally, this model provides a useful framework for understanding how CCR could
potentially function in a crisis. Within this criteria, it is suggested that a negative, in
essence what CCR was stipulated to be in during the election crisis, emerged as
governance cost critically exceeded any potential benefit with an outside externality.22
We can then derive crisis from a comparative model. Simply put, when CCR did nothing
the summer, it indicated that the organization was undergoing an increase in either the
cost of internal governance, or a increase in external interaction. Considering the external
political environment has undergone almost no significant external changes, and that
anecdotally Miss Danzek can be observed lacking any interactions with her, it can be
assumed internal governance became a problem. With no check on the chair, it then
seems that this accurately described the crisis at hand. In applying the model to the thesis
of this report, it is easy to then see that institutional rules makes crisis more explicit. With
more explicit crisis, comes clearer solutions. The election itself was a clear example of
this: in order to resolve the pressing procedural questions, the prior Chairman Allen was
forced to consult several parliamentarians, and have a Professional Parliamentarian issue
a report, and even then, the organization was met with the resignation of that Chair. Thus,
it seems that if there were clearer rules, or at least an actor to interpret the rules, then the
organization could have overcome future crisis by using said actor to reduce the cost of
governance. In this instance, cost is operationalized by the ability of the chair to act. An
explicit actor increases the ability of the chair to act in a timely manner, as it provides a
clear ruling. Therefore, it is not only clear that these rules are needed to arbitrate crisis,
but that policy can reduce this cost.
21
Note: This information was mythical, i.e. it drove policy proposals (such as Bylaw reform for Credentials
Reports), but may or may not have existed. From my anecdotal observation, I have, for instance, seen credential data
in Kevin Reeds, a member of the prior administrations staff, hand. It is unknown what happened to this
information.
22
Note: Governance cost may be ambiguous; unlike a corporation, which clearly has a profit incentive, CCR has a
multitude of motives such as personal ambition. Personal ambition, a trait unique a single or limited group of
individual(s) is often held to have strong associate with a lack of process or rules tempering the action of a leader, as
indicated by OConnor 1995.

(C). Organizational Processes
Prior analysis, however, consists largely only of the state organization itself. But CCR is
far more extensive than a single entity. Prior, I had insisted CCR functions as a
bureaucracy. Indeed, from a theory perspective, the structure of the organization indicates
this to an extent, especially based purely on the construction of the Executive Committee,
or even the Board of Directors.
Based on research, I have found there to be two primary possibilities to the current status
of CCR : first, which is in line with how I have been explaining my central thesis, argues
that CCR has been failing to arbitrate power crisis because of a lack of institutionalized
rules. The second possibility, however, is more tempered. It argues that CCR, while being
inherently bureaucratic with democratic tendencies, functions on the craft administration
principles outlined by Stinchcombe in the 1950s. Namely, that CCR operates with
defined jurisdictions that operate separately of the state organization, explaining
perceived inefficiencies.23
Below are two charts. First, I portray Webers classic bureaucracy. This shows activity as
explicitly defined, with jurisdictions defined. Second, I portray Stinchcombes craft
administration. This shows goals as explicitly defined, but with decentralized
jurisdictions.
Chart 1.1 Webers Classic Bureaucracy.
23
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. Bureaucratic and craft administration of production: a comparative study. Stratification
and Organization, pp. 177195.

Chart 1.2 Stinchcombes Craft Administration.
To fully understand these charts it is important to first note the distinctive characteristics
of each; bureaucracies, for instance, contain a large amount of centralized, direct
messaging, whereas the concentration of executed authority within Stinchcombes craft
administration lies in the individual jurisdictions. CCR is very similar, in many ways, to
the latter; indeed, with separate chapters and regions organizing under individual leaders,
and actions and philosophers greatly differing school to school, it is unlikely that each of
these institutions would be under a centralized bureaucracy, even in principle. The
constitution, in fact, gives little room to even run an effective bureaucracy, with
membership having little to do with actual operation capacity. Worse yet, there is not a
controlling influence to provide the necessary coercion to retain chapters; indeed, in the
status quo, there is no real reason to remain a chapter, as the state organization does little
to solve the collective action problem, nor has it proposed solvent policy to issues facing
the state.
This report will note, primarily, that there are plethora of benefits to the organization
maintaining this structure for chapters. Indeed, chapter organizations have a large host of

campus specific issues to deal with, and campus specific leadership structures inspire and
incentivize those College Republicans to become more active, something the CCR
bureaucracy, no matter how effective policy may make it, could never achieve.
Chapters and Governance

The CCR constitution does make not make clear to what extent a Federalist principle is to apply.
Indeed, the power of the state over the chapters, unlike the regions, exists solely in defining
good standing, and the materials necessary to charter. Art. III, 9.
This report seeks to draft an idea of what this governance more tangibly is, and how it affects
CCR, and how CCR ought to interact with it. Most simply put, this report divides CCR into three
categories: the State, the Region, and the Chapter. Seeing as the previous sections specified the
State and Regions under a bureaucratic rule, the purposes of this section will be to discuss the
latter.
First, it is important to dispel that CCR has no authority over chapters. CCR has two primary
authorities: first to determine good standing of the chapter, and second to determine the
qualifications (good standing) of the candidate running. Specifically, the ruling in Sacramento
College Republicans v. Daniels found that:
In the ideal world, the substantive law for elections, assuming no additional bylaws were
passed, would consist of two primary regulations: first, that of which is found under art.
V 5, which requires good standing in a Republican club, and maintaining the status of a
part time student,24 would be of concern; second, the requirement of notification to the
recording secretary pursuant to art. IX 12. The alleged violation of the substantive law
occurred under art. V 5, namely that the defendant was not in good standing with the
Republican club represented at the convention.
Simply put, the extent of CCRs authority exists to that which the chapter wishes to be involved;
this can be impactful in cases such as prior Capitol Vice Chair Daniels, as it shifted factional
power in the region.
This, however, does not imply CCR exists on the campus level to be a regulatory body. In fact,
CCR seems to be extremely limited in this manner. While the organization could, in theory, use
either incentives (such as more chapter materials) or sanctions (such as with the local GOP
Central Committees), there is no practical way for CCR to further extend power. Considering
chapters make up of the physical members of CCR society, there is some imperative for the state
24
Note: The definition of student will vary. This does not imply the student must be an undergraduate; indeed, the
constitution provides grounds for graduate or law students to be members. This regulation would, in fact, also be
applicable to trades or other schools, so long as the board determines these institutions to be (a) bona fide schools
with (b) bona fide students.

organization to be involved. In the past, this came in the form of the chapter box; however, as
even this has proven historically inaccurate, with certain chapters taking characteristics that stand
in contrast to direct goals. Finally, secessionism always remains a constant threat, a problem the
organization will increasingly face.
This is increasingly important as political division becomes a growing problem. Furthermore, in

order to enact meaningful policy the Board will need to devise policies that respect jurisdictions
while providing incentives to perform actions. This collective action problem will form the root
of the ability to function practically at the campus level, and furthermore, will be a necessary
issue to address for arbitration.
Therefore, most simply, chapters act as the ultimate temperament to any proposed policy. Thus,
in creating rules, it is important to not just seek the recognition of those rules from chapters, but
to earn a mutually desired respect for those rules wherever possible.
Confounding Variables
Memes
It was prior noted that social norms can lead to the creation of customs that affect the procedures
and outcomes of elections. The majority of scholars and academics would discount the
importance of memes in shifting voter polls. This is a mistake. Studies have, in fact, shown that
memes operate as discourse facilitators, and are more effective in their method of doing so than
traditional communication; indeed, under what has been classified by some scholars as the logic
of lulz, memes have been empirically related to the vocalization of a variety of movements. This
report indicates that these memes shifted the transactional cost it took to increase turnout, a
burden typically shouldered either by the present administration or by the candidates. This
occurrence, as suggested, provides insight into the actual impact of administrative incompetence.
Several studies confirm that memes and trolling can affect public discourse, and thus
corresponding turnouts. While on the face it might seem silly to suggest as much, empirical
evidence from 2016 has indicated that 4chan user raids on youtube channels, for instance,
actually succeeded in changing the corresponding discourse on these videos in a statistically
significant manner.25 Other authors have speculated that memes represent an identity of
25
Hine, Gabriel Emile , Jeremiah Onaolapo, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Nicolas Kourtellis, Ilias Leontiadis, Riginos
Samaras, Gianluca Stringhini, and Jeremy Blackburn. "A Longitudinal Measurement Study of 4chan's Politically
Incorrect Forum and its Effect on the Web." ResearchGate (2016): n. pag. Web. 27 Feb. 2017.
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309008911_A_Longitudinal_Measurement_Study_of
_4chan's_Politically_Incorrect_Forum_and_its_Effect_on_the_Web>

antagonism, constituting a method of vocalizing political emotions, rather than facts or debates,
over texted channels; as such, memes in this manner represent a form of propaganda.26
Studies on social media, which would be most topic to this election, are more difficult to
quantify. However, case studies show some light on the situation; indeed, a tweet sent out by
Dennys on January 4th, 2016 mocked the change of Hollywood to Hollyweed27 by posting a
similar image that showed the Hollywood sign changed, Eggdaddy. The resulting rush of
additional viewers from this incident was massive: almost immediately after the tweet exceeded
10k retweets, and within a year Dennys following increased by 132%.28
A similar occurrence has been unfolding during the CCR election. For instance, an anonymous
meme account nicknamed, Uncuck CCR, drew attention at both General Sessions.
Specifically, the author of the account took members of both slates, Thrive and Rebuild, and
successfully juxtapositioned them to the supposed lizards of the opposition, while providing
enough contextual analysis to mock himself. This, amongst many, may have altered internalized
viewpoints, thus forcing a pivot in the narrative of both slates. Anecdotally this explains the
nickname of Lizard Danzek colloquially applied to prior Chairman Danzek during the election
cycle, implying a nearly dehuman other.
This measures, while interesting and unique, are not in the realm of the discussion of this report.
Rather their impact should be considered generally; indeed, the relative ambiguous nature of
memes and the resulting discourse only serves to compound the complexity of the seemingly
simple formula of transactions laid out earlier. For instance, questions such as, what constitutes
an internal governance cost, or do election cycles shift internal governance costs, raise inquiries
about the nature of the political order. Of course, while a perfect Weberian bureaucracy would
largely ignore these costs, as rules ignore social customs, the practical implications would not;
indeed, a socially pressured bureaucrat, is likely to act and behave differently than one who
would otherwise not be so.
The result is a confounding variable to the strength of the relationship of successful arbitration
and rules. Simply put, is it possible that social customs created by tools such as memes, or other
rhetorical devices, could influence the interaction of these two principles? Future sanctioned
reports need to analyze this possibility more in depth.
Apathy
26
Miller, Ryan. "FCJ-156 Hacking the Social: Internet Memes, Identity Antagonism, and the Logic of Lulz." The
Fibreculture Journal (2013): n. pag. Web. 27 Feb. 2017.
27
"Hollywood Sign Altered to Read 'Hollyweed'" Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times. Web. 27 Feb. 2017.
28
Gustafson, Katherine. "How Denny's (Yes, Denny's) Became The King Of Twitter." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 03
Oct. 2016. Web. 27 Feb. 2017.

Little is required to be said of this attribute, as it is almost self evident amongst any CR
leader. People in organizations simply do not wish to partake in events, and if they do, it is
simply for the food, games, or friends. In such a case, individuals, not caring about the actual
conservative cause, may not act the same as a passionate individual. This is important as the
functionings of the organization, instead of a frozen bot, acts more fluidly; indeed, this is good
news for aspiring board members, and bad for those perhaps in the higher ranks for apathetic
about the actual pace of the organization involved. Yet worse, it seems that many of the prior
bureaucrats, many of whom no longer with the organization, failed to produce many of the
necessary documents to actually run the organization with precedent. Thus, it seems that the
organization is almost forced to start anew.
Needless to be said, but the result to this problem, similar to memes, is too informally difficult to
account. Indeed, it seems that if apathy overtakes a populace, there is little to be done in
resolving the procedures of that population. If no one was truly in charge however, not only
would that given association lack legitimate governance, but the tools used to develop just
customs would collapse with it. We saw this the prior administration, as a multitude of College
Republican officials simply stopped responding. The result is a confounding variable to the
strength of the relationship of successful arbitration and rules. Simply put, it is very possible that
apathy could be a significant explaination of the failure of CCR in the past.
IV. Substantive Summary

Throughout this memo, I have discussed several themes, including structural misconceptions,
abuses of power, and most dangerously, ambiguity.
Firstmost, I have identified that the very organizational structure of our organization inherently
conflicts with our functional operation; indeed, by, as Chief of Staff Robert Petrosyan has
phrased it, running off, respect, we have inadvertently placed our organization to subjective,
rather unstable, nature of traditional authority. I have thus concluded there are several problems
in this: first, individuals have lacked a clear method of proceeding, and thus have acted without
consistency; second, that there is no normative bureaucracy to interpret or implement the
procedures outlined in the constitution; third, and finally, the organization remains vulnerable if
lacking a charismatic leader to resolve problems that may arise in lieu of an effective
bureaucracy. Additionally, I noted that CCR has plethora of empirical and identifiable abuses of
power. I first identity that legal inequalities, such as the permissions given to the chairwoman to
make arbitrary interpretations of the rules without a check, has permitted the creation of rules

and regulations that favor factions that are in power. I second contend that these abuses in power
have contributed to a decay in traditional authority, as obvious abuses in procedural powers give
rhetorical weapons to opposition parties. I third find that these conflicts have disenfranchised
chapters, and have contributed to a general weakening of authority over local chapters and
governance. In total, this analysis provides the context needed to understand future policy, and
why arbitration has prior failed.
Secondmost, I outline several different theories of organization to apply to CCR. These, I

contend, lay a groundwork for future analysis. This analysis, simply put, relies on the calculation
of internal operating costs to external transaction cost. Additionally, I propose two different
structures of organization to follow, of which the conclusion is to grant chapters relative
independence, while retaining stricter controls on state functions. This, I contend, lays a
framework to construct policy to more effectively arbitrate crisis.
Thirdmost, I provide a brief outline of how governing has more or less pragmatically worked on
a chapter, regional, and finally state level. This serves to function as a temperament to the
proposal of policy, and to what extent the institutionalization of rules should exist. Pragmatically,
I thus conclude that rules function best to arbitrate crisis when there is a link to the state
organization.
Finally, I have analyzed any potential obvious confounding variables. Clearly, the majority of
this report used non-statistical data, and operated off theories that have been relatively accepted.
However, it is nonetheless important to note significant changes or movements in CCR that
could potentially change our conclusions. These objections are noted, and all are rejected as
important to policy changes, at least for the time being.
Based on the past functions of CCR, and that of what theory predicts, I demonstrate that the
following pattern of events is likely should no policy change occur:
(1). That the organization will continue to be maintained by a pattern of waves of charismatic or
traditional authority;
(2). Systematic decay, both to the traditional and bureaucratic authority, will continue to
accelerate at unprecedented levels, giving rise to charismatic leaders;
(3). Systematic decay will contribute to a rise in factionalism and sectarianism;
(4). That factionalism and sectarianism will lead to an increase in external affiliations, and thus
further act as a catalyst to systemic decay;
(5). That any centralized authority will thus suffer;
(6). That in lieu of centralized, respected, authority our organization will become operationally
insolvent sometime within the future;

V. Policy Recommendations
Plantext 1. Create Bylaws (Appendix B).
Resolved: The California College Republican Board of Directors ought to establish bylaws to
create committees and establish procedures.
Purpose and Intent:

In discussing with a multitude of CR executive members, I have noted that there is a wide range
of confusion regarding decision making. More specifically, there is no consensus for the explicit
designation of actions, laws, or rules. Part of decision making, for large organizations, must
involve the process of the written rule of law; otherwise, there is room for confusion, ambiguity,
and miscommunication. Written laws are thus the simple and easy cure for the duties of
members, and, when necessary, who is to be held responsible for failures.
I have additionally noted there are concerns that this process would create more bureaucracy
and would deter involvement in the program. I consider these points mute for several reasons;
first, the point is turned against itself because individuals not interested in the very most basic
governing practices shouldnt be involved in large organizational management. Instead, these
individuals should be focused on chapter engagement. Secondly, rules are not process;
bureaucracy, in the sense of the negative connotation, implies red tape and needless procedure.
That is not necessarily an inherent problem to bylaws or rules, but, as previously asserted, a
problem is misunderstanding in the system of management. To a certain extent, procedure is a
necessary evil for the management of large programs. As carefully noted in the background, it is
absolutely necessary for an organization with centralized structure to have centralized rules;
while individual chapters hold autonomy, centralization is necessary to maintain a centralized
organization. The two concepts, autonomy and effective centralization, are not compatible with
our current structure.
Finally, it is important to note that there is a presence of, as Chairwoman Rowlands noted, the
presence of the, mythical bylaws. While Roberts Rules and general procedural edicate dictate
the formalized creation of election rules, there is no evidence these said rules actually exist,
evident by the lack of response from Chairwoman Leesa Danzek. Worse, at the convention, there
was a wide range of specific abuses perpetrated in the name of these mythical bylaws. Such
regulations included physical removal (in contrast to RONR), the rejection of carried motions by
a unilateral force, the rejection of legitimate candidates, and other procedural wrongs.

However, it is likely that the creation of these legal documents, which would have widespread
impacts on our future governance of instance of law, would require extensive negotiation,
writing, and skill. Statutes must be explicit, easy to understand, and nearly unanimously agreed
on. While it may seem tedious at first to implement, it is important to establish an equitable
framework for this organization function off.
Plan of action:
Specifically, I therefore recommend the following steps to implement the resolution for plantext
1 (appendix B):
(1). The Chairwoman should create a Resolution Committee to revise necessary statutes and
draft bylaws for the executive committee to review and pass;
(2). The Chairwoman should appoint committee members pursuant to the procedures established
in the bylaws;
(3). The Chairwoman should appoint necessary bureaucrats to the committee to create
amendments, and to draft and edit necessary documents. This shall include:
(a). A clerk;
(b). A document manager;
(c). An editor;

Plantext 2. Constitutional Amendment for a Judicial Committee.
Resolved: The California College Republican constitutional committee shall create an a

subcommittee to draft articles for constitutional amendments to include an Arbitration
Committee.
Purpose and Intent:

In the past election, it has become obvious that CCR has no legitimate process of interpretation
for the constitution, and in many cases, Chairwoman Allen has ignored legitimate requests and
pleas, something whom the chairwoman is for all intents and purposes, obligated to fulfill. Of
course, similar to if the executive branch controlled the Supreme Court, there is no check on this
power.
In a lengthy discussion with Chairwoman Allens parliamentarian and Berkeley President Troy
Worden at CCR 2017, the parliamentarian had several arguments against this proposed system.
First, he contended that such a system was already in place, and that system was the convention
itself, with members able to, with a 3/4th vote, to suspend the rules, and with a majority vote, to
appeal a procedural decision on the rules.
There are several problems with this specific argument. Firstmost, the current system has failed
to check the Chairwoman simply because of its inability to meet. When the Chairwoman,
suspended, the elections for an indefinite period of time, she additionally created a de facto
position of power for herself, one that cannot be checked for the pragmatic inability of the
assembly to meet. Secondmost, were we to even assume the assembly could meet, there is no
adequate system of reform because the assembly does not have the time to discuss every
procedural wrongdoing that has been a part of the organization. Additionally, there have been a
multitude of legitimacy questions behind the actual boards themselves; at Berkeley, the past
president simply refused to allocate voting members based on the candidate-elects wishes, and at
San Francisco State, the board was illegally voted into power, which some stipulated created a
situation that made them ineligible to be a chartered school. Finally, some pro-Thrive,
establishment schools were within themselves not eligible to be chapters, as they lacked letters of
school recognition (Article 5, section 1), resulting in lengthy debates on eligible voters.
In summary, the creation of a Judicial Board, or its equivalent (regardless of the title we put
upon it), would create a legitimate institution to arbitrate these problems. Of course, should
members still demand debate upon these issues, it is entirely possible to contest them on the
convention floor. Additionally, the creation of such a board would result in a multitude of
options for individuals to resolve chapter problems through the state organization in an impartial
manner, which would largely solve issues of separatism that plague the organization. Simply put,

CCR lacks an impartial arbitrator, which ought to be vested into a Judicial Board or its
equivalent.
Secondly, Chairwoman Allens parliamentarian argued that such a board was infeasible, both
lacking knowledge on legal procedure and in resources.
I find this first argument to be astoundingly incorrect for a multitude of reasons. First, there is a
wide range of college students that knowledge in the legal field that could apply to this position,
and many of whom are paralegals or parliamentarians themselves. Secondly, the College
Republicans have deep associations with a multitude of party lawyers, and in complicated legal
proceedings, it is entirely possible to call upon these people to review cases and provide official
advice.
The second argument is incorrect by the very preventative nature this program provides; first, the
cost and potential of holding a second election is extremely expensive. I would doubt, in any
written advocacy, that the board would be required to meet frequently, at least in that meetings
exceed or equal the cost of a second convention. Thus, the saved cost of resources here emerges
as a preventative insurance mechanisms against wasted time and energy of secondary
conventions. Secondly, the chairwoman should be focused on advocacy and policy, not legal
confrontations. The benefit of such a branch secondly emerges as a focus on the chairwoman for
important policy manners. Indeed, as par with the Rebuild montro, Chairwoman Rowlands
should be primarily focused with advocating exact and specific policy, while facilitating
communications between the youth and the Republican party, not settling voter criteria, filing
paperwork, or monitoring elections.
Finally, the report does account for the argument that such a system has never been done before.
I do further understand that the initial establishment of the system may take time, resources, and
energy. However, once the system is established, it creates legitimacy in an organization that
previously had none. As I had previously stipulated in the opening of this paper, the age of
traditional authority is dead. We will win, and will win big not by relying constantly on future
Chairs that have charisma, but by creating a functional organization. Chairwoman Rowlands,
after all, is only but a single person.
Plan of action:
2 (appendix C):
(1). The Chairwoman should mandate the constitutional committee to create the necessary
amendments to the constitution to create a Judicial Board or legal equivalent to arbitrate
problems linked to the state organization;

(2). The Chairwoman should pass on the proposed resolution in this memo to the Board of
Directors to ratify to create awareness of the construction of the new branch of governance;

Plantext 3. Establishment of an Judiciary Committee
Resolved, the California College Republicans ought to establish a Judiciary Committee to hold
accountable unethical and corrupt officials, while providing members or entities guidance on the
constitution and other governing documents.
Purpose and Intent:
In lieu of an actual Judicial branch, the best alternative is to establish a Judiciary Committee,
similar to an actual judicial institution, to operate in a similar fashion. As noted earlier, it is
vitally important to establish a procedure for arbitrating disputes.
Plan of Action:
1C:
(1). The Chairwoman should implement this by passing a bylaws amendment through the Board
of Directors;
(2). The Chairwoman should have the Board of Directors approve the Judiciary Committees
charter (appendix e).

Plantext 4. Constitutional Amendment for the CCR Bill of Rights.
Resolved, the California College Republicans ought to mandate the Constitutional Review
committee to create and propose amendments to protect the basic rights of College Republicans.
Purpose and Intent:

There has been a multitude of wrongdoings from the state board this year; many of which have
included collusion, a lack of due process, and an ambiguity on rights. In order to protect the
rights of our members, and assure members that new parts of the constitution are in the best
interest of the general member, we must create a way to easily recognize these rights.
Plan of Action:
1C (appendix G):
(1). The chairwoman should mandate the constitutional committee to create and draft the
necessary constitutional amendments and language to promise the following rights to general
members of CCR:
1. All chapters and chapter members have a right to arbitration for wrongdoings that effect
or occur from the state organization;
2. All chapters and chapter members have a right to vote during the annual CCR
convention;
3. All chapters and chapter members have a right to equally access the institutions of CCR;
4. No chapter or chapter members shall be deprived of these aforementioned rights without
due process;
(2). The chairwoman should mandate the constitutional committee to submit a draft of these
amendments within 30 days of their establishment.

Plantext 5. Restructuring the Procedure for Requests
Resolved: The California College Republicans should institute a system of forms to facilitate
legal processes for state functions.
Purpose and Intent:

CCR, to lightly put the issue, lacks any bureaucratic procedure. Normally, organizations have
problems with too much procedure. However, procedure, for large organizations, provides
grounds to resolve issues in a timely manner (by timely I am referencing the facilitation of
information to the committees to work on the issues. State issues, of course, are by nature long
and arduous). Lack of procedure, however, creates a system ripe for bureaucratic distress;
indeed, the status quo organization has been noted to both ignore problems, requests, and
suggestions purely as a matter of convenience.
This problem, at its core, relies on the status quo narrative of either (a) confusion or (b) lack of
accountability. Of course, it impossible to hold one accountable without actually knowing who to
hold accountable! A form system, similar to ones used by most public organizations, is thus
necessary to facilitate communications between the state board and lower chapters.
I would like to note, however, that members of the executive board still retain the power to
directly access the system by a simple motion at any board meeting. This is by its nature the
power and privilege of elected officials, and remains, in my opinion, important to solve
emergencies or crisis that may emerge. However, for day-to-day governance, or less urgent
matters, it is important to have a way to solve problems and facilitate communications in an easy
to recognize and understand process.
Plan of Action:
1D (appendix D):
(1). The Chairwoman should mandate the Judiciary Committee create a subcommittee of
procedure to create the following forms:
a. Arbitration and Hearing Request;
b. Appeals;
c. Funding Request;
d. Election and Applications Forms:
i. Declaration of Candidacy;
ii. Proof of membership;
iii. Delegate List;
iv. Hosting;

e. Chartering and Renewal:
i. Chartership Renewal;
ii. Membership List;
iii. Officer List;
iv. School Recognition Letter;
v. Constitutional Submission;
f. State Board Job Application;
g. Preliminary Convention Motions;
h. Constitutional Amendments;
i. Complaints, wrongdoings, and Removals;
j. Resolutions and Policy Suggestions;
k. Legal Support:
i. Notice of Urgency;
ii. Assistance and Legal Help;
(2). The Chairwoman shall mandate that the constitutional committee, once formed, form the
said subcommittee within 10 days;
(3). The Chairwoman shall mandate that the subcommittee on procedure create draft forms
within 60 days of their creation;

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper argued that the ability to arbitrate conflict in relation to crisis is both positively related
to institutionalized rules and negatively related to power failures. This was found to be true, as
prior indicated in parts III and IV. Several specific policies were discussed, including the
establishment of bylaws, the creation of both a constitutional framework for a judiciary system
and a temporary one, while providing a direct mandate to the established committees in the
Bylaws. Therefore, by both understanding that power failures emerged from the lack of clearly
institutionalized rules combined with a lack of institutions to begin with, the organization can
move forward in effective policy implementation.
Effectively, the policies discussed here accomplishes several objectives.
First, it fixes the problematic conflict between charismatic rulers and the rules to temper them by
providing not only the grounds for a judiciary system, but a temporary provisional one. This was
accomplished through both a resolution of intent and the Bylaws, and effectively mitigates what
was identified as both abuses to power and organizational inconsistencies. The Bylaws contain
several rather significant parts, including the creation of a tangible Credentials Committee, and
guarantees to the General Session to fix inconsistencies.
Second, it increases the efficiency of governing amongst the state bureaucracy, providing
extremely explicit instructions on how to operate, as indicated by the new procedural suggestions
on forms.
Third, it provides the foundation for a CCR bill of rights, which will provide constitutional
protections against future abuses by the chairs, should there be no functional judiciary.
Finally, the policies as an aggregate provide a method to move forward. For months now, the
organization has been weighed down by procedural and bureaucratic red tape. These policies,
while seemingly lengthy, are the compromise between necessary rules and necessary efficiency.
As such, these rules will allow the organization to manage crisis, thus preventing the failure of
power witnessed in the last election.
In order for CCR to continue to Thrive, to succeed, to grow, changes are necessary. The changes
found within this paper provide the framework to begin implementing these changes.
VII. Attachments

Appendix A. A Resolution to Adopt the Parliamentarians Report
A Resolution to Adopt the Parliamentarians Report
Whereas, CCR has lacked any discernable rules; and
Whereas, a report issued by the Office of the Parliamentarian has dictated that it necessary to
create and establish bylaws; and
Whereas, the Chair has directed Parliamentarian to draft a working report on the status of
CCRs procedures; and
Whereas, RONR provides grounds for the Parliamentarian to assist the chair; and
Whereas, the Parliamentarian holds the authority to assist the Chair with events outside of the
General Session pursuant to the precedent held in California College Republicans v. Leibiwitz,;
and,
Therefore, let it be resolved, that the California College Board of Directors will adopt the
findings in the Parliamentarians Report on the Structural and Procedural Amendments for the
California College Republicans.

Appendix B - Bylaws
California College Republicans Bylaws
I. PURPOSE
Section 1: The purpose of these Bylaws shall be to provide procedures to be used in

conducting the business of the California College Republicans (CCR) as described in Roberts
Rules of Order and in carrying out the powers prescribed to the Board of Directors and
Executive Committee pursuant to the Constitution.
II. AUTHORITY
Section 1: These Bylaws are subject to the terms and limitations of the CCR constitution.
Section 2: Charters for committees approved under these Bylaws act as the official
interpretation of procedural and substantive matters of CCR.
Section 3: It is the responsibility of the Chair to ensure these policies are upheld and enforced.
III. MEMBERSHIP
Section 1: All CCR have a right to membership and chartering under the limitations and
specifications of the CCR constitution;
Section 2: All CCR members may be classified under the following categories:
a. Executive:
i. Elected Member, thereafter defined as any member who is found under art. V
1 of the CCR constitution;
ii. Unelected Voting Member, thereafter defined as the Executive Director;
iii. Unelected non-voting Member, thereafter defined as the Parliamentarian and
Sergeant-at-Arms, or those members appointed by the Chairman and approved
by the Executive Board;
iv. Staff, Assistant, or Clerks, thereafter defined as members unilaterally appointed
by the Chair or other legal authorized body without approval from the
Executive Board;
1. Staff, Assistant, or Clerks cannot manage, appropriate, or otherwise
handle CCR accounts or money without either explicit approval from

the chair or becoming an Unelected non-voting Member;
v. Nonvoting Ex-Officio, thereafter defined as a member appointed by the
chairman and approved by the Executive Committee to represent a permanent
station on the Executive Committee in an advisory position, and can petition
motions, point of orders, and appeals without approval of any other governing
body;
b. General:
i. Chapter Presidents or Presiding Officers, thereafter defined as the official
recognized official(s) retaining executive authority over an approved chapter, as
approved by chartership;
ii. Representative Voting Member, thereafter defined as voting member of the
Board of Directors not elsewhere defined in these Bylaws;
iii. General Members, thereafter defined as voting members of the General Session
that meet the prerequisites of the constitution not elsewhere defined in these
Bylaws;
iv. Associate Member, thereafter defined as nonvoting, nonmember observers
approved by a chapter and submitted in writing to the Chair or Board of
Directors for approval;
IV. ANNUAL CONVENTIONS
Section 1: All members shall retain the following rights:

a. In the case of a procedural dispute, all members have a right to:
i. Within one week of the General Session, to petition the Judiciary or Standing
Rules Committee found in these Bylaws to resolve the grievance, whose ruling
shall be binding unless overturned by the General Session pursuant to measures
found in the Constitution, and shall:
1. Publicly post all rulings;
2. Rule a day prior to the General Session, unless an impossibility arises;
3. Receive timely and equitable response;
ii. Receive appropriate response from the Chair prior to 3 hours of the opening of
the General Session;
iii. Petition the Chair for procedural substantive grievances during the General
Session;
iv. All members of CCR retain a right to see chartering materials;
v. To see approved public, legal documents;
vi. To be free of molestation without due process of removal specified in RONR;
Section 2: Student Identification shall hereby be defined as any bona fide proof of studentship,

which shall include, but not be limited to:
a. Physical Student Identification card;
b. Copy of Student Identification card;
c. Active student portal or other relatively similar platform;
d. Student transcript;
Section 3: All conventions shall have an open gallery that can be removed on the Chairs
discretion.
V. OFFICERS
Section 1: All officers shall maintain an official email, mailing address, or other form of
official communication. Social Media may not be used as a form of official communication.
Section 2: All officers shall be responsible for fulfilling their duties under the constitution.
Section 3: All officers shall be take an oath upon entering office at the Annual Convention
pursuant to Section 7408 of the California Election Code, which shall be: I, (name), do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So
help me God.
VI. BOARD OF DIRECTOR MEETINGS
Section 1: Board of Director (BOD) meetings shall be held in accordance to RONR;
Section 2: BOD meetings shall be closed door to nonvoting members, except by explicit
written approval by the chair to observe;
VII. COMMITTEES
Section 1: The Credentials Committee shall:

a. Be composed of 5 members;
b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Credentials Committee with
approval by the Executive Committee;
c. Be mandated to have the following duties:
i. To report to the Executive Committee on progress at the end of the every
quarter, and weekly upon the call to convention;

ii. To adhere to assist the chair in the distribution of election materials, including
but limited to:
1. Information to legally engage in elections;
2. Creation of chartering forms;
3. Examination of forms received for clerical or other errors;
4. Advising the Executive Committee on admissible and non-admissible
members;
5. Compilation of final list of potential voters arranged by club and then
alphabetical order.
6. Arrangements for Registration;
7. Registration process during and prior to the Annual Convention, in
coordination with the Sergeant at Arms, Tournament Host, and other
officials, in accordance to the following procedure:
a. Submission of necessary documents by the club for the members
attending;
b. Verification by the Executive Committee;
c. Recording of the Member as officially registered;
d. Issuement of credential to the member upon receiving the
necessary identification prior to the General Session;
iii. To hold preliminary authority over contested delegates;
iv. To submit a full credentials report to the Executive Board for approval with the
following information:
1. Name and title of each voting Board member;
2. Name of each chartered club;
3. Name of each Clubs presiding officer;
4. Delegate delegate strength for each club;
v. To submit a full credentials report to the General Session upon approval by the
Executive Board;
d. The Credentials Committee shall create and maintain a new charter, which will include
procedures and forms, every year;
Section 2: The Resolutions Committee shall:

i. To consider and make any policy recommends that must be codified;
ii. To receive and encourage members to engage in policy proposals to be voted on
by the appropriate committee;
iii. Report to the Executive Committee annually on any resolutions received and

codified into proper form pursuant to the rules of the constitution and Bylaws
prior the final Executive Meeting at the Annual Convention;
d. Create and maintain a charter approved by the Executive Committee;
Section 3: The Platform Committee shall:

b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Platform Committee with
i. Write, create, and draft formal policy positions on behalf of the Executive
Committee under supervision of the Chairman;
ii. Align values of any policy to that the primary organization, namely the
California Republican Party;
Section 4: The Finance Committee shall:

b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Finance Committee with
i. To prepare a plan and be in charge of implementing the plan for raising funds
for CCR;
ii. Assist the Chairman in drafting a budget;
iii. Assist the Chairman in the appropriation of funds pursaunt to the budget;
iv. Create annual reports for the Board of Directors meeting;
v. Create reports upon the request of the Executive Committee;
vi. Issue annual audit reports;
Section 5: The Judiciary Committee shall:

b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Judiciary Committee with
approval by the Board of Directors;
i. Investigate, hear, and rule upon member grievances that arise from violations of
the Constitution or Bylaws;
1. All rulings shall be issued in writing;
2. Rulings shall have binding preliminary authority, that, if imposing a
sanction, are to be then transferred to the Executive Board for review;
a. The Executive Board may reject any Judicial Ruling by a

majority vote;
3. Rulings shall be appealable;
4. Rulings may include sanctions that change the good standing of a
member, censure, or reprove;
ii. To offer rulings upon the findings of any violation CCR documents;
iii. To review the creation, drafting, or amending of bylaws or other legal
documents;
iv. To offer due process to petitioners or defendants;
v. To accept petitions until the day of the Annual Convention and to offer rulings;
vi. To review any material appropriated to it by the Chair;
d. Create and maintain a charter approved by the Board of Directors;
Section 6: The Constitutional Review Committee shall:

a. Be composed of 5 members:
b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Judiciary Committee with
approval by the Board of Directors;
i. Provide a report to the Executive Committee prior to the final Annual
Convention on the status of the constitution and pending amendments;
ii. To assist members in submitting constitutional amendments;
iii. To create constitution amendments;
iv. To submit, upon approval of the Chair and other necessary bodies in the
Constitution, constitutional amendments;
VIII. PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION
Section 1: CCR shall abide by procedures found within legal documents by the following
order:
a. Rules and Bylaws of California Republican Party;
b. Constitution;
c. Bylaws;
d. Committee Charters;
e. Roberts Rules of Order, 11th edition.
IX. ETHICS
Section 1: To remain in good standing, all members and associate members of the Board of
Directors must retain an ethical character.

Section 2: Unethical activities shall include the following:
a. Lying to the Executive Committee, Board of Directors, or Judiciary Committee;
b. Laundering, converting, or otherwise unlawfully using or transferring CCR funds;
c. Engaging in battery or excessive attempts of assault against any member with the intent
to coerce;
d. Using the position of title or office in issuing, receiving, or distributing of private
favors;
e. Willfully ignoring a defined conflict of interest pursuant to these Bylaws;
f. Using the name of CCR without the permissions outlined the Constitution or these
Bylaws;
Section 3: All members or associate members of CCR retain a right to petition for CCR for a
redress of grievances for unethical activity.
X. AMENDMENTS
Section 1: All proposed amendments must be submitted to the recording secretary within 3
days of a Board of Directors meeting.
Section 2: Resolutions for proposed amendment to be enacted by the Executive Committee

must be submitted to the recording secretary within 3 days of a Board of Directors meeting.

Appendix C - A Resolution to Mandate the Constitutional Review Committee to
Create a Judicial Board Amendment to the Constitution
A Resolution to Mandate the Constitutional Review Committee to Create a Judicial

Board Amendment to the Constitution
Whereas, there is currently not procedure for arbitration in the California College Republicans
(CCR); and
Whereas, the current organization remains susceptible to the withdrawal of a single leader; and
Whereas, the prior election has shown the Chair cannot be trusted to employ a trusted
parliamentarian; and
Whereas, there are a myriad of the legal, ethical, and procedural problems facing CCR; and
Whereas, many of the procedural problems facing CCR have affected the seating of delegates,
the offices of elected members, and the functioning of the organization; and
Therefore, be it resolved by the California College Republican Board of Directors that the
Constitutional Review Committee shall create a Judicial Board amendment to propose to the
General Session to ratify into the CCR constitution.

Appendix D - A Resolution for the Formalization of Legal Procedures
A Resolution for the Formalization of Legal Procedures
Whereas, the California College Republicans (CCR) lack any method of formal
communication; and
Whereas, an explicit structure would clarify and expedite the requests from a large host of
parties; and
Whereas, the chair requires assistance in processing requests from the entire state; and
Whereas, the appropriation of funds through legal assistance, or the response of policy requests
from the constituent chapters ought to be impartial; and
Therefore, be it resolved that the Judiciary Committee, 2 weeks into inception, shall establish a
procedures subcommittee to create the necessary forms to assist departments and established
offices of CCR in responding to constituents, in accordance to plantext 5 of this report.

Appendix E. Judiciary Committee Charter
California College Republican Judiciary Committee
Article 1. Purpose.
Section 1: The Judiciary Committee shall be established to hold accountable unethical or

unconstitutional activities, whether by an entity or individual, and shall act duly to enforce,
interpret, and provide guidance to the California College Republicans to ensure equal justice
under the law.
Section 2: The Judiciary Committee shall be established to assist in the creation, drafting, or
amending of bylaws or other legal documents pursuant to appropriation by the Chair.
Article 2. Jurisdiction
Section 1: The Judiciary Committee shall be the governing Judiciary of the California College
Republicans, and shall thus act within the spirit and text of the constitution, and the limitations
provided thereof.
Section 2: The Judiciary Committee shall work within all appropriated powers of the Board of
Directors, and with approval of the Executive Committee.
Section 3: The Judiciary Committee shall retain a right to preliminary authority over all
decisions involving procedural or substantive grievances arising out of a violation of the CCR
Bylaws or Constitution.
Section 4: The Judiciary Committee shall retain the authority to issue preliminary injunctions
against any member within the powers of the Executive Committee without prior council or
notice to the Executive Committee.
Section 5: Upon discovery and due process that proves any person(s) offering testimony to the
Judiciary Committee was falsified, that person shall be indefinitely classified as a member in
poor standing from the California College Republicans pending a ruling from the General
Assembly.
Article 3. Rights and Limitations
Section 1: No member shall be deprived of his rights under the California College Republican

constitution or other governing entity without due process of law.
Section 2: No member shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; nor
shall be compelled in any case to be a witness against himself. All members shall be permitted
to appoint counsel or representation on their behalf, but shall not burden the Judiciary
Committee with the duty to do so on their behalf.
Section 3: No pretrial order shall exceed 15 days without due process of the law.
Section 4: Only the Chief Justice retains the right to approve a pretrial order.
Section 5: All members have a right to a public and speedy trial or case.
Section 6: All members hold a right to accountability for Justices. Justices may not discuss
cases in progress or release information outside of the Judiciary Committee meetings or
hearings until the case is resolved. However, the Judiciary Committee may discuss cases or
release information to affected parties or relevant individuals in order to pursue facts and
evidence pertinent to pending matters.
Section 7: The defendant or plaintiff has a right to file for a summary judgement. Summary
judgements shall skip trial hearings, and shall be binding pursuant to this charter. Motions for
summary judgements must be included in the petition. The Judiciary Committee may reject a
motion for a summary judgement by a two thirds vote. If rejected, the Judiciary Committee
will hold a trial hearing at either the next California College Republican Convention, or
California College Republican Board of Directors Retreat, which will be determined by
whichever event is closer by date or by a majority vote of the Judiciary Committee.
Section 8: Proxy voting is prohibited.
Section 9: A majority vote by the Executive Committee can approve any decision by the
Judiciary Committee.
Article 4. Composition.
Section 1: The Judiciary Committee shall consist of 5 Justices and 3 alternate Justices
appointed by the Chairman and confirmed by a majority of votes of voting members of the
California College Republican Executive Committee.
Section 2: The Judiciary Committee shall consist of a Chief Justice, a Vice Chief Justice, and 3
other Associate Justices.

Section 3: The Chief Justice of the Judiciary Committee shall be appointed by the Chairman of
CCR. The Chief Justice shall hold the following responsibilities:
A. Preside over and organize meetings;
B. Request reasonable remuneration from the Executive Committee or other California
College Republican Committee for official Judiciary Committee expenses;
C. To submit all rulings to the Executive Committee;
D. To maintain a record of attendance of all Justices;
E. To suspend all Justices who fail to show up to any official meetings with no prior
approved and legitimate reason;
F. To appoint any necessary auxiliary staff, such as clerks;
Section 4: The Vice Chief Justice shall be elected by the Judiciary Committee by a majority
vote.
Article 5. Annual Meeting and Procedures.
Section 1: The Judiciary Committee shall hold an annual meeting once per year. The Chief
Justice retains the authority to call additional meetings upon the consent of at least a simple
majority of the Justices.
Section 2: Quorum shall be 4 justices in any circumstance.
Section 3: All meetings shall follow Roberts Rules of Order Newly Revised 11th edition
(hereafter RORN), with the exception of a formal hearings. All meetings shall herein be
defined as formalized discussions of legal problems affecting CCR, and resolutions to expand,
renew, or adjust procedural functions of the Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee
shall not hear any specific cases during these meetings.
Section 4: All meetings shall be open to the public and to reasonable public comment
determined by the Chief Justice, or a majority vote of the Justices .
Section 5: Alternate Justices shall not count towards quorum unless they are attending in place
of another Justice.
Section 6: Alternate Justices are empowered to act as Justices if a Justice is not in attendance
for the extent of the case.
Section 7: In the case of a multitude of Alternate Justices vying for the same seat, with the
Associate Justice not in attendance, the Alternate Justice shall be picked by a random number

generator.
Article 6. Procedures for Formal Hearings.
Section 1: A formal hearing shall hereby be defined as a petition to hear a legal or ethical
problem that has arose in the California College Republicans.
Section 2: Any member or associate member of the California College Republicans, from any
chartered or non-chartered College Republican club, association, or group, may petition the
Judiciary Committee for a formal hearing.
Section 3: The Judiciary Committee retains the right to investigate, hear, and subpoena
members, associate members, or entities of the California College Republicans, within the
limitations of the CCR constitution.
Section 4: A Justices temporary disqualification due to a conflict of interest pertaining to a

particular case shall not count against quorum but shall be recorded as an abstention.
Section 5: A conflict of interest for a Justice shall only pertain to the following cases:
A. A family member is significantly involved in a case;
B. A spouse or ex-spouse is significantly involved a case;
C. Using the position of title or office in issuing, receiving, or distributing of private
favors;
D. The Justice has pursued open, notorious, and numerous personal attacks against either
the plaintiff or defendant of any case;
Section 6: In the case where all Justices have a significant conflict of interest, the case shall be
investigated by the Judiciary Committee, written, recommended, and referred to the General
Session.
Section 7: All members or entities of the California College Republicans have a right to
petition the Judiciary Committee for grievances against any member, associate member, or
entity within the jurisdiction of this charter and the California College Republican constitution.
Section 8: To file a petition the petitioner must complete all forms and procedures found
within this charter.
Section 9: The procedure to file a petition with the Judiciary Committee is as follows:
A. The petitioner files a written grievance with the Judiciary Committee using a
Petition for Hearing form;

i. The petition contains all charges and contentions, refers to all vital evidence,
cites the relevant rule, principle or constitutional clause at issue, and states the
remedy sought.
Section 10: Upon a successful filing of a Petition for Hearing the Chief Justice shall convene a
Preliminary Hearing, which may be online or in person, where the Judiciary Committee can
hear arguments, vital evidence, and testimony concerning its jurisdiction in the matter, and the
Judiciary Committee, upon a two-thirds shall then make its own determination whether or not
to hold a trial hearing. Upon a successful vote, a trial hearing shall take place.
Section 11: All trial hearing procedure shall be in accordance to published trial procedure by
the Judiciary Committee.
Section 12: The Judiciary Committee retains a right, for at any time, to adjourn for a closed
session to discuss or deliberate upon any case.
Section 13: Upon the final deliberation and closure of any trial, the Judiciary Committee shall
release an opinion within seven days outlining the ruling.
Section 14: All rulings are decided by a majority vote.
Section 15: Speaking times, rules of evidence, and other procedural guidelines not specified in
this charter will be developed and approved by a majority vote of the Judiciary Committee.
Article 7. Amendments
Section 1. The Board of Directors may amend these bylaws by a vote pursuant to the CCR
constitution.
Appendix F: Letter from prior Chairman Allen
Leaders of Rebuild and Thrive,
Thank you so much for your extraordinary patience post-convention as we pursued the input of
our agreed-upon neutral third party, the CRNC Parliamentarian, Thomas J. Burke Balch,
J.D., PRP. I know Im not the only one who hoped to have this resolved weeks ago, and I
continue to look forward to a fair and timely resolution.
The purpose of this email is to give leaders of both the Rebuild and Thrive campaigns a status

update including Burkes Parliamentary response to the circumstances.
As the Rebuild leaders, Thrive leaders, and myself agreed on 04/30/17, the key element to a
fair and unbiased resolution is the oversight of a neutral third party, the opinion of whom
precedes any action taken by either campaign and especially CCR. Both campaigns and myself
agreed that this third party would be the CRNC Parliamentarian, Burke Balch. As you may
know, Burke had been travelling and/or ill for the majority of the time post-convention. Only
recently has he been able to fully review all relevant materials and provide responses to them,
and only today have I received sufficient information to provide you with a substantial update.
Therefore, the only factor that has delayed progress has been Burkes inability to immediately
respond to the facts. Only just now having the complete picture of his opinion and the facts, I
have not yet taken any conclusive action related to the resolution of the 2017 CCR Convention.
Burke's response to the question of holding a remote election:
Inability of Convention Delegates to Elect Officers by Electronic Means. CCR Constitution

Article XII, Section 3 makes Roberts Rules of Order Newly Revised the parliamentary
authority for all disputed matters not specifically covered by this Constitution or subsequent
Bylaws. Under RONR (11th ed.), p. 263, ll. 18-24, since it is a fundamental principle of
parliamentary law that the right to vote is limited to the members of an organization who are
actually present at the time the vote is taken in a regular or properly called meeting . . . , the
rules cannot be suspended so as . . . to authorize absentee . . . voting. Consequently, voting
by mail or email must be expressly authorized in the bylaws. RONR (11th ed.), p. 423, ll. 17-
25.
The CCR constitution (equivalent to bylaws; see RONR [11th ed.], p. 12, ll. 8-16) does
authorize election by phone . . . email, or mail in the specific case of filling a vacancy in the
office of Chairman when there is a simultaneous vacancy in the offices of Co-Chairman and
Administrative Vice Chairman. Article VII, Section 2. However, there is no similar
authorization for voting by convention delegates to elect to office. If the bylaws authorize
certain things specifically, other things of the same class are thereby prohibited. RONR (11th
ed.), p. 589, ll. 33-34.
Consequently, it is not possible for the CCR validly to conduct an election of officers by
convention delegates through email or similar electronic means, outside the context of a
meeting in continuation of the convention. And that meeting must be a physical meeting a
single official gathering in one room or area since an electronic meeting is possible only if
authorized in the bylaws/constitution. RONR (11th ed.), p. 97, ll. 9-14.

Burke's response to the question of reconvening convention:
1. The CCR Chair can and should call another meeting of the CCR 2017 convention to
complete its work. As long as that meeting is called to occur before the date of the 2018
convention, it may validly be set for a time when it is realistically expected the largest number
of delegates can attend, such as at the beginning of the next academic year if it is judged that
most delegates will be unavailable during the summer academic break.
2. Since a meeting in continuation of the 2017 CCR convention would be part of the same
session, which was originally called in accordance with the CCR Constitution, the CCR
constitutional requirements for the number of days and methods required for notice of a new
(Article IX, Section 4) or special (Article XI) convention would not apply.
Unlike a special meeting, an adjourned meeting does not require notice, although it is
desirable to give such notice if feasible. An adjourned meeting should not be confused with a
special meeting, which is a separate session called, in ordinary societies, as prescribed by the
bylaws. RONR (11th ed.), p. 244, ll. 21-25.
3. While maximizing the number of delegates attending is of course desirable, business

conducted at a meeting called in continuation of the 2017 convention would be valid even if
the number required for a quorum were not present.
Under CCR Constitution Article IX, Section 10, Once attained, quorum shall remain in effect
for the duration of the Convention. Since a quorum was declared attained at the April 30
meeting of the 2017 convention, and since any subsequent meetings will be continuations of
the same convention, under this constitutional provision should number of the delegates who
attend the second meeting be lower than that required for a quorum, that will not prevent the
meeting from validly conducting business.
Going forward:
It deeply disappoints me that the remote voting that we have been pursuing is parliamentarily
infeasible, as it would have served as a cost and time saver, not to mention would lower
accessibility barriers for delegates. It is also my opinion that not reconvening a second physical
meeting of the 2017 CCR Convention until the late summer or Fall would do grave disservice
to the organization and its mission. There is much work to be done on our campuses,
throughout our state, and in preparation for the critical upcoming year. The California College
Republicans cannot afford to put off this important work, and I feel that it would be
inappropriate for the 2016-2017 CCR State Board to be the ones leading any further statewide
efforts prior to the selection of a new board. For these reasons and others, I believe it is

imperative that the installment of the new CCR State Board occurs sooner rather than later.
Upon receiving the above information, I have taken immediate exploratory action to secure
two items that are essential to the reconvening of the second meeting of the 2017 CCR
Convention: (1) an unbiased registered parliamentarian and (2) a suitable venue. Further
details on the second meeting of the 2017 CCR Convention will be sent out in the coming days
as CCR secures those items.
Thank you again for the incredible patience you have shown, and thank you for your
leadership in civility during these unprecedented and trying circumstances. As we near a
resolution, I put my faith and optimism forward that every California College Republican will
soon be able to work passionately alongside each other towards our important, shared goals.
Best,
Ivy
ITEM 3
A Resolution to Adopt the California College Republicans Bylaws
WHEREAS, the CCR Board of Directors has the authority to pass and administer bylaws; and
WHEREAS, CCR currently lacks bylaws; and
WHEREAS, CCR has faced severe bureaucratic disrupt after the finalization of the election; and
WHEREAS, bylaws assist in specifying the implementation of the constitution; and

Therefore be it resolved, the California College Republicans Board of Directors that the Bylaws
below be adopted as the Bylaws of CCR.
California College Republicans Bylaws
I. PURPOSE
Section 1: The purpose of these Bylaws shall be to provide procedures to be used in conducting
the business of the California College Republicans (CCR) as described in Roberts Rules of
Order and in carrying out the powers prescribed to the Board of Directors and Executive
Committee pursuant to the Constitution.
II. AUTHORITY
Section 1: These Bylaws are subject to the terms and limitations of the CCR constitution.
Section 2: Charters for committees approved under these Bylaws act as the official interpretation
of procedural and substantive matters of CCR.
Section 3: It is the responsibility of the Chair to ensure these policies are upheld and enforced.
III. MEMBERSHIP
Section 1: All CCR members have a right to membership and chartering under the limitations
and specifications of the CCR constitution;
Section 2: All CCR members may be classified under the following categories:
a. Executive:
i. Elected Member, thereafter defined as any member who is found under art. V 1
of the CCR constitution;
ii. Unelected Voting Member, thereafter defined as the Executive Director;
iii. Unelected non-voting Member, thereafter defined as the Parliamentarian and
Sergeant-at-Arms, or those members appointed by the Chairman and approved by
the Executive Board;
iv. Staff, Assistant, or Clerks, thereafter defined as members unilaterally appointed
by the Chair or other legal authorized body without approval from the Executive
Board;
1. Staff, Assistant, or Clerks cannot manage, appropriate, or otherwise
handle CCR accounts or money without either explicit approval from the
chair or becoming an Unelected non-voting Member;

v. Nonvoting Ex-Officio, thereafter defined as a member appointed by the chairman
and approved by the Executive Committee to represent a permanent station on the
Executive Committee in an advisory position, and can petition motions, point of
orders, and appeals without approval of any other governing body;
b. General:
i. Chapter Presidents or Presiding Officers, thereafter defined as the official
recognized official(s) retaining executive authority over an approved chapter, as
approved by chartership;
ii. Representative Voting Member, thereafter defined as voting member of the Board
of Directors not elsewhere defined in these Bylaws;
iii. General Members, thereafter defined as voting members of the General Session
that meet the prerequisites of the constitution not elsewhere defined in these
Bylaws;
iv. Associate Member, thereafter defined as nonvoting, nonmember observers
approved by a chapter and submitted in writing to the Chair or Board of Directors
for approval;
IV. ANNUAL CONVENTIONS
Section 1: All members shall retain the following rights:

a. In the case of a procedural dispute, all members have a right to:
i. Within one week of the General Session, to petition the Parliamentarians Office
found in these Bylaws to resolve the grievance, whose ruling shall be binding
unless overturned by the General Session pursuant to measures found in the
Constitution, and shall:
1. Publicly post all rulings;
2. Rule a day prior to the General Session, unless an impossibility arises;
3. Receive timely and equitable response;
ii. Receive appropriate response from the Chair prior to 3 hours of the opening of the
General Session;
iii. Petition the Chair for procedural substantive grievances during the General
Session;
iv. All members of CCR retain a right to see chartering materials;
v. To see approved public, legal documents;
vi. To be free of molestation without due process of removal specified in RONR;
Section 2: Student Identification shall hereby be defined as any bona fide proof of studentship,
which shall include, but not be limited to:
a. Physical Student Identification card;

b. Copy of Student Identification card;
c. Active student portal or other relatively similar platform;
d. Student transcript;
Section 3: All conventions shall have an open gallery that can be removed on the Chairs
discretion.
V. OFFICERS
Section 1: All officers shall maintain an official email, mailing address, or other form of official
communication. Social Media may not be used as a form of official communication.
Section 2: All officers shall be responsible for fulfilling their duties under the constitution.
Section 3: All officers shall be take an oath upon entering office at the Annual Convention
pursuant to Section 7408 of the California Election Code, which shall be: I, (name), do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help
me God.
VI. BOARD OF DIRECTOR MEETINGS
Section 1: Board of Director (BOD) meetings shall be held in accordance to RONR;
Section 2: BOD meetings shall be closed door to nonvoting members, except by explicit written
approval by the chair to observe;
VII. COMMITTEES
Section 1: The Credentials Committee shall:

i. To report to the Executive Committee on progress at the end of the every quarter,
and weekly upon the call to convention;
ii. To adhere to assist the chair in the distribution of election materials, including but
limited to:

1.Information to legally engage in elections;
2.Creation of chartering forms;
3.Examination of forms received for clerical or other errors;
4.Advising the Executive Committee on admissible and non-admissible
members;
5. Compilation of final list of potential voters arranged by club and then
alphabetical order;
6. Arrangements for Registration;
7. Registration process during and prior to the Annual Convention, in
coordination with the Sergeant at Arms, Tournament Host, and other
officials, in accordance to the following procedure:
a. Submission of necessary documents by the club for the members
attending;
b. Verification by the Executive Committee;
c. Recording of the Member as officially registered;
d. Issuement of credential to the member upon receiving the
necessary identification prior to the General Session;
iii. To hold preliminary authority over contested delegates;
iv. To submit a full credentials report to the Executive Board for approval with the
following information:
1. Name and title of each voting Board member;
2. Name of each chartered club;
3. Name of each Clubs presiding officer;
4. Delegate delegate strength for each club;
v. To submit a full credentials report to the General Session upon approval by the
Executive Board;
d. The Credentials Committee shall create and maintain a new charter, which will include
procedures and forms, every year;
Section 2: The Resolutions Committee shall:

i. To consider and make any policy recommends that must be codified;
ii. To receive and encourage members to engage in policy proposals to be voted on
by the appropriate committee;
iii. Report to the Executive Committee annually on any resolutions received and
codified into proper form pursuant to the rules of the constitution and Bylaws
prior the final Executive Meeting at the Annual Convention;

Section 3: The Platform Committee shall:

b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Platform Committee with
i. Write, create, and draft formal policy positions on behalf of the Executive
Committee under supervision of the Chairman;
ii. Align values of any policy to that the primary organization, namely the California
Republican Party;
Section 4: The Finance Committee shall:

b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Finance Committee with
i. To prepare a plan and be in charge of implementing the plan for raising funds for
CCR;
ii. Assist the Chairman in drafting a budget;
iii. Assist the Chairman in the appropriation of funds pursuant to the budget;
iv. Create annual reports for the Board of Directors meeting;
v. Create reports upon the request of the Executive Committee;
vi. Issue annual audit reports;
Section 5: The Constitutional Review Committee shall:

a. Be composed of 5 members:
b. The Chairman of CCR shall appoint the members of the Constitutional Review
Committee with approval by the Board of Directors;
i. Provide a report to the Executive Committee prior to the final Annual Convention
on the status of the constitution and pending amendments;
ii. To assist members in submitting constitutional amendments;
iii. To create constitution amendments;
iv. To submit, upon approval of the Chair and other necessary bodies in the
Constitution, constitutional amendments;

Section 6: The Chair shall be an ex-officio member in every committee, and the Co-Chair shall
retain the position of Chair should there be an absence;
VIII. PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION
Section 1: CCR shall abide by procedures found within legal documents by the following order:
a. Rules and Bylaws of California Republican Party;
b. Constitution;
c. Bylaws;
d. Committee Charters;
e. Roberts Rules of Order, 11th edition.
IX. ETHICS
Section 1: To remain in good standing, all members and associate members of the Board of
Directors must retain an ethical character.
Section 2: Unethical activities shall include the following:

a. Lying to the Executive Committee, Board of Directors, or Parliamentarians Office;
b. Laundering, converting, or otherwise unlawfully using or transferring CCR funds;
c. Engaging in battery or excessive attempts of assault against any member with the intent
to coerce;
d. Using the position of title or office in issuing, receiving, or distributing of private favors;
e. Willfully ignoring a defined conflict of interest pursuant to these Bylaws;
f. Using the name of CCR without the permissions outlined the Constitution or these
Bylaws;
Section 3: All members or associate members of CCR retain a right to petition for CCR for a
redress of grievances for unethical activity.
X. AMENDMENTS
Section 1: All proposed amendments must be submitted to the recording secretary within 3 days
of a Board of Directors meeting.
Section 2: Resolutions for proposed amendment to be enacted by the Executive Committee must
be submitted to the recording secretary within 3 days of a Board of Directors meeting.

ITEM 6
A Resolution to Appoint a Chair to the Constitutional Review Committee
WHEREAS, the CCR Board of Directors has the authority to pass and administer bylaws; and
WHEREAS, the Constitutional Review Committee currently has no staff; and
WHEREAS, CCR has faced severe bureaucratic disrupt after the finalization of the election; and
WHEREAS, appointments are necessary to begin the process of the committee; and
WHEREAS, constitutional reform is necessary to prevent future harms; and
WHEREAS, the constitution permits too much consolidation of authority in the chair; and
Therefore be it resolved, the California College Republicans Board of Directors appoint Kimo
Gandall as Chair of the Constitutional Review Committee, and
Finally, let it be further resolved that Kimo Gandall will submit a charter for the Constitutional
Review Committee to the Executive Committee a week after the first Constitutional Review
Committee meeting.

ITEM 7
A Resolution to Appoint a Chair to the Finance Committee
WHEREAS, the California College Republicans (CCR) Board of Directors has the authority to
pass and administer bylaws;
WHEREAS, the Finance Committee currently has no staff; and
WHEREAS, CCR has faced severe bureaucratic disrupt after the resolution of the election; and
WHEREAS, finances are necessary for CCR to function; and
WHEREAS, a Finance Committee provides transparency and easy access for auditing for both
the Executive Board and members of the General Session; and
Therefore be it resolved, the California College Republicans Board of Directors appoint Joshua
Recalde-Martinez as Chair of the Finance Committee, and
Finally, let it be further resolved that Joshua Recalde-Martinez will submit a charter for the
Finance Committee to the Executive Committee a week after the first Finance Committee
meeting.

ITEM 8
A Resolution to Appoint a Chair to the Resolutions Committee
pass and administer bylaws; and
WHEREAS, the Resolutions Committee currently has no staff; and
WHEREAS, Resolutions and policies from members help in growing the College Republican
community and engage members; and
WHEREAS, engagement with members incentivizes new, creative policies, thus expanding the
competitive marketplace of ideas; and
Therefore be it resolved, the California College Republicans Board of Directors appoint

Christian Chacon as Chair of the Resolutions Committee, and
Finally, let it be further resolved that Christian Chacon will submit a charter for the Resolutions
Committee to the Executive Committee a week after the first Resolutions Committee meeting.

ITEM 9
A Resolution to Appoint a Chair to the Platform Committee
pass and administer bylaws; and
WHEREAS, the Platform Committee currently has no staff; and
WHEREAS, a strong College Republican Platform that address specific problems not covered by
the California Republican Party can assist strong policy advocacy on campuses; and
WHEREAS, the current CCR platform is vague and ambiguous; and
Therefore let it be resolved, the California College Republicans Board of Directors appoint
Andrew Gates as Chair of the Platform Committee, and
Finally, let it be further resolved that Andrew Gates will submit a charter for the Platform
Committee to the Executive Committee a week after the first Platform Committee meeting.

ITEM 10
A Resolution to Appoint a Chair to the Credentials Committee
pass and administer bylaws or approve the appointment of chairmen; and
WHEREAS, the Credentials Committee currently has no staff; and
WHEREAS, prior failures of the Credentials Committee largely originated out of a lack of
responsibility and oversight; and
WHEREAS, appointments are necessary to begin the process of issuing credentialing

requirements; and
WHEREAS, a Credentials Committee is an absolute necessity to the CCR election process; and
Therefore be it resolved, the California College Republicans Board of Directors appoint

Christian Chacon as Chair of the Credentials Committee, and
Finally, let it be further resolved that Christian Chacon will submit a charter for the Credentials
Committee to the Executive Committee a week after the first Credentials Committee meeting.

ITEM 11
A Resolution to Publish Applications for Committee Decisions
pass and administer bylaws or actions;
WHEREAS, the many committees lack sufficient members; and
WHEREAS, appointments ought to be thoroughly vetted; and
WHEREAS, a vetting process ought to be impartial and open to all members; and
WHEREAS, applications provide access to the full marketplace of College Republicans, thus
allowing CCR to make merit based decisions; and
Therefore, let it be resolved by the California College Republicans Board of Directors refer to
the Chair a mandate to create and issue applications for members of CCR to apply for these
committees within the next 3 days, and be due in a week from the date released, and
Finally, let it be further resolved that the Communications Director work with the Chairman to
accomplish the task of producing equitable, fair, and open applications to all those who wish to
apply.

ITEM 12
A Resolution to Authorize a 2017 California College Republicans Budget
WHEREAS, the California College Republicans (CCR) constitution requires that the Board of Directors
pass a budget pursuant to art. IV 5; and
WHEREAS, CCR requires a budget to move forward; and
WHEREAS, a prepared budget allows for the transparent appropriation of funds; and
WHEREAS, prior budgets lacked specific appropriations; and
Therefore, it be resolved by the California College Republicans Board of Directors that the following
budget be adopted:

Item 13
A Resolution to Refer Leadership Retreat Working Papers to the Resolutions
Committee
WHEREAS, the California College Republicans Leadership Retreat produced several working
papers from members and associate members that recommend policy; and
WHEREAS, these papers were debated and deliberated upon by the assembly of that event; and
WHEREAS, it is vitally important that all members have an equal opportunity to propose policy;
and
WHEREAS, the Leadership Retreat Chapter Forum produced interaction between normal
members and policy makers; and
WHEREAS, the Resolutions Committee specifically deals with proposals and policy from the
chapter level; and
Therefore, be it resolved by the California College Republicans Board of Directors refer to the
the below dockets (appendix A) to the Resolutions Committee, and
Let it be further resolved that the Resolutions Committee shall convert the working papers, upon
passing upon a deliberative vote of substantive value, into votable resolutions for the state
organization, and
Let it be further resolved that any working paper that passes the committee be converted into a
resolution and given to the Chairman for examination and voting, and
Finally, let it be further resolved that the Communications Director shall assist the Resolutions
Committee in publicizing these dockets if any resolution passes the committee and is approved
by the Chairman;
Appendix A: California College Republicans Chapter Forum

Item B1
A Bill to Ensure Conservative Cultural Legacy via New Officers
Author: Alex Saint Mary's College Republicans
BE IT PROPOSED BY THE CHAPTER FORUM HERE ASSEMBLED THAT:
SECTION 1: (Statement of policy)

A new Chapter officer position shall be created known as the Legacy Advisor so that each
chapter has the option to choose elect one member who will inform the club on the cultural
happenings, strategize how to spread their ideas, and network advocate for conservatism ideas
in the broader culture on campus and beyond. He or She will come up with event ideas, debate
ideas, speakers to request at panels, and ways of persuading people to conservative
perspectives.
SECTION 2: Cultural happenings being defined as incidents in the Culture War ongoing
various national debates over political-correctness, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and
so-on.
SECTION 3: Each CIO will report to an ongoing council of currently serving Legacy
Advisors as well as Legacy Advisor alumni.
A) These councils will take place once a year at CCR conventions, where all present
members will review initiatives on campus to express conservative ideas and assess their
success or areas where they have opportunities to strategically improve.
B) This council will also coordinate ideas for both events on campus as well as ways to get
CR alumni specifically suited to media/outreach into positions in media itself. In the same way
many see California College Republicans as a means to network into specific jobs for local
politicians and financial businesses, this council will be about networking for conservatives to
help eachother seek institutional power in tech/media rather than just politics/economics.
C) This council will also coordinate for panels or workshops to be hosted at the next CCR
event, specifically for clubs to better learn how to organize events/debates/community

outreach. Speakers would be conservative show hosts, conservative media icons, famous
activists, etc.
SECTION 4: Each club who chooses to participate in this council will send a nominee for this
position to be presented by the next CR event. They will meet along with any culture/media-
oriented alumni who have an interest in helping this new council get started.
SECTION 5: All bylaws and legislation in conflict with this legislation are hereby declared
null and void.
Item B2
A Bill for High School Outreach and Recognition
Author: Nolan Bridgford, Edison High School Next Generation Republicans
BE IT PROPOSED BY THE CHAPTER FORUM HERE ASSEMBLED THAT:
SECTION 1: The California College Republicans (herein CCR) ought to establish outreach
programs to assist in the facilitation, recruitment, and promotion of conservative, Republican,
principles on California high school campuses.
SECTION 2: Herein and after, all high schools chartered and approved under CCR shall
retain ex-officio status at all official functions and meetings, and may petition the chair for ex-
officio positions on all CCR committees.
SECTION 3: High school chapters must petition for associate membership under the following
procedure:
A). Notification of Intent. Petitioners must submit a formal, written notice to the CCR
Chairwoman petitioning for Associate membership;
B). Proof of Identity. If the chair accepts the Notification of Intent, and explicitly grants
permission to petition, the Chair of the High School chapter must submit to the Executive

Director:
i. Constitution, bylaws, or other governing document of the organization;
ii. Proof of attendance at the school wherein the petitioners organization resides;
iii. Proof of chartership at the school wherein the petitioners organization resides;
iv. Completion of all other necessary documents required by the Executive Director;
C). Submission of Associateship. As specified by the Chair, the petitioner shall submit
documentation specifying his or her reasons and intentions for joining the organization.
SECTION 4: Herein, High School Associate members (herein Associate Members) that submit
the necessary document, pursuit to regulations established by the Executive Director, are
defined as ex-officio members of CCR, and retain the right to attend General Session, petition
the chair for grievances, and other basic rights prescribed by the constitution.
SECTION 5: The definition of ex-officio shall not grant the following rights: to submit written
or verbal motions, speaking in debate, objecting to a procedural violation during a General
Assembly, or voting on any committee. Further, ex-officio Associate Members do not retain
the rights to vote at any CCR committee or assembly.
SECTION 6: Any CCR committee or assembly may delegate tasks or official authorization to
Associate Members with the permission of the Chair or Executive Director.
SECTION 7: The Executive Director shall create the necessary task forces, committees, or
other sub-agencies, within the realm of jurisdiction and or the permission of the chair to
implement this bill.
SECTION 8: The Executive Director shall create the necessary documentation and forms to
implement this bill within 10 days of the passing of this legislation.
SECTION 9: All legislation in conflict with this legislation is hereby declared

null and void.

Item B3
A Resolution to Reach out to the Latino Community to Make the
California GOP Competitive Again
Author: Richard Zierer, UCSB College Republicans
WHEREAS, Latinos make up one third of all California voters and voted nearly 78% for
Hillary Clinton in 2016; and
WHEREAS, the Republican Party must increase its share of minority votes in order to win
statewide elections; and
WHEREAS, the GOP has not won a statewide election since 2006, the Democrats have a
supermajority control over the state legislature that threatens Prop 13, and the Republican
Party has lost these 55 electoral college votes in every election since 1992; and
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED BY THIS CHAPTER FORUM, That the College

Republican Chapter Forum here assembled make the following recommendation for solution:
we must encourage our chapters to be very active in minority outreach efforts beginning
immediately, particularly in key competitive districts.
Item B4
A Resolution to Encourage Conditional Support of American
Universities
WHEREAS, the principles of free expression, due process, academic inquiry and intellectual
diversity should be paramount within the university; and

WHEREAS, American colleges and universities, both public and private, within the state of
California and without, have increasingly shown an unwillingness to abide by these principles;
and
WHEREAS, the prevailing philosophy of most modern college and university campuses is one
that is hostile to the United States of America and to the basic American values of private
property, capitalism, and free expression, as well as scorn for ordinary Americans who abide
by and cherish these values; and
WHEREAS, it may be taken as a basic moral axiom that it is wrong for any individual to
subsidize those individuals and organizations whose values are antithetical to their continued
survival; and
WHEREAS, the colleges and universities of this nation are largely dependent on the financial
support of the American people as a whole, both through involuntary means (i.e. taxation) and
voluntary means (i.e. donation); and
WHEREAS, universities that have shown themselves to be particularly hostile to free speech,
including the University of Missouri, have suffered financially as a result of their commitment
to illiberal values; now, therefore be it,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED BY THIS CHAPTER FORUM THAT: the Chapter Forum

encourages all American citizens, including parents and alumni, who voluntarily donate to
American colleges and universities which violate students rights and promulgate anti-
capitalist and anti-American ideology to immediately cease their donations; and
FURTHER RESOLVED, the Chapter Forum will work to create an independent organization
designed to target the most important financial supporters of colleges and universities within
California, to open channels of communication with these individuals and lay out in great

detail the problems with the universities to which they are donating, with the purpose of
encouraging them to cease their donations contingent on the university abandoning its wanton
disregard for students rights and its pernicious ideological indoctrination, so as to place
financial pressure on these universities; and
FINALLY RESOLVED, the Chapter Forum will work to lobby state and federal politicians to
enact and pass legislation which will revoke public funding from universities which repeatedly
violate the Constitutional rights of their students, including free speech and due process, and to
further enact and pass legislation which will revoke public funding from any and all courses
and departments within these universities that teach openly anti-American ideology.

Item 14
A Resolution to begin the Process of Bidding for Convention
WHEREAS, the constitution requires an annual convention; and
WHEREAS, the convention is to be held in April, a date that is approaching; and
WHEREAS, the convention requires a process of bidding; and
WHEREAS, the convention is to be held in Southern California this cycle; and
WHEREAS, all schools should be aware of the opportunity to bid; and
WHEREAS, competitive bidding results in higher yields for the state organization;
Therefore be it resolved, that the California College Republicans Board of Directors will approve
the start of the bidding process, and
Finally, let it be resolved that the Communications Director in conjunction with the Finance
Committee will work with the Chairman to authorize the facilitation of documents necessary or
schools to submit bids.

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California College Republicans

Board of Directors Meeting

Chairmans Letter to the Board:

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 1

Board of Directors Agenda

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 2

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 3

WHEREAS, CCR does not currently have an Executive Director; and

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 4

To the California College Republican Board of Directors

(4). Is structural reform necessary to maintain organizational efficiency?

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 5

Charisma: attainment of an identifiable pinnacle position of responsibility where the ability to

Traditional Authority: A form of leadership in which authority is based on tradition or customs.

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 6

III. Analysis and Harms

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 7

The report finds there to be 3 areas that need to be addressed:

(1). The Status Quo and Arbitration;

The Status Quo and Arbitration

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 8

Firstmost, as previously argued, it is poor practice to have internal constitutions, as their

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 9

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 10

(A). Charismatic Authority vs. RONR

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 11

Of course, charisma is a necessary element to an effective organization. Charisma, by its

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 12

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 13

(B). Charisma and Transactional Costs

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 14

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 15

Chart 1.1 Webers Classic Bureaucracy.

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 16

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 17

Chapters and Governance

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 18

This is increasingly important as political division becomes a growing problem. Furthermore, in

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 19

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 20

IV. Substantive Summary

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 21

Secondmost, I outline several different theories of organization to apply to CCR. These, I

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 22

Plantext 1. Create Bylaws (Appendix B).

Purpose and Intent:

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 24

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 25

Resolved: The California College Republican constitutional committee shall create an a

Purpose and Intent:

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 26

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 27

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 28

Purpose and Intent:

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 29

Purpose and Intent:

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 30

Purpose and Intent:

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 31

California College Republicans Board of Directors Meeting Docket 32