Brief of The United States Supporting Dave Davis in Guam

Case: 17-15719, 11/28/2017, ID: 10670505, DktEntry: 21, Page 1 of 41
No. 17-15719
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_________________
ARNOLD DAVIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly

situated,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
GUAM, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants
_________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF GUAM
_________________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND URGING AFFIRMANCE
_________________
JOHN M. GORE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
DIANA K. FLYNN
DAYNA J. ZOLLE
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Appellate Section RFK 3718
Ben Franklin Station
P.O. Box 14403
Washington, D.C. 20044-4403
(202) 305-8194
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES .................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ................................................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2
1. Guams Plebiscite Law.......................................................................... 2
2. The Proceedings Below ......................................................................... 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 8
ARGUMENT
GUAMS PLEBISCITE LAW VIOLATES THE FIFTEENTH

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS ......................................................10
A. The Plebiscite Law Intentionally Discriminates Based

On Race .....................................................................................10
1. Chamorro Is Generally Understood To Describe

A Race Or Ethnicity ........................................................11
2. The Plebiscite Law Purposefully Uses Ancestry

As A Proxy For Race ......................................................12
3. The Context Of The Plebiscite Laws Passage

Demonstrates That It Purposefully Establishes A
Race-Based Voting Qualification ...................................16
B. Congress Has Not Authorized The Guam Legislature

To Enact Voting Preferences For Chamorros Or
Native Inhabitants Of Guam.................................................20
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued): PAGE
C. The Fifteenth Amendment And The Equal Protection

Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment Apply With
Full Force To Guam .................................................................24
D. The Challenged Plebiscite Is An Election Within

The Meaning Of The Fifteenth Amendment ..............................25
E. Guam Has Failed To Show That The Plebiscite Laws

Racial Classification Survives Strict Scrutiny Under
The Equal Protection Clause Of The Fourteenth
Amendment ................................................................................27
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................31
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) .....................................24
Akina v. Hawaii, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Haw. 2015),

appeal dismissed as moot, 835 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................... 28-29
Akina v. Hawaii, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) ...................................................................29
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901) .....................................................7
Artichoke Joes Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003) ........24
Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commn, 844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 2017 WL 2405597 ............................................................. 14, 18
Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................... passim
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)......................................................................7
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901)...........................................................7
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) ..............................................................7
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)...................................................................7
Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1994) ....................................................28
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)......................................................... 29-30
Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada,

962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), as amended (June 8, 1992) ...................................25
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974) ..............................22
Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2015) ..........................................27
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) .................................................................7
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CASES (continued): PAGE
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)............................................................27
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) .....................................................................11
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ............................................................9, 20
Nevada Dept of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 566 U.S. 911 (2012) ..................................................................28
Paeste v. Government of Guam, 798 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2015),

cert. denied sub nom. Territory of Guam v. Paeste,
136 S. Ct. 2508 (2016)...................................................................................25
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,

551 U.S. 701 (2007).......................................................................................30
Rainbow Magazine, Inc. v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.),
77 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1996) ...........................................................................24
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) ........................................................... passim
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)....................................13
Santos v. Ada, No. SP0083-92 (Guam Superior Ct.) (1992) ...................................15
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ............................................................... 10, 26
United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113 (D. Guam) (2017) .......................................16
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation,

439 U.S. 463 (1979)................................................................................ 20, 23
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) .............................................................11
Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State Dept of Transp.,

407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005) .........................................................................30
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CONSTITUTION:
U.S. Const. Amend. XV, 1....................................................................................11
STATUTES: PAGE
Civil Rights Act of 1870, as amended (CRA), 52 U.S.C. 10101 (formerly

42 U.S.C. 1971) ...........................................................................................1, 5
52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(1) .....................................................................................6
52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(2) .....................................................................................6
52 U.S.C. 10101(c) ..........................................................................................1
Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. 1421 et seq...................................................1

48 U.S.C. 1421b(m) .........................................................................................6
48 U.S.C. 1421b(n) ....................................................................................6, 21
48 U.S.C. 1421b(u) ................................................................................ passim
48 U.S.C. 1421l .........................................................................................3, 17
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1407...................................4, 17
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 ................................................1

52 U.S.C. 10301(a) ..........................................................................................6
52 U.S.C. 10308(d) ..........................................................................................1
48 U.S.C. 1422c(a)...................................................................................................22
1 Guam Code Ann. 2105 (2017) ................................................................... 2-3, 26
1 Guam Code Ann. 2110 (2017) ................................................................... 2-3, 26
3 Guam Code Ann. 21000 (2016) ................................................................... 18-19
3 Guam Code Ann. 21001(c) (2016) ................................................................3, 12
3 Guam Code Ann. 21001(e) (2016) ................................................................3, 12
3 Guam Code Ann. 21002.1 (2016) ......................................................................15
21 Guam Code Ann. 75101(d) (2017) ..................................................................15
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STATUTES (continued): PAGE
21 Guam Code Ann. 75107(a) (2017) ..................................................................15
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 403(a)(42), 66 Stat. 163 (1952) .............................................4
Pub. L. No. 630, ch. 512, 4(a), 64 Stat. 384 (1950) ..........................................3, 17
Guam Elective Governor Act, Pub. L. No. 90-497, 4, 82 Stat. 842 (1968) .........22
Guam Pub. L. 23-130 1 (1996) .............................................................................12
Guam Pub. L. 23-147 2(b) (1997) ........................................................................17
Guam Pub. L. 23-147 10 (1997) ...........................................................................16
Guam Pub. L. 25-106 11 (2000) ...........................................................................17
Guam Pub. L. 25-106 21001(e) (2000).................................................................17
EXECUTIVE ORDERS:
Exec. Order No. 11,045, 27 Fed. Reg. 8511 (Aug. 21, 1962) ...................................4
Exec. Order No. 8683, 6 Fed. Reg. 1015 (Feb. 18, 1941) .........................................4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
H.R. Rep. No. 7273, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5(n) (1950).........................................22
Tr. Roundtable Meeting on the Political Status Bills (May 20, 2011) ....................19
96 Cong. Rec. 7574 (1950) ......................................................................................22
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MISCELLANEOUS:
Anthony (T.J.) F. Quan, Comment, Respeta I Taotao Tano: The

Recognition and Establishment of the Self-Determination and
Sovereign Rights of the Indigenous Chamorros of Guam Under
International, Federal, and Local Law, 3 Asian-Pac. L. &
Poly J. 3 (2002) ............................................................................................11
Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of

United States Territorial Relations (1989) ....................................................22
Lindsay Hixson et al., The Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander
Population: 2010, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Briefs (2012),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-12.pdf .....................12
Nicole Manglona Torres, Comment, Self-Determination Challenges

to Voter Classifications in the Marianas After Rice v. Cayetano:
A Call for a Congressional Declaration of Territorial Principles,
14 Asian-Pac. L. & Poly J. 152 (2012) ........................................................11
1950 Census, Vol. II, Pt. 54, Table 38 ..................................................... 4, 12-13, 18
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 17-15719
ARNOLD DAVIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
GUAM, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants
_________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF GUAM
_________________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND URGING AFFIRMANCE
_________________
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
This appeal concerns allegations that a Guam voting law discriminates based
on race in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; the Civil Rights
Act of 1870, as amended (CRA), 52 U.S.C. 10101; Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301; and the Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48
U.S.C. 1421 et seq. The Department of Justice has substantial responsibility for
the enforcement of the CRA and Section 2 of the VRA, which prohibit racial
discrimination in voting. See 52 U.S.C. 10101(c), 10308(d). Because these

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statutes ban conduct that may also violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, the United States similarly has an interest in ensuring the proper
interpretation of these Amendments.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The United States addresses the following issue:
Whether a Guam law providing that only Native Inhabitants of Guam are
eligible to register for or vote in the territorys Political Status Plebiscite, 1
Guam Code Ann. 2110 (2017), discriminates on the basis of race in violation of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as extended to Guam through the Guam
Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Guams Plebiscite Law
Under Guam law, only Native Inhabitants of Guam are eligible to vote in
a Political Status Plebiscite. 1 Guam Code Ann. 2110 (2017). The law directs
Guams Election Commission to hold such a plebiscite to help the Guam
Commission on Decolonization ascertain the intent of the Native Inhabitants of
Guam as to their future political relationship with the United States of America.
Id. 2105, 2110. The law also provides that the Election Commission shall
conduct the plebiscite when 70% of eligible Native Inhabitants register. Id.
2110.
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Voters in the plebiscite may support one of three political status options for
Guam: (1) Independence, (2) Free Association with the United States, or (3)
Statehood. 1 Guam Code Ann. 2110. The Commission on Decolonization
must transmit the plebiscites results to the President, Congress, and the United
Nations. Id. 2105. Guam has not yet held a plebiscite under this law. Davis v.
Guam, 785 F.3d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 2015).
For purposes of this legislation, Guam defines Native Inhabitants of Guam
as persons who became U.S. Citizens by virtue of the authority and enactment of
the 1950 Guam Organic Act and descendants of those persons. 3 Guam Code
Ann. 21001(e) (2016). It also defines descendant as a person who has
proceeded by birth * * * from any Native Inhabitant of Guam * * * and who
is considered placed in a line of succession from such ancestor where such
succession is by virtue of blood relations. Id. 21001(c) (emphasis omitted).
The Guam Organic Act conferred U.S. citizenship on (1) all individuals who, as of
April 11, 1899, were inhabitants of Guam and either were Spanish subjects or had
been born on the island; (2) all individuals born on Guam on or after April 11,
1899, who were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and (3) the
descendants of those individuals. See 48 U.S.C. 1421l; Pub. L. No. 630, ch. 512,
4(a), 64 Stat. 384 (1950) (repealed 1952). The Organic Acts citizenship
provisions were in effect only until 1952, when Congress repealed and replaced
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them with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1407. See Pub.
L. No. 82-414, 403(a)(42), 66 Stat. 163, 279-280 (1952); Appellees Br. 6-8.
Nearly all of those individuals who obtained U.S. citizenship under the
Organic Act were Chamorros, the indigenous people of Guam. According to the
1950 Census, approximately 98.6% of those who gained U.S. citizenship in 1950
through the Organic Act (25,788 of 26,142 people) were racially Chamorro. 1950
Census, Vol. II, Pt. 54, Table 38; see also Doc. 149, at 11. 1 Although some
additional individuals became citizens under the Organic Act after the 1950
Censusspecifically, those born on Guam to non-citizen parents before Congress
repealed the Organic Acts citizenship provisions in 1952the number of such
individuals was likely quite small. Immigration of non-citizens to Guam between
1950 and 1952 was almost certainly minimal because the U.S. government
maintained security restrictions on travel to Guam from 1941 until 1962. See
Exec. Order No. 11,045, 27 Fed. Reg. 8511 (Aug. 21, 1962), repealing Exec. Order
No. 8683, 6 Fed. Reg. 1015 (Feb. 18, 1941).
2. The Proceedings Below
Plaintiff-appellee Arnold Davis is a Guam resident who attempted to register
for the plebiscite. Davis, 785 F.3d at 1313-1314. The Decolonization Registry
1
Doc. __, at __ refers to documents and pages in the district court record.
Br. __ refers to pages in defendants-appellants opening brief.
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rejected his application because Davis, who is white (Doc. 1, at 6), is undisputedly
not a Native Inhabitant for purposes of Guams plebiscite law. Davis, 785 F.3d
at 1314. Davis brought suit against Guam, the Guam Election Commission, and its
members in their official capacity (collectively Guam), alleging that the
plebiscite laws Native Inhabitants classification discriminates on the basis of
race in violation of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the
CRA, the VRA, and the Guam Organic Act. 2 See ibid. He sought a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief. Ibid.
The district court initially dismissed Daviss complaint on the grounds that
Davis lacked standing and his claims were unripe, but this Court reversed. See
Davis, 785 F.3d at 1314-1316. This Court held that Davis had standing because
the Guam law does provide a tangible benefit to Native Inhabitants that Davis
alleges he is unlawfully denied: the right to help determine whether a plebiscite is
held. Id. at 1315. For similar reasons, this Court also concluded that Daviss
challenge was ripe: By being excluded from the registration process, Davis
claims he is unlawfully denied a right currently enjoyed by others. Id. at 1316.
The Court did not reach the merits of Daviss claims. Ibid.
2
Davis alleged in his complaint that the Guam law violates 52 U.S.C.
10101 (formerly 42 U.S.C. 1971) (see Doc. 1, at 8), which is part of the CRA.
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On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Doc.
149, at 1. Davis sought summary judgment on multiple bases, including his claims
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as applied to Guam by the Mink
Amendment to the Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u).3 Doc. 104, at 9, 14, 17.
The district court granted Daviss summary judgment motion on Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment grounds under 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u) and denied Guams
motion as moot. Doc. 149, at 2. In concluding that the plebiscite law violates the
Fifteenth Amendment, the district court determined that the law impermissibly
relies on ancestry as a proxy for race. See Doc. 149, at 7, 10 (citing Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)). It examined the laws historical context and
concluded that the Guam legislature enacted the Native Inhabitants distinction
for a racially discriminatory purpose. See Doc. 149, at 11-19. The court rejected
3
Davis also sought summary judgment under two provisions of the CRA,
52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(1) (providing that anyone otherwise qualified to vote shall be
allowed to vote without distinction of race), and 52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(2)
(prohibiting application of a different standard, practice, or procedure for
different people in a jurisdiction to determine voter eligibility); Section 2 of the
VRA, 52 U.S.C. 10301(a) (prohibiting voting qualifications that result[] in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color); and two additional provisions of the Guam Organic Act,
48 U.S.C. 1421b(m) (No qualification with respect to * * * any other matter
apart from citizenship, civil capacity, and residence shall be imposed upon any
voter.), and 48 U.S.C. 1421b(n) (No discrimination shall be made in Guam
against any person on account of race, * * * nor shall the equal protection of the
laws be denied.). See Doc. 104, at 19; Doc. 115, at 1-2. Davis did not seek
summary judgment on his Fifth Amendment claim. See Doc. 104, at 1.
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Guams argument that the plebiscite is not an election within the meaning of the
Fifteenth Amendment. See Doc. 149, at 19-20. The district court also concluded
that Guams plebiscite law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the laws racial classification does not survive strict scrutiny.
See Doc. 149, at 20-24.
The district court also rejected Guams contention that, under the Insular
Cases,4 these Amendments do not apply to Guam. See Doc. 149, at 24-25. The
court recognized that Congress has explicitly extended the Fifteenth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to Guam. Doc.
149, at 25 (citing 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u)).
Upon finding these constitutional violations under 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u), the
district court declined to address Daviss other statutory claims. Doc. 149, at 25.
It permanently enjoined Guam from enforcing the plebiscite law. Doc. 149, at 26.
Guam brought this appeal. Doc. 163.
4
The Insular Cases are a line of decisions that the Supreme Court issued in
the early 1900s concerning the relationship between the United States and its
territories and possessions: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v.
United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243
(1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197 (1903); and Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the decision of the district court that Guams
plebiscite law violates the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, as applied to
Guam through the Guam Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u).
1. Guams plebiscite law intentionally discriminates based on race against
non-Chamorros. The term Chamorro is generally understood to refer to a racial
or ethnic group consisting of the indigenous people of Guam and their descendants.
Although the challenged law does not mention the Chamorro race by name, it
purposefully uses ancestry as a proxy for race. The plebiscite laws definition of
Native Inhabitants of Guam is essentially identical to the Guam legislatures
definition of Native Chamorros in other legislation. Moreover, the context of the
plebiscite laws enactment demonstrates that the law purposefully establishes a
race-based voting qualification, as an earlier version of the law expressly limited
plebiscite registration to Chamorros only. Guam enacted the current version of the
law shortly after the Supreme Court decided Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495
(2000), which held that a Hawaii law limiting voting registration to people of a
particular ancestry was racially discriminatory in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Thus, although Guams plebiscite law states that it does not intend to
discriminate based on race, the district court correctly concluded that it does just
that.
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2. Congress has not authorized the Guam legislature to enact voting
preferences for Chamorros or Native Inhabitants of Guam. Under the special-
relationship doctrine of Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-555 (1974),
Congress may authorize a State or territory to provide certain preferences for
members of Indian tribes, and those preferences are subject only to rational-basis
review. Yet Congress has taken no action recognizing the Chamorro people as a
tribe or nation. Nor has Congress, through the Organic Act or any other legislation
or action, authorized Guam to provide preferential treatment for Chamorros in
elections. Absent such congressional authorization, Guams plebiscite law violates
the Fifteenth Amendment and is subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. The Fifteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment apply with full force to Guam, and binding precedent
forecloses Guams argument otherwise. This Court has already recognized in this
case and others that the Mink Amendment to the Guam Organic Act expressly
extends the Fifteenth Amendment and portions of the Fourteenth Amendment
(including the Equal Protection Clause) to Guam and provides that they shall have
the same force and effect there as in the United States or in any State. 48 U.S.C.
1421b(u).
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4. Contrary to Guams argument, the challenged plebiscite is an election
within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. Although Guam attempts to
support its argument by minimizing the significance of the plebiscite, this Court
has already rejected Guams attempts to downplay the plebiscites impact. The
Fifteenth Amendment governs any election in which public issues are decided or
public officials selected. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468 (1953). Guams
plebiscite falls well within this sphere. Thus, Guams plebiscite law violates the
Fifteenth Amendment by excluding individuals based on race from registering for
and ultimately voting in the election.
5. Guam has failed to show that the plebiscite laws racial classification
survives strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Guam provides almost no explanation for how the voting restriction
furthers a compelling government interest, and it points to nothing that would
establish that the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest.
Accordingly, Guams plebiscite law violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
ARGUMENT
GUAMS PLEBISCITE LAW VIOLATES THE FIFTEENTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
A. The Plebiscite Law Intentionally Discriminates Based On Race
Guams plebiscite law purposefully discriminates against non-Chamorros
based on race in violation of the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The

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Fifteenth Amendment guarantees that the right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged * * * on account of race. U.S. Const.
Amend. XV, 1. This Amendment proscribes the purposefully discriminatory
denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote. Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 64 (1980) (plurality opinion). Similarly, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits laws that deliberately discriminate based
on race. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). Guams plebiscite
law creates an intentionally race-based voting qualification that violates both of
these Amendments.
1. Chamorro Is Generally Understood To Describe A Race Or

Ethnicity
The term Chamorro describes the indigenous inhabitants of Guam and is
generally understood to refer to a distinct racial or ethnic group. 5 Indeed, Guam
has admitted in this case that Chamorro is a racial group (Doc. 1, at 3-4). See
5
See Anthony (T.J.) F. Quan, Comment, Respeta I Taotao Tano: The
Recognition and Establishment of the Self-Determination and Sovereign Rights of
the Indigenous Chamorros of Guam Under International, Federal, and Local Law,
3 Asian-Pac. L. & Poly J. 3, 59 (2002); see also id. at 61 (Based on
anthropological evidence, Chamorros are descendants of peoples from the
Southeast Asian region who had migrated to the western Pacific.); Nicole
Manglona Torres, Comment, Self-Determination Challenges to Voter
Classifications in the Marianas After Rice v. Cayetano: A Call for a
Congressional Declaration of Territorial Principles, 14 Asian-Pac. L. & Poly J.
152, 159 (2012) (describing the Chamorro people as the indigenous people of the
Mariana Islands, including Guam).
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Doc. 92, at 2. Guam itself has used the term Chamorro to refer to the
indigenous people of the island who, according to Guams legislature, have
maintained a distinct language and culture for hundreds of years. See Guam Pub.
L. 23-130 1 (1996) ([T]he Guam Legislature recognizes that the indigenous
people of Guam, the Chamorros, have endured as a population with a distinct
language and culture despite suffering over three hundred years of colonial
occupation.). Consistent with this common understanding of the term, the U.S.
Censusboth before and after Guams enactment of the plebiscite lawhas listed
Guamanian or Chamorro as a race along with White, Filipino, Chinese,
and others for self-identification purposes. See 1950 Census, Vol. II, Pt. 54, Table
38; Lindsay Hixson et al., The Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander
Population: 2010, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Briefs 2 (2012),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-12.pdf.
2. The Plebiscite Law Purposefully Uses Ancestry As A Proxy For Race
The challenged law limits participation in the territory-wide plebiscite to
Native Inhabitants of Guam, which it defines as persons who became U.S.
Citizens by virtue of the authority and enactment of the 1950 Guam Organic Act
and descendants of those persons, where descendants are those who have
proceeded by birth * * * by virtue of blood relations. 3 Guam Code Ann.
21001(c), (e). Approximately 98.6% of those who gained citizenship in 1950

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through the Organic Act were racially Chamorro. See 1950 Census, Vol. II, Pt. 54,
Table 38; Doc. 149, at 11.
Although Guams plebiscite law does not mention the Chamorro race by
name, the Supreme Court has held that [a]ncestry can be a proxy for race. Rice
v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000). Thus, in Rice the Supreme Court held that
a Hawaii constitutional provision violated the Fifteenth Amendment by limiting
registration to vote for trustees for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs to Hawaiians,
or any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
* * * in 1778. Id. at 498-499, 508-509 (citation omitted). The Court explained
that racial discrimination includes singling out identifiable classes of people
because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Id. at 515 (quoting Saint
Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)). It concluded that
[t]he Fifteenth Amendment was quite sufficient to invalidate a scheme which did
not mention race but instead used ancestry in an attempt to confine and restrict the
voting franchise. Id. at 513. In rejecting Hawaiis argument that the law was not
racial and that it merely distinguished based on the date of an ancestors residence
in Hawaii, the Court explained that [s]imply because a class defined by ancestry
does not include all members of the race does not suffice to make the classification
race neutral. Id. at 516-517.

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Recognizing Rice as controlling, this Court has also determined that an
ancestral voting qualification is in fact race-based in violation of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Davis v. Commonwealth Election Commn, 844 F.3d 1087, 1089,
1091 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 WL 2405597. In Davis, this Court struck
down a provision of the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)
constitution that restricted voting in certain elections to individuals of Northern
Marianas descent, defined as people of at least one-quarter Northern Marianas
Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood. Id. at 1090 (citation omitted).
The CNMI constitution defined a full-blooded Northern Marianas Chamorro or
Northern Marianas Carolinian as a person who was born or domiciled in the
Northern Mariana Islands by 1950. Ibid. (citation omitted). Although the
constitutional provision did not use the word race, and some people who were not
of Chamorro or Carolinian ancestry lived on the islands in 1950, the Court
determined that the provisions ancestral distinction was a proxy for race. Id. at
1092-1093. The Court also explained that Rice foreclosed the argument that the
constitutions definition was not race-based merely because it relied on race-
neutral criteria. Id. at 1093. It concluded that the constitutional provision
relie[d] on ancestral distinctions to limit voting in a territory-wide election in the
Commonwealth and therefore violate[d] the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 1090.

- 15 -
As in Rice and Davis, the ancestral distinction at issue here establishes an
intentionally race-based voting qualification. It is particularly telling that the
plebiscite laws definition of Native Inhabitants of Guam is essentially identical
to that of Native Chamorros in the Chamorro Land Trust Act (CLTA), a Guam
law that leases public land on generous terms to [N]ative Chamorros only. 21
Guam Code Ann. 75107(a) (2017). The CLTA defines Native Chamorro as
any person who became a U.S. citizen by virtue of the authority and enactment of
the Organic Act of Guam or descendants of such people, id. 75101(d) (emphasis
omitted), covering the same group of people as the plebiscite law. Moreover,
beneficiaries of the CLTA are automatically registered to vote in Guams plebiscite
unless they submit a written request otherwise. 3 Guam Code Ann. 21002.1
(2016). The use of virtually identical definitions for Native Inhabitants of Guam
and Native Chamorros is especially significant given Guams admission in this
case that Chamorro is a racial group (see Doc. 1, at 3-4; Doc. 92, at 2) and its
concession in previous litigation that the CLTA preference is unconstitutional
because it creates a class of preferred citizens based upon race and national
origin. Mem. of Points & Authorities in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Pet. for Writ of
Mandamus/In the Alternative Mot. for Summ. J. at 19, Santos v. Ada, No. SP0083-
92 (Guam Superior Ct.) (filed May 15, 1992); see id. at 30.6
6
Guam is now defending the CLTA preference in a lawsuit in which the
(continued . . . )
- 16 -
Indeed, it is unsurprising that the Guam legislature interchangeably uses the
terms Native Inhabitants of Guam and Native Chamorros to describe those
who gained U.S. citizenship under the 1950 Guam Organic Act, given that nearly
99% of those who obtained citizenship under the statute in 1950 were racially
Chamorro. Thus, although the plebiscite law is not explicitly racial, the Guam
legislatures description of the same group that is eligible to register for the
plebiscite as Native Chamorros in other legislation confirms that the plebiscite
law intentionally uses ancestry as a proxy for race.
3. The Context Of The Plebiscite Laws Passage Demonstrates That It

Purposefully Establishes A Race-Based Voting Qualification
The history of the plebiscite law further confirms that the law intentionally
discriminates based on race. In an earlier version of the plebiscite law, entitled
An Act to Create the Commission on Decolonization for the Implementation and
Exercise of Chamorro Self-Determination, the Guam legislature explicitly limited
participation in the plebiscite to the Chamorro people. Guam Pub. L. 23-147
10 (1997). But a month after the Supreme Court decided Rice, Guam amended
the plebiscite law by replacing the words Chamorro people of Guam with
( . . . continued)
United States is alleging that the statute discriminates based on race or national
origin in violation of the Fair Housing Act. See Compl. at 2, United States v.
Guam, No. 17-00113 (D. Guam) (filed Sept. 29, 2017). That case is in the early
stages of litigation.
- 17 -
Native Inhabitants of Guam. See Guam Pub. L. 25-106 11, 21001(e) (2000);
Doc. 149, at 12-13.
Despite the deletion of the word Chamorro, the substance of the law
remained largely unchanged: the current version still restricts plebiscite access to
nearly the same group of people as the earlier, expressly race-based version. In
particular, the pre-Rice version limited eligibility to [a]ll inhabitants of Guam in
1898 and their descendants. Guam Pub. L. 23-147 2(b). Similarly, the post-
Rice version limits eligibility to those who became U.S. citizens under the 1950
Guam Organic Act and descendants of those persons. Guam Pub. L. 25-106
21001(e). The categories of persons who became U.S. citizens under the
Organic Act are (1) all individuals who, as of 1899, were inhabitants of Guam and
either were Spanish subjects or had been born on the island; (2) all individuals
born on Guam between 1899 and 1952 who were subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States; and (3) the descendants of those individuals. See pp. 3-4, supra; 48
U.S.C. 1421l; Pub. L. No. 630, ch. 512, 4(a), 64 Stat. 384 (1950) (repealed and
replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1407). Thus,
the only differences between the definitions are that the post-Rice version (1) omits
individuals who lived on Guam in 1898 but not 1899 (a group likely to be
miniscule), plus those individuals descendants, and (2) includes individuals born
- 18 -
on Guam to non-citizens between 1899 and 1952 and their descendants. See pp. 3-
4, supra.
But these differences in legal definitions make no more than a negligible
difference in the racial composition of the groups covered by the pre- and post-
Rice versions of the plebiscite lawand, thus, fall far short of transforming the
plebiscite law into a race-neutral law. Indeed, nearly 99% of individuals who
became U.S. citizens in 1950 under the Organic Actincluding individuals born
on Guam to non-citizens between 1899 and 1950were racially Chamorro. See
1950 Census, Vol. II, Pt. 54, Table 38; Doc. 149, at 11. Although some individuals
born on Guam to non-citizen parents between 1950 and 1952 also became U.S.
citizens under the Organic Act, that group was likely quite small, given the tight
restrictions on migration of non-citizens to Guam during that period, see p. 4,
supra. Their inclusion almost certainly does not change the racial composition of
the covered group in any meaningful way. Therefore, the post-Rice alterations to
the statutes text did not make the law any less racial, let alone race-neutral. Cf.
Davis, 844 F.3d at 1093 (Substituting peoples for race did not make the
ancestral voting restriction in Rice constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment.
Neither can it here.).
To be sure, the current, post-Rice plebiscite law states that it shall not be
construed * * * to be race based. 3 Guam Code Ann. 21000 (2016); see also
- 19 -
ibid. (stating that the legislature intends that the new registry created by the law
not be one based on race). But merely asserting that a law is race-neutral does
not make it so, particularly given the Guam legislatures incentive to insert that
language to try to insulate the law from attack under Rice, which the Supreme
Court had issued the previous month. Indeed, even after the post-Rice
amendments, Guam legislators have referred to the plebiscite as a Chamorro-only
vote and expressed disapproval of a draft bill that would have abandoned this
restriction. See Doc. 149, at 15-17 (citing Tr. Roundtable Meeting on the Political
Status Bills (May 20, 2011)).
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that the plebiscite law
establishes a racial classification. To recap, several factors in combination confirm
the racial nature of the statutes preference: (1) the law restricts registration to
those who became U.S. citizens under the 1950 Organic Act and their descendants
(a group that is overwhelmingly Chamorro given that nearly 99% of those who
obtained citizenship under that law in 1950 were Chamorro); (2) the Guam
legislature used virtually the same definition for Native Inhabitants of Guam as it
used for Native Chamorros in other legislation, and Guam admitted in this case
that Chamorro is a racial group and conceded in earlier litigation that the
preference for Native Chamorros was an unlawful classification based on race
and national origin; (3) Guam amended the plebiscite law to remove express
- 20 -
references to Chamorros only one month after the Supreme Court struck down a
similar race-based voting qualification in Hawaii; and (4) Guam legislators have
since described the plebiscite as Chamorro-only. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 517
([T]he States argument is undermined by its express racial purpose and by its
actual effects.). These factors compel the conclusion that the plebiscite law
intentionally establishes a racial classification.
B. Congress Has Not Authorized The Guam Legislature To Enact Voting

Preferences For Chamorros Or Native Inhabitants Of Guam
Guam incorrectly asserts that Congress has authorized the Guam legislature
to pass the plebiscite law limiting eligibility to Native Inhabitants. See, e.g., Br.
45. Guam appears to rely (see Br. 48-50) on the special-relationship doctrine of
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-552 (1974), which established that
Congress can legislateand, by extension, authorize States and territories to
legislatespecial treatment for Indian tribes. See Washington v. Confederated
Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-501 (1979) (Yakima).
Where Congress legislates a preference for members of an Indian tribe under its
Indian Commerce Clause and Treaty Clause powers, courts generally view that
preference as a political classification subject to rational-basis review rather than a
racial classification triggering strict scrutiny. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551-555.
A State or territory needs congressional authorization, however, to provide its own
preference for an Indian tribe under Mancari; absent such authorization, the State
- 21 -
or territory must show that the preference survives strict scrutiny. See Rice, 528
U.S. at 518 (If Hawaiis restriction were to be sustained under Mancari, * * * it
would be necessary to conclude that Congress * * * has determined that native
Hawaiians have a status like that of Indians in organized tribes, and that it may,
and has, delegated to the State a broad authority to preserve that status.).
Here, Congress has taken no action recognizing the Chamorro people as an
Indian tribe or determining that they have a similar status. Nor has Congress,
through the Organic Act or any other legislation or action, authorized Guam to
provide preferential treatment for Chamorros in elections. To the contrary, the
Organic Act itself contains a Bill of Rights with nondiscrimination provisions
proscribing such disparate treatment, see 48 U.S.C. 1421b(n), and a provision
extending the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth
Amendments voter protections to Guam, see 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u).
Further, early changes to the text of the Organic Act underscore Congresss
intent not to authorize Guam to provide special treatment for Chamorros. An
original draft of the Organic Act would have allowed the Guam legislature to pass
laws to protect the lands and business enterprises of persons of Guamanian
ancestrya provision that itself would not have authorized Guam to pass the
plebiscite law. But Congress deleted that provision prior to passing the Organic
Act after legislators perceived this language as authorizing discriminatory

- 22 -
legislation. See Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis
of United States Territorial Relations 104 (1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 7273, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 5(n) (1950); 96 Cong. Rec. 7574 (1950)). This action suggests
that Congress did not intend to authorize Guam to provide special treatment for
Chamorros regarding land or business interests, let alone authorize preferential
treatment in voting. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186,
200 (1974) (deletion of a provision by a conference committee militates against a
judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact).
Likewise, in 1968decades before Guam enacted the plebiscite law
Congress amended the Organic Act to remove a provision that had afforded
persons of Guamanian ancestry a preference in higher education appointments
and the use of service training facilities. See Guam Elective Governor Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-497, 4, 82 Stat. 842, 845. The current version of this provision contains
no preference for individuals of Guamanian ancestry. See 48 U.S.C. 1422c(a).
This amendment suggests that any limited preferences Congress intended to
authorize for Chamorros in the Organic Act were intentionally short-lived. More
to the point, even these early preferences never included preferential or exclusive
voting rights for native Guamanians. Thus, although the Organic Act granted
Guam a measure of self-government and conferred U.S. citizenship upon certain

- 23 -
Guamanians, it did not authorize the Guam legislature to establish a plebiscite
exclusive to those Guamanians.
While Guam relies on Yakima, 439 U.S. 463, for its assertion that it
permissibly enacted the plebiscite law in response to the Organic Act, that decision
only demonstrates Guams error. See Br. 48-50. In Yakima, the Supreme Court
upheld a Washington State law that extended the States jurisdiction to Indians
within the Yakima Reservation. 439 U.S. at 465. In reaching its conclusion, the
Court determined that Washington was legislating under explicit authority granted
by Congress. Id. at 501 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the state
law at issue was not simply another state law. It was enacted in response to a
federal measure explicitly designed to readjust the allocation of jurisdiction over
Indians. Ibid. (emphasis added). The Court also determined that the challenged
law was within the scope of that federal authorization. Ibid. Accordingly, the
Court applied rational-basis review under the Mancari doctrine and held that the
law complied with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 501-502.
Here, by contrast, Congress provided no authorization, let alone explicit
authorization, for Guam to legislate voting preferences for Chamorros.
Accordingly, to the extent Guam designed the plebiscite laws voting classification
in response to the Organic Act, this action was unauthorized. Absent

- 24 -
congressional authorization, Guams plebiscite law violates the Fifteenth
Amendment, see Rice, 528 U.S. at 522, and is subject to strict scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Artichoke Joes Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353
F.3d 712, 731 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995)).
C. The Fifteenth Amendment And The Equal Protection Clause Of The

Fourteenth Amendment Apply With Full Force To Guam
Guams argument that the equal rights guarantees of the Fifteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to Guam7 is foreclosed by binding
precedent. This Court has already recognized in this case that [t]he Organic Act
extends the rights afforded by several constitutional provisions to Guam, including
the Fifth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Fifteenth Amendment. Davis, 785 F.3d 1311, 1314 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015).
This determination is binding. See Rainbow Magazine, Inc. v. Unified Capital
Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1996) ([T]he
decision of an appellate court on a legal issue must be followed in all subsequent
proceedings in the same case.) (citation omitted).
7
See, e.g., Br. 40-42 (suggesting that the right to vote is not necessarily
fundamental in the territories and therefore may not apply to Guam or may not
trigger strict scrutiny); Br. 46 (asserting that the Insular Cases established
constitutional flexibility in the territories).
- 25 -
In any event, there is no reason to disturb this determination, as this Court
has consistently reached the same conclusion in other cases. This Court has
previously recognized the clear statutory basis for application of the Fourteenth
Amendments Equal Protection Clause to Guam. See Paeste v. Government of
Guam, 798 F.3d 1228, 1231 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Territory of
Guam v. Paeste, 136 S. Ct. 2508 (2016). Similarly, this Court has held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies with full force to Guam,
declaring that it can scarcely imagine * * * any clearer indication of intent than
the language of the Mink Amendment: the relevant constitutional amendments
have the same force and effect in Guam as in a state of the United States. Guam
Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir.), as
amended (June 8, 1992) (referring to 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u)). Consistent with this
binding precedent, the district court correctly ruled that the Guam Organic Act
extends the Fifteenth Amendment and portions of the Fourteenth Amendment
(including the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause) to Guam,
where they apply with full force. See Doc. 149, at 25 (citing 48 U.S.C. 1421b(u)).
D. The Challenged Plebiscite Is An Election Within The Meaning Of The

Fifteenth Amendment
Guam incorrectly asserts that the challenged plebiscite is not an election for
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment. Although Guam attempts to support its
argument by minimizing the significance of the plebiscite, this Court has already
- 26 -
rejected Guams efforts to downplay the plebiscites impact. In its brief, Guam
repeatedly calls the plebiscite non-binding, symbolic, and advisory (see,
e.g., Br. 4, 36) and asserts that the plebiscite would have no effect except that the
results would be transmitted to the U.S. government and the United Nations (see
Br. 33). As this Court has already explained, however, Guam understates the
effect of any plebiscite that would be held if the registration threshold were
triggered. Davis, 785 F.3d at 1315. This Court has also recognized that the
plebiscite would make it more likely that Guams relationship to the United States
would be altered and that [t]his change will affect Davis. Ibid. Accordingly,
Guams renewed efforts to diminish the plebiscites impact must fail.
Consistent with this Courts earlier observations, the plebiscite is an election
for purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that the
Fifteenth Amendment governs any election in which public issues are decided or
public officials selected, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468 (1953) (emphasis
added), and Guams plebiscite falls well within this sphere. Under Guam law, the
Election Commission would conduct the plebiscite on the same day as a general
election, 1 Guam Code Ann. 2110, to resolve a public issuethat is, to
ascertain the intent of the Native Inhabitants of Guam as to their future political
relationship with the United States, id. 2105. Thus, Guams plebiscite is an
election for purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the plebiscite law violates
- 27 -
that Amendment by excluding individuals based on race from registering for and
ultimately voting in the election.
E. Guam Has Failed To Show That The Plebiscite Laws Racial Classification
Survives Strict Scrutiny Under The Equal Protection Clause Of The
Fourteenth Amendment
Because Guams plebiscite law violates the Fifteenth Amendment, this
Court need not decide whether it also violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In any
event, the plebiscite law violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because Guam has failed to show that its racial classification satisfies
strict scrutiny. Guam has the burden of proving that the race-based voting
restriction is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. See
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); see also Harrington v. Scribner,
785 F.3d 1299, 1307 (9th Cir. 2015) (We put the burden on state actors to
demonstrate that their race-based policies are justified. (quoting Johnson, 543
U.S. at 506 n.1)). Guam has not met this burden.
As an initial matter, Guam waived its argument by failing to address it
adequately in its opening brief. Guams argument that the plebiscite law survives
strict scrutiny consists, in its entirety, of only three conclusory statements. See Br.
14, 48.8 Such conclusory assertions, unsupported by legal analysis, do not suffice
8
The three statements are (1) a sentence in the Summary of the Argument
stating that even if this Court were to determine that strict scrutiny applies,
(continued . . . )
- 28 -
to preserve an issue for appellate review. See Nevada Dept of Corr. v. Greene,
648 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011) (deeming issues waived for lack of argument),
cert. denied, 566 U.S. 911 (2012); Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.
1994) ([A] bare assertion does not preserve a claim.); ibid. (finding issues
waived due to failure to present a specific, cogent argument for our
consideration).
At any rate, Guams argument is meritless. The only case Guam cites in
support of its assertion is the district courts decision in Akina v. Hawaii, 141 F.
Supp. 3d 1106, 1132 (D. Haw. 2015), appeal dismissed as moot, 835 F.3d 1003
(9th Cir. 2016). See Br. 48. It is true that the district court in Akina indicated in
dicta that the State of Hawaii had a compelling interest in bettering the conditions
of its indigenous people. 9 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1132. In making this
( . . . continued)
Guams interest in facilitating the self-determination of its colonized population is
compelling, and a vote that distinguishes native inhabitants from other residents
of Guam is the only way to determine the views of the former (Br. 14); (2) an
argument heading repeating the previous statement almost verbatim (Br. 48); and
(3) a single sentence asserting that [i]f it had to, the native inhabitants of Guam
classification could survive strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to achieve
the compelling governmental interest of providing dignity in simply allowing a
starting point for a process of self-determination, Akina v. Hawaii, [141 F. Supp.
3d 1106, 1132 (D. Haw. 2015), appeal dismissed as moot, 835 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.
2016)]and a purely symbolic one at that (Br. 48).
9
The district court in Akina concluded that the challenged election, which
was organized by a nonprofit corporation, was a private election and therefore did
(continued . . . )
- 29 -
determination, however, the court emphasized that the measure at issue in that case
needed to be viewed in context of Hawaiian history and the States trust
relationship with Native Hawaiians. Id. at 1131.
Even assuming the district courts reasoning in Akina was correct as to
Native Hawaiians, Guam has failed to show that it has a compelling interest in
granting race-based voting preferences to its own indigenous population in an
election concerning the entire territorys future. Context matters when reviewing
race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). It is therefore insufficient for Guam simply
to reference another sovereigns interest in benefiting a distinct group of people
with its own unique history without attempting to explain how Guam shares that
interest with respect to Native Inhabitants of Guam in this particular context.
See ibid. ([S]trict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully
examining * * * the use of race in that particular context.).
( . . . continued)
not involve state action. 141 F. Supp. 3d at 1127. As an alternative basis for its
decision, however, the court assumed for the sake of argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment applied. Id. at 1131.
After the Akina district court denied the plaintiffs request for a preliminary
injunction, the Supreme Court granted an injunction pending appellate review,
barring the counting of ballots and certifying of winners in the challenged election.
Akina v. Hawaii, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) (mem.). The nonprofit corporation
subsequently cancelled the election, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as
moot. Akina, 835 F.3d at 1010-1011.
- 30 -
In any event, Guam has not pointed to anything that would establish that its
voting restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. See Br. 48.
Although [n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable
race-neutral alternative, it does require serious, good faith consideration of
workable race-neutral alternatives. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339; accord Western
States Paving Co. v. Washington State Dept of Transp., 407 F.3d 983, 993 (9th
Cir. 2005); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 735 (2007) (concluding that a state actor had not shown narrow tailoring
where it failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives). Guam
has not presented any evidence that it considered alternatives to its Chamorro-only
voting restriction, nor does it explain why such alternatives would be unworkable.
Thus, Guams plebiscite law fails strict scrutiny and violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.
- 31 -
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the district court.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN M. GORE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
s/ Dayna J. Zolle
DIANA K. FLYNN
DAYNA J. ZOLLE
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Appellate Section RFK 3718
Ben Franklin Station
P.O. Box 14403
Washington, D.C. 20044-4403
(202) 305-8194
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the attached BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS
AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND URGING
AFFIRMANCE:
(1) complies with the type-volume limitation imposed by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 29(a)(5) and Circuit Rule 32-1(a) because it contains 6987
words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32(f); and
(2) complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Word 2016, in 14-point Times New Roman font.
s/ Dayna J. Zolle
DAYNA J. ZOLLE
Attorney
Date: November 28, 2017

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on November 28, 2017, I electronically filed the
foregoing BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND URGING AFFIRMANCE with the
Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by
using the appellate CM/ECF system.
I certify that all participants in this case are registered CM/ECF users and
that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.
s/ Dayna J. Zolle
DAYNA J. ZOLLE
Attorney

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Case: 17-15719, 11/28/2017, ID: 10670505, DktEntry: 21, Page 1 of 41

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ARNOLD DAVIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES .................................................................. 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ................................................................................. 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 2

1. Guams Plebiscite Law.......................................................................... 2

2. The Proceedings Below ......................................................................... 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 8

GUAMS PLEBISCITE LAW VIOLATES THE FIFTEENTH

A. The Plebiscite Law Intentionally Discriminates Based

1. Chamorro Is Generally Understood To Describe

2. The Plebiscite Law Purposefully Uses Ancestry

3. The Context Of The Plebiscite Laws Passage

B. Congress Has Not Authorized The Guam Legislature

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued): PAGE

C. The Fifteenth Amendment And The Equal Protection

D. The Challenged Plebiscite Is An Election Within

E. Guam Has Failed To Show That The Plebiscite Laws

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) .....................................24

Akina v. Hawaii, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Haw. 2015),

Akina v. Hawaii, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015) ...................................................................29

Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901) .....................................................7

De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)......................................................................7

Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901)...........................................................7

Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) ..............................................................7

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)...................................................................7

Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1994) ....................................................28

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)......................................................... 29-30

Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada,

Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2015) ..........................................27

Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) .................................................................7

CASES (continued): PAGE

Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)............................................................27

Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) .....................................................................11

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ............................................................9, 20

Paeste v. Government of Guam, 798 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2015),

Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) ........................................................... passim

Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)....................................13

Santos v. Ada, No. SP0083-92 (Guam Superior Ct.) (1992) ...................................15

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ............................................................... 10, 26

United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113 (D. Guam) (2017) .......................................16

Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation,

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) .............................................................11

Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State Dept of Transp.,

U.S. Const. Amend. XV, 1....................................................................................11

Civil Rights Act of 1870, as amended (CRA), 52 U.S.C. 10101 (formerly

Guam Organic Act of 1950, 48 U.S.C. 1421 et seq...................................................1

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1407...................................4, 17

Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 ................................................1

1 Guam Code Ann. 2105 (2017) ................................................................... 2-3, 26

1 Guam Code Ann. 2110 (2017) ................................................................... 2-3, 26

3 Guam Code Ann. 21000 (2016) ................................................................... 18-19

3 Guam Code Ann. 21001(c) (2016) ................................................................3, 12

3 Guam Code Ann. 21001(e) (2016) ................................................................3, 12