August

22

Constitutional Law
Case Digest
JD-1A

University of the Codilleras

1. The Province of North Cotabato vs. Gov. of the Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 183591
Decided on: October 14, 2008
Ponente: ESCOLIN, J.

FACTS:
August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (under Arroyo) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The petitioners filed for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to
information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a
public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.

By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and
directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.13
The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of
the final draft of the MOA-AD.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the
reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that [n]o
matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA.

In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had
already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.
ISSUE: There were several issue raised but in terms of the issue being discussed under territoriality
focused on number 3 below:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
HELD:

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when
he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act
No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed
and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.

Note: The respondents (Government under Arroyo) claim that there is no need for adjudication as
the matter is MERELY a “proposal”.

[Adjudication: a formal judgment on a disputed matter]

The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative
enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply
put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights
and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with.

In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon
issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete
bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could
possibly violate petitioners and intervenors rights since the acts complained of are mere contexts.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters
of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete
and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a
juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status
that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a
defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

OTHER ISSUES to note:

To concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people”
as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
blood, including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What
this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to
the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain
does not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to
conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology
including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

2. Magallona v Ermita
G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Article I, 1987 Philippine Constitution

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the
islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial
and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around between, the
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, from part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed RA 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State, following UNCLOS I in 1958 codifying the sovereign right of States parties over their
"territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the
second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. In March 2009, R.A. 9522
was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Magallona et al, in their capacity as citizens, taxpayers and legislators, petitioned for the writs of
certiorari and prohibition and questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend that the law decreased
the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
 RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
 RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions.
 RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime
area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Issue:
Primary: Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Other: Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.

Ruling:
No. RA 9522 is not unconstitutional., as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with
the archipelagic doctrine.
The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in
safeguarding the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk
the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign
power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not
affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed
and subsoil and the resources therein.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely
describe the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way
affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.

Article 48. UNCLOS III

Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

3. The Republic of the Philippines v. The

People’s Republic of China
Case No. 2013-19 in the Permanent Court
of Arbitration
Decided on: July 12, 2006

FACTS:
In the year 2013- the Philippines
sent a Notification and Statement of Claim
with respect to the dispute with China over the maritime jurisdiction of the Philippines in the West
Philippine Sea. Former Solicitor General Francisco H. Jardaleza, now Associate Justice of SC, was the
Republic’s agent in arbitration, whereas Rudiger Wolfrum was appointed as the first member of the
arbital tribunal to be constituted. China sent Note Verbal describing its position in the South China Sea,
returning the Notification and rejecting the arbitration. China’s deadline to appoint a second member of
the tribunal had already lapsed. In view of this, Philippines asked the International Tribunal Law of the
Sea (ITLOS) for appointment of a second member of the arbitral tribunal. After the first meeting of the
Tribunal, China reiterated their first rejection of the arbitration in a Note Verbale, returning with
Communications and documents from the Tribunal. A Rule of Procedure was adopted by the Tribunal,
wherein only the Philippines submitted comments to the draft version of said Rules. When China asked
audience to the President, the Tribunal sent a letter, reminding the Parties to refrain from ex parte
communications with the members of Tribunal.
In the year 2014- Philippines asked to apply for leave to amend the Statement of Claim by adding
to request the status of Second Thomas Shoal under the UNCLOS, which was subsequently accepted.
China, however, prevents the rotation and resupply of the Philippine personnel stationed at said Shoal.
The DFA summoned Charge d’ Affaires to object to China’s acts which constituted a clear and urgent
threat to the rights and interests of the Philippines under the UNCLOS, and to urge them further to desist
from interference. The Philippines wrote to the Tribunal to reserve its right to bring application for the
provisional measures for China’s conduct that it seriously aggravates and extends the dispute, and filing
its Memorial on the last day with accompanying annexes which addressed matters relating to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, admissibility of its claims and merits of its dispute. The Philippines wrote the
Tribunal anew to apprise China’s most recent actions, and reiterated its reservation of rights, including
the bringing of an application for provisional measures.
Viet Nam sought for the copies of furnished documents related to the proceedings for its legal
interest might be affected by the arbitration, which the Philippines disagreed but nevertheless consented
for transparency as the former is among the coastal States in the South China Sea. The Tribunal meets
in The Hague with the proposed timetable and noted China’s rejection of the Tribunal but is welcomed to
join anytime of the proceedings. Phil. DFA showed photos gathered showing extensive reclamation of
China of the Mabini Reef. Thereafter, they received a Note communicating the non-acceptance of the
proceedings. Philippines wrote to the Tribunal, apprising China’s land reclamation activities at
McKennan, Johnson, Gaven, and Cuarteron Reegs which expressed concern over possible effects of
the same in maritime entitlement and the environment.
Ministry of FA of Viet Nam sends Tribunal a Statement to request that it give due regard to Viet
Nam’s position and legal interests, supporting China’s competence as to certain matters in the
Convention and rejecting China’s claims especially the Nine-Dash Line, among others. China published
a Position paper on arbitration and maintained the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction. Its deadline to submit
counter-memorial lapsed.
In the year 2015- at least 24 Chinese Utility Boats were seen collecting giant clams in the lagoon
of Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines sent two letters to the tribunal: 1) allowing Viet Nam access to
the requested documents; and 2) opposing bifurcation of proceedings, and suggested standards for the
same. Phil. Coast Guards reported that 3 Philippine-flagged vessels were intentionally rammed by
Chinese Coast Guard vessels in Scarborough Shoal, causing damage and endangering the lives of the
fishermen on board. The DFA hand over two protest notes to representatives of Chinese Embassy in
Manila regarding the incidents in Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands
wrote individually to the members of the Tribunal stating the omnibus objection to all procedural
applications or steps that would require some kind of response from China. Viet Nam was given a copy
of the documents, and permissibility of intervention.
 DFA summoned Charges d’ Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Manila to protest China’s efforts
in prohibiting Filipino fishermen’s fishing activities at the Scarborough Shoal. AFP released photos
showing a massive reclamation activities and suggesting possible militarization of features in 7 areas of
West Philippine Sea. The Tribunal considered China’s position paper and other communications to the
same body. Bifurcation (conduct of separate hearings on jurisdiction and merits) was found to be
appropriate, however the Philippines suggested that merits be scheduled at the earliest possible time in
light of the massive projects China was conducting for there may be serious harm in the marine
environment. At the end of said year, Tribunal noted the Final submissions reflected three amendments
to the submissions
In the year 2016- China’s deadline to file a comment in writing on anything said during the
Hearing had lapsed. The Tribunal writes to the parties that it would benefit from further evidence and
clarification, and from independent experts’ views. Coral Reef experts were appointed. Malaysia also
sent the Tribunals two Notes Verbales drawing attention to the issue with certain maps contained,
asking that the Tribunal give respect to Malaysia’s rights.
ISSUE:
The Philippines sought rulings with respect to:
a. W/N China has historic rights to the resources in the South China Sea beyond
the limits of the maritime zones, and w/n China actually had historic rights prior
to entry into force of the convention
b. W/N under UNCLOS, certain maritime features claimed by both states are
properly characterized as islands, rocks, low tide elevations, or submerged
banks, in particular Scarborough Shoal and eight such features in the Spratlys
which are low-tide elevations or submerged banks that merely generate a
territorial sea, not an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf
c. W/N China violated the UNCLOS by interfering with the Philippines’ sovereign
rights and freedoms, through construction and fishing activities that have
harmed the marine environment

HELD:
a. No. China’s claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the detailed allocation of
rights and maritime zones in the Convention. Such rights were extinguished when the Convention
came into force to the extent that they were incompatible with the Convention’s system of
maritime zones. Prior to said Convention, the waters of South China Sea beyond the territorial
sea were legally considered part of the high seas where vessels of any State can fish, and as
such, China’s exercise of historical navigation and fishing in said waters were an exercise of a
high sea freedom rather than a historic right. Moreover, there is no evidence that China had
historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of South China Sea or prevented other
States from exploiting their resources, as such China has no legal basis to claim for historic rights
to resources.
b. Yes. Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, North Gaven Reef,
and McKennan Reef are high-tide features, whereas Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and
Second Thomas Shoal were submerged at high tide in their natural condition. Article 121 of the
Convention states that islands generate an entitlement to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of
200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf, but rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own shall have no jurisdiction and intended to prevent insignificant features
from generating large entitlements of inhabited territory or on high seas and the area of the
 seabed reserved for the common heritage of mankind. The entitlements depend on: objective
capacity of feature, its natural conditions to sustain either, or stable community of people, or
economic activity that is neither dependent on outside resources nor purely extractive in nature.
All high tide features in the Spratly Islands are legally rocks that do not generate an EEZ or
continental shelf, thus many features currently controlled by one or other littoral States which
have constructed installation and maintained personnel there and have been modified to improve
their habitability, such does not establish their capacity in their natural condition to sustain a
stable community of people. Historical evidence of habitation or economic life was more relevant
to the objective capacity of features.
c. Yes. Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged at high tide and are
not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China, they form part of the exclusive economic
zone and continental shelf of the Phil. The Convention was clear in allocating the sovereign rights
to the Philippines with respect to areas in its exclusive economic zone. China had violated the
Philippine’s sovereign rights with respect to its EEZ and continental shelf when:
 China interfered with Phil. Petroleum exploration at Reed Bank
 Purported to prohibit fishing activities by Philippine vessels within the EEZ
 Protected and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the Philippine’s EEZ
 Constructed installations and artificial island without authorization of the Philippines

Additional notes:
Traditional fishing rights in the Scarborough Shoal were not extinguished by the
Convention, as such China violated its duty to respect the traditional fishing rights of Philippine
fishermen by halting access to the shoal after May 2012.
The construction of artificial islands and large scale land reclamation caused severe harm
to coral reef environment.

4. The Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Antonio Campos Rueda

G. R No. L-13250
October 29, 1971

Facts:
In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco (an international zone [foreign country] in
North Africa). At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier. She
however left some personal properties (shares of stocks and other intangibles) in the Philippines. The
designated administrator of her estate here is Antonio Campos Rueda.
In the same year, the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) assessed the estate for deficiency tax
amounting to about P161k. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the
estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code which
provides:
“That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the
decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did
not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the
Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines
not residing in that foreign country.”
Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the Philippines.
However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred that Tangier is not a
“state” as contemplated by Section 22 of the Tax Code and that the Philippines does not recognize
Tangier as a foreign country.
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties
regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments,
the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector
of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122.
In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: It is,
therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle
the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code since:
A Foreign Country: refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international
person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person
properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tangier is a state.
Held:
Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a foreign country.
A foreign country to be identified as a state must be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory,
acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its
people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its
sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.
STATE:
A politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. It has been
referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to
promote the general welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification
of the nation."
Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within
its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence
as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15
DISPOSITIVES:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs De Lara)
which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in
the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in Section 22 of the Tax Code. Thus,
recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier provides such exemption to
personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the Philippines honor the exemption as provided
for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of reciprocity.

5. Free Telephone Workers Union vs Ople

108 SCRA 757

Presidential and Parliamentary forms of government

Facts
• On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices
following grounds " 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal terminatio
suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the implementation of said Code of Conduct; an
Unconfirmation (sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of
(AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation of our Collective Bargaining Agreement."

Issue
• Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power. They averred that by granting discretio
Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration, also effectively grant
to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.

Background

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction:
“(in) labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national in
as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of
banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment may
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitratio

• The arbiter then is called upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation o
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
instance of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is ordained by the fundamental law,
of labor, is ignored or disregarded.

• While the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of
government, it must be one approved by the President. The power which he would deny the Minister of
virtue of such principle is for petitioner labor unions within the competence of the President, who in its op
best determine national interests, but only when a strike is in progress.

Ruling

• The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Court holds that petitioner was not able to make out a case of
delegation of legislative power.

Notes
 • There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. The power of compulsory arbitration, while all
the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free fr
unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labo

• There is no ruling on the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, fo
repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining.

• Court - “It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to cope with the grave social
problems of the present and foreseeable future would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive and d
unrealistic meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation”

• During the pendency of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, both petitioner labor union and private r
enjoined to good faith compliance with the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.

6. LEGASPI vs.SECRETARY OF FINANCE

G.R. No. L-58289
July 24, 1982

Facts:
In 1982, after the Martial law was lifted Hon. Valentino L. Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare PD 1840 "granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of
assets and liabilities and some other purposes" unconstitutional. The decree was issued by the
President under supposed legislative powers granted to him under Amendment No. 6 of the
Constitution.

Contention of the Petitioner:

Legaspi averred that the decree was null and void with the fact that under the Constitution "(T)he
legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and that the President
granted it without concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. He further contends that the Constitutional
provisions of the Presidency do not restate the provisions of Amendment No. 6 which grants the
President (Prime Minister) limited powers to legislate. This is tantamount to a withdrawal or deletion of
such grant. Under No. 3 of the same amendment, “the incumbent President of the Philippines shall be
the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang
Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions, and likewise he shall continue to exercise
his powers and prerogatives under the 1935 Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the
Prime Minister under this Constitution. However, after the April 7 amendments there exists no longer "a
President (Prime Minister)" but "A President"and "A Prime Minister." They are now two different offices
which cannot be held by a single person — not a transitory one but a regular one provided for and
governed by the main provisions of the newly amended Constitution. Hence, Amendment No. 6 fails to
distinguish between "incumbent" and "regular" all provisions with reference to the powers of the
Presidency.

Issues:
 Whether Amendment No. 6 has been repealed in the April 7 amendments? No
 Whether or not the President can issue the said decrees? Yes

Contention of the state:

"The Legislative power shall be vested in the Batasang Pambansa" is an old provision which has been
retained. Nowhere in Amendment no. 6 can it be hinted that the hybrid-type of government also includes
a one-man legislature. It must be made clear that explicitly the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon
the "President (Prime Minister)" are to be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) "when
in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a threat or imminence thereof" and (2) "whenever
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang Pambansa)
fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action." The power is to "issue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part
of the law of the land." As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be exercised
even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other
Powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by
the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.

There is no way by which the incumbent President be referred to anymore as the "incumbent President"
in the amendment of 1976. While it is true that Amendment No. 6 fails to distinguish between
"incumbent" and "regular" all provisions with reference to the powers of the Presidency is deemed
foreclosed by Article VII of the newly amended Constitution. Article VII enumerates presidential powers.
To construe that the 1976 Amendments are still applicable, other than that referring to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa would be an incompatibility to the application of the present constitutional
provisions.

Ruling:
After mature study and deliberation and considering the peculiar circumstances that dictated the
formulation of Amendment No. 6, the Court's conclusion is, that Assemblyman-Petitioners posture lacks,
to say the least, sufficient merit. All the above premises taken into account, Amendment No. 6 of
October 1976 of the Constitution of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or modified, much less
repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981.

7. Bacani vs. NACOCO

G.R. No. L-9657
November 29, 1956

FACTS:

Leopoldo Bacani and Mateo Matoto were court stenographers assigned in a court in Manila. During the
pendency of a particular case in said court, counsel for one of the parties, National Coconut Corporation
or NACOCO, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
by them during the hearing. Bacani et al complied with the request and sent 714 pages and thereafter
submitted to said counsel their bills for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid
the amount of P564 to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcripts at the rate of P1 per page.

However, in January 1953, the Auditor General required Bacani et al to reimburse said amounts on the
strength of a circular of the Department of Justice. It was expressed that NACOCO, being a government
entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. Bacani et al counter that NACOCO is not a
government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. NACOCO set up as a
defense that the NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) do not acquire the status of being a part of
government because they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

The NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of Section 2 of Revise Administrative Code of
1917 which states that;"The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippine
Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to
the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government", hence, exmepted from the
payment of the fees in question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NACOCO is a government entity.

RULING:

The Court held No. There are two-fold functions of the government namely: constituent and ministrant.
The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are compulsory in nature, while ministrant is
more on public welfare like public works, education, charity, health and safety. The NACOCO has that
function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic life of the people. NACOCO
belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled corporation which is governed by
Corporation Law. However, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government,
for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and
the powers that it may exercise are concerned.

Therefore, NACOCO is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of fees in
question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.

Petition GRANTED.

8. THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND COOPERATIVE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (ACCFA)

vs. ACCFA SUPERVISORS’ ASSOCIATION, ACCFA WORKERS’ ASSOCIATION, and THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

FACTS:

On August 8, 1963, the President signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No.
3844) which required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA). ACCFA then became Agricultural Credit Administration
(ACA) that is in charge of loaning to farmers and lessees of land the business-like or private way in order
to stimulate agricultural production.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

NOTE: Contention of the State is in a different font color as it pertains to the case filed by the Unions
against the ACCFA regarding its violation of the collective bargaining agreement, a matter not relating to
the issue presented in this digest.

The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), brushing the defenses aside, decided that the Unions
have the right to self-organize and therefore entitled to the collective bargaining agreement. The ACCFA
is thus required to stop committing acts impeding said rights and to comply with and implement the
provisions of the said bargaining agreement including the payment of P30.00 for monthly allowance.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED (APPEAL):

The Unions contends that they are of proprietary function. This is in relation to the decision
rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) with regards to the former’s alleged violation of the
collective bargaining agreement it entered into together with the Unions, an organization consisting of
supervisors and rank-file employees. ACA is questioning whether or not the CIR has the jurisprudence
to decide on and enforce the collective bargaining agreement with the Unions given that ACA is of
proprietary function and not governmental.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the ACA performs proprietary function.

 Whether or not the land reform falls under the compulsory (constituent) or optional (ministrant)
function of the government.

RULING:

ACA has governmental objectives as it is geared towards the implementation of the land reform
program of the State. It is a government office therefore engaged in governmental functions and not
proprietary.

Given that it is of governmental function, the issue now leads to which function of the government
is at work. The implementation of R.A No. 3844 regarding land reform in which farmers and land lessees
are allowed to borrow money from the ACA (allotted funds amounting to P150, 000) is a ministrant
function as it provides those which private capital would not naturally undertake. This is so because the
government is more equipped to provide loans than any private individual or group of individuals. Yet it
is not an optional but a compulsory function of sovereignty, which now involves the constituent function.
This confusion between the ministrant and constituent functions of the government was attributed to the
growing complexities of modern society. Constituent functions are no longer as clear-cut as how
President Wilson enumerated it. Where there used to be areas which were left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, this time the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity to meet the increasing social challenges of times, in this case, to
increase greater socialization of economic forces. It is therefore not strictly constituent only.

The significance of the resolution of the issue relates to the nature of the function of ACCFA/ACA
because if it performs proprietary functions, the employees can unionize for collective bargaining; but, if
it is performing constituent or purely government function, the employees of ACCFA/ACA do not have
the right to form a labor union for collective bargaining (Sec. 11 of R.A 385). The Court decided that the
Unions, through the representation of the ACCFA Supervisors’ Association and ACCFA Workers’
Association, are thereby not allowed to form a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining because
ACCFA/ACA performs governmental function.

9. Government of the Philippines v. El Monte de Piedad

35 Phil 738
December 13, 1916

FACTS:

- Spain donated $400,000, to the treasury of the Philippine Islands, for the relief of the damages
brought by the 1863 earthquake.
- An allotment and a list of names of entitled persons to receive the relief was made. There was a
total of $30,000 for the enlisted names and the rest, $365,000 for redistribution.
- Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, ordered a loan amounting to $80,
000 for charitable puposes.
- Heirs of those entitled, represented by the Department of Finance, filed various petitions to return
the $80, 000, with corresponding interests.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

- Judgement was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, that Monte de Piedad shall return the $80, 000
or equivalent peso amount, and interests.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

- The Department of Finance under the Government of the Philippines is not bound to bring suit
with regards to the relief money, only the intended beneficiaries themselves or their heirs.

ISSUE:

- WON the Government of the Philippines has the power to reimburse the $80,000 worth of money
(plus interest) given to Monte de Piedad?

HELD:

- Yes. The Government being the protector of the Citizen has the inherent supreme power to
enforce laws that will promote public interest. This principle is in accordance with the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae, that political authority has the responsibility to protect citizens. Thus, the
Department of Finance, being the representative of the Government, has the power to reimburse
the $80,000 plus the interests since it is the right and privilege of the victims or their heirs.

10. MELCHORA CABANAS VS. FRANCISCO PILAPIL

G.R. No. L-25843
July 25, 1974

FACTS:
The disputants in this case are the mother (Melchora Cabanas) and uncle (Francisco Pilapil) of a
minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The
said minor beneficiary is the daughter of Melchora Cabanas (paintiff-appellee) and Florentino Pilapil
(brother of defendant-appellant). Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan
that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the
proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten
years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds
for the benefit of the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s
trustee.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

It is therefore that since the minor beneficiary is under the custody and parental authority of the
plaintiff, her mother; the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The said minor
acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership,
and in “usufruct” to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to
possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds.

*Usufruct- the legal right of using and enjoying the fruits or profits of something belonging to another
*Article 321, Civil Code: The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with
his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the
father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and in whose company he lives; but if the
child, with the parent's consent, should live independently from them, he shall be considered as
emancipated for all purposes relative to said property, and he shall have over it dominion, usufruct and
administration.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

Francisco Pilapil argued that the plaintiff should not be entitled to possession of the insurance
proceeds since the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract, its terms and
obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?

*Parens Patriae- Latin for "parent of his or her country." The power of the state to act as guardian for
those who are unable to care for themselves, such as children or disabled individuals. For example,
under this doctrine a judge may change custody, child support, or other rulings affecting a child's well-
being, regardless of what the parents may have agreed to.

HELD:
YES. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of
that person. If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be
strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still
deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. The uncle here
should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child
and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The
application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in
favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed. It would be more in consonance
not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. It
could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is
a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
“If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not
admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a
constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.”

“WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant.”

SUPPLEMENTAL: MAY 10, 1965 DECISION OF LOWER COURT:

The lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to
deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and
321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is
worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the
approval of the Court of First Instance."

DOCTRINE:
*Section 12, Article II: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

*Article 320, Civil Code: The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the
property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.

11. De Jure vs De Facto Government ñ Marcos as a De Jure President Under the 1973 Constitution
62 SCRA 275’

Fact:

In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of some Presidential Decrees
issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos. It was alleged that Marcos does not hold any legal office
nor possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and
therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and orders.

Issue:

Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government.

Held:

Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto proceedings and Benigno Aquino, Jr. et al, have no legal
personality to sue because they have no claim to the office of the president. Only the Solicitor General or
the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo warranto petition.

On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081
issued on September 22, 1972 by President Marcos because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance
of said proclamation pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that the factual bases (the circumstances of
lawlessness then present) had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated; that the question as to
the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the
1973 Constitution.

Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can continue in office beyond 1973. While
his term of office under the 1935 Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the
general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in
office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17, 1973 by
the sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as
this was the decision of the people, in whom ìsovereignty resides . . . and all government authority
emanates . . .,î it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. The logical consequence therefore is
that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic of the Philippines.

12. IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ

G.R. No. 76180 (145 SCRA 160)
October 24, 1986

FACTS:

In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner Saturnino Bermudez, as a

lawyer, questioned the validity of the first paragraph of Section 5 of Article XVIII of the then proposed
1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992.

The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under the then proposed constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

The petitioner, Saturnino Bermudez, claimed that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers,
he then asked the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to
who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and
the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to...”
as the “incumbent president”.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

The provision under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII, of the proposed Constitution “is not clear” regarding to whom it
refers to as the “incumbent president”

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

Sec. 5, Art. XVIII, of the proposed Constitution clearly refers to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino
and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, the de facto government and the de jure government, and no
other persons.

HELD:

Petitioner Saturnino V. Bermudez’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is

manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common public knowledge that the
Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of their term to noon of June
30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section
provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular elections for the
President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned with the claim that it
was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this
court which held that:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

13. Estrada vs. Desierto

G.R 146710-15

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman,

RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Facts:

Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims
she is the President.

From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that
he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as
“Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed,
with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan
and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations
joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that
only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

Ruling:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the
Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution,
wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether
the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court
held that the issue is legal and not political.

Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present
when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material
relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity.

Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and

after January 20, 2001

The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely
to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

14. CO KIM CHAM vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON
G.R. No. L-5
September 17, 1945

Contention of the State:

The respondent judge of the lower court refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceeding of
civil case No. 3012 of said court which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines.

Contentions of the Petitioner:

He argued that the proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgment of the courts of the said governments.
In addition,the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de
facto governments.

Ruling:

General MacArthur ,in behalf of the Government of the United States,had full legal authority to issue the
October Proclamation, and that no principle of the international law is violated by said proclamation, no
international wrong being committed by the reversal by the legitimate government of the acts of the
military invader. That said proclamation was issued in full conformity with the official policies to which the
United States and Philippine Governments were committed, and the annulment of all the facts of the
governments under the Japanese regime, legislative, executive, and judicial, is legal, and justified by the
wrongs committed by the Japanese. Also,"that all laws, regulations and processes" of the Japanese
sponsored governments, during enemy occupation, "are null and void and without effect".The Supreme
Court held that the Philippine Executive Commission which was organized by Order No. 1 by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. The source of its authority comes
from the Japanese military, it is a government imposed by the laws of war.The same is true with the
Republic of the Philippines. Apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent
from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by
the Japanese forces of occupation.The Commonwealth tribunals have no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of nor to continue the judicial proceedings under the Japanese regime.And the respondent Judge Dizon
did not commit the error complained of in the petition, and that the petition has no merits at all.

15. WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. L-26379
December 27, 1969

FACTS:

William Reagan is an employee for an American Corporation providing assistance to United States Air
Force in the Philippines. Nine months before his tour of duty expired, petitioner imported on April 22,
1960 a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. More than two months after the car was imported
into the Philippines, petitioner requested the Base Commander of Clark Air Base for a permit to sell the
car, which was granted provided that the sale was made to a member of the United States Armed
Forces or a citizen of the United States employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. On the
same date, July 11, 1960, petitioner sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson, Jr. as shown by a Bill of
Sale executed at Clark Air Base. As a result of the transaction, the Commission of Internal Revenue
rendered him liable for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying the amount, Reagan sought to
refund the amount claiming that the Clark Air Base is a “Foreign Soil” and cited that the nature of his
employment under the Military Bases Agreement, that he should be exempted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transaction made in a foreign military base excluded from the income tax declared by
the Commission of Internal Revenue.

HELD:

No. The Philippines is independent and authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is
the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it
were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
Chief Justice Taney, in an 1857 decision, affirmed the fundamental principle of everyone within the
territorial domain of a state being subject to its commands: "For undoubtedly every person who is found
within the limits of a government, whether the temporary purposes or as a resident, is bound by its laws."
It is no exaggeration then for Justice Brewer to stress that the United States government "is one having
jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly upon each [individual found
therein];

Also, there was no assertion in the Military Air Base Agreement that lends support to the statement of
the petitioner. Justice Tuason discusses the role of the American military contingent in the Philippines as
a belligerent occupant. In the course of such a dissertion, drawing on his well-known gift for rhetoric and
cognizant that he was making an as if statement, he did say: "While in army bases or installations within
the Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil." Petitioner then would be well-
advised to take to heart such counsel of care and circumspection before invoking not a legal fiction that
would avoid a mockery of the law by avoiding tax evasion but what clearly is a misinterpretation thereof,
leading to results that would have shocked its originator. By the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be
noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as
part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.

16. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LORETA GOZO

FACTS:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, convicting her of a
violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the
construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof.
The accused bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in its place,
without a building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto
Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building
permit was not necessary for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan Malones, a
building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon
Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the
accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation. ...
After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, S. of
1964 with the City Fiscal's Office."3 The City Court of Olongapo City found her guilty of violating
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well
as to pay the costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above facts of
violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to
demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

CRIME COMMITTED: VIOLATION OF THE MUNCIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 14 SERIES OF 1964

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
*to the lower court
She questions its validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process,1 a
contention she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. Fajardo.2 If such a ground
were far from being impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she would deny the
applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base
leased to the American armed forces.
*to the Court of appeals
In her brief, she would put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the
very least its applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

The court said that it would be fruitless for the petitioner to assert that the local government have not
authority to require building permits. Unless the given ordinances are violative of any constitutional right,
then it’s validity is could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to the person adversely
affected could be questioned.
The appellant’s contention using the case of Fajardo is not applicable because the appellant’s case has
nothing to do with Fajardo’s. because the latter’s case was oppressive and on the other hand, the former
never bothered to comply with the ordinance at hand.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE RELATED TO THE TOPIC “THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGNTY AS

AUTO LIMITATION:
One of the appallent’s assumption is regarding the controlling and authoritative doctrines that the mere
existence of military or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two
leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of sovereignty.
By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein.

Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted any
state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights.
There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to point out though that even
then, there is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words
employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control.
Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in
the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their
status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but
it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue
of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory."

What is sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal
corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be validly
exercised. What is even more to be deplored in this stand of appellant is that no such claim is made by
the American naval authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so asserted. Whether,
therefore, a given case which by the treaty comes within the United States jurisdiction should be
transferred to the Philippine authorities is a matter about which the accused has nothing to do or say. In
other words, the rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can
not be raised by the offender.

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the accused,
Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of
1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she
being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the required
permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision requiring demolition be
enforced. Costs against the accused

17. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. FRANK ROBERTSON, JAMES W. ROBERTSON,

ROBERT H. CATHEY, JOHN L. GARRISON AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 70116-19
August 12, 1986

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review of the consolidated decision dated 14 December 1984 of the Court of Tax
Appeals (C.T.A.) in C.T.A. Case No. 2735, entitled "Frank Robertson vs. Coconut commissioner of
Internal Revenue," C.T.A. Case No. 2736, entitled "James W. Robertson vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue;" C.T.A. Case No. 2738, entitled "Robert H. Cathey vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue" and C.T.A. Case No. 2739, entitled "John L. Garrison vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue," cancelling the assessments for deficiency income tax for taxable years 1969-1972, inclusive
of interests and penalties against:

Frank Robertson (CTA Case No. 2735)-P l32,750.65

James W. Robertson (CTA Case No. 2736)-190,433.17
Robert H. Cathey (CTA Case No. 2738)-92,013.17
John L. Garrison (CTA Case No. 2739)-196,754.32

The above-entitled cases are consolidated as these involve similar or Identical fact situations on a
question involving the scope of the tax exemption provision in Article XII, Par. 2, of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement of 1947, quoted as follows:

2. No national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection

with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the
Philippines by reason only of such employment, or his spouse and minor children and
dependent parents of either spouse, shall be liable to pay income tax in the Philippines
except in respect of income derived from Philippine sources or sources other than the
United States sources.

The Court of Tax Appeals found the following undisputed antecedent facts:

All told, the petitioners are citizens of the United States; holders of American passports and
admitted as Special Temporary Visitors under Section 9 (a) visa of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended; civilian employees in the U.S. Military Base in the
Philippines in connection with its construction, maintenance, operation, and defense; and
 incomes are solely derived from salaries from the U.S. government by reason of their
employment in the U.S. Bases in the Philippines." (pp. 76-78, Record)

ISSUE:

WON. The Robertsons, Cathey and Garrison are exempted from tax in accordance with the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement of 1947

HELD:

YES. The law and the facts of the case are so clear that there is no room left for US to doubt the validity
of private respondents' defense. In order to avail oneself of the tax exemption under the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement: he must be a national of the United States employed in connection with the
construction, maintenance, operation or defense, of the bases, residing in the Philippines by reason of
such employment, and the income derived is from the U.S. Government (Art. XII par. 2 of PI-US Military
Bases Agreement of 1947). Said circumstances are all present in the case at bar.

It bears repeating as so disclosed in the records that the petitioners together with families upon
repatriation in 1945 had since acquired domicile and residency in the United States. And, obtained
employment with the United States Federal Service. Not until after several years of a hiatus, petitioners
did return to the Philippines not so much of honoring a pledge nor of sentimental journey but by reason
of taking up assigned duties with the United States military bases in the Philippines where they were
gainfully employed by the U.S. Federal Government. The situation of the petitioners is of no different
mold as of the rest of the U.S. civilian employees who continued to enjoy the benefits of tax exemption
under the Agreement, Petitioners' circumstances before the questioned ruling remained obtaining thru
the taxable years 1969-1972. It appears too much of a stretch to hold petitioners straight-jacketed to an
irreversible situs of birth constraint and by reason thereof deny altogether any opportunity to a
serendipitous enjoyment of a tax relief accorded in the Agreement. Such a random quirk of pirouette in
the tax treatment fags sharply at odds with the shared expectations of the high contracting parties.

This Court will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the tax exemption provision
so explicit in terms and so searching in extent. (Emphasis supplied) This does not however foreclose the
possibility of petitioners' coming to roost in the country contingent upon the termination of their tour of
duty, but only then may the bridge be crossed for tax

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED
and the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

18. EN BANCBORIS MEJOFF vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

90 Phil. 70
July 30, 1949

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS:
Boris Mejoff was a secretive operative for the Japanes forces. Upon liberation from the Japanese
occupation, he was arrested as a spy by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps and later handed to
the Commonwealth Government for disposition (Commonwealth Act No. 682). The People’s Court
ordered his release thereafter.
 Case was then taken up by the Deportation Board, which found that he had no travel documents,
meaning he was an illegal alien since 1944. The matter was then referred to the immigration authorities.
He was ordered that he be DEPORTED to his homeland, Russia. He was under custody since March
18, 1948 and was later transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail to await the arrival of some Russian vessels.
Two boats of Russian nationality later arrived but did not take the petitioner due to their lack of authority
to do so.
After repeated failures to ship the petitioner, he was transferred to Bilibid Prison.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner should be deported
2. Whether or not his detention was unlawful so as to invoke a writ of habeas corpus

RULING:
Petition was denied.
1. Petitioner should be deported because according to the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, any
alien who enters this country "without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at
a designated point of entry" is subject to deportation within five years.
2. Petitioner cannot invoke a writ of habeas corpus because his temporary detention was necessary
in the process of removing undesirable aliens in the country. The arrangements for his
deportation were also pending and it is presumed that the Government does not relish keeping
the petitioner within our territory at the people’s expense so the Government was trying to
expedite his deportation. There was also no record on how long he was under custody since his
last arrest.
19. Kuroda v. Jalandoni
G.R. No. L-2662; 83 Phil 171
March 26, 1949

Moran, C.J.:

FACTS:
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding
General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged with having unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duties, permitting his men to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against non-combatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation
of the laws and customs of war. He was tried and charged before the Philippine Military Commission that
was created under Executive Order No. 68 by then President of the Philippines, Manuel A. Roxas.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

E.O. No. 68 is unconstitutional because Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague
Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and thus, Kuroda is being charged of
crimes not based on law, national or international. Thus, the Military Commission has no jurisprudence.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

E.O. No. 68 which creates the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused
war criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec. 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that
“the Philippines…adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land…” These generally accepted principles of international law include those formed during the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by the United
Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in
violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the
Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes,
most especially when it is committed against its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to
these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed in favour of the respondent.
Additional Notes:
The right of a country to establish military commissions to try war criminals.
This case is an example of the “INCORPORATION THEORY” of the “INCORPORATION CLAUSE” of
the Constitution. It is the principle embodied in Section Article II which states: “The Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of the international law (in this case, it is Hague Convention and
Geneva Convention) as part of the law of the land.

As such, even if the Philippines is not a signatory to a generally accepted principle of international law, it
may validly use the same in the trial of war criminals during the Second World War.

20. SALONGA VS. HERMOSO

97 SCRA 121
April 5, 1980

Petitioner: JOVITO R. SALONGA

Respondents: CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO, TRAVEL PROCESSING CENTER AND GENERAL

FABIAN VER

Ponente: FERNANDO, CJ.

FACTS:

During the time of the Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus against Captain Rolando
Hermoso of Travel Processing center to compel the latter to issue a certificate of eligibility for travel in
favor of Rolando Hermoso.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents have
issued his Certificate of Eligibility to Travel.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

Hermoso did issue and did not deny Salonga’s request for a certificate of eligibility for travel. A xeroxed
copy was enclosed. A resolution for dismissal is, therefore, in order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.
HELD:

The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

(Moot and academic - a pending case in court loses its “justiciability” because it no longer
presents a real problem as between the parties. Pursuant to the definition of judicial power in the
Constitution, courts step in only if there is an “actual controversy involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.” )

OTHER ISSUES:

 Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its injunction conformably to the mandate
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of the highlights of the
keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the
World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of ‘the ban on international
travel.’
 In his keynote address to the International Law Association, President Marcos made reference to
martial law being instituted in accordance with law and that the Constitution had been applied in
appropriate cases.

21. Agustin vs Edu

G.R. No. L-49112

February 2, 1979

FACTS:

Petitioner Leovillo C. Agustin was an owner of a Volkswagen beetle car, already properly
equipped with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device to other motorists. He is
assailing the validity or constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, requiring all motor vehicles to be equipped with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning
devices because of the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways
without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence which
causes fatal and serious accidents in land transportation. In compliance with such letter of instruction,
the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office Romeo F. Edu issued Administrative Order No. 1
directing the compliance thereof.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

1. Agustin is arguing that the said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power. For him they are oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary,
confiscatory, unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society.
*Police Power - State's constitution-granted power to govern, and to make, adopt, and enforce
laws for the protection and preservation of public health, justice, morals, order, safety and security, and
welfare.

2. The order is unlawful and unconstitutional because it is compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the
motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to
the specified set of EWD's (Early Warning Devices)
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

The Solicitor General mentioned the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road
traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly ratified. The
said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.

*The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is a treaty concerning the international
law on treaties between states. It was adopted on 23 May 1969 and opened for signature on 23 May
1969. The VCLT has been ratified by 114 states as of April 2014. Some countries that have not ratified
the Convention, such as the United States, recognize parts of it as a restatement of customary law and
binding upon them as such.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued
is valid and constitutional?

HELD:

Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible
even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or
from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early seaming device installed on the
roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic.
The conclusion reached by the Court that the petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:
Whereas, the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization (U.N.); Whereas, the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle
found in the Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which
it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which
is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

*Pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must kept”) – the principle refers to private contracts,
stressing that contained clauses are law between the parties, and implies that nonfulfillment of
respective obligations is a breach of the pact.

22. REYES VS BAGATSING,

125 SCRA 553
G.R. NO. L-65366/ NOVEMBER 9, 1983
FERNANDO, C.J.:
TOPIC: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
CONFLICT BETWEEN A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF A CITIZEN AND A GENERALLY
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

SECTION 2. ARTICLE II---1987 CONSTITUTION

THE PHILIPPINES RENOUNCES WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, ADOPTS THE
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PART OF THE LAW OF THE
LAND AND ADHERES TO THE POLICY OF PEACE, EQUALITY, JUSTICE, FREEDOM,
COOPERATION, AND AMITY WITH ALL NATIONS

SECTION 4. ARTICLE III---1987 CONSTITUTION (FREEDOM OF SPEECH)

NO LAW SHALL BE PASSED ABRIDGING THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF EXPRESSION OR OF
THE PRESS, OR THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE
GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES.

FACTS:
Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti- Based Coalition sought a permit from the City of
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 25, 1983, from 2:00- 5:00 in the afternoon, starting
from Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, requesting for the removal of the
foreign Military bases in Manila. The respondent Mayor denied the petition as it was recommended by
the police authorities a permit may only be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other
enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be issued.
Petitioner contends that such holding of a rally in front of the US Embassy would be violative of
Ordinance No. 7295 of the city of Manila.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the denial of issuance of permit by the respondent mayor valid.
 Whether or not the petioners holding of a rally in front of the US embassy violative of Ordinance
No. 7295 of the city of Manila.

HELD:
The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land, To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted
principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were
a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or
impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal
point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500)
feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. There was no showing, however, that
the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied. It does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the
way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued
that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable
assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less than 500 feet, the
need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification and observation of
Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded
the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less. Unless the ordinance is
nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of
the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.
The Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit.
The mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.
23. People vs. Lagman
66 Phil. 13

FACTS:

Tranquilino Lagman is a Filipino citizen who turned 20 years old in 1936. He was duly notified by
corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service
as compelled by Commonwealth Act No. 1 (The National Defense Act). He refused to register in the
military service between the 1st and 7th of April that year, saying that he has a father to support, has no
military learnings, and does not wish to be kill or be killed. He was sentenced to 1 month and 1 day
imprisonment with costs as per Sec. 60 of the above mentioned.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

The National Defense Law is constitutional. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:

The National Defense Law is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

WON the National Defense Law is constitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the National Defense Law is constitutional. It is in faithful compliance of Sec. 2, Art. II of the
Philippines Constitution that states “The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfilment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.” The
circumstance that the appellant has dependent a dependent father to support does not excuse them
from his duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists,
they can ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper
pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (Secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act
No. 1). SC affirms the appealed judgment rendered with the case, with the costs to the appellant.

24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO MANAYAO

July 28, 1947

FACTS/SUMMARY:

Pedro Manayao, the appellant, was a member of the Makapili. He collaborated with the Japanese army
to impose violence in Bannaban, Bulacan. On January 27, 1945, the guerrillas attacked the Japanese in
Sitio Pulong Tindahan, Angat, Bulacan. As revenge, the Japanese army, with the help of Makapili, killed
almost around sixty to seventy people/residents for being allegedly wives, relatives and supporters of
guerillas fighting against the Japanese army on January 29, 1945.

The appellant was charged with the following aggravating circumstances:

 1) The aid of armed men; and
2) The presence of a ‘band’ in the commission of the crime

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

The state contended that it is the constitutional duty of the citizens to defend the State especially in
times of war. His duty and obligation towards the land cannot be disregarded when the country is at war.

CONTENTION OF THE APPELANT:

Manayao’s counsel contended that the appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan (was
subject to military law), thus cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of the People’s court. Further, he
argued that Manayao had already lost his Filipino citizenship upon his allegiance to support and aid the
Japanese army, thus he cannot be charged with the high crime of treason. Further, it was argued that
the appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior, thus he shall be exempt from criminal
liability. He allegedly acted only to fulfill his duty related to his service for Japan since he is a member of
the Makapili. He further contended that certain provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 63 state that a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

1. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country

upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
2. By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; and
3. By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps in the time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of treason

HELD/RULING:

Yes. The appellant was found guilty of the high crime of treason with multiple murder.

1. He was indeed a member of Makapili, a group of Filipinos who rendered service and aided the
Japanese army against the Philippines during the war; however, the said organization was not
‘part’ of the said army. It was merely a group of Filipino traitors, pure and simple.
2. There was no evidence that Manayao subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution of laws of Japan. Further, members of the Makapili could have aid and support Japan
without having to swear to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution/laws of Japan. Also,
there was no evidence that the appellant has ever been declared as a deserter in the Philippine
Army, Navy or Air corps-nor even that he was a member of the said Army, Navy or Air Corps.
Therefore, there was no evidence that the appellant has already lost his Filipino citizenship,
especially in relation to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
3. The appellant’s contention is against the provision of Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
The said provision covers both time of peace and time of war.

The appellant was initially charged with death, and to pay a fine of Php 20, 000, an indemnity of Php 2,
000 to the heirs of each of the victims (named in the third paragraph of the lower court’s decision), and
the costs. However, due to the opposition of Justice Perfecto, in accordance with the applicable legal
provisions, the appellant was charged with reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Php 20, 000, an
indemnity of Php 2, 000 to the heirs of each of the victims (named in the third paragraph of the lower
court’s decision), and the costs.

25. Pamil vs Teleron (With Dissenting Opinion)

86 SCRA 413
Fact:
Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, was elected Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol in 1971. He was
later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival candidate, then filed a quo warranto against
Gonzaga, arguing that Gonzaga be disqualified that as provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised
Administrative Code:
…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality.

Respondent Judge Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code
of 1971 which now allows ecclesiastics to run. Thus, a certiorari was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935 Constitution, “No religious test shall
be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” If the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be
maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may run for elective office.
However, this issue proved to have divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority
vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional
7 members of the Court are of the view that judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is
no longer operative either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed; 6 Justices,
including Teehankee, are of the same mind, stating that the overriding principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution, or at the very least, the repeal of such provision bars a reversal; the remaining 5 members
if the Court, on the contrary, held the position that such prohibition against an ecclesiastic running for
elective office is not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. This vote is indecisive that while 5 members
constitute a minority, 7 votes does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. The
Supreme Courted granted a certiorari.
For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set
aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) in question, how one who swore to serve the
Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church
tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code
still stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective
office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or
position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer
disqualified from running for an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining
categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for
public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim,
‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible
under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications,
except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.”

26. GERMAN vs. BARANGAN

Facts of the case:

The petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees, converged at J.P.
Laurel Street, Manila for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which is connected to the
Malacañang grounds located in the same street. They wore inscribed yellow shirts and marched down
the said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government insults. Along the way, they
were barred by respondent Major Isabelo Lariosa, upon orders from Gen. Santiago Barangan on the
ground that the chapel was located within the Malacañang security area. They decided to leave when
their protests and pleas to get inside the chapel were denied, but not without allegedly receiving a
warning from respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to allow them to enter the
chapel in the future would likewise be prevented.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER

Petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and
pray inside St. Jude Chapel, and a writ of injunction to prevent respondents from prohibiting them from
getting into and praying in said church. This is pursuant to their right to religious worship and locomotion
as stated in sec 6, Art II of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P.
Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church.

Freedom of religious worship is guaranteed under Section 8, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, thus:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

DEFENSE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict,
any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that
petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-
government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the
Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as
sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow T-shirts worn by some of
the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to
substantiate the respondents’ allegations of their true motive. The restriction was also intended to secure
the several executive offices within the Malacañang grounds from possible external attacks and
disturbances. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of
the executive branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action would certainly disrupt.

RULING

The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street is allowed under the fundamental law, having
been established in the interest of national security. Hence, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, no
costs.

In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This
curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear
to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of
society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

Elucidating on the meaning and scope of freedom of religion, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut said:

The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the
one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two
concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.

DISSENTING OPINIONS

Teehankee voted to grant the petition on the ground that the right of free worship and movement is a
preferred right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restraint except where
there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evil sought to be prevented. There was and is
manifestly no such danger in this case.

The majority's dismissal of the petition on the ground that the restriction imposed by respondents was
"necessary to maintain the smooth functions of the executive branch of the government which
petitioners' mass action would certainly disrupt" and that such prior restraint was not violative of
petitioners' constitutional rights of freedom of religious worship and movement "having been established
in the interest of national Security," is not in accordance with the applicable established standards and
principles.

MAKASIAR

The petitioners gave the assurance that they are marching towards St. Jude's Church only for the
purpose of praying or attending mass therein; that they were and are going to march in an orderly
manner without blocking the traffic and with the marshals policing and Identifying the marchers; that they
are not armed and are not going to be armed with any kind of weapon; and that they are willing to be
frisked. These are practically the same assurances made by the petitioners in the case of Reyes vs.
Bagatsing (125 SCRA 553, November 9, 1983) and by the petitioners who marched from España
Rotonda to Liwasang Bonifacio sometime in September, 1984.

Their wearing yellow T-shirts and clothing and bearing yellow emblems or banners, are forms of
expression which are also protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression in
general, and religious freedom in particular. The fact that most, if not all, of them are not residents of
Sampaloc or the neighborhood around St. Jude's Church, should not impair their credibility as to their
true intentions because St. Jude's Church, to the believers or devotees, is the only church in Metro
Manila especially dedicated to supplications for the realization of impossible hopes and dreams.

With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and
present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of
Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents have adopted measures and are prepared to
insure against any public disturbance or violence.

Hence, the petition should be granted.

ABAD SANTOS voted to grant the petition.

We are asked to give meaning to the constitutional guarantee that, "The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed." (Art. IV,
Sec. 8.)

True it is that the free exercise of religion can be restrained under the clear and present danger principle.
But I fail to perceive the presence of any clear danger to the security of Malacañang due to the action of
the petitioners. The danger existed only in the fertile minds of the overzealous guardians of the complex
which is protected by a stout steel fence.

MELENCIO-HERRERA

I vote to accord to petitioners their right to freedom of worship.

One of the basic and fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution is the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship (Section 8, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). "For freedom of
religious expression, the Constitution assures generous immunity, unless it can be shown that there is a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent" (E. M. Fernando
on The Bill of Rights, Second Edition, p. 198).

The act of petitioners in converging at J.P. Laurel Street, majority of whom were wearing yellow T-shirts,
marching towards St. Jude Chapel, there to hear Mass, shouting anti-Government invectives with
clenched fists as they marched, did not in my opinion pose any clear and present danger. Petitioners
were unarmed, marching peacefully, albeit noisily.

The location of the St. Jude Chapel within the perimeter of the Malacañang security area is not, to my
mind, sufficient reason for a prior restraint on petitioners' right to freedom of religious worship. Proper
security measures can always be taken. It is only when petitioners, in the exercise of their religious
beliefs, exceed those bounds and translate their freedoms into acts detrimental or inimical to the
superior rights of public peace and order, that the test of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
is met and the acts having a religious significance may be infringed upon in the exercise of the police
power of the State. "Freedom of worship is susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect" (West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette (319 U.S. 624 [1943]).
RELOVA (Separate vote and statement)

The majority opinion doubts the sincerity and good faith of the fifty (50) petitioners in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of religious worship and of locomotion because they were wearing yellow T-
shirts as they marched down J. P. Laurel Street with raised clenched fists on October 2, 1984, at about
5:00 in the afternoon, for the purpose of praying and/or hearing mass at the St. Jude Chapel which
adjoins the Malacañang grounds.

Petitioners claim that they were on their way to hear mass and/or pray. For respondents to say, even
before petitioners have reached the place, that they would be delivering speeches is pure speculation.
Respondents should have allowed petitioners to hear mass and/or pray and, thereafter, see what they
would do. Only then would We know what were really in their minds. What respondents did by acting
before petitioners could display themselves was tantamount to prohibiting free exercise and enjoyment
of religious worship. Demonstrations about or near the premises of St. Jude Chapel because of its
proximity to the residence of the President may be restricted, but certainly, for petitioners or any group of
men for that matter, to hear mass and/or pray at the chapel should be tolerated.

The petition should be granted.

27. Rene A. V. Saguisag vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa

Case Digest: GR 212426
January 12, 2016

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality
of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive
department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US
forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities
within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the
parties.

Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated
the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops
and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The
Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional
ratification.

Contention of the State:

The State is questioning the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement due to
the said violation of the agreement with regards to Art XVIII, Section 25 of the constitution which states:

“After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held
for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

Contention of the Accused:

The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an executive agreement that gives U.S troops, pans
and ships increase rotational presence in Philippine military bases and allows the U.S to build facilities to
store fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the backdrop of the Philippines’ maritime dispute
with China over West Philippine Sea.

Issue:

 Whether or not the petitions as “citizen’s suit” satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA.
 Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing as “taxpayers”.
 Whether or not the petitions qualify as “legislator’s suit”.
 Whether or not the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case.

Held:

 No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may
dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the
act affects a public right. But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve the
protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the
petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated
by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be
considered by the Court as citizens’ suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned
requirements

 No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure,
nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.A taxpayer’s suit concerns a case in which
the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they
must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A
reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an
authorization of disbursement.

 No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative

granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislator’s suit, the injured party would be the
Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senate’s constitutional
function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former senators,
have the legal standing to maintain the suit.

 Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental
importance which justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised
here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides
for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be
 allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to
determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.

28. Espina vs. Zamora, JR

G.R. No. 143855
September 21, 2010

REPRESENTATIVES GERARDO S. ESPINA, ORLANDO FUA, JR., PROSPERO AMATONG,

ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, RAUL M. GONZALES, PROSPERO PICHAY, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI
AND FRANKLIN BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO ZAMORA, JR. (EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY), HON. MAR ROXAS (SECRETARY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY), HON. FELIPE
MEDALLA (SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY), GOV.
RAFAEL BUENAVENTURA (BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) AND HON. LILIA BAUTISTA
(CHAIRMAN, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION), Respondents.

ABAD, J.:
FACTS:

On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also known as
the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited
foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do so under
four categories.

R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their citizenship and now reside in the
Philippines, to engage in the retail trade business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.

On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of Representatives, filed the present
petition, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:

The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State to
place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities,
promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against unfair competition
and trade policies.

The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail trade, which taken together with
alien dominance of other areas of business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the
economy.

Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and sari-sari store vendors,
destroy self-employment, and bring about more unemployment.

The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the passage of R.A. 8762 on the
government as a condition for the release of certain loans.

There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies or combinations in restraint
of trade.

Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas,
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Gov. Rafael Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia Bautista
countered that:
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers
since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of public funds.

The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.

Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and
20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions that are judicially demandable.

The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign investments. It directs
Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the
NEDA and when the national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of the
Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit Congress from enacting laws
allowing the entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of
R.A. 8762

Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional

POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court
of justice and make such a challenge.

HELD:

Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a court of justice and make such a
challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has
suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law.

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act prejudices
petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve
the question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs when the
public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.

POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the Constitution are not self-
executing.

As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the
declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such
policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts.

Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not
impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply to prohibit
foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given
preference in all areas of development.

More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to
reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to pass it
depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to
open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them
exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.

Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it
blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has
contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation of R.A.
8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered
any concrete and strong argument to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on
foreign participation in that business. Thus -

First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated;
Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry
of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign
retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores
through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling,
restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.

29. Ichong vs. Hernandez

101 PHIL. 1155
May 31, 1957

Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted
the act which nationalizes the retail trade business, Republic Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business,” prohibiting aliens in general to engage in retail trade in our country. Petitioner, for
and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration
that said Act is unconstitutional.

Contention of the Petitioner: He attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
(1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law ;
(2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;
(4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article
XIV of the Constitution.

Contention of the State: The Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that:
(1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival;
(2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title;
(3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed;
(4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not
impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

Held: The petition was denied. The disputed law is a valid exercise of police power and is not the
product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and
determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic
situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. It was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it
protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien
and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose
power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of
the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the
police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Furthermore, an alien retailer in this country is never really makes a genuine contribution to national
income and wealth. Aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the
customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not
invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The removal
and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest
motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to
bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. Thus in the preamble, a principle
objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to
citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a
primary objective of the Constitution. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national
security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State
insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens. The law is reasonable and is
made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to
continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses.

Notes and Definitions:

 Section 9, Article II, 1987 Constitution
- The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide
adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living and an
improved quality of life for all.
 The main provisions of the R.A. No. 1180 are:
(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the
above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who
are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance
with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten
years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;
(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a
provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws
on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
 actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with
the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other
matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal
offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the
retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.
 Police Power
- It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
- Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do
is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause
and the equal protection clause. Theses constitutional guarantees which embody the essence
of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are
admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or
of nationality.
 Equal Protection Clause
- The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
 Due Process Clause
- The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance
of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the
Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection
with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can
the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified
interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process
test is applied.
Griffith vs. Court of Appeals
379 SCRA 94
March 12, 2009
Facts:

Lincoln Gerard, Inc. leased the lot and factory building of Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. for a
term of two years at monthly rental of P75,000. Geoffrey F. Griffith, petitioner and president of
Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued a two checks amounting to P215,442.65 to private respondent.The
checks were conditionally issued for arrearages on rental payments incurred by Lincoln Gerard,
Inc. The checks were signed by petitioner. It was a condition written on the voucher for each
check that the check was not to be presented for payment without clearance from Lincoln Gerard,
to be given at a specific date. However, Lincoln Gerard was unable to give such clearance owing
to a labor strike that paralyzed its business and resulted to the company’s inability to fund its
checks. Still, Phelps Dodge deposited the checks, per a note on the voucher attached thereto that
if written approval was not received from Lincoln Gerard before May 30, 1986, the checks would
be presented for payment. This is final and irrevocable, according to the note that was written
actually by an officer of Phelps Dodge, not by petitioner. The checks were dishonored and Phelps
Dodge filed criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner. But this filing took place only
after Phelps Dodge had collected the amount of the checks, with more than one million pesos to
spare, through notarial foreclosure and auction sale of Lincoln Gerard’s properties impounded by
Phelps Dodge.
The MeTC found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P. 22 and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for six months on each count, to be served consecutively. The RTC affirmed in toto
the lower court’s decision. He appealed his conviction in the CA and is now seeking reversal on
the CA decision and resolution on the criminal case.

Contention of the Petitioner:

Petitioner points out that he communicated to Phelps Dodge through a note on the voucher
attached to the checks, the fact that said checks were unfunded at the time of their
issuance. Petitioner contends that this good faith on his part negates any intent to put worthless
checks in circulation, which is what B.P. 22 seeks to penalize. Moreover, as regards the second
check that was postdated, petitioner contends that there could not be any violation of B.P. 22 with
said check since the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds is absent. Petitioner could not
have known at the time of its issuance that the postdated check would be dishonored when
presented for payment later on. Petitioner argues that his conviction in this case would be
violative of the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for failure to pay a debt, since
petitioner would be punished not for knowingly issuing an unfunded check but for failing to pay an
obligation when it fell due.

Contention of the State:

The Solicitor General contends that Lincoln Gerard assured Phelps Dodge, through the note on
the voucher attached to the checks, that said checks would be covered with sufficient funds by
May 30, 1996, which assurance was final and irrevocable. The OSG also argues that B.P. 22
does not distinguish between a check that is postdated and one that is not, for as long as the
drawer issued the checks with knowledge of his insufficient funds and the check is dishonored
upon presentment. The OSG asserts that the supposed payment that resulted from Phelps
Dodges notarial foreclosure of Lincoln Gerards properties could not bar prosecution under B.P.
22, since damage or prejudice to the payee is immaterial. Moreover, said payment was made
only after the violation of the law had already been committed. It was made beyond the five-day
period, from notice of dishonor of the checks, provided under B.P. 22

Held:
The Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage those who
seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law.
Moreover, while the philosophy underlying our penal system leans toward the classical school
that imposes penalties for retribution, such retribution should be aimed at actual and potential
wrongdoers. Note that in the two criminal cases filed by Phelps Dodge against petitioner, the
checks issued were corporate checks that Lincoln Gerard allegedly failed to fund for a valid
reason duly communicated to the payee. Further, it bears repeating that Phelps Dodge, through a
notarial foreclosure and auction that were later on judicially declared invalid, sold Lincoln Gerards
property for cash amounting to P1,120,540 to satisfy Phelps Dodge claim for unpaid rentals. Said
property was already in Phelps Dodges custody earlier, purportedly because a new tenant was
moving into the leased premises. The obligation of Lincoln Gerard to Phelps Dodge for said
rentals was only P301,953.12. Thus, by resorting to the remedy of foreclosure and auction sale,
Phelps Dodge was able to collect the face value of the two checks, totaling P215,442.65. In fact,
it impounded items owned by Lincoln Gerard valued far in excess of the debt or the checks. This
was the situation when, almost two years after the auction sale, petitioner was charged with two
counts of violation of B.P. 22. By that time, the civil obligation of Lincoln Gerard, Inc. to Phelps
Dodge Phils. Inc. was no longer subsisting, though respondent Court of Appeals calls the
 payment thereof as involuntary. That the money value of the two checks signed by petitioner was
already collected, however, could not be ignored in appreciating the antecedents of the two
criminal charges against petitioner. Because of the invalid foreclosure and sale, Phelps Dodge
was ordered to pay or return P1,072,586.88 to Lincoln Gerard, per decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 69, which became final after it was affirmed by the appellate court. The
court cannot, under these circumstances, see how petitioner’s conviction and sentence could be
upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. For Phelps Dodge has, in
our view, already exacted its proverbial pound of flesh through foreclosure and auction sale as its
chosen remedy.

The court agrees with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is
the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, they
should not apply penal laws mechanically. The court must find if the application of the law is
consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. (When
the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter alone but the spirit of the law
also that gives it life. This is especially so in this case where a debtors criminalization would not
serve the ends of justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more than a
sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find
that holding the debtors president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after
said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

Adjudication:

The petition was granted.

30. Ginsberg v. New York,

390 U.S. 629
(1968)

FACTS:

Appellant and his wife operate “Sam’s Stationery and Luncheonette” in Bellmore, Long Island. They
have lunch counter and also sell magazine which includes some so-called “girlie” magazines. The
appellant was prosecuted under two informations, each in two counts, charged that he personally sold a
16-year-old boy two “girlie” magazines on each of two dates in October, 1965, in violation of 484-h of the
New York Penal Law. He was tried before a judge without a jury and was found guilty on both counts.
The judge found out that the magazines contained pictures which depicted female “nudity” and that the
pictures were “harmful to minors” using the definition used in 484-h.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSSED/APPELANT:

The broad proposition that the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to
read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend upon whether the citizen is an adult
or a minor. He accordingly insists that the denial to minors under 17 of the materials condemned by 484-
h, insofar as that material is not obscene for 17 years of age or older, constitutes an unconstitutional
deprivation of protected liberty.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE:

“Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.” While the parents
have the primary responsibility for the children’s wellbeing the legislature or the state also has the power
to provide laws that will aid in performing those responsibilities.

Issues:

Whether or not the prohibition of sale of the “girlie magazine” to minors violates the right of parents in
rearing their children for civic efficiency.

Ruling:

New York Penal Law 484-h Exposing minors to harmful materials does not violate the primacy of the
right of parents in rearing their child rather it is an expression of the State’s interest “to protect the
welfare of the children” and that exposure to the material condemned by the 484-h is harmful to minors.

31. ROBERT T. MEYER vs. STATE OF NEBRASKA

Facts:

On April 9, 1919, Nebraska enacted a statute called an act relating to the teaching of foreign
languages in the state of Nebraska, also known as the Siman Act. It imposed restrictions on both the
use of a foreign language as a medium of instruction and on foreign languages as a subject of study.
The Act specifically prohibited teaching foreign languages to any pupil who had not yet attained and
successfully passed the eighth grade.

On May 25, 1920, Robert T. Meyer while an instructor in Zion Parochial School, taught the subject of
reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, a fourth grader who had not
attained and successfully passed the eighth grade. The Hamilton County Attorney entered the
classroom and discovered Parpart reading from the Bible in German. He charged Meyer with violating
the Siman Act.

Contention of the Petitioner:

The vocation of the plaintiff is teaching-a legitimate vocation-and in teaching, as he did, a certain
subject in a language other than English, he encroached upon the rights of no other person. Imparting
knowledge in a foreign language is not inherently immoral or inimical to the public welfare, and not a
legitimate subject for prohibitory legislation.

The relation to the common good of a law fixing a minimum of education is readily perceived, but
how one fixing a maximum — limiting the field of human knowledge — can serve the public welfare or
add substantially to the security of life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness is inconceivable.

Contention of the Respondent:

The statute forbids the teaching of foreign languages to children of tender years before such
children are grounded in the English tongue. It does not forbid the use of foreign languages by persons
of maturity or prevent the study of foreign languages by persons who have passed the eighth grade.
 The object of the legislation was to create an enlightened Page 394 American citizenship in
sympathy with the principles and ideals of this country, and to prevent children reared in America from
being trained and educated in foreign languages and foreign ideals before they have had an opportunity
to learn the English language and observe American ideals. It is a well known fact that the language first
learned by a child remains his mother tongue and the language of his heart. The purpose of the statute
is to insure that the English language shall be the mother tongue and the language of the heart of the
children reared in this country who will eventually become the citizens of this country.

Issue:

Whether or not the government can prohibit children from being taught foreign languages in
private schools.

Ruling:

No. The State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens,
physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be
respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well
as to those born with English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution — a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

31. Pierce vs. Society of Sisters

268 US 510
(1925)

Facts:
The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or gardians to send children between
the ages of eight and sixteen to public.
Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools
and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college
preparatory, and military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants
from enforcing Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send
children between 8 and 16 years to a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the
preliminary restraining orders.

Issue:
Whether or not Compulsory Education Act of 1922 violates the liberty of parents to direct the
education of their children.

Held:
The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with the protected liberty interest and
has no reasonabe relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.

The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the
appellees’ schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the
right and duty to choose the appropriate preparation for their children.

A law requiring small kids to be enrolled in public schools only is unconstitutional since it
interferes with the right of parents in rearing their children. They have the right to choose which school is
best suited for the development of their children without interference from the State.
33. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (PACU), etc. vs. SECRETARY
OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS
97 Phil 806
October 31, 1955

Facts:

Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction." The petitioning colleges and
universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be
declared unconstitutional because they deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and
parents of liberty and property without due process of law; and they deprive parents of their natural
rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency.

Issue:

Is Act No. 2706, as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 unconstitutional?

Held:

No. Petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of
law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which
provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the
Secretary of Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners
has cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and are actually operating
by virtue of their permits. And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has
threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law—and, naturally
need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education
might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive
relief. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein,
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues "reach
constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of
constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.

Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of
Education. Such requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by
Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936 because in March 1924 the Philippine Legislature
approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education
in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. It was said that there
was no law or regulation in the Philippines to prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance,
greed, or even immoral character, from opening a school to teach the young. In view of these findings
and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government in the exercise of its police power to
correct "a great evil" could validly establish the "previous permit" system objected to by petitioners? This
is what differentiates our law from the other statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any
doubt still exists, recourse may now be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The
power to regulate establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or
license.

ADJUDICATION: Petition for prohibition was denied.

34. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO
109 SCRA 1
November 5, 1981

FACTS:
Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the
City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service
Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such
appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular
No. 18 series of 1964.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

Villegas pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence
the same is no longer in effect.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

Subido pointed out that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and
placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of
the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service
Commissioner.

RULING:
Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on
his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal
predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside
their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to
point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority.

Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government
itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers
therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there
is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either
express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high
dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the
rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid