'I

OAD-CR-167 (3RD PRINTING)

I
NATO Standardization and
Licensing Policy -
Exploratory Phase

VOLUME Ill: SUPPLEMENT

I by

I Hoagland, Maclachlan & Co., Inc., Subcontractor

8 Grove Street, Wellesley, Massachusetts 02181

I
I Prepared for:

I European/NATO Directorate
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

I November 1976

I Contract No. MDA 903-76-C-0284

Contract Expiration: 31 December 1976
Short Title: NATO Standardization
Contractor: General Research Corporation
Contract Project Director: Robert A. Gessert
Phone Number: 893-5900

I
.I
GENERAL
I RESEARCH CORPORATION
WESTGATE RESEARCH PARK, McLEAN, VIRGINIA 22101

·I
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I
report,
OAD-CR-167 (3RD PRINTING)

I
I NATO Standardization and
Licensing Policy -
I Exploratory Phase
I VOLUME Ill: SUPPLEMENT

I by

t Hoagland, Maclachlan & Co., Inc., Subcontractor

8 Grove Street, Wellesley, Massachusetts 02181

I
I Prepared for:

I European/NATO Directorate
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs

·I November 1976

I Contract No. MDA 903-76-C-0284

Contract Expiration: 31 December 1976
Short Title: NATO Standardization
Contractor: General Research Corporation
Contract Project Director: Robert A. Gessert
Phone. Number: 893-5900

I
I GENERAL
I RESEARCH CORPORATION
WESTGATE RESEARCH PARK, McLEAN, VIRGIN lA 22101

I
I
I
I, (UNCLASSIFIED')
SECURITY C~ASSI FICATION OF Tli!s PAGE (When Dete £nter.,d)

READ INSTRUCTIONS
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I GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3.

I. REPORT NUMElER RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMElER

(oAD-CR-167, Vo:J.~IIIl
~ITt..E (_,d Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT) PERIOD COVERED

(Final~Aug;.l9.7.6:
NATO Standardization and Licensing Policy-
I Exploratory Phase?
Volume III: Supplement
~ I
!;. 'RERFORM!NG ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR( a) ---
~/..-;-Subeent-rac ·tor
8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

I 71Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co

,........._ ~MDA903-76-C-028~
(I
I
PERFO.RM!NG~ANIZAT!ON NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA a WORK UNIT NUMBERS
General Research Corporation/
Wes·t·ga·t·e-Re·se;:rcll-Park).--
McLean, v~a\ 22101

I (: CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

European/NA~O Directorate;
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
12.

13.
REPORT DATE

QO November 197V
N-UMB( o;;,>GES
fnr Tnt"Flrn:lct-1 rm::t1 SP!".t•-ri t-~1 A.ff<>i ,.., ' 3

I 1<4. MONITORING AGENCY NAME a AOORESS(irdilferenl from c;mttolling OWco) 15.

15...
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Distribution unlimited. ..

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I 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

f. 19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse .sid• il necessary and identUy by block number)

standardization licensed production

t licensing policy
-
NATO
co-production

;I interoP.erabili_ty;
2~ ABSTRACT (Continue on revera<> olde II necessary an~ Identity by block

This study describes the US and European political, economic and

number)

technological context for licensed production as a tool for stan-

I dardization or interoperability, identifjes particular problem areas,

discusses potential candidate systems, and recommends policy approach~~s to
further the goals of NATO standardization-and interoperability.
Particular attention is focused on (1) us political and economic
I DO
framework for licensed production, (2) European political, industria
FORM
1 JAN 73 1473 EOITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
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SECURITY CL.ASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

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UNCLASSIFIED
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20.
and technological factor~
I
Volume I is the executive summary; Volume II contains the main report
and appendices; Volume III supplements the main report by GRC with
an extensive survey of European industrial capacities and perspectives
I
on standardization conducted by Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co., Inc.,
subcontractor to GRC. I
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UNCLASSIFIED
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

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PREFACE

I
.I Weapons standardization has been an elusive goal of NATO since its

I founding in 1949. It is widely recognized that NATO"suffers diminished

combat capability as a result of lack of standardization. Standardiza-
tion and interoperability have recently been given new urgency in the

I'
light of Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional force modernization programs.
Also, the cost-budget squeeze in NATO countries, caused by competing
domestic priorities and increasing R&D, procurement, and manpower costs,
has added economic incentives to the military incentives to achieve greater

t collective military effectiveness and more efficient use of collective

resources through weapons standardization and improved interoperability.

·t New initiatives have been taken on both sides of the Atlantic to develop
better NATO policies, institutions, and procedures to address the long-

I standing problems of standardization and interoperability.

Both the US Congress and the Executive Branch have committed the

I United States to greater cooperation with European allies in achieving

the goals of NATO standardization and interoperability on the basis of

I a "two-way street" across the Atlantic in weapons selection and acquisi-

,. tion. Both have also singled out licensed production or co-production

of weapons developed by another country as a promising device to this
end. Because of this emphasis on licensing, the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) contracted

I with the General Research Corporation (GRC) in June 1976 for a two-months
exploratory phase of assistance in evaluating weapons licensing policy

I within NATO. To perform the study, GRC augmented the capabilities of

its own staff with the assistance of a subcontractor and consultants

I 1
iii

·a
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who have extensive experience in NATO political, military, and industrial
,.
matters. Full documentation of the literature examined and of the officials
in the US Executive Branch, the Congress, European Embassies, and industry
I
who were interviewed is provided in Volume II, which contains the main
report and its appendices. The subcontractor, in Volume III, has pro-
vided a survey of the European defense industrial environment within which
new US initiatives regarding standardization and interoperability will
have to function.
'I
The authors of this report express their deep appreciation to the I
numerous officials who gave generously of their time to the interviews
conducted in this study; to Major General ·R~~l]Jir.q.~OW!ii.an, ·Director, t
_............... --.----
European and NATO Affairs, ISA, who provided study guidance and encour-
agement; to Mr. ·.:J:efJ:qld. K.' .Mils ted, Special Assistant to the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, who served ably and effi-
I
ciently as the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative; and to COL
'I::a.fry_-~x:-L~.:r~.,;n., Chief, and COL Ha!oTd.·w.~HohzcLiw, Project Officer, in the
I
NATO Standardization Division, ISA, for their many suggestions, docu- t(
mentary search assistance, and support in obtaining interviews with
busy officials.
I
The views and judgments expressed in this report are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISA or any official
interviewed in the performance of the study.
,.
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II SUBCONTRACTOR'S FOREWORD

I In July 1976, General Research Corporation commissioned

I
__,
John H. Hoagland, Inc. (now Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co., Inc.) to per-
form a brief survey of theEuropean defense industrial environment
within which new US initiatives regarding NATO standardization will have
I to function.

I This particular study is part of a larger effort by General

Research Corporation, on behalf of the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense, International Security Affairs, to analyze options available
I to the United States, in the early future, with regard to NATO stan-
dardization and licensing policy. The larger effort by GRC incorporates
~~, a number of tasks, dealing with US and European government policies and
institutions, NATO and national military service requirements, and
·a governmental perceptions of licensing policy.

The present volume is concerned solely with the industrial

1- setting - especially the European defense industrial scene - as it will

affect US policy and actions in the furtherance of NATO standardization.

I ---~·-:;;

The work statement specified that all of the ,principaf European defense
._;:t_n·dust.r=i:-.flisec_t-Qt::§l,- ·ai;-craft, missiles~--tanks ·an(Cguns, electronics·:···~-
-----·
..___ ,- T

I and shipbuilding.- be surveyed within a 30-day deadline. The work

statement also called for country and corporate profiles in each industrial
sector that could lead to valid general conclusions about the probable
I European industrial response to different types of US activities -

1: especially in the area of direct licensing between Europe and the United
States. The undertaking of such a broad task, within a 30-day deadline,

I 1 v

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obviously calls for selectivity, since any one of the major topics, such
:I
as missiles or shipbuilding, could be the subject of a one-year study.
At the same time, the authors have considered it essential not to be so
il
selective as to sacrifice consideration of a key feature of the European
defense industries - their complexity. A strong effort has been made, in I
the preparation of the report, to accommodate complexity rather than
I
,,
eliminate it. The essence of the environment in which US initiatives
will be introduced is one of competition and duplication among national
industries, overlaid with a new trend toward multinational collaboration.
The combination of defense budgetary pressures, concerns over full employ-
ment, competition for export markets, decline of civil markets, and a host
of other factors in each of several countries, creates a complicated
I
industrial situation which must be recognized in the formulation of
successful US initiatives. Although the resulting study is rather long,
,J
all of the contents are considered relevant to the problem of matching
us.~~rop·osiiis~to~-Eliropearr··:cnd-us.trial .requirements and capabilities. I
The report is organized as follows: first, there is a summary
of the various findings and recommendations which emerge from each of I
the topical sections. This is followed by Part I, which discusses the
aircraft industry, beginning with a discussion of international ,I'
collaborative trends, followed by analyses of each national industry.
In Part II, the same process is repeated for the tactical missile industry.
Part III covers naval shipbuilding; and Part IV describes the European
t
tank and armored vehicle industry. Part V is a subordinate and rather
fragmentary section, covering some points about the electronics and
I
gun-making industries. Finally, Part VI provides a discussion of some
I
of the further current industrial issues that are not dealt with in
earlier sections.

A wide variety of source materials was employed in preparing

,,
the report, but it was necessary, given the very short deadline, to rely
a great deal on the personal experience of the authors. The sections
I
on aircraft and missiles were written by John Hoagland, who also acted
as project director for the report. As an industrial consultant, he
a·
vi I
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·t has worked closely with aerospace industries in this country and in

I Europe and has also served as consultant and contractor to the US Air
Force and US Department of Defense on related issues. In the course of

a~
writing Parts I and II, he was assisted by personal discussions with
several associates in the aircraft and missile industries of France,
Britain, and the United States. In addition, he was assisted by
'I Dr. Bernard Udis, head of the Economic Research Bureau at University
of Colorado, who shared the results of a number of private interviews

'.I
in the European defense industry, carried out under a National Science
Foundation grant •

Part III, on naval shipbuilding in Europe, was prepared by

Robert MacLachlan, who is also the author of a major forecast of the
~t, world shipbuilding industry, to be published by Frost & Sullivan, Inc.
of New York in the fall of 1976. Mr. MacLachlan was assisted by

a. discussions with US industry associations and shipyards as well as

members of the Webb Institute; and, in England, with a retired former

I head of naval ship procurement.

Part IV, on tanks, was written by Richard Ogorkiewicz, senior

I lecturer in mechanical engineering at Im~erial

a recognized authority on armored vehicles.

College, London, who is
He is a member of the UK

t Defense Scientific Advisory Board and has also worked, in association

with US research laboratories, on advanced concepts for US tanks. He

\I is also a consultant and lecturer to several governments on armored

vehicle requirements.

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(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK) ~,

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viii
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CONTENTS
I Part and Section

'.I!
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PREFA~E iii

SUBCONTRACTOR'S FOREWORD v

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS S-1

.I ,,_,
A.
B.
c.
The Aircraft Industry
The Aircraft Engine Industry
The Tactical Missile Industry
S-1
S-11
S-14
1 D. The Shipbuilding Industry S-20
~l E.
F.
Tanks, Armored Vehicles, and Self-Propelled Guns
Some Industrial Issues Summarized
S-24
S-31

I I. THE EUROPEAN MILITARY AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

A. The European Collaborative Aircraft Scene:
1

r'- Some Introductory Observations 2

·1. B. The National Industries
1. The British Aircraft Industry
20
21
2. The French Aircraft Industry 37
i 3.
4.
The
The
West German Aircraft Industry
Italian Aircraft Industry
51
63

I C. The Aircraft Engine Industry

1.
2.
Rolls-Royce (1971) Ltd.
Societe Nationale d'Etudes et de Construction
70
75

"I
' '
3.
4.
de Moteurs d'Aviation (SNECMA)
Turbomeca
Motoren und Turbinen Union (MTU)
86
93
95

I II. THE EUROPEAN TACTICAL MISSILE INDUSTRY

A. An Industry Overview
99
100
B. The National Industries 112
a: 1. The British Missile Industry 112-a
2. The French Tactical Missile Industry 119

I. III.
3. The German Missile Industry

THE EUROPEAN NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

125

129

I, __
A.
B.
Overview
Great Britain
130
135

I 1
ix

a
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I

C.
D.
France
Germany
151
158
I
E. Other NATO Navies
1. Italy
165
165
:,I
2.
3.
The Netherlands
Belgium
167
169 .I
F.
4.
5.
Denmark
Norway
Conclusions
170
171
172
,,
IV. THE EUROPEAN TANK INDUSTRY 177
A.
B.
Introduction
Organization of Development and Manufacture
179
180
I
1. United Kingdom 181
2.
3.
Federal Republic of Germany
France
185
188
I'
4. Other Countries 190
C. Current and Future Programs
1. United Kingdom
193
194
I
2.
3.
4.
Federal Republic of Germany
France
Other Countries
200
205
210
I
D. Comparisons with the United States
1. General Situation
211
212
I
2. Design of Battle Tanks 215
3.
4.
Other Vehicles
Major Components
218
221 I
E. Licensing Opportunities 226

V. OTHER EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

A. Defense Electronics
1.
2.
The British Electronics Industry
The German Electronics Industry
232
233
238
241
'
:t
·'·

B.
3. The French Electronics Industry
Some Notes on Guns and Artillery
244
245 I
VI. SOME INDUSTRIAL ISSUES
A. Standardization and Some Current Projects
252
253
I
1. The F-16 and Trans-Atlantic Industrial
Collaboration 254
2. The Roland II License 259

X
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t''

J, B. Lessons from Civil Aircraft Collaboration 262

C. Some Published French Views of Standardization 268

t: FIGURES
D. Some Notes on Licensing and Co-Development 279

I. 1. MCRA and Panavia Organization 9

., 2.
3.

4.
5.
Schematic of BAC's International Relationships
Schematic of Hawker Siddeley's International
Relationships
Schematic of RB.199 Work Sharing
Schehmatic of Rolls-Royce International
Collaboration
26

29
79

81

.I TABI..ES
6. MTU Ownership Structure 96

~~

.I. 1.

2.
Military Helicopter Sales in Western Europe,
1955-1976
European Airframe, Missile, and Aircraft
14

t: 3.
Equipment Sectors: Output and Employment,
1971
European Aero-engine Companies: Output and
16
...

I. ,
4.
Employment
Principal West European and American Airframe
and Missile Companies
17

18
5. European Aerospace Industry: Defense Turnover
·a, 6.
as Percent of Total Turnover
European Aerospace Industry: Output and Employment
19
22
7. SBAC Adjustment of EEC Aerospace Productivity

I 8.
9.
Figures
Comparison of Military Equipment Exports
French Aircraft Industry Manpower, 1975
24
33
39
10. Aerospatiale Helicopters 41
~I
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11.
12.
German Aerospace Employment
West Germany Aerospace Industry, 1970-1973
52'
53
13. German Military Aerospace Procurement Funding,
I 14.
15.
1973-1977
European Aero-engine Companies
Rolls-Royce Divisions and Main Products, 1974
54
73
76
'.,

I. 16. Characteristics of Selected Anti-Shipping Missiles 106

.,
.... -....
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Transatlantic Missile Trade Through mid-1975
British Shipyard Information
French Shipyard Information
West German Shipyard Information
Ownership of the Principal West German Shipyards
109
139
154
160
163
22. Ships in Service and on Order, 1975 173
I" 23. Defense-related Industries: Defense Output and
Defense Share of Total Output 235

I 1
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I.
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TABLES (cont'd)
24. European Electronics Companies Important
for Defense 237
25. Principal West European Ordnance and Ammunition
Producers 248
26. Principal Guns in European Country Forces 250

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Summary of Findings and Recommendations

I This summary presents briefly, and very broadly, some of the general

1 conclusions to be drawn from the report as a whole. These broad

general conclusions are presented under headings which correspond,

I for the most part, to the chapter headings in the report.

t A. The Aircraft Industry

I As Part I indicates, virtually all of the major development and production

I programs, both civil and military, in the European aircraft industry are
~
now collaborative in nature. These collaborations are based on strict
I cost-sharing and work-sharing formulas, established in advance among the
~

I national partners. Although such arrangements are cumbersome, they

provide the most satisfactory available: solution to the sharing of

t economic burdens and benefits in the aerospace industries. Any new

American overture to achieve greater standardization in the aircraft or

I missile field should take account of this evolution, which has already

t begun to improve the standardization of air forces and ground forces in

the central European theater.

I
~

Experience of the last fifteen years has led to the evolution of a new
-
I industrial form in the aircraft industry - an international management

company, responsible to ad hoc inter-governmental bodies for the co-

I ordination and supervision of work performed by designated national

industries in the consortium. The most advanced e~ample to date is

I Panavia in Munich, responsible to a NATO body for managing the development

I 1

I
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s- 2 I
and production of a possible 800 or more variable-geometry fighters
I
for three major European NATO air forces, Panavia is especially
v important because of its growing vested interest, supported to I
varying degrees by the participating governments, in identifying further

collaborative military aircraft projects with additional partners - e.g.

I
the United States or France.
I
In the military aircraft field, four major companies have developed the

highest degree of expertise in conducting and participating in colla-

I
borative programs. In order of experience, these are: British Aircraft I
Corporation (BAC), Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), Dassault-Breguet, and
l
/
v
Aerospatiale (or SNIAS).

In general, there have been important bilateral collaborations for I

military aircraft but relatively few multilateral programs to date -

especially programs that would combine British, French, and German

I
industries in a single project. One impediment to date has been the
I
Vf issue of design leadership, especially with regard to aircraft engines,

which represent the starting point of any military or civil aircraft J

program.
I
An issue of great importance, but still nebulous and of extreme political

sensitivity, is potential collaboration among these three governments, I

in one form or another, on a comparatively inexpensive fighter aircraft

to fulfill either an interceptor or air-to-air combat role in the late

I
1980s and 1990s. This question has been brought to the surface by its 1
inclusion in a list of four topics to be considered by subcommittees
I
I
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·J' s - 3

·a of the European Program Group (EPG). Obviously, this issue is also of

I' interest to the United States. Such an aircraft can be described as an

F-104G replacement, a replacement to the current generation of Mirage

J, aircraft, or an interceptor for national air defense and policing of

.'··-.. national airspace. Typical candidates might be airframes such as the

I F-16 or Mirage 2000 or, if a twin-engine aircraft were preferred, an

F-18 or Super Mirage. Potential engines might be the RB-199, M-53, or

I a U.S. engine. Panavia and its equivalent engine management organization,

I Turbo-Union, could provide a useful focal point for trans-Atlantic

examination of collaborative opportunitj..es.

I The British aircraft industry, with about 200,000 workers, is the

I largest of all the European national aircraft industries, representing

about half the total European aerospace workforce. It is the only

I ..
European industry with fully developed capabilities in aircraft, state-

1 1
of-the-art turbofan engines, and aircraft electronics. On the other hand,

it has been severely criticized by other national industries for its low

1/
,, rate of productivity in terms of output per worker, a factor which has

created difficulties in the negotiation of collaborative programs.

Although published analyses of the EC Commission on this problem have

I..
somewhat exaggerated the differential between Britain and other countries,

there is certainly no doubt that British aerospace. worker productivity is

I lower than in Germany and in France - and certainly than in the United

States. (These differentials are described in Part I.) Differences in

I productivity between Europe and the United States are due primarily to

I 1
differences of industrial scale.

I
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s - 4
I
In Britain, as in other European countries, comparatively low quanti-

tative demand for military and civil aircraft has suppressed major I
new investment in plant and equipment and has led to trans-Atlantic

disparities in manufacturing technology and, as a result, product

t
technology. This situation is a source of friction in licensing from I
Europe to the United States and a source of cost (and cost accounting)

conflicts in licensing from the United States to Europe. In Britain,

I
as in France and Germany, the most severe difficulty currently being

encountered by the aircraft industry is under-utilization of capacity

I
on troubled civil aircraft production lines. The company most affected I
in Britain is BAC, where about half of the factory workers are assigned to

Concorde, Airbus, and other civil programs. Although the military lines
I
assigned to Jaguar and MRCA are well capable of supporting the workers

currently employed on those programs, BAC faces severe difficulties in

I
utilizing the civil share of its workforce. This problem is echoed at I
each of the major European airframe firms, such as Aerospatiale and MBB.

A rough estimate, based on the discussions which follow, is that about

I
50,000 workers in the three major aircraft-producing countries are im-
J
minently threatened by such problems as the slow-down or cessation of

Concorde production and the stretch-out of orders for Airbus. U. S. in- I

itiatives for standardization in the field of military support aircraft

which take this problem into account will, of course, be especially

I
welcome. However, the main support aircraft initiative that has re-

cently been mounted by the United States - that is, the Boeing E-3A
I
AWACS - offers only a modest amount of work-sharing and also ignores I
I
I
I
J_ s - 5

.I. recent trends in European industrial collaborative practice.

~~
The imminent nationalization of the British aerospace industry will

undoubtedly lead to a major review of both civil and military colla-

I. borative prospects for BAC, Hawker Siddeley, and Rolls-Royce. It also

seems likely that this process of nationalization will gradually lead

I to integration of different company divisions along substantive lines,

such as the integration of the tactical missile groups in BAC and

I Hawker Siddeley. If these integrations are successful, then British

I military aircraft and tactical missile industry groupings should, within

a few years, be larger and more effective than they are now. These new
I. groupings will, however, remain committed to international consortia

rather than to purely national programs.

I
BAC, whose military aircraft division is the British participant in
J, both the Jaguar and MRCA programs, can be· regarded as the chief archi-

/1- tect and planner of European military aircraft collaboration. The

BAC management has accumulated more experience than any other European

1: group in the management ·Of large-scale international military projects.

·I: The national aerospace industries in Britain and France have a vital

foreign-earnings role. The British industry has been highly success-

I ful on the export market in recent years, setting a succession of

annual records. At the end of 1975, over 70% of BAC's total backlog
I of nearly $2 billion was for export, and Hawker Siddeley's export

a· share may have been as high. Due to the high level of exports, the

I ..,
I
 I
s - 6 I
British aircraft companies have performed well financially in the I
last few years. In an 11-year period from 1963 through 1974, the

British aerospace industry has exported slightly over 50% of its I

entire turnover. Nearly half of this backlog represented orders

from the United States, France, and Germany as part of license or

I
collaborative programs. This is a significant point for purposes I
of comparison with France, where a much higher proportion of exports

is to the third world. For the moment, British industry ts not as sensi- I
tive as France to the hazard of third-country export controls re-

sulting from U.S. licenses. but this situation may change rapidly as U.S.
I
manufacturers preempt third world markets. I
In Britain and France, and to lesser extent in Germany, the concern
I
over the absence of civil programs,or of military derivatives of civil

transport aircraft, is of paramount importance. Military and naval I

support aircraft projects capable of filling the current order gap
•
could be of vital importance in gaining a higher degree of European
I
aerospace cooperation. For Europe, as many observers have noted, I
employment is the new measure of industrial achievemen~.

The French aircraft industry, employing about 100,000 workers, has

t
been more productive than the British industry in terms of output per I
worker and currently exports about 60% of total industry production,

a vast majority of which is military. Although the engine and avionics I

industries are not as highly developed in France as in Britain, the
I
I
I
I
J_ s- 7

I French airframe industry has concentrated its resources very effectively

in a relatively limited number of programs. Its major difficulty is in

1 establishing a viable role in commercial aircraft development and manu-

J, facture. Here, the French government has sought to establish bilateral

relationships with the United States.

I The two principal manufacturers are Aerospatiale, a nationalized company

I with about 40,000 workers; and the smaller Dassault-Breguet, a private

company with about 15,000 employees. In spite of the deep admiration

I accorded in the United States to Dassault-Breguet as a developer and

manufacturer of-supersonic fighter aircraft, it seems possible that Aero-

J, spatiale may be the most appropriate future industrial partner for the U.S.

I in licensing and other collaborative ventu~es. Aerospatiale's divisions

for helicopters, tactical missiles, and ballistic missiles all appear

I. to be operating profitably, but severe difficulties in the commercial

aircraft division have kept the company in a state of turmoil. Dassault-

I Breguet, on the other ha~d, by concentrating its resources on incremental

I improvements in a few narrow but highly successful lines, continues to

expand its Mirage order backlog while maintaining participation in two

I important collaborative programs - Jaguar and Alphajet. Nevertheless,

the firm has definite limitations of capacity, as well as management and

I technical depth, to undertake any major licensing or co-development out-

I
. .
side its immediate areas of specialization •

Superficially, one exception to this judgment would be the possibility

I of trans-Atlantic or intra-European licensing or collaboration based on

I. 1

I
 I
s - 8 I
the Mirage 2000 single-engine fighter, which is now scheduled for
I
its first prototype flight in 1977. In fact, however, Aerospatiale

will perform at least half the production of this aircraft.* The I

concept involves a relatively light-weight advanced interceptor with

a ratio of total thrust to takeoff gross weight of about unity. The

I
technology of the aircraft calls for the use of carbon fiber in

selected structure parts and fly-by wire control systems. The air-
I
craft will use the SNECMA M-53 military turbofan, which is of con- I
siderable economic importance to French industry.
I
In France, as in Britain and Germany, workforce stability is a criti-

cal issue. It is an issue that works two ways - both in terms of the I
political hazards (and in some cases illegality) of workforce reduc-

tions, and in a corresponding inability to expand the workforce signi-

I
ficantly. Furthermore, it is more difficult in the European countries I
to shift workforce from one location to another, even in the same

company, than it would be in the United States. For these reasons,

I
there are strict limits on European ability to undertake any signifi-

cant expansion to already well-occupied fighter aircraft production

I
lines. I
In Britain and France, the aerospace firms are the largest of the de-
I
fense industries and the most important in terms of both employment

and exports. In Germany, the Federal Government has made a consistent I

effort to control growth of military production in general and the

* Some French industry observers argue forcefully, however, that Dassault-

I
Breguet will retain the dominant French airframe manufacturing role,
and that Aerospatiale will be forced to subcontract most of its airframe
production to Dassault.
I-
I
I
I. s - 9

I aircraft industry in particular.

space industry numbers about 50~000

As a result, although the aero-

worke_rs, its importance as an

I' employer and exporter is not comparable to that of the French or

British industries. A little over half the German aircraft industry

I workforce is employed in the three major airframe companies, MBB,

I Dornier, and VFW Fokker. In addition, there is a relatively small

but important engine industry employing about 7,000 workers. Virtually

I all German aerospace activity is collaborative in nature~ and Bonn has

firmly established a policy of reliance on collaboration with the Euro-

I pean allies or the United States in major programs. Although Bonn has

I been generally amenable to a licensee role, especially with the United

States, it has also sought to retain a subsistence level of R&D capa-

~I. bility so that its own industry would be able to exercise independent

critical judgments in collaborative programs, especially those with

I. Britain or France. For U.S. aircraft standardization initiatives with

I, Germany, MBB is the logi~al partner.

-MBB, with a workforce of about

20,000, is the German partner in the Panavia consortium and also in the
II
.I Euromissile consortium. One interesting point about the company is the

·t, minority ownership shares held by Boeing and Aerospatiale.

-------~--,-~ ~.~~--~-

Among the major aircraft firms, severe resentment has resulted from the
I establishment, in the F-16 project, of U.S. relationships with peripheral

manufacturing firms outside the leading industries. These relationships,

I in the European view, create over-investment in short-term programs and

I
I 1

I
 I
s- 10
I
under-utilization of major industrial capacity and sunk costs, all

leading to even lower European productivity compared to the United

I
States. The highest degree of acceptance will result from licensing
I
and collaboration with the major factors in the European aircraft in-

dustry. I
The other two German airframe companies also have some interesting I
collaborative experience. Dornier is the German partner on the Franco-

German Alphajet program. VFW Fokker has been licensee for German
I
production of the Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter; and most important, is a
!l
, I transnational German-Dutch company of which the Dutch arm has a lead-

ing role in the F-16 program. For the long-term, it seems likely that

there will be further rationalization of the German aircraft industry,

resulting in a greater concentration of military aircraft programs in

MBB.
I
I
I
I'
I
I
I
I
I
I
I s- 11

I B. The Aircraft Engine Industry

I' The specification of an engine is the starting point for any licensing

or co-development of a military or civil aircraft. There is only one

I aircraft engine company in Europe, Rolls-Royce, which has development

capabilities that approximate those of the two principal U.S. engine

I companies. The two other main European companies - SNECMA and MTU

I are much smaller.

te~?,t
Although they have impressive manufacturing and

capabilities on a selective basis, their R&D capabilities are

I very limited. The entire European aircraft engine industry has slightly

over 90,000 employees, two-thirds of whom are Rolls-Royce, compared with

rl over 150,000 in the United States. Even Rolls is constrained by limita-

I tions on R&D resources which have led to clearly identifiable penalties

in product development and manufacturing development, especially in the

I, manufacture of high-temperature turbine components. Nevertheless, the

latest military engine, the RB-199, is a technically ambitious project

I presenting a system with operating temperatures, pressure ratios, and

I thrust-to-weight ratios roughly comparable to U.S. technology.

maintenance of R&D capabilities at Rolls-Royce will continue to be a

The

I, primary objective of the British government after nationalization.

I Rolls has developed a complicated network of international collaborative

relationships, both within Europe and with the United States. With several

I specific exceptions, Roll~ licensing relationships to and from the United

States have proceeded reasonably well, if allowance is made for competi-

I
I 1

I
 I
s - 12
I
t~ve frictions. Specific difficulties that have arisen in licensing

arrangements can, for the most part, be traced to experi- I

ences with national user standards, as discussed in Part I.

future U.S. initiatives in the licensing of military aircraft en-

For any
I
gines, the relationship of R,g.lJ.-_s:PRoyce-:-a~i<rMTu-Tn- :tEe :Tu-rBo-Union
I
consortium represents an interesting candidate for partnership.

~1iicMi; the main French engine company, has only about 14,000 employees
I
and somewhat limited R&D capabilities. :·Uii:f~~~d Technologies Gorporati'on
A~ --~_., _ _ _ ,
I
-
'·"-- has a minority ownership in the company.
.
SNECMA has, with some U.S.

technical help, developed the new M-53 engine to power the next genera-
I
tion of supersonic fighters in France; and it has also formed with
--~
·(?,.E. the CFM-56 consortium to develop and produce a 20,000 pound thrust
I
(ten-ton) engine for the next generation of civil transports. In the I
view of the U.S. engine manufacturers, SNECMA has excellent manufactur-

ing facilities in selected areas (for example, in modern forging and

I
casting techniques) and a thoroughly respected engine-testing capabil-
I
ity. With the exception of the ATAR engine series for the current

generation of Mirage fighters, future programs will be collaborative - I

primarily with Rolls-Royce and General Electric.
I
It would be difficult to prove, either in Britain or France, that new

jet engine testing duration or procedures differ significantly from I

the United States. With regard to the M-53 program, through the spring

of 1976, 19 prototypes have accumulated some 5,000 hours of running

I
time, including nearly 700 with afterburner. I
I
I
I
I. s - 13

I In jet engine licensing, which evokes a number of difficult problems

in military and industrial security, the French government and

I SNECMA have been willing to accept the compromise of receiving a

I "sealed" core engine from G.E. in the CFM-56 program, to which peri-

pheral systems are added by SNECMA. This type of arrangement would,.

I in most cases, be rejected out of hand by Rolls-Royce.

I ~U in Germany is the chosen instrument for German participation in

licensed manufacture of foreign jet engines and Germany's portion in

.,
I Turbo-Union. Although the total capacity of the company is rather

small, its metal-working capabilities are fairly well advanced (e.g.

electrochemical milling, electron beam welding). The principal

I programs, either current or planned, include the RB-199 collaboration

with •&;1ls..:ROyc·e-:through Turbo-Union, probable participation with

I Pratt -&-Whitney; and Rolls-Royce on the JT-lOD engine to compete with
·-·---,
theG.E •.,..SNECMA CFM-56, and continuing production of the G.E. J-79
I engine (which powers both the F-4 and F-104). In addition, MTU parti-

I cipates with the French engine industry on production of the Larzac

engine for the Alphajet trainer.

I Finally, as the main text will indicate, Turbomeca is an important

I potential collaborator for small and medium-sized engines.

I
I
I 1

I
 I
s - 14 I
C. The Tactical Missile Industry
I
Tactical missiles are especially well suited to the technological

skills, the industrial scale and capacity, and military requirements

I
of the Western European countries. In addition, they offer the vitally I
important potential for large-scale export which is needed, by Britain

and France in particular, to maintain defense industrial viability.

I
For Europe as a whole, 50 to 60% of missile production is normally
I
exported, and prohibitions on freedom to export would effectively rule

out the prospect of most licensing or collaborative arrangements. I

\'f_~·s~:~~Jifi;;:£~~ii-~ d~vei9,pti~~t and manufacture is, consequently, an area I
of considerable strength among European NATO countries and represents

an area in which Ehtdpe::.Confird:ers· itself the technological equal of

~--------···-" ·-·· .
I
,,~~t::~~· Although there is considerable interest in future

trans-Atlantic collaboration, the principal mode envisioned by Europe

I
is one of co-development among equals with regard to more advanced systems, I
drawing especially on U.S. advances in precision guidance and resistance

to countermeasures. I
As in aircraft programs, European tactical missile activity is characterized I
by a fairly high degree of collaboration. The principal example to date

Lf/ is Euromissile, the consortium of MBB and Aerospatiale tactical missile

I
activities. Compared with the Panavia model, however, Euromissile lacks

an independent technical and management staff. In addition, MATRA and HSD

have formed a cooperative arrangement on the Martel project. However,

I
I
I. s - 15

I as in the case of aircraft, no consortia have yet been formed joining

Britain, France, and Germany in a unified program. It seems likely

I that this type of collaboration will emerge, possibly after the nationali- -~

I. zation of the British aerospace industry and the potential fusion of the

missile divisions of BAC and HSD •

.I In Britain, there are some 14,000 workers involved in tactical missile

I R&D and production, about equally divided between BAC and HSD.

addition, the British electronics industry is capable of acting as

In

I prime contractor for SAMs and other tactical missiles. The leader is

Marconi and its various operating elements. Marconi's semiactive radar

I ---·-·~---- ________ ..
,

guidance system for the XJ-521 British Sparrow and its participation

I in the radar and homing•systems on Sea Dart, Martel, Seawolf, and other

missiles indicates a capability that is important in future standardi-

I zation efforts. British capabilities appear to be particularly strong

in SAM systems, especially for naval applications.

I
Two major trends in British tactical missile industry are apparent:
I first, the likelihood of eventual merger of the two principal missile

'I. divisions in Britain; and second, the growing favor with which the

British government views collaborative tactical missile ventures I

I

I within Europe.

'1, In France, Aerospatiale and MATRA are the principal manufacturers. In

the past, MATRA has concentrated on Air Force requirements while

I Aerospatiale was more concerned with Army requirements, but these

distinctions may be diminishing in importance. Aerospatiale is the

I 1

I
 I
s - 16 I
collaborator with MBB in Euromissile, which is the sales and management

organization for three important programs -Roland, HOT and MILAN.

I
These programs, in addition to the Exocet anti-ship missile, are the major I
activities of Aerospatiale and are characterized by the prospect of long

production runs, at fairly high rates, and large export potential. The I
U.S. licensing of Roland II has, despite difficulties in the working

relationship, provided an important boost to industry morale.

I
MATRA's principal strengths are in air-to-air missiles, as exemplified
I
by the Super 530 long-range interceptor missile, which will enter opera- I
tional service in 1978, and the R-550 close-in dog-fight missile, which

reached operational status in 1975. These are national programs for I

the French Air Force, but their export potential is substantial.

collaborative basis, MATRA and HSD developed the Martel ASM for both
On a
I
the British and French military services, with alternative guidance I
systems. In cooperation with Thomson CSF, MATRA has also produced the

Crotale battlefield SAM, which was one of the contenders with Roland II I
for the U.S. Army competition. MATRA has collaborated with an Italian

firm, OTO-Melara 1 to develop the Otomat anti-ship missile.

I
In Germany, missile activities will probably be concentrated in-
I
creasingly in MBB, and both German industry and government will,
I
characteristically, keep pressing for further collaborative projects

within Europe and with the United States. MBB's collaboration with I
Aerospatiale has been harmonious and has been of particular importance

in the major programs to date. In addition to those already mentioned,

I
the Kormoran anti-ship missile has been developed in collaboration with
I
I
I
I. s- 17

I Aerospatiale and Thomson CSF; and there is already discussion of a

supersonic replacement, currently designated the FK-80, which would be

I a Franco-German collaboration but could also include other partners. *

In addition, MBB is working on a long-range ASM for use against large

I
,, or high-value surface targets, which would be carried on MRCA, and

here there has been some interest in collaboration with the United

States. The main projects at the moment are, however, MILAN, HOT,

I and other high-volume production activities.

I European industry observers seem dubious, at present, about further

trans-Atlantic licensing prospects beyond those which have already

I been established. In a number of tactical missile categories, U.S.

I and European industries are in direct competition in world markets.

There appears to be a general interest, however, in identifying

I collaborative opportunities for succeeding generations of tactical

missiles, due not only to a further interest in a share in the U.S.

I market but also due to recognition of U.S. technological advantages

I in certain selected areas, particularly those related to terminal

guidance.

1 Consequently, while there are certainly a number of specific opportunities

I remaining for the United States to license existing U.S. systems to various

European customers, any venture in tactical missile standardization,

I intended to encompass all of the major countries, would probably require

some element of co-development. This is particularly true if France

I were to be included in future projects aimed at standardization. Among

I 1
* Hawker Siddeley Dynamics has shown an interest in such a partnership.

I
 I
s - 18
I
types of future collaborative development activities that have been I
mentioned by European industry, the following appear to be the most

significant: I
A second-generation, short-range SAM to replace I
Roland, Rapier, and Grotale.
I
A third-generation anti-tank missile to replace

HOT and MILAN in meeting standardized NATO I

requirements.
I
A medium-range SAM with very low-altitude capability
I
.
and a high degree of resistance to ECM. (Here,

principal European collaborators might be the

I
electronics firms such as Marconi and AEG-Telefunken.)

More advanced AAMs in each principal category - e.g.

I
high-altitude, high-Mach-number interceptor missiles I
as follow-ons to Phoenix and Super 530; and close-in

dog-fight weapons as follow-ons to AIM 9L and R-550. I

A second-generation replacement of Lance and Pluton I
to fulfill the requirement for a 100-kilometer ballistic

weapon. Such a system could be based on improved navi-

I
gation and propulsion technology.
I
An anti-ship missile to replace Harpoon, Exocet, and

Otomat, in which the important specifications would be

I
supersonic speed and increased range. I
I
I
I s - 19

I An anti-missile missile for ship defense.

I There is a general recognition of U.S. technological superiority in a

number of specific areas of interest such as EO systems and miniaturized

I target seekers; large tactical missiles in the SAM and ASM roles; in

I, cruise missiles; and RPVs.

Finally, some European industry spokesmen express concern, based on

I the F-16 experience, that U.S. industry might by-pass the established

I European missile industry and set up license relationships with firms

having little or no background in missile development or producti~n.

I It is essential, in any licensing or collaborative arrangements

initiated by the United States, to concentrate attention on the

I principal industrial groupings in a given category in order to further

I the objectives of unification and standardization.

I
I
1
I
I
I
J
I
 I
s - 20
I
D. The Shipbuilding Industry
I
In terms of size and turnover, the shipbuilding industries of the

European NATO countries are much less important than the aerospace
I
industry. European naval ship design and construction are concentrated I
strongly in Britain and France due to the fact that the navies of

these two countries account for such a predominant share of operating J

surface ships and submarines. Britain and France together comprise

about 67% of naval ship procurement expenditures among six Western

I
European NATO countries. I
The collaborative trend has, for a number of reasons, not been applicable
I
to naval shipbuilding. There is a tendency for each country to direct

all shipbuilding contracts to its own yards. In Britain, the government I

has made a decision in recent years to direct all new naval construction

to commercial yards. In France, naval ship construction is performed in

I
four government dockyards with the exception of some small diesel
I
electric submarines and patrol craft which are constructed in private

yards. I
While Britain and France have tended to concentrated in recent years on I
fewer, heavier ocean-going surface ships in the frigate and guided

missile destroyer categories, there appears to hsve been a general I

agreement that West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium would concentrate

on lighter frigates as well as fast patrol boats and mine vessels for
I
in-shore missions. (It should also be noted that France has joined I
with the Netherlands and Belgium in a collaborative project for a mine-

sweeper.) I
I
I
I s - 21

I There has been a general decline in shipbuilding capability in Western

Europe. In 1964, there were 13 shipyards in Britain capable of producing

I naval vessels. By 1976, this number has been reduced to three lead

I commercial yards plus three additional commercial yards. Although there

is a possibility that the changing trend in naval warfare, towards. the

I employment of a larger number of smaller platforms, may permit the European

NATO countries to resume affordable shipbuilding programs to replace their

I aging fleets of larger-size vessels, the absence of advanced R&D and

I design capabilities may create a necessity to procure technology from

the United States.

I In Britain, defense shipbuilding accounts for about 31% of total ship-

I building. In the main British shipyards capable of naval shipbuilding,

there are now about 45,000 workers.

I Naval shipbuilding in France is confined exclusively to naval dockyards,

I which now have about 35,000 employees, of whom only about 12,000 are

actually engaged in naval construction. Total turnover appears to be on

I the order of $650 million. Of the four major dockyards, Cherbourg

1 concentrates on diesel and nuclear submarines; Toulon on repair, maintenance,

and refit; and Brest and Lorient construct all naval survace ships over

I 1,000 tons. Although these yards are relatively busy, they are not

operating at full capacity. One commercial yard, Constructions

I Mecaniques de Normandie, specializes in small boats such as fast patrol

I craft and minehunters. They currently have a contract to build 20 new

fast patrol missile boats for West Germany.

I 1

I
 I
s - 22 I
In Germany, a relatively small proportion of the defense budget is

allocated to naval construction; and the German navy is confined mainly

I
to small craft for in-shore patrolling. Germany is the only NATO I
European country to order naval vessels from outside the country, as

e~mplified in orders for patrol craft from France and three guided-missile I
destroyers from the United States.

funds have been spent abroad.)

(About 30% of naval ship procurement

Although there are five major ship-

I
building companies in Germany, they have found it extremely difficult to I
continue competing with Japan and other commercial shipbuilding industries.

Currently, the German shipbuilding industry, even with reduced activity, I

appears to be plagued by manpower shortages.
I
In terms of technology and capacity, probably the most logical potential

future licensees or contractors for U.S. purposes would be the three

I
lead shipyards in the United Kingdom - Vickers, Vosper Thorneycroft,
I
and Yarrow. As indicated by new designs such as the "Harrier Carrier",

British industry does retain technological capability and innovative I

capacity which can be responsive in future trans-Atlantic collaborations.
I
From the industrial standpoint, three collaborative prospects can be

identified: first, an examination of the relatively few unique European I

designs - e.g. Harrier Carrier - to determine their applicability to

licensed production in the United States; second, given the current

I
difficulties in U.S. naval shipbuilding, the possibility of placing I
orders for construction at leading European private yards that are

well capitalized and under-utilized (the three British yards are the I
I
I
I
I s - 23

main examples); and third, to examine the prospect of participation

I in the collaborative French-Dutch-Belgian minesweeper project, which

I is also of considerable interest in the context of EPG.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 I
s - 24
I
E. Tanks, Armored Vehicles, and Self-Propelled Guns
I
As the discussion in Part IV indicates, Britain and Germany in parti-

cular regard themselves as the technological equals of the United I

States in. tank development and manufacture, capable of strong independ-

ent judgments about technological alternatives. The European tank in-

I
dustries benefit from a strong automotive base and from relatively I
large military requirements as well as substantial export markets.
I
Qualified European observers make the following judgments about licens-

ing or collaborative opportunities between Western Europe and the I

United States in the tank and armored field:
I
Compared with the aerospace industry, where work-

force stabilization is of the utmost importance

I
in national policy-making, the situation with re-

gard to tanks is based more closely on military

I
requirements_and technological alternatives. I
The European industrial view is that Britain, Ger-
I
many, and France have been more successful in de-

veloping armored vehicles in recent years than the I

United States, especially in relation to the re-

sources available. In their collective view, Euro-

I
pean development efforts are not as fragmented as
I
those in the United States; their military authori-

ties have a clearer idea of what is needed and I

I
I
I
I s - 25

I practical, a factor which has avoided such false

I starts as ARSV, T-95, and MBT-70; and European

armored vehicle programs have been less vulnerable

,.

1'. to changes in senior military personnel and policy.

I The European view is that the quality of R&D facili-

ties directly related to armored vehicles is about

I the same on both sides of the Atlantic, while static

engine and vehicle test facilities are superior in

I Britain and Germany. Proving ground facilities are

I considered superior in the United States. The U.S.

lead in computer modeling of armored vehicle per-

I formance is also acknowledged.

I Manufacturing capabilities are roughly comparable

in the tank industry, with significant exceptions

I in some major components. British industry

I suffers labor and management problems in tank produc-

tion just as it does in other defense industry sec-

I tors. German management of production has been ex-

tremely efficient, somewhat 9ffsetting the high wage

I scales and difficulties in currency fluctuations.

I Britain has been responsible for a number of major

design innovations such as the new type of Chobham

I
I
I
 I
s - 26
I
armor as well as triple differential tank steering
I
systems and collapsible flotation screens. Other
I
equipment pioneered in Britain includes APDS ammuni-

tion, two-axis electrical stabilized gun controls, I

supine driving position, non-reflective periscopes,

and aluminum armor.

a·
France has pioneered in automatic loading systems and
I
oscillati:ng turrets. France was also the only country

which, during the 1960s, competed with the United States

I
in the development of gun/missile launchers. I
In general, Germany has not demonstrated any great
I
originality in tank design but has been superior from

the point of view of automotive performance and re- I

liability due to more thorough detail design of com-

ponents and testing. In recent years, however, the

I
Federal Republic has also started a program of re-
I
search into highly mobile tanks with power ratios that

are much higher than any other existing tanks. This I

trend will eventually produce some new and original

designs.
I
With regard to other vehicles, one program of interest
I
is that of self-propelled guns. The jointly-developed
I
I
I
I
I
s - 27

I 155mm SP-70 is regarded as a serious challenger to

I SP equipment produced in the United States.

I One divergent trend has been the development in all

major European industries of wheeled armored vehicles,

I a category which the United States has not yet entered.

I With regard to major tank components, one important

category in which the United States has a strong lead

I is that of electronics-based systems for tanks. Britain,

I France, and Germany have been quick to follow U. S.

leads in such systems as laser rangefinders.

I :There is no equivalent in Europe of the cannon-launched

I laser-guided projectiles recently developed in the

United States.
I France has led in a number of specialized areas such as

I medium-pressure smooth-bore guns of 90 and 105mm caliber

which fire fin-stabilized HEAT projectiles and which are

I particularly suitable for light armored vehicles. France

I is also now developing a high-velocity 120mm smooth-bore

gun firing APFSDS.

I In one particular category, U.S. production scale presents

I a great cost advantage over any of the European countries.

I
I
 I
s - 28
I
The scale of commercial engine manufacture in the I
United States makes tank engines cheaper than those

produced in Europe. (This is particularly true of

I
the two-stroke diesels produced by Detroit Diesel
I
Allison.) In addition, the greater development funds

available in the United States have made it possible I

to develop a gas-turbine engine successfully, a trend

which is not likely to be duplicated in Europe.

I
To some extent, the same judgment about cost advan-
I
tage is true of engine transmissions.
I
In general, licensed manufacture of complete vehicles

is not an attractive proposition for any of the major

I
European countries. In recent years, licensed manu- I
facture has been considered only twice. In both cases

it was a U.S. interest in obtaining a license from I

Western Europe - first, in the possible adoption of

the British Scorpion; and second in the recent prospect

I
of a license for Leopard II. I
Manufacture of components under license is an entirely
I
different matter which is accepted practice among all

the major industries. Examples include U.S. adoption I

of the British-designed 105mm tank-gun and licenses
I
I
I
I
I
s -
I 29

a· granted by Hughes for development and manufacture

of laser rangefinders in Britain and Germany.

I The greatest case for standardization and licens-

I ing arrangements can be made in tank-gun ammunition.

One European view is that the most immediate oppor-

I tunity for this purpose would be the licensing to the

I U.S. of German or possibly French 120mm smooth-bore

guns.

I In the European view~ if the U. S. Army should decide

I to develop a new light-armored vehicle~ there might be

an opportunity to license the British 76mm medium-

I velocity gun or the 30mm RARDEN gun. An alternative

I might be a license for the French medium-pressure 90

or 105mm smooth-bore gun.

I There are also further if somewhat limited opportunities

\
I for licensing u·.s. fire-control systems to Europe - e.g.

stabilized gun control systems such as those manufactured

I by Cadillac Cage and Honeywell.

I Because the tank industry is a mature industry closely associated with

automotive production, classical forms of licensing of specialized com-

I ponents have been widely used, due to the capabilities of the different

I
I
 I
s - 30 I
national industries to recognize new advances quickly and take I
advantage of them. The more current forms of collaboration that

have been developed among aerospace industries do not apply to the I

tank industry, which is a much smaller and more intimate international

community of industries. However~ one important example of collabora-

I
tion is that of Britain, Germany, and Italy in the SP-70 self-propelled I
artillery project. This is a collaboration which could be of potential

interest to the United States for purposes of standardization. I

I
The SP-70 is a derivative development of the collaborative FH-70 155mm

towed gun. For the three participating governments, it is designed to

I
replace the U.S.-built M-109 155mm howitzer. Industrial responsibility
I
for the program lies with Vickers in Britain and Rheinmetall and Faunwerke

in Germany. When the gun goes into production, OTO-Melara in Italy will I
also participate. This is a situation of potential U.S. interest.
I
I
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I
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I
I
I s - 31

I F. Some Industrial Issues Summarized

I For Euro.pean industry, the credibility of the American standardization

I initiative is inseparably linked with the establishment of a·"two-way

street". In the last 20 years, there has been a flood of U.S. hardware
.I and licenses from the United States to Europe and a trickle in the other

direction. If the latest U.S. standardization initiative comes to be

I perceived only as a Trojan Horse for a new wave of U.S. licenses (e.g.

I F-16, F-18, AWACS, Harpoon, Hawk, Sparrow, etc.), then intra-European

efforts to exclude the United States may intensify. For European in-

I dustrial purposes, the two-way street will be defined as a sharing,

according to pre-established formulas, of the costs and industrial

I work benefits, under the supervision of an established transnational

I body, in selected defense programs. In the sum total of such programs,

the major European industries will seek a balance approaching parity

I in the exchange of products and services.

I The focus of the total study being performed by GRC for ISA is the role

of licenses in meeting the objective of standardization. To focus on

I licensing is to concentrate on systems that are now in late development

or early production. For that reason, great care has been takenJin each
I of the substantive sections which follow, to ident~fy European tactical

I systems programs that are now either in late development in relatively

early stages of production - not only to characterize the capabilities

I of different industries, but to provide a detailed list of the European

systems which could, in the next several years, be available for licens-
I
I
 I
s - 32
I
ing to the United States as part of a two-way street.
I
These include some very impressive systems, such as the naval SAMS

in Britain, advanced AAMs in France, Franco-German anti-tank weapons,

I
British armor and guns, French light armored vehicles, etc. However,
I
to recite such a list even in outline is to recognize immediately the

existence of competing U.S. systems. European industry does recog- I

nize this fact and for that reason has tended to emphasize the need to

reach beyond the competing systems of the current generation and es-
I
tablish shared co-development programs for the next generations in
I
each of the tactical weapons categories. Such an approach would not

preclude licensing; but it would subordinate licensing within a larger I

co-developmental context. The current example of the two trans-Atlantic

collaborations on ten-ton engines is useful, since these projects in-

I
volve both co-development of the total package and specific licensing I
within that package.
I
The "interdependence" concept, formulated by DDR&E at the beginning of

this decade, called essentially for separate and independent design and I
development, followed by competitive selection of a single system, for

which production would then be licensed in each of the user countries.

I
The current European industrial concept calls for initial agreement on

joint specifications, followed by collaborative R&D and, ultimately a

I
production program that typically involves two (or more) final assembly I
lines supported by a specialized division and cross-vending of sub-
I
I
I
I
I s - 33

I assembles and components. Licensing has an important role in this

process, especially in cases where existing major sub-systems and

I assemblies (e.g. engines, avionics, homing heads, etc.) can be in-

corporated in a new system. Although this kind of approach may not,

I in many instances, be accepted in the United States, its long process

I of evolution in the European defense industries must be noted. Also

of great potential importance is the European evolution of ad hoc

I· inter-governmental organizations, such as NAMMO and NAMMA, to coordi-

nate government oversight of the resulting industrial consortia. Ex-

I perience to date in the licensing of Roland II to the United States

I demonstrates the need for the establishment of inter~governmental

authorities to resolve technical issues and establish industrial

I product and manufacturing spe-cifications and standards, contracting

I procedures, and security regulations in advance of major licenses or

other collaborative projects. The tendency to push the resolution of

I these problems down to the industrial level is virtually certain to

create frictions which could otherwise be avoided. The intermediary

I role of government offices or laboratories can be extremely beneficial,

as demonstrated by the use of a USAF system program office (SPO) as a

I clearinghouse for the resolution not only of technical but of manage-

I ment issues. The role of the USAF SPO in the case of the AVS program

of the mid-1960s, as well as the activities of the F-16 SPO at the

I present time, indicate the value of such a group to oversee the work

of industry.
I
I
I
 I
s - 34
I
Although it would be difficult to support, on any general basis, claims I
of inferior workmanship by European industry compared with the United

States in high-technology fields, there is no question whatever that

I
differences in scale of R&D funding and production have led to U.S. I
advances in manufacturing development which inevitably affect product

development. For this reason, it is often difficult to carry out I

adaptations needed in licensed production from Europe to the United

States; and it is essential that these issues be resolved by govern-

I
ment authorities before contracting to industry. The U.S. network I
of specialized service commands and laboratories can play an important

role in this regard.

I
Another key point to observe, in reading the sections which follow, is I
that virtually all of the new or recent European projects in high-

technology fields are collaborative rather than national, a trend which

I
favors greater efficiency and unification in NATO defense industries ·I
in the long run. Collaborative arrangements made with consortia rather

than national industries will demonstrate U.S. interest in encouraging I

and strengthening this trend. The establishment of intra-European con-

sortia is rapidly resulting in greater standardization in Second ATAF,

I
Premier Commandement Aerienne Tactique (ler CATAC), and other forces
I
assigned to the Central European front. For this reason, the consortia

represent a very logical focal point for new U.S. initiatives. I

I
I
I
I
I
s - 35
I Related to this is the urgent necessity for U.S. industry to work with

I leading defense firms in Britain, France, and Germany rather than

companies that are geographically or industrially peripheral. The

I European defense industries have been very concerned over the differ-

I ences in rates of productivity, both among the European countries and

in comparison with the United States. In order to increase the over-

I all level of European productivity, they have been anxious to achieve

economies of scale through collaboration, especially in high-technology

I programs. Consequently, reaction to the F-16 program has been adverse,

I because it harms total European productivity in two ways: first by

requiring capital investment in relatively small national industries

I where there is little long-term prospect for sustained aviation produc-

I tion; and second, by by-passing the major, well-capitalized industries

of the three large countries, where additional work would lead to

I fuller utilization of their o~ capital resources. For future U.S.

initiatives in standardization, this is a key issue, requiring primary

I concentration on the major speci~lized industries.

I With regard to French industrial attitudes, which are important to a

widening of trans-Atlantic defense industrial collaboration, the rela-

I tive ease with which Franco-American agreements have been reached on

I the CFM-56 and Mercure 200 civil programs indicates the absence of any

basic psychological impediment to major collaborations, especially

I
I
I
 I
s - 36
I
those that offer some hope of long-term beneficial effects on indus-

trial capabilities and employment stability. The lessons to be de-

I
rived from the Franco-American civil aircraft negotiations are related I
to the issues of: the promise of increasing work for under-utilized

production lines; potential access to the American market; and collabo- I

ration on a relatively full-partnership basis. To the extent that

these conditions can be met in collaboration for defense standardiza-

I
tion, French cooperation can probably be expected. I
On the related subject of EPG, national perceptions vary widely. While
I
.German and British attitudes may not differ too widely from those of

Washington, the declared French policy view is that EPG, far from being I
simply the European side of a trans-Atlantic dumbbell, is first and

foremost an effort to coordinate European military requirements and

I
programs and protect the European defense market against further U.S.
I
encroachments. Behind the'declaratory policy level, however, there

appears to be a genuine French interest in greater trans-Atlantic co- I

operation, if the United States is responsive, in particular, to the

issues of:
I
employment and worksharing
I
R&D collaboration

access to the U.S. market I

the SO% export requirement

prior and continuing inter-governmental

I
supervision to avoid frictions at the
industrial level.
I
I
I
I
I s - 37

I Finally, the issue of domestic employment is virtually fundamental in

I· current European planning. Although it may not be part of the rhetoric

of defense ministers, it is certainly of prime consideration in the

I voting patterns of parliaments. The issue of stable employment per-

meates the defense industrial sector in Western Europe and must not be
I underestimated.

I
I
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I
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I
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 s - 38
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(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
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I
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I - 1 -

I
I
I I. The European Military Aircraft Industry

I
A. The European Collaborative Aircraft Scene:
I Some Introductory Observations

I B. The National Industries

I C. The Aircraft Engine Industry

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 1

I
 - 2 -
I
I
I
I
I
A. The European Collaborative Aircraft Scene:
I
Some Introductory Observations
I
I
I
I
I
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I
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I - 3 -

I A. The European Collaborative Aircraft Scene: Some Introductory Observations

I Part I as a whole will deal, in considerable detail, with the programs and

I capabilities of each national aircraft industry in the NATO countries and

France. A recurring theme, in each of these national industry descriptions,

I will be the increasing role of multinational collaboration, especially within

Europe. Even in France,where industrial policies are totally nationalistic,

I collaborative programs have assumed great importance.

I This opening section provides a brief overview of the collaborative trend in

I Western Europe, in order to provide a much-needed perspective for the national

sections. This opening section is qualitative in nature, to complement the

I more quantitative discussions which follow.

I This discussion is especially important as a prelude to assessing industrial

opportunities for NATO standardization - whether they involve licensing or

I other collaborative forms. Broad aspects will be discussed here in Section A,

and detailed arrangements will be covered under the national headings in

I Section B.

I Any major new American overture to achieve greater standardization must take

I account of the collaborative forms that have already emerged in Europe. It

would be useless to pretend that the intra-European collaborative process does

I not exist or to ignore it in formulating U.S. initiatives. The European colla-

borative experiment has evolved some relatively new industrial forms which need
I to be recognized and understood.

I Starting in the late 1960s, a series of papers was circulated within the EC

Secretariat concerning the long-term goal of integrating the European aero-

I 1

I
 - 4 -
I
space industry. According to the formulation of EC planners, the 1960s were I
years of rationalizing the different national aerospace industries, involving

the consolidation and merger of numerous smaller companies into large,

I
unified national aerospace companies. The 1970s were perceived as a decade
I
in which these large national entities would engage in a series of major

collaborative programs, leading to increasing operational unity. As these I

projects advanced, they would make it possible, in the 1980s, to achieve

actual consolidation throughout Europe, through the creation of perhaps two

airframe companies and two engine companies for the entire community. Although

these veiws were advanced by EC planners rather than by national ministries or

industries, they were treated with considerable interest. I

Among most observers of the European aerospace industry, the goal of full I
consolidation in the 1980s now seems unrealistic, at least partly as a result

of difficulties experienced to date in the management of large-scale European

I
collaborative projects. Even the most doubtful (especially in France) would
I
agree, however, that collaboration has become the only serious means now

available for the mounting of major new aircraft or missile programs in I

Western Europe; and there is general recognition that discussions and nego-

tiations of collaborative ventures are now more numerous than they have ever
I
been. I
The arguments about the efficiency of multinational or even bilateral projects,
I
compared with separate national programs, are well known. Those who are most

critical of multinational efforts argue that the cost, compared with a national I
effort, will be about 50% higher, a figure which is almost certainly excessive.*

One frequently mentioned difficulty is that, even if the prime contractor is

I
completely tooled for the program, much of the work must be assigned to
I
* One formula now current is: CN = c0 JN:where CN is the cost of a multi-
lateral program involving N countries; and Co is the cost of a national program.
I
I - 5 -

I
inexperienced subcontractors, resulting in inefficient use of re-
I sources. In addition, companies with the same specialities - e.g.

(I MATRA and Hawker Siddeley in the Martel missile program - must share

work which either one of them could perform adequately with existing

I. personnel and facilities. Another frequently mentioned problem is

the difficulty of adequate collaboration between aerospace firms and

I the electronic companies who act as major subcontractors. These

I relations are difficult, even in a national setting, but the multi-

n~~ional aspect seems to increase the problems.

I Four projects are especially noteworthy:

I Concorde, the Anglo-French SST program, begun under

I agreements signed between the two governments in 1962,

and executed by British Aircraft Corporation and Aero-

I spatiale for the airframe and Rolls-Royce and SNECMA for

the engines. In the Concorde program, there are two

I assembly lines - one each in Toulouse and Filton - but

I each Concorde is assembled from components and equipment

manufactured in equal shares by the two partners. (For

I example, BAC has the electrical systems and Aerospatiale

has the hydraulic systems.)

I Jaguar, the Anglo-French training and attack.aircraft,

I for which the "brass plate" company SEPECAT was formed in

1966, mainly as a corporate shell for collaboration between

I British Aircraft Corporation and Dassault, a program in-

'I 1
volving at least.400 aircraft, of which more than 250 are

already delivered.

I
 - 6 - I
~-
MRCA, the European multi-role combat circraft, which

effectively began with the formation of Panavia, an international

1
industrial management company, operating under a governmental

agency formed jointly by Britain, German, and Italy. Panavia

I>
and its corresponding engine group in turn act as program

managers for work performed by British Aircraft Corporation,

I
Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, and Aeritalia for airframes and
I
Rolls-Royce and MTU for engines. This program is now virtually

committed to the production of more than 800 swing-wing combat

I
aircraft, and seven of nine development aircraft have already

flown.
I
Airbus Industrie, established in the late 1960s to manage the
I
development, manufacture and marketing of the wide-body A-300 I
medium-range civil transport by Aerospatiale in France, MBB and

VFW-Fokker in Germany, Hawker Siddeley in Britain, and other I

participants in the Netherlands and Spain.

32 orders and 24 options have been received.

To date, only some

It may be worth
I
noting that Aerospatiale, which owns 47% of Airbus Industrie, I
has made a study of a military version of Airbus which would

have a maximum takeoff weight of 157.5 tons and which would I

be designed mainly for in-flight refueling of Jaguar as well

as for long-haul cargo and personnel transport.

I
A learning curve in collaborative management is apparent in this succession of
t
programs. In the Concorde project, the first of the three, the airframe and
I
engine companies in the two countries were simply instructed to cooperate,
I
I
I
I under the terms of an umbrella agreement between the two governments. The

I necessary technical and manufacturing liaisons were established at all

levels in the airframe and engine firms, but without much of a formal manage-
I ment structure. Nevertheless, a collaborative development and manufacturing

I project of considerable sophistication and complexity was carried through

to successful completion. In the process, the participants, especially BAC,

I learned a great deal about the management of collaborative ventures.

I The Jaguar program began as a collaboration for a training and tactical

fighter aircraft for the British and French air forces, to be developed and

I built by BAC in partnership with Breguet, prior to the Dassault-Breguet

merger. Based on experience gained in the Concorde program, a corporate

I shell, SEPECAT, was established in France as legal contractor of the two

I governments; and an engine consortium was established in England as the

focus for collaboration on the Adour engine to power Jaguar. In essenee the

I progression from Concorde to Jaguar led to the use of single corporate

entity as contractor of the sponsoring governments, even though it was not

I staffed by its own personnel but served only as a legal entity in which the

t participating companies could coordinate their activities. In spite of

difficulties of both a technical and management nature, probably the most

I severe of which was the merger of Breguet with Dassault after the program

had begun, the Jaguar project is now committed to 400 aircraft, of which 250
I have already been delivered and 24 export orders have been obtained.

I The most impressive collaborat~ve effort to date is the British-German-

I Italian program to develop and manufacture the MRCA multi-role combat

aircraft. In spite of severe resistance both within and outside the MRCA

I 1
consortium, this program is now firmly set for manufacture of 807 aircraft -

I
 - 8 - I
'I
385 for Britain, 322 for West Germany, and 100 for Italy.
I'
It is instructive to read some of the forecasts that were written in the

late 1960s by American observers, pointing out the likelihood that success I
in the MRCA project would preclude British or German purchases of the F-14

and F-15 from the United States and leave the U.S. industry only with the
I
prospect of the NATO mini-consortium of the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway,

and Denmark. This forecast has, at least so far, been amply fulfilled.
I
I
In the MRCA case, the British and German governments organized a NATO

management structure which oversees the work of a genuine program manage- I

ment company, Panavia, staffed independently rather than by managements

borrowed from the participating industrial partners. (See Figure 1).

I
Panavia acts as prime contractor to the NATO management agency to bring together

all of the airframe and electronic work performed by BAC, MBB, and Aeritalia;
t
and there is also a separate engine program management company to coordinate I
the British and German engine manufacturing.
I
At the beginning of the decade, the aircraft being offered by Western Europe

on world markets were mainly national products. Currently, Panavia's sales ·I

teams are out with proposals for export versions of MRCA; and two squadrons

of Jaguars have been ordered by the less developed countries. On this point,
I
it seems likely that Jaguar's export potential would have been realized ·I·
sooner were it not for inherent conflicts which developed within France

between sales of Mirage and Jaguar after the Dassault-Breguet merger. Some
I
export markets were probably closed initially to Jaguar.

interest is belatedly emerging.

Now, however, export
I
a·
I
I - 9 -

I'~
Figure 1

I MRCA and Panavia Organization

I
I FRG I
~
jrtalyl
I I

'I·) I Policy

NATO MRCA Management Organization (NAMMO)

Group I

NATO MRCA Management Agency (NAMMA)

I .
r Panavia I
I
/I I
I
MBBI IBACI
I
I Aeritalia j
I! ' r Av'i'~;:rtl'i c a I I Turbo-Union I

t)
IM~ul
l I 1

IESG I IEASAMSI ISIAl RR jFiatj

I;
I
'I·
I
t.....

I 1

·a
 - 10 - I
British participants in the successive aerospace consortia argue that the
·a·
'· · /

costs of these programs are beginning to approximate those of national

programs. Currently, a number of studies are in progress to make more

.'1
' '

precise comparisons of this kind. Current estimates of the differential I

range from 33% down to as low as 5% within Western Europe.

Of all the consortia, Panavia is the most interesting and important model,
I
because it offers the greatest potential for follow-on projects, and also t
,,
'I
because it is a trilateral rather than merely bilateral venture. As noted

earlier, the German, British, and Italian governments have set up a supra-

national authority known as NAMMO (NATO MRCA Management Organization) and

its executive agency NAMMA (NATO MRCA Management Agency) to oversee the work

of Panavia. The two very significant points about Panavia are:

it has its own independent and very able management; and second, that it is
first, that

continuing to study potential follow-on activities for military aircraft that

'a·
would be complementary to MRCA. Although many Panavia employees have been

drawn from the parent companies, a substantial effort has been made to encourage

Panavia members to think of themselves first as part of the Panavia organization,

,,
I

responsible only to NAMMO and NAMMA. There has also been a strong effort,

within Panavia, to encourage the view that the Panavia organization will survive
:I
MRCA, based on the introduction of new programs. I
·I
-------r:
Some significance is also attached to the fact that ~ii!i9-Yi~-~ has supervised

the work of contractors and subcontractors not only in Europe but also in the

United States - especially for the Texaw··Instrumen-ts

-. ' - ·..
_:::__
~airborne ·radar. As of I
1972, Panavia had about 160 employees consisting of management, technical,

legal, and other white collar personnel. English is the official language
'I '•

of the company.
I
I
 I - 11 -

I Although Panavia has long been studying potential follow-on projects, its

I attempts are impeded by the constantly shifting alignments of companies and

national ~overnments with regard to other collaborations. Both BAC and MBB,
I for example, have investigated other alignments for future civil and military

I aircraft; and it is always difficult for Panavia to compete with its own

shareholders for future activities. Gero Madelung, Panavia's managing

t director, has stressed the importance of aircraft engines as the starting

point for planning any future civil or military project, a factor which has
I strongly nationalistic implications.

I
~ Like most other major defense programs, Panavia's MRCA project has suffered

I from cost escalation, a problem which constitutes the major threat to the

ultimate size of the project. It is very difficult to get a clear estimate of

- :~ MRCA unit prices, but it does seem likely that they are well in excess of $10

million per aircraft, making the MRCA price-comparable with the F-14 and F-15.

I Given the political commitment that has been made to this program in Britain

t and Germany, there is little likelihood of withdrawal from the project by

either partner. However, the escalation in unit costs certainly creates

I some likelihood that national impositions of ceilings on total procurement

budgets will result in reductions in total orders or stretch-outs of the

t program (e.g. from 10-11 aircraft per month down to six or eight). In this

I- event, there could b~_.a search, both by the British and German military services,

for a cheaper aircraft to augment a reduced MRCA inventory. If this were the

I case, the F-16 might become a strong c~ndidate, except among those planners

whose prejudices against single engine aircraft are too strong to permit such

I an interest.

I 1

t
 - 12 -
I
If there were such a reduction in total orders, a number of different
I
possibilities might emerge, involving either the U.S. industry (e.g. the I
F-16) or the French industry (e_.g. Mirage 2000 or a Super-Mirage). Although

this topic is highly speculative, it should be mentioned here because of the

I
considerable pol~cy sensitivities surrounding such a prospect and the need
:1,
'

for recognition of these sensitivities.

The British industrial leadership (e.g. Allen Greenwood, Chairman of BAC) has
f
heralded the recent French cancellation of Avian Combat de Futur (ACF) as an 1
opportunity to coordinate two military programs that have been out of phase.

(The ACF was to have been a highly advanced twin-engine fighter.) Britain
,1'1
would possibly welcome some form of French participation in Panavia, especially
I
in relation to the proposed air defense version (ADV) of MRCA.

In the MRCA program, the British goal at present is to purchase 385 aircraft,
I
of which 165 would be the air defense version. Prior to the apparently firm l
commitment of the British parliament to the ADV, one remote possibility was

the prospect of a Mirage powered by the RB-199 (i.e. the Rolls-Royce-Panavia 1

power plant rather than the French M-53) to provide the RAF's needed air defense

and air-to-air capability. In such a case, Turbo-Union (Panavia's engine

I
equivalent) and SNECMA could have joined together in a work-sharing arrangement. I
For Germany, as prices continue to escalate, there may be a question about the
I
extent to which MRCA can serve as a replacement in all the Luftwaffe squadrons

now flying the F-104G. An alternative might be the purchase of a cheaper I

aircraft for use,in some of these squadrons. In such a case, the German policy

preference would probably be to emphasize the role of Pana~ in such an aircraft.

I
Alternatives might be to draw on the corporate role of the German-Dutch firm, I
I
I - 13 -

·I: VFW-Fokker, whose Dutch arm is the major subcontractor on the F-16 project;

t: or to look to France for collaboration on one of the later Mirage versions -

or, best of all from the German standpoint - some widely multilateralized

~~ project that incorporates many of the elements above. The hope has occa-

sionally been expressed, in German industry, that an American role in

I Panavia might ultimately emerge.

t In addition to Panavia, Sepecat, and Airbus Industrie, a few other models

of multinational aerospace collaboration deserve mention. One of these

I is Heli-Europe Industries Limited, a joint company established in 1973 by
""
I) Aerospatiale and Westland. This company acts as clearinghouse for the in-

~<· dustrial cooperation between the two companies, especially with regard

I to future collaborative programs in the helicopter field. With regard

II to helicopters, market studies performed for U.S. industry< have indicated

that Europe will meet its own·civil and military requirements in the next

'I~ decade and considers its capabilities equal to those of the United States.

Through license agreements, there has historically been a very important

'I role for U.S. technology in European helicopter development and manufacture,

I: but this is now diminishing. The success of Aerospatiale and Westland in

cartelizing the military market is of special importance. There may, however,

t be opportunities for license agreements from the U.S. to Europe, particularly

in the dynamic elements of the helicopter. The cross-purchasing, between

I Britain and France, of Lynx, Gazelle, and Puma for different missions represents

~~
what Thomas Callaghan would term a "common market" approach to collaboration

and standardization. As Table 1 indicates, U.S. licenses to Europe for heli-

'I: copter production over the 20-year period 1955-1975 have been of vital impor-

tance. For the future, however, it seems very unlikely that such a sh<ire will be

I 1

·t'
 Table 1

Military Helicopter Sales in Western Europe, 1955-1975

(numbers of units)

France Italy Germany U.K. Other Total

Helicopters of
European Origin 1,000 25 340 770 465 2,600
(45%)

U. S. Helicopters Built
Under License in Europe 235 580 500 970 235 2,520
(totally or partially) (45%)

Helicopters Imported 245 15 190 20 275 745

From U. S. (15%)

Totals 1,480 620 1,030 1,760 975 5,865

Source: French aerospace industry

.~
.... -·:) ,.-.} -i ... -/·.; ,. .; ...
. ~.· ~~,
~· . . / liiiii
.....? ..............
........ (~ -
~ .............
~\ ·~" ,·-~ " ~
- -
I - 15 -

I' repeated. The European industry has achieved a remarkable degree of

t: cooperation, and the technical level is very high.

'I Another important collaboration is the Franco-German Alphajet program, in

which the industrial partners are VFW-Fokker in Germany and Dassault-

I Breguet in France. This program is discussed in detail in the French and

German sections. Here, it is worthwhile only to point out that this is a major
I
-~- _,
program, involving collaborative production of over 400 trainer and close

I support aircraft for Armee de l'Air and Luftwaffe, not including potential

expor.t orders.

·I In Part VI, which raises some critical industrial issues which will affect

·t
,,
, ..
U.S. standa~dization initiatives, the potential U.S. role in the European

collaborative trend will be discussed. Also discussed in Part VI is the

European view of American initiatives which run counter to that trend,

1'. especially the F-16 consortium, which is widely viewed as having a negative

impact on the total European industry's strength and productivity. That

'I section of the report will also deal with the new French 'interest in direct

bilateral cooperation with the United States on civil transports, and the
I implications of that trend for Alliance standardization.

I Some gross comparisons of size, prepared by the EC Commission in 1974, based on

figures~are
I 1971 shown in Tables 2 and 3. Although these are now somewhat out of

date, they are essentially accurate in terms of broad comparisons and have the

I'
..-"':

virtue of being based on European rather than U.S. data. These figures remain

compelling to Europe in its search for consolidation.

1:
I· .,
I
 Table 2

European Airframe, Missile and Aircraft Equipment Sectors

Output and Employment (1971)

EEC
Britain France Germany Italy a Holland Belgium total USA

Airframes and Missiles

Outputb ($ million) 896 937 598c 123 132 42 2,728 n.a.

Employment (000) 100 61.9 38.1 16.8 8 4.1 226 588

Equipment d
Output a 77 189 231 45 - 20 562 n.a.

Employment (000) 58 23.6 11.7 5.6 - 0.8 99 228

-

a Estimated. c
Includes aero-engines.
b d
Excluding intra-industry sales. Provisional.

Source: IISS 1975 from EC Commission.

··,·: ·-\
<, J
..
 •. . .~> - ;' ...,.
... _._,.
i_. . . . . . ~'
.....-J f-
' -1 -·-' -J '...

Table 3

European Aero-engine Companies, Output, and Employment

Turnover(l971) Employees
Company Country $ million (1972) ' Ownership

Rolls-Royce(l971) Britain 937a 64,000 Government

SNECMA France 296 14,600 80% Government

-" 10% United Aircraft
(Pratt & Whitney)

MTU Germany 118 5,750 50% Daimler-Benz

50% MAN

Turbomeca France 67 4,000

Fiat Italy n.a. 2,soob

Alfa Romeo Italy soc 2,oooc 100% IRI-Finmeccanica

Piaggio Italy 19 1,300

al972
bAviation divisions only: total turnover in 1971 was $2,910 million,
and workers employed numbered 182,500
cAero-engines only: total turnover was $418 million and workers employed 22,750.

Output and Employment(l971)

E.EC
Britain France Germany Italy Holland Belgium total USA

Output ($ million) 661 292 n.a. 56 - 16 1,025a n.a.

%of country's
aerospace output 40 21 25 - 19 24

Employment (000) 62 20.4 7 5.6 - 1.4 96.4 153.4

lo of country 1 s
--~e.mmst~-~Q.Y1!l~n t __ -~!_- _ _!.~- 12
----~-------
20 22 24 16
aLess Germany.
Source: EC Commission
 - 13 -
Table 4

I
'EUli.Ol'£
Company Country
Turnover (1971)
(S million)
Employees
(1971) Ownership I
I
Societe Nationale des France 7o6 44,000 nationalized (with some
Industries Aerospatiales participation by private
(Aerosp{ltiale) banks)
Hawket-Siddeley Aviation } Britain (25,000)'" parts of the Hawker-
Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics s67'" (7,000) Siddeley Group
British Aircraft
Corporation (BAC)
Messerschmitt-BOikow-
Blohm (MSB)
Britain
Germany
J82
317
34,000
18,000
{SO% GBC
so% Vickers
24 · 85% Blohm family
21 · 3% Messerschmitt
I
I
,,
family
13·45% Bolkow family
8·9% Boeing
8·9% Aerospatiale
8 · 35% Siemens
8 · 35% Thyssen-Hutte
s·91% Bavarian
Reconstruction Finance
Institute

YFW/Fok.ket- Germany/Holland 293 19,2~

{17·6 Krupp
13· IS% United Aircraft
IO·o% Northrop
:J
Dassault-Bregeut France 316 15,000 Sg% Societe Centrale

Westland
Aeritalia
Britain
Italy
139 12,500"
8,250
d'Etude Marcel
Dassault

{so~~ Fiat
I
83"
50% Finmeccanica/IRI
Dornier Ge:n:nany Ill 7,700
""
{ 69!% government
Short Bros. & Harland Britain so" 6,000 lSi% Rolls-Royce
lSi% Harland&. Wolff

,,
Fairey Brita.infBelgiwn 43 J,SW
Matra France 70 3,000
Scottish Aviation Britain n.a. 1.500 too% Laird Group
Agusta Italy 77 2,.400 32% EFIM (state
holding company)
SABCA Bel;ium n.a. 2,000 {so% Da.ssault
so% Fokker
A.e.~b.i. Italy 25 1,350 20% Lockheed
W..TIED STA 1"E3
McDonnell Doug1as
Lockheed
Boeing
United
United
United
States
States
States
2,700
2,470
2,J70
92,8oo
7I.500
64,ooo
I
General Dynamics United States

• Turnover of the whole group is SI,02S million and number

of employees worldwide 79,000.
• 6,100 are employed in !tolland.
1,539
4 1970.
J2,8oo

• Of whom 1,400 are employed in Belgium.

t
• or whom about 6.ooo are employed in helicopter manu-
facture.
I
Source: IISS 1975 from EC Commission
I - 19 -

-~ .._, Table 5

I, European Aerospace Industry -

Defense Turnover as % of Total Turnover

(average for 1968-69)

I
I Domestic
Defense Turnover
Export Total

,,; Britain
France
41
46
13
27
54a
73a

/1
r_

Germany 97 - 97a

Italy n.a. n.a. 68

I Holland 21 n.a. n.a.

Bel.gium 34 n.a. n.a.

I USA 75 4 79

'I
··-
·j,
!'-~'

I~~
t)
' (

I
1: Source: IISS 1975 from EC Commission

·a,

I 1

·a
 I
- 20 -
I
I
I
B. The National Industries
~I
1. The British Aircraft Industry

2. The French Aircraft Industry

I·
'-,_.~

1\
3. The German Aircraft Industry

4. The Italian Aircraft Industry

I
a
I
I
I
Jl
(I
I
I
a·
.a
a-
I - 21 -

I
1. The British Aircraft Industry
I The British aircraft industry remains the largest of all the European aircraft

I industries, about the size of all of the other countries combined. The British

i industry currently employs more than 200,000 workers compared to about 100,000

in France, slightly over 50,000 in West Germany, and far less in any of the other

I
~/
European countries. In view of the fact that the annual turnover of the British

and French industries are not very different, these employment figures are often

J used to argue that the British industry is significantly less productive than

~
the French or German industries. Although, as subsequent discussion and tabular

data will indicate, the British industry probably is somewhat less productive

i than the others, it also seems likely that available data from the European

community are distorted, due partly to the fact that the French aircraft
t industry subcontracts much of its production to vendors who are classified as

being outside the aircraft industry. a·result, the industry turnover is

I As

credited to a workforce which is smaller than what has actually been employed.

l In Britain, by contrast, there has been an excessive tendency to concentrate

and integrate the industry, bringing many components and functions into the

't prime contractor's facilities which are purchased from major subcontractors

or vendors in other countries.

on productiv~ty,
This practice has a genuinely negative effect

in addition to creating a statistical distortion. The

I productivity issue becomes cricially important in planning international

projects.
I On the basis of gross industrial data, the EC Commission has prepared the

I comparative productivity data shown in Table 6. This table suggests

I 1

t
 - 22 -

Table 6
I
European Aerospace Industry - Output and Employment

Britain France Germany

Output Ig&t I,J4,5 8.p 270
(tm at current 1!}69 1,647 I,l,Sl s98,.
prices) I9'7I 1,6J.4 1,418 829
Employment (ooo) Ig6.f
tg<S
1971
z61
l37
:Z:,u)
(9o)
99'9
H)5"9
28
ss·.s
s6·9
I
s.r.so
I
Output per man (S) I9&f (9,350) 9,6so
1969 6,950 ll,SJO I0,8oo
1971 7.430 13,400 14,6oo
Output per man a.s I9()4 n 139 144
% of 6 countries' 1969
average
Growth in output
1971
1964
78·s
73
100
141
131
(100)
Ill
144
100
I
i
per man 1!}69 134 (134) liZ
(1964= 100) 1971 144 (142) IBl

SOU11CES:1964 figures: Harlow (see note45). Figures

in brackets are estimates. ln this author's opinion,

I
Harlow over-estimated output in Italy and Holland
and employment in Belgium.
Other flsures: EEC Commission.

Source; IISS, 1975 I

I
I~ - 23 -

I that over the last decade, the output per man in the British aircraft industry

I has been roughly one-half that of their French and German counterparts. Worker

productivity is a difficult problem for all of British industry but may not be

t: as bad as it is portrayed here. British~onomists have attacked, with con-

siderable justification, the use of gross sales per person in the industry as
I a measure of productivity. The difficulty is that such a measure makes no

I allowance for equipment and parts purchased from vendors outside the industry.

Because the French engine and equipment sectors are much weaker than those of

I Britain, there is a great deal of purchasing from outside the French aircraft

.a industry, yet the value of these purchased items is assigned .to workers within

the industry, which leads to a skewed presentation of productivity. Neverthe-

/'".

.J' less, as shown in Table 7 , even when adjustments are made to show comparative

value added per worker, a factor which eliminates purchased items, the French
I, value added per man is still 39% above the British figure.

I. The quantitative demand for military and civil ~ircraft in Britain, as in the

rest of Western Europe, is so low compared with the United States, that major
I new investment in large-size plants with modern equipment has not been viewed

1\ as a justifiable expense. As a result, even though there has been a great deal

of administrative amalgamation of the British aircraft industry, the manu-

~~· facturing work itself is still scattered among many small plants throughout
~·
England. One British observer pointed out recently that no British aircraft
I plant employs as many as 10,000 workers. The result is duplication of effort,

I inefficiencies of manufacturing due to low capitalization and excessively high

labor content, and other factors related to limited scale and an inactive

I' industry.

a, 1

I
 - 24 -
I
Table 7

SBAC Adjustment of EEC Aerospace Productivity Figures I

France
AU**(f:.)
France/UK
ratio
UK
AU(b)
I
EEC sales per employee 13,167(5,480) 2.00 6,566(2,740)
I
Value added per employee 9,317 0,880) 1. 39 6,699(2,780) I
Corrected for production run 9, 317 ( 3' 8 80) 1.17 7,841(3,270) I
Average wage 5,556(2,320) 1.28 4,350(1,810) I
Personnel cost per employee 7,496(3,120) 1.53 4,900(2,040) I
Value added per unit of
personnel cost*** 1. 24 0. 77 1. 60 I·

*In 1969 prices.

**EEC Accounting Units converted at 1969 rate of AUl = b0.416.

Data provided by SBAC

***Corrected for French production run.

I
I
Source: Society of British Aerospace Constructors, 1975
I - 25 -

I Other than Rolls-Royce, which is discussed in the section on aircraft engines,

I the principal aircraft manufacturing firms in Britain are:

t The Hawker Siddeley Group, consisting of Hawker Siddeley

Aviation with about 25,000 employees and Hawker Siddeley

I Dynamics with about 7,000 employees.

-~

I British Aircraft Corporation, with about 34,000 employees.

I Westland, a helicopter manufacturing firm, with about 12,000.

Shorts Brothers and Harland, a firm which has already

I largely been nationalized, with about 6,000.
'~

I It is becoming increasingly difficult to discuss the British industry as an

I entity separate from European international collaboration. Shown in Figure 2

is a presentation of BAC's role in various international consortia of the

I last decade. The management ~f BAC, including such luminaries as Sir George

Edwards and Allen Greenwood, has been instrumental in the creation and
1 '
successful evolution of intra-European aerospace collaboration. Their

I' evolving knowledge of how to organize and manage such consortia could be of

considerable help in any future U.S. collaborative ventures in Western

'I Europe.

Until the process of nationalization is completed, BAC remains under the

joint ownership of General Electric Company, Ltd. of England and Vickers, Ltd.

I The company is organized in three main divisions: the Commercial Aircraft

Division, Military Aircraft Division, and Guided Weapons Division, each o~

I which is headed by separate and distinct management: The Commercial Aircraft

I 1

a
I - 26 -
I
Figure 2

Schematic of BAC's International Relationships

I
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
J:
I)

Source: Flight International~ 2 October 1975

•1:
I
I
I
I
I, - 27 -

II Division, with some 12,000 employees, is involved mainly on the Concorde

t: program and the BAC-111 short-haul passenger transport. Although there are

a few remaining outstanding orders for the 111, the program is obviously

1- nearing its end; and the heavy commitment of funding and manpower to

development and production of Concorde has become an extremely painful

I problem due to the absence of orders after the initial 16 aircraft are completed.
/"'""'- ~

Consequently, the outlook for BAC's Commercial Aircraft Division is a very

I pessimistic one, leading to considerable concern about the future of the

·a workforce. The Military Aircraft Division, also with about 12,000 employees,

is the British participant in both the Jaguar and MRCA programs, whose prospects

I remain fairly secure. Jaguar is currently the British industry's biggest

production program, with 202 on order for the UK, 170 for France, and 12 each
I for Ecuador and Oman. In addition there are still orders outstanding for the

;. BAC 167 Strikemaster, a light counter-insurgency and ground-attack aircraft

based on the earlier Jet Provost trainer.

I Within the Hawker Siddeley Group, of particular interest, in this section of

J, the report, is Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd., with headquarters at Kingston-

upon-Thames. On the civil side, Hawker Siddeley has developed and is manu-
I facturing the HS-125 business jet, HS-748 turboprop transport, and the Trident

·a medium-range civil transport. (There are apparently a few orders still out-

standing for the latest version of the Super Trident 3B, especially by the

l.i Civil Aviation Administration of China). On the military side, the most active

new or current programs are the Hawker-Siddeley Hawk multi-purpose jet trainer
I and the Harrier for the Royal Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. The Hawk, which

I can serve both as a straight-through trainer or a ground-attack aircraft, is

powered by a non-afterburning version of the Rolls-Royce Turbomeca Adour engine.

·a.
1

I
 - 28 -
I
The RAF has ordered 176 of these aircraft, of which deliveries are due to
I
start in late 1976. Finally, Hawker Siddeley is also responsible for the

Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft, now in production. I

Possibly the most innovative European military aerospace program of the post- I
war period has been the Hawker Siddeley Harrier VTOL fighter. This aircraft

is also the mast significant example of U.S. direct purchase and licensing
I
.
from Western Europe. The initial U.S. order for the AV-8A- that is, the existing

Hawker Siddeley version - has been 110 aircraft. There is also, however, a
I
strong potential for future licensing rights to McDonnell Douglas for an I'
improved AV-8B version; and conceivable future co-development activities

for a more advanced aircraft. Harrier presents the most compelling single
I
success story of European penetration of the U.S. military market of the last
I
decade. In late July 1976, the Pentagon authorized the development and
..
testing of two prototypes of the AV-8B Harrier by McDonnell Douglas. If the

new development is successful, the Marine Corps has announced its plans to

purchase "several hundred" of the aircraft, perhaps as many as 340. Hawker

I
Siddeley would be a major subcontractor on the program, and the Pentagon has

already specified "mutual cooperation in the procurement of supplies and

services and the exchange of information." The major change in the proposed I
AV-8B, compared with the AV-8A, lies in the use of a higher aspect ratio wing

with a supercritical airfoil and the greater use of composite materials,

especially graphite epoxy, as a means of reducing structural weight. Other

changes include a relocated undercarriage, extra hardpoints, and larger inlets.

A thicker wing section permits an increase in internal fuel tankage from

5,000 pounds to well over 7,000 pounds. Furthermore, improvements in overall

lift performance have been achieved for both vertical and STOL modes. In

addition, Rolls-Royce is providing further modification of the Pegasus engine, I

I
I. - 29 - v
Figure 3

I Schematic of Hawker Siddeley's International Relation~hip!

1:
I,
I
1·.
,,
,,
I
I
I
I-
f
I
,,,
I
.I
:a.
I Source: Flight International, 2 October 1975
J - 30 - I
to increase thrust from about 21,500 pounds up to 22,500. Third-country I
export of such an aircraft, and work-sharing on it, could become an issue

in the early future. I

On the European side, the most important recent decision regarding Harrier is 1\
the announcement, in May 1975, of a decision to proceed with full development

of a maritime version, the Sea Harrier. The initial requirement is for 25

11
aircraft to equip the Royal Navy's new Invincible class of through-deck cruisers. J,
The flight phase of the Sea Harrier development program will begin in mid-1977 ,,,
and will continue for 18 months. The Sea Harrier is changed very little from

the basic Harrier for the Royal Air Force. Changes involve some nose and

cockpit redesign to accommodate different sensors and instruments. There will

I,
presumably be a lag at Kingston of about six months between completion of I
existing Harrier orders and build-up of Sea Harrier production, but it is the

view of Hawker Siddeley that the build-up of Hawk production will absorb any I
slack in capacity.
I
There is considerable hope in the British industry that, as a result of the Sea

Harrier program and growing support for the AV-8B in the United States, Harrier
I
and its derivatives could remain active programs, with a great deal of British
I
participation, through the 1980s.

The Nimrod is still in production, at a low rate, for the RAF Strike Command,
I
where it will serve as the principal maritime reconnaissance aircraft until J,
the 1990s. It is concern over the Nimrod program that has led the British

Ministry of Defense to question British participation in licensed production

I;
of the Boeing E-3A AWACS.
I
I
I
I~ - 31 -

I Shorts, with headquarters in Belfast, has been strongly supported by the

I British government, possibly due to regional considerations. In addition

,_ to a variety of subcontracting work for European and American aircraft

,, firms, Shorts has developed a series of twin-turboprop light STOL transports for

cargo and passenger use.

,, In addition to BAC and Hawker Siddeley, the other firm of major importance

to the United States, in considering future collaborative possibilities,

'I is Westland Aircraft, Ltd., a helicopter manufacturing firm with headquarters

in Yeovil in Somerset. Westland, with some 12,500 employees (of whom about

I half are actively involved in helicopter manufactureh has collaborated closely,

in a variety of ways, with the U.S. and continental helicoper industries. Much
I. of its early success in such programs as the Sea King for the Royal Navy

depended on technical support and licensing of dynamic elements of the heli-

I copter from Sikorsky in the United States. In fact, Westland entered the

I helicopter industry in 1947 by acquiring a license to build the Sikorsky S-51,

of which it produced about 130 units as the Westland Dragonfly.

I. Westland has been the British instrumentality in the very successful Anglo-
,J French helicopter cooperation program involving the Gazelle, Lynx, and Puma

helicopters, which are produced under a cross-purchasing arrangement for both

1: the British and French armed forces. In the helicopter deal, Westland makes

:I. 60% of the Gazelle and 20% o.f the Puma, of which respectively about 600 and

400 had been sold through 1975. In the Lynx program, 35% of each aircraft is

.I made in France by Aerospatiale. Firm orders stand at 50 for the British Army,

30 for the Navy, 13 for the RAF and 18 for the French Navy. For the future,
I British MOD has been considering enlarged cooperation on helicopters involving

.I not only the UK and France but also Germany and Italy.

I
 - 32 - I
Turning now to broader issues in the British industry, the first point to make
I
is the importance of aerospace exports to the national economy. Offsetting

whatever negative views the British public may have of aerospace industry
I
productivity, the industry has been very successful on the export market, I
setting a succession of annual records in the export category. Final British

aerospace export figures for 1975 were on the order of b800 million, a level
I
which is nearly triple that of 1970. Of this, the United States was the

largest recipient, accounting for nearly bl97 million, France 97 million,

I
West Germany 73 million and China 23.7 million. Military exports account for I
about half of the total.
I
Some idea of the importance of exports can be gAined by the fact that, at the

end of 1975, 72% of BAG's total h900 million backlog was for export. Due to the I
high level of exports, the private British aircraft companies have actually been

performing very well finanacially in the last few years in spite of a downturn
I
in domestic prospects. For the 1974 financial year, for example, BAC achieved I
a profit of over h24 million on sales of h270 million, of which bl70 million

was for export.

I
In an eleven-year period from 1963 through 1974, the British aerospace industry I
as a whole has exported slightly over 50% of its turnover.
I
One key criterion of an industry's value to the national economy has been the

conversion ratio of exports over imports. Although these ratios vary, it is

I
nevertheless useful to review statistics provided in the publication "National
I
Income and Expenditure 1968" classifying a number of industries as follows:

I
I
I
 Table 8

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

c c
Britainb 412 499 552 480c 675 862

Franced 529 824 486 1,298 1,284 830e

Germany 91 114 92 (120) (100) (100)

Italy llO 120 120 (130) (130) (140)

Total 1,142 1,557 1,250 2,028 2,189 1,932

USAf 981 1,019 1,314 1,410 1,454 1,492 w

w

Figures in parentheses are estimates.

aDeliveries (except where stated). '

bFor the financial years 1967-68, 1968-69 etc.
c0fficia1 estimate.
dorders taken.
eEstimate based on projection of figures for first six months.
fExc1uding Military Assistance Program exports.

Source: IISS, 1975

 - 34 - I
Aircraft manufacture 13.8
I
Shipbuilding 11.6
I
Vehicles, other than cars
and aircraft

Other engineering
9.2

9.0
I
Motor vehicles 7.4 I
Beverages and tobacco 5.3
I
These comparisons are compelling to British government planners.

A second critical issue is nationalization, which appears to be imminent.

I
Although there have been-disclaimers of any substantive change following the I
planned merger of BAC, Hawker Siddeley, Shorts, and Rolls into British

Aero/Space, some changes are in fact likely to occur. A new look could be
I
taken, for example, at international alignments.
I
There is also some thought, for example, that British Aero/Space would seek

to rejoin the European Airbus consortium. There has also been speculation
I
about future collaborations between the nationalized firm and the United I
States - e.g. a Boeing-UK cooperative development of the 7N7 for British

Airways as a replacement for the Trident 3B. Such an aircraft would, of I

course, be powered by the JT-lOD.

on the 7X7 180 to 220-seat twin-engine

There could also be a later partnership

air~raft. (The 7N7 would

I
have the same fuselage cross-section and flight-deck as the 737 but a new I
advanced airfoil wing and two CFM-56s or JT-lODs. Passenger variations

would range from 126 up to 188 seats.) At this point, the only certainty I
about nationalization (which is opposed by present managements) is that

existing international relationships will be reexamined.

I
I
I
I - 35 -

I A third and related issue is the deep concern over the absence of civil

I programs, due in part to the difficulties of Concorde. The earliest

solution appears to be a collaborative medium-range, medium-capacity

I transport, developed either with U.S. or European industry.

I At present, both HSA and BAG are working hard to keep their existing Trident

I and 111 lines in operation to sustain the workforce until development of a

180- to 200-seat collaborative transport aircraft for the 1980s. This is

I certainly an area in which the United States could play a strong role, one

which could serve as a quid pro quo for other forms of licensing or military
I standardization.

I For Europe, as many observers have noted, employment is the new measure of

industrial achievement. Although this particular measure of corporate

I social responsibility has not yet been fully adopted in the United States, it

I is a very real measure in Europe and must be recognized as possibly the

dominant criterion in any collaborative project. It is for this reason that

I feeling about the success or failure·of Concorde runs so high- in view of

the fact that over 40,000 jobs are dependent on the con~inuation of the
I program.

l In closing, it is worth pointing out that Britain regards its aerospace

I industry as a unique and self-sufficient group - in effect the o~ly

aerospace industry outside the two superpowers capable of providing the

complete

I nucleus for European collaboration. The British view is that its aerospace

industry has the technical capability to design and manufacture any aero-
I space project but lacks two essential features - capital, and markets of

I
I
 - 36 - I
I
sufficient size to provide feasible unit prices. It is these needs to

which international collaboration is responsive. Such collaboration is I

especially desirable when Britain retains the design lead. In explaining

the higher American rates of productivity, British aerospace industry

I
officials are normally inclined to attribute the difference primarily
I
to scale of manufacturing. Sir George Edwards cites figures showing that

American productivity usually comes out about 150% higher per man than in J
Britain. Of this, typically, 50% might come from higher capital per man

employed, 50% from longer production runs due to a much larger domestic
I
market, and 50% from better production engineering on the shop floor. I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 37 -

I 2. The French Aircraft Industry·

I' The French aircraft industry currently employs about 100,000 workers,

·t roughly half the number employed in the British industry. Although

recent analyses of comparable productivity may show the French in-

I dustry in a more favorable light than real circumstances warrant,

there is certainly no question that the French industry is more pro-

1: ductive in terms of output per worker and has had a higher ratio of

successful ventures to project starts, especially in the military

I field. The French aircraft industry depends even more heavily than

I its British counterpart on exports in order to maintain its viability.

It seems likely that exports currently represent about 60% of total

I French aerospace production and that by far the major share of these

I exports are military in nature.

The engine and avionics industries are not as highly developed in

I France as in Britain.. However, as subsequent sections of this re-

I port indicate, they are adequate to support the very strong airframe

industry.

I The purpose of this section is to concentrate on the two principal

I. aircraft manufacturers, Aerospatiale (SNIAS) and Dassault-Breguet.

The two engine firms as well as the missile manufacturers, are dis-
I cussed in later sections. Aerospatiale, a nationalized company which

I has evolved from the successive aircraft industry reorganizations

since World War II, now has more than 40,000 employees. Although

I
I
I
 - 38 - I
there is some participation by private banks, Aerospatiale is for I
all practical purposes a nationalized industry. The second firm is

Dassault-Breguet, a much smaller firm of 15,000 employees, owned

I
largely by Marcel Dassault - a firm which has won world reknown
I
for the success of its light supersonic fighter designs as well as

its manufacturing efficiency.

t
While Aerospatiale is diversified in I
several different types of aircraft and missiles, Dassault-Breguet

has concentrated primarily on fighter aircraft, with one derivative

and successful business jet program and a so far unsuccessful com-

mercial transport project.

I
In spite of the success of Dassault-Breguet over the last two decades

and the continuing financial losses of Aerospatiale, it does seem I

clear that Aerospatiale is the chosen instrument of the French govern-

ment for major future aerospace activities, especially those that de-
I
mand collaboration. The success and efficiency of Dassault-Breguet
I
have depended, in large measure, on the small size and high degree of

concentration of its activities. Added to this, as will be discussed I

below, are the special characteristics of a unique manage~ent.
I
Aerospatiale is divided into four divisions, one eacrr for aircraft,

helicopters, tactical missiles, and ballistic and space systems. In I

addition, it has American sales subsidiaries - European Aerospace

Corporation and Vought Helicopter Corporation. In the Aircraft divi-

I
sion, two collaborative programs are the largest and most important I
at the present time: the Concorde program with BAC, and the A-300
I
I
I
I
- 39 -
I
I Table 9

French Aircraf t Industry Manpower, 1975

'I
I Airfram es and Missile s 60,174

I Engines 22,295

I Equipme nt 25,350

I Total 107,819

,,
I
I
I
I
I Source: GIFAS, 1975

I
I
I
I
I
 - 40 - I
European Airbus, in cooperation with the German Airbus consortium I
and Hawker Siddeley. In addition, there are some light business

and third-level transport aircraft in production. The decline in

I
sales prospects for Concorde, and the slowness in the growth of I
orders for Airbus, have created serious problems for Aero~patiale in

maintaining the employment of this division at established levels. I

The firm has repeatedly lost money and in 1974 reported a total

loss of $78.5 million. Apparently all of the losses can be attrib-

I
uted to the Aircraft division, since the helicopter, tactical missile I
and ballistic syste~s divisions are all operating profitably. The

difficulties stem, of course, from the Concorde and A-300 projects.

I
This helps to explain the urgency with which France has pursued

the issue of U.S. civil aircraft collaboration. The helicopter

I
I

division of Aerospatiale, with its headquarters at Marignane, is I

one of the leading success stories of French aircraft production.

The various helicopters produced by the firm have received very wide
I
acceptance on the world markets, and about 70% of the division's

production is exported. Principal types are the Alouette series as

I
well as the co-production that has resulted from British-French I
agreement on military helicopters - involving cross purchases of

the Puma, Gazelle, and Lynxmilitary helicopters for the British and
I
French armed forces, as already described in the British section.
I
In addition, there are the Super-Frelon heavy helicopter and the new

Dauphin helicopter series. The helicopter division, with 8,200 I

people, is now second only to Bell in world helicopter production.
I
I
I
-"
- - - - - - - .. ~ah!!'lto- .. - tiiJIII . . - .. - ..

Performance Turbomeca Engine

Maximum
Type Cruise Endurance Capacity Type Power Sales to
(hp) 01-01-76
-------- ~eed - ~·-----..-·

SA 315 B 190 km/h 3 h 20 1 + 4 1 Artouste 570 184 sold

Lama passengers IIIB

SA 319/316 220 km/h 3 h 50 1 + 6 1 Astazou 870 1323 sold

A1ouette 3 passengers XIV
Artouste 600
III

SA 330 260 km/h 2 h 50 2 + 21 2 Turmo 2 X 1580 406 sold

Puma p·assengers IV C

SA 341
Gazelle
265 krn/h 5 h 10 1 + 4
passengers
1 Astazou
III
600 -
t-718 sold
SA 342
Gazelle
270 km/h 4 h 50 1 + 4
passengers
1 Astazou
XIV
870 -
SA 360 275 krn/h 3 h 50 1 + 13 1 Astazou 1050 26 sold. Series
Dauphin passengers XVIII production
starts 1976

SA 365 272 km/h 3 h 30 1 + 13 2 Arriel 2 X 690 Series production

Dauphin passengers in 1977, 23 sold
---
SA 321 250 km/h 4 h 20
'
3 + 30 3 Turmo 3 X 1570 90 sold
Super-Frelon passengers Ill C. 6

Source: Defense Nationale, 1976

 - 42 -
I
I
It is larger than Westland (7,000 employees), Agusta (with 6,000),

and MBB with 1,500 in their helicopter operations. In 1974, the

I
company delivered 330 helicopters and about the same number in 1975.
I
To the end of 1975 Aerospatiale had sold over 4,500 helicopters in

86 countries to 350 clients. Of these sales about 3,300 were military. I

Sales trends, as distinct from deliveries, have been as follows:
I
1972 176

1973 241
I
1974 538
I
Dassault-Breguet is noted mainly for the successive versions of the

Mirage supersonic fighter, the backlog of which now accounts for

I
several years of production capacity. Through 1974, about 1,300 I
Mirage IIIs had been produced, about 400 Mirage Vs, and about 60

Mirage F-ls. In addition, Dassault-Breguet is the partner with

I
British Aircraft Corporation on the Jaguar attack-fighter program.

It should be noted, that this collaboration was inherited during the

I
merger of Dassault with Breguet. It is unlikely that Dassault itself I
would have taken part in the establishment of such a collaboration;

and the merger probably had a negative effect on the export potential
I
for Jaguar, since it was seen by the Dassault sales office to conflict
I
with the market for Mirage.

Dassault-Breguet is also the designated French partner in the Alphajet

I
trainer program with Dornier in Germany, a collaboration which has en- I
countered administrative and management problems. Currently, the
I
I
I - 43 -

I company is also involved in a relatively short production run of a

revived and modified version of the Etendard, a carrier-based

I fighter for the French Navy. Deliveries of production Super-Etendards

I are expected to begin in mid-1977, following a decision to re-tool

for production of the aircraft in 1974.

I With regard to Alphajet, the first series production version of the

I aircraft will be delivered in July 1978, and deliveries will stretch

into the 1980s. France is projecting production at the rate of four

I aircraft per month. Both Dornier and Dassault are extremely optimistic

I about the export potential of the aircraft. According to current

planning, France will build 200 Alphajets for use as trainers and the

I Federal Republic will build 200 as G-91 replacements in the tactical

role. Deliveries to the French Air Force will continue through the
I •
end of 1982. In France both SNECMA and Turbomeca are participating in

I the production of the Larzac engine, and in Germany production is divided

between MTU and KMD. A total production of 1,800 engines, at a· rate

I of 30 per month, is foreseen, with the first series engine coming off

the line in 1977. In the Alphajet program, the work assignment is as

I follows:

I Dassau~t makes the forward fuselage and various

I fittings, and assembles complete fuselages;

Dornier builds the aft-fuselage, the wing and

I and tail unit;

I, Fairey and SABCA in Belgium build the nose sec-

I tion and flaps (in exchange for a 33-aircraft

order by Belgium).

I
 - 44 - I
Totally, about 4,500 workers in Germany and about the same number
I
in France will be working on the program. I
In addition, the company has been successful in marketing its Falcon
I
business jets in the United States and elsewhere. Of the 320 Falcon 20

business jets delivered to mid-1975, over 200 have been del~vered I

through the u.s. sales subsidiary. Less likely of independent success

is Dassault's first post-war venture into commercial transport avia-

I
tion - the twin-turbofan short-range Mercure transport. This aircraft I
has encountered stiff competition in world markets which has severely

diminished the estimates of first-round orders; and currently discus- I

sions are underway with a U.S. manufacturer concerning possible

collaboration on a more developed version. The potential for a

I
Mercure 200 version, to carry up to 160 passengers, is of considerable I
importance to Dassault-Breguet and also to the French government. It

is here that the most interest in trans-Atlantic collaboration exists. I

Discussions that have been held with McDonnell Douglas about the

further development of this aircraft have been given very high priority
.I
by the various French ministries. Such an aircraft might be fitted I
with GE-SNECMA CFM-56 engines.
I
The area of greatest future interest to the company is the next genera-

tion follow-on to the Mirage F-1. Following the government's recent I

cancellation of the advanced, and potentially costly, ACF (Avion

Combat de Futur) the company has, with government approval, placed

I
primary emphasis on the single-engine Mirage 2000, a less sophisticated
I
I
I
I - 45 -

I aircraft with a large potential for export to the

I third world.

I One view expressed by senior French aerospace management in late

1975 was that the Mirage 2000 should be complementary with MRCA -
I meaning, presumably, that it should be lighter, cheaper, simpler,

I and more adaptable to the air-to-air role than the MRCA. One

conjecture that has been made occasionally in recent months has

I been the possible future collaboration of Panavia with France on

a Mirage 2000 type of aircraft. One difficulty in such a venture

I would, of course, be British reluctance to accept a French engine.

I Since the future role of the M-53 military turbofan is of tremendous

importance to French industry, this could be the major stumbling

I block.

I According to present thinking, the Mirage 2000 can enter series pro-

duction in 1982, following its first prototype flight around mid-1977.

I Apparently, the selected use of carbon fiber is being considered for

structural parts, as well as fly-by wire. It will be equipped with a

I Thomson CSF radar with a range on the order of 80 kilometers and will

I carry Matra Super 530 and R-550 air-to-air missiles. The principal

roles of the Mirage 2000 will be high-level interception, reconnais-

I sance, and possibly air superiority. Low level attack and penetration

missions will not be included, and for this role the French Ministry
I of Defense may be considering a Jaguar follow-on. The thrust envisioned

I
I
I
 - 46 -
I
I
for the M-53 engine in .the Mirage 2000 is 20,500 pounds dry and

about 25,000 pounds with afterburner. Some idea of the concept

I
of the aircraft can be gained by noting that the planned gross

weight of the aircr~f~ is no greater than 24,000 pounds - based

I
on substantial use of composite material for weight saving. It I
is increasingly obvious that Aerospatiale will play a large role

in the development of this aircraft, representing perhaps as much

I
as 40% of the value of the work.
I
At the time that the Mirage 2000 concept was announced by the French

Government, Dassault also announced that it would carry on a twin-

I
engine fighter development with its own funds. This aircraft would I
be aimed more at a low-level penetrator capacity. Much has been
~

written in the United States about Dassault's approach to aircraft

I
development. It is vital, in any such assessment, to avoid euphoria.
I
Dassault has concentrated on performance parameters and physical

characteristics of moderate complexity and has been careful to carry I

out new R&D only on an incremental basis, relying heavily on experi-

ence gained in previous production aircraft. Consequently, the sue-

I
cessive aircraft do not represent full generations. Instances in
I
which Dassault has made advances of greater complexity, such as the

Mirage G, have been less successful. I

The effectiveness of the Dassault organization, with regard to I
single-engine Mach 2 fighters, has depended considerably on the per-

sonal relationships of a handful of men of great ability and mutual I

I
I
i - 47 -

I
confidence in one another. One strong feature--hf the Dassaul t
I organization is an>absence of-aocumenta~~
I

In the United

I States, and in other countries, each program is accompanied with

literally thousands of pounds of documentation. Within Dassault,

I authorizations to proceed are often given verbally, based on trust

and long experience. Marcel Dassault has expressed the view that
I a group of about_2,500 employees is the largest in which the impact

I of a single leader can be felt. Consequently, the various units of

R&D, production, and other activities are limited to 1,500 to 2,500

I people with a single strong operating head who has absolute control

over his group. Dassaul t has, •through techniques such as these,

I managed to remain in the top rank of the world's companies on the

I basis of dollar output per employee. (In the early 1970s, this

figure was running at about $35,000 per employee.)

I There is also a strong effort within the Dassault organization to

-·-·
I .-------------------·
tresi~t sp~cialization! Dassault's view is that, while specialists

tend to dig far deeper into their own narrow field, the ultimate
I result is that they lose their ability to communicate with other

I elements of the firm. They argue that 20 American engineers are re-

quired to handle the work of two engineers in Dassault. While this

I may be true in a superficial sense, it may also suggest that Dassault

does not have the engineering depth to work on highly-advanced projects.

I As a result, although Dassault is often viewed as being obstructionist

I in terms of large-scale international collaborations, the actual

I
I
 - 48 -
I
fact may be that it is not really very capable of adapting to
I
larger scale enterprises with other partners, given the inherent I
personalities and organizational structures.
I
One firm operating criterion of Dassault which is not always ob-
I
The Dassault view is that, while it is very difficult to squeeze costs

out of one's own operations, it is far easier l~~_l?'q).lee_ze-jcompetitive

I
subcontractors on their .f~~~;;,~ Furthermore, subcontractors provide I
a cushion to keep the prime contractor's workforce stable. When the

backlog is low, subcontractors can be cut out and the work shifted I
to the internal force. Dassault has a reputation, within French in-

dustry, of being absolutely ruthless in its handling of subcontrac-

I
tors - who, being primarily specialists in various types of equipment, I
have little choice but to comply and shave their margins.
I
In 1974, Dassault received $1.52 billion in new aircraft orders,

a 75% increase over the previous year. Of these total orders, about I
$1.05 billion were for export, representing a 90% increase over the

previous year. This military order growth appears to be translated

I
into a growing backlog rather than stepped-up output, due to limita-
I
tions in manufacturing capacity. In 1975, the Dassault facilities

at Bordeaux produced 88 Mirage aircraft of all types. In addition, I

58 business jets were produced. Including 12 refurbished military

aircraft, the total production was 158 units, or roughly 15 units

I
per month. At Toulouse Colomiers, the Dassault factory employing
I
I
I
I - 49 -

I
1,500 delivered 28 Jaguar aircraft. in 1975. In addition, this

I factory furnished, at a rate of five per month, parts kits for

the British production line.

I
Under severe pressures created by difficulties in the Concorde and
I Airbus programs and loss of the.NATO fighter competition to the

I F-16, French government and industry have, as one of several solu-

tions, been pressing hard for collaboration with U.S. industry on

I future civil transport aircraft. This initiative has also been

spurred by the established government policy of shifting the em-

I phasis of the aircraft industry from military to civil projects,

I in the attempt to establish a stronger French share of what is ex-

pected to be a burgeoning civil aircraft market in the 1980s. The

I initiative is further influenced by a sense of malaise with regard

to intra-European collaboration. Finally, there is a perception

I in France, as in other European countries, that a share of the U.S.

I domestic commercial transport market provides a virtual sine qua non

for the establishment of viable commercial programs; and the hope

I is that a bilateral relationship with the United States will provide

such an access.
I
The U.S. industry, for its part, has also been facing greater un-
I certainties about future civil markets, resulting in a new interest

in collaborative programs as a means of sharing development costs

I and gaining access to markets.

I
I
I
 - 50 -
I
I
In any future civil aircraft, French interest centers around use

of the CFM-56 ten-ton engine, which is discussed in Section I-C. I

Also of particular interest in the civil side would be adaptation

of the Mercure 200 or the A-300B Airbus to reach the American

I
market. The logical partners would be either Boeing or McDonnell I
Douglas.
I
One possible collaborative aircraft that has been discussed would

be an adaptation of the Boeing 7N7, based essentially on the 737, I

which could be made available in various versions seating 125 up to

156 passengers, and powered by two CFM-56 engines. Another possi-

I
bility would be an aircraft based both on the Boeing 7X7 design and I
the A-300B, to seat 180 to 200 passengers. (It should be noted, by

the way, that Aeritalia has a 20% interest in the 7X7 program.) I
McDonnell Douglas and Dassault have also apparently discussed co-

operation on a derivative of the Mercure 200 which would seat from

I
160 to 186 passengers and be powered by two CFM-56s. Although there I
was originally some thought that the French government would arrive

at a decision for one of these programs by mid-1976, the timetable

I
has clearly been delayed.
I
Simultaneously, talks have also been underway between Britain and

France, relative to future collaborations after the nationalization

I
of the British industry. One possibility would be a broadened British
I
participation in the Airbus program. (At the moment, this collabora-

tion is limited to wing production by Hawker Siddeley.) I

I
I
I - 51 -

I 3. The West German Aircraft Industry

I Bonn's efforts, over the last two decades, to avoid the creation of

I industrial vested interests in the growth of military production, have

been manifested in three ways in the German aircraft industry: first,

I in clear limits on the size of the industry; second, in a predominance

I of collaborative projects, both with the European allies and with the

United States, wherever a major procurement is involved; and third, in

I an attempted balancing of civil and military projects. With the United

States, the West German industry has been engaged in a number of major
I licensed production programs including the Lockheed F-104, the Sikorsky

I CH-53, and the McDonnell Douglas F-4. With the European allies there

are several important co-development and co-production programs, includ-

I ing the Anglo-German MRCA and Franco-German Alphajet. In addition to

their restraining role on the defense industrial infrastructure, these

I collaborative programs have also played an important role in cementing

I alliance relationships.

Provided in 11 is a breakdown of employment in the German aero-

I Tabl~

space industry, indicating a total of 52,000 workers planned for the

I end of 1975, compared with nearly 60,000 in 1970. OVer 60% of the

workers are employed in the airframe industry, especially in the three

I major companies: Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), Dornier, and

VFW-Fokker. The engine industry, employing about 6,800 workers, is

I described in a later section. The largest and most important firm,

I
I
I
 Table 11

Accessories and
materials 1,427 2.7 1, 317 2.4 -7.7

52,982 100 51,914 100 -2

*Working full-time in aerospace, including staff and apprentices.

**1970, 57,253 (+9.6 per cent); 1971, 56,678 (-1 per cent); 1972, 52,456 (-8 per cent).

Source: Flight International, 1 May 1976

 - 53 -

I Table 12

West Germany Aerospace Industry, 1970-73

I 1970 1971 1972 1973

I Turnover, DM million
Total manpower
2881
57253
3075
56678
3565
52456
3900
52985

I Manpower by sector -
airframe
engines
39580
6442
38139 34524 34230
7059 6832 7186

I equipment

Manpower % working on
11231 11480 11100 11569

civil projects 25.0 25.5 21.6 28.2

I military projects
space projects
67.2
7.8
66.3
8.2
69.8
8.6
65.1
6.7

I Manpower % involved in
development 37.1 33.4 34.6 30.1
production 41.6 43.2 39.1 43.4
I maintenance/overhaul

Government contracts, DM million:

21.3 23.4 26.3 26.5

military 1886.0 2072.0 2625.0 2758.0

I space
civil research a
193.6
-
343.3
-
326.0
-
330.1
5.0

I Federal development subsidies, DM million:

A300 ai5bus 95.5
45.0
146.4
40.0
167.9
41.5
183.3
27.0
VFW 614
Other programs 9.5 0.6
I Total 150.0
3.6

190.0 210.0
4.2

214.5

I Federal guarantees for A300, DM millionc - - 90.0 125.0

I
I acontracts for industry companies, does not include purely research institutes
b.rncludes contribution to Rolls-Royce for engine development
cMaximum envisaged DM 500 million, of which DM 215 million had been taken up
I by end 1973

I
Source: Federal German Government Basic Program, Dec. 1974
I
I
I
 Table 13

Total Foreign
(In DM million) 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 program industry
cost share
--~~-~--------- --~--- 1--------- ,-------·- ~------ 1 - - - - - - - - -----·------- -------
Be 11 I Dornier UH-lD 8.4 28.5 10.6 0.3 852.3 30%

Sikorsky/VFW
CH-53 384.9 387.0 55.0 24.5 1622.0 40%

Transall C.l60 49.4 106.2 33.4 20.9 2809.0 43%

Do 28 Skyservant 51.5 13.6 213.0 20%

McDonnell Douglas
F-4F 572.2 553.1 599.5 430.8 204.6 3800.0 90%
Ln
.p-.
Other aircraft 36·. 9 15.8 53.0 20.0 126.0 55%

MRCA 21.8 4 106.04 N/A 5 See note 1

Alpha Jet 4 5 2
114.0 N/A N/A 52%
Milan 35.3 93.6 N/A 5 See note 3

Kormoran 72.0 N/A 5 N/A 45%

Holand 17.0 N/A 5 See note 3

HOT 27.0 N/A 5 See note 3

NOTES: 1 - West German industry share not yet precisely fixed

2 - Planned foreign participation in German share of the program
3 German industry seeking work-share proportional to national participation in
total program cost
4 - Production preparation cost
5 - Detailed figures for 1975 onwards are classified

Source: FRG Basic Program, Dec. 74

I - 55 -

I
for purposes of the present study, is MBB, which plays a vital role
I as German partner in international programs, which account for about

I 60% of corporate turnover. MBB has a workforce of about 20,000.

The membership of!MBB~reflects its international character.

I Messerschmitt owns 16.3%, Ludwig Bolkow 13.42%, the Blohm Family
Willy

I 15% 7 ;the Boeing Company 8.9%, Aerospatiale 8.9%, Siemens 8.35%,

August Thyssen-Hutte 8.35%, the Bavarian Reconstruction Finance

I Institute 5.93%, and the Bavarian state 7.8%, and the state of Hamburg 7%.

I The company has seven divisions, the largest of which is the aircraft

division responsible for military combat aircraft. This group, located

I in Augsburg, has about 6,000 employees. A second division is the

I former Hamburger Flugzeugbau group, concerned mainly with commercial

transport aircraft, with about 5,000 employees, located in Hamburg.

I ~~ Dynamics division,which works on missiles systems and civil elec-

tronics~-- has about 2,200 employees. The Surface Transportation division

I is concerned mainly with systems such as railroad equipment and subway

I cars. It has about 3,000 employees.

I The Space division has about 1,500 employees and the helicopter division

has about 450 employees. Finally, the corporate headquarters has about

I 1,700 employees. (This is also called the Administrative Services divi-

sion.)
I
As of 1972, about two thirds of MBB's sales were military. The distribu-

I tion of the workforce has not been proportional to these figures. The

I
I
 - 56 - I
higher concentration of employment in the civil area reflects the I
goal of building a substantial civil aircraft business to balance
I.
the military. Over the period 1975 to 1980, MBB has forecast an

annual growth rate of 4% with activities divided among four programs:

I
MRCA, the A300B European Airbus, tactical missiles, and a miscella-

neous category which includes helicopters, spacecraft, and diversified I

products.
I
As an instrument of national policy, MBB has a strong internal commit-

ment to joint European ventures, especially through the Panavia con-

I
sortium. MBB is perhaps second only to BAC in its knowledge of and
I
experience in the manag~~ent of multinational consortia. As a found-

ing member of Panavia, Airbus Industrie, and Euromissile, MBB has I

occupied a unique role in intra-European collaboration and therefore

has a strong vested interest in European aerospace industry collabora-

I
tion.
I
MBB has been especially strong in joint missile programs, especially

with Aerospatiale, in the Euromissile consortium, which accounts for

I
25-30% of MBB's current turnover. These programs include the Milan I
second-generation antitank missile; the HOT antitank missile on heli-

copters; and the Roland series of antiaircraft missiles. MBB also

:I
continues to work on one purely national programs: the Kormoran air-

to-surface antiship missile. ('J:'he ~ TV-guided air-to-surface

I
1

system, intended as a standard weapon for MRCA, !l~:~::been-·cancelled~·) I

These are discussed in a later section.
I
I
I
I - 57 -

I The breakdown of the Dornier workforce, as of 1972, was about as

I follows:
()'{R'(' h_~\lr!ftt~
Dornier Reparaturwerft 2000
I Dornier Systems 700

I Lindauer Dornier

Dornier AG
800

4000

I As of 1972, about 65% of this workforce was engaged mainly in military

I activity. Although total numbers have declined slightly, the proportions

probably remain unchanged.

I
One small but interesting part of the Dornier organization is Dornier

I Systems, which presently employs about 700 people to do advanced sys-

I naissance pods and other sensor systems, primarily as a systems inte-

I grator rather than a basic R&D house. It could be a useful group in

the definition and development of future airborne systems.

I Dornier is the German partner, with Aerospatiale of France, in the

I Alphajet Trainer Program. The program calls for 433 aircraft, which

are due to be completed by 1981. Consequently, Dornier is already

I looking hard for new programs to replace Alphajet. With regard to

I Alphajet, there has been some indication that Franco-German administra-

tive and contractual relationships have not proceeded as smoothly as

I the Anglo-German relationships of the MRCA program. However, the tech-

nical development of Alphajet has apparently proceeded very well, and

I an export potential exists which may extend the program.

I
I
 - 58 - I
I
VFW-Fokker, which, as the name implies, is the outgrowth of a merger

between West German and Dutch aircraft firms, has about 10,000 em- I
ployees in Germany. (The Dutch arm of the company is the principal

licensee of General Dynamics for the F-16 program.) In Germany,

I
VFW Fokker is engaged primarily in civil transport aircraft produc-
I
tion - in particular the VFW614 light jet transport and also as an

important participant in the A300B program of Airbus Industrie. If I

the Franco-German Transall military cargo transport program is rein-

stated at some future time, VFW-Fokker will be the German partner.

I
In addition, VFW is licensee for German production of the Sikorsky I
medium-lift CH-53 helicopter, of which more than 110 units have al-

ready been built. Because the CH-53 helicopter program is nearing I

its end, VFW-Fokker is in need of early future work. Consequently,

the company is very dependent on the fortunes of the A300B program

I
and a possible Transall re-start. I
National programs within the German aircraft industry tend to be
I
small. Perhaps the most interesting of these is the series of MBB

rigid-rotor helicopters, developed with the assistance of Boeing, I

starting with the B0-105. Some 300 of these helicopters have already

been sold, of which, through the summer of 1976, over 250 have been
I
delivered. Production is now scheduled for about 80 per year.
I
Another interesting national program would be a revival by Dornier

of the D0-24 flying boat, which could eventually become a joint I

program with Aerospatiale. Such an aircraft, roughly resembling
I
I
I
I - 59 -

I the old Martin PBY, but significantly improved in technology and

I powered by three turboprop engines, would fill an interesting gap

in world markets and could conceivably be of interest to the United

I States for patrol and rescue work.

I The West German aircraft industry has not yet arrived at its final

form of rationalization. There may still be a further integration

I of the main aerospace companies as a result of recent planning

I studies. Recent speculation would suggest a general plan to keep

MBB Munich and Dornier in combat aircraft and missiles and assign
I civil transport and space projects to VFW-Fokker (including ERNO)

I and MBB 1 s northern division, the former HFB.

A second part of future planning is to strengthen the role of Pan-

I •
avia, Airbus Industria, Euromissile, and Heli-Europe. One very

I significant point, for purposes of this study, is that German govern-

ment and industry continue to urge on other European partners the

I entry of U.S. manufacturers into these consortium relationships. It

is interesting to note that the Managing Director of MBB 1 s Aviation

I Division has made public statements in 1976 as supporting the estab-

I lished management structure of Panavia as the key to future expansion,

rather than the separate companies. It does seem clear that German

I government and industry are generally satisfied with the progression

of learning experience in collaborative projects, especially with

I Britain.

I
I
I
 - 60 - I
In general, the view of German industry leaders is that although I
their firms must depend on collaboration, they must also have

enough indigenous R&D capability to give them a basis of independent

I
judgment and a means of participating in early decisions, rather
I
than being completely at the mercy of the foreign partner. It may

be largely for this reason that MBB and Dornier have insisted on I
maintaining substantial design and development staffs.
I
Following a strenuous review of the West German aerospace industry,

it is clear that the Bonn Government has come to the decision, in

I
the first half of 1976, to maintain the industry at about its present
I
level of at least some 50,000 workers. The various alternatives,

such as cutbacks in the workforce or greater direct purchase from I

-
other countries, have essentially been ruled out. However, it is

equally clear that Bonn has no desire for expansion of the aerospace
I
industry - quite the contrary. Consequently, the primary issue in
' I
Germany, as in Britain and France, is maintenance of the existing

industries through adequate utilization of manufacturing facilities I

and also through the retention of existing design and development teams•
I
It should be noted that, following the rapid buildup in employment from

1968 through 1972, the German industry employment level has been in a I
steady state of decline since that time - from over 58,000 in 1972 to

the proposed 52,000 to 53,000 in 1975. At the same time, however,

I
sales have continued to increase - from less than $600 million in 1968 I
to about $1,900 million in 1975.
I
I
I
I - 61 -

I Many industrial observers in Germany feel that this number is below

I the minimum size needed to work effectively on an equal basis with

the British and French industries, which number about 200,000 and
I 100,000 respectively.

I The need for employment stability is virtually paramount. Govern-

ment restrictions on ~ndustrial reductions in workforce are even:.

I more severe in Germany than in the rest of Europe. This factor,

I combined with the great difficulties of transferring workers becween

sectors, and the inability of companies to diversify outside their

I basic fields of specialty, puts a premi~ on the company's ability

I to maintain orders at a constant level within a specified product

line.

I Most of the recent planning for the aerospace industry has c~me from

I a committee appointed in 1975 under the chairmanship of Mr. Martin

Gruener, Parliamentary State Secretary to the Economics Ministry. The

I work of -this staff has resulted, in part, in a position paper entitled

"A Basic Program for the German Aerospace Industry 1974-78." The
I Gruener report specified in particular the need for retention of some

I subsistence level of R&D capability in the Federal Republic. Accord-

ing to the report: "The capability of cooperating on an equal basis

I in the development of complex weapons systems will be insured by the

maintenance of a high level of know-how." One result of the Gruener

I study is likely to be a growing division of the German industry into

I "spheres of interest" in which each will develop specialties and over-

laps will be eliminated.

I
I
 - 62 -
I
I
In the past, the German aerospace industry has carried out a number

of highly advanced programs, especially in VTOL, which had a very

I
tenuous hope of economic return. The present emphasis is on a I
tighter control over the industry and, in the case of civil projects,

the hope of a stronger economic potential. For this reason, there I

is a growing emphasis on the civil field, especially on collaboration

with the United States, since it is recognized in Germany, as else-

I
where in Europe, that future economic feasibility will depend on
1:
access to the American civil market in the 1980s.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 63 -

I
4. The Italian Aircraft Industry

I As shown in Table 2 , the aerospace industry of Italy has historically

I been far smaller than those of Britain, France, or Germany. The new,

quasi-nationalized aerospace company, Aeritalia, with some 9,500 em-

I ployees, probably accounts for about one-third of total Italian aerospace

I industry employment.

meccanica-IRI,
Aeritalia, which is owned equally by Fiat and Fin-

began in 1969 as an amalgamation of Fiat's aerospace ac-

.I tivities (except aircraft engines) with Aerfer and Salmoiraghi of the

Finmeccanica group. In addition to the existing Fiat aircraft facili-

I ties in Turin, the company has established operations in the south of

I Italy, and one purpose of the firm is to create job opportunities in

. the south •

I The mix of programs in Aeritalia illustrates clearly the split of official

I attitudes about future directions of the Italian aircraft industry. On

one hand, many government planners have, since the late 1960s, favored
I a greater Italian commitment to intra-European collaborative programs

I and an abandonment of the Italian aircraft industry's classical post-war

role as a machine shop for American industry. Others, recognizing the

I viability of the Italian industry's subcontractor role, have fought

strongly for a continuation of bilateral American ties. Thus, within

I Aeritalia, one finds both the commitment to Panavia and the MRCA program,

I side by side with an agreement between Aeritalia and Boeing to develop

an advanced commercial subsonic transport. Also of considerable importance

I
I
I
 - 64 - I
to Aeritalia are strong relationships with Lockheed, with regard both I
to licensed production of the F-1048 fighter for the Italian Air Force

as well as technical support and marketing of the G-222 transport.

I
Another important program is continuation of the G91 series of aircraft,
I
in the form of the G91Y tactical fighter-bomber, for the Italian Air

Force and for export. The development of this aircraft was strongly I
based on earlier Italian experience in the maintenance and overhaul of

the F-86 aircraft.

I
It is also worthwhile to note that the G222, G91Y, and F-104S are all
I
powered by General Electric engines.
I
To summarize very briefly the main facilities of Aeritalia:
I
The factories in the Turin area, previously operated by

Fiat, are engaged in production of the G91Y, the F-1048,

I
and the G222; also in the design and construction of the
I
structural components for the MRCA; and collaboration

with Dassault-Breguet for the design and construction of

I.
structural parts of the Mercure transport.
I
The plants in the Naples area are involved in construction

of fuselage structural panels for the McDonnell Douglas

I
DC-9 (originally as part of an offset for Italian purchases

of the DC-9), vertical tail surfaces of the DC-10, engine

I
support pylons for the Boeing 747, parts construction for I
the G 222 and F-104S.
I
I
I
I - 65 -

I A large new plant in the Foggia area is currently under

I construction, as part of the government program to create

more employment in southern Italy.

I In addition to Aeritalia, there are several small but relatively success-

I ful Italian manufacturers of light aircraft of varying degrees of sophis-

tication, all operating on a rather limited production scale. Possibly

I the most interesting of these is Aeronautica Macchi in Varese, where

I the most important program is the AerMacchi MB326 light jet trainer

an9 counter-insurgency aircraft, which has found a fairly wide export

I market in the developing world. In addition to direct sales,

aircraft is also built under license in South Africa and Brazil. There
I have been direct sales to the air forces of Tunisia, Ghana, Australia,

I Argentina, Zaire, Zambia, and several other countries. The MB326 is

likely to be succeeded by an MB339, prototypes of which have already

I- been ordered by the Italian Air Force for trials as a new operational

trainer. AerMacchi is limited in its production capacity (it currently

I has less than 2,000 employees). Within these limits, it has excellent

I productive and marketing ability.

Like other Italian aircraft companies, AerMacchi has maintained close

I ties with the United States - for example, as maintenance and overhaul

I contractor for the T-33 jet trainer for the Italian Air Force and other

NATO air forces. Macchi has also been subcontractor for parts and com-

I ponents on the F-84 and the F-86 programs for the Italian Air Force and

is now involved in subassembly manufacture for the F-104, G222, and

I other aircraft.

I
I
 - 66 - I
Another important company is Agysta in Gallerate, which is the leading_ I
Italian helicopter manufacturer, primarily as a licensed producer of

successive Bell designs. This firm provides a typical example of Italian I

aircraft industry philosophy. Agusta has developed a prospering

helicopter-manufacturing operation, largely for export. Through the

I
early 1970s, most of the helicopters were manufactured under Bell license, I
but Agusta has also become the licensee of Sikorsky and Vertol as well.

Agusta typically manufactures the entire unit except the dynamic elements
I
(engine, rotor, etc.) which are imported directly from the United States.
I
About 50% of the value of each Agusta-Bell helicopter is imported from

the United States. During its association with Bell, Agusta has built I
up a complex of machine shops containing the largest grinding capacity

of any plant in Europe (45 grinding machines). It has also established

I
an overhaul facility in Tehran for the Iranian Air Force and has trained
I
many Iranian engineers in Italy.

Not all of the engines are imported direct from the United States.
I
Lycoming has provided a license to Piaggio in Italy for production of I
the T-55 and other engines for Agusta helicopters. In addition, Agusta

purchases engines from Allison, Rolls Royce, and SNECMA.

I
Agusta employs about 3,000 people in two plants - one at Cascina Costa, I
and a smaller plant at Frosinone near Rome. About 90% of Agusta's work

is military.
I
A third company of some importance is Piaggio, located in Genoa, which
I
employs about 1,300 people and also manufactures twin-engine light
I
I
I
I - 67 -

I transport aircraft with power plants ranging from light piston engines

I through light turbojet (Rolls-Royce Viper) engines. Piaggio, like the

other smaller Italian firms, appears to be capable of producing reliable

I aircraft and components of rather basic technology on a modest produc-

tion scale.
I
Finally, it is important to mention SIAI-Marchetti in Sesto Calende,

I which manufactures a series of light piston trainers and utility air-

I craft. About 30% of the stock was purchased by Agusta in 1970, and

SIAI Marchetti now allocates about 50% of its work to Agusta, which

I} in turn subcontracts to Aeritalia and Fiat. Nearly 90% of the work

force, in the early 1970s, was engaged in the manufacture and overhaul
I of military light aircraft and helicopters as well as Italian Air Force

I C-130s. There are about 2,000 employees in four small plants. SIAI

Marchetti has sold its light utility aircraft to a number of foreign

I governments including Belgium, Burma, Dubai, Morocco, the Philippines,

Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Zaire, and Zambia. The list of clients of

I the smaller Italian aircraft firms gives the strongest possible evi-

dence of Italy's remarkable acceptability to third world governments

I as a supplier of military hardware.

I In spite of this proliferation of competent but very small companies,

I it is difficult to identify major potential licensing roles for any of

them beyond the relationships that have been established already by

I American companies to gain price advantage or to create access to markets

that might otherwise be difficult or closed. For purposes of this study,

I
I
I
 - 68 -
I
Aeritalia merits the most detailed assessment for any consideration of I
licensing to gain further NATO standardization.
I
Aeritalia, like the rest of the Italian industry, has considerable

capabilities as a manufacturing partner on a subcontract basis. It has

I
little capability for design and development. The participation of
I
Aeritalia in the MRCA consortium has raised it quickly to the level of

a full-scale partner in the European collaborative system; but the firm I

also still maintains close and mutually valuable ties to the U. S.

industry. One evidence of this commitment has been the presence of

I
some 50 Italian engineers at Boeing to participate in early development I
of the 747 transport, in which the Italian government has a 20% share.

These factors, in combination, suggest the future utility of Aeritalia I

as a link between the European and American industries.
I
The Italian share of the MRCA program is 11% of the cost and 15% of the

work- an'imbalance which reflects the considerable anxiety of Germany,

I
and to a lesser extent Britain, to have another continental power in-
I
volved in the project. According to current planning, the Italian

Air Force will purchase at least 100 of the aircraft by 1985. I

For Italy, a main consideration in future licenses or co-developments I
will be the maintenance of stable employment, especially if jobs can be

found on an adequate scale to occupy the new Aeritalia plant in Foggia.

I
The Italian government and industry are much less likely than Britain

or France to demand U. S. offset purchases of Italian products or a

I
strong Italian voice in preliminary design or development. On the other I
I
I
I - 69 -

I hand, a greater Communist role in the Italian government may have

I deleterious effect, either in the form of increased resistance within

Italy to ties with the United States, or, on the other hand, greater

I concerns about industrial security in Washington. (The latter seems

I more likely).

Senior observers in Italy point out that, while the Italian government
I views 'favorably new defense programs that are intended to maintain the

I established level of employment, strong governmental resistance is en-

countered in most efforts to expand facilities or employment. The

I point here is clear - that for low-volume production, Italian industry

is a highly-qualified licensee and subcontractor. However, the number

I of units involved in Italian programs is typically rather small. The

I question of scale must, therefore, be carefully analyzed in any licensing

program.

I In conclusion, the machine shop capabilities of Italian industry are

I indeed impressive. Within the Italian aerospace•industry there is a

well established preference to buy license rights to already proven

I products rather than to undertake the risk of original development.

I There is also a strong preference for American products.

I
I
I
I
I
 - 70 -
I
'I
I
I
C. The Aircraft Engine Industry ·I
1. Rolls-Royce (1971) Ltd. I
2. SNECMA (Societe Nationale et de Construction
de Moteurs d'Aviation)
I
3. Turbom~ca
I
4. Motoren-und Turbinen Union (MTU) I
I
I
I
I
I.
I
.J·
I
I
I
I - 71 -

I C. The Aircraft Engine Industry

I Central to any discussion of independent European capabilities in the

I development and manufacture of military

aircraft engines.
a~rcraft is the question of

The availability of a powerplant is the starting

I point for any military or civil aircraft project and, in many instances,

represents the constraining feature on size and characteristics of the

t aircraft. (The Concorde is only one example of an aircraft which was

I constrained, in important economic parameters, by the performance and

characteristics of the available engine.)

I In aircraft engine development and production, far more than in airframe

I fabrication, European industry lags behind the United States and has

grown increasingly dependent on U.S. licenses and collaborations to

a assure suitable propulsion systems for future aircraft.

I There is only one aircraft engine company in Europe, Rol,ls-Royce, which

has development capabilities that approximate those of the two principal

I U.S. engine companies, Pratt & Whitney Division of United Technologies

I Corporation and General Electric. Nevertheless, even Rolls-Royce, in

attempting to maintain technological parity with the United States (for

I example, in the development and manufacture of a 40,000-lb., high-bypass

engine), encountered almost intolerable strains on its resources which

I finally resulted in receivership and nationalization. Still, as shown

I in the development of the RB-199 engine to power the Anglo-German MRCA,

Rolls-Royce still retains an independent engine development capability

t
I
I
 - 72 - I
which must be taken strongly into account in any assessment of I
European competence in this field.

As shown in Table 14, Rolls is by far the largest of the European

I
engine companies, representing virtually 40% of the entire British I
aerospace industry. The two other principal engine manufacturers are

SNECMA of France and MTU of Germany, both of which are relatively

I
limited in their development capabilities. A fourth co~pany, Turbomeca,

is also of some interest because of unique capabilities, due primarily

I
to its president, in the development and manufacture of light turbine t
engines~
I
.,'
The Italian engine firms identified in Table14are effective as licensees

of American firms for the manufacture of components and subsystems, as

well as assembly, of aircraft engines, but not as developers. The list

shown in Table 14 is not a complete representation of the European

aircraft engine industry. Fabrique Nationale (FN) in Belgium, for ex- I

ample, has an aircraft engine division engaged in parts manufacture; and

there are other important engine subcontractors such as Klockner-Hurnboldt-

I
Deutz in Germany.
I
A principal point to be kept in mind is the limited size of the European

aircraft industry compared with the United States, and its comparative
I
inability to develop and manufacture advanced gas turbine engines. As I
shown in Table 14, based on figures available in 1971, the entire European

aircraft engine industry had about 96,000 employees, two-thirds of them I

1
~

I
I
I
., - 73 -

,, Table 14
I lo
European Aero-engine Companies

I Company Coon try

Turnover (1971)
S million
Employees
(1972) Ownership

I Rolls-Royce (1971)
Si'<ECMA
Britain
France
937"
296
64,000
14,6oo
Government
So% Government
10% United Aircraft
(Pratt &. Whitney)

I Mro
Turbomcca
Fiat
Germany

Friuloc
ltaly
liS

67
n.a.
5.150

4,000
z,sool>
so% Daimler·Benz
so% MAN

I Alfa Romeo
Piaggio

• 1972. •
Italy
Italy
soe
19

J8l,!loo •
2,000"
l,JOO
100% 1Rl-Finmeccanica

~Aviation divisions only: tot.al turnover in 1971 • Aero-engines only: total turnover was S418 million

'·I
was Sl.910 million, and wort en employed numbered and workers employed :1::1..750.

I,.
t Source; IISS, 1975

:I
-./

I
'I
I·
I
I
 I
- 74 -

at Rolls-Royce, compared with over 150,000 in the United States.

,,
In order to arrive at valid qualitative judgments about the European
I
engine industry, it has been useful, in the present study, to hold 'I
interviews in the U.S. aircraft industry with individuals who have

long-time experience with European companies. These interviews have I

helped to augment the available documentary information.
t
::J
I
I
I
I
,,
t·
-.-·

I
t
I
I
:1
II
I - 75 -

I 1. Rolls-Royce (1971) Ltd.

I ;Rolls-Royce, in spite of the financial difficulties it has experienced

----·'

r in the 1970s, is still regarded by both Pratt and Whitney and General

Electric as being extremely capable technically. Essentially, the

I company is divided into three divisions. The '~ristol-dl.vision, which

I now engaged both in production of the Olympus engine for Concorde and

I development and production of the RB-199 for MRCA as well as the M-45H

collaborative Anglo-French turbofan and the Pegasus vectored thrust

I engine for Harrier.

------------ ~
The 'Derby_ division is occupied in the further
---.-~ .
development and manufacture of the RB-211 high-bypass turbofan for the

'
I

civil wide-bodied market, as well as continuing production of the

I ------- -------·
as the name implies, is involved in adaptations of existing gas turbine
-- ~----------- ---~

1: engines for industrial and marine use.

I Following the bankruptcy which resulted, in part, from the Lockheed

L-1011 crisis, the company was reconstituted as Rolls-Royce (1971) Ltd.,

I with the British Government acting as the sole shareholder. Shown in

I. Table 15 is the breakdown of programs and employees by division in 1974.

a The fact that Rolls engines have been purchased by over 200 airlines and

so:D.e 80 air forces assures a profitable continuing business for spare

I parts and engines; and the future of this business is in fact fairly

optimistic. The recent Chinese contract for a turnkey plant to manu-

I
1-
1:
 Table 15

Division Programs Employment

Headquarters 350

Bristol Engine Division Olympus, Viper, RB.l99,

M-45H, Pegasus, Odin 20,500

Derby Engine Division RB.211, Avon, Dart, Tyne,

Adour, Spey, RB.l62 34,500

Industrial & Marine Division Industrial & marine adaptations

of Avon, Olympus, Tyne, RB.211,
Spey, etc. 1,250

Small Engine Division Gem, Gnome, Artouste, Palouste 3,500

Source: Rolls-Royce, 1974

·a - 77 -

'I facture the Spey engine in China increases the prospects for a continuing

spares business to provide a base for new programs.

In spite of the acknowledged excellence of the engineering design teams

I at Rolls, there are occasional evidences of technological lag in design

I or manufacturing compared with General Electric or Pratt & Whitney.

recently, for example, Rolls-Royce designers continued to use forgings in

Until

I hot parts of the engine where U.S. designers had shifted to high-temperature

castings. This conservatism tended, in turn, to penalize turbine life in

I the blade and vanes.

\
Because of constraints on R&D resources, it is

I natural that Rolls has tended to be conservative in its design and develop-

ment methods, relying on proven techniques and materials wherever possible.

a This tendency was reinforced by the bitter experience of the RB-211

development program, in which the company - at the urging of the British

I Government - abandoned caution and promised engine specifications which

I could not be met within the contract price. (The prevailing u.s.
is that the Wilson government urged Rolls-Royce to get the L-1011 contract
view

I first and solve its technical problems afterward. Given the limitations

on R&D resources, the promise of using composite materials to replace

I high-temperature metals proved to be a costly failure; and a great deal

I of redesign was ultimately required.)

The latest military engine, the RB-199 turbofan for MRCA,is very ambitious
I technically. Turbine temperatures and the pressure. ratio are about as

I high as current U.S. military engines, and the 7:1 ratio of engine dry

weight to total thrust is comparable to u.s. technology. Consequently,

I
I
I
 - 78 - I
it represents a very significant technological effort, under difficult

financial and political conditions. The fact that Rolls has been able

to bring the engine to the flying prototype stage is itself a mark of

'I
considerable technical competence. I
Like most major British aerospace and defense programs, the RB-199 is I
a collaborative venture, involving Rolls-Royce, MTU, and Fiat in the

Turbo-Union consortium. Although manufacturing of the engine will be

I
shared according to the breakdown shown in Figure 4 , the development

has been virtually the exclusive province of Rolls-Royce as design

I
leader of the program; and the British Government can be expected, in I
future collaborations,to treat the engine design leadership of Rolls

as a sine gua non of cooperation. The overall worksharing on the

a
RB-199, within Turbo-Union, is broken down as follows: Fiat 15%, I
MTU 42.5%, and Rolls-Royce 42.5%.

Although development of the engine was attended with some difficulties,

I
especially in the high-pressure turbine rotor blades and intermediate I
pressure turbine disc, gevelopment problems in advance-technology

engines are scarcely unique. The prototype aircraft flew for the first
I
time in August 1974, by which time more than 2,000 hours had already

been logged in static testing, in addition to 320 hours in flight testing

I
on a Vulcan testbed. (These figures seem so~ewhat smaller but roughly l
comparable to the test hours amassed on a U.S. engine prior to the Pre-

liminary Flight Rating Test).

I
I
I
t
I~ - 79 -

I Figure 4

Schematic of RB.l99 Work Sharing

I
I'
I
r--,
1 <
-..:..:..::---
I '
----1==-)..~
I '

I. L-~

.e.ll Rolls-Royce @!t?>:l MTU &m Fiat

I'
I
I
I
II'
1:
·I
',

t;
II
I
1:
I
 - 80 - I
For the future, Rolls will necessarily emphasize international collabora-

tion, preserving, wherever possible, a leading role in the design stage.

In fact, Rolls is now one of the world's most experienced companies in

-I
the matter of international collaboration. In addition to the RB-199,

other major international collaborations are the following:

I
With Turbomeca, the Adour engine to power the Jaguar.
I
With ~!Iis;~, the XJ-99 experimental program for a I
third-generation engine.
I
With SNECMA, the Olympus engine for Concorde.
I
However, the continuing impediment to collaboration is the unfavorable

compari~on of costs and labor productivity which are a serious problem

I
throughout British industry, including Rolls-Royce. The manufacturing
I
facilities and techniques are old compared with the United States, and

the labor content is resultingly high. Lack of numerical control is a f

major issue and may be the most impor~ant single cause of low productiv~ty

compared with u.s. industry. In addition, Rolls-Royce has always, in

I
the view of U.S. industry, inflated its work force in relation to pro-
I
duction - possibly as a result of government pressures.

One feature of Rolls, compared with other major engine companies, is its
t
very small vendor base and its tendency to integrate manufacturing within

the company itself. Pratt & Whitney, for example, employs some 45,000

people, who are supported in turn by perhaps another 50,000 workers in

'I
l
.I'
I
 ai -:-

Figure 5

Schematic of Rolls-Royce International Collaboration

I
I
,J
I
1:
I'
I'

,J,
I
a:
Source: Rolls-Royce, 1975
I
 - 82 - I
the vendor and subcontracting network. The Rolls-Royce workforce of
I
about 60,000 is highly integrated and therefore lacks the flexibility I
that can be derived from a higher proportion of subcontracting. U.S.

observers believe that, as a result of recent crises, the British

I
labor unions are becoming more realistic about the need to improve

productivity and are more inclined to cooperate with the government

I
to restore the competitive position of British industry. I
~o:~is~Royce has had a number of close working relationships with u.s. I
industry, ranging from relatively harmonious to somewhat acrimonious.

Relationships as licensor to ~FriSoniin the TF-41 program, were initially

I
difficult.

the LTV A-7.

The TF-41 is an advanced version of the Spey engine to power

The agreement called for an equal division of manufacturing

I
effort. Production will number in the thousands, continuing into the I
1980s. Early in the program, the quality and durability of turbine and

combustor parts manufactured by Rolls were questioned by the American

I
partner. To some extent, this problem may have arisen from different

operational standards of USAF and the R~. Typically, the RAF has speci-
I
fied 500 hours for critical engine components, which is apparently below I
normal USAF requirements. Subsequently, in the RB-211 program, Rolls-

Royce changed its specifications and has, in the view of the American
I
operators, solved the critical component durability problem. In the j
view of highly qualified U.S. observers, the RB-211 is generally equal
both to the JT-9D and CF-6 in engine durability; and U.S. airline users I
I
I
I
 - 33 -

of the RB-211 are generally happy with the economics of the engine as

it has evolved.

Pt;"jitt & Whitney. Over the last two years, for example, there have been

sustained negotiations between Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce for co-

production and joint marketing of the RB-401 light turbofan and also

of the Pratt & Whitney JT-lOD, which would be a collaborative 10-ton

engine to compete with the GE-SNECMA CFM-56. .Pratt & Whitney was in-

terested in the RB-401 as a replacement engine for such aircraft as the

Dassaul t Falcon 20 and Rockwell Sabre:,liner 25. Recently, however, the

U.S. Justice Department effectively precluded Pratt & Whitney from

participating in a collaborative program on the RB-401, on the basis

that such a collaboration would restrict commercial competition.

As part of the JT-lOD program, Pratt & Whitney and Rolls have proposed

that Fiat and MTU join in a work sharing arrangement. Pratt & Whitney

would be responsible for the core compressor and turbine; Rolls for the

fan, combustor and diffusor; MTU for the low-pressure turbine; and Fiat

for accessory gear box and externally mounted equipment. The sharing

ratio of the four co~panies was 54:34:10:2. Subsequently, the transfer

of Pratt & Whitney JT-lOD engine technology to Western Europe has been

questioned by the Department of Defense on security grounds, just as

the General Electric core engine technology transfer to SNECMA was

challenged earlier. Although SNECMA ulti~tely agreed to work with a

 - 84 - I
I
sealed core in the CFM-56 program, Rolls-Royce has repeatedly been

adamant in its refusal to do so, insisting on participation in the

,I
hot sections of the JT-lOD core.
I
Rolls and Tu~bomecar signed a follow-on ten year agreement, in mid-1975,
• " ......
~::..""' •
~ f

for co-production of the A4au·r~:engirie~ They anticipate further uprated

I
versions both for aircraft and maritime - industrial uses. In addition
I
to Jaguar, the Adour also powers the Hawker Siddeley Hawk and the

Mitsubishi T-2 trainer. I

Turbo-Union has engaged in an active marketing effort for the RB-199 I
outside of Europe. In the United States, a sales effort was made to

consider the engine for the McDonnell Douglas F-18 in its export versions I
or for installation in the F-18 in foreign joint production programs.
I
In summary, Roll-Royce is the only West European engine company with

independent development capabilities in advanced turbine engines for

I,
aircraft. These capabilities are generally comparable with those of I
u.s. industry. The differences that occasionally emerge result either

from differences in user standards and specifications or from limita- I

tions on R&D or manufacturing facilities.

of course, be corrected if a sufficient market exists.

Both of these problems can,
I
The network of international relationships that has been created by
I
Rolls is virtually unique, involving the United States, Germany,
I
France, Italy, China, and, possibly in the future, the Soviet Union.

I
I'
I
I. - 85 -

I~
I For purposes of the present study, the 'MTU -}relationship may be the

most significant, since this liaison, through Turbo=uniori, offers a

I potential focal point for licensing aimed at greater NATO standard-

ization •
.I/
I
'I
I
I.
1'.
~I.
I.
I'
.I
a:
I.
I,
1:
I
 - 26 - I
2. SNECMA ~iete Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de
Moteurs d 1 Aviation) -- I
The major French aircraft engine firm, SNE~~, is largely nationalized I
but has some U.S. ownership participation. According to 1974 data, the

French government owned about 84% of the shares and United Technologies
I
Corporation in the United States about 9%, with remaining shares in the I.
hands of a private French holding company. The company is a relatively

small one, with only about 14,000 employees compared with over three I
times that number at Pratt & Whitney or General Electric. In spite
a-
of the Pratt & Whitney ownership share (as a division of UTC), the

main current U.S. collaboration is with General Electric Co~pany on I

the ten-ton engine.
I
In characterizing SNECMA, American industry observers point out that,

despite their admiration for its production efficiency, SNE~'s I

development capabilities are rather limited. They credit SNECMA with

only one and a half engine developments. The ·:,!\t;ai, which has powered
,'\_. :

successive versions of the Mirage supersonic fighter, was first

More recently, however, SNECMA has been almost solely responsible for
I
the development of the M-53, an advanced development based on Atar, to I
power a second-generation version of the Mirage F-1 and the forth-

coming Mirage 2000. Preliminary design of the M-53, which will have I
a maximum thrust with afterburner of 18,700 pounds, began in 1967.

The first prototype engine was tested in 1970. Although this engine
I
I
~I
I
I. - 87 -

I
is largely a SNECMA development, it must be pointed out that Pratt &

1: Whitney provided a great deal of design engineering support, in addi-

tion to testing the entire turbine section of the prototype engine

I. at its East Hartford test facilities. In the design phase, it ~eems

I likely that Pratt & Whitney provided much of the aerodynamic design

of the aft section of the engine, as part of its overall technical

I exchange agreement with SNECMA.

'I'
' ' American industry observers do credit SNECMA with considerable skill

both in testing and manufacture. SNECMA, like other European ad-

.I vanced technology firms, customarily engag~in more intensive test-

I ing of prototypes than its American counterparts to offset lower

expenditure levels on preliminary R&D. Consequently, SNECMA has

I developed test techniques that provide an even greater yield of data

per testing hour than its American counterparts.

I
SNECMA's test facilities, for example the altitude test chambers at
I Saclay, are highly regarded by U.S. industry; and the general ex-

I' pectation is that the collaboration with General Electric in the

CFM-56 ten-ton engine program will further improve French capabilities

I in engine testing and manufacture, since General Electric will demand

certification and endurance testing to U.S. commercial standards •

.J'
In summary, the most important early future program is the CFM-56

'I high by-pass ratio, ten-ton engine. This is being developed as part

of a consortium known as CFM International, in which General Electric

I
a:
I
 - 88 - I
and SNECMA hold equal shares. The purpose of the collaborative
I
company itself is to provide program management for the engine and
I
provide the customer interface for sales and service. The company

is staffed by teams from the two participating companies. In the I

division of work, General Electric is responsible for design inte-

gration, the core engine (which is essentially the same as the F-101
I
turbofan for the B-1 bomber), and the main engine controls. SNECMA

is responsible for the low pressure system, reverser, gear box, and
a
accessory integration and engine installation. I
The hope of the participants is that the CFM-56 will be the engine I
around which a number of new commercial transport aircraft can be

designed in the 1980s and the 1990s. In addition to civil trans-

I
ports, the engine is seen as being applicable for military trans-

ports, tankers, as well as long-duration patrol and reconnaissance

I
aircraft. For General Electric, the collaboration provides access I
'
to the future European commercial market as well as sharing of develop-

ment costs. For SNECMA, the project provides access to the latest
I
technology of much higher by-pass ratios in fan engines (5:1), high
I
thrust-to-weight ratios, higher internal pressure ratios, and higher

operating temperatures. I
In summary, SNECMA is not strong in development capabilities but has I
won the respect of U.S. industry in both testing and manufacturing.

For example, the company has developed modern forging techniques I

I
I
I
I - 89 -

J, which are generally comparable to the capabilities of Pratt & Whitney

I or General Electric - e.g. the forging of large parts such

foot-diameter ring for the RB-211 nacelle.

~s a ten-

SNECMA also has a foundry

I capable of super-alloy castings for high temperature applications;

and U.S. industry has occasionally subcontracted to SNECMA for aluminum

I forging and castings when plant capacity in the United States was

a limited. However, in spite of these qualitative strengths in manu-

facturing, it must also be kept very much in mind that total productive

I capacity is limited due to the size of the enterprise.

I In summary, the main programs of SNECMA at the present time are the

following:

I The Atar engine series for the Mirage III, Mirage V,

I Mirage F-1, and Super Etendard;

I The M-53 development program for the Mirage F-lE

and future generations of Mirage fighters;

I Collaboration with Turbomeca on the Larzac light

I' turbine engine for the Franco-German Alpha jet

trainer;
I
Collaboration with Rolls-Royce in the co-production
I. of the Olympus 593 engine for the Concorde supersonic

transport;
I
Collaboration with General Electric in the development
I of the CFM-56 20,000-pound turbofan civil engine;

I
I
 - 90 -
I
Licensed production of part of the GE CF-6
I
40,000-pound engine as an alternative power-

plant for Airbus, DC-10, and Boeing 747 pur-

I
chased in Europe; I
Collaboration with Rolls-Royce on the M-45H I
turbofan engine to power the German VFW 614

transport (a program that is likely to collapse); I

Licensed production of the afterbody of the Pratt & I
Whitney JT-8D engine to be used on the Dassault-

Breguet Mercure transport.

I
Perhaps some additional background is worthwhile on the M-53, since I
this could have a future role in European collaborative

programs.
milita~y

Through the spring of 1976, 19 prototypes of the engine

I
have been built which have accumulated some 5,000 hours of running I
time, including nearly 700 with afterburner. The Mirage F-1 testbed

engine has achieved an altitude of 53,000 feet and maximum speed of

I
Mach 2.1. By the time the aircraft reaches the production stage, it

will have a maximum thrust with afterburner of about 18,700 pounds

I
and maximum dry thrust of about 12,350 pounds, with an engine dry I
weight of only a little over 3,000 pounds. Consequently, the engine

could be available after 1978, for application in various different

I
future supersonic fighter designs.
I
I
I
I
 ,I. - 91 -

I It may be useful to digress briefly in order to draw some lessons

I
,,
from the complex negotiations that resulted in the GE-SNECMA agree-

ment on the CFM-56 engine. Recent unpublished case studies of this

negotiation suggest the following conclusions relevant to the current

a~· project:

a First, the French government has been prepared to

act quickly and decisively when national interests

I were perceived in a particular collaboration. Given

a need due to a policy established in the early 1970s

I to shift the French aerospace industry's workload

I from military to civil programs, and in view of

potential technology acquisitions, France was deci-

i\ I sive in funding the CFM-56 project - initially in

the amount of $200 million.

I
As a necessary compromise, both SNECMA and the French
I., government·agreed to the requirement of receiving a

I. "sealed" core engine around which to add their own

peripheral systems. The series of reviews within the

I U.S. government resulted, eventually, in several

creative technical steps which permitted general agree-

I ment on the transfer. For example, the F-101 core engine

technology was in fact downgraded in a number of ways,

I related to operating temperatures and by-pass ratios,

I so that concerns about disclosure could be assuaged.

I
I
 - 92 -
I
Second, the momentum of the negotiation was sustaine.d by the
I
direct personal interest of the two heads of state, who were I
able to revitalize the process when it flagged at lower
I
levels.
.,
(I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 93 -

I 3. Turbomeca

I No discussion of the European aircraft engine industry would be complete

I without a mention of this small and highly specialized developer and

producer of light aircraft turbine engines, T~rb;;tile~~7 This privately-

I owned company has prospered largely as a·result of the managerial and

....-..--~----.....,...._ ~- -- - - -~

technological skill of its President, ;~:1:"-c~~J~:· SzydlowskL The company has

I remained at the technological forefront in developing light turbine en-

in- th;-~~~pressor
I gines' with tratJ."soni"c -:ae-:r-o-dynamics·
'"-~"

copters and military trainers; and its designs have been licensed to
stage; for heli-

I several countries, including the United States, for civil and military

engines. The entire current line of French helicopters is powered by

I Turbomeca turboshaft engines. Turbomeca has teamed with SNECMA for

I development and production of the Larzac engine to power the Franco-

German Alphajet trainer. More important, as ostensible junior partners

J, on the Adour program with Rolls-Royce and SNECMA, they asserted themselves

when major technical choices were to be made and, according to U.S. ob-
I servers, played a critical role in developing this engine. Szydlowski

I holds a number of patents on compressors with transonic aerodynamics.

Among current development projects, of considerable interest is the new

I Arriel helicopter turbine engine. In addition, the Astafan light turbo-

',I fan engine, of 4500 pounds thrust, is now flying experimentally on an

Aero Commander and possibly has some future market potential which would

.I be, however, in competition with Garrett, Lycoming, and Canadian Pratt &

I
I
I
 - 94 - I
Whitney. Consequently, although Turbomeca is highly competent, any I
export licensing would run into fairly stiff overseas competition.

As far as direct sales are concerned, Turbomeca 1 s productive capacity

I
is very limited. However, in any collaborative program, they would I
have great technical ability either to lead in specialized areas or to

follow an overseas design lead. Their strong point in engine design

I
has been in the compressor stage, while their weak point is, naturally

enough, in the turbine stage due to lack of R&D capability and high
I
temperature materials. I
Turbomeca has a total of about 1.3 million square feet of covered floor I
space in three plants located in the south and west of France. In

addition, Turbomeca holds a 51% share of Bet-Shemesh Engines, an air-

I
craft engine factory in Israel. The company is capable of producing

only about 1,000 motors per year, not including about 800 motors which
I
are brought in for refurbishing. The workforce is only about 4,600 I
employees. Consequently, its manufacturing capabilities are very

limited; and presumably any major new business would have to be accom-
I
modated through licensing or collaboration with a larger firm.
I
I
I
I
·I
I
I
 - 95 -

4. Motoren-und-Turbinen Union (MTU)

As Table 14 indicates, MTU is the third largest aircraft engine company

in Europe, a firm which has resulted from the successive mergers of

other aircraft engine manufacturing facilities in Germany. The firm

currently employs about 6,000 workers, representing virtually the

entirety of the German aircraft engine industry. As is characteristic

of other major German defense firms, MTU is engaged almost totally in

collaborative ventures with British and French companies. Probably

I the most important is its participation, through the consortium

known as Turbo-Union, in which it owns 40%, in the manufacture of the

I RB-199 engine to power MRCA. Although German industry and government

are desirous, in aircraft engines as in other advanced technology

fields, to attain some advanced design and development capability,

I they are for the most part willing to assign design lead to their

British, French, or American partners.

I <':t:i'l'U in Munich has grown out of the BMW tradition of ~raft-;~gi.ne,'

I manufacture and has gradually incorporated the aircraft functions of

Daimler-Benz, MAN-Turbo, and other significant aircraft engine capa-

a· bilities. (See Figure 6 ). The MTU Munich group is also allied with

:Mtif :Ln- -:F~i;d~ich~h.;f~n, which concentrates on diesel-ailcC industrLil

I engines. The present discussion focuses primarily on M'firMunTch~ as
·--
I the aircraft engine entity.

:BE;nz and MAN.

This organization is jointly
----
o~ed:

In turn, MTU Munich owns about 84% of the shares of

~
by Daimler-

I MTU Friedrichshafen. MTU also has about 6,000 employees in

I
I
 - 96 - I
Figure 6 I
MTU Ownership Structure
I
I
MTU Munich 'I
(aircraft engines)
II
50%
ownership
84% ownership 50%
ownership I
1 I
MTU Friedrichshafen

(transport & industrial engines) I

diesel engine
I
collaboration
I'
Daimler-Benz A.G.
I
I
I
I
I
Source: MTU
I
I
I
I - 97 -

I Friedrichshafen, which produces diesel engines for ships, heavy trucks,

industrial units, and also the engine for the Leopard Tank.
I
The company currently has annual sales on the order of about $120

I million. Consequently, the principal point to keep in mind is that

I this is rather a small firm by American standards, in spite of the

wide variety of programs inwhich it is engaged. Although the metal-

I working capabilities are new and well-advanced - including electro-

chemical milling, electro-stream drilling, electron beam welding, and

I friction welding - the facilities are nevertheless rather small and

I total production capabilities are limited.

programs are the following:

Among the current principal

I Collaboration with Rolls-Royce in the Turbo-Union

I consortium for the RB-199 engine (also with Fiat).

I Continuing production of the General Electric J-79

engine under license.

I Licensed production of the GE T-64 turboshaft engine

(

I to power the Sikorsky CH-53 helicopters being built

in Germany.

I Participation with GE and SNECMA in component produc-

I tion for the CF-6-50 ~ngine to power some versions

of the European Airbus.

I Probable participation with Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-

I Royce on the JT-lOD ten-ton engine.

I
I
 - 98 - I
Participation with SNECMA and Turbomeca on Larzac I
engine production for the Alphajet trainer.
I
In spite of rather extravagant claims in German industry brochures,

MTU is faced with a substantial job of catching up in product and

I
manufacturing technology.

in Germany is very low.

The level of engine manufacturing experience

In spite of a capability of delivering high-

I
quality finished parts such as small forgings, blades, shafts, and I
discs, ,~~~p~btlitY.ito,~·turn-out- .. complete engines; supported by ade-

quate testing, ha:a::.not·:eyeJ:.~:been,-fully demonstrat~ed., However, the in-

I
dustry has gained a great deal of experience in J-79 subcontracting
I
and subsequent manufacture, initially for the F-104 and later for the

German F-4. MTU has also gained a great deal of useful information I
as a full-scale participant with Rolls-Royce in the RB-199 program

which is of great help in building development capabilities in Germany.

I
MTU has a long history of collaboration with General Electric, especially
I·
for the J-79 engine, of which 1,000 out of a total 13,000 production run

were built in West Germany. For the J-79 for the Phantom, the arrange-
I
ment called for 40% of the engine parts to be manufactured in Germany I
and 60% sold direct from General Electric.
I
One area of particular concern is the fact that no new programs are

currently anticipated following the development and production projects I

of the RB-199 and Alphajet engines. Much depends, therefore, on the

outcome of the JT-lOD turbofan program with Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-
I
Royce. I
I
I
I
I - 99 -

I
I
I II. The European Tactical Missile Industry

I A. An Industry Overview

I B. The National Industries

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 I
- 100 -
I
I
I
I
A. An Industry Overview
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
'!

I
I - 101 -

I A. An Industry Overview

I The remarkable proliferation and duplication of f.ac:tiC:al-missile!programs in

I Western Europe in the last 15 years can be attributed to a number of causes.

First of all, the requirements for ':_(ip1t~l'invest~~nt\ compared with the much
I higher levels of investment required for efficient production of aircraft,

are well matched to Europe's resources, and rapid market growth has made that
I investment secure. ·
Secondly, the f.F~ of R&D~manpowE;.r' allocation is well

I matched in a quantitative sense to European resources, while the high quali-

tative abilities of the European defense engineering base are sufficiently

I challenged by tactical missile development. Third, inany·E~op~;n air,

I naval, and ground force ~~q~irements are extremely wel~ served by tactical

missile technology, particularly in view of technological advances that have

I taken place, under the general heading of pr~cision guidance, in recent years.

Next, there is the manufacturing element. The reiatively ~o~~~and highl

I vol~!lle_pr;duction runs that characterize the tactical missile industry provide

I a virtually unique opportunity for European industry to gain the full benefits

of large-scale and highly repetitive manufacture. Further, the enormous

I expor't.pO"t~;,tial of the various families of tactical missiles renders them

important in Western Europe. Finally, the lower costs:of tactical missiles

I enhance their attractiveness to hard-pressed defense ministries.

I Another point which is often emphasized in Western Europe is that, while

the United States and Soviet Union were virtually pre-occupied, in the 1960s,
I with competitive advances in strategic weapons, the principal European

I countries - at least in Britain, -Germany: -~~d.-France - saw the importance of

tactical missiles and gained a considerable ~ad start--in the development of

I the next generation of such weapons. Consequently, in spite of a recent

I
 - 102 -
I
re-orientation of American efforts in this category, Europe still maintains I
parity in most categories of tactical missiles and is prepared to compete

head-to-head in a number of categories. In contrast with some other types

I
of military systems, the European tactical missile industry generally feels
I
itself to be the technological equal of the United States, capable of colla-

berating as a co-equal in any future programs or, if necessary, of competing I

in world markets.
I
Furthermore, there appears to be a more immediate~i~ch~ readiness for colla-
I
fields. Two possibilities are evident. First, the existing consortium of
I
interests between and ~.§!_:r;:Ospat~iale, in E~ff.?:tD,:j.ss.:Ll'{e, could be joined by

one of the British groups - for example the BAC Guided Missiles Division; I
or, merely as another example, there could be a German linkage with the

coalition that has formed between 'MAT~ and In practice, following the
I
nationalization of the British aerospace industry, which will probably lead
I
gradually to a merger of the missile activities at BAC and HSD, the colla-

boration of this merged British organization with Euromissile would appear I

to be the most likely development. In such a case, it will be important for

France to preserve the capabilities of MATRA in air-launched weapons develop-

I
ment in this new international context.
I
The head of E~romi~ii1~
~ ·-· (which will be mentioned frequently in the following
··~-··- .·-;

sections) has been quoted as saying that "equality is the golden rule": in the
I
division of development and production work between France and Germany. He has I
also added to this another "golden rule", to the effect that "there should be

no duplication of production activities." As a result of the second rule,

I
Euromissile has taken a somewhat different approach from other European
I
I
I - 103 -

I
collaborations. There is, for example, only a single f}.naf·a-ssembly line for
I the missile. itself - at the ·.S~urges facility of Aerospatiale. The ·launch_.
---------------· - --·-

I
-------~-- .......
units are assembled only at the q~tobrunn plant of MBB; .·and mounting of the

units on the respective vehicles is carried out separately in the two

I countries. Initial production rates are about four launch units and 200

missiles per month. The goal of Euromissile is to produce up to 40,000

I missiles and 2,000 firing posts by 1985, representing sales on the order of

I $2 billion, not including the U.S. market which is expected to be worth

another $2 billion.
I There appears to be a strong interest in Europe in further collaboration on
-
I missile systems, not only among a broadened group of European partners, but

.I also with the United States. Discussions with European industry analysts

in the course of the present study have been helpful.in identifying some Euro-

I pean views about possible future projects, all of which stress

·rather than licensing. With regard to areas in which European industry

~o-developme~t

______
I .
perceives a European
__,.-~--.-..........,

J,.~a~1, the short-range SAM for battlefield use against

fast, low-flying targets is certainly one category - a viewpoint substan-

I tiated by the Roland, Rapier, and Crotale developments in the first generation.

I However, there is interest in a collaborative approach, both intra-European

and trans-Atlantic, in a second generation ...s.hort::range--SAM.

I The same is true of 'lmti-=tank missiles·, an area in which Europe feels

I itself to be the equal of the United States based on systems that are

already fully developed but in which U.S. technology is important in the

I next generation. The British government, for example, has encouraged

future·collaboration on a third-generation anti-tank missile to meet

I· standardized alliance requirements.

I
 - 104 -
I
A
~ --~--r-~--------r----.~~-

me;c1'h1m~range .··s·AM·, with greater systems integration than preceding systems, I

with a very low-altitude capability and considerable ability to operate in

the presence of ECM, is certainly of interest for :~~oi~~l)?.!ation;; and the

I
European industries consider themselves in a good position to collaborate I
on such a project.* There are already two to three proposals underway which

would be based on various combinations of the electronics and aerospace

I
industries in Europe, using new types of radars.

for example, from such firms as Marconi and AEG-Telefunken.

A lead might be expected,
I
There is also a feeling of technological ~9~~~ity:'in the area of AAMs, as
I
exemplified by the R~~so·Magi2 missile. The European state of the art is I
considered to be well advanced both in terms of high-altitude interceptors

and close-in dog-fight weapons. In addition to the French capabilities I

-r___..,-~.;. -.----- --~- ·-
represented by MATRA, the new seeker developed by

is considered to be a superior unit.

~~1Z.5~P;i:i

Observers in the French industry

for the Ti!,l.~P~~u,;_ro!Y
I
believe that there could be a collaborative requirement for the next genera- I
tion of -~h:i.g~::;;l.tit~11iitf:.11ach--number -MM -i'Ut.erceptor ··i;t,:!:-~-siie:· as a follow-on

to the Super 530 and Phoenix. Such a missile would have long range and
I
would depend on a two-phase guidance system, one for cruise and one for

homing. A follow-on to the present generation of dog-fight missiles could

I
also be considered, using a U.S. target seeker with a European missile (or I
at least assigning design leads along these lines).
1

I
Another domain of considerable future interest for Europe is the SSM.

The view is that Lance and Pluton fulfill virtually the same requirement for I
a lOG-kilometer ballistic weapon. A new generation based on improved navi-

gation and propulsion technology could be of interest. In Europe, Aerospatiale

I
would be one obvious participant in such an effort. II
* A U.S.-German collaboration is possible, but French-U.K. collaboration seems
very unlikely. I
I - 105 -

I As for anti-ship missiles, the European position is considered to be fairly

I strong. As discussed later, there is some resentment that the United States
did not give greater attention to Exocet, which was already well into

·I development at the time that Harpoon was started. The attitude in Europe is

that the technologies and performance parameters of Exocet, Harpoon, and

I Otomat are generally equivalent and that Europe had, prior to the. start of

I the Harpoon project,at least some design lead in this area.

missiles operate at about the same cruise speed regime.

All three

A potential need

I for a follow-on to these three systems is recognized. The principal specifi-

cation would be supersonic speed, compared with the typical 300 meters per
I second of the present generation.

I A similar list of potential trans-Atlantic collaborative missile ventures

I has been provided privately by a French aerospace company.

follows:
'The list is as

I
I Long-range supersonic anti-ship missile

Next generation SSM to replace Lance and Pluton

I New AAM for interception of high-altitude high

Mach targets

I Ship defense against anti-ship missiles

New generation of low-altitude SAM to replace Rapier

I Roland and Crotale

RPV
I NIAG has also reportedly completed several early feasibility studies concerning

I a second-generation supersonic anti-ship missile which could be standardized

for the NATO countries. This has the strong support of the leading NATO
I
I
 Table 16

Characteristics of Selected Anti-Shipping Missiles

Country Max.
and desig- Length Weight range Propul-
nation (m) (kg). (km) sion Guidance Countries deploying

France· France Argentina*

EXOCET 5.2 730 40 s ARS Britain Brazil*
West Germany Belgium*
Malaysia Ecuador*
Greece Pakistan*
Peru

W. Germany
KORMORAN 4.4 600 35 s IR/ARS West Germany

Italy/France Italy Venezuela*

OTOMAT. 4.4 730 80 S/TB ARS Peru*
f

Italy/France
SEA KILLER 4.7 300 25 s RC Italy Iran
Mk 2

Norway Norway Sweden

PENGUIN 3 340 30 s IRS Turkey.

U.S.A. USA Britain*

HARPOON 4.6 660 110 S/TB ARS Holland* W. Germany*
Denmark* Iran*
Norway*

* Countries that have not yet deployed system, but are known to have placed an order.

Key: Propulsion: R ramjet SARS semi-active radar seeker

s solid-fuel rocket L liquid-fuel rocket TV television command

-
TB turbojet

. .urewill IIi11197- ..
Guidance:
ARS active radar seeker
IRS
RC
.. ..
infra-red seeker
radio command
I - 107 -

I
I countries and could possibly be a project for Euromissfle.

I There is general recognition in Europe of a :r,r.s. technological advantage in

a number of areas such as efectro=opt"i.caT syste~s -~or terminal guidance;

I various forms of precisionguidance-Eo du!~rget; in large SAMs; in- i.;,rg~·
~;and in cruise missiles.
I of P1;f!liat-t7ri;ed--t~~g-et--seekers.
A U.S. lead is also recognized in various types

Another domain in which the United States 'is

I recognized to have a strong lead is that of F"emotely

L.--..
piloted
-·-
·vehicles (RPVs).
... ,.

In this category, Europe would undoubtedly accept pure licensing arrangements

I from the United States; and it seems likely that air-to-ground missions would

I be of greatest interest.

In examining European interests and motivations, it is vitally important to

I recognize, that for Europe as a whole, 50% to 60% of missile production is

I normally exported. The prospect of an embargo on supplied parts would essen-

tially rule out the prospect of any licensing agreement. (Obviously, however,

I if export potential to the third world were replaced by some assured share

of the American military market, this could become a negotiable issue.)

I
One problem that is recognized in the European missile industry, as in the
I United States, is the difficulty that arises from different standards and

I regulations of manufacture and operation from country to country.

problem is discussed in more detail in Part VI.)

(This

Due to problems that have

I arisen within Europe, interest has developed in the establishment of supra-

national authorities to standardize regulations and standards of all kinds

I governing contractor performance. It is recognized as essential, in future

I trans-Atlantic collaboration, to establish an international body on standards.

 - 103 - I
There have been heavy administrative and psychological burdens created by I
the lack of standardized procurement regulations and specifications, and
I
performance standards within Europe, and the differences are likely to be even

greater where the United States is concerned (as the Roland II experience
,,
may suggest).
I
Another problem of general importance for standardization but of special

criticality for missiles is the "two-way street." The trans-Atlantic balance I

of missile purchases still strongly favors the United States as shown in

Table 17 • Although the United States will undoubtedly be able to establish

I
several significant licensing or subcontracting arrangements without a two-way I
street, any real progress toward standardization will require either co-

development, along lines already suggested, or additional Europe-to-U.S.

I
licensing agreements that are freer of difficulties than the Roland II

arrangement.
I
v
As the following sections will indicate, the :fd;rms involved in tactical ml.ssJ:l~e
I
development and production in Western Europe ~Fe, with few exceptions, the I
same as those involved in @rcraft _pr.o.flt!..£1;~<:>.!!: (~TRA··:-:i:s:-t·he-~mQ9t-impql."tant
I
~·-'-- ' ~Jw~

~xcept:i0n~.
··~--....__........,
In Britain, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics (a division of the Hawker

Siddeley Group), British Aircraft Corporation, and Short Bros. and Harland

have all developed tactical missiles of different types. In West Germany,

I
MBB is the principal developer and manufacturer of tactical missiles. In I
France, Aerospatiale and MATRA are the important factors in missile develop-

ment and production. I

The tactical missile industry, both in Europe and the United States, is closely I
linked and dependent upon the major electronics firms. In fact, the electronics
I
I
------------------- Table 17

European Purchases/Licenses U.S. Purchases/Licenses

Country Missile Missile SupQ_lier

Norway Bullpup, Sea Sparrow, Nike Hercules, Sidewinder, SS.lO France

Tow SS.ll France
Entac France
Sweden Hawk, Redeye, Falcon, Sidewinder Roland II France/Germany

Finland Falcon

Denmark Honest John, Bullpup, Harpoon?, Sea Sparrow,

Nike Hercules, Hawk, Redeye, Sidewinder, Tow

Germany Honest John, Sergeant, Pershing, Lance, Asroc,

Nike Hercules, Hawk, Tartar, Redeye, Sparrow,
Sidewinder, Tow.

Holland Honest John, Lance, Harpoon, Terrier,

Sea Sparrow, Hawk, Tartar, Sidewinder, Tow

Belgium Honest John, Lance, Sea Sparrow, Nike Hercules,

Hawk, Sidewinder

Luxembourg Tow

France Honest John, Hawk, Tartar, Sidewinder

Spain Asroc, Sea Sparrow, Hawk, Standard,

Sparrow, Sidewinder

Switzerland Falcon, Sidewinder

Italy Honest John, Asroc, Terrier, Nike Hercules

Hawk, Sea Sparrow, Tartar, Sparrow, Sidewinder, Tow
 Trans-Atlantic Missile Trade Through .!!,!_d-1975
---------(Continued)

European Purchases/Licenses

Country Missile

Greece Honest John, Asroc, Nike Hercules, Hawk,

Sparrow, Sidewinder, Tow

Turkey Honest John, Bullp~p, Harpoon, Asroc, Sparrow,

Sidewinder, Tow

UK Honest John, Lance, Bullpup, Sparrow, Sidewinder,

Harpoon

Source: Flight International, 29 May 1975

I - 111 -

I firms often act as prime contractors for tactical missile systems (e.g.

I ·,_R!iytheon' s role in the United States and that of Thomson CSF in France a,s

..;p..:rtme:~ontractors·). These firms are identified in Part V of the report.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 I
- 112 -
I
I
II
I
B. The National Industries
I
1. The British Missile Industry
I
2. The French Tactical Missile Industry
I
3. The German Missile Industry
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 112-a -

I
1. The British Missile Industry
I To summarize briefly, there are three British firms engaged in missile pro-

I duction: Hawker Siddeley Dynamics; British Aircraft Corporation; and Shorts.

Hawker Siddeley Dynamics, Ltd. is a subsidiary of Hawker Siddeley Group.

I This division has about 7,000 employees engaged in design, development and

I production of guided weapons as well as a small amount of work on space

programs. Because there have been so many program cancellations in Britain

I in the last several years, the emphasis here will be on projects which are

still active or on capabilities that provide a basis for further activity.

I In general, British industry appears to be stronger in
---- --~--

surface-to-~ir than

I other types of missile systems.

I 'HSD_maintains a strong R&D capability, as exemplified in its short-range

air-to-air missile research program (d;signated SRAAM), calling for high

I accelerations and high maneuverability for dog-fight conditions at high

closing speeds. The SRAAM program, as currently conducted, is guided by a

I passive IR homing system and uses thrust vector control for high maneuver-

I ability. Experienced observers in other countries are doubtful about the

use of thrust vector control but recognize its theoretical advantages for

I maneuverability. SRAAM has been reduced to a technology acquisition project

but may result in several test firings. There is also a concept study for
I a ship-launched version designated Shield.

I ·HSD is Rayt;heonYs:licensee for production of the British version of the

Sparrow AAM (designated XJ~521), a medium-range all-weather air-to-air

I weapon using a new semi-active radar guidance system developed by ~rconi'

I
I
 - 112..:b - I
I
I
I,
I
(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK) I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
',1
I
I
I - 113 -

I Space and Defense Systems. This project is now reportedly in the production

I phase. The Marconi system has attracted a fair amount of attention in

U.S. industry, and there is a strong feeling that the British version of

I Sparrow, with the Marconi semi-active radar homing head and EMI fuse, makes

it one of the best medium-range AAMs available. The XJ-521 will arm all RAF
I interceptors.. It will incorporate an inverse monopulse seeker to operate

I beyond visual range and give an all-weather capability. This seeker, combined

with an active fuse, is being tested in the United States for possible use

I on U.S. fighter aircraft. At the same time, Raytheon and General Dynamics

are now developing an inverse monopulse seeker for the AIM 7F and have already
I developed and tested an active fuse. According to press reports, the U.S.

I forces may proceed with the purchase of the XJ-521 monopulse seeker while

development of a second-generation seeker in the U.S. continues.

I In the surface-to-air category, one important program is the naval SAM

I designated Sea Dart, which is in production both for the Royal Navy and the

Argentine Navy. This is a third-generation area defense weapon capable of

I interception at both high and low altitudes, both of aircraft and missiles.

I It is intended for the Royal Navy's Type 42 destroyers and ASW cruisers.

The missile uses ramjet propulsion and radar guidance, combining an illumina-

I tion radar with semi-active homing in the missile. Range is in excess of 30 kilo-

meters.· The tracking and illumination radar is built by Marconi Radar

I Systems. The missile is boosted to speed by a solid fuel booster, followed

I by a ramjet engine for sustained cruising flight. Production began in 1967.

A land-based version of this system is also under development.

I In the air::to~.su'I'facecategory, HSD~has collaborated with MATRA in the

I development of the Ma:ftel-ASM~ which employs either TV or anti-radiation

I
 - 114 - I·
guidance systems, depending on national requirements. Both versions are
I
designed to operate in an Eci1:,:env1ronment. The AS-37 anti-radar version I
homes on electromagnetic radiation. In the AJ-168 version, a nose-mounted

TV camera and data link for video and command signals is employed. Range
II
is probably on the order of 60 kilometers. ~E~~c{r.oniqtie."Marcef.J:iassau1t..:
I
provides the hq~lng he~d for the anti-radiation missile. Marconi Elliott

Avionics Systems Ltd. produces the TV homing system. A proposed anti-ship I

version was abandoned when the McDonnell Douglas Harpoon was selected by the

Royal Navy in 1975.

I
Finally, HSD is the developer and manufacturer of the IKARA anti-submarine
I
missile, which in its principal mode of operation is dropped by parachute

from an aircraft operating in conjunction with anti-submarine surface vessels.

I
This is a collaboration with the Australian Navy. I
The second major missile firm in Britain is the Guided Weapons Division of I
British Aircraft Corporation, which also has about 7,000 employees. The

main current activities at BAC are the following: I

The Sea Skua anti-ship missile, using semi-active radar homing, I
which is a development primarily to arm the Lynx helicopters in

the Royal Navy. Its role is to provide long-range self defense

I
for frigates against missile-carrying fast patrol boats. The
I
target will be illuminated by a Ferranti radar on board the

Lynx helicopter. This system has not yet entered service, I

but full development has been authorized. Up to four missiles will

be carried on a single helicopter. It seems likely, according

I
I
I
I - 115 -

I to recent reports, that the French Navy will also purchase Sea

I Skua for use on its own Lynx aircraft, but this is far from certain.

I The Sea Wolf naval point-defense SAM is now in final stages of

development for the Royal Navy. This is a short-range radar-guided

I weapon which appears to be regarded, both in and outside Britain,

I as a promising system technologically. The system is designed

for use on frigates, to provide rapid reaction against both

I aircraft and anti-shipping missiles. Marconi Space and Defense

Systems is developing the surveillance radar, target tracking

I radar, TV and data handling equipment. The development program

I is largely completed, and production orders may have already

been placed. Sea Wolf is viewed primarily as an anti-missile

I missile capable of intercepting missiles with speeds of up to

Mach 2. The first role of Sea Wolf will be to arm the Royal.Navy's
I Type 22 frigates and subsequently to be fitted in existing vessels,

I both in Britain and for export.

Rapier is a low-level SAM with both optically guided and blind-

I fire versions. It is currently in operational service with the

I British Army and RAF as well as the armed services of Iran,

Zambia, Oman, Abu Dhabi, and Australia. Rapier was designed as

I a light-weight, highly mobile SAM for battlefield troop protection

against fast low-flying aircraft. Rapier was one of the finalists

I in the U.S. Army competition for a battlefield SAM, along with

I Crotale and Roland II. The loss to Ro~and II was apparently a

reflection of the operational mode desired by the U.S. Army

I
I
 - 116 - I
rather than any inferiority of operation. Roland is self-propelled
I
rather than towed and offers some armored protection to the crew. I
Furthermore, the Roland carrier holds more missiles and would

be marginally more effective against successive waves of attack I

down a single narrow corridor - whereas Rapier is considered

more effective in dispersed operations against individual air-

I
craft. However, Rapier is a much cheaper system than Roland II I
and probably has a strong export potential, as orders to date

confirm. Export orders for Rapier already total about $1 billion.

I
Currently, development of a tracked Rapier is underway, capable of
I
carrying eight missiles.

The further developments of the BAC Swingfire anti-tank missile,

I
•
the Hawkswing helicopter-mounted version and Beeswing infantry- I
operated version have all been cancelled as a result of the British

MOD decision to adopt the Franco-German MILAN fqr manufacture under I

licensing in Britain. The stated reason for the choice was that

MILAN is semi-automatic compared with the manually operated Swing-

I
fire system. Of interest to the British Army of the Rhine is a I
helicopter-launched MILAN. The British MOD has based negotiations

on the need for worksharing as well as British technical in- I

volvement in improvements of the missile, and also the prospect of

a Europe-wide missile for the next anti-tank generation so that

I
France, Germany, and the UK will all be involved in a standardized I
system.
I
1
I
I
I - 117 -

I
The SAM III. This is a BAC proposal for a joint development with

I Thomson CSF and MATRA. In addition, BAC has held discussions with

AEG-Telefunken on this proposal,,which would in effect be a successor

I to the Bloodhound, Thunderbird, Hawk and NIKE Hercules - presumably

I for an extended range interceptor missile.

I Short Bros. and Harland Ltd., with facilities in Belfast, has remained active

in the missile business, but there is some indication that the

I government's protection of this activity has been strongly associated with

its geographic location. The firm has about 6,000 employees, not all of
I whom are engaged in missile production. The ownership is largely in the

I hands of the British Government (69~%)

each by Rolls-Royce and Harland and Wolf.

with shares of slightly over 15%

The main current programs, not

I including older programs, are the following:

I Blowpipe, a shoulder-launched infantry mtssile for surface-

to-air use, of which 285 units are on order for the British
I Army and Royal Marines as·well as 100 for the Canadian Armed

I Forces.

The Seacat ship-based SAM which has been sold to numerous

I navies; and its land-based version, Tigercat, a low-level

I SAM which is in production for the RAF and the export market.

This system utilizes a command link with optical .. or radar

I tracking.

I The SLAM system (submarine launched air flight missile), a close-

range surface-to-air missile based on the Blowpipe. This system

I
I
 - 118 - I
was actually developed by Vickers to meet the need of submarines
I
and light surface craft for effective short-range defense both I
against helicopters and other surface craft. Shorts supplies

the Blowpipe missile for the system. I

Currently, two major trends in the British tactical missile industry are I
apparent: first, the likelihood of an eventual merger of the missile divisions

of the BAC and HSD in the course of the industry's nationalization into the
I
new "British Aero Space". Second, a number of recent decisions - especially
I
the choice of Milan over Hawkswing - indicates that the British government

will favor multi-national collaborative ventures to purely national guided I

weapons programs. A third point, already apparent, is that the major

British electronics firms such as ¥:£~~~~f:~;~~~_;:;klki:bY )::_o_ t:g:ke: the:.~rime rol.!=

I
in many future programs, rather than the missile manufacturers, given the I
necessary emphasis on electronics as the basis of any t_~~tieal"missi-le·: system.
I
""-< .,.,::c '--:::-
:'";.r"C'" ~· ~- ·~ ' ' r •• ,"(

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 119 -

I
2. The French Tactical Missile Industry
I
In France, there are two major centers for the development and production

I of tactical missiles. The largest is Aerospatiale, a diversified aerospace

company, in which one of four divisions is devoted to both tactical and

I strategic missiles. Aerospatiale is responsible not only for the tactical

·I missiles which are of interest in this study, but also for the land-based

and sea-based strategic missile programs, which will not be considered here.
I As already mentioned, Aerospatiale is a nationalized company and has acted

·I as France's collaborator with Germany on the Roland, HOT and MILAN programs

under the Euromissile rubric. Aerospatiale's tactical missile programs

II tend, in general, to be concentrated more on Army requirements than those of

;Eri~ins MATRA, the privately owned company which .has spe~::i.a.i:Cze~t in ·?-ir:.

I Iau~ched.~i~~iles of considerable sophistication.

I Not including older programs such as the AS-20 and AS-30 which have a long

production history, the current and early future programs of Aerospatiale

I which appear to be of most importance, for purposes of this study, are

I Exocet, Roland II, MILAN, and HOT.

Exocet is one of Aerospatiale's most important projects. This is a solid

I propellant anti-shipping missile which has been developed both in surface-

I launched and air-launched versions and is now in its second generation of

development. Orders have already exceeded over 1,000 rounds for 14 customers,
I including both the British and German navies. Over 90% of Exocet production

I is exported, which gives it special importance to French government and

industry. For the British orders, there is one offset agreement under

I
I
 - 120 - I
which many components are produced in Britain.
I
In addition to British and French orders, the missile has also sold very I
well in Latin America and the Middle East. Exocet is regarded in France

as the technological equal of Harpoon; and some cynicism about American

I
intentions on standardization is attributed to the fact that Exocet develop- I
ment preceded that of Harpoon by about two years. ~x6_C:et7 has a surface-to-

surface range of about 20 miles, flying at very low altitude. Although it

is a national program, it does use ;~;~·!-:aJ.:"-·eferit~iits":-±n:·coiiimon wit11 the joint

MBB-Aerospatiale :KobmQr~n?air-to-sea missile - for example a t;lin~gyro

iiier·eJ.·al -gui-dance ·sys.tein for the initial trajectory. In addition to Aero-

spatiale, which acts as system manufacturer and integrator, ~~~provides

the electromagnetic homing head, ~·~'f~·.-the radio altimeter, and 'BA.~~ provides

radomes. The initial production rate was about ten a month, and this may

have grown to about 25 per month currently. However, precise figures are
I
not available. I
For the future, it is not possible to assess Aerospatiale's tactical missile I
activities in a purely national context. For Aerospatiale, the collaboration

with MBB, through Euromissile, is becoming increasingly important. Obviously, I'

Roland II, MILAN, and HOT provide the basis of this collaboration, but there

are other design projects underway, such as the Jason study for a development
I
of Roland capable of intercepting anti-ship missiles. For France, as for I
Germany, the sustained production runs that have resulted from these programs

are especially welcome. For the long run, some 10,000 to 12,000 rounds will I
probably be purchased by each country. In addition, the selection by the

U.S. Army, resulting in the license to Boeing and Hughes, has increased world

I
·a - 121 -

I interest in the missile - even though it has created complications in

sourcing for the export market. All three countries have agreed to seek
I an optimum level of standardization for their Roland systems, but obviously

I any redevelopment of the system in the United States, which at the present

moment seems to be considerable, destandardizes the system. Furthermore,

I Norway has announced its intention to purchase Roland, but the announcement

I that a version would be'manufactured in the United States has led to compli-

cations in the Norwegian order.

I The MILAN medium-range man-portable anti-tank missile is now being turned

I out at the rate of 1,300 per month, with an increase to 1,600 a month anticipated

in the early future. Total French and German procurements are estimated at

I 100,000 - and this does not include the many export prospects. To date,

;I over 20,000 rounds have been manufactured, and orders reached 35,000 in 1975.

:s Turning now to MATRA~!this smaller and privately-owned. company has established

adva;~~~echnoiogy capabilities, especially in the development and manufacture

I· of air=l~iuiicliea mi'ssfles~-

into other families of tactical missiles.

In future, it will probably extend its activities

MATRA has formed an international

tf ·-~ -·--· .~.--- --- -~ - \

alignment through its collaboration with HSD,: which offers an interesting

alternative to Euromissile as a locus for American collaboration. MATRA has

I a total workforce of about 4,000 employees and current sales of about $190 to

I $200 million annually. Although the company engages in a number of civil

markets, especially automotive, by far its largest and most successful operation

I is in the missile field.

are the following:

The programs of principal current interest at MATRA

t The R-530 air-to-air missile, which is the standard Mirage

'I
·t
 - 122 -
I
armament, with IK homing provided by ?~AL Some 4,000 of these

have already been sold; and it is now being superceded by the

,,
I

MATRA Super 530.

I
The Stiper.530 is scheduled to enter operational service in
I
1978. It is a longer-range AAM which will arm the Mirage F-1.

There will probably be an initial French order of about 1,000

,,
rounds, and other Mirage F-1 customers are very likely purchasers.

The Super 530 is an interception missile which essentially

I
doubles the range and target acquisition distance of the R-530.

It is intended for use against high-altitude, high-Mach-number

I
targets - e.g. altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. Following the I
completion of tests against supersonic high-altitude targets,

this Mach 3 missile will probably enter production sometime in

I'
1977.
c
The R-550 Magic, with IR homing, is a close-in dog-fight missile.

There have already been orders for about 6,000 rounds by the
·I
French Air Force and Navy as well as a Sidewinder replacement in t:
the French military services. Deliveries of the first series-

produced missiles began in 1974. It reached operational status I

in 1975.
I
The Martel ASM program, carried out in collaboration with HSD, has

already been described. It is being used by the French Air Force

I
on Mirage 3 and Jaguar; by the French Navy on the Atlantique;
I
and also-on RAF aircraft as already discussed. MATRA has prime
I'
I'
I - 123 -

I responsibility for the AS-37 anti-radiation version, for which

I EMD provides the electromagnetic homing head.

I In collaboration with the electronics firm !l;o~sonCsF;:

.. ". --·
MATRA

is producing the Crotale battlefield SAM, which has been developed

I jointly with French and South African defense ministry funds.

It has been ordered by the French Air Force and Navy and also
I for export by South Africa and Saudi Arabia. In addition,

I other European and Middle Eastern countries have ordered the

system. As noted elsewhere, Crotale was a finalist in the

I competition with Rapier and Roland II for ground force

defenses against low-flying aircraft. The complete system is

I mounted on several separate vehicles, carrying the missiles

I in containers as well as a pulse Doppler S-band surveillance

radar and acquisition radar. The system uses command guidance

t by data-link. Series production has been underway since the end

of 1968.
I
t Finally, the Otomat anti-shipping missile, developed jointly

by MATRA and Oto-Melara of Italy, is worth mentioning. This

'I
missile is essentially a competitor to Exocet and Harpoon.

It is intended for launching from naval platforms of any size, but

it also has a capability for fixed or mobile land deployment or

aircraft deployment. The latest version has a range of about

I 100 kilometers in all modes. The missile has a lhomson

I ,csr-guldance which permits a late pull~up and dive trajectory to

the target. After launch, the Otomat follows a-cruise phase

I
I
 - 124 - I
using radio altimeter control and inertial buidance. First
I
launch was in 1974, and the missile is now in production I
following an initial order of 120 rounds, most of which were

for the Italian Navy. In addition Venezuela has ordered 40

.II
missiles and other export orders have reportedly been added.
I
Among European aerospace companies, ·MA~RA: has developed one of the more

impressive capabilities for systems analysis, systems integration, and

I
I
{or linking the sometimes conflicting technologies of missile ~er~~~namiCs,
I
:.-p_roptilsion, and ;gu~dance·. In the early 1970s, about 65% of MATRA' s sales

were military (50% missiles and 15% rocket-launchers and parachute bombs),

25% were in space activities, and the remaining 10% in civilian work -
,.
primarily for the MATRA sportscar. However, although the goal was to reach a I'
higher civilian proportion, it seems entirely likely that the balance has

shifted even more to the military by the mid-1970s.

,,:
:·"MA:iiA.' has recently expressed its di.s~appointment- that "after per-fect
·a
cooperation" on MARTEL, the British MOD appears to have reverted to trans-

Atlantic collaboration rather than further European missile development -

·i,
especially in rejecting the sub-MARTEL anti-submarine version of the weapon

for Harpoon, and also in collaborating on the Sparrow program instead of

joining with MATRA on the R-530. MATRA's earlier expectation had been that
't
British cancellation of the SRAAM and Taildog programs would have been a

first step to Anglo-French collaboration on a dog-fight missile. MATRA has

I
also argued that German purchase of AIM-9L has resulted in a second-rate II
system compared with what they regard as the superior R-550 Magic.
I
I'
I - 125 -

1: 3. The German Missile Industry

I The leading missile manufacturer in Germany is, of course, MBB. The firm's

I missile activities began in 1956 in the development of the Cobra anti-tank

missile for the German Ministry of Defense, a program that was performed in

I collaboration with another German firm and the Swiss firm Contraves-Oerlikon.

This missile is still in production, and through 1975 more than 150,000 units
I had been huilt.

I As noted in the aircraft section, the German government strongly supports

I collaboration, and this' attitude is thoroughly evidenced in MBB's missile

programs. In addition to Cobra, which is now well into its production life,

a: the following are some of the major programs and planning projects at MBB:

11 The Kormoran air-mo-surface anti-ship missile, a collaboration

of MBB and ·Aerospatiaie., has been ordered by the German Navy

I and may possibly also be used on MRCA. It is a long-range low-

level system with three different guidance systems: anti~

I rad.{ation·, actlve radar, and IR homing~ The missile is launched

t: when the aircraft is flying at a low level, and there is on-

board computation equipment to relate the position of the

·t aircraft at launch with that of the target in order to allow

e· the on-board inertial navigation system to guide the missile

toward the target at low altitude. The radar homing head

I
,,
is a development of Thomson CSF~ capable of active or passive

modes of operation.

The FK-80 (Hydra) is the designation for a project for the

'I next generation of supersonic anti=ship missile, which will

I
 - 126 -
I
probably be developed as a collaboration between MBB and t
Aerospatiale.

iong-term future.
Presumably, this will replace Kormoran in the

Development of this missile is proposed

I
to begin in about 1981, with service entry planned for about I
1986. This long-range weapon will probably be ramjet-powered

and will arm ships, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters. It J

would probably supercede all three of the present anti-ship

missiles including Kormoran, Harpoon, and Exocet.

t
The Mamba is a portable wire-guided infantry anti-tank missile,
t
based closely on Cobra technology, that is now in production t
at MBB. The motor for this missile utilizes programmed thrust,

which provides a comparatively slow start and a fast cruise mode.

• No orders have yet been placed, and the project is still in the

development phase.
'I
~~umbd is a long-range ASM utilizing a combined autopilot and
I
inertial guidance system in the cruise mode and TV homing and I
data-link in the terminal phase. It is now ca~ceiie~but was

scheduled to enter service in 1981, primarily for use on MRCA I

and to supplement the Kormoran missile on other naval aircraft.
J
The weapon was intended for use against large or high-value

surface targets. Project definition began in 1972, and full-scale

,,.
I
development started briefly in 1976. According to previous

planning, two of these missiles can be carried on MRCA, and the

system can be launched at high or low level. Clearly, MBB would

prefer to have a collaborator in this program, and there was

I
1
I
I
I - 127 -

·t some hope that the United States would be an appropriate

I partner.

·a The Armbrust, a ballistic anti-tank missile which is now in final

stages of development. This is a close combat weapon which has

I attracted attention in the United States, as demonstrated by its

:1~~~ inclusion _in an Army contract with Boeing for the study of close-_
·'
in combat weapons. Armbrust is a man-portable shoulder-fired weapon

'·e for use against armor and protected targets at ranges up to 300

meters.

Most important, however, within the MBB missile activities are the collaborations

I' with France on MILAN and HOT, which are being manufactured under the general

(I guidance of the collaborative firm Euromissile. It is interesting to note

here that MBB has expressed its hope, occasionally, that the British m~ssile

I' industry would also join Euromissile at some future time. MILAN began re-

placing Cobra in 1975 and is expected to serve until 1990 in the German forces.

I HOT will begin to-replace the SS-11 in about 1978 and remain operational until

the mid-1990s. As noted previously, MILAN will probably be built under

l license in Britain. MILAN is a wire-guided, spin-stabilized anti-tank

·t~ system incorporating semi-automatic guidance. Although it is somewhat

heavier than first-generation anti-tank missiles, it is nevertheless portable.

·I;,
HOT is also an anti-tank missile using wire guidance •. It differs from MILAN

I in terms of weight and application.

or other armored vehicle.

Typically, HOT is mounted on a tank

The weapon has been accepted for use in the German

1: and French ground forces and will undoubtedly have a long production run in

·t both countries, under the general direction of Euromissile. A helicopter-

I
 - 128 - I
~,

mounted version is under study which may also be accepted by the British

Armed Forces. The key points to make about HOT and MILAN are:

by combining the military markets of France and Germany, long production

first, that
I
runs are ensured which provide efficiencies of scale; and second, that I
standardization is a very real output of this effort.

Finally, it is also worth pointing out that Euromissile represents the

I
possible beginning of a fairly large consortium of European countries for 1:
the development and production of tactical missiles, since it is also

responsible for the Roland missile which has been licensed to the United
t
States. The next logical step, one which is very much desired by the

Germans, will be for Britain to take part more actively in the Euromissile

consortium. It may be that, in the missile field, as contrasted with

'
I
aircraft, there will be more French willingness to collaborate with British

industry - as already evidenced by the apparently harmonious relationships

I'
that have been developed between HSD and,MATRA. I
I
,.
For the future, it seems most likely that MBB will be the focal point for

additional development in tactical missiles. However, ~p~tnie~~is apparently

still engaged in a short-range naval SAM study, in collaboration with ~(;'.;·:

'f~:iei~rik.e.n, VFW Fokker, and MATRA. This project is designated J(!mAR~:?

,,
related to the development of a SAM for use against close-in targets.

I
I
I'
I'
I - 129 -

1:
I
,, III. The European Naval Shipbuilding Industry

A. Overview

I B. Great Britain

,I
:..,_.,.,.· C. France

I
,, D.

E.
Germany

Other NATO Navies

I v
1. Italy

'I 2. The Netherla:.,ds

,.
·'

Belgium
I 3.

4. Denmark
1/ 5;. Norway

1: ....... /

F. Conclusions

'I
I
I
I~
~a

t
 - 130 - I
A. Overview
I
In 1973, the report of the Commission on American Shipbuilding made the I
following comment: "By and large, Japanese shipbuilding has been dedi-

cated to perfecting production of the known, whereas the largest part

I
of the shipbuilding industry of the United States, through dominance

of Navy requirements, has been primarily dedicated to exploring the tech-

t
nologically unknown." While the experience of European shipyards, in- I J

eluding government-owned installations, has been closer to that of the

United States since World War II, cost inflation and competition within
t
Ministries of Defense for development funds, plus the much larger competi- '(
tive R&D program of the U. S. Navy, have made the development of advanced

naval technological systems in Europe very difficult to achieve. There

I ~H

have, of course, been exceptions to this (the hovercraft and the Harrier

Carrier in the U.K.). New designs and technology in subsystems of naval

I
construction since World War II have tended to originate in the United j
States.
I
Among the Western European countries, only the U. K. and France have

relatively large, continuous naval construction programs. Both countries I

have maintained a naval nuclear deterrent force. France has three nuclear-

powered ballistic-missile submarines, and the U. K. four. Both have

I
maintained helicopter carriers or amphibious assault ships, of which

France has one and Britain two. France has two 22,000-ton aircraft car-
t
riers, and Britain has one, the Ark Royal at 33,000 tons. Each country
·J·
\ '

has a varying number of cruisers, destroyers, frigates and fast patrol j·

boats, plus diesel-electric submarines. Both naval services have accepted

l
I'
I - 131 -

t the mission of deep-water ocean patrol and participate regularly in

't ocean-going training exercises. Britain participates in NATO exercises,

while France's participation has been limited to the planning level.

To keep a fleet of SO to 75 surface vessels at sea requires an annual

I construction program for naval vessels. There are essentially three

reasons for this, the most important of which is the replacement factor.
I
~~ It is generally accepted that warships, as adequate launch platforms,

I should be scrapped after approximately 20 years. The proportion of ships

in the British and French Navies, however, which are more than 10 years

•I old, is two to one over the portion that is less than 10 years old,

which argues for either a stepped-up construction program by each

country in the period 1976 through 1985, or the decision to kee~ a smaller

I fleet afloat by each country during that same period. A second demand

determinant for naval construction is technological developments which

~

I continue to occur during a 20-year period and generally require changes

:1_., in ship, i.e. platform, size and configuration, to accommodate the techno-
i :
logical changes that have occurred in the launching systems. Finally, the

I frequently less obvious desire on the part of national governments to

keep a naval shipbuilding capacity in-being adds to the argument for a

t regular program for naval ship construction.

t While Britain and France, together, normally account for 67% of naval

ship procurement expenditures among the six Western European NATO coun-

I tries that maintain significant naval forces (the others are the Federal

Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium), there has

I been a strong tendency on the part of all six countries to direct all

I
t
 - 132 - I
shipbuilding contracts to yards in their own country. In addition to I
keeping some naval shipbuilding capacity available for future needs,

and (with the exception of France) to assisting the commercial sh~pbuild­

I
ing of each country to survive, there has been a conscious effort in I
each country to support national employment policies as much as possible,

keeping in mind that while total shipyard production is frequently not a t

significant factor in a national economy, shipyard employment can be

highly significant in a few concentrated areas where it is located.

I
As in the United States, the British government made a decision in the
I
early 1970s to direct all new naval construction to commercial shipyards ~
on the grounds that it is cheaper to build there than in naval dockyards.

Four naval dockyards in Britain, plus a fifth in Gibraltar, have been

kept for maintenance and refit of existing vessels. In France, all

naval ship construction is done in four government dockyards, with the

'
I
exception of some small diesel-electric submarines and patrol craft, I
which have been allocated to private yards. In addition, the French

government dockyards compete with private dockyards for export orders of

I
warships.
I
Even in Britain and France, a relatively low level of naval construction

has forced specialization to occur in two different ways. First, in each

f
country there is specialization between yards. As in the case of Electric
t
Boat Company in Groton, Connecticut, each country has one shipyard that

specializes, to the exclusion of others, in nuclear submarines. (Cherbourg r

Dockyard in France and Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness in England). Different
I
I
l
I - 133 -

·~
.
types of surface ships are allocated among lead shipyards, and it would

be very difficult and costly for transfers to take place between them.
li
,, In a second dimension, specialization has occurred in a limited way be-

tween countries. Partially in response to the practical needs of the

construction program, and partly due to the nature of assigned missions,

I
,,
Britain and France have tended to concentrate in recent years on fewer,

heavier ocean-going surface ships in the frigate and guided-missile

'" destroyer categories. Informal discussions between Britain and the Con-

tinental NATO powers have led West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium

'·~ to concentrate on lighter frigates and a larger number of fast patrol

boats and mine vessels for the inshore missions they have to assume.

·t Since World War II, there has been a spiraling decline (with some sig-

nificant exceptions) in the physical capacities of a majority of Western

'I' European shipyards. By 1975, Japan was up to 48.2% of total world ship

~- output, followed by Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom. Sweden 1 s

increasingly high labor rates an~ the history of poor management policies

1 and low productivity in Germany and the United Kingdom led inevitably to

lower investments in shipyards. (The reverse sequence can also be argued

·I· effectively.) Thus all of these countries found themselves progressively

less able to compete on the world market. As noted above, the British
I government, as part of its attempt to offset this situation, has trans-

'I: ferred naval production from Royal dockyards to private shipyards.

result throughou~
The

Western Europe has been consolidation of large shipyards

I and the specialization already referred to. There remain many small and

a: medium-sized shipyards serving local needs for specialized vessels and

ships to engage in cabotage (coast-wise shipping).

'I
·t
 - 134 - I
/
The net result of these trends, however, has been to make it very

difficult for European shipyards to find the funds for R&D and design
I
work, much less the capital improvements that are necessary to keep I
up with the rapidly developing and changing technology in naval war-

fare.
I
A paradox growing out of the changing requirements of naval warfare I
in the future (i.e., a larger number of smaller and more varied ship
I
platforms,which will bear launching systems capable of sustaining

anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare) may permit European NATO coun-

tries to resume affordable shipbuilding programs to replace their

aging fleets of larger-sized frigates, destroyers, and cruisers at

'
j
the very time they need to. In the absence of advance R&D and design
~
work, however, it will continue to be more probabl~ that the technol-

ogy behind the development of these ships will come from the United I
States.
I
I
J
'
j
I
I
I
1
I - 135 -

t B. Great Britain.

l At the end of 1975, the Royal Navy comprised 75 surface ships of frigate

t size or larger, including one aircraft carrier and two helicopter

32 submarines, including four nuclear ballistic-missile vessels, and

carriers~

I eight other nuclear-powered submarines, and 464 smaller craft, including

two assault ships. The construction program included three nuclear

I submarines, five guided missile destroyers, five frigates, four fast patrol

'I
boats, one helicopter, or so-called through-deck cruiser, and smaller

·. craft. Future construction plans call for concentration on nuclear-powered

submarines, guided-missile destroyers, guided-missile frigates, and smaller

ship platforms, including Hovercraft and a flat-decked frigate capable of

I
c ~
carrying VSTOL, such as the Sea Harrier and/or anti-submarine helicopters

I such as Sea Kings.

I As noted previously, British Navy has accepted the NATO mission of deep-

sea patrol in the North Atlantic, complementing that of the United States

I and, to a lesser extent, France. As the forward construction program, therefore,

indicates, there will be a continued need for new naval ship construction for

replacement and addition to the fleet.

I In 1964, thirteen shipyards, including the Royal Dockyards, were capable

of producing naval vessels. By 1976, this number is down essentially to

I three lead commercial yards, plus three additional commercial yards capable

I of building primarily on license for export.

Five Royal Dockyards remain in commission, four in the U. K. and one in

I Gibraltar. They are now confined entirely to repair, maintenance, and re-fit

I work. The following Table outlines the task of each Royal Dockyard from

I
 - 136 -

Source: British Ministry of Defense

As in the United States, the decision to shift all new naval ship con-

struction out of government-owned shipyards into commercial yards was

based on studies that demonstrated that the cost of building in the

latter was significantly lower than in the government facilities. Total II

employment in the five dockyards in 1975-76 approximated 33,600, of whom

just under 26,000 were industrial workers. It is estimated that by I

-~
1979-80 there will be 34,750, with the number of industrial workers re-

maining fairly constant. Capital expenditures at the five dockyards are

estimated to be about $52 million in the current year and to be $41 million fl
annually by 1980. There have been repeated attempts by the government

to reduce this expenditure, either by closing dockyards or reducing the

1\
workloads, but the attempts have generally failed, due in part to concern
~I
about increased unemployment and, in part, to concern for the disbandment
of essential skills now concentrated in the dockyards. There is a fairly I'
high degree of standardization between the British Royal Dockyards and
,'il'
~~'
I. - 137 -

,,
1' the repair and refit dockyards of the other NATO navies in areas of fuel

transfer, couplings, pipe sizes, etc.

Defense shipbuilding accounted for approximately 31% of all shipbuilding

1: in the U. K. in 1974. The British shipbuilding industry has, under the

impact of price competition from abroad (particularly the Japanese) and

:1\.
t.!') cost inflation at home, been reduced to some severe rationalization,

usually under government supervision. As a result, the government has

I
,, found itself in the position of owning varying amounts of different

I shipyard companies. For example, the government has had to take over

Sunderland Shipbuilders, Ltd., Appledore Shipbuilders, Ltd. in North Devon,

I Govan Shipbuilders, Ltd. in Glasgow, and currently owns 50% ofCammel Laird

at Birkenhead, Scot Lithgow, Ltd. in Glasgow, and Harland & Wolff in

I~ Belfast. The orderbook for most yards (with some notable exceptions)

'I: runs out in 1976 and 1977. In 1975, only 11% of orders from U. K. owners were

placed in U. K.: yards, instead of the 37% which have historically filled

I. approximately 75% of total U. K. shipyards. The orders went instead to

Japanese and South Korean shipyards, and shipyard owners and workers in
f, the U. K. have turned increasingly to the government for assistance.

·I' An industry nationalization bill is due to receive royal assent in October

1976, following which major reorganizations of the shipyard industry

may be expected. Chairman of the organizing committee, and Chairman

designate of the British Shipbuilders Corporation, is Vice Admiral Sir

Anthony Griffin, GCB, who recently retired as Controller of the Royal Navy

I' and Third Sea Lord.

I. The exceptions to the gloomy outlook described above fall into two classes.

One shipyard, Austin & Pickersgill, has concentrated on production in

'I
I'
 - 138 -
I
'
series of a standard type cargo ship, SD-14. They currently have 18 of

these 15,000 dwt. ton ships on order, with additional orders stretching
I
well into 1978. Part of their success has been due to concentration on I
a single line, part on the willingness of the company to invest sufficient

capital in both the yard and management talent to successfully market

I
their product.
I_
The other class of exceptions, the three main shipyards involved in naval
I
construction - Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness. Vosper Thornvcroft at Ports-

mouth and Southampton, and Yarrow on the Clyde - each have, and will con- I
tinue to have, a significant naval construction program under way. At

mid-year 1976, current orderbook for all three is composed exclusively

I
of naval vessels for the Royal Navy and foreign non-NATO navies.
I
The Royal Corps of Naval Constructors have historically done most

of the ship design for the Royal Navy. In recent years they have begun
I
to work very closely with the Design Departments of the three lead shipyards. I
The combined skills of the two groups, plus government-ordered specializa-

tion among the three yards, has proven to be a very successful formula. I
Vickers concentrates on nuclear submarines, the new through-deck cruiser, and
the Type 42 guided missile destroyers; Vesper Thornycroft works on the Type 21
I
frigate, fast patrol boats, and mine-countermeasure vessels made of glass-

reinforced plastic. Yarrow has specialized in the Type 22 frigate, but

has also built Type 2ls as well.

'I
I

'I
'I
 Table 18
British Shipyard Information
Production Person- Current
Yard Capacity Facilities nel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed By

Vickers, Ltd. Naval ships 4 Dry Docks 8,300 3 Nuclear Sub- $86MM Part of Sulzer, Switzer-
of all types: 5 Building marines Vickers Group land
Barrow-in- Submarines - Berths 2 OBERON Class Profit
Furness Nuclear and 1 Fitting- Submarines- (1969) M.A.N., Augsberg,
Diesel Out Pier Brazil W. Germany
Surface vessels .8 Cranes 2 Type 42 Des- $9, 720M
up to 160,000 troyers-
DWT Argentina Capital
Tankers· 1 Type 42 Des- (1971)
Cargo Ships troyer at
Bulk Carriers Swan Hunter $93.8MM
Design and 1 ASW Cruiser 1-'
Engineering (Invincible) w
\0

Swan Hunter Naval surface Wallsend: 15,000 2 Type 42 Des- (1970) Part of N.A.
Shipbuilders, vessels from (3,000 on troyers Swan Hunter
Ltd. frigate to 8 Building warship 1 Tanker $153.2MM Group
aircraft ·car- Berths produc- 4 Product shipbuilding
Wall send rier size 2 Cross-over tion) Tankers only
Tankers Berths 3 Tankers
Cargo vessels 12 Cranes (Cayman Is. ) Profit
Small ships 1 Fleet Tanker
Engine work (Iran) ($14. 9MM)
shipbuilding
only

Capital

$28.1MM
 Table 18 (continued)

Production Per- Cur::rent

.Y1!."!;A CaQacity Facilities sonnel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed By:
(1972) (1971)

Yarrow & Co., Naval ships 6 Drydocks 4,300 4 Type 21 Frigates

Ltd. up to 630' 6 Berths $46MM Yarrow Engineers,
Destroyers 6 Quays 2 Type 22 Frigates Glasgow
Scots town, Frigates 14 Cranes
Glasgow Patrol Boats Yarrow Africa
Boilermaking Annual steel (Pty) Ltd.
use: South Africa
14,000 tons

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~
0

Vosper Naval ships; Camber ¥ard 5,100 Portsmouth: $75MM N. A. N. A.

Thorneycroft primarily 2 berths 6 - 110' Fast
Ltd. Frigates Patrol Boats,
Corvettes Portchester Foreign
Portsmouth Fast patrol Works /

and boats 8 berths 2 - 75' Fast Patrol

Southampton Hovercraft Boats, Foreign
Woolston Works
up to 3 berths Southampton:
5,000 tons 1 Type 21 Frigate
1 Type 42 Destroyer
4 Frigates-Brazil
 Table 18 (continued)

Production Per- Current

Yard CaEacity Facilities sonnel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed By
(1971)

Scotts Ship- Naval ships: 7 Building Ways 8,500 1 OBERON class $50MM Part of Scott N. A.
building Co., Submarines submarine-Chile Lithgow Group,
Ltd. Surface ves- 1 Dry Dock 2 OBERON class Ltd.
sels up to submarines-
Greenock 520 1 1 Garnel Dry Australia CaEital
LNG Carriers Dock 2 Fleet Replen-
Container ishment vessels $6 ,111M
Ships 1 Exper. Research
Reefers vessel
Bulk Car- 3 D/P Drillships
riers Foreign
Tankers

Cammell Laird Naval surface 4 Ship Berths 5,800 2 Type 42 Des- N. A. N. A. N. A.

& Co., Ltd. ships up to (1,500 troyers
1050 tons 8 Cranes available 11 Products
Birkenhead Tankers for war- Tankers
Bulk Car- ship pro-
riers duct ion
Submarines
 - 142 - I
Table 18 provides detailed information on each of these three yards, I
plus three additional, Swan Hunter, Cammell Laird, and Scot Lithgow,

Ltd., which, working with the lead yards, have built some naval ships,

primarily for export. I

The economies of scale inherent in concentrating all ship types on three I
yards have led to a considerable volume of export orders for all three.

The following Table lists the surface warships of corvette size and I
larger built, or building, by the three lead shipyards to their own

design since 1945.

I
Numbers Type Country Designers

Three
Two
One
Des·troyers
Destroyers
Frigate
Venezuela
Chile
Malaysia
Vickers
Vickers
Yarrow
I
One Frigate Thailand Yarrow
Two
One
Two
Four
Corvettes
Corvette
Corvettes
Frigates
Ghana
Libya
Nigeria
Iran
Vosper Thornycroft
Vosper Thornycroft
Vosper Thornycroft
Vosper Thornycroft 1
Source:
~tinistry
British
of Defense
I
One Frigate Libya Vosper Thornycroft
Six•
-· -
Frigates Brazil Vosper Thornycroft
- ,- I
In addition, Vickers have built submarines for Brazil and Argentina,

·Vosper has built fast patrol boats for Venezuela, and Yarrow has built

frigates for Chile. This type of warship export business, combined with . I
relatively advanced technologies and the continued worldwide demand for

warships - particularly among newly emerging nations, is given credit

by the managements of all three shipyards for a significant part of the

continued profitability of their companies.

The home market for naval ships has prospered during the past two years

with the introduction of all-gas turbine engines combined in submarines

with diesel-electric engines for cruising. The original intention was

to have a class of Type 82 large guided missile destroyer/cruisers. The

cost, however, became prohibitive, and only on~ HMS Bristol, was launched.
 I - 143 -

I Type 42 guided-missile destroyers began with the launching of H.M.S.

I. Sheffield in 1971~ Six more of these ships have been ordered, of

which four have been launched. Two additional ships have been construe-

I~ ted for Argentina. Displacing 3,500 tons, the destroyer is designed to

carry the SEADART missile. Of the five that have been launched, two
~~ were produced by Vickers, two by Gammell Laird, and one by Newcastle,

I all under the supervision of the design team from Vickers.

1: The following Table provides the main particulars about the Type 42

destroyer:
Length, o.a. 125m
Length, b.p. 119.5 m
Beam 14.6 m
Draught 5.18 m
Displacement, standard 3150 t
Displacement, full-load 3500 t
Speed 30 knots
Maximum power 56 000 bhp
Cruise power 8500 bhp
Endurance 4200 nm at 1•8 knots
Complement 300
Source: British Ministry of Defense

I Type 21 frigates are general purpose vessels, displacing 2,500 tons.

Each will carry a Lynx helicopter armed with homing anti-submarine tor-
,.I pedoes and will have a quadruple short-range surface-to-air missile

·I· Seacat, one 4.5 11 MK8 Vickers gun, and six torpedoes tubes. Later ships

will be armed with the Sea Wolf surface-to-air missile and the EXOCET

I. ship-to-ship missile. All will have gas turbine propulsion. Eight

ships have been ordered and four are in commission. The first two
I ships were constructed by Vesper Thornycroft asvas the fourth, and the

,J third by Yarrow.

I
I.
 - 144 - I
Type 22 missile frigates are designed at 3,800 tons. The first two are I
being built by Yarrow.

Three "through-deck" helicopter cruisers have been planned. The design

I
work has been done by Vickers and the naval constructors working to- I
gether. The prototype ship - Invincible - will have an angled flight

deck, very similar to a small aircraft carrier, and will carry about nine
I
helicopters and five Sea Harriers (VSTOL) craft. The ship is designed I_
to be about 20,000 tons, and the prototype should come into service in

1979. I
One of the problems brought out in the defense expenditure review under- I
taken in 1975 in Britain was that progress on construction of the Invincible

had been seriously delayed by labor problems at the Vickers Yard at Barrow-
I
in-Furness. In July 1975, the ship was as far from entering service as

she had been in January 1975, although no major technical problems had
I
arisen. While it had been hoped that all three cruisers could be built J,
by Vickers, allowing experience gained in construction of the lead ship

to reduce overall program costs, it is now planned to build the second at

I
Swan Hunter on the Tyne because of the difficulties at Barrow. The labor
I
problems have not been work stoppages or union difficulties, but, rather,

the large number of workmen who have left the yard to go to work on the
,.
Continent or in the North Sea oil rigs, particularly in the steelwork

trades. When Invincible was first laid down, it was with the understand- I-
ing that Vickers would be able to recruit additional workforce. Contrary

to being able to recruit, there has been a net loss of skilled trades and,
I
as a result, the Navy will have to convert one or both of the existing a:
I
I
I - 145 -

helicopter or commando carriers to Harriers to fill the gap, thereby

I sacrificing the ability to transport two battalion landing teams of

I Marines ashore in emergency areas.

1: A new design proposed by Vosper Thornycroft, in conjunction with the

Hawker Siddeley Aviation Company, is for a completely new type of war-

-I ship: a vessel of frigate size (6,000 tons) with a carrier deck capable

of launching either eight Sea Harrier VSTOL (vertical short take-off and
I landing) aircraft, or eight Sea King antisubmarine helicopters, or any

I. mix totaling eight aircraft. The ship is, in essence, a small version

of the Invincible, and for that reason may bring the cost within reach

I of many navies that could not otherwise afford the larger vessel.

I The following Table gives the principal data about the proposed vessel,

which is called a Harrier Carrier:

I

Full load· .. 7200 t

Length oa .. 135m
Length on WL 122m

I Beam-flight deck
Beam-waterline
Draught
Ship's fuel ~nom)
28 m
21.2 m
6.5 m
740 t

-I Aircraft fuel (nom)

Range at 16 knots
Maximum speed
570 t
4500 nm
25 knots
Maximum shp 32 000
Fresh water 70 t
?rovisions for 60 days
Naval/aviation stores for 45 days
Maximum complement .. 385

Source: British Ministry of Defense

I.
 - 146 -
I
The entire ship design is built around characteristics of the Sea·Harrier
I
aircraft which can land vertically without restriction on the ship's

heading. The Sea Harrier, as an interceptor, carries 30 mm. guns and I

a Sidewinder air-to-air missile complement. One aircraft can be kept

in instant readiness on the VTO grid to intercept a threat from any direc-
J
tion without interfering with flying activities on the short takeoff

(STO) deck. A typical mission profile permits over 20 minutes of combat

I
air patrol loiter time at 100 nautical miles from the ship. There is I
space on deck to park all aircraft. In addition to antisubmarine func-

tions and air defense, these ships could carry out fleet support, civil
I
disaster relief, and troop transport functions. The Harrier Carrier's
I
great versatility and its low cost have led Vesper Thornycroft to hope

that not only the Royal Navy but foreign navies will include it in their I
ordering in future years.
I
Britain was the pioneer and is today the world leader in the production

of Kovercraft. British Hovercraft Corporation, on the Isle of Wight, is·

I
a subsidiary of Westland Aircraft Corporation. The three main hovercraft

models that are used for military purposes are the SRN6 (Winchester) which
I
weighs 10 tons and has a maximum speed of 57 knots, propelled by a Rolls- I
Royce gas turbine engine driving an air propeller. This craft can carry

20 fully-equipped troops, perform coastal defense missions, search and

I
rescue, and casualty evacuation. A second model is the BH7 (Wellington)
which, at 55 tons, is much larger and has a maximum speed of 55 knots.
I
This craft can carry 152 fully-equipped troops, or various combinations I
of troops, vehicles and stores. As a logistic vehicle, it can carry mili-

tary loads up to 14 tons, or can be equipped with guided missiles for

I
offshore defense work. The third model, the SRN4, (Mountbatten) is 190
I
I
I - 147 -

I tons and cruises at speeds of 60 knots on 8-foot deep cushion of air.

I It carries 254 passengers and 30 vehicles. The main engines are four

Rolls-Royce gas turbines .driving four 19'-diameter Hawker Siddeley vari-

I able-pitch propellers. More than 50 of the Winchesters have been sold

in nine countries. Iran has bought eight, as well as six of the BH7
I category.

I Other liovercraft manufacturers have designed new versions to compete with

I BHC. Vosper Thornycroft have developed the VT2, a 66-ton 60-knot craft

capable of carrying up to four ship-to-ship missiles and a 57 or 76 mm.

I gun.

I The combination of design and production skills concentrated in the three

lead yards, which has led to the development of the pbove six new ship

I types, represents a technological asset in naval ship construction second

I only to that of the United States, and perhaps the Soviet Union. The new

materials, such as fiberglass in mine countermeasures vessels, the develop-

I ment of high-speed patrol liovercraft, which are also capable of transport-

ing men, equipment and vehicles onto a beach, and the concept of the Harrier

I Carrier, which provides a relati~ely small and low-cost platform from

which to launch a novel mixture of aircraft types for antisubmarine or

I other purposes, all attest to these skills. New technological developments

I are going to occur among the NATO Navies in Western Europe which can be

the basis for licensing agreements with U. S. naval ship constructors, and

I there is a high probability they will occur in Britain.

I On the question of buying foreign equipment for the British services,

the Ministry of Defense stated that 75% of the equipment for the forces
I
I
 - 148 - I
was British, 15% was collaborative, and 10% was foreign. In order to justify I
foreign purchases, the Ministry had to be able to point to substantial

cost savings as well as military necessity, and industrial and political

I
considerations also had to be taken into account. The Ministry also stated I
that while it was government policy that the Royal Navy should cooperate
~s
to the utmost with other NATO nAvies, the problem of standardization and

cooperation fell into two parts - i.e., standardization, where the goal

was interoperability, and collaboration, which involved a great many inter-

I
dependent projects. Some measures of standardization had been achieved I
on equipment. There are a number of areas of standardized interoperability

between NATO navies. Some weapons systems are common to more than one
I
service - for example, EXOCET on French, British, and German frigates,

or SEACAT, which is common both to the Royal Navy and the Dutch Van Speijk
I
•
class of frigates. There is a standard NATO agreement on the interchange- I
ability of fuels, lubricants, and associated products. The majority of

NATO navies, including the United States, have now adopted a common fuel
I
(RN Dieso) as the standard main propulsion fuel for all modern warships,

and, as a result, fuel interchangeability is becoming a lessening problem.

I
On the negative side, after 25 years of cooperative activity, there has I
been a failure to achieve an interoperable naval communications system.

A NATO project group was set up in 1973. to study the development of a light
I
frigate (less than 2,500 tons) for all services. An agreement was reached

on the characteristics of a future light frigate which could meet the

I
requirements of the participants, but it is now agreed that it is unlikely I
that final decisions in this area would be reached for some time.
I
I
I
I - 149 -

I In the effort to rationalize tasks among the NATO navies leading to

standardization, the Royal Navy decided to give a high priority to the

I nuclear submarine program since none of the other European NATO navies

I (with the possible exception of France) seemed likely to be able to af-

ford to construct more than conventional submarines. On a different

I subject, a decision was reached to phase out aircraft carriers at the

end of the Ark Royal's service and depend entirely on the United States
I to provide strike carrier capability. In a third area, both Britain and

I France are placing less emphasis on coastal forces, or fast patrol boats,

and rely on the Danish, German, Dutch and Belgian Navies to be more active

I in those ship classes in relation to their missions, while the French

and the British concentrate on heavier ocean-going vessels of the frigate

I and destroyer variety. While there have not yet been any significant

I industrial contracts for the production of standardized equipment for

mutual use between allies, an effort is being made for the Royal Navy

I to standardize on English marine gas-turbine equipment. Both countries

are attempting to maintain a balance between the transaction on both

I sides to ensure that it does not affect the balance of payments.

I In an interview with Vice Admiral Sir Anthony Griffin, he maintained

that, for weapon and shipbuilding standardization programs to be really

I effective, they should start from the bottom up - that is, with the com-

'
I.
mercial firms who are doing the building. If they are brought together,

they should be able to work out areas where cooperation can be most

effective and efficient and identify the problems that are involved.

In his view, political and high-level statements and assurances are

I rarely realistic or satisfactory, and very little progress is made by

I
I
 - 150 - I
starting at the top. As examples, he quoted the Harrier Carrier project
I
inside the U. K. where Hawker Siddeley Aviation Company, Rolls-Royce,

Pratt & Whitney, and other companies all worked directly with Vosper I
Thornycroft to get a good end result. The helicopter arrangement between

Westland Aircraft Company and SNIAS in France was another example. A

J·
sensible dialogue was established which leads to further proposals for
I
commercial development.

In summary, while standardization and specialization have yet to make

I
great progress in Britain, the need for export orders, the technological I
skills concentrated in the three lead yards, and the generally weakened

condition of the remainder of the British shipbuilding industry, may

I
lead to greater cooperative efforts with other NATO navies in Western

Europe and provide some critical mass to serve as the base for licensing
I
interchange with U. S. naval shipbuilders. I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I C. France
- 151 -

I In 1969, defense shipbuilding performed in private shipyards amounted

·a to approximately 4% of total shipbuilding, or approximately $18 million.

Beginning in 1973, government expenditures for warships, other than nu-

I clear submarines, began to be reduced in favor of other branches of serv-

ice. As noted previously, all naval vessels produced for the French
I Navy, with the exception of small diesel submarines, escort vessels,

I and patrol craft, are constructed in naval dockyards owned by the French

government.

I In 1975, the French fleet consisted of 54 surface ships larger than

I frigate size (1,000 tons); 23 submarines, including three nuclear-powered

ballistic missile vessels; and 265 smaller ships. Eight additional sur-
I face ships, including four guided-missile frigates and four escorts, were

I under construction in naval dockyards. Also under construction were six

submarines, including two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

I Eight additional surface vessels, including one helicopter carrier and

one additional nuclear-powered hunter/killer submarine are projected for

I the future.

I Direction Technique des Construction Navales (DTCN), which is part of the

French Ministry of Defense, is the French government agency responsible

I for supervising construction in naval dockyards. In 1974, DTCN had 35,000

I employees, of which 12,000 were engaged in naval construction. Total

turnover amounted to approximately $630 million. Of the four major

I dockyards comprising DTCN, Cherbourg concentrates mainiy on submarines,

both diesel and nuclear. Toulon works primarily on repair,maintenance

I and refit. Brest and Lorient construct all of the surface

I
I
 - 152 - I
ships for the French Navy over approximately 1,000 tons. As noted above,
I
the rate of construction has declined somewhat for surface ships since

1973, but it plans to construct an additional helicopter carrier, an~ as a

I
continued program of frigates and escort vessels is maintained, these I
yards should be kept busy, though not up to capacity.
a·-
Despite the fact that France is a major shipping nation (60% of France's

import-export trade is seaborne), only 18% of the seaborne cargo is car- 1

ried in French ships. In 1975, only 1.5% of the world's cargo ships were

French and only 3% of the gross tonnage. Repeated plans to stimulate

I
the French commercial shipping industry (and thereby the shipbuilding in- I
dustry) have been cancelled due to lack of availabl~ capital and drain

on the nation's foreign exchange resources. I

The French shipbuilding industry, as a result of lack of demand for com- I
mercial ships for the French fleet and the government policy of maintain-

ing almost all naval construction in government dockyards, has had to

I
turn more and more toward high technology competency and production of
I
specialty ships, such as LNG carriers, and to the export market, in which

to sell the output. There are remarkable similarities in the development I

of the French commercial shipbuilding industry during the past 10 years

with that of the United States. Although the U. S. government does contract
I
naval construction to private shipyards exclusively, more than 90% of
I
Federal funding of naval vessels normally goes to only three shipyards.

Thus the major French commercial shipyards had to concentrate heavily

I
on container ships, tankers, Roll-on Roll-Off vessels, and liquid natural I
gas and liquid petroleum carriers; and while each retains some potential
I
I
I - 153 -

I capacity for naval ship construction, any large-scale transfer of such

construction to private yards would now mean major capital investment and

I re-tooling on the part of all of the yards. The accompanying Table 19

outlines the capacities of five of the principal commercial shipyards.

I Each has some residual capacity for naval construction. Dubigeon Norman-

I die in Nantes has produced diesel submarines of the Daphne Class for

both the French Navy and that of South Africa, but none are in construc-

I tion at the present time. An additional yard, Constructions ~chaniques

I de Normandie (CMN) specializes in small boats, such as fast patrol craft

and mine hunters. They currently have a contract to build 20 new fast

I patrol missile boats armed with the EXOCET missile for the West German

government. CNIM on the Mediterranean Coast near Toulon produces torpedo

I tubes and rocket launchers for the naval dockyard program, in addition

I to possible export sales. •

An important factor in both capital investment decisions and yard capacities

I has been the interlocking directorships and overlapping ownership of a

I number of principal French shipyards. Penhoet, CIE Industrielle et

Financi~e de Participation~ is a holding company with major interests

I in shipbuilding, which is, in turn, owned 18.3% by Compagnie Financiere

de Suez. Penhoet owns 62% of Chantier de !'Atlantique, 82% of CMN,

I 16% of Dubigeon Normandie, and 12.17% of an additional French shipyard,

II Chantier de la Loire.

I As in the case of the United States and Britain, the French shipyard

industry is small in relative terms Total personnel employed will amount

I to somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000, and, with the exception of tech-

nology developed for liquid natural gas carriers, there has been very
·a little research and development work done since World War II on hull

I
 Table 19
French Shipyard Information

Production Person- Current

Yard Capacity Facilities nel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed By

Chan tiers de Tankers 1 Building Dock 8,300 1 Tanker Panama (1969) S.E.M.T.-Pielstich Diesel Engines:
!'Atlantique LNG Carriers 1 Graving Dock 2 Tankers Shell $143MM Diesel engines P_ielstich,
St. Nazaire Bulk Carriers 1 Shipway 2 Tankers France G.A.A.A. B&W, Sulzer
Container Ships 2 Gantry Cranes 2 Tankers Arab Profit Babcock Atlantique Nuclear Propul-
Large Naval 750 & 250 tons Mar. G.E.X.A. sion: B&W
Surface Ships 1 LNG Bermuda ($3,850M) Desulfurization Turbines:
Ann. steel use: 1 LNG Neth. coop. with Dubigeon Stal-Laval
130,000 tons 2 LNG France CaEital Normandie Compressors:
1 Container SA Nuovo Bignone
7 Container Fr. $15,500M Italy

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-----------------------------~
-1'-
1
Chan tiers Tankers (VLCC) 1 Building Dock 3,500 1 Tanker Kuwait $144MM Le Prait Rouen Foster Wheeler
Navals de la LNG Carriers 1 Graving Dock 1 Tanker Germany Boilers
Ciotat LPG Carriers 2 Berths (2,500 2 Tankers Foreign $N.A. Nordberg Diesel
Container Ships in 1 LNG Algeria Engines
La Ciotat Large Naval Ann. steel prod'n) 1 LPG Esso $6,125M Reavell Air
Surface Ships use: 1 LPG Iran Compressors
100,000 tons 4 LPGs Kuwait Brown Bros. Steer-
1 LPG Norway ing Gears-
1 LPG France
2 Container
Ships
3 Cargo Ships

___ .. ____ _
 --------~----~--~--
Table 19 (continued)

Production Per- Current

Yard Capacity Facilities sonnel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed By

Chan tiers Tankers 2 Berths 3,200 2 LNG El Paso $98,800M Corp. de la Constr. N. A.
de France Ore/Bulk Car- 1 LNG France Navale
Dunkerque riers 2 Dry docks 3 LNG Malaysia $14,785M
LNG Carriers 1 LPG Bibby Gas-Transport
Dunkerque LPG Carriers Annual 5 RO/RO France $8,800M
RO/ROs steel use:]!: 2 Containers C.I.N.B.
Reefers 50,000 tons France
Cargo Ships France Gironde
Naval Surface
Ships

Dubigeon Diesel Sub- 4 berths 3,800 5 Product $66,000M N. A. N. A.

Norman die marines Carriers
(Daphne Class) 1 RO/RO
Nantes Reefers 2 Car Ferries
Container Ships
Drilling Rigs
 Table 19 (continued)

Production Current Subsid-

Yard Capacity Facilities Personnel Sales iaries

Construction Navales LPG Carriers 1 Dry Dock 4,500 2 Logistic Support N. A. N. A. EVT: Boilers
et Industrielles de LNG Carriers (Foreign Navy) Blohm & Voss:
La Mediterranee (CNIM) Container Ships 2 Berths 3 Container (Tung) Turbines
Tankers 4 Container (France) G. E.: Turbines
La Seyne (in Toulon) Reefers Annual steel 2 LNG Algeria Foster Wheeler:
RO/ROs use: 2 LNG Malaysia Boilers
Naval surface 100,000 tons 2 LPG France
ships incl.
Torpedo Tubes
and rocket
launchers
I - 157 -

I design, propulsion systems, or other subsystems which would play a decis-

I ive role in naval construction. Development of missiles, such as the

EXOCET, has forced French naval construction, as it has with other coun-

I tries, into a pattern of smaller, lighter platforms such as frigates, es-

cort vessels, and fast patrol boats, which, of necessity, are of fairly
I standard design throughout western navies, and the numbers of which, in

I any case, have not been sufficient to support advanced technological

R&D or investment. Thus, while France may continue to be a logical cus-

I tamer for certain advanced U. S. weapons systems, there is little likeli-

hood of the development of naval ship construction techniques in France

I that could be licensed to U. S. manufacturers.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 - 158 - I
D. Germany. Since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, a I
relatively small proportion of the defense budget has been allocated to

naval construction. Germany has historically spent far more on army troups
I
and military aircraft, and the result has been that the Navy has been con-

fined to small ships designed primarily for inshore patrolling. Further-

I
more, Germany has been the only NATO European country to order .naval ves- I
sels to be constructed outside the country. Orders were.placed\for

three guided-missile destroyers from the Bath Iron Works at Bath, Maine,
I
and for 20 fast patrol boats from CNM in France, armed with EXOCET mis-
I
siles. Approximately 30% of procurement funds have been spent abroad, and

defense shipbuilding in 1969 constituted between 5% and 10% of total ship- I

building in Germany, or approximately $72 million.
I
In 1975, the West German Navy consisted of 29 diesel submarines, 43 surface

ships (all ranging from fast patrol boats to guided missile destroyer types) , I
and 247 small craft. The new construction program includes one submarine

and 10 more fast patrol boats armed with the EXOCET missile to be construe-
I
ted in France. '
Previous plans to replace aging destroyer and frigate ~ypes
I
have been postponed indefinitely.
I
As a seagoing nation, Germany has had a long history of shipbuilding, al-

though not of naval types. One percentof the total work force in West I
Germany is employed in the shipbuilding industry. In certain coastal locali-

ties, this is naturally a much higher concentration - 12% in Schleswig Holstein

I
and 27% in East Friesland
I
Despite this industrial base, German shipyards have found it more and more

difficult to compete, particularly with Japanese serial production of large

I
I
I
I - 159 -

I vessels such as tankers, and have consequently turned to other activities

to earn revenue. There are five major shipbuilding companies summarized in

a· Table 20 which accompanies this section. Blohm & Voss has built frigates
in the past, but naval work now represents less than 12% of Blohm & Voss's
I annual volume. Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft and Rheinstahl Nordseewerke

I have both built submarines for West German navy as well as for export to

non-NATO countries. No such construction is currently under way, however.

I A. G. Weser, which in 1971 accounted for 28.4% of the nation's total out-

I put of $1.9 million gross registered tons, produces no naval construction

at .all.

I West German shipyards, like those in the United Kingdom, have been plagued

I with labor shortages. As in the United States, there are over 60 separate

crafts required to construct higher-technology ships such as Liquid Natural

I Gas Carriers and Container Ships. The difficulty of retaining skilled

workers in each of these crafts, the competition from other industries (now
I including North Sea oil drilling) has made labor shortages one of the main

I cause for delays in scheduled launchings.

I As in the case of French shipbuilding industry, there is a fairly high de-

gree of ownership concentration, although not as many overlapping director-

I ships. Table 21 outlines the ownership of the principal West

German shipyards.
I The combination of low emphasis on naval expenditures in the defense budget,

I plus the propensity to buy what few ships are required in foreign yards,

has led to the point where there is almost no naval construction in German
I shipyards. Major West German shipyards have concentrated on commercial

I
I
 Table 20
West German Shipyard Information

Production Per- Current

Yard Capacity Facilities sonnel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed By

Blohm und Container Ships 2 Building Ways 7,325 4 Container Ships (1970) Hamburg: Stal-Laval,
Voss Tankers 1 Building Basin 2 Bulk Carriers $139MM Ottensener Gotenberg,
Bulk Carriers 10 Floating Docks (5,500 Self-propelled Eisenwerk Sweden
Hamburg Reefers prodn.) derrick Profit Barthels &
Diesel Engines Floating dock Lueders. M.A.N., Nurum-
Submersible ($8,400) Marine- berg
Drilling Schiffstechnik diesel engines
Platform Capital Planungs
H. Schiffbau- Pielstick,
($17,600) Versuchungsan- SEMT Paris
stalt diesel engines
Elbe Wohnungs-
gesellschaft
B & V Unter-
stuetzungskasse
Oslo:
B & V Norden A/S

S. Africa:
B & V (Pty)
Johannesburg ·
-------------~~----
Table 20 (continued}

Production Per- Current

Capacity Facilities sonnel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed By

Bremer Container 5 Building ways 5,400 3 Turbine Tankers (1971) Cooper Vulkan M.A.N. Diesel
Vulkan Ships 1 Building Basin 4 Container Ships $106.5MM (50%) Engines
Schiffbau und Tankers 2 Floating Docks 2 OBO.Carriers Compressors
Maschinen- Car Carriers Fitting-out piers 3 Cargo Motor $892,000 Stal Laval
fabrik Reefers with cranes Ships Living Room Con- Turbines
Bulk Carriers N. A. strti:ction Co.
Bremen Ships' boilers (55%)
Foundry
products
Compressors

Howaldts- Cargo ships 17 Floating Docks 19,800 2 LNG Carriers $190.5MM kieler Verkswohuns- M.A.N. Diesel
werke- Container 4 Graving Docks 4 Tankers gen - Kiel Engines
Deutsche Ships 1 Floating Tank (9,000 4 Container Ships N. A.
Werft A.G. Bulk Car- 13 Berths Hamburg) 3 Bulk Carriers Simplex Turbulo A. E.G.
riers 1 Product $21,576M Marine Co., Ltd.
Kiel and Tankers (8,800 Carrier London Stal-Laval
Hamburg OBOs Kiel) 1 Drilling Rig Turbines
Naval Sur-
face Ships G. V. Boilers
Submarines
 Table 20 (continued)

Production Per- Current

Yard Capacity Facilities sonnel Order Book Sales Subsidiaries Licensed

Rhein- Cargo Liners 3 Shipbuilding 5,754 1 Bulk Carrier $48.2MM N. A. Sulzer

stahl- Container Ways 2 OBOs
Nordsee- Ships 1 Drydock 4 LPG Carriers N. A. M.A.N. Diesel
werke' Bulk Carriers 2 Floating Docks Engines
Tankers Outfitting Piers (consolida-
Emden Medium-sized ted with
ships Rheinstahl)

I--'
::)\
N
I

A. G. Bremen': Bremen: 7,950 Bremen: $159.7MM N. A. G. E.

Weser Tankers
Container 2 Shipways 3 Tankers $4.2MM Foster Wheeler
Bremen Ships 6 Cargo Ships
Bulk Car- Bremenhaven: 2 Container $109.2MM Westinghouse
Bremer- riers Ships
haven LNG Car- 2 Docks Babcock & Wilcox
iers 1 Slipway Bremerhaven:
OBOs Mitsui
Up to Annual steel 13 Cargo Ships
500,000 used: 3 Tankers
DWT 150,000 tons 3 Container
Ships
Bremerhaven:
Cargo Ships
Ferries
Ice Breakers,
etc.·
Up to 25,000
DWT

,.. ..
8 - 163 -

I Table 21

I Ownership of the Principal West German Shipyards

I
I Blohm und Voss August Thyssen-Huette
Ver. Elbe (Blohm Group)
Siemens von Dietlein
64.7%
17.9%

I· family 4.9%

Bremer Vulkan Thyssen-Bornemisza

I Group 92.0%

I Howaldtswerke-Deutsche
Werft Salzgitter (Government) 100.0%

I Rheinstahl/Nordseewerke Rheinstahl Group 100.0%

I A. G. Weser
•
Fried. Krupp GmbH 86.34%

I
I
I
Source: Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co., Inc.
I
I
I
I
I
I
 - 164 -
I
production of large capacity bulk carriers, both tanker and dry bulk, but I
only in recent years have been forced by Japanese competition to return to

higher technology vessels such as Liquid Natural Gas Carriers, Roll-On/Roll-Off

I
Vessels, etc. A capacity for naval construction exists in a number of yards, I·
principally those of A. G. Weser and Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, but would

require large-scale capital investment and re-tooling in order to make sych I

construction feasible. In addition, a domestic German design effort would

have to be mounted, or rigorous efforts made to obtain licensing rights

I
from foreign countries, presumably the United States, for major ship con- I
struction.

Thus while it is not inconceivable that non-NATO countries might in the

I
future place contracts with the larger German shipyards for small diesel I
submarines, or surface ships of the size of frigates or smaller (3,000 tons

or lower), no such contracts currently exist and there is no current impe-

I
tus for German shipyards to be doing R&D or design work. In these circum-

stances, it is unlikely there will be any licensing opportunities for German

I
technology in the naval shipbuilding category in the near future. I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 165 -

I E. Other NATO Navies.

I 1. Italy. The Italian Navy consists of 11 diesel-powered sub-

marines and 41 surface vessels larger than fast torpedo boats. Included
I are three guided-missile cruisers, four guided-missile destroyers, four

I other destroyers, and 11 frigates.

craft.
In addition, there are 243 smaller

While the defense budget share of total government expenditure

I has been declining since 1971, an additional five-year appropriation for

new naval construction between 1975 and 1980 has been approved. This
I program calls for one helicopter carrier, eight frigates, two diesel

I submarines, and 19 smaller craft, including one amphibious assault ship.

Considerable emphasis is being placed on small patrol craft, such as hydro-

I foils for inshore work, as well as helicopters.

I The Italian shipbuilding industry is 90% controlled by Institute Per La

Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI), the leading financial and industrial

-I group in Italy, which, in turn, controls six holding companies. One of

I them is Fincantieri, which controls most of the firms involved in ship-

building, ship repair, marine engineering and propeller manufacture.

I Another of IRI's holding companies is Finanziaria Marittima (FINMARE)

which controls the state interest in Italian shipping companies.

I
Fincantieri is divided into two main operating groups, the first of which,

I Italcantiere, controls shipbuilding at three yards, Genoa-Sestri. Monfalcone.

north of Trieste, and Castellamare di Stabia, south of Naples. The second

I major operating group under Fincantieri is Cantieri Navali Riuniti (CNR)

I which controls shipbuilding facilities at Palermo, Ancona, and the Riva

Trigoso, which is between Genoa and LaSpezia.

I
I
 - 166 -
I
Finmare is developing a national fleet development plan which will
I
define Italian shipping needs and, in turn, translate these into re-

quirements for new ship construction for Italian shipyards. Government I

assumption of responsibility for 90% of the country's shipyard capacity,

plus repair and marine engineering industries and the resulting capital
ll
investment program, are being followed with great interest in the United
I
Kingdom, which is on the verge of nationalization and needs some simi-

lar planning to retain its competitive position in world markets. I

CNR facility at Riva Trigoso is the main Italian shipyard for naval I
construction. Twelve frigates of 2,400-ton displacement (of CNR design)

are currently on order - four for the Italian Navy, four for the Peruvian I
Navy, and four for the Venezuelan Navy. It is likely that this orderbook

will be extended to 18 ships in the near future.

I
The Riva Trigoso Yard is currently the subject of a high degree of CNR
I
investment. Now under way is the construction of a large assembled unit
I
shop and continued development of the building berth area. By the autumn

of this year, it is expected that its sectional building method will be I

in full swing.

crane.
There is a new CMIG 200-ton 72-meter-high traveling gantry

The capacity of the yard should be in the area of 2 to 2.5 ships

I
per year of the 2,400-ton frigate class.
I
Despite the design capabilities of the Riva Trigosa Yard and the extensive

tanker, bulk carrier, and container ship capacity in other major Italian
I
yards, it is unlikely that much new development will be contributed to I
naval ship construction in the near-term future.
I
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I - 167 -

I 2. The ~etherlands. The Netherlands Navy currently consists of

I six diesel-powered submarines, one old cruiser with Terrier SAM Missiles,

10 destroyers, six frigates, six corvettes, and 99 small craft. Additional

I ships under construction or on order are two large (3,500 ton) guided

missile frigates, four missile frigates, eight general purpose frigates,

I and two other vessels.

I Between 1968 and 1972, a variety of designs were produced in negotiation

I with the Royal Navy to evolve an Anglo-Dutch frigate which would replace

12 destroyers in the Dutch Navy built during the 1950s. This effort did

I not succeed, and a thorough study of the U. S. Patrol Frigate design was

also discarded. The Dutch Navy, therefore, designed its own Standard
I Frigate in close cooperation with the builders, Royal de Scheidt Yard

I at Flushing. Eight of these anti-submarine warfare Standard Frigates

will be ordered between 1974 and 1977.

I The main propulsion machinery consists of two Rolls~Royce gas turbine en-

I gines, similar to those used by the Royal Navy. They drive two lips cp

propellers. Armament includes anti-submarine warfare torpedo tubes, two

I quadruple Harpoon SSM launchers, and a NATO Sea Sparrow PDMS missile sys-

tem. Each ship will be equipped with a Lynx reconnaissance helicopter.

I
The following Table provides the significant statistics for the Netherlands
I Standard Frigate:

I
I
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 - 168 - I
I
RNN frigate - principal particulars

Length o.a. ............ . 128 m

I
Length b.p. 121.8 m II
Beam ................... 14.4 m

Displacement •.•••••••••. +3,500 t

I
Speed, maximum •....••••.

Cruising range ••••..•...

30 knots

4,000 nm
I
Complement •••.•.••.•..•. 189 I
While there are many medium-sized shipyards in the Netherlands, the I
largest and most significant is Rijn-Schelde-Verolme. This group holds

most of the shipbuilding capacity in the Netherlands. Only two other I

Netherlands yards show capacities above 20,000 tons. RSV has four

domestic yards and two overseas yards, with 26 building docks and 35
I
repair docks in Holland. One shipyard· in the group, Royal Schelde, I
Koninklijke Mij de Schelde, B.V. at Vlissingen, concentrates on naval

ships, including guided missile frigates and submarines. The shipyard I

employs 3,500 workers and has a current orderbook of one guided missile

frigate, and eight standard frigates for the Royal Dutch Navy.
I
While the Dutch take considerable pride in the design of the Standard
I
Frigate to Dutch specifications, it is nevertheless evident from the

ship's specifications that much of the design technology was derived from
I
the Type 42 Frigate developed in the U.K. It is unlikely that Dutch naval I
design or construction capacity will be significant in the development of

new technology in the near future.

I
I
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I - 169 -

I 3. Belgium. Prior to 1973, the Royal Belgian Navy concentrated on

mine counter-measure operations in the NATO Channel Command. Naval forces

I consisted entirely of mine vessels and smaller craft. It was decided,

I however, at that time to acquire four anti-submarine warfare frigates

suitable for operation in restricted waters adjacent to Belgium. With

I the cooperation of the two main shipyards, designs were begun with the help

of the Netherlands. Four ships were ordered beginning in 1973, and will
I begin to be delivered to the Navy in December 1976. The following Table

I provides vital statistics for the new frigate type:

I RBN frigate - principal particulars

I Length o. a. 128 m

Length b.p. 103 m

I Beam 12.3 m

..................
I Draught

Displacement, standard ...

5.6 m

1,940 t

I Displacement, Full-load .. 2,340 t

Speed, maximum ........... 28 knots

I Cruising range .......... 4,500 nm

I Complement 155

The two principal shipyards in Belgium, Boelwerf NV at Tamise, near Antwerp,

I and Cockerill Yards at Hoboken, can each produce major ship types. ?5,000-

I dwt. bulk carriers and 131,000 cubic meter LNG carriers are currently

being constructed. Like the other commercial yards in Western European

I NATO countries, with the exception of the three lead yards in the U.K.,

I
I
 - 170 - I
I
they have little or no capacity for the production of naval vessels.

4. Denmark. The Royal Danish Navy comprises six diesel-powered patrol

I
submarines, seven frigates, four corvettes, 16 fast patrol boats and 74 II
smaller craft. With the exception of the four corvettes, all of these

have been built in Denmark, either in private shipyards or the Royal

I
dockyard in Copenhagen.
I
In November, 1973, the Danish Navy started discussions with U. K. private

shipyards to consider the construction of corvettes or frigates, either

I
in the U.K. or under license in Denmark. The firm of Y-Ard, Ltd., consult- I
ants of Scotstoun, near Glasgow, were given a contract in 1974 to design

a new warship. It was to range in size between fast patrol boats and I
.
frigates. As a result, at the end of 1975, the Royal Danish Navy placed

an order with Aalborg Shipyard, Ltd. for the building of three corvettes
I
to the Y-Ard design. Each vessel will have a displacement of 1,300 tons I
and will include the Sea Sparrow surface-to-surface and the Harpoon surface-

to-air missiles. I
While design for this new class of ships was done in the U.K., the Aalborg I
Yard has had long experience of constructing small vessels to design for

the Royal Danish Navy. There are at least two other yards in Denmark,
I
Burmeister and Wains in Copenhagen, and Odense, which have the capacity
I
to build large tonnage ships but which do not have either experience or

equipment for naval vessels. I

I
I
I
I - 171 -

I
5. Norway. The Norwegian Navy consists of 15 coastal submarines,

I five frigates, two corvettes, 26 fast missile boats, 20 fast torpedo boats,

and 39 other vessels. No additional construction is currently under way.

I
Norway, like the other NATO sea-coast countries, has a significant ship-·
I building industry. A. Aker group and the Moss Rosenberg Verft are both

I world-famous. Moss Rosenberg is one of the principal producers of LPG

and LNG carriers in the world. While these yards may be able to accommodate

I naval construction in the future, it will require re-tooling and conversion.

I
I
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 - 172 - I
F. Conclusions. I
As can be seen from the following Table 22, Britain and France strongly I
dominate Western European NATO navies and therefore their requirements

for naval ship construction. Britain has 38% of total surface ships
I~
larger than frigate size among the eight nations studied, followed by

France with 27%. The two nations possess 37% of diesel~powered submarines
I
and 100% of nuclear-powered. West Germany and Italy form a second rank I
with medium-sized patrol ships and frigates, as well as diesel-powered

patrol submarines. The four smaller countries concentrate heavily on

I
fast patrol craft for inshore coverage.
I
It is not surprising, therefore, that naval ship construction, and especially

naval ship design, has tended to be strongly concentrated in Britain and

I
France. Since French naval ship construction is carried on in government- I
owned dockyards, much of the information related to it is classified.

The influence of the British drive for exPort orders, however, from the I
three lead shipyards, Vickers, Vosper Thornycroft and Yarrow, has been ap-

parent in design configuration and armaments of the remaining six coun-

I
tries. I
While the outlook for standardization of naval components, ammunition,
I
and fuel and for collaboration in naval ship construction is, at best,

unclear, certain conclusions about the future direction of naval ship I

technology seem reasonable at this time.
I
I
1
I
I
------------------- Table 22

Shi,es in Service (and on Order)

(1975)

West Nether-
Total Britain France Germany Italy Belgium Denmark Norway

Surface Ships
(Larger than Frigates) 197 (42) 75 (11) 54 (4) 17 22 (9) 17 (14) -(4) 7 5

SSBN 7 (2) 4 3 (2)

SSN 8 (3) 8 (3)

SS Diesel 107 (7) 20 - 20 (4) 29 (1) 11 (2) 6 6 15

1-'
-....!
w
Smaller Ships 1,603 (39) . 464 (4) 265 (4) 273 (10) 262 (19) 105 (2) 53 94 87

(On Order)

Source: Hoagland, MacLachlan & Co., Inc.

 - 174 - I
There will undoubtedly be continued pressure from cost inflation and I
the desire to reduce defense expenditures to hold down total ship con-

struction in each country. This will be offset in part by the desire

I
to maintain an employment policy and total shipyard capacity above I
certain minimum levels.
I
The types of ship platforms considered for construction in the next decade

by each of the NATO navies will be influenced by three factors. First, I

the recognized inability of all but the British, and possibly the French,

to keep up with technological developments at the same rate as the

I
Superpowers. Second, the decline, due to the lower level of naval ship
I
employment in recent year~ in over-age or excess vessels available for

sale on the export market. Third, the changing nature of the naval mis- I
sions assigned to the Continental naval powers and the rapidly-changing

configuration requirements for ship platforms to perform these tasks.

I
An interesting paradox is emerging from the confluence of the trends-toward I
limited defense expenditures for naval ship construction and the changing

requirements for types of ships. The enormously increased fire power

I
now available to smaller navies in the form of, particularly, antiship I
missiles may require a number of much smaller ship platforms to perform

the task of coastal and inshore patrol work, as well as deep-water ocean
I
patrol of medium endurance. Thus, new designs like the Harrier Carrier,

or smaller-sized frigates, may be both affordable in appropriate numbers

I
and sufficient for assigned missions for all or most of the smaller navies, I
as well as Britain and France. This possibility argues for increased ex-

port orders for the British lead yards as well as, possibly, for DTCN
I
1
in France. There will undoubtedly continue to be a drive on the part of

both countries to dominate the export market through continued design

I
I
I - 175 -

I development, as well as maintenance of ship construction capacity.

Notwithstanding this, the desire of each country to maintain its own

I naval shipbuilding capacity will remain strong and thus the need for

I collaboration between the design team,

and
wh~ch may be British or French,

the various national· shipyards will perhaps give rise to collab-

I orative efforts.

I The contrasting missions of the French and British offshore fleets

(deep-water ASW and patrol) and the Continental navies (inshore, coastal
I defense, and mine work) will continue to cause a disparity in the empha-

sis on naval construction and the amount of each national defense budget
I devoted to the navy. The cost factors, however, will continue to argue

I for greater interchangeability between particularly adjacent countries

and standardization, wherever possible, of equipment. The use of the

I French EXOCET missile by Britain, France, and Germany on patrol craft is

I an indication of how this can work, straddling both general mission areas.

On the question of technological development which can be exported (and

I excepting whatever may emerge from the design work done in the French

I government dockyards), it seems most likely that such developments will

be confined to the three main British yards and the associated design

I. firms. It is indeed possible that another NATO country may develop a

new weapons system for mounting on a frigate type, for example, or that
I the government design bureaus in, for example, Holland or Denmark might

I work out one new technological system applicable to a multinational class

of ships. On a longer-range basis, however, the combination of design

I and construction skills and the volume of continuous naval production

I
I
 - 176 - I
in Britain argue that this team will be the only one likely to compete

with the United States on the technology front. The development of the
I
Hovercraft and the Harrier Carrier have already been quoted as examples I
of this, and it is not inconceivable that developments such as these could

be the subject of licensing negotiations with three main shipyards doing

I
the bulk of U. S. Naval production, namely Electric Boat, Newport News,

and Ingalls Shipyard at Pascagoula, Mississippi. Joint projects such

I
as the Harpoon-equipped patrol hydrofoil, now under joint development I
by Italy, Germany and the United States, will benefit greatly from the

pioneer work done in Britain. Similar projects can be expected from

I
the British work on small platform types capable of supporting various
I
types of aircraft for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare.

I
I
I
I
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I
I - 177 -

I
IV. The European Tank Industry
I
A. Introduction

I B. Organization of Development and Manufacture

II 1. United Kingdom

2. Federal Republic of Germany

I 3. France

I 4. Other Countries

c. Current and Future Programs

I 1. United Kingdom

I 2. Federal Republic of Germany

3. France

I 4. Other Countries

I D. Comparisons with the United States

1. General Situation
I 2. Design of Battle Tanks

I 3.

4.
Other Vehicles

Major Components

I E. .Licensing Opportunities

I
I I

I
I
I
 - 178 -
I
I
I
A. Introduction I
I
I
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I
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I
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I - 179 -

I A. Introduction

I Part IV examines the capabilities of European NATO countries and

I France to develope and to manufacture tanks and other armored

vehicles, including their major components. It starts with a de-

I scription of how these activities are carried out in the different

countries concerned, which includes an outline of the organization

I of government and industrial establishments involved in them and a

I list of principal facilities. The paper then deals with the prin-

cipal current and future programs and the characteristics of the

I vehicles produced in the different countries. Finally, the paper

compares the activities and products of the countries concerned

I with those of the United States and ends with an attempt to assess

I opportunities for trans-Atlantic licensing, especially for European

licenses in the United States.

I This Section was completed, as the text will indicate, prior to the

I latest agreement between Bonn and Washington, signed in late July,

1976, regarding commonality of components for the main battle tanks

I of the two countries. However, few of the conclusions presented

I here would require change because of the latest agreement.

I
I
I
I
I
 I
- 180 -
I
I
B. Organization of Development and Manufacture
I
1. United Kingdom
I
2. Federal Republic of Germany I
3. France I
4. Other Countries I
I
I
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J
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I - 181 -

I
I 1. United Kingdom

I Of all the European countries, Britain has the longest record of tank

development and continues to be one of their .most important manufactur-

I ing centers. Development and design of armored vehicles in the UK is

very largely carried out in government establishments. The principal

I one is the Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment (MVEE),

I located in Chertsey, Surrey, which has an overall responsibility under

the British Ministry of Defense Procurement Executive for research and

I development in the field of armored combat vehicles, ranging from

heavy battle tanks to light armored reconnaissance vehicles. However,

I tank guns as well as other weapons are the responsibility of another

I government establishment, the Royal Armament Research and Development

Establishment (RARDE), at Fort Halstead, Kent, which also shares with

I MVEE the responsibility for the development of armor.

I MVEE employs about 2,000 professional engineers, technicians and workers,

and its capabilities compare in general with those of the U.S. Army
I Tank-Automotive Research and Development Command (TARADCOM, formerly

I TACOM) in Warren, Michigan.

Detailed design of armored vehicles for production is generally carried

I out elsewhere, at the manufacturing centers. The principal of these

I is the Royal Ordnance Factory (ROF) at Barnbow, Leeds. ROF Leeds is a

modern, well-equipped manufacturing plant built primarily to machine

I heavy components of battle tanks and to assemble them, but at present

I
I
 - 182 -
I
I
it manufactures not only the Chieftain battle tank but also the Fox

wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicle. The only other battle tank

I
manufacturing facility in the UK is the plant of the Armament Division

of Vickers Ltd., in Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

I
Light armored vehicles are for most part manufactured by Alvis Ltd.,
I
of Coventry, a division of British Leyland Ltd., Britain's largest I
automotive group is at present heavily dependent for its continued

operation on government financial support. However, in contrast to

I
its parent company, Alvis' financial position has been sound.
I
At present Alvis is manufacturing light tracked armored vehicles of

the Scorpion family. Until recently they also produced six-wheeled

I
armbred vehicles of the Saracen-Saladin series. Alvis employs 2,000
I
people and has what is probably the world's most modern equipment for

automatic machining and welding of the aluminum armor plates, of which I

~t
the turrets and hulls of the Scorpion family are made.

Some light wheeled armored vehicles based on truck chassis are also

being made by Short Brothers and Harland Ltd., of Belfast, in Northern

\1
Ireland, and by GKN Sankey Ltd., of Telford, Salop, a division of GKN,

Britain's largest engineering group, which was responsible for the manu-
I
facture of the FV 432 armored personnel carrier (APC), the British I
equivalent of the US Ml13 APC.
I
All British tank guns are made at the ROF in Nottingham, which together

with RARDE is responsible for the leading position occupied by the UK I

I'
'I
I - 183 -

I
in the tank field. In particular, it manufactures the 105mm high-
I velocity gun which is used in German Leopard 1 and several other types

I of tanks~ as well as being made under license in the United States.

ROF Nottingham also manufactures~ of course, the 120mm gun of the

'I Chieftain battle tank and a medium-velocity 76mm gun for lighter

armored vehicles, such as the Scorpion.

Smaller weapons, and in particular the highly effective 30mm RARDEN

I light armored vehicle gun, are the responsibility of ROF Enfield.

I Altogether there are eleven ROFs employing 20,000 people, of whom

about 1,500 work at ROF Leeds.

I Automotive components of armored vehicles are designed and manufactured

'I
by industrial companies. Thus, the L-60 diesel of the Chieftain has

been developed and produced by the Leyland division of British Leyland.

The Diesel Division of Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd., located in Shrewsbury,

is now developing a new range of tank diesels, while the Jaguar division
I of British Leyland, in Coventry, is manufacturing a militarized version

i of one of its gasoline engines for light armored vehicles, such as the

Scorpion and Fox.

I Self-changing Gears division of British Leyland and David Brown, Ltd.,

I Huddersfield, have manufactured tracked vehicle transmissions, while

GEC Ltd., and Marconi Radar Systems Ltd., have been responsible for

I the development and production of tank fire control systems.

I Between them, the government and industrial facilities provide the UK

with the ability to develop and produce, virtually without any help
I
I
 - 184 - I
I
·-.·
from abroad, the most advanced combat vehicles and to manufacture them

not only for British forces but also for large-scale export. Thus, I
the UK has sold more than 2,000 of the highly successful Centurion battle

tank and is now engaged in producing a similar number of Chieftains for

I
export. Until recently it has also been a major producer and exporter of

wheeled armored vehicles and is now beginning to export light tracked

armored vehicles of the Scorpion family, whose total production is going

'I
to amount to more than 3,000 vehicles.
I
I
t
'I
t
I
I
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I
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f;
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I - 185 -

I 2. Federal Republic of Germany

I Although the development of armored vehicles was not resumed in Germany

I· until the mid-fifties, Germany has since become the largest producer of

battle tanks in Western Europe. It has, in fact, produced about 3,000

I of them, not only for its own army but also for the armies of Belgium,

I Netherlands, Norway, Italy and Denmark; and more tanks have been ordered

from FRG by Australia, Canada, Greece and Turkey.

I In contrast to the UK, Germany has no government design and development

I establishment comparable to USATARADCOM, although it has a well-equipped

government establishment for the testing of armored vehicles, which

I might be compared, so far as automotive components are concerned, to

I the US Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground in Marrland, or some of the test

facilities at Warren, Michigan. Thus, design and development of armored

•I vehicles is done largely by industry.

In the case of tanks, development and production are carried out primarily

by the armored vehicle division of Krauss-Maffei AG, a heavy engineering

'I company located in Munich, which acts as the parent organization for the

manufacture of battle tanks in FRG. Krauss-Maffei have a total workforce

of 6,000, of whom about 10 per cent are concerned with tanks, and they

t have Europe's most highly organized tank assembly line.

However, turrets of German tanks are designed and made by Wegmann & Co.
I in Kassel, a heavy engineering company which has a workforce of about

I 1,800, approximately one half of whom are concerned with defense projects.

Tank design studies are also carried out by the Porsche Company in
I Stuttgart and by MAK Maschinenbau GmbH in Kiel.

I
 - 186 -
I
I
MAK also manufactures the armored recovery version of the standard

FRG Leopard I battle tank and shares in the production of the Marder
I
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV), whose principal manufacturer I
is Rheinstahl AG-Transporttechnik of Kassel. MAK has a workforce of

about 3,700, of whom 40% are engaged in defense contracts while I

Rheinstahl-Transporttechnik has about 4,000 of whom 1,000 are in de-

fense.
I
In addition to the Marder MICV, Rheinstahl also produces the eight-
I
wheeled Lynx armored reconnaissance vehicle and has produced several

hundred gun-and-missile-armed tank destroyers.based on the Marder

I
chassis. Other wheeled armored vehicles of.the Transportpanzer type I
which are based on truck components are being made by Daimler-Benz.
I
Engines for German tanks and MICVs, which are water-cooled four-stroke

diesels, are developed and built by Motoren and Turbinen Union GmbH of I~

Friedrichshafen AG and by Renk AG in Nuremberg.

I
Leopard tanks currently in production are still armed with the 105mm

gun imported from the UK, but Rheinmetall GmbH of Dusseldorf has now
I
developed new 105 and 120mm guns for Leopard II as well as manufactur-
I
ing 20mm automatic cannons for the Marder and for other light armored

vehicles. Rheinmetall employs about 8,000 people, of whom approximately ·I·

3,500 are employed on defense business.
I
Except for the participation of some U.S. companies, such as Cadillac

Gage in stabilized gun controls and Hughes Aircraft Co. in laser range- I
I
I
I. - 187 -

I finders, FRG is fully capable of producing by itself a full range of

'1: armored combat vehicles and has established a lead in some areas, such

as tank transmissions and stabilized optics.

I
I
·I·
I
a:
I
.,
.,'"

·a
I
I
.,
I
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a~
 - 188 -
I
I
3. France

Like the British, French armored vehicle development is government

I
centered. Tanks as well as other types of armored vehicles are de- I
veloped and designed at the Atelier d'Issy-les-Moulineaux (AMXO, a

government establishment located at Satory near Versailles. Battle

I
tanks and other tracked armored vehicles are also manufactured at a

government establishment, the Atelier de Construction de Roanne (ARE)

I
at Roanne in central France; but earlier AMX 13 light tanks are still I
manufactured by a private company, Creusot-Loire.
I
AMX and ARE are both part of the Groupement Industrielle des Armaments

Terrestres (GIAT), which comes under the Direction Technique des Arme- I
'I
ments Terrestres (DTAT) of the French Ministry of Defense. In addition

to AMX and ARE, GIAT incorporates eight other establishments and employs

a total of 17,000, of whom 1,050 are employed at AMX and 2,900 at ARE.

Tank guns as well as other guns of more than 30mm caliber are developed

and produced at the Etablissement d'Etudes et Fabrication d'Armament

I
de Bourges (EFAB), at Bourges, which employes 2,500 people. Turrets I
and other heavy components are made at another GIAT establishment, the

Atelier de Construction de Tarbes (ATS), which is located in the foot-

I'·
hills of the Pyrenees and which employs 2,900 people.
I
As in the UK, automotive components are produced by industrial companies.

In particular, tank engines are made by SAVIEM, the truck division of

I
the government-owned Regie Nationale des Usines Renault. I
1
I
I
II - 189 -

a:
~~ Wheeled armored vehicles are generally designed and made by industrial

organizations, under contract from DTAT or on their own initiative.

'1: The companies concerned consist of S.C.M., Panhard, and Levassor, the

a) world's oldest manufacturers of combat vehicles, who are located in a

suburb of Paris and who are now part of the Citroen car group.

:t Panhard have sold their light four-wheeled armored cars to about 30

countries. Two other companies are SAVIEM, mentioned earlier, who are

·I beginning to manufacture the VAB wheeled armored transporter, somewhat

·a similar in principle to the German Transportpanzer,and Berliet (now a

SAVIEM subsidiary), a heavy truck manufacturer which builds the four-

·t. wheeled general-purpose VXB armored carrier (which resembles the U.S.

Cadillac Gage Commando.)

·a
., Like the British, the French are virtually self-sufficient in the field

of armored combat vehicles and have shown themselves capable of develop-

ing and manufacturing all types. In fact, they have a wider range of
I armored vehicles than either the British or the West Germans.

t
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 - 190 -
I
I
4. Other Countries
I
Apart from the UK and FRG, the only European NATO country to have a

major armored vehicle manufacturing facility is Italy. Its facility .I'

consists of the OTO-Melara SpA plant outside La Spezia, which has a

workforce of about 1,500, employed on naval ordnance as well as ground

·I

'
equipment. The plant has assembled 200 U.S.-designed M60Al battle

tanks and is now manufacturing 600 Leopard I tanks, using a number of

components supplied from Germany. For several years OTO-Melara has I

also manufactured M113 armored personnel carriers under a co-production I.
agreement with the United States; and they have now produced an im-

I
proved version of the Mll3 which has been developed by the Italian

Army and is designated the Infantry Armored Fighting Vehicle (IAFV).

The Special Vehicles Division of Fiat, the large Italian automotive

,.
company, has also participated in OTO-Melara's production of the M60Al a
and more recently of the Leopard I. It has also developed two-

wheeled armored vehicles of its own, the Type 6614 armored carrier t
and the Type 6616 armored car, but neither has yet gone into quantity

production.

Italy has considerable further potential for armored vehicle develop-

'
t;·
ment based on companies such as: Ottico Meccanico Italiana (OMI), which ;J·
has manufactured tank optical rangefinders; Breda Meccanica Bresciana

SpA (BMB), which has been working closely with the Swedish Bofors Company ·I·
on naval and ground gun mountings; and Contraves Italiana, an affiliate
.I
I
I
I - 191 -

I of the Swiss Oerlikon-Buhrle company - well known for its light anti-

I aircraft guns and fire control systems.

I The Netherlands has limited armored vehicle design and development

facilities vested in the DAF truck company of Eindhoven. However,

I apart from one or two light to medium vehicle prototypes, DAF has

I
., __
only produced, some years ago, the YP-408 eight-wheeled armored carrier

based on one of their truck chassis.

I More significant are the Dutch capabilities in the area of electronics

I related to gun systems, vested in the Philips company which has played

a major role in the development of the twin 35mm anti-aircraft tank gun
1 based on the FRG Leopard chassis to be produced for German, Dutch and

I Belgian armies, by supply~g radar equipment for its fire control system.

t Apart from the rifle-caliber machine guns produced by its famous FN

company, Belgium has only produced medium-pressure 90mm smooth bore

I guns and integrated fire control systems for battle tanks. The former

are suitable for light armored vehicles; and one of the 90mm guns is

t offered on a model of the Cadillac Gage armored car series, while an-

other has been mounted in the FN police armored car, the only armored

' vehicle of Belgian design. The fire control system for the Leopard

'i tanks of the Belgian Army, and also those ordered by Australia, has been

produced by SABCA working under license from the Hughes Aircraft Company.

The only other significant Belgian activity in the field of armored

vehicles is participation in the production of the British-developed

I
I
I
 - 192 -
I
I
Scorpion family of light tracked vehicles, some of which have been

assembled in Belgium.
I
Norway's activities in the armored vehicle field have been confined l
to modernization of its U.S.-built M24 light tanks by the Thune-Eureka

Company. It has, however, made a significant contribution to some

I
British and other tank fire control systems by supplying laser range-
I
finders developed by Simrad AS of Oslo.

The remaining five countries - Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal, Greece

I
and Turkey - have at present no capability to develop or to manufacture I
armored vehicles, although Portugal built some copies of the U.S.

developed Cadillac Gage Commando armored cars, and Greece may start to
I
build some armored vehicles in the near future.
I
I
I
'
'I
i
I
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I
I. - 193 -

-~
a:
~~~ c. Current and Future Programs

a 1. United Kingdom

I .
-~ .,.,/
2. Federal Republic of Germany

·I: 3. France

1: 4. Other Countries

a.
I.
I.
II
I
II\
a:
a:
I
a·
I
 - 194 - I
1. United Kingdom
I
By far the most important British armored vehicle program is the
I
manufacture of Chieftain battle tanks. Approximately 600 have been
t
produced for the British Army and another 600 for Iran. A further

1,200 of an improved type are to be produced for Iran, and 100 have a
also been ordered by Kuwait.
I
With the possible exception of the latest Soviet tank, the Chieftain

is the most powerful battle tank in service anywhere in the world. I

It weighs 55 metric tons, which means that it carries heavy armor;

and it is armed with a 120mm gun which fires highly effective armor-
I
piercing discarding sabot (APDS) projectiles. The British have held I
a world lead in the development of this type of ammunition, and their

earlier APDS-firing 105mm gun has won wide acclaim. Thus, it was

adopted for production in the United States for the M60 series of tanks
·-1
and has been retained for the latest U.S. XM-1 battle tank prototypes.

It has also been adopted for the German Leopard, Swiss Px.61 and 68, I
Swedish S-tank, Indian Vijayanta and the Japanese Type 74 battle tanks.
I
The general layout of the Chieftain is much the same as that of almost

all other contemporary battle tanks, and its design has been evolved

directly from the earlier, well-proven Centurion tank. However, it

is unique in having a supine position for the driver, which lowers the
'I
height of its hull and reduces its silhouette.
1
t
I
I
I - 195 -

'I The original fire control system of the Chieftain has been unusual,

being of a simple and robust kind based on a ranging machine-gun,

l instead of the optical rangefinders favored in contemporary U.S. and

other tanks. Howeve~ this system is now being replaced by a fire

l control system incorporating a laser rangefinder and an electronic

I computer which is as advanced as that being retrofitted in U.S. M60Al

Product-Improved tanks. On the other hand, unlike contemporary U.S .•

l German, and French tanks, the Chieftain has been fitted from the start

t with stabilized gun controls for firing on the move, in keeping with

the lead which Britain established in the use of stabilized gun controls

t after World War II.

I The least satisfactory feature of the Chieftain has been its L-60 en-

gine, developed and produced by British Leyland. This 720 hp engine

t
,,
is of the six-cylinder, opposed-piston two-stroke type based on an

earlier German Junkers aircraft diesel. It has proved to be trouble-

some mechanically, suffers from high oil consumption, and requires

I frequent overhaul. Because of troubles with its pistons and other

,,
'
•.
'
'
components, its power could not be increased as much as had been hoped.

Consequently, the Chieftain has a relatively low power-to-weight ratio

and has a bad name from the automotive viewpoint.

I The engine shortcomings of the original Chieftains are to be rectified,

I in the new models to be produced for Iran, by replacing the Leyland L-60

I
I
I
 - 196 - I

diesel by a new V-12 four-stroke diesel of 1,200 hp which is being

a
developed by Rolls-Royce Motors. The new version of the Chieftain I
will also have "Chobham" armor which will greatly increase its sur-

vivability. This type of armor, invented in the UK, has also been
I
adopted for the latest U.S. XM-1 tanks and is one of their major I
features.
'~I
In addition to the basic gun tanks, which are now all being built by

ROF Leeds, there is also an armored recovery version of the Chieftain I

which is being built by Vickers and a bridgelayer version built by

ROF Leeds. W~l

Vickers is now marketing an improved~~ 3 versi~f their tank -
I
a 38-ton vehicle with a 105mm gun - which was originally developed

under contract from the Indian government and which is now being manu-
I
factured in India as the Vijayanta battle tank. The Vickers/Vijayant~ I
battle tank is a cross between the earlier Centurion and the Chieftain.

(It has the same gun as the former and the same engine and transmission
I
as the latter.) Being lighter, it is inevitably less well armored

than the Chieftain but it is more mobile; and because its L-60 engine
I
does not have to work so hard, it has been much more successful than 'I·
;

in the Chieftain. Apart from those produced originally for India,

50 Vickers battle tanks were produced for Kuwait, and additional ones
I'
may be ordered by one or two o'f the smaller countries.
'I
The second most important British program is represented by the produc-

tion, since 1970, of the Scorpion family of light, aluminum-armored

I
I
I
I - 197 -

I tracked vehicles. The basic Scorpion is an eight-metric ton, three-

I man light tank with a turret-mounted 76mm medium-velocity gun as well

as the usual rifle-caliber coaxial machine gun. It is powered by a

l 195 hp six-cylinder militarized Jaguar gasoline engine, which gives

a it a maximum road speed of 50 m.p.h., faster than almost all other

tracked armored vehicles currently in service.

I
~ The other members of the Scorpion family include the Scimitar, which

I is almost identical except for mounting a high-velocity 30mm RARDEN

gun instead of the 76mm gun, the turretless Striker launcher vehicle

I for Swingfire anti-tank guided missiles, and the seven-man Spartan

armored personnel carrier. There are also three other turretless

I models basically similar to the Spartan: the Sultan command vehicle,

l the Samaritan armored ambulance and the Samson recovery vehicle.

t Except for being cramped, because their design was over-constrained

by the cargo compartment dimensions of the aircraft in which they

I were originally to be carried, the Scorpion and its derivatives repre-

sent a very successful example of a coherent family of light armored

•t vehicles suitable for reconnaissance, security and airborne operations.

About 2,000 were originally ordered for the British Army and another

600 for the Belgian Army. Since then, further vehicles of the Scorpion

I family have been ordered by Iran and a number of smaller countries.

The vehicles have been manufactured by Alvis in collaboration with a

I factory operated by British Leyland at Malines in Belgium.

I As the British Army decided to switch to tracked armored vehicles of

the Scorpion series, the UK lost the position it held as a leading

I
I
 - 198 - I
developer and exporter of wheeled armored vehicles, represented by
I
the six-wheeled Saracen and Saldin which were produced by Alvis and

the light four-wheeled Ferret scout car which was produced by the
I
Daimler division of British Leyland. ROF Leeds is, however, manufactur- I
ing a development of the Ferret called the Fox. This is a four-wheeled

armored car which weighs six tons and is powered by the same Ja~uar
I
engine as the Scorpion; it has a crew of three and is armed with a

30mm RARDEN gun, which is its best feature.

t
ROF Leeds is also beginning to produce a Combat Engineer Tractor.
I
This is a unique aluminum=armored vehicle which can act as an earth- I
mover or bulldozer but is at the same time more mobile than corre-

sponding commercial vehicles. Only the British Army has so far developed I
such a vehicle, and it greatly increases the effectiveness of its combat

engineer units.
I
The first of the new programs to come to fruition is likely to be the
I'
SP-70, a 155mm self-propelled gun which has been developed by the UK
I
in collaboration with Germany and Italy. SP-70 is intended eventually

to replace U.S.-built Ml09 155mm s.p. howitzers with which British, I

German and Italian armies are at present equipped. It uses the same

ammunition as the towed FH-70 155mm gun already jointly developed by

f
UK, FRG and Italy, and it will have a considerably longer range than

the current Ml09.

I
Since 1972-73, Britain and Germany have also been carrying forward
I
joint studies of a new battle tank which, it has been hoped, would be I
produced by the two countries in the 1980s. A number of different
I
I
I - 199 -

I configurations have been considered for their MBT-80, but details are

1~. still classified.

'I In anticipation of new tank designs, RARDE has been developing a new

llOmm gun and an improved 120mm gun, one of which would eventually

l succeed the 120mm gun at present made for the Chieftain.

IJ The UK has also been studying, on its own, the design of a future

MICV which might succeed its current FV 432 armored personnel carrier.
,I
In addition, British companies have developed, on their own, various

I' systems to upgrade earlier British, U.S. and Soviet-built tanks in

I. the inventory of second or third rank powers. Thus, Vickers Ltd.,

and Airscrew Howden Ltd., offer new engine and transmission assemblies

I suitable for retrofitting in Centurions and, in the latter case, M47

and M48 tanks. Marconi Radar Systems Ltd., and Lucas Defence Systems Ltd.,
I. offer fire control systems incorporating laser rangefinders and elec-

I, tronic computers for retrofitting not only in Centurions and M47 or M48

tanks but also in Soviet-built T-54 or R-55 tanks used by various Arab

',1/ countries.

~a·

I
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I.
I
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 - 200 - I
2. Federal Republic of Germany I
The principal armored vehicle programs continue to be the production ·I
of the Leopard I and the development of the Leopard II battle tanks.
I
Leopard I is a 40-metric-ton vehicle manned by a crew of four and armed

with a British-made 105mm gun. It is powered by a 830 hp V-10 water- I

cooled diesel which has given it a power-to-weight ratio

21 hp per ton.
of almost

This high power-to-weight ratio has been equalled only

1
by the French AMX 30 among the tanks introduced into service so far. I.
The design of Leopard I stems from a specification for a "European"

tank, drawn up jointly by German and French General Staffs in the mid- I
fifties, which emphasized mobility at the expense of armor protection.

As a result, Leopard I is less heavily armored than its U.S. contemporary,

I·
.
the M60Al, and even less than the British Chieftain. On the other hand,
I
its automotive performance has been considered superior to that of other

tanks.
a·
The first production models of Leopard I were delivered in 1965. Since I
then it has become NATO's most numerous tank in Europe. Thus, in addi-

tion to 2,400 produced for the German Army, another 1,800 have been
I~
ordered by the NATO countries indicated earlier, and further tanks are
a·
on order. The international success of Leopard I must be ascribed to

a combination of its excellent automotive characteristics, the good I

performance of its gun and the attractive offset trade arrangements offered

to purchasing countries by the FRG. I

I
I
I
I - 201 -

I
In addition to the basic gun-armed battle tanks, a total of about 600
I Leopard armored recovery vehicles have also been produced, as well as

I 200 Leopard combat engineer and bridgelaying vehicles.

I A major extension of the Leopard I program is the development of the

twin 35mm gun anti-aircraft tank with an advanced, all-weather radar

I fire control system. This vehicle, called the Gepard, is well in ad-

vance of any other mobile anti-aircraft system - capable of giving

I close protection to armored units against low-level attack by aircraft.

I About 600 vehicles are to be produced for the German, Dutch and Belgian

armies, and the twin 35mm gun turret and radar system might also be

I adopted by the U.S. Army, in which case it would be mounted on the hull

of the M60 tank.

I,
A follow-on to the Leopard I is the Leopard II program. Leopard II

I is a new vehicle developed from the basis of Leopard I and of the ill-

fated U.S.-German MBT-70. It has heavier armor than L~opard I and a

I more powerful gun. The gun, developed by Rheinmetall, is a smooth-bore

I which fires armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS)

projectiles which are inherently more effective than the spin-stabilized

I APDS projectiles used at present.

I The heavier armor of Leopard II indicates a change of heart about the

value of armor protection b y the German Army and brings Leopard II up

I in weight almost to the level of the British Chieftain. However, in

I contrast to the latter, Leopard II still has a very high power-to-

weight ratio of almost 30 hp per (metric) ton, thanks to the automotive

I
I
 - 202 - I
components inherited from the MBT-70 program which was jointly pursued I
by Germany and the United States from 1963 to 1970. In fact, it has

a 1,500 hp engine, a robust V-12 water-cooled diesel produced by MTU,

·I
I
and a Renk hydrokinetic transmission which is more advanced than any

other of its kind in the world.

In its latest, Leopard II AV configuration, it weighs 54.5 tons, fully

,,
laden, and incorporates advanced composite armor equivalent to the 1
"Chobham" armor developed in the UK and adopted for the U.S. XM-1 pro-

totypes as well as the new versions of the British Chieftain. The

I
first Leopard II AV was built in the spring of 1976. In September I
1976, it is to be flown to the United States for competitive trials

with U.S. XM-1 prototypes. Its main advantage over the latter is I·
its 120mm gun.
I
So far as Germany is concerned, Leopard II is intended not to replace

Leopard I but to replace the earlier, U.S.-built M48A2C tanks, of

I
which.about 1,000 are still in service with t~e German Army. Phasing
I
out of Leopard I is not likely to start until the studies of MBT-80,

which have been carried out by FRG and UK, result in the production of
,,
a new and much more advanced battle tank.
I'
Next in importance to the Leopard program has been the Marder MICV

program. More than 2,000 of these vehicles have been produced by

:a·
Rheinstahl and MAK, all for the German Army. The first production

model of the Marder was delivered in 1971, and it became the first
I
MICV, developed and built as such, to come into service outside the I
Soviet Union. In other words, it is the first vehicle in service
I
I
I - 203 -

'I which can fight on the move and not serve merely as a transporter

of infantrymen for dismounted action, like the U.S. M113 and its

equivalents elsewhere. The Marder was also designed to closely ac-

I company tanks and, as a result, its automotive performance is compar-

I able to that of Leopard I. It weighs 25.5 metric tons, which makes

it heavier than all other armored infantry vehicles, be they APCs or

f MICVs. Moreover, it is considerably more expensive than any of them,

I and it has not therefore replaced all earlier APCs used by the

Bundeswehr, including U.S.-built Mll3s.

I The chassis of the Marder has also been used, however, for the

I Jagdpanzer (kanone), a 90mm gun turretless tank destroyer of which

770 were produced for the German Army and 80 have been ordered by

I Belgium. It has also been used for the Jagdpanzer (rakete), an anti-

tank missile tank destroyer. Originally 365 were produced for mount-

'I ing the French SS-11 anti-tank guided missile system, but a new ver-

sion has been in production since 1975 to mount the second-generation

Franco-German HOT guided missile system. The Jagdpanzer (rakete) is

I the most sophisticated of the anti-tank guided missile armed vehicles

to appear anywhere so far and is much in advance of the efforts now

I being made in the United States to mount the TOW anti-tank guided mis-

I sile under armor.

I The chassis of the Marder has also been adopted for mounting the Franco-

German Roland surface-to-air missile system. The production of this

I mobile anti-aircraft system for the German Army is planned for 1977

I
I
 - 204 -
I
I
and the U.S. Army is also to adopt the Roland system, mounted on a

U.S. armored vehicle, with the Hughes Aircraft Company acting as I

the prime contractor.
I
In the field of self-propelled artillery, Germany is pursuing the

SP-70 in collaboration with the UK and Italy, as already mentioned. I

Since 1975, Rheinstahl has been producing the eight-wheeled Lynx 1
armored reconnaissance vehicle, of which approximately 400 are

eventually to be made. This 20-ton amphibious vehicle with a crew

I
of four is interesting technically, but its large size, weak 20mm
I
gun main armament, and high cost make it a questionable military

investment. I
A much better investment is represented by the Transportpanzer, a I
six-wheeled amphibious armored cargo and personnel carrier which is

under development by Daimler-Benz. Procurement of this general-

I
purpose vehicle for the ~erman Army might eventually amount to 1,200.

It might also attract orders from other NATO armies, particularly as

I
there is no competitor to it in Western Europe, except for the French I
SAVIEM VAB.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 205 -

I 3. France

I The principal French armored vehicle programs are the production and

I further development of the AMX 30 and AMX 10 families of vehicles.

I The AMX 30 family is based on a battle tank which emanates from the

same Franco-German specification as Leopard I. It weighs 36 metric

( tons, which makes it as light as any battle tank currently in serv-

ice anywhere in the world; but it also indicates that it was designed
I at a time wheri the French as well as German armies did not place much

I value on heavy armor.

the AMX 30 is m~ned

Like almost all other contemporary battle tanks,

by a crew of four and is powered by a compact,

I flat-12 water-cooled diesel designed by Hispano-Suiza and produced

by SAVIEM. It develops 720 hp, which gives AMX 30 a power-to-weight ratio

I virtually as high as that of Leopard I and higher than that of other

I tanks currently in service.

I The main armament of the AMX 30 is an EFAB-developed lOSmm gun which,

in contrast to the 105mm guns of British origin used in the United

I States, Germany, and elsewhere, does not fire APDS or any other kind

of kinetic energy armor-piercing ammunition. The only armor-piercing

I projectile it fires is of the chemical-energy type (HEAT) with the

I shaped charge mounted in ball bearings within the body of the shell

to prevent its performance being degraded by the spin imparted to the

I body by the rifling of the gun. The reason for the adoption of this

ingenious projectile and the unique concentration on HEAT ammunition

I- for defeating armor lies in the exaggerated belief which was once held

I
I
 - 206 -
I
I
in France, and also in the United States, in the efficacy of HEAT

projectiles. I
The gun-ammunition system of the AMX 30 and its light armor have since I
been regarded as its major weaknesses, but they have not prevented

about 1,000 being produced for the French Army. In addition, 120 have
I
been built for Venezuela, 60 for Greece, 150 for Saudi Arabia and 20

for Spain, which is likely to produce more under license.

1
Like the U.S. M60A2 and the ill-fated MBT-70, a second-generation ver-
I
sion of the AMX 30 was to have been armed with a gun/missile launcher.
I
This was the 142mm ACRA which, in some respects, was even more advanced

than the U.S. 152mm gun/Shillelagh missile launcher. However, just as I

the U.S. Army decided not to proceed with the 152mm gun/missile launcher

beyond the M60A2 and the MBT-70, the French have shelved the development
I
of their 142mm gun/launcher.
I
Instead, AMX is now developing a new version of the AMX 30 which is

armed with a smooth-bore high-velocity llOmm gun firing APFSDS projec-

I
tiles. This should result in a tank comparable in fire power to Leopard II I
but probably much lighter. One of the other features of the new, second/

third generation version of the AMX 30 might be a high-output turbo- I

supercharged diesel employing the Hyperbar system of enhancing the per-

formance of supercharged diesel engines by using a gas turbine type

I
combustion chamber to supply additional energy to the supercharger tur- I
bine when required. The Hyperbar system is also being considered for

high output diesels outside France.

I
I
I
I - 207 -

I
In addition to the basic gun-armed version of the AMX 30, the French
I have also developed and produced the usual armored recovery and

I bridgelayer versions. They have also produced an anti-aircraft ver-

sion with twin 30mm Hispano Suiza guns which is comparable to the

I German Gepard anti-aircraft tank but whose clear-weather radar fire

control system is less advanced. There is also an AMX 30 armored

( launcher for the Pluton tactical nuclear missile and an AMX 30 155

I GCT, a 155mm self-propelled gun with all-round traverse and an auto-

matic loading system which provides a high rate of fire of eight

I rounds per minute. Neither vehicle has at present a counterpart in

any NATO army; and the 155 CGT represents a significant advance in
I self-propelled artillery equipment. In addition to the version based

I on the AMX 30 chassis, the. turret and gun of the 155 CGT have been

mounted experimentally on a Leopard I chassis. Still another deriva-

I tive of the AMX 30 is a launcher vehicle for the Roland surface-to-

air missile.
I
The second major French program is based on the AMX 10~ a 14-ton
I tracked armored infantry combat vehicle capable of carrying 11 men.

The AMX 10 is outwardly similar to the U.S. M113 and is also aluminum-
I armored and amphibious but it is better armed (with a 20mm cannon.)

I Like other vehicles of this kind, it has been adapted to a variety of

roles, including that of a command post vehicle and heavy mortar prime

I mover. There is also a version for launching HOT anti-tank guided mis-

siles, which has anticipated U.S. development of TOW under armor, and
I AMX 10 has also been used as the basis of the AMX 10 C, a four-man

I reconnaissance vehicle with a turret-mounted 105mm gun firing fin-

I
 - 208 - a·
stabilized HEAT projectiles. There is also a six-wheeled alternative
I
of the reconnaissance version, the AMX 10 RC, with a unique skid- I
steering system. A similar system had been tried before in Britain,

but without success.

I
No major foreign orders appear to have been placed yet for any of the I
models of the AMX 10 series but this is still relatively new and has

not been offered for as long a time as the AMX 30.

I
In the meantime, small-scale production continues for export of the
I
basic light tank of the earlier AMX 13 light armored vehicle family

which the AMX 10 family is replacing. The AMX 13 family has included
I
20 different models and has been widely used outside France as well as by I
the French Army.
I
In addition to the tracked vehicle programs, France has at least three-

wheeled armored vehicle programs. The most significant technically I

is that of Panhard who are continuing to produce their light five-ton

AML turreted armored car and its derivative, the VTT light armored
I
carrier. About 4,000 of these vehicles have already been made not only I
for the French Army but also for about 30 different countries. More-

over, several hundreds have been produced under license in South Africa. I
For some time Panhard have been working on new designs and have pro-

duced several experimental models. They are now about to launch a new
I·
series but details of it are still classified.
I
The second wheeled armored vehicle program is based on the VAB 4 and

six-wheeled general-purpose armored carriers which were developed under

I
I
I
I - 209 -

\1 French Army contract by SAVIEM and which are now entering production.

They include vehicles mounting various alternative forms of armament,

I from machine guns to light mortars for internal security operations

.I and HOT anti-tank guided missiles. The quantity of vehicles ordered

by the French Army is not known but appears considerable. Figures as

.I high as 4,000 have been mentioned.

I The third program involves the four-wheeled VXB armored carrier

developed on their own initiative by Berliet on the basis of their

I truck automotive components. It has been adopted by the French

I gendarmerie for internal security duties, and a military version has

been offered for export.

I
.J
I
·a
I
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I
I
I
I
I
 - 210 - I
I
4. Other Countries

The only other country to have programs of any significance is Italy,

I
whose OTO-Melara company is producing Leopard I tanks in collaboration I
with Krauss-Maffei, the German parent company. OTO-Melara has also

been producing M113 armore~ carriers under a co-production agreement I

with the U.S. and has also built an unknown number of an improved ver-

sion, the IAFV. It has also experimentally mounted the new FH-70 gun
I
in the U.S.-built M109s.p. gun chassis to produce a vehicle which offers I
the improved performance of the new gun and the low cost of the exist-

ing chassis. OTO-Melara has also studied and offered for export a I
20-ton MICV, the OF-24 Tifone, which incorporates the 76mm gun turret

of the British Scorpion and the chassis of a Swiss Mowag MICV.

I
Fiat's independent entry into the field with the four-wheeled 6614 and
I
6616 armored vehicles has not, so far, borne fruit beyond the order for

a few vehicles from the Italian carabinieri for internal security duties.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 211 -
,J
I
D. Comparisons with United States
I
,, 1. General Situation

r 2.

3.
Design of Battle Tanks

Other Vehicles
I
4. Major Components
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 - 212 -
I
I
1. General Situation
I
In general, the European view is that Britain, Germany, and France

have been more successful in developing armored vehicles in recent

I
years than the United States, especially in relation to the resources
I
available or deployed. The principal reasons for this appear to be

three. First, their development efforts are not as fragmented and 1

wasteful as in the United States, which is clearly illustrated by

the large number of·agencies involved in U.S. development of armored

I
vehicles. Second, their military authorities appear to have had a
I
clearer idea of what is needed and practicable, which has saved them

from fiascos like the development of the U.S. Armored Reconnaissance I

Scout Vehicle (ARSVJ, the T95 medium tank program in the 1950s, and

the MBT-70 program in the 1960s. Third, their armored vehicle pro-
I
grams have been less vulnerable and have suffered less from changes
I
of policy and in senior military personnel. They have also been more

cautious and evolutionary and less liable to prematurely embracing tech- I

nological novelties before their value could be fully assessed.
I
Given better management, there is no major armored vehicle program

that the U.S. could not have done at least as well as the three Euro-
I
pean countries. However, better management would have involved radical

changes in organization and attitudes, including a drastic concentra-

I
tion of effort at present dispersed among far too many agencies and I
the abolition of the present system of project management, except in

its proper sphere of getting new models into production. It would I

I
I
I - 213 -

I
I also have required greater continuity in the tenure of senior military

posts concerned with a~red vehicle development, in order to ensure

I greater involvement and personal responsibility, and less frequent

changes in the structure of the agencies involved.

I
On the whole, the quality of the R&D facilities directly related to
I armored vehicles is about the same on both sides of the Atlantic. Be-

I cause they are more recent, static engine and vehicle test facilities

are at present superior in Britain and Germany, but the United States

I has superior proving ground facilities. The United States is also

ahead in computer modelling of armored vehicle performance and should~

I therefore~ be in a better position to assess new models (but in the

I European view this has not, so far, given the U.S. any practical ad-

vantage.)

I Manufacturing facilities directly related to armored vehicles ~nd in

I particular to tanks are also comparable, each of the three European

countries concerned being capable of producing battle tanks at roughly

I the same rate under peacetime conditions. However, labor and manage-

ment problems of the British industry and lack of competitive pres-

I sures, or incentives, in British society have made British production

I slow and its delivery schedules long. On the other hand, the lower

level of wages in British industry has made armored vehicles cost less

I in UK than they would have done in Germany or France.

I Germany has generally managed its production of armored vehicles more

efficiently, but their cost reflects the high level of German wages
I
I
 - 214 - I
I
and the high exchange level of German currency. The cost of French

armored vehicles has also been relatively high, partly because of I

relatively high wages and partly because of high overheads, but de-

liveries have been quicker than from Britain.

I
Generally speaking, the French have shown an earlier and better ap-
I
preciation of the importance of selling armored vehicles abroad, both

on account of the contribution they can make to the balance of payments

I
and because of the help this provides to the development of vehicles I
for the French Army. They have also adopted a vigorous attitude to-

ward arms sales.

I
In contract, the British have shown much greater concern, for in- I
stance, over sales in southern Africa.
I
I
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I - 215 -

I
I 2. Design of Battle Tanks

I Until recently the view of the UK General Staff on tank design have

differed significantly from those of the FRG and France. All three

·I have regarded firepower as the most important characteristic, but

the UK has consistently championed kinetic energy APDS projectiles,

I' while the French opted for shaped-charge HEAT projectiles. The FRG

I and United States have had less definite views and used both. How-

ever, the biggest difference concerned armor protection, which the UK

I has rated second to firepower while FRG and France put mobility be-

fore armor. Once again, the United States adopted a less positive
I attitude, demanding more armor for its tanks than Germany and France

I but prepared to accept less than the UK; at the same time, the United

States has demanded greater mobility than the UK but less than the FRG.

I At first sight, British tank development has appeared very conservative,

I but the UK has, in fact, produced several major design innovations.

British tanks have incorporated several new features in advance of

I others. For instance, the new type of "Chobham" armor which has dramati-

cally increased the protection of tanks, including the u.s. XM-1, is a

I British invention; as are triple differential tank steering systems and

I collapsible flotation screens.

and adopted ahead of other

Other equipment pioneered in the UK

co~tries includes APDS ammunition, two-axis

I electrical stabilized gun controls, supine driving position, and non-

reflective periscopes.
I
I
I
 - 216 -
I
I
France has pioneered in such things as oscillating (trunion-mounted)

turrets and, coupled with them, automatic loading systems. France

I
was also the only country which, during the 1960s, competed with the I
United States in the development of gun/missile launchers. In fact,

its 142mm ACRA system was in some respects even more advanced than I
the contemporary U.S. 152mm gun/Shillelagh system. However, the

French were wiser in not over-committing themselves to it; and when

I
the shortcomings of the gun/missile launchers became obvious, they I
could shelve their ACRA program quietly without any of the reper-

cussions which attended the dramatic termination of the U.S. MBT-

I
70/XM803 program by the U.S. Congress.
I
One of the notable features of French tank development, first demon-

strated with the AMX 13 family, has been the ingenuity displayed in
I
the development of a number of different vehicles on the basis of one
I
chassis. Thus, seven different vehicles have already been built on

the AMX 30 chassis, which is more than the number of models derived I
from any other battle tank and which results in considerable economic

and logistical advantages.

I
The FRG has not, until recently, demonstrated any great originality I
in tank design. German tanks have, however, generally proved superior

to others from the point of view of automotive performance and relia-

I
bility, due to the thorough detail design of their components and I
equally thorough testing, includi~g extensive troop trials prior to
I
I
I
I - 217 -

I
production. In detail, German tanks have certainly been better
I engineered than British and French tanks, and at present the FRG

I is the only country which can match the latest U.S. tank designs

from the point of view of power-to-weight ratio and agility.

I In recent years, the FRG has also started a program of research

I into highly mobile tanks with power-to-weight ratios much higher

than in all other tanks. Details of this program are still classi-
I fied but it may be expected to produce some new and original designs.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I.
 - 218 -
I
I
3. Other Vehicles
I
Self-propelled guns have had far less effort devoted to them than

battle tanks, and the need for them has been met to a large extent I
by procurement from the United States. As a result, both British and

German armies are equipped with U.S.-built S.P. guns, except for the
I
British 105mm Abbot s.p. gun. The 155mm SP-70 is the first major
I
piece of s.p. artillery to be developed in either country for some

time, and its range and fire control should make it a serious challenger I
to s.p. equipment produced in the United States. In the s.p. gun as in

other fields the French have shown greater independence, and their
I
army is equipped with French-built s.p. guns; but the only one which I
might be considered superior to comparable U.S. guns is the new 155mm

AMX 30 GCT. I
In contrast to the limited progress with s.p. guns, European countries I
have made more progress than the United States with anti-aircraft tanks.

In particular the French, and more recently the Germans, have shown
I
much greater awareness of the need for them than the U.S. Army.

French Army has had a number in service for some time while the U.S.
The
I
Army still has none. I
Neither the UK nor France have, so far, shown much originality in the
I
development of tracked armored infantry vehicles, except for the in-

genuity displayed by the French in deriving several different models I

from the basis of their AMX 10 infantry vehicle.
I
1
I
I
I - 219 -

I
I On the other hand, Germany has developed the Marder MICV whose

characteristics are certainly different and in some respects superior

I to those of all earlier armored infantry vehicles. However, in recent

I years the concept of infantry fighting from its MICVs which is em-

bodied in the Marder has been seriously questioned and may well be

I recognised as unrealistic. The Marder might, therefore, prove to be

a doubtful investment, particularly in view of its high cost, and

I this may also be the case with the new U.S. XM723 MICV.

I The UK, FRG and France have all three developed wheeled armored

I vehicles (which the United States has not), although the military

value of the German eight-wheeled Lynx is debatable. The UK has re-

I •
cently contented itself with producing an improved version of one of

its earlier vehicles which, when first introduced, were in advance of

I others from the automotive viewpoint. Novel designs were studied in

I the 1960s but were abandoned when the British Army decided to adopt

tracked vehicles for reconnaissance.

I The widest and most original range of wheeled armored vehicles has

I been developed in France, by Panhard, SAVIEM-Berliet and AMX. A

measure of French leadership in this field is provided by the eight-

I wheeled Panhard EBR developed thirty years ago, whose sophistication

has still to be surpassed in several respects by other vehicles.

I Moreover, unlike the British, the French are continuing to develop

I more advanced wheeled armored vehicles. This is particularly true of

the development programs of Panhard and AMX.

I
I
 - 220 -
I
I
The UK is alone at present in having developed and produced a family

of light-weight tracked armored vehicles consisting of the Scorpion

I
and its derivatives. Their design is not particularly original but I
is nevertheless skillful from the point of view of compactness and

light weight. Armed as they are with medium-velocity 76mm and high- I
velocity 30mm guns respectively, the Scorpion and Scimitar carry con-

siderable firepower in relation to their weight, which is only sur-

I
passed by the five-ton Panhard AML armored car armed with a 90mm I
smooth-bore gun. The Scorpion and Scimitar are, in fact, unique at

present as effective tracked reconnaissance vehicles and an Americanized I

version of the Scorpion was included in 1972 in the U.S. Army competi-

tion for ARSV. It was not accepted, but nothing has come of the winner
I
of the competition either. I
I
I
I
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I
1
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I
I - 221 -

I
4. Major Components
I
Success in the development of major components for armored vehicles
I reflects to a considerable extent the position of the different coun-

I tries in particular fields of technology or their economic strength.

Thus, the United States has been strong in electronics-based systems

I because of its preeminent position in electronics technology. How-

ever, Britain, the FRG and France have not been slow in taking up
I U.S. developments such as laser rangefinders and developing them fur-

I ther on their own.

I On a much smaller scale, Britain had derived from the lessons of World

War II a strong base for tank gun development and has used it success-

I fully to develop a series of guns and related munitions, including the

highly successful APDS and the less well known high explosive squash
I head or HESH rounds. It has avoided dissipating its gun development

I talents, as the United States has done by undertaking dubious projects,

such as the gun of the T95 medium tank, or abandoning them prematurely,

I as it did with smooth-bore gun projects around 1960. But Britain be-

came too strongly wedded to APDS. Now that APFSDS has been shown
I superior not only in theory but also in practice, the UK is no better

I off than the United States, which has lagged behind in APDS development

but is as advanced as any country with APFSDS.

I France has led in the development of medium-pressure smooth-bore guns

I of 90 and 105mm caliber which fire fin-stabilized HEAT projectiles and

which are particularly suitable for light armored vehicles. France has

I
I
 - 222 - I
I
also led in the development of anti-tank guided missiles. Its

original SS-10 and SS-11 missiles were procured in quantity by the I

U.S. Army as well as others and were the first guided missiles to

be carried by armored vehicles. From the basis of its early ex-

I
perience, France developed the ACRA, which might have proved superior
I
to the U.S. Shillelagh and, in collaboration with the FRG, the second-

generation HOT anti-tank guided missile which is similar but superior I

with regard to range to the U.S. TOW. France has also developed with

FRG the Roland mobile surface-to-air missile system which is now being
I
adopted by the U.S. Army as well as being adopted by the French and
I
German armies.

France backedfhe wrong choice in its 105mm tank gun but is now re-
I
storing its position by developing a high velocity 120mm smooth-bore I
gun firing APFSDS.
I
Development of tank guns in Germany has suffered from the restrictions

imposed on it after World War II, but Rheinmetall is now restoring I

them and their country's position with 105 and 120mm smooth-bore guns

which fire APFSDS.

I
Both France and the FRG have successfully exploited Swiss light auto- I
matic cannon technology, represented by 30mm Hispano Suiza and 35mm

Oerlikon automatic guns, to develop anti-aircraft tanks with radar

I
fire control systems which have no equal anywhere, with the possible I
exception of the Soviet Union.
I
1
I
I
I - 223 -

I
I On the other hand, there appears no equivalent yet in any of the three

countries of the cannon-launched laser guided projectiles developed

I recently in the United States.

I · Britain has had a long tradition: of engine development and has origi-

nated the variable compression ratio pistons which are the basis of
I the latest U.S. tank diesels. It has also originated the two-stage

I rotary or Wankel diesel, although it abandoned further development of

it three years ago as unprofitable, even though the original spark

I ignition version of the Wankel invented in Germany continues to be

developed by Curtiss-Wright. Britain made a mistake in adopting the

I L-60 Leyland engine for the Chieftain and is now trying to restore

the situation with more conventional Rolls-Royce diesels.

I
France has shown originality in developing the Hypebar system mentioned
I earlier. ~therwise its engine development has been sound but generally

I undistinguished. This is true even more of FRG engine development.

I In relation to the United States, all three countries face the problem

of manufacturing scale, which makes commercial engines produced on a

I large scale in the U.S. much cheaper than engines produced in Europe.

This is particularly true of the two-stroke diesels produced by the

I Detroit Diesel Allison Division of General Motors, several of which

I are suitable for armored vehicles and have been adopted for them in

Europe as well as America for cost reasons, in preference to European

I engines.

I
I
 - 224 - I
I
The three countries have lacked the financial resources which made

it possible in the United States to develop successfully a gas tur- I

bine for tanks - the Avco Lycoming AGT-1500 which powers the Chrysler

version of the ~1. The first gas-turbine-powered tank was, in fact,

I
built in Britain 20 years ago but,' apart from anything else, the UK
I
has not had the money to continue the development of tank gas turbines.

As in the case of engines, Detroit Diesel Allison transmissions are

I
difficult to compete with for European manufacturers so far as smaller I
armored vehicles are concerned, because of their cost advantages based

on large-scale production. So far as battle tanks are concerned, I

their smaller numbers make European transmissions more competitive,

even though they may be less sophisticated than their Allison counter-
I
parts. This is certainly true of the transmissions of the AMX 30 and I
the Chieftain . . On the other hand the Allison CD-850 transmission

produced for the U.S. M60 and other tanks incorporates features copied I
from earlier British transmissions. At present, the most highly de-

veloped hydro-kinetic tank transmissions are those built for the Leopard II
I
by the Renk company in Germany. I
The UK and FRG are about level with the United States in the develop-
I
ment of hydro-pneumatic and other suspension systems, and the FRG is

level with the United States in the development of tracks. France, on I

the other hand, is ahead in the development of Michelin tires for cross-

country wheeled vehicles.

I
I
I
I
I - 225 -

I
The UK lead in the development of special armor has been mentioned
I already, and the UK is now leading in the construction of light

I vehicles from second-generation, 7039-type aluminum armor, even

though America originated and still leads in the application of the

I original 5083-type aluminum armor. The company responsible for the

UK lead is Alcan Booth Ltd. The UK has also established a lead,

I through RAR.DE and ROF Nottingham, in the application of very high

I strength ESR steels to gun construction.

I The FRG has exploited the strength of its optical industry to develop

superior optical devices, such as the stabilized panoramic commanders'

I sights developed by Zeiss and novel types of rangefinders. The UK

on the other hand has produced the Helio periscopes with inclined,
I nonreflective heads.

I The UK and France have independently taken a lead in the development

of tank-driving--simulators which can result in considerable savings

I in training costs and which have no equivalent in the United States.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 - 226 -
I
I
E. Licensing Opportunities I
The ultimate objective of activities concerned with licensing must I
be to arrange for one country to license one, or more, others to

manufacture in its entirety an armored vehicle which it has developed. I

Such an arrangement can be advocated on the grounds of economies in

development costs, of greater operational efficiency through standard-

I
ization of equipment in the field, and of the reduction in the logis- I
tical burden.
I
However, the country or countries which have acquired the license and

produce vehicles to another country's design might thereby lose the I

capability to develop similar vehicles themselves. This might lead

to a general contraction of its technological activities and a reduc-

I
tion of its independence, including its ability to export armored
I
vehicles without the consent of the licensing country, whose views on

sales to third parties might be very different. Production under I

license is also likely to lead to a reduction of employment opportuni-

ties in the country which acquires the license, particularly for highly
I
skilled specialists.
I
The above does not apply, of course, to countries which do not already

have their own tank development facilities and for whom manufacture
I
under license is an attractive proposition. In fact, for them it may I
be the only way to manufacture armored vehicles within a reasonably

short time scale. At the same time, it is much more advantageous economi- I
1
cally than the alternative of purchasing complete vehicles, even though many
I
I
I - 227 -

I
I components might still have to be imported. As a result, such manu-

facture under license may not amount to much more than assembly of

I imported components but it is still an attractive proposition for

the less highly developed countries.

I
A good example of this is provided by the manufacture in Italy first

I of the U.S.-designed M60 and now of the German-designed Leopard I

tanks. Further opportunities now exist for similar arrangements to

I manufacture under license of U.S. as well as UK, FRG or French de-

I signs in the smaller NATO countries, such as Greece, Turkey as well as

Netherlands and Belgium.

I On the other hand, manufacture under license of complete vehicles is

I not an attractive ·proposition for the larger countries, i.e., UK,

FRG and France, capable of developing their own vehicles, for the
I reasons stated earlier. In fact, manufacture under license under such

I circumstances has only been considered twice so far and in both cases

by the United States.

I The first instance was the possible adoption by the U.S. Army of the

I British-designed Scorpion in 1972 as the ARSV, but the Scorpion was

·eventually rejected, ostensibly for technical reasons. The second

I example is the recent candidature of the German-designed Leopard II AV

for u.s. manufacture. However, there was no strong technical reason

I why Leopard II AV should be adopted for manufacture in the United

I States in preference to the U.S.-designed XM-1.

I
I
 - 228 -
1\
I
Manufacture under license of components is an entirely different matter.

It has, in fact, become accepted practice and its extension appears a I

far more reasonable and profitable line to pursue than hankering after

the production of a single battle tank, for instance, for all NATO armies
I
and France .l
I
Good examples of manufacture under license are provided by the U.S.

adoption of the British-designed 105mm tank gun and the licenses granted
I
by Hughes Aircraft Co. for the development of laser rangefinders in the I
UK and FRG.
I
In the gun field, there are some further opportunities for licensing

arrangements but they are not as clear cut as before. Thus, UK no longer I
holds the lead it did over others with its gun-APDS ammunition systems, and

none of the four countries concerned has yet shown that its gun-APFSDS
I
system is clearly superior to all the others. Yet the case for stan-
I
dardization and therefore for licensing arrangements is far stronger

where tank gun ammunition is concerned than elsewhere. The most imme- I
diate opportunity related to this is the licensing to the United States

of the German or possibly the French 120mm smooth-bore guns, although

I
not necessarily of their APFSDS ammunition.
I
Should the U.S. Army decide to develop a new light armored vehicle,

there might be an opportunity to license the British 76mm medium velo-

I
city gun and, even more, the 30mm RARDEN gun. Alternatively, there I
might be an opportunity to license the French medium-pressure 90 or

lOSmm smooth-bore guns, or a Belgian 90mm gun of the same type. None I
of these weapons have counterparts in the U. S. armory.
I
I
I - 229 -

I The U.S. Army is already contemplating the procurement from the FRG

I of the twin 35mm anti-aircraft gun turret mentioned earlier and there

may be further opportunities for licensing to the U.S. of British or

I German smoke dischargers.

I So far as fire control systems are concerned, there appear to be no

opportunities for licensing any European equipment to America, except

I possibly for novel optical rangefinders from the FRG and the anti-air-

I craft radar gun control systems mentioned previously. However, there

are further if somewhat limited opportunities for licensing U.S. fire

I control systems to Europe, as indicated by the adoption of the Hughes

system for the Leopard II AV. Similar comments apply to stabilized

I gun control systems, and Cadillac Gage and Honeywell have been active

I in this field in Europe.

I The opportunities for licensing to the United States are greater for

optical equipment, such as the Zeiss and Helio periscopes mentioned

I earlier, which have no U.S. equivalents.

I Although U.S-. production of the German MTU diesel used in Leopard II

has been mentioned, it is difficult to foresee a real justification

I for it or for licensing any other European piston (diesel or gasoline)

engine. There is a far better case for U.S. licensing to Europe of

I the Avec-Lycoming AGT-1500, since no similar gas turbine has been

I developed in Europe. However, if that engine were adopted by the U.S.

Army, it would probably cost less for European countries to procure

I directly than to produce it themselves.

I
I
 - 230 - I)
On the other hand, there is scope for licensing components from Europe
I
for incorporating in U.S. engines, just as the British variable-

compression ratio pistons have been incorporated in the Teledyne

I
Continental AVCR-110 and AVCR-1360 tank diesels. Potential candidates I
are the French Hyperbar system for supercharging, advanced supercharg-

ing system§ developed in the UK under contract to ~WEE, and engine

I
cooling systems developed by Airscrew Howden Ltd., who have.already

worked under contract on U.S. armored vehicle development programs.

I
Purely on technical merit there is a case for licensing to U.S. the
I
latest Renk transmissions; but their U.S. counterparts, the Allison I
X-series~ including the X-1100 used in XM-1 prototypes, are adequate,

and there are no obvious licensing opportunities in either direction I

in the field of transmissions.
I
If they make further satisfactory progress,there might be a case for

licensing the interconnected hydro-pneumatic suspension systems'which

I
are being developed in the UK by Dunlop Ltd. and by Automotive Products

Ltd.
I
There appears nothing at present of consequence which any European
I
country could offer the United States in the field of tracked APCs or I
MICVs. On the other hand, if the United States were to develop a new,

low-cost APCs to succeed the Mll3, this could be adopted in Britain and I
possibly also in the FRG.
I
I
I
I
I - 231 -

I
In contrast, the United States has nothing to offer in wheeled armored
I vehicles, and if the U.S. Army finally recognized their virtues there

I would be licensing ~pportunities for French companies, in particular

Panhard, with all their experience in wheeled armored vehicle develop-

I ment. There would also be further opportunities for the French Michelin

tire company, whose excellent cross-country tires are already being

I considered for new U.S. Army trucks.

I There are also opportunities for licensing to the United States of tank

I driving training simulators developed in Britain by the Link-Miles Divi-

sion of Singer (UK) Ltd. and in France by Le Materiel Telephonique (LMT)

I and laser tank weapon simulators developed in the UK by The Solartron

Electronic Group Ltd.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 II
- 232 -
I
I
I
v. Other European Defense Industries

A. Defense Electronics
I.
B. Some Notes on Guns and Artillery
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I - 233 -

I
I A. Defense Electronics

I 1. The British Electronics Industry

I 2. The German Electronics Industry

I 3. The French Electronics Industry

I.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
I
I
 - 234 - I
A. Defense Electronics I
This part of the report is supplementary. It provides some added notes on two I
industries that are important but subordinated to other categories discussed

in the report, such as missiles and tanks. The discussions which follow
I
cannot be regarded as comprehensive. They merely cover a few basic points
I
that are important to the conclusions presented in Part VII. Consequently,

for anyone interested primarily in the electronics or arms industry, these I

two sections will be unsatisfactory, even though they serve the purposes of

the present report sufficiently.

I
As shown in Table 23, the electronics industries of Britain and France are I
second only to the aerospace industries in terms of total dollar output.

They represent, consequently, the second largest source of jobs and industrial
I
activity under the general defense heading. Furthermore, they are industries I
which are less dependent, in total, on defense than other defense-associated

sectors. The defense share of total British electronics output histori-

I
cally was less than 10%. This same ratio is true of Germany, where
the electronics industry is larger than the aircraft industry. In
I
France, the defense share of total electronics industry output has been much I
higher but still less than half the total industry turnover.
I
The electronics share of almost any type of modern weapons system is increasing

rapidly.
~r·"'"' ---w
In combat aircraft systems, the e;l.ect'tonic share of total cost has I
risen from about ;I5%'in:-th.e 1950s up to about 3o%;ai .t.he -present time: In

the tactical missile industry, the importance of electronics is illustrated by

I
the simple fact that the electronic firms are increasingly acting as prime
I
contractors. One highly qualified British civil servant has argued that "the

capacity of the country's industry to meet its own defense needs rests more I
I
 I - 235 - /
I Table 23

Defense-related Industries - Defense Outputa

I and Defense Share of Total Output

I Britain (1968)" France (1969)• Germany (1969)"

Defence %of total Defence %of total Defence %of total

I Industry
Airframes
output output output output output output

I
and
missiles
Aero-engine
} 8!5 52'9 540 46 175}
IOO
7<>-So

Shipbuildins 396 34'3 18 4 77. S-to

Motor
I vehicles 104 l'l 7l 1. 2. 140 S-to

-·~}
r
and 40 100 'depends
explosives heavily'

I Engineerins
and
ordnance
246 7.'9

117 1 2.:&2 S-IO

I Elc:ctroni<:a 6oo 9'1

• !n S million; taking St =£o.417, s·ss fr, DM4-

t Proportion of gross output generated by defence
396 45 317 S-JO
February 1971. The shipbw1ding and ammunition
and explosives figures exclude the activities or the
demand, as calculated by Roy Morris in "The relevant 'Directions Techniques'.
• Source: Hl'hite Paper I970 on the Security a/the
I
Industrial Impact of Defence Elq>enditure, 1963
and 1968- An Input-Output Study' (unpublished Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the
pa}X'r). The shipbuilding figures include ship Federal German Armed Force:1 (Bonn. 1970), pp.
repairing and the Royal Dockyards. 147-9. The fiJUrCS in the right·hand column are
• Source: Jean Blancard, 'Conception et Realisation not intended to be more precise than the general
u
I des Armernents', in Revue Defense Notionale, stat&:mont. in the text or this !OUICe.

I
I Source: IISS, 1975

I
I
I
I
I
I
 - 236 - I
on the capability of its electronic industry than that of any other sector. 11
I
Shown in Table 24 is a fairly complete list of major European electronics I
companies, together with their total turnover and work force. The main

difficulty with such a table is, of course, the need to recognize that only
I
some fraction (presumably ranging from about 10% in England and Germany up to
I
about 40% in France) is actually involved in defense projects.
I
I
Possibly because of their predominantly commercial nature - combined with

the types of commercial markets that are served by advanced electronics and
I
•
data processing industries - there has been far more multinational activity
I
in the electronics than in the aerospace industry. American investment is

~ more predominant in the European electronics industries than in other Euro- I

pean defense industrial sectors. According to one estimate, some 56% ··of the

B_:r~tish-~lectronics industry is foreign-owned - lllOSt of it ·American.

I
American ownership is strong in a number of the firms listed in Table 24 •
I
Within the limits of the present project, and given its precisely defined

purposes, it seems most useful here merely to outline and characterize the
I
main national electronics industries of Europe. I
I
I
I
I
I
 I. - 237 -

Table 24

European Electronics Companies Important for Defense

I Turnover (1971) Employees

Company Country Sm (1971) (1972) Ownenhip

I Philips
Siemens
Holland
Gennany
5,oo6
J,6I)
)67,000
2)4,000 8 · 9% Aerospatialc
8·9% Boeing

I GEC
AEG-Telefunken
STET group
Thomson-Brandt
Britain
Germany
Italy
France
2,420
2A66
1,224
I AI)
181,000
169,000
97,000
93,000
10% General Electric
52·46% IRI

Ple:ssey Britain 692" 62,000

I EMI
SEL
Standard Telephones
Britain
Germany
SS4
528
40,8oo
)6,700 95'44% ITT
and Cables Britain )87· 34,000 subsid. ofTIT

I Smiths Industries
ACEC
Ferranti
Britain
Belgium
Britain
211
26o
159
2),000
17,000
17,000
67 · 8% Westinghouse
mainly Ferranti
family

I G3S group
Lucas Aerospace
Decca
LMT
Frana:
Britain
Britain
France
%45
ISO
166
Io6"
t6,ooo
IS,OOO
9,100
6,soo
Sperry Rand Britain 90 • n.a. subsid.ofSperry

I MBLE
FIAR
Belgium
Italy
n.a.
25
.s.soo
3,500
Rand (US)
subsid. of Pbilipt
So% General Electric
(through CGE)
Racal Britain 63" 4,000
Selenia Italy so 2,900 {49~ STE'J
10% Raytheon
Electronique Marcel
Dassault France 41 1,8oo

.1970. • 197:Z.

I
I·
I
I
1-.l ,/17y-. Source: IISS 1975
I ,\/~\"'
~-

I
I
I
 - 238 -

1. The British Electronics Industry

,I
As indicated in Table 23 , the British industry is the largest of any of the I
European countries.
I
In Britain, the various #<;L:i;~~n:L ~ubsidiaries of :-<I~~! comprise one of the most

important defense electronic groups. This portion of the GEC group has I
about 27,000 employees and an annual turnover on the order of $400 million.

Within this division, Marconi Radar Systems supplies air defense systems and
I
is prime electronics contractor for Sea Wolf. Marconi-Elliott covers a I
fairly wide range of defense electronics products, primarily associated with

tactical aircraft and missiles. The firm is probably the world leader in I
-"
.··::·- -----·

I
~-·--··
the design of h~:aaSup·~di'!fplay~. Marconi has also provided the ipe;rt•ial:.
u ' .. ~ ~-·-·-· ~

riav1gat{cni system for Jaguar; has won contracts for an auto-throttle system

for the Boeing 747; and a fly-by-wire system for the YC 14. Other companies I
in the Marconi group are involved in the development of ground-based fire

control radars as well as air traffic control radars for the civil market.
I
Of particular recent interest has been a <-ll.i?!V".:"hQming·:'head~

. .uK;~~,Rarr.ow version by Marconi Space and Defense Systems.

developed for the

This is a semi-
I
active radar seeker incorporating an '~.::}fuse:-: To fit European operating ·I
conditions, the system uses a 'GW~}_acia:~:::;ath:er than pulse Doppler. The head
___ ____ _
.....___

has been designed specifically to operate in l:!:'e,'.~;v;y':1?mmin~. In addition to

I
the inertial platform, Marconi also makes a :d_l;gital-.T.comp£!t_er.:for the Jaguar

system. The firm has also been the supplier of height-finding radars along

the entire 3,000-mile radar chain operated by NADGE.

All of the }farconi are subsidiaries of GEC, the giant of the

I
British electrical companies, with total sales on the order of $3 billion

and total employees in Britain of about 170,000. I

I
I- - 239 -

I
I -!',lessey markets a fairly wide range of advanced technology radar and high

frequency devices both for civil markets and military. On the civil side,
II
'-' for e~ample, ILS equipment is important to ~e company. Plessey also has

I a fairly wide range of air traffic control radars on the world market.

Military programs include ground proximity warning systems, dunking sonars and

I
Plessey's world-wide emP.lOY:ment has reached 69,000 in several countries.
I ' -"'-""''"' _"""""_..,.., ...
-~-.

In the United States, it has established subsidiaries and sales operations

,,._..,.~"-~''""

I of considerable importance to the company.

$600 million.
Total sales are in excess of

I -
For Smiths Industries, the main areas of concentration appear to be hE;ad-up
~~~---·--._....,,..""""~~~

I dispfays (for Jaguar and-MRCA) and various types of flight monitoring and

-~ontroi-systems based on digita~ techniques. The company has pioneered an

I advanced electronic control system for gas turbine engines, including the

engine controls on the T-41 Spey engine used in the LTD A-7 aircraft.

'
I
Smiths also provides engine control systems for the Pegasus and Viper engines.

Total consolidated turnover of Smiths is probably on the order of $310 million,

I of which about $50 million is in aerospace. The company has about 20,000

employees, of whom about 5,000 are involved in aerospace projects.

1\, ·--- ~----

.Decca has found an important world market in Doppler---ra(Lirs-·for civil and

I military use. Currently, Decca radars are specified for Jaguar, MRCA, and

other military aircraft. Other Decca military programs include a passive

I ECM system, and a variety of airfield traffic control systems. The company

~a is rather small, with consolidated sales on the order of $300 million, of

I
 I
,.
- 240 -

which electronics and radar equipment account for about $50 million. There

are about 12,000 employees.

I
-::F'e:rf.?P:ti-~is a widely based avionics company with capabilities in two key

areas: first, in a;trborne r;;da~s; and second, in a'ifrborne laser applications.

\1
v

~his refers to target illumination radars). Ferranti will supply the Blue Fox

airborne radar for Sea Harrier and also radars for many other combat aircraft.
I
In addition, it has a development contract for the heading and altitude I
reference system for Sea Harrier and supplies the Sea Spray radar for the

Lynx helicopter. In addition, Ferranti is active in i'n:~£tial navigation

··I
systems and has supplied the system used in Harrier, as well as being selected I
for~MRGA~ It also provides the moving map display for Jaguar. Ferranti is

also responsible for development of navigation and attack systems that I

combine inertial navigation with a ~e:apo!i·-=-aiiiiini· comp.uter.

inertial navigation system and a laser device will be used on MRCA.

Both the Ferranti
I
Among Ferranti's current projects are the following:
I
Moving map display for MRCA t
Stabilized helicopter sights

Sea Spray helicopter radar

I
Inertial navigation system for MRCA and
Japanese military aircraft
I
Laser rangefinders and marked target seekers
I
I
I
I'·
I
I - 241 -

I
~a
2. The German Electronic Industry

German defense electronics are dominated by four major companies: AEG-

I
I
---Telefunken, Siemens, Standard Electric Lorenz (SEL)

---·
of ITT, and finally, Rohde & Schwarz.
w~ich is a subsidiary

In Germany particularly, th~-~~~nd

~<iJ."d~~!!;t,:f:<:_a~_ownership is pronounced. In general, German companies

-~ ----· --=:-.. -.. ·--.k .

',, appear to be ,strqng-· in gro-und:;;~ased -systems but lag somewhat in airborne

avionics. In military aircraft, they tend to make use of license-built equip-

ment. In addition, there is an important joint subsidiary of these four

I companies, known as Electronik System Gesellschaft (ESG), specializing in

system engineering for Panavia.

---~-
I
,, --···---.--
_AEG~Telefunken employs about 140,000 in West Germany.

two to three percent of their business·is involved in electronics for civil

and military aircraft and space equipment.

Probably only about

At the present time, the company

;8
w. is particularly active in space electronics and telecommunication systems.

'I In military systems, AEG-Telefunken has acquired licenses both from Bendix

and GE for :a.irbortie 'power supply equipment for military aircraft. It is

I now working with Ferranti on the transformer rectifier unit and power takeoff

shaft for MRCA.

I The Telefunken Radio and Radar Systems Division is engaged in a number of

I advanced military electronic and radar systems programs. Of particular

interest to American visitors has been the Telefunken mobile search radar (TRMS)
'I being developed for the German Navy. This is a mobile phased-array three-

I· dimensional air surveillance radar with digital processing.

Radar Systems division of AEG is committed about 80% to military work.

The Radio and.

'I Programs include the -control radar for Luftwaffe aircraft, and equipment

'I\
 - 242 - I
a·
for NADGE. Telefunken has built up to 60% of the basic Hawk missile under

Raytheon license. It also is contractor for the command transmitter and I

receiver in the on-ground equipment of Roland and antenna and transmitter

on the missile itself. Telefunken has also teamed with Raytheon on develop-
:J
ment of an advanced point defense system. I'

'
Currently, the firm is also subcontracting to Marconi-Elliott Avionics

Systems for components of the head-up display and map display unit on MRCA.

In missile equipment, the company has been active in radio command systems I
and other missile related electronics both for the Roland and Hawk programs. .,.
Siemens has about 300,000 employees, of which perhaps 2% are in the aerospace

field, both civil and military. Siemens is the principal supplier to the I'
Luftwaffe of IFF systems and transponders. Siemens has also collaborated with ,J·
---
-------~---- -
Thomson CSF in surveillance equipment associated with the Roland missile as

I
well as similar equipment for tank armaments.

SEL, a subsidiary of ITT, has abo~t 37,000 employees.

·--·· Aerospace ~epresents
,.
less than 5% of the company's business. (The principal line is telephone

switchgear.) On the military side, TACAN represents the main product line. I
Over 4,000 airborne TACAN sets have been delivered with 200 or more ground

stations. Practically all French and German military aircraft are equipped
I·
-- --- -
with sets produced in collaboration by LCT and SEt.
........_
The two firms also II
collaborate on an artillery radar and battlefield surveillance system.

Rohde &-S.chw_grz is a much smaller firm with some 4, 000 employees. The
t·
principal military lines are in communications equipment for airborne and

shipborne use. As of 1972, perhaps 12% of Rohde & Schwarz's sales were
I
a·
military; and this can probably be taken as a reasonable factor for the

,,
I - 243 -

a· industry as a whole. Although the sales level is often on the order of 12%,

the total number of employees involved in military work fluctuates from 5%

I to 10%. Within the electronics industry, it is a relatively simple matter

1: to shift workers from military to civil projects. Finally, ESG is a system

engineering company owned equally by AEG-Telefunken, Siemens} SEL, and

~ *" -·--,J--... -

I
··--

Rohde & Schwarz. It also has a sister company which collabo~~t~~_wi~~--.

t Honeywe~l, Litton, T~ldix (the Bendix German subsidiary) and Eltro (which
--~---:.-"---~

is also the subsidiary of a U.S. optical firm).

• --------·--

The major share of the

-t:~~~-.-~ ~ .... ~ '"' •

I ESG work load is related to the MRCA avionics firm, Avionica System, in

r
which it collaborates with EASAMS of England.
~------ .<-.r"'

·t
.,!
'I
.,.
·I
·a
a
I
·a
I
t
 - 244 - I
3. The French Electronics Industry I_,

I
Although there are a number of lesser companies involved in defense electronics

in France, the principal firm is

~~·
~.o.n CSF, a _p_a~~-=-~: Thomson-Brandt

The company is grouped in four main divisions of which the electronic

,,
equipment division is the most important for defense purposes. This division ~·

covers defense systems related to telecommunications, aeronautical systems,

ground detector equipment, weapon systems, shipboard equipment, and under-

water acoustics. The company as a whole employs about 28,000 people.

f
Thomson CSF has produced the Cyrano series of airborne radars for all of the
I
Mirage: fighter aircraft. For the forthcoming Mirage 2000, Thomson CSF will

develop the pulse Doppler interception radar. The Thomson CSF radar for the

Mirage F-1 has a range of 35 nautical miles against a fighter-sized target.

,,
'J·

\I
Electronique Marcel Dassault, a subsidiary of Dassault-Breguet,
·------ -------- --------
... ,

developed a series of radars and is collaborating with Thomson CSF on the

has also
,.
--------~

airborne radar for the Super-Etendard carrier-launched aircraft.

,.
and manufacturer of inertial navigation systems.
- --
Also important in a very specialized field is SAGEM, the French developer

SAGEM has worked_closely

-----
,,\
with Singer-Kearfott in various programs, for example in the digital inertial

system for the Super-Etendard. I

In general, it seems likely that there is a fair amount of lag both technolo-
I
gically and in manufacturing development, between the French electronics

industry and that of the United States. Furthermore, it seems likely that I'
the French industry runs a poor third to those of Britain and Germany.

heavy proportion of military work also suggests the problem that commercial
The
a·
product development is very modest. I'
I
I
I - 245 -

I
,,
I
I B. Some Notes on Guns and Artillery

·I
.,,
·a
·a
·a
I
f
I
I
I
I
I
:J
 - 246 - I
B. Some Notes on Guns and Artillery
I
In this section, the purpose is only to touch on a few highlights of gun and
I
artillery manufacture in Western Europe to amplify some of the points raised

in the section on tanks, to which this section is ancillary. First, it is

I
important to take note of some collaborative trends within the NATO countries. I
Perhaps the most important of these is the FH-70 155mm towed gun and its

associated ammunition; and the SP-70, self-propelled version. Under a 1968

I
memorandum of understanding Britain and the Federal Republic agreed to

collaborate in the development of these two systems. The FH-70 is intended

I
to replace the British 5.5-inch gun and German 155mm howitzer. Subsequently, I
Italy also joined the project, both to contribute funds to development and to

share in the manufacture. Plans for the SP-70 were reached much later, when
I
a decision was made within Eurogroup for Britain, Germany, and Italy to

jointly develop this unit, designed to replace the U.S.-built M-109 155mm
I
howitzer. Industrial responsibility for the program, at least as far as I
development is concerned, lies with Vickers in Britain and two companies -

Rheinmetall and Faunwerke - in Germany. During the development phase, the

I
gun carriage of the FH-70 is a Vickers responsibility.

developing the barrel and breech.

Rheinmetall is

When the gun goes into production,

t
~

Oto-Melara of Italy will be responsible for the recoil system. According to I

present plans, the gun will go into service in the late 1970s.
I
The Fll-70 incorporates a Leitz sighting system and data display unit and

can launch a 95-pound shell nearly twenty miles. A 1700cc four-cylinder I

gasoline engine is incorporated into the gun carriage to enable the gun to

move a limited distance under its own power.

I
I'
t
I - 247

l'
The gun will have a range of 24 kilometers with a full caliber

shell, and the goal is to increase this to ove~ 30 kilometers with

rocket-assisted shells. The rate of fire will be over six rounds per minute,

I with a sustained rate of two rounds per minute over a one-hour period.

types of 155mm shells now in NATO service will be usable, including nuclear,
All

I but special ammunition is also being developed for the gun. This will include

a new type of HE shell with a goal of higher lethality than the 175mm M-107

'I U.S. projectile. Also to be designed will be a smoke shell, an illuminating

shell, and an extended range shell which will have a longer, fin-stabilized

sub-calibre shell. The gun will also use U.S. M-549 rocket-assisted pro-

I jectiles. Mobility is one of the main goals in the program, as evidenced by

I the detachable auxiliary propulsion unit which wrill give it a limited cross-

country performance over a distance of up to 20 kilometers. The gun and

i ammunition will also be air portable.

I Shown in Table 25 are the principal ordnance anrl ammunition prodncers in

Western Europe. Many of these firms have diversified their activities as

I broadly as possible to counteract the decline in orders for conventional

armaments. This list, it will be noted, also includes the various state-
f controlled ordnance factories such as the Royal Ordnance Factories in

a Britain and DTAT in France. Even following severe cut-backs in the state-

owned factories, European industry as a whole is faced with overcapacity

I for conventional arms.

I In Britain, the most important private firm is Vickers. In France, aside

from state-owned operations, Creusot-Loire is important as a manufacturer

I of naval gun mounts and armor-plate. Also important is the armaments

I division of Thomson-Brandt. In Germany, Rheinmetall is principal manu-

facturer of artillery, and other armaments firms are Krauss Maffei and

I
 - 248 - I
Table 25

Principal West European Ordnance and Ammunition Producers

'I
Turnover (1971)
I
Company Country S million Employees (1971) Ownership

{SO% Marine..
Creusot-Loire France 463" J],8oo Finniny
so% Schneider
Vickers
Royal Ordnance

DTAT
Factories
Britain

Britain
France
364b

215
111 01
17Atd

18,900
17,000
Government
Government
I
Rheinmetall Germany 15<>'" n.a. So% Roechliog
family
FN Belgium 74 8,400
Krauss-Maffei Germany 105 6,)00 94'1%
Budeq,ts'schc
E.iscnwerke
SNPII France 70" 5,]00 Government
PRB Belgium n.a. ],000
Eurometaal Holland n.a. 66o1 70%
Government,
30% Dynant
Nobel AG
Contraves Italy 6o" l,SOO Contraves AG,
.. Zurich
Thomson-Brandt
(armaments div.) Frana: 40" 1,ooo• part of
Thomson-
I
Brandt group
Oto Melara Ilaly 16 ( ,400" uu-
Finmeccanica

!'
• 1970. "Group total•
•Group total (les~~ sbipbuildmg): tho engineering • Armament division only.
division's turnover was $101 million. t Military production only.
•J.9'ZJ·.

Source; !ISS 1975

I·
~I·

I
I - 249 -

l Dynamit Nobel. In Italy, Oto-Melara of La Spezia makes a wide variety of

I armaments and artillery, Breda makes gun mounts, and there are also explosive

and ammunition firms. FN in Belgium is obviously one of the most important

I designers and manufacturers of rifles and small arms for NATO. Shown in

Table 26 are some of the principal art~llery guns and rockets now in production
I or development within the NATO countries.

I
I
t
I
I
i
I

'I
a
I
I
I
I
 - 250 -

Table 26
I
Principal Guns in European Country Forces I
COUNTRY
OF ORIGIN GUN RANGE RATe OF FIRE REMARKS

U.K. 120 rr.m Tank Gun l11A3 APDS 3 km 7 r.p.m. In ;;ervice with British Army Mam
HESH 8 km armament of Chieft<:in tank.

105 mm Tank Guns L7A1 APDS 1.8 km 9-10 r.p.m. A1 und A2 fitted in Centurion
l7A2 & L7A3 HESH 5.5 km tanks. A3 in Vickers M!<3 tank
and Leopard. In service.

105 mm Towed SP gun 1/ km Highly mobile. Mounted on FV 433.

Abbot

105 mm Towo!d light Gun 17.5 km

In service with aritish Army.

Close support mobile. Will replace the

Italian 105mm Pack Howitzer. Uses same
·I
ammo as the Abbot.

61 mm Mortar 4.5 to 5.4 km 15 Man portable in 3 loads. In service w'th

British and other arrn;es ..
I
France 155 mm Howttzer Mk F 3 20 km 1 r.p.m. General lire ::upport for mechan1sed
divisions. Fires U.S. or French
ammunition. In service with French army.

155 mm GCT SP Gun 23.5 km 6 r.p.m. Direct and indirect lire support.

I
Under dev<Jiopment.

105 mm Tank Gun Main armament of the AMX 30 tank.

CN-105-F1 In service with the French Army.

105 nun Tank Gun 01504 Main armament of the AMX 13 tank. In
service with French and several other armies.
.1·
.
----------------------------------------------------------------
105 mm Light Gun 15 km Demonstratton prutotype only.
General purpose, air dropoable gun.

105 mm SP How:tzer
AMX 105A
~1.5 km w1tl1 US ammo
15 km wtth French ammo
Basic lor close fire support.
Fires US or French ammo. In service
with French and Dutch armies. ·
I
105 mm SP Howitzer improved AMX 105A. All round
AMX 1506 traversing ar.d lower silhouette.

90 mm AFV Gun Fitted in the smaller AFVs and in the

CN-90-F1 M24 Chaffee tank. In service in French

120 mm Heavy Mortar

MO 120 AM50
8 r.p.m.
and one other army.

Can be fired from its own road wheels

or bipod. In service in French Army.
I
120 mm Mortar
MO 120 M65
8.3 km 12 r.p.m. Normally transported on wheels but can
be hand carried. Lighter than the AMSO.
In service with French Army.
1:
120 mm Rifled Mortar 11 r.p.m. Maximum ran<Je
120-RT 61 a. with normal shell "PR-14" is 8.300m.
b. with she!l with addttional
propulsion "PAPA" is 13.000m.
in service in the Netherlands. on
I
order by the French Army.

120 mm Lioht Mortar

MO 120 M60
15 r.p.m. Lightweight. Divided into 3 loads for
man transport.
In service with French Army.
I
81 rn:n light Mortar 4.1 i<m 15 r.p.m. For use by parachut'} ;nrantry. Various
MO 81 61C lengths of Darrel available.
In service with French Army.

I
 - 251 -

Table 26 continued

COUNTRY
OF ORIGIN GUN RANGE RATE OF FIRE REMARKS

France 6U mm light Mortar For mobile operations. In production.

(conld) MO 60 63

60 mm Commando Mortar t km Short range. Highly portabla.ln production.

60 mm Vehicle Mortar 2.6 km Can be used from an APC either as a

60 MC At mortar or for direct fire. Breech or
muzzle loading. In service in several
countries.

60 mm CS Mortar 1.6 km Breech loading lor mounting in the turrets

Type 1969 of armoured vehicles. Under development.
W. Germany 155 mm SP Howitzer 18.1 km Modified U.S. Ml09.
M109G In service with German Army.

155 rnm Towed Light 14.1 km Modified U.S. M101. longer barrel. Muzzle
Field Howitzer brake. In service with Gi?t rnan Army.
--------------------------------------------------------------
90 mm Anti- Tank Gun High precision gun w1th auxiliary propulsion

lnterna\ional 155 mm Towed Howitzer 24 km Over 30 km with 6 r.p.m. Being devaloped jointly by Britain.
FH70 special shelf Italy and Germany.

155 mm SP Howitzer SP70

..
! MBT80 tank chassis.
'
110 Tank Gun LlO Under development for the leopard 11
by Britain and Germany.

AS80 Rocket 30-40 km Multiple launcher. Under development

by Britain. Italy & Germany.

Italy 155 mm SP Howitzer 24 km Modified U.S. !.1109.

In service with Italian Army.

105 mm Pack Howitzer 10.6 km Lightweight. highly portable. Can be

Model 56 manpacked. In service with 17
countries. including U.K.

., Source: NATO's Fifteen Nations, Dec. 1974-Jan. 1975

I
 'I
- 252 - ,,
I
VI. Some Industrial Issues

A. Standardization and Some Current Projects

I
B.

C.
Lessons from Civil Aircraft Collaboration

Some Published French Views of Standardization

"'
I
D. Some Notes on Licensing and Co-Development .t
I
I
I
I

.1'
I
~-·
I
I)
- 253 -
I_
I.
A. Standardization and Some Current Projects
1/
r 1. The F-16 and trans-Atlantic Industrial
I Collaboration

t 2. The Roland II License

II
I
"~"'"

"I:
1-
'I~
1/
J'
1\
l'
I
II
a
I
 I
- 254 -

I
1. The F-16 and trans-Atlantic Industrial Collaboration
I
In spite of its probable success as a cost-effective solution to

meeting the requirements of several air forces, one inevitable eco- I·

nomic effect of the F-16 program on the European aircraft industry

as a whole is to lower its productivity. This effect is created in

I
two ways: First, by requiring capital investment in countries where I
there is little long-term prospect for sustained aviation production,

resulting eventually in under-utilization of capital resources; and

t
second, by depriving the major, well-capitalized industries in Britain,

France, and Germany of work which would lead to fuller utilization of

I
their own capital resources. As a result, European-wide aerospace in- I
dustry productivity will continue to compare poorly with the United

States - a situation of which European industry planners are well aware.

I
It could be argued that the success of any Alliance standardization I
based on industrial cooperation will ultimately depend on successful

U.S. relationships with the major defense industries of Western Europe

I
rather than with smaller or non-defense companies that may serve as job
t
shops to American firms. The tooling-up of aerospace vendors in

smaller countries, simply to participate in one or two programs, may I

tend, directly or indirectly, to reduce the effectiveness of European
j
industry as a whole and make major trans-Atlantic collaborations more

difficult.
I
Under terms of the F-16 agreement, the European participants will build

40% of the European version (350 aircraft), 10% of the USAF version (650),
I
I
f
 - 255 -

and 15% of those ordered by other countries. Sharing will extend

I, into final stages of production. There will be three assembly lines -

one each in Fort Worth, in Belgium, and in the Netherlands. In July

It 1976, General Dynamics and Fokker-VFW of the Netherlands reached agree-

ment on the F-16-coproduction program. Under the contract, Fokker

I will produce major fuselage and wing components for more than 500 air-

'j craft and will assemble and deliver up to 102 complete aircraft for the

RAF and 72 for the RoY.al Norwegfan Air Force. Fuselage and wing com-

I ponents also will be furnished to production lines in the United States.

Work is to start immediately at six Fokker plants, and the first delivery
I of components is scheduled for May 1979.

Among the major European aerospace companies, the view has been ex-

pressed that the F-16 program has weakened European efforts to integrate
I national industries and achieve higher productivity rates through

'I, greater concentration of resources in principal facilities. The F-16

c.onsortium has necessitated capital investment for plant and equipment.

1: in small, scattered facilities with no conceivable hope for long-term

roles in aerospace. For this reason, the project is resented in Britain

.1~
and especially France. The latest American initiative for standardize-

~ tion comes hard on the heels of an American sales effort which actually

served to delay prospects for industrial unity within Europe.

I It is interesting to note that,among European missile manufacturers,

I the F-16 program has created renewed fears that large U.S. missile ~
companies will try to by-pass the European missile industry, which has
I
I,
.,
 - 256 - I
I
already made heavy investments of R&D and plant, and associate them-

selves with non-missile companies in the smaller countries~ thus I

undermining the existing European missile manufacturers.
I
In summary of this point, the credibility of the U.S. standardization

initiative will probably be enhanced if specific proposals are addressed I

to the major factors in the European defense industries.
I
In the present paper, given the stated goal of the U.S. policymakers

in strengthening European industry so that it can collaborate more

I
effectively with the United States, the primary emphasis is necessarily
I
placed on the major aircraft industries of Western Europe. However

skillfully the F-16 collaboration is being organized, and however cost- I

effective the aircraft will prove to be in the purchasing air forces,

this overall negative effect on European industry as a whole must be

I
noted. On the other hand, numerous features of the F-16 collaboration
I
could be of considerable interest in future collaborations with the

major producing countries. Notable among these are: I

The use of USAF System Program Office at Wright I
Field, as well as subsidiary SPO in Brussels, to
/ which the European partners have direct and fre-

quent access;

The participation of the European partners in both

the U.S. and third-country markets;

I ,,

I
I
I
I - 257 -

I A clear formula for work-sharing and offset for

I the aircraft to be used in Europe versus those

in the United States and third countries;

1/ The acceptance of a price differential for the

I European aircraft and parts.

t The positive intermediary role that a technically competent and ex-

perienced government office can play has long been apparent. The
1 history of the U.S.-German advanced VSTOL fighter (AVS), in the mid-

I 1960s, no matter how poorly conceived the aircraft itself may have

been, provides an interesting case of how a SPO can improve communi-

I cations and facilitate the work of industrial firms in a collaborative

development project. In the case of AVS, which had a brief life in

I the mid-1960s, the SPO at WPAFB supervised the work of EWR in Germany

I and ~irchild in the U.S. and incorporated about 20 German engineers

into the Dayton office. One of the bright spots of this ill-fated

I program was the smooth functioning of government and industry people

at the technical level.

I
As reports in the aviation trade press have indicated, the-open-door

I policy of the F-16 SPO and the free access to technical information

regarding the aircraft, have played a significant role not only since
I the decision to participate in the program, but in.-fact served as a

I strong sales feature for the European participants in making their

I
I
I
 - 258 -
I
initial decision. Currently, there are about 14 European govern-
I
ment program officers from the participating governments who are I
actually based at Wright Field.
,I
I
I
1\
I
I
J,
I'
II
I
I
,J
I
I
I
I
I, - 259 -

I 2. The Roland II License

I. The preparatory work for this report has not included_ any direct re-
.
I_ search or analysis on the Roland II license to Boeing and Hughes.

The program has received so much attention in Europe that it may be

I worthwhile to record here some of the secondary observations and

impressions that have been gained during this research, especially
I in order to identify any practical points that may add to policy

"I guidance concerning future licenses from Europe to the US.

I Clearly, there have been problems of adaptation - in terms of stan-

dards, manufacturing technology, and technical and performance speci-

I_ fications for the different military services. When the resolution

of such differences is pressed down to the contractor level, parti-

I cularly at a time when defense contractors are very hard pressed

'I themselves on questions of workforce stability, overhead and G&A

burdens resulting from underutilization, and generally critical govern-

,I' ment customers, the problems of adaptation are likely to be magnified.

Furthermore, there are certainly instances in which development or

manufacturing technology in Europe is behind that of the United States,

due to lower European capital investment. In such instances, it would

be inefficient to set up a retrograde manufacturing capability in the

I U.S. company, based on earlier and abandoned practices; but the alter-

I native is product redevelopment so that the system conforms with current

U.S. manufacturing technology. This class of problem is amplified by

.J any tendency of the procuring military service to specify additional

modifications in the system.

I.
I
 - 260 -

I
As discussions in Part I have already noted, many irritations that

development at the industrial level are the results of historical I

differences in customer requirements- e.g., hours of service life.

They do not always reflect relative backwardness in a particular

I
industry. I
Differences in RDT&E practices occur for many reasons but are most

often simply manifestations of differences in scale. In a private

I
interview in September 1972, Herman Bondi, the Chief Scientist of

the British Ministry of Defense, made substantially the following

statements to a visiting American:

I
If there are 10 obvious ways of doing a job, the United I
States will typically try them all, and one will emerge
as superior. In contrast, in the United Kingdom several
years will be spent, using the best brains, to decide
which option has a probability of more than 10% of being
a winner. If they are lucky, they will get one in the
35% range of success, and then will put all of their re-
sources into it and have one chance out of three to be
successful. Much of the difference in approach is due to
simple scale differences in the size of the two countries.

In practice, thi~ difference means that prototype testing of the single·

developed system is _very intensive in Europe. ~igures on bench test

I
and flight test hours compare favorably with similar U.S. systems.

Furthermore, for major systems, operational life standards tend to be

the same. With regard to military combat aircraft, the current de- I
sign criterion, both in the United States and Western Europe, is 4,000

hours. The standards are the same and presumably can be met satis-
I
factorily, even though the manufacturing technology required to reach I
I
I
I - 261 -

I
I those standards is likely to be different in Western Europe based

on lower production runs, resulting usually in a greater tendency

I to build up parts rather than fabricate them out of single work-

pieces, and a tendency to use a higher increment of labor.

I
Although many attempts have been made to generalize about comparable
I standards of quality across a spectrum of systems, these generaliza-

I tions usually collapse into a sort of military-industrial folklore.

Th~ best solution is to establish a governmental authority, in ad-

I vance of any specific program, to resolve all the important differ-

ences before assigning ~he work to industry.

I In the European view, the main solution to all of these problems is

I prior planning and the establishment of a centralized controlling

authority in advance of the project. It is essential, in the Euro-

I pean view, to have common discussions among military and government

I authorities before the project is started and not to leave to the

industrial contractors a great many unresolved problems. It is also

I regarded as essential to have the common procurement authority demand

a clear. identification of the various military services of their

I operational requirements and then to prevent divergence of require-

I ments and technical specifications during the life of the program.

One approach worthy of consideration would be a greater intermediary

I role not only for the SP.O but for the DOD development centers or

commands.
I
I
I
 I
- 262 - I
I
. I
,,
I
B. Lessons from Civil Aircraft Collaboration
J,
I
I,
I
I.
a.
I
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I - 263 -

I
I In August 1976, the French government announced its financial

support of a collaborative development by McDonnell Douglas and

I the French aircraft industry of a 160-180 passenger derivative

of the Dassault-Breguet Mercure transport. The aircraft, to be

I powered by the GE-SNECMA CFM-56, will enter production in 1980.

I It is worth examining briefly, in the present study, why this

program has been accepted so readily in France, in comparison with

I various past U.S.-French discussions in other fields. The key and

closely related issues are: jobs, access to the American market,

I and collaboration on a full-partnership basis.

-1
-· ~
Recent• studies under WEU auspices have resulted in the following

forecasts of European air transport requirements in the year 1990:

I 300 short-to-medium range aircraft of 160 seats each; 350 short-

I medium range aircraft of 200 to 260 seats; 100 to 150 long-range air-

craft with 200 seats; and 300 long-range, high-capacity aircraft like
I the Boeing 747. However, to break even on the production of a civil

transport aircraft typically requires minimum sales of about 400 units,

I which indicates that European manufacturers probably cannot break even

I on sales to the European market alone, even if they were able to pro-

tect this market completely. What is really needed, in the eyes of

I European industry leaders, is some form of collaboration in development

I and production, and some rational division of world markets, with the

United States. What is also badly needed, in the European view, is

I some logical structuring of the European share in the American home

market of the 1980s.

I
1
 I
- 264 -
I
European industry has already given a great deal of consideration to I
what types of transport aircraft could be brought to market collabora-

tively with the United States before the anticipated surge in transport
I
aircraft sales of the early 1980s. One result is that some of the I
national industries, especially that of France, have been making direct

overtures to American companies, with the guidance and encouragement

I
of their respective ministries, to form bilateral agreements, often to

the exclusion of their European partners. In response, the major

I
American companies have sent their senior executives, in the last six I
to twelve months, for frequent and detailed-discussions with European

ministries and companies. The main job of corporate managers is, I

quite properly, to be responsive to the needs of their own corporations.

There is also, however, a vital need for a U.S. policy voice in these
I
discussions - especially with regard to the alternative of broader I
multinational collaboration and the potential impact of civil projects

on the future trans-Atlantic military opportunities.

I
The difficulties being encountered in the civil sector of the European I
aerospace industry are matched in the United States. In this country,

industry employment has been dropping rapidly, and industry sales, in

I
constant dollars, have been in steady decline. In the late 1960s, the
I
U.S. aerospace workforce numbered about 1.4 million. By the end of

1975, it stood at 925,000, and the projection for the end of 1976 is I
893,000. In the late 1960s, industry sales ran at about $30 billion
I
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I - 265 -

I annually and declined to a low point, in current dollars, of $23

I billion in 1971. They have since recovermto about a $28 billion

level annually. In constant 1968 dollars, however, industry sales

I now stand at about $18 billion per year. The major part of this de-

I cline has been absorbed by the civil sector of the industry. The

industry's principal strength, at the moment, is in combat aircraft

I production for the U.S. and export market. As for commercial trans-

port aircraft, in which the United States has always dominated the
I world market, world-wide deliveries of U.S. built transport aircraft

I fell from 332 units in 1974 to 282 in 1975; and the Aerospace Indus-

tries Association is now predicting that commercial transport sales

I in 1976 will not exceed 215 aircraft. Currently, according to some

I estimates, the major airlines of the world could handle a 107. in-

crease in passenger traffic without buying any new aircraft.

-I Although the American industry, in its own difficulties, is thoroughly

I amenable to the idea of international collaboration as a means of

locating new development funds, there ar~ obvious risks in joining

I together two troubled industrial sectors in the hopes that new strength

will evolve. One potential solution would be to restore, to some de-

I gree, the role that military support aircraft development played in

I previous decades, in utilizing underemployed transport aircraft

capacities and opening the way for follow-on commercial aircraft

I development. If one were to search for potential candidates, AWACS

I
I
I
 - 266 -
I
I
would emerge immediately because of the requirement for a large I
airframe with large, long-endurance engines. Washington, however,

has proposed only minimal work-sharing on an existing American I

design rather than to suggest a co-development that could utilize

more fully the badly underemployed capacities of BAC, Aerospatiale,

I
and others.
I
In Britain and France, there is a desperate need to use the capa-
I
cities left vacant by the Concorde and Airbus programs. This

represents a high priority to which the AWACS proposals have not, I

apparently, been sensitive.
I
Furthermore, there is a deep concern in Britain that purchase of

the Boeing AWACS may mean the end of the Nimrod production line and I
the resultant jobs at Hawker Siddeley factories as well as at the
I'
supporting avionics firms such as Marconi. British officials are

known to doubt that Parliament would ever approve purchase of an I

American aircraft if the price were British jobs. At the moment, the

U.S., Britain, and Germany are funding the NATO AWACS Program Office I
(NAPO). The British remain concerned, of course, about a British

production share of up to 350 McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harriers. In

I
the meantime, British MOD is funding development work on advanced I
Nimrod avionics and has funded a feasibility study for the use of

Nimrod to carry a limited early warning system. I

I
I
I
I - 267 -

I
I AWACS is merely one case in point. The entire range of military

suppor~_aircraft and their engines for the 1980s and 1990s

I should be examined for their collaborative potential, since - as

I civil trends indicate - this is an area in which European industry

needs work and would welcome U.S. collaborative proposals. It is

I also, however, an area in which U.S. industry is presently under-

utilized.
I
The issue of domestic employment is virtually fundamental among the
I major manufacturing companies of Western Europe. Although it may

I not be part of the rhetoric of defense ministers, it is of prime con-

sideration in the voting patterns of parliaments. The issue of stable

I employment permeates both the civil and defense industries of Western

Europe and must not be underestimated. For the United States, in

'I attempting to identify potential licensing opportunities, the level

I of employment can to some extent be traded off against technological

design and development lead.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
 I
- 268 -
I
I
I
I
C. Some Published French Views of Standardization I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I - 269 -

I
I Particular attention should be given, in this closing section, to

French policies and needs - since it has been generally recognized

I that French participation in future Alliance standardization efforts

I is both essential and difficult.

I One .of the most useful recent statements of the current French de-

fense industrial view towards trans-Atlantic collaboration was provided

'I in a speech by Marcel Chassagny, President of MATRA and, for the last

10 years, French representative to NIAG. In a speech in the spring of

I 1976 to representatives of the French aerospace industry, Chassagny

I made the following statements:

I We must strengthen the bonds between France, Great

Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, all of
whom ~ust lead Europe in aeronautics since these coun-
tries possess the technical, industrial, financial and
I human resources necessary • • • We cannot admit Ameri-
can hegemony which allows them to provide 83% of the
market and which is further marked by a lack of fair
I play to such an extent that they have forbidden the
landing in the U.S. of the Franco-British supersonic
aircraft • • • In the NATO Industrial Advisory Group,
~·
I we have started some 20 studies on new weapon systems.
As soon as one of their projects is in conflict with
these, the United States withdraws from the study group,
and it is obviously not their intention to furnish to
I Europe the slightest technological support. Furthermore,
they do not share what they are doing with their Allies.
• • • Because of the differences in industrial potential
I between the member countries, Eurogroup is comparable
to the UN, where laws are made by Yemen, in concert with
Zaire and Zambia. Our industrial survival must not be

I linked to a Danish or Portuguese decision. France has

been extremely inept in its dealings in Europe. We have
had a policy of grandeur which has shocked our European
neighbors, who do not have the means to defend themselves
I and have a need for the American nuclear umbrella. The
fragmentation of European industries and the absence of
any common force are likewise difficulties in attempting
I to cooperate with the American~.

I
 - 270 -
I
I
For reasons that are clearly enunciated in the Chassagny statement,

French industry and government are likely to greet new American in-
I
itiatives on standardization with considerable skepticism, based on

past experience. At the same time, there is a gradual renunciation

I
of the "grandeur" of Gaullism and a new recognition of the need I
for intra-European defense collaboration. It is this latter element

that is probably the principal factor in France's participation in

I
the new European Program Group.
I
Clearly, in any large-scale U.S. initiative for standardization,

special attention must be given to France, whose policies are so

I
irritating in Washington because they often mirror so closely the I
attitudes of the United States itself. As Callaghan has pointed

out: I
France and the United States, more than any
NATO countries, see the issue of dependence
other
as the
I
major obstacle. It is perhaps all the more intract-
able an obstacle because its origin is more
than intellectual.
visceral I
In an article of May 1976 in Defense Nationale, Jean-Laurens Delpech, I
the D~legu( Ministeriel pour l'Armament and French member of CNAD.

enunciated an official policy view of standardization which is regarded

I
as a definitive view within French industry. In his view, standardiza- I
tion should be defined, in the strictest terms, as the body of rules

and procedures which permit the production of unified and interchange- I

able elements.
I
I
I
I - 271 -

I He criticizes the NATO definition which refers to standardization

I as the process by which member countries realize the most intense

possible cooperation in the use of resources for R&D and production,

I and undertake to adopt on the widest possible basis the utilization

I of common or compatible logistic and administrative procedures in an

operational plan.

I It is interesting that Delpech ridicules the Callaghan report as un- ~,

I realistic, especially in its underlying assumption of the value to

be derived from homogeneity of arms and equipment within the trans-

I Atlantic Alliance. The French argument is that, while the Warsaw

I Pact forces have a geographic unity and a single projected conflict,

it is only Germany on the Western side that is essentially continental,

I purely European and organized strictly for conv~~tional war in the

central European theater. Th~ French line of argument is that the

I other NATO countries are situated along coastal littorals and thus

I have concerns that are not nearly as continental in nature as that of

Germany or the Warsaw Pact. In the French policy view, the requirements

I of France, Italy, Greece, or others are entirely different from one

another. In specific terms, Delpech argues that the linear front of

I the Elbe lends itself to very heavy and powerful tanks. In France,

I on the other hand, mobility inside its many different frontiers demands

the use of lighter tanks whose dimensions are dictated by rail trans-

I portability and whose weight tolerances cannot exceed the historic

roadways and buildings of the countryside. According to this French

I
I
I
 I
- 272 -

I
declaratory view, naval vessels differ even more widely in their re- I
quired characteristics in different regions. Consequently, there is

a basic rejection, at the outset, of any notion that total unifica- I

tion of materials is practical or desirable.
I
In identifying obstacles to standardization, Delpech points first to

non-concurrency in new requirements. He argues that it would take

I
virtually a quarter of a century of very cooperative policy for the I
Alliance countries to achieve concurrency in their calendar of require-

ments. I
Delpech also ridicules the idea that a "two-way street" could ever I
actually be established with the United States in defense equipment,

comparing the flood of American equipment into Europe with the single
I
instance of the Roland into the United States. He argues that, however

high-minded the American goal of achieving the acceptance of the fewest

I
/
number of standardized systems in the largest number of Alliance coun- I
tries, and of furthering the interoperability of systems, the reality

is that these goals must be limited by the national interests of the

I
Americans, which are not confined to the Atlantic Alliance in general

, or the Central European theater in particular. Furthermore, in the

I
'"French
,,
view, Washington is bounded in its freedom of action
--- --
the I
technical and industrial interests of its industry. Consequently, in

this view, U.S. policy consists in achieving the most compatible degree I
of standardization without creating a threat to the U.S. role in
I
I
I
I - 273 -

I
world competition - in other words, standardization without a two-way
I street.

I He then makes the argument for European collaboration and points out

that France, no matter how incurably individualistic it may be, has

I brought to production with West Germany two aircraft, (Transall and

I Alphajet), the Roland surface~to-air missile, the Milan and HOT anti-

tank missiles, two marine missiles (Kormoran and Exocet), and the

I RATAC radar. With Britain, France has brought to realization the

Jaguar, the SA-30, SA-41, and WG-13 helicopters, and the air-to-surface
I missile Martel. With Belgium and Netherlands, France has entered de-

I velopment of a modern minesweeper. He argues that France has a much

better record than Britain in collaboration for standardization.

I Finally, Delpech leaves the door open for determination by specialists,

on a case-by-case basis, of programs which would permit reduction in

I costs and interoperability of systems. He even holds out a challenge

I to the United States

._____ ... __
to bring ,-forward .. realistic
----~··
.... '"""-~ -
proposals that genu-
.__ -~·-· ~-·~ --~ ~

inely involve a two-way street.

-··-· ... ---.. .. ·-·
~ , --~--""-·- -~

I
_

Consequently, both in public statements and in action, French govern-

I ment and industry have not closed the door on the American standardiza-

tion initiative, in spite of their obvious skepticism based on past

I experience. The need for collaboration in civil aircraft and engines,

I as the only apparent way to avoid heavy cutbacks in the workforce, is

certainly one factor. Another is the Roland II license andmemories

I
I
I
 I
- 274 -

I
of the SS-10 and SS-11 sales to the United States. A third is the
I
F-16 experience which, however unpleasant, provided a reminder of
I
the difficulties of competing for business in countries to whom the

U.S. security shield is highly valued. I

However, the ultimate test, for France, will be the two-way street, I
and a secondary test will be full collaboration in new projects,
.-~ ------------·- ·----·-~----· I
in the new European collaborative sense, in contrast with simple
__,.___
licensing. The French view, like that of Europe in general, is that

the $50 billion American civi~ and military government market

I
is the most protected market in the world. Total foreign penetration I
has recently been estimated at less than 0.5%. Any initiative that

offers a larger share of that market will obviously be of interest. I

FraJ:!ce has in fact been moderately forthcoming in its attitude toward I
purchases of U.S. equipment, provided there were offsets. Even in

the Gaullist period, France often showed a strong preference for

I
American technology. As Callaghan points out, the British often
I
found themselves confronted with French insistence upon the selection

of U.S. rather than British subsystems and components for Concorde. I

Examples can be found not only in civil programs but among the most

nationalistic of defense programs such as SSBS and MSBS, the strategic

I
missile.
I
As. mentioned above, collaborative arrangements involving co-develop-

ment appear to be of much greater interest than licensing. One .

I
I
I
 I - 275 -

I analyst in the French missile industry pointed out, in the course

I of this study, the potentially useful collaborative models provided

by three industrial consortia - ~' STAR, and COSMOS - that have

I been formed to carry out joint European space programs. Each of

these involves several major aerospace manufacturers from different

\I
\ countries to carry out space projects. There are two particularly

\a l
interesting features about these consortia:

\a first, the prime contractor alternates among

the main companies in the group- e.g., a

I rotation of HDS, MATRA, and ERNO in the MESH

I I
consortium;

second, each of the consortia will have a primal

I •
association with an American firm- e.g., TRW's

•I
~
'
established role in MESH.

Another stumbling-block, based on French perceptions or past experience,

is the issue of complete freedom in third-country exports. The aero-

I space industry in particular is regarded as indispensable to the country

in .two ways: first, at the political level, to give France an independent

I decision-making capacity on strategic issues; and second, as a critical

factor in the national balance of payments. French industrialists point

I out that exports per aerospace worker in France compare with the other

I major aerospace countries as follows (based on 1974 figures):

I
I
I
 - 276 - I
I
France 50,000 francs I
u.s. 45,000

U.K. 36,000
I
Germany - 25,000
I
Furthermore, particularly in France, the aerospace industry is re-

garded as a non-costly one based on the ratio of export sales to

I
R&D and tooling costs for most existing systems. French industry I
claims, for example, a ratio of 50:1 for the Mirage aircraft and 13:1

for Exocet. Any arrangement which threatens to reduce these highly I

favorable ratios would be rejected.
I
A further difficulty, in the French view, is presented by U.S. indus-

trial security and disclosure policy. For a number of reasons -e.g.,

I
the occasional role of the principal labor union, the CGT, in corporate

decision-making bodies in France - industrial security is apparently

I
a difficult issue to resolve. This difficulty is heightened by con- I
cerns in the United States about dual-purpose technology transfers

that have application in the competitive commercial marketplace as well

I
as defense- e.g., aircraft engine technology, integrated circuits,

aircraft and helicoptersl avionics, etc. It is precisely in the area

I
------,--
I
J since the economic priority is to build the civil sector.
~-- .. ~ --
I
A two-year study by a task force of the~!l§_e._Science_Bp_aJ:"d on the

export of U.S. technology was released in February 1976. This task I

force studied technology transfer in four industries: airframes, air-
I
I
I - 277 -

I
craft engines, instrumentation, and solid-state devices. The four
I subcommittees for these topics concluded that "control of design and

I manufacturing know-how is absolutely vital to the maintenance of U.S.

technological superiority. Compared to this, all other considera-

I tions are secondary." French industry would tend to agree with this

conclusion and would, therefore, be doubtful about the freedom of

I collaboration in any major defense industrial project.

I· Finally, it is probably useful, under this heading, to discuss

I briefly the potential role of the newly formed European Program

-~G""'r;;:.o~1,1L£§~G) in providing France with a medium for discussing trans-

I Atlantic collaboration.

I There are widely differing interpretations of the purpose of EPG.

Certainly, it is far more than a simple response td American initia-

I tives for greater standardization. For both France and Britain, the

issue of the "two-way street" is undoubtedly more important a goal

I of EPG than it is for the United States. For France more than other

I European countries, EPG is perceived as a means for protecting the

long-term technical independence of Europe and preserving a European

I armaments industry through far greater collaboration on military

projects within Europe. The perception is widespread in Europe that

I the European countries are purchasing about 10 times the value in

I arms from the United States that this co~ntry purchases from Europe.)
Certainly, for all European countries, the correction of this im-

I balance is a principal goal of EPG.

I
I
 - 278 -
I
I
With regard to the four sectors on which EPG will work, the specific I
tasks appear to be the following:

Definition of a program for a tactical support

I
fighter for service introduction in the 1985- I
1995 period. (For France, this would presumably

be a Jaguar replacement for low-altitude attack).

I
Extension of the Franco-Belgium-Netherlands co- I
operation for minehunters into a Europe-wide

program.
I.
Exploration of a possible ammunition program for lOSmm
I
guns of battle tanks.
I
Definition of a program for the next generation

of short-range anti-tank weapons.

I
In addition, there will be EPG committees working on principles and pro-
I
cedures and also on the harmonizing of timetables for major defense pro-

curements. Although the U.S. view (and possibly that of other NATO
I
countries) appears to be that EPG is primarily a European attempt to I
get organized in order to begin discussions with the United States on

co-production for standardization, the French emphasis is placed only

I
on intra-European harmonization of programs and resulting collaboration.
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I
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I .
I D. Some Notes on Licensing and Co-Development

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 - 280 - I
I
To support some of the conclusions presented elsewhere in this re-

port, it may be us~ful to assemble here some of the observations

I
about licensing and co-development arrangements that were provided I
by industry sources in the course of the study.
I
First, with regard to direct licensing from the United States to

Europe, some random observations may be useful. License income can I

take three basic forms: an initial license fee and royalty on sales;

specified sales of parts and components;and fees for supporting

I
sources. I
For major U.S. defense and aerospace companies, the royalty income

to be derived from licenses is often regarded as a by-product of an

I
action which was taken for other reasons entirely. Obviously the I
sale of parts and components is one potentially important motiva-

tion, since many contracts specify a phased program, beginning with

I
licensee assembly of knock-down

higher level of fabrication.

ki~s and leading gradually to a

In addition, the license can create

I
a long-term market for spares. I
In many major instances of licensing, the American firm really does I
not have an option of providing the required systems through direct

export of U.S.-manufactured units. Typically, for economic and I

political reasons, the recipient government has control over the

situation and can insist on a license and specify its general condi-
I
tions. Another consideration that is noted among major U.S. licensors,
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I - 281 -

I
I is a desire to maintain and strengthen connections, and therefore

future market position, with European corporate affiliates and Euro-

I pean governments. In essence, however, corporate managements are
.._
I likely to view licenses as defensive actions designed to generate

as much revenue as possible for markets which, for reasons beyond

I U.S. government or industry control, could not be served by direct

exports.
I
Another element in the income potential from li~~nsing agr~~m~~-is
__. _.
I -·-·-=·~

the required technical support in adapting the licensed product to

I

~
I the European user needs. Typically, such technical support is
charged to the licensee or the purchasing government on a straight

I time and materials basis.

I In the case of the CH-53G co-production program with West Germany,

manufacturing and other operations were divided between Sikorsky

I and its German partners (mainly VFW Fokker), with the German firms

responsible for about 60% of the value added and Sikorsky 40%. As
I in other cases, Sikorsky supplied an initial batch of U.S.-manufactured

I prototypes, followed by the shipment of complete parts sets for assembly

in Germany. Subsequently, some of the simpler parts were fabricated

I by the German licensees, with Sikorsky supplying only some of the more

sophisticated and complex components for the balance of the total run
I of 110 aircraft. As is typical in U.S. military procurement practice,

I the engines for these aircraft were procured under separate contract

I
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 - 282 - I
by the German Ministry of Defense from a German manufacturer, under I
license to GE in the United States.
I
It is also of interest in this arrangement that United Technologies,

Sikorsky's parent firm, owns 13~J?f the German prime contractor,]]}!_

I
Fokker. The terms of the license provided a lump sum fee for air-
I
craft manufactured and assembled in Germany, and an additional amount

for each spare main rotor blade and each spare tail rotor blade manu- I
factured in Germany. Subsequent to the license agreement, a number

of contracts were negotiated including one between Sikorsky and VFW

I
Fokker to provide the basis for the Sikorsky portion of the co- I
production program. Other contracts were signed by Sikorsky to pro-

vide for tooling, personnel, hardware, software, and training. There I

were also contracts with the German government for technical advisers,

instructors, pilot and personnel training, handbooks, support equip-

I
ment, and spares. I
Licensing experience by major American corporations to Europe suggests

a strong preference to acquire working control over licensees. Given

I
the difficulties of receiving what is regarded as an adequate return I
on investment through simple license agreements, licensing to affili-

strongly preferred. In the defense industries it

I
course a matter of national policy whether or not an American corpora-
--·~·----- .. ,-~ ~~:F"¥""""""'''"' ~· ... - ........,..,_~~ .. ~ ~- ..,..,..~ .... ...,_ ......, ,, •..•. '
I
corporation. Normally, for th.JS. reas_:>n,_ --~erican corporations have
-- -~-----·""··--
I
found it necessary to license to non-affiliates, since European
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I - 283 -

I governments are naturally cpncerned about overseas control of chosen

I instruments in the defense field. In such cases, there is a natural

effort on the part of the U.S. licensor to establish fees which, in

I themselves, can provide a sufficient return to the licensing company.

I In thes.e cases, the selection of a licensee is quite different than

in mass commercial markets. The American licensor often has little

I or no choice of licensees, since there is typically a single chosen

national interest instrument in a given field of defense technology.

I Consequently, negotiations may be more difficult than in a purely

I commercial endeavor.

I In one U.S. company which manufactures high-technology instrumentation,

typical royalty fees on gross sales in aerospace lines might range

I from 5 to 7.5% in relatively high-volume applications (for example,

navigation equipment for the general aviation market) and up to 10%

I in very specialized situations. These fees compare with 2 to 5% in,

I for example, automotive product lines. If the royalty is higher,

the initial fee or front-end load might be lower, intended only to

I cover routine costs of negotiation, and early coordination.

I The issue of technology transfer, already discussed in a previous

section, influences industry's consideration of licensing just as

I strongly as it does that of the U.S. government's disclosure policy

community. It may be helpful to take the example of helicopter tech-

I nology, where.Europe considers itself the technical equal of the

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 - 284 - I
United States. Discussions with American helicopter manufacturers
I
reveal a view that the U.S. helicopter industry has spent large
I
amounts on R&D to advance the state of the art of helicopter design

that are not matched by Western European industry. The major ob- I
jectives in U.S. industry have been to improve the parameters of

performance, especially speed, and to achieve significantly greater

I
reliability and maintainability. The most important and fundamental
I
R&D carried out by U.S. industry has been on the aerodynamic and

structural design of rotors, resulting in a series of significant I

contributions to helicopter flight performance. There has also been

a great deal of structural innovation aimed at weight reduction, re-

I
duced vulnerability to fatigue, and greater freedom for the aero-
I
dynamic designers who optimize rotor configurations. In these areas,

the U.S. industry feels that it has moved well ahead of Western I
Europe. Because of this, a strong position is taken ·in licensing

arrangements, affecting either the initial fee, or the amount of

I
technology transferred, or both. The view voiced by the head of one
I
U.S. firm is that, in view of the technological imbalance, his

company will let someone else do the sheet metal work, so long as I
the American licensor can retain the production share that requires

maximum productivity and investment in R&D and heavy machine tools.

I
There may also be a variation in fee or royalty schedules depending
I
on the ultimate destination of the equipment. On the European side,

for example, Euromissile has made it clear that, in future questions

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I - 285 -

I of third country export rights, Euromissile can be expected to demand

I higher license fees and royalty payments for units exported to third

countries than for those in the U.S. home market of the licensee.
I
Turning now to the issue of collaborative development and production
I as it has evolved in Europe, it may be helpful to summarize some of

I the points made throughout the report:

The sunken costs that have already been absorbed by

I European governments in establishing chosen industrial

I instruments in each of the principal fields of defense

technolo~y create a need of the major countries to ensure

I that the R&D and manufacturing capacities of these in-

dustries are adequately utilized. Collaboratively

I funded programs, based on careful division of work in

I the R&D and manufacturing phases (and balanced by fund-

ing contributions and _purchases) have evolved as a complex

I but satisfactory solution.

I The establishment of intra-European consortia has already

resulted in greater standardization in the defense field and

I will lead to more. For this reason, the consortia represent

I a useful focal point for new U.S. initiatives. It seems

useless, in the view of the present study, to attack or

I ignore this approach, since in fact it alr~ady exists and

I
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 - 286 - I
I
has the unique advantage of having already overcome I
some of the inherent European and political economic

impediments to standardization.
I
In any form of collaboration bet~een the United States and
I<
Europe for defense systems, it may in future be more comfort-

able for the

lateral entity, representing two or more European

------ I
I
<---·-."-----\
governments, than a single national industry. This

has the advantale of gaining a wider political consensus I

l .
an d a b roa d er Evropean
l
~
const~tuency, b ot h ~n
. d ustr~a
. 1 an d

political, to avoid the perceived_ _:i.E!9~J.a,nc.Et~ .. J~-~~t usually

I
-----~-------,_.....,----- .. -- --- --." --·-
...

result from a bilateral arran~eme~t between the United I

States and a single European country. Perhaps the most

interesting organization, in this regard, would be the I

British-German-Italian Panavia consortium, which has a

well-established management structure, an intimate con-

I
nection with NATO, and well-established major programs I
which can serve as the basis for future programs.
I
With regard to collaborative ventures, the view at Rolls-

Royce is that R&D costs are about 20% higher in a colla- I

borative program but that appreciable gains eventually

result in the reduction of production costs. The Rolls-

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I - 287 -

I
I Royce view is that the 20% cost differential cannot

I be reduced~ since it is npt necessarily the result

of wasteful practices but of necessary coordinations.

I However, it is also the Rolls-Royce line of argument

that this overlapping of activity reduces the chance

I of major mistakes. Furthermore, intentional under-

I bidding is virtually impossible in the consortium

context.

I One goal of standardization is to bring about a re-

I structuring of the European defense industries to

permit longer production runs and lower unit costs

I· due to economies of scale. This is to some extent

already being achieved through European collaborative

I projects. This goal suggests a U.S. interest in in-

I vading collaborative programs of major defense firms,

compared with purely national efforts.

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