Analysis of MKULTRA Hearing (Part 17)

Analysis of MKULTRA, 1977 Joint Hearing (Part 17)
by Dr. Jeffrey Russell, PhD
Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents by the Intelligence

Community
This is a report prepared by the Select Committee to specify their results and how it relates to
policy and law. Fears that hostile countries would use chemical or biological agents against
Americans led to the development of a defensive program to counteract this threat. This
reason was soon replaced when the use of drugs in interrogation and control of enemy agents
was discovered. Research and development programs to find materials to alter human
behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. These experimental programs used
human subjects, both witting and unwitting, to determine the potential effects of chemical and
biological agents. These testing programs were considered highly sensitive. [Note: The term
“highly sensitive” was used back then as a reason to cover things up like this. Today, they just
say it’s “national security” and that covers everything.] This is where they started learning how
to compartmentalize secret programs.
These programs resulted in massive abridgments of the rights of American citizens,
sometimes with tragic consequences. The manner in which these tests were administered
demonstrated a fundamental disregard for the value of human life. [Note: Operation Paperclip
brought over hundreds of Nazi scientists and researchers who were accepted by the CIA with
open arms. Some of the worst were placed in covert compartmentalized programs which in
many cases were just a continuation of the diabolic research activities they were engaged in
under Nazi rule.]
The Committee’s investigation also raised serious questions about the command and control
procedures in place at the CIA. In fact, the CIA waived normal protocols when chemical and
biological testing was involved to protect their security. There were also other intelligence
agencies involved. For instance, the Army was doing experimental testing with LSD overseas.
Naturally, the different intelligence agencies were not sharing data due to compartmentation.
A. The Programs Investigated
1. Project CHATTER: This was a Navy program begun in 1947 which focused on the
identification and testing of “truth drugs” for use in interrogation and recruitment of agents.
The drugs researched included Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine, and mescaline. The project
ended shortly after the Korean War in 1953.
2. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTICHOKE: Project BLUEBIRD was approved by the Director of the CIA in
1950. Its objectives were:
(a) Finding means of conditioning personnel to prevent extraction of information by
unfriendlys
(b) Investigating the possibility of control of a subject using special interrogation techniques
(c) Memory enhancement
(d) Establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel
Another objective was added during the project: the evaluation of offensive uses of
unconventional interrogation techniques which included drugs and hypnosis. In 1951, the
project was renamed ARTICHOKE which included “in-house” experiments on interrogation
techniques conducted under medical and security controls which ensured individual safety.
The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) initially led the projects. Eventually, the Office of
Security ended up with control of the project in collaboration with the CIA’s Technical Services
Division (TSD). The CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956 but evidence says otherwise.
3. Project MKNAOMI: This was a major CIA program whose purpose can be summarized as:
(a) Provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements.
(b) To stockpile lethal materials for the specific use of TSD (Technical Services Division)
(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of
biological and chemical materials
(d) To provide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading, and evaluation of materials
and items in order to assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be
expected when operational
The CIA formed an agreement with the Army in 1952 where the Special Operations Division
(SOD) at Fort Detrick was to assist CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents
and delivery systems. The SOD was essentially developing biological weapons and delivery
mechanisms for the CIA. The CIA also requested the SOD to study the use of biological agents
against crops and animals. This project was terminated in 1970. [Note: This project is just one
example of an agency of the government gone rogue. Tasked with gathering intelligence on
foreign powers, this project shows in intent to engage in biological/chemical warfare possibly
for their own agenda which may not align with that of the US]
4. Project MKULTRA: This was the principal CIA program to research and develop chemical and
biological agents. These developed agents were then deployed in clandestine operations to
control human behavior. In January of 1973, MKULTRA records were destroyed by TSD
personnel acting on verbal orders of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb was carrying
out a verbal order of then DCI Richard Helms. Helms was the individual who initially
recommended the project when he was the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. The project
was approved on April 13, 1953. The project was always considered extremely sensitive
because:
(a) Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many professionals to
be unethical
(b) Some activities raise the question of legality
(c) The testing phase places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy
(d) Public disclosure of MKULTRA could induce a serious adverse reaction in the public
Over the 10-year life of the program, many additional “avenues” to control human behavior
were designated as appropriate for investigation. These include radiation, electroshock,
psychology, psychiatry, sociology and anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and
paramilitary devices and materials.
The project was implemented in three stages:
(1) The search for materials suitable for study
(2) Laboratory testing on human subjects
(3) Application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.
In a 1963 survey of the TSD by the Inspector General (IG), the inspector learned of the
MKULTRA program and the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting subjects. As a
result, the project was shut down in 1964.
5. Testing of LSD by the Army: There were 3 major phases of the testing,
(a) LSD was administered to over 1,000 soldiers who volunteered to be subjects
(b) 95 volunteers received LSD in clinical experiments
(c) 16 unwitting subjects were interrogated after receiving LSD in operational field tests
B. CIA Drug Testing Programs

1. Rationale for the Testing Programs
The initial reason for developing these programs was a defensive one. Hostile powers like
Russia and China could use these new drugs against agents, military, or citizens. Of particular
concern was LSD because its effects were so potent and devastating. Soon, this reason
dropped by the wayside and the main goal became to learn how to use the drug to control
behavior of foreign agents. Substantial programs were launched to study the effects and
develop techniques to assist in intelligence operations with an emphasis on interrogations.
2. The Death of Dr. Frank Olson
Dr. Olson was a civilian employee of the Army who died on November 27, 1953. He was
unwittingly given 70 mg of LSD in a glass of Cointreau on November 19, 1953 as part of an
experiment performed at a meeting of Army and CIA scientists. Olson began developing
symptoms of paranoia and schizophrenia. A CIA officer took him to NYC to get help from Dr.
Abramson who was doing research on LSD. Olson fell to his death from a 10 th story window of
a hotel. [Note: Did he jump out the window or was he helped out the window because he was
about to become a huge embarrassment to the Agency?]
3. Administration of LSD in the aftermath of Dr. Olson’s death
The CIA continued to administer LSD to unwitting subjects until about 1963. Olson’s death was
looked upon as a fluke. None of the individuals involved was subject to any disciplinary action.
4. Monitoring and Control of the Testing/Use of Chemical and Biological Agents by the CIA
The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring and control of the testing
and use of chemical and biological agents. An analysis of the failures can be divided into 4
categories:
(a) Waiver of Administrative Controls: Normal Agency procedures were waived by the
Director due to the highly sensitive nature of the project. In 1973 when both Gottlieb and
Helms were retiring, they decided that it would be best to destroy the program files to protect
other organizations and outsiders who had participated in the program. What the destruction
of materials prevented was the ability to reconstruct the project and to determine the full
extent of the Project operations and how the developed materials were used. What is certain is
that the Clandestine Services division of the CIA was the chief beneficiary of the Program. The
MKULTRA program was approved on April 13, 1953 by then DCI Allen Dulles and he specified
the Program as highly sensitive and not to be handled under normal operating procedures. The
subprograms were handled on a compartmented basis with virtually no oversight as normal
procedures required. When possible, no paper trail was left. One example of the is the
transfer of biological agents like anthrax, cobra venom, and shellfish toxin from Fr. Detrick to
TSD agents. At the end of MKULTRA, the Agency had no way of determining how much of these
agents were on-hand, where they were stored, and what delivery systems had been issued.
(b) Authorization: The document destruction in 1973 made it almost impossible to determine
how and who authorized various subprograms. With highly sensitive aspects like LSD
administration, agents avoided leaving a paper trail. There is some evidence that TSD was given
explicit verbal orders to notify DCI whenever LSD was to be used which did not happen at least
in Dr. Olsen’s case.
(c) Internal Review: Both the waiver of controls and the disregard for authorization made
internal review also very difficult. The General Counsel’s opinion was not sought on MKULTRA’s
subprojects though they had been labeled in the IG 1957 Report on the TSD as “unethical and
illicit.”
(d) Compartmentation and Jurisdictional Conflict Within the Agency: In addition to the other
problems with MKULTRA, there was a jurisdictional conflict between the TSD and the Office of
Medical Services and the Office of Security. Agents in the different divisions said there was no
sharing of information due to compartmentation. A lack of proper documentation of work
made all that more difficult.
C. Covert Testing on Human Subjects by Military Intelligence Groups
EA 1729 was the name of the Army project for testing LSD. The positive
intelligence/counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like LSD supported the
development of an American military capability and this resulted in experimental testing. Two
projects which involved in administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in Europe and the Far
East. Much of the Army’s testing duplicated research done by MKULTRA subprograms. Like the
CIA’s programs, the Army’s research showed a clear lack of authorization and supervision.
(1) Scope of Testing
Between 1955 and 1958, research was done by the Army Chemical Corps to evaluate LSD as an
incapacitating agent on the battleground. 1,000 witting volunteers were tested to study the
effects on a soldier’s ability to function in warfare. In 1958, a new phase of testing was begun
to evaluate the intelligence potential of LSD. This included tests on 95 volunteers.
(2) Inadequate Coordination Among Intelligence Agencies
The Army’s program had no coordination with the CIA’s program as expected. If there was an
open forum, the Army could have just asked the CIA for their results rather than conducting
expensive and dangerous tests.
(3) Subordination of Individual Rights to National Security Considerations
Just as many of the experiments may have been unnecessary, the nature of the tests reflects a
basic disregard for the fundamental human rights of the subjects. There was some
psychological screening, but this did not eliminate the risks of injury. In addition, the
volunteers were asked to sign an NDA to maintain the secrecy of the operation.
(4) Lack of Normal Authorization and Supervision
The Army’s testing program operated under informal and nonroutine authorization. In fact, the
first Army program to test LSD was a violation of Army procedures. These proposals should
have been approved by the Secretary of the Army.
(5) Termination of Testing
On April 10, 1963, during a meeting to discuss program results General Leonard directed that
no further field testing be done.
D. Cooperation and Competition Among the Intelligence Community Agencies

(1) Relationships Among Agencies Within the Intelligence Community
Relationships between various intelligence agencies regarding LSD research varied widely. Early
on, there was good cooperation but as time progressed and research went down other paths,
the programs became compartmented and secretive due to the nature of the testing. Many
subprojects would not have been done if there had been open cooperation.
(2) Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Foreign Liaison Services
Most of the subjects that were tested overseas were being held for interrogation by foreign
intelligence agencies. Some MKULTRA programs operated overseas generally due to more
permissive laws there.
(3) Relationships Between the Intelligence Agencies and Other Governmental Agencies
Certain U.S. government agencies actively assisted the efforts of intelligence agencies by
providing “cover” for research activities. The Bureau of Narcotics assisted the CIA with the
administration of LSD.
(4) Relationships Between the Intelligence Community Agencies and Other Institutions and
Individuals, Public and Private
In the IG 1963 Survey of MKULTRA, it was noted that the research/development phase was
conducted through specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and
federal institutions, and private research organizations in a manner which concealed the CIA’s
involvement or interests. Only a few key individuals were made aware of Agency sponsorship.
This was followed by an operational phase involving physicians, toxicologists, and other
specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals and prisons. These specialists were
provided materials and findings of the research projects to proceed with intensive testing on
human subjects.

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Analysis of MKULTRA Hearing (Part 17)

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Analysis of MKULTRA, 1977 Joint Hearing (Part 17)

by Dr. Jeffrey Russell, PhD

Testing and Use of Chemical and Biological Agents by the Intelligence

B. CIA Drug Testing Programs

D. Cooperation and Competition Among the Intelligence Community Agencies

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