URDANETA CITY UNIVERSITY

Graduate Studies

The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Rights and

Jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea
By: Antonio T. Carpio

Subject Covered: Seminar in Public Administration

Reportage by:
Mr. Rodel Alba
DPA Student

Background:

Before Portuguese navigators coined the name South China Sea, the sea was known
to Asian and Arab navigators as the Champa Sea, after the Cham people who established a
great maritime kingdom in central Vietnam from the late 2nd to the 17th century.
The Chams had sailboats with outriggers, similar to the sailboats of the Austronesians.
The ancestors of the Chams spoke a MalayoPolynesian language, derived from the
Austronesian language. The early Chams are believed to have migrated by sea from Borneo
to central Vietnam starting in 500 BCE.
The islands in the Champa Sea were called pulo. In Filipino, the Philippine national
language, which is also derived from the Austronesian language, pulo means an “island,
isolated place.” When the Portuguese reached the Champa Sea, they learned that the
inhabitants called their islands pulo. This explains why early European maps depicting this sea
prefix the names of the islands with the word pulo.
The ancient Chinese named the sea Nan Hai or the South Sea. The ancient Chinese
never called this sea the South China Sea.
The ancient Malays also called this sea Laut Chidol or the South Sea, as recorded by
Pigafetta in his account of Ferdinand Magellan’s circumnavigation of the world from 1519 to
1522. In Malay, which is likewise derived from the Austronesian language, laut means sea and
kidol means south.

Legal Aspect

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS is the constitution
for the oceans and seas of our planet. UNCLOS governs maritime disputes among member
states. UNCLOS codified customary international law, introduced novel concepts like the
exclusive economic zone and the extended continental shelf, and institutionalized the common
heritage of mankind. It is considered the most comprehensive treaty ever devised by man —
with its own dispute settlement mechanism. UNCLOS was adopted on 10 December 1982 and
entered into force on 16 November 1994. To date, UNCLOS has been ratified by 167 states
and the European Union. All the states involved in the South China Sea dispute have ratified
UNCLOS.

THE NINE-DASHED LINE CLAIM OF CHINA

 In December 1947, the Kuomintang Government of China adopted the nine-dashed line
claim. The claim was embodied in a map, entitled Location Map of the South Sea Islands,
released within China in February 1948, with eleven dashes forming a broken U-shaped line
covering almost the entire South China Sea.
The title of the map indicates a claim to islands, not the sea. China did not explain the
meaning or basis of the eleven dashes, nor did China give the coordinates of the eleven
dashes. China claimed the islands enclosed by the eleven dashes, namely Dongsha Islands
(Pratas), Xisha Islands (Paracels), Zhongsha Island (Macclesfield Bank), and Nansha Islands
(Spratlys). China was silent on any claim to the surrounding waters.
Significantly, Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal), or its previous name Min’zhu, is
not mentioned in the map. Thus, Scarborough Shoal is not one of the islands that China
claimed under its 1947 eleven-dashed line map. Further, Zhongsha Island (Macclesfield Bank)
is not an island because it is fully submerged, its highest peak being 9.2 meters below sea
level.
In 1950, China, under communist rule, announced the removal of two dashes in the Gulf
of Tonkin without any explanation. The line became known as the nine-dashed line.

Main Driver of the South China Sea Dispute

In 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted to the United Nations (UN) their
extended continental shelf claims.27 China protested the claims and submitted to the UN a
map of its nine-dashed line, claiming “indisputable sovereignty” over all the islands and the
“adjacent” waters enclosed by the line, and “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over the “relevant”
waters enclosed by the line.28
This was the first time that China officially announced its nine-dashed line claim to the
world. Still, China did not give the coordinates of the dashes. Neither did China explain the
meaning or basis of the dashes, or the meaning of “adjacent” and “relevant” waters. The terms
“adjacent” and “relevant” waters are not UNCLOS terms.
China’s nine-dashed line claim, through which China is aggressively asserting
“indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters” and
“sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil”
enclosed by the dashes, is the main driver of the South China Sea dispute.
China’s nine-dashed line claim is bereft of basis under international law. The well-entrenched
doctrine in international law is that “land dominates the sea,” and all maritime entitlements must
be measured from baselines along the coast of continental land, island or rock above water at
high tide. China’s nine-dashed line does not comply with this basic requirement of UNCLOS.
Chinese legal scholars like Judge Zhiguo Gao of the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea (ITLOS), and Profs. Bing Bing Jia and Keyuan Zuo admit that what China claims
beyond the islands and their UNCLOS-derived maritime entitlements is not “sovereignty.”
Chinese legal scholars theorize that China’s claim to “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” to
exploit the fishery, oil, gas, and other resources within the nine-dashed line, beyond the islands
and their UNCLOS-derived maritime entitlements, emanates from “historic rights” formed in the
long course of history.
In short, these Chinese legal scholars claim that China is entitled to rights akin to EEZ
and ECS rights beyond what UNCLOS provides, even at the expense of depriving other coastal
states of their own EEZs and ECSs. No other state has made even a remotely similar claim.
China wants a sui generis right to claim the resources of almost the entire South China Sea,
as if there were no other land mass or coastal states that border the same sea.
In 2013, China released a new map of China, adding a tenth dash on the eastern side
of Taiwan. Thus, China’s nine-dashed line is still growing. In its 2013 map, China claimed the
ten dashes as its “national boundary.” The shading on the ten dashes is the same shading on
the lines marking China’s continental land boundary. SinoMaps Press published this 2013 map
under the jurisdiction of China’s State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, making it an official
Chinese government map.
In its Note Verbale of 7 June 201330 to China, the Philippines expressed its “strong
objection to the indication that the nine-dashed line represents China’s national boundary in
the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea.” The Philippines had to protest because what is
enclosed by a state’s “national boundary” is its national territory.

Ramifications of China’s “National Boundary” as Delineated by Its Nine-Dashed Line

China’s nine-dashed line claim encloses about 85.7 percent of the entire South China
Sea, equivalent to 3 million square kilometers of the 3.5 million square kilometers total surface
area of the South China Sea.31 Just over one-half of the world’s seaborne trade passes
through the South China Sea, valued at US$5.3 trillion annually.
Malaysia stands to lose about 80 percent of its EEZ in Sabah and Sarawak facing the
South China Sea, as well as most of its active gas and oil fields in the same area. Vietnam will
lose about 50 percent of its total EEZ, Brunei about 90 percent of its total EEZ, and Indonesia
about 30 percent of its EEZ facing the South China Sea in Natuna Islands, whose surrounding
waters comprise the largest gas field in Southeast Asia.
For the Philippines, what is at stake in the South China Sea are: (1) about 80 percent of
its EEZ comprising 381,000 square kilometers of maritime space, including the entire Reed
Bank and part of the Malampaya gas field; and (2) 100 percent of its ECS estimated at over
150,000 square kilometers of maritime space. Either the Philippines keeps these maritime
entitlements or loses them to China.
Effectively, China’s nine-dashed line claim encroaches on over 531,000 square
kilometers of Philippine EEZ and ECS, including all the fishery, oil, gas, and mineral resources
found within this vast area, which is larger than the total land area of the Philippines of about
300,000 square kilometers. This Chinese aggression is the gravest external threat to the
Philippines since World War II.
The dashes are only 64 kilometers from Balabac Island, which is the southernmost
island in Palawan, 70 kilometers from the coast of Burgos, Ilocos Norte, and 44 kilometers from
Y’ami Island, which is the northernmost island in Batanes. The Philippines will be left with only
a sliver of water as its territorial sea and EEZ. The Philippines and China will have an extremely
long common sea border, from Balabac Island in southern Palawan to Y’ami Island in northern
Batanes, stretching over 1,550 kilometers. This has far-reaching ramifications for present and
future generations of Filipinos on the following:
• National Security • Merchant Marine and Commercial Aviation • Energy Security
• Mineral resources Security • Food Security • Environmental Security

Core Dispute Between China and Philippines: China’s Claim to

Eighty Percent of Philippine EEZ

The core dispute between China and the Philippines is obvious — China wants to grab
80 percent of Philippine EEZ in the South China Sea. But to obfuscate matters, China is re-
framing the South China Sea dispute as a contest between China and the U.S., with the U.S.
containing or constraining the rise of China, and the Philippines having allied itself with the U.S.
As a world naval power, the paramount national interest of the U.S. is freedom of
navigation and over-flight so its military vessels and aircraft can sail and fly, and conduct military
activities, in the high seas and EEZs of the world, including the South China Sea. On the other
hand, China asserts that foreign military vessels and aircraft cannot conduct military activities
in China’s EEZ without China’s prior permission. This is the dispute between China and the
U.S. in the South China Sea. The Philippines has no interest in this dispute as the Philippines
has no blue-water navy or long-range air force that can sail and fly in the high seas and EEZs
of the world.
The paramount national interest of the Philippines in the South China Sea is to protect
its EEZ from Chinese encroachment. This is why the Philippines filed the arbitration case
against China. Obviously unable to match China’s military might, the Philippines brought China
to an UNCLOS tribunal, where the legality of China’s encroachment could be resolved
peacefully by arbitration solely in accordance with the Law of the Sea. The UNCLOS tribunal
is a forum where warships, warplanes and nuclear bombs do not count.
Under the nine-dashed line, China claims the Reed Bank off the coast of Palawan,
James Shoal off the coast of Sarawak, and the waters within the EEZ of Vietnam. China
prohibits foreign fishing vessels from fishing in the high seas of the South China Sea, including
portions of the waters of the Natuna Islands, without permission from China. In short, China
claims all the resources within the nine-dashed line, which encloses about 85.7 percent of the
South China Sea.

Source:
1. eBook of Justice Antonio T. Carpio - file:///C:/Users/rodel%20alba/Desktop/SCS-
WPS+Dispute+Interactive.pdf