I.A. Meaning of Taxation Obligation To Pay Tax Vs Obligation To Pay Debt

I.A.
Meaning of taxation
Obligation to pay tax vs obligation to pay debt
G.R. Nos. 141104 & 148763 June 8, 2007
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
FACTS:
"The taxpayer must justify his claim for tax exemption or refund by the clearest grant of
organic or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague implications."
"Export processing zones (EPZA) are effectively considered as foreign territory for tax
purposes."
Petitioner corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer engaged in mining, production, and sale of

various mineral products, filed claims with the BIR for refund/credit of input VAT on its
purchases of capital goods and on its zero-rated sales in the taxable quarters of the years 1990
and 1992. BIR did not immediately act on the matter prompting the petitioner to file a petition
for review before the CTA. The latter denied the claims on the grounds that for zero-rating to
apply, 70% of the company's sales must consists of exports, that the same were not filed within
the 2-year prescriptive period (the claim for 1992 quarterly returns were judicially filed only
on April 20, 1994), and that petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to support its claim
for refund/credit.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that CTA failed to consider the following: sales
to PASAR and PHILPOS within the EPZA as zero-rated export sales; the 2-year prescriptive
period should be counted from the date of filing of the last adjustment return which was April
15, 1993, and not on every end of the applicable quarters; and that the certification of the
independent CPA attesting to the correctness of the contents of the summary of suppliers’
invoices or receipts examined, evaluated and audited by said CPA should substantiate its
claims.
ISSUES:
Did the petitioner corporation sufficiently establish the factual bases for its applications for
refund/credit of input VAT?
RULING:
No. Although the Court agreed with the petitioner corporation that the two-year prescriptive
period for the filing of claims for refund/credit of input VAT must be counted from the date
of filing of the quarterly VAT return, and that sales to PASAR and PHILPOS inside the EPZA
are taxed as exports because these export processing zones are to be managed as a separate
customs territory from the rest of the Philippines, and thus, for tax purposes, are effectively
considered as foreign territory, it still denies the claims of petitioner corporation for refund of
its input VAT on its purchases of capital goods and effectively zero-rated sales during the
period claimed for not being established and substantiated by appropriate and sufficient
evidence.
Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. It is regarded as in derogation of the
sovereign authority, and should be construed in strictissimi juris against the person or entity
claiming the exemption. The taxpayer who claims for exemption must justify his claim by the
clearest grant of organic or statute law and should not be permitted to stand on vague
implications
I.C. Theory and Basis of Taxation

Necessity Theory
G.R. No. 149110 April 9, 2003
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF CABANATUAN, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Commonwealth

Act No. 120, as amended.
For many years now, petitioner sells electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City,
posting a gross income of P107,814,187.96 in 1992.7 Pursuant to section 37 of Ordinance No.
165-92,8 the respondent assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41,
representing 75% of 1% of the latter’s gross receipts for the preceding year.
Petitioner refused to pay the tax assessment arguing that the respondent has no authority to
impose tax on government entities. Petitioner also contended that as a non-profit
organization, it is exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees in
accordance with sec. 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended.
The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC, demanding that petitioner pay the assessed
tax due, plus surcharge. Respondent alleged that petitioner’s exemption from local taxes has
been repealed by section 193 of the LGC, which reads as follows:
“Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.”
RTC upheld NPC’s tax exemption. On appeal the CA reversed the trial court’s Order on the
ground that section 193, in relation to sections 137 and 151 of the LGC, expressly withdrew
the exemptions granted to the petitioner.
ISSUES:
W/N the respondent city government has the authority to issue Ordinance No. 165-92 and
impose an annual tax on “businesses enjoying a franchise
RULING:
YES. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for without taxes, the government can neither
exist nor endure. A principal attribute of sovereignty, the exercise of taxing power derives its
source from the very existence of the state whose social contract with its citizens obliges it to
promote public interest and common good. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax
emanates from necessity;32 without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting
the general welfare and well-being of the people.
Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs can impose franchise tax “notwithstanding
any exemption granted by any law or other special law.” This particular provision of the LGC does
not admit any exception. In City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes,74 MERALCO’s
exemption from the payment of franchise taxes was brought as an issue before this Court. The
same issue was involved in the subsequent case of Manila Electric Company v. Province of
Laguna.75 Ruling in favor of the local government in both instances, we ruled that the franchise
tax in question is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed by MERALCO under special
laws, viz:
“It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC
to support their position that MERALCO’s tax exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit
language of section 137 which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax
‘notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law’ is all-encompassing
and clear. The franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws.
Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that unless
otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed
by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled
corporations except (1) local water districts, (2) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938,
(3) non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this code, the obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the three enumerated
entities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. In the absence of any provision of the Code to the contrary, and we
find no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or incentive enjoyed by
MERALCO under existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn.
Reading together sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we conclude that under the LGC the local
government unit may now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar based on the incoming receipts realized within its territorial
jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or charter
is clearly manifested by the language used on (sic) Sections 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing
such exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and
impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or
privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges.
No more unequivocal language could have been used.”76 (emphases supplied)
Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to
finance and support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace,
progress, and prosperity of the people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, “the
original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-
owned or controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege
resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated
enterprises.” With the added burden of devolution, it is even more imperative for government
entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying taxes or
other charges due from them.
I.D. Purpose/Objectives of Taxation

General/Fiscal/Revenue
EN BANC
G.R. No. L- 41383 August 15, 1988
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ROMEO F. EDU in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, and UBALDO
CARBONELL, in his capacity as National Treasurer, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
PAL is engaged in the air transportation business under a legislative franchise (Act 4271),
wherein it is exempt from the
payment of taxes. On the strength of an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, PAL was
determined to have not been paying motor vehicle registration fees since 1956. The Land
Transportation Commissioner required all tax-exempt entities, including PAL, to pay motor
vehicle registration fees. PAL protested. The trial court dismissed PAL’s complaint. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES:
Are motor vehicle registration fees taxes or regulatory taxes?
RULING:
They are taxes. Tax are for revenue, whereas fees are exactions for purposes of regulation
and inspection, and are for that reason limited in amount to what is necessary to cover the
cost of the services rendered in that connection.
It is the object of the charge, and not the name, that determines whether a charge is a tax or a
fee. The money collected under the Motor Vehicle Law is not intended for the expenditures
of the Motor Vehicle Law is not intended for the expenditures of the Motor Vehicles Office
but accrues to the funds for the construction and maintenance of public roads, streets and
bridges.
As the fees are not collected for regulatory purposes as an incident to the enforcement of
regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles on public highways, but to provide
revenue with which the Government is to construct and maintain public highways for
everyone’s use, they are veritable taxes, not merely fees.
PAL is, thus, exempt from paying such fees, except for the period between June 27, 1968 to
April 9, 1979, where its tax exception in the franchise was repealed.
TOPIC:
I.C. Theory and Basis of Taxation

Non-revenue/Special or Regulatory
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92585 May 8, 1992
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HONORABLE COMMISSIONER
BARTOLOME C. FERNANDEZ and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER ALBERTO P. CRUZ,
respondents.
FACTS:
In 1989, COA sent a letter to Caltex, directing it to remit its collection to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF), excluding that unremitted for 1986 and 188 of the additional tax
on petroleum products authorized under Section 8 of PD 1956; and that pending such
remittance, all its claims for reimbursement from the OPSF shall be held in abeyance. Caltex
requested COA, notwithstanding an early release of its reimbursement certificates from the
OPSF, which COA denied. On 31 May 1989, Caltex submitted a proposal to COA for the
payment and the recovery of claims. COA approved the proposal but prohibited Caltex from
further offsetting remittances and reimbursements for the current and ensuing years. Caltex
moved for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
Whether the amounts due from Caltex to the OPSF may be offsetted against Caltex’
outstanding claims from said funds.
RULING:
Taxation is no longer envisioned as a measure merely to raise revenue to support the existence
of government; taxes may be levied with a regulatory purpose to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened industry which is affected with public interest
as to be within the police power of the state. PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, explicitly
provides that the source of OPSF is taxation. A taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the
claims that he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be the subject of compensation
because the government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors of each other
and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-
off.
TOPIC:
I.F. Classification of Taxes

Indirect Taxes
G.R. No. 88291 June 8, 1993
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, HON. VICENTE JAYME, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
Commonwealth Act 120 created NAPOCOR as a public corporation to undertake the

development of hydraulic power and the production of power from other sources. RA 358
(1949) granted NAPOCOR tax and duty exemption privileges. RA 6395 (1971) revised the
charter of the NAPOCOR, tasking it to carry out the policy of the national electrification, and
provided in detail NAPOCOR’s tax exceptions. PD 380 (1974) specified that NAPOCOR’s
exemption includes all taxes, etc. imposed “directly or indirectly.” PD 938 integrated the
exemptions in favor of GOCCs including their subsidiaries; however, empowering the
President or the Minister of Finance, upon recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review
Board (FIRB) to restore, partially or completely, the exemptions withdrawn or revised. The
FIRB issued Resolution 10-85 (7 February 1985) restoring the duty and tax exemptions
privileges of NAPOCOR for period 11 June 1984- 30 June 1985. Resolution 1-86 (1January
1986) restored such exemption indefinitely effective 1 July 1985. EO 93 (1987) again withdrew
the exemption. FIRB issued Resolution 17-87 (24 June 1987) restoring APOCOR’s exemption,
which was approved by the President on 5 October 1987. Since 1976, oil firms never paid
excise or specific and ad valorem taxes for petroleum products sold and delivered to
NAPOCOR. Oil companies started to pay specific and ad valorem taxes on their sales of oil
products to NAPOCOR only in 1984. NAPOCOR claimed for a refund (P468.58 million). Only
portion thereof, corresponding to Caltex, was approved and released by way of a tax credit
memo. The claim for refund of taxes paid by PetroPhil, Shell and Caltex amounting to P410.58
million was denied. NAPOCOR moved for reconsideration, starting that all deliveries of
petroleum products to NAPOCOR are tax exempt, regardless of the period of delivery.
ISSUES:
Whether NAPOCOR cease to enjoy exemption from indirect tax when PD 938 stated the
exemption in general terms.
RULING:
NAPOCOR is a non-profit public corporation created for the general good and welfare, and
wholly owned by the government of the Republic of the Philippines. From the very beginning
of the corporation’s existence, NAPOCOR enjoyed preferential tax treatment “to enable the
corporation to pay the indebtness and obligation” and effective implementation of the policy
enunciated in Section 1 of RA 6395. From the preamble of PD 938, it is evident that the
provisions of PD 938 were not intended to be strictly construed against NAPOCOR. On the
contrary, the law mandates that it should be interpreted liberally so as to enhance the tax
exempt status of NAPOCOR. It is recognized principle that the rule on strict interpretation
does not apply in the case of exemptions in favor of government political subdivision or
instrumentality. In the case of property owned by the state or a city or other public
corporations, the express exception should not be construed with the same degree of strictness
that applies to exemptions contrary to the policy of the state, since as to such property
“exception is the rule and taxation the exception.
TOPIC:

3. As to the Object or Subject Matter of the Tax
d. Excise
G.R. No. 104151 March 10, 1995

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
G.R No. 105563 March 10, 1995
ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue served two notices and demand for payment of the
respective deficiency ad valorem and buiness taxes for taxable years 1975 and 1976 against
the respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ACMDC). The
latter protested both assessments but the same were denied, hence it filed two separate
petitions for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA rendered a consolidated decision
holding, inter alia, that ACMDC was not liable for deficiency ad valorem taxes on copper and
silver for 1975 and 1976 thereby effectively sustaining the theory of ACMDC that in
computing the ad valorem tax on copper mineral, the refining and smelting charges should
be deducted, in addition to freight and insurance charges.
However, the tax court held ACMDC liable for the amount consisting of 25% surcharge for
late payment of the ad valorem tax and late filing of notice of removal of silver, gold and
pyrite extracted during certain periods, and for alleged deficiency manufacturer's sales tax
and such contractor's tax for leasing out of its personal properties. ACDMC elevated the
matter to the Supreme Court claiming that the leasing out was a mere isolated transaction,
hence should not be subjected to contractor's tax.
ISSUES:
Is the claim of the private respondent, with respect to the contractor's tax, impressed with
merit?
RULING:
No. It is being held that ACMDC was not a manufacturer subject to the percentage tax
imposed by Section 186 of the tax code. However such conclusion cannot be made with respect
to the contractor's tax being imposed on ACMDC. It cannot validly claim that the leasing out
of its personal properties was merely an isolated transaction. Its book of accounts shows that
several distinct payments were made for the use of its personal properties such as its plane,
motor boat and dump truck. The series of transactions engaged in by ACMDC for the lease of
its aforesaid properties could also be deduced from the fact that during the period there were
profits earned and reported therefor. The allegation of ACMDC that it did not realize any
profit from the leasing out of its said personal properties, since its income therefrom covered
only the costs of operation such as salaries and fuel, is not supported by any documentary or
substantial evidence.
Assessments are prima facie presumed correct and made in good faith. Contrary to the
theory of ACMDC, it is the taxpayer and not the BIR who has the duty of proving otherwise.
It is an elementary rule that in the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of
official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. All presumptions are in favor of tax
assessments. Verily, failure to present proof of error in assessments will justify judicial
affirmance of said assessment.
TOPIC:

6. As to Purpose
G.R. No. 173863 September 15, 2010
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.), Petitioner,
vs.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and CLARK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS:
On June 28, 2002, the Board of Directors of respondent Clark Development Corporation (CDC)
issued and approved Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and from the
Clark Special Economic Zone. In one of its provisions, it levied royalty fees to suppliers
delivering Coastal fuel from outside sources for Php0.50 per liter for those delivering fuel to
CSEZ locators not sanctioned by CDC and Php1.00 per litter for those bringing-in petroleum
fuel from outside sources. The policy guidelines were implemented effective July 27, 2002.
The petitioner Chevron Philippines Inc (formerly Caltex Philippines Inc) who is a fuel supplier
to Nanox Philippines, a locator inside the CSEZ, received a Statement of Account from CDC
billing them to pay the royalty fees amounting to Php115,000 for its fuel sales from Coastal
depot to Nanox Philippines from August 1 to September 21, 2002.
Petitioner, contending that nothing in the law authorizes CDC to impose royalty fees based
on a per unit measurement of any commodity sold within the special economic zone,
protested against the CDC and Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). They
alleged that the royalty fees imposed had no reasonable relation to the probably expenses of
regulation and that the imposition on a per unit measurement of fuel sales was for a revenue
generating purpose, thus, akin to a “tax”.
BCDA denied the protest. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal as well for lack of
merit.
Upon appeal, CA dismissed the case. CA held that in imposing the royalty fees, CDC was
exercising its right to regulate the flow of fuel into CSEZ under the vested exclusive right to
distribute fuel within CSEZ pursuant to its Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. (CSBTI) dated April 11,
1996. The appellate court also found that royalty fees were assessed on fuel delivered, not on
the sale, by petitioner and that the basis of such imposition was petitioner’s delivery receipts
to Nanox Philippines. The fact that revenue is incidentally also obtained does not make the
imposition a tax as long as the primary purpose of such imposition is regulation.
When elevated in SC, petitioner argued that: 1) CDC has no power to impose fees on sale of
fuel inside CSEZ on the basis of income generating functions and its right to market and
distribute goods inside the CSEZ as this would amount to tax which they have no power to
impose, and that the imposed fee is not regulatory in nature but rather a revenue generating
measure; 2) even if the fees are regulatory in nature, it is unreasonable and are grossly in
excess of regulation costs.
Respondents contended that the purpose of royalty fees is to regulate the flow of fuel to and
from the CSEZ and revenue (if any) is just an incidental product. They viewed it as a valid
exercise of police power since it is aimed at promoting the general welfare of public; that being
the CSEZ administrator, they are responsible for the safe distribution of fuel products inside
the CSEZ.
ISSUES:
Whether the act of CDC in imposing royalty fees can be considered as valid exercise of the
police power.
RULING:
Yes. SC held that CDC was within the limits of the police power of the State when it imposed
royalty fees.
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the
purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will
be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some form of regulation. On the other
hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of
the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated.
In this case, SC held that the subject royalty fee was imposed for regulatory purposes and not
for generation of income or profits. The Policy Guidelines was issued to ensure the safety,
security, and good condition of the petroleum fuel industry within the CSEZ. The questioned
royalty fees form part of the regulatory framework to ensure “free flow or movement” of
petroleum fuel to and from the CSEZ. The fact that respondents have the exclusive right to
distribute and market petroleum products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA with SBMA and
CSBTI does not diminish the regulatory purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied
by petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.
However, it was erroneous for petitioner to argue that such exclusive right of respondent CDC
to market and distribute fuel inside CSEZ is the sole basis of the royalty fees imposed under
the Policy Guidelines. Being the administrator of CSEZ, the responsibility of ensuring the safe,
efficient and orderly distribution of fuel products within the Zone falls on CDC. Addressing
specific concerns demanded by the nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in
the range of services which respondent CDC is expected to provide under Sec. 2 of E.O. No.
80, in pursuance of its general power of supervision and control over the movement of all
supplies and equipment into the CSEZ.
There can be no doubt that the oil industry is greatly imbued with public interest as it vitally
affects the general welfare. Fuel is a highly combustible product which, if left unchecked,
poses a serious threat to life and property. Also, the reasonable relation between the royalty
fees imposed on a “per liter” basis and the regulation sought to be attained is that the higher
the volume of fuel entering CSEZ, the greater the extent and frequency of supervision and
inspection required to ensure safety, security, and order within the Zone.
Respondents submit that the increased administrative costs were triggered by security risks
that have recently emerged, such as terrorist strikes. The need for regulation is more evident
in the light of 9/11 tragedy considering that what is being moved from one location to another
are highly combustible fuel products that could cause loss of lives and damage to properties.
As to the issue of reasonableness of the amount of the fees, SC held that no evidence was
adduced by the petitioner to show that the fees imposed are unreasonable. Administrative
issuances have the force and effect of law. They benefit from the same presumption of validity
and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two precepts place a heavy burden upon any
party assailing governmental regulations. Petitioner’s plain allegations are simply not enough
to overcome the presumption of validity and reasonableness of the subject imposition.
TOPIC:
I.H. Tax Systems

2. Basic Principle of a sound tax system/meaning of “neutral tax“
G.R. No. 76778 June 6, 1990
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME B. ONGPIN, in his capacity as Minister of Finance and FIDELINA CRUZ, in her
capacity as Acting Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Las Piñas, respondents,
REALTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-intervenor.
Brotherhood of Nationalistic, Involved and Free Attorneys to Combat Injustice and
Oppression (Bonifacio) for petitioner.
Ambrosia Padilla, Mempin and Reyes Law Offices for movant Realty Owners Association.
FACTS:
The petition seeks to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 73 dated November 25,
1986, Providing for the Collection of Real Property Taxes Based on the 1984 Real property
Values , As Provided for Under Section 21 of the Real Property Tax Code, As Amended .
The petitioner, Francisco I. Chavez, is a taxpayer and an owner of three parcels of land. He
alleges the following: that Executive Order No. 73 accelerated the application of the general
revision of assessments to January 1, 1987 thereby mandating an excessive increase in real
property taxes by 100% to 400% on improvements, and up to 100% on land; that any increase
in the value of real property brought about by the revision of real property values and
assessments would necessarily lead to a proportionate increase in real property taxes; that
sheer oppression is the result of increasing real property taxes at a period of time when harsh
economic conditions prevail; and that the increase in the market values of real property as
reflected in the schedule of values was brought about only by inflation and economic
recession.
ISSUES:
Whether the unreasonable increase in real property taxes brought about by Executive Order
No. 73 amounts to a confiscation of property repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due
process
RULING:
No. We agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that without
Executive Order No. 73, the basis for collection of real property taxes win still be the 1978
revision of property values. Certainly, to continue collecting real property taxes based on
valuations arrived at several years ago, in disregard of the increases in the value of real
properties that have occurred since then, is not in consonance with a sound tax system. Fiscal
adequacy, which is one of the characteristics of a sound tax system, requires that sources of
revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures and their variations.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED.
TOPIC:
II.A. Nature of the Power of Taxation

1. Inherent in Sovereignty / Distinguished from Police Power and Eminent Domain
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as members of the
Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as
members of the House of Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES, LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC.,
PHILIPPINE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG KILUSAN
NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in
representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, HEHERSON
ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO
HERRERA, JOSE LINA, GLORIA. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO, BLAS
OPLE, JOHN OSMEÑA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON REVILLA, RAUL ROCO,
FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the
Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her capacity
as National Treasurer; RIZALINO NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and
Industry; ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture; ROBERTO DE
OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers,
and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and
against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a
“free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the
said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that
Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general
welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2)
and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the
letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING:
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange
on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
TOPIC:

1. Exclusively Legislative in Nature
a. Extent of the Legislative Power to Tax
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 119252 August 18, 1997
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. APOLINARIO B. SANTOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 67, Pasig City; ANTONIO M. MARCO; JEWELRY BY MARCO & CO., INC.,
and GUILD OF PHILIPPINE JEWELLERS, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Guild of Phil. Jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the NIRC and
Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that present Tariff and tax
structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers
uncompetitive against other countries., in support of their position, they submitted what they
purported to be an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian
countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country. Judge Santos of RTC Pasig, ruled
that the laws in question are confiscatory and oppressive and declared them inoperative and
without force and effect insofar as petitioners are concerned. Petitioner CIR assailed decision
rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no authority to pass judgment
upon the taxation policy of the government. Petitioners also impugn the decision by asserting
that there was no showing that the tax laws on jewelry are confiscatory
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy
of the government.
RULING:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the
acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing
to the contrary. This is not to say that RTC has no power whatsoever to declare a law
unconstitutional. But this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to
legislative policy. RTC have the power to declare the law unconstitutional but this authority
does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC can only look
into the validity of a provision, that is whether or not it has been passed according to the
provisions laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence
TOPIC:

2. Exclusively Legislative in Nature
b. Cannot be delegated
II.B. Inherent Limitations

1. Prohibition against delegation of taxing power/exceptions
a. Delegation to local governments
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND
LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
FACTS:
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was

created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power
“to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in 1978, PD 1399
was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated
through PD 1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 1 of PD 1869
provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize
and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or
permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution. Basco et
al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes PAGCOR-
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like Manila
to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned; that Section
13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax
of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature,
whether National or Local” is violative of the local autonomy principle.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
RULING:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of

the equal protection is not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that
some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended
by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the
applicable laws, PD. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Basco’s posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of
the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons
or things to be conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The “equal
protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate. The Constitution does
not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue
and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes,
fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. A close reading of
the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers)
as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines
and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right
to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress”
which has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its
“general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local government. This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy”
of the National Government over local governments.
TOPIC:

Who may question the validity of a tax measure or expenditure of “taxes-taxpayer’s suit”?
II.C. Constitutional Limitations

10. Others
A. Grant of Tax Exemption
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL
GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON,
CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-
intervention.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government
official asked the court to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman from
privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning the properties and assets of
Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos
gold hoard. Chavez assailed the validity of the General and Supplemental Agreement
executed by the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs on December 28,1993.Item
No. 2 of the General Agreement states that the assets of the PRIVATE PARTY (Marcosheirs)
shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition.
Whether there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the
Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.”
RULING:
1. Yes. The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and
access to official records, documents and papers -- a right guaranteed under Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino
citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional
law to sustain petitioner’s legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2)
espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
2. Yes. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which
PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for
being contrary to law and the Constitution. Under Item No. 2 of the General
Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be
retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Construction. The power
to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in
the local legislative bodies. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically
provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence
of a majority of all the Member of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power
to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten
wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes
on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection
clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the
Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule
that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable. "Neither can the stipulation be
construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue to
compromise taxes.
TOPIC:

Who may question the validty of a tax measure or expenditure of “taxes-taxpayer’s suit”?
G.R. No. 138298 November 29, 2000

RAOUL B. DEL MAR, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, BELLE JAI-ALAI
CORPORATION, FILIPINAS GAMING ENTERTAINMENT TOTALIZATOR
CORPORATION, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 138982 November 29, 2000
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II and MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondent.
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, intervenor.
FACTS:
This case involves the authority of PAGCOR to run jai-alai or to subcontract it. This
authority is challenged by the petitioners, members of Congress, on the ground that PAGCOR
has no franchise. PAGCOR assails the locus standi of the petitioners on the ground that the
integrity of Congress is not involved nor will public money be used.
ISSUES:
Whether the petition cannot be maintained as a taxpayer suit, there being no illegal
disbursement of public fund involved.
RULING:
In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an
issue of overarching significance to our society,i[12] we find and so hold that as members of
the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions at bar. In the
instant cases, petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by
PAGCOR of the legislatures exclusive power to grant franchise. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution, so petitioners contend. The
contention commands our concurrence for it is now settled that a member of the House of
Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.ii[13] As presciently stressed in the case of Kilosbayan,
Inc., viz:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues
it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved
in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the
country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then
of the petitioners deserves recognition
TOPIC:
a. Purpose must be public in nature -taxpayer’s suit”?
G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960

WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-
appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for appellee.
FACTS:
RA 920 (Act appropriating funds for public works) was enacted in 1953 containing an
item (Section 1 c[a]) for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement
of Pasig feeder road terminals (the projected and planned subdivision roads, which were not
yet constructed, within Antonio Subdivision owned by Senator Jose C. Zulueta). Zulueta
“donated” said parcels of land to the Government 5 months after the enactment of RA 920, on
the condition that if the Government violates such condition the lands would revert to
Zulueta. The provincial governor of Rizal, Wenceslao Pascual, questioned the validity of the
donation and the Constitutionality of the item in RA 920, it being not for a public purpose.
ISSUES:
Whether the item in the appropriation is valid.
RULING:
The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax,
under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting
the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than a public purpose. The validity of a
statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon
events occupying, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consist of an
amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional
limitation infringed by said statute. Herein, inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to Senator Zulueta at the time RA 920 was
passed by Congress, or approved by the President, and the disbursement of said sum became
effective on 20 June 1953 pursuant to Section 13 of the Act, the result is that the appropriating
sough a private purpose and hence, null and void.
TOPIC:
b. Prohibition against delegation of taxing power/exceptions
c. Delegation to administrative agencies
G.R. No. 99886 March 31, 1993
JOHN H. OSMEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
OSCAR ORBOS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JESUS ESTANISLAO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance; WENCESLAO DELA PAZ, in his capacity as Head of the Office of
Energy Affairs; REX V. TANTIONGCO, and the ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD,
respondents.
FACTS:
Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as

amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase
of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall
accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing
oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection
on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax.
Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof
is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the
challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers granted
to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the
State
ISSUES:
Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
RULING:
None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they
are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special
fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general
fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that
these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard
to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the
general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment
the resources of the Fund.
TOPIC:

3. Exemption of government entities/agencies and instrumentality
G.R. No. 120082 September 11, 1996
MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, THE CITY OF CEBU, represented by its Mayor HON. TOMAS
R. OSMEÑA, and EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by

virtue of Republic Act No. 6958, mandated to principally undertake the economical, efficient
and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International
Airport,Lahug Airport and such other Airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu.
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from
payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter.
On October 11, 1994, however, Mr.Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the

Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land
belonging to the petitioner. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and
unjustified, claiming in its favor the aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from
payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991
which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. Respondent City
refused to cancel and set aside petitioner's realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a
government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by
virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Governmental Code. As the City of Cebu was about
to issue a warrant of levy against the properties of petitioner, the latter was compelled to pay
its tax account "under protest" and thereafter filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Trial court dismissed the petition. Motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the trial court, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
ISSUES:
Whether Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) is exempted from payment
of real property tax
RULING:
No. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the
effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical
persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the
said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it
necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A.
No. 6958, has been withdrawn.
It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax
exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other
units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and
distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for this
entities to share in the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the
taxes and other charges due from them.
Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom is the exception, the
exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. Besides, nothing
can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the
government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done
precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom.
TOPIC:

3. Limitation of Territorial Jurisdiction
G.R. No. L-52019 August 19, 1988
ILOILO BOTTLERS, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CITY OF ILOILO, defendant-appellant.
Efrain B. Trenas for plaintiff-appellee.
Diosdado Garingalao for defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Iloilo Bottlers Inc., a company in the business of bottling and selling soft drinks, was
demanded by the City of Iloilo to pay an amount of 59,505 in the form of an license tax the
city claims were due to it under an ordinance which was enacted on January 11, 1960 known
as Ordinance No. 5, Series of 1960; which provides that manufacturers, bottlers, and
distributers of soft drinks in Iloilo are subject to a municipal license tax of 10 centavos per
case of 24 bottles. Iloilo Bottling Inc asserted however that since their plant base has moved
to municipality of Pavia shortly after the aforementioned ordinance was enacted, they are
not liable for any taxes. The city however, still demanded taxes and also demanded back
taxes under the claim that Iloilo Bottlers is still distributing in the city of Iloilo since its
transfer. Iloilo Bottlers paid the demanded license tax and back taxes under protest. After
bringing the case to court, the courts ruled in favor of Iloilo Bottlers and declared that Iloilo
Bottlers is free from liability. The city of Iloilo then appealed this ruling, hence this case.
ISSUES:
Whether Iloilo Bottlers is bound by the ordinance.
RULING:
YES. Situs of taxation (place of taxation) depends on various factors including the
nature of the tax and subject matter thereof both of which must be scrutinized to reach a fair
decision. The tax ordinance enacted by the City of Iloilo imposes a tax on persons, firms, and
corporations engaged in the business of distribution of soft-drinks, manufacture of soft-
drinks, and bottling of soft drinks within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Iloilo. There
is no question that Iloilo Bottlers has moved out of Iloilo City’s jurisdiction and into the
municipality of Pavia where its plant now stands therefore, the latter two conditions for
taxation are no longer applicable. The ruling now depends upon whether or not Iloilo Bottlers
can be considered as distributing its products within Iloilo city.
The courts find that Iloilo Bottlers is indeed considered as distributing since while the
manufacturing and bottling occurs outside of Iloilo city, the drinks are sold in Iloilo city to
consumers in a “moving store” fashion. The transactions are considered to occur within the
city. The tax imposed under Ordinance No. 5 is an excise tax. By its nature, the power to levy
an excise tax depends upon the place where the business is done, or the occupation is engaged
in, or where the transaction took place. In this case, it is a tax on the privilege of distributing,
manufacturing or bottling soft drinks. Even though the base of operations is at Pavia, the areas
of transactions where it conducts its business are within Iloilo city limits. The Situs for excise
tax is the area of transaction, not necessarily base of operation.
TOPIC:

2. Equal Protection of the Laws
G.R. No. 143076 June 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. (PHILRECA);
AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO); ILOILO I ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (ILECO I); and ISABELA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(ISELCO I), Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, and THE
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Respondents.
FACTS:
On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf
of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of
petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela
1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD
269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National
Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling
recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any
court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now
National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements
with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries.
The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the
loan and any property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions
have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234
of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to
all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938,
while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal protection
clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of
the Philippines?
(2) Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between
the Philippine and the US Governments?
RULING:
(1) No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based
on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on
substantial classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to
the existing conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class.
We hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to
justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269
and electric cooperatives under RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those
under RA 6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called
electric cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as
source of funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require

cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit
that to qualify as a member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the
payment of a P5.00 membership fee is required which is even refundable the
moment the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from the
cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area covered by the
cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a
cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the
accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers
showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at
least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up
share capital be less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government

control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role
of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal
clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development and
operations of these electric cooperatives. Consequently, amendments were primarily
geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric cooperatives o ensure that
loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives
under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations
with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is

germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that “every local
government unit shall enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the
power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the
LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local
government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically
provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these
exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members
of the same class.
(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the

impairment of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing
laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation
of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to
constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with
reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax
exemption in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof.
The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan
agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by
the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously
enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or
the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted
therein.
TOPIC:

7. Prohibition re: Appropriation of Proceeds of Taxation
G.R. No. L-77194 March 15, 1988
VIRGILIO GASTON, HORTENCIA STARKE, ROMEO GUANZON, OSCAR VILLANUEVA,
JOSE ABELLO, REMO RAMOS, CAROLINA LOPEZ, JESUS ISASI, MANUEL LACSON,
JAVIER LACSON, TITO TAGARAO, EDUARDO SUATENGCO, AUGUSTO LLAMAS,
RODOLFO SIASON, PACIFICO MAGHARI, JR., JOSE JAMANDRE, AURELIO GAMBOA,
ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, PHILIPPINE SUGAR COMMISSION, and SUGAR
REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, respondents, ANGEL H. SEVERINO, JR., GLICERIO
JAVELLANA, GLORIA P. DE LA PAZ, JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS, intervenors.
FACTS:
Petitioners are sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers. Respondent

Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) was formerly the government office tasked
with the function of regulating and supervising the sugar industry until it was superseded by
Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) under Executive Order No. 18. Although said
Executive Order abolished the PHILSUCOM, its existence as a juridical entity was mandated
to continue for three more years "for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or
against it and enables it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and
to distribute its assets." Respondent Republic Planters Bank (Bank) is a commercial banking
corporation.
Petitioners and Intervenors praying for a Writ of mandamus commanding

respondents to implement and accomplish the privatization of Republic Planters Bank by the
transfer and distribution of the shares of stock in the said bank; now held by and still carried
in the name of the Philippine Sugar Commission, to the sugar producers, planters and millers,
who are the true beneficial owners of the common 761,416 common shares valued at
P36,548.000.00 and 53,005,045 preferred shares with a total par value of P254,424,224.72 or a
total investment of P290,972,224.72, the said investment having been funded by the deduction
of Pl.00 per picul from sugar proceeds of the sugar producers of the sugar producers
commencing the year 1978-79 until the present as stabilization fund pursuant to P.D. No. 388.
Respondents PHILSUCOM and SRA argue that no trust results from Section 7 of P.D.
No. 388; that the stabilization fees collected are considered government funds under the
Government Auditing Code; that the transfer of shares of stock from PHILSUCOM to the
sugar producers would be irregular, if not illegal; and that this suit is barred by laches.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the stabilization fees collected from sugar planters and millers are funds in
trust for them, or public funds.
2. Whether shares of stock in respondent Bank paid for with said stabilization fees belong
to the PHILSUCOM or to the different sugar planters and millers from whom the fees
were collected or levied.
RULING:
a. The stabilization fees collected form sugar planters and millers are public funds.
While the element of an intent to create a trust is present, a resulting trust in favor of
the sugar producers, millers and planters cannot be said to have ensued because the
presumptive intention of the parties is not reasonably ascertainable from the language of
the statute itself.
The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of
the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry. They constitute sugar
liens. The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy
is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State.
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters
and producers for a special purpose — that of "financing the growth and development of
the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including
the foreign market the fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law
is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose.
Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a
special fund, to be, in the language of the statute, "administered in trust' for the purpose
intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the essence of the trust
intended.
b. The shares of stock in respondent Bank paid for with said stabilization fees belong to
the different sugar planters and millers from whom the fees were collected or levied
That the fees were collected from sugar producers, planters and millers, and that the
funds were channelled to the purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not
convert the funds into a trust fired for their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners
of the shares so purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is
also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The
investment in shares of respondent Bank is not alien to the purpose intended because of
the Bank's character as a commodity bank for sugar conceived for the industry's growth
and development. Furthermore, of note is the fact that 1/2 or PO.50 per picul, of the
amount levied under P.D. No. 388 is to be utilized for the "payment of salaries and wages
of personnel, fringe benefits and allowances of officers and employees of PHILSUCOM"
thereby immediately negating the claim that the entire amount levied is in trust for sugar,
producers, planters and millers.
To rule in petitioners' favor would contravene the general principle that revenues
derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit
of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar
industry, "and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market," including the
foreign market the industry being of vital importance to the country's economy and to
national interest.
TOPIC:

10. Others
C. Non-impairment of the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
G.R. No. 119252 August 18, 1997

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. APOLINARIO B. SANTOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 67, Pasig City; ANTONIO M. MARCO; JEWELRY BY MARCO & CO., INC.,
and GUILD OF PHILIPPINE JEWELLERS, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Guild of Phil. Jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the

NIRC and Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that present Tariff
and tax structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers
uncompetitive against other countries., in support of their position, they submitted what they
purported to be an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian
countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country.
Judge Santos of RTC Pasig, ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and
oppressive and declared them inoperative and without force and effect insofar as petitioners
are concerned.
Petitioner CIR assailed decision rendered by respondent judge contending that the
latter has no authority to pass judgment upon the taxation policy of the government.
Petitioners also impugn the decision by asserting that there was no showing that the tax laws
on jewelry are confiscatory.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has authority to pass judgment upon taxation
policy of the government.
2. Whether the state has the power to select the subjects of taxation.
RULING:
1. NO. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear
and unmistakable showing to the contrary. This is not to say that RTC has no power
whatsoever to declare a law unconstitutional. But this authority does not extend to
deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC have the power to declare
the law unconstitutional but this authority does not extend to deciding questions
which pertain to legislative policy. RTC can only look into the validity of a provision,
that is whether or not it has been passed according to the provisions laid down by law,
and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence.
2. YES. The respondents presented an exhaustive study on the tax rates on jewelry levied
by different Asian countries. This is meant to convince us that compared to other
countries; tax rates imposed on said industry in the Philippines is oppressive and
confiscatory. This Court, however, cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of
other countries should be used as a yardstick in determining what may be the proper
subjects of taxation in their own country. It should be pointed out that in imposing the
aforementioned taxes and duties, the State, acting through the legislative and
executive branches, is exercising its sovereign prerogative. It is inherent in the power
to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that “inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation”.
TOPIC:

10. Others
F. Grant of Franchise
G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as
Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN
PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and
OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO
B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA),
petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO
C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO,
JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL
V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and PHILIPPINE BIBLE
SOCIETY, INC. and WIGBERTO TAÑADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON.
ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF
PHILIPPINE BOOK SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V.
CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 7716 imposing a VAT on the sale,
barter, or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties
sold, bartered, or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. RA
No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the NIRC. The contention of the petitioners is that in enacting
RA 7716 or the EVAT, Congress violated the Constitution because although H No. 11197 had
originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply
consolidated with the Senate version in the Conference committee to produce the bill which
the President signed into law.
ISSUES:
Whether RA 7716 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
It is not the law, but the revenue bill, which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. A bill originating in the House may
undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole.
To insist that a revenue statute—and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law—must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to
“propose amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they
are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body
is withheld pending receipt of the House Bill.

I.A. Meaning of Taxation Obligation To Pay Tax Vs Obligation To Pay Debt

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I.A.

Petitioner corporation, a VAT-registered taxpayer engaged in mining, production, and sale of

I.C. Theory and Basis of Taxation

Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Commonwealth

I.D. Purpose/Objectives of Taxation

Are motor vehicle registration fees taxes or regulatory taxes?

I.C. Theory and Basis of Taxation

I.F. Classification of Taxes

Commonwealth Act 120 created NAPOCOR as a public corporation to undertake the

I.F. Classification of Taxes

G.R. No. 104151 March 10, 1995

I.F. Classification of Taxes

I.H. Tax Systems

II.A. Nature of the Power of Taxation

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

II.A. Nature of the Power of Taxation

II.A. Nature of the Power of Taxation

II.B. Inherent Limitations

G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991

In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was

1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.

1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of

2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

II.A. Nature of the Power of Taxation

II.C. Constitutional Limitations

G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

II.A. Nature of the Power of Taxation

G.R. No. 138298 November 29, 2000

G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960

Whether the item in the appropriation is valid.

Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as

Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

II.B. Inherent Limitations

Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by

On October 11, 1994, however, Mr.Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the

II.B. Inherent Limitations

Whether Iloilo Bottlers is bound by the ordinance.

II.C. Constitutional Limitations

a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require

b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government

Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is

(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the

II.C. Constitutional Limitations

Petitioners are sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers. Respondent

Petitioners and Intervenors praying for a Writ of mandamus commanding

II.C. Constitutional Limitations

G.R. No. 119252 August 18, 1997

Guild of Phil. Jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the

II.C. Constitutional Limitations

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

Whether RA 7716 is unconstitutional.

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