Brief of Appellee Bobbie G Bayless

Case: 17-20360 Document: 00514171972 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/26/2017
NO. 17-20360
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
CANDACE LOUISE CURTIS and RIK WAYNE MUNSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
CANDACE KUNZ-FREED; ALBERT VACEK, JR.;

BERNARD LYLE MATTHEWS, III; NEAL SPIELMAN;
BRADLEY FEATHERSTON; STEPHEN A. MENDEL;
DARLENE PAYNE SMITH; JASON OSTROM; GREGORY LESTER;
JILL WILLIARD YOUNG; CHRISTINE RIDDLE BUTTS;
CLARINDA COMSTOCK; TONI BIAMONTE; BOBBIE BAYLESS;
ANITA BRUNSTING; AMY BRUNSTING; and DOES 1-99,
Defendants-Appellees
On appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
(No. 4:16-CV-1969)
APPELLEE BRIEF FOR BOBBIE G. BAYLESS
BAYLESS & STOKES

Bobbie G. Bayless
State Bar No. 01940600
2931 Ferndale
Houston, Texas 77098
Telephone: 713/522-2224
Telecopier: 713/522-2218
Attorneys for Appellee,

Bobbie G. Bayless
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons
and entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28.2.1 have an interest in the
outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the judges of this
Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
Plaintiffs-Appellants: Candace Louise Curtis

Rik Wayne Munson
Pro Se
Defendants-Appellees: Candace Kunz-Freed

Albert Vacek, Jr.
Bernard Lyle Matthews, III
Neal Spielman
Bradley Featherston
Stephen A. Mendel
Darlene Payne Smith
Jason Ostrom
Gregory Lester
Jill Williard Young
Christine Riddle Butts
Clarinda Comstock
Toni Biamonte
Bobbie Bayless
Anita Brunsting, Pro Se
Amy Brunsting, Pro Se
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Zandra E. Foley

Candace Kunz-Freed and Corey S. Reed
Albert Vacek, Jr.: Andrew L. Johnson
Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons LLP
One Riverway
-ii-
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Bernard Lyle Mathews, III

Bernard Lyle Mathews, III: Green and Mathews LLP
14550 Torrey Chase Blvd., Suite 245
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Martin Samuel Schexnayder

Neal Spielman Winget, Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP
Two Riverway, Suite 725
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Adraon D. Greene

Bradley Featherston and Kelsi M. Wade
Stephen A. Mendel: Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith
1301 McKinney Street, Suite 1400
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Barry Abrams

Darlene Payne Smith: Joshua A. Huber
Blank Rome LLP
717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Stacy L. Kelly

Jason Ostrom and Gregory Lester: ostrommorris, pllc
6363 Woodway, Suite 300
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Robert Harrell

Jill Williard Young: Rafe Schaefer
Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Keith Toler

Christine Riddle Butts, Laura Beckman Hedge
Clarinda Comstock, and Harris County Attorney’s Office
Toni Biamonte: 1019 Congress, 15th Floor
-iii-
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Bobbie G. Bayless

Bobbie Bayless: Bayless & Stokes
2931 Ferndale
BAYLESS & STOKES
By: /s/ Bobbie G. Bayless

Bobbie G. Bayless
2931 Ferndale
Telephone: 713.522.2224
Telecopier: 713.522.2218
bayless@baylessstokes.com
Attorney for Appellee, Bobbie G.

Bayless
-iv-
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT
The legal issues in this case are sufficiently well established that Appellee does
not believe oral argument would be of assistance in the Court’s review of this case.
-v-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
TABLE OF CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
-vi-
LIST OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Contey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 SW 3d 477 (Tex. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Sheshtawy, et al. v. Gray, et al.,

Case No. 17-20019 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2017) (unpublished). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Troice v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 816 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
STATUTES AND RULES
18 U.S.C. §1962(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
18 U.S.C. §1964(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
42 U.S.C. §1988(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Rule 10b-5 Securities Exchange act of 1934 (17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5). . . . . . . . . . . 5
-vii-
TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellee, Bobbie G. Bayless (“Bayless” or “Appellee”) submits her response
brief in this appeal of Judge Alfred H. Bennett’s order dismissing Appellants’ RICO
action. Bayless asks this Court to affirm the district court’s order.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1. Whether a party can end a state court proceeding by suing everyone
involved in the proceeding in federal court, alleging the court and the
attorneys representing the other parties are a RICO enterprise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, who are proceeding pro se, filed a RICO complaint against numerous
parties, attorneys, and court officials involved in a state probate court action
(ROA.16-79). The order being reviewed by this court granted dismissal because
Plaintiffs’ complaint failed to state a plausible claim for relief against any of the
Defendants, including Bayless (ROA. 3329-3335).
Plaintiffs’ statement of the case has very little, if anything, to d1o with this case.
Instead it is filled with extraneous and irrelevant matters which have no bearing on
this appeal. It appears to be Plaintiffs’ attempt to compile random allegations by third
parties the world over who describe alleged perceived injustices. The support for
many of the statements Plaintiffs make comes from the internet. Indeed, Plaintiffs
-1-
spend approximately five pages talking about alleged case studies or commentaries
found by Plaintiffs on the internet or some source other than the record in this case.
Plaintiffs apparently believe this makes their claims plausible, but it falls well short
of doing that. Even if these sources could somehow be verified, they have no bearing
on the issues before this Court, and they do not provide a basis for Plaintiffs’ claims.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs treat them as actual authorities, as is shown by their inclusion
in Plaintiffs’ table of authorities.
Plaintiffs’ discussion sheds no light on the issues in this case. By way of
example, Plaintiffs appear to rely on “Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives”
in trying to define corruption. Appellants’ Brief at p. 4. Plaintiffs also describe a
2002 survey by Roy Williams having nothing to do with this case which somehow
concluded that 70% of generational asset transfers fail and that 97% of the failures
were attributable to the family itself. Appellants’ Brief at p. 5. Plaintiffs go on to
state that Williams’ writing was silent on questions of how or to whom control was
lost and that Williams had no data to offer. Appellants’ Brief at p. 5-6. But perhaps
the most amazing part is that Plaintiffs end their reference to that completely
irrelevant information by giving Williams’ email address and phone number.
Appellants’ Brief, p. 6, footnote 17.
-2-
The facts actually relevant to the claims Plaintiffs assert against Bayless are as
follows. Bayless represents Carl Henry Brunsting in a case pending in Harris County
Probate Court Number 4 in Cause No. 412.249-401, styled Carl Henry Brunsting, et
al. v. Anita Kay Brunsting, et al. (the “Probate Proceeding”) (ROA. 2259-2278). The
Probate Proceeding involves disputes concerning a trust created by the now deceased
parents of the five Brunsting siblings, Bayless’ client being one of those five
Brunsting siblings and Plaintiff Curtis being another (ROA. 866). Neither Bayless
nor her client has any relationship with the other Plaintiff, Rik Munson, and, Munson
has no relationship to the Probate Proceeding.
In an attempt to end the probate court’s involvement in the dispute, Plaintiffs
filed their second pro se complaint1 in federal district court (ROA. 16-79). Plaintiffs’
new complaint was filed days before a mediation was occur in the Probate
Proceeding.2 This time even the judge, associate judge, and a visiting court reporter
of Harris County Probate Court Number 4 were named as defendants, as were the
attorneys involved in the probate proceeding (ROA. 16-79).
1
A prior action Plaintiff Curtis filed pro se in a different federal district court with
the “assistance” of Plaintiff Munson was long ago transferred to the same Harris County
probate court (ROA. 1148-49) and eventually consolidated with the Probate Proceeding
(ROA. 2667-2675). That first federal court case only involved Curtis and two of her sisters,
Anita Brunsting and Amy Brunsting (ROA. 2227-2233).
2
See paragraphs 113-115 of the Complaint (ROA. 41) which specifically complain
about mediation being required in the probate proceeding.
-3-
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court correctly dismissed the entire case because Appellants did not
plead anything close to a plausible claim for relief against any of the Defendants,
including Bayless (ROA. 3329-3335). Plaintiffs have not provided one single fact
to support their apparent position that Bayless is a person who is engaged in a pattern
of racketeering activity connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or
control of an enterprise, and that Bayless participated in the operation or management
of that enterprise.
The fact that Bayless practices law and, in the course of her practice, has
represented and taken actions on behalf of another party involved in litigation in
Harris County Probate Court Number 4 does not come close to supporting Plaintiffs’
claims. Regardless of whether Plaintiffs agree with the actions Bayless has taken in
the course of her representation of her client they have no right to complain about
those actions. Attorneys are immune from liability to other parties for actions taken
on behalf of their own client, something which the order of dismissal also stated as
a grounds for dismissal and which Plaintiffs do not address in their Brief, just as they
do not bother to try and distinguish the other authorities cited by the district court as
the basis for the order dismissing the case.
-4-
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
Plaintiffs filed a complaint purporting to assert causes of action against Bayless
and numerous other Defendants for what Plaintiffs describe as: (1) violations of the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §1962(c); (2) conspiracy
to violate 18 U.S.C. §1962(c); (3) conspiracy to violate due process rights; (4)
conspiracy to deny equal protection of law; (5) conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of an
impartial forum; (6) breach of the public trust; (7) aiding and abetting public and
private fiduciary breaches; (8) aiding and abetting fiduciary misapplications; and (9)
claims allowed by 42 U.S.C. §1988(a), 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) and Rule 10b-5 Securities
Exchange act of 1934 (17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5), including the right of private claims
implied therefrom (ROA. 16-79).
The allegations relating to Bayless are minimal and do not even allege
wrongdoing. The information identifying Bayless as a defendant is contained in
paragraphs 21, 49, and 50 of the Complaint (ROA. 21 and 27).3 Paragraph 55 of the
Complaint alleges that Bayless is an attorney who has practiced law in the Harris
County Probate courts (ROA. 28). Paragraph 56 alleges, without any facts to support
it, that Bayless and the other named parties have engaged in a criminal enterprise
3
Paragraph 21 names Bayless as a Defendant (ROA. 21). Paragraph 49 alleges the
law firm of Bayless & Stokes to be an enterprise and a “legal entity associated with Harris
County Probate Court....” (ROA. 27). Paragraph 50 alleges Bayless is employed by or
associated with Bayless & Stokes (ROA. 27).
-5-
somehow being conducted through Harris County Probate Court Number 4 (ROA.
28-29). Paragraph 59 makes a similar allegation, again without one shred of factual
support (ROA. 29-30). Bayless’ name only otherwise appears at paragraph 124 of the
Complaint, where an undefined conspiracy to alter the course of justice is alleged
(ROA. 45), and paragraph 131 of the Complaint (ROA. 48-49) which contains the
only alleged factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claim against Bayless. That so-called claim
is one, however, which fails on its face.
Even absent attorney immunity, Plaintiffs have no claim against Bayless
because there has been no wrongdoing. But Bayless has no civil liability to non-
clients for actions taken in representing her own client in litigation even if they could
be viewed as wrongful. Contey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 SW 3d 477, 481 (Tex.
2015). This Court has already been asked to address this issue and has held that such
immunity is true immunity from suit, not just a defense to liability. Troice v.
Proskauer Rose, LLP, 816 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiffs’ entire claim, as articulated in paragraph 131 of the Complaint, is
based on Bayless’ postponement of a hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Bayless filed in the probate proceeding on behalf of her client, Carl Henry
Brunsting (ROA. 48-49). Bayless certainly did postpone the hearing on her client’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Bayless’ postponement of the hearing on her
-6-
own motion is not something that has any relationship to the Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs
have no right to dictate if, when, or on what motion Bayless schedules hearings in the
representation of her client. There was nothing wrongful in what Bayless did, and
Plaintiffs have no right to complain about Bayless’ actions. Thus, there is no support
for any kind of cause of action by these Plaintiffs against Bayless under any
circumstances.
Nor, as the district court’s order points out, have Plaintiffs alleged any causal
relationship between any defined injury and any of Bayless’ actions (ROA. 3329-
3335). In a remarkably similar but unpublished case decided by this court on
September 14, 2017, a dismissal and a sanctions order were affirmed in a similar
RICO action filed against participants in a proceeding in Harris County Probate Court
1. In that case, the alleged damages were also financial losses to inheritance interests
at issue in the probate proceedings. In Sheshtawy, et al. v. Gray, et al., Case No. 17-
20019 (5th Cir. Sept. 14, 2017) (unpublished), this Court held that alleged injury to
one’s share of an estate or trust is “merely an expectancy interest that is too
speculative and indirect to satisfy RICO standing. (citations omitted).” Id. at pp. 3-4.
And Plaintiff Munson does not even have that speculative and indirect alleged injury,
because he is not a potential Brunsting heir.
-7-
After Bayless filed her Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs filed what they called
Plaintiffs’ Addendum of Memorandum in Support of RICO Complaint (ROA. 202-
1775). The filing is comprised of two motions relating to the first federal court action
Curtis filed in which Bayless never even appeared. Giving Plaintiffs every possible
benefit of the doubt, Plaintiffs’ “Addendum” also described actions Bayless took in
the Probate Proceeding, all of which were in the representation of her client, Carl
Brunsting (ROA. 210-211, 213, 215-217, 219).
And finally, in their Brief, Plaintiffs mention Bayless in similar contexts, none
of which provide any more support for Plaintiffs’ alleged claims against Bayless.
Plaintiffs first mention Bayless on pages 12-14 of their Brief when they complain
about the way in which Bayless described the style of the Probate Proceeding in her
filings. At page 21 of their Brief, Plaintiffs discuss the fact that Bayless filed the
Probate Proceeding. And finally, at page 25 of their Brief, Plaintiffs bring up Bayless
when talking about motions having been filed requesting fees. Again, there is
nothing there to support Plaintiffs’ alleged claims against Bayless.
Plaintiffs’ lack of understanding of the legal principles and procedures
involved in the Probate Proceeding and Texas law in general have been an issue in
all of their filings, including in the Brief filed in this Court, but addressing those
-8-
errors is unnecessary in the resolution of this case because there is nothing presented
by Plaintiffs which, even if true, would subject Bayless to liability.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ attempts to allege facts to support a claim against Bayless fall
woefully short. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Bayless asked the district court
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action against her because it failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and the district court correctly granted that request. Crowe v.
Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 1995).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have stated no claim against Bayless but even if Plaintiffs had alleged
some wrongful act, all actions Bayless took about which Plaintiffs complain were
taken on behalf of her client, Carl Henry Brunsting. Bayless is, therefore, immune
from suit by Plaintiffs for such actions. Judge Bennett’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’
claims should be affirmed in all respects.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Bayless prays that the district
court’s order of dismissal be affirmed, and that Bayless have such other and further
relief, both general and special, legal and equitable, to which she may show herself
justly entitled.
-9-
Respectfully submitted,
BAYLESS & STOKES
By: /s/ Bobbie G. Bayless

Bobbie G. Bayless
2931 Ferndale
Telephone: 713.522.2224
Telecopier: 713.522.2218
bayless@baylessstokes.com
Attorneys for Appellee,

Bobbie G. Bayless
-10-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served
on the following in compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 25, via U.S. Appellate CM/ECF
on this 26th day of September, 2017:
Zandra E. Foley Stacy L. Kelly

Corey S. Reed ostrommorris, pllc
Andrew L. Johnson 6363 Woodway, Suite 300
Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons LLP Houston, Texas 77006
One Riverway
Houston, Texas 77056 Robert Harrell
Rafe Schaefer
Bernard Lyle Mathews, III Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP
Green and Mathews LLP 1301 McKinney Street, Suite 5100
14550 Torrey Chase Blvd., Suite 245 Houston, Texas 77010
Keith Toler
Martin Samuel Schexnayder Laura Beckman Hedge
Winget, Spadafora & Schwartzberg LLP Harris County Attorney’s Office
Two Riverway, Suite 725 1019 Congress, 15th Floor
Houston, Texas 77056 Houston, Texas 77002
Adraon D. Greene Anita Brunsting
Kelsi M. Wade 203 Bloomingdale Circle
Galloway Johnson Tompkins Victoria, Texas 77904
Burr & Smith
Houston, Texas 77010 Amy Brunsting
2582 Country Ledge Drive
Barry Abrams New Braunfels, Texas 78132
Joshua A. Huber
Blank Rome LLP
717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400
/s/ Bobbie G. Bayless

BOBBIE G. BAYLESS
-11-
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 32.2.7(c), the undersigned certifies this brief complies with the
type-volume limitations of 5th Cir. R. 32.2.7(b).
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(7)(B) because:
this brief contains 2,058 words, excluding the parts of the

brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5)
and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because:
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced

typeface using WordPerfect X4 in Times New Roman 14
font for text and 12.5 font for footnotes.
3. THE UNDERSIGNED U ND E R S T AN D S A M A T ERIAL

MISREPRESENTATION IN COMPLETING THIS CERTIFICATE, OR
CIRCUMVENTION OF THE TYPE-VOLUME LIMITS IN 5TH Cir. R. 32.2.7,
MAY RESULT IN THE COURT’S STRIKING THE BRIEF AND IMPOSING
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PERSON SIGNING THE BRIEF.
/s/ Bobbie G. Bayless

BOBBIE G. BAYLESS
-12-

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Case: 17-20360 Document: 00514171972 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/26/2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

CANDACE LOUISE CURTIS and RIK WAYNE MUNSON,

CANDACE KUNZ-FREED; ALBERT VACEK, JR.;

On appeal from the United States District Court

APPELLEE BRIEF FOR BOBBIE G. BAYLESS

BAYLESS & STOKES

Attorneys for Appellee,

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

Plaintiffs-Appellants: Candace Louise Curtis

Defendants-Appellees: Candace Kunz-Freed

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Zandra E. Foley

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Bernard Lyle Mathews, III

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Martin Samuel Schexnayder

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Adraon D. Greene

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Barry Abrams

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Stacy L. Kelly

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Robert Harrell

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees, Keith Toler

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, Bobbie G. Bayless

BAYLESS & STOKES

By: /s/ Bobbie G. Bayless

Attorney for Appellee, Bobbie G.

STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT

STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

LIST OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Contey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd, 467 SW 3d 477 (Tex. 2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Sheshtawy, et al. v. Gray, et al.,

STATUTES AND RULES

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellee, Bobbie G. Bayless (“Bayless” or “Appellee”) submits her response

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

1. Whether a party can end a state court proceeding by suing everyone

attorneys representing the other parties are a RICO enterprise.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendants, including Bayless (ROA. 3329-3335).

this appeal. It appears to be Plaintiffs’ attempt to compile random allegations by third

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs treat them as actual authorities, as is shown by their inclusion

in Plaintiffs’ table of authorities.

Plaintiffs’ discussion sheds no light on the issues in this case. By way of

example, Plaintiffs appear to rely on “Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives”

in trying to define corruption. Appellants’ Brief at p. 4. Plaintiffs also describe a

were attributable to the family itself. Appellants’ Brief at p. 5. Plaintiffs go on to

irrelevant information by giving Williams’ email address and phone number.

Appellants’ Brief, p. 6, footnote 17.

has no relationship to the Probate Proceeding.

In an attempt to end the probate court’s involvement in the dispute, Plaintiffs

attorneys involved in the probate proceeding (ROA. 16-79).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

of racketeering activity connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or

control of an enterprise, and that Bayless participated in the operation or management

represented and taken actions on behalf of another party involved in litigation in

the basis for the order dismissing the case.