Planning Development Faults Graphics Dec04 PDF

Planning for Development of Land on
or Close to Active Faults
A guideline to assist resource management

planners in New Zealand
Report prepared for the Ministry for the Environment by

Janine Kerr, Simon Nathan, Russ Van Dissen, Peter Webb,
David Brunsdon and Andrew King
Published in July 2003 by the
Ministry for the Environment
Manatu Mo Te Taiao
PO Box 10-362, Wellington, New Zealand
ISBN: 0-478-18901
ME number: 483
Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences client report 2002/124

Project Number: 440W3301
The data presented in this report are available to GNS for other use from May 2003.
Titlepage photo: Totara Park suburb, Upper Hutt City. A “greenfield” development that has mitigated the fault rupture hazard of
the Class 1 Active Wellington fault (The photo dates from the late 1970’s, before Totara Park was fully developed). The photo
shows, in the distance, right of centre, the dual carriageway of California Drive leading into California Park, the large open space
at centre. The Wellington fault underlies the median strip of California Drive, crosses California Park, through the centre of the
photo, and continues to the lower left. It underlies a walkway between California Park and the Hutt River, just left of the leftmost
group of houses nearest the camera, on the far bank of the Hutt River. The fault crosses into the river, at the leftmost of the trees
aligned along the far riverbank. It continues to lower left, through Harcourt Park, another recreational reserve. Photo D.L.
Homer, GNS CN18547/39
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Why we developed the guidelines 1
1.2 Summary of the contents 2
2 Principles for Planning Approaches 3

2.1 Principle 1: Gather accurate active fault hazard information 3
2.2 Principle 2: Plan to avoid fault rupture hazard before development and subdivision 3
2.3 Principle 3: Take a risk-based approach in areas already developed or subdivided 3
2.4 Principle 4: Communicate risk in built up areas subject to fault rupture 4
3 Understanding Earthquakes and Active Faults 5

3.1 Definitions 5
4 Taking a Risk-based Approach 8

4.1 Using a risk management standard 8
4.2 Summary of the steps 8
5 Mapping Active Faults 10

5.1 The importance of mapping 10
5.2 Required scale of fault maps 10
6 Fault Avoidance Zones 12

6.1 Definition 12
7 Fault Recurrence Interval 13

7.1 Definition 13
8 Fault Complexity 15
8.1 Definition 15
9 Building Importance Category 20

9.1 Definition 20
10 Planning for Fault Rupture Hazard 23

10.1 The RMA and the Building Act 23
10.2 Responsibilities under the RMA 23
10.3 Agreement among councils 24
10.4 Role of the regional policy statement 25
10.5 Provisions in the regional policy statement 25
10.6 Role of the district plan 26
10.7 Gathering information 27
10.8 Assessing the risk 27
10.9 Identifying the issues 28
10.10 Developing objectives and policies 28
10.11 Developing methods 30
10.12 Non-regulatory methods 31
10.13 Regulatory methods (rules) 31
10.14 Section 32 analysis 32
Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults iii

10.15 Cross-boundary issues 32
10.16 Monitoring 33
10.17 Does your district plan need amending? 34
11 Taking a Risk-based Approach to Resource Consent 35

11.1 Determining consent categories 35
11.2 Exercises 38
11.3 Answers 39
11.4 Assessment criteria 39
11.5 AEE requirements 40
12 Case Studies – Implementing the Guidelines 41
13 Acknowledgements 55
14 Further Reading 56
Appendix 1: AS/NZ 4360:1999 59
Appendix 2: Maps of Active Faults 60
Appendix 3: Classification of Faults 64
iv Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

1 Introduction
Controlling the development of land on or close to active faults is a Resource Management Act
1991 issue. These guidelines provide direction on land use planning approaches for land on or
close to active faults. They aim to help local authorities minimise the hazard risk and the time it
takes for individuals, communities, and the government to recover from fault rupture.
The guidelines aim to assist planners, emergency managers, earth scientists, and people in the
building industry to avoid or mitigate the fault rupture hazard.
We hope that using these guidelines will help to avoid or mitigate the risks associated with
building on or close to active faults. Different planning approaches are appropriate in different
areas – councils can establish appropriate policies and criteria which are more or less restrictive
than those represented here if necessary.
A working party of representatives from the Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences,
Geological Society of New Zealand, New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering,
BRANZ, Earthquake Commission and Ministry for the Environment developed these
guidelines. Consultation took place with members from various local authorities. The
collaborative approach drew together a range of expertise from professions that have an interest
in land use issues and hazard risk reduction.
Note that these guidelines are only concerned with the avoidance and mitigation of risk arising
from active fault rupture. They don’t discuss other earthquake-related hazards, such as strong
ground shaking, liquefaction, uplift, subsidence, landslide and tsunami.
1.1 Why we developed the guidelines

New Zealand’s precarious location at the edge of two converging tectonic plates means we are
subject to natural hazards like earthquake shaking, earthquake fault rupture, and land
deformation. As these tectonic plates continue to move, New Zealand will continue to be
subject to earthquake-related hazards.
In March 2001, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment released the report
Building on the Edge – The Use and Development of Land On or Close to Fault Lines. The
Commissioner’s investigation arose following public concern that local authorities were not
able to adequately manage the use and development of land on or close to active faults.
The PCE report focused on the Building Act 1991 and the Resource Management Act 1991
(RMA). It reached a number of key conclusions.
• There is no technology to prevent earthquake damage to buildings built across faults.
• Few territorial authorities identify and plan for seismic hazards, despite their
responsibilities for subdivision and land use.
• Practical guidelines are urgently needed to reduce the risks associated with fault rupture.
Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults 1

Recommendation 1 (below) of the PCE report was the catalyst for the development of these
guidelines:
The Ministry for the Environment [is] working together with the Institute of
Geological and Nuclear Sciences and other interested organisations with
structural and geotechnical expertise to develop best practice guidelines for
territorial authorities in avoiding or mitigating seismic hazard through the district
plan process.
We suggest that users of these guidelines also read the PCE report, to gain an overview of active
fault and land use issues.
1.2 Summary of the contents

The first part of this guide (sections 2–9) focuses on the need for a risk-based approach to
planning for land use on and near active faults. It recommends that councils:
• identify active faults in their district, with maps that are at the right scale for the purpose
• create fault hazard avoidance zones on their district planning maps
• evaluate the fault rupture hazard risk within each fault avoidance zone
• avoid building within fault hazard avoidance zones where possible
• mitigate the fault rupture hazard when building has taken place or will take place within a
fault hazard avoidance zone.
The main elements of the risk-based approach are:

• the fault recurrence interval, which is an indicator of the likelihood of a fault rupturing in
the near future
• the fault complexity, which establishes the distribution and deformation of land around a
fault line
• the Building Importance Category, which indicates the acceptable level of risk of
different types of buildings within a fault avoidance zone.
The second part of this report (sections 10–11) discuss the role of regional councils and
territorial authorities in planning for fault rupture hazard. Section 11 describes how councils
can take a risk-based approach to establishing resource consent categories for buildings within a
fault hazard avoidance zone.
The appendices to the guide contain information that councils can use to begin identifying
active faults in their districts.
2 Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

2 Principles for Planning Approaches
The information in this guide is based on the four over-arching principles below. However, past
planning decisions have not always taken that approach. The principles recognise that a
different planning approach is needed for an area that has not been developed (a greenfield site)
and an area that has been developed or subdivided, or where there exists an expectation to build.
Defining a Greenfield site is something that each council needs to do. It may be an area where
there is currently no expectation to build (e.g. no zoning for intensive development) or may be
an undeveloped area of a certain defined size (e.g. < 20 acres).
2.1 Principle 1: Gather accurate active fault hazard

information
Identifying and accurately locating hazards on planning maps is an essential step towards
communicating hazard risk and mitigating hazards. Collecting information will often require
specialised scientific knowledge and surveys. Maps showing the location of hazards around
property boundaries must be developed at the right scale. Because the existence of a particular
hazard may have a major effect on a decision to purchase or build on a property, all information
on hazards should be as accurate as technology and resources permit.
2.2 Principle 2: Plan to avoid fault rupture hazard before

development and subdivision
Building away from areas of fault rupture can avoid, or certainly mitigate, the fault hazard risk.
For example, a new subdivision can be required to avoid building in an area of fault rupture (a
fault avoidance zone in the district plan). This is the safest and most satisfactory long-term
solution for current and later landowners and for the territorial authority. It can also be achieved
for little or no extra cost (although we recognise that loss of development opportunities are a
cost to the developer).
2.3 Principle 3: Take a risk-based approach in areas already

developed or subdivided
If land has already been subdivided and sites have been purchased, there is an expectation that
building on these sites will be allowed. Planning for land use in a fault avoidance zone helps to
avoid or mitigate the hazard risks caused by land-use intensification (such as urban infill) and
inappropriate building.
These guidelines propose a risk-based, approach, based on risk management standard AS/NZS
4360:1999. This standard takes into account the fault recurrence interval and fault complexity,
and the Building Importance Category of the building proposed for the site.
This approach does not guarantee that a building will not suffer damage from fault rupture in an
earthquake. It does establish that the risk of damage is sufficiently low to be generally accepted.

2.4 Principle 4: Communicate risk in built up areas subject to
fault rupture
One of the most difficult problems concerning fault rupture hazard is dealing with urban areas
where buildings have already been constructed on or close to an active fault. One of the clearest
examples of this situation is the suburb of Thorndon in Wellington. Although the risk posed by
building in such a location is obvious to us now, it was not clear when urban subdivision started
in New Zealand in the 19th century.
The ideal approach in this situation would be to avoid further development in high-risk areas, to
limit existing use rights to rebuild, and to limit the use of buildings.
The most realistic approach, however, is to accept the status quo whilst ensuring that:
• any further development and use of buildings is consistent with the level of risk posed
• district plan maps clearly show fault rupture hazard zones.
Non-regulatory approaches, such as hazard education programmes and incentives to retire at-
risk land, would also ensure that landowners and building occupiers are made aware of the
hazard, and the probability of future fault rupture.

3 Understanding Earthquakes and Active
Faults
3.1 Definitions
A fault is a fracture in the Earth’s crust. The opposite sides of the fracture are held together by
pressure and friction, but as stress builds up a fault may suddenly rupture. In a large rupture,
shock waves cause the earth to shake violently and produce an earthquake.
Figure 3.1: Relationship between faults and earthquakes
The point at which a fault plane starts to

rupture is known as the focus or origin.
The point on the surface directly above
the focus is called the epicentre.
An active fault is a fault that has ruptured repeatedly in the past, and whose history indicates
that it is likely to rupture again. An active fault creates a fault hazard risk. The level of that
risk depends on the fault recurrence interval (section 7), fault complexity (section 8), and nature
of development in the area.
New Zealand geological maps use a distinctive colour for faults that have moved in the last
120,000 years. This is generally regarded as the upper limit for a fault to be classified as active.
Most of New Zealand’s major active faults have been identified and mapped, at least on small-
scale maps.
In a large earthquake, the fault rupture may extend up to the ground surface, and suddenly form
a fault scarp (the disrupted land form created by the rupture). For example, in the 1987
Edgecumbe earthquake, a man climbing a tree felt the ground shaking and saw a fault scarp
develop across the field on either side of him.

All buildings close to the epicentre of a large shallow earthquake will be strongly shaken, and
this shaking causes most of the earthquake damage. Any building sited across a fault scarp is
likely to suffer more damage, especially if the foundations are offset. It is unlikely that any
building sited across the fault scarps in Figures 3.2(a)–3.2(c) would avoid major damage or
collapse.
Figure 3.2: Examples of fault displacement
b) White Creek Fault – The 1929

Murchison earthquake resulted in
over 4 m of vertical displacement
of the ground surface at the
White Creek fault (Berryman
1980). Note the cyclist standing
on the upthrown side of road that
is displaced by the fault.
a) Edgecumbe Fault – The 1987 Edgecumbe

earthquake resulted in about 7 km of surface rupture
along the Edgecumbe fault, and up to about 2 m of
vertical displacement of the ground surface at the
fault (Beanland et al 1989). Arrows mark the
location of surface fault rupture.
Photo by DL Homer: CN 10115/37.
c) Hope Fault – The 1888

earthquake on the Hope fault
resulted in about 3 m of right
lateral displacement of the
ground surface at the fault. The
offset fence-line shows the
amount of displacement across
the fault (Cowan 1991).
Faults may show horizontal offset, vertical offset, or a combination of the two.

Table 3.1 Historic examples of surface fault rupture that have accompanied major
earthquakes in New Zealand over the last 160 years
Year Event Approximate maximum Sense of displacement Photo in text

surface offset (metres)
1848 Awatere Fault, Marlborough 7 Strike slip Fig 5.5(c)

1855 Wairarapa Fault 13 Strike slip Fig 5.3
1888 Hope Fault, North Canterbury 3 Strike slip Fig 5.2(c)
(Glenn Wye)
1929 White Creek Fault, Murchison 4 Reverse and strike slip Fig 5.2(b)
1931 Napier 2 Reverse and strike slip –
1934 Pahiatua 4 Reverse –
1968 Inangahua 1 Reverse –
1987 Edgecumbe 2 Normal Fig 5.2(a)
Figure 3.3: Active faults map of New Zealand
Active fault: average recurrence

interval of surface rupture less
than 2000 years
Active fault: average recurrence
interval greater than 2000 years
or undefined
0 100 200 km

4 Taking a Risk-based Approach
4.1 Using a risk management standard

We recommend that councils use this risk-based approach, based on risk management standard
AS/NZS 4360:1999, when they develop provisions for their district plans. (AS/NZS 4360:1999
is set out fully in Appendix 1.)
This risk-based approach combines the key elements of fault recurrence interval (section 7),
fault complexity (section 8), and Building Importance Category (section 9).
Key points to remember about the fault recurrence interval, fault complexity, and Building
Importance Category are:
• Fault Recurrence Interval: The longer the recurrence interval of an active fault, the
lower the risk that the fault will rupture in the near future.
• Fault Complexity: A fault rupture with a wide and distributed deformation is lower risk
than a narrow, well-defined fault line.
• Building Importance Category: The Building Importance Category shows the need for
an assessment of the suitability of a building in a fault avoidance zone.
4.2 Summary of the steps

Figure 4.1 summarises the steps involved in the recommended risk-based approach. Note that
this approach depends upon accurate information and mapping of active faults. Identifying and
mapping faults are part of the Gathering information stage of district plan preparation.

Figure 4.1: Risk-based planning approach
Step One: Identify active faults in your district
Where are the active faults in the district? (Refer to Appendices 2 and 3.)
↓
Step Two: Create fault avoidance zones around active faults
Is a fault avoidance zone in a greenfield site?

Is a fault avoidance zone in an area already subdivided or developed? Is there an existing expectation to build?
↓
Step Three: Identify the nature of the fault rupture hazard risk
What is the likelihood of fault rupture in the fault avoidance zone? (Fault recurrence interval)
What is the nature of the fault in the fault avoidance zone? (Fault complexity)
↓
Step Four: Analyse and evaluate the level of the risk to a subdivision or development
What is the proposed use of the site?

What is the construction type, and the nature of its response to fault rupture movement? (Building importance
category)
↓
Step Five: Treat the risk
What action should be taken to avoid or mitigate the risk within the fault avoidance zone?
regulatory planning methods
non-regulatory methods
limiting the risk posed by the building
↓
Step Six: Monitor and review
Are we achieving our outcomes?

Is new information available?
Do we need to update our district plan?

5 Mapping Active Faults
5.1 The importance of mapping

Faults must be accurately located, and mapped at a scale appropriate for end use purposes, to
enable planners to make decisions about land use on or close to active faults.
Geologists with particular experience of mapping faults are the most appropriate professionals
to investigate, locate and assess active faults. Engineers with recognised qualifications and
experience in geotechnical engineering are also able to investigate faults.
Active faults are complex and often have multiple breaks. A number of methods and evaluative
tools need to be used in investigation.
Once a fault has been accurately located and assessed, the fault features should be clearly
marked out (for example, pegged) so they can be surveyed onto cadastral maps.
5.2 Required scale of fault maps

For planning purposes, faults should be mapped and classified at a minimum scale of 1:10,000.
At present, few local authorities have mapped active faults to this scale, instead relying on
existing fault maps for indicative purposes. This can create severe limitations for land use
planning. (See Appendix 2 for an indication of faults in your district.)
Most of New Zealand’s major active faults are mapped on small-scale geological maps
(1:250,000 or 1:50,000 scale). This does not provide adequate detail for planning purposes,
which requires detail to at least property boundary level. This is shown in Figure 5.1, and in
more detail in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.1: Example of fault mapping

Two recently published geological maps show the Wellington Fault, but neither is sufficiently
accurate to be used for planning purposes.
1: 250,000 scale 1: 50,000 scale
A map should only be interpreted at the scale it is compiled at. Figure 5.2 shows what happens
when published maps are enlarged.

Figure 5.2: Interpreting fault maps
1: 250,000 publication scale

Geological maps in New Zealand are often published
at the 1:250,000 scale. The fault data is simplified
for map clarity.
1: 250,000
1: 50,000 compilation scale

Fault data is drawn on maps at this scale when being
compiled for 1: 250,000 scale presentation, but the
data is then simplified for publication.
1: 50,000
1: 10,000 scale
If a 1: 250,000 scale map is enlarged to this degree

(as it often is, especially on photocopiers) the fault
will be inaccurately portrayed and its placement
interpreted wrongly. A key mistake is thinking that a
fault intersects a particular property when it does not.
On the 1: 10,000 scale map, the pink area

represents the width of the line portraying the fault in
the 1: 250,000 scale map. In reality, the fault is
unlikely to be this wide, although the zone of
deformation around the fault could be wider.
Faults shown on planning maps at 1: 10,000 scale

must be compiled, and features located, at a scale
consistent with end use.
Data should not be transferred from larger scale

1: 10,000 maps (1: 250,000) to typical district plan maps
(1: 10,000), or used for detailed land use planning
purposes.

6 Fault Avoidance Zones
6.1 Definition
A fault avoidance zone is an area created by establishing a buffer zone either side of the known
fault trace (or the identified likely fault rupture zone). These Guidelines recommend a
minimum buffer zone of 20 metres either side of the known fault trace or likely fault rupture
zone.
Twenty metres has been chosen because intense deformation and secondary ruptures are
commonly experiences as a result of fault movement within this distance from the primary
plane of the fault rupture. These effects can occur because near-surface weak materials deform
instead of breaking cleanly, and structures built near an area of fault rupture can cause surface
rupture to divert around them unpredictably. Twenty metres also represents a precautionary
approach to ensure a level of life safety.
Figure 6.1: A fault avoidance zone on a district planning map
Representative scale only
Fault
Fault Avoidance
trace Zone
Likely fault rupture zone
Detailed fault studies may show

that fault deformation is less
extensive than 20 metres from
20 metres either side of a fault the end of the fault trace –
trace is likely to be an area of therefore the fault avoidance
intense deformation zone may be reduced.
Fault Avoidance Zone –

to ensure life safety
Defining a fault avoidance zone on district planning maps, which is supported by policies and
methods (including rules) will allow a council to:
• restrict development within the fault avoidance zone
• take a risk-based approach to development in built-up areas.
The determination of the extent of a fault avoidance zone is closely related to fault complexity
(refer section 8). A wide and complex likely fault rupture zone is likely to have a significant
fault avoidance zone.
Displacement across a fault usually decreases with its distance from the fault trace. The fault
avoidance zone can be reduced if a detailed fault study shows that the zone of intense
deformation and secondary rupture is less than 20 metres from the likely fault rupture zone.

7 Fault Recurrence Interval
7.1 Definition
The fault recurrence interval is the average time between surface ruptures on a fault. We
consider it is the best measure to use when evaluating the hazard risk of an active fault.
Historic and geological evidence shows that faults rupture repeatedly along the same narrow
fracture. For example, there is evidence of two major fault ruptures on the Wellington Fault
within the last 700 years, each with a horizontal offset of about four metres. There is also
evidence of a total offset of almost one kilometre on the Wellington Fault in the last 140,000
years, indicating at least 200 major earthquake ruptures during this time. Along the Wairarapa
Fault, up to 130 metres has been displaced along the same fault scarp that first ruptured in 1855.
This indicates that multiple surface ruptures have occurred in the same location along the same
fault scarp.
Figure 7.1: Wairarapa Fault – repeated rupture on same fault

Faults with short recurrence intervals are generally more likely to rupture in the near future than
faults with a longer recurrence interval. It is important to remember that this is a statistical
measurement only, and may not be an accurate predictor of future movement on a fault. For
example, although the White Creek Fault has a long recurrence interval of more than 20,000
years, it actually ruptured in the 1929 Murchison earthquake.
Detailed investigation, usually involving trenching, is needed to determine the fault recurrence
interval.
Recurrence intervals of surface rupture on New Zealand faults range from several hundred years
(for example, the Hope and Alpine faults) to tens of thousands of years (for example, the
Waverly, Whitemans and White Creek faults).
Table 7.1 groups together fault recurrence interval classes.
Table 7.1: Fault recurrence interval classes

Recurrence interval class Average fault recurrence interval of surface rupture
I ≤2000 years
II >2000 years to ≤3500 years
III >3500 years to ≤5000 years
IV >5000 years to ≤10,000 years
V >10,000 years to ≤20,000 years
VI >20,000 years to ≤125,000 years
The fault recurrence interval measure can also be related to accepted levels of risk in the current
Building Code. Appendix 3 gives details of most of New Zealand’s known active faults, and
indicates which regional council jurisdictions these faults fall within. It also gives a confidence
rating of these faults’ average recurrence intervals.

8 Fault Complexity
8.1 Definition
Fault complexity refers to the width and distribution of the deformed land around the fault trace.
Many faults appear to be a simple linear feature on the ground surface, with a narrow zone of
deformation only a few metres wide, as shown in Figures 8.1(a)–8.1(c).
Others have a complex and distributed zone of deformation, as shown in Figures 8.2(a)–8.2(c).
Figure 8.1: Examples of simple linear fault features
a) Wellington Fault at Totara Park.

Photo by D.L. Homer; CN 14444/10.

b) Wairau Fault. The most recent rupture
along the well-defined trace of the Wairau
section of the Alpine fault in Marlborough
resulted in about 3–5 m of right lateral
displacement at the fault (Lensen 1976,
Zachariasen et al. 2001).
Photo by D.L. Homer;
CN 17871/24.
c) The 1848 earthquake on the eastern section of the Awatere

fault resulted in over 100 km of surface rupture along the
fault, and as much as about 7 m of right-lateral
displacement of the ground surface at the fault (Grapes et
al. 1998, Benson et al. 2001).

Photo by D.L. Homer; CN 3940/12
Figure 8.2: Examples of complex deformation on the Ostler fault trace
These photos show the complex

trace of the Ostler fault where
surface rupture deformation,
though concentrated at the fault,
is also distributed over a relatively
broad region on either side of the
fault (Van Dissen et al. 1994).
Arrows mark the location of
surface fault rupture.
Photos by D.L. Homer, CN
3418/a, 576/b and 6435/23
respectively.

Table 8.1 proposes a three-fold classification for fault complexity: well defined, distributed or
uncertain.
Table 8.1: Defining fault complexity types

A A well defined fault trace of limited geographic width
Well defined Typically metres to tens of metres wide
B Deformation is distributed over a relatively broad geographic width

Distributed Typically tens to hundreds of metres wide
Usually comprises multiple fault traces and/or folds
C The location of fault trace(s) is uncertain as it either has not been mapped in detail or it cannot
Uncertain be identified. This is typically a result of gaps in the trace(s), or erosion or coverage of the
trace(s)

Figure 8.3: View of fault complexity types
A fault trace is not always well

defined. Faults may locally
break into distributed
segments, or there may be
gaps along the fault trace,
making location of the fault
A uncertain.
gap
Well B
defined Distributed
C
Uncertain
Recent fault location studies have shown (refer case studies Section 12) that certain faults can
demonstrate all three levels of fault complexity at different parts of the fault. Variations on the
three types of complexities discussed above may therefore be warranted.

9 Building Importance Category
9.1 Definition
It is not always possible to avoid building within a fault avoidance zone. Past planning
decisions may have resulted in buildings being within a fault avoidance zone, or people may
have an expectation to build there now. Also, where the level of certainty is low regarding the
fault location, its complexity and recurrence interval, it may be difficult to justify rules that limit
any building in these areas.
Buildings within a fault avoidance zone, particularly buildings crossing active faults, are very
likely to be damaged in a fault rupture. A Building Importance Category states the relative
importance of assessing the suitability of a building within, or proposed for, a fault avoidance
zone.
The categories are based on risk levels for building collapse according to the building type, use
and occupancy. Category one is least importance; category four is most importance.
Councils can use Building Importance Categories to make decisions about resource consents
(Section 11), and to require conditions on buildings within fault avoidance zones.

Table 9.1: Building Importance Categories: a modified version of New Zealand Loading
Standard classifications
Building Description Examples

Importance
Category
(BIC)
2
1 Structures presenting Structures with a total floor area of les than 30m
a low degree of hazard Farm buildings, isolated structures, towers in rural situations
to life and other
property Fences, masts, walls, in-ground swimming pools
2a Residential timber- Timber framed single-story dwellings

framed construction
2
2b Normal structures and Timber framed houses of plan area of more than 300 m
structures not in other Houses outside the scope of NZS 3604 “Timber Framed Buildings”
categories
Multi-occupancy residential, commercial (including shops), industrial, office
and retailing buildings designed to accommodate less than 5000 people
2
and also those less than 10,000 m gross area.
2
Public assembly buildings, theatres and cinemas of less than 1000 m
Car parking buildings
3 Structures that, as a Emergency medical and other emergency facilities not designated as post
whole, may contain disaster facilities
people in crowds or Buildings where more than 300 people can congregate in one area
contents of high value
to the community or Buildings and facilities with primary school, secondary school or day care
pose risks to people facilities with capacity greater than 250
in crowds Buildings and facilities with capacity greater than 500 for colleges or adult
education facilities
Health care facilities with a capacity of 50 or more residents but not having
surgery or emergency treatment facilities
Airport terminals, principal railway stations, with a capacity of more than
250 people
Any occupancy with an occupancy load greater than 5000
Power generating facilities, water treatment and waste water treatment
facilities and other public utilities not included in Importance Category 4
Buildings and facilities not included in Importance Category 4 containing
hazardous materials capable of causing hazardous conditions that do not
extend beyond the property boundaries
4 Structures with Buildings and facilities designated as essential facilities

special post disaster Buildings and facilities with special post-disaster function
functions
Medical emergency or surgical facilities
Emergency service facilities such as fire, police stations and emergency
vehicle garages
Utilities required as backup for buildings and facilities of importance level 4
Designated emergency shelters
Designated emergency centres and ancillary facilities
Buildings and facilities containing hazardous materials capable of causing
hazardous conditions that extend beyond the property boundaries.
Table 9.2 shows the relationship between the fault recurrence interval and Building Importance
Category in previously subdivided or developed areas, and in greenfield sites.
It shows which Building Importance Categories are acceptable in a fault avoidance zone with a
particular fault recurrence interval.

Table 9.2: Relationship between fault recurrence interval and Building Importance
Category
Recurrence Fault recurrence interval Building importance category (BIC) limitations*

interval (allowable buildings)
class
Previously subdivided or “Greenfield” sites
developed sites
I ≤2000 years BIC 1 BIC 1
II >2000 years to ≤3500 years BIC 1 and 2a
III >3500 years to ≤5000 years BIC 1, 2a and 2b BIC 1 and 2a
IV >5000 years to ≤10,000 years BIC 1, 2a, 2b and 3 BIC 1, 2a, and 2b
V >10,000 years to ≤20,000 years BIC 1, 2a, 2b and 3
VI >20,000 years to ≤125,000 years BI Category 1, 2a, 2b, 3 and 4
Note: Faults with average recurrence intervals >125,000 years are not considered active.

10 Planning for Fault Rupture Hazard
10.1 The RMA and the Building Act

Councils need to make a planned response to fault rupture hazard in regional policy statements
and district plans. A combination of controls through the RMA and the Building Act can avoid
or mitigate the effects of fault rupture hazard.
The RMA concerns land use issues such as the location of a building and the effects of its
intended use, while the Building Act concerns a building’s construction and the safety and
integrity of the structure.
Under the Building Act, all building work must comply with the mandatory Building Code
1992. The Building Code sets out a series of minimum performance criteria for buildings. The
council must be satisfied that the criteria of Clause B1 of the Building Code will be met before
it issues a building consent. However:
• no guidance is available to councils to help them decide whether a design will comply
with Clause B1
• no existing technology will prevent damage to buildings sited across a fault, meaning
significant damage can occur even if the Building Code is complied with.
Therefore, relying solely on the Building Act to address the adverse effects of fault rupture is
not effective. Councils need to consider and develop a policy response in their district plans,
with the Building Act being one of the methods that can avoid or mitigate the risk.
Using controls under the RMA and Building Act are just part of a council’s response to
managing hazards. Protecting essential infrastructure and undertaking civil defence emergency
management planning are also required under other Acts, such as the Civil Defence Emergency
Management Act 2002.
10.2 Responsibilities under the RMA

Under the RMA, both regional councils and territorial authorities have responsibilities for
natural hazards. Sections 30 and 31 reflect the fact that some natural hazards are best managed
at a regional council level, and others at a territorial authority level.
Section 30 of the RMA lists the functions of regional councils. They include “the control of
the use of land for the purpose of… the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards”. Regional
councils are required to:
• prepare a regional policy statement, which helps to set the direction for the management
of all resources across the region
• produce regional plans where appropriate

• co-ordinate investigations into natural hazards, and maintain information about hazards of
regional significance
• integrate the approaches to manage the risk posed by fault rupture, and work with the
territorial authorities as to who will do what.
Section 31 of the RMA says that territorial authorities are responsible for, among other things,
“the control of any actual or potential effects of the use, development, or protection of land,
including for the purpose of the avoidance or mitigation of natural hazards ...”.
Territorial authorities are required to:

• prepare a district plan, the primary document for setting out district wide policies and
controls on what people can and can’t do on their land
• gather information on hazards associated with land use.
Generally, provisions in the regional policy statement should set out what approach the district
plan will take. The district plan should contain the specific policies to address hazard risk, and
any controls concerning land use and fault rupture.
10.3 Agreement among councils

Regional councils and territorial authorities must agree on their respective responsibilities for
managing hazards under the RMA. It is not effective for councils in the same region and
subject to the same hazards to work independently.
The way that councils work together to reach agreement will depend on the issues and resources
within each district in a region. Councils can reach agreement:
• during the regional policy statement development process
• by consulting during plan or policy statement preparation
• through a Memoranda of Understanding.
The issues that need to be agreed on include:

• who will be the key information provider (and what this information is)
• who will identify and map hazards
• who will carry out education and communication campaigns
• who will be responsible for planning and responding to hazards (under the RMA as well
as a Civil Defence response)
• who will develop and implement specific hazard mitigation plans for particular hazards
• who will be responsible for writing objectives, policies, and rules in plans.
Section 62(1)(i)(i) of the RMA says that a regional policy statement must state “the local
authority responsible in the whole or any part of the region for specifying the objectives,
policies, and methods for the control of the use of land to avoid or mitigate natural hazards or
any group of hazards”. If the regional policy statement does not clarify these responsibilities,
then they default to the regional council.

However, territorial authorities issues building consents, and control the subdivision of land and
most land uses. District plans are usually the best place to control land use to avoid or mitigate
fault rupture hazard.
10.4 Role of the regional policy statement

A key purpose of the regional policy statement is to identify the regional council’s and
territorial authority’s agreed responsibilities for planning for fault hazards.
The regional policy statement should therefore:

• state clearly which council (regional or district) has the primary responsibility for dealing
with fault rupture
• be quite specific as to what each will do.
For example: the regional council will co-ordinate hazard investigation, and the district councils
will develop objectives, policies and methods to control use of land to avoid or mitigate fault
rupture hazard.
Environment Waikato actually recognises in one of its objectives the need for the regional and
district councils to agree on their roles.
“The roles of all relevant agencies for the management of natural hazards in the
Waikato Region clearly identified and their responsibilities consistently
implemented” (Waikato Regional Policy Statement)
The Wellington Regional Council spells out the division of responsibilities in a table.
Responsibilities for Responsibilities for Responsibilities for

developing objectives developing policies developing rules
Coastal marine area WRC WRC WRC

Beds of lakes and rivers WRC WRC WRC
Other land WRC* WRC WRC
TA TA TA*
WRC = Wellington Regional Council, TA = territorial authorities, * = primary responsibility

Source: Wellington Regional Policy Statement
10.5 Provisions in the regional policy statement

The regional policy statement also:
• provides an overview of the resource management issues facing the region
• sets region-wide objectives and policies
• identifies the methods to be used across the region to address the objectives and
implement the policies.

Regional policy statement provisions tend to be reasonably generic (for example, by considering
all natural hazards within the same objective or policy). However, a regional council can be
more specific if it wishes, and can set a clear policy direction for the districts to follow. The
regional policy statement can identify fault rupture hazard as an issue across the region, and
then state the objectives and policies that explain how the issue will be addressed.
Regional policy statements also tend to have similar objectives. The objective is usually to
avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of natural hazards on life, property and the environment.
For example:
“To avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of natural hazards upon human life,
infrastructure and property, and the natural environment” (horizons.mw Regional
Policy Statement)
“Any adverse effects of natural hazards on the environment of the Wellington
Region are reduced to an acceptable level” (Wellington Regional Policy Statement)
“To avoid or mitigate natural hazards within the Taranaki region by minimising
the nett costs or risks of natural hazards to people, property and the environment
of the region” (Taranaki Regional Policy Statement)
Environment Waikato also seeks to increase public resilience to natural hazards:

“The adverse effects associated with natural hazards minimised, the resilience of
the community and public awareness of the causes and potential effects of natural
hazards events increased”
Policies in regional policy statements vary, but can be grouped into the following categories:
• raising awareness
• improving knowledge
• imposing planning controls, especially with respect to high risk areas
• preparing for hazard events and Civil Defence response.
10.6 Role of the district plan

The district plan should contain the specific policies to address fault rupture hazard risk, and
any controls concerning land use and fault rupture.
Section 75(2)(b) of the RMA states that a district plan must “not be inconsistent” with the
regional policy statement.
Before developing and adopting objectives, policies, and methods for the district plan, councils
needs to:
• gather information about fault rupture hazards
• assess the risk of fault rupture hazard
• identify and assess earthquake and fault rupture issues.

Plan provisions need to be appropriate to the community’s circumstances. No one policy
response to fault rupture hazard will work for all communities within New Zealand. The issues
and objectives between districts affected by active faults may be similar, but the methods (or
mix of methods) used to address the risk will often be different.
10.7 Gathering information

The first step is to determine whether there are any active faults in the district.
Information can be gathered from:

• the regional council, especially hazard information and hazard maps (the territorial
authority might create more detailed maps after assessing the active faults in the district)
• geotechnical information provided as part of resource consent applications
• data gathered from site-specific investigations
• Crown Research Institutes, such as the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences
• private companies involved in the geology, earthquake engineering, and geotechnical
professions.
The data may be very general in nature, incomplete, or contain conflicting conclusions. Initial
information gathering may show the need for further studies. Data also needs to be kept up to
date: section 35(5)(j) of the RMA requires councils to keep records of natural hazards that are
sufficient for the local authority to discharge its functions effectively.
The cost of obtaining fault data can be expensive, and prohibitive for smaller councils. Cost
sharing between neighbouring councils and agreements with the regional council may help.
The most hazardous faults in the district need to be accurately located, surveyed and mapped in
enough detail to provide accuracy at property boundary level (a scale of 1: 5000 to 1: 10,000).
This enables the development of appropriate objectives, policies, and methods.
It is not feasible to map all faults in the district, and not always possible to know where they are.
Highest priority needs to be given to faults with recurrence intervals of less than 5000 years, and
faults closest to urban areas or set aside for future urban development.
10.8 Assessing the risk

Having identified active faults in its district, the council needs to define a fault avoidance zone
around each active fault in the district planning maps. It then needs to assess the fault hazard
risk within each fault avoidance zone.
As outlined in Figure 4.1, the main elements that determine the risk of fault hazard are the fault
recurrence interval and the fault complexity.
The likely displacement along active faults is also important. Vertical and horizontal
displacement along the fault plane will result in more damage during a fault rupture.

In assessing the fault hazard risk, the council should also take account of:
• community values and expectations (what the community wants and what it does not want)
• which areas of the district are, or are likely to be, under pressure for development
• what infrastructure already exists near faults (buildings, network utilities etc) and the
value of that infrastructure
• what level of risk the community is prepared to accept or not accept (in practice, it is
easier to define what the community will not accept).
Risk assessment requires an understanding of the likely magnitude or consequences of events,

and the risks of injury or loss of life and damage to property and investment. It also requires
consideration of the cost of clean-up or repair or replacement of damaged property or services
after the event.
10.9 Identifying the issues

Gathering information and assessing the risk will determine whether the risk is a significant
issue that the community wants addressed. If so, the issue needs to be included in the district
plan, and a policy response developed (objectives, policies, and methods, including rules, to
address the issue) to help to avoid or mitigate the fault hazard risk.
10.10 Developing objectives and policies

Many district councils take an ‘all-hazards’ approach to developing hazard-related objectives
and policies in their plans. This provides simplicity and may be acceptable for an overall hazard
objective and some policies. However, a hazard-specific approach is likely to be more effective
and easier to implement.
When formulating policies, it is important to focus on the effects that need to be addressed to
achieve the objective, and to state how those effects are going to be dealt with.
As in regional policy statements, objectives in district plans tend to relate to the territorial
authority’s statutory function for natural hazards prescribed in section 31 of the RMA: to avoid
or mitigate adverse effects of the use of land for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating natural
hazards.
For example:
“The avoidance, remedying or mitigation of the adverse effects of natural hazards
on the environment” (Objective 14.3.1 of the Upper Hutt District Plan)
“To avoid or reduce the risk to people and their property from natural hazards
associated with seismic action, landslides, flooding and coastal hazards”
(Objective in Section 14H 1.1.1 of the Hutt City Proposed District Plan)
“To avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of natural and technological hazards on
people, property and the environment” (Objective 4.2.7 of the Wellington City
District Plan)

The Tasman District Council takes a different approach. Its objective (subject to appeal) is:
“Management of areas subject to natural hazard, particularly flooding, instability,
coastal and river erosion, inundation and earthquake hazard to ensure that
development is avoided or mitigated, depending on risk” (Objective 13.1.0 of the
Tasman Proposed Resource Management Plan)
A less common objective seeks to ensure that land use activities do not increase or worsen the
effects of the natural hazard:
“Activities and development do not create, accelerate, displace, or increase the
effects of a natural hazard” (Objective 31.2.2 of the Taupo Proposed District Plan)
“Safe land use practices which do not increase the risk of adverse effects from
natural hazards on the environment, people and their property” (Objective 11.2.3
of the South Waikato District Plan)
The use of a specific earthquake objective is rare. Examples include:

“To minimise the risk from earthquakes to the wellbeing and safety of the
community” (Objective C12.1 of the Porirua City District Plan)
“To minimise the risks of earthquakes affecting people and property in the District
as far as practicable” (Objective 5 in Section 3.2 of the Matamata Piako Proposed
District Plan)
In low-risk areas, the objective may instead seek to improve knowledge of potential risk:
“Increase Council and community understanding of the earthquake risk and
associated natural hazard” (Objective 8.3.1 of the Waimakariri Proposed District
Plan)
Policies in district plans generally fall into the same groupings as in regional policy statements,
but are at a more detailed level. Essentially, policies specify:
• collection of information, development of a hazards register or database, and
identification of at-risk areas
• provision of information and advice, to raise public awareness and to encourage good
practices
• inclusion of controls in plans, so that activities are located and designed to avoid or
mitigate adverse effects in at-risk areas
• required standards for emergency responses and essential services following an
earthquake event.
For example:
“To develop a database on natural hazards including implementing a hazards
identification system for risk assessment” (Policy 15.2 of the Masterton District
Plan)
“Promote community awareness of natural hazards to encourage avoidance of
adverse effects of hazards” (Policy 5 in Section C.15.1 of the Kapiti Coast District
Plan)

“In areas of known susceptibility to natural hazards, activities and buildings are to
be designed and located to avoid, remedy, or mitigate, where practicable, adverse
effects of natural hazards on people, property and the environment” (Policy 14.4.2
of the Upper Hutt District Plan)
“To provide warnings and emergency response systems for areas at risk from or
affected by natural hazards” (Policy 13.1.6 of the Tasman Resource Management
Plan)
Hutt City has a policy specific to fault rupture in its plan:

“That the area at risk from fault rupture causing permanent ground deformation
along the Wellington Fault be managed by the Wellington Fault Special Study Area
to address the effects of subdivision and development on the safety of people and
their property”
South Waikato realises the importance of working with the regional council on hazard issues:
“To work with Environment Waikato to develop measures to ensure that land use
practices do not cause or promote natural hazards” (Policy 11.3.6 of the South
Waikato District Plan)
10.11 Developing methods

Although it is not practical or possible to eliminate fault rupture hazard risk completely, doing
nothing is not an option. Methods should be developed specifically to address the effects of
fault rupture.
The plan needs to contain methods that address different aspects of the risk: what is the
likelihood of the hazard occurring? What are the consequences? Does the risk need treating?
District plan rules are not necessarily the only option: a mixture of rules and other methods can
be adopted. The exact makeup will vary, depending on the level of risk and the outcome of the
section 32 analysis (see below).
Methods can become more permissive as the risk of fault rupture decreases, by, for example:
• allowing a greater range of buildings to be located in an area of fault rupture
• allocating a less restrictive consent activity category
• relying more on the Building Act for controls
• relying more on non-regulatory approaches such as education and advocacy.

10.12 Non-regulatory methods
Non-regulatory methods are good for encouraging people to avoid putting themselves at risk.
One of the more important things a council can do is communicate the risk to the community.
Some of the non-regulatory methods available to councils include:

• purchasing at-risk land for passive recreational purposes
• exchanging at-risk land with land that can be put to some other purpose
• allowing greater development rights if land is retired or covenanted
• taking at-risk land as a condition of subdivision consent (reserves contribution)
• using financial incentives (for example, rates relief on at-risk land if it isn’t built upon)
• promoting and helping fund the use of covenants (privately or through the QEII National
Trust) for the voluntary protection from development of open space on private land
• educating to raise awareness of the risk and to encourage people to locate buildings away
from the fault rupture hazard
• using the Building Act to ensure that structures are safe and will remain intact throughout
the life of the building.
• including fault hazard information in LIM and PIM reports.
Fault avoidance zones still need to be clearly identified on district plan maps if non-regulatory
methods are used. This ensures that risk is communicated, and that landowners and building
occupiers can be made aware of the hazard.
10.13 Regulatory methods (rules)

Building within a fault avoidance zone should be discouraged wherever possible. Even when a
fault has a long recurrence interval, the chance exists that the fault may move during the lifetime
of a building.
Rules in the district plan can allow development in a fault avoidance zone only if resource
consent is granted. This approach is suitable for well-defined faults, or distributed faults that
have been accurately located. Section 11 describes how the fault recurrence interval, fault
complexity, and Building Importance Category can be used to establish resource consent
categories.
Rules need to be based upon risk. The approach used in built-up areas should differ from the
approach used in a greenfields area. In greenfields areas it is much easier to require a
subdivision to be planned around the likely fault rupture zone and buffer zone (i.e. the fault
avoidance zone). In built-up areas, buildings may have been established without the knowledge
of the risk posed by fault rupture. The community may have an expectation to continue living
there and be prepared to live with the risk despite the potential for damage.
Existing use rights under the RMA also mean that when an existing building over a fault is
damaged or burnt down, or requires rebuilding for whatever reason, it can be rebuilt, even once
the risk has been realised.

The district plan may have to include provisions to ensure that the risk is not increased by
intensified land use (such as urban infill) or by new building on sites not already occupied. It
can also require geotechnical investigations and appropriate earthquake-resistant design where
appropriate.
Some councils have taken a precautionary approach to fault rupture.
For example:
“To take a precautionary approach to development in suspected risk areas until
further information on the extent and nature of earthquake risk becomes available”
(Policy P1 in Section 3.2.2.5 of the Matamata Piako Proposed District Plan)
The council can also require a report, including certification from an appropriately qualified
person, stating that the land is suitable for the activities anticipated.
Nelson City Council has the following rule:

“Construction or alteration of a building within the Fault Hazard Overlay is
permitted if:
a) in the case of any site where a fault trace is identified and can be precisely
located by reference to the Council conditions book, subdivision files, site
files, or GIS database, buildings are set back 5 metres from the fault trace”
(Rule REr.71.1 of the Nelson Proposed Resource Management Plan)
The faults identified in Nelson City have low activity and long recurrence intervals. However,
Nelson City considered that it was best to design new subdivisions to avoid building on them.
10.14 Section 32 analysis

Before a council adopts any objective, policy, rule, or other method, it has a duty under
section 32 of the RMA to consider alternatives.
Essentially, the council is required to evaluate the costs and benefits of its proposed objective,
policy, or method.
Section 32 ensures that the proposed provisions are necessary, and that accurate data has been
used to carry out the evaluation.
It means that a council cannot simply adopt the approach of a neighbouring council – it must
first justify its reasoning. Any response the council chooses to take has to be supported by the
community and backed up by a section 32 analysis.
10.15 Cross-boundary issues

Natural hazards do not stop at local authority boundaries. It is important to consider how the
plan will co-ordinate with the plans of territorial authorities that share the same hazards, to
ensure that provisions are integrated across councils.

10.16 Monitoring
The plan needs to specify measurable outcomes that will ensure that issues are addressed, and
objectives and policies achieved.
These can be measured by looking at:

• number of houses being built on at-risk land
• type of houses being built (construction and use)
• land subject to active faults being set aside/purchased
• the level of awareness of the community and their acceptance of risk-based plan provisions.
If monitoring shows that the provisions aren’t reducing fault rupture hazard risk, councils need
to revise the provisions. If new information becomes available, councils need to review the
level of acceptable risk, and revise the provisions.
Advances in scientific information and technology will affect existing data held by councils,
and create new data that needs to be considered for incorporation into planning policy.
Councils need to identify new information should happen on an ongoing basis, to ensure plan
provisions are kept up to date, and ensure decisions based on the most accurate data.
Regional and district plan reviews are a good time to consider new information and data relating
to active faults. A programme of consultation should accompany any changes to hazard
information gained by the council.
To measure the effectiveness of policies and methods contained in plans, section 35(2A) of the
RMA requires that the results of plan monitoring be made available to the public every five
years. Keeping communities informed about the hazards they face, and changes to existing fault
knowledge is important because it not only lets them know what is going on in terms of plans
development, but raises awareness of hazards in the community.

10.17 Does your district plan need amending?
The following flow chart can help councils determine whether the district plan needs amending.
Figure 10.1: Clarifying whether a district plan needs amending
Are there active faults in your district?
Yes No
Does your district plan have specific No change required

provisions regarding the use and
development of land on or close to
active faults?
Yes No
Prepare a plan change or variation,

Do these provisions take a risk-based using the risk-based approach to
approach to managing fault hazard No developing provisions that will avoid
risk? or mitigate fault
Yes
No change required
Note: information on the location and type of faults to be found in New Zealand is
contained on the website: http://data.gns.cri.nz/af/index.jsp

11 Taking a Risk-based Approach to Resource
Consent
11.1 Determining consent categories

Determining consent categories for buildings within a fault avoidance zone involves evaluating
the fault recurrence interval, fault complexity, and Building Importance Category alongside the
risk the community is prepared to accept.
Differing types of buildings will be placed into different resource consent activity categories,
based upon the risk. The council needs to be satisfied that the risk isn’t significant, or that
appropriate mitigation measures have been taken, before granting resource consent.
Clearly, as the risk increases, the consent category should become more restrictive, and the
range of matters the council needs to consider will increase. The council needs to set
requirements for the bulk, location and foundations of any structure, so it can impose the
consent conditions that will avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of fault rupture.
Figure 11.1: Scale of risk and relationship to planning provisions

Limited
Permitted Controlled discretionary Discretionary Non-complying
Low High
Planning LEVEL OF RISK
Planning
provisions provisions
become more become more
permissive as restrictive as
overall risk overall risk
decreases increases
A rule may require resource consent for a new building, but with a requirement that a
geotechnical report be included with the application (confirming that the building will be
located at least 20 metres from an area subject to fault rupture, or that necessary engineering
precautions have been taken).
For example:
“For all structures and buildings, an engineering report will be required to
confirm that the Wellington Fault is not within 20.0m of any proposed structure or
building; or that the necessary engineering precautions have been taken”
(Standard 14H 2.1.1.2 to Rule 14H 2.1 of the Hutt Proposed District Plan)
Each council will want to apply the resource consent activity status categories that suits its own
circumstances. The key is to ensure that the council has the ability to address the fault rupture
hazard risk properly when assessing a resource consent application. The matters over which
the council can reserve control or restrict its discretion include:
• the proposed use of the building
• site layout, including building setback and separation distance
• building height and design

• construction type (for resource management purposes)
• financial contributions (for example, reserves contributions).
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 show an example of resource consent activity status for proposed
buildings within a fault hazard avoidance area. The activity status will depend on the Building
Importance Category, the fault recurrence interval, and the fault complexity.
Table 11.1: Resource consent activity status for greenfield sites

Building importance 1 2a 2b 3 4
category
Fault complexity Activity status
Fault recurrence interval class I less than or equal to 2000 years

A – Well defined Permitted Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying Prohibited
B – Distributed Permitted Discretionary Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Discretionary Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying
Fault recurrence interval class II greater than 2000 but less than or equal to 3500 years
A – Well defined Permitted Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying Prohibited
✝
Fault recurrence interval class III greater than 3500 to but less than or equal to 5000 years
A – Well defined Permitted Permitted* Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying
B – Distributed Permitted Permitted Discretionary Discretionary Non-complying
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Permitted Discretionary Discretionary Non-complying
Fault recurrence interval class IV greater than 5000 but less than or equal to 10,000 years
A – Well defined Permitted Permitted* Permitted* Non-complying Non-complying
B – Distributed Permitted Permitted Permitted Discretionary Non-complying
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Permitted Permitted Discretionary Non-complying
Fault recurrence interval class V greater than 10,000 but less than or equal to 20,000 years
A – Well defined Permitted Permitted* Permitted* Permitted* Non-complying
B – Distributed Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted Non-complying
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted Non-complying
Fault recurrence interval class VI greater than 20,000 but less than or equal to 125,000 years
A – Well defined Permitted Permitted* Permitted* Permitted* Permitted*
B – Distributed Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted**
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted**
Note: Faults with a recurrence interval of greater than125,000 years are not considered active.
* The activity status is permitted, but could be controlled or discretionary because the fault location is well defined.
** Although the activity status is permitted, care should be taken in locating BIC 4 structures on or near known active
faults. Controlled or discretionary activity status may be more suitable.
† Where the fault trace is uncertain, specific fault studies may provide more certainty on the location of the fault.
Moving the fault into the distributed or well defined category would allow a reclassification of the activity status and
fewer assessment criteria.
Italics show that the activity status is more flexible. For example, where discretionary is indicated, controlled activity
status may be considered more suitable.

Table 11.2: Resource consent activity status for developed and already subdivided sites
Building importance 1 2a 2b 3 4
category
Fault complexity Activity status
Recurrence interval class I less than or equal to 2000 years

A – Well defined Permitted Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying
✝
Recurrence interval class II greater 2000 but less than or equal to 3500 years
A – Well defined Permitted Permitted* Non-complying Non-complying Non-complying
B – Distributed Permitted Permitted Discretionary Non-complying Non-complying
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Permitted Discretionary Non-complying Non-complying
Recurrence interval class III greater than 3500 but less than or equal to 5000 years
A – Well defined Permitted Permitted* Permitted* Non-complying Non-complying
B – Distributed Permitted Permitted Permitted Discretionary Non-complying
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Permitted Permitted Discretionary Non-complying
Recurrence interval class IV greater than 5000 but less than or equal to 10,000 years
✝
Recurrence interval class V greater than 10,000 but less than or equal to 20,000 years
✝
Fault recurrence interval class VI greater than 20,000 but less than or equal to 125,000 years
A – Well defined Permitted Permitted* Permitted* Permitted* Permitted*
B – Distributed Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted**
✝
C – Uncertain Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted**
Note: Faults with a recurrence interval of greater than 125,000 years are not considered active.
* The activity status is permitted, but could be controlled or discretionary because the fault location is well defined.
** Although the activity status is permitted, care should be taken in locating BIC 4 structures on or near known active
faults. Controlled or discretionary activity status may be more suitable.
† Where the fault trace is Uncertain, specific fault studies may provide more certainty on the location of the fault.
Moving the fault into the Distributed or Well Defined category would allow a reclassification of the activity status and
fewer assessment criteria.
Italics – show that the activity status is more flexible. For example, where discretionary is indicated, controlled activity
status may be considered more suitable.
Note that the (restricted) discretionary category has not been shown in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 but
may be considered more effective than the non-complying activity status as it allows for
targeted assessment criteria to be developed.

11.2 Exercises
Example 1
A developer with a Greenfield site proposes to build a Building Importance Category 2a

structure (a typical New Zealand wood-framed house) within a fault avoidance zone). The fault
through this zone has a Fault Recurrence Interval Class of III (>3500 to ≤5000 years) and the
Fault Complexity is A (well defined).
Q: What type of resource consent would have to be applied for?
A: __________________________________________________1
Example 2
A philanthropist decides to make use of a spare plot of land she owns to build an art gallery to
display local work. The site is located within a densely built-up inner city suburb in a fault
avoidance zone. The proposed art gallery will have a floor area of 700m2 (refer to Table 7.1 to
determine the Building Importance Category). The Fault Recurrence Interval Class is III and
the Fault Complexity is B.
A: __________________________________________________2
Example 3
The philanthropist decides to move the proposed gallery to the country, where she owns
20 hectares of undeveloped rural land. The proposed location is within a fault avoidance zone
where the Fault Recurrence Interval Class is II and the Fault Complexity is C?
A: __________________________________________________3
Example 4
A local health care facility is proposed that will accommodate up 60 elderly patients who will
live at the facility (refer to table xx for the Building Importance Category). The proposed site is
in a rural area that has recently been subdivided into five-acre blocks, and is within a fault
avoidance zone. A well-defined active fault with a 4000-year fault recurrence interval runs
through the site.
A: __________________________________________________4

11.3 Answers
1 Permitted* activity (but a district plan may want to make this activity controlled or
discretionary given that the Fault Complexity is well defined).
2 Permitted. The building is a BIC 2b structure (defined as either a retail building less than
10,000 m2, or a public assembly building less than 1000 m2) to be located where the Fault
Recurrence Interval is >3500 to <5000 (Class III) and the Fault Complexity is distributed
(B).
3 Non-complying activity. The activity is proposed where the Fault Recurrence Interval is
<2000 to >35,000 years (Class II), the Fault Complexity is uncertain (C) and the building
is a BIC 2b structure (defined as either a retail building less than 10,000 m2, or a public
assembly building less than 1000 m2). The activity is classed Non complying as the site
allows for alternative siting of the gallery outside the fault avoidance zone – which would
reduce the risk to life and property.
4 Non-complying activity. The Fault Recurrence Interval Class is III (>3000 to <5000
years), the Fault Complexity is A (well defined) and the building is a BIC 3 (a health care
facility with a capacity of 50 or more residents but does not have surgery or emergency
treatment facilities).
11.4 Assessment criteria

Where there are rules in a district plan limiting development in a Fault Avoidance Zone, the
district plan needs to include assessment criteria that make clear what the council will consider
when assessing resource consents. Matters may include:
• the risk to life, property and the environment posed by the natural hazard
• the likely frequency and magnitude of movement
• the type, scale and distribution of any potential effects from the natural hazard
• the effects of ground shaking and ground displacement caused by earthquakes
• the distance of any proposed structure from the fault (as shown on either the district plan
map, or from a site-specific study locating the fault trace)
• the degree to which the building, structural or design work to be undertaken can avoid or
mitigate the effects of the natural hazard
• the accuracy and reliability of any engineering and geotechnical information (e.g. the
extent to which such a report shows how the risk of building failure following fault
rupture can be reduced to minimise the effects of the fault rupture on the safety of
occupants and neighbours).
If the council has not located the fault trace, and the developer does not wish to locate it, the
developer needs to prove that the building is resilient enough to withstand fault rupture.

11.5 AEE requirements
An applicant lodging a resource consent application to build on or near an active fault is
required by section 88 of the RMA to provide an adequate AEE with any application. The
district plan needs to spell out what is required of the resource consent applicants.
An AEE should:
• consider alternatives
• provide a risk analysis
• identify the hazard
• show mitigation measures.

12 Case Studies – Implementing the Guidelines
In this section we examine how two territorial authorities within the Wellington Region,
Wellington City Council (WCC) and Kapiti Coast District Council (KCDC), have used these
Guidelines when reviewing active fault hazard provisions in their district plans. The case
studies are preceded by an explanation of the unique tectonic setting in the Wellington region to
help explain the fault rupture hazard.
12.1 The Wellington Region’s Tectonic Environment
Both WCC and KCDC sit within the Wellington region; the jurisdiction of Greater Wellington –
The Regional Council. The tectonic environment within the Wellington region is very active
given its location astride the constantly moving Pacific and Australian plates. As a result, a
large number of active faults of varying complexity and recurrence interval classifications are
present within the region (refer Figure 1).

Figure 1: Schematic Representation of Major Faults in the Wellington Region. Adapted from: Begg. J.G
and Van Dissen. R.J. (2000).
The most active fault in the region (i.e., the one with the shortest recurrence interval) is the
Wellington Fault which extends northwards from the Cook Strait (its most southernmost
known location) past the south Wellington shoreline, through Wellington and the Hutt Valley
and through the Tararua Range to the Manawatu River. At this point, the name of the Fault
changes but continues north to the Bay of Plenty coastline.
The Wairarapa Fault, the source of the great 1855 Wairarapa earthquake, extends
northeastward along the base of the eastern flank of the Tararua Ranges. With a recurrence
interval of about 1500 years, it is a Class 1 active fault. Its average slip rate of just under
10mm/year means it is moving faster than the Wellington Fault. Past surface rupturing
earthquakes on the Wairarapa Faults have resulted in up to 10 metres or more of lateral slip at
the fault trace, with regional uplift and tilting east of the Fault.
The Ohariu Fault extends approximately 70km north-northeastward from offshore of the
Wellington south coast, through Porirua to Waikanae (Heron et al. 1998, Begg & Johnston
2000) and probably continues a further 60 km northwards as the Northern Ohariu Fault to just
south of Palmerston North (e.g. Van Dissen et al. 1999, Palmer and Van Dissen. 2002). The
Gibbs Fault is less constrained than the Ohariu and Northern Ohariu faults, but is thought to
branch off the Ohariu Fault near MacKays Crossing and extend 30km north north-east to within
3-4 kms of the Otaki Forks Fault which passes through Kapiti Coast District hill country to the
east for about 10-15 kms. Little is known about the Southeast Reikorangi Fault which most
likely extends from the Gibbs Faults about 20km in the hills east of Kapiti Coast (Van Dissen et
al. 2003).
12.1.1 Fault Rupture in the Region
In the Wellington region, the Wairarapa fault in the only fault that has ruptured in historical
times (during the 1855 Magnitude (M) 8 Wairarapa earthquake). The most known recent
surface fault rupture on the Wellington Fault occurred about 400 years ago (Van Dissen and
Berryman, 1996) and on the Ohariu Fault about 1000 years ago (Litchfield et al. 2004).
It is estimated that the Wellington Fault is capable of generating earthquakes in the order of M
7.5 with a 10 percent probability of it rupturing in the next 50 years. Such a rupture could move
the ground along the fault horizontally by 4-5 metres and vertically by about 1 metre (Froggatt
& Rhodes 1996, Van Dissen & Berryman 1996).
The Ohariu fault is capable of an earthquake about M 7.5 with expected fault rupture of 3-5
metres of right-lateral displacement at the ground surface with lesser and more variable vertical
displacement. (Heron et al. 1998). The Northern Ohariu Fault, Gibbs Fault and Otaki Forks
Fault are all capable of generating earthquakes M7+ and metre-scale surface rupture
displacements ((Litchfield et al. 2004, Van Dissen et al, 2003).
The region’s most active faults (Wellington, Wairarapa and Ohariu) all have varying fault
complexity at stages along the fault meaning that while parts of these faults are well-defined,
other parts are distributed or the location is uncertain. Finding the fault location can be difficult
in some areas due to two key reasons: fault traces have been removed by natural processes
(landslide, weather, and coastal); and/or the intensity of urban development has obscured the
fault trace.

12.2 The Wellington City Council
Wellington City Council’s District Plan Change 22 amended the Hazard (Fault Line) Area for
the Wellington Fault on district plan maps, and amended a number of district plan provisions
relating to the fault hazard.
12.2.1 Background
In 2001, the Wellington Emergency Management Office (WEMO) engaged the Institute of
Geological & Nuclear Sciences (GNS) to assess the impact on property from an earthquake
along the Wellington fault. The work by GNS uncovered the fact that the Wellington City
district plan maps depicting the Wellington Fault did not reflect GNS’s understanding of the
fault location.
The district plan team engaged GNS to undertake a Wellington Fault location review to provide
up-to-date information on the location of the urban section of the Wellington Fault from Aotea
Quay to the lower Karori Reservoir to include the Port, Railways Yards and the parts of the
suburbs Thorndon, Northland, Kelburn and Karori. WCC decided to concentrate the fault
location investigation solely on the Wellington Fault (although they were also aware of the
other active faults in the district these were not considered as high risk as the Wellington Fault).
The findings of the GNS report highlighted inaccuracies in the existing Hazard (Fault Line)
Area as shown on district plan maps and as a result identified two new updated fault hazard
zones:
1. Likely fault rupture hazard zone: The area containing the likely position of the
Wellington Fault, and the zone within which the fault is likely to rupture (but not across its
entire width). The width of the zone varies from approximately 10 to 50 metres.
2. Recommended fault rupture hazard zone: The width of this zone ranges from 50 to 90
metres as it includes the recommended (as per the Guidelines) 20 metre buffer zone either
side of the likely fault rupture hazard zone. In its report, GNS recommended that this
recommended fault rupture hazard zone be used for district planning purposes as it
accommodates uncertainties in the location and width of the likely fault rupture hazard
zone.
12.2.2 Properties Affected
The Wellington Fault location review identified 665 properties within the new recommended
fault rupture hazard zone (some properties straddle both the likely fault rupture zone and the
recommended fault rupture hazard zone or buffer zone). Of these 665 properties, there were
244 more properties than currently identified on the planning maps. Approximately 35
properties were removed from the fault rupture hazard zone.
12.2.3 Justification for Plan Change
In light of the new information from the Wellington Fault location review, the WCC decided to
look at whether a district plan change was justified to reflect the findings.
In addition to learning that the planning maps depicted the Wellington Fault in the wrong
location, the district plan team recognised that the current district plan fault hazard zone
provisions were not proving effective. A review of the existing plan provisions (which has been
developed as part of the district plan review in 1999) showed that they were not achieving their
intention (e.g. multiple unit developments had been approved and built in areas identified in the

district plan as active fault zones). Although the district plan policies reflected the intention to
limit development in these areas, the rules were not explicit enough and the planning team
decided they were in need of updating.
Clearer information requirements for developers were also needed and planners needed to have
better assessment criteria to use when assessing resource consent applications for development
in the fault rupture hazard zone.
12.2.4 Public Information Process
Prior to initiating Plan Change 22, the WCC undertook an extensive public consultation
campaign to clearly communicate the findings of the Wellington Fault location review.
Affected property owners and occupiers were targeted to gauge initial responses. Less than two
weeks after receiving the final GNS report WCC undertook the following:
letters were sent to over 700 property owners affected by the fault rupture hazard zones
an information centre was established on Tinakori Road (i.e. close to the affected
properties)
a public meeting was held.
Over 70 people dropped into the information centre during its three days of opening, and about
65 people attended the public meeting. The GNS scientists who worked on the Wellington
Fault location review attended the public meeting along with WCC staff. GNS’s role was to
explain the science behind the hazard zones, and WCC staff outlined the plan change process.
A facilitator was used to help manage the questions that followed the main presentations.
Key issues raised by the public at the information centre and public meeting related to:
• the 20m buffer zone and whether there was scope to change this
• the nature of information included on Land Information Memorandums
• requests that no new significant buildings be built in the fault hazard area, whereas others
were concerned about the level of existing regulation in the Plan.
• the impact on house values, insurance premiums and council rates
• expectations about compensation where the fault hazard zone now covered a property
• whether or not property owners were now required to strengthen their homes.

Figure 2 Newspaper article showing the line of the newly mapped Wellington Fault (looking south). The
photo does not show the Fault Rupture Hazard Zone with the buffer. The article reflects effective
communication between the WCC and the Dominion Post which has reported positively and discussed
key issues such as building restrictions, valuations, public consultation and insurance.
Source: Dominion Post, Wellington, 5 April 2003
12.2.5 The Plan Change
A number of options were considered when recommending the final Plan Change 22 which
included “do nothing” and reducing the buffer zone around the likely fault rupture hazard zone.
The final recommendations included:
• Amend the existing planning maps to re-align the Hazard (Fault Line) Area to reflect the
GNS recommendations which suggested a 20 metre buffer area either side of the likely fault
rupture hazard zone
• Delete reference to NZS4203:1992 and replace with definitions of ‘light roof’ and ‘light
wall cladding’ (from NZS 3604:19999 (Timber Framed Buildings)
• Allow for only one residential unit as a Permitted Activity in the Hazard (Fault Line) Area

• Provide for multi-unit developments to be assessed as a Discretionary (Unrestricted)
Activity (this would have the effect of allowing appropriate assessment criteria to be
developed for use by resource consent planners unlike a Non-Complying Activity status).
• Amend the explanation of the hazard policies to include specific reference to earthquake
hazards, and that the damage caused by such hazards can be reduced with mitigation
measures.
• Provide assessment criteria to give planners more scope when determining the effects to a
specific site from fault rupture including the opportunity to obtain geotechnical and
engineering information.
• Provide for geotechnical reports and engineering design reports to be supplied as part of any
resource consent in the hazard area.
• Changes to other associated rules in the plan.
12.2.6 Issues raised by submitters
Following notification, Plan Change 22 received eleven submissions and four further
submissions, with the majority of the submitters opposing aspects of the Plan Change or seeking
amendments. Issues raised by submitters included:
a) The width of the 20m buffer zone.

b) Whether a whole property was affected by the hazard zone rules, or only land within the
Hazard (Fault Line) Area.
c) The requirement to provide geotechnical and engineering design reports with any resource
consent in the Hazard (Fault Line) Area
d) The proposed change to reduce the number of permitted residential units to one per site
e) The impact of this information on property values, insurance premiums and compensation
Of these, the first two points were considered the most significant but all are discussed below:
a) The width of the 20m buffer zone
Both the Guidelines and the GNS report recommend a minimum 20 metre buffer zone. Public
concerns were mostly related to this additional 20 metre zone rather than the narrower likely
fault rupture hazard zone - suggesting that residents accepted the risk of living on the fault.
Those residents not within the likely fault rupture hazard zone however, questioned the
necessity of their inclusion within the buffer zone.
It was decided, that if a smaller buffer zone (i.e. less than 20 metres) was put in place it would
not resolve the fundamental problem that there would always be some properties just within the
zone that would argue to be taken out of the zone. WCC acknowledged that the science of
accurately locating fault rupture areas will continue to improve new technology, and better
understanding of the hazard itself. If relevant information became known as site specific
geotechnical investigations were carried out this may allow WCC to narrow the fault rupture
hazard zone even further.
b) Whether a whole property was affected by the hazard zone rules, or only land within
the Hazard (Fault Line) Area.

As with any type of zoning that does not strictly adhere to property boundaries, issues arose
over interpretation of properties that i) had a boundary aligned with a line of the hazard zone, ii)
were partially within the hazard zone, iii) had a right of way or similar within the fault rupture
hazard zone (Figure 3):
HZ HZ HZ Right Of Way
(i) (ii) (iii)
Line on planning map showing boundary of hazard zone
Property boundary
Figure 3 Interpreting fault rupture hazard zone lines
The WCC was required to make decisions on these situations in relation to whether or not the
hazard information would be included in a LIM report; however the interpretations could easily
apply to resource consent decisions. In scenario (i) planning staff assessed this property as
being out of the hazard zone. In scenario (ii) the hazard information had to be included in a
LIM, but the rules in the plan only apply to that portion of the land covered by the hazard area.
Likewise with scenario (iii), the information had to be included in a LIM, but an extra note was
included on that LIM explaining it was only the ROW affected by the hazard area and not the
building itself.
Notes were put on property files for those properties where interpretation of the fault rupture
hazard zone lines was unclear (as in the scenarios above) to provide clarity for property owners
and planners assessing development proposals. In most cases, the planner will be able to
interpret whether or not a property is in the hazard zone from the planning maps.
c) Requirement to provide geotechnical & engineering reports
The requirement for geotechnical and engineering reports as part of a resource consent
application was objected to by a utility company on the grounds that such structures were
designed to withstand ground-shaking events, that the structures are small in comparison to
other structures (such as houses) and the potential environmental impacts are minor.
The requirement for geotechnical and engineering reports were part of Plan Change 22 as they
allow for ground conditions (which can vary from site to site) to be assessed and also provide
WCC with information about how a fault rupture event may affect a certain development. It
was agreed that as the focus of the rules was on structures where people live, work and play and
therefore no need for utility structures to be subject to the requirement to provide geotechnical
and engineering reports.
d) Limiting residential units to one per site

Although the district plan already permitted only one residential unit per site in most of the area
covered by the hazard zone (i.e. Thorndon), other areas of Wellington that were currently
permitted two units per site, were affected by a rule in the Plan Change.
The rule does not prevent landowners from building more than one dwelling on a site but
outlines what is permitted as of right without requiring resource consent. The assessment
criteria, geotechnical and engineering requirements, developed as part of Plan Change 22, will
allow WCC the opportunity to gather the information needed to assess any proposals in the
hazard area that require a resource consent.
e) Property values, Insurance Premiums and Compensation
While some property owners accepted the hazard risk by living in the area, others were
concerned about the impact of a hazard zone on property values and insurance premiums.
Although difficult to accurately confirm, there has been no evidence to suggest that the fault
hazard zone has affected property prices in the past; similarly insurance premiums have not
reflected any increase due to the risk identified in the fault rupture hazard zone. Even if it had
been proven that property values decreased as a direct result of the fault hazard zone, WCC had
not prohibited any development along the fault allowing people to still make reasonable use of
their land. No compensation would be required.
12.2.7 Council hearing and decision-making process
The hearing for Plan Change 22 was held in February 2004 and attended by three submitters.
The hearing was notable for the level of detail that the Hearings Committee went into in order to
establish the appropriateness of the hazard zone in areas that were contested by submitters. One
submitter bought along their own geotechnical advisor, which helped to raise the level of the
debate about the accuracy of the hazard zones. The Committee found itself in a position of
weighing the evidence from its District Planning Team geotechnical advisors against the expert
bought in by the submitter. As a consequence of this debate between the experts, the
Committee decided that there was enough evidence to narrow the fault rupture hazard area at
two specific locations as argued by the submitter’s expert. The Committee considered that it
was ultimately better to narrow the fault rupture hazard area based on good quality
information, rather than to reduce the 20m buffer area to appease submitters. Upon reflection,
these changes were agreeable to GNS also, and consequently the hazard zones were revised for
the decision.
Some changes were made to clarify some of the rules.
In June 2004, Plan Change 22 has received no appeals at the close of the appeal period.
Plan Change 22 resulted in planning map inaccuracies being fixed with properties that were no
longer within the fault rupture hazard zone removed from the zone and no longer be subject to
the rules for the Hazard (Fault Line) Area. Similarly, properties not currently within the fault
rupture hazard area, but included in the fault rupture hazard zone recommended by GNS
became subject to the Hazard (Fault Line) Area rules.
12.2.8 Key lessons
• Once WCC had the findings of the GNS report they acted quickly by initiating an
extensive public consultation campaign that included the information centre, a public

meeting and media liaison. A lot of questions the public had related to science and
geotechnical issues which were able to be answered by the GNS staff who attended the
meeting, and who had written the Wellington Fault location review report. As a result, very
few written submissions were received on the proposed Plan Change 22. Of those that
were received, they were all very focused and did not generally cover issues that could not
be resolved in the plan change process. WCC considered that because of their well
executed public campaign the submissions received were far more manageable than
anticipated.
• The information requirements, developed as part of the plan change for inclusion within
the district plan, needed to be explained clearly for both the planner (to request the right
information) and the developer (to provide the right information). The cost of these
requirements needed to be considered and should be met by the developer.
• If a council requires geotechnical and engineering information then it is important to

have staff who can explain what is needed and interpret the information when it is received.
The WCC now have a geotechnical staff member.
• It is important for assessment criteria to be very clear as it gives the consent planner a
good basis when assessing an application and reasoning to refuse consent if necessary.

12.3 The Kapiti Coast District Council
The Kapiti Coast District is the fastest growing area in the Wellington Region (approximately
2% population increase per year) and is traversed by five known active faults – Ohariu,
Northern Ohairu, Gibbs, Otaki Forks and South East Reikorangi. The Ohairu and Northern
Ohariu faults are two of the more significant earthquake generating faults in the Wellington
Region, and they both pass through areas of urban, semi-urban and rural development.
Following a comprehensive review of all the known fault traces in the district, the Kapiti Coast
District Council (KCDC) is now in the process of reviewing and updating its district plan
provisions for the development and subdivision of land on or close to active faults.
Plan Change 64 (Fault traces), while not yet complete, will seek to update the GIS and District
Plan maps by more accurately depicting the locations of faults traces, as well as amending the
supporting package of objectives, policies, rules and standards in the district plan.
12.3.1 Background
In November 2000, KCDC notified a Proposed Plan Change that sought better planning and
management of development on or close to the active faults in the district. The plan change
however, was withdrawn after submissions highlighted that further research was needed to more
accurately define the fault trace locations in the district.
In 2003 KCDC, along with Greater Wellington – the Regional Council, commissioned GNS to
carry out a comprehensive study of the known active fault traces in Kapiti.
Although KCDC already had some data regarding the location and type of fault generated
features for some parts of the district, the information had been gathered in a piecemeal and site
specific manner, and was basically confined to small sections of the Ohariu and Gibbs faults
only. In addition, the accuracy of the information was in some cases limited to +/- 100 metres.
A fault trace study was therefore necessary to improve the existing information held by KCDC
and improve the detail and accuracy of fault trace locations on the district plan maps.
12.3.2 Current planning for fault rupture
The Kapiti Coast District Plan currently contains provisions in the rural and residential zones
restricting the construction of buildings within 20 metres of an earthquake fault trace shown on
district plan maps. Any building proposal falling within 20 metres of a fault trace requires
Controlled Activity resource consent and conditions are usually applied to ensure appropriate
engineering requirements are included in the building design in order to avoid, remedy or
mitigate any adverse effects resulting from ground rupture.
12.3.3. Findings
The GNS report presented a comprehensive study of all known active fault traces in Kapiti. The
locations were mapped into GIS to allow for incorporation into the Council’s GIS system and
onto the district plan planning maps. The findings were presented in a way compatible with the
process set out in the Guidelines.

GNS established Fault Avoidance Zones (this is the same as the terminology in the Guidelines,
whereas WCC used the term fault rupture hazard zone) based on fault locations and complexity
(well defined, distributed, and uncertain). A Fault Avoidance Zone includes the fault rupture
hazard zone, and the buffer zone.
Due to the particular fault trace complexities in Kapiti, GNS found it necessary to expand upon
these categories to include:
• Well defined– fault rupture is well defined and of limited geographic width
• Well defined – extended – a well defined fault had either been buried or eroded over short
distances but its position is tightly constrained
• Distributed – fault rupture can be constrained to lie within a relatively board geographic
width (tens to hundreds of metres) typically as multiple fault traces and/or folds.
• Uncertain – constrained - areas where the location of the fault rupture is uncertain because
evidence has been eroded or buried but where the location can be constrained to within a
reasonable geographic extent (e.g. < to 300 metres)
• Uncertain – poorly constrained where the fault trace was uncertain to be within 300 metres
usually because deformation has been buried or eroded or the fault features are widely
spaced and/or very broad.
Fault Avoidance Zones are defined along all the faults based on the rupture complexity of the
particular fault, and the precision to which its location can be constrained. The Fault Avoidance
Zones identified range in width from about 40m (well defined) to greater than 300m (uncertain-
poorly constrained).
The GNS report also provided examples of resource consent activity classes appropriate to
different Fault Avoidance Zones based on the fault recurrence interval, fault complexity and
building importance category. This approach is consistent with the Guidelines and was
included in order to provide assistance in drafting the district plan rules relating to fault traces.

Figure 4 The Ohariu Fault (northern end) showing Fault Avoidance Zone. An example of the complex
nature of faulting in the Kapiti district. Van Dissen. R., and Heron. D (2003).
12.3.4 Public consultation
As soon as KCDC received the GNS report and considered its findings, planning staff set about
putting into action a public consultation process that would advise landowners affected by the
report findings and seek feedback to assist the council with preparing a plan change.
Letters were sent to all landowners in September 2003, along with an Information Sheet
summarising the fault trace study results and the implications. A large number of responses
were received, including 32 written comments, which raised a raft of concerns including:
• The effect of the new information on property value, insurance premiums and insurance
policy coverage
• The nature and extent of fault trace information included on Land Information
Memorandums
• Expectations for compensation where the fault trace hazard now covers a property, as well
as a reduction in council rates
• Concerns regarding existing houses built on or very close to a fault – what can landowners
do to reduce risk and damage? Should owners be strengthening their homes?
• Greenfield areas should not be treated any differently to areas that are already developed
• The approach proposed is overly conservative and risk adverse, especially in areas where
risk is uncertain (i.e. uncertain-unconstrained areas)
• The building importance categories identified are defective (no provision for 2-3 story
timber framed houses within scope of NZS 3604)
• Concerns regarding the accuracy of information – How was it gathered? How accurate is it?
Why did KCDC not already have accurate information for the whole of the district?
12.3.5 Towards a Plan Change
KCDC is currently dealing with the concerns raised by submitters and deciding on the scope
and content of Plan Change 64. District plan maps will be updated with the new fault trace
information supplied by GNS and amendments made to the supporting objectives, policies,
rules and standards in the district plan, for example:
• Amending the relevant objectives and policies within the Natural Hazards chapter to include
specific reference to earthquake fault trace hazards
• Including the opportunity within the rules and standards to obtain geotechnical and
engineering information as part of any resource consent within a Fault Avoidance Zone
• Amending other relevant rules and standards in the plan.
The plan change will reflect the GNS report findings and the approach set out in the Guidelines,
but will be adapted to the Kapiti Coast situation, and to the District Plan structure. The
comments already received from landowners will also be taken into account in the drafting of
new provisions.
The complexity of the nature of faults in Kapiti raises issues in terms of the provisions to be
included in the District Plan. The challenge includes drafting provisions which cover:
• five different faults, all with slightly different faulting characteristics

• five different Fault Avoidance Zones reflecting different levels of certainty
• greenfield vs already developed land
• the different types of structure/building that could be erected (temporary structures, single
or multiple-storied timber dwellings, through to more significant structures and buildings)
• and because of these differences, the potential for several different categories of resource
consent.
The emphasis is on making the district plan provisions, particularly the rules and standards, as
straightforward as possible to aid understanding by landowners, developers and decision
makers.
In order to facilitate robust decision-making whilst the plan change is being developed, and to
ensure the Council meets its obligations in terms of providing the most up-to-date information
available, the GIS layer supplied by GNS as part of the study has been incorporated into the
Council’s GIS system.

13 Acknowledgements
The development of these guidelines was made possible with funding by provided by:
• Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences
• Ministry for the Environment
• New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering
• Earthquake Commission.
The principal authors are:

• Janine Kerr, Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences
• Simon Nathan, Geological Society of New Zealand
• Russ Van Dissen, Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences
• Peter Webb, Ministry for the Environment
• David Brunsdon, New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineering
• Andrew King, BRANZ (now at Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences).
Numerous people in addition to the above authors have provided valuable time, assistance and
contributions to this report including: Dick Beetham (GNS), Robyn Fisher (Hutt City Council),
Andrew Guerin (Kapiti Coast District Council), Wayne Hastie (Wellington Regional Council),
Brett McKay (Wellington City Council), Graeme McVerry (GNS), Bruce Shephard (Earthquake
Commission), Sue Southy (Masterton District Council), Mark Stirling (GNS), Peter R Wood
(GNS). The report was peer reviewed by Mark Ashby, Connell Wagner Limited, Wellington
and Jane Forsyth (GNS).

14 Further Reading
Begg, J.G., and Van Dissen. R. J. 2000. Documentation of multiple post-glacial ruptures on the
Akatarawa Fault, Wellington Region, New Zealand, p.5. Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences.
Begg, J.G., and Johnston, M.R. (compliers). 2000. Geology of the Wellington area. Institute of
Geological & Nuclear Sciences 1:250,000 geological map 10. 1 sheet + 64 p. Lower Hutt, Institute of
Geological & Nuclear Sciences.
Berke PR. 1994. Evaluating environmental plan quality: The case of planning for sustainable
development in New Zealand. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 37(2):
155–69.
Berke PR, Crawford JL, Dixon JE, et al. 1999. Do co-operative planning mandates produce good plans?
Empirical results from the New Zealand experience. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design
26: 643–64.
Berke PR, Crawford JL, Dixon JE, et al. 2000. Plan quality in district councils. Planning Quarterly
September: 17–19.
Berke PR, Dixon JE, Ericksen N. 1997. Coercive intergovernmental mandates: a comparative analysis of
Florida and New Zealand environmental plans. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 24:
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Appendix 1: AS/NZ 4360:1999
Figure A1.1: Stylised risk management process (after AS/NZS 4360:1999)
ESTABLISH THE CONTEXT
* The strategic Context

* The organsational Context
* The Risk Management Context
Develop Criteria Set the structure

C
O
M IDENTIFY RISKS
M
* What can happen?
U * How can it happen? M
N O
N
I I
C ANALYSE RISKS T
A O
R
T Determine existing controls
A
I S
O Determine Determine A
S Likelihood Consequences N
N E
D
S
S
&
Estimate Level of risk R
R
E
I
C S
V
I
O K
E
N S
EVALUATE RISKS W
S
U * compare against criteria?
* set risk priorities?
L
T
A YES
T ACCEPT
I NO
O
N TREAT RISKS
Evaluate treatment option:
* Select treatment methods
* Prepare treatment plans
* Implement plan

Appendix 2: Maps of Active Faults
The following maps show New Zealand’s active faults within current territorial authority
boundaries. Note: the purpose of these maps is to raise awareness of active faults and should be
used for indicative purposes only.

Appendix 3: Classification of Faults
This table provides an interim classification of most of New Zealand’s on-land active faults,
based on fault recurrence interval.
Fault-avoidance Fault name* Affected regional Confidence of Method of

#
recurrence councils** classification recurrence interval
##
interval class estimation
Alfredton Wgtn, M-W M 1, 2, 3

Alpine S, WC, Tas H 1, 2, 3
Amberley C M 2, 3
Aorangi–Ngapotiki Wgtn M 3
Aratiatia W M 3
Awatere WC, C, M H 1, 2, 3
Braemar BP L 4
Clarence WC, C, M H 1, 2, 3
Dreyers Rock Wgtn, M-W L 4
Edgecumbe BP H 1, 3
Fyffe C L 4
Hanmer C L 3, 4
Highlands W, BP M 3
Hope WC, C H 1, 2, 3
Jordan Thrust C M 1, 4
Kaiapo W M 3
Kakapo C H 3
Karioi M-W M 3, 4
Kekerengu C H 3
Kelly C L 4
Kowhia C L 4
Lake Ohakuri W L 4
Maleme (including Rehi fault) W H 3
Matata BP M 1, 4
Mohaka M-W, HB M 1, 3
Mt Grey C M 1, 4
≤ 2000 years
National Park M-W L 4
(RI Class I)
Ngangiho W M 3
Ohakune M-W M 1, 2, 3
Orakeikorako W L 4
Paeroa W, BP H 1, 2, 3
Patoka HB L 4
Porters Pass C M 1, 2, 3
Poutu W M l, 3, 4
Puketerata W L 4
Rangiora HB H 1, 2
Rangipo M-W, W M 1, 2, 3
Raurimu M-W M 3
Rotoitipakau BP H 1
Shawcroft Road M-W L 3, 4
Snowgrass M-W L 1, 4
Tumunui W, BP L 4
Waihi M-W, W M 3, 4
Waipukaka M-W M 1
Wairarapa Wgtn, M-W H 1, 2, 3
Wairau Tas, M M 1, 2, 3
Wellington Wgtn, M-W H 1, 2, 3
West Whangamata W L 4
Whakaipo W M 3
Whakatane (south) BP L 3, 4
Whangamata W M 3
Wharekauhau W L 4
Whirinaki W M 3

#
##
Akatore O M 1, 3
Ashley–Cust C L 1, 4
Awaiti BP L 4
Barber W L 3
Carterton Wgtn M 3
Cross Creek Wgtn L 4
Elliott C, M M 3, 4
Fidget C L 4
Fowlers C L 3, 4
Fox’s Peak C L 3
Hihitahi M-W L 4
Irishman’s Creek C M 1, 3
Kerepehi W H 1, 2, 3
Lake Heron C M 3
Little Rough Ridge O L 4
Long Valley O M 3
Makuri M-W L 4
Masterton Wgtn L 3, 4
Mokonui Wgtn L 3, 4
Mt Hutt – Mt Peel C L 3
Northern Ohariu Wgtn, M-W L 2, 3, 4
Ngapouri M-W, BP M 3
> 2000 years
Oaonui T M 1
to
Ohariu Wgtn L 1, 2, 3
≤ 3500 years
(RI Class II) Omeheu BP L 4
Onepu BP M 1, 4
Orakonui W M 3
Ostler C M 1, 2
Otakiri BP L 4
Pa Valley M-W L 4
Raetihi M-W L 4
Raggedy Range O L 4
Ranfurly O L 4
Rotohauhau W, BP M 1, 3
Ruahine M-W, HB L 3, 4
Saunders Road M-W L 4
Silver Range HB L 4
Te Teko BP L 4
Te Weta W M 3
Thorpe-Poplar W M 3
Torlesse C L 4
Vernon M L 3, 4
Waikaremoana HB, BP L 4
Waimana BP M 3
Waiohau BP M 1, 3
Waipiata O L 4
Weber M-W L 4

#
##
Akatarawa Wgtn L 3, 4
Blue Lake O L 3
Cheeseman C L 4
Dry River Wgtn M 3, 4
Gibbs Wgtn L 4
Glendevon HB L 4
Hossack Road W L 1, 3
Huangarua Wgtn M 1, 3
Hundalee C L 4
Inglewood T M 1
Kaiwara C L 4
Kaweka HB L 4
Kidnappers (east) HB M 3
Kidnappers (west) HB M 3
Lees Valley C M 1, 4
Lindis Pass C, O L 4
London Hill M L 4
> 3500 years
Martinborough Wgtn M 3
to
Maunga M-W L 4
≤ 5000 years
(RI Class III) Moumahaki T L 3
Mt Thomas C L 4
Ngakuru W M 1, 3
Norfolk T L 4
North Rough Ridge O L 4
Omihi C L 4
Oruawharo HB, M-W L 4
Otaraia Wgtn L 3, 4
Poulter C, WC L 4
Pukerua Wgtn L 3, 4
Raukumara (many different faults) G L 4?
Ruataniwha HB L 4
Shepherds Gully Wgtn L 2, 3
Tukituki HB L 3
Waimea–Flaxmere N, Tas L 4?
Waipukurau–Poukawa HB M 1, 3
Waitawhiti M-W L 4
Whakatane (north) BP L 1, 4

#
##
Awahokomo C L 4
Bidwill Wgtn L 3, 4
Big River WC L 4
Blackball WC L 4
Cardrona O M 1, 3
Dalgety C L 4
Dunstan O M 1, 2, 3
Esk C L 4
Fern Gully C M 1, 2, 3
Fernside G L 3, 4
Giles Creek WC L 4
Hog Swamp M L 4
Horohoro W, BP H 1, 3
Hyde O L 4
> 5000 years Kirkliston C L 1, 3
to Lowry Peak C L 4
≤ 10,000 years Mangaoranga Wgtn, M-W L 4
(RI Class IV) Mangatete W M 3
Moonlight S, O L 4
Nevis O M 1, 3, 4
Nukumaru T L 3
Paparoa Range WC L 3, 4
Poukawa (north) HB M 1
Punaruku W, BP M 1, 3
Quartz Creek C L 4
Rostreivor C L 4
Rotokohu WC L 4
Rough Creek WC L 4
Southland (several different faults) S L 4?
Springbank C L 4
Waitotara T L 3
West Culverden C L 4
* Faults are listed alphabetically within each fault-avoidance recurrence interval class.
** Regional councils: BP, Bay of Plenty; C, Canterbury; G, Gisborne; HB, Hawke’s Bay: M, Marlborough; M-W,
Manawatu-Wanganui; N, Nelson; O, Otago; T, Taranaki; Tas, Tasman; S, Southland; W, Waikato; WC, West Coast;
Wgtn, Wellington.
#
Relative confidence that the fault can be assigned to a specific fault-avoidance recurrence interval class.
H High – fault has a well constrained recurrence interval (usually based on fault-specific data) that is well within a
specific fault-avoidance class, or fault has such a high slip rate that it can be confidently placed within the ≤ 2000
year fault-avoidance class.
M Medium – uncertainty in average recurrence interval embraces a significant portion (> ∼25%) of two fault-avoidance
classes; the mean of the uncertainty range typically determines into which class the fault is placed.
L Low – uncertainty in recurrence interval embraces a significant portion of three or more fault-avoidance classes, or
there are no fault-specific data (i.e. fault-avoidance recurrence interval class is assigned based only on subjective
comparison with other faults).
##
Method by which recurrence interval was determined/constrained.
1 Fault-specific sequence of dated surface ruptures. The longer the sequence of dated surface ruptures, the more
preference we give this method with respect to constraining average recurrence interval, and assigning fault-
avoidance recurrence interval class.
2 Fault-specific slip rate and single-event displacement, and the use of Equation 1. The better the constraints on slip
rate and single-event displacement, the more preference we give this method with respect to constraining average
recurrence interval.
3 Indicative determination of recurrence interval based on fault-specific slip rate constraints, rupture length estimates,
and Figures 1 and 2; however, well constrained recurrence interval estimates based on methods 1 and 2 above,
take precedence over this method.
4 Based on comparisons with other, similar, faults.

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Planning for Development of Land on

or Close to Active Faults

A guideline to assist resource management

Report prepared for the Ministry for the Environment by

Institute of Geological & Nuclear Sciences client report 2002/124

2 Principles for Planning Approaches 3

3 Understanding Earthquakes and Active Faults 5

4 Taking a Risk-based Approach 8

5 Mapping Active Faults 10

6 Fault Avoidance Zones 12

7 Fault Recurrence Interval 13

9 Building Importance Category 20

10 Planning for Fault Rupture Hazard 23

Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults iii

11 Taking a Risk-based Approach to Resource Consent 35

12 Case Studies – Implementing the Guidelines 41

Appendix 1: AS/NZ 4360:1999 59

Appendix 2: Maps of Active Faults 60

Appendix 3: Classification of Faults 64

iv Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

1.1 Why we developed the guidelines

Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults 1

1.2 Summary of the contents

The main elements of the risk-based approach are:

2 Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

2.1 Principle 1: Gather accurate active fault hazard

2.2 Principle 2: Plan to avoid fault rupture hazard before

2.3 Principle 3: Take a risk-based approach in areas already

Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults 3

4 Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

Figure 3.1: Relationship between faults and earthquakes

The point at which a fault plane starts to

Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults 5

Figure 3.2: Examples of fault displacement

b) White Creek Fault – The 1929

a) Edgecumbe Fault – The 1987 Edgecumbe

c) Hope Fault – The 1888

6 Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

Year Event Approximate maximum Sense of displacement Photo in text

1848 Awatere Fault, Marlborough 7 Strike slip Fig 5.5(c)

Figure 3.3: Active faults map of New Zealand

Active fault: average recurrence

Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults 7

4.1 Using a risk management standard

4.2 Summary of the steps

8 Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

Is a fault avoidance zone in a greenfield site?

What is the proposed use of the site?

Are we achieving our outcomes?

Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults 9

5.1 The importance of mapping

5.2 Required scale of fault maps

Figure 5.1: Example of fault mapping

1: 250,000 scale 1: 50,000 scale

10 Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults

1: 250,000 publication scale

1: 50,000 compilation scale

If a 1: 250,000 scale map is enlarged to this degree

On the 1: 10,000 scale map, the pink area