1|Page

the case on several grounds one of which is that there

CASE DIGESTS
was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the PCGG has the authority to
(Atty. Rene Gorospe) investigate Ramas and Dimaano
Compiled by JP ROMERO
2. Whether or not the properties and other

A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND belongings confiscated in Dimaano’s house were

illegally seized which will consequently make it
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
inadmissible

HELD: The petition was dismissed. Even in the absence of

A.1 PRELIMINARY MATTERS a Constitution, the right against unlawful seizure can be
found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
MAJOR -GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND Nevertheless, even during the interregnum, the Filipino
ELIZABETH DIMAANO 407 SCRA 10 July 21, 2003 people under the Covenant and Declaration continued to
enjoy almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of
Petitioner: RP Respondent: Sandiganbayan, et al.
the 1973 Constitution. As stated in Article 2(1) of the
Ponente: J. Carpio Nature of Action: Petition for review
Convenant, the State is required “to respect and to
on certiorari
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
FACTS: The PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Government) created an AFP Anti-Graft Board tasked to Covenant.” Further, under Article 17(1) of the Covenant,
scrutinize the reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that
practices by any AFP personnel (active or retired). The “[n]o one else shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful
AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged “ill- interference with his privacy, family, home or
gotten” wealth of respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas. correspondence.” The Declaration also provides in its
Along with this, the Constabulary raiding team served a Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
search and seizure warrant on the premises of Ramas’ his property.” The Court has taken into consideration the
alleged mistress, Elizabeth Dimaano. The Board then Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
concluded that Ramas be prosecuted for violating the international law and binding on the State. Hence, the
“Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)” and revolutionary government was also obligated under
“Forfeiture of unlawfully Acquired Property (RA 1379)”. international law to observe the rights of individuals
Thereafter, they filed a petition for forfeiture against him under the Declaration, because it didn’t repudiated either
before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum
2|Page

Footnotes: jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present

Covenant.”
(1) REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT

PRACTICES ACT) Section 1. Statement of policy. It is the (5) Art. 17(1) of the Declaration –“ to respect and to

policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress its jurisdiction the right recognized in the present
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike Covenant.”.
which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
2. Manila Prince Hotel vs Government Service Insurance
lead thereto.
System –
(2) REPUBLIC ACT No. 1379 (AN ACT DECLARING

FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY November 10, 2010

FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY 267 SCRA 408 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING Supremacy of the Constitution – Filipino First Policy
FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFORE.) Section 1. Self-Executing Provisions of the Constitution – Par. 2, Sec.
Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public 10, Art. XII
officer or employee" means any person holding any
FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the
public office or employment by virtue of an appointment,
government, the Government Service Insurance System
election or contract, and any person holding any office or
(GSIS) decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel
employment, by appointment or contract, in any State
Corporation. Two bidders participated, Manila Prince
owned or controlled corporation or enterprise.
Hotel (MPH) and the Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad (RB).
(3) E.O. # 14 Sec. 3. The civil suits to recover unlawfully MPH’s bid was at P41.58/per share while RB’s bid was at
acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was
restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be
consequential and other damages or any other civil declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RB’s bid
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed and invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined under par.
with the Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate family, Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of
close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business the economic and planning agency, when the national
associates, dummies, agents and nominees, may proceed interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or
independently of any criminal proceedings and may be to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
proved by a preponderance of evidence (4) Art. 2(1) of of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher
the Covenant – “to respect and to ensure to all percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
individuals within its territory and subject to its investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will
3|Page

encourage the formation and operation of enterprises Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self

whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. executing. The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions written in every statute and contract.
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in

its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,

accordance with its national goals and priorities. as the Constitution could have very well used the term
natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
But GSIS refused to accept said offer. In turn MPH filed a Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences
petition for TRO against GSIS to avoid the and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our

perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. TRO was lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also
granted. the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for
more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore

RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and

among others that: frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with

public interest; its own historicity associated with our

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution needs an struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.

implementing law because it is merely a statement of

principle and policy (not self-executing); Even if said Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos
passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations
under national patrimony. as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term
“qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall be
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the given to those citizens who can make a viable

highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit contribution to the common good, because of credible
buyer of shares. competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT

mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would
Policy. be counter productive and inimical to the common good.
4|Page

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and City Of Manila Office allowing it to build a 49 Storey with

concessions, when a choice has to be made between a Basement & 2 penthouse Level Residential
“qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter Conduminium.

shall be chosen over the former.”

However the City Council of Manila issued Resolution No.

3. Knights of Rizal vs. DMCI et al., G.R. No. No. 213948, 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to

April 19, 2017 temporarily suspend the Building Permit og DMC citing
among others, that “the Torre de Manila Condominium,

Remedial Law. Mandamus only issues when there is a based on their development plans, upon completion, will

clear legal duty imposed upon the office or the officer rise up high above the back of the national monument,

sought to be compelled to perform an act, and when the to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such

party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of

performance of such act. the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage

point.”

Remedial Law. Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve

substantive rights and prevent further injury102 until final Building Official Melvin Q. Balagot then sought the

adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present opinion of the City of Manila’s City Legal Officer on

case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not well- whether he is bound to comply with Resolution No. 121.8

defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus In his letter dated 12 September 2012, City Legal Officer

must be dismissed and the TRO lifted. Renato G. Dela Cruz stated that there is “no legal

justification for the temporary suspension of the Building

There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]” since the

de Manila. What is not expressly or impliedly prohibited construction “lies outside the Luneta Park” and is “simply

by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to too far to be a repulsive distraction or have an

morals, customs and public order.” This principle is objectionable effect on the artistic and historical

fundamental in a democratic society, to protect the weak significance” of the Rizal Monument.9 He also pointed

against the strong, the minority against the majority, and out that “there is no showing that the [area of] subject

the individual citizen against the government. In essence, property has been officially declared as an

this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society anthropological or archeological area. Neither has it been

under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act categorically designate.

can be curtailed only through law.

National Historical Commission of the Philippines Dr.

FACTS: DMCI started construction of Torre De Manila Maria Serena I. Diokno maintained that the Torre de

Condominium, after it was issued Building permit by the Manila project site is outside the boundaries of the Rizal
5|Page

Park and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument, and

thus, cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of the ISSUES: Whether or not the Court can issue a writ of
National Monument. mandamus against the officials of the City of Manila to

stop the construction of DMCI-PDI’s Torre de Manila

On 26 November 2013, following an online petition Project; and
against the Torre de Manila project that garnered about

7,800 signatures, the City Council of Manila issued Whether or not Torre De Manila is a nuisance per se.
Resolution No. 146, reiterating its directive in Resolution
No. 121 enjoining the City of Manila’s building officials to RULING: The petition for mandamus lacks merit and must

temporarily suspend DMCI-PDI’s Building Permit. be dismissed.

Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals Mandamus does not lie against the City of Manila.
(MZBAA) issued Zoning Board Resolution No. 06, Series

of 2013, recommending the approval of DMCI-PDI’s The Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be
application for variance, which was later on amended. deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law x x x.”61 It is a fundamental principle that no

The City Council resolution later states that “the City property shall be taken away from an individual without

Council of Manila find[s] no cogent reason to deny due process, whether substantive or procedural. The

and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the dispossession of property, or in this case the stoppage of
[MZBAA] and hereby ratifies] and confirm[s] all previously the construction of a building in one’s own property,

issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City would violate substantive due process.

[Council] of Manila for Torre de Manila[.]”

The Rules on Civil Procedure are clear that mandamus
On 12 September 2014, the Knights Of Rizal, a “civic, only issues when there is a clear legal duty imposed upon
patriotic, cultural, non- partisan, non-sectarian and non- the office or the officer sought to be compelled to
profit organization”18 created under Republic Act No. perform an act, and when the party seeking mandamus

646,19 filed a Petition for Injunction seeking a temporary has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.
restraining order, and later a permanent injunction,

against the construction of DMCI- PDI’s Torre de Manila In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No.
condominium project. The KOR argues that the subject 8119 or in any law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that
matter of the present suit is one of “transcendental the construction of a building outside the Rizal Park is
importance, paramount public interest, of overarching prohibited if the building is within the background
significance to society, or with far- reaching implication” sightline or view of the Rizal Monument. Thus, there is no

involving the desecration of the Rizal Monument. legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider,”
6|Page

in the words of the Dissenting Opinion, “the standards set will be an empty exercise since these standards cannot

under Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the applications apply outside of the Rizal Park- and the Torre de Manila
of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the is outside the Rizal Park. Mandamus will lie only if the

ordinance these standards can never be applied outside officials of the City of Manila have a ministerial duty to
the boundaries of Rizal Park. While the Rizal Park has consider these standards to buildings outside of the Rizal
been declared a National Historical Site, the area where Park. There can be no such ministerial duty because

Torre de Manila is being built is a privately-owned these standards are not applicable to buildings outside of
property that is “not part of the Rizal Park that has been the Rizal Park.
declared as a National Heritage Site in 1995,” and the

Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-beyond” the Rizal The KOR also invokes this Court’s exercise of its
Park, according to NHCP Chairperson Dr. Maria Serena I. extraordinary certiorari power of review under Section 1,
Diokno.62 Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila Article VIII65 of the Constitution. However, this Court can
been designated as a “heritage zone, a cultural property, only exercise its extraordinary certiorari power if the City

a historical landmark or even a national treasure.”63 of Manila, in issuing the required permits and licenses,
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
Also, to declare that the City of Manila failed to consider of jurisdiction. Tellingly, neither the majority nor minority

the standards under Ordinance No. 8119 would involve opinion in this case has found that the City of Manila

making a finding of fact. A finding of fact requires notice, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the

hearing, and the submission of evidence to ascertain permits and licenses to DMCI-PDI. Thus, there is no
compliance with the law or regulation. In such a case, it is justification at all for this Court to exercise its

the Regional Trial Court which has the jurisdiction to hear extraordinary certiorari power.

the case, receive evidence, make a proper finding of fact,

and determine whether the Torre de Manila project Moreover, the exercise of this Court’s extraordinary
properly complied with the standards set by the certiorari power is limited to actual cases and
ordinance. In Meralco v. Public Service Commission,64 controversies that necessarily involve a violation of the
we held that it is the cardinal right of a party in trials and Constitution or the determination of the constitutionality

administrative proceedings to be heard, which includes or validity of a governmental act or issuance. Specific
the right of the party interested or affected to present his violation of a statute that does not raise the issue of

own case and submit evidence in support thereof and to constitutionality or validity of the statute cannot, as a
have such evidence presented considered by the proper rule, be the subject of the Court’s direct exercise of its
court or tribunal. expanded certiorari power. Thus, the KOR’s recourse lies
with other judicial remedies or proceedings allowed
To compel the City of Manila to consider the standards under the Rules of Court.

under Ordinance No. 8119 to the Torre de Manila project

7|Page

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, mandamus under Rule 65. There is, however, no clear

Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,66 legal duty on the City of Manila to consider the
we held that in cases where the question of provisions of Ordinance No. 8119 for applications for

constitutionality of a governmental action is raised, the permits to build outside the protected areas of the Rizal
judicial power that the courts exercise is likewise Park. Even if there were such legal duty, the
identified as the power of judicial review– the power to determination of whether the City of Manila failed to

review the constitutionality of the actions of other abide by this legal duty would involve factual matters
branches of government. As a rule, as required by the which have not been admitted or established in this case.
hierarchy of courts principle, these cases are filed with the Establishing factual matters is not within the realm of this

lowest court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Court. Findings of fact are the province of the trial courts.
judicial review that the courts undertake requires:
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining
1) there be an actual case or controversy calling for the or determining the background sightline that is supposed

exercise of judicial power; to be protected or that is part of the “physical integrity”

of the Rizal Monument. How far should a building like the
2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument- one, two,

challenge; he must have a personal and substantial three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General,

interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will during the Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance

sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; does not prescribe how sightline is determined, neither is
there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether

3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the a construction that is not part of the historic monument

earliest possible opportunity; and itself or is outside the protected area can be said to
violate the Rizal Monument’s physical integrity, except
4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota only to say “when you stand in front of the Rizal
of the case. Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is
marred and impaired.” This kind of a standard has no

The lower court’s decision under the constitutional parameters and can include a sightline or a construction
scheme reaches the Supreme Court through the appeal as far as the human eyes can see when standing in front

process, through a petition for review on certiorari under of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. apply such a subjective and non-uniform standard that
adversely affects property rights several kilometers away
In the present case, the KOR elevated this case from a historical sight or facility.
immediately to this Court in an original petition for

injunction which we later on treated as one for

8|Page

The Dissenting Opinion claims that “the City, by reason of permits into a “contested case” necessitating notice and

a mistaken or erroneous construction of its own hearing with all the parties involved.
Ordinance, had failed to consider its duties under

[Ordinance No. 8119] when it issued permits in DMCI- Pro hac vice means a specific decision does not
PDI’s favor.” However, MZBAA Zoning Board Resolution constitute a precedent because the decision is for the
Nos. 06 and 06-A67 easily dispel this claim. According to specific case only, not to be followed in other cases. A

the resolutions, the City of Manila, through the MZBAA, pro hac vice decision violates statutory law- Article 8 of
acted on DMCI-PDI’s application for variance under the the Civil Code- which states that “judicial decisions
powers and standards set forth in Ordinance No. 8119. applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall

form part of the legal system of the Philippines.” The

Without further proof that the MZBAA acted whimsically, decision of the Court in this case cannot be pro hac vice
capriciously, or arbitrarily in issuing said resolution, the because by mandate of the law every decision of the
Court should respect MZBAA’s exercise of discretion. The Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If

Court cannot “substitute its judgment for that of said another case comes up with the same facts as the
officials who are in a better position to consider and present case, that case must be decided in the same way
weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically as this case to comply with the constitutional mandate of

vested in them by law.”68 Since the Court has “no equal protection of the law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision

supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of also violates the equal protection clause of the

the administrative departments of the government,” it Constitution.

“should not generally interfere with purely administrative

and discretionary functions.”69 The power of the Court in It is the policy of the courts not to interfere with the

mandamus petitions does not extend “to direct the discretionary executive acts of the executive branch
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. And
exercise of either”70 subject to well-settled exceptions, mandamus does not
lie against the legislative and executive branches or their

Still, the Dissenting Opinion insists on directing the re- members acting in the exercise of their official ministerial
evaluation by the City of Manila, through the CPDO, of functions. This emanates from the respect accorded by

the permits previously issued in favor of the Torre de the judiciary to said branches as co-equal entities under
Manila project to determine compliance with the the principle of separation of powers.
standards under Ordinance No. 8119. It also declares that
the circumstances in this case warrant the pro hac vice In De Castro v. Salas,71 we held that no rule of law is
conversion of the proceedings in the issuance of the better established than the one that provides that

mandamus will not issue to control the discretion of an

9|Page

officer or a court when honestly exercised and when such directives but mere guidelines- a set of the best practices

power and authority is not abused. and techniques that have been proven over the years to
be the most effective in preserving and restoring

In exceptional cases, the Court has granted a prayer for historical monuments, sites and buildings.
mandamus to compel action in matters involving
judgment and discretion, only “to act, but not to act one The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI’s Zoning

way or the other,”72 and only in cases where there has Permit was granted without going through the process
been a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, under Ordinance No. 8119. However, the same was
manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.73 properly rectified when, faced with mounting opposition,

DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of

In this case, there can be no determination by this Court Manila and immediately began complying with the
that the City of Manila had been negligent or remiss in its procedure for applying for a variance. The MZBAA did
duty under Ordinance No. 8119 considering that this subsequently recommend the approval of the variance

determination will involve questions of fact. DMCI- PDI and the City Council of Manila approved the same,
had been issued the proper permits and had secured all ratifying the licenses and permits already given to DMCI-
approvals and licenses months before the actual PDI. Such ratification was well within the right of the City

construction began. Even the KOR could not point to any Council of Manila. The City Council of Manila could have

law that respondent City of Manila had violated and denied the application had it seen any reason to do so.

could only point to declarations of policies by the NHCP Again, the ratification is a function of the City Council of
and the Venice Charter which do not constitute clear Manila, an exercise of its discretion and well within the

legal bases for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. authority granted it by law and the City’s own Ordinance

No. 8119.
The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding
principles for the preservation and restoration of ancient The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public
monuments, sites, and buildings. It brings together safety, health, convenience, and welfare. There is no
principles in the field of historical conservation and indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any

restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and harm, danger, or hazard to the people in the surrounding
and laid down by experts over the years. Each country, areas except that the building allegedly poses an

however, remains “responsible for applying the plan unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual
within the framework of its own culture and traditions.”74 appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and
tourists. In fact, the Court must take the approval of the
The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City
become enforceable as law. The Philippines is not legally Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of

bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not discretion by the city officials. Great care must be taken
10 | P a g e

that the Court does not unduly tread upon the local KOR now believes that the Torre de Manila is a nuisance

government’s performance of its duties. It is not for this per accidens and not a nuisance per se.88
Court to dictate upon the other branches of the

government how their discretion must be exercised so Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any
long as these branches do not commit grave abuse of act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers

the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the

Likewise, any violation of Ordinance No. 8119 must be senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
determined in the proper case and before the proper morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage

forum. It is not within the power of this Court in this case of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or
to make such determination. Without such (5) hinders or impairs the use of property.
determination, this Court cannot simply declare that the
City of Manila had failed to consider its duties under The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. The first,

Ordinance No. 8119 when it issued the permits in DMCI- nuisance per se, is one “recognized as a nuisance under
PDI’s favor without making a finding of fact how the City any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct
of Manila failed “to consider” its duties with respect to menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason,

areas outside the boundaries of the Rizal Park. In the first may be abated summarily under the undefined law of

place, this Court has no jurisdiction to make findings of necessity.”89 The second, nuisance per accidens, is that

fact in an original action like this before this Court. which “depends upon certain conditions and
Moreover, the City of Manila could not legally apply circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact,

standards to sites outside the area covered by the it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a

ordinance that prescribed the standards. With this, taken tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law
in light of the lack of finding that there was grave abuse constitutes a nuisance.”90
of discretion on the part of the City of Manila, there is no
basis to issue the writ of mandamus against the City of It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a
Manila. nuisance per se. The Torre de Manila project cannot be

considered as a “direct menace to public health or

Torre de Manila is Not a Nuisance Per Se. safety.” Not only is a condominium project commonplace

in the City of Manila, DMCI-PDI has, according to the

In its petition, the KOR claims that the Torre de Manila is proper government agencies, complied with health and
a nuisance per’ se that deserves to be summarily abated safety standards set by law. DMCI-PDI has been granted
even without judicial proceedings.87 However, during the the following permits and clearances prior to starting the
Oral Arguments, counsel for the KOR argued that the project: (1) Height Clearance Permit from the Civil

Aviation Authority of the Philippines;91 (2) Development

11 | P a g e

Permit from the HLURB;92 (3) Zoning Certification from The task to receive and evaluate evidence is lodged with

the HLURB;93 (4) Certificate of Environmental the trial courts. The question, then, of whether the Torre
Compliance Commitment from the Environment de Manila project is a nuisance per accidens must be

Management Bureau of the Department of Environment settled after due proceedings brought before the proper
and Natural Resources;94 (5) Barangay Clearance;95 (6) Regional Trial Court. The KOR cannot circumvent the
Zoning Permit;96 (7) Building Permit;97 (8) and Electrical process in the guise of protecting national culture and

and Mechanical Permit.98 heritage.

Later, DMCI-PDI also obtained the right to build under a The TRO must be lifted.

variance recommended by the MZBAA and granted by

the City Council of Manila. Thus, there can be no doubt Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights
that the Torre de Manila project is not a nuisance per se. and prevent further injury102 until final adjudication on
the merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal

On the other hand, the KOR now claims that the Torre de rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain,
Manila is a nuisance per accidens. the petition for mandamus must be dismissed and the
TRO lifted.

By definition, a nuisance per accidens is determined

based on its surrounding conditions and circumstances. The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings

These conditions and circumstances must be well of administrative agencies when they are supported by
established, not merely alleged. The Court cannot simply substantial evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already

accept these conditions and circumstances as established acquired vested rights in the various permits, licenses, or

facts as the KOR would have us do in this case.99 The even variances it had applied for in order to build a 49-
KOR itself concedes that the question of whether the storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the
Torre de Manila is a nuisance per accidens is a question City of Manila’s zoning ordinance.
of fact.100
As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate

The authority to decide when a nuisance exists is an to review discretionary decisions or actions of
authority to find facts, to estimate their force, and to administrative agencies in the absence of proof that such

apply rules of law to the case thus made.101 This Court is decisions or actions were arrived at with grave abuse of
no such authority. It is not a trier of facts. It cannot simply discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
take the allegations in the petition and accept these as
facts, more so in this case where these allegations are In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa,103 we held that
contested by the respondents. mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that

there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the

12 | P a g e

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and

as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party whimsically trampled upon by the shifting passions of
from the use and enjoyment of a right to which he is those who can shout the loudest, or those who can

clearly entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced gather the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet
by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal trolls. In other instances,54 the Court has allowed or
rights of the petitioner are not well-defined, definite, upheld actions that were not expressly prohibited by

clear, and certain,104 the petition must be dismissed. statutes when it determined that these acts were not
Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that
It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply upholding the same would lead to a more equitable

a command to exercise a power already possessed and solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself-
to perform a duty already imposed.105 Articles 130655 and 1409(1 )56 of the Civil Code- which
prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good
In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also

discretionary acts of the executive department in the not contrary to law.

absence of grave abuse of discretion,106 and considering
that mandamus may only be issued to enforce a clear In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre

and certain legal right,107 the present special civil action de Manila project is “contrary to morals, customs, and

for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued public order” or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to

earlier must be lifted. the community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has
determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards

There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to

de Manila. construct its Torre de Manila project.

In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service There is one fact that is crystal clear in this case. There is
Commission,53 the Court held that “what is not expressly no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de
or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when Manila due to its effect on the background “view, vista,

the act is contrary to morals, customs and public order.” sightline, or setting” of the Rizal Monument.
This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to

protect the weak against the strong, the minority against Zoning, as well as land use, in the City of Manila is
the majority, and the individual citizen against the governed by Ordinance No. 8119. The ordinance provides
government. In essence, this principle, which is the for standards and guidelines to regulate development
foundation of a civilized society under the rule of law, projects of historic sites and facilities within the City of
prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only Manila.

through law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms,

13 | P a g e

Specifically, Section 47 reads: Any designated heritage property which is to be

demolished or significantly altered shall be thoroughly

SEC. 47. Historical Preservation and Conservation documented for archival purposes with a history,

Standards.- Historic sites and facilities shall be conserved photographic records, and measured drawings, in
and preserved. These shall, to the extent possible, be accordance with accepted heritage recording guidelines,
made accessible for the educational and cultural prior to demolition or alteration.

enrichment of the general public. Residential and commercial infill in heritage areas will be
sensitive to the existing scale and pattern of those areas,
The following shall guide the development of historic which maintains the existing landscape and streetscape

sites and facilities: qualities of those areas, and which does not result in the
loss of any heritage resources.
Sites with historic buildings or places shall be developed Development plans shall ensure that parking facilities
to conserve and enhance their heritage values. Historic (surface lots, residential garages, stand-alone parking

sites and facilities shall be adaptively re-used. garages and parking components as parts of larger
developments) are compatibly integrated into heritage
Any person who proposes to add, to alter, or partially areas, and/or are compatible with adjacent heritage

demolish a designated heritage property will require the resources.

approval of the City Planning and Development Office Local utility companies (hydro, gas, telephone, cable)

(CPDO) and shall be required to prepare a heritage shall be required to place metering equipment,
impact statement that will demonstrate to the satisfaction transformer boxes, power lines, conduit, equipment

of CPDO that the proposal will not adversely impact the boxes, piping, wireless telecommunication towers and

heritage significance of the property and shall submit other utility equipment and devices in locations which do
plans for review by the CPDO in coordination with the not detract from the visual character of heritage
National Historical Institute (NHI). resources, and which do not have a negative impact on
its architectural integrity.
Any proposed alteration and/or re-use of designated

heritage properties shall be evaluated based on criteria Design review approval shall be secured from the CPDO
established by the heritage significance of the particular for any alteration of the heritage property to ensure that

property or site. design guidelines and standards are met and shall
Where an owner of a heritage property applies for promote preservation and conservation of the heritage
approval to demolish a designated heritage property or property. (Emphasis supplied)
properties, the owner shall be required to provide
evidence to satisfaction that demonstrates that It is clear that the standards laid down in Section 47 of

rehabilitation and re-use of the property is not viable. Ordinance No. 8119 only serve as guides, as it expressly
14 | P a g e

states that “the following shall guide the development of The height and bulk of buildings and structures shall be

historic sites and facilities.” A guide simply sets a direction so designed that it does not impair the entry of light and
or gives an instruction to be followed by property owners ventilation, cause the loss of privacy and/or create

and developers in order to conserve and enhance a nuisances, hazards or inconveniences to adjacent
property’s heritage values. developments.
Abutments to adjacent properties shall not be allowed

On the other hand, Section 48 states: without the neighbor’s prior written consent which shall
be required by the City Planning and Development Office
SEC. 48. Site Performance Standards.- The City considers (CPDO) prior to the granting of a Zoning Permit

it in the public interest that all projects are designed and (Locational Clearance).
developed in a safe, efficient and aesthetically pleasing The capacity of parking areas/ lots shall be per the
manner. Site development shall consider the minimum requirements of the National Building Code.
environmental character and limitations of the site and its These shall be located, developed and landscaped in

adjacent properties. All project elements shall be in order to enhance the aesthetic quality of the facility. In no
complete harmony according to good design principles case, shall parking areas/ lots encroach into street rights-
and the subsequent development must be visually of- way and shall follow the Traffic Code as set by the

pleasing as well as efficiently functioning especially in City.

relation to the adjacent properties and bordering streets. Developments that attract a significant volume of public

modes of transportation, such as tricycles, jeepneys,

The design, construction, operation and maintenance of buses, etc., shall provide on-site parking for the same.

every facility shall be in harmony with the existing and These shall also provide vehicular loading and unloading

intended character of its neighborhood. It shall not bays so as street traffic flow will not be impeded.
change the essential character of the said area but will be Buffers, silencers, mufflers, enclosures and other noise-
a substantial improvement to the value of the properties absorbing materials shall be provided to all noise and
in the neighborhood in particular and the community in vibration-producing machinery. Noise levels shall be
general. maintained according to levels specified in DENR DAO

No. 30- Abatement of Noise and Other Forms of

Furthermore, designs should consider the following: Nuisance as Defined by Law.

Glare and heat from any operation or activity shall not be

Sites, buildings and facilities shall be designed and radiated, seen or felt from any point beyond the limits of
developed with regard to safety, efficiency and high the property.
standards of design. The natural environmental character No large commercial signage and/or pylon, which will be
of the site and its adjacent properties shall be considered detrimental to the skyline, shall be allowed.

in the site development of each building and facility.

15 | P a g e

Design guidelines, deeds of restriction, property other cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order

management plans and other regulatory tools that will “when the physical integrity of the national cultural
ensure high quality developments shall be required from treasures or important cultural properties [is] found to be

developers of commercial subdivisions and in danger of destruction or significant alteration from its
condominiums. These shall be submitted to the City original state.”60 This law declares that the State should
Planning and Development Office (CPDO) for review and protect the “physical integrity” of the heritage property or

approval. (Emphasis supplied) building if there is “danger of destruction or significant

Section 47 of Ordinance No. 8119 specifically regulates alteration from its original state.” Physical integrity refers
the “development of historic sites and facilities.” Section to the structure itself- how strong and sound the

48 regulates “large commercial signage and/or pylon.” structure is. The same law does not mention that another
There is nothing in Sections 47 and 48 of Ordinance No. project, building, or property, not itself a heritage
8119 that disallows the construction of a building outside property or building, may be the subject of a cease and
the boundaries of a historic site or facility, where such desist order when it adversely affects the background

building may affect the background of a historic site. In view, vista, or sightline of a heritage property or building.
this case, the Torre de Manila stands 870 meters outside Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot apply to the Torre
and to the rear of the Rizal Monument and “cannot de Manila condominium project.

possibly obstruct the front view of the [Rizal]

Monument.”57 Likewise, the Torre de Manila is not in an A FINAL WORD

area that has been declared as an “anthropological or

archeological area” or in an area designated as a heritage It had been Rizal’s wish to die facing the rising sun. In his

zone, cultural property, historical landmark, or a national Mi Ultimo Adios, the poem he left for his family the night

treasure by the NHCP.58 before he was executed, Rizal wrote:

Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals Yo muero cuando veo que el cielo se colora Y al fin
with the subject of arts and culture, provides that “[t]he anuncia el dia tras lobrego capuz108
State shall conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s

historical and cultural heritage and resources x x x.” Since [Ako y mamamatay, ngayong namamalas na sa
this provision is not self-executory, Congress passed laws Silanganan ay namamanaag yaong maligayang araw na

dealing with the preservation and conservation of our sisikat sa likod ng luksang nagtabing na ulap.]109
cultural heritage.
[I die just when I see the dawn break, Through the gloom
One such law is Republic Act No. 10066,59 or the of night, to herald the day]110
National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers

the National Commission for Culture and the Arts and

16 | P a g e

Yet at the point of his execution, he was made to stand The Rizal Monument is expressly against Rizal’s own

facing West towards Manila Bay, with his back to the wishes. That Rizal’s statue now stands facing West
firing squad, like the traitor the colonial government towards Manila Bay, with Rizal’s back to the East, adds

wished to portray him. He asked to face his executioners, salt to the wound. If we continue the present orientation
facing the East where the sun would be rising since it was of Rizal’s statue, with Rizal facing West, we would be like
early morning, but the Spanish captain did not allow it. the Spanish captain who refused Rizal’s request to die

As he was shot and a single bullet struck his frail body, facing the rising sun in the East. On the other hand, if
Rizal forced himself, with his last remaining strength, to Rizal’s statue is made to face East, as Rizal had desired
turn around to face the East and thus he fell on his back when he was about to be shot, the background- the blue

with his face to the sky and the rising sun. Then, the sky above Manila Bay- would forever be clear of
Spanish captain approached Rizal and finished him off obstruction, and we would be faithful to Rizal’s dying
with one pistol shot to his head. wish.

Before his death, Rizal wrote a letter to his family. He WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DISMISSED
asked for a simple tomb, marked with a cross and a stone for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
with only his name and the date of his birth and death; by the Court on 16 June 2015 is LIFTED effective

no anniversary celebrations; and interment at Paang immediately.

Bundok (now, the Manila North Cemetery). Rizal never

wanted his grave to be a burden to future generations. SO ORDERED.

The letter never made it to his family and his wishes were 4. Santiago vs COMELEC
not carried out. The letter was discovered many years
later, in 1953. By then, his remains had been entombed at Political Law – Separation of Powers
the Rizal Monument, countless anniversaries had been
celebrated, with memorials and monuments built FACTS: On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed
throughout the world. with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to

Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”

Rizal’s wish was unmistakable: to be buried without pomp The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time
or pageantry, to the point of reaching oblivion or and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.)
obscurity in the future.111 For Rizal’s life was never about caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
fame or vainglory, but for the country he loved dearly papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local
and for which he gave up his life. election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in

establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD

Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
17 | P a g e

against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the can then take cognizance of the petition for prohibition

COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition, the filed by Santiago notwithstanding Roco’s petition.
petition having been untenable due to the foregoing. COMELEC did not even act on Roco’s petition. In the final

Santiago argues among others that the People’s Initiative analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the
revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the

limits of those in power (particularly the President) paramount majesty of the Constitution. It must be
constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a
people’s initiative. The respondents argued that the motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that

petition filed by Roco is pending under the COMELEC the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain
hence the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it. the petition. The COMELEC made no ruling thereon
evidently because after having heard the arguments of
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December

cognizance of the case. 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or
HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically gave due course

abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition. to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition publication of the petition, together with the attached

under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice
it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.
COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have

known that the petition does not fall under any of the 5. LAMBINO, ET AL. VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 174153, 25
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of OCTOBER 2006)
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which
reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. FACTS: On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino
Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, and Erico Aumentado (“Lambino Group”) commenced
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino
dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and (COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7
so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its Referendum Act. The proposed changes under the
time, energy, and resources. Being so, the Supreme Court petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
18 | P a g e

system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the

government. people through initiative upon a petition” is that the

entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.

The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their petition had the This means two essential elements must be present.
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12%
of all registered voters, with each legislative district First, the people must author and thus sign the entire

represented by at least 3% of its registered voters; and proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
(b) COMELEC election registrars had verified the behalf.
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal

The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the must be embodied in a petition.
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the These essential elements are present only if the full text

Supreme Court’s ruling in Santiago vs. Commission of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
on Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to who express their assent by signing such complete
the Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition. proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed

amendments may be either written on the face of the

1. The initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition

Article XVII of the Constitution on direct proposal by the must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
people assurance that every one of the several millions of

signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing proposed amendments before – not after – signing.
provision that allows a people’s initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. While this provision Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the
does not expressly state that the petition must set forth time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
the full text of the proposed amendments, the proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and

deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly misleading” which renders the initiative void.
show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt the relevant

American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a
particular, the people must first see the full text of the single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text. signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks

a question whether the people approve a shift from the

19 | P a g e

Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional

system of government. The signature sheet does not Commission. A people’s initiative to change the
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes Constitution applies only to an amendment of the

before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress
omission is fatal. or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people

without first showing to the people the full text of the Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute an
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and amendment or revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any

can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That’s why legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
the Constitution requires that an initiative must be Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
“directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition” – system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
meaning that the people must sign on a petition that President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress,

contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
so vital an issue as amending the nation’s fundamental
law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments Courts have long recognized the distinction between an

cannot be hidden from the people under a general or amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision

special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in

unelected individuals. the constitution, like altering the principle of separation

of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is

2. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety

Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of

second mode is through a constitutional convention. The the constitution, while amendment generally affects only
third mode is through a people’s initiative. the specific provision being amended.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second Where the proposed change applies only to a specific
modes, applies to “any amendment to, or revision of, this provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, section or article, the change may generally be
referring to the third mode, applies only to “amendments considered an amendment and not a revision. For

to this Constitution.” This distinction was intentional as example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years
20 | P a g e

to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or

a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the
companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not other hand, constitutions allow people’s initiatives, which

a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or
an additional qualification for election to the Presidency recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments
is an amendment and not a revision. and not revisions.

The changes in these examples do not entail any In California where the initiative clause allows
modification of sections or articles of the Constitution amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like

other than the specific provision being amended. These in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part
changes do not also affect the structure of government test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
or the system of checks-and-balances among or within quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so
the three branches. extensive in its provisions as to change directly the

substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or

However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court
is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word examines only the number of provisions affected and

of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision does not consider the degree of the change.

and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of

the word “republican” with “monarchic” or “theocratic” in The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of
Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the proposed change in the constitution. The main

the entire structure of government and the fundamental inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such

ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
change will have to be examined case-by-case, governmental plan as to amount to a revision.”
depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
how it affects the structure of government, the carefully government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a
crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the change in the nature of [the] basic governmental

underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. plan” includes change in its fundamental framework or
the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body changes that jeopardize the traditional form of
with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a government and the system of check and balances.
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the

remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize Lambino Group initiative is a revision and not merely an
21 | P a g e

amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group changes are made by ordinary people who do not make

proposed changes overhaul two articles – Article VI on an “occupation, profession, or vocation” out of
the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive – affecting such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express

a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially Constitution contradict the Lambino Group’s theory.
the basic plan of government, from presidential to Where the intent of the framers and the language of the

parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not
legislature. deviate from such categorical intent and language.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of 3. A revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary
the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are The petition failed to comply with the basic requirements
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the

the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral- conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to amend the
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system Constitution. There is, therefore, no need to revisit this
is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,

and executive branches is a radical change in the inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions

structure of government. The abolition alone of the to cover the system of initiative to amend the

Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a not change the outcome of the present petition. It settled

revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a

of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks- statute if the case can be resolved on some other
and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a grounds.
revision of the Constitution.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference the result here because the present petition violates

between “amendment” and “revision” is Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provision
only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino must first be complied with even before complying with

Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and RA 6735. Worse, the petition violates the following
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive provisions of RA 6735:
changes are called “revisions” because members
of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. a. Section 5(b), requiring that the people must sign the
The same substantive changes, when proposed through petition as signatories. The 6.3 million signatories did not

an initiative, are called “amendments” because the sign the petition or the amended petition filed with the
22 | P a g e

COMELEC. Only Attys. Lambino, Donato and Agra signed country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
the petition and amended petition. resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions;

b. Section 10(a), providing that no petition embracing c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as

more than one subject shall be submitted to the well as the Scarborough Shoal ( bajo de masinloc), as a
“regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
electorate. The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
are tenable.
government.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522,
or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose,
6. Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita
territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to
do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of
the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to
655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA
acquisition or loss of territory is the international law
9522 is Constitutional
principle on occupation, accretion, cession and
FACTS: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral
the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
– the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
meant to comply with the terms of the third United maritime zones and continental shelves.
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our
ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that
decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.).
the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive
arguments are as follows: economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased

a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)

of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international
the exclusion of our claim over Sabah; community of the scope of the maritime space and

b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the submarine areas within which States parties exercise

Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in treaty-based rights.

international law, opens our waters landward of the

baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the
23 | P a g e

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well

as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not
diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under
the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they
generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are
not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main
archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is
because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger
area which would already depart from the provisions of
UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the
natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG

and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.

NOTES:

Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three

levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based
rights:
Anent their particular contentions:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines;
A. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is
where we exercise sovereignty
evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial
baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs,
sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the
the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated
baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living
in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the
and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the UNCLOS.
bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over
these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. 7. IN THE MATTER OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

However, due to our observance of international law, we ARBITRATION

allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent

- before -
passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is
AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED UNDER ANNEX
exercised in accordance with customary international law
VII TO THE
without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
24 | P a g e

1982 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF RULING:

THE SEA
1. Article 288 of the Conventions states that “In the event
- between - of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES court or tribunal.”

- and - 2. With respect to Submission No. 1, for the reasons set

out above, the Tribunal concludes that, as between the
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Philippines and China, the Convention defines the scope
of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, which
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines(Philippines)
may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein.
instituted an arbitration case against the People’s
Republic of China(China) under the 1982 United Nations
The Tribunal concludes that, as between the Philippines
Convention on the Law of the Sea(Convention or
and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other
UNCLOS) since both parties have ratified the Convention.
sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the
However, China have consistently stated its view on the
maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by
lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the matter.
the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash line’ are contrary to
the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent
The arbitration concerns disputed between the parties
that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of
regarding the legal basis of maritime rights and
China’s maritime entitlements under the Convention. The
entitlements in the South China Sea, the status of certain
Tribunal concludes that the Convention superseded any
geographic features in the South China Sea, and the
historic rights or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction in
lawfulness of certain actions taken by China in the South
excess of the limits imposed therein.
China Sea.

3. Features that are above water at high tide generate an

ISSUES:
entitlement to at least a 12 nautical mile territorial sea,

1. WON the Tribunal has jurisdiction. whereas features that are submerged at high tide do not.

2. Whether China have claims under historical rights and The Tribunal noted that the reefs have been heavily

the “nine-dash-line” modified by land reclamation and construction, recalled

that the Convention classifies features on their natural
3. What is the status of features in the South China Sea condition, and relied on historical materials in evaluating
the features.
4. WON the activities of China in the South China Sea is
lawful. Article 121 establishes a regime of islands as follows:

5. WON the actions of China since the commencement of Article 121- Regime of Islands
arbitration have aggravated and extended the dispute.
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land,
6. What is China’s future conduct? surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
25 | P a g e

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial (b) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning
sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone the protection and preservation of the marine
and the continental shelf of an island are determined in environment at Mischief Reef by inflicting permanent,
accordance with the provisions of this Convention irreparable harm to the coral reef habitat of that feature.
applicable to other land territory .
(c) China has extended the Parties’ dispute concerning
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or the protection and preservation of the marine
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive environment by commencing large-scale island-building
economic zone or continental shelf. and construction works at Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross
Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef,
The tribunal found that although there were evidence of and Subi Reef.
transient habitation on the features, there was no
showing of permanent habitation that the features could (d) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning
support a stable community therefore they are the status of maritime features in the Spratly Islands and
considered rocks. Thus, Having found that none of the their capacity to generate entitlements to maritime zones
features claimed by China was capable of generating an by permanently destroying evidence of the natural
exclusive economic zone, the Tribunal found that it condition of Mischief Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross
could—without delimiting a Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, Hughes Reef,
and Subi Reef.
boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, because 6. The Tribunal considers it beyond dispute that both
those areas are not overlapped by any possible Parties are obliged to comply with the Convention,
entitlement of China. including its provisions regarding the resolution of
disputes, and to respect the rights and freedoms of other
4. The Tribunal finds that China has, by virtue of the States under the Convention. Neither Party contests this,
conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the and the Tribunal is therefore not persuaded that it is
vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of necessary or appropriate for it to make any further
collision and danger to Philippine vessels and personnel. declaration.
The Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8,
15, and 16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to be
in breach of Article 94 of the Convention.
A.2 STATE IMMUNITY

5. YES, it has. 8. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND

COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES
(a) China has aggravated the Parties’ dispute concerning VICENTE ABECINA AND MARIA CLEOFE ABECINA,
their respective rights and entitlements in the area of RESPONDENTS.
Mischief Reef by building a large artificial island on a low-
tide elevation located in the exclusive economic zone of Facts: Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria
the Philippines. CleofeAbecina (respondents/spouses Abecina) are the
registered owners of five parcels of land in SitioPaltik,
Barrio Sta. Rosa, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. The
26 | P a g e

properties are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Hence this petition.

(TCT) Nos. T-25094, T-25095, T-25096, T-25097, and T-
25098. Issue: Whether the DOTC’s contention that instead of
allowing recovery of the property, the case should be
In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel remanded to the RTC for determination of just
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract compensation has merit
for the management, operation, maintenance, and
development of a Regional Telecommunications Ruling: The Philippines recognizes the vital role of

Development Project (RTDP) under the National information and communication in nation building.As a

Telephone Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1) consequence, we have adopted a policy environment
that aspires for the full development of communications
Later on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines infrastructure to facilitate the flow of information into, out
Norte, donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200) of, and across the country. To this end, the DOTC has
square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the been mandated with the promotion, development, and
implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. regulation of dependable and coordinated networks of
However, the municipality erroneously included portions communication.
of the respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to
the FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on The DOTC encroached on the respondents' properties

the property which encroached on the properties of the when it constructed the local telephone exchange in

respondent spouses Daet, Camarines Norte. The exchange was part of the
RTDP pursuant to the National Telephone Program. We
On April 29, 2003, the respondent spouses sent a final have no doubt that when the DOTC constructed the
demand letter to both the DOTC and Digitel to vacate encroaching structures and subsequently entered the FLA
the premises and to pay unpaid rent/damages in the with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a
amount of one million two hundred thousand pesos sovereign function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC's
(P1,200,000.00). Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall within
with the demand. the cloak of state immunity.

The RTC held that as the lawful owners of the properties, The Constitution identifies the limitations to the awesome
the respondent spouses enjoyed the right to use and to and near-limitless powers of the State. Chief among
possess them - rights that were violated by the DOTC's these limitations are the principles that no person shall be
unauthorized entry, construction, and refusal to vacate. deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
The RTC ordered the Department - as a builder in bad of law and that private property shall not be taken for
faith -to forfeit the improvements and vacate the public use without just compensation.These limitations
properties; and (2) awarded the spouses with are enshrined in no less than the Bill of Rights that
P1,200,000.00 as actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral guarantees the citizen protection from abuse by the
damages, and P200,000.00 as exemplary damages plus State. Consequently, our laws require that the State's
attorney's fees and costs of suit, The Court of Appeals power of eminent domain shall be exercised through
affirmed the RTC’s decision. expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private
property is taken for public use, it becomes the
27 | P a g e

ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to (1) Whether or not RTC Manila committed grave
initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary abuse of discretion.
implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a
waiver of State immunity.If the DOTC had correctly (2) Whether or not the Arlegui Property was legally

followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it owned by Mendoza. Thus, entitled for reconveyance and

had encroached on the respondents' property, it would monetary compensation.

have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of

(3) Whether or not the cost of suit and Hidalgo’s
insisting on its immunity from suit. The petitioners would
issuance of writ of execution against government funds
not have had to resort to filing its complaint for
to satisfy money judgment is valid
reconveyance.

Held:
The exercise of eminent domain requires a genuine
necessity to take the property for public use and the
(1) No. Grave Abuse of Discretion connotes
consequent payment of just compensation. The property
capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of
is evidently being used for a public purpose. However, we
judgment and conveys the notion of willful and
also note that the respondent spouses willingly entered
unreasoning action. The mere issuance by the trial court
into a lease agreement with Digitel for the use of the
of order of default following judgment by default is
subject properties.
within Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

If in the future, the factual circumstances should change

(2) Yes. Evidence presented adequately supports the
and the respondents refuse to continue the lease, then
conclusion that the Marcos Administration wrested
the DOTC may initiate expropriation proceedings.
possession of the property in question and somehow
secured a certificate of title over it without a conveying
9. Republic v Hidalgo
deed. The Court accordingly granted private
respondent’s basic plea for recovery of the Arlegui
Facts: Mendoza, an alleged owner of the No. 1440
property, which was legally hers all along.
Arlegui St. San Miguel, Manila, near Malacanang (Arlegui
Property), filed a suit against the Republic for
However, the monetary award set forth therein was
reconveyance and declaration of nullity of a deed of sale
declared erroneous. To the court, an award of P 20,000 a
between the Republic and Fidel Vivar. Mendoza claimed
month for use and occupancy of the Arlegui property
that the Arlegui Property was illegally and forcibly taken
beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same is
from her by the PSG of then President Marcos; thus,
reasonable.
making her the owner of the said property. On
Mendoza’s 3rd amended complaint, RTC Manila ruled
(3) No.It is basic principle that government funds
that the deed of sale between the Republic and Fidel
and properties may not be seized under writ of execution
Vivar was null and void. Republic is ordered to pay P
or garnishment to satisfy a judgment. Office of the
143,600,000 and P 1,480,627,688.
President was ordered to make appropriate budgetary
arrangements to pay Mendoza.
Issue:
28 | P a g e

10. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. v. HON. Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA
AGUSTIN S. DIZON, et al. sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.

FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a ISSUES:

General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern
Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction I. Was UP's funds validly garnished?

and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP

II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out
in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing.
of time?
However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not
paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit
HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not
(COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the
subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public funds;
unpaid balance.
suability vs. liability of the State)

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision

Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP
ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16,
remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC
legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a
denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was
government instrumentality, performing the States
served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the
constitutional mandate of promoting quality and
UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty.
accessible education. As a government instrumentality,
Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the
the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees
OLS inDiliman, Quezon City.
and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section
1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3,
appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by
2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice
Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No.
of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October
9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued
including any interest accruing from the deposit of such
the writ of execution.
funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust

On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs fund," the disbursement of which should always be

petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should

Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of

despite their previous motion having already been the UP are government funds that are public in character.

granted and despite the writ of execution having already They include the income accruing from the use of real

issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the

motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the attainment of its institutional objectives.

RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October

A marked distinction exists between suability of the State
4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served notices of
and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in
garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A
ordered the release of the funds.
distinction should first be made between suability and
liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to
29 | P a g e

be sued, liability on the applicable law and the unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional
does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other power to disregard the declaration of finality of the
hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the
consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere UPs right to due process.
fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for

the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal

defendant is liable. Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was

admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and
appropriation made by law." The execution of the no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by
monetary judgment against the UP was within the counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule
a final and executory decision already validated the claim 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party
against the UP. has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be
made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service
HELD: The period of appeal did not start without effective upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where
service of decision upon counsel of record. (The doctrine one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be
of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by
fresh-period rule; computation of time) the opposite side."

At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty.
amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining
funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by
based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the
the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a judgment of the RTC became final and immutable
decision that has attained finality becomes immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late
and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect, on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the
conclusions of fact and law, and whether the modification rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule
is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a
the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the
immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed
and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) upon notice of the denial of the motion for
the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC
tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule
judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire then prevailing.
after the finality of the decision that render its execution
30 | P a g e

However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the DECISION

UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first
announced in mid-September of 2005 through its ruling REYES, J.:

in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize the

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
Court assailing the Decision[2] dated November 20, 2012
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
of the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA CP Case No.
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
2010-089, which denied the money claims of Madag
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
Buisan (Buisan), et al. (petitioners) against the
a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration."
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a
the amount of P122,051,850.00 for lack of merit, and the
procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the
Resolution[3] dated February 14, 2014 denying the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
motion for reconsideration.
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order
FACTS:
or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This
is because there are no vested rights in rules of In 1989, the DPWH undertook the construction of the
procedure. Liguasan Cut-off Channel (Project) in Tunggol,
Pagalungan, Maguindanao, to minimize the perennial
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17,
problem of flooding in the area. In April 2001, the DPWH
2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs
received various claims from land owners for damages
filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not
allegedly caused to their properties, crops and
tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the
improvements by the premature opening or the Project.
UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of
Hence, the Regional Director (RD), DPWH Regional Office
the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end
(R.O.) No. XII, Cotabato City, investigated the claims.[4]
on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP
had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a The DPWH R.O. No. XII and the Technical Working Group
Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with (TWG) recommended in 2004 to pay just compensation
Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If to the claimants. The TWG, however, noted that since the
the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a event occurred in 1989, it could not account physically
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the actual quantity of the damaged crops and properties.
the court sits, the time shall not run until the next In 2006, an ad hoc committee was created to determine
working day. GRANTED the legality and propriety of the claims. However, due to
the considerable lapse of time and the insufficiency of
11. Madag Buisan, et al. Vs. Commission of Audit and
evidence, no final resolution was made by the DPWH.
Department of Public Works and Highways
The claims were forwarded to the RD of the DPWH R.O.
No. XII to be returned to the claimants, as such are
2017 Jan 31
considered to be under the jurisdiction of the COA
G.R. No. 212376
En Banc
31 | P a g e

pursuant to Rule VIII of the 2009 Revised Rules of Ruling of the Court
Procedure of the COA.[5]
The Court denies the petition. The petition failed to
On April 14, 2010, the petitioners, represented by Mayor comply with the rules on certification against forum
Bai Annie C. Montawal (Montawal), filed a petition with shopping.
the COA,[6] praying that the DPWH be ordered to pay
the petitioners the sum of P122,051,850.00 as Section 5 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court requires,

compensation for their damaged crops, properties and among others, that in a petition for review of judgments

improvements. On September 16, 2010, Buisan filed a and final orders or resolutions of COA, the petition

Motion to Dismiss the Petition alleging that Montawal should be verified and contain a sworn certification

was not authorized to represent them. In fact, Buisan and against forum shopping as provided in the fourth

the other claimants filed a separate petition with the COA paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46, viz.:

based on that same money claim.[7]

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-

In its Answer, the DPWH averred that the petitioners compliance with requirements. – x x x.

failed to establish that they are the owners of crops and

xxxx
properties allegedly damaged, and that the damage was
caused by the construction of the Project. Moreover, the
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition
DPWH asserted that the petitioners’ cause of action had
a sworn certification that he has not theretofore
already prescribed.[8]
commenced any other action involving the same issues in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
In its Decision[9] dated November 20, 2012, the COA
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there
denied the money claims of the petitioners, to wit:
is such other action or proceeding, he must state the

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that

DENIES the herein Petition for money claim for lack of a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is

merit.[10] pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,

or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
The COA held that for the petitioners’ failure to file their agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
money claims within a reasonable time, they are deemed courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5)
to have committed laches. Furthermore, the petitioners’ days therefrom.
cause of action had already prescribed in view of Article
1146 of the Civil Code.[11] xxxx

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the The failure of the petitioner to comply any of the

same was denied by the COA for lack of merit.[12] requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition. (Emphasis ours)
Issue: WHETHER THE COA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONERS’ CLAIM In the present case, the certification against forum

WAS BARRED BY LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION. shopping was signed by Montawal, the mayor of the
Municipality of Montawal, Maguindanao.[13] Her bare
32 | P a g e

statement that she was the petitioners’ duly constituted incorporated or unincorporated agencies. In case of
attorney-in-fact in filing the petition before the COA can incorporated agencies, its suability depends upon
hardly constitute as compliance with the rules. She did whether its own organic act specifically provides that it
not even append a Special Power of Attorney executed can sue and be sued in Court.[19]
by the affected landowners. Montawal’s legal capacity to
sue on behalf of the petitioners is questionable, As the State’s engineering and construction arm, the

considering that her authority to represent the claimants DPWH exercises governmental functions that effectively

was even assailed by the petitioners, when they filed with insulate it from any suit, much less from any monetary

the COA a Motion to Dismiss the Petition filed therein by liability. The construction of the Project which was for the

Montawal.[14] purpose of minimizing the perennial problem of flood in

the area of Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is well
In the case of natural persons, the rule requires the within the powers and functions of the DPWH as
parties themselves to sign the certification against forum mandated by the Administrative Code of 1997.
shopping. The reason for such requirement is that the
petitioner himself knows better than anyone else whether Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH

a separate case has been filed or pending which involves from being held responsible for alleged damages it

substantially the same issues.[15] In this case, the performed in consonance with its mandated duty.

certification against forum shopping in the filing of this Nowhere does it appear in the petition that the State has

petition was neither signed by the petitioners nor their given its consent, expressly or impliedly, to be sued

counsel, but by the mayor of their town who is not even before the courts. The failure to allege the existence of

one of the petitioners in this case. Evidently, the the State’s consent to be sued in the complaint is a fatal

petitioners failed to comply with the certification against defect, and on this basis alone, should cause the

forum shopping requirement absent any compelling dismissal of the complaint.[20]

reason as to warrant an exception based on the

The petitioners’ cause of action has been barred by
circumstances of the case.[16]
prescription and laches.

The Doctrine of Non-Suability of State insulates the

The COA denied the petition primarily on the ground
DPWH, a governmental entity, from claims of damages.
that the petitioners filed their money claims only on 2014,

The fundamental law of the land provides that the State or 15 years after their cause of action arose in 1989. The

cannot be sued without its consent.[17] It is a petitioners’ assertion that the cause of action arose in

fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from 1992 is self-serving as no pieces of evidence was

the juristic concept of sovereignty that the State, as well presented or even attached as supporting documents in

as its government, is immune from suit unless it gives its their petition to prove their claim. Worse, the petitioners

consent. The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does could not even pinpoint the exact moment of time of the

not say that the State may not be sued under any destruction of their properties.[21]

circumstances. The doctrine only conveys that “”the state

The petitioners’ statement that there were already heavy
may not be sued without its consent;”” its clear import
rains since 1989 that caused flooding in the area negates
then is that the State may at times be sued.[18] Suits filed
their previous claim that the cause of action arose in
against government agencies may either be against
33 | P a g e

1992. If in fact there were already heavy rains since 1989, to file a formal suit for their claims before the COA, there
then it can also be argued that prior to 1992, their is an apparent lack of notice that would give the DPWH
properties were already damaged by the floods and that the opportunity to defend itself.
would be the reckoning point of their cause of action.
This further establishes that their cause of action has Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,[25] as amended by

already prescribed. Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,[26] which

were the applicable laws at the time the cause of action
Thus, while it may be argued that the petitioners have a arose, the COA has primary jurisdiction over money
cause of action against the DPWH, the same has already claims against government agencies and
prescribed in view of Article 1146 of the Civil Code viz.: instrumentalities. Moreover, Rule II, Section 1(b) of the
2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA[27]
ART. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within specifically enumerated those matters falling under
four years: COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include “”money
claims due from or owing to any government agency.””
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
Rule VIII, Section 1(a) further provides that COA shall have
original jurisdiction over money claims against the
(2) Upon a quasi-delict. (Emphasis ours)
Government, among others. Therefore, the petitioners’

Undeniably, the petitioners’ money claims which were money claims have prescribed and are barred by laches

only filed with the DPWH in 2004 or even in 2001 had for their failure to timely file the petition with the COA.

already prescribed. As correctly pointed out by the Office

COA did not abuse its discretion in denying the
of the Solicitor General, “”[i]t will be the height of injustice
petitioners’ claims for damages against the DPWH.
for respondent DPWH to be confronted with stale claims,
where verification on the plausibility of the allegations
Even if the Court sets aside the technical and procedural
remains difficult, either because the condition of the
issues in the interest of substantive justice, the instant
alleged inundation of crops has changed, or the physical
petition must be denied. The COA is endowed with
impossibility of accounting for the lost and damaged
enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
crops due to the considerable lapse of time.””[22]
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is
On the other hand, “”[l]aches has been defined as the
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
the proper use of the government’s and, ultimately, the
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
people’s property. The exercise of its general audit power
diligence could or should have been done earlier.””[23]
is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to

In the case at bar, laches has set in as the elements[24] the check and balance system inherent in our form of

thereof are present. Firstly, the premature opening by the government.[28]

DPWH of the Project allegedly causing flash floods, and

damaging the petitioners’ properties took place in 1989
or even in 1992. Secondly, the petitioners took 15 years to
In denying the petitioners’ money claims against the
assert their rights when they formally filed a complaint in
DPWH, the COA did not abuse the exercise of its
2004 against the DPWH. Thirdly, as the petitioners failed
34 | P a g e

discretion as its denial was grounded on facts and computed that population density was only about 2-3
circumstances that would warrant such denial arising per square meter. This means that the distance of every
from the following observations: fruit tree trunk/clump to each other is only about 2-3
meters, hence, in order for the fruit trees to be fruit
In her 5th Indorsement dated July 22, 2011, the ATL, bearing, it would appear that their branches would
DPWH, Cotabato 2nd Engineering District, interposed no already be interlocking with each other. (Schedule 1)
objection to the claims for payment for damaged crops
allegedly caused by the construction of the [Project] but 6. That in view of the above, the total number of fruit
made significant observations, among others, to wit: trees per lot indicated in the lists were determined to be
only estimates and not the actual number/quantity of
xxxx fruit trees allegedly damaged.

3. That the names of claimants and other details in the 7. That review of the lists of claimants disclosed that there
attached List of Claims for Crop Damages Affected by the are instances that two (2) or more claimants are owners
Overflow of the Diversion Cut-Off Channel in Tunggol, of the same lot number. (Schedule 2)
Pagalungan, Maguindanao, (Annexes C-1 to C-12)
submitted by the IROW Task Force, DPWH Central Office 8. That [in the] tracing [of] the affected lots in the
amounting to P122,049,550.00, were based on and the parcellary map, there were lots which we believe the
same with that of the following three (3) reports: flooding of which should not be attributed to the
construction of the Cut-Off Channel but to the original
3.1) Undated and Unsigned List of Improvements and existing course of the river. Moreover, said lots are
Affected by the Overflow of the Diversion Cut-Off not on the downstream of the project (Lots # 61, 73, 74,
Channel in Tunggol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao 75, 76, 78, 297, 291, 289, 288, 287, 286, 284, 281, 282,
amounting to P122,049,550.00 (Annex “”D”” to Annex 279, 280, 276, 273, 274, 271, 270, 265, 263, 301, 302, 303,
“”D-4″”) with sub-heading, “”NOTE: BASE[D] ON THE 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 379, 377, 380, and 378). The
ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT AND APPROVED DATA FROM construction of the Cut-Off Channel was actually a relief
ARMM”” (Original List) to the upstream which [do not] experience perennial
flooding, but sadly a disaster to the downstream portion.
xxxx
(See attached parcellary Map).

4. That in the above-mentioned paragraph (3.1), the

xxxx
claimants/owners declared their lots as either cornland,
riceland, lowland or marshyland as opposed to their 9. That there are listed lots which are not in the parcellary
claim for crop damages for coconut trees, mango trees, map. (Lot # 386, 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1444).
coffee, jackfruits and banana under paragraphs (3.2) and
(3.3) and Annexes “”C-1″” to “”C-12″”, mentioned below. 10. That all undated DECLARATION OF REAL PROPERTY
submitted by the owners/claimants in support of [their]
claims for crop damages were all signed by Municipal
Assessor Babai M. Bangkulit of Datu Montawal,
5. That [in the] analysis of all lists with regards to the
Maguindanao, which we believe were issued only on
population density of plant and fruit trees, it was
April 12, 2007, the same date the Statements of Tax
35 | P a g e

Delinquency were signed by the aforementioned contemplation of law resulting to the prejudice of the
Municipal Assessor. rights of the claimants, the Court believes that COA did
not abuse, much less gravely, its discretion in denying the
11. That [in the] tracing [of] the lots on the parcellary map, claims of the petitioners.
majority of the lots are located on the side of the
Municipality of Pagalungan, Maguindanao, and not in the Thus, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the
Municipality of Datu Montawal, Maguindanao. (See part of COA in denying the petitioners’ money claims for
attached Parcellary Map). failure to present substantial evidence to prove that their
properties were damaged by floods due to the
xxxx premature opening of the Project of the DPWH. Without
a doubt, the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the
13. That not a single copy of land title was submitted by
evidence presented by the petitioners backed by the
the claimants to prove that they are the legal owners and
findings of COA lead only to one inescapable conclusion:
rightful claimants to the alleged crop damages therein.
that there is no substantial evidence to prove the
petitioners’ claims that would render the DPWH or the
xxxx
State liable for the amount claimed.

Finally, the then Cluster Director, Cluster D-Economic

In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual
Services, National Government Sector (NGS), this
findings of COA, which are undoubtedly supported by
Commission, in her 8th Indorsement dated December 15,
the evidence on record, must be accorded great respect
2011, stated that taking into account the fact that DPWH
and finality. COA, as the duly authorized agency to
undertook the construction of the [Project] in the
adjudicate money claims against government agencies
discharge of its governmental function, it cannot be held
and instrumentalities has acquired special knowledge and
liable. In support of her position, she cited the decision of
expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized
the Supreme Court in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, G.R.
jurisdiction.[30]
No. L-29993 dated October 23, 1978, citing Palafox, et al.
vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, et al., 102 Phil. 1186 (1958).
Finally, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the
decision of administrative authorities, especially one that
After observing that there are conflicting claims between
was constitutionally created like herein respondent COA,
the petitioners and that it is a primary consideration that
not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
a claim must be instituted by the proper party in interest
powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws
otherwise the same will fail, the then Cluster Director,
they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an oft-
Cluster D, NGS, this Commission, recommended the
repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are
dismissal of the Petition, subject to the final
accorded not only respect but also finality when the
determination by the Commission Proper.[29] (Emphasis
decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
ours)
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of

Absent any showing that COA capriciously, arbitrarily or discretion.[31]

whimsically exercised its discretion that would

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision
tantamount to evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
dated November 20, 2012 and Resolution dated February
refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
36 | P a g e

14, 2014 of the Commission on Audit in COA CP Case No. contained in the order of payment and notice of award
2010-089 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. issued to him. After the NHA rejected his appeal, he
commenced in the RTC this action for specific
12. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. ERNESTO performance and damages, with prayer for the issuance
ROXAS G. R. No. 171953, 21 October 2015, FIRST of a writ of preliminary injunction.
DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
He amended the complaint to compel the NHA to
FACTS: The NHA is charged, among others, with the comply with the terms and conditions of the order of
development of the Dagat-dagatan Development payment and the notice of award.

Project (project) situated in Navotas, Metro Manila. On The NHA countered in its answer that Roxas' prayer to
December 4, 1985, Roxas applied for commercial lots in include in the original contract the increase in lot
the project, particularly Lot 9 and Lot 10 in Block 11, Area measurement of 144 square meters was contrary to its
3, Phase III A/B, with an area of 176 square meters, for the existing rules and regulation; that he could not claim
use of his business of buying and selling gravel, sand and more than what had been originally awarded to him; and
cement products. The NHA approved his application, and that at the very least, his right in the additional area was
issued on December 6, 1985 the order of payment limited only to first refusal.
respecting the lots. On December 27, 1985, the NHA
issued the notice of award for the lots in favor of Roxas, ISSUE: Whether or not NHA is immuned from suit?
at P1,500.00/square meter. On the basis of the order of
RULING: The mantle of the State's immunity from suit did
payment and the notice of award, Roxasmade his
not extend to the NHA despite its being a government-
downpayment of P79,200.00. A relocation/reblocking
owned and -controlled corporation. Under Section 6(i) of
survey resulted in the renumbering of Lot 9 to Lot 5 and
Presidential Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the
Lot 10 to Lot 6 (subject lots). He completed his payment
for the subject lots on December 20, 1991. NHA could sue and be sued. As such, the NHA was not
immune from the suitof Roxas.
In the meanwhile, the NHA conducted a final subdivision
There is no question that the NHA could sue or be sued,
project survey, causing the increase in the area of the
and thus could be held liable under the judgment
subject lots from 176 to 320 square meters. The NHA
rendered against it. But the universal rule remains to be
informed Roxas about the increase in the area of the
that the State, although it gives its consent to be sued
subject lots, and approved the award of the additional
either by general or special law, may limit the claimant's
area of 144 square meters to him at P3,500.00/square
action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior
meter. Although manifesting his interest in acquiring the
to the stage of execution. In other words, the power of
additional area, he appealed for the reduction of the
the court ends when the judgment is rendered because
price to Pl,500.00/square meter, pointing out that Lot 5
government funds and property may not be seized
and Lot 6 were a substitution unilaterally imposed by the
pursuant to writs of execution or writs of garnishment to
NHA that resulted in the increase of 144 square meters
satisfy such judgments. The functions and public services
based on the technical description, and that although he
of the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or
desired to purchase the increased area, the purchase
disrupted by the diversion of public fund from their
must be in accordance with the terms and conditions
37 | P a g e

legitimate and specific objects, and as appropriated by violation of environmental laws and regulations in
law. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public connection with the grounding incident. Specifically,
policy. Indeed, the disbursements of public funds must petitioners cite the following violations committed by US
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry
required by law. (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section
21); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30);
13. MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et al. v. SCOTT H. damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and
SWIFT, et al. (G.R. No. 206510, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014) disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore,
petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify for
Executive Branch on the matter of compensation and being unconstitutional.
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. It is
settled that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our ISSUES:
government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative—“the political”--departments of 1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over US
the government, and the propriety of what may be done respondents who did not submit anypleading or
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to manifestation?
judicial inquiry or decision.”
2. Will the unauthorized entry of the Foreign Warship of
The USS Guardian, the United States avenger class mine the US with resulting damage tomarine resources bear an
counter-measures ship, from its routineship international responsibility under the UNCLOS when the
replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty in Subic said flagstate is not a signatory to the same convention?
Bay damaged the Tubbataha reef on its wayto Sulu Sea.
3. Does the grounding of the USS Guardian, which
The Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift and US
Ambassador to the Philippines adversely affected the Tubbataha reef,make the crew
liable to the Philippines as provided by the VFA?
Harry K. Thomas, Jr expressed their regret over the
4. May the Writ of Kalikasan be validly implemented as a
incident andassured Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F.
proper remedy for the situation at hand?
del Rosario that the United States will provide
appropriate compensation for damage to the reef caused
HELD:
by the ship. Petitioners claim that the grounding,
salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
1. No the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over US
Guardian caused and continue to cause environmental
respondents who did not submit any pleading or
damage that affected the provinces of Palawan, Antique,
manifestation. The matter deals with a sovereign nation
Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
and in the maxim “par in parem, non habet imperium”
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-
where all sovereign states are equals and thus cannot
Tawi, which violate their constitutional rights to a
assert jurisdiction over one another in which assertion of
balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a
jurisdiction may vex the peace among nations, the matter
directive from this Court for the institution of civil,
is one that should be dealt with the executive department
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in
due to its nature of dealing with another sovereign
38 | P a g e

nation thus may not be dealtwith judicially and the flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and
judiciary may not have jurisdiction concerning the US they will be liable for damages caused by their warships
respondents who did not submit any pleading or or any other government vessel operated for non-
manifestation. commercial purposes under Article 31.

2. Yes non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean 3. No, for in the VFA the US only waives its immunity
that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a concerning criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil
coastal state over its internal waters and territorial sea actions as is implemented in this case
The Court thus expects the US to bear “international
responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of

Guardian grounding which adversely affected the United States troops and personnel visiting the

Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our Philippines to promote “common security interests”

long-time ally and trading partner, which has been between the US and the Philippines in the region. It

actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of

vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to military personnel, and further defines the rights of the

compensate the damage caused by its warship while United States and the Philippine government in the

transiting our internal waters. Much less can the Court matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and

comprehend a Government exercising leadership in aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment,

international affairs, unwilling to comply with the materials and supplies.36

UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the

The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common
global task to protect and preserve the marine
law is thus improper considering that it is the VFA which
environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
governs disputes involving US military ships and crew

Article 197 - Cooperation on a global or regional basis navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as objectives of the agreement.As it is, the waiver of State

appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal

competent international organizations, in formulating jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the

and elaborating international rules, standards and present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.

recommended practices and procedures consistent with

4. No, for the concept of state immunity from suit does
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of
not allow another state to sue another state without its
the marine environment, taking into account
consent. Also the VFA only provides that the US will only
characteristic regional features.
waive its immunity concerning criminal jurisdiction and

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the the writ of Kalikasan which was implemented in this

present controversy is beyond dispute. situation is a special civil suit, which the US is immune
from.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of
warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only

navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions

be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
39 | P a g e

Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP.
7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be certain department heads and military officials to speak
filed separately: before the committee as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads
Sec. 17. Institution of separate actions.—The filing of a cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters
petition for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga
preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president,
administrative actions. excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly
and arrangements were already made and scheduled.
In any case, it is our considered view thata ruling on the
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
application or nonapplication ofcriminal jurisdiction
immediately.
provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior
would be premature and beyond the province of a officials of executive departments who in the judgment of
petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it the department heads are covered by the executive
unnecessary at this point to determine whether such privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP)
recovery of damages, including the collection of officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior
action charging the same violation of an environmental national security officials who in the judgment of the
law. National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined

A.3 SEPARATIONS OF POWERS by the President, from appearing in such hearings

conducted by Congress without first securing the
AND CHECKS AND BALANCES president’s approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were

14. Senate of the Philippines vs Executive Secretary Ermita
invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to
(495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled
Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
E.O. 464 attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring
military personnel from testifying before legislative
FACTS: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col.
transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s
conduct a public hearing to investigate the said constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
40 | P a g e

infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21
functions in the implementation of laws. and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part.
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information
To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the
that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains
SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI
oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
compel the appearance of executive officials under
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
basis in the principle of separation of powers.
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative information. When Congress exercises its power of
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
effectively in the absence of information respecting the themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
change; and where the legislative body does not itself department heads. Only one executive official may be
possess the requisite information – which is not exempted from this power — the President on whom
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
do possess it. Congress except through the power of impeachment. It
is based on her being the highest official of the executive
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to
standing custom. The requirement then to secure
or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.
very essential not only in the application of check and
For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22
appearance of department heads in the question hour is
refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be
refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if
in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A
instances to respect the refusal of the department head
distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was
41 | P a g e

is subsequently made, either by the President herself or merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420
by the Executive Secretary. reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability,
compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how of current ID systems of government entities under
department heads are implementing the statutes which it existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive
has issued, its right to such information is not as issuance and not an act of legislation.
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of 16. In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and
states that Congress may only request their appearance. the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012
requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under
Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same Facts: During the impeachment proceedings against
reasons stated in Arnault. Chief Justice Corona, the prosecution Panel manifested in
a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100
15. KMU vs. NEDA (GR no. 167798 April 19, 2006) witnesses which included Justices of the Supreme Court,
and Court officials and employees who will testify on
FACTS: In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal – matters internal to the Court and almost a thousand
Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all documents
government agencies and government-owned
corporations to streamline and harmonize their Letters were sent to the SC asking for the examination of
Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID records, and the issuance of certified true copies of the
data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations
efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and of various cases decided by the SC for purposes of the -
provide convenience to the people served by Impeachment Complaint. Subpoena Ad Testificandum et
government entities. Duces TecumAnd Subpoena Ad Testificandum were also
issued against Clerks of Court of the SC.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because
it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a
executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they court ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent
allege that EO420 infringes on the citizen’s rights to laws and of the Court’s rules and policies, we shall now
privacy. determine how the Court will comply with the subpoenas
and the letters of the Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
ISSUE: In issuing EO 420, did the president make, alter or
repeal any laws? Issue during discussion: What is Judicial Privilege?

RULING: Legislative power is the authority to make laws In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence
and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the prohibiting the revelation of confidential or “secret”
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but information that causes damage to public interest even in
judicial and other proceedings such as the sui generis
42 | P a g e

impeachment trial. As far as the Court is concerned, its administrative cases and criminal cases involving the
Members and officials involved in all proceedings are penalty of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict
duty-bound to observe the privileged communication confidentiality and where the raffle results are not
and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the disclosed even to the parties themselves.
administration of justice were to be preserved – i.e., not
even Members of the Court, on their own and without Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the actions

the consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters taken in each case in the Court’s agenda, which are

covered by the prohibitions and exclusions, particularly noted by the Chief Justice or the Division Chairman, are

with respect to matters pending resolution before the also to be treated with strict confidentiality. Only after the

Supreme Court. official release of the resolution embodying the Court

action may that action be made available to the public. A
Sub-issues: Whether or not Court Records are considered resolution is considered officially released once the
Confidential or priviliged. envelope containing its final copy, addressed to the
parties, has been transmitted to the process server for
As to Court Deliberations: personal service or to the mailing section of the Judicial
Records Office.
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official
records “create a hierarchy of rights that protect certain Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as
confidential relationships over and above the public’s privileged communication. Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC
evidentiary need” or “right to every man’s evidence.” provides:
Accordingly, certain information contained in the records
of cases before the Supreme Court are considered Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court
confidential and are exempt from disclosure. To reiterate, sessions are executive in character, with only the
the need arises from the dictates of the integrity of the Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are
Court’s decision-making function which may be affected confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside parties,
by the disclosure of information. except as may be provided herein or as authorized by
the Court. [emphasis ours]
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits
the disclosure of Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his
concurring opinion to the Court Resolution in Arroyo v.
(1) the result of the raffle of cases, De Lima13 (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on
confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included
“freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for
in the agenda of the Court’s session,
holding unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for
one’s comments. The privilege against disclosure of these
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on
kinds of information/communication is known as
cases and matters pending before it.
deliberative process privilege, involving as it does the

Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC10 declares that the results of deliberative process of reaching a decision. “Written

the raffle of cases shall only be available to the parties advice from a variety of individuals is an important

and their counsels, unless the cases involve bar matters, element of the government’s decision-making process
43 | P a g e

and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if same manner, a justice of the court or a judge may
courts forced the government to disclose those invoke judicial privilege in the Senate sitting as an
recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to prevent Impeachment Court, for proceedings in the performance
the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.” of his or her own judicial functions. What applies to
magistrates applies with equal force to court officials and
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in employees who are privy to these deliberations. They
passing recognized the claim of this privilege by the two may likewise claim exemption when asked about this
other branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates privileged information.
Authority17 (speaking through J. Carpio) when the Court
declared that - While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC cited above speaks
only of the confidentiality of court deliberations, it is
[t]he information x x x like internal deliberations of the understood that the rule extends to documents and
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive other communications which are part of or are related to
sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as the deliberative process. The deliberative process
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting
open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free that are component parts of the process for formulating
from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested governmental decisions and policies. Obviously, the
parties, is essential to protect the independence of privilege may also be claimed by other court officials and
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, employees when asked to act on these documents and
Legislative and Judicial power.18 (emphases ours) other communications.

Justice Brion noted this fact in his Separate Concurring The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel in fact provides
Opinion in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of that access shall be denied with respect to information or
Public Officers and Investigations: records relating to drafts of decisions, rulings, orders, or
internal memoranda or internal reports. In the 2007
19 Significantly, this type of privilege is not for the
Resolution on Access to Justice for the Poor Project, the
Executive to enjoy alone. All the great branches of
Court excluded the same information and records from
government are entitled to this treatment for their own
the public by classifying them as confidential:
decision and policy making conversations and
correspondence. It is unthinkable that the disclosure of Article 1. Definition of Terms.
internal debates and deliberations of the Supreme Court
or the executive sessions of either Houses of Congress 2. Confidential information generally refers to information
can be compelled at will by outside parties. [emphasis not yet made a matter of public record relating to
ours] pending cases, such as notes, drafts, research papers,
internal discussion, internal memoranda, records of
Thus, a Senator may invoke legislative privilege when he internal deliberations, and similar papers. Even after the
or she is questioned outside the Senate about decision, resolution, or order is made public, such
information gathered during an executive session of the information that a justice or judge uses in preparing a
Senate’s legislative inquiry in aid of legislation. In the
44 | P a g e

decision, resolution, or order shall remain confidential. of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory
[emphases ours] process:

To qualify for protection under the deliberative process (1) the disqualification by reason of privileged
privilege, the agency must show that the document is communication and
both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative.
(2) the pendency of an action or matter.
A document is “predecisional” under the deliberative
process privilege if it precedes, in temporal sequence, the The prohibition against disclosure of confidential

decision to which it relates. In other words, information is required to be observed by members of

communications are considered predecisional if they the Court under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for

were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion. the Philippine Judiciary. Section 9, Canon 4 (Propriety)
states:
A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects
the giveand- take of the consultative process. The key Section 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in

question in determining whether the material is their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for

deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

information would discourage candid discussion within [emphasis ours]

the agency. If the disclosure of the information would

This rule of judicial ethics complements the rule
expose the government’s decision making process in a
of evidence that disqualifies public officials from testifying
way that discourages candid discussion among the
on information they acquire in confidence in the course
decision-makers (thereby undermining the courts’ ability
of their duties:
to perform their functions), the information is deemed
privileged.
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24. Disqualification by
reason of privileged communication. – The following
Court records which are “predecisional” and
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
“deliberative” in nature are thus protected and cannot be
confidence in the following cases:
the subject of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be
preserved. The privilege in general insulates the Judiciary
xxxx
from an improper intrusion into the functions of the
judicial branch and shields justices, judges, and court (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term
officials and employees from public scrutiny or the of office or afterwards, as to communications made to
pressure of public opinion that would impair a judge’s him in official confidence, when the court finds that the
ability to render impartial decisions. The deliberative public interest would suffer by the disclosure. [emphasis
process can be impaired by undue exposure of the ours]
decision-making process to public scrutiny before or
even after the decision is made, as discussed below. Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may
not be compelled to testify in the impeachment
Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members
access to court records, as well as preventing members of the Court about information they acquired in the
45 | P a g e

performance of their official function of adjudication, These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and
such as information on how deliberations were are for the Supreme Court (as the representative and
conducted or the material inputs that the justices used in entity speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the
decision-making, because the end-result would be the individual justice, judge, or court official or employees to
disclosure of confidential information that could subject waive. Thus, every proposed waiver must be referred to
them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial the Supreme Court for its consideration and approval.
privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it
pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence

adjudication. prohibiting the revelation of confidential or “secret”

information that causes damage to public interest even in
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be judicial and other proceedings such as the sui generis
subject to any compulsory process in relation to the impeachment trial. As far as the Court is concerned, its
performance of their adjudicatory functions. In Senate of Members and officials involved in all proceedings are
the Philippines v. Exec. Sec. Ermita,31 the Court declared duty-bound to observe the privileged communication
that members of the Supreme Court are also exempt and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the
from [the Congress’] power of inquiry [in aid of administration of justice were to be preserved – i.e., not
legislation]. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested even Members of the Court, on their own and without
in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is the consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters
exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but covered by the prohibitions and exclusions, particularly
also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional with respect to matters pending resolution before the
independence of the judiciary. Supreme Court.

This ruling was dictated in no small measure by the To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot
principle of comity mentioned above. Inter-departmental be compelled to testify on matters relating to the internal
courtesy demands that the highest levels of each deliberations and actions of the Court, in the exercise of
department be exempt from the compulsory processes their adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be
of the other departments on matters related to the differentiated from a situation where the testimony is on
functions and duties of their office. a matter which is external to their adjudicatory functions
and duties.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same
rules on confidentiality that apply to justices and judges As to Court Records: As a penultimate point, witnesses
apply to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the need not be summoned to testify on matters of public
result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the record. These are the records that a government unit is
Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court’s required by law to keep or which it is compelled to keep
session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court in the discharge of duties imposed by law. A record is a
sessions on cases and matters pending before it. They public record within the purview of a statute providing
are subject as well to the disqualification by reason of that books and records required by law to be kept by a
privileged communication and the sub judice rule. As clerk may be received in evidence in any court if it is a
stated above, these rules extend to documents and other record which a public officer is required to keep and if it
communications which cannot be disclosed. is filled in such a manner that it is subject to public
46 | P a g e

inspection. Under the Rules of Court, the rule on public As a last point and mainly for purposes of stress, the
records is embodied in Section 44, Rule 130. privileges discussed above that apply to justices and
judges apply mutatis mutandis to court officials and
To restate the rule, entries in official records may be employees with respect to their official functions. If the
presented without the necessity of presenting in court intent only is for them to identify and certify to the
the officer or person who made the entries. Entries in existence and genuineness of documents within their
public or official books or records may be proved by the custody or control that are not otherwise confidential or
production of the books or records themselves or by a privileged under the above discussed rules, their
copy certified by the legal keeper thereof. These records, presence before the Impeachment Court can be and
however, may be presented and marked in evidence only should be excused where certified copies of these non-
where they are not excluded by reasons of privilege and privileged and non-confidential documents can be
the other reasons discussed above. provided.

The reasons for this rule are necessity and

17. Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic of the
trustworthiness. Necessity consists in the inconvenience Philippines
and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a
witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the Civil Law – Equity – Change of Name – Change of Sex –
course of his duty. A public officer is excused from Marriage
appearing in court in order that public business may not
be interrupted, hampered or delayed. Where there is no FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male
exception for official statements, hosts of officials would transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a
be found devoting the greater part of their time male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment
attending as witnesses in court, delivering their in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful – he
deposition before an officer. Trustworthiness is a reason (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed
because of the presumption of regularity of performance a petition for the change of his first name (from Rommel
of official duty. The law reposes a particular confidence in to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth
public officers that it presumes that they will discharge certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC.
their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and He wanted to make these changes, among others, so
therefore, whatever acts they do in the discharge of their that he can marry his American fiancé.
public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken
to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it

and circumstances of each case may appear to require. should be granted based on equity; that Silverio’s

Thus, “[t]he trustworthiness of public documents and the misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own

value given to the entries made therein could be doing and should not be in any way taken against him;

grounded on: 1) the sense of official duty in the that there was no opposition to his petition (even the

preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which OSG did not make any basis for opposition at this point);

is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to

and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) anybody or the community in granting the petition. On

the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-

exposure of such errors as might have occurred.”

47 | P a g e

awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he
and the realization of their dreams. merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.

Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before Issue on the change of sex
the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and the regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry.
first name in the birth certificate may be changed on the Not with the courts because there is no law to support it.
ground of gender re-assignment. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical
error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of but right that the entry written in his birth certificate is
such entries finds no support in existing legislation. that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician
Issue on the change of first name
or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made
CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
immutable.
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR
CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial
registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the change legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will
of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned is marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed man with another man who has undergone sex
properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
of name may only be grounded on the following: Code on employment of women, certain felonies under
the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the
write or pronounce;
public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually
granted.
and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to
community; or
confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment
the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
48 | P a g e

his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that vs.
privilege.”
FLORENCIO M. REYES, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, and RENE

DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
18. REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON
A.M. No. P-08-2535. June 23, 2010.
GR # 166429, December 19, 2005 (Constitutional Law –
Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation) FACTS: Judge Sta. Romana of Branch 31 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, requested the
FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and
Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office (CLO) to
the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc
(PIATCO) was nullified. conduct a drug test on Rene De Guzman, clerk of his
court, for the latter’s alleged irresponsibility and queer
Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate
behavior. The results from the CLO yielded a positive
operation, the Government, through expropriation filed a
result of drug use on the part of De Guzman.
petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending
Thereafter, a complaint for gross misconduct filed against
that a mere deposit of the assessed value of the
property with an authorized government depository is him, where it was alleged that

enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the • Judge Romana would often have to remind him
Rules of Court). about the transmittal of records of appealed cases for

more than a dozen times as he was in charge of the

However, respondents avers that before an entitlement
preparation and transmission of the records on appeal
of the writ of possession is issued, direct payment of just
• De Guzman would just dismiss the subject in
compensation must be made to the builders of the
facilities, citing RA No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence ridicule and with the empty assurance that the task is as

(2004 Resolution). good as finished

• He did not transmit the records of PP v. Mangan
ISSUE: WON expropriation can be conducted by mere
• The following matters what was probably
deposit of the assessed value of the property.
prompted Judge Sta. Romana to have De Guzman

HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of undergo a drug test

writ of possession is issued only after direct payment of On September 2007, the Court required De Guzman to
just compensation is given to property owner on the comment on the charge of misconduct relative to the
basis of fairness. The same principle applied in the 2004
alleged use of prohibited drugs. Notwithstanding, De
Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law
Guzman failed to file his comment. De Guzman complied
(RA No. 8974).
with the Court’s directive only on March, 2008 claiming

19. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. REYES, that he failed to comply because he lost a copy of the

621 SCRA 511 (2010). resolution. De Guzman’s comment was referred to the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, to

49 | P a g e

which the OCA submitted a recommendation of De submitted the affidavit of Caoile. Similarly, we also

Guzman’s dismissal from the service. required De Guzman to file his comment within 10 days
from notice as regards the allegation that he was using

ISSUE: Whether de Guzman should be dismissed from prohibited drugs. However, he again ignored our
service directive as contained in the Resolution of September 17,
2007. Thus, on January 23, 2008, we required him to

RULING: We adopt the findings and recommendation of show cause why he should not be held in contempt for
the OCA. such failure. By way of explanation, De Guzman
submitted a letter dated March 12, 2008 wherein he

MINOR ISSUES: We note that De Guzman is adept at claimed that he failed to file his comment on the charge
ignoring the Court’s directives. of misconduct because he allegedly lost his copy of the
said September 17, 2007 Resolution.Finally, on August 27,
REASON of the COURT: In his letter-explanation in the 2008, we required De Guzman to manifest whether he is

administrative matter relative to the delay in the willing to submit the case for resolution based on the
transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 1144-G, he pleadings submitted. As before, he failed to comply with
requested for a period of 10 days or until November 15, the same. As correctly observed by the OCA, De Guzman

2004 within which to submit the Affidavit of George has shown his propensity to defy the directives of this

Caoile (Caoile), the retired Stenographer, as part of his Court.

comment. However, despite the lapse of five months, De

Guzman still failed to submit Caoile’s affidavit. De Guzman’s use of prohibited drugs has greatly affected

Subsequently, we furnished him with a copy of the April his efficiency in the performance of his functions. De

18, 2005 Resolution wherein we mentioned that we are Guzman did not refute the observation of his superior,
awaiting his submission of the affidavit of Caoile which Judge Sta. Romana, that as a criminal docket court clerk,
shall be considered as part of his (De Guzman’s) he (De Guzman) was totally inept and incompetent.
comment. Hence, to get across his displeasure and dissatisfaction
with his job performance, Judge Sta. Romana gave De

Nine months from the time he undertook to submit the Guzman an unsatisfactory rating. Moreover, De Guzman’s
affidavit of Caoile, De Guzman has yet to comply with his efficiency as a custodian of court records is also totally

undertaking. Thus, on August 10, 2005, we required De wanting.

Guzman to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such In the same vein, Reyes also put forth the absurd
failure. Unfortunately, De Guzman merely ignored our behavioral manifestations of De Guzman. According to
show cause order. Finally, on January 24, 2007, or after Reyes, Judge Sta. Romana would always remind De

the lapse of one year and two months, De Guzman Guzman to prepare and transmit the complete records of
50 | P a g e

the appealed cases. However, De Guzman would only time to punish and atime to give a chance for contrition

make empty assurances to perform his task. and change.

Notwithstanding the reminders of his superiors, De

Guzman would still fail to transmit the records. Instead, However, the legislative policy as embodied in Republic
he would report the next day and jubilantly declare that Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort
the problem has been solved at last. to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment

must be considered in light of this Court’s constitutional

In fine, we agree with the OCA that by his repeated and power of administrative supervision over courts and court
contumacious conduct of disrespecting the personnel. The legislative power imposing policies

Court’sdirectives, De Guzman is guilty of gross through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the
misconduct and has already forfeited his privilege of substantive and constitutional limitations that set
being an employee of the Court. Likewise, we can no parameters both in the exercise of the power itself and
longer countenance his manifestations of queer behavior, the allowable subjects of legislation.

bordering on absurd, irrational and irresponsible,

because it has greatly affected his job performance and As such, it cannot limit the Court’s power to impose
efficiency. By using prohibited drugs, and being a front- disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and

line representative of the Judiciary, De Guzman has court personnel. Neither should such policy be used to

exposed to risk the very institution which he serves. It is restrict the Court’s power to preserve and maintain the

only by weeding out the likes of De Guzman from the Judiciary’s honor, dignity and integrity and public
ranks that we would be able to preserve the integrity of confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict

this institution. and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing

the conduct of justices, judges and court employees.

MAJOR ISSUE (related to separation of powers): Likewise, we cannot subscribe to the idea that De
Two justices disagree with the majority opinion. They Guzman’s irrational behavior stems solely from his being
opine that the Court’s action in this case contravenes a drug user. Such queer behavior can be attributed to
anexpress public policy, i.e., "imprisonment for drug several factors. However, it cannot by any measure be

dealers and pushers, rehabilitation for their victims." They categorically stated at this point that it can be attributed
alsoposit that De Guzman’s failure to properly perform solely to his being a drug user. Finally, it must be

his duties and promptly respond to Court orders emphasized at this juncture that De Guzman’s dismissal is
precisely springsfrom his drug addiction that requires not grounded only on his being a drug user. His outright
rehabilitation. Finally, they state that the Court’s real dismissal from the service is likewise anchored on his
strength is not in itsrighteousness but in its willingness to contumacious and repeated acts of not heeding the
understand that men are not perfect and that there is a directives of this Court. As we have already stated, such

attitude betrays not only a recalcitrant streak of character,

51 | P a g e

but also disrespect for the lawful orders and directives of RULING: NO. Shari’a Circuit Court which, under the Code

the Court. of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code)

20. BAGUAN M. MAMISCAL v. CLERK OF COURT enjoys exclusive original jurisdiction to resolve disputes

MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH, SHARI'A relating to divorce.

CIRCUIT COURT, MARAWI CITY

The civil registrar is the person charged by law for the

A.M. No.SCC-13-18-J, July 1, 2015, SECOND DIVISION recording of vital events and other documents affecting

(Mendoza, J.) the civil status of persons. The Civil Registry Law
embraces all acts of civil life affecting the status of

FACTS: Mamiscal and Adelaidah decided to have divorce persons and is applicable to all persons residing in the

repudiated Adelaidahs (talaq) embodied in an agreement Philippines. Under Article

(kapasadan) but later on they reconciled. Despite such, 185 of the Muslim Code provides that neglect of duty by

Adelaidah still filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD) with registrars. Any district registrar or circuit registrar who

the office of Abdullah for registration. Albeit the same fails to perform properly his duties in accordance with

was not signed by Mamiscal it was annotated in the this Code shall be penalized in accordance with Section

certificate that it was executed in the presence of two 18 of Act 3753 states that “any local registrar who fails to

witnesses and in accordance with Islamic Law. Abdullah properly perform his duties in accordance with the

then issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce provisions of this Act and of the regulations issued

finalizing the same. It was opposed through a motion by hereunder, shall be punished for the first offense, by an

Mamiscal contended that the kapasadan and the COD administrative fine in a sum equal to his salary for not less

was invalid because he did not prepare such and that than fifteen days nor more than three months, and for a

there were no witnesses to its execution but it was denied second or repeated offense, by removal from the

by Abdullah opined that it was his ministerial duty to service.”

receive the COD and the attached kapasadan. Mamiscal

then filed a complaint with the SC against Abdullah Prescinding from the foregoing, it becomes apparent that

charging the same with partiality, violation of due SC Court does not have jurisdiction to

process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a court impose the proper disciplinary action against civil

employee. registrars. While he is undoubtedly a member of the

Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the Shari'a Circuit Court, a

ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review of the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal

impose administrative sanction against Abdullah for his seeks to hold Abdullah liable for registering the divorce

acts? and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as Circuit

Registrar of Muslim divorces. It has been said that the

test of jurisdiction is the nature of the offense and not the

52 | P a g e

personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for

charges Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a court prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the
employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the rule that President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the

what controls is not the designation of the offense but ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances empowered the
the actual facts recited in the complaint. Verily, unless DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to
jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, seize the regional government’s powers. They also

no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it. claimed that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province
of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no

critical violent incidents occurred and that the

deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM
constitutes an invalid exercise of the President’s

A.4 DELEGATION OF POWERS emergency powers.

21. AMPATUAN v. PUNO

Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs
G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011, EN BANC (Abad, J.)
273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.

FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the

ISSUES: 1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and
Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued
273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under the
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of
Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of

Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised
AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273
City
“transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of
the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her
273-A, which amended the former AO (the term
actions
“transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”,
referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).
RULING:

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on

1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG
the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy
Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the
Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-
53 | P a g e

ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the 3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or

respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged suppress lawless violence springs from
complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of

Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated the Constitution, which provides:
post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession
found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-

Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary therefore did to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or

not take over the administration or the operations of the rebellion.

ARMM.
xxx
2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of

emergency powers as understood under Section While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the

emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President

President, for a limited period and subject to such that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and

necessary and proper to carry out a declared national suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such

policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.
adjournment thereof. Thus, the Court said:

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the

only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. assertion that the President acted without factual basis,
And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by then this Court cannot undertake an independent

Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable
suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that and cannot be objectively established since matters
the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. several factors which are not always accessible to the

courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the

54 | P a g e

court may use to judge necessity, information necessary sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s

to arrive at such judgment might also prove fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent preventive action. She called out the armed forces to

information might be difficult to verify, or wholly control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle
unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence the armed groups that continuously threatened the
upon which the President might decide that there is a peace and security in the affected places.

need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not

constituting technical proof. On the other hand, the Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence proclamation of state of emergency in the subject places

network to gather information, some of which may be and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual
the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions.
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency

situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass 22. Southern Cross Cement Corp vs Philippine Cement
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out Manufacturers’ Corporation
the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must

be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect FACTS: Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation
at all. x x x. (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of cement manufacturing, production,
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a importation and exportation. Private respondent
state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic cement
President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from
factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland
under the ARMM were placed under a state of cement in increased quantities has caused declines in
emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire domestic production, capacity utilization, market share,
ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too. sales and employment; as well as caused depressed local
prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition a
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement
President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act.
ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed
and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI
also indicated that there was movement in these places for a formal investigation to determine whether or not to
of both highpowered firearms and armed men
55 | P a g e

impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of for it is on the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that the SMA

gray Portland cement conferred jurisdiction to review rulings of the Secretary in

connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.

Tariff Commission’s report: The elements of serious injury

and imminent threat of serious injury not having been ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the
established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive case which is concerned with imposition of safeguard

general safeguard measure be imposed on the measures

importation of gray Portland cement
RULING: CTA has jurisdiction. Under Section 29 of the

After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel SMA, there are three requisites to enable the CTA to
Roxas II (DTI Secretary) disagreed with the conclusion of acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review
the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to contemplated therein: (i) there must be a ruling by the
the local cement industry caused by the surge of imports. DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an

In view of this disagreement, the DTI requested an interested party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii)
opinion from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the DTI such ruling must be in connection with the imposition of
Secretarys scope of options in acting on the Commissions a safeguard measure. The first two requisites are clearly

recommendations. present. The third requisite deserves closer scrutiny.

Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez Contrary to the stance of the public respondents and
rendered an opinion stating that Section 13 of the SMA Philcemcor, in this case where the DTI Secretary decides

precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff not to impose a safeguard measure, it is the CTA which

Commissions negative finding, or finding that a definitive has jurisdiction to review his decision. The reasons are as
safeguard measure should not be imposed. follows:

DTI then denied application for safeguard measures First. Split jurisdiction is abhorred. The law expressly
against the importation of gray Portland cement confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized

competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of

Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 judicial review without mention of any other court that

April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with the Court of may exercise corollary or ancillary jurisdiction in relation
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and to the SMA.
Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well
as the Tariff Commissions Report. On the other hand, Second. The interpretation of the provisions of the SMA
Southern Cross filed its Comment arguing that the Court favors vesting untrammeled appellate jurisdiction on the

of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, CTA.

56 | P a g e

558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation –

A plain reading of Section 29 of the SMA reveals that Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) –
Congress did not expressly bar the CTA from reviewing a Population Requirement

negative determination by the DTI Secretary nor

conferred on the Court of Appeals such review authority. FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM.
Respondents note, on the other hand, that neither did Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but

the law expressly grant to the CTA the power to review a it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted
negative determination. However, under the clear text of against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.
the law, the CTA is vested with jurisdiction to review the Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st

ruling of the DTI Secretary in connection with the legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other
imposition of a safeguard measure. Had the law been municipalities.
couched instead to incorporate the phrase the ruling
imposing a safeguard measure, then respondents claim A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic

would have indisputable merit. Undoubtedly, the phrase Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
in connection with not only qualifies but clarifies the municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law,
succeeding phrase imposition of a safeguard measure. As the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan

expounded later, the phrase also encompasses the (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised

opposite or converse ruling which is the non-imposition of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao

of a safeguard measure. with the exception of Cotabato City.

Third. Interpretatio Talis In Ambiguis Semper Fienda Est, For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially

Ut Evitur Inconveniens Et Absurdum. stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato
City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this
Even assuming arguendo that Section 29 has not stating that status quo should be retained; however, just
expressly granted the CTA jurisdiction to review a for the purposes of the elections, the first district should
negative ruling of the DTI Secretary, the Court is be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is

precluded from favoring an interpretation that would also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress
cause inconvenience and absurdity. Adopting the as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of

respondents position favoring the CTAs minimal any).

jurisdiction would unnecessarily lead to illogical and

onerous results. Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the

23. Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st
district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City

should be a separate legislative district and that votes

57 | P a g e

therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third,

because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the

Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), There is neither an express prohibition nor an express
that province automatically gains legislative grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power

Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of to create local government units. However, under its
a representative in the HOR. plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In
the legislative district is not affected and so is its fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
representation. city and municipal councils, the power to create

barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. with the criteria established in the Local Government
Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10,

Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of

the Constitution, which provides: Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a

population of at least 250k, and that a province, once

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may created, should have at least one representative in the
be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said
established in the local government code and subject to district. Cotabato City did not meet the population
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the

the political units directly affected. other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of
S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government But this can never be legally possible because the
units province, city, municipality or barangay must creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays
government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the not cities and provinces.
Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not

24. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association v. NPC

58 | P a g e

capacities, the present Petition for Injunction to restrain

(Corporate Acts of the NPC Done by Duly Authorized respondents from implementing NPB Resolution Nos.
Board Members) 2002-124 and 2002- 125.

FACTS: On June 8, 2001, Republic Act 9136, otherwise ISSUE: Whether or not NPB Resolution Nos. 2002-124
known as the “Electric Power Industry Reform Act of and 2002-125 were properly enacted.

2001” (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It took effect on 26 RULING: The Court’s Decision, written by Justice Minita V.
June 2001. Chico-Nazario,[5] held that the Resolutions were invalid,

because they lacked the necessary number of votes for

Under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,[2] a new National their adoption.
Power Board (NPB) of Directors was formed. An energy
restructuring committee (Restructuring Committee) was Under Section 48, the power to exercise judgment and

also created to manage the privatization and the discretion in running the affairs of the NPC was vested by
restructuring of the National Power Corporation (NPC), the legislature upon the persons composing the National
the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and Power Board of Directors. When applied to public

the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation functionaries, discretion refers to a power or right

(PSALC). conferred upon them by law, consisting of acting officially

in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their

On November 18 , 2002, pursuant to Section 63[3] of the own judgment and conscience, and uncontrolled by the

EPIRA Law and Rule 33[4] of the Implementing Rules and judgment or conscience of others.

Regulations (IRR), the NPB passed NPB Resolution No.

2002-124, which provided for “Guidelines on the Presumably, in naming the respective department heads
Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and as members of the board of directors, the legislature
Placement of Personnel.” Under this Resolution, the chose these secretaries of the various executive
services of all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated departments on the basis of their personal qualifications

on January 31, 2003, and shall be entitled to separation and acumen that had made them eligible to occupy their
benefits provided therein. On the same day, the NPB present positions as department heads. Thus, the

approved NPB Resolution 2002-125, constituting a department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as
Transition Team to manage and implement the NPC’s members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and
Separation Program. approve board resolutions. Their personal judgments are
what they must exercise in the fulfillment of their
Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions were void, responsibilities.

petitioners filed, in their individual and representative

59 | P a g e

There was no question that the enactment of the assailed FACTS: Deutsche Bank is an international bank which has

Resolutions involved the exercise of discretion, not its branch in Manila and is based on Germany while CIR is
merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed the head of BIR. a government agency.

by a delegate.
There was a tax treaty which provides a preferential tax
Respondents’ reliance on American Tobacco Company v. rate of 10% Branch Profit Remittance Tax (BPRT) instead

Director of Patents[6] was misplaced. The Court explicitly of the regular 15% imposed under the tax code.
stated in that case that, in exercising their own judgment ·
and discretion, administrative officers were not prevented To prevent erroneous applications for relief of a tax

from using the help of subordinates as a matter of treaty, BIR issued a memorandum (RMO 1-2000) which
practical administrative procedure. Officers could seek requires a filing of application for tax treaty relief with its
such aid, as long as the legally authorized official was the International Tax Affairs Division 15 days before the
one who would make the final decision through the use transaction.

of personal judgment. The tax refund was denied in the lower court due to
Deutsche’s failure to file an application for tax treaty
In the present case, it is not difficult to comprehend that relief.

in approving NPB Resolutions 2002-124 and 2002-125, it

is the representatives of the secretaries of the different ISSUE: Is the Revenue Memorandum Order (or the filing

executive departments and not the secretaries of application for tax treaty relief valid?)
themselves who exercised judgment in passing the

assailed Resolution. This action violates the duty imposed RULING: NO. The BIR must not impose additional

upon the specifically enumerated department heads to requirements that would negate the availment of a relief
employ their own sound discretion in exercising the provided for under international agreements.
corporate powers of the NPC.
The failure to strictly comply with the RMO does not
deprive the Bank of the benefits under the RP-Germany
A.5 STATE PRINCIPLES AND treaty.

POLICIES
In case of tax treaties, their purpose is to avoid
simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions or the
25. Deutsche Bank AG Manila v. Commissioner of Internal
occurrence of international double taxation.
RevenueG.R. 188550

26. Imbong vs Ochoa

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Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; protection against hazardous products.

Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 involuntary servitude.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for law.
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the
and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners, The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s
vs. family protected by the Constitution

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,

HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power

Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. of judicial review over the controversy.

LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture

and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Power of Judicial Review
Department of Interior and Local Government, Actual Case or Controversy

Respondents. Facial Challenge

Locus Standi
Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as Declaratory Relief
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act One Subject/One Title Rule
of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012. Issue/s:

Challengers from various sectors of society are SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
on the following grounds:
Right to life
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Right to health

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

61 | P a g e

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief

Freedom of expression and academic freedom through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
Due process clause from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a

Equal protection clause hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement

Prohibition against involuntary servitude of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act

being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the

PROCEDURAL: individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has

review over the controversy. then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture, and the
Actual Case or Controversy petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
Facial Challenge threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged

Locus Standi action. He must show that he has sustained or is

Declaratory Relief immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
One Subject/One Title Rule a result of the act complained of

Discussions: Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First

Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail

PROCEDURAL the validity of statutes concerning not only protected

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.

the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but

must be the lis mota of the case. component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means externalized.

an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as
decision of the court would amount to an advisory a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result

theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
62 | P a g e

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to

assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

depends for illumination of difficult constitutional imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
questions. office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the this view, the court in passing upon the question of
doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses

plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties
when the public interest so requires, such as when the just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for

partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The

the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, valid portion can stand independently as law.

fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute

details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the

title is comprehensive enough as to include the general Ruling/s:

object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as SUBSTANTIAL

here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that
as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one individual Members could express their own views on this

subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title matter.
of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State

person reading it would not be informed of the purpose recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
one subject where another or different one is really and the life of the unborn from conception.”
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or

indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

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In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or

construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR)

is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
support the view that conception begins at fertilization. that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
“conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives

for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729
the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe

female ovum, and those that similarly take action before contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
constitutionally permissible. DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the

contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the

protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The devices will be done following a prescription of a

Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in qualified medical practitioner.

line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is
using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices
4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and

womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum effective”.

already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to

protect it. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as However, the Court has the authority to determine

abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion

64 | P a g e

whether or not the RH Law contravenes the which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of

Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of
without being dictated upon the policies of any one Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their

restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental

thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical
enhance its population control program through the RH procedures.”
Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners. However, a minor may receive information (as opposed

to procedures) about family planning services. Parents

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH are not deprived of parental guidance and control over
procedures even with only the consent of the spouse their minor child in this situation and may assist her in

undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), deciding whether to accept or reject the information

intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-

against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the threatening procedures.
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV

of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of

right of spouses to found a family in accordance with Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
their religious convictions and the demands of provide Age-and Development-Appropriate
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or Reproductive Health Education. Although educators
family associations to participate in the planning and might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
implementation of policies and programs that affect education program, the Court reserves its judgment

them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual should an actual case be filed before it.
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because

marriage and the family. the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor education.
undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more

and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, importance on the role of parents in the development of
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their children with the use of the term “primary”. The The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used

right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
that of the State. “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice

and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and the nature and effect of programs and services on
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather reproductive health.

than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the

moral development of their children. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,

school officials, and other interest groups in developing Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall

of the petitioners. endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law

the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are

observed by the petitioners are not vague. suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.

The definition of “private health care service provider” In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law children a couple may have and does not impose

which defines a “public health service provider”. The conditions upon couples who intend to have children.

“private health care institution” cited under Section 7 The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
should be seen as synonymous to “private health care
service provider. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom

enough to include providing of information and of private educational institutions especially with respect
rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity

operated by religious groups are exempted from towards the teaching of reproductive health education
rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private
well as from giving RH information and procedures. and non-government health care service providers to
render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not

amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First,

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the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating

interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
to control and regulate it in order to protect and some modifications. While the Court has withheld the

promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it
encourages private and non-government RH service has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth regulating free speech, but also those involving religious

accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
otherwise. reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded

jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

PROCEDURAL on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution

controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty

determination. Considering that the RH Law and its to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

implementing rules have already taken effect and that Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already have seriously alleged that the constitutional human

been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental

present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when rights mentioned above have been violated by the
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there

because medical practitioners or medical providers are in exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only

for vague violations thereof, particularly public health when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the detriment of the Filipino people.
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter now. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be
assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court

has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi

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requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill

to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
interest affected by a Government act, provided a provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive

constitutional issue of transcendental importance is health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural and germane to the overriding objective to control the
technicality which the Court has, on more than one population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of

occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional Section 2 of the RH Law:

plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may guarantees the human rights of all persons including

not have been directly injured by the operation of a law their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
or any other government act. rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
The present action cannot be properly treated as a right to health which includes reproductive health, the
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of right to education and information, and the right to

the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues the demands of responsible parenthood.

raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the

social and moral well being of this nation, specially the Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive

youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well- attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human

entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds

inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
strict and rigid application, which would result in legislation.
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT

UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and following provisions which are declared

so the Court would just consider them as petitions for UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications 1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned

and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not

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in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the

under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor- punish any public officer who refuses to support

parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
access to modem methods of family planning without hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
written consent from their parents or guardian/s; program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-
RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive

punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or health service in so far as they affect the conscientious
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs. 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which

added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore,
the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law

in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive 27. REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS (G.R. NO. 198780; OCTOBER 16,
health procedures without the consent of the spouse; 2013)
FACTS: On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a
the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of

her marriage with Fringer, alleging that immediately after

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in their marriage, they separated and never lived as
the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as husband and wife because they never really had any
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails intention of entering into a married state or complying
and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or with any of their essential marital obligations.
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit
regardless of his or her religious beliefs; her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her
counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
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attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,

schedule. therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or

existence of a marriage.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC

opined that the parties married each other for In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which
convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the

Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980

she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized
never processed her petition for citizenship that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a nonsubsisting one.
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed

the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be
consent was lacking. valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely given consent

ISSUE: Is a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of requires that the contracting parties willingly and

acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be

ground of lack of consent? real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45

HELD: In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,

and Naturalization Service, established the principal test intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
for determining the presence of marriage fraud in conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
bride and groom did not intend to establish a life both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their
together at the time they were married.This standard was act.

modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent

the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
not ntered into for the purpose of evading the vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, intelligent as they understood the nature and the
shifted from determining the intention to establish a life beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
together, to determining the intention of evading marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That

immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
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conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship

through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they

willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There

was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid

marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
an application for citizenship. There was a full and

complete understanding of the legal tie that would be

created between them, since it was that precise legal tie

which was necessary to accomplish their goal. GRANTED.