San Beda College of Law

Mendiola, Manila

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Rules of Construction of Doubts in the Constitution

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997]

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and

administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in
every statute and contract.

Concept of Self-Executing Provisions

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and

principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out
the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been

generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -

x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-

executing rather than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing
to pass the needed implementing statute.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives [G.R. No. 160261, Nov 10, 2003]

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles
of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search

for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance
and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And
so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38
in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention

underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through
Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that
the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel
Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not

have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also
affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted,
if not willed, that said provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.43
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed
that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that

no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of
the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should
be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction,
the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other
aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and

proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
 of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Effectivity of the 1987 Constitution

De Leon vs. Esguerra [G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987]

1987 CONSTITUTION; DATE OF RATIFICATION; RETROACTS ON THE DAY OF THE

PLEBISCITE. — The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date that the plebiscite for its
ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the date its
ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the
Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino. The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution
should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification shall have been
ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it."
This view was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but
was withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view
that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the plebiscite." The record
of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the
Court's judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the
Constitutional Commission in unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor
and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people.
So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the
votes] is merely the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date
of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely the official
confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in
adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the
Constitution took effect on the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on March 25,
1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the
same date February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987,
absent any saying clause to the contrary in the Transitory Article of the
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to
replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence,
the attempted replacement of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation
on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no longer produce any legal force and
effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period expiring on
March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this
period was shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the
Constitution. Had the intention of the framers of the Constitution been otherwise,
they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed they provided
for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g.
extension of the six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to
noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections, the continued
exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the convening of the
first Congress, etc.
The Power to Amend the Constitution is not included in the General Legislative
Power

Gonzales vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967]

NATURE OF POWER TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION. — The power to amend the

Constitution or to propose, amendments thereto is not included in the general grant
of legislative powers to Congress (Sec. 1, Art, VI, Const.) It is part of the inherent
powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such
as ours (Sec. 1, Art. II, Const.) — to make and hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power (Sec. 1, Art. XV, Const.). Hence,
when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the
very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

POWER OF THE COURT TO REVIEW THE EXERCISE OF THIS POWER BY THE

CONGRESS. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as
a constituent assembly — violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view
may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, the latter
should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous
on this point.

THE CONGRESS, ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY MAY DIRECTLY PROPOSE

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY CALL A
CONSITUTIONAL CONVENTION TO PROPOSE THE NEEDED AMMENDMENTS. Atty.
Juan T. David, as amicus curiae maintains that Congress may either propose
amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it cannot
do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2)
alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is,
however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances — and none has been
brought to our attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae.
In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa,
when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.

It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
constitutional provisions on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification
on November 14, 1967, whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to
consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words,
the subject- matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3.
Moreover, the amendments proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted
for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R.B.H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3)
resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote
separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the
same time.

In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof,
anything that would negate the contested of different Congresses to approve the
contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in different
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to
propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention,
instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for
ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be
conceded, but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not
its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof is to permit Members of
Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and
participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress.
Whether or nothing should be done is a political question, not subject to review by
the courts of justice.

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION MAY BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY IN A

GENERAL ELECTION. There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the
"election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general election. The circumstance
that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the
people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its
authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed

amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of
the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact that an adequate
appraisal of the merits and demerits of proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of
personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial and
municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed
to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public
officers. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as
implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the above-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when we
consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of
candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V
of the Constitution concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but
"plebiscite."

Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the
Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election Some members of
the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any
"election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional
amendments are, in general, if not always, of such importance, if not
transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may
reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of
the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not
insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to
affect the selection of elective officials.

This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which

should be promoted. The ideal conditions, are, however, one thing. The question
whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the
people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those
who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to
subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe
is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since
 Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]

THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS A PURELY

JUSTICEABLE CONTROVERSY. - The Solicitor General would consider the question
at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review. We
disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a
judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency
to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally
exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory
Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active
session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of
the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure
for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos.
991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of
legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is
plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section
2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.
. . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties
and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other
powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited
power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine
whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity
of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to
perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of
vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori
not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people

SINCE THE PRESIDENT, UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, MAY EXERCISE

LEGISLATIVE POWER, HE MAY LIKEWISE THEREFORE, PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION. - As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is
constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition
period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed
to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment,
the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the
people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special
call by the President (Sec. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the
dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the
President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his
assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President
has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly,
there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar,
to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has
converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted
by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and
only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf
of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its
very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose
amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from
that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the
governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a
destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end
the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential
initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns
supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the
President now, are mere agents of the people.

Imbong vs. Ferrer, COMELEC [G.R. No. L-32432, September 11, 1970]

THE CONGRESS, ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, MAY PROPOSE

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, AND EXERCISING ITS GENERAL
LEGISLATIVE POWER, PROVIDE FOR THE DETAILS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION. — The constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132 by Congress
must be upheld for the following reasons: 1) Congress, acting as Constituent
Assembly pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, has authority to propose
constitutional amendments or call a convention for the purpose by 3/4 votes of
each house in joint session assembled but voting separately; 2) Such grant includes
all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power by
necessary implication; 3) Implementing details are within the authority of Congress
not only as a Constituent Assembly but also in the exercise of its comprehensive
legislative power so long as it does not contravene any provision of the
Constitution; and 4) Congress as a legislative body may thus enact necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as a Constituent
Assembly omitted.
 Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the
required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to

call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of
necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of
the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications,
number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as
appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and
for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other
implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos.
2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details, except the
appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the

present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which
are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132,
does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly.
Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in
the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn
or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as
long as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
Constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to

provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional
convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly
recognized in Sec. 8 of Res. No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by
the President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a
legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as
Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a
Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required
implementing details.

Occena vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 56350, April 2, 1981]

TO APPROVE PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, THE CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION ONLY NEEDS MAJORITY VOTE, SUBJECT TO THE RATIFICATION BY
THE PEOPLE. - The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can
propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be
an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it
sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as
constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in
this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
propose amendments.

AMNEDMENT INCLUDES REVISION - Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition

that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far
propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present
Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign
to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to
the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no
debate about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the present
Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one . . . is no argument
against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely
amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." There is here the adoption
of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as legal texts that a
constituent body can propose anything but conclude nothing. We are not
disposed to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also
advantageous in practice.

Tolentino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971]

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE

PEOPLE FOR RATIFICATION IN ONE ELECTION, PIECE-MEAL RATIFICATION IS NOT
ALLOWED. - The ultimate question, therefore, boils down to this: Is there any
limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated
by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the
condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It
being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention will propose We hold that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the
people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear.

It says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a
convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution, "thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that
Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as
definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification,"
thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may
be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same
constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision
unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.

2. Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the
Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution
making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as
the whole of it, if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and
harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the
purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in
its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to
them, more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they
can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it
before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as
a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part
of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its
parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already
from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant
qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage,
there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if
a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he
feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in
the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not,
because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can
he render on the proposal?

But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to
approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the
right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in
other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a
voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of
the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish
and of which presently he is not given any idea?

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of
an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter
not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of
the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of
things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of
hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people
are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject
the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for
the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of
the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the
election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In
 Santiago vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997]

PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS

TO THE CONSTITUTION, NOT SELF-EXECUTORY. — Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution is not self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without implementing legislation Section 2
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode
of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action. Bluntly stated the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative would
remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for
its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND DOES NOT COVER INITIATIVE ON
THE CONSTITUTION. - First, Contrary to the assertion of public respondent
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."'
. . . Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines
initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three
systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5
paragraph (c) requires, among other things, a statement of the proposed law
sought to be enacted, approve or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may
be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. . . .
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted
earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Third. While the Act
provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle, II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress
intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of
values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. . . . The
foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate,
or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and.
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act."
 (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2)
of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial

functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative
authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation,
there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected.

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have
that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.

Lambino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006]

PETITION FOR INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

MUST CONTAIN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS. - Clearly, the framers of the
Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author
and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that
contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to
prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature
and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and
misleading" which renders the initiative void.

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that
the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires
that the people must sign the "petition . . . as signatories."

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the
people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that
an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people . . . in a petition" — meaning
that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the
writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people
under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.

The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members
of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this
trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they
have signed the petition.

INTIATIVE CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, AND NOT REVISION. - This Court, whose members are sworn to
defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to
insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution — that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision,
then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision
of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described
the fundamental difference in this manner:

[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding

nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.

The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper
subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of
check and balances."

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a
revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles — Article VI on the Legislature and Article
VII on the Executive — affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when

the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power
alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of
checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
 necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that
may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates
a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to
determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for
instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary
system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to
a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.

Republic Act No. 6735

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Campos Rueda [G.R. No. L-13250, Oct 29,
1971]

FOREIGN COUNTRY IS DIFFERENT FROM A STATE; A FOREIGN COUNTRY DOES

NOT NEED TO POSSESS THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A STATE. It does not admit
of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of
law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an
organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact
obedience to its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by
common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general
welfare. Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification
of the nation." This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress
is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically
organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the
individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski
could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects,
claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. McIver
similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within
its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations.
With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a
condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine.

Bacani vs. NACOCO [G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956]

FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT; CONSTITUENT AND MINISTRANT. - To begin

with, we state that the term "Government" may be defined as "that institution or
aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out
those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or
which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the
power or authority of prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This
institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative,
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government
 (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of
citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.'" (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine
Islands, p. 19.)

The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education,
public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.
The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of
these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare
those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a
government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals. (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.)

From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our
Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations
owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic
life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call
government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a
private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a
private corporations under the Corporation Law.

GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS ARE NOT GOVERNMENT

ENTITIES. - The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporations
perform certain functions of government make them a part of the Government of
the Philippines?

The answer is simple: they do not acquire that status for the simple reason that
they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take
for instance the National Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the
purpose of "adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
preferences in the United States" and of providing "Facilities for the better curing of
copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products", a function which
our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry, however,
it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it
was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any
other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
corporation. . . . Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its
consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an
agency or instrumentality of government." (Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)

To recapitulate, we may mention that the term "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the government are exercised as
an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which
political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other
form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do
not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate
and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law.
Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law
and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption
clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.

"Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government

of a portion of the State." (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459,
Corporation Law).

"'The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would

only include organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with
political and legislative powers for the local, civil government and
police regulations of the inhabitants of the particular district included
in the boundaries of the corporation.' Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309,
312."

"In its more general sense the phrase 'municipal corporation' may
include both towns and counties, and other public corporations created
by government for political purposes. In its more common and limited
signification, it embraces only incorporated villages, towns and cities.
Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661."
(McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.)

"We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and

strict sense to be the incorporation, by the authority of the
government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and
authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate
specified powers of legislation and regulation with respect to their local
and internal concerns. This power of local government is the distinctive
purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation
proper." (Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. CIR [G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975]

THE PROMOTION OF GENERAL WELFARE IS A GOVERNMENT FUNCTION,

REPUDIATION OF THE CONCEPT OF LAISSEZ FAIRE. - The growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which
used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was
called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice." Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v.
National Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks
incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the
laissez faire principle. That concept, then dominant in economics, was carried into
the governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political science, the first
edition of which was published in 1898, its author being the then Professor, later
American President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was
categorized by him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what
was demanded by the "strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed the
very bonds of society." The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or
optional.

It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly
commanded the authoritative position which at one time it held in the United
States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial Board, could affirm:
"The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as
axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has
shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government
activity." The 1935 Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach.
As noted in Edu v. Ericta: "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional
Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to
our government the responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with
the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up
to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action." Nor did
the opinion in Edu stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in
1935 erased whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a
repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the Constitutional
Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it clear
when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted
the 'vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions' and the 'almost
unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to
compete with existing business' as 'reflections of the fascination exerted by [the
then] current tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: 'My answer is that
this constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy, not only political but
social and economic. . . . If in this Constitution the gentlemen will find declarations
of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the
interest and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have
come when in self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those
safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national
aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries
which a constitutional provision automatically imposes."

It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural

Credit Administration decision about which the observation was earlier made that it
reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution and is even more in consonance
with the expanded role of government accorded recognition in the present Charter
if the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental function were not heeded.
That path this Court is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to
retreat rather than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no
constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly
reserved for private enterprise. This is one way, in the language of Laski, by which
through such activities, "the harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels
of the rich and the poor" may be minimized. It is a response to a trend noted by
 Gov. of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de Piedad [G.R. No. 9959, December
13, 1916]

DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE - In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 How., 369, 384), Mr.
Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:

"When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the

crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power still
remains with them except so far as they have delegated a portion of it
to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made known to us by
legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens partiae."

Chancelor Kent says:

"In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens

partiae, has the right to enforce all charities of a public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests,
where no other person is entrusted with it." (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States,
supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:

"This prerogative of parens partiae is inherent in the supreme power

of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in
the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of
the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a
most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in the
interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who
cannot protect themselves."

The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3
Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that
there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the sale of the estates of
infants, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot
act for themselves, said:

"These remarks in reference to infants, insane persons and persons

not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who
are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for
protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens partiae. They
show that this beneficent function has not ceased to exist under the
change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now
resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise
whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is as
clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other
cases whatever."

In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no power to institute the
action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the
people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action
could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in
overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the
public generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no
individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to
allow it." (2 Kent's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 665; 1
Daniell's Chancery Practice, sec. 13; Perry on Trusts, sec. 732.)

It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be
damages by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donor or the
cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is
not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the
accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the
contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They
parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting
of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite
numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died,
leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or
actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course
that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to against assume control
of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.

The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground
upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true
ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public
property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was
intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and
became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the
Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the
Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy,
as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and
Christian benevolences in like instances in the future.

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh [G.R. No. L-5a, November 16, 1945]

DURING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION, JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE

INVADER CONTINUE ITS FORCE AND EFFECT EVEN AFTER THE CESSATION OF
INVASION. Suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which
imposes upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the
municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to
reestablish and insure "I'ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public order and
safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not
for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or
inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in
order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged.

This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among them
Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised
Treatises on International Law, edited in the year 1944, and the interpretation of
the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of Dow
vs. Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary
consequence of such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people
to their former government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection
and benefit, and the protection and benefit of others not in the ordinary pursuits
and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws,
that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was,
does not, therefore, exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague
Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued
by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts
would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing
as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory,
and prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist
the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in
penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or
occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.

We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of
General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean
judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did not
deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be
construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of person interested in
sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say
that the term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative
and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According
to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meaning, its meaning may be made clear and specific by
considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d
ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or
construed to refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of
said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations
with which the world "processes" is associated.

As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect
private rights or persons and property and provide for the punishment of crimes,
are good and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that no
crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the
restored or legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is
nonetheless true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be
caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the
law of nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and
after the occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored.
As there are vested rights which have been acquired by the parties by virtue of
such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or
abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because
such reversal would deprive them of their properties without due process of law.

People vs. Gozo [G.R. No. L-36409, October 26, 1973]

SOVEREIGNTY IS COMPREHENSIVE, BUT ITS EXERCISE MAY BE RESTRICTED. -

Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel
concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty
the only thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at war with
controlling and authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval
bases of a foreign country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases
may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of
sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself
completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the
treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only
jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States
Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty." There was a reiteration of
such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines
being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be
exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty." Then came
this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted
that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power
plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in
the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it
has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state
then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence." The opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there
is at the most diminution of jurisdictional rights, not in appearance. The words
employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no
longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are
still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by
virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign
territory."

Laurel vs. Misa [G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947]

LAW ON TREASON, THOUGH POLITICAL IN NATURE, IS NOT SUSPENDED DURING

BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION. Considering that the absolute and permanent
allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham v~. Valdez
Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil.,
285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested
in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which
constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent
thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it
cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended
without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during
the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of
the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied
by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military
subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing
as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests

Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary allegiance,' repudiated by

Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the
inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which
the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign;
that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted
for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid comfort; and that if the allegiance of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to
its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto
acquire the citizenship thereof since he has to obey, with certain exceptions, the
laws of that country which enforce public order and regulate the social and
commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other
hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of
the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a
foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of rights of

sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed
into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear
relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable
to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with
hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order,
such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are
of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our
Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also
suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not
be committed against the latter (Peralta 1.S. Director of Prisons, supra); and that,
while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above
stated, unless adopted by him, were also ill operative as against the ousted
government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public
order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was
applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by
their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;

Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue

to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of
public conscience ( Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules
of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory,
who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which
have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in
conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended
or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity
and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not
demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from
adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance
owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control
of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to
the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force,
threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist
and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;

Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would

lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be
repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring
the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid
them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their
own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of
invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party i n the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
commit a political suicide.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]

THE SUSPENSION OF POLITICAL LAWS DURING BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION DOES

NOT APPLY TO THE ENEMIES IN ARMS. The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that
laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or
in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the
enemies in arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of
a contrary ruling should readily manifest itself. Under the petitioners' theory the
forces of resistance operating in an occupied territory would have to abide by the
outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the very lifeblood of an
army, the right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the
organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Republic vs. Sandoval [G.R. No. 84607, March 19, 1993]

CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. - Under our Constitution the principle of immunity

of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The
principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public
service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority
could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently
controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper
administration of the government.

INSTANCES OF SUITS AGAINST THE STATE. - Some instances when a suit against
the State is proper are:

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case
is such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government.

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not
pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party
defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred,
their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority.
Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the
government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and
military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as
there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign
state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts except when it has
given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the military officers to release them
from any liability, and by the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the
government. The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this
case, when the relief demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on
the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs
to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its
agents and servants. This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position
in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another."

THE STATE IMMUNITY IS NOT WAIVED ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT THE
PRESIDENT CREATED A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT, OR BY THE
PRESIDENT’S ACT OF JOINING A RALLY OF THE COMPLAINANTS. In effect,
whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall only serve as the
cause of action in the event that any party decides to litigate his/her claim.
Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary venue. The Commission is not
the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the
State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory.
mean that there was an admission by the State of any liability. In fact to borrow
the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an act of solidarity by the
government with the people". Moreover, petitioners rely on President Aquino's
speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the
rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred that the State has admitted any
liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.

Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be maintained

that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant
case.

Sanders vs. Veridiano [G.R. No. L-46930, June 10, 1988]

ACTS COMMITTED BY THE OFFICERS IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY ARE COVERED

BY STATE IMMUNITY. - It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a
government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically
remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official
character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act
imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state
but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign
state, as in the present case.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are
being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official
duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA,
undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents,
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter written was in fact a reply to
a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the
case of the private respondents. Moreover, even in the absence of such request,
he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism — in effect
a direct attack against him — that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic
form of supervision."

As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval
Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of
employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced.
Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in
nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly
answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department
of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the
department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-
designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private
about it.

Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that
the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States
government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the
scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally,
that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is
proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY APPLIES TO FOREIGN STATES SUED IN THIS
JURISDICTION. - There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot
prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its
consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions
where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own
government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of
our courts.

The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no
legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends."
In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign
equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium
and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our
adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our
Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land.

par in parem non habet imperium (meaning, an equal has no authority over an
equal)

Festejo vs. Fernando [G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954]

ACTS COMMITTED BY OFFICIALS OUTSIDE THEIR AUTHORITY WILL NOT GIVE RISE
TO THE CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. Ordinarily the officer or employee
committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other
citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortious
act." — 49 Am. Jur. 289. . . If an officer, even while acting under color of his office,
exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the
plea that he is a public agent." — 43 Am. Jur. 86.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial,

ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without
authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a
civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter
himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under color of his office, and not
personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority." — 43
Am. Jur. 89-90.

United States vs. Guinto [G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990]

CONCEPT OF STATE IMMUNITY. - The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part
of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely
reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also
intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international
community.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the
justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends." There are other
practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is
expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition
would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.

The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty"

because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate claim against it
by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic
societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved by the valid claims of its
citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be
sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not
be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents.

WAIVER OF STATE IMMUNITY. The consent of the state to be sued may be

manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general
law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it
itself commences litigation.

The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No.
3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued
upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." In
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, a special law was passed to
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged tort. When the government
enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim.

The above rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only by the
will of the legislature through the medium of a duly enacted statute. We have
held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver
of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietary
acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only
where the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.

RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF STATE IMMUNITY. - There is no question that the United

States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It
function, we held that the contract did not operate to divest the United States of its
sovereign immunity from suit. In the words of Justice Vicente Abad Santos:

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from being sued in

the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality
of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish
them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is
that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United
States, the United Kingdom and other states in Western Europe.

xxx xxx xxx

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to
be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

SUABILITY IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH LIABILITY. - The private respondent

invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the government liable if it acts
through a special agent. The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground
that since the officers are designated "special agents," the United States
government should be liable for their torts.

There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a

misconception that the two terms are synonymous. Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established
facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to
be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be
held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the
accepted forms of consent.

Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is not a special agent even if
he is so denominated, as in the case at bar. No less important, the said provision
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state with its inhabitants and,
hence, applies only to the Philippine government and not to foreign governments
impleaded in our courts.
but must be construed strictissimi juris (Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424). The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence,
from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the public respondents.

We agree with the observation of the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State
to be sued:

"The Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 was entered into
by the PC Chief in relation to the exercise of a function sovereign in
nature. The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.
This was clearly enunciated in the case of United States of America vs.
Ruiz where the Hon. Supreme Court held:

"'The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to
be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its functions.' (136 SCRA
487, 492.)

"In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by

the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the industry
and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the
current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function.
The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of
R.A. 5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies.
(Emphasis Ours.)" (pp. 258-259, Rollo.)

The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the
inconvenience and danger which would flow from a different rule. "It is obvious that
public service would be hindered, and public safety endangered, if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suits at the instance of every citizen, and,
consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the government" (Siren vs. U.S. Wall, 152, 19 L. ed. 129,
as cited in 78 SCRA 477). In the same vein, this Court in Republic vs. Purisima (78
SCRA 470, 473) rationalized:

"Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of nonsuability is

not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be cause
[by] private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater
if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known
propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least
provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against
law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such
an effective obstacles, could very well be imagined." (citing Providence
Washington Insurance Co. vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 598.)
 Merritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands [G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916]

SPECIAL LAW WAIVING STATE IMMUNITY. - Act No. 2457, effective February 3,
1915, reads:

"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of

the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.

"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the

Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting
from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
thirteen;

"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it

possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
claimant is entitled; and

"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General

recommend that an act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E.
Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order
that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine

Legislature, that:

"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the

Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of
the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E.
Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the attorney-
General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to
appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to
defend said Government at the same.

"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

"Enacted, February 3, 1915."

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the former, then it
cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff
or extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously recognized.

All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one
against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the
plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the
terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to
fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff
as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is
legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if
it exists.

SUABILITY VS. LIABILITY. - As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting

individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or
contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:

"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from

suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense."

In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16,
1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:

"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the

town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such
court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the
purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may
now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers
and agents, relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher,
the fish hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill
property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and
relative to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka
Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin."

In determining the scope of this act, the court said;

"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature

admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers,
and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private
parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do,
more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the state. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or
suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall
depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of
damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of
the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability,
but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's
immunity from suit. If the Legislature had intended to change the rule
that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of
the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere
inference but would have done so in express terms. (Murdoc Grate Co.
vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R.A., 399)

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's
liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the
substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
 Amigable vs. Cuenca [G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972]

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY CANNOT BE USED TO PERPETRATE

INJUSTICE. - In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1
involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening
of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a private
landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent. We there said:

". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for

property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a
suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine
of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed
the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right to
enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to
the public use defined in the judgment.' If there were an observance of
procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they
are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a
failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand
to benefit. It is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity
to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be
maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes
any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of
just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that
it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that
the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked."

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991]

STATE IMPLIEDLY WAIVES ITS IMMUNITY WHEN IT COMMENCES LITIGATION. - So,

too, the PCGG's postulation that none of its members may be "required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial . . . proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance," has no application to a judicial proceeding it has itself initiated.
As just suggested, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the exemption
from giving evidence; by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope
of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the
rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the
parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to "disgorge all the facts"
within their knowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like
compulsion.

The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be
sued without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself
of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level
of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the
governmental capacity, is unacceptable; it attempts a distinction without support in
principle or precedent. On the contrary —

"The consent of the State to be sued may be given expressly or

impliedly. Express consent may be manifested either through a
general law or a special law. Implied consent is given when the State
itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract."

"The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right
to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail
itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In
short, by taking the initiative in an action against the private parties,
the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain
limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might
have against the state. . . . (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth E.,
pp. 36-37, citing U.S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L.ed. 899)'" 51

It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain, the State
exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis.
Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been taken
in expropriation without just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity
from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the
owner.

Republic vs. Feliciano [G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987]

We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has
proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not
an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a
specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties.
The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental
agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against
the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no
such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the
existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the
complaint should have been dismissed.

THE STATE IMMUNITY MAY BE INVOKED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. -

The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the
case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal.
It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings."

EXPRESS WAIVER OF IMMUNITY MUST BE THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ACT. - Private

respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris.
Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be
sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be
made by an act of the legislative body.

Neither is there merit in respondent's submission. which the respondent appellate

court sustained, on the basis of our decision in the Begosa case, that the present
action is not a suit against the State within the rule of State immunity from suit,
because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its lands or its
funds. It is contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but
private land belonging to the plaintiff, hence the Government is not being divested
of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved in this argument, since
the character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and
the plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to
litigate the ownership and possession of the property. In other words, the plaintiff is
out to establish that he is the owner of the land in question based, incidentally, on
an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he seeks to establish his claim of
ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an action in personam.

United States vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985]

RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF STATE IMMUNITY. The traditional rule of State immunity

exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent
or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United
States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and
Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84
Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the
United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to
recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had
expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been
vacated.

The Holy See vs. Rosario [G.R. No. 101949, December 1, 1994]
In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where
the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court
requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled
to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit,
he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the
defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only
the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a
"suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit
of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088
[1941]).

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement
to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190
SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-
employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World
Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1
(1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the
Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval
Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus
curiae.

TWO CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. - There are two

conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with
regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private
acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987];
Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).

In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be

considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come
out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be.

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular
course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act
is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

REMEDY OF THE COMPLAINANTS WHEN THE STATE IMMUNITY IS INVOKED. -

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its
grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person
who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government
to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.
(Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings
on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the
Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a
private cause.

According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the

International Court of Justice:

"By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to

diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a
State is in reality asserting its own rights — its right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law (The
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports
293, 302 [1924]).

Republic vs. Villasor [G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973]

FUNDS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT. – It is a

fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must be so. In the classic
formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was
indicated in a recent decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of
the Philippines, with its affirmation that "a continued adherence to the doctrine of
non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be
caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the
performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental
principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus
restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go to court,
at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law
suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective
obstacle, could very well be imagined."

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in
the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued
without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from such
a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the
state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways
v. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice
Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action `only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law." Such a principle applies even to an
employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue
of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express
authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be
to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys
sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing
officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason
which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy
forbids it."

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993]

FORMS OF WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. - The basic postulate enshrined in the

constitution that "(t)he State may not be sued without its consent," reflects nothing
less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of
courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As has been aptly observed,
by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called "the royal
prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. We have had
occasion to explain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the
doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency
and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far
greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if
such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of judicial
remedy is not to be accordingly restricted.

The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may
not be sued under any circumstance. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the
doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its clear
import then is that the State may at times be sued. The States' consent may be
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of
civil action between private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is
conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the
private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered
into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must
still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
functions and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

PROCEDURE IN ENFORCING THE LIABILITY OF THE STATE. - But, be that as it may,

the claims of private respondents, i.e., for underpayment of wages, holiday pay,
overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security
Services, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the
consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
 "(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the
Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act 3083
stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity
from suit, subject to its general limitation expressed in Section 7
thereof that 'no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by
any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the
conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims
against the Government must be strictly observed.' "

We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of

C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State.
The Labor Code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State
liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be
pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445.

When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily
consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives
its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. In Republic vs. Villasor, this Court, in
nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has
explained, thus —

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's
action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.

PNB vs. Pabalan [G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978]

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; A GOVERNMENT OWNED AND

CONTROLLED CORPORATION HAS DISTINCT PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN; FUNDS
OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY MAY BE PROCEEDED AGAINST. — The doctrine of non-
suability cannot be legally set forth as a bar or impediment to a notice of
garnishment. In National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 118 Phil. 782 (1963), it was explicitly stated: "That allegation to the
effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that,
as such the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for,
as a government owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality
of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has — pursuant to
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 . . ., pursuant to
which the NASSCO has been established — "all the powers of a corporation under
the Corporation Law . . . " Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be
subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No.
1459, as amended.)
SUABILITY MAY BE DETERMINED FROM ITS CHARTER. - It is not necessary to write
an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a governmental
function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is
sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put
money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
(R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d].) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it
has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government.
(See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963,
8 SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in
any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can
include a tort claim such as the one instituted by petitioners.

Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Ass. [G.R. No. L-15751,
January 28, 1961]

GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, THOUGH INCEDENTALLY PERFORMING PROPRIETARY

FUNCTIONS, ARE ENTITLED TO STATE IMMUNITY. - The Bureau of Printing is an
office of the Government created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct
supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with
the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those
processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same
character as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the (Secretary of Finance)
Executive Secretary, be authorized to undertake . . .." (Sec. 1644, Rev. Adm.
Code.) It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the
General Appropriations Act. Designed to meet the printing needs of the
Government, it is primarily a service bureau and is obviously, not engaged in
business or occupation for pecuniary profit.

Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical

personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. (Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.)
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule
is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over
its objection. (See Metran vs. Paredes, 45 Off. Gaz., 2835; Angat River Irrigation
System, et al. vs. Angat River Workers' Union, et al., G.R. Nos. L-10943-44,
December 28, 1957).

It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing receives
outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular
working days and on holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its
functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Overtime work in the Bureau of
Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires (sec. 566, Rev.
Adm. Code). As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may
be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending
upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the
functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Anent the additional
work it executes for private persons, we find that such work is done upon request,
as distinguished from those solicited, and only "as the requirements of Government
work will permit" (sec. 1654, Rev. Adm. Code), and "upon terms fixed by the
Director of Printing, with the approval of the Department Head" (sec. 1665, id.). As
shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these works
consist of orders for greeting cards during Christmas from government officials, and
percent, and in computing the costs for work done for private parties, the Bureau
does not include profit, because it is not allowed to make any. Clearly, while the
Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot be
pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional work it
executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such
work may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the
employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from
those employed in its general governmental functions.

Mobil Phils. Exploration vs. Customs Arrastre Service [G.R. No. L-23139,
December 17, 1966]

PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS NECESSARY TO THE GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSES OF THE

GOVERNMENT ENTITY ARE COVERED BY THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY. - The
situation here is not materially different. The Bureau of Customs, to repeat, is part of the
Department of Finance (Sec. 81, Rev. Adm. Code), with no personality of its own apart
from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of
assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and
customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R. A. 1937). To this function,
arrastre service is a necessary incident. For practical reasons said revenues and customs
duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's
or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided
in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies
with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed
merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to
enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation.

Clearly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a

necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs,
so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit. For
otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily exposing
itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the
necessary means to that end.

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA [G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988]

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO GOVERNMENT OWNED

AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS. - This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the
recent case of Malong v. Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7,
1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held that the Philippine National Railways,
although owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it
does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions.
Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport
operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the
immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly
governmental functions.

Mun. of San Fernando vs. Firme [G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991]

THE SUABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IS DETERMINED THROUGH THEIR

CHARTER. - Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are
agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and
therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter
established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not
first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state
has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it
is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable." (United States of America v. Guinto, supra, p. 659-660).

Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed
by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not
the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio v. Fontanilla (G.R. No. L-
29993, October 23, 1978. 85 SCRA 599, 606), the distinction of powers becomes
important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of
its agents which result in an injury to third persons.

Mun. of San Miguel vs. Fernandez [G.R. No. L-61744, June 25, 1984]

FUNDS OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ARE EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION. - In

Tantoco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52, it was held that "it is the settled
doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the taxes and public
revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against them,
either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and
the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject
to execution unless so declared by statute.

Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, as well as those in the possession of the
Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan, are also public funds and as such they are exempt
from execution. Besides, there must be, pursuant to Section 2(a) of Presidential
Decree No. 477, known as "The Decree on Local Fiscal Administration," a
corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the
case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has passed an
ordinance to this effect. Furthermore, the procedure outlined by Section 15, Rule 39
of the New Rules of Court has not been followed.

Mun. of Makati vs. CA [G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990]

REMEDY TO ENFORCE THE LIABILITY OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - There is

merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A
263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction,
well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution,
unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether
real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities
and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan
Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926); The Municipality of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel,
Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The
foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no
legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may
avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of
the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of
municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo,
supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil.
247 (1960)].

City of Caloocan vs. Judge Allarde [G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003]

GOVERNMENT FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR A PURPOSE MAY BE GARNISHED TO

SATISFY THAT PURPOSE. - However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-
defined exception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required
by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or
garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under execution
are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment
against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally
enforced by judicial processes.

Thus, in the similar case of Pasay City Government, et al. vs. CFI of Manila, Br. X,
et al., where petitioners challenged the trial court's order garnishing its funds in
payment of the contract price for the construction of the City Hall, we ruled that,
while government funds deposited in the PNB are exempt from execution or
garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for
the payment of the City's obligations —

Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioner-appellants

moved for its quashal alleging among other things the exemption of
the government from execution. This move on the part of petitioner-
appellants is at first glance laudable for 'all government funds
deposited with the Philippine National Bank by any agency or
instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or
special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to
garnishment or levy.' But inasmuch as an ordinance has already been
enacted expressly appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 as
payment to the respondent-appellee, then the herein case is covered
by the exception to the general rule

ARTICLE II – FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 1

Villavicencio vs. Lukban [G.R. No. 14639, March 25, 1919]

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY LAW, GOOD INTENTIONS CANNOT JUSTIFY THE

CURTAILMENT OF FREEDOM. - Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta
decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer
to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1
Eng. Stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S.
vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the
same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his
life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life,
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom
prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus,
and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was
whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to
be established in the Philippine Islands.

One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for
women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of
Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to
defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to
regions unknown. No law, order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of
Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of
habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who
was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure
to comply with the order of the court.

These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not
chattles, but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as
are other citizens.

Section 2

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni [G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]

PENALIZING WAR CRIMES IS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW. - In accordance with the generally accepted principles of
international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva
Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by
the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of
planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes
and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and
customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted
principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try

petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva
Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the
second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the
Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were
accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were
signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part
of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general
and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and
 Agustin vs. Edu [G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949]

The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is
reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas
clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such
obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which
was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the
enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; .
. ." It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, . . ." The
1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a
character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had
pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

Ichong vs. Hernandez [G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]

TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT LAW. —

The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of
their subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32),
and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country". But the
nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all Prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject
to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power
of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).

Gonzales vs. Hechanova [G.R. No. L-21897, October 22, 1963]

PRESIDENT MAY NOT, BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, ENTER INTO A TRANSACTION

WHICH IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTES ENACTED PRIOR THERETO. — It is lastly
contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another
with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding and
effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; that in case
of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the
aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a
treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved
— under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of
time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive relative to
foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and
that the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the
Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved
appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming
that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same
are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said
agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter
into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is
to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his
veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status
of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing
for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and
a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to
the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that
treaties to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its
Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification
can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous
legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up and that of the United States.

In Re: Garcia [2 SCRA 984, August 15, 1961]

Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides:

"The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or

diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting
States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be deemed
competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other,
subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. . . ."

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting
State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1
of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force
of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the
Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the
Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only
to the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art. VIII, Phil. Constitution).

At any rate, the Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice
their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the
legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own
Section 4

People vs. Lagman [G.R. No. 45892, July 13, 1938]

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. The National Defense Law,

in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The
duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through
an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein.

In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the
compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war
does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from
that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army.
This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military
service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its
duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson
vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without
violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against
his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, and risk the
chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson
(253 Feb., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due
process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office
or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by
reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different,
inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the
defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more
effective, in case of need.

Section 6

Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]

THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND NOT MERE

RELIGIOUS TOLERATION. - The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of
the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting
to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say
that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the
union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the
state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance
of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle
of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and
Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the
Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the
Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino People. It is almost trite to say
now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of
the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and
defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and
Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the
Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare,
and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies
of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution
and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes
(sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec.
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code)
sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional
mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec.
928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the
secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law
allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against
religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state
(see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

Taruc vs. De la Cruz [G.R. No. 144801, March 10, 2005]

INTRAMURAL RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES. The only issue to be resolved in this case is

whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.

We rule that the courts do not.

Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of

religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct
from each other. "Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar's and to God what is God's." We
have, however, observed as early as 1928 that:

upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that

cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always
received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only because
of their inherent interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the
decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson
of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of
members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion
of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not
for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their
discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. In the words of
Justice Samuel F. Miller 5:

. . . all who unite themselves to an ecclesiastical body do so with an

implied consent to submit to the Church government and they are
bound to submit to it.

In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that
in disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which
the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences. Thus,

The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion

and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to
do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of
excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership,
are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts. (emphasis ours)

Section 10

Calalang vs. Williams [G.R. No. 47800, December 2, 1940]

SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor

atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-
honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest
good to the greatest number."

Almeda vs. CA [G.R. No. L-43800, July 29, 1977]

IN THE PROMOTION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, THE STATE MAY REGULATE PROPERTY

OWNERSHIP. - It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property
ownership is impressed with social function. Property use must not only be for the
benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social
justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits." 7 One
deemed "owner of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if
not irrigated and there (3) hectares if irrigated."

Ondoy vs. Ignacio [G.R. No. L-47178, May 16, 1980]

SOCIAL JUSTICE IS NOT EQUALITY, BUT PROTECTION. - Lastly, to quote from the
opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in
this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually poor and
unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the
law has reason to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in
these cases is not equality but protection."

Salonga vs. Farrales [G.R. No. L-47088, July 10, 1981]

SOCIAL JUSTICE CANNOT NULLIFY THE LAW ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS.

— Social Justice provided for in Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who under the Constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection. The Social justice consecrated in our
constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to
another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot
nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of
the Courts to grant.

Section 11

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually
evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. It
became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece
of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that
institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived."84
What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in
violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo
libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus
writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants'
rights derived from the agrarian reform process.

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to
their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed
been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to
security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v.
CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to
be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right
to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to
which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property
may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property...
pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." In
a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things
which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament,
and lawful desires of the individual."123

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's

rights by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is
built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary
of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article
II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of
order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation
in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and

not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation
must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal
duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without
an effective search for the truth by the government.135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government

protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136
in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of
person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the
Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily
be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In
Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher
at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those
of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
Section 12

Virtouso vs. Municipal Judge [G.R. No. L-47841, March 21, 1978]

THE STATE SAFEGUARDS THE RIGHTS OF THE YOUTH. - This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which
is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes
the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical,
intellectual, and social well-being."

Section 16

Oposa vs. Factoran [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]

THE RIGHT TO A BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, THOUGH NOT INCLUDED

IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS, IS A SOURCE OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. — The
complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature." This right unites with the right to health which is provided
for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15. The State shall protect
and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them." While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political
rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter
of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve
the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA [G.R. No. 110120, March 16, 1994]

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital

public interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II,
Section 16 which provides:

"The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature."
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration
of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical
matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its
power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and
desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of
Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.

Section 19

Garcia vs. Board of Investments [G.R. No. 92024, November 9, 1990]

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan,
practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-
absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but
to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the
least.

And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:

xxx xxx xxx

"The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based
on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through
industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural
resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
xxx xxx xxx

Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is

infused with the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources,
the State's full control over the development and utilization of our scarce resources,
agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign investments
in accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to be noticed
and understood.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not

be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an
assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may
be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to the
national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the
government superintends the industry by controlling the upstream or cracker
facility.

Section 21

Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. vs. Sec. of DAR [G.R. No.
78742, July 14, 1989]

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the
not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the
contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own
mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all
means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron
shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the
farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but
also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of
inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the
farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth
that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once
it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a
more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his
insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."

Section 25

Basco vs PAGCOR [G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991]

LOCAL AUTONOMY SIMPLY MEANS DECENTRALIZATION. - The power of local

government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until
"amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its
"exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is
consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 436-436, as cited in Bernas, The
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in
imperio." "Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a
nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the
Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local
government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the
function of government. (emphasis supplied) As to what state powers should be
"decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a
matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question.
(Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA
539). What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing
with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State
to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

Limbona vs. Mangelin [G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989]

DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION DISTINGUISHED FROM

DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER. — Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to
its constituency.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two
senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall
be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy
. . . Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of
the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree
of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is,
as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government).

Section 26

Pamatong vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004]

THE STATE’S PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITIES IS NOT

JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE. - Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the
constitutional provision ensuring “equal access to opportunities for public office” is
the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,
particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of
an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which
suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,

entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason
for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of
action before the courts.

An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the
phrase “ensure equal access,” and the substitution of the word “office” to “service.”
He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word “broaden” to “ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO”

because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If
you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be
mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate
as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of
broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should
not mandate the State to make the government the number one
employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and
expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the
word “broaden.” (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
The approval of the “Davide amendment” indicates the design of the framers to
cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded

as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this
rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as “equal
access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous
foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may
be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on
“Nuisance Candidates” and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give
due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,

however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long
as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.

Section 28

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]

AGENCIES CAN ONLY REGULATE THE MANNER OF INSPECTION, BUT MAY NOT
PROHIBIT ACCESS. - It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court
that government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access
to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on
the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the
 . . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that
damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of
other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured . . . (Subido
vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).

Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a

municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal
docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May
5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent
judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in
his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed
the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the
respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by
him upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that
the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry
with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to
refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the
authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the
Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to
the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of,
public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies
may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra).

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of
the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte [G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989]

GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS ARE LIKEWISE SUBJECT

TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. - Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions
are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into
by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted
by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate
relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss
the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.

THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN DOES NOT

CARRY WITH IT THE RIGHT TO DEMAND COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT TO
BE INSPECTED. - However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act
sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right
to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern.

Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato [G.R. No. 92541, November 13, 1991]

RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN IS

SELF-EXECUTORY. — As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA
530 [1987]), the constitutional provision "The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern" is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized
may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need
for any ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature
are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec.
28)." (See also Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,
170 SCRA 256 [1989]).

Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board
in reviewing films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote
of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the
individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the
member concerned.

The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual

person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging
to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW
372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members
concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As
may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public in character; it is an office
created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid
claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private
capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in,
the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be
no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a
product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To
declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable
mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.
IN DEFERENCE TO THE CONCEPT OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, JUDICIAL
OFFICERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BE APPOINTED TO POSITIONS PERFORMING
NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. - Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme
Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial

Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation
of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

"While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to

be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government
precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the
judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is
a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed
in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an
executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable
that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as
expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the
judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less."

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on
Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government.
Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the
solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society.
Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for
which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to
the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]

CONCEPTS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES - The

separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For
example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the
legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define
their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly
controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises
the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and
duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say
just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or
political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and

perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions
and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In
the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of our Constitution.

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY - The Constitution is a definition of the powers of

government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers?
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly
is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . .
the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their
eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis, then, must the
success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible
of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO JUDGE ALL CONTROVERSIES

RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CARRIES WITH IT THE POWER TO ISSUE REGULATIONS
RELATIVE TO THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED. - The grant
of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of
the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution
(Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A.,
1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that
said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be
filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested
cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time
to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission
retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality
without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate
on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to
the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
independence of the National Assembly as a coordinate department of the
government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized
would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of
protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out
hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Casibang vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-38025, August 20, 1979]

POLITICAL QUESTION - The term "political question" connotes what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity;
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Tañada vs.
Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962): "Prominent
on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due
coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate
Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The term has been made
applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction
or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which
there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference
must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716,
July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov.
9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit
where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch
thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192
[1946]). If to be delimited with accuracy; 'political questions should refer to such as
would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity
or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or
Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. . . ."
(Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971])

JUSTICEABLE QUESTION - A purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies

a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of
said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right
(Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and after the ratification and
effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the
consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TERM” OF OFFICE AND “RIGHT” TO OFFICE. - That "there

is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term'
of office is the period during which an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold
office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to
hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and
responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration
of length of time during which the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein
whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article
XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not
Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private
respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a
new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under
the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite"
(Paredes, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).

Tañada vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957]

THE COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS A JUSTICEABLE QUESTION -

Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that
the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact
that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective
political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral
Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the
only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to
bring the matter to the bar of public opinion."

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing
facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and
Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192) — relied upon by the respondents — this is not an
action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly
or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said
House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6)
Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither
of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139;
Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.)

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to
choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the
fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be
exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has
aptly put it:

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain
powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine
whether the powers thus possessed have been validly exercised. In
performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers
of a coordinate branch of the government, since the determination of
the validity of an act is not the same thing as the performance of the
act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves
the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely
seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by
anything done or attempted by either an executive official or the
legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244,
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied.)

Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the
Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress And, since judicial power
includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two
Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why
the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the
Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of
 Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976]

POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION IS JUSTICEABLE

CONTROVERSY. - Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the
legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality
or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose
amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be
found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of
that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority
assumed was valid or not.

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments
and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the
people ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of
vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided
for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the
present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has
been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people
themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which
includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori
not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court on prior constitutional cases underline
the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the
amending process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, the
contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential
Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor, "is a
political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as
justiciable in nature. Subsequently, in the Ratification Cases involving the issue of
whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, "announcing the
Ratification by the Filipino people of the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the
affirmative stand of the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the
question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, "(T)hus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory
of the respondents therein that the question-whether Presidential Decree No. 73
calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection
of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We
unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With identical unanimity.
We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases,
questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of
13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the
Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion
continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the
same as those given in support of the political question theory advanced in said
habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court
and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As
consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of
the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual
reiteration."

Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]

THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IS A JUSTICIEABLE

ISSUE - Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the
respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar.
Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in
removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a
political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tañada v.
Cuenco:

. . . the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it

means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, . . . it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia
that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could
resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not
the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice
in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the
manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The
Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias — a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate — on behalf of its Committee on Rules,
contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination . . . of the
party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and
hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature.
It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to
pass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
 conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute
has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or
statutory rights . . . .' (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also
the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the
parties herein."

DELEGATION OF POWER

People vs. Vera [G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937]

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION OF POWER. - Any attempt to abdicate the

power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest. This principle is said to have originated with the glossators, was
introduced into English law through a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a
principle of agency, was established by Lord Coke in the English public law in
decisions forbidding the delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America
as an enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted
corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social Sciences,
p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative
neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on Civil Government, sec 142.)
Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-quoted language: "One of
the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body
or authority. Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority,
there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve
itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other
body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign
trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224. Quoted with
approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court posits the doctrine
"on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but
a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening
mind of another. (U. S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)

EXCEPTION OF NON-DELEGATION, PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE

POWERS. The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. "It is a cardinal principle of our system of government,
that local affairs shall be managed by local authorities, and general affairs by the
central authority; and hence while the rule is also fundamental that the power to
make laws cannot be delegated, the creation of municipalities exercising local self
government has never been held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not
regarded as a transfer of general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the
authority to prescribe local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject
of course to the interposition of the superior in cases of necessity." On quite the
same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power to such
agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory stands in
political question, and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked upon
with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the more
conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. Doubtless, also, legislative power
may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of article VI of
the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law
authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and
tonnage and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution
provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National Assembly
may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a
declared national policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine
whether or not, in the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the
President could be authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon
the other hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the
Constitution itself.

TESTS TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF DELEGATION. In testing whether a statute

constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature. (6 R. C. L., p. 165.) In United States vs.
Ang Tang Ho ([1922], 43 Phil., 1), this court adhered to the foregoing rule when it
held an act of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to authorize the
Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the price of rice
and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime. (See and cf.
Compañia General de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners [1916], 34
Phil., 136.) The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain
extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. (6 R. C.
L., pp. 177-179.)

For the purposes of the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take
effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or delegates of the
legislature in this respect. The rules governing delegation of legislative power to
administrative and executive officers are applicable or are at least indicative of the
rule which should be here adopted. An examination of a variety of cases on
delegation of power to administrative bodies will show that the ratio decidendi is at
variance but, it can be broadly asserted that the rationale revolves around the
presence or absence of a standard or rule of action — or the sufficiency thereof —
in the statute, to aid the delegate in exercising the granted discretion. In some
cases, it is held that the standard is sufficient; in others that it is insufficient; and in
still others that it is entirely lacking. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the
provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether
or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards
are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the
respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix
and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of
their discretionary power. What is granted, if we may use the language of Justice
Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a "roving commission" which
to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does
not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain
language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our
minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA [G.R. No. L-76633, October 18, 1988]

TESTS IN DETERMINING VALIDITY OF DELEGATION. There are two accepted tests

to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers
of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power
because of the many instances when its delegation is permitted. The occasions are
rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to
which they legally pertain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such
occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to
the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.

REASON FOR PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION. The reason is the increasing complexity

of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society
has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in
legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon
present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide
the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields assigned to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the
"power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.
the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which,
in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to
protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment
practices."

Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards

"public interest" in People v. Rosenthal, "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold
Fields v. CIR, "public convenience and welfare" in Calalang v. Williams, and
"simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to mention
only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was
accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, and "national security" in
Hirabayashi v. United States.

United States vs. Ang Tang Ho (43 PHIL 1 [1922])

Ynot vs. IAC [G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987]

DELEGATION MUST SET UP STANDARDS AND MUST BE CANALIZED WITHIN THE

BANKS AND PREVENT IT FROM OVERFLOWING. We also mark, on top of all this, the
questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall
"be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase
"may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It
is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better
still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their
distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may
choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely,
there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate
and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez [G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987]

STANDARDS SET FOR SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION NECESSARILY BROAD AND

HIGHLY ABSTRACT. — The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power,
which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation
and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government, must
be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of
1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education
and the practice of medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed
this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public
Service Commission: "One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the
principle of separation of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest
delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus
et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol.
2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d.17.18,3)
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by
the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." The
standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by
an administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad
and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta —

"The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the

non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy
and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is 'safe transit upon the roads.'"

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of
the 1959 Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education"
and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that
these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
non-delegation principle.

Pelaez vs. Auditor General [G.R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965]

INVALID DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. Although Congress may delegate

to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy,
the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence
of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means
to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it,
by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the
fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:

". . . may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require."

It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the
public welfare may require" qualifies, not the clauses preceding the one just
quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred.
This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was
— which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code —
governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein
conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said
section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to
be transferred.

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is
concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require",
in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs.
William (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
upheld "public welfare" and "public interest", respectively, as sufficient standards
for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid
down in these cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in
relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do
not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 4 The law construed in the
Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and
regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon the other
hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under
Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative
securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to
the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of
questions of fact.

Garcia vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992]

TARIFF POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT - Turning first to the question of

constitutionality, under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not
follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they
may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that
they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government."(Emphasis
supplied)

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the

President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to
fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."

The relevant congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof. These are
the provisions which the President explicitly invoked in promulgating Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478. Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides in
relevant part:

"Sec. 104. All tariff sections, chapters, headings and subheadings

and the rates of import duty under Section 104 of Presidential Decree
There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all imported articles the
rates of duty indicated in the Section under this section except as
otherwise specifically provided for in this Code: Provided, that, the
maximum rate shall not exceed one hundred per cent ad valorem.

The rates of duty herein provided or subsequently fixed pursuant to

Section Four Hundred One of this Code shall be subject to periodic
investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the
President upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 401 of the same Code needs to be quoted in full:

"Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —

a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or

national security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the
President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby
empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective
rates of import duty (including any necessary change in classification).
The existing rates may be increased or decreased but in no case shall
the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten
(10) per cent ad valorem, nor shall the increased rate of import duty
be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem;
(2) to establish import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as
may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty on all imports
not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem whenever necessary;
Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission
and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual
reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four
of this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this
section.

b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the

NEDA pursuant to the provisions of this section, except in the
imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad
valorem, the Commission shall conduct an investigation in the course
of which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties
shall be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present, produce
evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear the views
and recommendations of any government office, agency or
instrumentality concerned. The Commission shall submit their findings
and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the
termination of the public hearings.

c. The power of the President to increase or decrease rates of

import duty within the limits fixed in subsection `a' shall include the
authority to modify the form of duty. In modifying the form of duty,
the corresponding ad valorem or specific equivalents of the duty with
 of Customs. The Commission or its duly authorized representatives
shall have access to, and the right to copy all liquidated customs
import entries and other documents appended thereto as finally filed in
the Commission on Audit.

e. The NEDA shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to

carry out the provisions of this section.

f. Any Order issued by the President pursuant to the provisions of

this section shall take effect thirty (30) days after promulgation,
except in the imposition of additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per
cent ad valorem which shall take effect at the discretion of the
President." (Underscoring supplied)

THE GRANT OF TARIFF POWERS TO THE PRESIDENT IS NOT ONLY INTENDED TO

PROTECT LOCAL INDUSTRIES, BUT ALSO TO RAISE REVENUE. - The Court is not
persuaded. In the first place, there is nothing in the language of either Section 104
or of 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code that suggest such a sharp and absolute
limitation of authority. The entire contention of petitioner is anchored on just two
(2) words, one found in Section 401 (a) (1): "existing protective rates of import
duty," and the second in the proviso found at the end of Section 401 (a): "
protection levels granted in Section 104 of this Code . . . ." We believe that the
words "protective" and "protection" are simply not enough to support the very
broad and encompassing limitation which petitioner seeks to rest on those two (2)
words.

In the second place, petitioner's singular theory collides with a very practical fact of
which this Court may take judicial notice — that the Bureau of Customs which
administers the Tariff and Customs Code, is one of the two (2) principal traditional
generators or producers of governmental revenue, the other being the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. (There is a third agency, non-traditional in character, that
generates lower but still comparable levels of revenue for the government — The
Philippine Amusement and Games Corporation [PAGCOR].)

In the third place, customs duties which are assessed at the prescribed tariff rates
are very much like taxes which are frequently imposed for both revenue-raising and
for regulatory purposes. Thus, it has been held that "customs duties" is "the name
given to taxes on the importation and exportation of commodities, the tariff or tax
assessed upon merchandise imported from, or exported to, a foreign country." The
levying of customs duties on imported goods may have in some measure the effect
of protecting local industries — where such local industries actually exist and are
producing comparable goods. Simultaneously, however, the very same customs
duties inevitably have the effect of producing governmental revenues. Customs
duties like internal revenue taxes are rarely, if ever, designed to achieve one policy
objective only. Most commonly, customs duties, which constitute taxes in the sense
of exactions the proceeds of which become public funds — have either or both the
generation of revenue and the regulation of economic or social activity as their
moving purposes and frequently, it is very difficult to say which, in a particular
instance, is the dominant or principal objective. In the instant case, since the
Philippines in fact produces ten (10) to fifteen percent (15%) of the crude oil
consumed here, the imposition of increased tariff rates and a special duty on
imported crude oil and imported oil products may be seen to have some
"protective" impact upon indigenous oil production. For the effective price of
imported crude oil and oil products is increased. At the same time, it cannot be
and Customs Code establishes general standards with which the exercise of the
authority delegated by that provision to the President must be consistent: that
authority must be exercised in "the interest of national economy, general welfare
and/or national security." Petitioner, however, insists that the "protection of local
industries" is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the exercise of
that delegated authority, and that therefore "protection of local industries" is the
sum total or the alpha and the omega of "the national economy, general welfare
and/or national security." We find it extremely difficult to take seriously such a
confined and closed view of the legislative standards and policies summed up in
Section 401. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers, who after
all constitute the very great bulk of our population, is at the very least as important
a dimension of "the national economy, general welfare and national security" as the
protection of local industries. And so customs duties may be reduced or even
removed precisely for the purpose of protecting consumers from the high prices and
shoddy quality and inefficient service that tariff-protected and subsidized local
manufacturers may otherwise impose upon the community.

Araneta vs. Dinglasan [G.R. No. L-2044, August 26, 1949]

THE GRANT OF EMERGENCY POWERS IS INTENDED TO BE LIMITED AND DOES NOT

NEED A LAW FOR ITS WITHDRAWAL. - It is to be presumed that Commonwealth
Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would
make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that
the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its
powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be
in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary
to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly
pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs.
Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it
would, the repeal might not meet with the approval of the President, and the
Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the
anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it
might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it
would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is
not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and
Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:

"It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may
not abdicate its powers. Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative
delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and
abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated
powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . ."

Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671.
Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be
in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide."
The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the
express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of
it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was
no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about
the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed
to make a provision for its termination in the same way that it did for the
As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the
duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering
his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called
the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of
the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very
President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good
Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid
unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon
the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period.
They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant
should be prolonged.

What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph
of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a
special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were
completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine
Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1,
1942." (Italics ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring
of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the
inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability
could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an
abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and
continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions
could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete
disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we
are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must
start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated,
the period that best comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations,
with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not
the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability
of Congress to function, a period ending with the convening of that body.

THE CONTINUED EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE EMERGENCY POWER WHEN

THE CONGRESS HAS ALREADY CONVENED SHALL CREATE AN ANOMALOUS
SITUATION OF TWO LEGISLATIVE BODIES. - More anomalous than the exercise of
legislative functions by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise
of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over
the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each
other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be
suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment,
the anomaly would not be eliminated. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the
President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress,
laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it
materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the
country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order
regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by
Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export
control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.

Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No.
671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the
 "The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the
rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein
granted."

The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of
Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The
section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had
been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report mentioned
in section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon the convening
of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what reason could there be for its
failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent
reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the
form of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as
unimportant, as the initial one.

EMERGENCY POWERS CEASE WHEN THE CONGRESS MEET IN REGULAR SESSION. -

It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671
became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and
that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of
law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special
session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think we are
giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special
session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular
session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the
limitations imposed by the organic law.

Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the
regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain
stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express
provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos.
600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to
be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following
sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the
minds of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse
not later than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic
repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the
consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not
this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily
foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the
President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to
issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning
heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of
Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.

Rodriguez vs. Gella [G.R. No. L-6266, February 2, 1953]

WITHDRAWAL OF THE EMERGENCY POWERS DOES NOT NEED THE CONSENT OF

THE DELEGATE. - As the Act was expressly in pursuance of the constitutional
provision, it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended it to be only
for a limited period. If it be contended that the Act has not yet been duly repealed,
and such step is necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers delegated to
determine the indefinite duration of the delegation of legislative powers, — in
palpable repugnance to the constitutional provision that any grant thereunder must
be for a limited period, necessarily to be fixed in the law itself and not dependent
upon the arbitrary or elastic will of either the Congress or the President.

Although House Bill No. 727, had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby
become a regular statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution
of the Congress formally declaring the termination of the emergency powers. To
contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence to produce effect, would lead
to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, "while Congress might delegate its
powers by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third
vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to
take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law."

Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent
of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept
the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation
in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency
created under the Act is coupled with interest.

The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the powers lasted
only during the emergency resulting from the last world war which factually
involved the Philippines when Act No. 671 was passed on December 16, 1941. That
emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was
contemplated by the members of the National Assembly on the foresight that the
actual state of war could prevent it from holding its next regular session. This is
confirmed by the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to
open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a
resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their
loyalty to, the United States. The Assembly also enacted a law granting the
President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution
may be delegated to him in time of war." 3 When President Quezon said "in time of
war", he undoubtedly meant such factual war as that then raging.

OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCIES, MEANING. - Moreover, section 26 of Article VI of

the Constitution, in virtue of which Act No. 671 was passed, authorizes the
delegation of powers by the Congress (1) in times of war or (2) other national
emergency. The emergency expressly spoken of in the title and in section 1 of the
Act is one "in time of war," as distinguished from "other national emergency" that
may arise as an after-effect of war or from natural causes such as widespread
earthquakes, typhoons, floods, and the like. Certainly the typhoons that hit some
provinces and cities in 1952 not only did not result from the last world war but were
and could not have been contemplated by the legislators. At any rate, the Congress
is available for necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people down
without somehow being answerable thereover.

EMERGENCY DOES NOT CREATE POWER. - The framers of the Constitution,

however, had the vision of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative
powers to the President for a limited period "in times of war or other national
emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the
duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient procedure; but it
alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should not create power.
ARTICLE VI – LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1

R.A. No. 6735 (System of Initiative and Referendum)

Section 5

Tobias vs. Abalos [G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]

THE INCREASE OF DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE BY CONVERTING A MUNICIPALITY

TO A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF ART VI, SEC.
5 (1). As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the
number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is
that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]

REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS MAY BE MADE THROUGH A

SPECIAL LAW. Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1),
Article VI) clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a
law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative
representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be
forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Montejo vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995]

REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS BELONGS TO THE CONGRESS.—

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular
province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in
the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending
on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for
petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's
remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically
gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
COMELEC to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province of Leyte.

COMELEC HAS NO POWER TO REAPPORTION LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS. Our first

inquiry relate to the constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative district in the
province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and
administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c),
Article IX of the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision
but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make
laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative
Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." The Ordinance
was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished
the Batasang Pambansa. She then exercised legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution. The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court. The
records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several prejudicial
issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987
Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of
Representatives would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake
the apportionment of the legislative districts; and, how the apportionment should
be made. Commissioner Davide, Jr., offered three (3) options for the Commission
to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2)
empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission
exercise the power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The
different dimensions of the options were discussed by Commissioners Davide,
Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. On the basis of their extensive debate, the
Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only
empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment
herein made." The meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments" was again clarified
in the debates of the Commission. That consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the
respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was created...." Prescinding from
these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its
Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District
of Leyte.

Aquino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010]

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum

population that must compose a legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city
to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the
other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each
province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum

population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was,
in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.1

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized
City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative
district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that
case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported by
a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of
only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and
the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the
Constitutional phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand,” to wit:

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district

in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of
the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it
has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative. (Emphasis supplied)

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an

average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)

square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty

thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is

merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran
through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.

The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of “at least two
hundred fifty thousand” may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional
Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI,
proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document.
The Ordinance is captioned “APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN
MANILA AREA.” Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark
was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among
provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was
used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila
should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population
had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was
not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the
point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province
to which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have
been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among,
several determinants.

Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district

apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC2[39] that:

x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes

of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in
gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by
 practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis
supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of

petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at
least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.

The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the
contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the
formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth
has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.

To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the
first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in
the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the
text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2000]

FOUR INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM. To determine the

winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
"qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is

entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."

FORMULA IN COMPUTING THE ALLOCATING SEATS TO THE PARTY-LIST

REPRESENTATIVES. Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district
representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for
party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal
provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

———————————— x .20 = No. of party-list
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of
party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208
—— x .20 = 52
.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The

problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short
answer is "No."

ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES. Having determined that the

twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed
under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list
seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very
first step — there is no dispute on this — is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties")
according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes
as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then
determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast
have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
"those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute
additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further
imposed by the law.

After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.

Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private
respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to
rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then
the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least
two -percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these
parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
"first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since
the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats
to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the
first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is
equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list
groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total
of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is
equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first
party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is
less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
 No. of votes of
concerned party
——————
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
——————
Total no. of votes
for party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ———————— x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)

THE 20% ALLOCATION IS ONLY THE CEILING AND DOES NOT NEED TO BE FILLED
UP. The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list."

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said

earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation"
in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would
benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those
garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or
coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the
relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats."

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that

Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a
ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result
in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine
whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-
judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the
proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be
respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

TWO PERCENT RATIO. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to

ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.

We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:

"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to

follow up a point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he
said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum
percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat
under the party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2

percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the votes cast.
Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party
groups and those who have not really been given by the people
sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn,
they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under
the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the house of
Representatives, as the following shows:

"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this

computation is based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would
distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors.
There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that
of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more
particularly the Bundestag of Germany."

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote

requirement, the specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:

"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to modifications in the minimum

percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-
half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who
cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would
mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000
votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that
down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average
vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000
families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to
get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships
of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our
proposal. What we are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the
reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of
the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a
republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the
people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number
of people. Otherwise, in a legislature features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of
Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
22 to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is
precise and crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple
application, not interpretation or circumvention.

THE THREE-SEAT LIMIT. An important consideration in adopting the party-list

system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again,
we quote Commissioner Monsod:

"MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested

or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system.
But we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation
in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings
of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there.
That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the
50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up
and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their
seats among the fifty. . . ."

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the

seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified"
means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit
ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no
single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list
seats, if not the entire House.

We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three seat limit is not
seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.

BANAT vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 179171, APRIL 21, 2009]

FORMULA FOR COMPUTING PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES. We therefore strike

down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives."
 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in

paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than

three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats"
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.
7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our

allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The
percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing
the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-
List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer
of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds
to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list
seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes
Garnered
over Guaranteed Additional (B) plus Applying
Total Seat Seats (C), in the
Votes
Rank Party Votes for (First (Second whole three
Garnered
Party Round) Round) integers seat cap
List, in (B) (C) (D) (E)
%
(A)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

COOP-
9 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 147589, June
26, 2001]

POLITICAL PARTIES REPRESENTING THE MARGINALIZED AND

UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS MAY PARTICIPATE IN THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party — or any organization or group for that matter —
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more

than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per

centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of

the Constitutional Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision
was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress. Hence, when the provision
was discussed, he exultantly announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we
shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine
power to our people in the legislature."

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact,
interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by
law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the
Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this
wise:

"SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State shall promote

proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
 compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible."

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional

representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable"
the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,

1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and

parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."

"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a

particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers
to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by
the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to
feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must
be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally

identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit
of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified
with the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No.190582, April 8, 2010]

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its
rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,

not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings
as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public
moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular
terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion,"
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in

criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct
is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral
judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in
public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation
punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind
endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

Palparan v. HRET [G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010]

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941,
the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which
parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House
of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions
for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into
office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules,
the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as
person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action
against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
"members" of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members
x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution’s
point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not
their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through
that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress
by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties
to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives
are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and
emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit
their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term
limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes
party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional

representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack
well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to
compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the
simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing
the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. – No person shall

be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five
(25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be

twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed
to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act
provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent."

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a

nominee—the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of
his party-list organization—in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners
Abayon and Palparan’s relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine
the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that
nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring
nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the
party or organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that
the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become
its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that
goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC
seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has
the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of
party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not
raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed
out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
Section 6

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995]

RESIDENCE IS SYNONYMOUS WITH DOMICILE IN ELECTION LAWS. Article 50 of

the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence."
In Ong vs. Republic this court, took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an

individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in
law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite
clearly:

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is

used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose
at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place
of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any
means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile."

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

MODE OF LOSING DOMICILE OF ORIGIN. First, a minor follows the domicile of his
parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows
that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her
domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when
she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to
Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, one must demonstrate:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for
a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of
a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant
the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between
the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil
Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence.

Article 110 of the Civil Code provide:

ARTICLE 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family.
But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or

residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which
would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in
favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su

residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a
ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This
part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a
positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is
further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in
the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence,"
referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile
which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention
of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband
and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference
could for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband a
single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately
preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live
together, thus:

ARTICLE 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live

together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help
and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to
any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further
explains:

Residence and Domicile. — Whether the word "residence" as used with

reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made
from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there
be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other place.

Aquino vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995]

WHILE RESIDENCE IS EQUIVALENT TO DOMICILE FOR ELECTION PURPOSES,

DOMICILE IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH RESIDENCE. We agree with COMELEC's
contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he
has established not just residence but domicile of choice."

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of

Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a
period of not less than one (I) year prior to the elections. Residence, for election
law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives this Court held that the
 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for
Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that

in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it
the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular

members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, and a
resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile (underscoring ours)
Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II,
July 22, 1986, p. 87).

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7,

page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
same point that 'resident' has been interpreted at times
as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider

at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather
than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty

especially considering that the provision in the
Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p.
110).

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given

to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning
as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest
purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs Vera is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with
the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or
who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would,
therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to
whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the
area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of
his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.

BEFORE PROCLAMATION AND BEFORE TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE, THE

QUALIFICATIONS OF CANDIDATES IN CONGRESS SHALL BE WITHIN THE
JURISIDICTION OF THE COMELEC. Under the above-stated provision, the electoral
tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only
when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken
his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives
subject to Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a
winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B .P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6
of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned
therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and
(petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass
upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because even after the
elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A.
6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates. Section 6 states:

SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has

been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason
a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a

candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the
suspension or termination of the proceedings against him when the evidence of
guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to
suggest that the provisions of Section. 6 ought to be applicable only to
disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of
R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving
disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B .P. 881. Section 7
states:

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of

Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
based on Sec 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
Section 7

Dimaporo vs. Mitra [G.R. No. 96859, October 15, 1991]

In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of
a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office.
As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor General:

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended

or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during
which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may
be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will
not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs.
Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is
allowed to serve its unexpired portion.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in
the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4)
grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex
rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances which
shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it
preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in
the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of
which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect
of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds
provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never
intended such absurdity.

Section 11

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang [G.R. No. 15905, August 3, 1966]

THE SPEECH OR EXPRESSION MUST BE MADE WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN

SESSION AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MEMBER’S OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of
their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as
a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to
the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.

Osmeña vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ENJOY ABSOLUTE PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF

PRIVILEGED SPEECH, BUT THEY MAY BE HELD ANSWERABLE BY THE CONGRESS
ITSELF. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or
debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives
"shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of
sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country,
the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from
prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they
shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule
XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words
spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege

cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the
English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that
he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." Such immunity has come
to this country from the practices of Parliament as construed and applied by the
Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt
in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But
it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman
Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the
floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many
infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2, pp. 798-799).
Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during
debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his
parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-
124.)

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or

could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of
their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attests to the consensus of
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.

Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago, [A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long
experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process
of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum.
Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the
motives.

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding
the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has
the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of
the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair
of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the
country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does
not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters,
not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity.

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,3[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to
the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or
“misconduct,” the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––
would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
their license and the law invest in them.4[16]

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust
in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers
who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly
administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or,
worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the
Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang5[17] who
repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on

Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without
any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and
disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It
is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect
courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to
protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as
the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of
being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional
hall.6[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or
improper language against another Senator or against any public
institution.”7[19] But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the
Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance.8[20] The lady senator clearly violated the
rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Section 13

Zandueta vs. De la Costa [G.R. No. 46267, November 28, 1938]

The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official

voluntarily accepts an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by
law, — which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him — ,
qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath,
and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said
newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will
be considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his
former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the
constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed (11 American
Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule
only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or
when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American
Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124).

In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad
interim appointment issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in
accordance with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled
him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of public interest, being one
of the means employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes, which
is the administration of justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice
in the Philippines and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes,
the temporary disability of a judge may be immediately remedied without detriment
to the smooth running of the judicial machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he
now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is unconstitutional, he
should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should
have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the
laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the
final determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The
petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by
implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of first
instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of
Palawan and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after
taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily
accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be estopped from
questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of
which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise knew, or at least
he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission
were to disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease
discharging the office.

Section 14

Puyat vs. De Guzman [G.R. No. 51122, March 25, 1982]

THE DISQUALIFICATION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED

BY INTERVENING IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY. In an election for the eleven
Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), the Puyat Group
won six seats to gain control of the Board and of the management of the company.
The Acero Group which won only five seats, questioned the said election in a quo
warranto proceeding filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
wherein they claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted. In the
said case, Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez, then member of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero
to which the Puyat Group objected on constitutional grounds, thus discouraging
Assemblyman Fernandez from further appearing therein as counsel. Subsequently,
however, Assemblyman Fernandez acquired P200.00 worth of stock in the subject
company representing ten (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares, on the
basis of which he filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case alleging
legal interest therein. The respondent Associate Commissioner of the SEC granted
leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez ownership of the said ten shares.

The Supreme Court, finding that under the facts and circumstances, there had been
an indirect "appearance as counsel before any administrative body" which is a
circumvention of the prohibition under Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, held that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the Securities
and Exchange Commission case falls within the ambit of the said constitutional
prohibition.

Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Estanislao Fernandez in the quo warranto case filed before the Securities and
before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel
for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners.
Realizing perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene"
on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be noted
that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he
appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero
therein. Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there
has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body"
and in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the prohibition contained in Section
11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. That which the Constitution directly
prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or implied prohibited. (Am. Digest,
2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P1046.)

Section 16

Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr. [G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998]

DEFINITION OF MAJORITY AND MINORITY. Petitioners answer the above question

in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional provision requiring the
election of the Senate President "by majority vote of all its members" carries with it
a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and "minority", as well as
who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted
constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the
winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly,
those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships
comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs.
As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate
minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President.
Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority
leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and
accepted committee chairmanships.

We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear

support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from
practices of the Upper House.

The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring
to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply "means the number
greater than half or more than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous words
of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal
does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority", much less the "minority," in
the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in
mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it
does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto
constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.

The Comment of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which

reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those
belonging to the minority. This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where
even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. History would also
show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political
party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority"
normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.

Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority". Majority
may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not
necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a
whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the
lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal
groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as
in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several
minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the "dominant
minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition
of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many
minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to
select the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." To our mind, the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

Avelino vs. Cuenco [G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAJORITY OF THE HOUSE AND MAJORITY OF THE

MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE. If the rump session was not a continuation of the
morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority
required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate?
Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minutes
say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least
fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in
view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution
declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House"
does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute
"the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a
difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of
"the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo
believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could
have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so
arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it
would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of
the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
that body being amendable at any time by that majority. And at any session
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy
arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all
concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia [G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997]

RULES OF PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY CONGRESS MAY BE DISREGARDED BY THE

CONGRESS ITSELF WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION. First. It is clear
from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI,
§§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with,
this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from
interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose
of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In
Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
 Osmeña vs. Pendatun [G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960]

WHAT CONSTITUTES DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR IS A PURELY POLITICAL QUESTION.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be disciplined, many
arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House
is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not
be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate
branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously
observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

"SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is

well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any
case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department
with the legislature since each department is equally independent
within the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . ."

"The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the state Senate
is given the power to expel a member, the courts will not review its action or revise
even a most arbitrary or unfair decision." (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. 200, p.
902.) [Italics Ours.]

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford
vs. French. 7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate
of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceedings to compel
reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to
make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of
California declined to interfere, explaining in orthodox juristic language:

"Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power

to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the
power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution.
It had been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an
express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which
is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied
power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss vs. Barlett. 3 Gray 473. 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of
Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every
legislative body; that it is necessary to enable the body 'to perform its
high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a
power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily
be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its
exercise. '. . . There is no provision authorizing courts to control,
direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power
 of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions,
which it is expressly forbidden to do."

We have underscored in the above quotation these lines which in our opinion
emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion,
they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the
case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to
interfere.

Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001]

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides
that each —

"x x x . house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days." 17

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive

measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its
resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 18 the
Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the
Sandiganbayan, despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the
prerogatives of Congress. The Court ruled:

"x x x . Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the

Constitution — which deals with the power of each House of Congress
inter alia to 'punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend
or expel a Member' by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject
to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days — is unavailing, as it appears to be quite
distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which
is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding
from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives."

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have

effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its
sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary — has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its
own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding
into the internal affairs of either branch.

Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the

1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of "actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but
also in the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into
any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any government
Executive, the Court subscribes to the view 19 that unless an infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional
precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for Judicial intervention. If any
part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs,
it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed
by the Charter itself.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.

Paredes, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 118364, August 8, 1995] 252
SCRA 541

U.S. vs. Pons [G.R. No. 11530, August 12, 1916]

THE CONTENTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE

COURTS OF JUSTICE, AND THE LATTER MAY NOT GO BEYOND THESE JOURNALS IN
VERIFYING THE FACTS CONTAINED THEREIN. Passing over the question whether
the printed Act (no. 2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as
to the date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind
the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment
when such journals are clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science which embraces and
illustrates the laws of evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the
Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28,
1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established
by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of
the legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In
order to understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to consider the nature
and character of the evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood to be that
which proves or disproves "any matter in question or to influence the belief
respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in the
instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et
seq. ) Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must
necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the
legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their
very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of
the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public knows
that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left
so until the determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other
words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect
an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for
the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant
evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and
character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend
rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to
many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling
matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.) Upon the same
point the court, in the State ex rel. Heron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in
1886, said:

"Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up the various

cases upon this question; and, out of multitude of citations, not one is
found in which any court has assumed to go beyond the proceedings
of the legislature, as recorded in the journal a law has been adopted.
And if reasons for this limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters
have not generally been stated, it doubtless arises from the fact that
they are apparent. Imperative reasons of public policy require that the
authentic of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most
permanent character. They should be public, because all are required
to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired
to-day upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals."

In the case from which this last quotation is taken the court cited numerous
decisions of the various states in the American Union in support of the rule therein
laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where the
rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover
the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those
of the Federal Government and the various states we do not hesitate to follow the
courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17931, February 28,
1963]

THE TERMS OF THE ENROLLED BILL ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS ON THE
TENOR THEREOF. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which
is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and,
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product,
citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate,
during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But,
said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much
less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat
Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors, Inc. vs.
Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 27, 1960].
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts
as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961 ). If there
 Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11,
1993]

CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE ENROLLED BILL AND THE CERTIFICATION OF THE

CONGRESS. It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the
bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by
Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was
then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the
journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid)
case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature

when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among
the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals
certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.

Section 17

Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [G.R. No. 86647,

February 5, 1990]

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POWERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. Where the

court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its orders upon all questions
pertaining to the cause are orders within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous
they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 56614, July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna,
G.R. No. 61404, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 564). This rule more appropriately
applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a constitutional body has time
and again been upheld by Us in many cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297,
December 8, 1988, thus:

"The use of the word 'sole' emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162].
 Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the
amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon
the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81
Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission
[Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA
140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution. Thus, 'judicial review
of decisions or final resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal is
(thus) possible only in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or, paraphrasing
Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use
by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of
law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR,
manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that
there has to be a remedy for such abuse."

Angara vs. Electoral Commission [G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF POWER TO JUDGE ALL CONTROVERSIES

RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CARRIES WITH IT THE POWER TO ISSUE REGULATIONS
RELATIVE TO THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS EXPRESSLY CONFERRED. - The grant
of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The
express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of
the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution
(Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S. D., 260; L. R. A.,
1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that
said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the
power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be
filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested
cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally
transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual
authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time
to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission
retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality
without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and
wherever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that
intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate
on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to
the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional
grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and
rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

Lazatin vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [8 SCRA 391 (1988)]

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION VESTS THE POWER TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE ON ALL
CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATION OF THE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS. Petitioner's reliance on
Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in
unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed
before the COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should
be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the COMELEC
"shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional,
provincial and city officials," reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973
Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution there was no
provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving
Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC.

That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is
concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily
apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the
legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution
vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction
of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to
election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those
involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to
promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including
the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making
power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This
is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
[63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in
no uncertain terms:

. . . [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex

necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within
which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or
 Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177;
emphasis supplied.]

A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973
Constitution, the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively granted
either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the
Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial and non-
partisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the
1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the
1987 Constitutions].

Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this
wise:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the
power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as " full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
[Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as
full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA
140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the
powers of the three branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the legislature in
an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the
Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was
That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral
Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to the separation of powers
of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is too evident
to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC's
purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties and
accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters
and prosecute, where appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1),
(3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to these
areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully
applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same
cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide
election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution.
Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art.
XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive
original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate
jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials
[Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and
the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. LLpr

The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of
the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is
founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly,
on the clear language of the Constitution itself.

Abbas vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal [G.R. No. L-83767, October 27, 1988]

THE MEMBERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL REPRESENTING THE CONGRESS

CANNOT BE DISQUALIFIED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TRIBUNAL MERELY BECAUSE THEY ARE PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN THE
PETITION. The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) —
requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of
whatever nature — is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than
three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with
no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,
whose disqualification is not sought.

We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested device is neither
unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution. We opine that in fact the most
fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
 three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman."

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both
Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this
proposition when it held that said provision ". . . is a clear expression of an intent
that all (such) contests . . . shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the
Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is
that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the
same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme
Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the proportion of Senators
to Justices in the prescribed membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1
— an unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot be totally
excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any

Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without
inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative
but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the
performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest
that would involve all 24 Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit
in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of
the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate
will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal
whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate

Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective
and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
 Bondoc vs. Pineda [G.R. No. 97710, September 26, 1991]

MEMBERS OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ENJOY SECURITY OF TENURE. The

independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers
of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the
House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the
electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura

from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote
in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the

House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority
party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence — even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to
party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of
the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge" of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group.
As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a
registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from
the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

Chavez vs. COMELEC [211 SCRA 315 (1992)]

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES ARE NOT ALLOWED IN THE ELECTION OF

THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. It is clear from the above-quoted provision of
the law that "pre-proclamation cases (are) not allowed in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives." What is
allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order
enjoining "the proclamation of the 24th highest ranking senatorial candidate
without first acting upon petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and
urgent petition dated May 22, 1992" but also prays that judgment be rendered
requiring the Comelec to re-open the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13
provinces therein enumerated (Petition, p. 9) including Metro Manila, scan the
ballots for "Chavez" votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said
scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner.

It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of
"manifest error's in the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the
Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots
contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any "manifest error"
in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There
being none, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which,
under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Thus, Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that "(t)he Senate and the House
of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The word "sole" underscores the
exclusivity of the Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their
respective Members (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199
SCRA 692 [1991]; Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA
391 [1988]; Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). It is therefore
crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is
the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a
member of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial
candidates have been proclaimed.

Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that a recount before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal where he would be forced to shell out the expenses imposes not only a
property requirement for the enjoyment of the right to be voted upon but also a
price on the right of suffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign will.

The argument, however, is beside the point. The law is very clear on the matter
and it is not right for petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence,
engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter the Omnibus
Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the existing law in cases
like the one at bar must be faithfully followed lest we allow anarchy to reign. The
proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact
remedial measures.

Section 18

Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]

Coseteng vs. Mitra [G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990]

APPOINTMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS

SHOULD BE MADE BY THE HOUSE CONCERNED. The composition of the House
members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority
and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the
House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of proportional representation
of the political parties therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which
is presumably a member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the
majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its
lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1% of the
House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of
the House membership, i.e., it should have been able to elect at least 17
congressmen or congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the
petitioner's election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival,
respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the
Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their
respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by
their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of
their election to the Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is unassailable.

Guingona vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992]

RULE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS. It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is
entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18
of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as
above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the
Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance
with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party —
either the LAKAS — NUCD or the NPC.

On the claim of Senator Tañada that under the ruling in the case of Senator
Lorenzo Tañada, and the case of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be
elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments because of: (a) the
physical impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional membership must
be rounded up into one senator, (b) being the sole elected senator of his party, his
The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be invoked as a precedent
in support of incumbent Senator Tañada's claim to a membership in the present
Commission on Appointments. In the time of his illustrious father, out of 24 elected
senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23 belonged to the Nacionalista Party,
while Senator Lorenzo Tañada, who belonged to the Citizens' Party, was the lone
opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of the Commission on
Appointments because he alone represented the minority party. Had there been
another senator belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this problem of
who should sit as the sole representative of the opposition party would have arisen.
In the case of Senator Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from the
opposition party, namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying the rule of proportional
representation mentioned earlier (see formula), the opposition was entitled to one
full member (not a fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally
nominated and elected as the minority representative in the Senate. In the present
case, if there were a political party other than the present four political parties is
the Senate. and We follow Senator Tañada's claim that he is entitled to full
membership as lone representative of his party, We would have the anomaly of
having 13 senators, where the Constitution allows only twelve (12) in the
Commission on Appointments.

We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments

by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance
with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the
same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators
shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make
a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give
the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership
of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.

The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in

character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party
with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can
by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in
effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain
the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under
such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to
confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on
Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same
token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.

Section 18 also assures representation in the Commission on Appointments of any

political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the
number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission
on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 12
a political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2
will not entitle such a party a membership in the Commission on Appointments.
This applies to the respondent Senator Tañada.

We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:

2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot
constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.

We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators

to the Commission on Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that
the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators
and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under
Section 18, the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members and in
Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call
of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge such powers and
functions herein conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions of the
Constitution, Section 10, Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments, provides as follows:

SECTION 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall

meet at either the session hall of the Senate or the House of
Representatives upon call of the Chairman or as the Commission may
designate. The presence of at least thirteen (13) members is
necessary to constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at least
four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from
either house . . ."

It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence
of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives
in order that the Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their functions even if not fully
constituted and even if their composition is expressly specified by the Constitution.
Among these are the Supreme Court, Civil Service Commission, Commission on
Election, Commission on Audit. They perform their functions so long as there is the
required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The Commission on
Appointments may perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten
(10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.

Section 21

Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee [G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991]

THE POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION

IS NOT ABSOLUTE. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
vprocess and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in

Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel
a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee
or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment
requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain
the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the
privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or
39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to
be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212, because, firstly, Senator
Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the
herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.

It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is

not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or
not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA
No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more
within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court
may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this
case. In John T . Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held:

" . . . . The power of congress to conduct investigations is inherent in

the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,
economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to
remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal
Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as
is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely
conceded by the Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is
the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of
the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an
end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate
task of Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to 'punish' those investigated
are indefensible." (emphasis supplied)

It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decided to conduct its
investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil Case No. 0035 had already
been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of
its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is
the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of
petitioners' respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the
respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the
respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before
the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
In fine, for the respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt
vs. United States, 21 it was held that:

"Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since

Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may
potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which
are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of the
government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it
cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the
Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively
belongs to the Executive. . . . ."

CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF

THE PARTIES. Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional
committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action,' including 'the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights'."

In another case —

" . . . the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an

inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the
existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the
Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We
cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional
investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any
private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility
placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the
Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to
privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly."

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right
against self-incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completely
silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by
other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable
Court of Appeals, et al. thus —

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an

ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to
take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question
requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused may
altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any
and all questions."

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents administrative

investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, the Court reiterated
the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses
to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but
also in all other types of suit.
 and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination
only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will
incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the
character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that
controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is
sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not."

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may
not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
evidence before it, it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in
aid of legislation and, If pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government,
ordained by the Constitution.

Arnault vs. Nazareno [G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950]

POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO ISSUE CONTEMPT ORDER. Although there is no

provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to
the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry —
with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information — which is not frequently true — recourse must be had to
others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is
not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to
obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50
A. L. R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly hives to congress the power to
punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication
exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6
Wheaton. 204; 5 L ed., 242.)

But no person can punish for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless
his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to
inquire. (Killbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)

Since, as we noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative
field than either the congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it
is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It
would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can
be bounded. It is necessary for us to do so in this case. Suffice it to say it must be
coextensive with the range of the legislative power.

EXTENT OF THE POWER OF INQUIRY OF THE CONGRESS. Once an inquiry is

admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested
by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed
or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by
the sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and
not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

Senate vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]

POWER TO CONDUCT INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION IS AN INHERENT POWER

OF CONGRESS. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any

of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Underscoring supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature
established therein — the Batasang Pambansa — and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno, a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already
recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the

Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault,
who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify
thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the
senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for
contempt. Upholding the Senate's power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court
held:

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing

either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some
means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . . .
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch
may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled,
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction
involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being
related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the
transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish."

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch,
it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to
executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive
operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is

grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the
information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is
necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has
the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF INQUIRY. As evidenced by the American

experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than
executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Court's certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself
might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power
of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one
possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to
indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that
matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given
such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of
inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in
aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in
accordance with the Senate or House's duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without
duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that
obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit
filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch.
Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at
present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might
be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members
of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending
on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these
abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions
to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE. The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this
jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986
Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has
been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines
it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has

encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is
customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to
speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may
be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be
asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or
legislative investigations."

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by
U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is
of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic
objectives. Another variety is the informer's privilege, or the privilege of the
Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a
generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.

Tribe's comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a

variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the
confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique
role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government.
Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold
documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have
also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of
government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to
withhold information related to pending investigations. . . ." (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The entry in Black's Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive

regarding the scope of the doctrine.

This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,

exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary
citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of
highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental
operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to
documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive' domestic decisional
and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank
expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative
communications. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural
setting.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in
the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive
privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from
the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials.
Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION AND QUESTION HOUR.

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of
which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress' oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are

implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process

only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent
with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials

under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle
of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the
legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads
to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch,
and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this
power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body;
hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of
powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
 Gudani vs. Senga [G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]

THE PRESIDENT MAY VALIDLY PREVENT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM
ATTENDING CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL.
Preliminarily, we must discuss the effect of E.O. 464 and the Court's ruling in
Senate on the present petition. Notably, it is not alleged that petitioners were in
any way called to task for violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for
violating the direct order of Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate
Committee, an order that stands independent of the executive order. Distinctions
are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed "generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege," as among those public
officials required in Section 3 of E.O. 464 "to secure prior consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress." The Court in Senate declared
both Section 2(b) and Section 3 void, and the impression may have been left
following Senate that it settled as doctrine, that the President is prohibited from
requiring military personnel from attending congressional hearings without having
first secured prior presidential consent. That impression is wrong.

Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which

is encumbered by significant limitations. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of
the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before
Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. However,
the ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent
before appearing before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent
specie of presidential authority — the commander-in-chief powers of the President.
By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are
not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to
executive privilege or executive control.

During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency
of this petition as well as the issues raised herein. The decision in Senate was
rendered with the comfort that the nullification of portions of E.O. 464 would bear
no impact on the present petition since petitioners herein were not called to task for
violating the executive order. Moreover, the Court was then cognizant that Senate
and this case would ultimately hinge on disparate legal issues. Relevantly, Senate
purposely did not touch upon or rule on the faculty of the President, under the
aegis of the commander-in-chief powers to require military officials from securing
prior consent before appearing before Congress. The pertinent factors in
considering that question are markedly outside of those which did become relevant
in adjudicating the issues raised in Senate. It is in this petition that those factors
come into play.

The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18,

Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that "[t]he President shall be
the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines . . ." Outside explicit
constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such
authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and
speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under
civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was
 [T]he Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of
military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of
persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may
be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain
degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of
the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large
extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful
orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully
complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter.
It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner
Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.

Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military
way of life circumscribes several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part
and parcel of the military package. Those who cannot abide by these limitations
normally do not pursue a military career and instead find satisfaction in other
fields; and in fact many of those discharged from the service are inspired in their
later careers precisely by their rebellion against the regimentation of military life.
Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain on character,
for the military mode is a highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally
conscripted into, but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for those who do make
the choice to be a soldier, significant concessions to personal freedoms are
expected. After all, if need be, the men and women of the armed forces may be
commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal inclinations.

Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of
the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the
President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any
chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer
against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel
such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Explication of these principles is in order.

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to
attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executive's power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President's prerogatives
as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.

Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on
the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
President's ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be
accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the
President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the
officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is
the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislature's functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the
President's power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress's right to conduct legislative inquiries.
The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by
which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries
even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief
Executive's prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to
the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify
before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative
and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is
only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode
of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not
enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies
and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the
Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of
government.

In re Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio [G.R.

No. 174340, October 17, 2006]

THE POWER OF THE CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION

CANNOT BE RESTRICTED BY MERE LEGISLATIVE FIAT. Dispelling any doubt as to
the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their
maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. Then came
the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was
therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American
jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of
Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it
constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it
means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly

repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members
and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced.
Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG
belongs to this class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested

with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the
powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be
exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the
intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of
duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of
the people, and not their rulers.

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle
of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority opinion
barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for
damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted,

clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here
interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal
terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No. 1. If Section 4 (a)
were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member
thereof from civil liability "for anything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the constitutionality
of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most serious
doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the
irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the
PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of
the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. . . . .

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or

 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, [G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008]

Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of
the President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public
official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the
benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or
forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the
Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s
conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of
judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all
citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally
ordained separation of governmental powers.

Section 22

Senate vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006]

QUESTION HOUR. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not,

unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are
covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order,
made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage
of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department
heads' possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no
reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under
Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has
been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own

initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and
the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted
in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning

of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be
interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of
Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that
these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.

MR. MAAMBONG. . . . When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22

on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of the
Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the
House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a
particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in
 ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it
is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner

Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet ministers
may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the
Senate [when requested under Section 22] does not mean that
they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the
committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of
legislation or congressional investigation. According to
Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be
had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam
President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20

refers only to what was originally the Question Hour, whereas,
Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House. 83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez
bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the
appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the
Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the
provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original
draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation.
This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:

MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the

Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the
Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the
Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his
reaction.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is

recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one
reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting
it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?

MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding

Officer.

MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we

sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is
Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of
 MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative
power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement
of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application
of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in

the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are
accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become
Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide

and Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions
pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners
understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from
the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davide's
only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely
together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner
considered them as identical functions of Congress.

The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners' alone. From the above-
quoted exchange, Commissioner Maambong's committee — the Committee on Style
— shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress.
Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman
of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed
as representing that of his Committee.

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a

definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the
Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation
of the government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question
period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution
86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly
conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the
ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.

An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate

accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They
shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and
shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their
term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as
they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is
lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform
more fully to a system of separation of powers. 88 To that extent, the question
hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question
period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to
appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered
 Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the
subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain
information from any source — even from officials of departments and
agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike
the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in
Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive
branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right
to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions
of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are
adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between
the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to
those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence
in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period
have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain
information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform
its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain
executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a
system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical
content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information
parceled out ex gratia by the executive. 89 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Section 24

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]

WHAT IS NEEDED TO ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IS

ONLY THE BILL AND NOT THE LAW. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No.
7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners
point out that although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal
Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in
the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other
bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain
the essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law — but the
revenue bill — which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that
the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the
conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to
note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
amendments" but also to " propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in
respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the
the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive
power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of
the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such non-legislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has
never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of
Representatives.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can
be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore,
understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months
before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate.
After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the
Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7,
1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the
time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to
amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been
filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was
only a substitute of those earlier bills.

Alvarez vs. Guingona [G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996]

INTRODUCTION OF A BILL OF LOCAL APPLICATION IN THE SENATE IN

ANTICIPATION OF THE BILL TO BE PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION. Although a bill of local application
like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same
import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be
denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB
No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own
admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed
on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said
Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that
initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act
No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is
perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.

Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already

approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate
Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB
No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and
transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it
receives the House bill.

Section 25

Garcia vs. Mata [G.R. No. L-33713, July 30, 1975]

RIDER IN AN APPROPRIATION BILL. A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A.

1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or
to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of paragraph 11
itself, which reads,

"After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no

reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to
a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five
consecutive years:"

the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated
money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said
paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental governmental policy matters of the calling
to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP.
The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire paragraph.

In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was a non-appropriation item

inserted in an appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition
against 'riders' to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and
completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.

The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1 5 of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title
of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any
provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the subject
expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that
subject.

In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject

and is properly connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one
expressed in the title of the act, and every fair intendment and reasonable doubt
should be indulged in favor of the validity of the legislative enactment. But when an
act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as
expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.

We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of
the act. Thus, in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is
"a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject."
The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating

funds for the operation of the government." Any provision contained in the body of
the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or any matter properly
 Demetria vs. Alba [G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987]

REALLIGNMENT OF BUDGET MAY ONLY BE DONE WHEN THERE ARE SAVINGS FROM
THE APPROPRIATIONS OF A PARTICULAR DEPARTMENT AND THE SAME IS TO BE
DONE TO AUGMENT OTHER ITEMS IN THEIR OWN APPROPRIATIONS. Paragraph 1
of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only
completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting
to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null
and void.

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: . . ." and money belonging to no one
in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for
misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of
the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money
from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public
purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to
another [Sec. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among
others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public
funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as
correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon
the President, ". . . Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment
of unfounded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures,
diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel
system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of
development priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5 The contention
of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted
pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall
flat on its face.

Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from
one branch of the government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. I, Eight
Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:

". . . The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the

government, of equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of
its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting
within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or
supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that
other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The
Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not
make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when
 law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the
courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce
the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature
has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at
liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every
private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when
the judges assume to act and to render judgments or decrees without
jurisdiction. 'In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no
judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges
have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is
forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the people,
which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives
expressed in any law.' [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61;
People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169,
1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825]" (pp. 332-334).

Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of
its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But
where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of
the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power
conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X,
Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitutional and which power
this Court has exercised in many instances.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

NECESSITY OF REALLIGNMENT MAY BE MADE BY A MEMBER OF CONGRESS, BUT

THE RE-ALLIGNMENT ITSELF MUST BE MADE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OR THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES. The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is
further divided into expenditures for salaries, personal services, other compensation
benefits, maintenance expenses and other operating expenses. In turn, each
member of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a proportionate
share of the appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend
for one item of expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his
allocation in said item to another item of expense.

Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-
92), claiming that this practice is prohibited by Section 25(5) Article VI of the
Constitution. Said section provides:

"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations:

however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations."
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of
Congress is authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994,
which provides:

"Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the

Philippines, no change or modification shall be made in the
expenditure items authorized in this Act and other appropriation laws
unless in cases of augmentations from savings in appropriations as
authorized under Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution." (GAA
of 1994, p. 1273).

Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, but not the individual members of Congress are the ones
authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.

Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the
members of Congress only determine the necessity of the realignment of the
savings in the allotments for their operating expenses. They are in the best position
to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving their stamp of approval,
these two officials will have to see to it that:

(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the

items of expenditures from which the same are to be taken; and

(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items
of expenditure to which said transfer or realignment is to be made.

Section 26

Philconsa vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-23326, December 18, 1965]

RULE ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE TITLE. Parenthetically, it may be added that

the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an act should be expressed in its
title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the
Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the opportunity
of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law
Reviewer, Book One [1965] p. 119)

With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:

"The Constitutional requirements with respect to titles of statutes as

sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate
to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the
title be a complete index of the content." (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil.
535)

"The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be

expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so as not to
interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly
illustrated and explained in Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the
question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land
Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its
provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court
held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as indicated in its title,
and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this
provision of the Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title, is
not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory.
It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this
constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164 5 ; See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil.
676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)

In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the
title of said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and
is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution.

In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first,
the prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second,
the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not
embrace more than one subject.

Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board [G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987]

THE IMPOSITION OF A REGULATORY FEE IS GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE

LAW CREATING THE AGENCY. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the
general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement
is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject
matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign
to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in
the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional
requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple
or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than
technical construction.

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the
DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province
shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or
rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of
a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its
title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE
to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and
5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the
measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram
Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in
its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express
all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the
DECREE.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado [G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993]

PURPOSE OF THE ONE-SUBJECT ONE-BILL RULE. We consider first the objection

based on Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling"

legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of
provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore
be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise
the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made,
of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.

THE SUBJECT OF THE LAW NOT THE EFFECT THEREOF IS REQUIRED TO BE STATED
IN THE TITLE. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the
act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It
has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature
or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable
but would actually render legislation impossible. As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its

title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and
adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be
included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the
machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its
execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as
expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have
special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal
of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect
and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law,
which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if
the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed
that every other act which it repeals or alters by implication must be mentioned in
the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies
is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which
is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is
that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance [G.R. No. 115544, August 25, 1994]

THE CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT DISPENSES WITH THE PRINTING OF THE

COPIES OF THE BILL AS WELL AS THE THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS.
Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to
propose S. No. 1630. We not pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No.
1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution
8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24,
1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 9 and again on March 22, 1994,
10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity
of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualified the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days
before it is finally approved.

In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause,
because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe
the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the
"unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval)
would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise
of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill
which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only
the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved
would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may
well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing
copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy
enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special
election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is
required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency
session.

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three
readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version,
became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the
House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been
certified by the President as urgent.
 Tan vs. Del Rosario [G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994]

Article VI, Section 26(1), of the Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to
prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the members of the legislature who
favor any one of unrelated subjects in the support of the whole act, (b) to avoid
surprises or even fruad upon the legislature , and (c) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publications of its proceedings as are usually made, of the subjects of
legislation. 1 The above objectives of the fundamental law appear to us to have
been sufficiently met. Anything else would be to require a virtual compendium of
the law which could not have been the intendment of the constitutional mandate.

Tobias vs. Abalos [G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994]

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON “NO AMENDMENT UPON THE LAST

READING OF THE BILL” APPLIES ONLY TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF EACH HOUSE
AND NOT TO THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE. Petitioners' argument
that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add or
delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three
readings is in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule" (Sec. 26 (2), Art.
VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in
the Tolentino case that:

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in
these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two
houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since
each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . .

Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills

introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the
conference committee report. 32 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in
each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for
its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to
proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to
absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived
of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI,
Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by
the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to
disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of
Congress is prohibited.

Section 27

Gonzales vs. Macaraig [G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990]

VETO POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power
of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a
general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the
line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and
first came into being in the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August
1916. This was followed by the 1935 Constitution, which contained a similar
provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the veto power was made
more expansive by the inclusion of this sentence:

". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more

items of the same, the President can not veto the provision without at
the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates .
. ."

The 1935 Constitution further broadened the President's veto power to include the
veto of item or items of revenue and tariff bills.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and
compact form, thus:

"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto
any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object."

It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI,
Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official
concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a
provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a
disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge?

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of
money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120,
124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312)
declared "that an 'item' of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in
itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill."

It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI,

Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision,
the extent of the President's veto power as previously defined by the 1935
Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely
pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916
(1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).

The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that
a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein
and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
Petitioners' further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the
President partakes of the nature of legislative powers it should be strictly
construed, is negative by the following dictum in Bengzon, supra, reading:

"The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative

department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of
power to the executive department. The Legislature has the
affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative
power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of
the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his
authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may
not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the
unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every
intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they
will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature" (Commonwealth v. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55
L.R.A., 882; People v. Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N.Y.S., 52;
Fulmore v. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State [1927], 53
A.L.R., 258 [at 917]).

INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the

Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some " particular appropriation"
therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the
vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They
apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the
Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be
found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the
original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by
petitioners themselves, i.e., the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring
Office" (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather
than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16
(FY '90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that
should be treated as items for the purpose of the President's veto power. (Henry v.
Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)

"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp

constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the
legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred
on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general
appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate
legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor
to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or
vetoing 'items' of expenditure essential to the operation of
government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it
immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's
veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on
an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted
to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers
doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its
 must be treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's item veto
power over general appropriation bills.

". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to

encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof 'logrolling
measure,' special interest provisions which could not succeed if
separately enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation
incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)

Bengzon vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992]

THE PRESIDENT CANNOT EXERCISE HER VETO POWER TO AMEND AN EXISTING

LAW. We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no
President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his
or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a final and
executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.

A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.

Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices
which privilege was extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by
Republic Act No. 3595.

On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which
repealed Republic Acts 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of
pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was surreptitiously restored
through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.

It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of
Justices and Constitutional Commissioners which led Congress to restore the
repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When her finance and
budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions is the
1992 General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier
1990 veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this petition.

It turns out, however, that P. D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P. D. No. 644
was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be
effective up to the present. In the same way that it was enforced from 1957 to
1975, so should it be enforced today.

House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were
never taken away validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 did not also
produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises.

From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed
certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing
Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to accomplish.

Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1797
never achieved that purpose because it was not properly published. It never
became a law.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an
appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein"
and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows
that any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in
its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate
provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the
category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions
which are intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no
place in an appropriations bill. These are matters of general legislation more
appropriately dealt with in separate enactments. Former Justice Irene Cortes, as
Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish conditions for
and regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for
that would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.

The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards,

supra., thus:

"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp

constitutional powers conferred on the legislature, neither can the
legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred
on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general
appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate
legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor
to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or
vetoing `items' of expenditures essential to the operation of
government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it
immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's
veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on
an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted
to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in
contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no
more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to
infringe on the Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach
on the constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this
result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be
treated as 'items' for purposes of the Governor's item veto power over
general appropriation bills.

". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to

encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof 'logrolling
measures,' special interest provisions which could not succeed if
separately enacted, or 'riders,' substantive pieces of legislation
incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied).

Section 28
 ". . . In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco (69 Phil. 420), Justice
Laurel, speaking for the Court, stated: 'A tax is considered uniform
when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where
the subject may be found.'

"There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on

such a constitutional requirement where there is a classification. The
opportunity came in Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso (83 Phil. 852,
862). Thus: 'Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation; . . .' About two years
later, Justice Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race Horses
Trainers Assn. v. de la Fuente (88 Phil. 60, 65) incorporated the above
excerpt in his opinion and continued; 'Taking everything into account,
the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to
the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory
within the meaning of the Constitution.'

"To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another
case decided two years later, (Uy Matias v. City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300)
is that the statute or ordinance in question 'applies equally to all
persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation.' This Court
is on record as accepting the view in a leading American case
(Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 US 495) that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.' (Lutz v.
Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153)."

The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold
to the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engage in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt
from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine
products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are
from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the
reach of the general public.

Province of Abra vs. Hernando [G.R. No. L-49336, August 31, 1981]

THE USE OF THE PROPERTY AND NOT THE OWNERSHIP IS THE CONTROLLING
FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE EXEMPTION. Respondent Judge would not
have erred so grievously had he merely compared the provisions of the present
Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of
"lands, buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference. Under the
1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The present
Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries"
and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings, and improvements," they
should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for religious
According to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero: "From 1906, in
Catholic Church v. Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting
Commissioner of Customs, it has been the constant and uniform holding that
exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it
must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns
on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed
strictissimi juris." In Manila Electric Company v. Vera, a 1975 decision, such
principle was reiterated, reference being made to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; 15 Commissioner of Customs v. Philippine
Acetylene Co. & CTA; 16 and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs.

Abra Valley College vs. Aquino [G.R. No. L-39086, June 15, 1988]

Section 29

Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works [G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960]

Aglipay vs. Ruiz [G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937]

Guingona vs. Carague [G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991]

AUTOMATIC BUDGET ALLOCATION FOR DEBT SERVICING IS ALLOWED UNDER THE

CONSTITUTION. More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that
provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an
authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be 'made
by law,' such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation
may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just
as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application
which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned
decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly
and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present."

Osmeña vs. Orbos [G.R. No. 99886, March 31, 1993]

THE RULE ON SECTION 29 (3) APPLIES ONLY TO MONIES COLLECTED IN THE

EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF TAXATION AND NOT THOSE LEVIED FOR
REGULATORY PURPOSES. Also of relevance is this Court's ruling in relation to the
sugar stabilization fund the nature of which is not far different from the OPSF. In
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld the legality of the sugar
stabilization fees and explained their nature and character, viz.:

"The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is

within the power of the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar
industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). The tax collected is not in a
pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory
purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar industry.
The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State
(Lutz v. Araneta, supra).
 market.' The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys
pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even
though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence v. American
Surety Co. 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am Jur Sec. 2, p.
718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected
are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the
statute, 'administered in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the
purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance if any, is to be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the
essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec.
29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). 17

The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized by

the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the
Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29 (3), lifted from
the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1)." (emphasis supplied.)

Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes,
they are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that
the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137.
It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers
to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to the
scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not
without precedent.

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

Section 30

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]
Diaz vs. CA [G.R. No. 109698, December 5, 1994]

Section 32

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 125416, September
26, 1996]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM. Prescinding from these

definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people
directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law,
ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or
modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body
is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within
thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their duly-authorized
and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice
thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to
collect the number of signed conformities with the period granted by said statute,
the Commission Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum)
at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned . . .".

On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is
begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-
making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes
of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate
approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body.
Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex
than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or
"No" in the ballot.

[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as
"powers" or "legal processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms
them, or "concepts", or "the proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred
to in this Decision.]

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to
supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the
counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act
submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted by the electorate. This is especially true where the proposed
legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several
autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be
exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to
the electorate," although "two or more propositions may be submitted in an
initiative".

It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition."

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision

of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-
making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its
authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and
adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power"
features of our Constitution.

ARTICLE VII – EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1

Marcos vs. Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989]

[G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989]
Soliven vs. Makasiar [G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988]

Section 4

Brillantes vs COMELEC [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004]

THE COMELEC CANNOT MAKE “UNOFFICIAL COUNT” FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise
of an "unofficial" tabulation of election results based on a copy of the election
returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass the votes for the
election of President and Vice-President. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass
the votes.

As early as January 28, 2004, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon already conveyed
to Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. his deep-seated concern that the respondent
COMELEC could not and should not conduct any "quick count" of the votes cast for
the positions of President and Vice-President. In his Letter dated February 2, 2004
addressed to Chairman Abalos, Senate President Drilon reiterated his position
emphasizing that "any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said
positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-
President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but
would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."

Nonetheless, in disregard of the valid objection of the Senate President, the

COMELEC proceeded to promulgate the assailed resolution. Such resolution directly
infringes the authority of Congress, considering that Section 4 thereof allows the
use of the third copy of the Election Returns (ERs) for the positions of President,
Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, intended
for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of advanced precinct
results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President,
ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress.

Parenthetically, even the provision of Rep. Act No. 8436 confirms the constitutional
undertaking of Congress as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the
President and Vice-President. Section 24 thereof provides:

SEC. 24. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for

President and Vice-President. — The Senate and the House of
Representatives, in joint public session, shall compose the national
board of canvassers for president and vice-president. The returns of
every election for president and vice-president duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to
the Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of
the certificates of canvass, the president of the Senate shall, not later
than thirty (30) days after the day of the election, open all the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress upon
determination of the authenticity and the due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass all the results for president and vice-
president by consolidating the results contained in the data storage
devices submitted by the district, provincial and city boards of
canvassers and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidates for
president and vice-president.

The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is "unofficial," is puerile and
totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official
canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is,
with more reason, prohibited from making an "unofficial" canvass of said votes.

The COMELEC realized its folly and the merits of the objection of the Senate
 The word you are saying that within 36 hours after election,
more or less, you will be able to tell the people on the basis of your
quick count, who won the election, is that it?

COMM. SADAIN:
Well, it's not exactly like that, Your Honor. Because the fact of
winning the election would really depend on the canvassed results, but
probably, it would already give a certain degree of comfort to certain
politicians to people rather, as to who are leading in the elections, as
far as Senator down are concerned, but not to President and Vice-
President.

JUSTICE PUNO:
So as far as the Senatorial candidates involved are concerned,
but you don't give this assurance with respect to the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential elections which are more important?

COMM. SADAIN:
In deference to the request of the Senate President and the
House Speaker, Your Honor. According to them, they will be the ones
canvassing and proclaiming the winner, so it is their view that we will
be pre-empting their canvassing work and the proclamation of the
winners and we gave in to their request.
xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:

Perhaps what you are saying is that the system will minimize
"dagdag-bawas" but not totally eradicate "dagdag-bawas"?

COMM. SADAIN:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE CALLEJO, [SR.]:

Now, I heard either Atty. Bernas or Atty. Brillantes say (sic) that
there was a conference between the Speaker and the Senate President
and the Chairman during which the Senate President and the Speaker
voice[d] their objections to the electronic transmission results system,
can you share with us the objections of the two gentlemen?

COMM. SADAIN:
These was relayed to us Your Honor and their objection or
request rather was for us to refrain from consolidating and publishing
the results for presidential and vice-presidential candidates which we
have already granted Your Honors. So, there is going to be no
consolidation and no publication of the . . .

COMM. SADAIN:
Reason behind being that it is actually Congress that canvass
that the official canvass for this and proclaims the winner.

Section 13

Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 85468, September 7, 1989]

subpar. 24) that "pursuit of private business . . . without the permission required by
Civil Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
any officer or employee in the civil service.

On the suspension of the petitioner from office, Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) provides:

"SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public

officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement
or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him."

Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information

with an offense punishable under the Constitution and the laws (RA 3019 and PD
807), the law's command that he "shall be suspended from office" pendente lite
must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive
suspension for as indicated by the Solicitor General, an approved leave, whether it
be for a fixed or indefinite period, may be cancelled or shortened at will by the
incumbent.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896, February 22,
1991]

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS OFFICIAL FAMILY CANNOT BE APPOINTED TO ANY OTHER
OFFICE IN THE GOVERNMENT EXCEPT IN THOSE INSTANCES ALLOWED BY THE
CONSITUTION AND IN THOSE PROVIDED BY LAW IN AN EX OFFICIO CAPACITY
WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AND REQUIRED BY THE PRIMARY
FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION. Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the
second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These
sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official
family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in
general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987
Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President
and his official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz
after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and
debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions,
originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the
Executive Department. Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be
stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise
more powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.

This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possible refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and
meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation
that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2)
of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the
Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the
President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil
servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the
other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under

Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these
posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to
absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot
chair the National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115
(December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and
the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local
Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack of
a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, would also be prohibited.

Section 15

Aytona vs. Castillo [G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962]

MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS. Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia

ceased to be such earlier than at noon at December 30, 1961. But it is common
sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal,
his was no more than a "care-taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare
of the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he should not do
acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. The time for debate had passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not
for him to use his powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare
that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan
purposes. The filing up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need
for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned
deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.

Normally, when the President makes appointments with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, he has the benefit of their advice. When he makes
ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be
prudent to insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the
members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them the reason for
such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments
that will consider the appointees is different from that existing at the time of the
appointment and where the names are to be submitted by his successor, who may
not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in
extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to believe that in signing 350
appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care" which
was required and expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the
contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and spirit of the
constitutional provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim
appointments.

Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this
Court resolves that it must decline to disregard the Presidential Administrative
Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.

Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an
appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, specially where the
appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interim appointments
(three hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in
a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the other hand, the authorities admit of
exceptional circumstances justify revocation and if any circumstances justify
revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.

Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to
revoke after the appointee has qualified is the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is
doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present situation,
considering the rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other
happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality and propriety which
form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be
argued, wittingly or unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline,
whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and efficiency of the public
service. Needless to say, there are instances of the public service. Needless to say,
there are instances wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice and
righteousness should be taken into account.

In re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon.

Vallarta [A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998.]

THE PRESIDENT CANNOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY DURING THE

TWO-MONTH PERIOD DESPITE THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE TO FILL
VACANCIES IN THE JUDICIARY WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM SUBMISSION OF THE
NOMINEES. The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution — "(t)wo months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his terms" — the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and
9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the
Now, it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan
considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared
election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an

election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1) Any person who gives,

offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any
office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes
or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an
expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation,
entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general
to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the
election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or
choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a
political party.

(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position,

promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-five
days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election,
(1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office,
agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires
any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or
creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought
unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the
proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the
position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of
the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after
the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos
P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a
"caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President." Said the Court:

"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so

spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's
qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of
them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments."

As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to

important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not
unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" appointments — those
made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of
their making — but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.

On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII — allowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided — is much
narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making of
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly
restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.

Section 16

Binamira vs. Garucho [G.R. No. 92008, July 30, 1990]

DISTTINCTION BETWEEN APPOINTMENT AND DESIGNATION. It is not disputed

that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only
designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between
appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider.

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition
by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the case before us,
the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of
the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that appointment is
essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise

involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the
common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in
a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In
this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment,
which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

MAY THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT BE EXERCISED BY ANY OFFICER OTHER THAN

THE ONE TO WHOM IT IS VESTED. Even if so understood, that is, as an
appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has
been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the
appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be
made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment
involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated.
Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise
of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation)
of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly
performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of
 and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given
to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.

In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on

the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the
presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and
competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless
power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he
cannot delegate his duties to another.

Indeed, even on the assumption that the power conferred on the President could be
validly exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept that the act of the latter,
as an extension or "projection" of the personality of the President, made
irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in question. The petitioner's
conclusion that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Aquino is
based only on half the doctrine he vigorously invokes. Justice Laurel stated that
doctrine clearly in the landmark case of Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, where
he described the relationship of the President of the Philippines and the members of
the Cabinet as follows:

. . . all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the

Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the
President of the Philippines when "performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business," which was true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor
of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts shall be considered valid only if not
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also happened in the case at
bar.

Sarmiento vs. Mison [G.R. No. L-79974, December 17, 1987]

APPOINTMENTS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to
time, are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if
the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President
appoints.

The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule
in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects
excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of
constitutional construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if
not precision, the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, on whether the appointments by the President, under the second, third
and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad
Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:

"In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional

provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the
light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference
to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a
constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express
their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N.D.,
131; 99 N.W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.) "

Bautista vs. Salonga [G.R. No. 86439, April 13, 1989]

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS MAY BE APPOINTED BY

THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS. Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.
VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment
by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or
participation of the Commission on Appointments.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the

Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution
itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointment.

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the
officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
 without re-appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired term of the predecessor."

THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT CANNOT EXERCISE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL

POWERS TO CONFIRM OR DENY APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICES WHICE ARE
EXCLUDED BY THE CONSTITUTION EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT VOLUNTARILY
SUBMITS SUCH APPOINTMENT FOR ITS CONFIRMATION. Respondent Commission
vigorously contends that, granting that petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is one that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, as interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for the President to make,
yet, it is within the president's prerogative to voluntarily submit such appointment
to the Commission on Appointment for confirmation. The mischief in this
contention, as the Court perceives it, lies in the suggestion that the President (with
Congress agreeing) may, from time to time move power boundaries, in the
Constitution differently from where they are placed by the Constitution.

The Court really finds the above contention difficult of acceptance. Constitutional
Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not political convenience, wisdom,
exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative (Commission
on Appointments) can create power where the Constitution confers none. The
evident constitutional intent is to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter
of appointments to public office, between the President and Congress (the latter
acting through the Commission on Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of
the scale is to disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the extent
that the Constitution has blocked off certain appointments for the President to
make with the participation of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the
Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power of participation in
the Commission on Appointments over other appointments exclusively reserved for
her by the Constitution. The exercise of political options that finds no support in the
Constitution cannot be sustained.

Nor can the Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its

constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments, create power
to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
Stated differently, when the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is
for the President to make without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, the executive's voluntary act of submitting such appointment to the
Commission on Appointments and the latter's act of confirming or rejecting the
same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction.

EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAY VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THAT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELY
BELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NO VACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENT
COULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989. Under this heading, we will assume, ex
gratia argumenti, that the Executive may voluntarily allow the Commission on
Appointments to exercise the power of review over an appointment otherwise solely
vested by the Constitution in the President. Yet, as already noted, when the
President appointed petitioner Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the advice to her that by virtue
of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments),
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after taking her
oath of office, the presidential act of appointment to the subject position which,
under the Constitution, is to be made, in the first place, without the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, was then and there a complete and finished act,
January 1989 to which an appointment could be validly made. In fact, there is no
vacancy in said office to this day.

To insist on such a posture is akin to deluding oneself that day is night just because
the drapes are drawn and the lights are on. For, aside from the substantive
questions of constitutional law raised by petitioner, the records clearly show that
petitioner came to this Court in timely manner and has not shown any indication of
abandoning her petition.

THE CONCEPT OF AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS APPLIES ONLY TO APPOINTMENTS

SUBJECT TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Nor
can respondents impressively contend that the new appointment or re-appointment
on 14 January 1989 was an ad interim appointment, because, under the
Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely
for the President to make, i.e., without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is,
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim
appointments.

Quintos-Deles vs. Commission on Appointments [G.R. No. 83216, September

4, 1989]

SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ARE TO BE

APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Since the seats reserved for sectoral
representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by
the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are
among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
(Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution

which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as
appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec.
9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such
exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral
representatives in the Constitution.

The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly

derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the
second "Whereas" clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by the
President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on
Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution. More to the point, petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by
virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2
and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the
confirmation process.
Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII,
appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
the Congress." If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no
confirmation, the President need not make any reference to the constitutional
provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the
President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner's
appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Considering
that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments
having acted on petitioner's appointment, said appointment/nomination had
become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the
Commission."

Calderon vs. Carale [G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992]

THE CONGRESS CANNOT BY LEGISLATIVE FIAT EXPAND THE LIST OF OFFICERS

SUBJECT TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMNETS –
APPOINTMENTS OF NLRC CHAIRMAN AND COMMISSIONERS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. Indubitably, the NLRC
Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees
referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the
extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor
Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:

1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the
President.

Deciding on what law to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their

constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court respects the laudable intention of
the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA
6715 amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Members
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond
redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16,
Art. VII thereof.

It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was
deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the
Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all
presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of
confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
 commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint; . . ."

The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on

Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of
members of the Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a
problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional
convention or Congress sitting as a constituent (constitutional) assembly may then
consider either a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a
hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is
the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says
and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it
interpreted.

Tarrosa vs. Singson [G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994]

THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANKO SENTRAL IS NOT SUBJECT

TO THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. However for
the information of all concerned, we call attention to our decision in Calderon v.
Carale, 208 SCRA 254 (1992), with Justice Isagani A. Cruz dissenting, where we
ruled that Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other
government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.

Flores vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993]

THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT INVOLVES THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, AND

ONCE CONFERRED, SUCH MAY NOT BE RESTRICTED BY THE CONGRESS TO A
POINT THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY LOSES ANY DISCRETION ON WHO TO
APPOINT. As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person,
by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some
office or trust," or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge
the duties of the same." In his treatise, Philippine Political Law, Senior Associate
Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office."

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily
exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J., "the choice of a person to fill an
office constitutes the essence of his appointment," and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds
that an "[a]pointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the
exercise of discretion." In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate
Appellate Court we held:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing

power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according
to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a
prerogative of the appointing power . . . ."
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one
candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the
pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such
power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion
to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by
Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates
the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a
presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A.
7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible,
i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts
in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose
whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element
of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer
during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo
City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the
appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso
limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

Matibag vs. Benipayo [G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002]

AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT IS A PERMANENT APPOINTMENT. An ad interim

appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
provides as follows:

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for
any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.

More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad interim
appointment is permanent in character. In Summers vs. Ozaeta, 25 decided on
October 25, 1948, we held that:

". . . . an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of

 Congress.' It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim
appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an 'acting' appointment which is merely
temporary, good until another permanent appointment is issued."
(Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim

appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately. The
appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the
powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as
follows:

"A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential

prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In
the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the
Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume
office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes
effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his
function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the
language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective 'until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.'"

Petitioner cites Black's Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" to mean
"in the meantime" or "for the time being." Hence, petitioner argues that an ad
interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in character. This argument is not
new and was answered by this Court in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 27 where we explained that:

". . . . From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should
experience difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent
had been extended several 'ad interim' appointments which petitioner
mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature.
Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word 'ad interim' which
creates such belief. The term is defined by Black to mean "in the
meantime" or "for the time being". Thus, an officer ad interim is one
appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office
during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent
(Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not
the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In
referring to Dr. Esteban's appointments, the term is not descriptive of
the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to
denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is,
done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the
Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter
with the power of appointment, is unable to act. . . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment signed
appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, 28
where the Court stated:

"We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not

descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative
of whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity,
rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In
the instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent by
then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor
limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent's
appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested to
by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner's
submission that private respondent's ad interim appointment is
synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly
terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments
are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves
them." (Emphasis supplied)

Luego vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986]

NATURE OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The Civil Service Commission is not

empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Laws.

As Justice Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an earlier case:

"It is well settled that the determination of the kind of appointment to

be extended lies in the official vested by law with the appointing power
and not the Civil Service Commission. The Commissioner of Civil
Service is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer. When the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, the Commissioner of Civil Service has no
choice but to attest to the appointment. Under the Civil Service Law,
Presidential Decree No. 807, the Commissioner is not authorized to
curtail the discretion of the appointing official on the nature or kind of
the appointment to be extended."

Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact
that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we
have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil
Service merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then
the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the
considered part of the appointing process, which was held complete only after such
confirmation.

Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the wisdom of the

appointment and had the power to refuse to concur with it even if the President's
choice possessed all the qualifications prescribed by law. No similar arrangement is
provided for in the Civil Service Decree. On the contrary, the Civil Service
Commission is limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining
whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by
the law.

Pobre vs. Mendieta [G.R. No. 106677, July 23, 1993]

THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT CANNOT BE RESTRICTED TO THE POINT THAT THE

OFFICER LOSES THE DISCRETION. The Court finds unacceptable the view that
every vacancy in the Commission (except the position of "junior" Associate
Commissioner) shall be filled by "succession" or by "operation of law" for that would
deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner and
Associate Commissioners — "all to be appointed by the President" under P.D. No.
223. The absurd result would be that the only occasion for the President to exercise
his appointing power would be when the position of junior (or second) Associate
Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume that when the President
issued P.D. No. 223, he deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and appoint
the head of the PRC and limited himself to the selection and appointment of only
the associate commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in that agency.
Since such an absurdity may not be presumed, the Court should so construe the
law as to avoid it.

"The duty devolves on the court to ascertain the true meaning where
the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, or where an
adherence to the strict letter would lead to injustice, absurdity, or
contradictory provisions, since an ambiguity calling for construction
may arise when the consequence of a literal interpretation of the
language is an unjust, absurd, unreasonable, or mischievous result, or
one at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole; and the
real meaning of the statute is to be ascertained and declared, even
though it seems to conflict with the words of the statute." (82 CJS
589-590; Emphasis supplied.)

Section 17

Drilon vs. Lim [G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994]

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTROL AND SUPERVISION. Section 187 authorizes the

Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted
the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did
not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not
pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He
did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it
was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions is accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

Villena vs. Secretary of Interior [G.R. No. 46570, April 21, 1939]

DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY. After serious reflection, we have

decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad
proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government
which we have adopted and considering the departmental organization established
and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution,
all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.

With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one

purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The
first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of
the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.
The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in
an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the
President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of
Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the
various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of
the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must
be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President
is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of departments, of
course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any
way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a
matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to
certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the absence of
valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in the
Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a
language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These are
the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of government, and if
there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot modify the
system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution
by any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño [G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967]

THE PRESIDENT CAN REVOKE THE ACTS OF DEPARTMENT HEADS. Plaintiff's

position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional
origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that
department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his,
too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs
their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the
action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that
the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department
secretary.

Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow
appeals from such decisions to the Office of the President. This Court has
recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director
as approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President's
on appeal. In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal
was considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion
of all administrative remedies.

Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes
upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control
simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of
his department secretary.

2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an
undue delegation of power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain
any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the
Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to
act personally upon the matter.

It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must
exercise in person.10 Not as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive
may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person.11 Reason is not wanting for this view. The
President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit
which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that
"under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf
and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify,
or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
including the Director of Lands, may issue.12
where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the
President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full
faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is
to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive
Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is
"disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act of the
Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.

City of Iligan vs. Director of Lands [G.R. No. L-30852, February 26, 1988]

POWERS CONFERRED TO HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS MAY BE

EXERCISED DIRECTLY BY THE PRESIDENT. Since it is the Director of Lands who
has direct executive control among others in the lease, sale or any form of
concession or disposition of the land of the public domain subject to the immediate
control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and considering that
under the Constitution the President of the Philippines has control over all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., the President of the Philippines has
therefore the same authority to dispose of portions of the public domain as his
subordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources.

Such power of the President is recognized under Section 69 aforecited of the Public
Land Act as it provides:

"Sec. 69. Whenever any province, municipality, or other branch or

subdivision of the Government shall need any portion of the land of
the public domain open to concession for educational, charitable, or
others similar purposes, the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may execute contracts
in favor of the same, in the form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or
any other form, under terms, and conditions to be inserted in the
contract; but land to be granted shall in no case be encumbered or
alienated, except when the public service requires their being leased or
exchanged, with the approval of the President, for other lands
belonging to private parties, or if the Congress disposes otherwise."

From the foregoing provision it is clear that the President of the Philippines may
execute contracts in favor of any province, municipality or other branch or
subdivision of the government who shall need any portion of the land of the public
domain open to concession for educational, charitable or other similar purposes, in
the form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other form.

Gascon vs. Arroyo [G.R. No. 78389, October 16, 1989]

ALTER EGO DOCTRINE. Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines (also known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and effect
when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was signed by the parties thereto on 6 January
1987, the President exercised both the legislative and executive powers of the
Government. As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) "assisted by a
Cabinet" composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and
accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads
of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.

Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and authority to enter
into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as
he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid
agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party
thereto.

Kilusang Bayan vs. Dominguez [G.R. No. 85439, January 13, 1992]

CONTROL AND SUPERVISION. An administrative officer has only such powers as

are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be
necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse
or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d) determine
priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to
the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the
operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively,
efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2)
require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit,
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be
necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of
violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon
budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.

Ang-Angco vs. Castillo [G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963]

POWER OF CONTROL APPLIES ONLY TO THE ACT AND NOT TO THE ACTOR. The
extent of the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all
officers and employees in the executive department was interpreted by this Court in
the case of Hebron vs. Reyes 104 Phil., 175 to mean "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter", to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to
remove an officer or employee in the executive department. The power merely
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the
actor or agent himself of the act.

National Marketing Corp. vs. Arca [G.R. No. L-25743, September 30, 1969]

PRESIDENT’S CONTROL POWER COVERS GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS. Petitioners, however, disagree, and contend that the word
"offices," interpreted in the light of the preceding words "executive departments,"
and "bureaus," refers to offices performing governmental functions which have no
juridical personality, and, therefore, does not include government-owned and
in reversing the order of the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive
from the service, and in ordering his reinstatement, the President of the Philippines
arrogated unto himself a power not authorized either by the Constitution or by law,
hence his actuations were legally ineffective and certainly could not be a basis for
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

We hold that the President of the Philippines' authority to review and reverse the
decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing Juan T. Arive from his
position in the NAMARCO and to order his reinstatement falls within the
constitutional power of the President over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. Under our governmental setup, corporations owned or controlled by the
government, such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of government bureaus
or offices, which are administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office
of Economic Coordination, "whose compensation and rank shall be that of a head of
an Executive Department" and who "shall be responsible to the President of the
Philippines under whose control his functions . . . shall be exercised." (Executive
Order No. 386 of December 22, 1950; section 1, issued under the Reorganization
Act of 1950).

Take Care Power

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission [G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That
the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does
not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case
of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential

system of government and restored the separation of legislative,
executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for checks and
balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is

the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as
well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the
 the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government

that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano, the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of
medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating

Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted
full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong,
the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials
and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as
mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is
not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC
had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and
facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to

exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be
revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past
like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and
the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure,
the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just
because the direction of the political winds have changed.

Section 18

Guazon vs. De Villa [G.R. No. 80508, January 30, 1990]

AREAL ZONING OR SATURATION DRIVES MAY BE ORDERED BY THE PRESIDENT BY

VIRTUE OF HIS MILITARY POWERS. There can be no question that under ordinary
circumstances, the police action of the nature described by the petitioners would be
illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. If the
military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out and catch
criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the constitutional and
statutory rights of all the people affected by such actions.

There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the
Chief Executive, invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop
the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods
of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose
spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may
still be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of
the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing features.

Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff [G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946]

COURT MARTIAL PERTAINS TO THE PRESIDENT IN EXERCISE OF HIS MILITARY

POWERS. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the
authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of
legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike
courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the
United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to
provide for the government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil
jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as follows:
'These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and
punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by
civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection
between it and the 3d Article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the
United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.'

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-
martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as
Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.' (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents; 2d Edition, p.
49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It
must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to
aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army." (Footnote
No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition.).

Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 [G.R. No. L-54558, May 22, 1987]

COURT MARTIALS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS. Due process of

law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose
either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to
the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military
process. Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are
not courts within the Philippine judicial system. As explained by Justice Teehankee
in his separate dissenting opinion —

". . . Civilians like (the) petitioner placed on trial for civil offenses
under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by
executive or military process.

"Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the

Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by
law. Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have 'exclusive
power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or
liberty or property of a citizen.'
 are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open
and have been regularly functioning. . . .

"And in Toth v. Quarles, the U.S. Supreme Court further stressed that
'the assertion of military authority over civilians cannot rest on the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief or on any theory of martial
law.'

"The U.S. Supreme Court aptly pointed out . . ., in ruling that

discharged army veterans (estimated to number more than 22.5
million) could not be rendered 'helpless before some latter-day revival
of old military charges' and subjected to military trials for offenses
committed while they were in the military service prior to their
discharge, that 'the presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge
whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and
undiminished salary and nurture by the judicial tradition, but is a
military law officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and
procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences, the
suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-
martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its members and the
counsel on both sides and who usually has direct command authority
over its members is a pervasive one in military law, despite strenuous
efforts to eliminate the danger.'

"The late Justice Black . . . added that '(A) Court-Martial is not yet an
independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a
specialized part of the over-all mechanism by which military discipline
is preserved,' and that ex servicemen should be given 'the benefits of
a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians . . . Free countries
of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals to the narrowest
jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline
among troops in active service.' "

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the

Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
the legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under
his orders or those of his authorized military representatives. Following the
principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization
of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the
laws (as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is
primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the
Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today
and as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them
and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would
be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned.

Quiloña vs. General Court Martial [G.R. No. 96607, March 4, 1992]

COURT MARTIALS DO NOT APPLY TO MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

POLICE. Republic Act No. 6975, creating the Philippine National Police (PNP),
which took effect on 1 January 1991, provides: "SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal
Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as, the Articles of War, as amended
by Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial:
Provided, further, that criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not
yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this it shall be transferred to the proper
city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge."

Gudani vs. Senga [G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006]

SANLAKAS vs. Reyes [G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004]

CALLING OUT POWER. The above provision grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter
two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely,
an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such
power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
"[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The
only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the
armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"

Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution
vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and
foremost, with Executive powers.

Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "The executive
power shall be vested in the President. . . ." As if by exposition, Section 17 of the
same Article provides: "He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The
provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.

The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when
taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of
office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with
the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of
government or the integrity of the State.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a

declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be
called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional
effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this
Court's mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration.
This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all
legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly
pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of
rebellion could not bring about these conditions. At any rate, the presidential
majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion,
as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'" In other words, a person may be subjected to
a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has
declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest
are present.

It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While
the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional
limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners
here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted
without factual basis.

The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration

of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap
of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in
the "theater of war" or that military authorities have taken over the functions of
civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights.
There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative
powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to
exercise or has exercised martial law powers.

Section 19

Torres vs. Gonzales [G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987]

A CONDITION IN THE GRANT OF PARDON THAT THE PARDONEE SHALL NOT

VIOLATE ANY OTHER LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE CONVICTION BEFORE THE PARDON
MAY BE WITHDRAWN. It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant
case is not the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular
course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved is rather the
ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his undertaking that he would
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for purposes of
reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained
breach of the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the
petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final
judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged
before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon
him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct,
substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned
and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President
PARDON EXTENDED AND ACCEPTED WHILE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IS ON
APPEAL RESULTS IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE APPEAL. Pardon is defined as "an
act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended,
and not communicated officially to the Court. . . . A pardon is a deed, to the validity
of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.

At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power
was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite.
The pertinent provision reads:

"The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves,

commutations and pardon, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty."

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be
extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even
before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her
appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987
Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it
may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal
and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
finality.

EFFECTS OF PARDON. The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one
not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the punitive
consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based
on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however,
that the offender is a `new man', and `as innocent as if he had never committed
the offense;' is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A
person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he
may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard
him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it
places no restraints upon him following his conviction."

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the
past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." This
would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

People vs. Salle, Jr. [G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995]

INSTANCES WHEN A CONVICTION BECOMES FINAL. Where the pardoning power is

subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after
conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected,
(b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (C) when the right to
appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed
by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving
his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and
has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency
may not yet be granted to the appellant.

THE GRANT OF PARDON WHILE THE APPEAL IS PENDING DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A
WITHDRAWAL OF THE APPEAL. It must, nevertheless, be noted that the
constitutional provision quoted is that of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which
authorized the exercise of the pardoning power at anytime, either before or after
conviction. Also, in Monsanto vs. Factoran, this Court stated that the acceptance of
a pardon amounts to an abandonment of an appeal, rendering the conviction final;
thus:

The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency
could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency
could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional
pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court.
It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former
limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it may, it is
our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon
was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would
still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to
have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the
Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

This statement should not be taken as a guiding rule for it is nothing but an obiter
dictum. Moreover, the pardon involved therein was extended on 17 December 1984
or under the regime of Section 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, which allowed the grant of pardon either before or after conviction.

The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final

judgment" requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973
Constitution on the pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner
Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from exercising executive power in
derogation of the judicial power.

Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
appellate court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers
demands that such exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and
kept unimpaired. For truly, had not the present Constitution adopted the
"conviction by final judgment" limitation, the President could, at any time, and even
without the knowledge of the court, extend executive clemency to any one whom
he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential mercy. It cannot be
denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendment to the 1973 Constitution
on the pardoning power which did no require conviction, the President had
unimpeded power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard.
And under the 1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could
be exercised at any time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the
appeal. In either case, there could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also
of a frustration of the system of administration of justice in view of the derogation
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to
finality.

Garcia vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993]

THE GRANT OF PARDON ON THE GROUND THAT THE PARDONEE IS INNOCENT OF

THE CHARGE RESULTS IN THE OBLITERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY.
Time and again this Court has unfolded the effects of a pardon upon the individual
to whom it is granted. In Monsanto v. Factoran, we have firmly established the
general rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the
existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as
though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The
very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness.
It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's
innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public
office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since
pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender
has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

But, stated otherwise, if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it
affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent as if he had not
been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because
he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive
consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and
consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the
trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for which he
was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack
of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the
offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial
court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant.
Verily, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement
by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service
Commission.

The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated

the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of
dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from
the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge
and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant
of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to
his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of
the clemency.

Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back

wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start
no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle
him to back wages.

Further, it is worthy to note that the dismissal of petitioner was not the result of
any criminal conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public
office, but is the direct consequence of an administrative decision of a branch of the
Executive Department over which the President, as its head, has the power of
control. The President's control has been defined to mean "the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter." In pardoning petitioner and ordering his reinstatement, the Chief Executive
exercised his power of control and set aside the decision of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications. The clemency nullified the dismissal of
petitioner and relieved him from administrative liability. The separation of the
petitioner from the service being null and void, he is thus entitled to back wages.

Sabello vs. DECS [G.R. No. 87687, December 26, 1989]

THE GRANT OF PARDON, AND THE SUBSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF THE PARDONEE

TO THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE SHOULD ENTITLE THE PARDONEE TO HIS FORMER
POSITION. As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be
reappointed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing
authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been
unfairly deprived of what is rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the
requirements of giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion
on the part of the appointing power, but discretion tempered with fairness and
justice.

As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot be
sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in
their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a suit against
the officials of this government agency.

In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to the
service as a classroom teacher by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
As there are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice
and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School
Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.

However, the Court cannot grant his prayer for backwages from September 1, 1971
to November 23, 1982 since in Monsanto this Court said he is not entitled to
automatic reinstatement. Petitioner was lawfully separated from the government
service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although his reinstatement had
been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to backwages. Such right is
afforded only to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charge against them.

In the same light, the Court cannot decree that his government service be made
continuous from September 10, 1948 to the present when it is not. At any rate
when he reaches the compulsory age of retirement, he shall get the appropriate
retirement benefits as an Elementary School Principal I and not as a mere
classroom teacher.
We must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which
cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment
are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve
criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the
President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason
can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.

A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the exercise of

executive clemency in administrative cases.

Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In meritorious cases, . . ., the President may commute
or remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued upon officers and
employees, in disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may
impose in the interest of the service."

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a subject of deliberations

was the proposed amendment to Art. VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows:
"However, the power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices
laws may be limited by legislation." The Constitutional Commission, however, voted
to remove the amendment, since it was in derogation of the powers of the
President. As Mr. Natividad stated:

"I am also against this provision which will again chip more powers
from the President. In case of other criminals convicted in our society
we extend probation to them while in this case, they have already
been convicted and we offer mercy. The only way we can offer mercy
to them is through this executive clemency extended to them by the
President. If we still close this avenue to them, they would be
prejudiced even worse than the murderers and the more vicious killers
in our society. . . ."

The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President from protecting his
cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission preferred to trust in the discretion of
Presidents and refrained from putting additional limitations on his clemency powers.
(II RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-525)

It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the
President's executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage,
except as already provided in the Constitution, that is, "no pardon, amnesty,
parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation
of the COMELEC" (Article IX, C, Section 5, Constitution). If those already adjudged
guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively
should likewise be extended the same benefit.
mention that as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not
bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases.
It will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some
charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to
them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the
public. (p. 34, Comment of public respondent)

We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, We refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

Section 21

Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading [G.R. No. L-14279, October 31,
1961]

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS DO NOT NEED THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE. The

Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement
sought to be implemented by Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our
Senate had not concurred in the making of said executive agreement. The
concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the
making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]),
which are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements", which may
be validly entered into without such concurrence.

"Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the

approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or by Congress.

". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements

without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been
confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we
have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as
commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has
never been seriously questioned by our courts.

"Agreements with respect to the registration of trade-marks have been

concluded by the Executive with various countries under the Act of
Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502). Postal conventions
regulating the reciprocal treatment of mail matters, money orders,
parcel post, etc., have been concluded by the Post-master General
with various countries under authorization by Congress beginning with
the Act of February 20, 1792 (I Stat. 232, 239). Ten executive
agreements were concluded by the President pursuant to the McKinley
Tariff Act of 1890 (26 Stat. 567, 612), and nine such agreements were
entered into under the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 203,
214). A very much larger number of agreements, along the lines of the
one with Rumania previously referred to, providing for most-favored-
nation treatment in customs and related matters have been entered
into since the passage of the Tariff Act of 1922, not by direction of the
Act but in harmony with it.
 well-established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the
form of executive agreements.

"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly

recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements
entered into without Senate approval." (39 Columbia Law Review, pp.
753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299
U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed.
1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S. 188
F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 1905-1906; California Law
Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675; Hyde on International Law [Revised
Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; Willoukhby on the U.S.
Constitutional Law, Vol. I [2d. ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore, International
Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, International Law Digest,
Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Emphasis supplied.)

In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U. S. High Commissioner to the

Philippines, said in his work on "The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts":

"Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are

commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less
common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the
form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated 'agreements' or 'protocols'. The point where
ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult
of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded
from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than
those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of
1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and
that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain
classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive
without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the
inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits,
the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the
registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity
with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those
with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments,
were concluded independently of any legislation." (39 Columbia Law
Review, pp. 651, 755.)

Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005]

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as
the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole
realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
"no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate." The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered
into by the executive.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed
essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By
requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the
President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance
necessary in the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate.

We disagree.

Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treaty-making
process in this wise:

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation,

signature, ratification, and exchange of the instruments of ratification.
The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication
under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the
validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he

now usually assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These
representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers,
which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal
discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a
draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-
proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The
negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues
involved, and may even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to
come to an agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty,
the same is opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a
means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of
symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not
indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the
treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance
with the alternat, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to
sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
 to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the government other
than that which negotiated them.

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the

instruments of ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of
the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties.
Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is
embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its
signature. [emphasis supplied]

Petitioners' arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine

representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the
treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is
usually performed by the state's authorized representative in the diplomatic
mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms
and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is
generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government. Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 25, 1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international
agreements and its ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed
by the Philippine representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department
of Foreign Affairs. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the
ratification papers and forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for
ratification. After the President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign
Affairs shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the
concurrence of the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the
provisions of the treaty to render it effective. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459
reads:

Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a

Treaty or an Executive Agreement. — The domestic requirements for
the entry into force of a treaty or an executive agreement, or any
amendment thereto, shall be as follows:

A. Executive Agreements.

i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the

Department of Foreign Affairs after their signing for the
preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall
include the highlights of the agreements and the benefits which
will accrue to the Philippines arising from them.

ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement

by the concerned agency, shall transmit the agreements to the
President of the Philippines for his ratification. The original
signed instrument of ratification shall then be returned to the
Department of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action.

B. Treaties.

i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with

the requirements provided in sub-paragraph[s] 1 and 2, item A
 certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall
accompany the submission of the treaties to the Senate.

ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department

of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provision of the treaties
in effecting their entry into force.

Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute
itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by
which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By
ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound
by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state's
representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the
responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure
that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the
President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the
head of states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be
pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to
ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal
obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be
based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons.
Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested
in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in
its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court
via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore,
cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the
signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

ARTICLE VIII – JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1

Santiago vs. Bautista [G.R. No. L-25024. March 30, 1970]

NATURE OF JUDICIAL POWER. The last point raised by appellees deserves first
consideration, for if really the said committee of teachers does not fall within the
category of the tribunal board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated
by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be
necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:
the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a
special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the
following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific
controversy involving rights of persons or property and said
controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing
and determination of their respective rights and obligations.

'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in

general appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process,
and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It
implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims,
and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand — for the tribunal
must decide according to law and the rights of the parties — or with
dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own
judgment under the laws and not act under a mandate from another
power . . . The character of its action in a given case must decide
whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it
be simply that of a public agent of the country or State, as in its varied
jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County
Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern
Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 S. E. 836-
837.)

'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to

determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are,
with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is
clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of
St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)

(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is

brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment
and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the
laws to that end.

'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which

would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined
as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by
arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the
instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department
of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is
and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power
vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some
court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject
matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a
judge as such; the power conferred upon a public officer, involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions
of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property,
as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the
mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts
in hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter
incidental thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a
court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which
power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine
a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the
parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.)

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does
not belong to the legislative or executive department.

". . . the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and

judicial functions is difficult to point out What is a judicial function does
not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed
or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must
be had to the organic law of the state and the division of power of
government. In the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the
exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary,
and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is
not enough to make a function judicial that it requires discretion,
deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the exercise of
discretion and judgment within the subdivision of the sovereign power
which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to
the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to
which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named
departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and
what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than
its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of
Philadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.), pp. 321, 328-329.) [Emphasis
supplied] 1

" 'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not

impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts,
and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in
connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. It is
clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather
than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines
whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial
function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and
technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when
applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial.
It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision,
whatever may be their public character . . .'

"In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the
following statements were made:

'The precise line of demarcation between what are judicial and what
are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to
determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the
performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the
performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said
generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a
matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts
From the above-quoted portions of the decisions cited, it will be gleaned that before
a tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed
With power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate
the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,
however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when
teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of
rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is
and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial
functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the
pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees
allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder,
and, in the performance of that committee's duties.

Daza vs. Singson [G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989]

Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. Nos. 86540-41, November 6, 1989]

THE CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO DEFINE THE EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF

THE COURTS OF JUSTICE. Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe
any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts
"to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature,
except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution).

The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing
restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and the purchasers of any
assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this
instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying
out "the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government
corporations and/or the assets thereof" (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation,
not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or
revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution).

While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the
system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts
over the other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to
the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by
them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority
and in the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor
block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an
administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or
commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr. [G.R. No. 86695, September 3, 1992]

LAWS WHICH PREVENT COURTS FROM ISSUING RESTRAINING ORDERS OR

INJUNCTIONS ARE VALID BUT MAY ONLY APPLY TO CONTROVERSIES INVOLVING
FACTS OR THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN TECHNICAL CASES. In the case of
Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito, this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained
in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared
that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by
courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge
these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative
machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear, however, that on issues definitely
outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be
prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
administrative acts.

P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed
by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the
challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge
and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from
Annex Q of the private respondent's memorandum, however, that the subject
project has already been "100% completed as to the Engineering Standard." This
fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and
academic.

PACU vs. Secretary of Education [G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955]

PROPER PARTY. "It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual

immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has
sustained or his interest common to all members of the public." (Ex parte Levitt,
302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)

"Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law" upon the complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S.
405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S.
316-325.)

"The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient." (United Public
Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)

"Bona fide suit. — Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the
decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and
vital controversy between litigants." (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the
justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.)
197 S. W. 2d. 771.)

An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and
positive relief. (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.) Courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially true where the
issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for
the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes
evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1955, Law Ed.,
Vol. 99, p. 511.)

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995]

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR JUDICIAL

DETERMINATION. We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of
section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will
run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998
elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue
in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority [G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993]

REQUISITIES OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY. It is a rule firmly entrenched in our

jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential
requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law are: (a)
the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised
by a proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary
to the decision of the case. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in
danger or sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of.

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental
requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not
claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he
has been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and
exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties
LEGAL STANDING. The rule is settled that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided
by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be
an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important
are the first two (2) requisites.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is
premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and
that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the
relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of
judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff
must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right
of some third and unrelated party.

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the
rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the
Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.

Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987]

Dumlao vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980]

Bugnay Construction & Devt. Corp. vs. Laron [G.R. No. 79983, August 10, 1989]

Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona [G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994]

Philconsa vs. Enriquez [G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]

Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. [G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995]

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. [G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993]

Kilosbayan vs. Morato [G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995]

Lozada vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. L-59068, January 27, 1983]

 Bengzon vs. Drilon [G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992]

THE VETO POWER OF THE PRESIDENT CANNOT BE EXERCISED TO DEPRIVE THE

SUPREME COURT OF ITS FISCAL AUTONOMY. There is a matter of greater
consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power to set
aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by
Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the
Judiciary.

Sec. 3 Art. VIII mandates that:

"SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations

for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall
be automatically and regularly released."

We cannot overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary.
The Court has on various past occasions explained the significance of judicial
independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982], it ruled:

"It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the

people who are endowed with rights, to secure which a government is
instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant
them either expressly or implicitly certain powers. These they exercise
not for their own benefit but for the body politic . . .

"A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration.
It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain
rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his
responsibilities more efficiently . . . It is an added guarantee that
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even
more likely to be inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the
dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base
or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is
impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal
right." (At pp. 338-339).

As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix
rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and play plans of the government and allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.

Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it
needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its
recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by
the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the
and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system
is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their
objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant
of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should
be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief
Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular
item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld.
Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given
a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.

Section 4

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 118509, September 5, 1996]

THE COMPOSITION OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IS AN INTERNAL

MATTER WHICH COULD NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY CAUSE OF ACTION. What
petitioner bewails the most is the present composition of the Third Division which
deliberated on private respondents' motions for reconsideration and by a majority
vote reversed the unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. More specifically,
petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of
the Third Division and arrogantly rams its idea on how each Division should be
chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice Narvasa,
the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice, and the Third
Division by Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line. We need only to state that the
change in the membership of the three divisions of the Court with inevitable by
reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano's retirement. Such reorganization is purely an
internal matter of the Court to which petitioner certainly has no business at all. In
fact, the current "staggered" set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is similar
to that adopted in 1988. In the year, the Court's Third Division was likewise chaired
by then Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and Second Divisions were headed by
the next senior Justices — Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera, respectively.

Section 5

Drilon vs. Lim [G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994]

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO RULE ON THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANY LAW, BUT TRIAL COURTS ARE ADVISED TO BE MORE
CIRCUMSPECT IN NULLIFYING LAWS. We stress at the outset that the lower court
had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.
Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases
in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as
the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken
against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X,
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts,
if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in
the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty
of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory
that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative
departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached
by the requipped majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it
cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

Larranaga vs. CA [G.R. No. 130644, March 13, 1998]

THE POWER TO CHANGE VENUE AND PLACE OF TRIAL DOES NOT INCLUDE THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. As regards petitioner's motion to change the venue
and the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, we are constrained to
dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary investigation
is a function of the Executive Department and not of the Judiciary. Petitioner
should therefore address their plea to the Department of Justice that has control
and supervision over the conduct of preliminary investigations.

Bustos vs. Lucero [G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948]

Separate Opinion

RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION DURING PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS A

SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT WHICH CANNOT BE WITHHELD BY THE SUPREME COURT BY
VIRTUE OF ITS RULE MAKING POWER. Section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution
prescribes that "the Supreme Court shall have power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, but said rules shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." The Constitution added the last
part of the above-quoted constitutional precept in order to emphasize that the
Supreme Court is not empowered, and therefore can not enact or promulgate
substantive laws or rules, for it is obvious that rules which diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, are substantive and not adjective laws or rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.

It does not require an elaborate argument to show that the right granted by law
upon a defendant to be confronted with and cross- examine the witnesses for the
prosecution in preliminary investigation as well as in the trial of the case is a
substantive right. It is based on human experience, according to which a person is
not prone to tell a lie against another in his presence, knowing fully well that the
latter may easily contradict him, and that the credibility of a person or veracity of
his testimony may be efficaciously tested by a cross-examination. It is a
accusation of crime, the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, and the
corresponding anxiety or moral suffering which a criminal prosecution always
entails.

This right is not a constitutional but a statutory right granted by law to an accused
outside of the City of Manila because of the usual delay in the final disposition of
criminal cases in provinces. The law does not grant such right to a person charged
with offenses triable by the Court of First Instance in the City of Manila, because of
the promptness, actual or presumptive, with which criminal cases are tried and
disposed of in the Court of First Instance of said city. But this right, though not a
constitutional one, can not be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Supreme
Court, by virtue of the rule making power conferred upon this Court by the
Constitution.

Since the provisions of section 11 of Rule 108 as construed by this Court in several
cases, (in which the question of constitutionality or validity of said section had not
been squarely raised) do away with the defendant's right under discussion, it
follows that said section diminishes the substantive right of the defendant in
criminal case, and this Court has no power or authority to promulgate it and
therefore is null and void.

First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

THE RULES OF COURT WILL TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER LAWS REGULATING

PROCEDURES OF COURTS. The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be
validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right
which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this
Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it
seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of
appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also
provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter
portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to
regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created by a

substantive law and those arising from procedural law:

"Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is

a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980).
Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to
a cause of action, as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their
invasion."

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the
BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to
be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions
of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of
appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the
substantive right to appeal.
to appeal from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an
appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court."
E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words
"(A)mong these agencies are . . .," strongly implying that there are other quasi-
judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been
expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of
the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions
and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of:
(1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasi-
judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by
statute. Since in DBP v. CA 13 we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among
the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91,
which is but implementary of said law.

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226

insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of
the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be
brought to the Court of Appeals.

Aruelo vs. CA [G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993]

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION CANNOT PROMULGATE RULES GOVERNING

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURTS OF JUSTICE. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular
courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to
proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

"SEC. 2. Applicability. — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to

all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI
shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by
courts of general or limited jurisdiction."

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it

provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional Trial Court denying
his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12
of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after
receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent,
therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer
with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed
timely.
COURT. Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of
law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between
the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in
those instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and
doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or
engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian members
"may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly
to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is more likely
than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

Section 6

Maceda vs. Vasquez [G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993]

COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES MUST BE REFERRED FIRST TO THE SUPREME

COURT BY VIRTUE OF THE COURTS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER THEM.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case
despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged
arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the control
and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the
Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is
nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by
a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service
is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and
inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to
the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action
taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted
to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make
such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the
three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-
complaint.

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case.

Administratively, the question before Us is this: should a judge, having been
granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before him, report these
cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present
criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises
from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

Raquiza vs. Castañeda, Jr. [A.M. No. 1312-CFI, January 31, 1978]

IN ADMISNISTRATIVE CHARGES AGAINST JUDGES THE REQUIRED QUANTUM OF

EVIDENCE IS PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. The rules even in an
administrative case demands that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for
grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented against him should
be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which
respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it
should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This
is all the more so when as in this case the charges are penal in nature.

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is
sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The
general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.

Section 7

Kilosbayan vs. Ermita [G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007]

Section 10

Nitafan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [G.R. No. L-78780, July 23, 1987]

SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ARE SUBJECT TO TAX. Besides,

construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is
again reproduced hereunder:

"The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased."
(Emphasis supplied).
construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of
the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David
must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego
of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted.

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

Section 11

De la Llana vs. Alba [G.R. No. 57883, March 12, 1982]

DISSOLUTION OF OFFICE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON THE DICIPLINARY AUTHORITY

OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER JUDGES. Petitioners contend that the abolition of
the existing Inferior Courts collides with the security of tenure enjoyed by
incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution. There
was a similar provision the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as far as
conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts.
Moreover, this Court is empowered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a
vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. "Thus it possesses the
competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be, distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. After the abolition, there is in law
no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would
thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the stand-point of strict law,
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless,
for the incumbents of 'Inferior Courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As
to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the Judiciary.
In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its
view be accorded, the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there
is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where
the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in
the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to
be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the Inferior Courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
 People vs. Gacott, Jr. [G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995]

NOT ALL DISCIPLINARY ACTION PROCEEDINGS NEED TO BE HEARD EN BANC. At

any rate, the very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that
there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states
that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was
not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and
decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be
explained.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that
the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated
upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the
Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted,
entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. — In the Matter of the Amendment and/or
Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter
alia:

For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases:

6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a

judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or
either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1)
year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both.

This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the
aforequoted provision was maintained.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in
the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the
penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc. This would subvert
the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the
lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in
divisions of three, five or seven members.

Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of

lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in
cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges
against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not
exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the
administrative matter may be decided in division.

It must not also be overlooked that as early as February 7, 1989, the Court
promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which clarifies that:
 concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution
of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3], Article VIII, 1987 Constitution).

That guideline or rule in the referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a
division thereof rests on the same rationale and applies with equal force to confute
the antithetical theory of respondent Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. Apropos
thereto, it would indeed be desirable for said respondent to hereafter deal with
situations like the one subject of this resolution with more perspicacity and
circumspection.

Section 12

In re Manzano [A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988]

Section 13

Prudential Bank vs. Castro [A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST CONTAIN A

CERTIFICATION THAT THE CASE HAS BEEN REACHED IN CONSULTATION DOES
NOT APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES. The challenge hurled against this Court's
decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of certification by the Chief
Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft
of basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not
administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in
administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In
fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by
their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate
composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario
de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an oversight.

But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the
conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and
deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an
opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the
Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is
obviously not required.

Section 14

Nicos Industrial Corp. vs. CA [G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT A DECISION MUST STATE CLEARLY

AND DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED IS AN
ADDITIONAL GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS. It is a requirement of due process
that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.
The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y
and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The
losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if
permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based
In one case, this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife
with irrelevant details, castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage."
Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the
other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of
words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its
ruling and, having done so, ends.

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE

ABOVE-MENTIONED CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT. It is important to observe
at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders,
such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because
it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court
resolving incidental matters." As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have
already observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that —

The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute

resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case
is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature,
where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence
and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws,
where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely
to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance
with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a
petition always gives the legal basis.

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It
has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

DISMISSAL ON LACK OF JURISDICTION DOES NOT REQUIRE A STATEMENT OF THE

FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED, BUT WHEN DISMISSAL IS COUPLED
WITH OTHER GROUNDS LIKE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, THE COURT MUST
COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTHS. It may be argued that a
dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits
and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this
established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is
dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other
additional ground is invoked.

A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was
dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the
evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground,
all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by
the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements
of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to
explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its
conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but
it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second
ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the
factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.

Mendoza vs. CFI [G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973]

provision requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose v.
Santos, what is expected of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear
why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor
is there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the
requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this
respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of
words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by
what the Constitution directs." What must then be stressed is that under such a
provision as held in the early case of Soncuya v. National Investment Board, the
decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the
proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its
disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, the above
decision was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing
the following: "Plaintiff-appellant assigns as another error that the order appealed
from does not contain any statement of the facts and the law on which it is based.
Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, and Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since these provisions
have been held to refer only to decisions of the merits and not to orders of the trial
court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar."

It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if
the situation is subjected to a searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is
really involved is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner. Had he
prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisional liberty. Under the
circumstances, as the facts of the case clearly demonstrate, with the plea for
habeas corpus being unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly
would require less time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely,
the leniency shown the parties to dwell at length on their respective contentions
should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without
according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the
Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way,
foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we
deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application.
In that sense, a minute resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise
failing to abide by a constitutional command.

Borromeo vs. CA [G.R. No. 82273, June 1, 1990]

MINUTE RESOLUTIONS ARE ALLOWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. The Court reminds

all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by
minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is
patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that
the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the
petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta
(148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case"
(Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it
and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. The Court ordinarily acts on
the incidents or basic merits of three hundred (300) to four hundred (400) cases
separate chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in session — either
in Divisions or En Banc.

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated
by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof
to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on a particular
case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken on their
cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never
participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions
of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court's action. This was
explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante,
et al.", where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said — "[M]inute
resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the
petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the
members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its
judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be
known to counsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court
sustains the challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal
conclusions."

In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.
(May 21, 1987), the Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision
must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based as
referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the
constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review . . . shall be
refused due course . . . without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article
VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any
subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due
course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal
basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement.

MINUTE RESOLUTION DOES NOT NEED TO BE SIGNED BY THE JUSTICES NOR TO

CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 13, ART VIII. Minute
resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the
deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For
to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly
delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be
spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court and which time
could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of
decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this
procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over
the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. Remedial
legislation to meet this problem is also pending in Congress.

In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the full time and attention
of its Clerks of Court and other key officials. Its officers do not have the time to
answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled litigants questioning decisions and
resolutions of the Court and involving cases deliberated upon and resolved by the
Court itself. As earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court,
not its subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility for all its acts.
Its personnel cannot answer and should not be made to answer for acts of the
Court.
MINUTE RESOLUTIONS. As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, it has
been stressed that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it;
and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the
Court's denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals' decision.

This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al., and further clarified in Munal vs.
Commission on Audit, et al. that the constitutional mandate is applicable only in
cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due
course, with the resolution therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the
Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny
due course to the petition and states that the questions raised "are factual or there
is no reversible error in the respondent court's decision, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.

Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA [G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998]

MEMORANDUM DECISION IS ALLOWED UNDER THIS JURISDICTION. The

constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based
does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of
inferior tribunals. In Francisco v. Permskul, this Court held that the following
memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the
requirements of Section 14 Article VIII of the Constitution:

"MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this

case, this Court hereby adopts reference the findings conclusions of
law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the same.

"WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto."

(Emphasis supplied.)

This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case of
Romero v. Court of Appeals, where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
adopted the findings and disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:

"We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-
assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to
affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual findings and the
soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency,
therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts
and conclusions of the court a spread in its decision, as integral part of
this Our decision." (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to

THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION APPLY ONLY TO PHILIPPINE
COURTS, BUT NOT TO FOREIGN COURTS. Furthermore, the recognition to be
accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This
Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori
or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil
Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the
arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if
the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes
final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts
in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because
our rules provide otherwise.

Francisco vs. Permskul [G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989]

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALIDITY OF MEMORANDUM DECISIONS. It is clear that

where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or
the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as
envisioned in the above provision. The distinctive features of the memorandum
decision are, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, and second, it incorporates
by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision,
order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm the decision,
although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the lower
court may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the
reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in
the decision of the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of
the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they are
being approved or adopted anyway.

That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following
requirement, as a condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg.
129. The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact
and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to
say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the
person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other
words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129
should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower
court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made
of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without
a proper examination of the facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity
at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has
been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted
should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an
the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to
dismiss it.

Valdez vs. CA [G.R. No. 85082, February 25, 1991]

THE DECISION SHOULD NOT ONLY MAKE A CONCLUSION OF LAW, BUT SHOULD
STATE THE FACTS AND THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW. This is not what is
contemplated under the Constitution and the Rules as a clear and distinct
statement of the facts on the basis of which the decision is rendered. The foregoing
one-paragraph statement constitute a mere conclusion of facts and of law arrived at
by the trial court without stating the facts which serve as the basis thereof. Indeed
the conclusion of fact therein that petitioners had not registered the sale to them is
traversed by the records which show on the contrary, petitioners earlier registered
the sale to them. The court statement in the decision that a party has proven his
case while the other has not, is not the findings of facts contemplated by the
Constitution and the rules to be clearly and distinctly stated.

Unfortunately, the appellate court overlooked this fatal defect in the appealed
decision. It merely adopted the alleged findings of facts of the trial court. Although
it made some findings on how the deed of assignment in favor of respondent
Viernes came about, it is far from complete and is hardly a substantial compliance
with the mandate aforestated.

As it is now, this Court has before it a challenged decision that failed to state clearly
and distinctly the facts on which it is predicated. This Court has said again and
again that it is not a trier of facts and that it relies, on the factual findings of the
lower court and the appellate court which are conclusive. But as it is, in this case,
the Court has to wade through the records and make its own findings of facts,
rather than further delay the disposition of the case by remanding the records for
further proceedings.

ARTICLE IX – CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

A. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 6

Aruelo vs. CA [G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993]

THE COMELEC CANNOT ADOPT RULES THAT MAY BE APPLIED TO PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE COURTS OF LAW. Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No.
343-M-92) with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the
Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1,
Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill
of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section
2, Rule 1, Part I provides:

"SEC. 2. Applicability. — These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to

all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it
provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Section 7

Cua vs. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. L-80519-21, December 17, 1987]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE PROVIDING DECISION BY MAJORITY OF EACH

COMMISSION APPLIES TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC AND IN
DIVISION DESPITE ANY RULE OF THE COMMISSION TO THE CONTRARY. After
considering the issues and the arguments raised by the parties, the Court holds
that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First Division was a valid decision under
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who
voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five members who
deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid under the
aforecited constitutional provision. Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of
the two aforecited decisions was a valid act that entitles him now to assume his
seat in the House of Representatives.

It is expected that the above categorical rulings will put an end to the seemingly
interminable debates on this matter that have been festering for quite some time
now not only in this case but also in other cases still pending in the COMELEC. The
indecisiveness of the public respondent in the appreciation and application of its
own rules has seriously prejudiced a considerable number of our people who remain
unrepresented to date in the House of Representatives despite the fact that the
congressional elections were held more than seven months ago.

Acena vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. 90780, February 6, 1991]

DECISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE

COURT OF APPEALS THROUGH PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT. The proper remedy which petitioner should
have taken from the resolution of public respondent Civil Service Commission is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of said rules. Although Rule 65 does not provide
for a period, the petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Civil Service
Commission should be filed within thirty (30) days from receipt of the resolution as
provided under Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. (Pacis v. Secretary of
Science and Technology, G.R. No. 89165, August 10, 1989). Error in the title of the
petition is a defect in form that may be disregarded as it does not affect the merits
of the case. Considering the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition, we consider
the same as a special civil action under Rule 65.

DECISIONS OF THE MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD MAY BE APPEALED TO

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE
DECISION OR RESOLUTION. Based on the above provisions of law, the decision of
the MSPB is appealable to the Civil Service Commission within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the copy thereof. Perfection of the appeal within the prescribed
requirements of the law. Failure to do so, the right to appeal is lost (Ozaeta v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83281, December 4, 1989).

Ostensibly, public respondent Civil Service Commission has the jurisdiction to

review the decision of the MSPB. However, said authority to review can only be
exercised if the party adversely affected by the decision of the MSPB has filed an
appeal with the Commission within the reglementary period.

Here, it is admitted by public respondent Commission and not disputed by private

respondent Estolas that the petition for review which can be considered as an
appeal from the decision of the MSPB dated March 23, 1988 was filed outside the
reglementary period. This being so, the public respondent exceeded its jurisdiction
when it entertained the petition that was erroneously filed with the Office of the
President. Having exceeded its jurisdiction public respondent committed a
reversible error when it set aside the order dated March 23, 1988 of the MSPB
which had long become final and executory. Final decision or orders of the MSPB is
an adjudication on the merits conclusive on the parties, hence, it can no longer be
subject to review (San Luis, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 80160, June
26, 1989).

Vital-Gozon vs. CA [G.R. No. 101428, August 5, 1992]

THE COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE COERCIVE WRITS FOR THE

EXECUTION OF ITS DECISIONS. Now, final and executory judgments are enforced
by writ of execution and not by another, separate action, whether of mandamus or
otherwise. Hence, execution of the Civil Service Commission's decision of August 9,
1988 should have been ordered and effected by the Commission itself, when de la
Fuente filed a motion therefor. It declined to do so, however, on the alleged
ground, as de la Fuente claims he was told, that it "had no coercive powers —
unlike a court — to enforce its final decisions/resolutions." That proposition,
communicated to de la Fuente, of the Commission's supposed lack of coercive
power to enforce its final judgments, is incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous
acts of the Commission of actually directing execution of its decisions and
resolutions, which this Court has sanctioned in several cases; and it is not in truth a
correct assessment of its powers under the Constitution and the relevant laws.

In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in G.R. No. 96938

entitled "Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service
Commission, et al.," this Court declared that in light of the pertinent provisions of
the Constitution and relevant statutes —

" . . it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission

the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been
exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the
authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the
grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to
hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to
include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it
thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution

has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases."
enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution, instead of simply being given
short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court of Appeals were
totally unnecessary because the Civil Service Commission actually had the power to
execute its final and executory Resolution.

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer [G.R. No. L-31455,
February 28, 1985]

FINAL ORDERS AND DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS WHICH ARE

REVIEWABLE BY THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI ARE THOSE RENDERED IN
THE EXERCISE OF ITS QUASI-JUDIACIAL POWER. We are however, far from
convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as
a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation
to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly
appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final
orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative
and sometimes ministerial in character.

We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the
award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein
the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the
questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued
pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In
short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its
inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by
the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Mateo vs. CA [G.R. No. 113219, August 14, 1995]

APPEAL OF THE DECISIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION SHALL BE FILED

WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No.
292, 10 and Rule II, section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the
Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against
illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private
respondent could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission. So we held
in Mancita v. Barcinas, viz:

"[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Civil Service Commission,
and that parties aggrieved thereby may proceed to this Court alone on
 'SECTION 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.'

The Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable
and subject only to this Court's certiorari judgment."

Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular
No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect
on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether under the old rule or the
present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered y the Civil Service Law.

Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95

1. Scope. — These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final

orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central
Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land
Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments and Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission.

2. Cases Not Covered. — These rules shall not apply to judgments and
final orders or resolutions issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3. Where to Appeal. — An appeal under these rules may be taken to the

Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

4. Period of Appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its
last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the
governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.

B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 2
however, was modified in the 1987 Constitution, the corresponding provision
whereof declares that "(t)he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters."

Consequently, the civil service now covers only government-owned or controlled

corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created by an act of
Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a
general legislation. As We recently held —

". . . , the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution

and expressed by this Court in the National Housing Corporation case .
. . appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987
Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters and therefore,
by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-
owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries
of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general
corporation law."

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS

FOR PURPOSES ALLOWED BY LAW, BUT MAY NOT ENGAGE IN STRIKE. The
workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or
employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now
explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the
private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."

This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on

Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. . . ."

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is

recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides that "(t)he right
to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." The rationale of
and justification for this innovation which found expression in the aforesaid
provision was explained by its proponents, as follows:

". . . The government is in a sense the repository of the national

sovereignty and, in that respect, it must be held in reverence if not in
awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does perform a
mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word
except that terms and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil
Service Commission. The government is the biggest employer in the
Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship and we all
know that the accumulated grievances of several decades are now
beginning to explode in our faces among government workers who feel
that the rights afforded by the Labor Code, for example, to workers in
the private sector have been effectively denied to workers in
government in what looks like a grotesque, (sic) a caricature of the
equal protection of the laws. For example, . . . there were many
 majority of the world's countries now entertain public service unions.
What they really add up to is that the employees of the government
form their own association. Generally, they do not bargain for wages
because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum
where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic)
promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own
bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is
the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-
organization that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and
corruption and for exposing it.

De los Santos vs. Mallare [G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950]

“FOR CAUSE” AS A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF SERVICES OF A CIVIL

SERVICE PERSONNEL MUST BE ONE RECOGNIZED BY LAW AND NOT DEPENDENT
ON THE WILL OF THE OFFICER. The Constitution leaves it to the Congress to
provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested that the President's pleasure
is itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with removals of public
officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law
and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal
cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of
discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at
the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause.
Moreover the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and
must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights
and interests of the public.

POSITIONS EXEMPTED FROM THE MERIT SYSTEM. As has been seen, three
specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly
technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These
positions involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and
dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in
nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that
appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer
that makes them.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor

highly technical.

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is
reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase
denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the
office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining.
A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of
its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference
to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him
by section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial
in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A
city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly
technical" is, we believe, employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of
 Salazar vs. Mathay [G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976]

TWO MODES OF DETERMINING WHETHER A POSITION IS PRIMARILY

CONFIDENTIAL. The crux of the problem in this appeal hinges on the nature of the
position held by the petitioner in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS — whether it is
primarily confidential or not. If it is, then her services as confidential agent can be
terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power. There are two
instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the
President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil
Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or (2)
In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the office,
there exists "close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving
or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state." In the case before
Us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ". . . confidential agents in
the several departments and offices of the Government, unless otherwise directed
by the President, to be primarily confidential" brings within the fold of the
aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of
the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential. Since
the position of the petitioner falls under the first category of primarily confidential
positions, it is no longer necessary to inquire into the nature of the functions
attached to the office in order to determine whether her position is primarily
confidential or not. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot
complain that the termination of her services as confidential agent in the Office of
the Auditor, GSIS is in violation of her security of tenure. In the case of Delos
Santos vs. Mallari, supra, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the
merit system, and dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed
by the Constitution, although in Ingles vs. Mutuc, this assumption was held to be
inaccurate. According to the Court, the proper expression to be used is that the
term of the incumbent merely expires. Thus in said case, the Court held:

"This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a

primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the
appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or
"dismissed" from office — his "term" merely "expires," in much the
same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of
the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and
cannot be deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom upon the
expiration of said term. The main difference between the former — the
primarily confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's term is
fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but
indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes
fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its
decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this
even takes place, the latter is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office
— his term has merely "expired."

Corpus vs. Cuaderno [G.R. No. L-23721, March 31, 1965]

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE TERMINATION OF SERVICES

OF PERSONNEL WHO ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL. The tenure of officials holding
primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public functionaries)
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as
fundamental charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a
clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not
be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such as an economist or a
scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No
technical man worthy of the name would be willing to accept work under such
conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the Bank would demand that highly
technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an eye cocked
at the humor of their superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical
positions will have to be filled by incompetents and yes- men, who must rely not on
their own qualifications and skill but on their ability to carry favor with the powerful.
The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and dignifying the Civil
Service on the basis of merit, would be thus negated.

Luego vs. Civil Service Commission [G.R. No. L-69137, August 5, 1986]

APPROVAL OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION IS MERELY AN

ATTESTATION OF THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE APPOINTEE. Indeed, the approval
is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that the appointee is
qualified for the position to which he has been named. As we have repeatedly held,
such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check
to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then
the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

THE COMMISSION CANNOT REVOKE THE APPOINTMENT ON THE GROUND THAT

THERE ARE BETTER QUALIFIED THAN THE APPOINTEE. Significantly, the
Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the petitioner and the private
respondent were qualified for the position in controversy. That recognition alone
rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon
except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's appointment. To be sure, it had no
authority to revoke the said appointment simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment
on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA [G.R. No. 104639, July 14, 1995]

SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITION OF THE REQUIRED SERVICE ELIGIBILITY DOES NOT

AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE APPOINTMENT TO A PERMANENT. Private
respondent does not dispute the fact that at the time he was appointed Assistant
Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate
examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility
made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is
dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private
respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having
passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his
temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases such as the one at bench,
what is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the
power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the Civil Service
Commission. In Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court ruled that CSC has
the power to approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have
the power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to
change the employment status of an employee. The CSC can only inquire into the
eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified it
must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC
is to attest appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in
the appointment process ceases. In the case at bench, CSC should have ended its
participation in the appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it
confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service
eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it
stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the
discretion vested solely upon the latter.

SSS Employees Association vs. CA [G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989]

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES MAY FORM UNIONS, BUT MAY NOT STRIKE. The 1987
Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and
employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself
fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service
Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that
"[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent
as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.

Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed by Commissioner
Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission, explained:

MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When
we proposed this amendment providing for self-organization of
government employees, it does not mean that because they have the
right to organize, they also have the right to strike. That is a different
matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union. With
 because the moment that is prohibited, then the union which will go
on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is carried in
Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from
the government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but
they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice-
President is unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve
this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is a different
matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussed in the
Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find a solution to
this problem. We know that this problem exists; that the moment we
allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen
to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion
in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an
organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the
Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].

It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed
by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in
the Government, including instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but
excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:

Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The

terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law
and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein
shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in
their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may
belong to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation
to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall
apply only to employees employed in governmental functions and not
those employed in proprietary functions of the Government including
but not limited to governmental corporations.

No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized
the right of employees of government corporations established under the
Corporation Code to organize and bargain collectively and those in the civil service
to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its
amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276]. Understandably, the
Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for
such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D.
No. 807], is equally silent on the matter.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of

government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which
provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be
observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The
President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the
Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment
any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to
do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by
express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
[At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6
is not at issue].

The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor

and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it
furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike:

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions
of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act,
R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through
collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].

Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his

position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with
approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:

It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily
regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to
public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people
in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present
in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and
those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National Housing
Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however,
relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:

SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or

improvements thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the
subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government authorities.

The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the
settlement of labor disputes in the public sector, to wit:
 under existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the
dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council for
appropriate action.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either

petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of
employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the
appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed
by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the
Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in
the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede
to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-
Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and
conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof."

Section 7

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991]

THE EXCEPTIONS IN SECTION 7, PARAGRAPH 2, ARTICLE IX-B OF THE

CONSTITUTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT,
MEMBERS OF THE CABINET AND THEIR DEPUTIES AND ASSISTANTS. The
threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general
under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew,
thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."

We rule in the negative.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the

provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated
to effect that purpose.

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became
prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There
emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these
instrumentalities have remained up to the present time.

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to
abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government
was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. This condemnation
came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983
Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure
No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B
already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or
employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
itself.

Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the

constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution
was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far
as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under

Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these
posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to
absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot
chair the National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115
(December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and
the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local
Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack of
a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries, would also be prohibited.
he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The
deliberation in the Constitutional Commission is enlightening:

"MR. DAVIDE.
On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word "term"
with TENURE.

"MR. FOZ.
The effect of the proposed amendment is to make possible for one to resign
from his position.

"MR. DAVIDE.
Yes, we should allow that prerogative.

"MR. FOZ.
Resign from his position to accept an executive position.

"MR. DAVIDE.
Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because of, say, incapacity, he
may leave the service, but if he is prohibited from being appointed within the
term for which he was elected, we may be depriving the government of the
needed expertise of an individual."

Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible

for appointment to another public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,

notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not
automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the
Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to
the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in
view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be
confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference
between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another
government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their
posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post
as well as not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that
ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite
different where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall
be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an
office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan,
283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to
render his election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v
Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v
State, 107 Okla 272, 232 P 388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the constitution or
statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be ineligible for election or
appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition
has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so
that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. — State ex rel. Van Antwerp v.
Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445)."
his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a
de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of
the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .
under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body,
or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election,
or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is
adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell
[N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323).

Section 8

Quimson vs. Ozaeta [G.R. No. L-8321, March 26, 1956]

WHAT IS PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION IS DOUBLE COMPENSATION, BUT

NOT DOUBLE APPOINTMENT. In our opinion, the present appeal can be resolved
without much difficulty. Section 691 of the Administrative Code above reproduced
refers and applies to unlawful employment and not to unlawful compensation. The
appointment or employment of plaintiff-appellant Quimson as agent-collector was
not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility between said appointment
and his employment as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer. In fact,
he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal
treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two
government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility. Clerks of court are sometimes appointed or designated as provincial
sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers like plaintiff are often appointed and designated as
deputy provincial treasurer. The Department Secretaries are often designated to act
as Chairman or members of Board of Directors of government corporations. The
objection or prohibition refers to double compensation and not to double
appointments and performance of functions of more than one office.

According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double
compensation in some cases, such as government officials acting as members with
compensation in government examining boards like the bar examinations, or
department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government
corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is not
observed. This undoubtedly, was the reason why the appointment of Quimson had
to be coursed through different offices like the Department of Finance, the Civil
Service Commission, and the Office of the Auditor General to the President for
approval. If the President approves the double compensation, well and good. The
appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning
could receive extra compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will
have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the appointee was willing to
serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection. This is
another proof that the appointment of Quimson was not illegal or unlawful. It was
only the double compensation that was subject to objection. The trouble was that
plaintiff herein assumed office without waiting for the result of the action to be
taken upon his appointment and compensation by the President and the different
offices which the appointment had to go through.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 1

Cayetano vs. Monsod [G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991]

DEFINITION OF “PRACTICE OF LAW”. The University of the Philippines Law Center

in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling
and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment

in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is
of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such
as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111
ALR 23).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod ‘ past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Brillantes vs. Yorac [G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990]

NO MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS MAY BE APPOINTED IN AN

ACTING CAPACITY. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the
regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised
for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines.

A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and

therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation.
Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at
any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent,
having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal.

It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be
removed at will from her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no
less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without
cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President,
however well-meaning.

In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections
would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would
have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them
and not the President to make.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But
while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the
Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista
case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the

Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its
members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of
the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.

Section 2

Gallardo vs. Tabamo [G.R. No. 104848, January 29, 1993]

THE COMELEC HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER

ELECTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo, decided by this Court
on 3 May 1968, had squarely resolved the issue above posed. Speaking through
then Associate Justice Enrique Fernando (who later became Chief Justice), this
Court explicitly ruled that considering that the Commission on Elections is vested by
the Constitution with exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all
laws relative to the conduct of elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial
court over cases involving the enforcement of the Election Code "is at war with the
plain constitutional command, the implementing statutory provisions, and the
hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and unmistakable in
recent decisions."

Said case was decided under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution and R.A. No. 180,
otherwise known as the Revised Election Code, which took effect on 21 June 1947.
The present Constitution and extant election laws have further strengthened the
foundation for the above doctrine; there can be no doubt that the present COMELEC
has broader powers than its predecessors. While under the 1935 Constitution it had
"exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections." exercised "all other functions . . . conferred upon it by law"
and had the power to deputize all law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities
of the Government for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.
and under the 1973 Constitution it had, inter alia, the power to (a) "[E]nforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections" (b) "[D]eputize, with the
consent or at the instance of the Prime Minister, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections," and (c) "[P]erform
such other functions as may be provided by law," it was not expressly vested with
the power to promulgate regulations relative to the conduct of an election. That
power could only originate from a special law enacted by Congress; this is the
necessary implication of the above constitutional provision authorizing the
Commission to "[P]erform such other functions as may be provided by law."
 "SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."
(Emphasis supplied)

The word regulations is not found in either the 1935 or 1973 Constitutions. It is
thus clear that its incorporation into the present Constitution took into account the
Commission's power under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881),
which was already in force when the said Constitution was drafted and ratified, to:

"Promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this

Code or other laws which the Commission lies required to enforce and
administer, . . . ."

Hence, the present Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the aforesaid

statutory authority to grant the Commission broader and more flexible powers to
effectively perform its duties and to insulate it further from legislative intrusions.
Doubtless, if its rule-making power is made to depend on statutes, Congress may
withdraw the same at any time. Indeed, the present Constitution envisions a truly
independent Commission on Elections committed to ensure free, orderly, honest.
peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred
right of suffrage — the citizenry's vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of
government and in achieving and promoting political stability.

Additionally, by statutory mandate, the present Commission on Elections possesses,

inter alia, the following powers:

"1) Exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over

national and local officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the
government required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct
of elections. In addition, it may authorize CMT cadets eighteen years
of age and above to act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its
orders.

The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred to in the

preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to
electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with
its instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute.
Upon recommendation of the Commission, the corresponding proper
authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such
officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of
such violation or failure.

2) To stop any illegal election activity, or confiscate, tear down,

and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing."

Relampagos vs. Cumba [G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995]

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTION HAS AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE EXTRAORDINARY

WRITS OF CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS ONLY IN AID OF ITS
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon
the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold that the last
paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases remains
in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section
1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply
put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in
granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ
of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent
received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed
within five days from 1 July 1994 or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for
execution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the
appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of Interim Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which
is deemed to have supplementary effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures
pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last
day for any of the parties to appeal, or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private
respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the
trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of
the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. Since the motion for execution pending
appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial
court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion
was filed before the perfection of the appeal. Accordingly, since the respondent
COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside the challenged order
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by
the trial court.

Edding vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 112060, July 17, 1995]

TRIAL COURTS MAY ISSUE WRITS OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OF THE

ELECTORAL PROTEST WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN
APPEAL. But notwithstanding the aforementioned pronouncements, the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in the instant case when it enjoined the order
of the RTC, dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioner's motion for immediate
execution. Private respondent's petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction before the COMELEC is anchored on the former's claim that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in granting execution despite the filing of a notice of appeal by private
respondent within the reglementary period.

It appears however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private respondent
filed his notice of appeal with the RTC, petitioner in turn filed his motion for
immediate execution. Both actions were therefore seasonably filed within the five-
day reglementary period for filing an appeal since the decision of the RTC was
promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993.

The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial
court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion
to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at
the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and
was not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing party.

Galido vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991]

DECISIONS OF THE COMELEC ON ELECTORAL PROTEST DECIDED BY THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ARE FINAL, BUT THE SAME MAY BE ELEVATED TO THE
SUPREME COURT THROUGH PETITION ON CERTIORARI. The fact that decisions,
final orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not
preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The
proceedings in the Constitutional Commission on this matter are enlightening. Thus
—

"MR. FOZ. So, the amendment is to delete the word 'inappealable.'

MR. REGALADO. Before that, on page 26, line 26, we should have a
transposition because decisions are always final, as
distinguished from interlocutory orders. So, it should read:
'However, decisions, final orders or rulings,' to distinguish them
from interlocutory orders, '. . . of the Commission on Elections
on municipal and barangay officials shall be final and
IMMEDIATELY executory.'

That would be my proposed amendment.

MR. FOZ. Accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. It is understood, however, that while these decisions

with respect to barangay and municipal officials are final and
immediately executory and, therefore, not appealable, that does
not rule out the possibility of an original special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, as the case may be, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

MR. FOZ. That is understood, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. REGALADO. At least it is on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer."

We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned
decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior
court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

People vs. Inting [G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990]

THE COMELEC HAS AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION TO

DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE IN A VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS, AND DOES
NOT NEED THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR FOR THIS PURPOSE. In effect the 1987
Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute
 "The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the
concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is
not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment
in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly
and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to
vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their
office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.

From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by

the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to
it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public
officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from the clear
and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the
COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Section 182 and 184,
respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election

Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC
exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer
or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the
offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense
jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view
of its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections." (Corpus v.
Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987]).

Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election
offenses. If the Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense
or prosecutes a violation of election law, it is because he has been deputized by the
COMELEC. He does not do so under the sole authority of his office. (People v.
Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the instant case, there is
no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the Provincial
Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's
preliminary investigation.

It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was
already in effect) the President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the
ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof provides:

"Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal

officers, have exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of
all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding
section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that
the Commission fails to act on any complaint within two (2) months
from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of
 People vs. Basilla [G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989]

THE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS MAY BE DEPUTIZED BY THE COMELEC TO CONDUCT

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF ELECTION
LAWS. The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec
of the prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the
elections and only to ensure free, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections,
that is, to perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There
is nothing in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a
pinched and niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as
its deputies, officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the
government. The prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election
offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of
election offenses are, in an important sense, more important than the maintenance
of physical order in election precincts. Without the assistance of provincial and city
fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the
Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election
offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not
be possible, unless, perhaps, the Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger
than what it actually has. Moreover, the prosecution officers designated by the
Comelec become deputies or agents of the Comelec and pro tanto subject to the
authority, control and supervision of the Comelec in respect of the particular
functions covered by such deputation. The acts of such deputies within the lawful
scope of their delegated authority are, in legal contemplation, the acts of the
Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself places upon the Comelec's
authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of such authority through
administrative sanctions. Such sanctions — e.g., suspension or removal — may be
recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article IX-C, 1987
Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to pre-empt
and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the Government
where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily located.

People vs. Delgado [G.R. No. 93419-32, September 18, 1990]

WHEN THE COMELEC PROSECUTES A CRIMINAL CASE FOR VIOLATION OF

ELECTION LAWS, IT IS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it
is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to
decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of
a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code
before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a
prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court,
said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the
subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court.
The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of
the court or unless so ordered by the court.

The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court

must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of
the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court
requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court
the record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may
review its actions is certainly untenable.

COMELEC vs. Silva [G.R. No. 129417, February 10, 1998]

THE PROSECUTION OF ELECTION CASES IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE

COMELEC AND NOT BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. The ultimate question concerns
the authority of the COMELEC prosecutor. More precisely, the question is, who has
authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of dismissal — the
COMELEC or its designated prosecutor? The trial courts held the view that the Chief
State Prosecutor's decision not to appeal the dismissal of the cases, consistent with
his earlier decision to leave the determination of the existence of probable cause to
the trial courts, was binding on them.

We think this view to be mistaken. The authority to decide whether or not to appeal
the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, §2(6) of the Constitution
expressly vests in it the power and function to "investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices." As this Court has held:

In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to

investigate but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws.
This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of
helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an
information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

Indeed, even before the present Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881) and, before it, the 1971 Election Code (R.A. No. 6388) and the 1978 Election
Code (P.D. No. 1296) already gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute them in Court.
The purpose is to place in the hands of an independent prosecutor the investigation
and prosecution of election offenses.

Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its deputies.
They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was
beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño to oppose the appeal of the
COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated
prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was
probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases
should be dismissed. Those cases were filed by the COMELEC after appropriate
preliminary investigation. If the Chief State Prosecutor thought there was no
probable cause for proceeding against private respondents, he should have
discussed the matter with the COMELEC and awaited its instruction. If he disagreed
with the COMELEC's findings, he should have sought permission to withdraw from
the cases. But he could not leave the determination of probable cause to the courts
and agree in advance to the dismissal of the cases should the courts find no
probable cause for proceeding with the trial of the accused. It was, therefore, grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judges to rely on the
manifestation of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño as basis for denying due course to the
notices of appeal filed by the COMELEC.
Section 3

Sarmiento vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 105628, August 6, 1992]

ALL ELECTION CONTROVERSIES MUST BE HEARD AND DECIDED FIRST BY THE

DIVISION COMMISSION ON ELECTION. It is clear from the abovequoted provision
of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-proclamation controversies,
and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission.
The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide
the same at the first instance. In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-
proclamation cases are classified as Special Case and, in compliance with the above
provision of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested
with the authority to hear and decide these Special Cases. Rule 27 thereof governs
Special Cases; specifically, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from
rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which
they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:

"SEC. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. — (a) A

party aggrieved by an oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had
stated orally his intent to appeal said ruling shall, within five days
following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board of
canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a
copy thereof to the board of canvassers and the adverse party.

(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the
Clerk of Court concerned.

(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.

(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set
the case for hearing." (Emphasis supplied)

A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be

filed within five (5) days from its promulgation. The Clerk of Court of the Division
shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding
Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the
Commission en banc. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall
calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
banc within ten (10) days from the certification.

Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the
abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently,
the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Division.

Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro [G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995]

ONLY DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION EN BANC MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE

SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the
COMELEC, raises a fundamental question. He contends that the filing of the present
petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX, A, §7 of the Constitution because under this
Constitution in its Art. IX, A, §7 means the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65. Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that the petitioner first
file a motion for reconsideration, it follows that petitioner's failure to file a motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to
his present action.

Petitioner argues that this requirement may be dispensed with because the only
question raised in his petition is a question of law. This is not correct. The questions
raised by petitioner involve the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions in light of the facts of this case. The questions tendered are, therefore,
not pure questions of law.

Moreover, that a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is

required for the filing of a petition for certiorari is clear from the following
provisions of the Constitution:

Art. IX, C, §2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating

to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election

contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.

Id. §3. The Commission on Elections may be sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Conformably to those provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a
party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari."

Section 4

National Press Club vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992]

AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE

MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION. The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by
the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information.
The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out
in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of
(Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with the Article IX (C)
(4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited
period — i.e., "during the election period." It is difficult to overemphasize the
special importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press in a
democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of the
electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall
have governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are
accorded a preferred status in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free
speech and free press are not unlimited rights for they are not the only important
and relevant values even in the most democratic of polities. In our own society,
equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the
level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article
II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law."

The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that
no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press.
For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely
conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly
and convincingly proving that assertion.

Put in slightly different terms, there appears no present necessity to fall back upon
basic principles relating to the police power of the State and the requisites for
constitutionally valid exercise of that power. The essential question is whether or
not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether
such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations
so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election
periods.

In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the

character and extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being
assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential
considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of
speech and freedom of the press Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain
important limitations.

Firstly, Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability.
By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328
dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority
by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January
1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political
parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach
commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications,
and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs
are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary or other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office.
We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of
particular candidates.

The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) — that it does not
restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or comment
upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all candidates for
office — constitutes the critical distinction which must be made between the instant
case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on Elections. In Sanidad, the Court
declared unconstitutional Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 which
provided as follows:

"Sec. 19 Prohibition on Columnists, Commentators or Announcers

— During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign
for or against the plebiscite issues."

Resolution No. 2167 had been promulgated by the Comelec in connection with the
plebiscite mandated by R.A. No. 6766 on the ratification or adoption of the Organic
Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The Court held that Resolution No. 2167
constituted a restriction of the freedom of expression of petitioner Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of the Baguio Midland Courier, "for no justifiable reason." The
Court, through Medialdea, J., said:

". . . [N] either Article, IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 [b], 2nd
par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also
been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in the plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2476 has no statutory
basis." (Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied).

There is a third limitation upon the scope of application of Section 11 (b). Section
11 (b). exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of
print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required
to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual
candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the
newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently
apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space"
on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions
materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations
effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at
least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the
benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out.
the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is
commanded by statute to bur or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in
mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory
command. There is no indication, so far as the record here would show, that
Comelec would not in fact carry out its statutory duty in this connection, and if it
does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have
judicial remedies at their disposal.

The points that may appropriately be underscored are that Section 11 (b) does not
cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, their
qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and
television stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal
information and communication operations. Section 11 (b) does not authorize any
intervention and much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content
of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political
advertisements which the individual candidates are quite free to present within
their respective allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is here no
"officious functionary of [a] repressive government" dictating what events or ideas
reporters, broadcasters, editors or commentators may talk or write about or display
on TV screens. There is here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. What
Section 11 (b), viewed in context, in fact does is to limit paid partisan political
advertisements to fora other than modern mass media, and to "Comelec time" and
"Comelec space" in such mass media.

Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX (C) (4)
and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of
print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core
problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and
the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX (C) (4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism
which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political
candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.

Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. vs. GMA Network,

Inc. [G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998]

RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS MAY BE REQUIRED TO GIVE AIR TIME TO THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS FREE OF CHARGE. Petitioners' argument is without
merit. All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance
with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common
good so requires."

The idea that broadcast stations may be required to provide COMELEC Time free of
charge is not new. It goes back to the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388), which
provided:
 of prime time once a week which shall be known as "Comelec Time"
and which shall be used exclusively by the Commission to disseminate
vital election information. Said "Comelec Time" shall be considered as
part of the public service time said stations are required to furnish the
Government for the dissemination of public information and education
under their respective franchises or permits.

This provision was carried over with slight modification by the 1978 Election Code
(P.D. No. 1296), which provided:

SEC. 46. COMELEC Time. — The Commission [on Elections] shall

procure radio and television time to be known as "COMELEC Time"
which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates
within the area of coverage of said radio and television stations. For
this purpose, the franchises of all radio broadcasting and television
stations are hereby amended so as to require such stations to furnish
the Commission radio or television time, free of charge, during the
period of the campaign, at least once but not oftener than every other
day.

Substantially the same provision is now embodied in §92 of B.P. Blg. 881.

Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the
franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was
brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just
compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of
franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the
common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but
even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed
of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."

Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that
broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are
responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can
constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public
affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations
may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. 12 Thus,
Professor Cass R. Sunstein of the University of Chicago Law School, in urging
reforms in regulations affecting the broadcast industry, writes:

Elections. We could do a lot to improve coverage of electoral

campaigns. Most important, government should ensure free media
time for candidates. Almost all European nations make such provision;
the United States does not. Perhaps government should pay for such
time on its own. Perhaps broadcasters should have to offer it as a
condition for receiving a license. Perhaps a commitment to provide
free time would count in favor of the grant of a license in the first
instance. Steps of this sort would simultaneously promote attention to
public affairs and greater diversity of view. They would also help
overcome the distorting effects of "soundbites" and the corrosive
financial pressures faced by candidates in seeking time on the media.

Adiong vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992]

as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so
substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be
stilled:

"The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the
Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's
power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is
perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is
balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment . .
. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of
the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice . . .

For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear
public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present
danger. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be
curbed, which in other context might support legislation against attack on due
process grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation.
Accordingly, whatever occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or
impending. Only the greatest abuses, endangering permanent interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V. Collins, 323 US 516 [1945]."
(Emphasis supplied)

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the question prohibition is not

so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car,
to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but
once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression
becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If,
in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on
reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or
columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased
opinions with less reason can sanction the prohibition against a sincere
manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an individual person who
pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.

Sanidad vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990]

THE SUPERVISION OR REGULATION OF MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION DOES NOT

APPLY IN THE CASE OF PLEBESCITE. However, neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11(b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis.

In the case of Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, L-32546, Oct. 16, 1970, where the
constitutionality of the prohibition of certain forms of election propaganda was
election where votes are cast in favor of specific persons for some office. In other
words, the electorate is asked to vote for or against issues, not candidates in a
plebiscite.

Anent respondent Comelec's argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167

does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and or from
campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the
Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious.
While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is
still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No
reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this
form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom of
expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to
be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the
forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.

D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Section 2

Guevarra vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17115, November 30, 1962]

EXTENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL. Under our Constitution,

the authority of the Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the
Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property
pertaining to, or held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities
thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a
determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose;
Whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in
conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by
said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions
thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has
been authorized by the officials of the corresponding department or bureau. If
these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor
General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said
payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said payment upon the
ground that the aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated
thereon is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do more than
discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), "to
bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or
property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant". This duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove
payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor,
would bring to the attention of the aforementioned administrative officer the
reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and,
hence render the imposition of said duty unnecessary.
or instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should not be bound by the opinion of the
legal counsel of said agency or instrumentality which may have been the basis for
the questioned disbursement; otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger
and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile exercise. Its beacon
lights then should be nothing more than the pertinent laws and its rules and
regulations.

IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COA, DUE PROCESS SHOULD BE OBSERVED.

Respondent Agustin then cannot be faulted when in his Certificate of Settlement
and Balances No. 01-04-83, he disallowed NPC's questioned disbursement.
However, in his notation as to the persons to be liable therefor, he mentions only
Mr. M.V. Villafuerte (the Approving Authority) whose liabilities are primary; E.
Gamama and P. Gajasan (Management's Examiners) whose liabilities are secondary
and joint"; and H.L. Hermosura (Chief Accountant) whose liability is primary.
Petitioner was not found to be liable. He was made jointly and severally liable with
Villafuerte, Gajasan and Hermosura only in the Memorandum of respondent Agustin
dated 30 June 1986. It may be noted that in his Memorandum he excluded
Gamama. Considering that what was sustained up to the level of the General
Counsel of the COA was the disallowance made in the aforementioned Certificate of
Settlement and Balances and necessarily, his ruling thereon as to who are the
parties liable therefor, Agustin acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion
when, without prior notice to petitioner, he made the latter liable for the
disallowance and worse, he directed, in the guise of a request, the Chief Accountant
of the NPC, Metro Manila Regional Center, to book the disallowance in the name of
petitioner. Petitioner was not made a party to the motion for reconsideration which
the General Counsel of the COA acted upon. Respondent Agustin effectively denied
petitioner of his right to due process.

Osmeña vs. Commissionner on Audit [G.R. No. 98355, March 2, 1994]

Sambeli vs. Province of Isabela [G.R. No. 92279, June 18, 1992]

Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit [G.R. No. 103309, November 27, 1992]

We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's contention that the Commission, in the

exercise of its power granted by the Constitution, usurped the statutory functions of
the NPC, Board of Directors for it leads to the absurd conclusion that a mere Board
of Directors of a government-owned and controlled corporation, by issuing a
resolution, can put to naught a constitutional provision which has been ratified by
the majority of the Filipino people. If We will not sustain the Commission's power
and duty to examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to this particular
expenditure or use of funds and property, owned or held in trust by this
government-owned and controlled corporation, the NPC, We will be rendering
inutile this Constitutional Body which has been tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately,
the people's property.

Saligumba vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. L-61676, October 18, 1982]
Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative
matters as mentioned above, We can not do so on factual issues; Our power to
review is limited to legal issues.

Section 3

Philippine Airlines vs. Commission on Audit [G.R. No. 91890, June 9, 1995]

Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization [G.R. No. 112399, July 14, 1995]

ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 8

Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998]

FOR THE THREE-TERM LIMIT TO APPLY, THE LOCAL OFFICIAL SHOULD BE ELECTED
TO THE OFFICE AND COMPLETES THE FULL TERMS. To recapitulate, the term limit
for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that
an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the
following cases or situations:

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason

of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he
resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in
the next election?

Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by

succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term
expired, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the
purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, §8, voluntary
renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for
which he was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the
term for which the deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be
considered to have completed one term. His resignation constitutes an
interruption of the full term.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he
is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice
reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next
election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions
for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred, namely,
times. In the second case, the local official has been elected three consecutive
times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by

succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for
the purpose of applying Art. X, §8. Suppose he is twice elected after
that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term
but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had
he served the full term because he only continued the service,
interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but
also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the
situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand,
he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to
office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of
the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of
the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.