Torts 345 PDF

[TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY.
ALDEN GONZALES] 3A AY 2017-2108

PRESCRIPTION; QUASI-DELICT highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and
that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations.
KRAMERvs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC. The trial court went on to say that the four-year
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989 prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil
FACTS: Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date
when the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines
F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the Ernesto had been finally ascertained.
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila. The boat figured in a collision with CA DECISION:
an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. The F/B Marjolea sank. The CA granted the Petition filed by Trans-Asia
and ordered the trial court to dismiss the Complaint.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed
their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine The CA held that petitioners should have
Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board immediately instituted a complaint for damages based on a
conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident
the proximate cause of the maritime collision.The Board because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at
concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish the onset of the collision. Also, while it is true that the
catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of findings and recommendation of the Board and the decision
the Trans-Asia who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines of the Commandant may be helpful to the court in
during the collision. ascertaining which of the parties are at fault, still the court
is not bound by said findings and decision.
The petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages
against Trans-Asia. On the other hand, Trans-Asia filed a ISSUE:
Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the Whether or not a Complaint for damages arising from a
ground of prescription. marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations (4
year period)
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
SC DECISION:
It argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code,the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for YES. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action
damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within
collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from
should have filed their Complaint within four years from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs.
the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April Sarabia,this Court ruled that in an action for damages
8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being
accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period
instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. must be counted from the day of the collision.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of
action, which consists of 3 elements:
The petitioners argued that the running of the a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine under whatever law it arises or is created;
protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such
29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the right; and
negligence of the crew had become final, and that the four- c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the right of the plaintiff
should be computed from the said date. The petitioners
concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted
30, 1985, the same was seasonably filed. when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time
of the commission of an act or omission violative of the
RTC DECISION: right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of
action arises.
The RTC denied the Motion filed by Trans-Asia.
The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising
relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year
[TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY. ALDEN GONZALES] 3A AY 2017-2108
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision.Thus, the respondent court correctly found that On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of
the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration. As CCCI
occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote
filed iii court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond the four another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On
(4) year prescriptive period. November 5, 1997, responden again sent CCCI a letter
inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.SO Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with
ORDERED. the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a
complaint for damages against petitioners
ARTICLE 19-28; HUMAN RELATIONS
RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor
G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008 of respondent. Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated
January 31, 2003, affirmed the trial court‘s Decision with
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, modification as to the amount of the damages awarded.
RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, ISSUE: In disapproving respondent’s application
DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO* for proprietary membership with CCCI, are
E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA, Petitioners, vs. petitioners liable to respondent for damages, and if
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, Respondent. so, is their liability joint and several?
FACTS: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a HELD: YES. Petitioners are liable to respondent for
domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non- damages and their liability is joint and several. As shown by
stock private membership club, having its principal place of the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as
business in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are the ―black ball system‖ of voting wherein each member will
members of its Board of Directors. drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents
conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special ball means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as
company proprietary member of CCCI, designated amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is
respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President required. When respondent‘s application for proprietary
and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on
a special non-proprietary member. July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black ball.
Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was
The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCI‘s disapproved.
Board of Directors.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove an
proprietary membership. The application was indorsed by application for proprietary membership. But such right
CCCI‘s two (2) proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the
Misa and Silvano Ludo. Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions, thus:
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5
million range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI,
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million.
and in the performance of
Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr.
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6,
observe honesty and good faith.
1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership Certificate No.
1446 to respondent.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on respondent‘s
compensate the latter for
application for proprietary membership was deferred. In
the damage.
another Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondent‘s
application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on August 1, In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,[5] we expounded Article 19
1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, and correlated it with Article 21, thus:
CCCI‘s corporate secretary, informing him that the Board
disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of
as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI,
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give and civility. At the very least, they should have informed
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. him why his application was disapproved.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm. When
by itself legal because recognized or granted by law the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and
as such, may nevertheless become the source of results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.[6] It bears
manner which does not conform with the norms reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to that petitioners‘ disapproval of respondent‘s application is
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for characterized by bad faith.
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the As to petitioners‘ reliance on the principle of damnum
government of human relations and for the maintenance of absque injuria or damage without injury, suffice it to state
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Gutierrez,[8] Taking into consideration the attending
Article 21 would be proper. (Emphasis in the original) circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent of
P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages
In rejecting respondent‘s application for proprietary is reasonable.
membership, we find that petitioners violated the rules
governing human relations, the basic principles to be Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 allows
observed for the rightful relationship between human it by way of example or correction for the public good.
beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court Nonetheless, since exemplary damages are imposed not to
and the Court of Appeals aptly held that petitioners enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
respondent‘s applications. This is contrary to morals, good deleterious actions,[9] we reduce the amount from
custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00 only.
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of
the same Code. On the matter of attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses,
Article 2208 of the same Code provides, among others, that
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of attorney‘s fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered
CCCI‘s Amended By-Laws requiring the unanimous vote of in cases when exemplary damages are awarded and where
the directors present at a special or regular meeting the court deems it just and equitable that attorney‘s fees
was not printedon the application form respondent filled and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as in this
and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the case. In any event, however, such award must be
original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the reasonable, just and equitable. Thus, we reduce the amount
required number of votes needed for admission of an of attorney‘s fees (P500,000.00) and litigation expenses
applicant as a proprietary member. (P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed Lastly, petitioners‘ argument that they could not be held
on the application form due to economic reasons. We find jointly and severally liable for damages because only one (1)
this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, voted for the disapproval of respondent‘s application lacks
aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way merit.
back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent
filed his application. We cannot fathom why such a Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
prestigious and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI,
whose members are all affluent, did not have enough money
to cause the printing of an updated application form. SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. —
Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who
wondering why his application was disapproved. He was are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or
members was required. When he sent a letter for pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and
objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by
the corporation, its stockholders or members and other ISSUES: Whether or not the grant of right of way to the
persons. (Emphasis ours) heirs of Mabasa is proper.
1. Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged 1. Petitioners are already barred from raising the first issue.
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Petitioners did not appeal from the RTC decision granting
CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMED with modification in the the Mabasas the right of way, hence they are presumed to
sense that (a) the award of moral damages is reduced from be satisfied with the adjudication. Such issue is already laid
P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary to rest.
damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00;
and (c) the award of attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses 2. No. CA erred in awarding damages in favor of Mabasa.
is reduced from P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 to The award of damages was based solely on the fact that
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectiv Pacifico Mabasa incurred losses in the form of unrealized
rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by
reason of the closure of the passageway.
SPS. CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPS.
LITO and CRISTINA SANTOS vs. CA The mere fact that the Pacifico suffered losses does not give
rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery
FACTS: of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
Pacifico Mabasa filed a case for the grant of an easement of wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to
right of way against Sps. Custodio, Sps. Santos and Rosalina the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
Morato. Pacifico died during the pendency of the case and without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
was substituted by his surviving spouse Ofelia Mabasa and damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
their children. injury caused by a breach or wrong.
Pacifico owns a parcel of land with an apartment thereon at There is a material distinction between damages and injury.
P. Burgos Street, Taguig. Said property is surrounded by Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
other immovables owned by Sps. Custodio, Sps. Santos, and loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
Morato. Going to Pacifico‘s property, the row of houses on damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for
the left are as follows: the house of Sps. Custodio, that of the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
Sps. Santos, and that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side is injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
that of Rosalino Morato and then a Septic Tank. the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
From Pacifico‘s property, the passageway to access P.
Burgos Street is one meter wide. It is the path in between In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
the previously mentioned row of houses. injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
Tenants were occupying the apartment. When Pacifico went owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff
to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
adobe fence in the passageway making it narrower in width. underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
Said adobe fence was constructed by Sps. Santos along their premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
property which is along the passageway. Morato law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and
constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. It may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there
was then that the tenants of the apartment vacated the area. should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered
Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence some pain and suffering.
because there was an incident when her daughter was
dragged by a bicycle pedalled by one of the tenants along Many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
the passageway. She mentioned other inconveniences of damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to
having a pathway in front of her house, such as when some such other person, and consequently create no cause of
of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be
windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
RTC ordered Sps. Custodio and Sps. Santos to give the amount to a legal injury or wrong.
Mabasas permanent access ingress and egress, to the public
street. It also ordered the Mabasas to pay the Custodios and In order that the law will give redress for an act causing
Santoses indemnity for the permanent use of the damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.
passageway. CA affirmed the RTC decision and awarded There must be damnum et injuria. If a person sustains
damages in favor of Mabasa. actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or
property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act
or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v.
damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. YU AND YUHICO
G.R. No. 191033, January 11, 2016
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no
legal injury. Contrary to the claim of Mabasa, Sps. Custodio, FACTS: Yu andYuhico went to the Orchard Golf &
Sps. Santos, and Morato could not be said to have violated Country Club to play a round of golf with another member
the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of of the club. At the last minute, however, the other member
abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the NCC can be informed them that he could not play with them. Due to the
applied, the ff. requisites must concur: "no twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in the
(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is membership handbook prohibiting groups of less than
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; three players from teeing off on weekends and public
(2) The acts should be willful; and holidays before 1:00 p.m.,respondents requested
(3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. management to look for another player to join them.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot Because Orchard were unable to find their third
is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not player, Yu tried to convince Montallana, Orchard's assistant
contrary to morals, customs, etc. It is within the right of golf director, to allow them to play twosome, even if they
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. had to tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course.
Article 430 of the NCC provides that "(e)very owner may Montallana refused, stating that the flights which started
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, from the first nine holes might be disrupted. Yu then
xxx hedges, or by any other means without detriment to shouted invectives at Montallana, at which point he told
servitudes constituted thereon." Yuhico that they should just tee off anyway, regardless of
what management's reaction would be. Respondents then
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not teed off without permission from Montallana. They were
subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way thus able to play, although they did so without securing a
existing in favor of Mabasa, either by law or by contract. tee time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a
The fact that the Mabasas had no existing right over the rule in the handbook. As a result of respondents' actions,
said passageway is confirmed by the decision of the RTC Montallana filed a report on the same day with the board of
granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after directors.
payment of just compensation. It was only that decision
which gave the Mabasas the right to use the said The boardrequested respondents to submit their
passageway after payment of the compensation and written comments on Montallana's incident report.
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to Subsequently, the board resolved to suspend respondents.
interfere in the exercise of said right. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The decision of the
Club's Board of Directors suspendingYu and Yuhico was
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute declared void and of no effect. Thus, petitioners were
right over their property and their act of fencing and ordered to pay respondents moral damages, exemplary
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully damages, attorney‘s fees and costs of litigation.
perform in the employment and exercise of said right.
Whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by the ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
Mabasas by reason of the rightful use of the said land by
petitioners is damnum absque injuria. RULING: No. Yu acknowledged that there was an
offense committed. Similarly, Yuhico admitted that he was
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his aware or had prior knowledge of the Club's "no twosome"
own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes policy as contained in the Club's Membership Handbook
to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, and that they teed off without the required tee time
there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon slip.Montallana cannot be faulted in exercising his
his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although prerogative to disallow respondents from playing since they
such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss made no prior reservation and that there were standing
to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque flights waiting for tee time.
injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in
the general and ordinary manner in which the property is With regard to the purported damages they incurred,
used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, respondents testified during the trial to support their
nobody can complain of having been injured, because the respective allegations. Yuhico stated that he distanced
incovenience arising from said use can be considered as a himself from his usual group (the "Alabang Boys") and that
mere consequence of community life. he became the butt of jokes of fellow golfers. On the other
hand, Yu represented that some of his friends in the
One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful business like Freddy Lim, a certain Atty. Benjie, and Jun
purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage Ramos started to evade or refuse to have dealings with him
to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's favor. An after his suspension. Apart from these self-serving
injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque declarations, respondents presented neither testimonial nor
injuria. documentary evidence to bolster their claims. Worse, Yu
even admitted that Freddy Lim and Atty. Benjie did not tell sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which
him that his suspension was the reason why they did not the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as
want to transact with him. damnum absque injuria.
Records reveal that respondents were given due notice and xxxx
opportunity to be heard before the Board of Directors
imposed the penalty of suspension as Club The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a
members.Respondents were suspended in accordance with legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act
the procedure set forth in the Club's By-laws. may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a
Way different from the trial court's findings, there is, lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause
therefore, no factual and legal basis to grant moral and damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter's
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit in favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum
favor of respondents. The damages suffered, if there are absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship
any, partake of the nature of a damnum absque injuria. to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated
to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
As elaborated in Spouses Custodio v. CA:brary
xxx [T]he mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does "One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury.
not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum facit. If damage results
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage absque injuria.‖In this case, respondents failed to prove by
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, preponderance of evidence that there is fault or negligence
or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of on the part of petitioners in order to oblige them to pay for
action, since damages are merely part of the remedy the alleged damage sustained as a result of their suspension
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. as Club members. Certainly, membership in the Club is a
privilege.Regular members are entitled to use all the
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. facilities and privileges of the Club, subject to its rules and
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the regulations.As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and mental anguish respondents experienced, assuming to be
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for true, was brought upon them by themselves for deliberately
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not Club. Considering that respondents were validly suspended,
the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are there is no reason for the Club to compensate them. Indeed,
often called damnum absque injuria. the penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article
XIV of the By-Laws is a means to protect and preserve the
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the interest and purposes of the Club. This being so, the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such suspension of respondents does not fell under any of the
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to the grant of moral
owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation
and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The costs.
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA,
law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and FLORDELIZA J. ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN,
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO,
may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL JONGCO vs.
should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered ISMAEL VELOSO III
some pain and suffering. G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010
FACTS:
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by
acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another A complaint for unlawful detainer case filed by
but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and [herein petitioners] against [herein respondent]. It was
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such alleged that they are the lessors of a residential house
cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured located at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village,
person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages Quezon City [subject property] which was leased to
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal respondent at a monthly rental of P17,000.00. The action
injury or wrong. was instituted on the ground of respondents failure to pay
rentals from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an repeated demands. Respondent denied the non-payment of
act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may of P825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done on the
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage,
leased property.
that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
MeTC decided in favor of petitioners by ordering
respondent to (a) vacate the premises ofthe subject Whether or not respondent has a cause of action in
property; (b) pay petitioners the sum of P306,000.00 his complaint for damages.
corresponding to the rentals due from May 23, 1997 to
November 22, 1998, and the sum of P17,000.00 a month RULING: YES
thereafter until respondent vacates the premises; and (c) The Courtruled that RTC-Branch 227 should not
pay petitionersattorneys fees. On appeal,(RTC)[Branch 88, have dismissed respondents complaint for damages on the
Quezon City]reversed the MeTC decision. Respondent was ground of failure to state a cause of action.When the ground
ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action,
of the decision but he was also given an option to choose such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in
between staying in the leased property or vacating the the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot
same, subject to the reimbursement by petitioners of one- consider other matters aliunde. Thus, the test is whether,
half of the value of the improvements which it found to be assuming the allegations of fact in the complaint to be true,
in the amount of P120,000.00. Respondent was also given a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the
the right to remove said improvements pursuant to Article prayer stated therein.
1678 of the Civil Code, should petitioners refuse to
pay P60,000.00. A cause of action (for damages) exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the
After successive appeals to the CA and the SC, the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
decision of the RTC which reversed the decision of the arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
MeTC, became final and executory.Whilst respondent‘s named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
appeal of the (MeTC) judgment in the unlawful detainer (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
case was pending before the RTC-Branch 88, respondent violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach
filed before the RTC-Branch 227 a Complaint for Breach of of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the
Contract and Damages docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02- latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. The
48341.The compalaint‘s first cause of action was for Court found that all three elements exist in the case at
damages because the respondent supposedly suffered bar. Respondent may not have specifically identified each
embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners element, but it may be sufficiently determined from the
distributed copies of the above-mentioned MeTC decision allegations in his complaint.
in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of
Horseshoe Village while respondents appeal was still First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his
pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch good character, name, and reputation. Every man has a
88. The second cause of action was for breach of contract right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name.This
since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make continuing right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and
repairs on the subject property to preserve and keep it libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or
tenantable. tortuous conduct.Second, petitioners are obliged to
respect respondent‘s good name even though they are
RTC-Branch 227 dismissed complaint in Civil Case opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19
No. Q-02-48341 for violating the rule against splitting of of the Civil Code requires, every person must, in the
cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
the pendency of a related case sinceit involved the same act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
facts, parties, and causes of action as those in the unlawful and good faith. A violation of such principle constitutes an
detainer case, and the MeTC had already properly taken abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. We expounded in Sea
cognizance of the latter case.On appeal, the CA fully agreed Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of Appealsthat:
with the RTC-Branch 227 in dismissing respondent‘s
second cause of action (i.e., breach of contract) in Civil Case ―The principle of abuse of rights stated in the
No. Q-02-48341. However, it held that RTC-Branch 227 above article, departs from the classical theory that he
should have proceeded with the trial on the merits of the who uses a right injures no one. The modern tendency is to
first cause of action (i.e., damages). The CA found that depart from the classical and traditional theory, and to
petitioners were indeed liable to respondent for moral and grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an
exemplary damages ruling that the distribution of the abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.”
copies of MeTC Decision pending appeal was primarily “Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of
intended to embarrass respondentin the community he torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
mingled in and found that there was evident bad faith number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
intended to mock respondents right to appeal which is a foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. If mere
statutory remedy to correct errors which might have been fault or negligence in ones acts can make him liable for
committed by the lower court. damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason
should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of
good faith is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an
ISSUE:
honest intention to abstain from taking any merely examples and do not preclude other similar or
unconscientious advantage of another, even through the analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for
forms or technicalities of the law, together with an absence actions against a person’s dignity, such as profane,
of all information or belief of fact which would render the insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive
transaction unconscientious. In business relations, it language. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral
means good faith as understood by men of affairs.” damages which include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
“While Article 19 may have been intended as a wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
mere declaration of principle, the cardinal law on human similar injury, although incapable of pecuniary
conduct expressed in said article has given rise to certain computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate
rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.”
so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a
manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, And third, respondent alleged that the
he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe Village
rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or homeowners of copies of the MeTC decision in the unlawful
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole detainer case, which was adverse to respondent and still on
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.” appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, had no apparent lawful
Petitioners are also expected to respect or just purpose except to humiliate respondent or assault
respondent‘s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of his character. As a result, respondent suffered damages
mind under Article 261of the Civil Code.Thus, Article becoming the talk of the town and being deprived of his
2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral political career.
damages for acts and actions referred to in Article 26, Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of
among other provisions, of the Civil Code.In Concepcion v. action against them since the MeTC decision in the
Court of Appeals, the Court explained that: unlawful detainer case was part of public records.It is
“The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the already settled that the public has a right to see and copy
necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code judicial records and documents. However, this is not a case
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human of the public seeking and being denied access to judicial
personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human records and documents. The controversy is rooted in the
personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan dissemination by petitioners of the MeTC judgment against
for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were
law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus,
far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a purportedly affecting negatively respondent‘s good name
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human and reputation among said homeowners. The unlawful
personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed detainer case was a private dispute between petitioners and
defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was
amply protected, and damages are provided for violations then still pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 88,
of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
rendering suspect petitioners intentions for distributing
mind.”
copies of said MeTC decision to non-parties in the
“It is petitioners position that the act imputed to case. While petitioners were free to copy and distribute such
him does not constitute any of those enumerated in Arts. copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is
26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations whether they did so with the intent of humiliating
mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are respondent and destroying the latter‘s good name and
reputation in the community.
1ART. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, Nevertheless, the CA erred in already awarding
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and moral and exemplary damages in respondents favor when
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they the parties have not yet had the chance to present any
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause evidence. In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden
of action for damages, prevention and other relief: of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers incumbent upon the party claiming affirmative relief from
residence; the court to convincingly prove its claim. Bare allegations,
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof
life or family relations of another; under our Rules. In short, mere allegations are not
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be evidence.
alienated from his friends;
At this point, the finding of the CA of bad faith and
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account
malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty
physical defect, or other personal condition. to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind
which is manifested by the acts of the individual exemplary damages. The CA modified the decision. It ruled
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from that the sale of Lot 2 is valid while the sale of Lot 1 and the
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of house is null and void. It also ordered the payment of
another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply damages.
connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious ISSUE:
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some Whether or not the petitioners are liable.
motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in HELD:
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and The sale of Lot 2 is valid, the property exclusively
unjustifiable harm. belongs to Pedro. On the other hand, the sale of Lot 1 and
the house therein is void. Art. 160 of the New Civil Code
The Court cannot subscribe to respondents provides that, ―All property of the marriage is presumed to
argument that there is no more need for the presentation of belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved it
evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the pertains exclusively to the husband or wife.‖ Lot 1 is
dismissal of respondents complaint for damages, acquired during the marriage, the presumption of conjugal
hypothetically admitted respondents allegations. The nature subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
hypothetical admission of respondent‘s allegations in the convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
complaint only goes so far as determining whether said prove that the subject property is exclusively owned.
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to Pedro‘s bare assertion would not suffice to overcome said
state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint presumption. In addition the house is a conjugal property
sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily having been built thru their joint efforts.
mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result
in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the To further amplify the nullity of the sale, the
case for presentation of evidence by the parties. Family Code provides that, a sale or encumbrance of
conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the
RAVINA v. VILLA-ABRILLE Family Code on August 3, 1988. The Family Code provides
G.R. No. 160708, 16 October 2009, SECOND that the disposition of a conjugal property shall be void if
DIVISION, Quisumbing, Acting C.J. without the consent of both the husband and wife. If the
sale is with knowledge but without approval of either
FACTS: spouse, the sale is annullable within 5 years from the date of
Mary Ann and Pedro Villa-Abrille are husband and the sale.In the present case, the sale was concluded in 1991,
wife. They begot 4 children. During the marriage they hence covered by the Family Code, and Mary Ann brought
acquired parcel of land (Lot 1) which is adjacent to a lot (Lot the case within 5 years from said sale.
2) acquired by Pedro when he was still single. Through their
joint efforts and a loan from the bank, they constructed a As to Spouses Ravina they are not buyers in good
house which covers both lots. However, Pedro eventually faith. Indeed a buyer is only required to rely on the face of
had a mistress and began to neglect his family. He then sold the title, but the same is not true when the seller has
the house and lot to Spouses Ravina without Mary Ann‘s restricted capacity to sell, such as that provided in Art 124
consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale without Mary Ann‘s of the Family Code. The buyer is now required to inquire
signature. the seller‘s capacity to establish good faith. In the case, the
property is registered in the name of the Mary Ann and
One day, Pedro and Spouses Ravina, together with Pedro, however Mary Ann‘s conformity did not appear in
armed forces from CAFGU surreptitiously transfer Mary the Deed of Sale. Also at the time of the sale, Mary Ann and
Ann and her children‘s belongings outside the house and her children are the occupants of the said property, the
was eventually prohibited from entering the same. Mary Spouses were even apprised by Mary Ann‘s lawyer that the
Ann filed a case for Annulment of Sale, Specific property is not exclusively Pedro‘s. All told, the
Performance with prayer for damages. circumstance does not establish Spouses Ravina‘s good
faith.
Pedro proffered that the properties are exclusively
his. He alleged that the money used to purchase Lot 1 are As to the award of damages, the Court ruled that
proceeds from a previous sale of a parcel of land owned by the same was supported by evidence. The manner by which
him, in effect the purchase of the subject land is by barter or Mary Ann and her children were removed from the family
exchange. Spouses Ravina, on the other hand, allege that home deserves condemnation. Firmly established in civil
they are purchasers in good faith who merely relied on the law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the
title of the property. The RTC ruled that the sale is valid as exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
to one-half (1/2) of the properties and awarded moral duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
damages to Mary Ann and her children, as well as observe honesty and good faith. When a right is
exercised in a manner that does not conform with The Golf Share was adjudicated to respondent, who paid the
such norms and results in damages to another, a corresponding estate tax due, including that on the Golf
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the Share.It was only through a letter dated 15 May 1990 that
wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, the heirs of Caram learned of the sale of the Golf Share
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to following their inquiry with Valley Golf about the share.
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, After a series of correspondence, the Caram heirs were
good customs or public policy shall compensate the subsequently informed, in a letter dated 15 October 1990,
latter for the damages caused. It is patent in the that they were entitled to the refund of P11,066.52 out of
case that the alleged acts fall short of these the proceeds of the sale of the Golf Share, which amount
established civil law standards. had been in the custody of Valley Golf since 11 June 1987.[12]
Respondent filed an action for reconveyance of the

VALLEY GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,- versus - share with damages before the SECin favor of respondent,
TINGA, ROSA O. VDA. DE CARAM, ordering Valley Golf to convey ownership of the Golf Share
or in the alternative to issue one fully paid share of stock of
FACTS: In 1961, the late Congressman Fermin Z. Caram, Valley Golf the same class as the Golf Share to respondent.
Jr. (Caram), the husband of the present respondent, Damages totaling P90,000.00 were also awarded to
subscribed to purchased and paid for in full one respondent.The SEC hearing officer noted that under
share (Golf Share) in the capital stock of Valley Section 67, paragraph 2 of the Corporation Code, a share
Golf. He was issued Stock Certificate No. 389 dated 26 stock could only be deemed delinquent and sold in
January 1961 for the Golf Share. The Stock Certificate an extrajudicial sale at public auction only upon the
likewise indicates a par value of P9,000.00. Valley Golf failure of the stockholder to pay the unpaid
would subsequently allege that beginning 25 subscription or balance for the share. The section
January 1980, Caram stopped paying his monthly could not have applied in Carams case since he had fully
dues, which were continually assessed until 31 paid for the Golf Share and he had been assessed not for the
June 1987. Valley Golf claims to have sent five (5) letters share itself but for his delinquent club dues. Proceeding
to Caram concerning his delinquent account within from the foregoing premises, the SEC hearing officer
the period from 27 January 1986 until 3 May 1987, all concluded that the auction sale had no basis in law and was
forwarded toP.O. Box No. 1566, Makati Commercial Center thus a nullity. The SEC hearing officer did entertain Valley
Post Office, the mailing address which Caram allegedly Golfs argument that the sale of the Golf Share was
furnished Valley Golf. The first letter informed Caram that authorized under the by-laws. However, it was ruled
his account as of 31 December 1985 was delinquent and that that pursuant to Section 6 of the Corporation Code,
his club privileges were suspended pursuant to Section 3, a provision creating a lien upon shares of stock for
Article VII of the by-laws of Valley Golf. Despite such notice unpaid debts, liabilities, or assessments of
of delinquency, the second letter, dated 26 August 1986, stockholders to the corporation, should be
stated that should Carams account remain unpaid for 45 embodied in the Articles of Incorporation, and not
days, his name would be included in the delinquent list to merely in the by-laws, because Section 6 (par.1)
be posted on the clubs bulletin board.[6] The third letter, prescribes that the shares of stock of a corporation
dated 25 January 1987, again informed Caram of his may have such rights, privileges and restrictions as
delinquent account and the suspension of his club may be stated in the articles of incorporation.[15] It
privileges.[7] The fourth letter, dated 7 March 1987, was observed that the Articles of Incorporation of Valley
informed Caram that should he fail to settle his Golf did not impose any lien, liability or restriction on the
delinquencies, then totaling P7,525.45, within ten (10) days Golf Share or, for that matter, even any conditionality that
from receipt thereof Valley Golf would exercise its right to the Golf Share would be subject to assessment of monthly
sell the Golf Share to satisfy the outstanding amount, again dues or a lien on the share for non-payment of such
pursuant to the provisions of the by-laws.[8] The final letter, dues.[16] In the same vein, it was opined that since Section
dated 3 May 1987, issued a final deadline until 31 May 98 of the Corporation Code provides that restrictions on
1987 for Caram to settle his account, or otherwise face the transfer of shares should appear in the articles of
sale of the Golf Share to satisfy the claims of Valley incorporation, by-laws and the certificate of stock to be
Golf.[9]The Golf Share was sold at public auction valid and binding on any purchaser in good faith, there was
on 11 June 1987 for P25,000.00 after the Board of Directors more reason to apply the said rule to club delinquencies to
had authorized the sale in a meeting on 11 April 1987, and constitute a lien on golf shares.[17]The SEC hearing officer
the Notice of Auction Sale was published in the 6 June further held that the delinquency in monthly club
1987 edition of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[10]As it dues was merely an ordinary debt enforceable by
turned out, Caram had died on 6 October judicial action in a civil case. The decision generally
1986.Unaware of the pending controversy over the affirmed respondents assertion that Caram was not
Golf Share, the Caram family and the RTC included properly notified of the delinquencies, citing Carams letter
the same as part of Carams estate. The RTC approved dated 7 July 1978 to Valley Golf about the change in his
a project of partition of Carams estate on 29 August 1989. mailing address. He also noted that Valley Golf had sent
most of the letters after Carams death. In all, the decision property, unless otherwise provided in the
concluded that the sale of the Golf Share was effectively a articles of incorporation or the by-
deprivation of property without due process of law. On laws. (Emphasis supplied)
appeal to the SEC en banc,[18] said body promulgated a
decision[19] on 9 May 2000, affirming the hearing officers Clearly, the right of a non-stock corporation such
decision in toto. Valley Golf elevated the SECs decision to as Valley Golf to expel a member through the
the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review.[21] On 4 forfeiture of the Golf Share may be established in
April 2003, the appellate court rendered a the by-laws alone, as is the situation in this case.
decision[22] affirming the decisions of the SEC and the Thus, both the SEC and the appellate court are
hearing officer, with modification consisting of the deletion wrong in holding that the establishment of a lien
of the award of attorneys fees. and the loss of the Golf Share consequent to the
enforcement of the lien should have been provided
ISSUE: May a non-stock corporation seize and dispose of for in the articles of incorporation.
the membership share of a fully-paid member on account of
its unpaid debts to the corporation when it is authorized to Given that the cause for termination of
do so under the corporate by-laws but not by the Articles of membership in a non-stock corporation may be established
Incorporation? through the by-laws alone and need not be set forth in the
articles of incorporation, is there any cause to invalidate the
HELD: As found by the SEC and the Court of Appeals, the lien and the subsequent sale of the Golf Share by Valley
Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not Golf?(YES) Examining closely the relevant by-law
contain any provision authorizing the corporation provisions of Valley Golf,[36] it appears that termination of
to create any lien on a members Golf Share as a membership may occur when the following successive
consequence of the members unpaid assessments conditions are met: (1) presentation of the account of the
or dues to Valley Golf. To bolster its cause, Valley Golf member; (2) failure of the member to settle the account
proffers the proposition that by virtue of the by-law within forty-five days after the cut-off date; (3) posting of
provisions a lien is created on the shares of its members to the member as delinquent; and (4) issuance of an order by
ensure payment of dues, charges and other assessments on the board of directors that the share of the delinquent
the members. Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals member be sold to satisfy the claims of Valley Golf. These
debunked the tenability or applicability of the proposition conditions found in by-laws duly approved by the SEC
through two common thrusts.Firstly, they correctly noted warrant due respect and we are disinclined to rule against
that the procedure under Section 67 of the Corporation the validity of the by-law provisions.The by-laws does
Code for the stock corporations recourse on unpaid not provide for a mode of notice to the member
subscriptions is inapt to a non-stock corporation vis--vis a before the board of directors puts up the Golf Share
members outstanding dues. The basic factual backdrops in for sale, yet the sale marks the termination of
the two situations are disperate. In the latter, the member membership. The by-laws does not require any
has fully paid for his membership share, while in the notice to the member from the time delinquency is
former, the stockholder has not yet fully paid for the share posted to the day the sale of the share is actually
or shares of stock he subscribed to, thereby authorizing the held. The setup is to the extreme detriment to the
stock corporation to call on the unpaid subscription, declare member, who upon being notified that the lien on
the shares delinquent and subject the delinquent shares to a his share is due for execution would be duly
sale at public auction.[33]Secondly, the two bodies below motivated to settle his accounts to foreclose such
concluded that following Section 6 of the Corporation Code, possibility.Does the Corporation Code permit the
the lien on the Golf Share in favor of Valley Golf is not valid, termination of membership without due notice to the
as the power to constitute such a lien should be provided in member? The Code itself is silent on that matter, and the
the articles of incorporation, and not merely in the by- argument can be made that if no notice is provided for in
laws.However, there is a specific provision under the articles of incorporation or in the by-laws, then
the Title XI, on Non-Stock Corporations of the termination may be effected without any notice at
Corporation Code dealing with termination of all. Membership in Valley Golf entails the acquisition of a
membership. Section 91 of the Corporation Code property right. In turn, the loss of such property right could
provides: also involve the application of aspects of civil law, in
addition to the provisions of the Corporation Code. To put it
SEC. 91. Termination of simply, when the loss of membership in a non-stock
membership.Membership shall be corporation also entails the loss of property rights, the
terminated in the manner and for manner of deprivation of such property right should also be
the causes provided in the articles of in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
incorporation or the by-laws.
Termination of membership shall have the With these foregoing concerns in mind, were the
effect of extinguishing all rights of a actions of Valley Golf concerning the Golf Share and
member in the corporation or in its membership of Caram warranted? We believe not. It is
unmistakably wise public policy to require that the pretense that he was still alive could bring into operation
termination of membership in a non-stock Articles Articles 19, 20 and 21 under the Chapter on Human
corporation be done in accordance with substantial Relations of the Civil Code.[46] These provisions enunciate a
justice. No matter how one may precisely define such general obligation under law for every person to act fairly
term, it is evident in this case that the termination of and in good faith towards one another. Non-stock
Carams membership betrayed the dictates of substantial corporations and its officers are not exempt from that
justice. obligation.
Meralco vs. Spouses Ramos

Valley Golf alleges in its present petition that it
was notified of the death of Caram only in March of G.R. No. 195145 February 10, 2016
1990,[43] a claim which is reiterated in its Reply to
FACTS: MERALCO entered into a contract of service with
respondents Comment.[44] Yet this claim is belied by the the Spouses Sulpicio and Patricia Ramos agreeing to supply
very demand letters sent by Valley Golf to Carams mailing the latter with electric power in their residence. It installed
address. The letters dated 25 January 1987 and 7 March the electric meter outside the front wall of the property
1987, both of which were sent within a few months after occupied by Patricia's brother, Isidoro Sales, and his wife,
Carams death are both addressed to Est. of Fermin Z. Nieves Sales (Nieves), located beside the respondents'
Caram, Jr.; and the abbreviation [e]st. can only be taken house.
to refer to estate. This is to be distinguished from the two
earlier letters, both sent prior to Carams death on 6 On November 5, 1999, MERALCO's service inspector
October 1986, which were addressed to Caram himself. inspected the respondents' electrical facilities and found an
Inexplicably, the final letter dated 3 May 1987 was again outside connection attached to their electric meter, an
illegal one. Respondents‘ connection was attached to the
addressed to Caram himself, although the fact that the two
residence and appliances of Nieves. Nieves was the only one
previous letters were directed at the estate of Caram present during the inspection and she was the one who
stands as incontrovertible proof that Valley Golf had signed the Metering Facilities Inspection Report. The
known of Carams death even prior to the auction service inspector disconnected the respondents' electric
sale. Valley Golf acted in clear bad faith when it sent services on the same day. This were done, however, without
the final notice to Caram under the pretense they believed the knowledge of the respondents who were not at home
him to be still alive, when in fact they had very well known and their house was closed at the time.
that he had already died. That it was in the final notice that
Valley Golf had perpetrated the duplicity is especially In denying the illegal activity, the respondents requested
blameworthy, since it was that notice that carried the final MERALCO to immediately reconnect their electric services
threat that his Golf Share would be sold at public auction but MERALCO instead demanded from them the payment
of P179,231.70 as differential billing.
should he fail to settle his account on or before 31 May
1987. The respondents filed a complaint for breach of
contract with preliminary mandatory injunction
Valley Golf could have very well addressed that and damages against MERALCO for the immediate
notice to the estate of Caram, as it had done with the third reconnection of their electric service and the award of
and fourth notices. That it did not do so signifies that Valley actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and
Golf was bent on selling the Golf Share, impervious to litigation expenses. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor
potential complications that would impede its intentions, of the respondent and ordered MERALCO to pay a total
such as the need to pursue the claim before the estate damages of P2,000,000.00 with legal interest and as
proceedings of Caram. By pretending to assume that Caram follows:
was then still alive, Valley Golf would have been able to
capitalize on his previous unresponsiveness to their notices 1. P100,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages;
2. P1,500,000.00 as moral damages;
and proceed in feigned good faith with the sale. Whatever
3. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
the reason Caram was unable to respond to the earlier
4. P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and,
notices, the fact remains that at the time of the final 5. Costs of suit;
notice, Valley Golf knew that Caram, having died
and gone, would not be able to settle the obligation On appeal by MERALCO, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
himself, yet they persisted in sending him notice to RTC's order. The appellate court held that MERALCO failed
provide a color of regularity to the resulting sale. to comply not only with its own contract of service, but also
with the requirements under Sections 4 and 6 of the Anti-
That reason alone, evocative as it is of the absence Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
of substantial justice in the sale of the Golf Share, is Pilferage Act of 1994 (R.A. 7832), when it resorted to the
sufficient to nullify the sale and sustain the rulings immediate disconnection of the respondents' electric
of the SEC and the Court of Appeals.Moreover, the service without due notice. It also ruled that the
utter and appalling bad faith exhibited by Valley Golf in respondents were not liable for the differential billing as it
sending out the final notice to Caram on the deliberate had not been established that they knew or consented to the
illegal connection or even benefited from it. CA denied during the inspection of the respondents' electric meter.
MERALCO‘s motion for reconsideration. Also, it did not claim that the respondents were ever
notified beforehand of the impending disconnection of their
Hence, the instant petition for review oncertiorari. electric service. Therefore, MERALCO had no authority
to immediately disconnect the respondents' electric
MERALCO’s Argument
service and as a result, presumed to be in bad faith
That under R.A. 7832, it had the right and authority to or abuse of right.
immediately disconnect the electric service of the
Differential billing
respondents after they were caught in flagrante delicto
using a tampered electrical installation. By virtue of their The law provides that the person who actually consumed
contract of service, the respondents are liable to pay the the electricity illegally shall be liable for the differential
differential billing regardless of whether the latter benefited billing. It does not ipso facto make liable for payment of the
from the illegal electric service or not. This is true even if differential billing the registered customer whose electrical
the respondents did not personally tamper with the facilities had been tampered with and utilized for the illegal
electrical facilities. use of electricity. While this Court recognizes the right of
MERALCO as a public utility to collect system losses, the
Finally, MERALCO contends that there is no basis for the
courts cannot and will not blindly grant a public utility's
award of damages as the disconnection of the respondents'
claim for differential billing if there is no sufficient evidence
electric service was done in good faith and in the lawful
to prove entitlement. As MERALCO failed to
exercise of its rights as a public utility company.
sufficiently prove its claim for payment of the
The Respondents' Comment differential billing, the respondents cannot be held
liable for the billed amount.
That the discovery of an outside connection attached to
their electric meter does not give MERALCO the right to The disconnection of respondents' electric service
automatically disconnect their electric service as the law is not supported by MERALCO's own Terms and
provides certain mandatory requirements that should be Conditions of Service.MERALCO failed to follow its own
observed before a disconnection could be effected. procedure for the discontinuance of service under its
Respondents contend that MERALCO breached its contract of service with the respondents: Before
contractual obligations when its service inspector disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the
immediately disconnected their electric service without Company may adjust the bill of said customer accordingly
notice. They claim that this breach of contract, coupled with and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may
MERALCO's failure to observe the requirements under R.A. disconnect the same. MERALCO's allegation that the
7832, entitled them to damages which were sufficiently respondents refused to pay the differential billing before the
established with evidence and were rightfully awarded by disconnection of their electric service is an obvious falsity.
the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Thus, MERALCO breached its contract of service with the
respondents as it disconnected the latter's electric service
Lastly, the respondents argue that they are not liable to on November 5, 1999before they were ever notified of the
MERALCO for the differential billing as they were not the differential billing through a letter dated December 4, 1999.
ones who illegally consumed the unbilled electricity through
The records show that MERALCO presented no proof that it
the illegal connection.
ever caught the respondents, or anyone acting in the
ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted in good faith. respondents' behalf, in the act of tampering with their
electric meter. The presence of an outside connection
RULING: NO. attached to the electric meter operates only as a prima facie
evidence of electricity pilferage under R.A. 7832; it is not
R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider enough to declare the respondents in flagrante delicto
to be authorized to disconnect its customer's electric service tampering with the electric meter.In fact, MERALCO itself
on the basis of alleged electricity pilferage: first, an officer admitted in its submissions that Nieves was the illegal user
of the law or an authorized ERB representative must be of the outside connection attached to the respondents'
present during the inspection of the electric facilities; and electric meter.
second, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of
electricity and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto On this point, MERALCO argues that Nieves was an
committing the acts under Section 4(a), the customer must authorized representative of the respondents. However, the
still be given due notice i.e. a written notice or warning records are bereft of any sufficient proof to support this
prior to the disconnection. The Court reiterated that the claim. The fact that she is an occupant of the premises
presence of government agents who may authorize where the electric meter was installed does not make her
immediate disconnections go into the essence of due the respondents' representative considering that the unit
process. occupied by the respondents is separate and distinct from
the one occupied by Nieves and her family. Similarly, the
The records of the case show no proof that MERALCO fact that Nieves was able to show the respondents' latest
complied with the strict requirements under R.A. 7832. electric bill does not make her the latter's authorized
MERALCO never even alleged in its submissions that an representative.
ERB representative or an officer of the law was present
On the issue of damages culpable action.While prevailing jurisprudence deems it
appropriate to award 100,000.00 in moral damages in
With MERALCO in bad faith for its failure to follow the cases where MERALCO wrongfully disconnected electric
strict requirements under R.A. 7832 in the disconnection of service,such amount is not commensurate with the injury
the respondents' electric service, the award of damages is in suffered by the respondents. Thus, in view of the specific
order. However, the Court deemed it proper to modify the circumstances present in this case, the award of moral
award in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. damages is reduced from P1,500,000.00 to
P300,000.00.
First, actual damages pertain to such injuries or losses that
are actually sustained and are susceptible of measurement. Third, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way
They are intended not to enrich the injured party but to put of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
him in the position in which he was in before he was moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages.
injured.In order to recover actual damages, there must be The award of exemplary damages is allowed by law as a
pleading and proof of the damages suffered. To justify an warning to the public and as a deterrent against the
award of actual damages, there must be competent repetition of socially deleterious actions.
proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be
given only to claims which are duly supported by In previous disconnection cases involving MERALCO, the
receipts. Court aptly awarded exemplary damages against
MERALCO to serve as a warning against repeating the same
In this case, Patricia stated that her family's food expenses
actions. While MERALCO insists that R.A. 7832 gives it the
doubled after MERALCO disconnected their electric
right to disconnect the respondents' electric service,
services as they could no longer cook at home. However,
nothing in the records indicates that it attempted to comply
there is no sufficient proof presented to show the actual
with the statutory requirements before effecting the
food expenses that the respondents incurred. Nevertheless,
disconnection. The previous awards against MERALCO
Patricia also testified that they were forced to move to a new
have not served their purpose as a means to prevent the
residence after living without electricity for eight (8)
repetition of the same damaging actions that it has
months at their home. They proved this allegation through
committed in the past. Therefore, the Court increased
the presentation of a contract of lease and receipts for
the award of exemplary damages from
payment of monthly rentals for 42 months amounting to
P300,000.00 to P500,000.00 in the hope that this will
P210,000.00. Thus, the Court found it proper to
persuade MERALCO to be more prudent and responsible in
increase the award of actual damages from
its observance of the requirements under the law in
P100,000.00 to P210,000.00.
disconnecting a customer's electrical supply.
Second, an award of moral damages calls for the
Lastly, in view of the award of exemplary damages, the
presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or
award of attorney's fees is proper, in accordance with
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code. The CA's award of
claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually
attorney's fees in the amount of P100,000.00 just
established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of
and reasonable under the circumstances.
the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages
sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.They may
modifications: MERALCO is ordered to pay respondents
be properly awarded to persons who have been unjustly
Spouses Sulpicio and Patricia Ramos:
deprived of property without due process of law.
1. P210,000.00 as actual damages;
After due consideration of the manner of disconnection of
the respondents' electric service and the length of time that 2. P300,000.00 as moral damages;
the respondents had to endure without electricity, the
award of moral damages in favor of respondents is proper. 3. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
Aside from having to spend eight (8) months in the dark at
their own residence, Patricia testified that they suffered 4. P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. Costs against
extreme social humiliation, embarrassment, and serious MERALCO.
anxiety as they were subjected to gossip in their
ARDIENTE vs. SPOUSES PASTORFIDE, ET AL.
neighborhood of stealing electricity through the use of an
illegal connection. The damage to the respondents' G.R. No. 161921 (2013)
reputation and social standing was aggravated by their
decision to move to a new residence following the absolute FACTS: Joyce Ardiente entered into a
refusal of MERALCO to restore their electric services. Memorandum of Agreement conveying in favor of Ma.
Therese Pastorfide all her rights and interests in a housing
However, the Court finds the award of P1,500,000.00 in unit in Cagayan de Oro. It was agreed that the water and
moral damages to be excessive. Moral damages are not power bill of the property shall be for the account of
intended to enrich the complainant as a penalty for the Pastorfide. For 4 years, Pastorfide‘s use of the water
defendant. It is awarded as a means to ease the moral connection in Ardiente‘s name was never questioned until,
suffering the complainant suffered due to the defendant's without notice, the water connection was cut off despite the
non-arrival of the due date of her payment. In response to a for the government of human relations and for the
letter Pastorfide sent, the Cagayan de Oro Water District maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
(COWD) told her that it was at the instance of Ardiente that for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
the water line was cut off. Hence, Pastorfide and her either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
husband filed a complaint for damages against Ardiente,
COWD, and COWD‘s general manager, Gaspar Gonzalez,
Jr. The water line was only restored 9 months later when
MARSMAN & COMPANY AND QUIRINO R.
the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
ILEDAN v. ARTEMIO M. LIGO
Both the RTC and the CA awarded damages in
favor of the Spouses Pastorfideon the ground thatArdiente G.R. No. 198643 August 19, 2015
and her co-defendants did not act with justice in the
Facts:Petitioner Marsman& Company (now Metro Drug,
exercise of their rights and performance of their duties. The
Inc.) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
appeal filed by COWD and Gonzalez was denied with
finality by the SC. Ardiente, on the other hand, filed the distributing pharmaceutical products. Petitioner Iledan was
present petition, impleading COWD and Gonzalez as Marsman's Warehouse Manager during the time material to
respondents. Ardiente insisted that she should not be held this case. Meanwhile, Respondent Ligo was then Marsman's
liable for the disruption of the water supply as she had no Warehouse Supervisor and was primarily responsible for
participation in its actual disconnection. the destruction of bad order2 and expired drugs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joyce Ardiente is liable for Sometime in 1993, Iledan had received a telephone
damages. informationfrom Isabelito Miguel that some of Marman‘s
bad order and expired drugs were not actually destroyed
HELD: YES. While it was COWD which actually but were sold at the back of the Sto. Nino Church in
discontinued Spouses Pastorfide‘s water supply, it cannot
Parañaque. Iledan relayed this information to Marsman
be denied that it was through the instance of Ardiente that
President Santos. Consequently they sought the assistance
there was a disconnection in the first place. This was
admitted by Ardiente herself and was confirmed by COWD of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in the
and Gonzalez. investigation of the matter. NBI then conducted several
surveillance and on May 7, 1993 it arrested several
It is true that it is withinArdiente's right to ask and individuals who were supposedly caught in the act of
even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of distributing these medicines that should have been
the former's account with COWD to the latter's name destroyed. However, respondent Ligo was not one of them.
pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However,
the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the The following day, petitioner Iledan asked Ligo to
disconnection of the spouses' water supply. The exercise of accompany him to the NBI office on the pretext of visiting
a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it one of the suspects arrested, Francisco Mercado—who is
was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; Ligo‘s colleague at work. Ligo was arrested then and was
there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, placed on a detention cell (for at least 10 days). Thereafter,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In the respondent and other individuals were presented to the
present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of media during a live conference as the suspects in the
Ardiente when she requested for the disconnection of the
distribution and sale of bad order and expired medicines.
water supply without warning or informing the spouses of
Their photographs were taken, and later published, by news
such request. What made matters worse is the fact that
COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior reporters of The Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star, Bulletin,
notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide‘s Taliba, Balita, and Tempo. He was criminally charged with
water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was violation of Republic Act No. 3720 before the MeTC of
clearly an abuse of right on the part of Ardiente, COWD and Taguig—however MeTC acquitted him3. He was charged for
Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith. serious misconduct, breach of trust, and commission of a
crime against Marsman and was thereafter terminated from
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in work.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his The foregoing had prompted Ligo to file a
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe complaint for damages against petitioners Marsman and
honesty and good faith.The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
2Bad order drugs are those that are retrieved from the market for being
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
unfit for human consumption, while expired drugs are those which have
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized reached their expiry date.
or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the 3There was no showing that the accused has sold or was selling much less
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a dispensing the expired medicines because what the witness testified is that
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined he merely saw Ligo transferring the expired drugs from a 10-wheeler truck to
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong a white van. Such transferring is not a crime itself. Also, even arguendo that
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held such transfer was a crime, MeTCTaguig claimed that it has no jurisdiction as
responsible. But while Article 19lays down a rule of conduct the transferring happened in Agono, Rizal.
Iledan before RTC of Las Pinas. Respondent alleged that Issue:whether or not there is malicious prosecution which
petitioners maliciously (1) conspired to frame him and will entitle Ligo for damages
fabricate a criminal charge against him by making it appear
that he feloniously sold, dispensed or delivered expired or Held: Yes, there is malicious prosecution.
bad order medicines; (2) that he was illegally arrested by In this jurisdiction, the term 'malicious
the NBI, (3) humiliated in a press conference, and (4) prosecution' has been defined as 'an action for damages
unlawfully detained for 10 days; (5) he became the object of brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil
embarrassing news reports on radio and television; (6) that suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
he was falsely charged criminally with violation of RA maliciously and without probable cause, after the
3720—to which he was acquitted and (7) illegally dismissed termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding
from employment; (8) that as a result of the frame-up, he in favor of the defendant therein.' While generally
and his family became the object of ridicule in the associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has
community, school and workplace, which thus forced them been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted
to relocate in order to avoid further shame and just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence
embarrassment; and (9) that in a demand letter to of a cause of action or probable cause.
petitioners, he sought restitution, but was ignored. He
claimed that Iledan would have caused the filing of the Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to
fabricated case because he was angry with union members prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following:
as they were organizing a supervisors' union [in] which he
was active. He thus prayed for indemnity in the amount of (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant
P5 million as moral damages, P1 million as exemplary was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its
damages, P50,000.00 as actual damages, 25% of the total commencement;
amount as attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
(2) the criminal action finally ended with an
In their Answer, petitioners insisted that acquittal;
respondent was involved in a scheme of selling expired and
(3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
bad order drugs which he was supposed to destroy. Their
without probable cause; and
modus operandi was subjected to 3 preliminary
surveillances which revealed that the scheduled destruction (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice —
of medicines through burning did not take place, and that an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of
respondent left the site without supervising the complete malicious prosecution is not the filing of a
destruction of the medicines, while his cohorts transferred complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but
the medicines from the company truck to another vehicle the deliberate initiation of an action with the
and the next day, May 8, 1993, respondent reported for knowledge that the charges were false and
work and submitted a false Certificate of Destruction stating groundless.
that all medicines scheduled for destruction the day before
were destroyed.By way of counterclaim, petitioners prayed First Element: There is no doubt that Marsman
to be awarded P10 million as moral damages; PI million as instigated the investigation and prosecution of respondent
exemplary damages; and P250,000.00 as attorney's fees and his colleagues. Petitioners cannot claim that they
and litigation expenses. merely sought to investigate - and not prosecute -
respondent; certainly, prosecution follows as a necessary
RTC decided in favor of Ligo and because herein consequence if the NBI believes that a crime has been
petitioners had maliciously prosecuted Ligo they are committed, and petitioners cannot prevent the filing of
solidary liable to pay 3M as moral damages; 500K as charges, even if they wanted to. As correctly observed by the
exemplary and 25% of the total amount awarded to plaintiff appellate court, if indeed petitioners simply sought to
as attorney's fees and pay the cost of the suit. CA affirmed in investigate and not prosecute respondent, they should have
toto RTC‘s decision. Hence this petition on the ground that first conducted their own internal investigation of the
not all the elements of malicious prosecution were matter instead of immediately referring the case to the NBI;
established4. the option to prosecute may be exercised later. In fact, this
should have been the case; nothing prevented them from
fielding confidential personnel to pose as buyers of these
bad medicines they believe were being sold in Parañaque.
4In connection with the first requisite, petitioners contend that they did not
act as prosecutors, nor did they commence the criminal case against
Their so-called informant Miguel - if he actually existed -
respondent; that it was the NBI that investigated and caused the filing of could have produced more than a simple telephone report.
Criminal Case and their role was limited to requesting the NBI's assistance in
investigating the respondent's alleged pilferage of bad medicines. Relative to
the second element, petitioners insist that they acted with probable cause in
seeking the investigation of respondent and his colleagues, based on the tip was probable cause to charge respondent, then this is tantamount to
provided by Miguel that bad medicines were being sold in Parañaque. On the absence of malice. Moreover, good faith is presumed in the absence of clear
third element, or the issue of legal malice, petitioners argue that since there and convincing evidence of malice.
Second Element: Respondent was acquitted in investigative and prosecutorial process that resulted in a
the resulting criminal case - Criminal Case No. 9070 - for bungled, crackpot operation and the inevitable acquittal of
lack of evidence and lack of jurisdiction, through an October the respondent. If petitioners and the NBI were prudent
12, 1994 Order of the Taguig City Metropolitan Trial Court. and clever enough, they would have taken the surveillance
operations all the way to the point where the bad medicines
Third Element: On the question of probable were being actually sold to the public, before any arrests
cause,it must be said that against the respondent, no were made; instead, their half-baked and poorly planned
probable cause existed to warrant his prosecution for operation yielded nothing to build a case on.
violation of the provisions of RA 3720. There is no legal
ground to suppose that respondent was involved in a There is an absolute lack of strict protocol and
syndicate which sold Marsman's bad medicines in procedure in the disposal of bad medicines. There is no
Parañaque; the supposed tipster Miguel was not presented controlled environment for the complete destruction of
in court to identify the alleged perpetrators of the illegal act these potentially harmful chemicals: they are simply
- hence, the basis for the accusation is lacking. Although brought to a vacant lot or open space - where scavengers
informants are usually not presented in court because of the gather and ogle, hoping to salvage something from the pile
need to hide their identity and maintain their valuable of hazardous substances - or private residential or
service to the police, this rule cannot apply in Miguel's case commercial lot, there to be burned without regard for the
because he was not a confidential informant; his identity health and safety of bystanders and residents. The bad
was precisely divulged. medicines are burned openly and the fumes allowed to
escape freely, contaminating the environment, wreaking
Likewise, there is no evidence to prove that havoc and causing unimaginable damage and deadly
respondent was involved in or committed any act violative disease; worse, the resultant chemical reactions caused by
of RA 3720. He was not even part of the group that was burning - which have permanent effects on the soil,
arrested by the NBI on May 7, 1993; he was arrested and groundwater, and all animal life in general - are of no
detained - illegally, in fact - only the next day. Quite the concern to petitioners. The destruction is carried out and
contrary, the evidence indicates that on May 7, 1993, witnessed by lowly employees of Marsman - bereft of
respondent was with the BIR representative Rotoni and proper accountability and training — and whose attention is
Duncan Pharmaceuticals employee Ferrer the whole time. distracted as they must simultaneously attend to the
Rotoni testified as well that on that day, all the bad personal needs of the BIR and pharmaceutical company
medicines were placed in a single pile, poured with representatives, feed them and men drive them home.The
gasoline, and burned, and nothing was left in the 10- warehouse head Iledan, all the while, simply sits idly in his
wheeler truck and van that brought the bad medicines to comfortable office, there to conveniently await the return of
the destruction site; this he made sure before he left - only his supervisor. It is as if Marsman actually encourages the
that he, Ferrer and respondent left without making sure pilferage of bad medicines. If any such pilferage occurs,
that all the bad medicines in the pile were completely Marsman and its officials should be prosecuted together
destroyed. Nonetheless, if anything was recovered from the with the perpetrators; indeed, Marsman should be held
burning pile after Rotoni and respondent left, respondent responsible for downright negligence in failing to carry out
did not actually participate in the recovery as he had to take strict procedure for the disposal of its bad medicines, which
Rotoni and Ferrer home. promotes permanent environmental damage and the
Moreover, if it is true that the NBI recovered bad introduction of these harmful products to the public at
medicines from respondent's colleagues on May 7, 1993 large.
when they were arrested, this does not appear to constitute Fourth Element: On the issue of legal malice,
a violation of RA 3720: according to Mercado, the bottled the Court notes respondent's complaint which specifically
bad medicines could not be burned in the pile because they alleged that when Iledan assumed his position as
would explode - which is true as a matter of experience -and warehouse manager, he was arrogant and hostile toward
thus, they had to be brought to a location in Taguig where the employees and even manifested his desire to replace
their contents would be emptied, destroyed and the bottles respondent and other employees of the respondent's
recovered and given to the helpers as compensation, in warehouse. Respondent testified particularly that Iledan did
accordance with accepted practice sanctioned by the not relish his attempt in 1992 at establishing a supervisors'
petitioners. However, before they could get to the said union, and that Iledan was angry at union members.
location, they were intercepted and arrested by the NBI.In Mercado corroborated this, testifying that in December
short, while Marsman officials confined themselves to their 1992, he invited Iledan and his family to their house for
secure and relaxed offices, they simply relied on Iledan's dinner, where Iledan became intoxicated and said "Kayong
claim that he received a tip from a so-called informant and mga unionista, ida-down kokayonglahatsa warehouse;"
did not even lift a finger to verify the truth of allegations that was "mad with the unionista and those in the
that their bad medicines were being peddled in Parañaque. warehouse;" that union members like him will not stay long
On the strength of a questionable and unreliable third party because Iledan will file cases against them; that Iledan will
tip - by telephone at that, petitioners set into motion an terminate him from the service; that Iledan was not able to
say anything more as his wife - Malou, whom he knew - Gen. de Villa‘s letter-complaint was referred for preliminary
persuaded him to leave because what he was doing was inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors
wrong; and that he reported the incident to the union created pursuant to DOJ Order No. 5. Petitioner then
president, which prompted the union to send a letter to Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe, found
Iledan. For his part, Iledan affirmed that he and his family sufficient basis to continue the inquiry, issued a subpoena
attended the December 1992 dinner at Mercado's home, but to the individuals named in the letter-complaint, Adaza
simply denied that he was intoxicated and made the remark included, and assigned the case for preliminary
about targeting union members. He did not present his wife investigation to a panel of investigators composed of
to testify in his favor; nor did he refute the letter sent to him prosecutors George Arizala, as Chairman, and Ferdinand
by the union pertaining to the December 1992 incident.As Abesamis and Cesar Solis as members.
against Iledan's denial, respondent's declarations and
Mercado's testimony deserve weight. The panel released its findings that there is probable cause
to hold respondents for trial for the crime of REBELLION
As to the awards of damages
WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Hence
SC had affirmed in toto the awards for damages recommend the filing of the corresponding information
granted by CA. The award of moral damages is proper against them in court.The Resolution became the basis for
when the following circumstances concur: (1) there is an the filing of information, charging private respondent with
injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder
sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or before the RTC QC, with no recommendation as to bail.
omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the RTC QC: Private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages, charging petitioners with engaging in a deliberate,
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him
2219.Exemplary damages are awarded in addition to a charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated
moral damages if the basis for the latter was established. It murder when petitioners.
must be shown that the party acted in a wanton, oppressive
or malevolent manner for the award of exemplary damages Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Adazas complaint on
to be proper.The discretion of the court to award the ground that said complaint states no actionable wrong
attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code constituting a valid cause of action against
demands factual, legal, and equitable justification, without petitioners.Public Respondent Judge denied petitioners
which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis Motion to Dismiss. Petitioners moved for reconsideration,
being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In all but respondent Judge likewise denied the same. The
events, the court must state the reason for the award of subsequent Order reiterated that petitioners file their
attorney's fees. responsive pleading within the prescribed reglementary
period.
Albenson Ent. Corp. vs. CA
CA: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,

G.R. No. 107019. March 20, 1997
against respondent judge‘s ruling statingthat sufficient
cause of action exists to warrant a full-blown hearing of the
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, case filed by Adaza and thus denying petitioners Motion to
GREGORIO A. ARIZALA, CESAR M. SOLIS and Dismiss. The court dismissed the petition for lack of merit
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, vs. COURT OF and ordered respondent Judge to proceed with the trial. MR
APPEALS, HON. GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, in his was denied.
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 100 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and
SC: Dismissed the petition for failure to comply the
HOMOBONO ADAZA. HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
requirement on the payment of the prescribed docketing
fees. Thereafter, the petition was reinstated and the court
FACTS:General Renato de Villa, who was then the Chief of required the respondents to comment on the aforesaid
Staff of the AFP, requested the DOJ to order the petition. In the same Resolution, a TRO was issued,
investigation of several individuals, including herein private enjoining respondent Judge from further proceeding with
respondent Adaza, for their alleged participation in the the case until further orders from the Court.
failed December 1989 coup detat. The letter-complaint was
based on the affidavit of Brigadier General Alejandro
Galido, Captain OscarlitoMapalo, Colonel Juan Mamorno,
Colonel Hernani Figueroa and Major Eduardo Sebastian.
ISSUE: WON the claim before the trial court was merely a complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to state a
suit for damages based on tort and not a suit for malicious cause of action under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised
prosecution? Rules of Court.
RULING: YES. The term malicious prosecution has been There is nothing in the records, which shows, and the
defined in various ways. In American jurisdiction, it is complaint do not allege, that Criminal Case No. Q-90-
defined as:One begun in malice without probable cause to 11855, filed by the petitioners against respondent Adaza for
believe the charges can be sustained (Eustace v. Dechter, Rebellion with Murder and Frustrated Murder, has been
28 Cal. App. 2d. 706,83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with finally terminated and therein accused Adaza acquitted of
intention of injuring defendant and without probable the charge. Not even Adaza himself, thru counsel, makes
cause, and which terminates in favor of the person any positive asseveration on this aspect that would establish
prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called his acquittal.
the action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29
S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264; Eggettv. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 The complaint likewise does not make any allegation that
Wis. 625). the prosecution acted without probable cause in filing the
criminal information for rebellion with murder and
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:An action frustrated murder. Elementarily defined, probable cause
for damages brought by one against whom a criminal is the existence of such facts and circumstances as
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is well
the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously
for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v. instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable
Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956). cause. Elsewise stated, a suit for malicious prosecution
would lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule
malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the is that it would be a very great discouragement to public
New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of
particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their
2219 (8).To constitute malicious prosecution, however, indictment miscarried.
there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his the Court applied it in 1956 during the communist-inspired
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the
act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Thus, all-embracing applicability of the doctrine considering the
in order for a malicious prosecution suit to emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the
prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3) duly-constituted Government not contemplated in Articles
elements: 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent
effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law
(1) the fact of the prosecution and the further then, but there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine
fact that the defendant was himself the that needs clarification.
prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; Apparently, not even the Supreme Court then was of one
mind in debunking the theory being advanced by the
(2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor petitioners in this case, some of which were also the
acted without probable cause; and petitioners in the Enrile case. Nevertheless, it was held in
Enrilethat the Information filed therein properly charged
an offense -- that of simple rebellion --and thereupon
(3) that the prosecutor was actuated or
ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for the
impelled by legal malice, that is by improper
prosecution of the named accused in the Information.
or sinister motive.All these requisites must
Following this lead, the Information against Adaza in
concur.
Criminmal Case No. Q-90-11855 was not quashed, but was
instead treated likewise as charging the crime of simple
Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza rebellion.
against the herein petitioners, none of the foregoing
requisites have been alleged therein, thus rendering the
A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis 31, 1992 and September 2, 1992 affirming the February 8,
of good faith and, in this regard, the law always accords to 1991 and May 14, 1991 Orders of respondent Judge George
public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity C. Macli-ing are all hereby NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.
in the performance of official duties.Any person who seeks Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to take no further action
to establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith on Civil Case No. Q-90-6073 except to DISMISS the
or ill-motive. Here, since the petitioners were of the honest same.SO ORDERED.
conviction that there was probable cause to hold
respondent Adaza for trial for the crime of rebellion with Wassmer vs. Velez
murder and frustrated murder, and since Adaza himself,
through counsel, did not allege in his complaint lack of
probable cause, we find that the petitioners cannot be held
liable for malicious prosecution. Needless to say, probable Republic vs. Lacap
cause was not wanting in the institution of Criminal Case Facts District Engineer of Pampanga offered an invitation
No. Q-90-11855 against Adaza. to bid for a project. The respondent won the bidding since it
was a lowest bidder and was awarded the contract for
It was evident that petitioners were not motivated by concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Accordingly, respondent
malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass undertook the works, made advances for the purchase of
private respondent, but only by a well-founded belief that the materials and payment for labor costs.
respondent Adaza can be held for trial for the crime alleged
in the information. After the project was completed, respondent
sought to collect payment for the completed project. The
DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of
All told, the complaint filed by Adaza before Branch 100 of
petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld payment from
the Regional Trial Court against the petitioners does not
respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on
allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the
malicious prosecution. Lack of cause of action, as a ground
ground that the contractor‘s license of respondent had
for a motion to dismiss under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the
expired at the time of the execution of the contract. The
Revised Rules of Court, must appear on the face of the
District Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal
complaint itself, meaning that it must be determined from
Department on whether the contracts of Carwin
the allegations of the complaint and from none other.
Construction for various Mount Pinatubo rehabilitation
projects were valid and effective although its contractor‘s
The ordinary procedure, as a general rule, is that petitioners license had already expired when the projects were
should have filed an answer, go to trial, and if the decision contracted.
is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal.This general rule,
however, is subject to certain exceptions, among which are, Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the DPWH Legal
if the court denying the motion to dismiss acts without or in Department opined that since Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A.
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in No. 4566), otherwise known as the Contractor‘s License
which case certiorari under Rule 65 may be availed of. The Law, does not provide that a contract entered into after the
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendants license has expired is void and there is no law which
(petitioners in this case) to undergo the ordeal and expense expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the
of trial under such circumstances, because the remedy of contract is enforceable and payment may be paid, without
appeal then would then not be plain and adequate.Judge prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action
Macli-ing committed grave abuse of discretion in denying that may be imposed on the contractor and the government
petitioners motion to dismiss the Adaza complaint, and officials or employees concerned.
thus public respondent Court of Appeals should have issued
the writ of certiorari prayed for by the petitioners and the District Engineer requested clarification from
annulled the February 8, 1991 and May 14, 1991 Orders of the DPWH Legal Department on whether Carwin
respondent Judge. It was grievous error on the part of the Construction should be paid for works accomplished
court a quo not to have done so. This has to be corrected. despite an expired contractor‘s license at the time the
Respondent Adazas baseless action cannot be sustained for contracts were executed.
this would unjustly compel the petitioners to needlessly go
Cesar D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal
through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden the
Department, recommended that payment should be made
court with one more futile and inconsequential case.
to Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal
opinion.13 Despite such recommendation for payment, no
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: payment was made to respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent filed the complaint for Specific
Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated January Performance and Damages against petitioner before the
RTC.
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor an administrative nature is to be or can be done.36 The issue
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on does not require technical knowledge and experience but
the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and one that would involve the interpretation and application of
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the law.
action since respondent did not appeal to the COA the
decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim. **The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does
(non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts
doctrine of non-suability of the State.) entered into by a contractor whose license had already
expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment
ISSUE: of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be
paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however,
WON there is a failure to exhaust administrative
is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed
remedies.
under the law.
WON expiration of its license does not entitle the
respondent of payment for the project **Besides, Article 22 of the Civil Code which
embodies the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode
HELD: the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative debetlecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of
remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, another‘s injury) states:
which are based on sound public policy and practical
considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the comes into possession of something at the expense of the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay him.
or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively This article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code
small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) on Human Relations, the provisions of which were
where the question involved is purely legal and will formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;32 (f) rightful relationship between human beings and for the
where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its stability of the social order, x xx designed to indicate certain
application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x
where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when xx guides human conduct [that] should run as golden
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has threads through society to the end that law may approach
been rendered moot;33 (j) when there is no other plain, its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public justice."43 The rules thereon apply equally well to the
interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto Government.44 Since respondent had rendered services to
the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the
proceedings.34 Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the
former should be compensated for them. To allow
present case.
petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner
Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is
Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment not allowed by law.
to a contractor with an expired contractor‘s license is
proper, respondent remained unpaid for the completed G.R. Nos. 147925-26 June 8, 2009
work despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was
unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name
prejudice of respondent. and style EDISON DEVELOPMENT
&CONSTRUCTION,Petitioner,
Furthermore, whether a contractor with an expired vs.
license at the time of the execution of its contract is entitled PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and the
to be paid for completed projects, clearly is a pure question HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
of law. It does not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a Facts: Respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA) was
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to designated as project manager by the Bases Conversion
what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the Development Authority (BCDA), primarily tasked to
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.35Said question at best develop its demilitarized lot in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City
could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative into a first-class memorial park to be known as Heritage
authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with Park. PEA then engaged the services of Makati
them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of
Development Corporation (MDC) to undertake the
administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of
horizontal works on the project; and Uy, doing business
under the name and style Edison Development and costs of the additional hauling distance of topsoil, and of the
Construction (EDC), to do the landscaping. mobilization ofwater trucks.
EDC undertook to complete the landscaping works REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE
in four hundred fifty (450) days commencing on the date of DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
receipt of the notice to proceed. HIGHWAYS, Petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS
and ROSARIO RODRIGUEZ REYES, Respondents.
EDC received the notice to proceed on December 3,
1996; and three (3) days after, or on December 6, 1996, it G.R. No. 160379 ,August 14, 2009
commenced the mobilization of the equipment and
manpower needed for the project. PEA, however, could not Facts: Private respondent Rosario Rodriguez Reyes is the
deliver any work area to EDC because the horizontal works absolute owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot 849-B
of MDC were still ongoing. EDC commenced the and covered by TCT No. T-7194. The lot is situated on Claro
landscaping works only on January 7, 1997 when PEA M. Recto and Osmeña Streets, Cagayan de Oro City.
finally made an initial delivery of a work area. Private respondent received a letter from petitioner
PEA continuously incurred delay in the turnover of Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
work areas. In view of the delay in the delivery of work area, Public Works and Highways (DPWH), requesting
EDC claimed additional cost from the PEA-PMO. The PEA- permission to enter into a portion of private respondent‘s
PMO evaluated the EDC‘s claim and arrived at a lesser lot consisting of 663 square meters, and to begin
amount. The evaluation of PEA-PMO was then referred to construction of the Osmeña Street extension road.
the Heritage Park Executive Committee (ExCom) for Petitioner took possession of private respondent‘s property
approval. The Performance Audit Committee (PAC) without initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently,
reviewed the progress report submitted by the works private respondent sent letters to the DPWH stating her
engineer and noted that the EDC‘s landscaping works were objection to the taking of her property. Private respondent
behind schedule by twenty percent (20%). The PAC sent a letter to the City Appraisal Committee (CAC)
considered this delay unreasonable and intolerable, and rejecting the latter‘s appraisal of the subject property but
immediately recommended to BCDA the termination of the said request was denied.
landscaping contract. The BCDA adopted PAC‘s Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
recommendation and demanded from PEA the termination (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City a complaint claiming just
of the contract with EDC. In compliance, PEA terminated compensation and damages against petitioner. The RTC
the agreement. appointed three commissioners to determine the subject
PEA fully paid all the progress billings up to August property‘s fair market value, as well as the consequential
26, 1999, but it did not heed EDC‘s additional claims. benefits and damages of its expropriation.RTC ordered the
Consequently, Uy filed a Complaint with the Construction commissioners to submit their report as soon as possible,
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). CIAC rendered but until the scheduled hearing, the commissioners still
judgment in favor of Uy. failed to submit their report. Upon motion of private
respondent, the RTC issued an order appointing a new set
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA for of commissioners. The new commissioners submitted their
correct of the computation. CA dismissed. report,
Issue: WON CA erred in denying certain claims of UY In effect, what has been taken over and used by the
defendant is not only 663 square meters but 746 square
Held: The principle of unjust enrichment cannot be meters, more or less, which includes Lot No. 849-B-1.On
validlyinvoked by a contractor who, through his own act or the other hand, the remaining portion left to the plaintiff,
omission, took the risk of being deniedpayment for Lot No. 849-B-3 will not actually be 297 square meters. If
additional costs by not giving the owner prior notice of such we deduct the setback area from Osmeña Extension Street,
costs and/or by notsecuring the latter‘s written consent the usable/buildable area left to the plaintiff would only be
thereto, as required by law and their contract.—Neithercan a little over 50 square meters. This portion would not
we hold PEA liable based on solutioindebiti, the legal command a good price if sold. Neither is it ideal for
maxim that no one should enrichitself at the expense of purposes of any building construction because aside from
another. As we explained in PowtonConglomerate, Inc. v. its being a very small strip of land, the shape is triangular.
Agcolicol (400SCRA 523 [2003]) the principle of unjust
enrichment cannot be validly invoked by therespondent The RTC declared the private respondent having the right
who, through his own act or omission, took the risk of being to retain 590 square meters of the property covered by TCT
denied payment foradditional costs by not giving the No. T-7194, and ordering the latter to return 293
petitioners prior notice of such costs and/or by not square meters of the 746 square meters taken; that
securingtheir written consent thereto, as required by law defendants are solidarily liable to pay the sum of
and their contract. Uy cannot, therefore, claimfrom PEA the ₱4,696,000.00, the fair market value of 1990 (sic), as just
compensation for the 453 square meters taken for the consequential damages the consequential benefits to be
Osmeña Street extension; to pay ₱185,000.00 representing derived by the owner from the public use or purpose of the
damages for 37 months computed at the rate of ₱5,000.00 property taken, the operation of its franchise by the
per month from the filing of this case. corporation or the carrying on of the business of the
corporation or person taking the property. But in no case
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the
judgment, affirming with modifications the decision of the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived
RTC. The Court of Appeals found that the commissioners‘ of the actual value of his property so taken.
recommendations on just compensation were not
supported by valid documents. Also, it was unclear in the
RTC decision whether the trial court merely adopted the
commissioners‘ recommendations or the court made its An award of consequential damages for property not taken
own independent valuation of the subject property. Thus, is not tantamount to unjust enrichment of the property
the Court of Appeals held that a reconvening of the owner. There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly
commissioners or an appointment of new commissioners to retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
determine just compensation was necessary. The appellate retains money or property of another against the
court further held that the trial court‘s order for petitioner‘s fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
return of the 293-square meter lot had no legal basis and conscience." Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that
was no longer feasible since the lot was already part of the "every person who through an act of performance
completed Sergio Osmeña extension road. Moreover, by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
consequential damages should be awarded in lieu of actual into possession of something at the expense of the
damages for private respondent‘s alleged loss of income latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
from the remaining 297-square meter lot. same to him." The principle of unjust enrichment under
Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
Issue: Whether or not no consequential damages may be benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
awarded as the remaining lot was "not actually taken" by such benefit is derived at another‘s expense or damage.
the DPWH, and to award consequential damages for the lot There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will
which was retained by the owner is tantamount to unjust benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.
enrichment on the part of the latter.
As stated, consequential damages are awarded if as a result
Held: We find the appeal unmeritorious. of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. Thus,
No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real there is a valid basis for the grant of consequential damages
property is necessary to grant consequential damages. If as to the property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result
a result of the expropriation made by petitioner, the therefrom.
remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of private
respondent suffers from an impairment or decrease in Zenaida Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, Sansio
value, consequential damages may be awarded to private Philippines, Inc. and Emma J. Datuin
respondent. On the other hand, if the expropriation results 599 SCRA 594
to benefits to the remaining lot of private respondent, these
consequential benefits may be deducted from the awarded FACTS: Emma Datuin, OIC of the Accounts Receivables
consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of Department and upon authority of Sansio Philippines, Inc.
the expropriated property. We held in B.H. Berkenkotter & filed an Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against Zenaida Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino, as
Co. v. Court of Appeals that:
proprietors of Alvi Marketing. Datuin and Sansio claimed
that Gregorio delivered insufficiently funded bank checks as
payment for numerous appliances Alvi Marketing bought
To determine just compensation, the trial court should first from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was
ascertain the market value of the property, to which should incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges
be added the consequential damages after deducting against her. Gregorio was then indicted for 3 counts of
therefrom the consequential benefits which may arise from violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MeTC of Manila. The
the expropriation. If the consequential benefits exceed the MeTC issued a warrant of arrest and and it was served upon
her by the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and
consequential damages, these items should be disregarded
Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of
altogether as the basic value of the property should be paid
Interior and Local Government (DILG) in Quezon City
in every case. while she was visiting her family at their city residence.
Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she
was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots and was
provides:
detained. She was released in the afternoon of the same day
The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages when her husband posted a bond for her temporary liberty.
to the property not taken and deduct from such
Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion for Deferment of between Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio
Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act
have a checking account with the bank on which the checks or omission of its employee Datuin.
were drawn. This was certified by the branch manager of
the Philippine National Bank, Sorsogon Branch. Gregorio These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently
also alleged that the signature on the bounced checks were constituted a cause of action against Sansio and Datuin.
radically and patently different from her own signature. The Thus, the RTC was correct when it denied respondents
MeTC granted the motion, and a reinvestigation was motion to dismiss.
conducted. In the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin
submitted an Affidavit of Desistance, stating, among others, Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that
that Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced Gregorio‘s complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In
checks subject of prosecution. Subsequently, the MeTC an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it
ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed. must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin
were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately
Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the
Datuin before the RTCof Ligao, Albay. Part of her complaint charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and
was that as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, humiliate her. As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not
she suffered helplessness, hunger and humiliation and allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact that she
being distraught. Datuin and Sansio filed a Motion to prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her
Dismiss on grounds that Gregorio‘s complaint arose from action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the
grounds of compensation arising from malicious mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral damages,
prosecution. The RTC denied this Motion to Dismiss. considering that she suffered physical suffering, mental
Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for Reconsideration anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
but was again denied. They went to the CA alleging grave wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on
abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
RTC in denying their motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration.The CA rendered a Decision granting the Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right when she
petition and ordering Gregorio‘s damage suit to be instituted against Sansio and Datuin an action she
dismissed. perceived to be proper, given the factual antecedents of the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sansio and Datuin areliable for
damages JOSE ZULUETA, vs NICANOR NICOLAS in his
capacity as Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
HELD: Yes. A scrutiny of Gregorio‘s civil complaint
reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the FACTS:Plaintiff Zulueta instituted an action on May 19,
elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil 1954 against the defendant provincial fiscal of Rizal to
Code. It appears that Gregorio‘s rights to personal dignity, recover moral pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000.
personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were The complaint alleges that the defendant fiscal conducted
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise an investigation of a complaint for libel filed by Zulueta
the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff
person they should rightfully accuse of tendering members of the Philippine Free Press; that after said
insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded investigation the fiscal "rendered an opinion" that there was
when they failed to ascertain the correct address of no prima facie case; that the alleged libelous statements
petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to
were made in good faith and for the sole purpose of serving
controvert the charges, because she was not given proper
the best interest of the public; and that in consequence the
notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges
against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for 3 counts of fiscal absolved the said governor and the Free Press staff
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at from the crime of libel.
No. 76 Pearanda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi
ISSUE: WON Zulueta‘s complaint against Nicolas states a
Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was
cause of action.
conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-
DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon HELD: The action is based on article 27 of the new Civil
City, while visiting her family. Code, which provides that "any person suffering material or
moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her
sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, neglects without just cause, to perform his official duty may
effort and money to clear her tarnished name and file an action for damages and other relief against the latter.
reputation, considering that she had held several honorable But this article,‖contemplates a refusal or neglect without
positions in different organizations and offices in the public just cause by a public servant or employee to perform his
service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at official duty." Refusal of the fiscal to prosecute when after
the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation the investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case is not a refusal, without just cause, to That sometime in November 2000, [respondent]
perform an official duty. discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar
But it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after the design, same material and colors but was selling these
investigation he has become convinced that the evidence products at a lower price as [respondent‘s] plastic-made
available is not enough to establish a prima facie case. The automotive parts and to the same customers.
Fiscal is vested with authority and discretion to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of Respondent alleged that it had originated the use
of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of
corresponding the information and having control of the
automotive under chassis parts such as spring eye bushing,
prosecution of a criminal case.Having legal cause to refrain
stabilizer bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing
from filing an information against the person whom the cushions, among others. [Petitioner‘s] manufacture of the
herein plaintiff wants him to charge with libel, the same automotive parts with plastic material was taken from
defendant fiscal cannot be said to have refused or neglected respondent‘s idea of using plastic for automotive parts.
without just cause to perform his official duty. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent‘s]
products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is
As a general rule, a public prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms of
personally liable for resulting injuries when acting within lost and unrealized profits in the amount of 2,000,000 as of
the scope of his authority, and in the line of his official duty the date of respondent‘s complaint.
ISSUE/s: 1. Whether or not there is unfair competition
Nor are officers or agents of the Government under human relations.
charged with the performance of governmental
duties which are in their nature legislative, or
quasi-judicial, liable for the consequences of their RULING:1. YES. Petitioner is guilty of unfair competition
official acts, unless it be shown that they act under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
willfully and maliciously, and with the express
purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff. In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it
must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts
Willaware Products Corp. vs. Jesichris
which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or
Manufacturing "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair the language of our law, these include force, intimidation,
competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.
of action by the person who thereby suffers damage." First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both
being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive
FACTS: Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to
filed this present complaint for damages for unfair good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed
competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin respondent‘s former employees, deliberately copied respondent‘s
Willaware Products Corporation the petitioner from products and even went to the extent of selling these products to
manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive respondent‘s customers.
parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The
respondent, alleged that it is a duly registered partnership Thus, it is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his business
metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive
Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration in parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to transfer to his
1992, Jesichris Manufacturing Company has been employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.
manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing
throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive Coca Cola Bottlers Phils. Vs. Spouses Bernardo
parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the other hand,
which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS FORTUNE
near that of the Jesichris Manufacturing Company. TOBACCO CORPORATION
Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
proximity of petitioner‘s office to respondent‘s office, and in
view of the fact that some of the respondent‘s employees FACTS: LiwaywayVinzons-Chato (Vinzons-Chato) was
had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while Fortune
familiarity with respondent‘s products, especially its plastic- Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the
made automotive parts.
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which deals specifically with the public officers‘ violation of
are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. constitutional rights, is a special provision which should
determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or
On 1993, The legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA not.
7654). Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‗Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected ISSUE:
to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, two
days before RA 7654 took effect, Vinzons-Chato issued RMC (1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her
37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as private capacity for acts done in connection with
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand the discharge of the functions of his/her
subjectto the 55% ad valorem tax. office?(YES)
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code
Fortune Tobacco filed a motion for reconsideration and Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code
requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a should govern in determining whether the instant
letter. The same letter assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad complaint states a cause of action?(ART. 32 NCC)
valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00
(computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded RULING: PETITION DENIED.
payment within 10 days from receipt thereof. Fortune
Tobacco filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), whichissued an injunction enjoining the 1. YES. As a general rule, a public officer is not liable for
implementation of RMC 37-93. The CTA ruled that RMC damages which a person may suffer arising from the just
37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further performance of his official duties and within the scope of
enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax his assigned tasks.An officer who acts within his authority
assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this not liable for damages that may have been caused to
Court. another, as it would virtually be a charge against the
Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by
On 1997,Fortune Tobacco filed before the RTC a law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity
complaintfor damages against Vinzons-Chatoin her private for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of
capacity. Fortune Tobacco contended that the Vinzons- his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of
Chato should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of immunity for official actions.
the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative
protection of the laws. Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil
Vinzons-Chato filed a motion to dismiss but the court liability may arise where the subordinate public officer‘s act
deniedand ruled in favour of Fortune Tobacco. Upon is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus –
Appeal to CA via Rule 65, the same was dismissed on the
ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may
arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad Sec. 38.Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A
faith.Hence, this petition. public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done
in the performance of his official duties, unless
there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or
Vinzons-Chato filed the instant recourse contending that gross negligence.
the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of x xxx
her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Section 39.Liability of Subordinate Officers.
Book I of the Administrative Code which should be applied. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be
She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in
32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of the performance of his duties. However, he shall be
constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of liable for willful or negligent acts done by him
public officers; while Section 38, Book I of the which are contrary to law, morals, public policy
Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public and good customs even if he acts under orders or
officers‘ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instructions of his superior.
instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a
cause of action. In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly
Conversely, Fortune Tobacco argued that Section 38 which sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if
treats in general the public officers‘ "acts" from which civil his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may which the motive of the defendant has been rendered
be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
the course of the performance of the functions of the office, otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer,
where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of
constitutional right of the plaintiff. an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is
otherwise an invasion of another‘s legal right; that is,
2. ART. 32 NCC.A general statute is one which embraces a liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant
class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or acted without evil intent.
place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as
the term is generally understood, is one which relates to The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create
particular persons or things of a class or to a particular a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of
portion or section of the state only.A general law and a constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of
special law on the same subject are statutes in parimateria the defendant.
and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized,
if possible, with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is In Aberca v. Ver, it was held that with the enactment of
that where there are two acts, one of which is special and Article 32, the principle of accountability of public officials
particular and the other general which, if standing alone, under the Constitution acquires added meaning and
would include the same matter and thus conflict with the assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior
special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise
legislative intent more clearly than that of a general statute his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not
and must not be taken as intended to affect the more have to answer for the transgressions committed by the
particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it latter against the constitutionally protected rights and
is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to give its liberties of the citizen. While it would certainly be too naive
words any meaning at all. to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that
after the general act does not change the principle. Where Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the
to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the transgression, joint tortfeasors.
general act is later, the special statute will be construed as
remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the
expressly or by necessary implication. Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability
of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in
Article 32 of the Civil Code provides: the performance of their duties. For both superior and
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith,
private individual, who directly or indirectly malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make
obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and deal in particular with the liability of government officials,
liberties of another person shall be liable to the the subject thereof is general, i.e.,"acts" done in the
latter for damages: performance of official duties, without specifying the action
x xxx or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the
(6) The right against deprivation of property official concerned.
without due process of law;
x xxx Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may
x xxx give rise to an action for damages against a public officer,
and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are
Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code.
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there a special and specific provision that holds a public officer
is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff. liable for and allows redress from a particular class of
wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers.
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,
There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in
in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the
state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under specific provision which must be applied in the instant case
precisely filed to seek damages for violation of action before the prosecution rests. However, in the case,
constitutional rights. there is no basis to file the said motion because no
prejudicial question exists. Under Section 7(a) of 2000
ARTICLE 36; RULE III, SECTION 6&7; Rules on Criminal Procedure, prejudicial question has two
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION essential elements: a) previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CLEOFE raised in the criminal actions; and b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
JANIOLA proceed. Before the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
there was no ―previously instituted‖ to qualify the nature of
Facts: Dreamwork Construction, Inc, (Dreamwork) filed a civil action. The Court held that there is no other logical
complaint in MTC for violation of BP 22 against explanation for the insertion except to qualify the
CleofeJaniola (Janiola). Janiola filed a civil complaint in relationship of the criminal and civil actions, that the civil
RTC for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement action must precede the criminal action.
between the parties, as well as for damages. Notably, the
checks subject of the criminal cases were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement. Thereafter,
Janiola filed Motion to Suspend Proceeding alleging that Additionally, it is a principle in statutory
the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar construction that a statute should be construed not only to
or intimately related such that in the resolution of issue in be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other
the civil case, guilt or innocence of the accused would laws on the same subject matter. In the case, the phrase
necessarily be determined. In other words, Janiola claimed "previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is
that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
criminal cases. Dreamworkopposed the suspension of the interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution
proceedings in the criminal cases claiming that there is no may be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil
prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion
contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or
respondent violated BP 22 and Section 7, Rule 111 of the court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with
Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a the court hearing the case. It is this interpretation of Art. 36
prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil that should govern in order to give effect to all relevant
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the provisions of law.
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this
element is missing in this case, the criminal case having
preceded the civil case. Granting that civil case was instituted prior to
criminal action, there is still no prejudicial question because
the fact that there exists valid contract to support the
MTC granted the motion and reasoned that should issuance of checks does not make up the elements of the
the trial court declare rescission of the contract and the crime. The gravamen of the offense charged is the issuance
nullification of the checks as the same are without of bad check. The law punishes the mere act of issuing a
consideration, then the criminal case for BP22 must be bouncing check. Therefore, the 2nd element of a prejudicial
dismissed. RTC affirmed. Hence, the present case. question is absent.
Dreamwork interpreted Sec. 7(a) of Rules on Criminal
Procedure to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
must first be established that the civil case was filed
previous to the filing of the criminal case. On the other RICARDO QUIAMBAO v. HON. ADRIANO OSORIO,
hand, Janiola argued that the under Article 36 of the Civil ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA
Code, phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be BERNARDO, and FELIPE GAZA, respondents-
instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean appellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenor-
that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is appellant.
filed either before the institution of the criminal action or
during the pendency of the criminal action and that there is FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry was filed by herein
conflict between the two laws. private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina
Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner
Issue: Whether or not prejudicial question exists
Ricardo Quiambao. Quiambao filed a motion to dismiss the
Held: NO. Section 6 of the Rules provides that a petition for complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his Answer to the
suspension of the criminal action based on prejudicial complaint, specifically denying the material allegations
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the therein and averring that the Agreement upon which
office of prosecutor; when it has been filed in court for trial, private respondents base their prior possession over the
the motion to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal questioned lot had already been cancelled by the Land
Authority in an Order signed by its Governor, Conrado existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in
Estrella. By way of affirmative defense and as a ground for the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter
dismissing the case, Quiambao alleged the pendency of L.A. pending final determination of the former.
Case No. 968, an administrative case before the Office of
the Land Authority between the same parties and involving The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided
the same piece of land. (In said administrative case, under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:
Quiambao disputed private respondents' right of possession [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
over the property in question by reason of the latter's related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the
default in the installment payments for the purchase of said resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
lot.) Quiambao asserted that his administrative case was criminal action may proceed.
determinative of private respondents' right to eject The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively
petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that
question which bars a judicial action until after its technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of.
termination. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact
dismiss contained in Quiambao's affirmative defenses. It that the right of private respondents to eject Quiambao
ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was from the disputed portion depends primarily on the
the recovery of physical possession, the court had resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. Dissatisfied with this may be true that private respondents had prior possession
ruling, Quiambao filed before the then CFI of Rizal a of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of the
petition for certiorari with injunction against public ejectment case, such right of possession had been
respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the Municipal Court of terminated, or at the very least, suspended by the
Malabon and private respondents, praying for the issuance cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell
of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent executed in their favor. Whether or not private respondents
judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case until can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a
after the resolution of said petition. As prayed for, the then necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the
CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order enjoining further pending administrative case assailing the validity of the
proceedings in the ejectment case. cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent
award of the disputed portion to Quiambao. If the
Hence, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent
petition, maintaining that the administrative case did not award to Quiambao are voided, then private respondents
constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question would have every right to eject Quiambao from the disputed
of ownership, unlike the ejectment case which involved area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is
merely the question of possession. Meanwhile, the Land lost and so would their right to eject Quiambao from said
Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene portion.
alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the
same parties on the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent
968 and praying that the petition for certiorari be granted, course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the
the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively. determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and
pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To
Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
prior possession, the CFI dismissed the petition for possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in
certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously issued. the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not
only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort
ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative case between the and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in
private parties involving the lot subject matter of the futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us: The court in which an
ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
would operate as a bar to said ejectment case. upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the
HELD: YES. A prejudicial question is understood in law to action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending
be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a in another court, especially where the parties and the issues
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The control the disposition of causes on its dockets with
doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action
the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in
related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the the first action are settled the second action should be
civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the stayed.
Jr. is employed in the Public Attorney's Office. He has made
it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at the time
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving the questioned order of dismissal was issued by his father.
two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of the He thus impliedly rejects the charge of bias against his
same considerations of Identity of parties and issues, father.
economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and
the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there
possession before the ejectment case may be properly may have been a basis for the order in view of the alleged
determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the double sale of the property which was being litigated in the
case at bar. regional trial court. He concedes, however, that the order
may have been premature and that it could not have been
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature issued motuproprio.
of a prejudicial question to an administrative case, We see
no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the ISSUE: W/N respondent judge commit grave abuse of
proper case, such as in the petition at bar. discretion in motuproprio issuing the dismissal order
JULIANA P. YAP, vs. HELD: YES. Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of GlanMalapatan, South
Cotabato Section 6.Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon
FACTS:The case involves a Dispute between brother and the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may
sister over a piece of property they inherited from their be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the
parents. preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
According to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
estate of their parents for P300.00. The sale was evidenced prosecution rests.
by a private document. Nineteen years later, Paras sold the
same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. least, in light of the clear provision of the above-quoted
When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the
for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the original provision in the Rules of Court before they were
Provincial Prosecuto. On the same date, she filed a amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be made
complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge
Regional Trial Court. alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One
also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed
After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a second sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might
criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the be related to the respondent judge.
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, presided by Judge Alfredo D.
Barcelona, Sr. But more important than the preceding considerations is
Before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge the trial judge's misapprehension of the concept of a
motuproprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case prejudicial question.
on the ground that there is a prejudicial question to a civil
action. Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended provides:
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was Section 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2)
denied. She then came to this Court for relief in this special essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil
civil action for certiorari.The Court could have referred this action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
petition to the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
directly in view of the peculiar circumstances involved. may proceed.
The petitioner's contention is that where there is a A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a
prejudicial question in a civil case, the criminal action may case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
suspension may not be done motuproprio by the judge to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the determinative of the case before the court but the
defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged
in another court or tribunal.[4] It is a question based on a
The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
Paras who filed the comment in his behalf is the son and connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, of the accused.
before the CA). The trial court ruled that there was no
It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the prejudicial question (forgery is not an issue in the civil
continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action case). On appeal, the CA ordered the suspension of the
that is prejudicial to the civil action. criminal case due to pre-judicial question. Hence, the
present case before the Court.
The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order
does not appear anywhere in the decision of Ras v. Appellants Fortich-Celdran contend that there is
Rasul. Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but no prejudicial question because Ignacio Celdran ratified the
also wrongly applied it. The facts of that case are not extrajudicial partition and signed the motion to withdraw as
analogous to those in the case at bar. plaintiff. The latter maintained that there was forgery.
In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.
action on the ground that the defense in the civil case —
forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale — had to be RULING:YES. Since ratification is principal issue in the
threshed out first. Resolution of that question would civil action pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the
necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in falsification or genuineness of the motion to withdraw —
the criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for presented and marked as evidence in said civil case — is
suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly, the among the questions involved in said issue, it follows that
respondent judge had not been informed of the defense the civil action poses a pre-judicial question to the criminal
Paras was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could prosecution for alleged falsification of the same document,
not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil the motion to withdraw
action would determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil
action is the motion to withdraw; its authenticity is assailed
It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the in the same civil action. The resolution of this point in the
civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify civil case will in a sense be determinative of the guilt or
suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending in
an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue another tribunal. As such, it is a prejudicial question which
raised in the criminal action and its resolution should should first be decided before the prosecution can proceed
determine whether or not the latter action may proceed. in the criminal case. A pre-judicial question is one that
arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance
FORTICH vs. CELDRAN of which pertains to another tribunal; that is, it is
G.R. No. L-22677 February 28, 1967 determinative of the case before the court and jurisdiction
to pass upon the same is lodged in another tribunal.
FACTS There was a case for annulment of an extrajudicial On the procedural question regarding Ignacio
partition of properties of the deceased Pedro Celdran. Celdran's right as private offended party to file through
Ignacio Celdran was one of the deceased‘s children in his counsel a motion to suspend the criminal case, the same
first marriage who were plaintiffs in said case, while the exists where the Fiscal, who had direction and control of the
children in the second marriage all surnamed Fortich- prosecution, did not object to the filing of said motion. The
Celdran were the defendants. A motion to withdraw as filing complied with Sec. 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
plaintiff signed by ―Ignacio Celdran‖ was filed. As a result, which provides:
plaintiffs impleaded Ignacio as defendant. After trial and
before judgment, Ignacio Celdran asked for new trial on the SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of
ground of a newly discovered evidence upon finding that prejudicial question. — A petition for the
the motion to withdraw was falsified. This motion was suspension of the criminal action based upon the
denied by the court. pendency of a pre-judicial question in a civil case,
may only be presented by any party before or
Meanwhile, all parties excluding Ignacio Celdran during the trial of the criminal action.
entered into an amicable settlement recognizing valid the
extrajudicial partition. Few years later, the court declared Denial of the motion to suspend the prosecution
said partition as valid for having been ratified by Ignacio was therefore attended with grave abuse of discretion; and
Celdran as the court found that Ignacio received 10,000php the issue having been squarely and definitely presented
of the agreed 20,000php and two residential lots in return before the trial court, a motion for reconsideration, which
of the signed motion to withdraw and his ratification. This would but raise the same points, was not necessary. Neither
civil case was elevated to the CA which was still pending was appeal the remedy available, since the order denying
when an information for falsification of a public document suspension is interlocutory and thus not yet appealable.
(the motion to withdraw) was filed impleading the
defendants in the civil case as the accused in this criminal
case. Ignacio Celdran moved to suspend the criminal
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question (that the
alleged falsification is at issue in the civil case pending
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO v. CONSUELO TAN Article 40 of the Family Code, anew provision, expressly
requires a judicial declaration ofnullity of the previous
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, Third Division, marriage, as follows:
Panganiban, J.
―ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
FACTS: Dr. Vincent Mercado and Ma. Consuelo Tan got beinvoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
married on June 27, 1991 before the MTCC-Bacolod City of a finaljudgment declaring such marriage void.‖
which a marriage contract was duly executed and signed by
the parties. As entered in said document,the status of In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a
Mercado was ‗single.‘ Their civil marriage was confirmed in finaljudgment declaring such marriage void was necessary.
a churchceremony on June 29, 1991.
In the instant case, Mercado contracted a second
marriagealthough there was yet no judicial declaration of
There is no dispute either thatat the time of the celebration nullity ofhis first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition
of the wedding with complainant,accused was actually a to havethe first marriage declared void only after Tan
married man, having been in lawfulwedlock with Ma. hadfiled a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy.
Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April Bycontracting a second marriage while the first was
10, 1976which matrimony was further blessedin religious stillsubsisting, he committed the acts punishable under
rites. Article349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Both marriages wereconsummated when out of the first That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration ofthe
consortium, Olivabore Mercado two children; while a child, nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat,the
Vincent Paul, Jr. wassired by Mercado with Tan. crime had already been consummated by then.Moreover,
his view effectively encourages delay in theprosecution of
In October 1992, Tan filed a complaint for bigamy against bigamy cases; an accused could simply file apetition to
Mercado. Thereafter, an information was filed. In declare his previous marriage void and invokethe pendency
November 1992, Mercado filed an action for declaration of of that action as a prejudicial question in thecriminal case.
nullity of marriage against Oliva. In a decision, the marriage The Court cannot allow that.
between Mercado and Oliva was declared null and void.
Under the circumstances of the present case, Mercado is
By way of defense, Mercado posited that his previous guiltyof the charge against him.
marriage with Oliva had been judicially declared null and
void, and that Tan had knowledge of such first marriage.
The trial court convicted Mercado of the crime of bigamy. Victoria Jarillo v. People
On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction. G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009 (Del
Hence, this petition. Castillo, J.)
ISSUE: Is the element of previous legal marriage present? Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase
the fact that a person entered into a second marriage
RULING:YES. When the Information was filed on January during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
22, 1993, allthe elements of bigamy were present. It is in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
undisputed that Mercado married Thelma G. Oliva on April criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
10, 1976 inCebu City. While that marriage was still
subsisting, hecontracted a second marriage, this time with FACTS: On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael
Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaintfor Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony
bigamy. solemnized by Mayor Tanyag. On May 4, 1975, Victoria
Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a
In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether ajudicial church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in
declaration of nullity was still necessary for therecovery and Pangasinan. Out of the marital union, Jarillo begot a
the separation of properties of erstwhilespouses. Ruling in daughter, Rachelle.
the affirmative, the Court declared: ―TheFamily Code has
settled once and for all the conflictingjurisprudence on the On November 26, 1979, Jarillo thereafter contracted a
matter. A declaration of the absolutenullity of a marriage subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Uy before Judge
is now explicitly required either as acause of action or a Nicanor Cruz. On April 16, 1995, Jarillo and Uy exchanged
marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila.
ground for defense; in fact, therequirement for a
In 1999, Uy filed against Jarillo a civil case for annulment of
declaration of absolute nullity of amarriage is also for the
marriage before RTC-Manila. Thereafter, Jarillo was
protection of the spouse who,believing that his or her charged with bigamy before RTC-Pasay. Parenthetically,
marriage is illegal and void,marries again. With the judicial Jarillo filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the
declaration of the nullityof his or her first marriage, the RTC-Makati for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
person who marries againcannot be charged with bigamy.‖
Trial court found Jarillo guilty of bigamy and was sentenced the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 to 10 years civil case is not essential to the determination of the
imprisonment. It made no pronouncement on the civil criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused‘s bigamous
marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their In Abunado v. People, it was held thus: the subsequent
property. This aspect is being determined by RTC-Manila. judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
For her defense, Jarillo insisted the following: petitioner‘s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
1. her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
and void because Alocillo was allegedly still petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke
married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
the celebration of their marriage; criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the
2. her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null civil case for annulment of petitioner‘s marriage to private
and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and complainant had no bearing upon the determination of
3. the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her petitioner‘s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
On appeal to the CA, conviction was affirmed in toto. CA the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a
held that Jarillo committed bigamy when she contracted marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
marriage with Uy because, at that time, her marriage to deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the proceeding. Even if petitioner eventually obtained a
court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her point is, both the first and the second marriage were
marriage to Uy. subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
In the meantime, the RTC-Makati rendered a decision In the case at bar, Jarillo‘s conviction of the crime of bigamy
declaring Jarillo‘s 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of
and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo‘s psychological nullity of petitioner‘s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
incapacity. In her motion for reconsideration, Jarillo considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the moment Jarillo contracted a second marriage without the
reversal of her conviction. But CA denied the motion. previous one having been judicially declared null and void,
the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
ISSUE: Whether CA committed reversible error in the time of the celebration of the second marriage, Jarillo‘s
proceeding with the case despite the pendency of a case marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null
which is prejudicial to the outcome of this case. and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed
valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of
HELD: NO. It is true that right after the presentation of the nullity of Jarillo‘s marriage to Uy make any difference.
the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension
of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
petition for declaration of nullity of Jarillo‘s marriages to valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
Alocillo, which, Jarillo claimed involved a prejudicial second marriage is not per se an argument for the
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. A plain reading of
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, would
the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the
struck down her arguments. subsistence of a valid marriage.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court categorically stated WILSON PO CHAM vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO
that: he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial (A.C. No. 5499; August 16, 2005)
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the Facts:VSometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete), Elenita
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased Mario Navarro (Navarro) who
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. was then the Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for
sale to him a parcel of land with an area of approximately forty
The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262,
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the
Respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded property).
as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any He having expressed interest in the offer, Caete and Navarro
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the arranged a meeting between him and respondent at the latters
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during residence in Balanga, Bataan where respondent categorically
represented to him that the property being offered for sale was fails (sic) to comply with his obligation to pay in
alienable and disposable. Respondent in fact presented to him 1) full on the scheduled period the P10,000.00 earnest
Real Property Tax Order of Payment dated July 10, 1995 money shall be forfeited in favor of the SELLER
covering the property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal and the Option to Buy is automatically cancelled.
Treasurer and Navarro as Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of
Absolute Sale[4] dated July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by the 2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price
alleged previous actual occupant of the property, one Jose R. shall execute a final Deed of Sale and shall
Monzon (Monzon), transferring all his rights, interest and surrender all documents, plans and paper relative to
possession thereover in favor of Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), the properties subject of sale;
Rolando B. Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed
consideration of P500,000.00; and 3) Special Power of 3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights
Attorney[5] dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala and claims over the above stated properties
authorizing him (respondent) to: including the trees planted on it as against the rights
of third party except that of the government.[8]
1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
parcel of land, which is more particularly
described as follows: In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid
AREA: 40 has. more or less respondent the amount of P10,000.00 for which respondent issued
situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, the corresponding Receipt[9] reading:
Bataan covered by Tax Declaration No. 6066 PIN
#108-08-044-05-126 Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the from MR. WILSON CHAM, representing earnest/option money
consumation (sic) of sale of the subject property; for Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262. Full payment shall be paid
and to sign the same. within three (3) weeks from date hereof.
3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation
to distribute the corresponding share of each co- On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute
owner; Sale[11] over the property in his favor, the pertinent portions of
which read as follows:
On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed
an Option to Buy, the pertinent portions of which provide: For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE
WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and HUNDRED THIRTY THREE (P3,372,533.00), Philippine
Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners of rights with Currency, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged from the
planted trees (improvements) containing an area of BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the SELLERS, the said
FORTY THREE (43) hectares, situated in Pook SELLERS do by these presents SELL, TRANSFER and
Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan; (Portion CONVEY, in manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the
of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre), covered said BUYER, his heirs and assigns, all their rights, interest and
by Tax Declaration 6066. participation over that certain real estate destined for, and in
actual use as fruit land, situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong,
WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the Morong, Bataan and more particularly described as follows:
same for a total price of THREE MILLION AND Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong
(P3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic), as Cadastre, containing an area of 392,155 square meters
follows: more or less.
a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of

this contract and the balance of full payment within The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the
three (3) weeks from date hereof which offer the foregoing land are visible by means of monuments, creeks and
SELLER accepts; trees; that the land including the permanent improvements
existing thereon consist of fruit-bearing trees assessed for the
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of current year at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY TWO THOUSAND
the foregoing premises and the terms and FOUR HUNDRED P262,400.00 as per Tax Declaration No.
conditions hereunder specified the parties have 5010; and that the property is presently in the possession of the
agreed on the following: SELLERS.
1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the
earnest (sic) of P10,000.00 upon signing of this absolute owners of the rights over the said property; that they
contract, which shall form part of the contract price have the perfect right to convey the same; that they acquired their
if and when the buyer comply (sic) with his rights over the said property by absolute deed of sale from Jose R.
obligation to pay in full within three (3) weeks Monzon who acquired his rights over the property from Marianito
from date hereof, otherwise should the BUYER Holgado; that Marianito Holgado acquired his right from Pedro
de Leon who, in turn, acquired his right from Julian Agujo who possession within the Bataan Natural Park which is prohibited
was the original owner who cleared the land and who was in under our laws.
possession of the same immediately after the Second World War.
xxx
The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the
aforedescribed real estate including the trees planted thereon and In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way
they undertake to defend the same unto said Vendee, his heirs and of informing us and in controlling this land rush and massive
assigns against the claims of any third person whomsoever. selling and buying of rights of possession within prohibited areas
as stated above.[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax
Declaration No. 5010[13] with Property Index No. 018-08-004- Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification dated March
05-126 issued in his (respondents) name and his alleged co- 14, 1996 stating that those named by respondent as prior owners
owners, and Real Property Tax Receipt No. 025201 dated August of rights over the property from whom respondent and his alleged
17, 1995 issued in his (respondents) name. co-owners acquired their alleged rights were not among those
inventoried as occupants per the PENRs 1978 to 1994 Forest
He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 Occupancy Census (IFO) Survey.
representing the purchase price of the rights over the property,
Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA063210[15] in the amount Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the
of P168,627.00 payable to respondent, and Asian Bank Managers purchase price of the rights over the property.
Check No. 004639GA[16] in the amount of P3,193,906.00
payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala. In his present complaint dated September 10, 2001, complainant
charges respondent to have violated his oath as a member of the
He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a Bar in committing manifest falsehood and evident
barbed wire fence at its front portion. Soon after, however, a misrepresentation by employing fraudulent means to lure him into
forest guard approached him and informed him that the property buying rights over the property which property he represented to
could not be fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park. be disposable and alienable.
Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an In his Comment[26] dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied
alienable or disposable land susceptible of private ownership. He having employed deceit or having pretended to co-own rights
thus secured a Certification from the Community Environment over the property or having represented that it was alienable and
and Natural Resources Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the disposable. He claimed that complainant, being engaged in
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) speculation in the purchase of property, knew exactly the
dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer Laurino D. character and nature of the object of his purchase;[27] and that
Macadangdang, reading: despite complainants awareness that he was merely buying rights
to forest land, he just the same voluntarily entered into the
This pertains to your request for a certification as transaction because of the propertys proximity to the Subic Bay
to the status of land claimed by spouses Perfecto Economic Zone.
and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al, Virgilio
Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located at Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the
Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan. property in the hope that lands belonging to the public domain in
Morong would be eventually declared alienable and disposable to
Please be informed that per verification meet the rising demand for economic zones.
conducted by the personnel of this Office, said
lands fall within the Bataan Natural Park per L.C. By Resolution of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to
Map/N.P. Map No. 34 as certified on December the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
1, 1945. Under the Public Land Law, lands report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days
within this category are not subject for from notice.
disposition.
On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply to
He also obtained a Letter-directive[20] dated August 31, 1995 respondents Comment, maintaining that the sale of rights over the
issued by Officer-in-Charge Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial property was attended with deceit as respondent deliberately did
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENR) of Balanga, not disclose that the property was within the confines of the
Bataan to the Municipal Assessor, the pertinent portions of which Bataan National Park. And he denied being engaged in
read: speculation, he claiming that with his purchase of the property, he
would venture into low-cost housing for the employees of the
Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are nearby Subic Bay area.
some forest occupants that are securing land tax declarations from
your office in (sic) the pretext that the area they occupied (sic) The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for
were (sic) within alienable and disposable lands. Presently, this estafa against respondent, Banzon, Zabala, Caete, Alipio and
tax declaration is being used in the illegal selling of right [of] Navarro in 1999[36] arising from the questioned sale of rights.
The complaint was twice dismissed by the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. On petition for review, however, the Department of purchasing subject property unmindful that the same
Justice, through then Secretary Hernando B. Perez, by is not alienable or disposable being a portion of the
Resolution[37] of March 6, 2002, reversed the dismissal of the public domain; whereby respondent violated his
complaint as it found probable cause to indict respondent et al. in solemn oath as member of the Philippine Bar for
court. An information for estafa was thereupon filed against having committed such falsehood and
respondent et al. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of misrepresentations to the complainant.
Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-00-94232.
By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the
By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the April 20, 2004
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Committee Report and Recommendation. The case was
Lydia A. Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his oath as forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of
a member of the Bar to do no falsehood and misrepresentations, the Rules of Court.
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months, subject to the approval of the members of the Board Issue:
of Governors. Pertinent portions of the Report and 1. Whether or not the Misconduct of a Lawyer in his
Recommendation read: private capacity warrants disciplinary action
2. Whether or not a Conviction for Estafa is essential
. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the for administrative liability in a Disbarment Case,
Implementing Rules and Regulations of NIPAS thus being a Prejudicial Question
ACT[38] prohibited the illegal selling of rights or
possession of the areas occupied within the Bataan Held:
Natural Park, the subject property not excluded as 1. Yes, the misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional
per letter of OIC CENRO Laurino D. Mapadanig or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
[illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus
No. 34 to the Municipal Assessor therein and render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and
certified on December 1, 1945 that subject property the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment
which is within this category was not subject for or suspension. Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from
disposition; a fact supposed to be known by the the practice of law for One (1) Year and STERNLY WARNED
respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan and that a repetition of the same or similar offense will merit a more
was in the practice of his profession also in said area. severe penalty.
Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal
Monzon was not among those inventoried occupants proficiency but of honesty and fair dealing.[41] Thus, a member
as per Forest Occupancy (IFO) Survey since 1978 up should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
to the latest census in 1994 from whom respondent degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the
allegedly bought the subject property; the Absolute fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, under
Deed of Sale executed between the complainant Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of
Wilson Po Cham and the respondent relative to the the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
same subject property was not notarized which on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice or other gross
partook the nature of a private and not official misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction
document. of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers
oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
Although respondent furnished complainant the court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
foregoing documents to prove their rights, interest authority. And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of
and possession to the subject property, respondent Professional Responsibility which mandates a member of the Bar
and his co-owners failed to show a permit from the to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule
government conferring upon them rights or 1.01 of the Code specifically enjoins him not to engage in
concessions over the subject property, which formed unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Conduct, as
part of the Bataan Natural Park classified as public used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection
and not subject to disposition, therefore respondent with the performance of professional duties.
and his co-owners have no rights and interests
whatsoever over the subject property and their In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented
representations to complainant were simply not true certifications from the DENR that the property is part of the
but a falsehood. public domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan
National Park. Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 24 issued on
Respondent being extensively conversant and December 1, 1945, all properties of the public domain therein
knowledgeable about the law took advantage of his designated as part of the Bataan National Park were withdrawn
versatility in the practice of law and committed from sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private
misrepresentations that he and his co-owners have rights. On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to
irrevocable rights, interests and possession over the substantiate his documented claim of having irrevocable rights
subject property which convinced complainant into and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to
complainant. E.g., he could have presented any document issued FACTS
by the government conferring upon him and his alleged co-
owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of
any such right or interest, but he presented none. He merely the CA requiring Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by a Balandan and his wife, damages in the sum of P2k for the
certain Jose R. Monzon in his, Banzons and Zabalas favor on July death of their son Mario.
25, 1995, a month shy of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of complainant.
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-
plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose
The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do
premises were installed two tanks full of water, 9ft. deep,
not help his cause any as neither tax receipts nor realty tax
for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory
declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over
compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks
realty unless supported by other effective proof. The presentation themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top
of a tax declaration must indeed have been a pretext, as observed covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from
by the PENR in its earlier-quoted portion of its letter-directive to the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance,
the Balanga Municipal Assessor that the area occupied . . . [is] which is continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and
within alienable and disposable land. Respondent must thus be persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could
faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase, for easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no
P3,372,533.00, non-existent irrevocable rights, interest and guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948,
participation over an inalienable property. plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old,
while playing with and in company of other boys of his age
2. No, Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a
of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario
independently of Criminal cases. It is jurisprudentially sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later,
established though that in a disbarment proceeding, it is already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary
immaterial that the complainant is not blameless or is in pari to drowning.
delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy
The CA and the CFI of Laguna, took the view that
members to protect the public and the courts. The record does not
the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the
disclose the status of the Estafa case against respondent. His
tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to
conviction or acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as the
avoid accidents to persons entering its premises.
present administrative case against him is concerned.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal ISSUE: WON petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.‘s tanks
case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an are attractive nuisance.
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly
preponderant evidence is all that is required. Thus, a criminal HELD: No. The Doctrine of attractive nuisance
prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the provides for One who maintains on his premises dangerous
same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
proceedings. It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in care to prevent children from playing therewith or
the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
not necessarily exculpate him administratively. It is not thus injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser
sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal in the premises.
case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from vigorously The principle reason for the doctrine is that the
applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in condition or appliance in question although its danger is
the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to
is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get
proceedings are vastly disparate. on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation
to such children
ARTICLE 694 – 707; NUISANCE
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. GUILLERMO applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in
BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature
OF APPEALS other than the mere water and its location.
G.R. No. L-3422 91 PHIL 488June 13, 1952 The reason why a swimming pool or pond or
reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance
Ponente: J. BENGZON was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as
follows:
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which On June 29, 1995, respondent requested that the 36
attract children. Lurking in their waters is always blowers of Feliza Building be tested by the NCR
the danger of drowning. Against this danger Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR.
children are early instructed so that they are The report stated that the noise generated from the blowers
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if was beyond the legal allowable level under PD 984. Despite
the owner of private property creates an artificial repeated demands, petitioner refused to act on the
pool on his own property, merely duplicating the matter.On August 14, 2000, respondent again wrote
work of nature without adding any new danger, . . .
petitioner, demanding that it abate the nuisance. Petitioner
(he) is not liable because of having created an
ignored the letter anew. Respondent then had the blowers
"attractive nuisance." Anderson vs. Reith-Riley
Const. Co., N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170. tested again by the EMB with same results.
On March 11, 2001, Frabelle I Condominum Corporation

Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as
(FCC) filed a complaint against petitioner with the Pollution
attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had
taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the Adjudication Board (PAB) for the abatement of noise
other issue submitted by petitioner — that the parents of and/or air pollution and damages with a plea for injunctive
the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding relief. The complainant alleged, inter alia, that:
recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day
leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual Feliza Building's airconditioning system is served by
— needs no further discussion. some 36 blowers, installed 4 blowers to each floor, all
located on the same sidedirectly facing Frabella I.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Everytime the Feliza Building's airconditioning system
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. is turned on, all or a good number of the 36 blowers
No costs. operate at the same time. As a direct result of the
operation of the blowers, unbearable hot air is
AC ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. generated and blown towards Frabella I.
FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, Apart from the hot air, the blowers also generate a
RESPONDENT. continuous, deafening, intolerable and irritating,
G.R. NO. 166744, November 02, 2006, CALLEJO, SR., J.: vibrating noise which makes normal conversation
across the street and at the Frabella I difficult if not
(sorry for a long digest) impossible.
As a consequence of such hot air, vibrating and
Petitioner ACEI owns the FELIZA BUILDING, a 10-storey intolerable noise, the occupants of Frabella I have been,
bldg. located along Herrera St. Legaspi Village, Makati. The and still are, prevented from enjoying peaceful and
bldg was equipped with 36 blowers from 18 air-cooled type comfortable use of their property thereby forcing them
airconditioning units in the building, four blowers on each to vacate and/or transfer elsewhere.
floor. Respondent Frabelle Properties Corporation (FPC)is Such intolerable noise, hot air, and vibration constitute
the developer of Frabella I Condominium (Frabella I), a 29- noise and/or air pollution violative of P.D. 984, the
storey commercial/residential condominium located at Clean Air Act and other related environmental laws.
Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. It owned some
units in the condominium which it leased to its tenants. The On July 1, 2003, respondent, after several demands/letters
building is managed by the Frabella I Condominium filed in various government agencies, including the City
Corporation (FCC). Government, filed a complaint for the abatement of
nuisance with damages with prayer for the issuance of a
Rada and Herrera streets lie parallel to each other such writ of preliminary and permanent injunction before the
that Feliza Building is situated at the back of Frabella I. RTC. Aside from similar allegations mentioned in the
The two buildings are separated by Rodriguez Street, a complaint of FCC, this complaint alleges that:
two-lane road approximately 12 meters wide. The exhaust
of the blowers from the airconditioning units at the Feliza The operation of the Feliza's blowers generates a
Building were directed towards the rear of Frabella I. continuous deafening unbearable vibrating and
stressful noise affecting the tenants of the Frabella
On April 11, 1995, respondent wrote petitioner demanding I Condominium. The tenants occupying the 5th to
that the latter abate the daily continuous, intense and the 16th floors of the Frabella I Condominium
''unbearable noise" and the hot air blast coming from the 36 facing Feliza Building are directly subjected to a
blowers in the Feliza Building. Petitioner rejected the daily continuous intense noise and hot air blast
demand. A second letter was sent reiterating its demand to coming from the blowers of the[10-storey] Feliza
abate the nuisance but such was also rejected. Building. Some are tenants of plaintiff, who have
complained to plaintiff about the matter. Tenants
who could not bear the nuisance any longer have
vacated their units, and as a result, many units of complaints, both involved the same set of facts and
plaintiff have remained vacant, and unoccupied or issues. Consequently, the petition is barred
uninhabitable, thereby depriving plaintiff with by litispendentia.
rental income that it should have otherwise be 4. Petitioner further claimed that the complaint
receiving. stated no cause of action because it failed to allege
any right of respondent which it was obliged to
respect, and any act or omission of defendant in
In all good faith, without any desire to cause any
violation of such right.
unnecessary inconvenience or trouble, plaintiff has
written and made numerous contacts with
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent.
defendant to complain about this nuisance, even
soliciting the help and intercession of the Barangay
ISSUE: Whether or not the complained ―Noises‖ in this
San Lorenzo, Makati Commercial Estate
case constitutes a Nuisance.
Association, Inc. (MACEA), Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), Makati City
RULING: YES. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Government, Makati Pollution Office and
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources(DENR), to try to settle the matter The RTC Has Jurisdiction Over the Action of the
amicably. Several meetings have taken place, as Respondent for Abatement Of Nuisance
well as many correspondences made by plaintiff to
defendant. But reasonable and lawful demands by The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by
plaintiff to abate the nuisance have been repeatedly the CA, that as gleaned from the material averments of the
ignored/refused by defendant. complaint as well as the character of the relief prayed for by
respondent in its complaint before the RTC, the petition is
one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance, more
As a consequence of such unbearable, hot air and
specifically the noise generated by the blowers of the
stressful noise, the occupants of the Frabella I,
airconditioning system of the Feliza Building owned by
including the tenants of plaintiff, have been and
petitioner, with a plea for a writ of preliminary and
still are, prevented from enjoying peaceful and
permanent injunction, plus damages. Such action of
comfortable use of their property thereby forcing
respondent is incapable of pecuniary estimation because
them to vacate and or to transfer elsewhere.]
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money. Although respondent prayed for judgment
Respondent prayed to abate the noise and air pollution
for temperate or moderate damages and exemplary
being generated by all the blowers of the airconditioning
damages, such claims are merely incidental to or as a
system of Feliza Building, and/or to make the Writ of
consequence of, the principal relief sought by respondent.
Preliminary Injunction permanent;
An action incapable of pecuniary estimation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. the Court ruled that a
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is within the
following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction of the court over
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the
the subject matter of the complaint; (2) the complaint does
RTC.
not state a cause of action; and (3) the action is barred
by res judicata, litispendentia, and forum shopping.
(The Court cited Articles 695, 695, 697, 705 and 706 of the
New Civil Code as legal basis for its decision)
Petitioner averred the following:
1. That it is the Makati City Government that had

jurisdiction over the complaint. A private nuisance has been defined as one which violates
2. That the respondent had filed a similar action only private rights and produces damages to but one or a
before the Makati City Government concerning the few persons.A nuisance is public when it interferes with the
same issues and that the City Building Official, exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public
Engr. Morales, had already ruled that the excess in property or by causing a common injury. It is an
the noise quality standard within the vicinity was unreasonable interference with the right common to the
caused not only by the air-conditioning system of general public.A private nuisance action is the remedy for
Feliza Building but also by other prevailing factors an invasion of a property right. On the other hand, the
which were beyond its control. Respondent had action for the abatement of a public nuisance should be
failed to appeal the resolution; hence, the
commenced by the city or municipality.A private person
resolution of the City Building Official barred the
complaint. may institute an action for the abatement of a public
3. That FCC already filed a case for Abatement of nuisance in cases wherein he suffered a special injury of a
Noise and/or Air Pollution and Damages with PAB. direct and substantial character other than that-which the
As gleaned from the material averments of the two general public shares.
property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does
In the present case, respondent opted to file an action in the that it can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable
RTC for abatement of the private nuisance complained of in degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact
and damages under Article 697 of the New Civil Code for its dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions.
past existence. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise
constitutes a nuisance.
One has an action to recover personal damages arising from
a private nuisance. The gist of the action is the The respondent’s complaint properly states a
unreasonable interference by the defendant with the use cause of action for abatement of a private
and enjoyment of properties. Indeed, petitioner may be nuisance and for damages.
compelled to adopt the necessary measures to reduce or
deaden the nuisance emanating from the blowers of the A real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right
airconditioning system at the Feliza Building. while a real party defendant is one who has a correlative
legal obligation whose act or omission violate the legal right
The resolution of the issue before the RTC, which is whether of the former.
the noise complained of is actionable nuisance, does not A person injured by a nuisance may bring an action in his
require any special technical knowledge, expertise and own name and in behalf of others similarly affected to abate
experience of the PAB or even of Makati City requiring the the same. One who has an interest in the property affected
determination of technical and intricate matters of fact. such as the owner thereof or fix interest therein are proper
parties as plaintiffs.
Also, in relation to petitioner‘s contentions, the SC held that
although LGUs may conduct inspections, at all reasonable In the present case, respondent is the real party-in-interest
times, without doing damage, after due notice to the owners as party plaintiff in the complaint below because it owned
of buildings to ascertain compliance with the noise several units in Frabelle I and, as a result of the defeaning
standards under the law; however, the LGUs have no power and unbearable noise from the blowers of the
to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such as airconditioning units of the Feliza Building owned by
thing is a nuisance per se; nor can they effect the petitioner, many tenants of the respondent vacated their
extrajudicial abatement of that as a nuisance which in its units. The units remained unoccupied, thereby depriving
nature or use is not such. Those things must be resolved by respondent of income. Some of the tenants even threatened
the courts in the ordinary course of law. to sue respondent on account of the noise from the Feliza
Building. In fine, respondent is obliged to maintain its
Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the tenants in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
airconditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is to units.
be resolved only by the court in due course of proceedings.
The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the Under Article 697 of the New Civil Code, the aggrieved
consequences thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may party is entitled to damages for the present and past
be of such a character as to constitute a nuisance, even existence of a nuisance.He is entitled to actual or
though it arises from the operation of a lawful business, compensatory damages[62] or indemnification for damages
only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of inclusive of the value of the loss suffered and profits which
ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. respondent failed to obtain.
Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of
reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and
Liability for nuisance may be imposed upon one who sets in
of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. What
motion the force which entirely caused the tortuous act;
those limits are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of
upon one who sets in motion a force or a chain of events
quantity or quality; they depend upon the circumstances of
resulting in the nuisance. In an action for damages resulting
the particular case.
from a nuisance, responsibility arises not only from the
creator of the nuisance but from its continued maintenance
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of
as well. One is entitled to damages on account of the
comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question
conduct by another of his business which unreasonably and
that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond
substantially interferes with the quiet enjoyment of his
the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of
premises by himself or of his tenants. It is sufficient to
living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact
maintain an action for abatement of a nuisance if his
devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise
buildings is rendered valueless for the purpose it was
although ordinary care is taken to confine it within
devoted.
reasonable bounds.The determining factor when noise
alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or
A negligent act may constitute a nuisance. An intentional
volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to
act may also constitute a nuisance. A nuisance may be
produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a
formed from a continuous, known invasion, where, after
person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent
complaint, and notice of damage, the defendant continues particular trades or industries in populous neighborhoods;
to offend and refuses to correct or discontinue the nuisance. from acts of public indecency, keeping disorderly houses,
In such a case, the nuisance is deemed intentional. An and houses of ill fame, gambling houses, etc.
unreasonable use, perpetrated and uncorrected even after
Nuisances have been divided into two classes: Nuisances
complaint and notice of damage is deemed intentional.
per se, and nuisances per accidens. To the first belong
those which are unquestionably and under all
circumstances nuisances, such as gambling houses, houses
ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE CO. v. of ill fame, etc.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO ET AL.
A particular thing is a nuisance is generally a question of
GR No. 7012, 1913-03-26 fact, to be determined in the first instance before the term
nuisance can be applied to it.This is certainly true of a
Facts:Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. (IICSC), upon legitimate calling, trade, or business such as an ice plant.
authority granted by the Municipal Council of Iloilo (MCI),
constructed an ice and cold storage plant in the city of It is clear that municipal councils have, under the code, the
Iloilo. power to declare and abate nuisances, but it is equally clear
that they do not have the power to find as a fact that a
After the plant had been completed and was in operation, particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nearby residents made complaints to MCI that the smoke nuisance per se; nor can theyauthorize the extrajudicial
from the plant was very injurious to their health and condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which
comfort. MCI appointed a committee to investigate and in its nature, situation, or use is not such. These things
report upon the matters contained in said complaints. Since must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.
the committee reported that IICSC were well founded, MCI
passed a resolution granting IICSC one month to proceed In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the
with the elevation of said smokestacks, or else the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry,
municipal president will order the closing or suspension of beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health and
IICSC‘s operations. comfort. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
IICSC commenced this action in the Court of First Instance resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair
to enjoin MCI from carrying into effect the said resolution, and impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal.
alleging that MCI intend and threaten to require
compliance with said resolution administratively and The respondent denied that it was intending to proceed
without the intervention of the court, and by force to with the abatement of the alleged nuisance by arbitrary
compel the closing and suspension of operations of the administrative proceedings.
plaintiff's machinery and consequentlyof the entire plant.
It is said that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to build its
MCI answered with the following allegations: that the smokestack higher if said stack is in fact a nuisance, for
factory of the plaintiff company stands in a central and the reason that the stack was built under authority granted
populated district of the municipality, that the quantity of by the defendant, and in accordance with the prescribed
smoke discharged from the smokestacks of said factory is so requirements. If the charter or license does not expressly
great and so dense that it penetrates into the dwelling subject the business or industry to the exercise of the police
houses situated near it and causes great annoyance to the power by the State, it is conceded by the great
residents and prejudice to their health, that the municipal preponderance of authority that such a reservation is
board of health of the city has reported that the smoke implied to the extent that may be reasonably necessary for
discharged from the smokestacks of said factory is the publicwelfare.
prejudicial and injurious to the public health, and that the The order sustaining the plaintiff's demurrer to the
plaintiff company has no right to maintain and operate defendant's answer is reversed. The record will be returned
machinery in its factory under the conditions which it is at
to the court whence it came with instructions to proceed
present operating the same, without complying with the
with the trial of the cause in accordance with this opinion.
regulations which were imposed upon it when the license
for its installation was granted, because it thereby violates
the ordinances of the city now in force upon the matter. City of Manila V. Laguio
The plaintiff demurred to this answer.It was sustained. To
Facts: Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is
this order the defendant excepted and, not desiring to
a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
amend its answer, appealed to this court. motels, hostels and lodging houses.MTDC filed a Petition
Issues:W/N the municipal council has absolute power of for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
declaring anything to be a nuisance. Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order(RTC Petition) with the lower court that the
Ruling: NO. The municipal council is, under section 39 (j) Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
of the Municipal Code, specifically empowered "to declare its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
and abate nuisances." Nuisances arise from pursuing unconstitutional.8
The said Ordinance is entitled– establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute,
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug
OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION such other activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. the inhabitants of the city;
. . .
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City
unconstitutional for this reason, among others:The Council the power to prohibit the establishments
Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so
it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the
property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section.
a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these
have the power to extrajudicially destroy it. establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the
City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of
In their AnswerCity of Manila and Lim maintained that the Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach
City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral establishments may only be regulated in their
welfare of the community‖. establishment, operation and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from
Issue: W/N the City Council has power to find as a fact the establishments themselves. That these establishments
that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from
the power to extrajudicially destroy it. another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on
Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned
Ruling: proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish
and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as
No. The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h)
of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant thereof. The same Section also defined "amusement" as a
to general laws. "pleasurable diversion and entertainment,""synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement
Petitionerscannot seek cover under the general welfare places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without and other places of amusement where one seeks admission
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code
property and may be summarily abated under the considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises
undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels and activities.
are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of
the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a ARTICLE 2105 – 2235; DAMAGES
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance Smart Communications vs. Astorga
warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention. Astorga was employed by Smart Communications as
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent District Sales Manager of the Marketing group.
and prohibit certain activities and establishments in
another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows: SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve
more efficient operations. Part of the reorganization was the
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. outsourcing of the marketing and sales force. Thus, SMART
(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of entered into a joint venture agreement with NTT of Japan,
the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and and formed SMART-NTT Multimedia, Incorporated
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD,
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as Astorga‘s division. SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: personnel who would be recommended by SMART. Astorga
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for
landed last in the performance evaluation, thus, she was not
an efficient and effective city government, and in this
recommended by SMART. SMART, nonetheless, offered her
connection, shall:
. . . a supervisory position in the Customer Care Department,
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and but she refused the offer because the position carried lower
impose appropriate penalties for habitual drunkenness in salary rank and rate. Despite the abolition of the
public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, CSMG/FSD, Astorga continued reporting for work. SMART
issued a memorandum advising Astorga of the termination Astorga was terminated due to redundancy, which is one of
of her employment on ground of redundancy. the authorized causes for the dismissal of an employee.
The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to The characterization of an employee‘s services as
file a Complaintfor illegal dismissal and also a prayer for superfluous or no longer necessary and, therefore, properly
moral and exemplary damages. She claimed that abolishing terminable, is an exercise of business judgment on the part
CSMG and terminating her employment was illegal for it of the employer.
violated her right to security of tenure. She also posited that
it was illegal for an employer, like SMART, to contract out Astorga claims that the termination of her employment was
services which will displace the employees. illegal and tainted with bad faith. She asserts that the
reorganization was done in order to get rid of her. But
SMART responded that there was valid termination. It except for her barefaced allegation, no convincing evidence
argued that Astorga was dismissed by reason of was offered to prove it. This Court finds it extremely
redundancy, which is an authorized cause for termination difficult to believe that SMART would enter into a joint
of employment, and the dismissal was effected in venture agreement with NTT, form SNMI and abolish
accordance with the requirements of the Labor Code. Also, CSMG/FSD simply for the sole purpose of easing out a
that it was an exercise of management prerogative. particular employee, such as Astorga.
In the meantime, SMART sent a letter to Astorga As aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the
demanding that she pay the current market value of the mandated one (1) month notice prior to termination. The
Honda Civic Sedan which was given to her under the record is clear that Astorga received the notice of
company‘s car plan program, or to surrender the same to termination only on March 16, 1998 or less than a month
the company for proper disposition. prior to its effectivity on April 3, 1998.However this is a
mere procedural lapse which does not affect the validity of
Astorga refused. SMART filed a suit for replevin with the the termination.
RTC.Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint. Astorga
posited that the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the However, we find the need to modify, by increasing, the
complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit indemnity awarded by the CA to Astorga, as a sanction on
arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction SMART for non-compliance with the one-month mandatory
over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in notice requirement. We deem it proper to increase the
regular courts. amount of the penalty on SMART to P50,000.00.
Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring Astorga‘s dismissal Finally, we note that Astorga claimed non-payment of
from employment illegal. wages. This assertion was never rebutted by SMART in the
proceedings a quo. No proof of payment was presented by
Subsequently, RTC issued an Order denying Astorga‘s SMART to disprove the allegation. It is settled that in labor
motion to dismiss the replevin case. CA reversed. CA held cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims
that the case is intertwined with Astorga‘s complaint for rests on the employer. SMART failed to discharge the onus
illegal dismissal; thus, it is the labor tribunal that has probandi.
rightful jurisdiction over the complaint.
However, the award of backwages to Astorga by the CA
Upon appeal by SMART, NLRC declared the abolition of should be deleted for lack of basis.
CSMG and the creation of SNMI to do the sales and
marketing services for SMART a valid organizational action. YSMAEL MARITIME CORPORATION vs. HON.
CELSO AVELINO, in his capacity as Presiding
ISSUE: W/N Astorga is entitled to payment of damages Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of
Cebu and SPOUSES FELIX C. LIM and
HELD:. Yes. CONSTANCIA GEVEIA | G.R. No. L-43674; June 30,
As to jurisdiction in the replevin case 1987
The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and FACTS: Rolando G. Lim, a licensed second mate, was on
acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga‘s motion board the vessel M/S Rajah, owned by petitioner Ysmael
to dismiss. SMART‘s demand for payment of the market Maritime Corporation, when the same ran ground and sank
value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the near Sabtan Island, Batanes. Rolando died. His parents,
respondents Felix Lim and ConsorciaGeveia, sued
car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the
petitioner for damages due to their negligence.
relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-
employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the In its answer, petitioner-defendant alleged:[1] that the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. complaint stated no cause of action; [2] that respondent-
plaintiffs had received P4,160 from petitioner and had
Having resolved that issue, we proceed to rule on the
signed release papers discharging petitioner from any
validity of Astorga‘s dismissal. liability, and [3] that the respondents had already been
compensated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission THIRD VIEW: that the employee or his heirs have a choice
for the same incident, for which reason they are now of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of
precluded from seeking other remedies against the same suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
employer under the Civil Code. damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But
once the election has been exercised, the employee or his
RTC (CFI) DECISION:Judge Avelino upheld heirs are no longer free to opt for the other remedy. In other
respondents' vigorous opposition and denied petitioner's words, the employee cannot pursue both actions
motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious. simultaneously.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation remedy under This (third) view was adopted by the majority, in
the Workmen's Compensation Act [WCA], and now under the Floresca case, reiterating as main authority its earlier
the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries decision in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Company. In so
sustained by an employee, is exclusive of the other remedies doing, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the
available under the Civil Code. rights and remedies granted by the WCA as laid down in
the Robles case. Three justices dissented. Unless and until
SC RULING: At issue is the exclusory provision of Section the Floresca ruling is modified or superseded, and We are
5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act reiterated in Article not so inclined, it is deemed to be the controlling
173 of the Labor Code jurisprudence vice the Robles case.
Sec. 5 Exclusive right to compensation. — The As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim
rights and remedies granted by this Act to an spouses cannot be allowed to maintain their
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling present action to recover additional damages
him to compensation shall exclude all other rights against petitioner under the Civil Code. In open
and remedies accruing to the employee, his court, respondents admitted that they had previously filed a
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of claim for death benefits with the WCC and had received the
kin against the employer under the Civil Code and compensation payable to them under the WCA. It is
other laws, because of said injury, therefore clear that respondents had not only opted to
recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At
the very least, a sense of fair play would demand that if a
Art. 173 Exclusive of liability. — Unless otherwise person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election
provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all allowed to exercise the second option.
other liabilities of the employer to the employee,
his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, respondent
receive damages on behalf of the employee or his Judge Avelino's orders dated December 29, 1975 and
dependents. The payment of compensation under February 3, 1976 are reversed and set aside, Civil Case No.
this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as 12861, entitled "The Spouses Felix C. Lim, and
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised ConsorciaGeveia vs. Ysmael Maritime Corp." is hereby
Administrative Code, Republic Act No. 1161, as ordered dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued
amended, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as by this Court on May 5, 1978 enjoining respondent Judge
amended, Republic Act No. 610, as amended, Avelino from conducting further proceedings in said case is
Republic Act No. 4864, as amended, and other made permanent. No costs.SO ORDERED.
laws whose benefits are administered by the
System, during the period of such payment for the
same disability or death, and conversely. NOTES:
In the case of Floresca vs. Philex Mining Company (1985), TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
this Court was confronted with three divergent opinions on
the exclusivity rule: This right of choice is qualified in that "the employee should
be held to the particular remedy on which he has staked his
FIRST VIEW: that the injured employee or his heirs, in case fortunes and must pursue even his alternative claim for
of death, may initiate an action to recover damages (not compensation exclusively in the same regular courts, once
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) he has opted to seek his remedy there rather than in the
with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Such a view would
employer pursuant to the Civil Code. be more in consonance with the legal principles that enjoin
multiplicity of suits and splitting a cause of action.
SECOND VIEW: As enunciated in the Robles case, is that Conversely, if the employee has originally opted to seek his
the remedy of an employee for work connected injury or remedy in the Workmen's Compensation Commission, he is
accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the barred from the regular courts, since section 5 of the
WCA. Workmen's Compensation Act expressly thereby "excludes
all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his
personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws,
because of said injury."
On September 14, 1993, petitioner filed an Amended
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:I concur in the result. I Complaint adding allegations that she suffered actual and
reiterate my dissent in the Floresca case. moral damages. Thus, she prayed that she be declared the
absolute owner of the property and/or that respondent be
ordered to pay her P165,000.00 plus the agreed monthly
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:I maintain my
interest of 10%; moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
view in Floresca pursuant to the clear exclusory provision of
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. fees and expenses of litigation.
G.R. NO. 145871, January 31, 2006

LEONIDES C. DIÑO, PETITIONER, VS. LINA RTC declared such contract as deed of sale with right to
JARDINES, RESPONDENT. repurchase or pacto de retro sale. It also ordered defendant
DECISION Jardines to pay actual and/or compensatory damages to the
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: plaintiff as follows:
FACTS: On December 14, 1992, Leonides C. Diño

(petitioner) filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership 1) P3,000.00 representing expenses in going to and from
with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7 Jardines' place to collect the redemption money;
(RTC). She alleged that: on January 31, 1987, Lina Jardines
(respondent) executed in her favor a Deed of Sale
with Pacto de Retro over a parcel of land with
2) P1,000.00 times the number of times Diño came to
improvements thereon covered by Tax Declaration No.
Baguio to attend the hearing of the case as evidenced by the
44250, the consideration for which amounted to
signatures of Diño appearing on the minutes of the
P165,000.00; it was stipulated in the deed that the period
proceedings found in the Rollo of the case;
for redemption would expire in six months or on July 29,
1987; such period expired but neither respondent nor any of
her legal representatives were able to redeem or repurchase
the subject property; as a consequence, absolute ownership 3) P10,000.00 attorney's fee.
over the property has been consolidated in favor of
CA reversed the RTC judgment and held that the contract is
petitioner.
an equitable mortgage. CA deleted the award for damages.
ISSUES
Respondent countered in her Answer that: the Deed of Sale

with Pacto de Retro did not embody the real intention of
the parties; the transaction actually entered into by the 1. What is the true nature of the contract?
parties was one of simple loan and the Deed of Sale 2. Was CA justified in deleting the award for
actual damages?
with Pacto de Retro was executed just as a security for the
loan; the amount borrowed by respondent during the first
week of January 1987 was only P50,000.00 with monthly HELD
interest of 9% to be paid within a period of six months, but
since said amount was insufficient to buy construction
materials for the house she was then building, she again
borrowed an additional amount of P30,000.00; it was 1. The CA correctly ruled that the true nature of the
never the intention of respondent to sell her property to contract entered into by herein parties was one of
petitioner; the value of respondent's residential house alone equitable mortgage.
is over a million pesos and if the value of the lot is added, it
would be around one and a half million pesos; it is
unthinkable that respondent would sell her property worth Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances
one and a half million pesos for only P165,000.00; when a purported pacto de retro sale may be considered an
respondent has even paid a total of P55,000.00 out of the equitable mortgage, to wit:
amount borrowed and she is willing to settle the unpaid
amount, but petitioner insisted on appropriating the
property of respondent which she put up as collateral for Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an
the loan; respondent has been the one paying for the realty equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
taxes on the subject property; and due to the malicious suit
filed by petitioner, respondent suffered moral damages.
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is property, clearly show that the intention of the parties was
unusually inadequate; merely for the property to stand as security for a loan. The
transaction between herein parties was then correctly
construed by the CA as an equitable mortgage.
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as
lessee or otherwise;
2. YES. In the present case, the RTC's award for actual
damages is a plain error because a reading of said trial
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to court's Decision readily discloses that there is no sufficient
repurchase another instrument extending the period evidence on record to prove that petitioner is entitled to the
of redemption or granting a new period is executed; same. Petitioner's only evidence to prove her claim for
actual damages is her testimony that she has spent
P3,000.00 in going to and from respondent's place to try to
collect payment and that she spent P1,000.00 every time
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the she travels from Bulacan, where she resides, to Baguio in
purchase price; order to attend the hearings.
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the In People vs. Sara,[12] the Court held that a witness'
taxes on the thing sold; testimony cannot be "considered as competent proof and
cannot replace the probative value of official receipts to
justify the award of actual damages, for jurisprudence
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that instructs that the same must be duly substantiated by
the real intention of the parties is that the transaction receipts."[13] Hence, there being no official receipts
shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance whatsoever to support petitioner's claim for actual or
of any other obligation. compensatory damages, said claim must be denied.
In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise
shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the PEOPLE vs. BALINO
usury laws. (Emphasis supplied)
B.F. METAL CORPORATION v. LOMOTAN
G.R. NO. 170813 : April 16, 2008
In Legaspi vs. Ong,[7] the Court further explained that: FACTS: Umuyon was driving the owner-type jeep
owned by respondents, Spouses Lomotan. The jeep was
cruising along Felix Avenue in Cainta, Rizal at a moderate
The presence of even one of the above-mentioned speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Suddenly, at the
circumstances as enumerated in Article 1602 is sufficient opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by
basis to declare a contract of sale with right to repurchase as Onofre Rivera overtook a car by invading the lane being
traversed by the jeep and rammed into the jeep. The jeep
one of equitable mortgage. As stated by the Code
was a total wreck while Umuyon suffered injuries which
Commission which drafted the new Civil Code, in
entailed his hospitalization for 19 days. Also in view of the
practically all of the so-called contracts of sale with right of injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive,
repurchase, the real intention of the parties is that the reducing his daily income from P150.00 to P100.00.
pretended purchase price is money loaned and in order to
secure the payment of the loan, a contract purporting to be Respondents instituted a separate and independent
a sale with pacto de retro is drawn up. civil action for damages against petitioner BF Metal
Corporationand Rivera alleging that defendant Rivera‘s
gross negligence and recklessness was the immediate and
proximate cause of the vehicular accident and that
In the same case, the Court cited Article 1603 of the Civil
petitioner failed to exercise the required diligence in the
Code, which provides that in case of doubt, a contract
selection and supervision of Rivera. The complaint prayed
purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages and
construed as an equitable mortgage. In the instant case, the attorney‘s fees in favor of respondents.During the trial,
presence of the circumstances provided for under respondents offered the testimonies of Fajardo, the auto-
paragraphs (2) and (5) of Article 1602 of the Civil Code, and repair shop owner who gave a cost estimate for the repair of
the fact that petitioner herself demands payment of the wrecked jeep. Among the documentary evidence
interests on the purported purchase price of the subject
presented were the 1989 cost estimate of Pagawaan Motors, speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the
Inc., which pegged the repair cost of the jeep at fact and amount of damages.The best evidence to prove the
P96,000.00, and the cost estimate of Fajardo Motor Works value of the wrecked jeep is reflected in the Deed of Sale
done in 1993, which reflected an increased repair cost at showing the jeep‘s acquisition cost at P72,000.00.
P130,655.00. They also presented in evidence a copy of the However, the depreciation value of equivalent to 10% of the
Decision of the RTC,finding Rivera guilty of reckless acquisition cost cannot be deducted from it in the absence
imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical of proof in support thereof.
injuries.
(2) NO. Petitionerargues that the award of moral damages
The trial court found defendants negligent and was premised on the resulting physical injuries arising from
ordered to pay actual, moral, exemplary damages and the quasi-delict; since only respondent Umuyon suffered
attorney‘s fees. The trial court split the award of actual physical injuries, the award should pertain solely to him.
damages into three items, namely, the cost of the wrecked Correspondingly, the award of exemplary damages should
jeep, the medical expenses incurred by respondent Umuyon pertain only to respondent Umuyon since only the latter is
and the monetary value of his earning capacity. On appeal, entitled to moral damages.
the Court of Appeals reduced the amount of medical
expenses and loss of earning capacity to which respondent Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are
Umuyon is entitled but increased from P96,700.00 to designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering,
P130,655.00 the award in favor of Spouses Lomotan for the mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
cost of repairing the wrecked jeep.The instant petition reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
assails only the modified valuation of the wrecked jeep. humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.
Petitioner points out that the alleged cost of repairing the In order for the award of moral damages to be justified, the
jeep pegged at P130,655.00 has not been incurred but is claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has
only a job estimate or a sum total of the expenses yet to be suffered such damages and that the injury causing it has
incurred for its repair. It argues that the best evidence sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219and
obtainable to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty 2220of the Civil Code. The damages must be shown to be
the value of the jeep is the acquisition cost or the purchase the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The
price of the jeep minus depreciation for one year of use claimant must establish the factual basis of the damages
equivalent to 10% of the purchase price. and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. In fine, an
award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
ISSUES: psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
secondly, a culpable act or omission factually
(1) whether or not the amount of actual damages based established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or
only on a job estimate should be lowered; omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
(2) whether Spouses Lomotan are also entitled to moral damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that
damages; and the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or
(3) whether the award of exemplary damages and envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
attorneys is warranted. Code.
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act

RULING: or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the
defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may
(1) YES. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is aptly be recovered. This rule also appliesto breaches of
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.Actual faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully
damages are such compensation or damages for an injury due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries,
that will put the injured party in the position in which he lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary
had been before he was injured. They pertain to such detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or
injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible defamation.Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral
of measurement. To justify an award of actual damages, damages suffered by respondent Umuyon. Its liability is
there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the
Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supervision and selection of its driver, causing the vehicular
supported by receipts.In the instant case, no evidence was accident and physical injuries to respondent Umuyon.
submitted to show the amount actually spent for the repair Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent
or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan Umuyon based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict.
presented two different cost estimates to prove the alleged
actual damage of the wrecked jeep. One is a job estimate by However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral
Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which pegged the repair cost of the damages to Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the
jeep at P96,000.00, while the other estimated the cost of criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the
repair at P130,655.00. Neither estimate is competent to negligence of petitioner under Article 2180. Article
prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on 2219speaks of recovery of moral damages in case of a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi- refused to accept him with his disability as he could not
delicts causing physical injuries, the two instances where perform his usual job.As an initial assistance, petitioner
Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral damages to gave respondent's wife, AnalizaPante, the sum
respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding of P7,000.00, which was spent for the stainless steel
moral damages where there is injury to property, but the instrument used in his fractured arm.After the first
injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such operation, respondent demanded from petitionerthe full
damages are justly due. There being no proof that the payment or reimbursement of his medical and
accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply. hospitalization expenses, but petitioner refused
payment.Four years later, respondent underwent a second
(3) YES. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by operation. He spent P15,170.00 for medical and
way of example or correction for the public good, in hospitalization expenses.
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a Respondent filed a Complaint for damages for the
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they injuries he sustained as a result of the vehicular
should be adjudicated. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages accident.Petitioner put up the defense that it had always
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
negligence. While the amount of the exemplary damages selection and supervision of its employees, and that the
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is accident was a force majeure for which it should not be held
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages liable.
before the court may consider the question of whether or
Trial was first set on February 26, 1996, and from
not exemplary damages should be awarded.
then on trial was postponed several times on motion of
petitioner.Six years later, in 2001, respondent‘s direct
Spouses Lomotan have shown that they are entitled
examination was concluded. His cross-examination was
to compensatory damages while respondent Umuyon can
reset to December 5, 2001 due to the absence of petitioner
recover both compensatory and moral damages. To serve as
and its counsel. It was again reset to January 23, 2002 upon
an example for the public good, the Court affirms the award
petitioners motion. On January 23, 2002, petitioner,
of exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to
through its new counsel, asked for another postponement
respondents. Because exemplary damages are awarded,
on the ground that he was not ready. Hence, the cross-
attorney‘s fees may also be awarded in consonance with
examination of respondent was reset to March 13,
Article 2208 (1).
2002.On March 13, 2002, petitioner was declared to have
waived its right to cross-examine respondent due to the
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, represented by its absence of petitioner and its counsel, and respondent was
owner/President RIZALINA LAMZON vs. allowed to offer his exhibits. Petitioners motion for
EDUARDO PANTE reconsideration was denied.In the hearing of June 19, 2002,
G.R. No. 162104, September 15, 2009 petitioner was declared to have waived its right to present
evidence on motion of respondents counsel in view of the
FACTS: Petitioner R Transport Corporation is a common unexplained absence of petitioner and its counsel despite
carrier engaged in operating a bus line transporting prior notice. The case was declared submitted for decision.
passengers to Gapan, Nueva Ecija from Cubao, Quezon
City and back.At about 3:00 a.m. of January 27, 1995, The trial court found that the respondents to be
respondent Eduardo Pante rode petitioners R. L. Bus entitled to damages and ordered petitioners to
Liner. Respondent paid for his fare, and he was issued bus [pay]:1.) P39,112.60 as actual damages;2.) P50,000.00
ticket.While traveling along the DoaRemedios Trinidad as moral damages;3.) P50,000.00 as exemplary
Highway in Baliuag, Bulacan, the bus hit a tree and a house damages;4.) Twenty-five percent (25%) of the total of
due to the fast and reckless driving of the bus driver, which shallconstitute a lien as contingent fee of plaintiffs
Johnny Merdiquia. Respondent sustained physical injuries (herein respondent) counsel.The trial court held that the
as a result of the vehicular accident. He was brought by to provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers
the BaliuagDistrict Hospital, where respondent was govern. Upon appeal, the CAaffirmedin toto the decision of
diagnosed to have sustained a laceration frontal area, with the trial court.Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was
fracture of the right humerus, or the bone that extends from denied for lack of merit.Hence, petitioner filed this petition.
the shoulder to the elbow of the right arm. Respondent ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent
underwent an operation for the fracture of the right for damages.
humerus per Certification issued by Dr. Virginia C. Cabling
of the Baliuag District Hospital. RULING: YES. Under the Civil Code, common carriers,
like petitioner bus company, from the nature of their
The hospital's Statement of Account showed that business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
respondents operation and confinement observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
cost P22,870.00. Respondent also spent P8,072.60 for his passengers transported by them, according to all the
medication. He was informed that he had to undergo a circumstances of each case. They are bound to carry the
second operation after two years of rest. He was passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
unemployed for almost a year after his first operation provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
because Goldilocks, where he worked as a production crew, persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.Article
1756 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of death of or Appeals, which awarded moral damages to paying
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to passengers, who suffered physical injuries on board a bus
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they that figured in an accident. Spouses Ong held that a person
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as is entitled to the integrity of his body and if that integrity is
prescribed by Articles 1733 and 1755.Further, Article 1759 of violated, damages are due and assessable. Thus, the usual
the Civil Code provides that [c]ommon carriers are practice is to award moral damages for physical injuries
liable for the death or injury to passengers through sustained. In Spouses Ong, the Court awarded moral
the negligence or willful acts of the former's damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to a passenger who
employees, although such employees may have acted was deemed to have suffered mental anguish and anxiety
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the because her right arm could not function in a normal
orders of the common carriers. This liability of the manner. Another passenger, who suffered injuries on his
common carriers does not cease upon proof that left chest, right knee, right arm and left eye, was awarded
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the mental
family in the selection and supervision of anxiety and anguish he suffered from the accident.
their employees.
In this case, respondent sustained a laceration
In this case, the testimonial evidence of respondent frontal area, with fracture of the right humerus due to the
showed that petitioner, through its bus driver, failed to vehicular accident. He underwent an operation for the
observe extraordinary diligence, and was, therefore, fracture of the bone extending from the shoulder to the
negligent in transporting the passengers of the bus safely to elbow of his right arm. After a few years of rest, he had to
Gapan, Nueva Ecija on January 27, 1995, since the bus undergo a second operation. Respondent, therefore,
bumped a tree and a house, and caused physical injuries to suffered physical pain, mental anguish and anxiety as a
respondent. Article 1759 of the Civil Code explicitly states result of the vehicular accident. Hence, the award of moral
that the common carrier is liable for the death or injury to damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is proper.
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of its
employees, and that such liability does not cease upon proof Petitioner likewise contends that the award of
that the common carrier exercised all the diligence of a exemplary damages is improper, because it did not act
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
its employees. Hence, even if petitioner was able to prove manner.The contention is without merit.Article 2232 of the
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family Civil Code states that [i]n contracts and quasi-contracts, the
in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, it is still court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted
liable to respondent for the physical injuries he sustained in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
due to the vehicular accident.Petitioner cannot complain manner. In this case, respondents testimonial evidence
that it was denied due process when the trial court waived showed that the bus driver, Johnny Merdiquia, was driving
its right to present evidence, because it only had itself to the bus very fast in a reckless, negligent and imprudent
blame for its failure to attend the hearing scheduled for manner; hence, the bus hit a tree and a house along the
reception of its evidence on June 19, 2002. There is no highway in Baliuag, Bulacan. The award of exemplary
denial of due process where a party was given an damages is, therefore, proper. The award of exemplary
opportunity to be heard. damages is justified to serve as an example or as a
correction for the public good.
DAMAGES
Further, the Court affirms the award of attorneys
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in affirming fees to respondents counsel. The Court notes that
the decision of the trial court, which awarded actual respondent filed his Complaint for damages on March 14,
damages in the amount of P22,870.00 based on the 1995as pauper-litigant. The award of legal fees by the trial
statement of account issued by court to respondents counsel was a contingent fee of 25
the Baliuag District Hospital and not based on an official percent of the total amount of damages, which shall
receipt. Petitioner argues that the statement of account is constitute a lien on the total amount awarded. The said
not the best evidence. The contention is without merit.As award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Twenty-five
cited by the Court of Appeals in its Decision, Jarco percent of the total damages is equivalent
Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals awarded actual to P34,778.15. The award of legal fees is commensurate to
damages for hospitalization expenses that was evidenced by the effort of respondents counsel, who attended to the case
a statement of account issued by in the trial court for seven years, and who finally helped
the Makati Medical Center. Hence, the statement of account secure redress for the injury sustained by respondent after
is admissible evidence of hospital expenses incurred by 14 years.
respondent.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the medical
Petitioner also contends that the award of moral certificate presented in evidence is without probative value
damages is not proper, because it is not recoverable in since respondent failed to present as witness Dr. Virginia
actions for damages predicated on breach of the contract of Cabling to affirm the content of said medical certificate.The
transportation under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Court of Appeals correctly held that the medical certificate
Code.The Court of Appeals correctly sustained the award of is admissible since petitioner failed to object to the
moral damages, citing Spouses Ong v. Court of presentation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of the appeal, however personally embarrassing
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76170, the cause for the dismissal might have been. As mentioned
dated October 7, 2003, and its Resolution datedFebruary 5, earlier, Conlu came to know about the outcome of his
2004, are hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner R Transport appeal only after his wife took the trouble of verifying the
Corporation is ordered to pay respondent Eduardo case status when she came to Manila. By then, all remedies
Pante P39,112.60 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral had been lost. Hence, Atty. Aredonia was found by the
damages; and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. Twenty- Court guilty of gross inexcusable negligence and meted to
five percent (25%) of the total amount shall constitute a lien
him the penalty of suspension of 1 year from the practice of
as contingent fee of respondents counsel.
law.
CONLU v. AREDONIA JR.
A.C. No. 4955, 12 September 2011, THIRD However, Conlu’s prayer for damages
DIVISION (Velasco Jr., J.) cannot be granted. Irrespective of the fact that
Conlu chose not to file his position paper before the
FACTS: Conlu is the defendant in a case for Quieting of IBP and, therefore, was unable to satisfactorily
Title before the RTC. He was represented by Atty. Aredonia. prove his claim for damages, a proceeding for
The trial court ruled against Conlu. They appealed before disbarment or suspension is not in any sense a civil
the CA, however it was dismissed for non-filing of action; it is undertaken and prosecuted for public
appellant‘s brief within the reglementary period. Atty. welfare. It does not involve private interest and
Aredonia did not inform Conlu about this, it was only upon affords no redress for private grievance.
inquiry of the latter‘s wife that they know of the same. Atty.
Aredonia promised to file a motion for reconsideration,
OPTIMUM MOTOR CENTER CORPORATION,- versus -
however the same was also denied for being filed out of
ANNIE TAN, doing business under thename & style AJ &
time. Disgusted, Conlu retrieved his files from Atty.
T Trading
Aredonia and himself ask for appellate reviews. However,
up to the Supreme Court his reliefs weren‘t granted because G.R. No. 170202. July 14, 2008
of the prejudicial impact of the dismissal before the CA.
FACTS:
Brought about by the events, Conlu filed an
administrative case for disbarment with prayer for damages Respondents version of the facts is as follows.
against Atty. Aredonia. Conlu asserted that he suffered On 14 January 1994, she brought the subject truck
sleepless nights, mental torture and anguish due to Atty. to Optimum for body repair and painting. Pea introduced
Aredonia‘s fault, not to mention that he lost properties as a himself as the owner and manager of
consequence of the finality of the trial court decision. Atty. Optimum. Respondent verbally contracted with Pea for the
Aredonia failed to refute nor file his comment, despite repair of the damaged portions of the truck, repainting and
repeated demands, during the investigation before the IBP. upholstery replacement. It was then agreed that the work
would take thirty (30) days to complete and would thus be
ISSUE: Whether or not Conlu may be awarded the reliefs finished on 15 February 1994. Leopoldo Daza, a
prayed for. security guard assigned to Optimum, received the truck and
prepared a checklist of the items found therein. On 20
HELD: Yes, Atty. Aredonia is administratively January 1994, an estimate detailing the description and
liable but Conlu is not entitled to damages. price rates for the repair was sent to respondent. To bring
down the repair costs, the parties agreed that
Res ipsa loquitur. Atty. Aredonia had doubtless respondent would supply the necessary materials
been languid in the performance of his duty as Conlu‘s such as windshield glasses for the front and back of
counsel. He neglected, without reason, to file the appellant‘s the truck, rubber strip and quartered glass
brief before the CA. He failed, in short, to exert his utmost panel.On 15 February 1994, respondent went to Optimum
ability and to give his full commitment to maintain and but was told to come back in March as the repair was not
defend Conlu‘s right. Conlu, by choosing Atty. Aredonia to yet finished. On several occasions, respondent tried to claim
represent him, relied upon and reposed his trust and her truck from Optimum to no avail. On 4 March 1994, she
confidence on the latter, as his counsel, to do whatsoever again went to Optimums repair shop and was surprised to
was legally necessary to protect his interest, if not to secure see that the trade name AJ & T Trading painted in the
a favorable judgment. Once they agree to take up the cause middle and side doors of the truck had been scraped
of a client, lawyers, regardless of the importance of the off. She also noticed that the 100-meter skyline rope, oil
subject matter litigated or financial arrangements agreed stick gauge and right side mirror were missing. On 22
upon, owe fidelity to such cause and should always be April 1994, she found her truck abandoned and
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on them. And unrepaired at Optimums compound. On 16 May
to add insult to injury, Atty. Aredonia appeared not to have 1994, she discovered that Optimum had already
taken any effort to personally apprise Antonio of the vacated its shop in Del Monte and that her truck
was nowhere to be found. Later, she learned that retention of the truck. It advances the view that by virtue of
Optimum had transferred to a new location but her the repairs it has actually performed on respondents truck,
still unrepaired truck was found it has the right under Article 1731 of the Civil Code to
in Valenzuela City. This prompted respondent to file the enforce the mechanics lien. It maintains that the lien
instant complaint with the trial court on 5 October applies and can be availed of whether or not the repair work
1994. She prayed for the recovery of possession of was completely executed. Accordingly, it prays for the
the truck or, in the alternative, the payment of the payment of the cost of repairs amounting to P69,145.00 in
value thereof. She also sought the award of attorneys exchange for the return of the subject truck, as well as for
fees, moral damages and costs of suit. At the trial of the the award of temperate damages in the sum of P30,000.00
case, two witnesses, Maximo Merigildo and Bel Eduardo and attorneys fees. Respondent counters that Optimum
Nitafan, testified on the dilapidated condition of the truck cannot avail of the mechanics lien because it was found by
when they saw it on separate occasions.On 20 October the lower courts that the repairs on the truck had not been
1994, the trial court issued an order directing the seizure of accomplished.
the vehicle upon respondents filing of a bond in the amount
of P1,200,000.00. Respondent posted the required ISSUE: Whether or not Optimum can avail of the
bond. Optimum posted a counterbond to lift said order. mechanics lien because it was found by the lower courts
that the repairs on the truck had not been accomplished.
Petitioners version:
HELD: NO.The concept of a mechanics lien is articulated
Itdenied guaranteeing that the repair work would in Article 1731 of the Civil Code, which provides: ARTICLE
be completed within 30 days from 15 January 1994. It 1731. He who has executed work upon a movable has a right
claimed that the repairs were completed only on 8 May to retain it by way of pledge until he is paid.
1994 due to delay in respondents delivery of the parts. It
presented as its witnesses the employees who had The mechanics lien is akin to a contractors
undertaken the tinsmithingpainting and electrical works on or warehousemans lien in that by way of pledge,
the truck.Optimum also explained that by virtue of a writ of the repairman has the right to retain possession of
execution issued against it by the Metropolitan Trial Court the movable until he is paid. However, the right of
of Quezon City, it was forced to vacate its repair shop and to retention is conditioned upon the execution of work upon
transfer all its equipment, tools and all the vehicles in its the movable. The creation of a mechanic's lien does not
possession and custody, including respondents truck, to the depend upon the owner's nonpayment. Rather, the
IIC Compound in Sitio Malinis, contractor "creates" his or her own lien by performing the
Bagbaguin, Valenzuela City. It claimed that it tried to get in work or furnishing the materials.Optimums invocation of
touch with respondent to ask her to claim the truck but she the mechanics lien is apparently based on the repairs it
was not available.Optimum claimed its right to retain executed on the truck. However, the lower courts had
possession of the truck, by virtue of Article 1731 of the Civil already come up with a categorical finding based on
Code, until the cost of repairs is paid. By way of testimonies of independent witnesses that the repairs
counterclaim, it asked for the payment of P79,370.00 as the had not been accomplished in accordance with the
unpaid cost of repairs and P25,000.00 as attorneys fees. agreement of the parties. We have to sustain these
factual findings, for basic is the tenet that the trial court's
On 31 May 1999, the trial court rendered a findings of facts as affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
decision in favor of respondent.On 28 June 2005, the Court binding on this Court, unless the lower courts overlooked,
of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of
modification the ruling of the RTC. The Court of Appeals substance which, if considered, would change the outcome
adhered to the trial courts findings that the repairs on the of the case. As a result of the failure to accomplish
truck had not been completed and that Optimum is liable the repairs on the truck, the right to retain the
for damages. It likewise ordered the return of the truck to truck in accordance with Article 1731 did not
respondent. Both parties moved for arise. Optimums continuous possession or detention of the
reconsideration. For her part, respondent reiterated that truck turned to be that of a deforciant and so respondent
her claim for compensatory damages is supported by has every right to recover possession of it.From another
statement of accounts showing the earnings of the truck perspective, Optimum is obliged to take care of the truck
before it was brought to Optimum for repair. She likewise with the proper diligence of a good father to a family while
expressed disinterest in the return of the truck as it was no the same is in its possession. Records show that the subject
longer in good condition. Instead, she sought merely the truck had already deteriorated while in the possession of
reimbursement of its value at P600,000.00 with Optimum. Taking into consideration the last known
interest. Both motions were denied in a Resolution dated 17 condition of the truck in tandem with the fact that the court
October 2005.Unfazed by the unfavorable judgment, proceedings have spanned almost a decade, it can be readily
Optimum now comes to this Court via a petition for inferred that the truck has become wholly useless. Since
review.In refusing to abide by the appellate courts ruling, restitution is no longer feasible, Optimum is bound
Optimum reiterates its claim for mechanics lien to justify its to pay the value of the truck.The value of the truck
should be based on the fair market value that the property which prevented him from accepting new orders from other
would command at the time it was entrusted to Optimum. customer causing him actual and potential losses of income.
Such recoverable value is fair and reasonable considering That the respondent‘s extrajudicial rescission of contract is
that the value of a motor vehicle depreciates. This value void since there is no breach or violation thereof by
may be recovered without prejudice to such other damages petitioner and in fact it was Octagon which violated the
a claimant is entitled to under applicable laws. terms/conditions of the contract, entitling petitioner to
have the same judicially rescinded.
Nevertheless, temperate damages have been
properly imposed by the appellate court. Under Article The RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent finding
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be that Casiñobreached the agreement. On appeal, the CA
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss upheld the rescission of the contract. Petitioner‘s motion for
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition filed by
the case, be proved with certainty. Casiño seeking the annulment of CA‘s issuances.
BIENVENIDO M. CASIÑO, JR. v. THE COURT OF ISSUE:

APPEALS and OCTAGON REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION Whether or not Octagon is entitled to rescind the contract
on the strength of Art. 1191 of the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 133803 September 16, 2005
(GARCIA, J.) Whether or not petitioner is liable for breach of contract.
FACTS: PetitionerBienvenido M. Casiño, Jr., owner and RULING:

proprietor of the Casiño Wood Parquet and Sanding
Services, agreed to supply and installation of 60,973 sq. It is petitioner who breached the contract. While Octagon
ft.narra wood parquet ordered by Octagon Realty was able to fulfill that which is incumbent upon it by
Development Corporation for its condominium project for a making a downpayment representing 40% of the agreed
total price of P1, 158,487.00. The contract stipulated price upon the signing of the contract and even paid the
thatCasiño will make full delivery of labor and materials by first billing of petitioner,the latter failed to comply with his
May 1990. In accordance with the terms of payment in the contractual commitmentto supply and deliver the
contract, Octagon paid Casiñothe amount P463, 394.50, contracted volume of narra wood parquet materials and
representing 40% of the total contract price. Petitioner install the same at respondent‘s condominium project by
incurred in delay in the delivery of the remainder of the May 1990. For, after delivering only less than one-half of
wood parquet materials. Respondent alleges that due to the contracted materials, petitioner failed, by the end of the
petitioner‘s refusal to comply with his obligations the
agreed period, to deliver and install the remainder despite
former incurred actual damages in the amount of P912,
demands for him to do so.
452.39 representing estimated loss on the new price,
unliquidated damages and cost of money especially in order No sufficient proof was presented by Casiñoto substantiate
to minimize losses it contracted the services of another his allegation that respondent was not ready to accept
corporation to complete the work at an amount of P1,
deliveries. On the other hand, the Octagon was able to
198,609.30.
prove by substantial evidence that as of May 1990, the time
Respondent filed a complaint for rescission of contract with when the Casiñowas supposed to make complete delivery
damages against petitioner. In its complaint, respondent there was already available in the condominium building
complaint prays for rescission of contract, actual damages any space from the basement to the fourteenth floor, and
of P912, 452.39, reimbursement in the amount of P1, the latter could have chosen from any of those.
198,609.30, moral damages of P200, 000.00, and
attorney‘s fees and other expenses of the suit. Since petitioner has failed to comply with his prestations
under his contract with respondent, the latter is vested by
Casiño’s Defense law with the right to rescind the parties‘ agreement,
conformably with Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which
In his answerwith ,petitioner admits the execution of the partly reads:
contract, the terms thereof relating to total price and scope
of work, as well as the payment by the Octagon of the 40% Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is
downpayment. He, however, avers that the stoppage of the implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
work is attributable to Octagon because the latter failed to obligors should not comply with what is
prepare the area suitable for the delivery and installation of incumbent upon him.
the wood parquet, preventing compliance with the delivery
schedule under the contract. Nevertheless, petitioner The injured party may choose between the
fulfillment and the rescission of the
delivered the required materials and performed the work
obligation, with the payment of damages in
despite these constraints although only partially or a total of
either case. He may also seek rescission even
29,209.82 sq. ft. of wood parquet when Octagon issued
orders to suspend work which created a storage problem
after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would
should become impossible. have pertained to him x xx. In the latter instance, the
familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized
In reciprocal obligations, or those which arise from the profits, frequently referred as ganaciasfrustradas or
same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a lucrumcessans, are not to be granted on the basis of mere
creditor of the other, in the sense that the obligation of one speculation, conjecture, or surmise, but rather by reference
is dependent upon the obligation of the other,the right to to some reasonably definite standard such as market value,
rescind is implied such that absent any provision providing established experience, or direct inference from known
for a right to rescind, the parties may nevertheless rescind circumstances.
the contract should the other obligor fail to comply with its
obligations.It must be stressed, though, that the right to Absolute certainty, however, is not necessary to establish
rescind a contract for non-performance of its stipulations is the amount of ganaciasfrustradasor lucrumcessans. The
not absolute. The general rule is that rescission of a injured party must produce the best evidence of which his
contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the
but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as inference that he has been damaged by the loss of profits
would defeat the very object of the parties in making the which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated
agreement. but for the defendant‘s wrongful act, he is entitled to
recover. Here, the evidence adduced by respondent is
The breach committed by petitioners cannot be considered sufficient enough to substantiate its claim for actual or
as only slight or casual but doubtless a substantial and compensatory damages in the amount of P 2,111,061. 69. As
fundamental breach in view of the fact that Octagon had to found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
pay another contractor a large amount of money to Appeals, respondent must be indemnified for the following
complete petitioner‘s unfinished work. Likewise, contrary damages it sustained by reason of petitioner‘s breach of
to petitioner‘s claim, he had knowledge of respondent‘s contract:
recourse to rescission. True, the act of a party in treating a
contract as cancelled or resolved on account of infractions 1. P912, 452.39, representing estimated losses on
by the other party must be made known to the other.In this new price, unliquidated damages and cost of money;
case, however, petitioner was fully aware, as he was, of his
non-compliance with what was incumbent upon him, not to 2. P 1,198,609.30, representing the cost incurredin
mention the several demand letters respondent sent to engaging the services of Hilvano Quality Parquet and
him. Sanding Services for the completion of the work unfinished
by [petitioner].
Respondent acted well within its rights in unilaterally
terminating its contract with petitioner and in entering into Respondent is beyond doubt entitled to attorney‘s fees,
a new one with a third person in order to minimize its what with the fact that respondent was compelled to litigate
losses, without prior need of resorting to judicial action. and incurred expenses relative thereto by reason of
Without such resort, however, the party rescinding petitioner‘s breach of his contractual obligations.
proceeds at his own risk for it is only the final judgment of WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed
the corresponding court that will conclusively and finally Decision and Resolution of the appellate court
settle whether the action taken was or was not correct in AFFIRMED.
law. But the law definitely does not require that the
contracting party who believes itself injured must first file MENDOZA vs PAL
suit and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial
steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by 90 Phil. 836 (1952)
the others breach will have to passively sit and watch its FACTS:Jose Mendoza, owner of the Cita Theater located in
damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until
Naga City, Camarines Sur, contracted with the LVN
the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law
Pictures, Inc., a movie producer in Manila, for him to show
itself requires that he should exercise due diligence to
minimize its own damages. during the town fiesta the Tagalog film entitled ―Himala ng
Birhen.‖ LVN delivered to Philippine Airlines (PAL) a can
Damages containing the aforesaid film consigned to the Cita Theater.
For reasons not explained by PAL, this can of film was not
Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code,actual or
unloaded at the airport and was brought back to Manila.
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of
or in recompense for loss or injury sustained. They proceed Mendoza, who went to the airport to inquire about the can,
from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair received the same and exhibited the film only after the town
the wrong that has been done. fiesta, missing his opportunity to realize a large profit as he
expected since the people had already left Naga City.
There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: Mendoza then brought an action for damages against PAL.
one is the loss of what a person already possesses, and the While the trial court found that Mendoza suffered damages
due to his failure to exhibit the film during the town fiesta, present case, the findings of the trial court are to the effect
it nonetheless found PAL not liable therefor as it was a that LVN and Mendoza on one side, and PAL on the other,
debtor in good faith. entered into a contract of transportation. One
interpretation of said finding is that the LVNthrough
On appeal, Mendoza insists that the Code of previous agreement with Mendoza acted as the latter's
Commerce rather than the Civil Code should have been agent.Another interpretation is that even if LVN as
applied and that he is not suing on a breach of contract but consignor of its own initiative, and acting independently of
on a tort. Mendoza for the time being, made Mendoza as consignee, a
ISSUE: Whether or not PAL is liable to pay damages due to stranger to the contract if that is possible; nevertheless,
Mendoza. when he, Mendoza, appeared at the airport armed with the
copy of the Air Way Bill demanding the delivery of the
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court concurs shipment to him, he thereby made himself a party to the
with the decision of the trial court. contract of the transportation. Still another view of this
phase of the case is that contemplated in Art. 1257,
Whether or not the transportation by air should be
paragraph 2, of the (old) Civil Code since the contact of
regarded as a commercial contract is immaterial. The
carriage between LVN and PAL contains stipulations of the
pertinent provisions of both the Code of Commerce and the
delivery to Mendoza as consignee. His demand for the
Civil Code regarding damages only treat of ordinary
delivery of the can to him may be regarded as a notice of his
damages or damages in general, not special damages like
acceptance of the stipulation in his favor, making himself a
those suffered by Mendoza. Inasmuch as the special
party to the contract. Thus, his cause of action must
damages herein claimed finds no applicable provision in the
necessarily be founded on its breach.
Code of Commerce, the rules of the civil law would have to
come into play. Under Art. 1107 of the (old) Civil Code, a ROSITA LIM et al. vs LUIS TAN et al.
debtor in good faith like PAL, may be held liable only for
damages that were foreseen or might have foreseen at the G.R. No. 177250 November 28, 2016
time the contract of transportation was entered into. The Facts:Luis, William, Joaquin, Vicente, Alfonso and Eusebio
trial court correctly found out that PAL could not have Tan (the Tan brothers), and AngTiatChuan, together with
foreseen the damages that would be suffered by Mendoza eight others, were charged with murder of Florentino Lim
for the reason that the plans of Mendoza to exhibit that film (from the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of CDO City) before
during the town fiesta and his preparations, specially the Military Commission No. 1—Luis, Chuan and 45 others,
announcement of said exhibition by posters and were found guilty of murder while the other brothers of Luis
advertisement in the newspaper, were not called to PAL‘s were acquitted. The judgment however only dealt with the
attention. A similar case, Chapman vs. Fargo, L.R.A. (1918 criminal prosecution but not on the indignant feelings
F), stated the rule that before the defendant could be held to instigated by the death of Florentino. Thus, on February 11,
1983, Rosita B. Lim (Rosita), wife of the deceased
special damages, such as the present alleged loss of profits
Florentino, together with her then minor children Jennifer,
on account of delay or failure of delivery, it must have
Lysander and Beverlie, all surnamed Lim Ket Kai
appeared that he had notice at the time of delivery to him of (collectively, the petitioners), commenced a civil action for
the particular circumstances attending the shipment, and damages in the RTC of Manila, against all those charged
which probably would lead to such special loss if he with the slaying of Florentino. RTC rendered a judgment in
defaulted. Otherwise stated, in order to impose on the favor of herein petitioners requiring all defendants to pay
defaulting party further liability than for damages naturally petitioners. Tan Brothers and Chuan appealed before CA.
and directly, i.e., in the ordinary course of things, arising The appellate court modified RTC‘s Decision6. Both parties
from a breach of contract, such unusual or extraordinary
damages must have been brought within the contemplation
of the parties as the probable result of a breach at the time 5Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Ocasiones, L~opoldoNicolas, and Marciano
Benemerito
of or prior to contracting.
6CA’s Decision: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June
21, 1999 and the Order dated February 10, 2000 are hereby MODIFIED, as
Moreover, if Mendoza does not invoke the contract follows:
of carriage entered into with PAL, then he would hardly 1. Defendants-appellants [Luis], [Chuan ], Mariano Velez, Jr.[,] Antonio
have any leg to stand on. His right to prompt delivery of the Ocasiones, Leopoldo Nicolas, Marciano Benemerito, and Oscar Yaun are
can of film stems and is derived from the contract of hereby ordered to pay the [petitioners], jointly and severally, the following
amounts:
carriage under which contract, PAL undertook to carry the (a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of
can of film safely and to deliver it to him promptly. Take [Florentino];
away or ignore that contract and the obligation to carry and (b) Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P350,000.00) as temperate
damages;
to deliver and the right to prompt delivery disappear. In the
(c) One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as moral damages;
then filed their respective petitions for review on certiorari; The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of
these two petitions were consolidated in this case. the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by
competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof.
Issue: whether or not the CA erred in modifying the For loss of income due to death, there must be unbiased
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses awarded to proof of the deceased's average income. Credence can be
the heirs of Florentino given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
Held:After a careful examination of the present case, the Nevertheless, the CA properly awarded
Court sustains the awarded damages, attorney's fees and temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages,
litigation expenses of the appellate court, but modifies the considering that Rosita was unable to prove the actual
amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of expenses incurred by the death of his husband. "According
Florentino. to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages, which
It is jurisprudentially settled that when death are more than nominal but less than compensatory
occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot,
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."Here,
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of there is no doubt that pecuniary expenses were incurred in
litigation; and (6) . . .interest, in proper cases. the funeral and burial of Florentino and the award of
temperate damages shall answer for the same in the
In imposing the proper amount of damages, the amount of P350,000.00, in consideration to the social
principal consideration is the penalty provided by law or status and reputation of the victim.
imposable for the offense because of its heinousness and
not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender. The Court also agrees with the finding of the CA
Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be that the award of moral damages of
imposed because of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, the P25,000,000.00 by the RTC is excessive, if not
imposable penalty as provided by law for the crime, such as exorbitant. "Moral damages are not intended to enrich the
those found in R.A. No. 7569, must be used as the basis for victim's heirs but rather they are awarded to allow them to
awarding damages and not the actual penalty. obtain means for diversion that could serve to alleviate their
moral and psychological sufferings.‖ In cases of murder, the
Here, the Court sustains the award of civil award of moral damages is mandatory without need of
indemnity but increases its amount to Pl 00,000.00 in allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. The
accordance with recent jurisprudence. "In our jurisdiction, award of moral damages of P150,000.00 in the present case
civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of is proper.
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the
damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the Corollarily, the rule in the Court's jurisdiction is
accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Thus, that exemplary damages are awarded in addition to moral
in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of damages. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution." the public good. The purpose of exemplary damages is to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings and as a
The CA' s deletion of the award of actual and vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the
compensatory damages which included the loss of rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
earning capacity of the victim is also proper. "For outrageous conduct. Here, the Court upholds the amount
one to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages.
the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best Finally, as a general rule, the parties may stipulate
evidence obtainable by the injured party." More so, the R the recovery of attorney's fees. In the absence of such
TC awarded damages for loss of earning capacity based stipulation, Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the
solely on the deposition of Rosita without even requiring legal grounds which justify or warrant the grant of
other documentary evidence to prove the· same. Although attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and this case
Rosita testified as to the annual income of Florentino, she qualifies for the first and eleventh reasons why attorney's
failed to substantiate the same by documentary evidence. fees are awarded, namely: (a) when exemplary damages are
awarded; and (b) in any other case where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
(d) One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Pl50,000.00) as exemplary damages; litigation should be recovered. Considering that the Court
(e) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as attorney's fees; and has awarded exemplary damages in this case, attorney's
(f) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl 00,000.00) as litigation expenses; fees can likewise be awarded. Since this case has been
2. The claims against appellants Alfonso Tan, Eusebio Tan, William Tan,
Vicente Tan, Joaquin Tan and Enrique Labita, stated in the Amended
hauled on for too long, the Court concurs with the
Complaint are hereby denied for lack of merit. ratiocination of the R TC in awarding attorney's fees and
SO ORDERED. litigation expenses of PlS0,000.00 and P350,000.00,
respectively, bearing in mind the legal extent of the work On the award of damages: when death occurs dueto a crime,
undertaken as well as the length of time that had elapsed to the following may be recovered: (1) civilindemnity ex delicto
prosecute this case. for the death of the victim; (2) actualor compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4)exemplary damages; (5)
In sum, considering the reputation and social attorney‘s fees and expenses oflitigation; and (6) interest, in
status of the victim at the time of his death, the Court proper cases.
sustains the awarded damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses granted by the CA. The amount of civil indemnity The CA awarded P42,337.25 as actual damages
is, however, increased to Pl 00,000.00 in accordance with andP10,000.00 as temperate damages to the heirs of Regis.
recent jurisprudence. Lastly, the heirs of Florentino should In People v. Villanueva and People v. Abrazaldo, we
likewise be granted an interest at the legal rate of six ruledthat temperate and actual damages are mutually
percent ( 6%) per annum on all the damages awarded from exclusivein that both may not be awarded at the same time.
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. Hence,no temperate damages may be awarded if actual
damageshave already been granted. The award of
P10,000.00 astemperate damages must, therefore, be
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FORD deleted.The grant of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
GUTTIEREZ Y DIMAANO andP50,000.00 as moral damages is proper, and thus,
wesustain the same. In murder, the grant of civil
When death occurs dueto a crime, the following may be indemnity,which has been fixed by jurisprudence at
recovered: (1) civilindemnity ex delicto for the death of the P50,000.00,requires no proof other than the fact of death
victim; (2) actualor compensatory damages; (3) moral as a result of the crime and proof of theaccused‘s
damages; (4)exemplary damages; (5) attorney’s fees and responsibility therefor. Moral damages, on theother hand,
expenses oflitigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. are awarded in view of the violent death of thevictim. There
is no need for any allegation or proof of theemotional
FACTS:On appeal is a decision of the Court of Appeals sufferings of the heirs. Likewise, the award of exemplary
finding appellant Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano guilty beyond damages is warrantedwhen the commission of the offense is
reasonable doubt of murder, frustrated murder and three attended by anaggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
(3) counts of attempted murder. Dimaano assails the trial or qualifying, as in this case(treachery).
court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution‘s
evidence. He admits having killed Regis and wounding Similarly, we affirm the award of P22,596.50 as
Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense. actualdamages to Dalit, who is, likewise, entitled to
moraldamages, which this Court fixes in the amount
ISSUE:W/N Dimaano is guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of40,000.00. Ordinary human experience and
by giving weight and credence to the contradictory commonsense dictate that the wounds inflicted on the
testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses survivingvictims would naturally cause physical suffering,
fright,serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries.
RULING: YES. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation
Finally,the award in the amount of P20,000.00, as
and offersexculpation from liability for crimes only if
exemplarydamages to Dalit, is also in order considering that
satisfactorilyproved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on
thecrime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
the part ofthe victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
treachery.
employedby the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficientprovocation on his part. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailedDecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge theburden
H.C. No.02680 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
of proving unlawful aggression. His version of theevents
was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found tobe less
credible by the trial court. On the other hand, thesurviving G.R. No. 175926 July 6, 2011
victims were unanimous that appellant suddenlyfired at
them, without any provocation on their part. The credibility PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RESTITUTO
of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMAN
court,and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. CHUA.LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
As arule, the appellate court gives full weight and respect to
thedetermination by the trial court of the credibility FACTS: On April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of the
ofwitnesses, since the trial judge has the best opportunity La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance
toobserve their demeanor. While this rule admits from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that
ofexceptions, none of such exceptions obtains in this case.In would allegedly take place in her house at Calavite St., Brgy.
Razon v. People, we held:―x x x in invoking self-defense,the Salvacion, Quezon City. When the team reached the place at
burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming around 4:00 p.m.,they alighted from their vehicles and
surrounded Milan‘s house. The two groups eventually met
selfdefense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
at the back of the house near Milan‘s room. The door to
and not onthe weakness of the prosecution.‖
Milan‘s room was open, enabling the police officers to see presence of his wife, Col. Doroteo Reyes and media man
Carandang, Milan and Chua inside. However, when the Ramon Tulfo. He went out of the house at around midnight
group introduced themselves as police officers, Milan when the three arrived. Milan and Chua‘scorroborated
immediately shut the door. accounts affirms that of Carandang‘s.
PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red pushed the door open, causing it P/Sr. Insp. Grace Eustaquio, Forensic Chemist of the PNP
to fall and propelling them inside the room. Suddenly, Crime Laboratory, later testified that the paraffin test on
gunshots rang, hitting PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red who Chua yielded a negative result for gunpowder nitrates, but
dropped to the floor one after the other. Due to the that performed on Carandang produced a positive result.
suddenness of the attack, PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red were She was not able to conduct a paraffin test on Milan, who
not able to return fire and were instantly killed by the just came from the operating room when she saw him.
barrage of gunshots. SPO1 Montecalvo, who was right
behind SPO2 Red, was still aiming his firearm at the TRIAL COURT: Found Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty
assailants when Carandang shot and hit him. of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated
murder. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reinforcements came at around 4:30 p.m. upon the arrival reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and to
of P/Sr. Insp. Calaro, Chief Operations Officer of the La indemnify the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally. To
Loma Police Station 1, and P/Supt. Roxas, the Deputy the heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red: ₱50,000.00 as civil
Station Commander of Police Station 1 at the time of the indemnity;₱50,000.00 as moral damages;₱149,734.00 as
incident.SPO1 Montecalvo was brought to the Chinese actual damages; and₱752,580.00 as compensatory
General Hospital. Milan was also brought to a hospital, but damages. To the heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo:₱50,000.00
Carandang and Chua remained holed up inside the house as civil indemnity;₱50,000.00 as moral
for several hours. After a lengthy negotiation for the damages;₱139,910.00 as actual damages; and₱522,960.00
surrender of Carandang and Chua, which they requested for as compensatory damages.Likewise, finding the accused
the presence of a certain Colonel Reyes and media man guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated
Ramon Tulfo, both surrendered. SPO2 Red and PO2 Alonzo murder, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
were found dead inside the house, their bodies slumped on they were sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 6 years of
the floor with broken legs and gunshot and grenade prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal,
shrapnel wounds. and to indemnify the victim WilfredoMontecalvo:
₱14,000.00 as actual damages; ₱20,000.00 as moral
Dr. Winston Tan, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine damages;₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney‘s fees; and To
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted the pay the costs.
post-mortem examination of the bodies of SPO2 Red and
PO2 Alonzo and found that the gunshot wounds of Red and CA:Affirmed the Trial Court‘s ruling on the 2 counts of
Alonzo were the cause of their deaths.According to SPO1 Murder and 1 count of frustrated Murder, but modified the
Montecalvo‘s account, Dr. Bu Castro of the Chinese General award of damages to pay the heirs of PO2 Dionisio S.
Hospital operated on him, removing a bullet from the right Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo P. Red an indemnity for loss of
portion of his nape. SPO1 Montecalvo‘s hospitalization earning capacity in the amount of ₱2,140,980.69 and
expenses amounted to ₱14,324.48. ₱2,269,243.62, respectively; and reduce the sentenceto an
indeterminate prison term of 6 years and 1 day of prision
The defense presented the three accused as witnesses. mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
Carandang claims that he had no firearm during the reclusion temporal, as maximum.
incident, and that it was the police officers that fired all the
shots. He was in Milan‘s house during the incident in order Milan and Chua appealed to this Court anew.Carandangdid
to ask Milan to accompany him to convert his cellular not appeal, and instead presented a letter informing this
phone‘s SIM card. When he arrived at Milan‘s place, he Court that he is no longer interested in pursuing an appeal.
found Milan and Chua playing a card game. A short time
later, there was banging on the door. The door of the house ISSUES:
was destroyed and gunfire suddenly erupted, prompting
him to take cover under a bed. Chua cried out to him that he
was hit and that he might lose blood. Milan ran outside and 1. Whether or not court a quo erred in holding that
sustained injuries as well. There was an explosion near the there was conspiracy among the appellants in the
door, causing burns on Carandang‘s left arm. Gunfire case at bar?
continued coming from different directions for two to three 2. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in
minutes. Suddenly, the place became dark as the lights went convicting them of the crime of murder and
out. frustrated murder instead of homicide and
frustrated homicide only, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery not having been duly
Since gunshots were still heard, Carandang stayed in the proven to attend the commission of the crimes
house and did not come out. Col. Tor, the new Chief of the charged?
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Sikatuna, negotiated
for Carandang to come out. Carandang requested for the
RULING: NO and NO. Milan‘s and Chua‘s arguments issues of the case; and (11) such findings are
focus on the lack of direct evidence showing that they contrary to the admissions of both parties.
conspired with Carandang during the latter‘s act of shooting
the three victims. However, as in People v. Sumalpong, Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate
conspiracy may also be proven by other means: a finding of conspiracy. Unlike evident premeditation, there
is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an sufficient period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises
decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or
agreement among the conspirators showing a impliedly, to commit the subject felony.
preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the
crime. Proof of concerted action before, during and after As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan‘s
the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and act of closing the door facilitated the commission of the
objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden
act of one is the act of all regardless of the degree of gunshots when the police officers pushed the door open
participation of each. illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to
prevent any chance for the police officers to defend
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua themselves. Treachery is thus present in the case at bar, as
conspired with Carandang was established by their acts (1) what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the
before Carandang shot the victims (Milan‘s closing the door execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to
when the police officers introduced themselves, allowing defend themselves or to retaliate.
Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting
(Chua‘s directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and The court held that trial court correctly sentenced
Milan‘s following such instruction). The facts are appellants to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose penalty for murder under Article 248of the RPC is reclusion
in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are perpetua to death. Applying Article 63of the same Code,
considered principals by direct participation. since there was no other modifying circumstance other than
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the penalty that
SPO1 Estores‘s positive testimonyon this matter prevails should be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The court also
over the plain denials of Milan and Chua. SPO1 Estores has affirms the modification of the Court of Appeals as regards
no reason to lie about the events he witnessed on April 5, the penalty for the frustrated murder of SPO1 Montecalvo.
2001. As part of the team that was attacked on that day, it
could even be expected that he is interested in having only The civil liabilities of appellants are modified in accordance
the real perpetrators punished. with current jurisprudence. Thus, in the Criminal Cases, the
award of ₱50,000.00, as civil indemnity for each victim,are
Furthermore, time and again the court has ruled that increased to ₱75,000.00. In cases of murder and homicide,
factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 and moral damages of
by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive when supported by ₱50,000.00 are awarded automatically, without need of
the evidence on record. It was the trial court that was able allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.
to observe the demeanors of the witnesses, and is Appellants are furthermore solidarily liable to each victim
consequently in a better position to determine which of the for ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, which is awarded
witnesses are telling the truth. Thus, as a general rule, when the crime was committed with an aggravating
the Supreme Court would not review the factual circumstance, be it generic or qualifying. However, since
findings of the courts a quo, except in certain Carandang did not appeal, he is only solidarily liable with
instances such as when: (1) the conclusion is Milan and Chua with respect to the amounts awarded by
grounded on speculations, surmises or the Court of Appeals, since the Court of Appeals‘ Decision
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly has become final and executory with respect to him. The
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave additional amounts (₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages) are borne only by
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact Milan and Chua, who are held liable therefor solidarily.
are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific
evidence on which the factual findings are based; The solidary liability of Milan and Chua for moral damages
(7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by to SPO1 WilfredoMontecalvo is likewise increased to
the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings ₱40,000.00, in accordance with prevailing
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings jurisprudence.An award of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary
of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals damages is also warranted. The additional amounts
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
(₱20,000.00 as moral damages and ₱20,000.00 as
undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
exemplary damages) are likewise to be solidarily borne only
would justify a different conclusion; (10) the
by Milan and Chua.
findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: iii. ₱139,910.00 as actual damages
to be solidarily borne by
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- Carandang, Milan and Chua;
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934 dated May 10, 2006 is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS: iv. ₱2,269,243.62 as indemnity
for loss of earning capacity to be
1. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-100061 and Q-01- solidarily borne by Carandang,
100062, appellants Henry Milan and Jackman Milan and Chua;
Chua are held solidarily liable for the amount of
₱25,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
exemplary damages to the heirs of each of the damages to be solidarily borne by
victims, PO2 Dionisio S. Alonzo and SPO2 Wilfredo Milan and Chua only;
P. Red, in addition to the amounts to which they
are solidarily liable with RestitutoCarandang as 2. In Criminal Case No. Q-01-100063, appellants
held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01934. Thus, to Henry Milan and Jackman Chua are held solidarily
summarize the rulings of the lower courts and this liable for the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral
Court: damages and ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to
SPO1 WilfredoMontecalvo, in addition to the
a. The heirs of SPO2 Wilfredo Red are amounts to which they are solidarily liable with
entitled to the following amounts: RestitutoCarandang as held in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 01934. Thus, to summarize the rulings of the
i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, lower courts and this Court, SPO1
₱50,000.00 of which shall be WilfredoMontecalvo is entitled to the following
solidarily borne by Carandang, amounts:
Milan and Chua, while
₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary i. ₱14,000.00 as actual damages to be
liability of Milan and Chua only; solidarily borne by Carandang, Milan and
Chua;
ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
to be solidarily borne by ii. ₱40,000.00 as moral damages,
Carandang, Milan and Chua; ₱20,000.00 of which shall be solidarily
borne by Carandang, Milan and Chua,
iii. ₱149,734.00 as actual damages while ₱20,000.00 shall be the solidary
to be soldarily borne by liability of Milan and Chua only;
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
iii. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages to
iv. ₱2,140,980.00 as indemnity be solidarily borne by Milan and Chua
for loss of earning capacity to be only; and
solidarily borne by Carandang,
Milan and Chua; and iv. ₱20,000.00 as reasonable attorney‘s
fees, to be solidarily borne by Carandang,
v. ₱30,000.00 as exemplary Milan and Chua.
damages to be solidarily borne by
Milan and Chua only; 3. Appellants are further ordered to pay interest on
all damages awarded at the legal rate of Six Percent
b. The heirs of PO2 Dionisio Alonzo are (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
entitled to the following amounts: judgment.SO ORDERED.
i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PEOPLE vs. GARCHITORENA

₱50,000.00 of which shall be
solidarily borne by Carandang,
Milan and Chua, while Sulpicio Lines vs CA
₱25,000.00 shall be the solidary
liability of Milan and Chua only; Facts: Plaintiff Tito Duran Tabuquilde (hereinafter, "Tito")
and his three-year old daughter Jennifer Anne boarded the
ii. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages M/V Dona Marilyn at North Harbor, Manila, bringing with
to be solidarily borne by them several pieces of luggage.
Carandang, Milan and Chua;
In the morning of October 24, 1988, the M/V Dona On November 24, 1988, a claim for damages was
Marilyn, while in transit, encountered inclement weather filed by Tito with the defendant Sulpicio Lines in
which caused huge waves due to Typhoon Unsang. connection with the death of the plaintiff-appellee's
daughter and the loss of Tito's belongings worth
Notwithstanding the fact that Storm Signal No. 2 P27,580.00.
had been raised by the PAG-ASA authorities over Leyte as
early as 5:30 P.M. of October 23, 1988 and which signal was Trial Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs ordering
raised to Signal No. 3 by 10 P.M. of the same day, the ship defendant to pay P27,580.00 as actual damages,
captain ordered the vessel to proceed to Tacloban when P30,000.00 for the death of Jennifer Tabuquilde,
prudence dictated that he should have taken it to the P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
nearest port for shelter, thus violating his duty to exercise damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
extraordinary diligence in the carrying of passengers safely costs.Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which
to their destination. affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner then filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied.
At about the same time, plaintiff-appellee Angelina
Tabuquilde (hereinafter, "Angelina") mother of Jennifer ISSUE: WON actual damages of 27,580 is proper.
Anne, contacted the Sulpicio Office to verify radio reports
that the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn was missing. Employees HELD: NO. In the case at bench, the trial court merely
of said Sulpicio Lines assured her that the ship was merely mentioned the fact of the loss and the value of the contents
"hiding" thereby assuaging her anxiety. of the pieces of baggage without stating the evidence on
which it based its findings. There is no showing that the
At around 2:00 P.M. of October 24, 1988, said value of the contents of the lost pieces of baggage was based
vessel capsized, throwing plaintiff-appellee Tito and on the bill of lading or was previously declared by
Jennifer Anne, along with hundreds of passengers, into the respondent Tito D. Tabuquilde before he boarded the ship.
tumultuous sea. Hence, there can be no basis to award actual damages in the
amount of P27,850.00.
Tito tried to keep himself and his daughter afloat
but to no avail as the waves got stronger and he was The trial court awarded an indemnity of
subsequently separated from his daughter despite his P30,000.00 for the death of the daughter of private
efforts. respondents. The award of damages under Article 2206 has
been increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Flores
He found himself on Almagro Island in Samar the
next day at round (sic) 11:00 A.M. and immediately With respect to the award of moral damages, the
searched for his daughter among the survivors in the island, general rule is that said damages are not recoverable
but the search proved fruitless. in culpa contractual except when the presence of bad faith
was proven (Trans World Air Lines v. Court of Appeals, 165
In the meantime, Angelina tried to seek the SCRA 143 [1988]). However, in breach of contract of
assistance of the Sulpicio Lines in Manila to no avail, the carriage, moral damages may be recovered when it results
latter refusing to entertain her and hundreds of relatives of in the death of a passenger
the other passengers who waited long hours outside the
Manila Office. Angelina spent sleepless nights worrying With respect to the award of exemplary damages,
about her husband Tito and daughter Jennifer Anne in view Article 2232 of the Civil Code of the Philippines gives the
of the refusal of Sulpicio Lines to release a verification of Court the discretion to grant said damages in breach of
the sinking of the ship. contract when the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent
and reckless manner
On October 26, 1988, Tito and other survivors in PETITIONER FAILED TO EXERCISE
the Almagro Island were fetched and were brought to
extraordinary diligence of a common carrier because the
Tacloban Medical Center for treatment.
crew of the vessel M/V Dona Marilyn took a calculated risk
when it proceeded despite the typhoon brewing somewhere
On October 31, 1988, Tito reported the loss of his in the general direction to which the vessel was going. The
daughter, was informed that the corpse of a child with his
crew assumed a greater risk when, instead of dropping
daughter's description had been found. Subsequently, Tito
anchor in or at the periphery of the Port of Calapan, or
wrote a letter to his wife, reporting the sad fact that Jennifer
Anne was dead. Angelina suffered from shock and severe returning to the port of Manila which is nearer, proceeded
grief upon receipt of the news. on its voyage on the assumption that it will be able to beat
and race with the typhoon and reach its destination before
it (Unsang) passes.
On November 3, 1988, the coffin bearing the
corpse of Jennifer Anne was buried in Tanauan, Leyte. Upon appeal to us, we deleted the award of
attorney's fees because the text of the appealed decision was
bereft of any findings of fact and law to justify such an Casas averred that he refused to accept Joel‘s challenge, but
award. Moreover, there was no proof, other than the bare the latter took a knife and attacked him. During the alleged
allegation of harassment that the adverse party had acted in attack, Casas posited that he suffered minor injuries when
bad faith. The aforementioned decision is inapposite to the he disarmed and stabbed Joel. Eligio and one Rolando
instant case where the decision clearly mentions the facts Jaronel witnessed the fight, and when they saw that Casas
and the law upon which the award of attorney's fees were stabbed Joel they began to attack him also. In order to
based. protect himself, Casas repeatedly stabbed Eligio. He
maintained that he did not intend to kill Joel.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of Issue: whether or not the award of damagers is proper
P27,580.00 as actual damages for the loss of the contents of
the pieces of baggage is deleted and that the award of Held:The downgrading of Casas‘s conviction results in the
P30,000.00 under Article 2206 in relation Article 1764 is deletion of the award of ₱30,000.00 in exemplary damages.
increased to P50,000.00. Further, keeping with recent jurisprudence, the Court is
impelled to increase the award of moral damages from
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, ₱30,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, as well as delete the award of
vs. BENJAMIN CASAS y VINTULAN, Accused- ₱12,500.00 in actual damages and, in lieu thereof, award
Appellant. temperate damages in the higher amount of ₱25,000.00.
Facts:On December 24, 2007, Casas, accompanied by a Accordingly, the award of loss of earning capacity is
certain "Ron-Ron", went to a certain taho factory looking increased from ₱37,200.00 to ₱348,000.00 as above-
for a certain Jesus. Failing to find the person he was looking computed. Meanwhile, the civil indemnity award of
for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail used ₱75,000.00 stands.
for making taho. Consequently, Eligio, an employee of the
In similar light, the Court modifies the award of
taho factory, confronted Casas, Eligio told Casas to get rid
moral damages from ₱10,000.00 to ₱20,000.00 to conform
of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron. Eligio and
with recent jurisprudence.
Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas
took the knife from Ron-Ron and stabbed Eligio twice while
the latter was fleeing. Casas, during his continued pursuit of
Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his part, tried to help PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
Eligio with the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, vs. FEDERICO BALANAG alias "Pedring," accused-
fell face first on the floor, and was prostrate. There and appellant, TITO BALAWAG alias "Andres," (at
then, Casas stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his large) and ROBERTO BALANAG alias "Berto," (at
back and exiting at the front of his torso, and the second large) accused.
blow hitting the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to
overtake Eligio, and stabbed him again on the stomach. G.R. No. 103225 September 15, 1994, PUNO, J.
Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a plastic Facts: Accused-appellant Federico Balanag and father and
stool and hit Casas on the head with it, forcing the latter to son Roberto and Tito Balanag were charged with Robbery
drop the knife and cease the attack. PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes with Homicide. After trial, the court a quo found Federico
claimed that he was riding his motorcycle on the date of the Balanag and his co-accused Tito Balanag guilty of Robbery
incident when he met PO3 Eduardo Fronda (PO3 Fronda) with Homicide. They were meted the penalty of reclusion
who asked for assistance as the latter saw a bloodied male. perpetua. The court a quo also ordered accused-appellant
The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, who and Tito Balanag, to indemnify, solidarily, the heirs of the
turned out to be Casas, and asked him what happened. The deceased Dr. Guillermo Lopez, the following amounts:
latter replied that he had just stabbed someone. After
confirming that there was indeed a stabbing incident a) P50,000.00 — for the death of Guillermo
nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas. Lopez;
b) P48,110.00 — as actual damages;
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a c) P20,000.00 — as moral damages; and
demurrer to Evidence on the basis of the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution d) P172,000.00 — for loss of earning
witnesses, which the RTC denied. With the demurrer‘s capacity.
denial, the defense changed its theory as Casas admitted Both accused appealed. However, Tito Balanag, who has
that he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but interposed self- remained at large, did not file the required Appellant's
defense to justify his actions. In particular, Casas claimed Brief. His appeal was considered abandoned for failure to
that he was a former employee of the taho factory and his prosecute his appeal and, more importantly, for his refusal
former employer asked him to get the remainder of his to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the authorities.
salary. While at the factory, Joel challenged him to a fight.
Issue Whether or not the indemnification imposed by the d) P144,000.00, for loss of the earning capacity.
court against the accused was proper
Held: No. In connection with the civil liability of

accused-appellant, the award of P48,110.00, for Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. vs.
actual or compensatory damages, is not fully Borja
supported by evidence. The records show that the total 383 SCRA 34
amount incurred for burial/funeral expenses was
P19,482.00, not P23,110.00. FACTS: Smith Bell filed a written request with the Bureau
of Customs for inspection of vessel M/T King Family which
Anent Mrs. Lopez' additional claim of P25,000.00 for the was due to arrive at the port of Manila. Said vessel
expenses incurred during the two weeks wake for the contained 750 metric tons of Alkyl Benzene and Methyl
victim, we find the said claim reasonable considering the Methacrylate Monomer. CatalinoBorja, a customs inspector
social standing of the Lopezes in the community. The of the Bureau of Customs, was instructed to board said
Lopezes are prominent in their place, not to mention they vessel and perform his duties as inspector upon the vessel's
belong to a big family. (Mr. and Mrs. Lopez sired 13 arrival until its departure.
children, most of whom are professionals and gainfully
employed). The total award for actual damages should then When M/T King Family was already unloading chemicals
be P44,482.00, and not P48,110.00. unto 2 barges owned by International Towage and
Transport Corporation (ITTC), a sudden explosion occurred
With respect to the claim for loss of earning capacity of the setting the vessel on fire. Upon hearing the explosion, Borja,
victim, we note that the victim was already 69 years old at who was at that time inside the cabin preparing reports, ran
the time he was killed on November 24, 1985. His income as outside to check what happened. Again, another explosion
a dentist was P10,000.00 per month, or P120,000.00 per happened. Seeing the fire and fearing for his life, he
annum. After deducting therefrom the necessary and hurriedly jumped over board to save himself. However, the
incidental expenses which the victim would have incurred if water was likewise on fire due to the spilled chemicals.
he were alive, the court a quo, declared that the victim's Despite the tremendous heat, Borja swam his way for 1 hour
annual net income would be P24,000.00. The trial court until he was rescued and sent to San Juan De Dios Hospital.
multiplied his net annual income by his life expectancy of
seven (7) years and two (2) months, hence, P172,000.00 After weeks of intensive care at the hospital, he was
was awarded for loss of the earning capacity of the victim. diagnosed to be permanently disabled due to the incident.
Thereafter, Borja made demands against Smith Bell and
In computing the loss of the earning capacity of the victim, ITTC for the damagescaused by the explosion. However,
several factors are considered besides the mathematical both denied liabilities and attributed to each other
computation of annual income times life negligence. The RTC ruled in favor of Borja and held Smith
expectancy.Allowances are made for circumstances which Bell liable for damages and loss of income. The CA affirmed
could reduce the computed life expectancy of the victim, the RTC decision.
e.g., nature of work of the victim, his lifestyle, age, and state
of health prior to his death. In addition, we have to consider ISSUE:Whether or not Smith Bell is liable for Borja‘s
the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the victim. In this injuries
case, albeit there was no evidence on the state of health of
the victim, considering his advanced age, we find it RULING:YeS. The attempts of Smith Bell to shift the
reasonable and fair to assume that he would not be able blame on ITTC were all for naught. First, thetestimony of its
work and earn, as a dentist, until he reaches the final alleged eyewitness was stricken off the record for his failure
moment of his life. Thus, we reduce the award for loss to appear for cross-examination. Second, the documents
of the earning capacity of the deceased to offered to prove that the fire originated from barge ITTC-
P144,000.00, which is the approximate amount he 101 were all denied admission by the Court for being, in
would have earned until his 75th birthday. effect, hearsay, thus, there is nothing in the record to
support Smith Bell‘s contention that the fire and explosion
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM WITH originated from barge ITTC-101.
MODIFICATION the assailed Decision, dated September
5, 1991, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch XXXIII) of Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to
Bauang, La Union, in Criminal Case No. A-1540. another. It is the failure to observe that degree of care,
Accordingly, the indeminification granted in favor of the precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly
heirs of DR. GUILLERMO LOPEZ, are modified as follows: demand, whereby that other personsuffers injury. Smith
Bell's vessel was carrying chemical cargo -- alkyl benzene
a) P50,000.00, for the death of Dr. Lopez; and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that
their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals,
b) P20,000.00, for moral damages; its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary
c) P44,482.00, for actual expenses; and
precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, On September 28, 2004 petitioner Magsaysay paid the
therefore, negligent. deficiency award of US$30,000.00 in full and final
settlement of Chin‘s disability compensation claim. On
The three elements of quasi-delict are the following: (a) February 26, 2007, however, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of Decision ordering it to pay Chin: a) ₱19,279.75 as
the defendant; and (c) the connection of cause and effect reimbursement for medical expenses; b) US$147,026.43 as
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the loss of future wages; c) ₱200,000.00 as moral damages; d)
damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these elements were ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and e) 10% of the total
established in this case. Knowing fully well that it was award as attorney‘s fees.
carrying dangerous chemicals, Smith Bell was negligent in
not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the On November 25, 2008 the NLRC modified the Labor
cargo. Hence, the owner or the person in possession and Arbiter‘s Decision by deleting the awards of loss of future
control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural wages and moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual
and proximate damage caused to persons and property by and legal bases. On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC‘s
reason of negligent management or navigation. Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the Labor
Arbiter‘s Decision, hence, this petition.
Therefore, Smith Bell is liable for Borja‘s injuries.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in affirming the Labor Arbiter‘s
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION vs.
award of loss of future earnings on top of his disability
OSCAR D. CHIN, JR
benefits as well as awards of moral and exemplary damages
FACTS: Thome Ship Management Pte. Ltd., through its and attorney‘s fees.
agent petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
RULING: The LA‘s award of loss of earning is unwarranted
(Magsaysay) hired respondent Oscar D. Chin, Jr. to work
since Chin had already been given disability compensation
for nine months as able seaman on board MV Star Siranger.
for loss of earning capacity. An additional award for loss of
earnings will result in double recovery. The Court has
On October 22, 1996 Chin sustained injuries while working consistently ruled that disability should not be understood
on his job aboard the vessel. Dr. Solan of Wilmington, more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning
North Carolina, examined him and found him to have capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of
suffered from lumbosacral strain due to heavy lifting of
an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or
pressurized machine. The doctor gave him medications and
work of similar nature that he was trained for or
advised him to see an orthopedist and a cardiologist. Chin
was repatriated on November 30, 1996. On return to the accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person
Philippines, Chin underwent a surgical procedure called of his mentality and attainment could do. What is
laminectomy and discectomy L-4-L-5. A year after the compensated is one‘s incapacity to work resulting in the
operation, Dr. Robert D. Lim of the Metropolitan Hospital impairment of his earning capacity.
diagnosed Chin to have a moderate rigidity of his tract.
In awarding damages for loss of earning capacity, the LA
On August 6, 1998 Chin filed a claim for disability with relies on the rulings in cases involving essentially claims for
Pandiman Phils., Inc. which is the local agent of P & I Club damages arising from quasi-delict. The present case
of which Magsaysay Maritime is a member. Pandiman involves a claim for disability benefits under Chin‘s contract
offered US$30,000.00 as disability compensation which of employment and the governing POEA set standards of
Chin accepted on August 6, 1998. He then executed a recovery. The long-standing rule is that loss of earning is
Release and Quitclaim in favor of Magsaysay Maritime. recoverable if the action is based on the quasi-delict
provision of Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
Chin filed a complaint with the NLRC, claiming
underpayment of disability benefits and attorney‘s fees. He While the Labor Arbiter can grant moral and exemplary
later amended his complaint to include claims for damages. damages, the amounts are quite excessive in the absence of
evidence to prove the degree of moral suffering or injury
Labor Arbiter dismissed Chin‘s complaint for lack of merit. that Chin suffered. It has been held that competent and
The NLRC affirmed the dismissal on May 17, 2001. On substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid
appeal, however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the before the court. It is worthy to stress that moral damages
dismissal and ruled that Chin was entitled to permanent are awarded as compensation for actual injury suffered and
total disability benefit of US$60,000.00. The CA remanded not as a penalty.
the case to the Labor Arbiter for determination of the other
monetary claims of Chin. This prompted petitioner As for exemplary damages, the award of ₱25,000.00 is
Magsaysay to come before this court on a petition for review already sufficient to discourage petitioner Magsaysay from
on certiorari. The Court denied the petition, however, in a entering into iniquitous agreements with its employees that
Resolution dated September 8, 2003. This Resolution violate their right to collect the amounts to which they are
entitled under the law. Exemplary damages are imposed not
became final and executory on February 23, 2004.
to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially After trial, the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
deleterious actions Branch VII, dismissed the stating that the proximate cause
of the fall of the payloader was Vicente E. Concepcion's act
SULPICIO LINES, INC. vs. CURSO or omission in having misrepresented the weight of the
payloader as 2.5 tons instead of its true weight of 7.5 tons,
PEOPLE vs. BUSTAMANTE which underdeclaration was intended to defraud
CompañiaMaritima of the payment of the freight charges
and which likewise led the Chief Officer of the vessel to use
COMPAÑIA MARITIMA vs.COURT OF APPEALS the heel block of hatch No. 2 in unloading the payloader.
and VICENTE CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-31379 August 29, 1988 From the adverse decision against him, Vicente E.
Concepcion appealed to the Court of Appeals which
FACTS: Vicente E. Concepcion, a civil engineer doing reversed the earlier decision and ordered
business under the name and style of Consolidated CompañiaMaritima to pay damages. Hence, this petition.
Construction, had a contract with the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA) sometime in 1964 for the ISSUE: W/N the act of Vicente E. Concepcion in furnishing
construction of the airport in Cagayan de Oro City Misamis petitioner CompañiaMaritima with an inaccurate weight of
Oriental. 2.5 tons instead of the payloader's actual weight of 7.5 tons
was the proximate and only cause of the damage on the
Being a Manila — based contractor, Vicente E. Concepcion Oliver Payloader OC-12 when it fell while being unloaded by
had to ship his construction equipment to Cagayan de Oro petitioner's crew, as would absolutely exempt petitioner
City. Concepcion negotiated anew with CompañiaMaritima, from liability for damages under paragraph 3 of Article 1734
thru its collector, Pacifico Fernandez, for the shipment to of the Civil Code.
Cagayan de Oro City of one (1) unit payloader, four (4) units
6x6 Reo trucks and two (2) pieces of water tanks. He was RULING: NO. The general rule under Articles 1735 and
issued Bill of Lading 113 on the same date upon delivery of 1752 of the Civil Code is that common carriers are
the equipment at the Manila North Harbor. presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
in case the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed or
These equipment were loaded aboard the MV Cebu arrived had deteriorated. To overcome the presumption of liability
at Cagayan de Oro City in the afternoon of September 1, for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods under
1964. The Reo trucks and water tanks were safely unloaded Article 1735, the common carriers must prove that they
within a few hours after arrival, but while the payloader was observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733
about two (2) meters above the pier in the course of of the Civil Code. Also, mere proof of delivery of the goods
unloading, the swivel pin of the heel block of the port block in good order to a common carrier, and of their arrival at
of Hatch No. 2 gave way, causing the payloader to fall. The the place of destination in bad order, makes out prima
payloader was damaged and was thereafter taken to facie case against the common carrier, so that if no
CompañiaMaritima's compound in Cagayan de Oro City. explanation is given as to how the loss, deterioration or
destruction of the goods occurred, the common carrier must
Consolidated Construction, thru Vicente E. Concepcion, be held responsible. Otherwise stated, it is incumbent upon
wrote CompañiaMaritima to demand a replacement of the the common carrier to prove that the loss, deterioration or
payloader which it was considering as a complete loss destruction was due to accident or some other
because of the extent of damage. Consolidated Construction circumstances inconsistent with its liability.
likewise notified petitioner of its claim for damages.
Meanwhile, CompañiaMaritima shipped the payloader to In this case, CompañiaMaritimaseems to have overlooked
Manila where it was weighed at the San Miguel the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in
Corporation. Finding that the payloader weighed 7.5 tons the vigilance over the goods transported by them by virtue
and not 2.5 tons as declared in the B-111 of Lading, of the nature of their business, which is impressed with a
CompañiaMaritima denied the claim for damages of special public duty.
Consolidated Construction contending that had Vicente E.
Concepcion declared the actual weight of the payloader, Thus, Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides:
damage to their ship as well as to his payloader could have
been prevented.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reason of
To replace the damaged payloader, Consolidated public policy, are bound to observe
Construction in the meantime bought a new one at extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
P45,000.00 from Bormaheco Inc. Vicente E. Concepcion over the goods and for the safety of the
filed an action for damages against CompañiaMaritimawith passengers transported by them according
the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, to all the circumstances of each case.
seeking to recover damages.
Such extraordinary diligence in the Pisang, who is tasked with the over-all supervision of
vigilance over the goods is further loading and unloading heavy cargoes and upon whom rests
expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, the burden of deciding as to what particular winch the
Nos. 5, 6 and 7, ... unloading of the payloader should be undertaken. While it
was his duty to determine the weight of heavy cargoes
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods before accepting them. Mr. Felix Pisang took the bill of
tendered for shipment requires the common carrier to know lading on its face value and presumed the same to be
and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage correct by merely "seeing" it. Acknowledging that there was
to, or destruction of the goods entrusted to it for safe a "jumbo" in the MV Cebu which has the capacity of lifting
carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render 20 to 25 ton cargoes, Mr. Felix Pisang chose not to use it,
service with the greatest skill and foresight and "to use all because according to him, since the ordinary boom has a
reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic capacity of 5 tons while the payloader was only 2.5 tons, he
of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in did not bother to use the "jumbo" anymore.
the handling and stowage including such methods as their
nature requires." In that sense, therefore, private respondent's act of
furnishing petitioner with an inaccurate weight of the
In the instant case, it cannot be reasonably concluded that payloader upon being asked by petitioner's collector, cannot
the damage caused to the payloader was due to the alleged be used by said petitioner as an excuse to avoid liability for
misrepresentation of private respondent Concepcion as to the damage caused, as the same could have been avoided
the correct and accurate weight of the payloader. As found had petitioner utilized the "jumbo" lifting apparatus which
by the respondent Court of Appeals, the fact is that has a capacity of lifting 20 to 25 tons of heavy cargoes. It is
petitioner used a 5-ton capacity lifting apparatus to lift and a fact known to the Chief Officer of MV Cebu that the
unload a visibly heavy cargo like a payloader. Private payloader was loaded aboard the MV Cebu at the Manila
respondent has, likewise, sufficiently established the laxity North Harbor on August 28, 1964 by means of a terminal
and carelessness of petitioner's crew in their methods of crane. Even if petitioner chose not to take the necessary
ascertaining the weight of heavy cargoes offered for precaution to avoid damage by checking the correct weight
shipment before loading and unloading them, as is of the payloader, extraordinary care and diligence compel
customary among careful persons. the use of the "jumbo" lifting apparatus as the most prudent
course for petitioner.
It must be noted that the weight submitted by Concepcionas
an addendum to the original enumeration of equipment to While the act of private respondent in furnishing petitioner
be shipped was entered into the bill of lading by petitioner, with an inaccurate weight of the payloader cannot
thru Pacifico Fernandez, a company collector, without successfully be used as an excuse by petitioner to avoid
seeing the equipment to be shipped. Mr. Mariano Gupana, liability to the damage thus caused, said act constitutes a
assistant traffic manager of petitioner, confirmed in his contributory circumstance to the damage caused on the
testimony that the company never checked the information payloader, which mitigates the liability for damages of
entered in the bill of lading. Worse, the weight of the petitioner in accordance with Article 1741 of the Civil Code,
payloader as entered in the bill of lading was assumed to be to wit:
correct by Mr. Felix Pisang, Chief Officer of MV Cebu.
Art. 1741. If the shipper or owner merely
The weights stated in a bill of lading are prima facie contributed to the loss, destruction or
evidence of the amount received and the fact that the deterioration of the goods, the proximate
weighing was done by another will not relieve the common cause thereof being the negligence of the
carrier where it accepted such weight and entered it on the common carrier, the latter shall be liable
bill of lading. Besides, common carriers can protect in damages, which however, shall be
themselves against mistakes in the bill of lading as to weight equitably reduced.
by exercising diligence before issuing the same.
TRANS- ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC. v. COURT OT
While petitioner has proven that Concepcion did furnish it APPEALS and ATTY. RENATO ARROYO
with an inaccurate weight of the payloader, petitioner is
nonetheless liable, for the damage caused to the machinery G.R. No. 118126, 4 March 1996
could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable skill
and attention on its part in overseeing the unloading of Facts: Atty. Renato Arroyo (Atty. Arroyo) bought a ticket
such a heavy equipment. And circumstances clearly show [Trans- Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. (Trans- Asia), a
that the fall of the payloader could have been avoided by corporation engaged in inter-island shipping, for the voyage
petitioner's crew. Evidence on record sufficiently show that of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de Oro City from
the crew of petitioner had been negligent in the Cebu City. At around 5:30 in the evening, Atty. Arroyo
performance of its obligation by reason of their having boarded the M/V Asia Thailand vessel. He noticed that
failed to take the necessary precaution under the
some repair works were being undertaken on the engine of
circumstances which usage has established among careful
persons, more particularly its Chief Officer, Mr. Felix the vessel. The vessel departed at around 11:00 in the
evening with only one (1) engine running.After an hour of liability. On the contrary, such a claim demonstrates
slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island and beyond cavil the petitioners lack of genuine concern for the
dropped its anchor thereat. After half an hour of stillness, safety of its passengers. Trans- Asia should not expect its
some passengers demanded that they should be allowed to passengers to act in the manner it desired. The passengers
return to Cebu City for they were no longer willing to were not stoics; becoming alarmed, anxious, or frightened
continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. The captain at the stoppage of a vessel at sea in an unfamiliar zone at
acceded to their request and thus the vessel headed back to nighttime is not the sole prerogative of the faint-hearted.
Cebu City.At Cebu City, Atty. Arroyo together with the other More so in the light of the many tragedies at sea resulting in
passengers were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the the loss of lives of hopeless passengers and damage to
vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Atty. Arroyo, the property simply because common carriers failed in their
next day, boarded the M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance
Cagayan de Oro City, likewise a vessel of Trans- Asia. For of their obligations.
failure to transport him to the place of destination, Atty.
Arroyo filed a complaint for damages. In his complaint, he However, the attorney‘s fee must be deleted. Under
alleged that the engines of the M/V Asia Thailand conked Article 2208 of the Civil Code, these are recoverable only in
out in the open sea, and for more than an hour it was stalled the concept of actual damages, not as moral damagesnor
and at the mercy of the waves, thus causing fear in the judicial costs. Hence, to merit such an award, it is settled
passengers. It sailed back to Cebu City after it regained that the amount thereof must be proven. It must be
power, but for unexplained reasons, the passengers were specifically prayed for - as was not done in this case - and
arrogantly told to disembark without the necessary may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for
precautions against possible injury to them. He further such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just
alleged that by reason of the Trans- Asia‘s wanton, reckless, and equitable. Finally, it must be noted that aside from the
and willful acts, he was unnecessarily exposed to danger following, the decision of the CA does not satisfy the
andincurred additional expenses and loss of income. He benchmark of factual, legal and equitable justification
then prayed that he be awarded P1,100.00, P50,000.00, needed as basis for an award of attorneys fees.
and P25,000.00 as compensatory, moral, and exemplary NOTE:
damages, respectively. In his pre-trial brief, he asserted that
his complaint was an action for damage arising from breach 1. The damages comprised in Title XVIII of the Civil
of contract and from tort. Code are actual or compensatory, moral, nominal,
temperate or moderate, liquidated, and exemplary. Actual
RTCdismissed the complaint since it did not or compensatory damages represent the adequate
appear that Atty. Arroyo was left in the Port of Cebu due to compensation for pecuniary loss suffered and for profits the
fault, negligence, malice, or wanton attitude of Trans- Asia‘s obligee failed to obtain. In contracts or quasi-contracts, the
employees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the obligor is liable for all the damages which may be
RTC decision and ordered Trans- Asia to pay Atty. Arroyo reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
P20,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as exemplary obligation if he is guilty of fraud, bad faith, malice, or
damages, P5,000 as attorney‘s fees, and cost of suit. It did wanton attitude. Moral damages include moral suffering,
not, however, allow the grant of damages for the delay in mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
the performance of the Trans- Asia‘s obligation as the reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
requirement of demand set forth in Article 1169 of the Civil humiliation, or similar injury. They may be recovered in the
Code had not been met by Atty. Arroyo. cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, likewise,
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Arroyo is entitled to damages if they are the proximate result of, as in this case, the
petitioners breach of the contract of carriage.Anent a breach
Held: YES. The Court concurs with CA that Trans- Asia is of a contract of common carriage, moral damages may be
liable for moral and exemplary damages. In allowing its awarded if the common carrier, like the petitioner, acted
unseaworthy M/V Asia Thailand to leave the port of origin fraudulently or in bad faith.Exemplary damages are
and undertake the contracted voyage, with full awareness imposed by way of example or correction for the public
that it was exposed to perils of the sea, it deliberately good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
disregarded its solemn duty to exercise extraordinary compensatory damages. In contracts and quasi-contracts,
diligence and obviously acted with bad faith and in a exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant acted
wanton and reckless manner. The defense of Trans- Asia in a wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
that safety of passengers was never at stake because the sea manner.
was calm and that the incident resulted only from Atty.
Arroyo‘s over-reaction cannot exculpate it nor mitigate its
2. Article 698 of the Code of Commerce specifically representing the premium paid by the insured with interest
provides for right of passenger to indemnity if the at the rate of 12% per annum from the time of the death of
interruption of the voyage is due to acts of captain the insured until fully paid.
exclusively. If the interruption should be caused by the The parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration.
disability of the vessel and a passenger should agree to While respondents questioned the factual and legal bases of
await the repairs, he may not be required to pay any the CA Decision, SUN LIFE, on the other hand, assailed the
increased price of passage, but his living expenses during imposition of interest on the premium ordered refunded to
the stay shall be for his own account.Article 698 must then respondents. However, the appellate court denied the
motions. Only SUN LIFE appealed to SC.
be read together with Articles 2199, 2200, 2201, and 2208
in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. This article ISSUE: Whether or not SUN LIFE is liable to pay interest
assumes that passenger stayed on the vessel and was with it on the premium to be refunded to respondents.
when it thereafter resumed its voyage.
HELD: NO. SUN LIFE argues that no interest should have
been imposed on the premium to be refunded because the
G.R. No. 183272 October 15, 2014 CA Decision does not provide any legal or factual basis
therefor; that petitioner directly and timely tendered to
SUN LIFE OF CANADA (PHILIPPINES), INC. respondents an amount representing the premium refund
vs.SANDRA TAN KIT and The Estate of the but they rejected it since they opted to pursue their claim
Deceased NORBERTO TAN KIT for the proceeds of the insurance policy; that respondents
should bear the consequence of their unsound decision of
FACTS: Respondent Tan Kit is the widow and designated rejecting the refund tendered to them; and, that SUN LIFE
beneficiary of Norberto Tan Kit (Norberto), whose is not guilty of delay or of invalid or unjust rescission as to
application for a life insurance policy,with face value of make it liable for interest. Hence, following the ruling in
₱ 300,000.00, was granted by petitioner on October 28, TioKheChio v. Court of Appeals,no interest can be assessed
against petitioner.The Court finds, however, that
1999. On February 19, 2001, or within the two-year TioKheChio is not applicable here as it deals with payment
contestability period, Norberto died of disseminated gastric of interest on the insurance proceeds in which the claim
carcinoma. Consequently, respondent Tan Kit filed a claim therefor was either unreasonably denied or withheld or the
under the subject policy. SUN LIFE denied respondent Tan insurer incurred delay in the payment thereof. In this case,
Kit‘s claim on account of Norberto‘s failure to fully and what is involved is an order for SUN LIFE to refund to
faithfully disclose in his insurance application certain respondents the insurance premium paid by Norberto as a
material and relevant information about his health and consequence of the rescission of the insurance contract on
smoking history. Specifically, Norberto answered "No" to account of the latter‘s concealment of material information
the question inquiring whether he had smoked cigarettes or in his insurance application. Moreover, SUN LIFE did not
cigars within the last 12 months prior to filling out said unreasonably deny or withhold the insurance proceeds as it
application. However, the medical report of Dr. Anna Chua was satisfactorily established that Norberto was guilty of
(Dr. Chua), one of the several physicians that Norberto concealment.
consulted for his illness, reveals that he was a smoker and
had only stopped smoking in August 1999. According to Nature of interest imposed by the CA
SUN LIFE, its underwriters would not have approved
Norberto‘s application for life insurance had they been There are two kinds of interest – monetary and
given the correct information. Believing that the policy is compensatory.
null and void, SUN LIFE opined that its liability is limited
to the refund of all the premiums paid. Accordingly, it "Monetary interest refers to the compensation set by the
parties for the use or forbearance of money. "No such
enclosed in the said letter a check for ₱ 13,080.93 interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated
representing the premium refund. in writing.26 "On the other hand, compensatory interest
refers to the penalty or indemnity for damages imposed by
Respondent Tan Kit refused to accept the check and law or by the courts." The interest mentioned in Articles
insisted on the payment of the insurance proceeds. Hence, 2209 and 221228of the Civil Code applies to compensatory
SUN LIFE filed a Complaint for Rescission of Insurance interest.
Contract before the RTC which ruled in favour of Tan Kit.
RTC orderd SUN LIFE to pay Tan Kit, the sum of Clearly and contrary to Tan Kits‘ assertion, the interest
₱ 300,000.00 representing the face value of the insurance imposed by the CA is not monetary interest because aside
from the fact that there is no use or forbearance of money
policy with interest at 6% per annum from October 4, 2002
involved in this case, the subject interest was not one which
until fully paid.
was agreed upon by the parties in writing. This being the
SUN LIFE moved for reconsideration, but was denied. case and judging from the tenor of the CA, to wit:
Hence, SUN LIFE appealed to the CA which reversed and Accordingly, [petitioner] is ordered to reimburse
set aside the RTC‘s ruling. Accordingly, SUN LIFE was [respondents] the sum of ₱ 13,080.93 representing the
ordered to reimburse Tan Kit the sum of ₱ 13,080.93 [premium] paid by the insured with interest at the rate of
12% per annum from time of death of the insured until fully and 4, with accrued interest from August 1, 1991 plus moral
paid. and exemplary damages with attorney‘s fees.9 In its
complaint,FSI alleged that FBI refused to pay said amount
There can be no other conclusion than that the interest despite demand and itscompletion of ninety-seven percent
imposed by the appellate court is in the nature of (97%) of the contracted works.
compensatory interest. The CA incorrectly imposed
compensatory interest on the premium refund reckoned
In its Answer with Counterclaim, FBI claimed that FSI
from the time of death of the insured until fully paid. As a
form of damages, compensatory interest is due only if the completed only eighty-five percent (85%) of the contracted
works, failing to finish the diaphragm wall and component
obligor is proven to have failed to comply with his
works in accordance with the plans and specifications and
obligation.
abandoning the jobsite. FBI maintains that because of FSI‘s
In this case, it is undisputed that simultaneous to its giving inadequacy, its schedule in finishing the Project has been
of notice to respondents that it was rescinding the policy delayed resulting in the Project owner‘s deferment of its
due to concealment, petitioner tendered the refund of own progress billings.10 It further interposed counterclaims
premium by attaching to the said notice a check for amounts it spent for the remedial works on the alleged
representing the amount of refund. However, respondents defects in FSI‘s work. RTC ruled in favor of FSI. CA
refused to accept the same since they were seeking for the affirmed the Decision of the lower court
release of the proceeds of the policy. Because of this
discord, petitioner filed for judicial rescission of the ISSUE: W/N FSI neglected the fulfilment of its obligations
contract. Petitioner, after receiving an adverse judgment under the contract
from the RTC, appealed to the CA. And as may be recalled,
the appellate court found Norberto guilty of concealment HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
and thus upheld the rescission of the insurance contract
and consequently decreed the obligation of petitioner to We agree with the courts below and reject FBI‘s first and
return to respondents the premium paid by Norberto. third arguments.
Moreover, we find that petitioner did not incur delay or
unjustifiably deny the claim.
Under the construction agreement, FSI‘s scope of
Based on the foregoing, we find that SUN LIFE properly workconsisted in (1) the construction of the guide walls,
complied with its obligation under the law and contract. diaphragm walls, and capping beam; and (2) the
Hence, it should not be made liable to pay compensatory installation of steel props. As the lower courts aptly
interest. observed from the records at hand, FSI had, indeed,
completed ninety-seven percent (97%) of its contracted
Considering the prevailing circumstances of the case, SUN works and the non-completion of the remaining three
LIFE to reimburse the premium paid within 15 days from percent (3%), as well as the alleged defects in the said
date of finality of this Decision. If petitioner fails to pay works, are actually attributable to FBI‘s own fault such as,
within the said period, then the amount shall be deemed but not limited to, the failure to deliver the needed cement
equivalent to a forbearance of credit. In such a case, the rate as agreed upon in the contract
of interest shall be 6% per annum.
The construction of the diaphragm wall panel by panel
FEDERAL BUILDERS, INC., vs. FOUNDATION caused misalignment and the chipping off of the portions
SPECIALISTS, INC. misaligned is considered a matter of course. Defendant, as
the main contractor of the project, has the responsibility of
FACTS: On August 20, 1990, Federal Builders, Inc. (FBI) chopping or chipping off of bulges. Wrong location of rebar
entered into an agreement with Foundation Specialists, Inc. dowels was anticipated by both contractor and
(FSI) whereby the latter, as subcontractor, undertook the subcontractor as the latter submitted a plan called "Detail of
construction of the diaphragm wall, capping beam, and Sheer Connectors" which was approved.The plan provided
guide walls of the Trafalgar Plaza located at Salcedo Village, two alternatives by which the wrong location of rebar
Makati City (the Project), for a total contract price of Seven dowels may be remedied. Hence, defendant, aware of the
Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos possibility of inaccurate location of these bars, cannot
(₱7,400,000.00).7 Under the agreement,8 FBI was to pay a therefore ascribe the same to the plaintiff as defective work.
downpayment equivalent to twenty percent (20%) of the
contract price and the balance, through a progress billing Construction of the capping beam required the use of
every fifteen (15) days, payable not later than one (1) week cement. Records, however, show that from September 14,
from presentation of the billing. 1990 up to May 30, 1991, plaintiff had repeatedly requested
defendant to deliver cement. Finally, on April 22, 1991,
On January 9, 1992, FSI filed a complaint for Sum of Money plaintiff notified defendant of its inability to construct the
against FBI before the RTC of Makati City seeking to collect capping beam for the latter‘s failure to deliver the cement as
the amount of One Million Six Hundred Thirty-Five provided in their agreement. Although records show that
Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-Eight Pesos and Ninety- there was mention of revision of design, there was no
One Centavos (₱1,635,278.91), representing Billings No. 3 evidence presented to show such revision required less
amount of cement than what was agreed on by plaintiff and that he may be allowed to board the plane. But when it
defendant. reached Narita, he was bumped off the flight, and while he
was waiting at the ground office of JAL for three hours, the
The seventh phase of the construction of the diaphragm plane took off and he was left behind. Subsequently, he was
wall is the construction of the steel props which could be informed that his travel documents were in order, was
installed only after the soil has been excavated by the main refunded with the cost of his airline ticket. Eventually, his
contractor. When defendant directed plaintiff to install the US Visa was cancelled.
props, the latter requested for a site inspection to determine
if the excavation of the soil was finished up to the 4th level Simangan filed a complaint for damages against
basement. Plaintiff, however, did not receive any JAL before the RTC claiming that he failed to donate his
response.It later learned that defendant had contracted out kidney, and suffered terrible embarrassment and mental
that portion of work to another sub-contractor. anguish. He prayed for 3M moral damages, 1.5M exemplary
Nevertheless, plaintiff informed defendant of its willingness damages, and 500k for attorney‘s fees. On the other hand,
to execute that portion of its work. JAL justified their action by stating that there was a need
for the US Embassy to authenticate the travel documents
because no one of JAL‘s staff encountered a parole visa
It is clear from the foregoing that contrary to the allegations before; and that the parties agreed that the flight be
of FBI, FSI had indeed completed its assigned obligations, rebooked the next day.
with the exception of certain assigned tasks, which was due
to the failure of FBI to fulfil its end of the bargain. The RTC ruled in favor of Simangan that JAL
violated the contract of carriage, hence liable for damages,
It can similarly be deduced that the defects FBI complained and it cannot prejudice third persons as it is presumed to be
of, such as the misaligned diaphragm wall and the conversant with the travel documents. The CA affirmed
erroneous location of the rebar dowels, were not only such decision but lowered down the amount of damages
anticipated by the parties, having stipulated alternative (500k MD, 250k ED, deleted attorney‘s fees). Hence, the
plans to remedy the same, but more importantly, are also present case before the Court.
attributable to the very actions of FBI. Accordingly,
considering that the alleged defects in FSI‘s contracted ISSUE: Whether or not JAL is liable for moral damages,
works were not so much due to the fault or negligence of the exemplary damages and attorney‘s fees.
FSI, but were satisfactorily proven to be caused by FBI‘s
own acts, FBI‘s claim of ₱8,582,756.29 representing the RULING: YES. The Court awarded 500k moral damages,
cost of the measures it undertook to rectify the alleged 100k exemplary damages and 200k attorney‘s fees to
defects must necessarily fail. Simangan which are considered reasonably sufficient to
indemnify the latter for humiliation and embarrassment,
Thus, in the absence of any record to otherwise prove FSI‘s and will serve as an example to discourage the repetition of
neglect in the fulfilment of its obligations under the said oppressive acts.
contract, this Court shall refrain from reversing the findings
of the courts below, which are fully supported by and JAL is liable for moral damages which are
deducible from, the evidence on record. Indeed, FBI failed recoverable in suits predicated on breach of a contract of
to present any evidence to justify its refusal to pay FSI for carriage where it is proved that the carrier was guilty of
the works it was contracted to perform. As such, We do not fraud or bad faith, as in this case. Inattention to and lack of
see any reason to deviate from the assailed rulings. care for the interests of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience,
amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an
JAPAN AIRLINES vs. JESUS SIMANGAN
award of moral damages. What the law considers as bad
G.R. No. 170141 April 22, 2008
faith which may furnish the ground for an award of moral
damages would be bad faith in securing the contract and in
FACTS: Simangan was set to travel to the United States to
the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its
complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery as
terms, or any other kind of deceit.
it was found out that his blood and tissue well-matched
with Loreto, the former‘s cousin in California who was in
JAL is also liable for exemplary damages as its acts
need of a kidney donation. Simangan was granted with a US
constitute wanton, oppressive and malevolent acts against
Emergency visa, thereafter he bought a round trip plane
Simangan. Exemplary damages, which are awarded by way
ticket from Japan Airlines (JAL). He was scheduled to a
of example or correction for the public good, may be
particular flight bound for California via Narita, Japan. On
recovered in contractual obligations, as in this case.
the date of his flight, after being subjected to rigid
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit
immigration and security routines, he was allowed by JAL
the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious
to enter its airplane. While inside the plane, JAL‘s airline
in its consequence by creating negative incentives or
crew suspected him of carrying a falsified travel document
deterrents against such behaviour. Neglect or malfeasance
and imputed that he would only use the trip to the US as a
of the carrier's employees could give ground for an action
pretext to stay and work in Japan. After he showed his
for damages. Passengers have a right to be treated by the
travel documents, he was haughtily ordered to stand up and
carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
leave the plane. He pleaded that they monitor his actions so
due consideration and are entitled to be protected against constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and press includes fair commentaries on matters of public
abuses from such employees. interest which are privileged and a defense for libel or
slander.
Attorney‘s fees may be awarded when defendant's
act or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate with third Considering that the published articles involve
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. There matters of public interest and that its expressed opinion is
are two concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary not malicious but based on established facts, the
and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee imputations against JAL are not actionable. Therefore, JAL
is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his may not claim damages for them.
client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter.
The basis of this compensation is the fact of his
employment by and his agreement with the client. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO)v.
EDITO and FELICIDAD CHUA, and
In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an JOSEFINAPAQUEO
indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by
the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the G.R. No. 160422, July 5, 2010, Third Division,
cases provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and is Brion, J.
payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have
agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as FACTS: The Chuas are the beneficial users at their
additional compensation or as part thereof. residence of electric service provided by MERALCO.
MERALCO installed an electric meter in front of the Chuas‘
The amount is actually discretionary upon the home to record the Chuas‘ electric consumption. The meter
Court so long as it passes the test of reasonableness. They was in a concrete post outside the Chuas‘ perimeter fence.
may be recovered as actual or compensatory damages when
exemplary damages are awarded and whenever the court From June 11, 1996 to September 11, 1996, the Chuas
deems it just and equitable. consumed between 231 to 269 kilowatt hours of electricity
per month, with their corresponding monthly electric bills
The total amount of P800,000.00 as the liabilities ranging from P747.84 to P887.27. In October 1996, the
of JAL will earn legal interest pursuant to the guidelines in Chuas were surprised to receive an electricity bill for the
the Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals case. amount of P4,906.87 for the period of September 11 to
The legal interest is 6% and it shall be reckoned from October 11, 1996 (September 1996 bill). According to this
September 21, 2000 when the RTC rendered its judgment. bill, they consumed 1,297 kilowatt hours for this one month
From the time this Decision becomes final and executory, period, or approximately 553% higher than their previous
the interest rate shall be 12% until its satisfaction. monthly bill. Alarmed by the significant increase, Florence
Chua (the Chuas‘ daughter) went to the MERALCO office to
The compulsory counterclaim for damages of JAL question the bill. Florence paid the bill under protest to
arising from the filing of the complaint may not be granted
avoid disconnection.
inasmuch as the complaint against it is obviously not
malicious or unfounded. It was filed by Simangan precisely MERALCO responded to the Chuas‘ complaint by sending a
to claim his right to damages against JAL. Well-settled is representative, Francisco Jose Albano, to their residence to
the rule that the commencement of an action does not per
inspect the electric meter. Albano filed a Meter/Socket
se make the action wrongful and subject the action to
Inspection Report stating that he replaced the old meter
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a
penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a and installed a new one because the old meters terminal
party's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria. seal was missing, the cover seal was broken, and the meter
Lawful acts give rise to no injury. had a broken sealing wire. The Chuas were billed based on
the new meter and its readings from October 11, 1996 to
The alleged publication of the complaint in a January 24, 1997, with an average usage ranging from 227
newspaper which resulted damage on the part of JAL was to 254 kilowatt hours, with corresponding monthly electric
not raised in the pleadings. And even if treated to be part of bills ranging from P700.00 to P800.00.
the pleadings, the publications involved matters about
which the public has the right to be informed because they On January 3, 1997, the Chuas received a letter from
relate to a public issue. This public issue or concern is a MERALCO billing them the amount of P183,983.66 in view
legitimate topic of a public comment that may be validly of the findings of their service inspectors after the metering
published. JAL‘s business, a common carrier, mainly deals installation in their home. The Chuas refused to pay as
with the traveling public. It invites people to avail demanded. MERALCO, then, returned to their residence
themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers. Since and removed their meter, thereby disconnecting their
JAL deals with the public, its bumping off of Simangan electric supply. MERALCO sent the Chuas another demand
without a valid reason naturally drew public attention and letter asking them to pay a reduced amount of P71, 737.49
generated a public issue. Also, Simangan may not be held after the re-evaluation of the Chuas‘ case.
liable for damages for the publication because the
Subsequently, the Chuas filed a complaint for mandamus In the present case, however, MERALCO presented no
and damages, praying that they be granted a preliminary proof that it ever caught the Chuas, or anyone acting in the
mandatory injunction to compel MERALCO to restore the Chuas behalf, in the act of tampering with their electric
electrical connection to their residence. The trial court ruled meter. As correctly observed by the CA, the Chuas could not
in favor of the Chuas. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) have been caught in flagrante delicto committing the
affirmed the trial court‘s decision, but modified the award tampering since in the first place, they were the ones who
for moral damages. Hence, this petition by MERALCO. reported the defect in their meter. Moreover, the presence
of a broken cover seal, broken sealing wire, and a missing
ISSUES: terminal seal, is not enough to declare the Chuasin
1. Was the immediate disconnection undertaken by flagrante delicto tampering with the electric meter. As the
MERALCO proper under the circumstances? basic complaint for mandamus alleged, without any serious
refutation from MERALCO, the electric meter is in a
2. Is the award of moral damages proper? concrete post outside of the Chuas‘ perimeter fence; hence,
in a location accessible to the public. The Court noted, too,
RULING: that MERALCO did not present any evidence that it caught
the Chuas committing any of the acts constituting prima
1. NO. The discovery of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on
facie evidence of illegal use of electricity for the second
the meter shall only constitute prima facie evidence of
time.
illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from the
illegal use if such discovery is personally witnessed and In view of MERALCO‘s failure to comply with both Section
attested to by an officer of the law or a duly 4 and Section 6 of RA 7832, MERALCO obviously had no
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory authority to immediately disconnect the Chuas‘ electric
Board (ERB). With such prima facie evidence, service.
MERALCO is within its rights to immediately disconnect
the electric service of the consumer after due notice. 2.
After thoroughly examining the records of this case, the YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides that moral
Court found no proof that MERALCO ever complied with damages are proper when the rights of individuals,
the required presence of an officer of the law. In his including the right against deprivation of property without
testimony, Albano never mentioned that he was due process of law, are violated. Jurisprudence has
accompanied by an authorized government representative established the following requisites for the award of moral
during the inspection. damages: (1) there is an injury whether physical, mental, or
psychological clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is
The Court noted, too, that while MERALCO claimed in its a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the
Answer that an ERB representative was present and wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
witnessed the testing of the Chuas‘ electric meter at the cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the
MERALCO laboratory, it never once identified this ERB award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
representative. MERALCO did not allege in either the Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
present petition or in the Memorandum it filed with the
Court that an ERB representative witnessed the laboratory Considering the manner MERALCO disconnected the
testing of the Chuas‘ electric meter. The Meter Verification Chua‘s electric service, the Court found the award of moral
Report, the document that contains the results of the damages proper. Apart from the havoc wreaked on the
laboratory testing, was also not signed by either an ERB Chua‘s daily lives when MERALCO abruptly and without
representative or by any officer of the law. legal basis cut off their electricity, the removal of the electric
meter also caused the Chua‘s extreme social humiliation
For lack of any evidence showing that a government and embarrassment as they were subjected to speculations
representative personally witnessed and attested to the in their neighborhood of being power thieves. As Mrs.
discovery of the Chuas‘ tampered electric meter, no Felicidad Chua testified, she suffered sleepless nights and
supporting prima facie evidence can be invoked for the felt serious anxiety after the removal of their electric meter
immediate disconnection of the Chuas‘ electric service came to the attention of the barangay. In fact, she even had
pursuant to Section 4 of RA 7832. to consult a doctor for this anxiety.Thus, even if the Chuas
did subsequently obtain their electricity from another
Further, MERALCO is authorized under Section 6 of RA
source, the damage to the Chuas‘ reputation and social
7832 to immediately disconnect the electric service of its
standing had already been done.
consumers without the need of a court or administrative
order when: (a) the consumer, or someone acting in his However, moral damages, which are left largely to the
behalf, is caught in flagrante delicto in any of the acts sound discretion of the courts, should be granted in
enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832; or (b) when any of the reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances constituting prima facie evidence of illegal circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of
use of electricity is discovered for the second time. pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a from fellow barangay officials who are in need of assistance.
penalty. As prevailing jurisprudencedeems the award of On the same day, he received a call from his companion,
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 appropriate who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall
in cases where MERALCO wrongfully disconnected electric any unusual incident that transpired on that day. While he
service, the Court upheld the CA ruling, reducing the moral admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a
damages awarded from P300,000.00 to P100,000.00. complaint against him but he denied that he knew her
personally. He denied raping AAA and claimed that after
PEOPLE v.MANOLITO LUCENA alias "Machete," 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014(Perez, J.) fact, he was shocked when he was arrested.
FACTS: On 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while RTC: guilty of 3 counts of rape. CA sustainedthe conviction
AAA, who was then 17 years old, was walking and chatting for 3 counts of rape, as well as the damages awarded.
with her friends along one of the streets of San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, two barangay tanods, one of whom is the ISSUE: Should the award for damages be upheld? “In
Machete, approached and informed them that they were addition, Lucena is ordered to pay AAA the amount of
being arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil
curfew against minors. AAA‘s companions, however, indemnity for each count.”
managed to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended.AAA
was then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the HELD: NO. The conviction of Machete stands but the
tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA damages awarded in favor AAA must be modified.
pleaded with them and protested that she did not commit
any offense as she was just chatting with her friends. AAA‘s
plea, however, remained unheeded. We agree with the trial court that heshould be convicted of
three counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the
appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the
AAA was then brought by the two tanods within the vicinity private part of AAA. The three penetrations occurred one
of the Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from after the other at an interval of five minutes wherein the
the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. Machete appellant would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim
stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a while, the and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape
barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall, AAA. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing
returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just that when the appellant decided to commit those separate
be the one to bring AAA back to her house. Instead of and distinct acts of sexual assault upon AAA, he was not
escorting AAA back to her house, Machete brought her to motivated by a single impulse but rather by several criminal
Kabuboy Bridge. While on their way, Machete threatened intent. Hence, his conviction for three counts of rape is
AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the indubitable. Indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in
tricycle. Upon arrival, Machete then took out the backseat satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality.
of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He
subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her to
lie down and to take off her clothes. He later put the gun As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a
down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA‘s finding of rape is distinct from and should not be
vagina despite the latter‘s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, he denominated as moral damages which are based on
stopped. But, after a short while, or after about 5 minutes, different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the
he once again inserted his penis into AAA‘s vagina. exercise of sound discretion. The award of moral damages,
Thereafter, he stopped. Machete successfully satisfied his on the other hand, is automatically granted in rape cases
bestial desire for the third time. He then brought AAA in without need of further proof other than the commission of
front of a school and repeated his threat to kill her should the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has
she tell anyone about the incident. actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award. Hence, this Court upholds the ₱50,000.00 civil
indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages, for each count
The following day, AAA sought the assistance of their of rape, that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of
barangay kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed AAA.
to the barangay hall to lodge her complaint. AAA and her
mother subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected
to physical examination. AAA also went to the Coastal Road In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary
Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn damages in favor of AAA. The award of exemplary damages
statement accusing Machete of rape. AAA was able to is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an
identify him as her assailant because the former was aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
wearing a jacket with "Barangay Police," as well as a qualifying. In this case, since the qualifying circumstance of
Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident. the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission
of the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00, for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of
As for the accused Machete, he claimed that he was on duty AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the
as a radio operator whose task was to receive complaints interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all
from the residents of the barangay, as well as to receive calls
damages awarded from the date of the finality of this Mary Grace went with her mother to the municipal
judgment until fully paid. hall and filed a complaint against appellant for 11 counts of
rape. Mary Grace was examined by Medico-legal examiner Dr.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Edgardo Gueco and was found to be in a non-virgin state. Her
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 dated 24 hymen had deep-healed laceration at one o'clock position.
August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond Later that same day, and on the bases of the complaints filed
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby against him, appellant was arrested and detained by the
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the police.
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, for each
count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the RTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on all damages doubt of 11 counts of rape and as a consequence of which he
at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
this judgment. perpetua for each and every count and all the accessory
penalties. From said decision, accused interposed the present
appeal.
PEOPLE vs. BACUS
ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANOLITO ESPINOZA y
DUAZO HELD: Yes. First, the acused maintains that the reaction of
G.R. Nos. 113521-31 August 3, 1995 complainant's mother, when she chanced upon accused-
Ponente: MELO, J appellant at around 4 am having sexual intercourse with the
victim, is contrary to human nature and experience. The Court
FACTS: Manolito Espinoza was a stay-in-baker in the has observed in a long line of decisions that different people
bakeshop owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ricardo Pineda since 1992. react differently to different situations and there is no
The victim, Mary Grace Nicdao, is the natural daughter of standard form of human behavioral response when one is
Mrs. Luz Pineda by a previous relationship and was 12 years confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.
old when the incidents involved happened.
Accused-appellant's contention that if it is true that
On November 28, 1992, at about 3a.m, appellant the rape was committed in the very room where the victim,
surreptitiously entered the room of Mary Grace Nicdao and by Judith and Jef-Jef, were sleeping together on the same mat, the
threatening to use a "veinte-nueve" knife on her forced her to two chilkdren should have been called to the witness stand to
have sexual intercourse with him. She tried hard to fight him testify to the act of rapeis devoid of merit. Both Judith and Jef-
off but the latter was just too strong for her. She was able to Jef were only seven years old at the time of the rape and
recognize appellant because of the light coming from the young children are sound sleepers. Moreover, the prosecution
terrace near her bedroom. Appellant also threatened Mary and complainants acted properly in not presenting these two
Grace not to tell anyone or else he will kill her. Mary Grace minors as witnesses, even on the assumption that they did
slept in one of the two rooms on the second floor with her witness the rape at that time, for the identification of accused-
niece Judith and cousin Jef-Jef, both aged seven years old. appellant as the rapist was sufficient without the need of
Appellant's sexual assaults upon Mary Grace was repeated on putting to risk the psychological and mental health of two
November 29, 1992 and then again on December 6-13, 1993. young persons by asking them to relive an utterly horrible,
Each lasted for about five minutes evil, and disgusting scene.
On January 19, 1993, Mary Grace and her two Accused-appellant advances the argument that the
children, slept in the sala on the upper floor because her step- sexual encounters between him and the victim were not rapes
sister was then occupying their room. Early in the morning of because the victim had given her consent to the sex acts and
that day appellant forced Mary Grace to have sexual that the separate acts of sexual congress were animated by
intercourse with him again and was made to swallow a tablet, mutual lust. The evidence does not support accused-
which caused her to feel dizzy. Meanwhile, at about 4am, Mrs. appellant's argument. He threatened the victim with a knife
Pineda stepped out of her room and caught appellant lying on and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him.
top of her daughter. Shocked, she immediately retreated to Threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to cow the
her bathroom. After regaining composure, she went to the victim to submission and constitutes an element of rape. The
sala and saw accused sitting on the stairs with a bladed testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time
weapon, while her daughter was still in a lying position. When of the rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given
accused went downstairs, she went to her daughter and weight, for testimony of young and immature rape victims are
repeatedly slapped her until she woke up. It was then, that credible.
Mary Grace disclosed to her mother the ordeal she had gone
through with appellant. Mrs. Pineda told her husband about Accused-appellant furthermore insists that the
the incident and the latter called the police. failure of the victim to immediately report the rape to the
immediate members of her family or to the police authorities
is a clear manifestation of acquiescence or consent to the appellant took her in. In the year 2000, AAA lived in the
sexual encounters. The Court is not persuaded by such accused-appellant‘s house.
contention. Failure of a rape victim to immediately report the
rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge The failure of a One day, she was awakened from her sleep when the
complainant to report the rape immediately does not detract accused-appellant removed her undergarments. The
from her credibility, her hesitation being attributable to accused-appellant then removed his shorts and went on top
accused-appellant's death threats. of AAA and then inserted his penis into her organ. He told
her not to create any noise because their neighbors might
The defense that the filing of the rape charges is in hear them. He also warned AAA that he would kill her if she
retaliation against accused-appellant for leading a strike would report the incident. AAA could not do anything but
against his employers seems too shallow. It is unlikely for a cry. Subsequently, another similar incident happened at
newcomer like him to lead a strike against his employer as he around 6:00 a.m. on January 17, 2005. The accused-
had only been employed in the bakery for less than a year appellant similarly threatened AAA not to report the
when the alleged strike took place and his testimony is incident, otherwise, he would cut her tongue and kill her.
uncorroborated.
On January 23, 2005, the accused-appellant asked AAA to
look for a lighter. When AAA failed to find one, the accused-
In a last-ditch effort at exculpation, accused-
appellant told her to go inside a room in their house. There,
appellant cites the testimony of Dr. Edgardo Gueco, the
he kicked AAA in the buttocks, hit her head with a hammer
medical examiner, to the effect that accused-appellant and the
and smashed her head on the wooden wall. She suffered
victim could not have engaged in sexual intercourse injuries on her forehead and the back of her head.
on January 19, 1993 because of the deep healed lacerations in Afterwards, she told the accused-appellant that she was
the victim's hymen and vagina and the absence of going to use the toilet so she was able to go out of their
spermatozoa in her vaginal canal. However, it should be house. She ran to the street and went to the house of a
noted that the first act of rape occured almost 2 months neighbor where she hid from the accused-appellant. The
before Dr. Gueco conducted the examination, so whatever neighbors treated AAA‘s wounds and put her to sleep. When
laceration on the vagina must have already healed. It is well she woke up, the barangay tanods were already at the place.
settled that healed lacerations do not negate rape nor does They first talked to AAA then they called the police so that
the absence of spermatozoa in the vaginal canal preclude the accused-appellant could be apprehended. When the
rape. accused-appellant was arrested, AAA was brought to the
police station where she gave her statement. AAA was then
One last point. The trial court failed to award moral taken to the hospital where she was treated and examined.
damages to the victim. The offended party in the crime of rape
is entitled to moral damages in the amount of at least P50K. In The Medico-Legal Certification revealed that AAA sustained
the case at bench, there having been multiple rapes on the various contusion hematomas and had lacerations in her
victim, we believe that she should be awarded no less than hymen, among other injuries.
P150,000.
The Defense DENIED the charges. He claimed that AAA
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby might have been raped at her grandparents‘ house where
AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant she stayed before, as there was a person living in that house
is hereby ordered to pay the offended party the amount with a mental defect. He also denied causing the contusions
of P150,000.00 as moral damages. of AAA, stating that those were obtained by her when she
fell into a canal at the side of their house.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCO BILLA RTC: rendered judgment of conviction against the accused-
appellant for being guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of child abuse and rape. The RTC gave the following
G.R. No. 194446, April 21, 2014, LEONARDO-DE
penalties:
CASTRO, J.:
1. In relation to Child Abuse - an indeterminate sentence

This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Delen
of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
seeking the reversal of his conviction for child abuse and
(2) MONTHS and One (1) DAY of Prision Correccional,
qualified rape.
as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as maximum, and
The Prosecution‘s Version of Events to pay the costs
2. In relation to Rape - in [C]riminal [C]ase [N]o. 13870
AAA was accused-appellant and BBB‘s daughter. AAA‘s and [the] penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, in [C]riminal
parents separated as the accused-appellant was beating [C]ase [N]o. 13932, respectively.
BBB. AAA then lived with her aunt until the accused- 3. Further, for the rape committed the accused is ordered
to indemnify [AAA] the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand
(Php75,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity plus the sum As to The Proper Penalties
of Fifty Thousand (Php50,000.00) Pesos, as moral
damages, the sum of Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) For the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstances of
Pesos, as moral damages of [AAA]‘s mother, and the minority and relationship attended the commission of the
sum of Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos, as crime. The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly held that
exemplary damages, and to pay the costs. the appropriate penalty that should be imposed upon the
accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
Court of Appeals: affirmed the above ruling of the RTC with
modification as to the amount of damages as follows: (2) YES, the civil damages awarded by the CA was
proper.
xxx that the moral damages awarded to the victim
is INCREASED to ₱75,000.00, while the award of The Court of Appeals properly upheld the trial court‘s
moral damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 to award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱30,000.00 as
the victim‘s mother is DELETED. exemplary damages in favor of AAA, as well as the increase
of the award of moral damages in favor of AAA from
ISSUES: ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, in accordance with current
jurisprudence. The appellate court‘s removal of the separate
(1) Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of the award of moral damages in favor of AAA‘s mother is also in
alleged crimes; accordance with our ruling in People v. Alajay where we
(2) Whether or not the civil damages awarded were proper. held that "the prevailing jurisprudence is that the award
of moral damages should be granted jointly to both
the victim and her parents. Stated differently, the
RULING: parents are not entitled to a separate award of
moral damages."
(1) YES, accused-appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. For the charge of child abuse, the Court, finds that the
penalty imposed by the trial court needs to be modified
After thoroughly reviewing the records of the present case, since, as previously discussed, the alternative circumstance
the Court similarly finds worthy of credence the testimony of relationship, i.e., that the accused-appellant is the father
of AAA that the accused-appellant is guilty of physically and of AAA, has been duly established by the prosecution.
sexually abusing her. In this case, AAA positively identified
the accused-appellant as the person who kicked her in the In this case, the imposable penalty is prision mayor
buttocks, hit her head with a hammer, and smashed her minimum, the range of which is from 6 years and 1 day to 8
head on the wall on January 23, 2005. Because of the said years..
brutal and inhumane acts of the accused-appellant, AAA
suffered bruises and contusions in different parts of her
body. The Medico-Legal Certification clearly reflected the WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATIONS
fact that AAA indeed sustained contusions, coupled with a the Decision dated February 17, 2010 of the Court of
finding that she suffered multiple physical injuries Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03324. The accused-
secondary to mauling. appellant Hermenigildo Delen y Escobilla is hereby
sentenced as follows:
The accused-appellant was also found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified rape. 1. In Criminal Case No. 13932, the accused-
appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of one count of qualified rape and is
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA on perpetua without eligibility for parole, in lieu of
January 17, 2005. AAA narrated in a straightforward death. The accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay
manner the harrowing details of how the accused-appellant AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as
had sexual intercourse with her. Likewise, the Court finds
moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
no cogent reason to disbelieve AAA‘s testimony, which was damages, plus legal interest on all damages
corroborated by the medical findings that the "eloquent awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of
testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings finality of this Decision.
attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to
confirm the truth of her charges." As to the manner by
which the rape was committed, the accused-appellant‘s 2. In Criminal Case No. 13870, the accused-
moral ascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
intimidation that is required in rape cases. doubt of committing child abuse in violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610
and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging
The Court finds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals were
from 6 years of prision correccional, as minimum,
correct in rejecting the accused-appellant‘s bare denials.
to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Costs against the accused-appellant. Issues:W/N Gucaban was constructively and
illegally dismissed, which would entitle her to
SO ORDERED. damages.
Ruling:YES.In illegal dismissal cases, fundamental is the
SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES v. rule that when an employer interposes the defense of
GWENDELLYN ROSE S. GUCABAN resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove
that the employeeindeed voluntarily resigned. Guided by
GR No. 153982, 2011-07-18 these principles, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
Facts:Gucaban was an employee of petitioner San Miguel with the availing evidence, SMPI was unable to discharge
Properties Philippines, Inc. (SMPI) from 1991 to 1998. In this burden.
1995, she was promoted to project development manager, In all stages of the proceedings, SMPI has been persistent
where she also sat as a member of the company's that there was an existing reorganization plan in 1998 and
management committee. that it was implemented shortly after the effective date of
Gucaban filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. She was Gucaban's resignation. As proof, it submitted a copy of its
informed by SMPI's President and Chief ExecutiveOfficer, June 9, 1998 Memorandum which shows thatnew
Federico Gonzalez (Gonzalez), that the company was appointments had been made to various positions in the
planning to reorganize its manpower in order to cut on company. A fleeting glance at the said document, however,
costs, and that she must file for resignation or otherwise tells that there were four high-ranking personnel who
face termination. Three days later, the Human Resource received their respective promotions, yet interestingly it
Department allegedly furnished her a blank resignation tells nothing of a reorganization schemebeing implemented
form which she refused to sign. within the larger corporate structure.
Gucaban complained of the ugly treatment which she had SMPI, in its Supplemental Argument to the Motion for
since received from Gonzalez and the management Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, attached copies of the
supposedly on account of her refusal to sign the resignation notices it sent to the Department of Labor and Employment
letter. She claimed she had been kept off from all the to the effect that it would have to terminate the services of
meetings of the management committee; and that she its 76 employees due to business losses and financial
received an evaluation report signed by Gonzalez showing reverses. True, while a reorganization of SMPI's corporate
that for the covered period she had been negligent and structure might have indeed taken place as shownby these
unsatisfactory in the performance of her duties. notices, nevertheless, it happened only in the latter part of
1999 - or more than a year after Gucaban's separation from
She alleged that SMPInever actualized its reorganization the company and incidentally, after she filed the instant
and streamlining plan; on the contrary, SMPI allegedly complaint.
expanded its employee population and also made new
appointments and promotions tovarious other positions. In other words, although the company might have been
suffering from losses due to market declineas alleged, there
SMPI argued that it truly encountered a steep market was still no concrete plan for a corporate reorganization at
decline in 1997 that necessitated cost-cutting measures and the time Gonzalez presented to Gucaban the seemingly last
streamlining of its employee structure which, in turn, would available alternative options of voluntary resignation and
require the abolition of certain job positions. SMPI termination by abolition of her office. Certainly, inasmuch
allegedly proposed to Gucaban that she voluntarily resign as the necessityof corporate reorganization generally lies
from office in consideration of a financial package but within the exclusive prerogative of management, Gucaban
Gucabaninstead negotiated to augment her benefits at that point had no facility to ascertain the truth behind it,
package with the Human Resource, and upon grasping the and neither was she in a position to question it right then
favorable end of the bargain, she voluntarily tendered her and there. Indeed, she could not have chosen tofile for
resignation. resignation had SMPI not broached to her the possibility of
her being terminated from service on account of the
SMPI admitted that several other appointments in June supposed reorganization.
1998 were supposedly part of the full implementation of its
reorganization scheme. It is then understandable for Gucaban, considering the
attractive financial package which SMPI admittedly offered
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. to her, to opt for resignation instead of suffering
The NLRCreversed the ruling found that Gucaban has been termination - a consequence the certainty of which she was
illegally dismissed, and ordered her reinstatement without made to believe.
loss of seniority rights with full backwages, as well as the
award of moral damages of P200,000.00, exemplary Another argument advanced by SMPI to support its claim
damages of P100,000.00, and ten percent (10%) of the total that the resignation of Gucaban was voluntary is that the
award asattorney's fees. latter has actually been given ample time to weigh her
options and was, in fact, able to negotiate with management
The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC's findings but for improved benefits. Whether there have been
reduced the monetary awards to P50,000.00 moral negotiations or not, the irreducible fact remains that
damages and P25,000.00 exemplary damages. Gucaban's separation from the company was the confluence
of the fraudulent representation to her that her office would Unusual vibrations in the second floor level which are
be declared redundant, coupled with the subsequent apparent when subjected to live loadings. The findings
alienation which shesuffered from the company by reason reveal that the building is structurally unsafe for human
of her refusal to tender resignation. The element of occupancy.
voluntariness in her resignation is, therefore, missing. She
had been constructively and, hence, illegally dismissed as AMA wrote ICA demanding the return of all that it
indeed her continued employment is rendered paid. AMA cited the building‘s structural deficiency, which
impossibleunreasonable or unlikely under the it regarded as a violation of ICA‘s implied warranty against
circumstances. hidden defects. AMA did not pursue the lease contract.
When its request for reimbursement remained unheeded,
Moral damages are awarded in termination cases where the AMA filed an action for breach of contract and damages
employee's dismissal was attended by bad faith, malice or against ICA alleging that ICA (represented by the late Dr.
fraud, or where it constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or Paulo C. Campos) fraudulently entered into the lease
where it was done in a manner contrary to morals, good agreement,breached the same, and violated its implied
customs or public policy. In Gucaban's case, the said bases warranty against hidden defects; that despite knowledge of
indeed obtain when she was fraudulently induced to resign the instability of the building, ICA insisted on offering it to
and accede to a quitclaim upon the false representation of AMA; and that ICA had been unable to produce the
an impending and genuine reorganization as well as on the buildings certificate of occupancy. AMA prayed for
pretext that such option would be themost beneficial. This, restitution of the amounts it paid to ICA with interest and
coupled with the subsequent oppression that immediately award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees.ICA denied
preceded her involuntary resignation, deserves an award of that AMA asked for the building's certificate of occupancy.
moral damages consistent with the Court of Appeals' ICA alleged that it was AMA‘s responsibility to secure the
ruling. Accordingly, Gucaban is likewise entitled to certificate from the municipal government as stipulated in
exemplary damages as decreedby the Court of Appeals. the contract. Further, ICA claims that it never
misrepresented the condition of the building and that AMA
Reinstatement and payment of backwages, as the normal
inspected it before entering into the contract of lease.
consequences of illegal dismissal, presuppose that the
previous position from which the employee has been
The RTC ruled in favor of AMA justifying rescission
removed is still in existence or there is an unfilled position
of the contract. The RTC ordered ICA to return the amount
of a nature, more or less, similar to the onepreviously
representing security deposit and three months advance
occupied by said employee. Yet, it has been more than a
rentals plus interest as well as exemplary damages and
decade since the incident which led to Gucaban's
attorneys fees. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but
involuntary resignation took place and, hence, with the
deleted the grant of exemplary damages and attorneys
changes in SMPI's corporate structure through the years,
feesholding that ICA did not violate its implied warranty
the formerposition occupied by Gucaban, or an equivalent
against hidden defects, misrepresent the buildings
thereof, may no longer be existing or is currently
condition, or act in bad faith since AMA inspected the
occupied.Gucaban's rejoining SMPI's workforce would only
building before it entered into the lease agreement.
exacerbate the tension and strained relations which in the
first place had givenrise to this incident.
ISSUE:
In lieu of reinstatement, an award of separation pay is in
order, equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of (1) Whether or not rescission of the contract is
service. proper
(2) Whether or not ICA and Dr. Campos are
Immaculate Concepcion Academy & Campos v. entitled to their claims for damages against AMA.
AMA
G.R. No. 173575, February 2, 2011 RULING:
FACTS: AMA Computer College, Inc. (AMA) and ICA (1) No. AMA‘s representatives inspected the building to
signed a contract of lease of the three stores building owned determine if it was suitable for their schools needs. The
by Immaculate Concepcion Academy (ICA) for 10 years. In cracks on the floor and on the walls were too obvious to
accordance with the contract, AMA paid ICA in earnest suggest to them that something was amiss. It was their
money, three months advance rentals, and security fault that they did not check the significance of such
deposit.After the signing of the contract, officials of AMA signs. ICA for its part was candid about the condition
re-inspected the building and began renovating it for the of the building and did not in fact deny AMA access to
upcoming school year. But during inspection, several cracks it. Upon the discovery of the buildings structural
on the floor and walls of the building‘s second storey were defects, AMA had the right to seek their repair by ICA
found. Eventually, AMA applied with the municipal based on stipulations in their contract. However, AMAs
engineers office for an occupancy permit. The inspection demand for ICA to produce a certificate of occupancy
reveals the following defects: (1) Multiple cracks in the covering the building from the local building official
second floor slabs showing signs of insufficient or improper does not amount to a demand for ICA to undertake a
reinforcements; (2) Deflections in the second floor slabs repair of its structural defects.AMAs outright rescission
and bears which are beyond normal and allowable; and (3) of the lease contract and demand that ICA return the
deposit and advance rentals it got within 24 hours from
such demand precluded ICA, first, from contesting the
findings of the local building official or getting some Respondent Jose Mateo (Jose) spoke with Swift's Feeds
structural specialists to verify such findings or, second, Sales Supervisor, Efren Buhain[5] (Buhain), regarding the
from making the required repair. Clearly, AMAs hasty possible lease of Jose's warehouse for the storage of Swift's
rescission of the contract gave ICA no chance to feeds products. The two agreed and on July 5, 1995, Jose
exercise its options. signed the Warehousing Agreement, which was to remain in
force for a two-year period. Respondents in apparent
However, the local building official found ICAs building compliance with the bond requirement, delivered three land
structurally defective and unsafe. For this reason, ICA titles to Swift.[14] The acknowledgment receipt issued by
has no justification for keeping AMAs deposit and Swift for the surrendered titles stated that these were
advance rentals. Still, the Court holds that AMA is not "collateral for feeds warehousing."
entitled to recover more than the return of its deposit
and advance rental considering that, contrary to AMAs
claim, ICA acted in good faith and did not mislead it
about the condition of the building. On May 9, 1996, Swift's personnel, Wilfredo and Jasmine
Pena, conducted an audit of the stocks stored in
(2) Aside from seeking the dismissal of the complaint, ICA respondents' warehouse. They went over the warehousing
and Dr. Campos separately seek moral and exemplary documents and counted the remaining stocks. A
damages plus attorneys fees and cost of suit. ICA is not comparison of the two warehouse documents revealed one
entitled to moral damages since itfailed to prove that it missing bag, which respondent Jose duly paid on the same
had a good reputation and that AMAs action day. Swift informed respondents that it was terminating
besmirched the same.As for Dr. Campos, he has amply
their contract effective May 13, 1996 because of
proved that he suffered mental anguish, serious
respondents' violations of their Warehousing
anxiety, and social humiliation following AMAs
unfounded accusation that he fraudulently misled Agreement.[17] Swift explained that, under Paragraph V of
AMA regarding the structural condition of ICAs the Warehousing Agreement, the warehouse operator
building. However, due to his untimely demise before should only release stocks to Swift's sales personnel after
the finality of this case, his claim for moral damages the latter presents a clearance to withdraw stocks.[18] This
does not survive and is not transmissible to his was to ensure that Swift's stocks would only be released to
substitutes, for beingextremely personal to him.Since authorized individuals and Swift could collect payment
AMA acted in a reckless, wanton, oppressive, and accordingly. Contrary to this provision, respondents
malevolent manner in imputing fraud and deceit on released stocks without the necessary clearance to withdraw
ICA and Dr. Campos, exemplary damages is proper. and without the participation of Swift's sales
Further, the Court holds that, having been compelled personnel. The violations were evident from the WIS which
to litigate in order to protect their interests, ICA and did not contain the signatures of Swift's sales personnel.
Dr. Campos are also entitled to attorneys fees. The absence of the sales personnel's signature meant that
the warehouseman released stocks, without the
participation of Swift's sales personnel, and without any
MERALCO vs. TEAM ELECTRONICS CORP. written authority from Swift. These unauthorized releases
caused Swift a cash shortage of around P2 million, for
VILLANUEVA vs. SALVADOR which respondents should be held liable.[19] Swift then
retained respondents' three land titles until the latter shall
G.R. No. 170486, September 12, 2011 have fully complied with their obligation. It cited as its
SWIFT FOODS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES basis Paragraph XII of the Warehousing Agreement, which
JOSE MATEO, JR. AND IRENE MATEO, states that the "bond x x x shall answer for whatever
RESPONDENTS. obligation the warehouse operator may have with [Swift].‖
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondents denied violating the terms of the warehousing
FACTS: Petitioner Swift Foods, Inc. (Swift) is a agreement. They explained their actions as mere obeisance
corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale, and to Buhain and Enfestan's instructions to release the stocks
distribution of animal feeds. Respondent-spouses Jose and directly to customers. As proof of these instructions,
Irene Mateo (respondents) are businessmen engaged in a respondents presented the handwritten letter they received
dealership in poultry and feeds supply and a trucking from Buhain[21] authorizing them to release the stocks
business in San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. In 1984, the two directly to customers. Respondents maintained that Buhain
parties entered into a Trucking Agreement whereby and Enfestan should answer for the cash
respondents' trucks hauled Swift's feeds from its central shortages. Expecting their explanation to be satisfactory,
office in Pioneer Street in Mandaluyong City to its various respondents demanded that Swift return their three land
warehouses in Luzon. titles.[22] When Swift did not accede to their
demand,[23] respondents filed a complaint against Swift for court to having several successful businesses) should have
the surrender of their certificates of title with damages. been alert to the dangers of contravening the clear terms of
one's contract. He should not have deviated from the
RTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner to procedure provided in the contract in the absence of any
return the three land titles. The RTC held that respondents amendment therein. At the very least, ordinary diligence
did not breach the Warehousing Agreement for which their required him to inquire with the head office whether the
titles may be answerable. They merely followed the changes being introduced by Buhain or Enfestan were
instructions given to them by Swift's sales personnel, which proper or authorized. Respondents' total reliance on the
instructions they had no reason to doubt. Since Swift did word of petitioner's sales personnel, contrary to the written
not allege damages incurred pursuant to the trucking contract, is a clear act of negligence. A contract is the law
agreement, it is not justified in keeping the P100,000.00 between the parties and those who are guilty of negligence
cash bond beyond its purpose. in the performance of their obligations are liable for
CA held that petitioner had no basis for terminating the damages.
Warehousing Agreement. The CA observed that petitioner Worse, the real reason why respondent Jose did not notice
did not bring the alleged contractual breach to respondents' the dubious nature of the procedures being introduced by
attention. Its silence can be taken as its condonation of the Swift personnel was his total ignorance of his
respondents' acts. CA ruled that the shortages appear to be obligations under the warehousing agreeement. He
attributable to petitioner's employees, Buhain and admitted not reading the agreement, which was a total
Enfestan, not to respondents. Thus, petitioner has no abdication of his duties. Unless a contracting party cannot
justification for withholding respondents' titles and was read or does not understand the language in which the
ordered to return the same to respondents. The CA also agreement was written, he is presumed to know the import
found sufficient basis for the trial court's award of moral of his contract and is bound thereby.[49] Not having alleged
damages to respondents in the amount of any of the foregoing, respondent Jose has no excuse for his
P200,000.00.[35] The CA, however, deleted the award of actions. It was his nonchalance to his contractual duties
attorney's fees to respondents for lack of basis. and obligations, which facilitated the malfeasance of
ISSUES: petitioner's personnel and exposed petitioner to undue
risks.
1. Is there a breach of contract on the part of 2. NO. Swift maintains that, due to respondents'
the respondents? unauthorized stock releases, it was unable to collect the
2. Is Swift entitled to actual damages? payments for 4,444 bags of feeds, the price of which
3. Is Swift entitled to nominal damages? amounts to P2,197,063.00.[50] What Swift is trying to
recover are actual damages, which is only awarded to the
4. Are respondents entitled to moral extent that pecuniary loss had been
damages?
proven.[51] Unfortunately for Swift, it miserably failed to
HELD
prove its actual damage.
1. YES. the Warehousing Agreement states that the
According to Paragraph IV of the Warehouse Agreement,
warehouseman should only release stocks to Swift's sales
Swift's "claims x x x against the operators shall be based on
personnel who present a clearance to withdraw stocks. The
prevailing price list at the time of loss."[52] The records
records reveal that, contrary to this provision, respondents
show that Swift failed to prove the existence and extent of
released stocks without the necessary clearance. They
the alleged shortages for which respondents are being held
admitted in court that they never required a clearance prior
liable. It did not even attempt to show in court the
to the release of stocks. Moreover, they admitted that there
prevailing price of the feeds that respondents released. The
were times when they released stocks directly to customers
least that Swift could have done was to produce the audit
and not to petitioner's sales personnel. When asked to
report to serve as basis of its claims against
explain his actions which were in contrast to his contractual
respondents. As it is, Swift only presented the WIS that did
undertakings, respondent Jose admitted not reading, much
not contain the signatures of the sales personnel, which is
less understanding, the warehouse agreement. He simply
only proof that respondents violated paragraph V of the
followed all the verbal instructions given to him by Buhain
warehouse agreement, but is not sufficient proof of the
and Enfestan. Thus, respondents' breach of Paragraph V of
damages caused by the violation.
the Warehousing Agreement is clear.
3. YES. In these situations where there has been a breach
These admissions were ignored by the trial and appellate of contract but actual damages have not been established,
courts, which seemed to brush off Jose's negligence as nominal damages may be awarded to vindicate the injured
understandable because he was a novice in the warehousing party's rights.[53] Considering that the respondents did not
business. But one's newness to the business is not an perform or even take efforts to fully comply with their
excuse to violate the clear terms of one's contract. A duties and obligations under the warehousing agreement, it
seasoned businessman such as Jose (who admitted in open is only just that they be ordered to return P150,000.00 as
nominal damages which is an approximation of whatever SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or SANG IK
benefit they received from such agreement. JANG, JISSO JANG, WISSO JANG and NORBERTO
TADEOv.SANGWOO PHILIPPINES, INC.
EMPLOYEE UNION - OLALIA, represented by
PORFERIA SALIBONGCOGON
4. YES. Swift has no basis for retaining respondents‘ land G.R. No. 173154 December 9, 2013
titles as "collateral for feeds warehousing."[54] While the
warehousing agreement stipulated that the respondents
shall post a bond (which may be in the form of a property FACTS:Sangwoo Philippines, Inc.(SPI) filed with the
bond), this was merely a future undertaking that did not Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a letter-
actually materialize. Although the respondents delivered notice of temporary suspension of operations for one
their land titles to Swift, they did not actually execute any monthdue to lack of orders from its buyers. SPEU was
bond agreement or security instrument (such as real estate furnished a copy of the said letter. The collective bargaining
mortgage). In the absence of such bond agreement or agreement negotiations between Sangwoo Philippines, Inc.
security instrument, it cannot be said that a bond has Employees Union – Olalia (SPEU) and continued and the
actually been posted or constituted. Besides, even parties signed a handwritten Memorandum of Agreement,
assuming arguendo that the real properties served as whichspecified the employees‘ wages and benefits for the
collateral, petitioner cannot just appropriate them in view next 2 years.
of the prohibition against pactum commissorium.
Then, SPI temporarily ceased operations on
Considering petitioner's wrongful retention of respondents' September 15, 2003. Thereafter, it successively filed two
titles, we affirm the lower courts' award of moral damages letters with the DOLE, copy furnished SPEU, for the
in favor of respondents. "The person claiming moral extension of the temporary shutdown until March 15,
damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and 2004. Meanwhile, SPEU filed a complaint for unfair labor
convincing evidence for the law always presumes good practice, illegal closure, illegal dismissal, damages and
attorney‘s fees before the Regional Arbitration Branch of
faith."[56] "Bad faith is defined in jurisprudence as a state of
the NLRC. Subsequently, or on February 12, 2004, SPI
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
posted, in conspicuous places within the company premises,
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior notices of its permanent closure and cessation of business
purpose."[57] Respondents were able to prove that petitioner operations, effective March 16, 2004, due to serious
acted in bad faith in keeping the titles despite its knowledge economic losses and financial reverses. The DOLE was
that there was no bond or real estate mortgage to justify its furnished a copy of said notice together with a separate
retention thereof. Petitioner knew that it needed a real letter notifying it of the company‘s permanent
estate mortgage to keep the titles, as shown by the fact that closure. SPEU was also furnished with a copy of the notice
its officer even went to respondents' home to try to obtain of permanent closure. Forthwith, SPI offered separation
their signatures to a deed of real estate mortgage (without benefits of one-half month pay for every year of service to
success).[58] Despite its failure to obtain such bond, each of its employees. 234 employees of SPI accepted the
petitioner bull-headedly kept the titles. The Court, however, offer. Thosewho refused the offer, i.e., the minority
finds the sum awarded as moral damages excessive under employees, were nevertheless given until March 25, 2004 to
the circumstances.[59] The Court believes that the amount of accept their checks and correspondingly, execute
P50,000.00 as moral damages is reasonable and sufficient. quitclaims. However, the minority employees did not claim
the said checks.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature and not intended
to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of SPI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition finding that it is indeed suffering from serious business
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Spouses Jose Mateo, Jr. and losses–as evidenced by financial statements which were
Irene Mateo are ordered to PAY SWIFT FOODS, INC. the never contested by SPEU –and, as such, validly
amount of P150,000.00 by way of NOMINAL discontinued its operations. Consequently, the LA held that
DAMAGES, which amount may be offset (to the extent SPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice, and similarly
applicable) against the monetary award in favor of spouses observed that it duly complied with the requirement of
furnishing notices of closure to its employees and the
Jose Mateo, Jr. and Irene Mateo. The award of moral
DOLE. Lastly, the LA ruled that since SPI‘s closure of
damages in favor of spouses Jose Mateo, Jr. and Irene
business was due to serious business losses, it was not
Mateo is REDUCED to P50,000.00. mandated by law to grant separation benefits to the
ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK vs. BARIC minority employees.
CELEBES JAPAN FOODS CORP. vs. YERMO Aggrieved, SPEU filed an Appeal
Memorandum before the NLRC. While NLRC upheld SPI‘s
closure due to serious business losses, it ruled that the
members of SPEU are entitled to payment of separation pay
equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service.
The NLRC opined that since SPI already gave separation Code as interpreted in the case of Galaxie. As such, SPI
benefits to 234 of its employees, the minority employees should not be directed to give financial assistance
should not be denied of the same. amounting to ₱15,000.00 to each of the minority employees
based on the Formal Offer of Settlement. If at all, such
Dissatisfied, SPI filed a petition formal offer should be deemed only as a calculated move on
for certiorari before the CA, praying for the issuance of a SPI‘s part to further minimize the expenses that it will be
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of bound to incur should litigation drag on, and not as an
preliminary injunction against the execution of the indication that it was still financially sustainable. However,
aforesaid NLRC resolution. The CA granted the issuance of since SPEU chose not to accept, said offer did not ripen into
the TRO and thereafter the issuance of the writ of an enforceable obligation on the part of SPI from which
execution.Meanwhile, SPI sent a Formal Offer of financial assistance could have been realized by the
Settlement to SPEU, offering the amount of ₱15,000.00 as minority employees.
financial assistance to each of the minority employees.
However, settlement talks broke down as SPEU did not B.Insufficient Notice of Closure.
accept SPI‘s offer.
As enunciated in the case of Galaxie:The mere
The CA held that the minority employees were not posting on the company bulletin board does not,
entitled to separation pay considering that the company‘s however, meet the requirement under Article [297]
closure was due to serious business losses. It pronounced of "serving a written notice on the workers."The
that requiring an employer to be generous when it was no purpose of the written notice is to inform the employees of
longer in a position to be so would be oppressive and the specific date of termination or closure of business
unjust. Nevertheless, the CA still ordered SPI to pay the operations, and must be served upon them at least one
minority employees ₱15,000.00 each, representing the month before the date of effectivity to give them sufficient
amount of financial assistance as contained in the Formal time to make the necessary arrangement. In order to
Offer of Settlement.Both parties filed motions for meet the foregoing purpose, service of the written
reconsideration which were, however, denied. Hence, the notice must be made individually upon each and
consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assailing the every employee of the company.(Emphasis and
CA decision. underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
ISSUES: Keeping with these principles, the Court finds that

(a) Whether or not the minority employees are the LA, NLRC, and CA erred in ruling that SPI complied
entitled to separation pay; - NO with the notice requirement when it merely posted various
(b) Whether or not SPI complied with the notice copies of its notice of closure in conspicuous places within
requirement of Article 297 of the Labor Code –NO, the business premises. As earlier explained, SPI was
thus it is liable for NOMINAL DAMAGES required to serve written notices of termination to its
employees, which it, however, failed to do.It is well to stress
that while SPI had a valid ground to terminate its
RULING:
employees, i.e., closure of business, its failure to comply
with the proper procedure for terminationrenders itliable to
A. Non-entitlement to Separation Benefits. pay the employee nominal damages for such omission.
Based on existing jurisprudence, an employer which has a
As explained in the case of Galaxie Steel Workers valid cause for dismissing its employee but conducts the
Union (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU) v. NLRC(Galaxie):In other dismissal with procedural infirmity is liable to pay the
words, Article [297] of the Labor Code does not obligate an employee nominal damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 if
employer to pay separation benefits when the closure is due the ground for dismissal is a just cause, or the amount of
to serious losses. To require an employer to be generous ₱50,000.00 if the ground for dismissal is an authorized
when it is no longer in a position to do so, in our view, cause. However, case law exhorts that in instances where
would be unduly oppressive, unjust, and unfair to the the payment of such damages becomes impossible, unjust,
employer. Ours is a system of laws, and the law in or too burdensome, modification becomes necessary in
protecting the rights of the working man, authorizes neither order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing
the oppression nor the self-destruction of the employer. circumstances. Thus, in the case of Industrial Timber
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Corporation v. Ababon (Industrial Timber),the Court
reduced the amount of nominal damages awarded to
In this case, the LA, NLRC, and the CA all employees from ₱50,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 since the
consistently found that SPI indeed suffered from serious authorized cause of termination was the employer‘s closure
business losses which resulted in its permanent shutdown or cessation of business which was done in good faith and
and accordingly, held the company‘s closure to be valid. due to circumstances beyond the employer‘s control,viz.:
Perforce, without any cogent reason to deviate from the
findings on the validity of SPI‘s closure, the Court thus In the determination of the amount of nominal
holds that SPI is not obliged to give separation benefits to damages which is addressed to the sound discretion of the
the minority employees pursuant to Article 297 of the Labor court, several factors are taken into account: (1) the
authorized cause invoked, whether it was a retrenchment or FACTS: Spouses Andolong are the majority stockholders of
a closure or cessation of operation of the establishment due RAII, a corporation engaged in operating amusement
to serious business losses or financial reverses or otherwise; centers. The Spouses entered into a Memorandum of
(2) the number of employees to be awarded; (3) the Agreement with Evangelista which provides that the they
capacity of the employers to satisfy the awards, taken into will have a 50-50 share with the net profits of the
account their prevailing financial status as borneby the amusement centers and that the Spouses would remit
records; (4) the employer‘s grant of other termination Evangelista‘s share on the 15th and 30th of the month. The
benefits in favor of the employees; and (5) whether there
Spouses failed to remit as per agreement.
was a bona fide attempt to comply with the notice
requirements as opposed to giving no notice at all.
Evangelista filed a complaint for sum of money
with the RTC. He merely adduced the computation of the
In the case at bar, there was a valid authorized
monthly revenues of the amusement park, while the
cause considering the closure or cessation of ITC's business
Spouses waived their right to present evidence. The RTC,
which was done in good faith and due to circumstances
beyond ITC's control. Moreover, ITC had ceased to generate affirmed by the CA, dismissed Evangelista‘s complaint on
any income since its closure on August 17, 1990. Several the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It ruled that
months prior to the closure, ITC experienced diminished Evangelista‘s evidence only disclosed the gross monthly
income due to high production costs, erratic supply of raw revenue earned by the amusement centers, which is still
materials, depressed prices, and poor market conditions for subject to the expenses of the daily operation. It did not
its wood products. It appears that ITC had given its show the actual profit earned by said centers.In view of the
employees all benefits in accord with the CBA upon their inconclusiveness of the evidence presented in proving the
termination.Thus, considering the circumstances existence of the net profits, Evangelista failed to prove its
obtaining in the case at bar, we deem it wise and cause of action by a preponderance of evidence.
just to reduce the amount of nominal damages to
be awarded for each employee to Pl0,000.00 each ISSUE: Whether or not Evangelista is entitled to
instead of 1!50,000.00 each.(Emphasis and reliefs prayed for.
underscoring supplied)
HELD: YES It is undisputed that under the MOA,
In this case, considering that SPI closed down its Evangelista is entitled to receive 50% of the net profits of
operations due to serious business losses and that said the amusement centers and that such profits must be
closure appears to have been done in good faith, the Court - remitted to him on the 15th and the 30th of each month.
similar to the case of Industrial Timber -deems it just to However, and as correctly pointed out by both courts, the
reduce the amount of nominal damages to be awarded to
documents presented by Evangelista only showed the gross
each of the minority employees from ₱50,000.00 to
monthly revenue of the amusement centers without taking
Pl0,000.00. To be clear, the foregoing award should only
obtain in favor of the minority employees and not for those into consideration their daily operational expenses. As such,
employees who already received sums equivalent to these documents are inconclusive in proving the existence
separation pay and executed quitclaims "releasing [SPI] of any net profits that the Spouses failed to remit. However,
now and in the future any claims and obligation which may the Court recognizes that the Spouses have exclusive control
arise as results of [their] employment with the over the operations of the amusement centers, Evangelista
company." For these latter employees who have already acting as a mere investor, naturally, would have no access to
voluntarily accepted their dismissal, their executed documents that would show the existence of net profits,
quitclaims practically erased the consequences of considering that all documents pertaining to the operations
infirmities on the notice of dismissal,40 at least as to them. of the covered amusement centers, including financial
statements, are all in the possession of the Spouses. Given
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The this circumstance, Evangelista was constrained to rely on
Decision dated January 12, 2006 and Resolution dated the various computations of the revenues earned by the
June 14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. amusement centers as certified. Having possession of the
88965 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION records, the Spouses could have easily rebutted
deleting the award of financial assistance in the amount of Evangelista‘s claim and present what was the actual profits
₱15,000.00 to each of the minority employees. Instead, of the amusement centers. However, it chose to waive its
Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. is ORDERED to pay nominal right hence, the Court applies the presumption that
damages in the amount of Pl0,000.00 to each of the evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
minority employees.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court is
EVANGELISTA v. SPOUSES ANDOLONG and RINO convinced that Evangelista should have received
AMUSEMENT INNOVATORS INC.(RAII) remittances, albeit he failed to prove the exact amount he
G.R. No. 221770, 16 November 2016, FIRST should receive.Therefore recovery of temperate damages
DIVISION (Perlas-Bernabe, J.) under Article 2224 of the Civil Codeis proper. The case is an
instancewhere it has been established that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount went to the store of Felipe Lagera.The accused-
cannot be proven with certainty. appellant further testified that when he reached the house
As explained by the Code Commission: ―There are of Felipe, the latter was feeding chickens. When Felipe
cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of asked him what was his business in going there, he
pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his
convinced that there has been such loss. For instance, wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that the accused-appellant
injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a had a bad purpose for being there and that the latter wanted
to start a fight. Accused-appellant denied the accusation
business firm is often hard to show with certainty in terms
and responded that Felipe should not get angry, as it was he
of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The
(Felipe) who committed a wrong against him and his
judge should be empowered to calculate moderate damages wife. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a
in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, chicken cage at him, but he was able to parry it with his
without redress from the defendant's wrongful hand. The accused-appellant then drew his long bolo and
act.‖Consequently, in computing the amount of hacked Felipe on the left side of the abdomen, as the latter
temperate or moderate damages, it is usually left to was already turning and about to run to the house. He also
the discretion of the courts, but the amount must went inside the house since Felipe might get hold of a
be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to
damages should be more than nominal but less deliver a second hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the
than compensatory. child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was
delivered suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same
As already adverted to, the Spouses' failure to remit anymore such that the blow landed on Ranil. When he saw
the net profits to Evangelista pursuant to the subject MOA that he hit the child, he got angry and delivered a third
caused some pecuniary loss on the part of the latter, albeit hacking blow on Felipe, which landed on the right side of
the latters neck. Thereafter, Felipe ran outside. He
he failed to prove the exact amount of such loss. In view of
followed Felipe and hacked him again, which blow hit the
such circumstance, the Court deems it reasonable to award
victims upper left arm. At that time, Felipe was already on
temperate damages in the amount of P1,100,000.00, which the yard of his house and was about to run towards the
is roughly half of P2,241,632.00, or the amount of gross road. He then left and surrendered to
revenue claimed to have been earned by the amusement the barangay chairperson.During his cross-examination,
centers. the accused-appellant said that he was a bit tipsy when
he proceeded to Felipes house, but he was not
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROSENDO drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house after the first
REBUCAN y LAMSIN hacking blow, the accused-appellant stated that he had no
G.R. NO. 182551. July 27, 2011 (LEONARDO DE intention to back out because he was thinking that the
CASTRO, J.) victim might get a gun and use the same against him. The
FACTS: The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in accused-appellant also asserted that when he was about to
Carigara, Leyte from Manila on August 15, 2002. He went deliver the second hacking blow, Felipe simultaneously took
to the house of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his Ranil who was sitting on a sack and used him to shield the
children. There, he learned that his wife went blow. There was a long bolo nearby but Felipe was not able
to Manila and his brother was taking care of his to take hold of the same because the accused-appellant was
two children and his stepson, Raymond. On chasing him. He admitted that he had a plan to kill
November 2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the place of his Felipe but claimed that when he arrived at the
friend, Bernie Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latters house on the day of the attack, he had no
latters mother went to Manila and he was told that, intention to kill him.
while he was still in Manila, Felipe and Timboy
Lagera went to their house and tried to place On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision,
themselves on top of his wife. He then said that he convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of double
harbored ill feelings towards the said men but he was able murder.The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
to control the same for the sake of his children. On decision on August 21, 2007, modifying the judgment of the
November 6, 2002, at about 2:00 p.m., he went to the RTC. The appellate court adopted the position of the Office
house of barangay chairperson Arminal to place a of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the
call to his wife who was in Manila. He was carrying accused-appellant resulted in two separate crimes of
a bolo at that time since he was using the same to murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove
cut cassava stems in his farm. When he talked to his the existence of a complex crime of double murder. The
wife, she confirmed that she was sexually molested by Court of Appeals subscribed to the findings of the
Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter, as the accused-appellant RTC that the killing of Felipe Lagera was attended
proceeded to go home, it rained heavily so he first sought by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter was evident premeditation.
drinking gin and he was offered a drink.After staying
there and drinking for half an hour, the accused- ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE
appellant decided to go home. Afterwards, he COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
remembered that he had to buy kerosene so he
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial courts and the
DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER. Court of Appeals appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.It is not enough that
HELD: NO. In the instant case, the evidence of the evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but
prosecution established the fact that the killings of Felipe criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious
and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the outward acts evidencing determination to commit
same to murder.The RTC gave more weight to the the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the
testimony of Carmela Tagpis in establishing the presence of offense, the circumstance must not merely be
treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant premeditation; it must be evident premeditation. In the
carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. As can be case at bar, the evidence of the prosecution failed to
gleaned from the testimony, Carmela firmly and establish any of the elements of evident premeditation since
categorically pointed to the accused-appellant as the person the testimonies they presented pertained to the period of
who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly stated that the the actual commission of the crime and the events that
attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation between occurred thereafter. The prosecution failed to adduce any
the accused-appellant and Felipe. Without any provocation, evidence that tended to establish the exact moment when
the accused-appellant suddenly delivered fatal hacking the accused-appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the
blows to Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected assault latter clung to his determination to carry out the plan and
rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his
opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was plan.Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the
carrying his grandson Ranil, the child unfortunately aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength,
suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the
killing of Ranil, the trial court likewise correctly appreciated circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs
the existence of treachery. The said circumstance may be with treachery, the former is absorbed in the
properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was latter. On the other hand, dwelling, minority and
not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating
appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons circumstances in the instant case considering that the same
could in any manner put up defense against the attack or were not alleged and/or specified in the information that
become aware of it. Furthermore, the killing of a child is was filed on January 23, 2003. With regard to the
characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is conflicting rulings of the RTC and the Court of
not shown. For the weakness of the victim due to his tender Appeals vis--vis the nature of crimes committed,
years results in the absence of any danger to the we agree with the appellate court that the accused-
accused.Indeed, the Court has ruled that the appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate
testimony of children of sound mind is more counts of murder, not the complex crime of double
correct and truthful than that of older persons and murder.The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence
that children of sound mind are likely to be more to prove that the instant case falls under any of the two
observant of incidents which take place within classes of complex crimes. The evidence of the
their view than older persons, and their prosecution failed to clearly and indubitably
testimonies are likely more correct in detail than establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed
that of older persons. In the instant case, Carmela was by a single fatal hacking blow from the accused-
cross-examined by the defense counsel but she remained appellant. The eyewitness testimony of Carmela did not
steadfast and consistent in her statements. Thus, the Court contain any detail as to this material fact. To a greater
fails to see any reason to distrust the testimony of degree, it was neither proven that the murder of Felipe was
Carmela. Incidentally, the testimony of the accused- committed as a necessary means for committing and/or
appellant not only contradicts that of Carmela, but some facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa.
portions thereof do not also conform to the documentary
evidence admitted by the trial court. The testimony of Dr. In the determination of the penalty to be imposed
Profetana and the sketch of the human anatomy of Felipe, on the accused-appellant, we uphold the trial courts
which was marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution, stated ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds that were found surrender should be appreciated.To be sufficient, the
on his right arm, at his nose maxillary area and on his left surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner
arm. On the other hand, the accused-appellant testified that clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender
he delivered four hacking blows on Felipe, the three of unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt
which landed on the left side of the victims abdomen, the or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense
right side of his neck and on his upper left arm. When that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
confronted on the said apparently conflicting statements, capturing them. The accused-appellant has duly
the accused-appellant did not offer any established in this case that, after the attack on
explanation.Therefore, on the strength of the Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered unconditionally
evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling to the barangay chairperson and to the police on
of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the his own volition and before he was actually
circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of arrested. The prosecution also admitted this
Felipe and Ranil to murder. circumstance of voluntary surrender during
trial. We reject, however, the accused-appellants
contention that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and immediate part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
vindication of a grave offense.The Court finds that the was committed with one or more aggravating
accused-appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
circumstance of intoxication since his own from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
testimony failed to substantiate his claim of
drunkenness during the incident in Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of P50,000.00
question. During his cross-examination, the accused- as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The
appellant himself positively stated that he was only a bit award of exemplary damages is, however, increased
tipsy but not drunk when he proceeded to the house of to P30,000.00 in accordance with the prevailing
Felipe. He cannot, therefore, be allowed to make a contrary jurisprudence. As held in People v. Combate, when the
assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
crimes he committed on the basis thereof.As regards the of reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts that should
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication be awarded are P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
of a grave offense, the same cannot likewise be as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
appreciated in the instant case.In the case at bar, the damages.In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the
accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of Felipe Court further orders the award of P25,000.00 temperate
and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. The
offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He award of P25,000.00 for temperate damages in homicide or
testified that he learned of the same from his stepson, murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and
Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under
November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant carried out the Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim
mind, a period of four days was sufficient enough a time suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not
within which the accused-appellant could have regained his proven.
composure and self-control. Thus, the said mitigating
circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN DEL
appellant.Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as ROSARIO
amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to G.R. No. 189580 February 09, 2011
death for the crime of murder. In this case, apart from the (NACHURA, J.)
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of any other aggravating FACTS: Appellant Del Rosario was charged with murder
circumstance in both the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On of one Edwin Gelua. The information read that the accused
the other hand, as the presence of the lone mitigating armed with a knife, with intent to kill and taking advantage
circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly of night time, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
established in both instances, Article 63, paragraph 3 of then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
the Revised Penal Code mandates that the proper penalty assault and stab the victim thereby inflicting upon him
to be imposed on the accused-appellant is reclusion mortal wounds on the stomach which caused his death, to
perpetua for each of the two counts of murder. the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.Appellant
pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a
crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil Two of the four prosecution witnesses testified that during
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual Edwin‘s drinking spree with Salvador and Samson Gepiga
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) at their home, Edwin went out of the house to answer the
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of call of nature. AngelitaGelua(first witness) was standing by
litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.Civil indemnity
the main door while Edwin urinated when appellant
is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without
suddenly appeared and stabbed Edwin with a machete. She
need of proof other than the commission of the
crime. Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the immediately brought Edwin to the hospital and was
court for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the transferred to another where Edwin died. This testimony
victim by reason of the latters death. The purpose for was corroborated by the testimony of Salvador Gepiga who
making such an award is not to enrich the heirs of the added that he saw appellant holding a knife and who ran
victim but to compensate them for injuries to their away upon seeing him. Meanwhile, Dr. De Castro, Edwin‘s
feelings. The award of exemplary damages, on the other attending physicianopined that based on the location of the
hand, is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil stab wound, the victim was in front of the assailant - face to
Code, viz: face with the latter when attacked. However, it was also
possible that the assailant was at the back of the victim by
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, "hitting the anterior part from behind holding the patient."
by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or The RTC rendered a guilty verdict and accused was thereby
compensatory damages. sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetuaand to indemnify the
heirs of deceased Edwin Gelua in the amount of
Php17,258.00 as actual and compensatory damages; In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another fixed by jurisprudence at P50, 000.00, requires no proof
Php50,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs. The other than the fact of death as a result of the crime, and
Court of Appealsaffirmed appellant's conviction. proof of an accused's responsibility therefor. Similarly,
moral damages are awarded in view of the violent death of
ISSUE: the victim, and these do not require any allegation or proof
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond of the emotional sufferings of the heirs.The Court sustains
reasonable doubt of murder. the awards of P50, 000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,
000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Edwin.
What damages, if any, are the heirs of Edwin Gelua
entitled to? As to actual damages, the official receipts that Angelita
presented showed expenses that amounted to P17, 258.00.
RULING: The accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt However, when actual damages proven by receipts amount
of murder. to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages
amounting to P25,000.00 is justified, in lieu of actual
The factual findings of the trial court as regards its damages for a lesser amount. This is based on the sound
assessment of the witnesses' credibility particularly trial reasoning that it would be anomalous and unfair to the
court which forms first-hand impressions as witnesses heirs of the victim who tried but succeeded only in proving
testify before it are entitled to great weight and respect by actual damages of less than P25, 000.00. They would be in
the Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said a worse situation than another who might have presented
findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that no receipts at all, but is entitled to P25,000.00 temperate
the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances damages. Thus, considering that expenses in the amount of
which could substantially affect the outcome of the P17,258.00 were proven by Edwin's heirs, an award of
case.Appellant failed to convince the Court that the RTC P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of this lesser
and the CA overlooked certain facts and circumstances amount of actual damages, is proper.
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
An award of exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of
The witnesses for the People - Angelita and Salvador - were Edwin is proper. An aggravating circumstance, whether
consistent in the identification of appellant as Edwin's ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to
assailant. Appellant was directly identified by these an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
witnesses as the one who stabbed and killed Edwin. The meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code which provides:
alleged improper motive on the part of Angelita and
Salvador remains purely speculative, as no evidence was Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary
offered to establish that such a relationship affected their damages as a part of the civil liability may be
objectivity. As against the positive identification by Angelita imposed when the crime was committed with
and Salvador, appellant's bare denial carries no evidentiary one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
weight or probative value, especially so because he opted damages are separate and distinct from fines
not to present any evidence to prove his defense. and shall be paid to the offended party.
Appellant argues that he should be made liable for homicide The award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is,
only absent any treachery which attended the killing. That therefore, proper under current jurisprudence.
treachery or alevosia was present is
incontrovertible. The essence of this qualifying WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
circumstance is the sudden and unexpected attack by the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
assailant on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Alvin del Rosario is found
any real chance to defend himself. Concededly, appellant's GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, and is
attack, coming from behind, on the unarmed Edwin, was hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
sudden, unprovoked, unexpected, and deliberate. Edwin perpetua. Appellant is also ordered to pay the heirs of
was in no position and without any means to defend Edwin Gelua the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
himself. By all indications, Edwin was left with no P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
opportunity to evade the knife thrusts, to defend himself, or damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
to retaliate. In sum, the finding of treachery stands. PEOPLE vs. GANNABAN, JR.
Award of Damages G.R. No. 173249 (2007)
As to the damages awarded, when death occurs due to a FACTS:Gannaban, Jr., together with Bernales who died
crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil during trial, were charged with the murder of Spouses
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual Amado and Rosita Vista. The prosecution presented the
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) victims‘ minor children who positively identified the two
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages. malefactors as the ones who shot their parents while the
whole family was in their house. Gannaban, Jr. denied the have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in
charges and alleged that he was in the house of Buelta exchange for the boy. As a proof that she has Christopher,
shelling corn and was simply being implicated in the case she instructed Teresa to receive a recent photo of her son
because he shot Amado‘s father when the latter was from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo—
stabbing his cousin. The RTC found Gannaban, Jr. guilty of true enough someone gave her the recent photo of
double murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman
double reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs P140,000 as whereby Teresa was instructed to board a ship for
indemnity and P40,000 as actual damages. The CA Mindanao, but she reasoned that she had not raised the
affirmed the conviction but reduced the civil indemnity to ransom money yet. Later on, they agreed to conduct the pay
P100,000, deleted the award of actual damages, and off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at PitangsCarinderia in
awarded moral damages of P50,000 and temperate Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
damages of P25,000.
Teresa then engaged the help of the Presidential
ISSUE: Whether or not Gannaban, Jr. is guilty of the crime Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). PO3 Juliet
of double murder. Palafox was designated to act as Teresa‘s niece. In the
designated meeting place, while Teresa and PO3 Palafox
HELD: YES, double murder was clearly established by the were approached by 2 women namely Raga
prosecution‘s witnesses who were then elementary pupils at SarapidaMamantak and LikadSarapidaTaurak. Mamantak
the time of the incident. Their testimonies were worthy of asked who werthey waiting for. Teresa replied that they
belief since they were young and had no ill-motive to falsely were waiting for a certain RocmaBato, the name written at
testify and impute a serious crime against Gannaban, Jr. the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in
The accused‘s alibi cannot prevail over the positive and Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that
categorical testimonies of the victims‘ minor children. she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would
Moreover, the killing was attended by treachery as the ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan.
evidence shows that Gannaban, Jr. suddenly and Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato.
unexpectedly attacked the victims, who were resting in their Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed
house. them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and
The CA correctly imposed the penalty of double PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak
reclusion perpetua and correctly awarded the reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she
aforementioned amounts as damages. Furthermore, the fetched Christopher.
victims‘ heirs are likewise entitled to exemplary In the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned
damagessince the qualifying circumstance of treachery was and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant.
firmly established by the prosecution. The SC has held that She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on
if a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, their agreement that the boy be handed over at the
either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000 as carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the minutes with Christopher.Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried
New Civil Code. This kind of damages serves as deterrent to and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He
serious wrongdoings, as vindication of undue suffering and no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only
wanton invasion of the rights of an injured person, and as speak in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. boy gave a muslim name with Taurak as surname7.
PEOPLE vs. RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and Later that day Mamantak and Taurak were
LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK apprehended and charged with kidnapping for ransom.
G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008 Both pleaded not guilty. Taurak testified that at the time
and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling wares
Facts:At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher
went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a wandering about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not
McDonald‘s outlet in the KP Tower, Binondo Manila. seem to understand her. She took the boy under her care
Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while and waited for someone to come for him. No one did. As it
Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her
took her seat, Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. to the Muslim Center in Quiapo.She did not bring the boy at
Barely had Christopher gone from his mother‘s sight when first as a precautionary measure. Only after confirming that
she realized that he had disappeared. After looking with no Teresa was the boy‘s mother did she relinquish custody to
avail, they reported him missing to the nearest police
detachment.
7Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time
woman who sounded like a muslim. The caller claimed to Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child,
born very sickly, eventually died.
her. However, she was shocked when members of the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate
PAOCTF suddenly arrested her. She protested because she courts. There is no reason to disturb them as they are
was innocent. There were no charges against her nor was sufficiently supported by evidence.
there a warrant for her arrest.
Tauraks story that she merely gave Christopher
Mamantak corroborated her sister Tauraks refuge was incredible. It was like the apocryphal tale of a
testimony. She claimed that she met man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse was that he
taurakinPitangsCarenderia by chance. When Teresa arrived saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that
later, Taurak talked to her and then left, returning after a there was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried
few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the to bring the boy to the proper authorities or surrender him
first time. Taurak told her that she had found the boy and to the Department of Social Welfare and Developments
was returning him to his mother. Mamantak stayed in the social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any
carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 time during the 16 months he was with her. And how could
p.m. She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly Teresa have initiated her phone conversations with Taurak
arrested her and her sister as she had not committed any when they were total strangers to each other?Similarly,
crime and there was no warrant for her arrest. RTC and CA Mamantaks account that she was at PitangsCarinderia only
convicted Mamantak and Taurak. by coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw
Christopher invites nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal
Issues: testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on her role in
1. Whether or not the two accused are guilty of the arranging for the payment of ransom and the release of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and
2. Whether or not Teresa is entitled to damages demanding and receiving the ransom money) showed
otherwise. The evidence clearly established that Mamantak
Held: was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
1. Yes, they are guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom. The Court of Appeals considered the demand
for P30,000 as a qualifying circumstance which
Kidnapping has the following elements: necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the
other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too
(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of
measly, compared to what must have been actually spent
the parents of the victimor a public officer who has
a duty under the law to detain a person; for the care and subsistence of Christopher for almost two
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any years. It therefore treated the amount not as ransom but as
manner deprives the latter of his liberty; a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement
illegal and for board-and-lodging.)Ransom means money, price or
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a
following circumstances is present: (a) the captured person that will release him from captivity. No
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three specific form of ransom is required to consummate the
days; (b) it is committed by simulating public felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is
authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victims
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is
threats to kill him are made or (d) the person immaterial.
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a
public official. 2. Yes, Teresa is entitled to awards of damages.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award
deprivation of the victims liberty coupled with the intent of of P50,000 civil indemnity was proper. Pursuant to People
the accused to effect it. It includes not only the v. Garalde, the award of P50,000moral damages is
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his increased to P200,000 considering the minority of
liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a
And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but demand for ransom, and by way of example or correction,
embraces ones right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject Christopher is entitled to P100,000 exemplary damages.
only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.
Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control

and custody and even brought him to Lanao del Norte. She
demanded P30,000 in exchange for his return to his
mother. On the other hand, Mamantaks actions (e.g., her
presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the
ransom) showed without doubt that she was aiding her
sister and was acting in concert with her. These were the

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[TORTS AND DAMAGES: ATTY.

ALDEN GONZALES] 3A AY 2017-2108

Respondent filed an action for reconveyance of the

Meralco vs. Spouses Ramos

CA: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,

a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of

On March 11, 2001, Frabelle I Condominum Corporation

1. That it is the Makati City Government that had

G.R. NO. 145871, January 31, 2006

FACTS: On December 14, 1992, Leonides C. Diño

Respondent countered in her Answer that: the Deed of Sale

In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other

In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act

BIENVENIDO M. CASIÑO, JR. v. THE COURT OF ISSUE:

FACTS: PetitionerBienvenido M. Casiño, Jr., owner and RULING:

i. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, PEOPLE vs. GARCHITORENA

b) P48,110.00 — as actual damages;

Held: No. In connection with the civil liability of

1. In relation to Child Abuse - an indeterminate sentence

ISSUES: Keeping with these principles, the Court finds that

Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control

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