Card Cross Jones Criminal Law

C A R D, CROSS A N D J O N E S
CR I M I N A L L AW
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CARD, CROSS AND JONES
CRIMINAL LAW
Twentieth Edition
RICHARD CARD LLB, LLM, FRSA

Emeritus Professor of Law, De Montfort University, Leicester
1
3
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Twentieth edition published 2012
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Preface
Since the publication of the last edition of this book in 2010, the criminal appellate courts
have been busy, as evidenced by the numerous recent decisions referred to. In total,
around 100 cases have been added to the text some of them are listed overleaf. Provisions
from four pieces of legislation have also been incorporated. It follows from these devel-
opments, in particular the case law, that there are considerable changes in the text. No
chapter has been unaffected.
As with previous editions, this book is designed for use on undergraduate degree
courses, graduate diploma in law courses and similar courses. I have continued the prac-
tice of end-of-chapter further reading lists. These contain recommended reading of a
general nature about the contents of each chapter. Further reading in respect of particu-
lar cases or specific points still appears in the footnotes in each chapter.
I wish to thank all those who have assisted me in various ways. In particular, I would
like to thank my wife, Rachel, for her assistance with the manuscript, John Carroll,
Heather Smyth, Elissa Connor and Carolyn Fox for their help in the production of the
book, and the publishers for compiling tables of cases and statutes and the index. For such
imperfections that remain, I am solely responsible.
I have tried to summarise and explain the law as it was reported on 16 December
2011.
Free online updates are produced twice a year and are available at: www.oxfordtext-
books.co.uk/orc/card20e/.
Richard Card
January 2012
New to this edition
Revisions to the 20th edition include:

The latest case law developments (around 100 new cases have been added since the last
edition), including:
Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority (2011) (consent in sexual offences)
British Pregnancy Advisory Service v Secretary of State for Health (2011) (abortion)
Ciccarelli (2011) (consent in sexual offences)
Gnango (2011) (parties to crime)
Hichens (2011) (public and private defences)
Inglis (2010) (murder and mercy killing)
Mendez and Thompson (2010) (parties to crime)
Moore v DPP (2010) (attempt)
R (Jones) v Bedford and Mid Bedfordshire MC (2010) (harassment)
S (2011) (encouraging or assisting crime)
St Regis Paper Co Ltd (2011) (corporate liability)
Wenton (2010) (Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(2))
Winter and Winter (2010) (manslaughter by gross negligence)
Zaman (2010) (assisting offenders).
Legislative developments are also discussed, including the Bribery Act 2010.
Reference is also made to academic literature produced since the last edition and the fol-
lowing Law Commission consultation papers are discussed:
Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency No 193
(2010)
Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts No 195 (2010)
Unfitness to Plead No 197 (2010).
Contents
Table of Statutes xiii

Table of Cases xxvii
Table of Secondary Legislation lix
1 Introduction 1
The characteristics of criminal offences 1
The purposes of the criminal law 3
The courts of criminal jurisdiction 4
Jurisdiction 8
Maximum sentences 11
Sources 12
Common law 12
Legislation 19
EU law 22
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and Human Rights Act 1998 23
Codification 30
2 Criminal liability 1: actus reus 32

Actus reus and mens rea 32
Actus reus 34
3 Criminal liability 2: mens rea 69

Mens rea 69
Motive 103
Ignorance or mistake of law 104
Ignorance of morals 108
viii | Contents
4 Proof 110
The two burdens 110
Presumptions 115
Proof of a state of mind 116
5 Mistake and related matters 119

Accident 119
Ignorance 120
Mistake 120
Mistake negativing mens rea 121
Mistake relating to an excuse 125
6 Strict liability 130

The meaning of strict liability 130
Strict liability and the presumption of innocence 133
Offences of strict liability 135
Strict liability at common law 135
Strict liability in statutory offences 136
7 Non-fatal offences against the person 159

Consent 159
Assault and battery 176
Aggravated assaults 187
Wounding and grievous bodily harm 196
‘Racially or religiously aggravated assaults’ 204
Administering poison etc 211
Draft Offences Against the Person Bill 217
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 220
Racially or religiously aggravated harassment 229
8 Homicide and related offences 231

Introduction 231
Murder, manslaughter and infanticide 232
Contents | ix
Common elements of murder, manslaughter and infanticide 233

Murder 238
Manslaughter 246
Voluntary manslaughter 246
Involuntary manslaughter 266
Infanticide 287
Other homicide offences: (1) corporate manslaughter 289
Other homicide offences: (2) causing death by dangerous or
careless driving etc 298
Offences related to homicide 307
Causing or allowing death of a child or vulnerable adult 308
Solicitation of murder 313
Threats to kill 314
Encouraging or assisting suicide 314
Abortion and child destruction 319
9 Sexual offences 327

Introduction 327
Non-consensual sexual offences 332
Child sex offences 354
Abuse of position of trust 363
Familial child sex offences 367
Sex with an adult relative 371
Offences against people with a mental disorder 373
Preparatory offences 380
Other offences 381
Jurisdiction over paedophile offences outside the United Kingdom 382
10 Theft and related offences 386

Theft 386
Actus reus of theft 387
Mens rea of theft 425
Robbery 439
x | Contents
Unauthorised borrowing 442

Making off without payment 450
11 Other offences under the Theft Act 1968 454

Burglary and aggravated burglary 454
Blackmail 463
Handling 467
Theft Act 1968, s 23 480
Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit 480
Going equipped for stealing or burglary 482
12 Fraud and related offences 485

Fraud Act 2006 485
Fraud 486
Possession etc of articles for use in frauds 496
Making or supplying articles for use in frauds 498
Obtaining services dishonestly 498
Fraudulent offences under the Theft Act 1968 502
Liability of controlling officer for fraud or falsification
offence by corporation 503
Forgery and related offences 503
Forgery 504
Copying a false instrument 512
Using a false instrument or a copy of a false instrument 513
Offences relating to money orders, share certificates, cheques etc 513
Jurisdiction 515
13 Offences of damage to property 518

Destroying or damaging property belonging to another 518
Destroying or damaging property intending thereby to endanger
life or being reckless as to life being endangered thereby 529
Arson 531
Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage 532
Contents | xi
Threats to destroy or damage property 533

Possessing anything with intent to destroy or damage property 534
14 Inchoate offences 536

Encouraging or assisting crime 536
The offences 537
Common provisions 544
Conspiracy: general 554
Statutory conspiracy 558
Common law conspiracy 579
Attempt 591
15 Mental condition defences 610

Infancy 610
Mental disability 614
Unfitness to be tried 614
Defence of insanity 622
Automatism and other involuntary conduct 639
Intoxication 646
16 Other general defences 672

Public or private defence 672
Self-help 690
Duress by threats 691
Marital coercion 706
Duress of circumstances 708
Necessity 716
Superior orders 724
17 Participation 727
Perpetrators 728
Accomplices 730
Assistance after an offence 773
xii | Contents
18 Vicarious liability, corporate liability and liability

of unincorporated associations 778
Vicarious liability for the criminal acts of another 778
Corporations 784
Unincorporated associations 799
Index 805
Table of Statutes
Paragraph numbers in bold type indicate where legislation is set out in part or in full.
Abortion Act 1967 . . . 8.202, 16.93 British Nationality Act 1948

s 1 . . . 8.193, 8.195, 16.91 s 3 . . . 8.3
(1) . . . 8.194, 8.195, 8.197 (1) . . . 8.3, 8.180
(d) . . . 8.195 British Nationality Act 1981 . . . 9.123
(2) . . . 8.194 s 51 . . . 8.3, 8.180
(3), (3A), (4) . . . 8.196 Broadcasting Act 1990
s 4(1), (2) . . . 8.198 Sch 15 . . . 14.97
s5
(1) . . . 8.202 Broadcasting Act 1996
(2) . . . 8.192, 8.193, 8.195 s 144(1) . . . 3.47
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861
s 8 . . . 17.8, 17.79 Children Act 1989 . . . 8.139
s 2 . . . 7.51
Adulteration Acts . . . 6.36 s 31 . . . 15.5
Aggravated Vehicle-Taking Act 1992 Children Act 2004
s 1 . . . 10.125 s 58 . . . 7.51
Aliens Restriction Acts . . . 6.6 (1)–(3) . . . 7.51
Animal Welfare Act 2006 Children and Young Persons Act 1933
s 18 . . . 16.91 s 1 . . . 6.29, 7.51, 8.85, 8.169
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (1) . . . 2.8
2001 . . . 7.95, 7.150 s 50 . . . 15.1
s 39 . . . 13.27 Children and Young Persons Act 1963
Armed Forces Act 2006 s 16 . . . 15.1
s 272 . . . 2.32 Civil Aviation Act 1982
Armed Forces Act 2008 s 92 . . . 1.26
s 300(7) . . . 8.133 Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act 1996
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of s 1 . . . 1.26
Claimants, etc) Act 2004 . . . 17.62 Civil Partnership Act 2004
Aviation Security Act 1982 s 1 . . . 9.85, 10.50
s 1 . . . 1.25 ss 246, 247 . . . 9.94
s 2 . . . 1.25 Sch 21 . . . 9.94
Sch 27 . . . 9.85, 9.97, 9.119, 10.50, 13.3, 14.47, 14.74
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 Coinage Offences Act 1936 . . . 12.48
s 3 . . . 8.133 Communications Act 2003
s 11 . . . 8.133 s 125 . . . 10.33
Bribery Act 2010 . . . 14.39 s 126(2) . . . 3.46
s 1 . . . 18.20 s 127(1)(a) . . . 6.15
s 7 . . . 18.20, 18.46, 18.52 Companies Act 1985
(1) . . . 18.20 s 450 . . . 6.45
(2) . . . 6.47, 18.20 Companies Act 2006
(3) . . . 18.20 s 993 . . . 12.1
(5) . . . 18.20, 18.52
s 9 . . . 18.20 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986
s 10(1)–(6) . . . 18.20 s 2 . . . 18.50
s 13(1) . . . 16.90 Computer Misuse Act 1990
s 14 . . . 18.46 s 1 . . . 10.31, 12.51
s 15 s 3 . . . 13.5
(1) . . . 18.52 Consumer Credit Act 1974 . . . 17.9
(3) . . . 18.52 Consumer Protection Act 1987
Sch 1 . . . 14.39 s 20 . . . 18.5
xiv | Table of Statutes
s 39 . . . 6.47 s 8(1)–(5) . . . 8.141

s 40 . . . 18.44 s 9 . . . 8.143
Contempt of Court Act 1981 (1)–(2) . . . 8.143
s 1 . . . 6.9 (4)–(5) . . . 8.143
Control of Pollution (Amendment) Act 1989 s 10 . . . 8.143
s 1(4)(a) . . . 16.91 (1)–(4) . . . 8.143
s 11 . . . 8.131
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 . . . 15.14, 16.64 s 14 . . . 18.52
s 52 . . . 8.45 (1)–(4) . . . 18.52
s 54 . . . 8.58, 8.61, 8.62, 16.36 s 17(a) . . . 8.143
(1) . . . 8.63, 8.81 s 18
(a) . . . 8.67, 8.71 (1) . . . 8.144, 17.9
(b) . . . 8.70 (1A) . . . 8.144, 14.2
(c) . . . 8.71, 8.78, 8.79, 8.80 s 19(1), (2) . . . 8.146
(2) . . . 8.67 s 20 . . . 8.129, 8.133, 18.43
(3) . . . 8.79 ss 21, 22, 25 . . . 8.131
(4) . . . 8.66 s 27
(5) . . . 8.81 (3) . . . 8.130
(6) . . . 8.81 (4) . . . 8.129
(7) . . . 8.63 s 28(3) . . . 8.145
(8) . . . 8.64, 17.59 Sch 1 . . . 8.131
s 55 . . . 8.58, 8.61, 8.62, 16.36
(2)–(5) . . . 8.70 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 . . . 7.1, 7.95, 7.152, 15.3
(6) s 11 . . . 15.5
(a) . . . 8.73 s 28
(b), (c) . . . 8.76 (1) . . . 7.97, 7.98, 7.100, 13.27
s 56(1) . . . 8.62 (a) . . . 7.98, 7.101, 7.102, 7.103, 7.104, 7.106,
s 57 . . . 8.123 7.107, 7.111
s 59 . . . 8.181, 8.182 (b) . . . 7.103, 7.108, 7.109, 7.110, 7.111
s 72(1) . . . 14.77 (2)
Sch 12 . . . 8.186 (a) . . . 7.101
Sch 16 . . . 8.151 (b) . . . 7.107
Sch 21 . . . 8.15, 14.4, 14.106 (3) . . . 7.111
(4) . . . 7.98
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate (5) . . . 7.99
Homicide Act 2007 . . . 8.128, 8.144, 18.52 s 29 . . . 7.96, 7.97
s 1 . . . 8.128, 8.130, 8.131, 8.145 (1) . . . 7.96
(1) . . . 8.130, 8.133, 8.142 (b), (c) . . . 7.74
(2) . . . 8.131 (2), (3) . . . 7.96
(3) . . . 8.130 s 30 . . . 13.27, 13.28
(4) (1) . . . 13.27
(b) . . . 8.140 (2) . . . 13.28
(c) . . . 8.132 (3) . . . 13.27
(5)(a), (b) . . . 8.128 s 32
(6) . . . 8.143 (1) . . . 7.150
s 2 . . . 8.133 (a), (b) . . . 7.152
(1) . . . 8.133 (3), (4) . . . 7.152
(a), (b) . . . 8.135, 8.137, 8.138, 8.139 s 34 . . . 15.3
(d) . . . 8.133, 8.135, 8.137, 8.139
(2) . . . 8.133 Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003
(4)–(7) . . . 8.133 s 84(1) . . . 7.65
s 3 . . . 8.134 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 . . . 15.19
(1)–(4) . . . 8.135 ss 12, 13 . . . 15.43
s 4 . . . 8.134 s 15 . . . 15.19
(1)–(4) . . . 8.136 s 16 . . . 15.19
s 5 . . . 8.134 (4) . . . 15.19
(1)–(3) . . . 8.137 Criminal Attempts Act 1981 . . . 2.24, 9.71, 14.14,
s 6 . . . 8.134, 8.138 14.53, 14.118, 14.121, 14.134, 14.142, 14.143
(1)–(7) . . . 8.138 s 1 . . . 14.104, 14.105, 14.106, 14.107, 14.111,
s 7 . . . 8.134 14.120, 14.134, 14.136, 14.139, 14.140,
(1)–(3) . . . 8.139 14.141
Table of Statutes | xv
(1) . . . 7.143, 14.14, 14.104, 14.105, 14.108, s 31 . . . 1.25

14.111, 14.120, 14.122, 14.123, 14.127, Criminal Justice Act 1967
14.130, 14.143 s 8 . . . 4.18, 5.6, 8.58, 8.96, 15.76, 15.78, 15.79, 15.80
(2) . . . 14.130, 14.131, 14.132, 14.133, 14.134 Criminal Justice Act 1972
(3) . . . 2.24, 14.115, 14.130, 14.132, 14.133, s 36 . . . 1.17
14.134, 14.136
(4) . . . 7.143, 14.105, 14.106 Criminal Justice Act 1982
(a) . . . 14.106 s 37 . . . 1.28
(b) . . . 14.106 Criminal Justice Act 1987
(ba) . . . 14.106 s 12
(c) . . . 14.106 (1) . . . 14.92
s 1A . . . 14.105 (3) . . . 14.103
s 2 . . . 14.138 Criminal Justice Act 1988
s 3 . . . 14.141 s 36 . . . 1.17
(3)–(5) . . . 14.141 s 38 . . . 13.2
s4 s 39 . . . 7.34, 7.35, 7.60
(1) . . . 14.139, 14.140 s 40 . . . 1.9, 7.35
(3) . . . 14.122 (1), (2) . . . 7.35, 10.114, 13.2
(4) . . . 14.141 s 93A . . . 3.48
s 5(1) . . . 14.50 s 93C(2) . . . 3.57, 14.65
s 6(1) . . . 14.104 s 141A . . . 6.47
s 9 . . . 10.114 s 160 . . . 9.121, 9.124
Criminal Damage Act 1971 . . . 1.41, 3.36, 10.13, Criminal Justice Act 1993
12.48, 13.1, 13.4, 13.7, 13.27, 14.104, 15.93, 15.97 Pt 1 . . . 1.23, 12.69, 12.70, 14.38, 14.76, 14.94,
s 1 . . . 2.19, 3.35, 13.29 14.137
(1) . . . 2.13, 2.17, 3.35, 3.38, 3.85, 5.14, 13.2, s 1 . . . 14.38, 14.76, 14.105, 14.137
13.3, 13.7, 13.8, 13.9, 13.14, 13.15, 13.23, (2) . . . 12.70
13.24, 13.25, 13.27, 13.28, 15.93 (3) . . . 12.70
(2) . . . 3.32, 13.3, 13.19, 13.20, 13.21, 13.22, (a) . . . 14.76
13.23, 13.24, 13.25, 13.26, 14.70, 15.91, (b) . . . 14.94
15.93, 15.110 (c) . . . 14.137
(3) . . . 2.13, 3.35, 13.3, 13.9, 13.14, 13.24, 13.25, (d) . . . 14.38
13.26, 13.27, 15.93, 15.110 s2
s 2 . . . 13.9, 13.29, 13.30 (1) . . . 12.71, 14.105
(a), (b) . . . 13.29 (1A) . . . 12.71
s 3 . . . 13.9, 13.14, 13.31, 13.32 (3) . . . 12.71, 14.105
(a), (b) . . . 13.31 s3
s 4 . . . 13.2, 13.19, 13.30, 13.32 (1) . . . 12.71, 14.38, 14.76, 14.94, 14.137
s 5 . . . 5.14, 13.17, 13.18, 13.23, 13.25, 13.29, (2) . . . 14.76, 14.94
13.31, 15.97, 16.101 (3) . . . 14.137
(1) . . . 13.29, 13.31 s5
(2) . . . 13.9, 13.31, 15.97 (2) . . . 14.105
(a) . . . 13.10, 13.11, 13.18 (3) . . . 14.95
(b) . . . 13.9, 13.12, 13.13, 13.14, 13.15, 13.16, (4) . . . 14.38
13.18 s6
(3) . . . 5.14, 13.9, 15.97 (1) . . . 14.95
(4) . . . 13.12 (2) . . . 14.38, 14.105
(5) . . . 13.18 (4) . . . 14.38, 14.95, 14.105
s 10 (7) . . . 14.38, 14.95, 14.105
(1) . . . 13.6 Criminal Justice Act 2003 . . . 1.9, 1.28
(a) . . . 10.36, 13.15 Pt 7 . . . 1.12
(2) . . . 13.6, 13.7, 13.15 s 145 . . . 7.95
(a), (c) . . . 13.7 s 269 . . . 8.21
(3), (4) . . . 13.7 s 280 . . . 1.28
(5) . . . 13.5 (2) . . . 7.69
Criminal Justice Act 1925 . . . 16.65 s 281 . . . 1.28
s 47 . . . 16.65, 16.67 (4), (5) . . . 7.35, 7.64, 7.143, 10.114
Criminal Justice Act 1948 s 282 . . . 1.28
xvi | Table of Statutes
(1)–(3) . . . 1.28 Sch 3 . . . 7.90

Sch 26 . . . 7.69 Criminal Law Act 1977 . . . 14.101
Sch 32 Pt 1 . . . 14.44, 14.50
para 27 . . . 13.2 s 1 . . . 14.44, 14.49, 14.52, 14.56, 14.77, 14.93,
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 14.101
s 72 (1) . . . 14.14, 14.50, 14.51, 14.56, 14.57, 14.58,
(1) . . . 9.123 14.66, 14.67, 14.68, 14.71, 14.72, 14.77
(2), (3) . . . 9.124 (a) . . . 14.51, 14.53, 14.55
s 76 . . . 16.7, 16.8, 16.19, 16.24 (b) . . . 14.55
(1) . . . 16.8 (2) . . . 14.62, 14.63, 14.64, 14.65, 14.66, 14.67
(2) . . . 16.7, 16.8 (4) . . . 14.77
(3), (4) . . . 16.19 s 1A . . . 9.122, 14.77, 14.78, 14.80, 14.82
(5) . . . 15.87, 16.19 (2)–(5), (8), (10), (12) . . . 14.77
(6) . . . 16.19, 16.23 s 2 . . . 14.49, 14.74, 14.101
(6A) . . . 16.23, 16.26 (1) . . . 14.74, 14.82
(7), (8) . . . 16.19, 16.26 (2) . . . 14.47, 14.74
(9) . . . 16.7 (a) . . . 14.47, 14.74
(10) (b) . . . 14.74
(a) . . . 16.26 (c) . . . 14.74, 14.82
(b) . . . 16.7, 16.8, 16.26 (3) . . . 14.74
(c) . . . 16.8, 16.19, 16.24 s 3 . . . 14.80, 14.101
Sch 15 . . . 9.73, 9.92, 9.100 s 4 . . . 14.101
Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act (1)–(5) . . . 14.78
2010 s 5 . . . 14.101
s 52(2) . . . 15.1 (1) . . . 14.44
(2) . . . 14.14, 14.84, 14.101
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 . . . 7.139 (3) . . . 14.14, 14.97, 14.99, 14.100, 14.101,
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 14.103
s 46 . . . 13.2 (6) . . . 14.49
s 51 (8) . . . 14.48
(1) . . . 4.14 (10) . . . 8.175
(a)–(c) . . . 4.14 Sch 12 . . . 8.180
(7) . . . 4.14 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885
s 68 . . . 16.2 s 5 . . . 17.62
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964
1998 s 1 . . . 15.41
s5 s 4 . . . 15.13, 15.20
(1) . . . 14.77 (2) . . . 15.13
(2) . . . 14.78 (5) . . . 15.9
Sch 1 . . . 14.95 (6) . . . 15.13
Sch 2 . . . 9.122 s 4A . . . 15.14, 15.15, 15.19, 15.20, 15.41
Criminal Law Act 1967 . . . 8.25, 13.13, 16.4, 17.9 (2)–(5) . . . 15.14
s 1 . . . 17.9 s 5 . . . 15.17, 15.18, 15.20, 15.42, 15.51, 15.60
s 3 . . . 16.11, 16.25 s 6 . . . 8.47, 15.40
(1) . . . 16.1, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.8, 16.12, Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to
16.19, 16.23, 16.26, 16.29 Plead) Act 1991 . . . 15.13, 15.42, 15.44
(2) . . . 16.4 s 1 . . . 15.37
s 4 . . . 17.87 s 2 . . . 15.9, 15.14
(1) . . . 14.14, 14.106, 17.85, 17.86, 17.88 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
(1A) . . . 17.87 s 41A . . . 15.1
(3) . . . 17.88
(4) . . . 17.86 Customs and Excise Management Act 1979
s 5 . . . 17.87 s 170(2) . . . 3.50, 3.88, 14.141
(1) . . . 11.58, 14.14, 14.106, 17.89, 17.90
(3) . . . 17.89 Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 . . . 6.41
(5) . . . 17.90 s3
s 6(2) . . . 8.36 (1) . . . 6.41
s 10(2) . . . 7.90 Deer Act 1991
s 12(5) . . . 7.90 s 1 . . . 10.37
Table of Statutes | xvii
Defective Premises Act 1972 . . . 8.133 Pt 1 (ss 1–13) . . . 12.48

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 Pt 2 (ss 14–28) . . . 12.48
. . . 15.42 s 1 . . . 12.49, 12.57, 12.62, 12.65
s 5 . . . 8.15, 8.168, 8.169, 17.76 s 2 . . . 12.60, 12.65
(1) . . . 8.168, 8.169, 8.172 s 3 . . . 12.55, 12.62, 12.63, 12.65
(a) . . . 8.169, 8.170 s 4 . . . 12.63, 12.65
(b) . . . 8.170 s 5 . . . 12.64
(c) . . . 8.171, 8.172 (1) . . . 12.65, 12.66, 12.67
(d) . . . 8.171, 8.172 (2) . . . 12.66
(i) . . . 8.170, 8.172 (3) . . . 12.67, 12.68
(ii) . . . 8.172, 8.173, 8.174 (4) . . . 12.68
(iii) . . . 8.170, 8.172 s 6(4) . . . 12.66, 12.68
(2) . . . 8.172 s 8(1) . . . 12.51
(3) . . . 8.174 s 8(2)–(4) . . . 12.51
(4)(a), (b) . . . 8.170 s9
(5) . . . 8.169 (1) . . . 12.52, 12.53, 12.55
(6) . . . 8.168, 8.169 (a)–(f) . . . 12.53, 12.54
(7) . . . 8.168 (g) . . . 12.53, 12.54, 12.55, 12.56
s 22 . . . 15.9, 15.13, 15.14 (h) . . . 12.53, 12.54
s 24 . . . 15.16, 15.42 (2) . . . 12.50
Sch 10 . . . 8.15 s 10 . . . 12.58
Sch 11 . . . 8.15 (1), (2) . . . 12.58
(3) . . . 12.57
(4), (5) . . . 12.58
Education Act 1996
s 548 . . . 7.51 Fraud Act 2006 . . . 3.89, 10.1, 11.45, 11.65, 12.1,
12.10, 12.13, 12.21, 12.25, 12.39, 12.46, 12.47,
Education and Inspections Act 2006 12.48, 12.70, 13.1, 14.38, 14.76, 14.84, 14.93,
s 93 . . . 7.50, 7.51 14.104, 14.105, 14.137
s 165 . . . 7.51 s 1 . . . 10.20, 10.24, 10.31, 10.46, 10.87, 10.119,
Electricity Act 1989 10.132, 10.134, 11.60, 11.63, 12.2, 12.30,
s 59(1) . . . 3.47 12.34, 12.35, 12.37, 12.40, 12.41, 12.51, 12.71,
Energy Act 2004 14.85
s 68(1) . . . 7.65 (1), (2) . . . 12.3
Explosive Substances Act 1883 (3) . . . 12.3
s 4 . . . 3.49 s 2 . . . 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.12, 12.13, 12.14, 12.15,
(1) . . . 6.33 12.17, 12.19, 12.22, 12.23, 12.37
(1) . . . 12.4, 12.12
(a) . . . 12.17
Family Law Reform Act 1969
(b) . . . 12.18
s 8 . . . 7.25
(2) . . . 12.13
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (b) . . . 12.16
s 1 . . . 7.12 (3) . . . 12.6
s 2 . . . 14.53 (4) . . . 12.6
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (5) . . . 12.12
s 400 . . . 18.44 s 3 . . . 12.2, 12.3, 12.14, 12.17, 12.20, 12.22,
Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 12.23, 12.25, 12.28, 14.85
s 44 . . . 16.91 (a), (b) . . . 12.23
Sch 1 . . . 16.91 s 4 . . . 10.31, 10.46, 12.2, 12.3, 12.17, 12.23, 12.24,
Firearms Act 1968 12.25, 12.27, 12.28, 14.85
s 5 . . . 6.21, 16.80 (1) . . . 12.24
s 25 . . . 3.56 (b), (c) . . . 12.28
(2) . . . 12.26
Food Safety Act 1990
s 5(1)–(4) . . . 12.19
s 21 . . . 6.47
s 6 . . . 2.16, 12.31
s 36 . . . 18.44
(1) . . . 12.29
Forgery Act 1913 . . . 12.48, 12.51, 14.87 (2) . . . 12.29
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 . . . 12.1, s 7 . . . 12.34
12.48, 12.51, 12.70, 13.1, 14.38, 14.76, 14.92, (1) . . . 12.33, 12.34
14.104, 14.105, 14.137 (2) . . . 12.33
xviii | Table of Statutes
s 8(1) . . . 12.30, 12.34 Human Rights Act 1998 . . . 1.48, 1.49, 1.50, 1.51, 8.20
s 9 . . . 12.1 s 1 . . . 1.59
s 11 . . . 3.65, 10.32, 10.135, 12.37, 12.38, 12.39, s 2(1) . . . 1.61
12.40, 12.41, 12.42 s 3 . . . 1.52, 1.53, 1.54, 4.8, 9.86
(1) . . . 12.35, 12.42 (1) . . . 1.50, 1.52
(2) . . . 12.35 (2)(b), (c) . . . 1.50
(a), (b) . . . 12.36 s 4(1)–(4) . . . 1.56
(3) . . . 12.35 s6
s 12 . . . 12.47, 18.46 (1)–(3) . . . 1.58
(1)–(3) . . . 12.47 (6) . . . 1.58
Sch 1 . . . 11.45, 11.60, 11.64, 12.70, 12.71 s 9(1) . . . 1.58
Further and Higher Education Act 1992 s 10 . . . 1.57
s 85C . . . 7.51 s 19 . . . 1.55, 1.555
s 21(1) . . . 1.50
Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 . . . 17.62 Sch 1 . . . 1.59
Gas Act 1986 . . . 2.8
s 38(2) . . . 2.8 Identity Cards Act 2006
s 44(2) . . . 12.64
Government of Wales Act 2006
Pt 3 . . . 1.39 Identity Documents Act 2010
Pt 4 . . . 1.39 ss 4–6 . . . 12.64
Sch 7 . . . 1.39 Sch . . . 12.70
Sch 10 . . . 1.50 Indecency with Children Act 1960 . . . 4.17, 6.31
s 1(1) . . . 6.14
Health Act 2006 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 . . . 8.200,
ss 76, 77 . . . 18.53 8.202, 8.203
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 . . . 8.144, s 1 . . . 8.199, 8.202, 16.90
8.146 (2) . . . 8.201
s 3(1) . . . 18.23 Infanticide Act 1922 . . . 8.123
s 33(1) . . . 18.23 Infanticide Act 1938 . . . 8.13
s 37 . . . 8.144, 18.44, 18.45 s 1 . . . 8.123
Sch 3A . . . 18.23 (1) . . . 8.123, 8.124, 8.125, 8.127
Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 . . . 18.23 (2) . . . 8.123, 8.124, 8.126
Highways Act 1959 Insolvency Act 1986
s 140(1) . . . 4.6 s 362(1) . . . 6.20
Highways Act 1980 Interpretation Act 1978
s 161(1) . . . 4.6 s 5 . . . 7.135, 18.19, 18.53
Homicide Act 1957 . . . 8.19, 8.25, 8.30, 15.44 s 6 . . . 7.138
s 1 . . . 8.25 s 22(1) . . . 18.19, 18.53
s 2 . . . 2.26, 8.39, 8.44, 8.47, 8.49 Sch 1 . . . 1.28, 7.135, 13.2, 18.19, 18.53
(1) . . . 8.43, 8.44, 8.45, 8.46, 8.47, 8.50, 8.51, Sch 2
8.52, 8.54, 8.55, 8.56 para 4
(a) . . . 8.49 (1)(a) . . . 18.53
(b) . . . 8.51 (5) . . . 18.19
(c) . . . 8.52
(1A) . . . 8.45, 8.46, 8.51, 8.56 Larceny Act 1861 . . . 10.37
(1B) . . . 8.45, 8.46, 8.52 s 23 . . . 6.29
(2) . . . 8.47 Larceny Act 1916 . . . 10.1, 11.28
(3) . . . 8.39 Law Reform (Year and A Day Rule) Act 1996 . . .
(4) . . . 17.59 8.3, 8.142, 8.159, 8.168, 8.182
s 4 . . . 8.37, 8.38 s 1 . . . 8.15
(1) . . . 8.37, 17.59 s 2(1)–(3) . . . 8.15
(2), (3) . . . 8.37 s 3(2) . . . 8.15
Housing Act 1988 Licensing Act 1872
s 29 . . . 6.18 s 12 . . . 2.16, 6.6
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental s 13 . . . 6.32
Orders) Act 2008 . . . 9.100 s 16(1), (2) . . . 6.33
Table of Statutes | xix
Licensing Act 1921 Metropolitan Police Act 1839

s 4 . . . 17.33 s 44 . . . 18.8
Licensing Act 1964 . . . 18.5 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 . . . 6.13, 14.49
s 161(1) . . . 18.11 s 4(3) . . . 8.87
Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000 . . . 8.128, s 8 . . . 3.50
10.9, 18.19, 18.51 s 28 . . . 1.53, 5.15, 6.46, 15.99
Limited Partnerships Act 1907 . . . 8.131, 18.51 Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 . . .
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) 8.20
Act 1982
s 15 . . . 2.19, 7.13 Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors Act 1977
s 16(1), (2) . . . 16.90
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980
s 3A . . . 1.26 Obscene Publications Act 1959
s 17(1) . . . 7.55, 7.62, 7.75, 8.180, 10.2, 10.96, s2
10.99, 10.108, 11.1, 11.2, 13.2, 13.24, 13.30, (1) . . . 2.26
13.32, 17.86, 17.89 (4A) . . . 14.97
s 22 . . . 10.128, 13.2 s 4(1) . . . 2.26
(11) . . . 13.2 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957 . . . 8.133
s 32 . . . 1.28
(1) . . . 1.28 Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 . . . 8.133
s 33 . . . 13.2, 17.87 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 . . . 1.41, 7.1,
s 44 . . . 17.8, 17.79 7.58, 7.143, 8.168
Sch 1 . . . 7.55, 7.62, 7.75, 8.180, 10.2, 10.96, 10.99, s 4 . . . 8.175, 8.177, 8.181, 14.14
10.108, 11.1, 11.2, 13.2, 13.24, 13.30, 13.32, s 5 . . . 8.34
17.86, 17.89 s 9 . . . 1.25, 8.3
Sch 2 . . . 10.128, 13.2 s 16 . . . 8.180
Malicious Communications Act 1988 s 18 . . . 2.23, 7.51, 7.63, 7.75, 7.83, 7.90, 7.91, 7.92,
s 1 . . . 3.28 7.94, 7.131, 8.15, 8.29, 15.44, 15.65, 15.68,
(1) . . . 3.27 15.95, 17.5, 17.52
s 20 . . . 2.23, 3.37, 7.3, 7.28, 7.31, 7.45, 7.51, 7.75,
Malicious Damage Act 1861 . . . 13.1 7.76, 7.80, 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.84, 7.85, 7.86, 7.88,
Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 7.89, 7.91, 7.92, 7.94, 7.95, 7.96, 7.120, 7.129,
s 228 . . . 10.37 7.131, 8.15, 9.26, 11.17, 15.44, 15.68, 15.80,
Medicines Act 1968 15.82, 15.88, 15.89, 17.5, 17.35, 17.52
s 58 . . . 8.85 s 21 . . . 14.10
(2)(a) . . . 6.32 s 23 . . . 2.44, 2.45, 2.47, 7.82, 7.112, 7.113, 7.114,
s 67 . . . 8.85 7.116, 7.117, 7.118, 7.119, 7.122, 7.124, 7.125,
Mental Capacity Act 2005 . . . 16.95 7.126, 7.127, 7.132, 8.87, 9.28, 11.17
s 2 . . . 2.12 s 24 . . . 7.43, 7.112, 7.113, 7.117, 7.118, 7.119, 7.125,
s 4A . . . 16.95 7.126, 7.127, 7.128, 7.132, 9.28
ss 24–26 . . . 2.12 s 38 . . . 7.62, 7.93
Sch A1 . . . 16.95 s 44 . . . 1.6
Mental Health Act 1983 . . . 8.39, 16.95 s 45 . . . 1.6
s 1 . . . 9.102 s 47 . . . 2.23, 7.3, 7.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.55, 7.60, 7.61,
s 37 . . . 15.42 7.75, 7.84, 7.95, 7.96, 7.129, 7.131, 15.44
(1) . . . 15.6 s 55 . . . 6.2
(3) . . . 15.20, 15.46 s 56 . . . 17.19
s 48 . . . 15.7 s 57 . . . 2.18, 5.12
s 63 . . . 7.1, 16.91 s 58 . . . 7.118, 8.190, 8.191, 8.192, 8.194, 8.195,
8.200, 16.93
Mental Health Act 2007 . . . 16.95
s 1 . . . 9.102 Official Secrets Act 1911 . . . 10.31
Sch 1 . . . 15.7, 15.20, 15.42, 15.46 Official Secrets Act 1989 . . . 16.81
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 . . . 1.26, 8.138 s 5(2) . . . 3.56, 3.86
s 3(2) . . . 16.91
s 281 . . . 1.26 Partnership Act 1890 . . . 8.131, 18.51
s 282 . . . 1.26 Patents Act 1977
Sch 13 . . . 1.26 s 30 . . . 10.28
xx | Table of Statutes
Perjury Act 1911 (b) . . . 7.140

s 1(1) . . . 3.46 (1A) . . . 7.135, 7.136, 7.137, 7.138, 7.139, 7.141,
Police Act 1996 . . . 7.1 7.142, 7.143
s 89 (b) . . . 7.140
(1) . . . 7.64, 7.65, 7.68 (c) . . . 7.138
(2) . . . 7.69 (2) . . . 7.140
(3) . . . 7.65 (3) . . . 7.137, 7.142
(4), (5) . . . 7.67 s 2 . . . 3.53, 7.137, 7.143, 7.146, 7.150, 7.152, 18.43
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (1), (2) . . . 7.143
s 28(3) . . . 2.24, 7.66 s 3 . . . 7.143
s 74(1), (2) . . . 11.45 s 4 . . . 7.143, 7.145, 7.146, 7.147, 7.149, 7.150
s 78 . . . 17.65, 17.68 (1) . . . 3.53, 7.144
(2), (3) . . . 7.145
Police and Justice Act 2006 (4) . . . 7.149
Sch 14 s7
para 2 . . . 13.5 (2) . . . 7.137
Police Reform Act 2002 (3) . . . 7.136
s 104 . . . 7.67 (3A) . . . 7.139, 7.145
Policing and Crime Act 2009 (4) . . . 7.135, 7.145
s 14 . . . 6.11 (5) . . . 7.135
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 Public Order Act 1986
s 78(1) . . . 1.28 Pt 1 . . . 15.112
s 90 . . . 8.20 s 3(1), (2) . . . 7.63
s 111(4) . . . 11.2 s 5 . . . 3.54
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 s 6(5) . . . 15.112
s 1 . . . 14.49 s 28 . . . 18.46
s 29M . . . 18.46
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916
s 2 . . . 14.49 Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981
s 12(5) . . . 18.3
Prevention of Crime Act 1953
s 1 . . . 2.5, 2.16, 11.23
Race Relations Act 1976 . . . 7.98
Prison Act 1952
s 3 . . . 7.98
s 40A . . . 6.37
s 40B . . . 6.37 Railways Act 1993
(1)(a), (b) . . . 6.37 s 146(1) . . . 3.47
s 40C . . . 6.37 Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003
(1) . . . 6.33 s 68(1) . . . 7.65
(a) . . . 6.33, 6.37 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 . . . 3.48, 3.57 s 76A . . . 7.65
Pt 7 . . . 11.57, 17.86 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008
s 327 . . . 3.48, 11.57, 14.65 Pt 3 (ss 36–65) . . . 6.44
s 328 . . . 3.48, 11.57 Sch 5 . . . 6.44
s 329 . . . 3.48, 11.57 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951
s 340(3) . . . 3.48, 11.57 s 2 . . . 6.36
Property Misdescriptions Act 1991 Road Safety Act 2006
s 1(1), (2) . . . 18.3 s 20(1) . . . 8.161
s 2(1) . . . 6.47 s 21(1) . . . 8.166
Protection of Children Act 1978 s 30 . . . 8.162
s 1 . . . 9.121, 9.124 s 31 . . . 8.164
s 3 . . . 18.44 Road Traffic Act 1930
Protection from Eviction Act 1977 s 72 . . . 6.40
s1 Road Traffic Act 1988 . . . 7.70
(3) . . . 2.5, 2.9, 3.27, 3.28, 6.18 s 1 . . . 2.48, 8.152, 17.25
(3A) . . . 3.57, 18.6 s 1A . . . 8.152
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 . . . 7.1, 7.37, s 2A . . . 8.154
7.42, 7.134, 7.135, 9.5 (1) . . . 8.154, 8.155, 8.158, 10.125
s 1 . . . 7.134, 7.143, 7.144 (a) . . . 8.154
(1) . . . 7.135, 7.137, 7.138, 7.139, 7.141, 7.142 (2) . . . 8.155, 8.158
Table of Statutes | xxi
(3) . . . 8.156, 8.157, 8.158, 8.162 (1)(b) . . . 14.8, 14.10

(4) . . . 8.155 (2) . . . 14.9
s 2B . . . 8.161, 8.162, 8.165 s 45 . . . 14.9, 14.11, 14.12, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15,
s 3A . . . 8.164, 8.165 14.16, 14.17, 14.20, 14.24, 14.25, 14.26, 14.27,
(1) . . . 8.164 14.28, 14.31, 14.32, 14.33, 14.37, 14.39, 14.40,
s 3ZA . . . 8.162, 8.165 14.41, 14.42
(1) . . . 8.162, 8.165 (b) . . . 14.15, 14.16
(2) . . . 8.162, 8.165 s 46 . . . 14.14, 14.16, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20, 14.24,
(3) . . . 8.162, 8.165 14.25, 14.26, 14.27, 14.28, 14.31, 14.32, 14.33,
(4) . . . 8.162 14.37, 14.39, 14.40, 14.41, 14.42, 14.43
s 3ZB . . . 8.166 (1) . . . 14.18
s 4 . . . 2.16 (a) . . . 14.18
s 5 . . . 6.3, 6.7, 14.24, 15.39, 16.80 (b) . . . 14.21, 14.23
(1)(a) . . . 14.141 (2) . . . 14.18, 14.21
s 6 . . . 8.165 (3)
s 7 . . . 8.164, 8.165 (a) . . . 14.18, 14.24
s 7A . . . 8.164 (b) . . . 14.18, 14.19
ss 8–9 . . . 8.165 (4) . . . 14.24
s 11(2) . . . 8.165 s 47 . . . 14.10, 14.16
s 13A . . . 8.153 (2) . . . 14.10, 14.31
s 87(1) . . . 8.166 (3) . . . 14.16, 14.31
s 103(1)(b) . . . 8.166 (4) . . . 14.23
s 143 . . . 2.19, 8.166 (5) . . . 14.10, 14.16, 14.23, 14.24
s 164(7) . . . 15.59 (a) . . . 14.24
s 165(4) . . . 15.59 (iii) . . . 14.24
s 170 . . . 2.8, 16.4 (b) . . . 14.24
s 185 . . . 8.148 (i) . . . 14.24
s 189 . . . 8.148 (6), (7) . . . 14.24
s 192 . . . 8.149 (8) . . . 14.10, 14.16, 14.23
Road Traffic Act 1991 . . . 16.72 (c) . . . 14.10
s 1 . . . 8.152 (9) . . . 14.31
s 3 . . . 8.164 s 48(2)–(4) . . . 14.24
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 s 49
s 34 . . . 8.151, 10.128 (1) . . . 14.25
s 35A . . . 8.151, 10.128 (2)
Sch 2 . . . 8.151, 10.128 (a) . . . 14.11
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (b) . . . 14.17
s 25(5) . . . 2.8 (3) . . . 14.27
s 87 . . . 16.91 (4)
(a) . . . 14.14
(b) . . . 14.20
Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006
(5)(a) . . . 14.14
s 18 . . . 18.53
(7) . . . 14.15, 14.22
Sale of Goods Act 1979 s 50 . . . 14.28, 14.82
ss 16, 17 . . . 10.39 (1)–(3) . . . 14.28
s 18 . . . 10.39 s 51 . . . 14.29, 14.74
r 1 . . . 10.8 s 51A . . . 14.4
School Standards and Framework Act 1998 . . . 7.51 s 52 . . . 14.37, 14.38
Senior Courts Act 1981 (1) . . . 14.32, 14.82
s 46A . . . 1.26 (2) . . . 14.33
Serious Crime Act 2007 . . . 14.1, 14.5, 14.82 (3) . . . 14.37
Pt 2 . . . 8.144, 9.122, 9.124, 10.50, 13.2, 13.3, 14.1, (5) . . . 14.38
14.2, 14.6, 14.30, 14.38, 14.106, 15.117, 16.61, s 53(1), (2) . . . 14.39
17.9, 17.15, 17.78, 17.79 s 54
s 1(1) . . . 14.58 (1) . . . 14.40
s 44 . . . 14.3, 14.9, 14.10, 14.11, 14.13, 14.14, (2)(a), (b) . . . 14.40
14.15, 14.20, 14.24, 14.25, 14.26, 14.27, 14.28, (3) . . . 14.40
14.31, 14.32, 14.33, 14.34, 14.35, 14.36, 14.37, s 55 . . . 14.41
14.39, 14.40, 14.41, 14.42, 14.53 s 56 . . . 14.31
xxii | Table of Statutes
(2), (3) . . . 14.31 (1) . . . 9.45

s 58 (a) . . . 9.46
(1)–(3) . . . 14.42 (2) . . . 9.47
(4)–(7) . . . 14.43 (3) . . . 9.21
s 59 . . . 9.122, 14.1 (4) . . . 9.45
s 62 . . . 8.144, 14.2 s 4 . . . 3.59, 9.10, 9.12, 9.20, 9.21, 9.22, 9.24, 9.50,
s 63(1) . . . 9.122, 9.124, 10.50, 12.70, 13.2, 13.3, 9.55, 9.103, 9.108, 9.122, 9.124
14.38 (1) . . . 9.51
s 65 . . . 14.5, 14.13, 14.20 (d) . . . 9.53
s 66 . . . 14.7, 14.13, 14.20 (2) . . . 9.53
s 67 . . . 14.6, 14.13, 14.20 (3) . . . 9.21
s 70 . . . 18.53 (4)–(5) . . . 9.51
Sch 3 . . . 14.14 s 5 . . . 6.8, 6.32, 9.12, 9.35, 9.36, 9.37, 9.38, 9.44,
Pts 1–3 . . . 14.14 9.49, 9.57, 9.58, 9.60, 9.89, 9.122, 9.124, 15.92
Sch 4 . . . 14.32, 14.38, 14.39, 14.82 (1) . . . 9.35
para 1 . . . 14.33, 14.37 (2) . . . 9.35
(1), (2) . . . 14.34 s 6 . . . 9.12, 9.39, 9.44, 9.49, 9.58, 9.60, 9.122,
para 2 . . . 14.33, 14.37 9.124, 15.92
(1) . . . 14.35 (1) . . . 9.44
(d) . . . 14.35 (2) . . . 9.44
(2), (3) . . . 14.35 s 7 . . . 9.12, 9.39, 9.49, 9.58, 9.60, 9.124, 15.92
para 3 . . . 14.33, 14.37 (1) . . . 9.49
(1) . . . 14.36 (2) . . . 9.49
(c) . . . 14.36 s 8 . . . 9.12, 9.55, 9.56, 9.57, 9.60, 9.124
(2) . . . 14.36 (1) . . . 9.55, 9.61
para 4 . . . 14.32, 14.34 (2), (3) . . . 9.55
Sch 6 s 9 . . . 6.32, 9.58, 9.61, 9.64, 9.70, 9.71, 9.72, 9.76,
Pt 1 . . . 9.122, 9.124, 10.50, 12.70, 13.2, 13.3, 9.114, 9.124, 14.63
14.38 (1) . . . 9.58, 9.59, 9.60, 9.62
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (c) . . . 9.60
s 125 . . . 7.135, 7.136, 7.140, 7.142, 7.143 (2), (3) . . . 9.58
Sch 4 . . . 7.67, 16.91 s 10 . . . 9.58, 9.59, 9.60, 9.61, 9.64, 9.70, 9.71, 9.72,
Sch 7 . . . 17.86, 17.87, 17.89 9.76, 9.114, 9.124
Sexual Offences Act 1956 . . . 6.31, 7.29 (1) . . . 9.61, 9.62
s 1 . . . 7.30, 14.116, 15.94 (2), (3) . . . 9.61
s 14 . . . 6.14 s 11 . . . 9.58, 9.60, 9.66, 9.67, 9.70, 9.71, 9.72, 9.76,
s 30 . . . 17.62 9.114, 9.124, 15.92
Sexual Offences Act 2003 . . . 1.41, 1.46, 2.5, 3.3, (1) . . . 9.64
3.51, 3.56, 5.7, 6.31, 7.24, 7.29, 7.74, 9.1, 9.2, 9.4, (2) . . . 9.64
9.5, 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 9.12, 9.15, 9.17, 9.30, 9.31, 9.37, s 12 . . . 9.58, 9.60, 9.66, 9.68, 9.69, 9.70, 9.71, 9.72,
9.46, 9.47, 9.56, 9.57, 9.108, 9.120, 9.122, 11.2, 9.76, 9.114, 9.124, 15.92
11.13, 14.14, 14.104, 14.116, 14.128, 15.92, 17.12, (1) . . . 9.67, 9.68
17.62 (2) . . . 9.67
Pt 1 . . . 9.6, 9.75, 9.120 s 13 . . . 9.38, 9.58, 9.70, 9.71, 9.72, 9.124
s 1 . . . 3.59, 5.6, 9.10, 9.12, 9.20, 9.21, 9.22, 9.24, (1) . . . 9.70
9.29, 9.42, 9.47, 9.53, 9.103, 9.108, 9.122, 9.124, (2) . . . 9.70
15.92 s 14 . . . 9.58, 9.69, 9.71, 9.72, 9.120, 9.124, 14.106
(1) . . . 9.29 (1) . . . 9.71
(2) . . . 9.33 (2), (3) . . . 9.72
(3) . . . 9.21 (4) . . . 9.71
s 2 . . . 3.59, 9.10, 9.12, 9.20, 9.21, 9.22, 9.24, 9.39, s 15 . . . 9.58, 9.73, 9.74, 9.120, 9.124
9.103, 9.108, 9.122, 9.124, 15.92 (1) . . . 9.73
(1) . . . 9.40 (a), (c) . . . 9.74
(2) . . . 9.42 (d) . . . 9.75
(3) . . . 9.21 (2)
(4) . . . 9.40 (a) . . . 9.74
s 3 . . . 3.59, 9.10, 9.12, 9.20, 9.21, 9.22, 9.24, 9.39, (b) . . . 9.75
9.45, 9.46, 9.47, 9.60, 9.103, 9.108, 9.122, 9.124, (4) . . . 9.73
15.82, 15.91, 15.92, 15.107 s 16 . . . 9.76, 9.77, 9.81, 9.109, 9.114, 9.124
Table of Statutes | xxiii
(1) s 27 . . . 9.87, 9.88, 9.90, 9.91, 9.92, 9.98

(a) . . . 9.81 (1) . . . 9.92
(d) . . . 9.83 (2) . . . 9.92, 9.93, 9.98
(e) . . . 9.82 (3) . . . 9.92, 9.94
(2) . . . 9.83 (a)–(d) . . . 9.94
(3) . . . 9.82 (4) . . . 9.92, 9.95
(4) . . . 9.83 (a) . . . 9.95
(5) . . . 9.76 (5)
ss 16–25 . . . 9.122 (a) . . . 9.93
s 17 . . . 9.76, 9.77, 9.81, 9.109, 9.114, 9.124 (b), (d)–(e) . . . 9.94
(1) s 28(1), (2) . . . 9.97
(a) . . . 9.81 s 29(1)–(3) . . . 9.98
(d) . . . 9.83 s 30 . . . 9.16, 9.28, 9.102, 9.103, 9.105, 9.107, 9.108,
(e) . . . 9.82 9.109, 9.111, 9.124
(2) . . . 9.83 (2) . . . 9.106, 9.107
(3) . . . 9.82 (a) . . . 9.107
(4) . . . 9.83 (b) . . . 9.108
(5) . . . 9.76 (3), (4) . . . 9.105
s 18 . . . 9.76, 9.77, 9.79, 9.81, 9.109, 9.114, 9.124, s 31 . . . 9.28, 9.102, 9.103, 9.105, 9.107, 9.108,
15.92 9.109, 9.111, 9.124
(1) (2) . . . 9.106
(a) . . . 9.81 (a) . . . 9.107
(e) . . . 9.83 (b) . . . 9.108
(f) . . . 9.82 (3), (4) . . . 9.105
(2) . . . 9.83 s 32 . . . 9.28, 9.102, 9.103, 9.105, 9.107, 9.109,
(3) . . . 9.82 9.111, 9.124, 15.92
(4) . . . 9.83 (2)
(5) . . . 9.76 (a) . . . 9.107
s 19 . . . 9.76, 9.77, 9.81, 9.109, 9.114, 9.124, (b) . . . 9.108
15.92 (3) . . . 9.105
(1) s 33 . . . 9.28, 9.102, 9.103, 9.105, 9.107, 9.109,
(a) . . . 9.81 9.111, 9.124, 15.92
(d) . . . 9.83 (2)(b) . . . 9.108
(e) . . . 9.82 (3) . . . 9.105
(2) . . . 9.83 s 34 . . . 9.102, 9.110, 9.112, 9.124
(3) . . . 9.82 (2), (3) . . . 9.112
(4) . . . 9.83 s 35 . . . 9.102, 9.110, 9.112, 9.124
(5) . . . 9.76 (2) . . . 9.112
s 21 . . . 9.80, 9.84, 9.114 (a) . . . 9.107
(1) . . . 9.78 (3) . . . 9.112
(2)–(13) . . . 9.78, 9.79 s 36 . . . 9.102, 9.110, 9.112, 9.124, 15.92
s 22(2), (3) . . . 9.80 (2) . . . 9.112
s 23 . . . 9.85 s 37 . . . 9.102, 9.110, 9.112, 9.124, 15.92
(1), (2) . . . 9.85 (2) . . . 9.112
s 24 . . . 9.85 s 38 . . . 9.102, 9.114, 9.115, 9.119, 9.124
(1)–(3) . . . 9.85 (3), (4) . . . 9.114
s 25 . . . 4.7, 9.87, 9.88, 9.89, 9.90, 9.91, 9.92, 9.96, s 39 . . . 9.102, 9.114, 9.115, 9.119, 9.124
9.100, 9.124 (3), (4) . . . 9.114
(1) . . . 9.87 s 40 . . . 9.102, 9.114, 9.115, 9.119, 9.124, 15.92
(e) . . . 9.89 (3) . . . 9.114
(2) . . . 9.89 s 41 . . . 9.102, 9.114, 9.115, 9.119, 9.124, 15.92
(3) . . . 9.88 (3) . . . 9.114
(4)–(5) . . . 9.87 s 42 . . . 9.115, 9.119
(6) . . . 9.87, 9.105, 9.112, 9.114 (1) . . . 9.115
s 26 . . . 9.87, 9.90, 9.91, 9.92, 9.96, 9.100, 9.124 (2) . . . 9.115, 9.116
(1) . . . 9.90 (3) . . . 9.115, 9.117
(e) . . . 9.91 (4) . . . 9.115, 9.118
(2), (3) . . . 9.91 s 43 . . . 9.119
(4)–(6) . . . 9.90 (1), (2) . . . 9.119
xxiv | Table of Statutes
s 44 . . . 9.119 (7) . . . 9.65

(1)–(3) . . . 9.119 (8) . . . 9.46
ss 47–50 . . . 9.121, 9.124 Sch 2 . . . 1.25, 9.124
ss 51–53 . . . 9.121 Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act
s 53A . . . 6.11 1996 . . . 9.122
ss 57–60 . . . 9.121 Shops Act 1912 . . . 18.23
s 61 . . . 9.120, 9.124
s 62 . . . 9.8, 9.120, 9.124, 15.92 Stamp Duties Management Act 1891
(2) . . . 9.120 s 27 . . . 12.51
s 63 . . . 9.120, 9.124, 14.126, 15.92 Statutory Instruments Act 1946 . . . 1.43
(2) . . . 9.120 s 3 . . . 3.84
s 64 . . . 2.18, 9.99, 9.100 Suicide Act 1961 . . . 8.181, 8.186, 18.53
(1) . . . 9.99, 9.100 s 1 . . . 8.181
(2) . . . 9.99, 9.100, 9.101 s 2 . . . 8.181, 8.182, 8.183, 8.186
(3) . . . 9.100 (1) . . . 8.181, 8.182, 8.184, 8.185, 8.186, 8.187,
(za), (zb) . . . 9.100 8.188, 8.189, 14.4, 14.14, 14.106
(3A) . . . 9.100 (a) . . . 8.183
(4) . . . 9.101 (1A), (1B) . . . 8.181, 8.183
(5) . . . 9.99 (1C) . . . 8.181, 8.182
s 65 . . . 2.18, 9.99, 9.100 (2) . . . 8.182
(1) . . . 9.99, 9.100 (4) . . . 8.188
(2) . . . 9.100, 9.101 ss 2A, 2B . . . 8.183
(3) . . . 9.100 s 3(2) . . . 8.37
(za), (zb) . . . 9.100 Sch 3 . . . 8.37
(3A) . . . 9.100
(4) . . . 9.101 Tattooing of Minors Act 1969 . . . 7.13
(5) . . . 9.99
Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878
s 66 . . . 9.120, 9.121
s 2 . . . 1.24
ss 67–70 . . . 9.121
s 71 . . . 9.121 Terrorism Act 2000
(2) . . . 9.6 s 38B . . . 2.8
s 72 . . . 1.25, 9.122, 9.123, 9.124, 14.38 Terrorism Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010
(1) . . . 9.123 s 34 . . . 18.44, 18.53
(2) . . . 9.123 s 38 . . . 18.53
(b) . . . 9.123 Theatres Act 1968
(3) . . . 9.123 s 2(4) . . . 14.97
(b) . . . 9.123 Theft Act 1968 . . . 1.41, 3.89, 10.1, 10.42, 10.45,
(4) . . . 9.123 10.86, 10.97, 10.133, 11.45, 12.1, 12.2, 12.4,
(6), (8), (9) . . . 9.123 12.42, 12.48, 12.70, 13.1, 14.38, 14.76, 14.104,
s 73 . . . 9.37, 9.44, 9.49, 9.58, 9.70, 9.76, 9.87, 14.105, 14.137
9.103, 9.110, 9.114, 17.12, 17.29 s 1 . . . 10.2, 10.19, 10.51, 10.79, 10.97, 11.45
s 74 . . . 9.12, 9.14, 9.15, 9.16, 9.20, 9.26, 9.28 (1) . . . 10.2, 10.17, 10.18, 10.68, 10.80
s 75 . . . 4.14, 9.12, 9.22, 9.25, 9.27, 9.34, 9.43, 9.48, (2) . . . 10.68
9.54 (3) . . . 11.56, 11.62
(1) . . . 9.26, 9.27 s 2 . . . 10.2, 10.19, 10.33, 10.79, 10.97
(2) . . . 9.27, 9.28, 9.108 (1) . . . 3.86, 10.69, 10.73, 10.76, 10.79, 11.56,
s 76 . . . 4.13, 9.12, 9.13, 9.20, 9.22, 9.23, 9.24, 11.62
9.26, 9.34, 9.43, 9.48, 9.54 (a) . . . 10.70
(1) . . . 9.21, 9.23 (b) . . . 10.7, 10.71
(2) . . . 9.21, 9.23 (c) . . . 10.72
(a) . . . 9.23 (2) . . . 10.79
s 77 . . . 9.21, 9.22, 9.24, 9.27 s 3 . . . 10.2, 10.4, 10.16, 10.19, 10.79, 10.97
s 78 . . . 9.6 (1) . . . 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.12, 10.15, 10.20,
(a) . . . 9.7 10.21, 10.22, 11.51
(b) . . . 9.8 (2) . . . 10.20, 10.72, 11.51
s 79 s 4 . . . 10.2, 10.19, 10.33, 10.79, 10.97, 13.6
(2), (3) . . . 9.30 (1) . . . 10.26, 10.29, 11.29, 11.44, 12.39
(4), (5) . . . 9.67 (2) . . . 10.34, 10.35
(6) . . . 9.102 (a)–(c) . . . 10.35
Table of Statutes | xxv
(3) . . . 10.34, 10.35 s 18 . . . 12.47, 18.46

(4) . . . 10.36 (1), (2) . . . 12.47
s 5 . . . 10.2, 10.19, 10.51, 10.79, 10.97 s 19 . . . 12.43, 12.45
(1) . . . 10.38, 10.39, 10.43, 10.46, 10.47, 10.48, s 20 . . . 12.43, 12.44, 12.46
10.49, 10.51, 10.54, 10.58, 10.59, 10.61, (3) . . . 12.46
10.62, 10.66, 13.7 s 21 . . . 11.45
(2) . . . 10.46, 10.51, 10.58, 10.67 (1) . . . 11.26, 11.32
(3) . . . 10.45, 10.52, 10.53, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, (2) . . . 11.27, 11.28
10.57, 10.58, 10.62, 10.66, 10.67 (3) . . . 11.26
(4) . . . 10.62, 10.63, 10.64, 10.65, 10.66, 10.67 s 22 . . . 3.50, 11.34
(5) . . . 10.67 (1) . . . 11.36
s 6 . . . 10.2, 10.19, 10.79, 10.80, 10.85, 10.86, s 23 . . . 11.58
10.87, 10.88, 10.90, 10.95, 10.97 s 24 . . . 11.45
(1) . . . 10.87, 10.88, 10.89, 10.90, 10.91, 10.92, (1) . . . 11.45
10.93 (2) . . . 11.47
(2) . . . 10.88, 10.93 (a), (b) . . . 11.46
s 7 . . . 10.2 (3) . . . 11.48
s 8 . . . 10.97 (4) . . . 11.45
(1) . . . 10.96, 10.101 s 24A . . . 2.8, 11.59, 11.61, 11.62, 11.63
(2) . . . 7.74, 10.96, 10.99 (1) . . . 11.59
s 9 . . . 2.18, 3.26, 11.2, 11.4, 11.13 (2) . . . 11.60
(1) (2A) . . . 11.45, 11.60, 11.63
(a) . . . 11.2, 11.3, 11.13, 11.19 (5) . . . 11.60
(b) . . . 11.2, 11.17, 11.18, 11.19 (6) . . . 11.59
(2) . . . 11.2, 11.3, 11.14 (7), (8) . . . 11.45, 11.60
(3) . . . 11.2 s 25 . . . 11.65, 12.29, 12.31, 12.32
(4) . . . 11.11 (1) . . . 11.64
s 10 . . . 11.24 (2) . . . 11.64
(1) . . . 11.20, 11.21 (3) . . . 11.67
(a) . . . 11.21 (5) . . . 11.64
(b) . . . 11.23 s 27(3) . . . 11.55, 11.61
(c) . . . 11.22 s 30(4) . . . 10.50, 13.3
(2) . . . 11.20 s 34 . . . 12.44
s 11 . . . 10.108, 10.109 (1) . . . 11.29, 11.44
(1) . . . 10.108, 10.109, 10.110, 10.112 (2)
(2) . . . 10.109, 10.110 (a) . . . 11.29, 11.30, 11.31, 12.19
(3) . . . 10.113 (b) . . . 10.133, 11.44
(4) . . . 10.108 Sch 1 . . . 10.37
s 12 . . . 10.108, 10.114, 10.115, 10.116, 10.117, Theft Act 1978 . . . 3.89, 10.1, 12.2, 12.4, 12.42,
10.127 12.48, 13.1
(1) . . . 10.114, 10.119, 10.123, 10.124, 10.127, s 1 . . . 12.37, 16.47
11.64 s 3 . . . 10.131, 10.133, 10.135, 10.136
(2) . . . 10.114 (1) . . . 10.129
(5) . . . 10.124 (2) . . . 10.133
(6) . . . 10.122 (3) . . . 10.135
(7) s 4 . . . 10.129
(a) . . . 10.115 s 5(2) . . . 10.133
(b) . . . 10.120 Theft (Amendment) Act 1996
s 12A . . . 10.108, 10.125, 10.127 s 2 . . . 11.59
(1) . . . 10.128 (1) . . . 11.45
(b) . . . 10.126, 10.127 s 3 . . . 12.70
(2) . . . 10.126
(b) . . . 10.126, 10.128 Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002
(c) . . . 10.126 s 5 . . . 6.45
(3) . . . 10.127 s 17 . . . 6.45
(4) . . . 10.128 Town Police Clauses Act 1847
(7) . . . 10.125 s 28 . . . 3.78
(8) . . . 10.127 Trade Descriptions Act 1968 . . . 18.36
s 13 . . . 10.31, 10.33 s 14(1)(a) . . . 6.18
s 17 . . . 12.43, 12.44, 12.47 s 20 . . . 18.44
xxvi | Table of Statutes
s 24 . . . 18.16 (1) . . . 16.27, 16.98

(1) . . . 6.47, 18.36 (2) . . . 16.27, 16.28, 16.29, 16.30, 16.31
Trade Marks Act 1994 (a)–(c) . . . 16.29, 16.30
s 92 . . . 12.30 Art 3 . . . 1.59, 1.60, 1.62, 2.15, 8.21, 16.75
s 101(5) . . . 18.46 Art 5 . . . 1.59, 1.60, 1.69, 8.21, 15.51
Trade Union and Labour Relations (1) . . . 16.95
(Consolidation) Act 1992 (e) . . . 15.18, 15.51
s 45 . . . 18.52 (4) . . . 16.95
s 242 . . . 14.60 Art 6 . . . 1.59, 1.69, 6.8, 15.4, 15.16, 17.66, 17.68
(1) . . . 6.8, 9.25
Transport Act 1968 (2) . . . 1.53, 4.1, 4.8, 4.14, 6.8, 6.46, 8.37, 8.47,
s 99 . . . 17.28 9.25, 9.86, 14.28, 15.23, 16.63, 16.64
(5) . . . 12.56 Art 6(2) . . . 1.53
s 120B . . . 18.53 Art 7 . . . 1.34, 1.35, 1.59, 1.62, 1.68, 8.107, 10.75,
Transport and Works Act 1992 12.17, 14.41, 14.87, 14.90
s 28 . . . 18.3 Art 8 . . . 1.59, 1.60, 1.62, 1.64, 1.65, 1.66, 1.67,
Trial of Lunatics Act 1883 7.4, 8.189, 9.16, 9.38
s 2 . . . 15.41 (2) . . . 7.4, 8.189
Art 9 . . . 1.59, 1.62, 1.64, 1.65, 1.66, 1.67
Video Recordings Act 1984 Art 10 . . . 1.59, 1.60, 1.62, 1.64, 1.65, 1.66, 1.67
s 11(2) . . . 18.17, 18.37 (2) . . . 7.142
s 14A . . . 6.47 Art 11 . . . 1.59, 1.60, 1.62, 1.64, 1.65, 1.66, 1.67
(2) . . . 7.142
Art 16 . . . 1.50
War Crimes Act 1991
Art 17 . . . 1.50
s 1 . . . 8.3
Art 18 . . . 1.50
Water Industry Act 1991 First Protocol
s 73(1) . . . 3.53 Art 1 . . . 1.59
Water Resources Act 1991 Thirteenth Protocol
s 85 . . . 18.55 Art 1 . . . 1.59, 8.20
(1) . . . 2.47 UN Minimum Rules for the Administration of
Weights and Measures Act 1985 Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules)
Pt IV . . . 6.47 r 4.1 . . . 15.3
s 34 . . . 6.47, 6.49, 18.16
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 European Legislation
s 1(1) . . . 10.37 Lisbon Treaty 2007 . . . 1.46
s 9(1) . . . 10.37 Maastricht Treaty 1992 . . . 1.46
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949
s 1(1) . . . 6.41 Non-UK Legislation
s 5(b)(i) . . . 2.9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . . . 15.23
Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 Criminal Code of the British Virgin Islands
s 8(1) . . . 6.41 ss 203–208 . . . 10.79
s 35(1) . . . 6.41 s 204(2) . . . 10.79
s 48(1)(a) . . . 2.9 French Criminal Code
arts 122–3 . . . 3.82
International Law Hong Kong Building Ordinance . . . 6.14
European Convention on Human Rights . . . 1.28,
Italian Penal Code . . . 16.100
1.48, 1.49, 1.50, 1.51, 1.59, 1.63, 2.15, 6.8, 7.22,
8.201 Singapore Immigration Ordinance . . . 6.40
Art 2 . . . 1.59, 1.60, 1.62, 2.15, 16.27, 16.28, 16.29,
16.31, 16.32, 16.64
Table of Cases
A (a juvenile) v R [1978] Crim LR 689, Crown Ct A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715;
. . . 13.5 [1981] 2 All ER 1057; 73 Cr App Rep 63,
A, B, C and D [2010] EWCA Crim 1622 . . . 17.41, CA . . . 2.23, 7.3, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.15, 7.18
17.43, 17.44, 17.57 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1982) [1983] QB 751,
A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation), CA . . . 14.85, 14.88
Re [2001] Fam 147; [2000] 4 All ER 961; [2001] 2 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] QB 624;
WLR 480, CA . . . 2.20, 2.28, 3.7, 3.18, 3.23, 3.24, [1984] 2 All ER 216; 78 Cr App Rep 131,
8.5, 8.7, 16.5, 16.88, 16.95, 16.96, 16.98 CA . . . 10.9, 10.71
A Hospital v W [2007] EWHC 425 (Fam) . . . 2.15 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182;
A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25; [2001] 3 All ER 1 . . . 1.67 [1984] 3 All ER 369; 79 Cr App Rep 288,
A, Re [1992] 3 Med LR 303 . . . 8.11 CA . . . 10.62, 10.65
A v United Kingdom (human rights: punishment A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983) [1984] QB 456;
of child) (Application 25599/94) (1998) 27 [1984] 1 All ER 988; 78 Cr App Rep 183,
EHRR 611; [1998] 3 FCR 597, ECtHR . . . 7.51 CA . . . 16.9, 16.10, 16.38
A-G, ex p Rockall [1999] 4 All ER 312; [2000] 1 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) [1986] QB 491;
WLR 882; [1999] Crim LR 972 . . . 14.49 [1986] 2 All ER 219; 83 Cr App Rep 70,
CA . . . 10.46, 10.56
A-G of Hong Kong v Chan Nai-Keung [1987] 1
WLR 1339; 86 Cr App Rep 174, PC . . . 10.28 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1992) [1993] 2 All ER
190; 96 Cr App Rep 298, CA . . . 14.123
A-G for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324; [1994]
1 All ER 1; [1993] 3 WLR 1143, PC . . . 10.46 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91; [1993]
4 All ER 683; 99 Cr App Rep 429, CA . . . 15.55
A-G of Hong Kong v Tse Hung-Lit [1986] AC 876;
[1986] 3 All ER 173; [1986] 3 WLR 320, A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1992) [1994] 2 All ER
PC . . . 6.30, 9.52 121; [1994] RTR 122; 98 Cr App Rep 383,
CA . . . 14.116, 14.117
A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC
349; [1961] 3 All ER 299; 45 Cr App Rep 316, HL A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] QB 581;
. . . 15.28, 15.72, 15.90, 15.93, 15.100, 15.102, 15.104 [1996] 2 All ER 10; [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 351,
CA . . . 3.41, 8.30
A-G for State of South Australia v Brown [1960]
AC 432; [1960] 1 All ER 734; 44 Cr App Rep A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245;
100, PC . . . 15.48 [1997] 3 All ER 936; [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 91, HL
. . . 1.38, 3.38, 3.40, 3.41, 8.6, 8.9, 8.24, 8.29, 8.30,
A-G v Able [1984] QB 795; [1984] 1 All ER 277; 8.31, 8.32, 8.90, 8.91, 8.94, 8.95, 8.97
[1983] 3 WLR 845; 78 Cr App Rep 197,
DC . . . 17.28, 18.53 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1995) [1996] 4 All
ER 21; [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 320, CA . . . 3.80,
A-G v Lockwood (1842) 9 M & W 378 . . . 6.36 18.45
A-G v Scotcher [2005] UKHL 36; [2005] 3 All ER A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1998) [2000] QB 401;
1; [2005] 1 WLR 1867, HL . . . 3.75 [1999] 3 All ER 40; [1999] 2 Cr App Rep 214, CA
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1974) [1974] QB 744; . . . 15.40
[1974] 2 All ER 899; 59 Cr App Rep 203, A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796;
CA . . . 11.48 [2000] 3 All ER 182; [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 207,
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773; CA . . . 3.62, 8.106, 8.116, 8.128, 18.23, 18.30,
[1975] 2 All ER 684; 61 Cr App Rep 118, CA . . . 18.31, 18.32, 18.33, 18.34
17.10, 17.17, 17.18, 17.30 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 331;
A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 1979) [1981] 1 All ER [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 218, CA . . . 12.56
1193; 71 Cr App Rep 341, CA . . . 11.45 A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2000) [2001] UKHL 53;
A-G’s References (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979) [1980] QB [2001] 4 All ER 897; [2002] 1 Cr App Rep 360
180; [1979] 3 All ER 143; 69 Cr App Rep 266, . . . 17.68
CA . . . 11.15, 14.119 A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2000) [2001] EWCA
A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 617; Crim 780; [2001] RTR 415; [2001] 2 Cr App Rep
73 Cr App Rep 40, CA . . . 3.74 417 . . . 8.154, 15.55
xxviii | Table of Cases
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) [2002] EWCA Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; [1993]
Crim 1768; [2002] 3 All ER 840; [2003] 1 Cr 1 All ER 821; [1994] 1 FCR 485, HL . . . 2.12, 2.15,
App Rep 131 . . . 11.31, 12.59 3.23, 7.1, 8.11, 8.184, 16.98
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2002) [2002] EWCA Aitken [1992] 4 All ER 541n; [1992] 1 WLR 1006;
Crim 2392; [2003] Crim LR 410 . . . 3.75, 3.76 95 Cr App Rep 304, C-MAC . . . 7.14, 7.52, 7.89,
A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43; 15.80, 15.88
[2005] 1 AC 264, HL . . . 1.54 AK (medical treatment: consent), Re [2001] 2 FCR
A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA 35; [2001] 1 FLR 129; [2000] Fam Law 885 . . . 2.12
Crim 868; [2005] QB 73; [2004] 2 Cr App Rep Al Fawwaz [2001] UKHL 69; [2002] 1 AC 556, HL
366, CA . . . 2.17, 3.36, 6.29 . . . 14.76
A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Albert v Lavin [1981] 1 All ER 628; 72 Cr App Rep
Crim 1944; [2005] 1 Cr App Rep 16 . . . 14.58 178, CA . . . 5.6, 5.18
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004); Edwards, Denton, Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 All ER 878;
Jackson, Hendley, Crowley [2004] EWCA Crim 74 Cr App Rep 150, HL . . . 3.79, 16.37
1025; [2004] 1 WLR 2111; [2004] All ER (D) 288 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire
(May) . . . 4.8, 4.14, 8.37 Police [1992] 1 AC 310 . . . 8.108
A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004) see A-G’s Ali [1995] Crim LR 303; [1995] Crim LR 260, CA
Reference (No 2 of 2004); Quayle and others . . . 16.42, 16.51, 16.52
A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2004) [2005] EWCA Ali [2002] see Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002]
Crim 1882; [2006] Crim LR 63, CA . . . 17.50 Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 716; [2008] All ER (D) 56
A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2004) [2005] EWCA (Mar), CA . . . 16.53
Crim 889; [2005] 1 WLR 2810, CA . . . 7.104 Allen [1985] AC 1029; [1985] 2 All ER 641; 81 Cr
A-G’s Reference (Nos 74 and 83 of 2007) [2007] App Rep 200, HL . . . 10.138
EWCA Crim 2550; (2007) The Times, 16 Allen [1988] Crim LR 698, CA . . . 15.71
November, CA . . . 9.4
Allen [2005] EWCA Crim 1344; [2005] All ER (D)
A-G’s Reference for Northern Ireland (No 1 of 248 (May), CA . . . 3.12
1975) [1977] AC 105; [1976] NI 169; [1976] 2 All
ER 937, HL . . . 16.35 Allen v Metropolitan Police Comr [1980] Crim LR
441 . . . 16.25
Abbott v R [1977] AC 755; [1976] 3 All ER 140; 63
Cr App Rep 241, PC . . . 16.55, 16.56 Allen v Whitehead [1930] 1 KB 211; 27 LGR 652;
[1929] All ER Rep 13, DC . . . 18.8, 18.13
Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570, CA . . . 16.45,
16.49, 16.71, 16.77, 16.78, 16.81, 16.87 Allsop (1976) 64 Cr App Rep 29; [1976] Crim LR
738, CA . . . 14.85, 14.86
Abdullahi [2006] EWCA Crim 2060; [2007] 1
WLR 225, CA . . . 9.69 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824; [1972]
2 All ER 475; [1972] 2 WLR 1320, HL . . . 6.18,
Abraham [1973] 3 All ER 694; 57 Cr App Rep 799, 6.30, 6.36, 6.42
CA . . . 2.21, 4.10, 16.12
Altham [2006] EWCA Crim 7; [2006] 2 Cr App
Abu Hamza [2006] EWCA Crim 2918; [2007] QB Rep 127 . . . 16.75
659 . . . 8.179
Ambler [1979] RTR 217, CA . . . 10.119
Adams [1957] Crim LR 365 . . . 2.28, 2.32
Anderson [1986] AC 27; [1985] 2 All ER 961; 81 Cr
Adams (1993) 15 Cr App Rep (S) 466, CA . . . 10.20 App Rep 253, HL . . . 14.68, 14.71, 14.82
Adams v Camfoni [1929] 1 KB 95; 26 LGR 542; Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 QB 110; [1966] 2
[1928] All ER Rep 53, DC . . . 18.13 All ER 644; 50 Cr App Rep 216, CCA . . . 17.52,
Adams v R [1995] 1 WLR 52; [1995] 2 Cr App Rep 17.53
295, PC . . . 14.85 Anderson v Alnwick DC [1993] 3 All ER 613;
Adkins [2000] 2 All ER 185, CA . . . 5.1 [1993] 1 WLR 1156 . . . 1.24
Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171; [1994] 3 All ER 79; Anderton [1984] see Morris; Anderton v Burnside
[1994] 3 WLR 288, HL . . . 8.83, 8.106, 8.107, [1984]
8.108, 8.109, 8.114, 8.115, 8.119, 8.160 Anderton v Rodgers (1981) 145 JP 181; [1981] Crim
Ahlers [1915] 1 KB 616; 11 Cr App Rep 63, CCA LR 404, DC . . . 18.4, 18.13
. . . 3.29 Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560; [1985] 2 All ER
Ahmad (1986) 52 P & CR 346; 84 Cr App Rep 64, 355; 81 Cr App Rep 166, HL . . . 14.134
CA . . . 2.9, 2.13 Andrews [2002] EWCA Crim 3021; [2003] Crim
Air-India v Wiggins [1980] 2 All ER 593; [1980] 1 LR 477; [2002] All ER (D) 321 (Nov) . . . 8.85,
WLR 815; 71 Cr App Rep 213, HL . . . 1.20 8.86, 8.91
Table of Cases | xxix
Andrews and Craig [1962] 3 All ER 961; [1962] 1 Atkinson (1869) 11 Cox CC 330 . . . 17.60
WLR 1474; 47 Cr App Rep 32, CCA . . . 17.87 Atlantic Emperor, The see Hardie
Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576; [1937] 2 All ER Attorney-General see A-G
552; 26 Cr App Rep 34, HL . . . 8.83, 8.85, 8.106, Attwater [2010] EWCA Crim 2399; [2011] RTR
8.107 173 . . . 16.4
Andrews Weatherfoil Ltd [1972] 1 All ER 65; [1972] Atwal v Massey [1971] 3 All ER 881; 56 Cr App
1 WLR 118; 56 Cr App Rep 31, CA . . . 18.27 Rep 6, DC . . . 11.52
Andronicou and Constantinou v Cyprus Austin [1981] 1 All ER 374; 72 Cr App Rep 104, CA
(Application 25052/94) (1997) 25 EHRR 491; . . . 17.19
[1998] Crim LR 823, ECtHR . . . 16.30
Aves [1950] 2 All ER 330; 48 LGR 495; 34 Cr App
Anon (1584) 1 And 117 . . . 11.5 Rep 159, CCA . . . 11.54
Anon (1634) Kel 53; 84 ER 1079 . . . 17.6 Aziz [1993] Crim LR 708, CA . . . 10.133
Anon (1702) 12 Mod Rep 559 . . . 18.19
Antar [2004] EWCA Crim 2708; (2004) Times, 4 B [1984] Crim LR 352, CA . . . 14.75
November . . . 16.46
B [2006] EWCA Crim 2945; [2007] 1 Cr App Rep
Anthony [1965] 2 QB 189; [1965] 1 All ER 440; 49 388, CA . . . 9.26
Cr App Rep 104, CCA . . . 14.48
B (a minor) v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428; [2000] 1 All
Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340; [2000] 2 All ER 208; ER 833; [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 65, HL . . . 2.1, 2.2,
[2000] 2 Cr App Rep 94, HL . . . 2.1, 8.39, 15.14, 3.3, 3.58, 4.17, 5.5, 5.7, 5.13, 6.14, 6.16, 6.18, 6.19,
15.15 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23, 6.24, 6.31, 6.34, 6.38, 6.48
Antonelli and Barberi (1905) 70 JP 4 . . . 8.177 B (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment), Re
Appleyard (1985) 81 Cr App Rep 319; [1985] Crim [1990] 3 All ER 927, CA . . . 7.25
LR 723, CA . . . 13.10 B (consent to treatment: capacity), Re [2002]
Ardalan [1972] 2 All ER 257; [1972] 1 WLR 463; 56 EWHC 429 (Fam); [2002] 2 All ER 449 . . . 2.12
Cr App Rep 320, CA . . . 14.46 B and S v Leathley [1979] Crim LR 314 . . . 11.11
Armstrong v Clark [1957] 2 QB 391; [1957] 1 All B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] Fam 133;
ER 433; 41 Cr App Rep 56, DC . . . 8.165 [1995] 1 All ER 683; [1995] 1 FCR 662, CA . . . 16.91
Arnold [1997] 4 All ER 1; [1997] Crim LR 833, CA B v DPP; R v DPP [2007] EWHC 739 (Admin);
. . . 10.52, 10.91 (2007) 171 JP 404; (2007) The Times, 27 March,
Arobieke [1988] Crim LR 314, CA . . . 8.87 DC . . . 10.101
Arrowsmith [1975] QB 678; [1975] 1 All ER 463; 60 Babbs [2007] EWCA Crim 2737; [2007] All ER (D)
Cr App Rep 211, CA . . . 3.83 383 (Oct) . . . 7.106
Arrowsmith v Jenkins [1963] 2 QB 561; [1963] 2 Backshall see Symonds; Backshall
All ER 210, DC . . . 6.29 Bagshaw [1988] Crim LR 321, CA . . . 10.86
Asbury [1986] Crim LR 258, CA . . . 5.7 Bailey (1800) Russ & Ry 1, CCR . . . 3.81
Ascroft [2004] EWCA Crim 2365; [2004] 1 Cr App Bailey (1818) R & R 341 . . . 11.4
Rep (S) 56, CA . . . 10.22
Bailey (1977) 66 Cr App Rep 31n, CCA . . . 8.55
Ashford and Smith [1988] Crim LR 682, CA . . . 13.14
Bailey [1983] 2 All ER 503; [1983] 1 WLR 760; 77
Ashlee (2006) 212 CCC (3d) 477, Alberta CA . . . 9.28 Cr App Rep 76, CA . . . 15.68, 15.111
Ashton [1992] Crim LR 667, CA . . . 14.68 Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129; [1959] 3 All ER 200;
Ashton-Rickardt [1978] 1 All ER 173; [1978] 1 43 Cr App Rep 194; , CCA . . . 17.36, 17.37
WLR 37, CA . . . 2.5 Baker [1994] Crim LR 444, CA . . . 17.70
Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] Baker and Ward [1999] 2 Cr App Rep 335, CA . . .
EWHC 2849 (Admin); [2011] All ER (D) 13 16.49, 16.52, 16.54
(Nov); [2011] 44 LS Gaz R 17, DC . . . 9.12, 9.23,
9.26, 9.28 Baker and Wilkins [1997] Crim LR 497, CA . . .
3.79, 13.9, 16.21, 16.43, 16.75
Associated Octel Co Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 846;
[1996] 1 WLR 1543; [1996] ICR 972, HL . . . 18.23 Baldessare (1930) 22 Cr App Rep 70, CCA . . . 17.35
Aston and Mason (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 180, CA Ball [1983] 2 All ER 1089; [1983] 1 WLR 801; 77 Cr
. . . 17.76 App Rep 131, CA . . . 11.54
Atakpu [1994] QB 69; [1993] 4 All ER 215; [1994] Ball [1989] Crim LR 730, CA . . . 8.84, 8.100
RTR 23; 98 Cr App Rep 254, CA . . . 10.12, 10.22, Balogun (1999) unreported, CA . . . 16.33
10.23, 10.103 Bane [1994] Crim LR 134, CA . . . 4.10
xxx | Table of Cases
Banks (1873) 12 Cox CC 393 . . . 9.56 Berry (No 3) [1994] 2 All ER 913; [1995] 1 WLR 7;
Bannister [2009] EWCA Crim 1571; [2010] 2 All 99 Cr App Rep 88, CA . . . 6.33
ER 841; [2010] RTR 4 . . . 8.157 Bett [1999] 1 All ER 600; [1999] 1 WLR 2109;
Barclays Bank Ltd v WJ Simms, Son and Cooke [1999] 1 Cr App Rep 361, CA . . . 3.50
(Southern) Ltd [1980] QB 677; [1979] 3 All ER Betts and Ridley (1930) 22 Cr App Rep 148; 29 Cox
522; [1980] 2 WLR 218 . . . 10.63 CC 259, CCA . . . 17.11
Barker v Levinson [1951] 1 KB 342; [1950] 2 All ER Betts v Stevens [1910] 1 KB 1; 7 LGR 1052; 73 JP
825; 49 LGR 110, DC . . . 18.13 486; 79 LJKB 17 . . . 7.70
Barking Youth Court, ex p P [2002] EWHC 734; Bevans (1988) 87 Cr App Rep 64; [1988] Crim LR
[2002] 2 Cr App Rep 294; [2002] All ER (D) 93 236, CA . . . 11.29
(Apr), DC . . . 15.20 Bezzina [1994] 3 All ER 964; [1994] 1 WLR 1057,
Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246; [2005] 2 All ER CA . . . 6.3, 6.41
113; [2005] 1 WLR 910, CA . . . 2.23, 7.6, 7.8, 7.9, Bianco [2001] EWCA Crim 2516 . . . 16.45
7.18, 7.31
Bickley (1909) 2 Cr App Rep 53; 73 JP 239, CCA
Barnes [2008] EWCA Crim 2726; [2009] RTR 262 . . . 17.63
. . . 2.32
Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 2 East 469; 102 ER 448;
Barnfather v Islington London Borough Council [1775–1802] All ER Rep 425 . . . 3.81
[2003] EWHC 418 (Admin); [2003] 1 WLR
2318; [2003] ELR 263 . . . 6.8 Bingham [1991] Crim LR 433, CA . . . 15.28, 15.63
Barr [1978] Crim LR 244, Crown Ct . . . 10.109, 10.110 Bird [1985] 2 All ER 513; [1985] 1 WLR 816; 81 Cr
App Rep 110, CA . . . 16.23
Barrett and Barrett (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 212,
CA . . . 5.7 Birmingham [2002] EWCA Crim 2608; [2002] All
ER (D) 299 (Nov) . . . 7.79
Barrett v DPP [2009] EWHC 423 (Admin); [2009]
All ER (D) 123 (Aug); [2010] RTR 8, DC . . . 8.149 Birmingham and Gloucester Rly Co (1842) 3 QB
223; 3 Ry & Can Cas 148 . . . 18.23, 18.43
Bastable v Little [1907] 1 KB 59; 5 LGR 279; 71 JP
52, DC . . . 7.70 Bishop (1880) 5 QBD 259; 44 JP 330, CCR . . . 6.36
Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App Rep 8; 89 JP 162; [1925] Blackburn v Bowering [1994] 3 All ER 380; [1994]
All ER Rep 45, CCA . . . 8.106, 8.107, 8.113 1 WLR 1324; [1995] Crim LR 38, CA . . . 5.7,
7.68, 16.37
Baxter [1972] 1 QB 1; [1971] 2 All ER 359,
CA . . . 8.185 Blades v Higgs (1865) 29 JP 390; 11 HL Cas 621 . . .
10.36
Bayley and Easterbrook [1980] Crim LR 503,
CA . . . 14.119 Blake [1997] 1 All ER 963; [1997] 1 WLR 1167; [1997]
1 Cr App Rep 209, CA . . . 6.22, 6.26, 6.38, 6.41
Beal v Kelly [1951] 2 All ER 763, DC . . . 9.8
Blake v DPP [1993] Crim LR 586, DC . . . 13.11,
Beasley (1981) 73 Cr App Rep 44; [1981] Crim LR
13.14, 13.18, 16.4, 16.87
635, CA . . . 7.81, 7.84
Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr App Rep 212, CA Blakely and Sutton v DPP [1991] RTR 405; [1991]
. . . 17.70, 17.71, 17.73 Crim LR 763, DC . . . 17.30
Beckford v R [1988] AC 130; [1987] 3 All ER 425; Bland (1987) 151 JP 857; [1988] Crim LR 41, CA
85 Cr App Rep 378, PC . . . 2.21, 5.7, 5.9, 5.18, . . . 17.14
8.26, 16.9, 16.15, 16.16 Blaue [1975] 3 All ER 446; 61 Cr App Rep 271, CA
Beg (1994) unreported, CA . . . 14.70 . . . 2.36, 2.51, 2.57, 2.61
Belfon [1976] 3 All ER 46; [1976] 1 WLR 741; 63 Cr Blayney v Knight (1974) 60 Cr App Rep 269, DC . . .
App Rep 59, CA . . . 3.25 8.147, 10.116
Bell [1984] 3 All ER 842; [1985] RTR 202; [1984] Bloxham [1983] 1 AC 109; [1982] 1 All ER 582; 74
Crim LR 685, CA . . . 15.53 Cr App Rep 279, HL . . . 11.36, 11.40
Benge (1865) 4 F & F 504 . . . 2.33 Boal [1992] QB 591; [1992] 3 All ER 177; 95 Cr App
Rep 272, CA . . . 18.44
Bennett (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 168, CA . . . 17.69
Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602; [1957] 1 All
Bennett [1995] Crim LR 877, CA . . . 15.74
ER 411; 41 Cr App Rep 11, HL . . . 14.86
Bentley (1850) 14 JP 671; 4 Cox CC 406 . . . 3.85, 16.37
Bogacki [1973] QB 832; [1973] 2 All ER 864; 57 Cr
Bentley v Brudzinski [1982] Crim LR 825 . . . 7.66 App Rep 593, CA . . . 10.116
Berry (1977) 66 Cr App Rep 156, CA . . . 15.9 Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846; [2003] All ER
Berry [1985] AC 246; [1984] 3 All ER 1008; 80 Cr (D) 143 (Dec); [2004] 2 Cr App Rep 50, CA . . .
App Rep 98, HL . . . 1.21, 2.17 7.79, 7.80
Table of Cases | xxxi
Bolton (1992) 94 Cr App Rep 74, CA . . . 14.46 Briggs [2003] EWCA Crim 3662; [2004] 1 Cr App
Bolton (HL) (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Rep 451; [2003] All ER (D) 240 (Dec) . . . 10.15,
Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159; [1956] 3 All ER 624; 10.19, 10.28
[1956] 3 WLR 804, CA . . . 18.28 Bright [2008] EWCA Crim 462; [2008] 2 Cr App
Bolton v Crawley [1972] Crim LR 222, DC . . . 15.93 Rep (S) 578; [2008] All ER (D) 83 (Mar) . . . 14.103
Bone [1968] 2 All ER 644; 52 Cr App Rep 546, CA Brightling [1991] Crim LR 364, CA . . . 7.63
. . . 4.4, 16.45 Brindley and Long [1971] 2 QB 300; [1971] 2 All
Bonner [1970] 2 All ER 97n; 54 Cr App Rep 257, ER 698; 55 Cr App Rep 258, CA . . . 17.87
CA . . . 10.49 Bristol Magistrates’ Court, ex p E [1998] 3 All ER
Booth [1999] Crim LR 144, CA . . . 13.24 798, DC . . . 13.2, 14.105
Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 192 (Admin); (2006) British Pregnancy Advisory Service v Secretary
170 JP 305, DC . . . 3.33 of State for Health [2011] EWHC 235 (Admin);
Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; [1938] 3 All ER 615, CCA [2011] 3 All ER 1012 . . . 8.196
. . . 8.202, 16.93 British Steel plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356; [1995] ICR
Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App Rep 125, CCA . . . 16.40, 586, CA . . . 18.23
17.21, 17.22, 17.23 Broad [1997] Crim LR 666, CA . . . 3.78, 14.72
Bournewood Community and Mental Health Brockley (1993) 99 Cr App Rep 385, CA . . . 6.41
NHS Trust, ex p L [1999] 1 AC 458; [1998] 3 All Brook [1993] Crim LR 455, CA . . . 11.51
ER 289; [1998] 3 WLR 107, HL . . . 16.95, 16.98 Brookes v Retail Credit Card Ltd (1985) 150 JP
Bow [1977] RTR 6; 64 Cr App Rep 54, CA . . . 10.118 131; [1986] Crim LR 327, DC . . . 17.9
Bowden [1993] Crim LR 379, CA . . . 15.76 Brooks and Brooks (1982) 76 Cr App Rep 66, CA
Bowen [1996] 4 All ER 837; [1996] 2 Cr App Rep . . . 10.131
157, CA . . . 16.46, 16.47, 16.49 Brooks v Mason [1902] 2 KB 743; 67 JP 47, DC . . .
Boyea (1992) 156 JP 505; [1992] Crim LR 574, CA 2.19, 3.46
. . . 7.7, 7.52 Broom v Crowther (1984) 148 JP 592 . . . 10.21
Boyle and Boyle (1986) 84 Cr App Rep 270; [1987] Broome v Perkins [1987] RTR 321; 85 Cr App Rep
Crim LR 111, CA . . . 14.123 321, DC . . . 15.55
Boyle v Smith [1906] 1 KB 432, DC . . . 18.13 Brown (1841) Car & M 314; 4 State Tr NS App A
Bradford v Wilson [1984] RTR 116; 78 Cr App Rep 1369 . . . 2.8
77, DC . . . 8.165 Brown [1970] 1 QB 105; [1969] 3 All ER 198; 53 Cr
Bradish [1990] 1 QB 981; [1990] 1 All ER 460; 90 App Rep 527, CA . . . 11.42
Cr App Rep 271, CA . . . 6.21, 6.38, 11.25 Brown [1984] 3 All ER 1013; 80 Cr App Rep 36,
Bradley (1979) 70 Cr App Rep 200; 2 Cr App Rep CA . . . 14.115
(S) 12; [1980] Crim LR 173, CA . . . 11.55 Brown [1985] Crim LR 212, CA . . . 11.4
Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83 . . . 7.9 Brown [1994] 1 AC 212; [1993] 2 All ER 75; 97 Cr
Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413; [2007] Crim LR App Rep 44, HL . . . 2.23, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.8, 7.10,
564, CA . . . 3.33, 15.82 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, 7.16, 7.17, 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, 7.22, 7.53
Branchflower [2004] EWCA Crim 2042; [2005] 1 Brown [1998] Crim LR 485, CA . . . 7.79, 15.74, 15.76
Cr App Rep 140, CA . . . 10.125 Brown [2011] EWCA Crim 2796; [2011] All ER (D)
Brannan v Peek [1948] 1 KB 68; [1947] 2 All ER 05 (Dec); [2012] Crim LR 223 . . . 8.51
572, DC . . . 17.63 Brown (Uriah) v R [2005] UKPC 18; [2005] 2 WLR
Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386; 1558, PC . . . 8.114
[1961] 3 All ER 523; 46 Cr App Rep 1, HL . . . Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681; [2001] 2 All ER 97,
4.4, 4.10, 15.25, 15.29, 15.40, 15.53, 15.54, 15.56, PC . . . 4.8
15.60, 15.62, 15.66, 15.93
Browning and Dixon (1998) unreported, CA . . . 14.70
Bravery v Bravery [1954] 3 All ER 59; [1954] 1
WLR 1169, CA . . . 7.12 Browning v J W H Watson (Rochester) Ltd [1953]
2 All ER 775; [1953] 1 WLR 1172, DC . . . 3.58
Brazil v Chief Constable of Surrey [1983] 3 All ER
537; 77 Cr App Rep 237, DC . . . 7.66 Bruzas [1972] Crim LR 367 . . . 14.109
Breaks and Huggan [1998] Crim LR 349, CA . . . Bryan (1984) unreported, CA . . . 7.77
10.52, 10.55 Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231; [2004] 2 Cr App
Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 804; [2007] 2 All ER 676, Rep 592; [2004] All ER (D) 255 (May), CA . . .
CA . . . 9.17 17.11, 17.17, 17.27, 17.28, 17.32, 17.34, 17.36, 17.70
Briggs [1987] Crim LR 708, CA . . . 10.122 Bryson [1985] Crim LR 669, CA . . . 3.14, 7.92, 15.90
xxxii | Table of Cases
Bubbins v United Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR 458, C, Re [1994] 1 All ER 819; [1994] 1 WLR 290;
ECtHR . . . 16.31, 16.32 [1994] 1 FLR 31 . . . 2.12
Buck and Buck (1960) 44 Cr App Rep 213 . . . 17.35 C v DPP [1996] AC 1; [1995] 2 All ER 43; [1995] 2
Buckingham (1976) 63 Cr App Rep 159, CA . . . 13.31 Cr App Rep 166, HL . . . 1.37, 15.2, 15.3
Buckley and Smith v DPP [2008] EWHC 136 C v S [1988] QB 135; [1987] 1 All ER 1230; [1987] 2
(Admin); [2008] All ER (D) 06 (Jan), DC . . . 7.136 FLR 505, CA . . . 8.7, 8.201
Bullard v R [1957] AC 635; [1961] 3 All ER 470n; 42 Cadman (1825) Carrington’s Supplement 237 . . . 7.114
Cr App Rep 1, PC . . . 4.11 Cahill [1993] Crim LR 141, CA . . . 10.87
Bullock [1955] 1 All ER 15; 38 Cr App Rep 151, Cairns [1999] 2 Cr App Rep 137, CA . . . 16.60,
CCA . . . 17.11, 17.36 16.76, 16.81, 16.87
Bullock v Turnbull [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 303, DC Cairns, Zaidi and Chaudhury [2002] EWCA Crim
. . . 6.29 2838; [2003] 1 WLR 796; [2003] 1 Cr App Rep
Bundy [1977] 2 All ER 382; [1977] RTR 357; 65 Cr 662, CA . . . 16.67
App Rep 239, CA . . . 11.66 Cakmak [2002] EWCA Crim 500; [2002] 2 Cr App
Burgess; Byram [2008] EWCA Crim 516 . . . 7.115 Rep 158; [2002] All ER (D) 119 (Feb) . . . 13.29
Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92; [1991] 2 All ER 769; 93 Cr Caldwell see Metropolitan Police Comr v Caldwell
App Rep 41, CA . . . 15.27, 15.28, 15.29, 15.30, Calhaem [1985] QB 808; [1985] 2 All ER 266; 81 Cr
15.31, 15.50, 15.55, 15.64, 15.65 App Rep 131, CA . . . 17.10, 17.11, 17.17, 17.18
Burgoyne v Phillips [1983] RTR 49; (1983) 147 JP Callow v Tillstone (1900) 64 JP 823; 83 LT 411 . . .
375 ; [1983] Crim LR 265, DC . . . 8.147 17.40
Burke [1991] AC 135; [1990] 2 All ER 385, HL . . . 3.29 Campbell (1985) 80 Cr App Rep 47, CA . . . 12.57,
Burles [1970] 2 QB 191; [1970] 1 All ER 642; 54 Cr 12.58, 12.59
App Rep 196, CA . . . 15.13 Campbell (1986) 84 Cr App Rep 255; [1987] Crim
Burley [2000] Crim LR 843, CA . . . 16.37 LR 257, CA . . . 8.47
Burns (1973) 58 Cr App Rep 364, CA . . . 15.68 Campbell (1990) 93 Cr App Rep 350; [1991] Crim
Burns [2010] EWCA Crim 1023; [2010] All ER (D) LR 268, CA . . . 14.121, 14.122, 14.126
186 (Apr); [2010] 1 WLR 2694 . . . 16.39 Campbell [1997] Crim LR 495 . . . 8.40, 14.109
Burns v Bidder [1967] 2 QB 227; [1966] 3 All ER 29 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605;
. . . 15.58 [1990] 1 All ER 568, HL . . . 8.108
Burns v Currell [1963] 2 QB 433; [1963] 2 All ER Carey [2006] EWCA Crim 17; [2006] Crim LR
297, DC . . . 8.148 842, CA . . . 8.96, 8.101, 8.104
Burns v HM Advocate 1995 SLT 1090, High Ct of Carmichael & Sons (Worcester) Ltd v Cottle
Justiciary . . . 16.33 [1971] RTR 11, DC . . . 17.9
Burnside [1984] see Morris; Anderton v Burnside Carpenter [2011] EWCA Crim 2568; [2012] 1 Cr
[1984] App Rep 141 . . . 17.52, 17.53
Burrell v Harmer [1967] Crim LR 169; 116 NLJ Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; [1943] 2 All ER 156; 29
1658 . . . 7.24 Cr App Rep 76, CCA . . . 4.5
Burstow [1996] Crim LR 331, Crown Ct . . . 7.83 Carter v Richardson [1974] RTR 314; [1974] Crim
Burstow [1998] see Ireland; Burstow LR 190 . . . 17.32
Button (1994) Times, 21 October, CA . . . 3.50 Case (1850) 14 JP 339; 4 Cox CC 220, CCR . . . 7.27
Buzalek and Schiffer [1991] Crim LR 130, CA . . . Cash [1985] QB 801; [1985] 2 All ER 128; 80 Cr
10.77 App Rep 314, CA . . . 11.50
Byram [2008] see Burgess; Byram [2008] Cassady v Reg Morris (Transport) Ltd [1975] RTR
470; [1975] Crim LR 398, DC . . . 17.13
Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396; [1960] 3 All ER 1; 44 Cr
App Rep 246; , CCA . . . 8.48, 8.51, 8.55 Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App Rep 41, CA . . .
2.32, 7.119, 7.125, 8.86, 8.87
Caurti v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 867; [2001]
C [2007] EWCA Crim 1862; [2007] All ER (D) 91 All ER (D) 287 (Oct) . . . 7.146
(Sep) . . . 15.66, 15.68
Chal [2007] EWCA Crim 2647; (2008) 172 JP 17
C [2008] EWCA Crim 1155; [2009] 1 Cr App Rep . . . 15.14
211; [2008] All ER (D) 335 (May) . . . 9.16
Chamberlain v Lindon [1998] 2 All ER 538; [1998]
C [2009] UKHL 42; [2009] 4 All ER 1033 . . . 9.16, 1 WLR 1252, DC . . . 13.12, 13.14, 13.16, 13.17
9.107
Chan Man-sin v A-G of Hong Kong (or R) [1988] 1
C (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331; [1983] 3 All ER 1; 86 Cr App Rep 303, PC . . . 10.4, 10.87
WLR 537; 78 Cr App Rep 48, DC . . . 7.84
Table of Cases | xxxiii
Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168; [1984] 3 All Clarke [1972] 1 All ER 219; 56 Cr App Rep 225, CA
ER 877; 80 Cr App Rep 117, PC . . . 17.32, 17.34, . . . 15.26
17.45 Clarke (1984) 80 Cr App Rep 344, CA . . . 17.63
Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552; 99 Cr App Rep Clarke [2009] EWCA Crim 921; [2009] RTR 397
147, CA . . . 7.58, 7.69, 8.101 . . . 15.68
Chandler v DPP [1964] AC 763; [1962] 3 All ER Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344; 55 Cr App Rep 445,
142 46 Cr App Rep 347, HL . . . 3.75, 11.65 C-MAC . . . 15.94, 17.11, 17.61
Chapman v DPP (1988) 89 Cr App Rep 190, CA Clear [1968] 1 QB 670; [1968] 1 All ER 74; 52 Cr
. . . 2.24 App Rep 58, CA . . . 11.28
Charge Card Services Ltd, Re [1989] Ch 497; Cleary v Booth [1893] 1 QB 465; 57 JP 375, DC . . . 7.51
[1988] 3 All ER 702, CA . . . 10.134 Clegg [1995] 1 AC 482; [1995] 1 All ER 334; [1995]
Chargot Ltd [2008] UKHL 73; [2009] 2 All ER 645 1 Cr App Rep 507, HL . . . 1.36, 16.35, 16.100
. . . 18.45 Clinton (Chief Inspector of RUC) v Cahill [1998]
Charlson [1955] 1 All ER 859; 39 Cr App Rep 37, NI 200, NICA . . . 10.90
CCA . . . 15.25, 15.55, 15.62 Closs (1857) 21 JP 805; Dears & B 460, CCR . . . 12.51
Charman (F E) v Clow [1974] 3 All ER 371; [1974] Clouden [1987] Crim LR 56, CA . . . 10.104, 10.105
1 WLR 1384 . . . 18.5
Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316, CA . . . 10.45,
Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank 10.49, 10.55
(London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105; [1979] 3 All ER
1025 . . . 10.61 Cobb [2005] EWCA Crim 1549; [2005] All ER (D)
71 (Jun) . . . 10.77
Chaulk (1990) 2 CR (4th) 1, SC Canada . . . 15.23,
15.34 Cocks (1976) 63 Cr App Rep 79, CA . . . 10.85
Chelsea Yacht and Boat Co Ltd v Pope [2001] 2 All Codère (1916) 12 Cr App Rep 21, CCA . . . 15.33
ER 409; [2000] 1 WLR 1941, CA . . . 10.34 Coe [2009] EWCA Crim 1452; [2010] 3 All ER 83n
Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670; [1991] 1 WLR 844, . . . 8.165
CA . . . 2.32, 2.33, 2.54, 2.57, 2.58, 2.59 Coffey [1987] Crim LR 498, CA . . . 10.85
Cheshire County Council v Alan Helliwell & Sons Coffin v Smith (1980) 71 Cr App Rep 221, DC . . . 7.66
(Bolton) Ltd (1991) 155 JP 425, DC . . . 6.28 Cogan and Leak [1976] QB 217; [1975] 2 All ER
Chief Constable of Hampshire v Mace (1986) 84 1059; 61 Cr App Rep 217, CA . . . 17.21, 17.22,
Cr App Rep 40, DC . . . 14.106 17.23
Chilvers v Rayner [1984] 1 All ER 843; 78 Cr App Cole [1993] Crim LR 300, CA . . . 15.76
Rep 59, DC . . . 6.37 Cole [1994] Crim LR 582, CA . . . 16.42
Chippenham Magistrates’ Court, ex p Thompson Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod Rep 149; 90 ER 958 . . .
(1996) 160 JP 207, DC . . . 15.20, 15.46 7.32, 7.43
Chisam (1963) 47 Cr App Rep 130, CCA . . . 5.18 Coleman (1985) 150 JP 175; [1986] Crim LR 56,
Choi [1999] 5 Archbold News 3, CA . . . 14.98 CA . . . 11.41, 11.42
Choudhury [1999] 1 Cr App Rep 91, CA . . . 7.77 Collins [1973] QB 100; [1972] 2 All ER 1105; 56 Cr
Chrastny (No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 189; 94 Cr App App Rep 554, CA . . . 11.4, 11.9, 11.13
Rep 283, CA . . . 14.46, 14.47 Collins [1997] RTR 439; [1997] 2 Cr App Rep (S)
Christou [1992] QB 979; [1992] 4 All ER 559; 95 Cr 302, CA . . . 8.157
App Rep 264, CA . . . 17.61 Collins, ex p Brady (2000) 58 BMLR 173; [2000]
Church [1966] 1 QB 59; [1965] 2 All ER 72; 49 Cr Lloyd’s Rep Med 355 . . . 16.91
App Rep 206, CCA . . . 3.71, 3.72, 3.74, 8.96, 8.97, Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374; 79 Cr App
8.101 Rep 229, DC . . . 7.32, 7.33, 7.53, 7.66
Churchill v Walton [1967] 2 AC 224; [1967] 1 All Collinson (1931) 23 Cr App Rep 49, CCA . . . 8.150
ER 497; 51 Cr App Rep 212, HL . . . 14.72 Collinson [2003] EWCA Crim 2206; [2003] All ER
Ciccarelli [2011] EWCA Crim 2665; [2012] 1 Cr (D) 269 (Jul) . . . 10.44
App Rep 190 . . . 9.27, 9.28 Collister and Warhurst (1955) 39 Cr App Rep 100,
City of Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161 CCA . . . 11.27
(Canada) . . . 6.43, 6.48 Colohan [2001] EWCA Crim 1251; [2001] 3 FCR
Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23; 53 JP 149, CCR . . . 409 . . . 3.59, 7.140, 7.142
7.28, 7.30, 7.31, 7.45, 7.81, 7.82 Commission of the European Communities v
Clark [2001] EWCA Crim 884; [2002] 1 Cr App Council of the European Union (C-176/03)
Rep 141 . . . 10.91 (2005) 3 CMLR 20, ECJ . . . 1.46
xxxiv | Table of Cases
Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton [1989] Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 CCR; 44 JP 411, CCR . . .
QB 783; [1989] 1 All ER 306; [1989] IRLR 8, CA 7.118, 7.119, 8.191
. . . 7.98 Cratchley (1913) 9 Cr App Rep 232, CCA . . . 17.62
Conegate Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72; [1965] 3 All ER 257; 49 Cr
(C-121/85) [1987] QB 254; [1986] 2 All ER 688, App Rep 368, CCA . . . 14.109, 17.35
ECJ . . . 1.47 Cresswell v DPP; Currie v DPP [2006] EWHC
Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534; 46 JP 404, CCR . . . 7.9, 3379 (Admin); (2007) 171 JP 233, DC . . . 10.36,
7.10, 17.60, 17.61 13.9, 13.15
Congdon [1990] 140 NLJ 1221 . . . 17.62 Croft [1944] 1 KB 295; [1944] 2 All ER 483; 29 Cr
Constanza [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 492, CA . . . 7.37, App Rep 169, CCA . . . 17.70
7.39, 7.40, 7.41, 7.42 Crooks [1999] NI 266, NICA . . . 17.52
Conteh [2003] EWCA Crim 962; [2004] RTR 1 . . . Crowley see A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004);
8.154 Edwards, Denton, Jackson, Hendley, Crowley
Conway [1989] QB 290; [1988] 3 All ER 1025; 88 Crown Suppliers (Property Services Agency) v
Cr App Rep 159 . . . 5.19, 16.73, 16.74 Dawkins [1993] ICR 517; [1993] IRLR 284, CA
Cook v Atchison [1968] Crim LR 266, DC . . . 15.66 . . . 7.99
Cooke (1826) 5 B & C 538, CCR . . . 14.48 Cuddy (1843) 1 Car & Kir 210 . . . 7.2
Cooke [1986] AC 909; [1986] 2 All ER 985; 83 Cr Cugullere [1961] 2 All ER 343; 45 Cr App Rep 108,
App Rep 339, HL . . . 10.56 CCA . . . 11.25
Cooper and Schaub [1994] Crim LR 531, CA . . . 9.30 Cullen (1873) LR 2 CCR 28; 37 JP 422, CCR . . . 10.56
Coppen v Moore (No 2) [1898] 2 QB 306; 62 JP Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207; 48 JP 599 . . .
453, DC . . . 18.4, 18.13 6.32, 6.34
Corbett [1996] Crim LR 594, CA . . . 2.52 Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237; [1950] 1 All
Corbett v Corbett (otherwise Ashley) [1971] P 83; ER 720 . . . 3.7
[1970] 2 All ER 33 . . . 7.12 Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396; [1957] 2 All ER 412;
Corcoran v Anderton (1980) 71 Cr App Rep 104, 41 Cr App Rep 155, CCA . . . 3.33, 7.86, 7.124, 7.125
DC . . . 10.11 Cunningham [1982] AC 566; [1981] 2 All ER 863;
Cory Bros & Co [1927] 1 KB 810; 96 LJKB 761 . . . 73 Cr App Rep 253, HL . . . 8.25, 8.28
18.43 Curphey (1957) 41 Cr App Rep 78 . . . 8.159
Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd [2011] Currie v DPP [2006] see Cresswell v DPP; Currie v
EWCA Crim 1337; [2011] All ER (D) 100 (May); DPP [2006]
[2012] 1 Cr App Rep (S) 153 . . . 8.143 Curtis (1885) 15 Cox CC 746 . . . 2.11
Cotter [2002] EWCA Crim 1033; [2003] QB 951; Curtis [2010] EWCA Crim 123; [2010] 3 All ER
[2002] 2 Cr App Rep 405 . . . 1.68 849 . . . 7.137, 7.144
Cotterill v Penn [1936] 1 KB 53; 33 LGR 307, DC Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470; [1980] 2 All ER 401;
. . . 6.29 71 Cr App Rep 148, HL . . . 14.49
Coughlan (1976) 64 Cr App Rep 11, CA . . . 14.48 Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd; Clarke v Kato
Coupe v Guyett [1973] 2 All ER 1058; [1973] 1 [1998] 4 All ER 417; [1999] RTR 153, HL . . . 8.149
WLR 669, DC . . . 18.7
Court [1989] AC 28; [1988] 2 All ER 221, HL . . . 9.8 D v DPP [2005] EWHC 967 (Admin), DC . . . 7.52
Courtie [1984] AC 463; [1984] 1 All ER 740; 78 Cr D County Council v LS [2010] EWHC 1544 (Fam)
App Rep 292, HL . . . 2.1, 3.50, 9.51, 9.55, 9.87, . . . 9.16
11.2, 17.88 Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654; [2006] 4 All ER
Cousins [1982] QB 526; [1982] 2 All ER 115; 74 Cr 900, CA . . . 3.48
App Rep 363, CA . . . 8.180, 16.5 Dabas v Spain [2007] UKHL 6; [2007] 2 AC 31 . . .
Cox [1968] 1 All ER 386; 52 Cr App Rep 130, CA 1.48
. . . 8.56 Dadson (1850) 14 JP 754; 3 Car & Kir 148, CCR
Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38 . . . 3.23 . . . 2.24
Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 54, DC . . . 13.5 Dalby [1982] 1 All ER 916; 74 Cr App Rep 348, CA
CPS v Shabbir [2009] EWHC 2754 (Admin); . . . 8.87, 8.93, 8.94
[2009] All ER (D) 221 (Oct) . . . 7.50 Dalloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273 . . . 2.30, 8.117
CR v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363; [1996] Davenport [1954] 1 All ER 602; 38 Cr App Rep 37,
1 FLR 434, ECtHR . . . 1.35 CCA . . . 10.28
Table of Cases | xxxv
Davey v Towle [1973] RTR 328, DC . . . 15.59 Diggin [1981] RTR 83; 72 Cr App Rep 204, CA . . .
Davies [1974] RTR 4, DC . . . 10.117 10.123
Davies [1991] Crim LR 469, CA . . . 15.76 Dimmock v Hallett (1866) 2 Ch App 21 . . . 12.14
Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563 . . . 15.100 Dinnick (1909) 3 Cr App Rep 77, CCA . . . 4.10
Davis [1977] Crim LR 542, CA . . . 17.26 Ditta [1998] Crim LR 43, CA . . . 16.65
Davis (1988) 88 Cr App Rep 347, CA . . . 10.64 Dix (1981) 74 Cr App Rep 306, CA . . . 8.55
Davison [1972] 3 All ER 1121; 57 Cr App Rep 113, DJ and others [2007] EWCA Crim 3133; [2007] All
CA . . . 3.54 ER (D) 375 (Dec) . . . 8.105
Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App Rep 150, CA . . . 8.98, Dobson v General Accident Fire and Life
8.100, 8.101, 8.102 Assurance Corpn plc [1990] 1 QB 274; [1989] 3
Dawson and James [1976] RTR 533; 64 Cr App Rep All ER 927, CA . . . 10.8, 10.13
170, CA . . . 10.105 Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1996]
Day (1841) 9 C & P 722 . . . 7.26 4 All ER 474; [1997] 1 FLR 598 . . . 10.30
Day and Day [2001] see Roberts, Day and Day Dodge [1972] 1 QB 416; (1971) 55 Cr App Rep 440,
[2001] CA . . . 12.53
De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry Dodman [1998] 2 Cr App Rep 338, CMAC . . . 3.1
of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing Dolan (1975) 62 Cr App Rep 36, CA . . . 11.35
[1999] 1 AC 69; [1998] 3 WLR 675, PC . . . 1.67 Donald (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 49, CA . . . 17.87
De Kromme (1892) 66 LT 301, CCR . . . 9.56 Donnelly [1984] 1 WLR 1017; 79 Cr App Rep 76,
Deacon v AT (A Minor) [1976] RTR 244, DC . . . CA . . . 12.54, 12.55, 12.56
6.150 Donnelly v Jackman [1970] 1 All ER 987; 54 Cr
Dean [2002] EWCA Crim 2410; [2002] All ER (D) App Rep 229, DC . . . 7.66
499 (Oct) . . . 8.111 Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498; 25 Cr App Rep 1; [1934]
Deana (1909) 2 Cr App R 75, CCA . . . 16.9 All ER Rep 207, CCA . . . 7.3, 7.6, 7.51, 7.57
Dear [1996] Crim LR 595, CA . . . 2.51, 2.53 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406; 15 ALR
Denham v Scott (1983) 77 Cr App Rep 210; 147 JP 105, HC of A . . . 10.30
521, DC . . . 11.58 Downer [2009] EWCA Crim 1361; [2009] 2 Cr
Dennis [1981] Crim LR 5 . . . 14.115 App R 28 . . . 11.2
Denton [1982] 1 All ER 65; 74 Cr App Rep 81, Downes (1983) 77 Cr App Rep 260, CA . . . 10.87
CA . . . 13.10, 16.101 Dowson v Northumbria Police [2010] EWHC 2612
Denton [2004] see A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004); (QB); [2010] All ER (D) 191 (Oct) . . . 7.137
Edwards, Denton, Jackson, Hendley, Crowley Doyle [2004] EWCA Crim 2714; [2005] All ER (D)
Devlin v Armstrong [1971] NI 13, NICA . . . 16.5 235 (Jan), CA . . . 7.77
Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527; [2008] All ER DPP, ex p Jones [2000] IRLR 373; [2000] Crim LR
(D) 241 (Feb) . . . 9.24 858 . . . 8.116
Deyemi and Edwards [2007] EWCA Crim 2060; DPP, ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326; [1999] 4 All
[2008] 1 Cr App Rep 345, CA . . . 6.8, 6.21 ER 801; [2000] 1 Cr App Rep 275, HL . . . 4.8
Dhaliwal [2006] EWCA Crim 1139; [2006] 2 Cr DPP (Jamaica) v Bailey [1995] 1 Cr App Rep 257,
App Rep 348, CA . . . 2.53, 7.58 PC . . . 16.12
Dhingra (1991) unreported . . . 8.192 DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653;
[1975] 1 All ER 913; 61 Cr App Rep 6, HL . . .
Dias [2001] EWCA Crim 2986; [2002] 2 Cr App Rep 2.26, 16.40, 16.43, 16.50, 16.55, 16.56, 16.57,
96; [2001] All ER (D) 198 (Dec) . . . 8.85, 8.86, 8.91 16.65, 17.10, 17.28
Dibble v Ingleton [1972] 1 QB 480; [1972] 1 All ER DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] NI 42;
275 . . . 7.70 [1978] 3 All ER 1140; 68 Cr App Rep 128, HL . . .
Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103; [2004] QB 1257; 17.8, 17.31, 17.36
[2004] 3 All ER 593 . . . 7.7, 7.12, 7.17, 7.29, 7.31, DPP v Armstrong-Braun (1998) 163 JP 271; [1999]
7.82, 7.88 Crim LR 416 . . . 16.15
Dickie [1984] 3 All ER 173; 79 Cr App Rep 213, DPP v Bayer [2003] EWHC 2567 (Admin); [2004]
CA . . . 15.25, 15.40 1 Cr App Rep 493 . . . 16.1, 16.2
Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10; [2003] 1 AC 1209; DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479; 14 Cr App Rep 159;
[2003] 1 All ER 897; [2003] 2 Cr App Rep 54 . . . [1920] All ER Rep 21, HL . . . 15.72, 15.73, 15.75,
8.54 15.76, 15.77, 15.90, 15.93, 15.100, 15.102
xxxvi | Table of Cases
DPP v Bell [1992] RTR 335; [1992] Crim LR 176, DPP v Nock; DPP v Alsford [1978] AC 979; [1978]
DC . . . 16.80 2 All ER 654; 67 Cr App Rep 116, HL . . . 14.102
DPP v Collins [2006] UKHL 40; [2006] 4 All ER DPP v Parmenter see Savage; Parmenter
602, HL . . . 6.15 DPP v Ramsdale [2001] EWHC 106 (Admin);
DPP v Coulman [1993] RTR 230; [1993] Crim LR (2001) Independent, 19 March, DC . . . 7.137
399, DC . . . 8.150 DPP v Ray [1974] AC 370; [1973] 3 All ER 131; 58
DPP v Davis [1994] Crim LR 600, DC . . . 16.81 Cr App Rep 130, HL . . . 12.14
DPP v Doot [1973] AC 807; [1973] 1 All ER 940; 57 DPP v Rogers [1998] Crim LR 202, DC . . . 5.23,
Cr App Rep 600, HL . . . 14.46 16.43, 16.45, 16.76
DPP v Dunn [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 352; 165 JP 130, DPP v Saddington (2001) 165 JP 122; [2001] RTR
DC . . . 7.138, 7.141 15 . . . 8.148
DPP v Dziurzynski [2002] EWHC 1380 (Admin); DPP v Santana-Bermudez [2003] EWHC 2908
(2002) 166 JP 545, DC . . . 7.138 (Admin); [2004] Crim LR 471, DC . . . 7.37, 7.46,
DPP v Glendinning [2005] EWHC 2333 (Admin); 7.48
(2005) 169 JP 169, DC . . . 7.70 DPP v Shannon [1975] AC 717; [1974] 2 All ER
DPP v Gomez see Gomez 1009; 59 Cr App Rep 250, HL . . . 14.48
DPP v Green [2004] EWHC 1225 (Admin); [2004] DPP v SJ [2002] EWHC 291 (Admin); [2002] All
7 Archbold News, DC . . . 7.103 ER (D) 260 (Feb) . . . 10.89
DPP v H [1997] 1 WLR 1406; [1998] RTR 200, DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 All ER 161;
DC . . . 6.3, 6.7, 15.39, 15.46 44 Cr App Rep 261, HL . . . 7.77, 8.25, 8.28
DPP v Hardy [2008] EWHC 2874 (Admin); (2009) DPP v Smith (Michael) [2006] EWHC 94
173 JP 10, DC . . . 7.137 (Admin); [2006] 2 All ER 16 . . . 7.69
DPP v Harris [1995] RTR 100; [1995] 1 Cr App Rep DPP v Spriggs [1994] RTR 1; 157 JP 1143, DC . . .
170, DC . . . 16.87 10.116
DPP v Huskinson (1988) 152 JP 582; [1988] Crim DPP v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER
LR 620, DC . . . 10.52, 10.56 909; 65 Cr App Rep 192, HL . . . 1.22, 14.122
DPP v Hynde [1988] 1 All ER 649, DC . . . 11.23 DPP v Taylor; DPP v Little [1992] QB 645; [1992]
DPP v Jones [1990] RTR 33, DC . . . 16.80 1 All ER 299; 95 Cr App Rep 28, DC . . . 7.34,
7.36, 7.54
DPP v K (a minor) [1990] 1 All ER 331; 91 Cr App
Rep 23, DC . . . 7.45, 7.46, 7.47, 7.48 DPP v Tomkinson [2001] EWHC 182 (Admin);
[2001] RTR 38 . . . 16.80
DPP v K and B [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 36, DC . . .
17.22, 17.23, 17.24 DPP v Vivier [1991] 4 All ER 18; [1991] RTR 205,
DC . . . 8.150
DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB
146; [1944] 1 All ER 119, DC . . . 18.24, 18.25, 18.35 DPP v Waite (1996) 160 JP 726; [1997] Crim LR
123 . . . 2.9
DPP v Lavender [1994] Crim LR 297, DC . . . 10.87
DPP v Withers [1975] AC 842; [1974] 3 All ER 984;
DPP v M (a minor) [2004] EWHC 1453 (Admin); 60 Cr App Rep 85, HL . . . 14.86
[2004] 1 WLR 2758, DC . . . 7.103
DPP v Woods [2002] EWHC 85 (Admin); [2002]
DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 All ER All ER (D) 154 (Jan) . . . 7.103
142, HL . . . 15.64, 15.71, 15.73, 15.77, 15.78,
15.79, 15.82, 15.85, 15.86, 15.90, 15.91, 15.92, Drake v DPP [1994] RTR 411; 158 JP 828, DC . . . 13.5
15.93, 15.96, 15.115 Drane [2008] EWCA Crim 1746; [2009] Crim LR
DPP v Milcoy [1993] COD 200, DC . . . 16.43 202 . . . 16.13
DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182; [1975] 2 All ER 347; Drayton [2005] EWCA Crim 2013; [2006] Crim
61 Cr App Rep 136, HL . . . 3.3, 3.31, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, LR 243, CA . . . 13.24
5.9, 5.12, 5.13, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19 Drew [2000] 1 Cr App Rep 91; [1999] All ER (D)
DPP v Moseley (1999); The Times, 23 June; [1999] 153, CA . . . 14.52
All ER (D) 587, DC . . . 7.142 Du Cros v Lambourne [1907] 1 KB 40; 5 LGR 120
DPP v Mullaly [2006] EWHC 3448; [2006] All ER . . . 17.13
(D) 49 (Nov), DC . . . 16.80 Dubar [1995] 1 All ER 781; [1995] 1 Cr App Rep
DPP v Neville (1995) 160 JP 758 . . . 8.150 280, C-MAC . . . 10.55, 10.56
DPP v Newbury [1977] AC 500; [1976] 2 All ER Dudley [1989] Crim LR 57, CA . . . 13.21, 13.22
365; 62 Cr App Rep 291, HL . . . 3.31, 8.84, 8.89, Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273; 49 JP 69,
8.90, 8.91, 8.94, 8.96 CCR . . . 16.83, 16.84, 16.98
Table of Cases | xxxvii
Duff us (1994) 158 JP 224, CA . . . 11.55 Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd
Duff y [1949] 1 All ER 932n, CCA . . . 8.69 [1999]
Duff y [1967] 1 QB 63; [1966] 1 All ER 62; 50 Cr English [1999] see Powell and Daniels; English
App Rep 68, CCA . . . 16.1 Enoch (1833) 5 C & P 539 . . . 8.7
Duguid (1906) 70 JP 294; 75 LJKB 470, CCR . . . 14.75 Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers
Duke [1963] 1 QB 120; [1961] 3 All ER 737; 46 Cr Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd
App Rep 42, CCA . . . 15.43 [1999] 2 AC 22; [1998] 1 All ER 481, HL . . . 2.31,
Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1; [1957] 2 All ER 737; 41 Cr 2.39, 2.46, 2.47, 2.48, 18.22
App Rep 182, CCA . . . 8.47 Esop (1836) 7 C & P 456 . . . 3.81
Dunne (1998) 162 JP 399, CA . . . 3.44 Evans & Co Ltd v LCC [1914] 3 KB 315; 12 LGR
Dunnington [1984] QB 472; [1984] 1 All ER 676; 1079; 78 JP 345, DC . . . 18.23
78 Cr App Rep 171, CA . . . 14.106, 17.9 Evans [1992] Crim LR 659, CA . . . 8.104
Durante [1972] 3 All ER 962; 56 Cr App Rep 708, Evans (Gemma) [2009] EWCA Crim 650; [2010] 1
CA . . . 15.90, 15.93 All ER 13; [2009] 2 Cr App Rep 10 . . . 2.10, 2.11,
Durkin [1973] QB 786; [1973] 2 All ER 872; 57 Cr 2.13, 3.68, 8.111, 8.112
App Rep 637, CA . . . 10.109
Dyke and Munro [2001] EWCA Crim 2184; [2002] F, Re [1990] 2 AC 1; [1989] 2 All ER 545; [1989] 2
1 Cr App Rep 404; [2001] All ER (D) 264 (Oct) FLR 376, HL . . . 7.33, 7.53, 16.94, 16.95, 16.96,
. . . 10.56 16.98, 16.99
Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454; 1 Cr App Rep 13; [1908– Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 1 QB
10] All ER Rep 736, CCA . . . 2.28, 8.15 439; [1968] 3 All ER 442; 52 Cr App Rep 700,
Dytham [1979] QB 722; [1979] 3 All ER 641; 69 Cr DC . . . 3.67, 3.68, 7.36, 7.37, 7.43, 7.44, 7.46,
App Rep 387, CA . . . 2.11 7.52
Fairclough v Whipp [1951] 2 All ER 834; 35 Cr
App Rep 138, DC . . . 7.38
Easom [1971] 2 QB 315; [1971] 2 All ER 945; 55 Cr
App Rep 410, CA . . . 10.94 Faraj [2007] EWCA Crim 1033; [2007] 2 Cr App
Rep 322 . . . 5.7, 16.15, 16.16
Eaton v Cobb [1950] 1 All ER 1016 . . . 6.29
Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 3 All ER 468; 74 Cr App
Eden District Council v Braid [1999] RTR 329; Rep 1, DC . . . 7.53
[1998] COD 259, DC . . . 6.7, 16.54
Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Department
Edwards [1991] Crim LR 45, CA . . . 14.68, 14.71 of Trade and Industry [1974] 2 All ER 97; 59 Cr
Edwards [2004] see A-G’s Reference (No 1 of App Rep 131, HL . . . . 8.201
2004); Edwards, Denton, Jackson, Hendley, Feely [1973] QB 530; [1973] 1 All ER 341; 57 Cr
Crowley App Rep 312, CA . . . 10.73, 10.74
Edwards v Ddin [1976] 3 All ER 705; 63 Cr App Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428; [1970] 3 All ER 215; 54 Cr
Rep 218, DC . . . 10.16 App Rep 451, CA . . . 7.63, 7.68, 16.37
Edwards v DPP (1993) 97 Cr App Rep 301, Fennell (2000) 164 JP 386, CA . . . 13.2
DC . . . 7.66
Fenton (1830) 1 Lew CC 179 . . . 8.85
Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470; 95 Cr App Rep 278, CA
. . . 8.51 Ferguson v British Gas Trading [2009] EWCA Civ
46; [2009] 3 All ER 304 . . . 7.141, 18.33
Eifinger [2001] EWCA Crim 1855; [2001] All ER
(D) 112 (Aug), CA . . . 8.55 Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814; [1951] 1 All
ER 412 . . . 6.28, 17.10, 17.31, 17.33, 18.15
El-Hakkaoui [1975] 2 All ER 146; 60 Cr App Rep
281, CA . . . 1.21 Fernandes [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 175, CA . . . 10.87,
10.88
Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 2 All ER 513; [1997]
1 WLR 687, HL . . . 10.34 Fiak [2005] EWCA Crim 2381; [2005] 10 Archbold
News 1, CA . . . 13.5
Elkins v Cartlidge [1947] 1 All ER 829, DC . . . 8.150
Finch and Jardine (1983) unreported, CA . . . 16.9
Ellames [1974] 3 All ER 130; 60 Cr App Rep 7, CA
. . . 11.68, 11.69, 11.70, 12.32 Finegan v Heywood [2000] JC 444; [2000] SCCR
848; [2000] SLT 905 . . . 15.30
Ellis [1899] 1 QB 230 . . . 1.22
Finlay [2003] EWCA Crim 3868; [2003] All ER
Emery (1992) 14 Cr App Rep (S) 394, CA . . . 16.46 (D) 142 (Dec) . . . 2.47
Emmett (1999) The Times, 15 October, CA . . . 7.20 Finlay (Deceased) [2009] EWCA Crim 1493;
Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] see [2009] All ER (D) 07 (Jul) . . . 2.47
Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers
xxxviii | Table of Cases
First Sport Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [1993] 3 All ER Garcia (1987) 87 Cr App Rep 175, CA . . . 12.57, 12.58
789, CA . . . 12.11 Gardner v Akeroyd [1952] 2 QB 743; [1952] 2 All
Firth (1990) 91 Cr App Rep 217; 154 JP 576, CA . . . ER 306 . . . 18.15
12.14 Garlick (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 291, CA . . . 15.76
Fisher (1865) LR 1 CCR 7; 29 JP 804 . . . 13.5 Garrett v Arthur Churchill (Glass) Ltd [1970] 1
Fisher [1987] Crim LR 334, CA . . . 5.7 QB 92; [1969] 2 All ER 1141, DC . . . 17.11
Fisher [2004] EWCA Crim 1190; [2004] Crim LR Garwood [1987] 1 All ER 1032; 85 Cr App Rep 85;
938, CA . . . 16.42, 16.81 [1987] Crim LR 476, CA . . . 11.28
Fitzgerald, Re [1992] Crim LR 660, CA . . . 17.76 Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78;
Fitzmaurice [1983] QB 1083; [1983] 1 All ER 189; [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 40, CA . . . 18.23
76 Cr App Rep 17, CA . . . 14.30 Gatland v Metropolitan Police Comr [1968] 2 QB
Fitzpatrick v Kelly (1873) LR 8 QB 337; 38 JP 55 279; [1968] 2 All ER 100, DC . . . 4.6
. . . 6.36 Gaughan (1991) 155 JP 235, CA . . . 17.8
Flack v Hunt (1979) 70 Cr App Rep 51, DC . . . 7.87 Gaumont British Distributors Ltd v Henry [1939]
Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576, CA . . . 16.46 2 KB 711; [1939] 2 All ER 808, DC . . . 2.19, 3.49
Flavell (1926) 19 Cr App Rep 141, CCA . . . 15.48 Gayford v Chouler [1898] 1 QB 316; 62 JP 165, DC
Fletcher [1962] Crim LR 551, CCA . . . 17.70 . . . 13.5
Flintshire CC v Reynolds [2006] EWHC 195 Geddes (1996) 160 JP 697; [1996] Crim LR 894, CA
(Admin); (2006) 170 JP 73, DC . . . 3.55 . . . 14.126, 14.127, 14.129
Floyd v DPP [2000] Crim LR 411 . . . 10.58 Georgiades [1989] 1 WLR 759; 89 Cr App Rep 206,
CA . . . 16.38
Forbes [2001] UKHL 40; [2002] 2 AC 512; [2001] 4
All ER 97; [2002] 1 Cr App Rep 1, HL . . . 3.50 Getty v Antrim County Council [1950] NI 114 . . .
13.5
Forbes and Webb (1865) 10 Cox CC 362 . . . 7.68
GG plc [2008] UKHL 17; [2009] 2 All ER 737 . . . 14.87
Forrester [1992] Crim LR 793, CA . . . 10.97
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30;
Forsyth [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 299, CA . . . 3.46, [2004] 2 AC 557; [2004] 3 All ER 411, HL . . . 1.54
11.46, 11.52
Ghosh [1982] QB 1053; [1982] 2 All ER 689; 75 Cr
Fowler v Padget (1798) 7 Term Rep 509 . . . 3.65 App Rep 154, CA . . . 10.69, 10.73, 10.74, 10.75,
Francis [1982] Crim LR 363, CA . . . 11.20 10.77, 10.78, 10.79, 10.139, 11.33, 11.56, 12.17,
Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163 . . . 8.85 12.42, 14.89
Fretwell (1862) 26 JP 499; Le & Ca 161, CCR . . . 17.28 Ghulam [2009] EWCA Crim 2285; [2010] 1 WLR
891 . . . 15.13
G [2003] UKHL 50; [2004] 1 AC 1034; [2003] 4 All Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 1, CA . . . 17.10,
ER 765; [2004] 1 Cr App Rep 237 . . . 3.3, 3.33, 17.17, 17.76
3.35, 3.36, 3.58, 5.13, 6.29 Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App Rep 134,
G [2006] EWCA Crim 821; [2006] 1 WLR 2052, CCA . . . 2.11, 8.13
CA . . . 6.32, 6.36, 6.38 Gibson [1990] 2 QB 619; [1991] 1 All ER 439; 91 Cr
G [2008] UKHL 37; [2008] 3 All ER 1071, HL . . . App Rep 341, CA . . . 6.9, 14.98
6.8, 9.32, 9.36 Gibson and Gibson (1984) 80 Cr App Rep 24, CA
G [2011] Crim LR 340 . . . 9.73, 9.74 . . . 17.13
G v UK (2011) 53 EHRR SE25, ECtHR . . . 9.38 Gilks [1972] 3 All ER 280; 56 Cr App Rep 734, CA
. . . 10.62
Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060; 73 Cr App Rep
124, CA . . . 4.2, 4.10 Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688; 47 Cr App Rep 166, CCA
. . . 4.4, 16.45, 16.49, 16.54
Gallasso (1992) 98 Cr App Rep 284, CA . . . 10.10,
10.11 Gill [1994] 1 All ER 898; 98 Cr App Rep 437, CA
. . . 17.61
Gamble [1989] NI 268 . . . 17.50, 17.51
Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App Rep 189 . . . 7.113, 7.114, 7.117
Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong
[1985] AC 1; [1984] 2 All ER 503; 80 Cr App Rep Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health
194, PC . . . 6.2, 6.14, 6.18, 6.19, 6.22, 6.25, 6.26, Authority [1986] AC 112; [1985] 3 All ER 402;
6.37, 6.38, 6.40 [1986] 1 FLR 224, HL . . . 7.25, 17.29
Gannon [1988] RTR 49; 87 Cr App Rep 254, CA . . . Gilmartin [1983] QB 953; [1983] 1 All ER 829; 76
10.122, 15.97 Cr App Rep 238, CA . . . 12.11
Gantz [2004] EWCA Crim 2862; [2005] 1 Cr App Gilmour [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 407; [2000] NI 367,
Rep (S) 583, CA . . . 7.119 NICA . . . 17.52, 17.54
Table of Cases | xxxix
Gingell [2000] 1 Cr App Rep 88, CA . . . 11.39 Green v DPP (1991) 155 JP 816; [1991] Crim LR
Girdler [2009] EWCA Crim 2666; [2010] RTR 307 782, DC . . . 7.72
. . . 2.39, 2.46, 2.48 Green v Moore [1982] QB 1044; [1982] 1 All ER
Gittins [1982] RTR 363; [1982] Crim LR 584, CA 428; 74 Cr App Rep 250, DC . . . 7.70
. . . 6.29 Greener (1996) 160 JP 265, DC . . . 6.28
Gnango [2011] UKSC 59; [2012] 2 WLR 17 . . . 3.38, Gregory (1982) 77 Cr App Rep 41, CA . . . 10.23,
14.74, 17.3, 17.38, 17.42, 17.43, 17.56, 17.60, 17.62 10.103
Godfrey [1923] 1 KB 24; 86 JP 219, DC . . . 17.9 Gregory [2011] EWCA Crim 1712; [2011] All ER
Gold and Schifreen [1988] AC 1063; [1988] 2 All (D) 235 (Jun); 175 CL&J 517 . . . 6.7, 16.81
ER 186; 87 Cr App Rep 257, HL . . . 12.51 Gresham [2003] EWCA Crim 2070 . . . 10.61
Goldstein see Rimmington; Goldstein [2005] Griffi n (1869) 11 Cox CC 402 . . . 7.51
Gomez [1993] AC 442; [1993] 1 All ER 1; 96 Cr App Griffi n [1993] Crim LR 515, CA . . . 14.122
Rep 359, HL . . . 10.4, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 10.10, 10.11, Griffiths (1974) 60 Cr App Rep 14, CA . . . 3.46, 11.52
10.14, 10.15, 10.17, 10.18, 10.19, 10.23, 10.55 Grifft hs [1966] 1 QB 589; [1965] 2 All ER 448; 49
Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 23, CA . . . 8.94, Cr App Rep 279, CCA . . . 14.46
8.95 Grifft hs v Freeman [1970] 1 All ER 1117; [1970] 1
Goodfellow v Johnson [1966] 1 QB 83; [1965] 1 All WLR 659, DC . . . 11.36
ER 941, DC . . . 18.5 Grifft hs v Studebakers Ltd [1924] 1 KB 102; 21
Goodwin [1996] Crim LR 262, CA . . . 10.39 LGR 796 . . . 18.14
Gore [2007] EWCA Crim 2789; [2008] Crim LR Groark [1999] Crim LR 669, CA . . . 15.74, 15.76
388 . . . 8.124, 8.125 Grout [2011] EWCA Crim 299; [2011] 1 Cr App
Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412; [1992] 1 All ER 832; 94 Cr Rep 472 . . . 9.55, 9.56, 9.57
App Rep 312, HL . . . 16.54, 16.59, 16.60 Grundy [1977] Crim LR 543, CA . . . 17.71
Gould [1968] 2 QB 65; [1968] 1 All ER 849; 52 Cr Gullefer [1990] 3 All ER 882; 91 Cr App Rep 356n,
App Rep 152, CA . . . 5.12 CA . . . 14.121, 14.122, 14.123, 14.124, 14.125, 14.127
Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex p Osman Gunnell v DPP [1994] RTR 151; [1993] Crim LR
[1989] 3 All ER 701; 90 Cr App Rep 281, DC . . . 619, DC . . . 8.147
10.5, 10.6, 10.13
Graham [1982] 1 All ER 801; 74 Cr App Rep 235,
CA . . . 5.19, 5.23, 16.43, 16.45, 16.58 H [2003] UKHL 1; [2003] 1 All ER 497; [2003] 2 Cr
App Rep 25 . . . 15.16
Graham [1996] NI 157, NICA . . . 17.71
H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056 . . . 9.17, 9.31
Graham [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 302, CA . . . 10.28,
10.91 H (assault of child: reasonable chastisement)
[2001] EWCA Crim 1024; [2002] 1 Cr App Rep
Grainge [1974] 1 All ER 928; 59 Cr App Rep 3, CA 59; [2001] 3 FCR 144 . . . 7.51
. . . 11.52
H (Gavin Spence) [2001] FCR 569; [2001] 1 FLR
Grant [1960] Crim LR 424 . . . 8.47, 15.40 580 . . . 7.136
Grant [2001] EWCA Crim 2611; [2002] QB 1030; H (Karl Anthony) [2005] EWCA Crim 732; [2005]
[2002] 2 WLR 1409; [2002] 1 Cr App Rep 528 . . . 2 All ER 859 . . . 9.8, 9.46
15.14, 15.18
H v CPS [2010] EWHC 1374 (Admin); [2010] 4 All
Grant v Borg [1982] 2 All ER 257, HL . . . 3.85 ER 264, DC . . . 7.32
Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554; [1971] 2 All ER 949, Hacker [1995] 1 All ER 45; [1995] 1 Cr App Rep
CA . . . 8.82, 8.119 332, HL . . . 11.55
Gray’s Haulage Co Ltd v Arnold [1966] 1 All ER Haider (1985) unreported, CA . . . 11.37
896, DC . . . 3.58, 6.16, 6.28
Hale (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 415, CA . . . 10.23, 10.103
Great North of England Rly Co (1846) 9 QB 315;
11 JP 21 . . . 18.21 Hall (1961) 45 Cr App Rep 366, CCA . . . 8.96
Greater London Metropolitan Police Hall [1973] QB 126; [1972] 2 All ER 1009; 56 Cr
Commissioner v Streeter (1980) 71 Cr App Rep App Rep 547, CA . . . 10.56
113, DC . . . 11.48 Hall (1985) 81 Cr App Rep 260, CA . . . 3.44, 11.52
Greatrex and Bates [1999] 1 Cr App Rep 126, CA Hallam [1957] 1 QB 569; [1957] 1 All ER 665; 41 Cr
. . . 17.43, 17.46 App Rep 111, CCA . . . 3.49, 4.17
Green v Burnett [1955] 1 QB 78; [1954] 3 All ER Hallam and Blackburn [1995] Crim LR 323, CA
273, DC . . . 18.4, 18.14 . . . 10.24
xl | Table of Cases
Hallett v R [1969] SASR 141 . . . 2.38 Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476; [1973] 3 All ER
Hallett Silberman Ltd v Cheshire County Council 1109; 58 Cr App Rep 198, HL . . . 2.1, 14.102,
[1993] RTR 32, DC . . . 18.5 14.130, 14.132, 14.133, 14.142
Hamilton [1987] NIJB 1, NICA . . . 17.36 Havell v DPP (1993) 158 JP 680; [1993] Crim LR
Hamilton (1991) 92 Cr App Rep 54, CA . . . 12.11 621, DC . . . 8.150
Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062; [2008] 1 All Hayes (1976) 64 Cr App Rep 82, CA . . . 10.56, 10.68
ER 1103, CA . . . 14.98 Haynes’s Case (1613) 2 East PC 652; 12 Co Rep
Hammersley (1958) 42 Cr App Rep 207 . . . 14.81 113; 77 ER 1389 . . . 10.30
Hammond [1982] Crim LR 611 . . . 10.132, 10.134 Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2000]
3 All ER 890; [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 339, DC . . .
Hancock and Shankland [1986] AC 455; [1986] 1 7.34, 7.45
All ER 641; 82 Cr App Rep 264, HL . . . 3.10, 3.11,
3.14, 3.16, 3.18, 3.30 Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692 . . . 2.35
Handley (1874) 13 Cox CC 79 . . . 8.7 Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125; [2008] QB 43;
[2007] 3 All ER 306, CA . . . 3.36, 9.47, 15.82,
Handyside v United Kingdom (Application 5493/ 15.91, 15.92, 15.93, 15.95
72) (1976) 1 EHRR 737, ECtHR . . . 1.67
Heath [2000] Crim LR 109; [1999] All ER (D)
Handyside’s (Dr) Case (1749) 2 East PC 652; 1 1068, CA . . . 16.49
Hawk PC 148 . . . 10.30
Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353, CA . . . 16.46
Haque [2011] EWCA Crim 1871; [2012] 1 Cr App
Rep 48 . . . 7.137, 7.144, 7.145 Henderson v Jones (1955) 119 JP 305, DC . . . 15.69
Harden [1963] 1 QB 8; [1962] 1 All ER 286, CCA Henderson and Battley (1984) unreported, CA . . .
. . . 1.22 13.5
Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848; 80 Cr App Rep 157, Hendley see A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004);
CA . . . 13.20, 13.26, 15.78, 15.110, 15.111 Edwards, Denton, Jackson, Hendley, Crowley
Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Hendrickson and Tichner [1977] Crim LR 356,
Somerset Constabulary [1986] Crim LR 330, CA . . . 9.56
Crown Ct . . . 13.5 Henley [2000] Crim LR 582, CA . . . 7.144
Hardwicke and Thwaites [2001] Crim LR 220, CA Hennah (1877) 13 Cox CC 547 . . . 7.118, 7.119, 8.191
. . . 17.67 Hennessey (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 419, CA . . . 3.50
Hargreaves [1985] Crim LR 243, CA . . . 11.68 Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9; 89 Cr App Rep 10, CA
Haringey LBC v Marks and Spencer plc; Liverpool . . . 15.25, 15.28, 15.31, 15.63
City Council v Somerfield Stores plc [2004] Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133; [1971] RTR 305; 55
EWHC 1141 (Admin); [2004] 3 All ER 868, DC Cr App Rep 262, CA . . . 2.32, 8.159
. . . 18.4 Herbert (1960) 25 JCL 163 . . . 10.30
Harley (1830) 4 C&P 369 . . . 7.114 HG [2010] EWCA Crim 1693; [2011] Crim LR 339
Harris (1986) 84 Cr App Rep 75, CA . . . 11.52 . . . 9.73, 9.74
Harrison and Francis [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 138, Hibbert (1869) LR 1 CCR 184, CCR . . . 6.2
CA . . . 6.3, 6.38 Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142, DC . . . 10.40
Harrow London Borough Council v Shah [1999] 3 Hichens [2011] EWCA Crim 1626; [2011] 2 Cr App
All ER 302; [1999] 2 Cr App Rep 457 . . . 6.26, 6.37 Rep 370 . . . 16.9, 16.11
Harry [1974] Crim LR 32, Crown Ct . . . 11.28 Hill (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 386, HL . . . 7.128
Hart [1986] 2 NZLR 408, NZCA . . . 2.38 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277; [1958] 1 All ER 193;
Harvey [1999] Crim LR 70, CA . . . 14.68 42 Cr App Rep 51, DC . . . 4.10, 15.53
Harvey [2009] EWCA Crim 469 . . . 16.33 Hill and Hall (1988) 89 Cr App Rep 74, CA . . . 13.9,
Harvey, Uylett and Plummer (1981) 72 Cr App 13.14, 13.16
Rep 139, CA . . . 11.33 Hillen and Pettigrew v ICI (Alkali) Ltd [1936] AC
Hasan [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467, HL . . . 65; [1935] All ER Rep 555 . . . 11.10
5.19, 5.23, 16.1, 16.40, 16.43, 16.44, 16.45, 16.49, Hills v Ellis [1983] QB 680; [1983] 1 All ER 667; 76
16.51, 16.52, 16.59, 16.63, 16.70, 16.76, 16.78, 16.81 Cr App Rep 217, DC . . . 3.75, 6.29, 7.71
Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom (2000) Hilton [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 445, CA . . . 10.6, 10.15,
30 EHRR 241; [2000] Crim LR 185, ECtHR . . . 10.28, 10.87
1.65, 10.75 Hinchcliffe v Sheldon [1955] 3 All ER 406; [1955] 1
Hatton [2005] EWCA Crim 2951; [2006] 1 Cr App WLR 1207, DC . . . 7.70
Rep 247, CA . . . 15.85
Table of Cases | xli
Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241; [2000] 4 All ER 833; [2001] Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] 2 All
1 Cr App Rep 252, HL . . . 10.7, 10.10, 10.14, ER 244; 56 Cr App Rep 1, CA . . . 16.43, 16.49,
10.17, 10.18, 10.19 16.50, 16.54, 16.78
Hipperson v DPP [1996] CLY 145 . . . 16.21 Huggins (1730) 1 Barn KB 358 . . . 18.1
Hipperson v DPP [1996] CLY 1445 . . . 13.18 Hughes (1841) 9 C & P 752; 2 Mood CC 190, CCR
HL v United Kingdom (2004) 17 BHRC 418 . . . 16.95 . . . 9.30
HM Coroner for East Kent, ex p Spooner (1987) 88 Hughes v Hall [1960] 2 All ER 504; [1960] 1 WLR
Cr App Rep 10, DC . . . 8.128, 18.30 733, DC . . . 15.58
Hobbs [2002] EWCA Crim 387; [2002] 2 Cr App Hulme v DPP [2006] EWHC 1347 (Admin);
Rep 324; [2002] All ER (D) 175 (Feb) . . . 14.46 (2006) 170 JP 598, DC . . . 9.108
Hobson v Impett (1957) 41 Cr App Rep 138, DC Humphreys and Turner [1965] 3 All ER 689 . . . 17.26
. . . 11.37 Hunt (1977) 66 Cr App Rep 105, CA . . . 13.14
Hogdon [1962] Crim LR 563, CCA . . . 10.119 Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd v Curtin (1997) The
Holden [1991] Crim LR 478, CA . . . 10.69 Times, 11 December, DC . . . 7.142
Holland (1841) 2 Mood & R 351 . . . 2.50, 2.51 Hurst [1995] 1 Cr App Rep 82, CA . . . 16.46, 16.49
Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328; [1861–73] Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567; [1969] 2 All ER 1117; 53
All ER Rep 237, Ex Ch . . . 10.34 Cr App Rep 448, CA . . . 3.50
Hollinshead [1985] 1 All ER 850; [1985] 2 WLR Hussain [1981] 2 All ER 287; 72 Cr App Rep 143,
761; 80 Cr App Rep 285, CA . . . 14.53 CA . . . 6.38, 11.25
Hollinshead [1985] AC 975; [1985] 2 All ER 769; 81 Hussain, Bhatti and Bhatti [2002] EWCA Crim 6;
Cr App Rep 365, HL . . . 14.53, 14.85 [2002] 2 Cr App Rep 363 . . . 14.58
Holmes [1953] 2 All ER 324; 37 Cr App Rep 61, Husseyn (1977) 67 Cr App Rep 131 CA . . . 14.119
CCA . . . 15.34 Hutchins [1988] Crim LR 379, CA . . . 15.93
Holmes v Governor of Brixton Prison [2004] Hutchinson v Newbury Magistrates’ Court (2000)
EWHC 2020 (Admin); [2005] 1 All ER 490, DC Independent, 20 November . . . 16.4
. . . 10.46, 12.2 Hutton [1994] Crim LR 919, CA . . . 17.61
Hoof (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 126; 2 Cr App Rep (S) Hyam [1997] Crim LR 439, CA . . . 10.78
299, CA . . . 13.20, 13.26 Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55; [1974] 2 All ER 41; 59
Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14; [2010] 2 AC 373; Cr App Rep 91, HL . . . 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 8.24, 8.25
[2010] 2 All ER 359 . . . 1.61 Hyde [1991] 1 QB 134; [1990] 3 All ER 892; 92 Cr
Horne [1994] Crim LR 584, CA . . . 16.46 App Rep 131, CA . . . 17.34, 17.45
Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p K [1997]
QB 23; [1996] 3 All ER 719; [1996] 2 Cr App Rep Ibrams and Gregory (1981) 74 Cr App Rep 154,
574, DC . . . 15.39, 15.46 CA . . . 8.69
Horsey v Hutchings (1984) The Times, 8 Iby [2005] NSWCCA 178; [2005] Crim LR 742,
November . . . 12.59 NSWCCA . . . 8.7
Horton v Gwynne [1921] 2 KB 661, DC . . . 5.2 ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551; [1944] 1 All ER
Howard [1965] 3 All ER 684; [1966] 1 WLR 13; 50 691; 30 Cr App Rep 31, CCA . . . 18.24, 18.40,
Cr App Rep 56, CCA . . . 7.24, 9.15 18.41, 18.42, 18.43
Howard v G T Jones & Co Ltd [1975] RTR 150; Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2637; [2011] 1 WLR
[1974] Crim LR 606 . . . 18.5 1110; 117 BMLR 65 . . . 2.15, 8.6
Howe [1987] AC 417; [1987] 1 All ER 771; 85 Cr Inner South London Coroner, ex p Douglas-
App Rep 32, HL . . . . 5.19, 5.23, 16.40, 16.45, Williams [1999] 1 All ER 344 . . . 8.104, 8.117, 8.119
16.54, 16.55, 16.56, 16.57, 16.58, 16.59, 16.60, Inner West London Coroner, ex p De Luca [1989]
16.76, 16.83, 16.84, 16.98, 17.28, 17.57, 17.59 QB 249; [1988] 3 All ER 414, DC . . . 8.15
Howells [1977] QB 614; [1977] 3 All ER 417; 65 Cr Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976] RTR 251; [1976]
App Rep 86, CA . . . 6.38, 6.39 Crim LR 131, DC . . . 9.56
Howker v Robinson [1973] QB 178; [1972] 2 All ER Iqbal v Dean Manson Solicitors [2011] EWCA Civ
786 . . . 18.11, 18.12 123; [2011] IRLR 428 . . . 7.137
Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 (QB); (2006) Ireland; Burstow [1998] AC 147; [1997] 4 All ER
105 SJLB 161 . . . 7.141, 7.142 225; [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 177, HL . . . 7.36, 7.37,
Huckerby v Elliott [1970] 1 All ER 189 . . . 18.45 7.39, 7.41, 7.42, 7.43, 7.58, 7.78, 7.82, 7.83, 7.143,
Hudson [1966] 1 QB 448; [1965] 1 All ER 721; 49 7.144
Cr App Rep 69, CCA . . . 3.59 Isitt [1978] RTR 211; 67 Cr App Rep 44, CA . . . 15.55
xlii | Table of Cases
Ives [1970] 1 QB 208; [1969] 3 All ER 470; 53 Cr Johnson v DPP [2008] EWHC 509 (Admin);
App Rep 474, CA . . . 8.58 (2008) Times, 9 Apri;
[2008] All ER (D) 371 (Feb), DC . . . 7.103
J (a minor), Re [1991] Fam 33; [1990] 3 All ER 930, Johnson v DPP [2008] EWHC 509 (Admin);
CA . . . 3.23 (2008) Times, 9 April; [2008] All ER (D) 371
J (child’s religious upbringing and circumcision), (Feb), DC . . . 7.104, 7.105
Re [2000] 1 FCR 307; [2000] Fam Law 246, CA Johnson v Phillips [1975] 3 All ER 682; [1976] RTR
. . . 7.12 170, DC . . . 16.93
JA [2011] SCC 28, SC of Canada . . . 9.28 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544; [1950] 1 All
Jackson [1985] RTR 257; [1985] Crim LR 674, CA ER 300; 48 LGR 276 . . . 17.31, 17.40
. . . 5.7 Johnstone [1982] Crim LR 454 . . . 10.87
Jackson [2000] 1 Cr App Rep 97n, CA . . . 14.52 Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28; [2003] 3 All ER 884;
Jackson [2004] see A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004); [2003] 2 Cr App Rep 493 . . . 4.8
Edwards, Denton, Jackson, Hendley, Crowley Jones (1832) 4 B & Ad 345 . . . 14.46
Jackson, Golding and Jackson [1985] Crim LR Jones (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 375, CA . . . 5.7, 7.14,
442, CA . . . 14.56 7.52, 7.86, 7.89
Jacobson v United States 112 SC 1535 (1992) . . . 17.64 Jones [1990] 3 All ER 886; 91 Cr App Rep 351, CA
Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527; [1980] 3 All . . . 14.121, 14.123, 14.127
ER 716; 72 Cr App Rep 33, DC . . . 13.9, 15.97, Jones (Ian Anthony) [2007] EWCA Crim 1118;
15.117 [2007] 4 All ER 112, CA . . . 9.56
Jakeman (1982) 76 Cr App Rep 223, CA . . . 3.65 Jones (Iorwerth) [2003] EWCA Crim 894; [2003]
James & Son Ltd v Smee [1955] 1 QB 78; [1954] 3 All ER (D) 113 (Apr) . . . 13.9, 13.17
All ER 273 . . . 6.28 Jones (Margaret) [2004] EWCA Crim 1981; [2005]
James (1837) 8 C & P 131 . . . 16.101 QB 259; [2004] 4 All ER 955, CA . . . 13.13
James (1844) 1 Car & Kir 530; 1 Cox CC 78 . . . 7.38 Jones (Margaret) [2006] UKHL 16; [2007] 1 AC
136, HL . . . 1.33, 13.13, 16.4
James [1997] 34 LS Gaz R 27, CA . . . 3.31
Jones v Pratt [1983] RTR 54, DC . . . 8.147
James v CPS [2009] EWHC 2925 (Admin); [2010]
Crim LR 580, DC . . . 7.136 Jones v Sherwood [1942] 1 KB 127; 40 LGR 4, DC
. . . 7.36
Janaway v Salford Area Health Authority [1989]
AC 537; [1988] 3 All ER 1079, HL . . . 8.198 Jones and Smith [1976] 3 All ER 54; 63 Cr App Rep
47, CA . . . 11.8, 11.13
Janjua [1999] 1 Cr App Rep 91, CA . . . 7.77
Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App Rep 152, CCA . . . 2.57,
Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618; [1970] 1 All ER 219, 2.58, 2.59
PC . . . 4.10
Jordan [2002] see Lambert, Ali and Jordan
Jefferson [1994] 1 All ER 270; 99 Cr App Rep 13,
CA . . . 17.9, 17.61 JTB [2009] UKHL 20 [2009] AC 1310; [2009] 3 All
ER 1 . . . 15.2, 15.3
Jenkins [1983] 1 All ER 1000; 76 Cr App Rep 255,
CA . . . 11.17 Justice of the Peace for Peterborough, ex p Hicks
[1978] 1 All ER 225; [1977] 1 WLR 1371, DC . . .
Jenkins [1984] AC 242; [1983] 3 All ER 448; 77 Cr 12.66
App Rep 319, HL . . . 11.17
Jennings [1990] Crim LR 588, CA . . . 8.87, 8.92
K (1983) 78 Cr App Rep 82, CA . . . 16.54
Jennion [1962] 1 All ER 689; 46 Cr App Rep 212,
CCA . . . 8.55 K [2001] UKHL 41; [2002] 1 AC 462; [2001] 3 All
ER 897; [2002] 1 Cr App Rep 121 . . . 2.2, 2.23,
Jeraj [1994] Crim LR 595, CA . . . 12.55, 12.56 3.3, 5.7, 5.9, 5.13, 6.1, 6.14, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.20,
JF Alford Transport Ltd [1999] RTR 51; [1997] 2 6.21, 6.22, 6.23, 6.24, 6.34, 6.35, 6.38, 7.52, 9.5
Cr App Rep 326, CA . . . 17.13, 17.27, 17.28, 17.32 Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092; [2005]
Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699; [2007] 2 Cr App 2 Cr App Rep 457, CA . . . 8.127
Rep 477, CA . . . 9.23 Kaitamaki v R [1985] AC 147; [1984] 2 All ER 435;
Johnson [1997] 8 Archbold News 1, CA . . . 12.57 79 Cr App Rep 251, PC . . . 9.30
Johnson [2007] EWCA Crim 1978; [2008] Crim Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610, NZCA . . . 15.96
LR 132 . . . 15.34 Kanwar [1982] 2 All ER 528; [1982] 1 WLR 845; 75
Johnson and Jones (1841) Car & M 218 . . . 17.75 Cr App Rep 87, CA . . . 11.41
Johnson v DPP [1994] Crim LR 673, DC . . . 13.14 Kay v Butterworth (1945) 110 JP 75, CA . . . 15.69
Table of Cases | xliii
Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355; [1994] 3 All ER 353, HL
465; [2006] 4 All ER 128, HL . . . 1.61 . . . 1.36, 3.1, 15.96, 15.107, 15.117
Keane; McGrath [2010] EWCA Crim 2514; [2011] Kirk and Kirk [2008] EWCA Crim 434; [2008] All
Crim LR 393 . . . 16.7, 16.33, 16.34 ER (D) 29 (Mar) . . . 9.19
Kelbie [1996] Crim LR 802, CA . . . 16.25 Klass [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 453; 162 JP 105, CA . . .
Kelly (1992) 97 Cr App Rep 245, CA . . . 11.20, 11.23 11.24
Kelly and Lindsay [1999] QB 621; [1998] 3 All ER Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council
741, CA . . . 10.30 [1999] 2 AC 349; [1998] 4 All ER 513, HL . . . 10.63
Kelly v DPP [2002] EWHC 1428 (Admin); 166 JP Klineberg and Marsden [1999] 1 Cr App Rep 427;
621 . . . 7.136 [1999] Crim LR 417, CA . . . 10.54, 10.58
Kelly v Solari (1841) 11 LJ Ex 10; [1835–42] All ER Knott [1973] Crim LR 36, CA . . . 11.55
Rep 320, Exch Ct . . . 10.63 Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions)
Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; [1956] 3 All ER 249; 40 Cr Ltd v DPP [1973] AC 435; [1972] 2 All ER 898;
App Rep 121, DC . . . 15.25, 15.27, 15.55, 15.62, 56 Cr App Rep 633, HL . . . 1.33, 1.35, 14.96,
15.63 14.98, 14.100
Kendall v South East Magistrates’ Court [2008] Kohn (1979) 69 Cr App Rep 395; [1979] Crim LR
EWHC 1848 (Admin); [2008] All ER (D) 356 675, CA . . . 10.5, 10.28
(Jun), DC . . . 7.103 Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397, ECtHR
Kendrick and Hopkins [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 524, . . . 1.68
CA . . . 10.18 Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706; [2005] 2 Cr App
Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510; [1966] 3 All Rep 198; [2005] Crim LR 763 . . . 7.17, 7.31, 7.88, 7.89
ER 931 . . . 7.66, 7.68, 16.37 Kooken (1981) 74 Cr App Rep 30, CA . . . 8.47
Kennedy (No 1) [1999] Crim LR 65, CA . . . 8.86, 8.87 Kopsch (1925) 19 Cr App Rep 50, CCA . . . 15.48
Kennedy (No 2) [2005] EWCA Crim 685; [2005] Kosar v Bank of Scotland plc (trading as Halifax)
3 WLR 2159; [2005] 2 Cr App Rep 348, CA . . . [2011] EWHC 1050 (Admin); [2011] 19 LS Gaz
2.44, 2.47, 2.48 R 21 . . . 7.135
Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38; [2007] 3 WLR Kousar [2009] EWCA Crim 139; [2009] 2 Cr App
612, HL . . . 2.31, 2.44, 2.46, 2.47, 2.48, 7.112, Rep 88 . . . 12.30
7.113, 7.114, 7.115, 7.116, 7.117, 8.85, 8.86, 8.87, Krause (1902) 66 JP 121; 18 TLR 238 . . . 8.178
8.91, 8.104, 8.120 Kumar [2004] EWCA Crim 3207; [2005] 1 Cr Rep
Kenning [2008] EWCA Crim 1534; [2009] QB 221 App 566 . . . 6.24
. . . 14.53 Kumar, Re [2000] Crim LR 504 . . . 10.54, 10.56
Kerr v DPP (1994) 158 JP 1048; [1995] Crim LR Kwaku Mensah v R [1946] AC 83; 115 LJPC 20, PC
394, DC . . . 7.66 . . . 7.38
Keyn (1876) 2 Ex D 63 . . . 1.24
Khalil [2003] EWCA Crim 3467; [2004] 2 Cr App L [2008] EWCA Crim 1970; [2009] 1 All ER 786 . . .
Rep (S) 121, CA . . . 14.46 18.53, 18.55
Khan [1990] 2 All ER 783; 91 Cr App Rep 29, CA Laing [1995] Crim LR 395, CA . . . 11.10
. . . 14.112, 14.116
Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981; [1967] 2 All ER 1282; 51 Cr
Khan [1995] Crim LR 78, CA . . . 16.12 App Rep 417, CA . . . 5.8, 8.85, 8.89, 8.90
Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 2; [2009] 1 Cr App R 28 Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545; [2001]
. . . 8.169, 8.170, 8.172, 8.173 3 All ER 577; [2001] 2 Cr App Rep 511 . . . 1.53,
Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 1569; [2010] 1 Cr App R 4.8, 6.46
4 . . . 8.55, 8.56 Lambert [2009] EWCA Crim 2860 . . . 11.27, 11.28
Khan and Khan [1998] Crim LR 830, CA . . . 8.111, Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002] QB 1112; [2001] 1
8.112, 8.119 All ER 1014; [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 205, CA . . . 8.47
Kilbride v Lake [1962] NZLR 590 . . . 15.53 Lambie [1982] AC 449; [1981] 2 All ER 776; 73 Cr
Kilic v Turkey (2001) 33 EHRR 58, ECtHR . . . App Rep 294, HL . . . 12.11
16.27, 16.64 Landy [1981] 1 All ER 1172; 72 Cr App Rep 237,
Kimber [1983] 3 All ER 316; [1983] 1 WLR 1118; 77 CA . . . 14.89
Cr App Rep 225, CA . . . 2.23, 5.7, 7.36, 7.43, 7.52 Lane and Lane (1985) 82 Cr App Rep 5; [1985]
Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35, CA . . . 2.32 Crim LR 789, CA . . . 17.76
King [1964] 1 QB 285; [1963] 3 All ER 561; 48 Cr Lang (1975) 62 Cr App Rep 50; [1976] Crim LR 65,
App Rep 17, CCA . . . 5.12 CA . . . 7.24
xliv | Table of Cases
Lankford [1959] Crim LR 209, CCA . . . 14.142 Lincolnshire (Kesteven) Justices, ex p O’Connor
Larkin [1943] KB 174; [1943] 1 All ER 217; 29 Cr [1983] 1 All ER 901; [1983] 1 WLR 335 . . . 15.20
App Rep 18, CCA . . . 8.82, 8.87, 8.96 Linekar [1995] QB 250; [1995] 3 All ER 69; [1995] 2
Larsonneur (1933) 31 LGR 253; 24 Cr App Rep 74, Cr App Rep 49, CA . . . 7.30
CCA . . . 6.6, 6.7 Lines (1844) 1 Car & Kir 393 . . . 9.30
Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom Lingens v Austria 26 DR 171 (1981), EComHR . . . 4.8
(1997) 24 EHRR 39, ECtHR . . . 7.4 Linnett v Metropolitan Police Comr [1946] KB
Latham [1965] Crim LR 434, CCA . . . 15.24 290; [1947] 1 All ER 380, DC . . . 18.10
Latif and Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 353; [1996] 2 Cr Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152; [1969] 3 All ER 410; 53
App Rep 92, HL . . . 2.43, 2.47, 3.50, 14.137, 17.64 Cr App Rep 600, CA . . . 8.96, 15.64, 15.71, 15.82,
Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359; 51 JP 184; [1886–90] 15.93
All ER Rep 386, CCR . . . 3.38 Lister & Co v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1; [1886–90]
Lau v DPP [2000] 1 FLR 799 . . . 7.136 All ER Rep 797, CA . . . 10.46
Lawrence and Pomroy (1971) 57 Cr App Rep 64; Litchffeld [1998] Crim LR 507, CA . . . 8.114
[1971] Crim LR 645, CA . . . 11.32 Liverpool JJ, ex p Molyneux [1972] 2 QB 384, DC
Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Comr [1972] AC . . . 1.26
626; [1971] 2 All ER 1253; 55 Cr App Rep 471, Lloyd [1967] 1 QB 175; [1966] 1 All ER 107n; 50 Cr
HL . . . 10.7, 10.10, 10.14, 10.17, 10.18, 10.19 App Rep 61, CCA . . . 8.51
Le Brun [1992] QB 61; [1991] 4 All ER 673; 94 Cr Lloyd [1985] QB 829; [1985] 2 All ER 661; 81 Cr App
App Rep 101, CA . . . 3.71, 3.72 Rep 182, CA . . . 10.85, 10.86, 10.87, 10.89, 10.90
Leahy [1985] Crim LR 99 . . . 17.39 Lloyd [1998] 3 All ER 741, CA . . . 10.44
Lee [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 293; [2000] All ER (D) Lloyd v DPP [1992] 1 All ER 982; [1992] RTR 215,
1215, CA . . . 7.63, 16.37 DC . . . 13.5, 13.18, 16.39
Lee [2006] EWCA Crim 156; [2006] All ER (D) 27 Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547, CA . . . 16.12
(Jan) . . . 11.60 Lockley [1995] Crim LR 656, CA . . . 10.23, 10.103
Lee Chun-Chuen (alias Lee Wing-Cheuk) v R Lockwood [1986] Crim LR 244, CA . . . 10.74
[1963] AC 220; [1963] 1 All ER 73, PC . . . 4.10 Lockyer v Gibb [1967] 2 QB 243, DC . . . 2.5
Leicester v Pearson [1952] 2 QB 668; [1952] 2 All Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121, DC . . . 7.38, 7.39
ER 71; 50 LGR 534, DC . . . 6.7, 15.58
Loizidou v Turkey (Application 15318/89) (1995)
Leigh v Gladstone (1909) 26 TLR 139 . . . 16.97 20 EHRR 99, ECtHR . . . 1.63
Lemon [1979] AC 617; [1979] 1 All ER 898; 68 Cr Lomas (1913) 9 Cr App Rep 220; 78 JP 152, CCA
App Rep 381, HL . . . 4.18, 6.1 . . . 17.11
Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum London and Globe Finance Corpn Ltd, Re [1903]
Co Ltd [1915] AC 705; 84 LJKB 1281; [1914–15] 1 Ch 728; 82 JP 447; [1900–3] All ER Rep 891
All ER Rep 280, HL . . . 18.29 . . . 14.86
Leung Kam Kwok v R (1984) 81 Cr App Rep 83; Longbottom (1849) 13 JP 270; 3 Cox CC 439 . . . 2.34
[1985] Crim LR 227; [1985] LS Gaz R 687, PC
. . . 8.24 Longman (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 121, CA . . . 14.48
Lewis (1975) 62 Cr App Rep 206; [1976] Crim LR Loose v Carlton (1978) 41 P & CR 19 . . . 1.24
383, CA . . . 10.73 Looseley; A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2000) [2001]
Lewis [2010] EWCA Crim 151 . . . 2.52 UKHL 53; [2001] 4 All ER 897; [2002] 1 Cr App
Rep 360 . . . 17.65, 17.66, 17.68
Lewis v Cox [1985] QB 509; [1984] 3 All ER 672; 80
Cr App Rep 1, DC . . . 7.70, 7.71 Lord Advocate v Dumbarton District Council
[1990] 2 AC 580; [1990] 1 All ER 1, HL . . . 8.131
Lewis v Dickson [1976] RTR 431; [1976] Crim LR
442, DC . . . 16.100 Loughnan [1981] VR 443, Vic Full Ct . . . 16.49
Lewis v Lethbridge [1987] Crim LR 59, DC . . . 10.57 Loukes [1996] RTR 164; [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 444,
CA . . . 3.60, 6.5, 6.30, 8.159, 17.16, 17.25
Liangsiriprasert v Government of the United
States of America [1991] 1 AC 225; [1990] 2 All Lovelace v DPP [1954] 3 All ER 481; [1954] 1 WLR
ER 866, PC . . . 14.76 1468, DC . . . 6.30
Lichniak [2002] UKHL 47; [2003] 1 AC 903; [2002] Lovesey [1970] 1 QB 352; [1969] 2 All ER 1077; 53
4 All ER 1122; [2003] 1 Cr App Rep 560 . . . 8.21 Cr App Rep 461, CA . . . 17.52
Lidar [2000] 4 Archbold News 3, CA . . . 3.33, 8.119 Low v Blease [1975] Crim LR 513, DC . . . 10.33
Lim Chin Aik v R [1963] AC 160; [1963] 1 All ER Lowe [1973] QB 702; [1973] 1 All ER 805; 57 Cr
223, PC . . . 6.39, 6.40 App Rep 365, CA . . . 8.85
Table of Cases | xlv
LT v DPP [2004] see RG v DPP; LT v DPP [2004] McGowan [1990] Crim LR 399, CA . . . 14.49
Luberti v Italy (Application 9019/80) (1984) 6 Machent v Quinn [1970] 2 All ER 255; 134 JP 501,
EHRR 440, ECtHR . . . 15.51 DC . . . 10.25
Ludlow v Burgess (1971) 75 Cr App Rep 227n, DC McHugh (1988) 88 Cr App Rep 385, CA . . . 10.9
. . . 7.66 McInnes [1971] 3 All ER 295; 55 Cr App Rep 551,
Luff man [2008] EWCA Crim 1739 . . . 17.17, 17.18 CA . . . 16.6, 16.35
Lunderbeck [1991] Crim LR 784, CA . . . 14.98 McKechnie (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 51; [1992] Crim
Lunt v DPP [1993] Crim LR 534; [1993] COD 430, LR 194, CA . . . 2.59
DC . . . 7.70 McKenzie [2011] EWCA Crim 1550; [2011] 1 WLR
Lynch v DPP for Northern Ireland see DPP for 2807 . . . 15.19
Northern Ireland v Lynch Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App Rep 453, CA . . . 2.52,
Lynn (1788) 1 Leach 497; 2 Term Rep 733 . . . 10.30 7.51, 8.96
Lynn [1964] 1 QB 164; [1963] 3 All ER 659; 48 Cr McKinnon [1980] 2 NZLR 31 . . . 3.70
App Rep 42, CCA . . . 7.66 Mackintosh (1998) unreported, CA . . . 16.45
Lynsey [1995] 3 All ER 654; [1995] 2 Cr App Rep Macklin and Murphy’s Case (1838) 2 Lew CC 225
667, CA . . . 7.35, 7.129 . . . 17.3
Lyons v May [1948] 2 All ER 1062; 47 LGR 125, DC McKnight (2000) The Times, 5 May, CA . . . 15.74,
. . . 6.28 15.76
McKnight v Davies [1974] RTR 4; [1974] Crim LR
M [2003] EWCA Crim 3452; [2003] All ER (D) 199 62 . . . 10.117
(Nov) . . . 15.9 McKoen v Ellis [1987] RTR 26; 151 JP 60; [1987]
M [2011] EWCA Crim 1291; [2011] All ER (D) 198 Crim LR 54, DC . . . 8.147
(May) . . . 9.33 McMillan (1984) unreported, CA . . . 7.77
M and B [2009] EWCA Crim 2615; [2010] 4 All ER McMillan v Crown Prosecution Service [2008]
51 . . . 6.5, 6.23, 6.33, 6.37 EWHC 1457 (Admin); (2008) 172 JP 485 . . . 7.33
M (KJ) [2003] EWCA Crim 357; [2003] 2 Cr App McPherson [1973] Crim LR 191, CA . . . 10.11
Rep 322, CA . . . 15.14 MacPherson [1973] RTR 157; [1973] Crim LR 457,
M (Rizwan) [2003] EWCA Crim 3067; [2003] All CA . . . 10.122, 15.93
ER (D) 285 (Oct) . . . 8.180 McPhillips [1989] NI 360, NICA . . . 14.68
MacAngus and Kane v HM Advocate [2009] McQuade [2005] NICA 2; [2005] NI 331, NICA
HCJAC 8 . . . 2.45 . . . 8.47
McAngus, Re [1994] Crim LR 602, DC . . . 11.65, 11.69 McQuaid v Anderton [1980] 3 All ER 540; [1981] 1
McBean v Parker (1983) 147 JP 205; [1983] Crim WLR 154, DC . . . 8.147
LR 399, DC . . . 7.66 McShane (1977) 66 Cr App Rep 97; [1977] Crim
McBride v Turnock [1964] Crim LR 456 . . . 7.68 LR 737, CA . . . 14.106
McCann (1971) 56 Cr App Rep 359, CA . . . 17.63 Maginnis [1987] AC 303; [1987] 1 All ER 907; 85
McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97, Cr App Rep 127, HL . . . 12.34
ECtHR . . . 16.27, 16.30, 16.31, 16.32 Magna Plant v Mitchell [1966] Crim LR 394 . . .
MacCarthy [1967] 1 QB 68; [1966] 1 All ER 447; 50 18.29
Cr App Rep 109, CCA . . . 15.9 Maher v Musson (1934) 52 CLR 100, HC of
McCreadie and Tume (1992) 96 Cr App Rep 143, Australia . . . 6.48
CA . . . 10.33 Maidstone Borough Council v Mortimer [1980] 3
McCullum (1973) 57 Cr App Rep 645; [1973] Crim All ER 552; 79 LGR 81, DC . . . 6.29
LR 582, CA . . . 3.50, 11.53 Mail Newspapers plc v Express Newspapers plc
McDavitt [1981] Crim LR 843 . . . 10.131 [1987] FSR 90 . . . 8.11
MacDonagh [1974] QB 448; [1974] 2 All ER 257; Mainwaring (1981) 74 Cr App Rep 99, CA . . .
[1974] 2 WLR 529, CA . . . 8.147 10.52, 10.55
McDonald (1980) 20 Cr App Rep 288, CA . . . 11.45 Majrowski v Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Trust
McDonald [1999] NI 150 . . . 8.201 [2006] UKHL 34; [2007] 1 AC 224 . . . 7.141
McDonald [2003] EWCA Crim 1170 . . . 16.49 Malcherek [1981] 2 All ER 422; 73 Cr App Rep 173,
CA . . . 2.42, 2.61
McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233; [1966] 1 All ER 193;
50 Cr App Rep 5 . . . 14.47 Malik v Bartram Personnel Group (1990) unre-
ported, decision No. 4343/90 EAT . . . 7.99
McEvilly (1973) 60 Cr App Rep 150, CA . . . 17.63
xlvi | Table of Cases
Malone [1998] 2 Cr App Rep 447; [1998] Crim LR May (1989) 91 Cr App Rep 157, CA . . . 14.98
834; [1998] All ER (D) 176, CA . . . 9.31 Mayer v Marchant (1973) 5 SASR 567 . . . 6.5
Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14, Mayling [1963] 2 QB 717; [1963] 1 All ER 687; 47
ECtHR . . . 1.65 Cr App Rep 102, CCA . . . 14.98
Mandair [1995] 1 AC 208; [1994] 2 All ER 715; 99 Mazo [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 518; [1996] Crim LR
Cr App Rep 250, HL . . . 7.129 435, CA . . . 10.18
Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548; [1983] 1 All MB, Re [1997] 2 FLR 426, CA . . . 16.95
ER 1062; [1983] ICR 385, HL . . . 7.98, 7.100 MD [2004] EWCA Crim 1391 . . . 3.12
Manley (1844) 1 Cox CC 104; 3 LTOS 22 . . . 17.6 Meachen [2006] EWCA Crim 2414 . . . 7.7
Manning [1999] QB 980; [1998] 4 All ER 876; Meech [1974] QB 549; [1973] 3 All ER 939; 58 Cr
[1998] 2 Cr App Rep 461, CA . . . 1.22 App Rep 74, CA . . . 10.49, 10.52, 10.55
Mansfield [1975] Crim LR 101, CA . . . 11.69 Meli v R [1954] see Thabo Meli v R [1954]
Marchant (1985) 80 Cr App Rep 361, CA . . . 10.118 Mellor [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 245; [1996] Crim LR
Marchant [2003] EWCA Crim 2099; [2004] 1 All 743, CA . . . 2.57
ER 1187 . . . 8.155 Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516;
Marcus [1981] 2 All ER 833; 73 Cr App Rep 49 . . . [2011] QB 876 . . . 17.17, 17.18, 17.43, 17.49, 17.51,
7.119 17.57
Mari [2009] EWCA Crim 2677; [2010] RTR 192 Mepstead v DPP (1995) 160 JP 475, DC . . . 7.33, 7.66
. . . 8.158 Meredith [1973] Crim LR 253, Crown Ct . . . 10.49
Maria v Hall (1807) 1 Taunt 33 . . . 8.12 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v
Marjoram [2000] Crim LR 372, CA . . . 2.52 Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500; [1995]
Marlow (1964) 49 Cr App Rep 49 . . . 8.191 3 All ER 918; [1995] 3 WLR 413, PC . . . 18.31,
Marlow [1998] 1 Cr App Rep (S) 273, CA . . . 9.56 18.32, 18.34, 18.35, 18.36, 18.38
Marsh [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 67, CA . . . 10.126 Metropolitan Police Comr v Caldwell [1982] AC
Marshall [1998] 2 Cr App Rep 282, CA . . . 10.39, 341; [1981] 1 All ER 961; 73 Cr App Rep 13, HL
10.87, 10.91 . . . 3.33, 3.35, 6.29, 8.83, 15.91, 15.93
Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54; 46 JP 228, CCR . . . 7.45 Metropolitan Police Comr v Charles [1977] AC
177; [1976] 3 All ER 112; 63 Cr App Rep 252, HL
Martin [2011] EWCA Crim 1450 . . . 17.13 . . . 12.11
Martin (Anthony Edward) [2001] EWCA Crim Metropolitan Police Comr v Wilson see Jenkins
2245; [2003] QB 1; [2002] 1 Cr App Rep 323 . . . [1983]
16.20
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p
Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652; 88 Cr App Rep Aniifowosi (1985) 149 JP 748, DC . . . 15.20
343 . . . 5.19, 6.7, 16.74, 16.76, 16.81, 16.94
Mew v Tristmire Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 912; [2011]
Martin (David Paul) [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 42; 164 HLR 742 . . . 10.34
JP 174, CA . . . 5.23, 16.20, 16.45, 16.76
Meyrick and Ribuffi (1929) 21 Cr App Rep 94,
Mason v DPP [2009] EWHC 2198 (Admin), DC . . . CCA . . . 14.46
14.126, 14.127, 14.141
M’Growther’s Case (1746) 1 East PC 71; Fost 13; 18
Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87; 42 Cr App Rep 145, State Tr 391 . . . 16.43, 16.62
CCA . . . 8.55
MH [2011] EWCA Crim 1508; [2011] 4 All ER 761
Matthews and Alleyne [2003] EWCA Crim 192; . . . 2.32, 2.46, 2.48
[2003] 2 Cr App Rep 461; [2003] All ER (D) 103
(Feb) . . . 3.17, 3.18, 3.19 Michael (1840) 9 C & P 356; 2 Mood CC 120, CCR
. . . 17.6, 17.7
Matudi [2003] EWCA Crim 697; [2003] EHLR 13;
[2003] All ER (D) 238 (Mar) . . . 6.20, 6.21, 6.35, Mickleborough v BRS (Contracts) Ltd [1977] RTR
6.39, 6.41 389; [1977] Crim LR 568, DC . . . 18.4
Mawji v R [1957] AC 126; [1957] 1 All ER 385; 41 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1982]
Cr App Rep 69, PC . . . 14.47 Ch 529; [1981] 3 All ER 744; [1982] 2 WLR 1, CA
. . . 14.47
Maxwell [2010] UKSC 48; [2011] 4 All ER 941 . . .
17.66 Millard and Vernon [1987] Crim LR 393, CA . . .
14.113
Maxwell and Clanchy (1909) 2 Cr App Rep 26; 73
JP 176, CCA . . . 7.68 Miller [1954] 2 QB 282; [1954] 2 All ER 529; 38 Cr
App Rep 1, DC . . . 7.57, 7.58
May [1912] 3 KB 572; 8 Cr App Rep 63, CCA . . . 2.23,
7.50 Miller [1976] Crim LR 147, CA . . . 10.123
Table of Cases | xlvii
Miller [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 1 All ER 978; 77 Cr Morgan [1970] VR 337 . . . 9.15
App Rep 17, HL . . . 2.1, 2.13, 3.68, 7.37, 7.46, 7.49, Morgan [1972] 1 QB 436; [1972] 1 All ER 348; 56
8.111 Cr App Rep 181, CA . . . 17.87
Miller [2010] EWCA Crim 809; [2011] 1 Cr App Morley [1994] Crim LR 919, CA . . . 17.64, 17.68
Rep (S) 7 . . . 3.50, 11.2 Morphitis v Salmon (1989) 154 JP 365; [1990]
Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372; Crim LR 48, DC . . . 13.5
[1948] LJR 203 . . . 4.5 Morris; Anderton v Burnside [1984] AC 320;
Millward [1985] QB 519; [1985] 1 All ER 859; 80 Cr [1983] 3 All ER 288; 77 Cr App Rep 309, HL . . .
App Rep 280, CA . . . 6.29 10.4, 10.5, 10.7, 10.8, 10.82
Millward (1994) 158 JP 1091; [1994] Crim LR 527, Morris [1951] 1 KB 394; [1950] 2 All ER 965; 34 Cr
CA . . . 17.22, 17.23, 17.25 App Rep 210, CCA . . . 1.31
Minor v DPP (1987) 86 Cr App Rep 378, DC . . . 11.71 Morris [1966] see Anderson and Morris [1966]
Mir (1994) unreported, CA . . . 14.70 Morris [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 386, CA . . . 7.58
Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375; Morris v Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925 . . . 16.2
[2005] 1 Cr App Rep 328, CA . . . 1.68, 8.107, 8.114 Morris v Tolman [1923] 1 KB 166; 20 LGR 803;
Mitchell [1983] QB 741; [1983] 2 All ER 427; 76 Cr [1922] All ER Rep 182 . . . 17.16
App Rep 293, CA . . . 8.90, 8.94, 8.104 Morrison (1988) 89 Cr App Rep 17, CA . . . 7.94
Mitchell (1990) unreported, CA . . . 10.74 Moses and Ansbro [1991] Crim LR 617, CA . . . 14.86
Mitchell [2008] All ER (D) 109 (Apr), CA . . . 10.90, Moses v Winder [1981] RTR 37; [1980] Crim LR
10.91, 10.97 232, DC . . . 15.66, 15.69
Mitchell and Ballantyne [2008] EWCA Crim 2552; Most (1881) 7 QBD 244; 45 JP 696, CCR . . . 8.176
[2009] 1 Cr App Rep 438 . . . 17.43
Mousell Bros Ltd v London and North Western
Mitchell and King (1999) 163 JP 75; [1999] Crim Rly Co [1917] 2 KB 836; [1916–17] All ER Rep
LR 496, CA . . . 17.43, 17.52, 17.73 1101 . . . 18.7
M’Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635 . . . 7.84 Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; [1967] 3 All ER 47; 51 Cr
M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 1 Car & Kir 130n; 10 Cl App Rep 402, CA . . . 7.87, 7.94
& Fin 200, HL . . . 8.39, 8.47, 8.126, 15.23, 15.38 Moyle [2008] EWCA Crim 3059; [2009] Crim LR
Moberly v Allsop (1992) 156 JP 514; [1992] COD 586 . . . 15.9
190, DC . . . 10.131 Moys (1984) 79 Cr App Rep 72; [1984] Crim LR
Mogul Steamship Co v McGregor Gow & Co 495, CA . . . 3.46, 11.52
(1888) 21 QBD 544 . . . 14.46, 17.69 Muhamad [2002] EWCA Crim 1856; [2003] QB
Mogul Steamship Co v McGregor Gow & Co [1892] 1031, CA; [2003] 2 WLR 1050 . . . 6.8, 6.20, 6.21,
AC 25; 56 JP 101; 61 LJQB 295, HL . . . 14.46 6.33, 6.35, 6.37, 6.38, 6.41
Mohan [1976] QB 1; [1975] 2 All ER 193; 60 Cr Mullins (1848) 12 JP 776; 3 Cox CC 526 . . . 17.63
App Rep 272, CA . . . 3.7, 3.8, 3.30, 15.93 Murphy and Douglas (1837) 8 C & P 297; 1 Jur 983
Moloney [1985] AC 905; [1985] 1 All ER 1025; 81 . . . 14.46
Cr App Rep 93, HL . . . 3.5, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11, 3.13,
3.14, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.30, 8.24, 8.27
N Ltd [2008] EWCA Crim 1223; [2008] 1 WLR
Monaghan [1979] Crim LR 673, CA . . . 10.24 2684 . . . 4.2
Moore [1986] Crim LR 552, CA . . . 4.10 Naismith [1961] 2 All ER 735; [1961] 1 WLR 952,
Moore and Dorn [1975] Crim LR 229, CA . . . 3.70 C-MAC . . . 7.90
Moore v DPP [2010] EWHC 1822 (Admin); [2010] Nash [1999] Crim LR 308, CA . . . 14.128
RTR 429, DC . . . 14.125 National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11;
Moore v Green [1983] 1 All ER 663 . . . 7.71 [1958] 3 All ER 203; 42 Cr App Rep 240, DC . . .
Moore v I Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 515, DC . . . 17.10, 17.11, 17.28
18.24, 18.35 Naviede [1997] Crim LR 662, CA . . . 10.28
Morby (1882) 8 QBD 571; 46 JP 422; 51 LJMC 85, Navvabi [1986] 3 All ER 102; 83 Cr App Rep 271,
CCR . . . 2.60 CA . . . 10.24
Morden v Porter (1860) 25 JP 263; 7 CBNS 641 . . . Neal v Gribble [1978] RTR 409; 68 Cr App Rep 9,
6.36 DC . . . 10.115
More [1987] 3 All ER 825; 86 Cr App Rep 234; Nedrick [1986] 3 All ER 1; 83 Cr App Rep 267, CA
[1988] Crim LR 176, HL . . . 12.53, 12.54, 12.55, . . . 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18
12.56
xlviii | Table of Cases
Nelson [1999] 6 Archbold News 2, CA . . . 17.44 O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster
Ness [2011] Crim LR 645, Crown Ct . . . 16.54, Constabulary [1997] AC 286; [1996] NI 8, HL
16.61, 16.81 . . . 3.57
Newberry v Simmonds [1961] 2 QB 345; [1961] 2 Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 2 All ER 490; [1975] 1
All ER 318; [1961] 2 WLR 675, DC . . . 8.148 WLR 724, DC . . . 11.23
Newton and Stungo [1958] Crim LR 469; (1958) Oldcastle’s Case (1419) 1 Hale PC 50 . . . 16.62
The Times, 15 October, CCA . . . 8.202 O’Leary (1986) 82 Cr App Rep 341 . . . 11.20
Ngan [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 331, CA . . . 10.5, 10.6, Olugboja [1982] QB 320; [1981] 3 All ER 443; 73 Cr
17.9 App Rep 344, CA . . . 2.22
NHS Trust A v M [2001] Fam 348; [2001] 1 All ER Ondhia [1998] 2 Cr App Rep 150; [1998] Crim LR
801; [2001] 2 WLR 942 . . . 2.15 339, CA . . . 12.57
NHS Trust B v H [2001] Fam 348; [2001] 1 All ER Oommen [1994] 2 SCR 507, SC of Canada . . . 15.34
801; [2001] 2 WLR 942 . . . 2.15 Ormerod [2003] Crim LR 479 . . . 8.85
Nicholls (1874) 13 Cox CC 75 . . . 2.11 Ormerod [2010] Crim LR 638 . . . 7.137
Nichols (1745) 13 East 412n; 2 Stra 1227 . . . 14.48 Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 173, CA . . . 16.45,
Nicklin [1977] 2 All ER 444; 64 Cr App Rep 205, 16.54
CA . . . 11.36 Osborn (1919) 84 JP 63 . . . 14.123
Norfolk Constabulary v Seekings and Gould Osland v R (1998) 73 ALJR 173; [2000] 2 LRC 486,
[1986] Crim LR 167 . . . 11.11 HC of A . . . 17.4
Norman [2008] EWCA Crim 1810; [2009] 1 Cr Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245;
App Rep 192 . . . 15.19 [1999] 1 FLR 193; [1999] Fam Law 86, ECtHR . . .
Norris v Government of the United States of 16.27, 16.64
America [2008] UKHL 16; [2008] 1 AC 920; Ostler v Elliott [1980] Crim LR 584, DC . . . 7.71
[2008] 2 All ER 1103 . . . 1.35, 14.87 O’Sullivan v Truth and Sportsman Ltd (1957) 96
Notman [1994] Crim LR 518, CA . . . 2.32, 7.54 CLR 220, High Ct of Australia . . . 9.52
Nottingham City Justices v Wolverhampton O’Toole [1987] Crim LR 759, CA . . . 14.113
and Dudley Breweries plc [2003] EWHC 2847 Owino [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 128; [1995] Crim LR
(Admin); [2004] QB 1274; [2004] 2 WLR 820 743, CA . . . 5.7, 8.90, 16.12, 16.15
. . . 18.5
Oxford v Moss (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 183; [1979]
Noye [2011] EWCA Crim 650; 119 BMLR 151 . . . Crim LR 119 . . . 10.31
16.23
Nugent [1987] 3 NIJB 9, NICA . . . 16.26
P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd 93 Cr App
Rep 72; [1991] Crim LR 695 . . . 8.128, 18.30
O’Connell (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 39; [1991] Crim P [2004] EWCA Crim 1043 . . . 15.74
LR 771, CA . . . 10.77
P Ltd [2007] EWHC 1937 (Admin); (2007) The
O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64; 29 ALR 449; 54 Times, 13 August, DC . . . 18.45
ALJR 349, HC of A . . . 15.96
Page [1954] 1 QB 170; [1953] 2 All ER 1355; 37 Cr
O’Connor [1991] Crim LR 135, CA . . . 15.85 App Rep 189 . . . 8.12
O’Driscoll (1977) 65 Cr App Rep 50, CA . . . 8.90 Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App Rep 279; [1983] Crim LR
Odyssey (London) Ltd v OIC Run Off Ltd (2000) 394, CA . . . 2.33, 2.43, 2.47, 2.61
150 NLJ 430, CA (reported as Sphere Drake Palmer v R [1971] AC 814; [1971] 1 All ER 1077; 55
Insurance plc v Orion Insurance Co plc) . . . Cr App Rep 223, PC . . . 16.12, 16.26, 16.35
18.32, 18.41
Panton [2001] EWCA Crim 611; [2001] All ER (D)
Official Solicitor v News Group Newspapers 134 (Mar); (2001) 98 (19) LSG 36, CA . . . 16.54
[1994] 2 FCR 552; [1994] 2 FLR 174; [1994] Fam
Law 499 . . . 3.78 Park (1987) 87 Cr App Rep 164; [1988] Crim LR
238, CA . . . 11.43
O’Flaherty, Ryan and Toussaint [2004] EWCA
Crim 526; [2004] 2 Cr App Rep 315, CA . . . Parker [1993] Crim LR 856, CA . . . 13.21
17.43, 17.70, 17.71, 17.73 Parker v South Eastern Rly Co (1877) 2 CPD 416; 41
O’Grady [1987] QB 995; [1987] 3 All ER 420; 85 Cr JP 644; [1874–80] All ER Rep 166, CA . . . 10.39
App Rep 315, CA . . . 15.83, 15.84, 15.85, 15.86, Parkes [1973] Crim LR 358 . . . 11.31
15.87, 15.88 Parks (1990) 95 DLR (4th) 27, Ont CA . . . 15.30
O’Hadhmaill [1996] Crim LR 509, CA . . . 14.56 Parmenter see Savage; Parmenter [1992]
Table of Cases | xlix
Parnell (1881) 14 Cox CC 508 . . . 14.46 Pitham and Hehl (1976) 65 Cr App Rep 45; [1977]
Parry v DPP [2004] EWHC 3112 (Admin); [2005] Crim LR 285, CA . . . 10.13, 11.49
ACD 64, DC . . . 7.106 Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37 . . . 2.11
Parsons [2009] EWCA Crim 64 . . . 17.53 Pleydell [2005] EWCA Crim 1447; [2006] 1 Cr App
Patel [2004] EWCA Crim 3284; [2005] 1 Cr App Rep 212, CA . . . 8.158
Rep 440, CA . . . 7.136 Plummer [1902] 2 KB 339; 66 JP 647; [1900–3] All
Patel [2009] EWCA Crim 67; [2009] 2 Cr App Rep ER Rep 613, CCR . . . 14.48
(S) 475 . . . 14.77, 14.80 Podola [1960] 1 QB 325; [1959] 3 All ER 418; 43 Cr
Patnaik [2000] 3 Archbold News 2, CA . . . 14.123 App Rep 220, CCA . . . 15.9, 15.12
Paul [1952] NI 61, CCA . . . 8.148 Police Comrs v Cartman [1896] 1 QB 655, DC . . .
Paul v Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 18.13
[1973] RTR 245, DC . . . 3.78 Pollard v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire
Pawlicki [1992] 3 All ER 902; 95 Cr App Rep 246, [1999] PIQR P219, CA . . . 16.12
CA . . . 11.24 Polycarpou (1978) 9 HLR 129, CA . . . 2.9
Pearce [1973] Crim LR 321, CA . . . 10.118 Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App Rep 607, CA . . . 16.50,
Pearce (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 295; [1981] Crim LR 16.80, 16.81, 16.83, 16.94
639, CA . . . 14.78 Pooley (2007) unreported . . . 15.30
Pearman (1984) 80 Cr App Rep 259; [1985] RTR Pordage [1975] Crim LR 575, CA . . . 15.76, 15.93,
39, CA . . . 3.7, 14.113 15.95
Peart [1970] 2 QB 672; [1970] 2 All ER 823; 54 Cr Postermobile plc v Brent London Borough
App Rep 374, CA . . . 10.119 Council [1998] Crim LR 435 . . . 3.83
Pedro v Diss [1981] 2 All ER 59; 72 Cr App Rep Poulterers’ Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 55b . . . 14.46
193, DC . . . 7.66, 16.37 Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329; 172 ER 997 . . . 8.7
Pembliton (1874) LR 2 CCR 119; 38 JP 454; Poultry World Ltd v Conder [1957] Crim LR 803
[1874–80] All ER Rep 1163 . . . 3.39 . . . 17.32
Pengelley v Bell Punch Co Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 945, Powell and Daniels; English [1999] 1 AC 1; [1997]
CA . . . 12.54 4 All ER 545; [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 261, HL
Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593; [1993] 1 All ER 42; . . . 8.29, 17.32, 17.34, 17.43, 17.45, 17.46, 17.48,
[1992] 3 WLR 1032, HL . . . 15.3 17.49, 17.50, 17.52, 17.53, 17.54, 17.57
Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255 . . . 8.108 Powell v MacRae [1977] Crim LR 571; 141 JP Jo
Peterson [1970] 1 QB 352; [1969] 2 All ER 1077; 53 432, DC . . . 10.46
Cr App Rep 461, CA . . . 17.52 Practice Direction [2002] 3 All ER 904; [2007] 1
Petters and Parfft t [1995] Crim LR 501, CA . . . 17.76 WLR 1790 . . . 14.81, 15.4
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Practice Direction [2007] 1 WLR 1790 . . . 15.4
Storkwain Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 635; 83 Cr App Practice Direction [2008] 1 WLR 154 . . . 14.81
Rep 359, HL . . . 6.32, 6.34, 6.38 Preddy [1996] AC 815; [1996] 3 All ER 481; [1996]
Phekoo [1981] 3 All ER 84; 73 Cr App Rep 107, CA 2 Cr App Rep 524, HL . . . 10.54, 10.91
. . . 5.7, 6.18 Prestatyn Magistrates’ Court, ex p DPP [2002]
Phelon and Moore Ltd v Keel [1914] 3 KB 165, DC Crim LR 924; [2002] All ER (D) 421 (May), DC
. . . 18.13 . . . 13.2
Philippou (1989) 89 Cr App Rep 290; [1989] Crim Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRLR 1,
LR 559, CA . . . 10.9 ECtHR . . . 8.189
Phillips [2004] EWCA Crim 112; [2004] All ER Price (1989) 90 Cr App Rep 409; [1990] Crim LR
(D) 45 (Feb) . . . 3.12 200, CA . . . 10.77
Phipps and McGill [1970] RTR 209; 54 Cr App Price v Cromack [1975] 2 All ER 113; [1975] 1
Rep 300, CA . . . 10.117, 10.119 WLR 988, DC . . . 6.30, 9.52
Phipps v Hoff man [1976] Crim LR 315, DC . . . 18.5 Prince (1875) LR 2 CCR 154; 39 JP 676; [1874–80]
Pickford [1995] QB 203; [1994] 3 WLR 1022; [1995] All ER Rep 881, CCR . . . 6.2, 6.36
1 Cr App Rep 420, CA . . . 17.16 Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 303 . . . 15.9
Pike [1961] Crim LR 547, CCA . . . 8.119 Proprietary Articles Trade Association v A-G for
Pilgram v Rice-Smith [1977] 2 All ER 658; 65 Cr Canada [1931] AC 310; [1931] All ER Rep 277,
App Rep 142, DC . . . 10.11, 10.25 PC . . . 1.7
Pitchley (1972) 57 Cr App Rep 30; [1972] Crim LR Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536, HC of
705, CA . . . 11.40, 11.42 Australia . . . 6.48
l | Table of Cases
Pullen [1991] Crim LR 457, CA . . . 15.66 R (on the application of Lewin) v Crown
Pupino (C-105/03) [2006] QB 83, ECJ . . . 1.48 Prosecution Service; [2002] EWHC 1049
Purcell (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 45; [1986] Crim LR (Admin); [2002] All ER (D) 379 (May), DC . . .
466, CA . . . 7.92 8.114
Purdy (1946) 10 JCL 182 . . . 16.62 R (on the application of P (a juvenile)) v Barking
Youth Court [2002] EWHC 734 (Admin);
Purdy [1975] QB 288; [1974] 3 All ER 465; 60 Cr [2002] 2 Cr App Rep 294, DC . . . 15.20
App Rep 30, CA . . . 7.66
R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2001]
Pursell v Horn (1838) 8 Ad & El 602 . . . 7.43 UKHL 61; [2002] 1 AC 800; [2002] 1 All ER 1;
Pyrah [2002] UKHL 47; [2003] 1 AC 903; [2002] 4 [2002] 1 FCR 1 . . . 8.189
All ER 1122; [2003] 1 Cr App Rep 560 . . . 8.21 R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009]
UKHL 45; [2009] 4 All ER 1147; [2010] 1 Cr App
Qadir [1997] 9 Archbold News 1, CA . . . 14.128, R 1 . . . 8.189
14.141 R (on the application of Ricketts) v Basildon
Quality Dairies (York) Ltd v Pedley [1952] 1 KB Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 2358
275; [1952] 1 All ER 380, DC . . . 18.5 (Admin); [2011] 1 Cr App Rep 202 . . . 10.40
Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004) R (on the application of Rutherford) v
[2005] EWCA Crim 1415; [2005] 2 Cr App Rep Independent Police Complaints Commission
527, CA . . . 16.43, 16.49, 16.54, 16.71, 16.75, [2010] EWHC 2881 (Admin); [2010] All ER (D)
16.78, 16.82, 16.87, 16.94 150 (Nov) . . . 7.66
Quick [1973] QB 910; [1973] 3 All ER 347; 57 Cr R (on the application of Singh) v Stratford
App Rep 722, CA . . . 15.27, 15.28, 15.29, 15.55, Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC 1582
15.60, 15.65, 15.100 (Admin); [2007] 4 All ER 407, DC . . . 15.46
Qureshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1584 . . . 3.57, 18.6, 18.7 R (on the application of Smeaton) v Secretary of
State for Health [2002] EWHC 886 (Admin);
[2002] 2 FLR 146 . . . 8.192
R [1992] 1 AC 599; [1991] 4 All ER 481; 94 Cr App
Rep 216, HL . . . 1.35, 17.21 R (on the application of T) v DPP [2003] EWHC 266
(Admin); [2003] Crim LR 622 . . . 7.57, 7.69, 7.78
R [2008] EWCA Crim 619; [2008] 172 JP 441 . . .
9.71, 14.106 R (on the application of Traves) v DPP [2005]
EWHC 1482 (Admin); (2005) 169 JP 421 . . .
R (a child) v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 17; 165 JP
8.147
349; [2001] All ER (D) 120 (Jan) . . . 7.146, 7.147
R (on the application of Uttley) v Secretary of State
R (on the application of A) v Snaresbrook [2001]
for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ
EWHC 456 (Admin); (2001) 165 JPN 495;
1130; [2003] 4 All ER 891; [2004] 1 Cr App Rep
[2001] All ER (D) 123 (Jun), DC . . . 10.6, 10.9
(S) 362 . . . 1.56
R (on the application of Bennett) v HM Coroner
R (on the application of Wilkinson) v DPP [2006]
for Inner South London [2006] EWHC 196
EWHC 3012 (Admin); (2007) 157 NLJ 103, DC
(Admin); (2006) 170 JP 109 . . . 16.32
. . . 11.57
R (on the application of Burke) v General Medical
R (on the application of Young) v Central
Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003; [2006] QB 273;
Criminal Court [2002] EWHC 548 (Admin);
[2005] 3 FCR 169 . . . 2.12, 2.15
[2002] 2 Cr App Rep 178; [2002] All ER (D) 268
R (on the application of Dacre and Associated (Mar) . . . 2.5, 15.14
Newspapers) v City of Westminster
R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of
Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 1667
State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL
(Admin); [2009] 1 All ER 639; [2009] 1 Cr App
46; [2003] 1 AC 837; [2002] 4 All ER 1089;
R 6, DC . . . 17.67
[2003] 1 Cr App Rep 523 . . . 1.56
R (on the application of DPP) v Prestatyn
R v DPP [2007] see B v DPP; R v DPP [2007]
Magistrates’ Court [2002] EWHC 1177; [2002]
Crim LR 924; [2002] All ER (D) 421 (May), DC Rabey (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 414; 17 OR (2d) 1; 37
. . . 13.2 CCC (2d) 461 (Ont CA), Ont CA . . . 15.31
R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of Race Relations Board v Applin [1973] QB 815; [1973]
JFS [2009] UKSC 15; [2010] ELR 26; [2010] 1 All 2 All ER 1190; [1973] 2 WLR 895, CA . . . 9.56
ER 319 . . . 7.98 Rahman [2007] EWCA Crim 342; [2007] 3 All ER
R (on the application of Jones) v Bedford and Mid 396, CA . . . 17.49
Bedfordshire Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC Rahman [2008] UKHL 45; [2009] AC 129 . . . 8.28,
523 (Admin); [2010] 3 All ER 1057 . . . 7.103, 17.43, 17.44, 17.46, 17.48, 17.49, 17.50, 17.51,
7.108, 7.137 17.57
Table of Cases | li
Ram and Ram (1893) 17 Cox CC 609 . . . 17.20 Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App Rep 95; [1972] Crim LR
Ramchurn [2010] EWCA Crim 194; [2010] 2 Cr 27, CA . . . 2.52, 7.61
App Rep 18 . . . 8.51 Roberts (1983) 78 Cr App Rep 41; 148 JP 14, CA
Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB . . . 14.48
587; [1991] 1 All ER 801; [1991] Fam Law 24 . . . Roberts (1987) 84 Cr App Rep 117; [1986] Crim LR
8.5, 8.7, 8.201 122, CA . . . 10.77
Raphael [2008] EWCA Crim 1014; [2008] All ER Roberts [1993] 1 All ER 583, CA . . . 17.45
(D) 159 (May) . . . 10.87, 10.97 Roberts [1993] 9 Archbold News 2, CA . . . 11.39
Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim 3377; [2005] All ER Roberts [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 441; [1998] Crim LR
(D) 192 (Dec) . . . 16.33 334, CA . . . 13.20, 13.26
Reader (1977) 66 Cr App Rep 33, CA . . . 11.52 Roberts, Day and Day [2001] EWCA Crim 1594;
Reading Borough Council v Ahmad [1999] LGR [2001] Crim LR 984, CA . . . 17.52, 17.54
595; 163 JP 451 . . . 3.78 Roberts and George [1997] RTR 462; [1997] 1 Cr
Reardon [1998] 5 Archbold News 2, CA . . . 17.39 App Rep 217, CA . . . 6.5, 17.16, 17.32
Redhead Freight Ltd v Shulman [1989] RTR 1, DC Roberts v Egerton (1874) LR 9 QB 494; 38 JP 485;
. . . 18.29 43 LJMC 135; 22 WR 797; 30 LT 633 . . . 6.36
Reed [1982] Crim LR 819, CA . . . 14.56, 14.57 Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 All ER 7; [1980] 1
Reed v Wastie [1972] Crim LR 221 . . . 16.26 WLR 823; [1980] RTR 261; 124 Sol Jo 313 . . . 16.2
Reeves (1839) 9 C & P 25 . . . 8.7 Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557; 52 Cr App Rep 690,
Reid [1992] 3 All ER 673; 95 Cr App Rep 391, HL . . . 2.1 CA . . . 15.9, 15.12, 15.40
Reilly [1982] QB 1208; 75 Cr App Rep 266, CA . . . Robinson [1977] Crim LR 173, CA . . . 10.70, 10.98
14.46 Robinson (2000) unreported, CA . . . 17.70
Renouf [1986] 2 All ER 449; [1986] RTR 191; 82 Cr Robinson [2005] 5 Archbold News 2 . . . 17.73
App Rep 344, CA . . . 16.10 Robinson v R [2011] UKPC 3; [2011] 4 LRC 231;
Reynolds v G H Austin & Sons Ltd [1951] 2 KB [2011] All ER (D) 04 (Mar) . . . 17.61
135; [1951] 1 All ER 606, DC . . . 6.40, 18.18 Robson (John Paul) [2009] EWCA Crim 1472 . . . 9.71
RG v DPP; LT v DPP [2004] EWHC 183 (Admin); Rodger and Rose [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 143, CA . . .
(2004) 168 JP 313 . . . 7.110 16.71
Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414; [1966] 2 All ER Roe v Kingerlee [1986] Crim LR 735, DC . . . 13.5
649; [1966] 3 WLR 17, DC . . . 7.66, 7.70, 7.72 Rogers (Philip) [2007] UKHL 8; [2007] 2 AC 62;
Richards [1974] QB 776; [1973] 3 All ER 1088, CA [2007] 2 All ER 433, HL . . . 7.98, 7.100, 7.103, 7.104
. . . 17.59 Rogers (Stephen) [2003] EWCA Crim 945; [2003]
Richardson [1999] QB 444; [1998] 3 WLR 1292, 2 Cr App Rep 160 . . . 2.44, 7.115
CA . . . 7.27, 7.28, 7.30 Rolle v R [1965] 3 All ER 582; [1965] 1 WLR 1341,
Richardson and Irwin [1999] 1 Cr App Rep 392, PC . . . 4.11
CA . . . 7.14, 15.80, 15.88 Romer and Haslam, Re [1893] 2 QB 286; 62 LJQB
Richens [1993] 4 All ER 877; 98 Cr App Rep 43, 610, CA . . . 10.134
CA . . . 8.69 Rook [1993] 2 All ER 955; 97 Cr App Rep 327, CA
Richman [1982] Crim LR 507 . . . 16.65, 16.67 . . . 17.45, 17.57, 17.70, 17.71
Richmond upon Thames London Borough Roper v Knott [1898] 1 QB 868; 62 JP 375; 67 LJQB
Council v Pinn & Wheeler Ltd (1989) 87 LGR 574, DC . . . 13.5
659; [1989] RTR 354, DC . . . 18.6 Roper v Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd see
Rimmington; Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63; [2006] Taylor’s Central Garages
1 AC 459; [2005] 3 WLR 982, HL . . . 1.33, 1.68, Rose (1884) 15 Cox CC 540 . . . 5.18
3.53, 3.63, 6.9 Rose (1961) 46 Cr App Rep 103, CCA . . . 17.87
Rivett (1950) 34 Cr App Rep 87, CCA . . . 15.24, Ross Hillman Ltd v Bond [1974] QB 435; [1974] 2
15.32, 15.37 All ER 287; 59 Cr App Rep 42, DC . . . 6.30
Rizvi and Christi [2003] EWCA Crim 3575; [2003] Ross v Moss [1965] 2 QB 396; [1965] 3 All ER 145;
All ER (D) 428 (Nov), CA . . . 14.63 [1965] 3 WLR 416, DC . . . 3.45
Roach [2001] EWCA Crim 2698; [2002] 3 Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752; 95 Cr App Rep 326,
Archbold News 1, CA . . . 15.21, 15.28, 15.65 CA . . . 4.10
Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd [1970] 2 QB 54; Rostron and Collinson [2003] EWCA Crim 2206;
[1970] 1 All ER 577; 54 Cr App Rep 158, CA . . . [2003] All ER (D) 269 (Jul) . . . 10.44
17.9, 18.43
lii | Table of Cases
Rowley [1991] 4 All ER 649; 94 Cr App Rep 95, CA Saunders [1985] Crim LR 230, CA . . . 7.77
. . . 14.98 Saunders [1988] AC 148; [1987] 2 All ER 973; 85 Cr
Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom App Rep 334, HL . . . 8.36
v Department of Health and Social Security Saunders and Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473; Fost 371
[1981] AC 800; [1981] 1 All ER 545; [1981] 2 . . . 17.39
WLR 279, HL . . . 8.197 Savage; Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699; [1991] 4 All
Ruse v Read [1949] 1 KB 377; [1949] 1 All ER 398; ER 698; 94 Cr App Rep 193, HL . . . 3.37, 7.36,
33 Cr App Rep 67, DC . . . 15.93 7.43, 7.61, 7.84, 7.86, 7.87
Rushworth (1992) 95 Cr App Rep 252, CA . . . 7.86 Saycell v Bool [1948] 2 All ER 83, DC . . . 8.147
Russell and Russell (1987) 85 Cr App Rep 388; Sayer v Wagstaff (1844) 5 Beav 415; 13 LJ Ch 161
[1987] Crim LR 494, CA . . . 17.13, 17.76 . . . 10.134
Ryan (1993) unreported, CA . . . 16.37 Scarlett [1993] 4 All ER 629; 98 Cr App Rep 290,
Ryan (1996) 160 JP 610; [1996] Crim LR 320, CA CA . . . 8.90, 16.15
. . . 11.4, 11.15 Schama and Abramovitch (1914) 11 Cr App Rep
Ryan (1999) unreported, CA . . . 14.70 45; [1914–15] All ER Rep 204, CCA . . . 11.54
Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR 205; [1967] ALR 577; 40 Scott (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 164; [1979] Crim LR
ALJR 488, HC of A . . . 15.53 456, CA . . . 14.46
Scott v Metropolitan Police Comr [1975] AC 819;
S [2011] EWCA Crim 2872 . . . 14.19, 14.21, 14.23, [1974] 3 All ER 1032; 60 Cr App Rep 124, HL . . .
14.41 14.84, 14.85, 14.86, 14.87
S Ltd and L Ltd [2009] EWCA Crim 85; [2009] 2 Scudder v Barrett [1980] QB 195; [1979] 3 WLR
Cr App R 11 . . . 16.78, 16.79 591; 69 Cr App Rep 277, DC . . . 14.119
Safi [2004] 1 Cr App Rep 157; [2003] EWCA Crim Searby [2003] EWCA Crim 1910; [2003] CMLR 15,
1809; [2003] Crim LR 721; [2003] 31 LS Gaz R 31; CA . . . 1.47
[2003] All ER (D) 81 (Jun) . . . 16.45, 16.76, 16.87 Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
Saik [2006] UKHL 18; [2007] 1 AC 18, HL . . . 3.48, p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115; [1999] 3 All ER 400;
3.57, 14.46, 14.56, 14.62, 14.63, 14.65, 14.66, [1999] 3 WLR 328, HL . . . 6.23
14.67, 14.68, 14.70, 14.82 Secretary of State for the Home Department v
St George (1840) 9 C & P 483 . . . 7.38 Robb [1995] Fam 127; [1995] 1 All ER 677;
St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam [1995] 2 WLR 722 . . . 2.12, 16.97
26; [1998] 3 All ER 673; [1998] 3 WLR 936, CA Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Hart
. . . 2.12, 7.1, 16.97 [1982] 1 All ER 817; [1982] 1 WLR 481, DC . . . 3.85
St Regis Paper Co Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 2527; Sekfali v DPP [2006] EWHC 894 (Admin); (2006)
[2012] 1 Cr App Rep 177 . . . 18.8, 18.11, 18.29, 18.34 170 JP 393, DC . . . 7.70, 7.72
Sainthouse [1980] Crim LR 506, CA . . . 11.35 Senior [1899] 1 QB 283; 63 JP 8, CCR . . . 8.85
Sakavickas [2004] EWCA Crim 2686; [2005] 2 Serné (1887) 16 Cox CC 311 . . . 3.9
WLR 316, CA . . . 14.63 Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493; [1983] 2 All ER 1058; 77
Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379, ECtHR Cr App Rep 215, HL . . . 8.83, 8.119
. . . 4.8, 6.8, 9.25 SH [2010] EWCA Crim 1931 . . . 7.103, 7.105
Salisbury (1976) 76 Cr App Rep 261n; [1976] VR Shadrokh-Cigari [1988] Crim LR 465, CA . . .
452 . . . 7.45, 7.81, 7.83 10.46, 10.61, 10.66
Salmon [2005] 3 Archbold News 2, CA . . . 8.55 Shanks and McEwan (Teeside) Ltd v Environment
Sanders (1982) 75 Cr App Rep 84; [1982] Crim LR Agency [1999] QB 333; [1997] 2 All ER 332 . . .
695, CA . . . 11.42 18.31
Sanders (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 245; [1991] Crim LR Shannon [1975] see DPP v Shannon [1975]
781, CA . . . 8.55 Shannon (1980) 71 Cr App Rep 192; [1980] Crim
Sandhu [1997] Crim LR 288, CA . . . 6.4 LR 438, CA . . . 16.26
Sang [1980] AC 402; [1979] 2 All ER 1222; 69 Cr Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51; [2001] 1 Cr App Rep
App Rep 282, HL . . . 17.63, 17.64 12, CA . . . 17.67, 17.68, 17.79
Sansom [1991] 2 QB 130; [1991] 2 All ER 145; 92 Cr Shannon v UK [2005] Crim LR 133, ECtHR . . .
App Rep 115, CA . . . 14.76 17.68, 17.69
Sard v Rhodes (1836) 4 Dowl 743; 1 M & W 153 . . . Sharp [1987] QB 853; [1987] 3 All ER 103; 85 Cr
10.134 App Rep 207, CA . . . 16.51, 16.52
Table of Cases | liii
Sharpe (1857) 21 JP 86; Dears & B 160; 26 LJMC Singh v Rathour (Northern Star Insurance Co Ltd,
47, CCR . . . 3.75, 10.30 third party) [1988] 2 All ER 16; [1988] 1 WLR
Shaw [1961] 1 All ER 330; [1960] CLY 750, CCA 422; [1988] RTR 324, CA . . . 10.117
. . . 14.100 Sinnasamy Selvanayagam v R [1951] AC 83, PC
Shaw [1962] AC 220; [1961] 2 All ER 446; 45 Cr . . . 3.29
App Rep 113, HL . . . 14.96, 14.100 Siracusa (1989) 90 Cr App Rep 340; [1989] Crim
Shaw v R [2001] UKPC 26; [2001] 1 WLR 1519; LR 712, CA . . . 14.69, 14.71
[2002] 1 Cr App Rep 77 . . . 16.20 Sissen [2001] 1 WLR 902; [2000] All ER (D) 2193,
Shayler [2001] EWCA Crim 1977; [2001] 1 WLR CA . . . 1.47
2206 . . . 16.44, 16.49, 16.71, 16.81, 16.95 Skelton [1995] Crim LR 635, CA . . . 8.159
Shayler [2002] UKHL 11; [2003] 1 AC 247; [2002] 2 Skivington [1968] 1 QB 166; [1967] 1 All ER 483;
All ER 477 . . . 16.49, 16.71, 16.81, 16.95 51 Cr App Rep 167, CA . . . 10.98
Sheehan [1975] 2 All ER 960; 60 Cr App Rep 308, Slater and Suddens [1996] Crim LR 494, CA . . . 11.39
CA . . . 15.76, 15.90, 15.93 Sleep (1861) 25 JP 532; Le & Ca 44; [1861–73] All
Sheldrake v DPP; A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) ER Rep 248, CCR . . . 3.45
[2004] UKHL 43; [2005] 1 AC 264; [2005] 1 All Slingsby [1995] Crim LR 570, CC . . . 7.7
ER 237, HL . . . 1.54, 4.8 Smith (1855) 19 JP 758; Dears CC 559, CCR . . . 11.37
Shelton (1986) 83 Cr App Rep 379; 150 JP 380, CA Smith (1858) 22 JP 274; Dears & B 566, CCR . . . 12.51
. . . 11.35
Smith (1900) 17 SCR 561; 17 CGH 561 . . . 16.100
Shephard [1919] 2 KB 125; 14 Cr App Rep 26;
[1918–19] All ER Rep 374, CCA . . . 8.177 Smith [1959] 2 QB 35; [1959] 2 All ER 193; 43 Cr
App Rep 121, C-MAC . . . 2.32, 2.33, 2.55, 2.57
Shepherd (1988) 86 Cr App Rep 47; [1987] Crim
LR 686, CA . . . 16.51 Smith [1960] 2 QB 423; [1960] 1 All ER 256; 44 Cr
App Rep 55, CCA . . . 3.76
Sheppard [1981] AC 394; [1980] 3 All ER 899; 72
Cr App Rep 82, HL . . . 6.18, 6.29 Smith [1963] 3 All ER 597; [1963] 1 WLR 1200,
CCA . . . 17.45
Sheriff [1969] Crim LR 260, CA . . . 7.43
Smith [1974] 1 All ER 376; 58 Cr App Rep 106, CA
Sheriff and others [2008] EWCA Crim 2653; . . . 8.194
[2009] 2 Cr App Rep (S) 235 . . . 3.46
Smith (1976) 64 Cr App Rep 217, CA . . . 11.52
Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918; 59 JP 440;
[1895–9] All ER Rep 1167 . . . 3.1, 6.33, 6.36 Smith [1985] Crim LR 42, CA . . . 7.50
Sherry and El-Yamani [1993] Crim LR 536, CA . . . Smith [2008] EWCA Crim 1342; [2009] 1 Cr App
14.75 R 36 . . . 17.44
Sherwood; Button [1995] RTR 60; [1995] Crim LR Smith (David) [1974] QB 354; [1974] 1 All ER 632;
176, CA . . . 10.128 58 Cr App Rep 320, CA . . . 3.37, 3.85, 5.6, 13.8
Shiartos (1961) unreported . . . 16.54 Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 4) [2004] EWCA
Crim 631; [2004] QB 1418; [2004] 2 Cr App Rep
Shivpuri [1987] AC 1; [1986] 2 All ER 334; 83 Cr 269, CA . . . 1.22
App Rep 178, HL . . . 2.1, 3.50, 14.134
Smith, Plummer and Haines [2011] EWCA Crim
Shorrock [1994] QB 279; [1993] 3 All ER 917; 98 Cr 66; [2011] 1 Cr App Rep 379 . . . 10.44
App Rep 67, CA . . . 3.53, 6.9
Smith, Re (1858) 22 JP 450; 3 H & N 227; 27 LJMC
Shortland [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 116; 160 JP 5, CA 186 . . . 17.10
. . . 16.66, 16.67
Smith and Smith [1986] Crim LR 166, CA . . .
Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347, 14.119
ECtHR . . . 1.65, 1.67
Smith v Chief Superintendent, Woking Police
Simpson [1983] 3 All ER 789; 78 Cr App Rep 115, Station (1983) 76 Cr App Rep 234; [1983] Crim
CA . . . 11.23 LR 323, DC . . . 7.39
Sinclair [1998] 148 NLJ 1353, CA . . . 8.112 Smith v Dear (1903) 67 JP 244; 88 LT 664, DC . . . 1.5
Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Smith v Mellors and Soar [1987] RTR 210; (1987)
Finance Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 347; [2011] 4 All 84 Cr App Rep 279, DC . . . 17.76
ER 335 . . . 10.46
Smurthwaite [1994] 1 All ER 898; 98 Cr App Rep
Singh [1973] 1 All ER 122; 57 Cr App Rep 180, CA 437, CA . . . 17.68
. . . 16.43
Smythe (1980) 72 Cr App Rep 8, CA . . . 11.37
Singh [1999] Crim LR 582, CA . . . 8.111, 8.112,
8.114 Soanes [1948] 1 All ER 289; 32 Cr App Rep 136,
CCA . . . 8.126
liv | Table of Cases
Sockett (1908) 1 Cr App Rep 101; 72 JP 428, CCA Stokes [1983] RTR 59; [1982] Crim LR 695, CA . . .
. . . 8.190, 17.62 10.118
Sodeman v R [1936] 2 All ER 1138, PC . . . 4.5, Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354; [1977] 2 All
15.23, 15.48 ER 341; 64 Cr App Rep 186, CA . . . 2.11, 2.14,
Solanke [1969] 3 All ER 1383; 54 Cr App Rep 30, 8.82, 8.119
CA . . . 8.180 Stones [1989] 1 WLR 156; 89 Cr App Rep 26, CA
Somerset v Hart (1884) 12 QBD 360; 48 JP 327, DC . . . 11.23
. . . 3.45, 18.45 Stratton (1779) 1 Doug KB 239; 21 State Tr 1045 . . .
Somerset v Wade [1894] 1 QB 574; 58 JP 231; 16.50, 16.62
[1891–4] All ER Rep 1228, DC . . . 6.28 Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485, CA . . . 7.79, 15.74,
Sooklal v State of Trinidad and Tobago [1999] 15.76
UKPC 37; [1999] 1 WLR 2011, PC . . . 15.73, 15.74 Stringer (1991) 94 Cr App Rep 13; [1991] Crim LR
Sopp v Long [1970] 1 QB 518; [1969] 1 All ER 855; 639, CA . . . 17.6
[1969] 2 WLR 587 . . . 6.30 Stringer and Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396;
Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [2011] 3 All ER 1119 . . . 17.10, 17.17, 17.18, 17.57
[1971] Ch 734; [1971] 2 All ER 175; [1971] 2 Stripp (1978) 69 Cr App Rep 318, CA . . . 4.4, 15.66,
WLR 467, CA . . . 16.39, 16.89, 16.93 15.68
Sparks v Worthington [1986] RTR 64, DC . . . 15.59 Studer (1915) 11 Cr App Rep 307; [1914–15] All ER
Spectrum Plus Ltd, Re [2005] UKHL 41; [2005] 2 Rep 607, CCA . . . 11.27
AC 680; [2005] 4 All ER 209 . . . 1.35 Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46, CA . . . 7.87, 15.93, 15.95
Spence [1999] RTR 353; 163 JP 754; [1999] Crim Sullivan [1984] AC 156; [1983] 2 All ER 673; 77 Cr
LR 975, CA . . . 8.150 App Rep 176, HL . . . 15.27, 15.28, 15.33, 15.45,
Sphere Drake Insurance plc v Orion Insurance Co 15.50
plc (2000) 150 NLJ 430, CA . . . 18.32 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (Application
Spicer (1955) 39 Cr App Rep 189 . . . 8.191 6538/74) (1979) 2 EHRR 245, ECtHR . . . 1.65
Squire [1990] Crim LR 341, CA . . . 14.89 Sunman [1995] Crim LR 569, CA . . . 12.66
Stalham [1993] Crim LR 310, CA . . . 10.65 Surrey County Council v Battersby [1965] 2 QB
Stanley [1965] 2 QB 327, CCA . . . 14.98 194; [1965] 1 All ER 273; [1965] 2 WLR 378, DC
. . . 3.83
Stapleton v R (1952) 86 CLR 358, HC of A . . . 15.34
Surrey County Council v Burton Retail Ltd (1997)
Steane [1947] KB 997; [1947] 1 All ER 813; 32 Cr 96 LGR 262; 162 JP 545 . . . 18.5
App Rep 61, CCA . . . 3.8, 3.29, 16.43, 16.62
SW v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363;
Stear v Scott [1992] RTR 226n . . . 13.5 [1996] 1 FLR 434, ECtHR . . . 1.35
Steel [1981] 2 All ER 422; 73 Cr App Rep 173, CA Swales v Cox [1981] QB 849; [1981] 1 All ER 1115;
. . . 2.42, 2.61 72 Cr App Rep 171, DC . . . 7.43
Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603; Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; [1969] 1 All ER 347;
[1998] Crim LR 893, ECtHR . . . 1.65, 1.69, 10.75 53 Cr App Rep 221, HL . . . 2.2, 3.1, 3.42, 5.13,
Steer [1986] 3 All ER 611; [1986] 1 WLR 1286; 84 6.5, 6.13, 6.14, 6.15, 6.18, 6.19, 6.22, 6.25, 6.33,
Cr App Rep 25, CA . . . 2.17 6.38, 6.48
Steer [1988] AC 111; [1987] 2 All ER 833; 85 Cr Sweetland (1957) 42 Cr App Rep 62, CCA . . . 14.46
App Rep 352, HL . . . 13.22 Swindall and Osborne (1846) 2 Car & Kir 230; 2
Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702; 30 JP 822 . . . 6.9 Cox CC 141; 175 ER 95 . . . 2.34, 17.35, 17.76
Stephens [2007] EWCA Crim 1249; [2007] 2 Cr Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528; [1961] 3 All ER 33; 45
App Rep 330, CA . . . 8.171 Cr App Rep 230, HL . . . 2.8, 17.90
Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C & P 349 . . . 7.38 Sylveire [1990] 2 QB 619; [1991] 1 All ER 439; 91 Cr
Stephenson [1979] QB 695; [1979] 2 All ER 1198; App Rep 341, CA . . . 6.9, 14.98
69 Cr App Rep 213, CA . . . 3.33 Symonds; Backshall [1999] 1 Cr App Rep 35;
Stewart [2009] EWCA Crim 593; [2010] 1 All ER [1999] Crim LR 662, CA . . . 16.81, 16.87
260 . . . 8.54, 8.55 Symonds [1998] Crim LR 280, CA . . . 16.38, 16.81,
Stewart [2010] EWCA Crim 2159 . . . 8.54 16.85
Stewart and Schofield [1995] 3 All ER 159; [1995] 1
Cr App Rep 441, CA . . . 17.52, 17.57 T [1990] Crim LR 256 . . . 15.28, 15.31
Stockdale v Coulson [1974] 3 All ER 154, DC . . . T (adult: refusal of treatment), Re [1993] Fam 95;
15.58 [1992] 4 All ER 649, CA . . . 2.12
Table of Cases | lv
T v DPP [2003] see R (on the application of T) v Tilley [2009] EWCA Crim 1426; [2009] 2 Cr App
DPP [2003] Rep 31 . . . 2.14
T v T [1988] Fam 52; [1988] 1 All ER 613; [1988] 1 Tobierre [1986] 1 All ER 346; 82 Cr App Rep 212,
FLR 400 . . . 7.33, 7.53 CA . . . 12.63
Taaffe [1984] AC 539; [1984] 1 All ER 747; 78 Cr Tolley v Giddings [1964] 2 QB 354; [1964] 1 All ER
App Rep 301, HL . . . 3.88 201; 48 Cr App Rep 105, DC . . . 10.123
Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App Rep 328; [2000] Crim Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168; [1886–90] All ER Rep
LR 686; [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 404, CA . . . 26, CCR . . . 2.2, 3.58, 5.4, 5.12, 5.13
7.27, 7.29, 7.30, 7.52 Tomsett [1985] Crim LR 369, CA . . . 10.5
Tait [1990] 1 QB 290; [1989] 3 All ER 682; 90 Cr Toor (1986) 85 Cr App Rep 116; [1987] Crim LR
App Rep 44, CA . . . 8.8, 8.180 122, CA . . . 11.52
Tamlin v Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 1, CA . . . 8.131 Toothill [1998] Crim LR 876, CA . . . 14.119, 14.128
Tan [1983] QB 1053; [1983] 2 All ER 12; 76 Cr App Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427; [1900–3] All
Rep 300, CA . . . 1.35 ER Rep 991 . . . 10.28
Taylor (1834) 2 Lew CC 215 . . . 8.34 Tosti [1997] Crim LR 746, CA . . . 14.127, 14.129
Taylor (1869) LR 1 CCR 194; 33 JP 358 . . . 7.81, 7.84 Trainer (1864) 4 F & F 105 . . . 16.101
Taylor [1979] Crim LR 649, CA . . . 11.19 Treacy v DPP [1971] AC 537; [1971] 1 All ER 110;
Taylor [1996] 10 Archbold News 2, CA . . . 10.102, 55 Cr App Rep 113, HL . . . 1.21, 2.17, 11.27
10.106 Tringham (1988) 88 Cr App Rep 385, CA . . . 10.9
Taylor [2004] EWCA Crim 213; [2004] All ER (D) TRM Copy Centres (UK) Ltd v Lanwall Services
296 (Jan), CA . . . 8.154 Ltd [2009] UKHL 35; [2009] 4 All ER 33; [2009]
Taylor, Harrison and Taylor [1998] Crim LR 582, 1 WLR 1375 . . . 10.41
CA . . . 17.8 Troughton v Metropolitan Police [1987] Crim LR
Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd v Roper 138, DC . . . 10.136
[1951] WN 383; 115 JP 445; [1951] 2 TLR 284, True (1922) 16 Cr App Rep 164, CCA . . . 15.48
DC . . . 3.43, 3.45, 3.55 Tuberville v Savage (Turbervell v Savadge) (1669)
Teixeira de Castro v Portugal (1998) 28 EHRR 101; 2 Keb 545; 1 Mod Rep 3; 86 ER 684 . . . 7.38
[1998] Crim LR 751; [1998] HRCD 8, ECtHR Tuck v Robson [1970] 1 All ER 1171; [1970] 1 WLR
. . . 17.66 741 . . . 17.13
Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council Tunkel (1983) 133 NLJ 844 . . . 11.51
[1993] 2 All ER 718; [1993] 1 WLR 103; [1993]
Crim LR 624, DC . . . 18.17, 18.27 Tuppen v Microsoft Corpn Ltd (2000) The Times,
15 November . . . 7.141
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153;
[1971] 2 All ER 127; [1971] 2 WLR 1166, HL . . . Turner (No 2) [1971] 2 All ER 441; 55 Cr App Rep
18.18, 18.27, 18.28, 18.29, 18.36 336, CA . . . 10.44, 10.49
Testouri [2003] EWCA Crim 3735; [2004] 2 Cr Turner v Shearer [1973] 1 All ER 397; [1972] 1
App Rep 76, CA . . . 14.48 WLR 1387, DC . . . 3.54
Thabo Meli v R [1954] 1 All ER 373; [1954] 1 WLR Tyler and Price (1838) 8 C & P 616 . . . 16.55, 17.6
228, PC . . . 3.70, 3.71, 3.74 Tyler v Whatmore [1976] RTR 83; [1976] Crim LR
Thain [1985] NI 457; [1985] 11 NIJB 31, NICA . . . 2.24 315, DC . . . 8.147, 17.3
Thambiah v R [1966] AC 37; [1965] 3 All ER 661; Tynan v Balmer [1967] 1 QB 91; [1966] 2 All ER
[1966] 2 WLR 81, PC . . . 17.10, 17.11 133; [1966] 2 WLR 1181, DC . . . 7.70
Thomas (1985) 81 Cr App Rep 331; [1985] Crim LR Tyrrell [1894] 1 QB 710; [1891–4] All ER Rep 1215,
677, CA . . . 7.43 CCR . . . 14.29, 14.74, 17.62
Thomas (1996) 29 BMLR 120, CA . . . 15.25
Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] Uddin [1999] QB 431; [1998] 2 All ER 744; [1999]
EWCA Civ 1233; [2001] All ER (D) 246 (Jul) . . . 1 Cr App Rep 319; [1999] Crim LR 987, CA . . .
7.137, 7.141, 7.142 17.43, 17.45, 17.46, 17.52
Thomas v R (1937) 59 CLR 279; 44 ALR 37; [1938] Utting [1987] 1 WLR 1375; 86 Cr App Rep 164;
VLR 32; 11 ALJ 343, HC of A . . . 6.43 [1987] Crim LR 636, CA . . . 12.57, 12.58
Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797;
[1937] 3 All ER 157; 26 Cr App Rep 51, HL . . . 11.28 V and T v United Kingdom (Application
Thornton v Mitchell [1940] 1 All ER 339; 104 JP 24888/94) 30 EHRR 121; [2000] Crim LR 187,
108, DC . . . 17.16, 17.25 ECtHR . . . 15.4, 15.10
lvi | Table of Cases
Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220, CA . . . Wall (1802) 28 State Tr 51 . . . 2.50, 2.51

16.45, 16.54 Walls [2011] EWCA Crim 443; [2011] 2 Cr App
Vane v Yiannopoullos [1965] AC 486; [1964] 3 All Rep 61 . . . 15.9, 15.14
ER 820; [1964] 3 WLR 1218, HL . . . 18.7, 18.11, Walters v Lunt [1951] 2 All ER 645; 35 Cr App Rep
18.12 94, DC . . . 11.45
Vantandillo (1815) 4 M & S 73 . . . 16.93 Waltham (1849) 13 JP 183; 3 Cox CC 442 . . . 7.84
Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttall (t/a Redline Walton v R [1978] AC 788; [1978] 1 All ER 542; 66
Coaches) [1999] 3 All ER 833; [1999] IRLR 656, Cr App Rep 25, PC . . . 8.55
HL . . . 2.1, 3.45, 6.28 Wan and Chan [1995] Crim LR 296, CA . . . 17.57
Velumyl [1989] Crim LR 299, CA . . . 10.81 Wang [2005] UKHL 9; [2005] 1 All ER 782; [2005]
Venna [1976] QB 421; [1975] 3 All ER 788; 61 Cr 1 WLR 661, HL . . . 4.2, 13.9, 14.122
App Rep 310, CA . . . 7.36, 7.52 Ward (1986) 85 Cr App Rep 71; [1987] Crim LR
Vernege [1982] 1 All ER 403n; 74 Cr App Rep 232, 338, CA . . . 17.45
CA . . . 8.55 Ward [1997] 1 Cr App Rep (S) 442; (1996) 161 JP
Verrier v DPP [1967] 2 AC 195; [1966] 3 All ER 297, CA . . . 14.80, 14.81
568; 50 Cr App Rep 315, HL . . . 1.31, 14.81 Warneford and Gibbs [1994] Crim LR 753, CA . . .
Vestey v IRC (No 2) [1980] AC 1148; [1979] 3 All 12.55, 12.56
ER 976; [1979] 3 WLR 915, HL . . . 10.51 Warner (1970) 55 Cr App Rep 93; 135 JP 199, CA
Vickers [1957] 2 QB 664; [1957] 2 All ER 741; 41 Cr . . . 10.85
App Rep 189, CCA . . . 8.25 Warner v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 2 AC
Vinagre (1979) 69 Cr App Rep 104, CA . . . 8.56 256; [1968] 2 All ER 356; 52 Cr App Rep 373, HL
Vinall [2011] EWCA Crim 6252 . . . 10.68, 10.86, . . . 6.38
10.97, 10.106 Warren v A-G of Jersey [2011] UKPC 10; [2012] 1
Vincent [2001] EWCA Crim 295; [2001] 1 WLR AC 22; [2011] 2 All ER 513 . . . 17.66
1172; [2001] 2 Cr App Rep 150 . . . 10.134 Warwick [1995] 2 All ER 168 . . . 13.22
Wass v DPP (2000) unreported, DC . . . 7.136
W [2010] EWCA Crim 372; [2010] QB 787; [2010] Waterfield [1964] 1 QB 164; [1963] 3 All ER 659; 48
3 WLR 165 . . . 3.2 Cr App Rep 42, CCA . . . 7.66
W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdic- Watson [1989] 2 All ER 865; 89 Cr App Rep 211,
tion) [1993] Fam 64, CA . . . 7.25 CA . . . 8.99
W Stevenson & Sons (a partnership) [2008] Watson and Watson (1959) 43 Cr App Rep 111 . . .
EWCA Crim 273; [2008] Bus LR 1200 . . . 18.53 8.85
W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam); [2012] 1 All ER Webb [1969] 2 QB 278; [1969] 2 All ER 626; 53 Cr
1313 . . . 2.15 App Rep 360, CA . . . 15.13
Wacker [2002] EWCA Crim 1944; [2003] QB 1207; Webster [1995] 2 All ER 168 . . . 13.22
[2003] 4 All ER 295; [2003] 1 Cr App Rep 329 Webster [2006] EWCA Crim 415; [2006] 2 Cr App
. . . 8.109 Rep 103, CA . . . 8.158, 17.13, 17.32
Wai Yu-tsang v R [1992] 1 AC 269; [1991] 4 All Welham v DPP [1961] AC 103; [1960] 1 All ER 805;
ER 664; 94 Cr App Rep 264, PC . . . 3.76, 14.85, 44 Cr App Rep 124, HL . . . 14.86, 14.87
14.86, 14.87
Wells Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate,
Wain [1995] 2 Cr App Rep 660, CA . . . 10.57 ex p Westminster City Council [1986] 3 All ER
Wakeman v Farrar [1974] Crim LR 136, DC . . . 10.52 4; [1986] 1 WLR 1046; 53 P & CR 421, DC . . .
Walford (1899) 34 L Jo 116 . . . 7.114 6.22, 6.26
Walkden (1845) 1 Cox CC 282; 6 LTOS 194 . . . 7.43 Welsh [1974] RTR 478, CA . . . 10.30
Walker [1996] 1 Cr App Rep 111 . . . 14.98 Wemhoff v Germany (Application 2122/64) (1968)
Walker [2003] EWCA Crim 1837; [2003] All ER 1 EHRR 55, ECtHR . . . 1.63
(D) 64 (Jun) . . . 16.46 Wenton [2010] EWCA Crim 2361; [2010] All ER
Walker [2006] EWCA Crim 1907; [2006] All ER (D) 81 (Nov) . . . 13.22
(D) 08 (Jun), CA . . . 9.56, 9.57 West (1848) 2 Car & Kir 784; 2 Cox CC 500; 11
Walker and Hayles (1989) 90 Cr App Rep 226; LTOS 49 . . . 8.30
[1990] Crim LR 44, CA . . . 3.7, 3.14, 14.113 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v
Walkington [1979] 2 All ER 716; 68 Cr App Rep Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC
427, CA . . . 11.12, 11.15 669; [1996] 2 All ER 961, HL . . . 10.46, 10.61
Table of Cases | lvii
Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd Williams (Roy) [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 362; [2000]
[1985] 1 All ER 740, CA . . . 3.49 All ER (D) 1393, CA . . . 10.28
Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200 . . . 3.9
[1986] 2 All ER 353; 83 Cr App Rep 155, HL . . . Williams v DPP [1993] 3 All ER 365; 98 Cr App
3.45, 3.49, 4.17, 5.5 Rep 209, DC . . . 17.63
Wheatley v Commissioner of Police of the British Williams v Phillips (1957) 41 Cr App Rep 5; 121 JP
Virgin Islands [2006] UKPC 24; [2006] 1 WLR 163, DC . . . 10.40
1683, PC . . . 10.6, 10.79 Williamson (1977) 67 Cr App Rep 35, CA . . . 11.23
Wheeler [1967] 3 All ER 829; 52 Cr App Rep 28, Williamson and Ellerton (1977) 67 Cr App Rep 63,
CA . . . 2.21 CA . . . 16.43
Whitchurch (1890) 24 QBD 420, CCR . . . 8.190, Williamson v Chief Constable of West Midlands
14.75 Police [2003] EWCA Civ 337; [2004] 1 WLR 14;
White [1910] 2 KB 124; 4 Cr App Rep 257; [1908– 167 JP 181 . . . 7.63
10] All ER Rep 340, CCA . . . 2.27, 2.29 Willis [1972] 3 All ER 797; 57 Cr App Rep 1, CA
White [2001] EWCA Crim 216; [2001] 1 WLR 1352 . . . 11.36
. . . 7.97, 7.98 Willoughby [2004] EWCA Crim 3365; [2005] 1 Cr
Whitefield (1984) 79 Cr App Rep 36; [1984] Crim App Rep 495, CA . . . 8.82, 8.112
LR 97, CA . . . 17.70, 17.71 Wills [1983] 2 VR 201 . . . 8.96
Whitehouse (1852) 6 Cox CC 38 . . . 14.47 Wills (1990) 92 Cr App Rep 297, CA . . . 10.52
Whitehouse (1941) 4 WWR 112, BC CA . . . 17.70, Wilson [1984] AC 242; [1983] 3 All ER 448, HL . . .
17.73 7.45, 7.81, 7.83, 7.84
Whitehouse [1977] QB 868; [1977] 3 All ER 737; 65 Wilson [1997] 1 All ER 119; [1997] Crim LR 53,
Cr App Rep 33, CA . . . 14.30, 17.62 CA . . . 18.44, 18.45
Whitehouse [2000] Crim LR 172; [1999] All ER (D) Wilson [1997] QB 47; [1996] 3 WLR 125; [1996] 2
1387; (1999) The Times, 10 December, CA . . . 3.54 Cr App Rep 241, CA . . . 7.13, 7.19, 7.20
Whiteley (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 25; 155 JP 917, CA Wilson [2007] EWCA Crim 1251; [2008] Crim LR
. . . 13.5 138, CA . . . 16.56
Whitfield v DPP [1998] Crim LR 349, DC . . . 8.147 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] UKHL 40;
Whittaker v Campbell [1984] QB 318; [1983] 3 All [2004] 1 AC 816; [2003] 4 All ER 97 . . . 1.67
ER 582; 77 Cr App Rep 267, DC . . . 10.119 Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237; [1986] 2 All ER
Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App Rep 141, CCA . . . 440; [1986] 1 WLR 1, CA . . . 7.53
14.113 Windle [1952] 2 QB 826; [1952] 2 All ER 1; 36 Cr
Whyte [1987] 3 All ER 416; 85 Cr App Rep 283, App Rep 85, CCA . . . 15.34, 15.35
CA . . . 16.26 Windsor, Re (1865) 29 JP 327; 6 B & S 522; 10 Cox
Wibberley [1966] 2 QB 214; [1965] 3 All ER 718; 50 CC 118 . . . 12.53
Cr App Rep 51, CCA . . . 10.117 Wings Ltd v Ellis [1985] AC 272; [1984] 3 All ER
Widdows [2011] EWCA Crim 1500; [2011] 2 FLR 577; 83 LGR 193, HL . . . 6.18, 6.22, 6.25
869; (2011) 175 JP 348 . . . 7.144, 7.149 Winson [1969] 1 QB 371; [1968] 1 All ER 197;
Wilcox v Jeffery [1951] 1 All ER 464; 49 LGR 363 [1968] 2 WLR 113, CA . . . 18.7, 18.9, 18.12
. . . 17.61 Winter [2007] EWCA Crim 3493; [2007] All
Willer [1987] RTR 22; 83 Cr App Rep 225, CA . . . ER(D) 440 Nov, CA . . . 8.175
16.72, 16.73, 16.74 Winter v Hinckley and District Industrial
Williams [1923] 1 KB 340; 17 Cr App Rep 56; Co-operative Society Ltd [1959] 1 All ER 403;
[1922] All ER Rep 433, CCA . . . 7.27 57 LGR 97; 123 JP 160, DC . . . 18.4
Williams [1980] Crim LR 589, CA . . . 12.11 Winter v Winter [2010] EWCA Crim 1474; [2011]
Williams (1986) 84 Cr App Rep 299, CA . . . 8.180 1 Cr App Rep (S) 476 . . . 8.108, 8.109
Williams [1992] 2 All ER 183; 95 Cr App Rep 1, Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387,
CA . . . 2.52, 8.104 ECtHR . . . 15.51
Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552; [2011] 3 All Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent (1983) The
ER 969 . . . 2.32, 8.166 Times, 28 March, DC . . . 6.6, 6.7
Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All ER 411; 78 Cr With v O’Flanagan (1936) Ch 575, CA . . . 12.14
App Rep 276, CA . . . 2.21, 5.7, 5.9, 5.18, 7.52, Wood [1987] 1 WLR 779; 85 Cr App Rep 287, CA
8.26, 15.84, 15.85, 16.15, 16.16 . . . 11.55
lviii | Table of Cases
Wood [2002] EWCA Crim 832; [2002] 4 Archbold X [1994] Crim LR 827, CA . . . 3.75
News 3, CA . . . 10.77 X City Council v MB [2006] EWHC 168; [2006] 2
Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305; [2008] 3 All ER FLR 968; [2007] 3 FCR 371 . . . 9.15, 9.16
898 . . . 8.54
Wood v DPP [2008] EWHC 1056 (Admin); (2008) Yaqoob [2005] EWCA Crim 2169; [2005] 9
Times, 23 May . . . 7.66 Archbold News 2, CA . . . 8.114
Woodley v Woodley [1978] Crim LR 629, DC . . . Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009]
10.50, 13.3 EWCA Civ 37; [2009] 2 All ER 986; (2009) 107
Woodman [1974] QB 754; [1974] 2 All ER 955; 59 BMLR 47 . . . 10.30
Cr App Rep 200, CA . . . 10.44 Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930; [2009] Crim LR
Woodrow (1846) 15 M & W 404 . . . 6.36 888 . . . 17.44, 17.49, 17.54
Woodward [1995] 3 All ER 79; [1995] 2 Cr App Yip Chiu-cheung v R [1995] 1 AC 111; [1994] 2 All
Rep 388, CA . . . 8.158 ER 924; 99 Cr App Rep 406, PC . . . 3.1, 14.68,
Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82; [1998] 4 All ER 103; 16.100
[1999] 1 Cr App Rep 8, HL . . . . 3.9, 3.11, 3.12, Yorkshire Traction Co Ltd v Vehicle Inspectorate
3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.22, 3.23 [2001] EWHC Admin 190; [2001] RTR 518, DC
Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; 25 Cr App . . . 6.28
Rep 72; [1935] All ER Rep 1, HL . . . 4.3, 4.5, 4.7, Young (1838) 8 C & P 644 . . . 7.2
15.23, 15.53, 15.66 Young [1984] 2 All ER 164; 78 Cr App Rep 288,
Wootton and Peake [1990] Crim LR 201, CA . . . C-MAC . . . 3.59, 9.9, 15.97, 15.99
10.76
Worthy v Gordon Plant (Services) Ltd [1989] RTR Zafar (1992) unreported . . . 9.18
7n; [1985] CLY 624, DC . . . 18.26, 18.29 Zahid [2010] EWCA Crim 2158; [2010] All ER (D)
Wright [1992] QB 979; [1992] 3 WLR 228; 95 Cr 30 (Oct) . . . 6.21
App Rep 264, CA . . . 17.68 Zaman [2010] EWCA Crim 209; [2010] 1 WLR
Wright [2000] Crim LR 510, CA . . . 16.44 1304 . . . 17.87
Wuyts [1969] 2 QB 474; [1969] 2 All ER 799; 53 Cr Zecevic v DPP (Victoria) (1987) 162 CLR 645 . . .
App Rep 417, CA . . . 12.66 16.35
Table of Secondary Legislation
UK Secondary Legislation reg 32(1)(g) . . . 18.34

Products of Animal Origin (Import and Export)
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/3124)
Homicide Act 2007 (Amendment) Order 2011 reg 21 . . . 6.20
(SI 2011/1868) . . . 8.133 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 2005 (Consequential and Supplementary
Homicide Act 2007 (Commencement No 3) Amendments to Secondary Legislation) Order
Order 2011 (SI 2011/1867) . . . 8.133 2006 (SI 2006/594)
Sch 1 . . . 16.91
Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Extension of Group A
Offences) Order 2000 (SI 2000/1878) . . . 12.70 Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland Consequential
Amendments) Order 2008 (SI 2008/1779) . . .
Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order 1986 (SI
9.75, 9.123
1986/948) . . . 8.3
Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental
2002 (SI 2002/3113)
Orders) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/985)
reg 36 . . . 16.91
reg 5 . . . 9.100
Sch 4 . . . 9.100 Zebra, Pelican and Puffi n Pedestrian Crossings
Regulations and General Directions 1997 (SI
Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order
1997/2400) . . . 2.8
2004 (SI 2004/1574) . . . 1.59
Limited Liability Partnerships Regulations 2001
(SI 2001/1090) EU Secondary Legislation
reg 4(2) . . . 18.50
Motor Vehicles (Off Road Events) Regulations
1995 (SI 1995/1371) . . . 8.153 Directive 2008/99/EC . . . 1.46
Pollution Prevention and Control (England and-
Wales) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/1973)
1
Introduction
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals with the following introductory points:
• the characteristics of criminal offences;

• the purposes of the criminal law;
• the courts of criminal jurisdiction;
• jurisdiction;
• maximum sentences;
• the sources of the criminal law;
• the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998; and
• codification of the criminal law.
1.1 This book is concerned with the substantive criminal law of England and Wales, ie
the law relating to the general principles of legal liability for an offence (otherwise known
as a ‘crime’) and specific offences. There are around 11,000 offences at a conservative esti-
mate. This book does not attempt to deal with all of them. It concentrates on those which
are more serious in nature.1 The law of criminal procedure and of criminal evidence is
outside the scope of this book, as is that relating to the disposal of offenders, although
occasionally the context requires reference to be made to parts of those areas of law.
The characteristics of criminal offences
Key points 1.1

A criminal offence is a legal wrong for which the offender is liable to be prosecuted on
behalf of the State, and if found guilty liable to be punished.
1.2 A wrong is a breach of a rule; it may be moral or legal according to whether the rule
is one of morality or law. Legal wrongs may be civil or criminal or both. The distinction
1 For a discussion of a much wider range of offences see English and Card Police Law (12th edn, 2011).
 | 1.3 introduction
between a civil wrong (such as a breach of contract, a tort or a breach of trust) and a
criminal wrong (a crime) depends upon that between civil and criminal law. The civil
law is primarily concerned with the rights and duties of individuals among themselves,
whereas the criminal law defines the duties which a person owes to society.
1.3 The principal legal consequence of a crime is that the offender, if he is detected and
it is decided to prosecute, is prosecuted on behalf of the Crown (ie the State), even in the
case of a private prosecution,2 and if he is found guilty is liable to be punished.
1.4 Civil law is not exclusively concerned with the definition of wrongs, for it embraces
the law of property, which largely consists of the rules governing the methods whereby
property may be transferred from one person to another, and the law of succession, which
concerns the devolution of property on death. There are, however, several branches of the
civil law which exist in whole or in part to provide redress for wrongs; the most important
of these are contract, tort and trusts.
One purpose of the law of contract is to provide redress for breaches of legally binding
agreements. The aggrieved party may claim damages as claimant in civil proceedings,
and the amount which he recovers is assessed on the basis of the loss which he has sus-
tained in consequence of the non-fulfi lment of the contract.
The object of the law of tort is to provide redress for breaches of duties which are owed
to persons generally and do not depend on an agreement between parties. If A assaults B,
or publishes a libel concerning B, or causes B personal injury by the negligent driving of
a motor car, A commits a tort and is liable to be sued by B in civil proceedings. In these
cases the claimant’s damages will almost always be assessed on the basis of the loss sus-
tained in consequence of the tort.
One purpose of the law of trusts is to provide redress for breaches of trust. A breach of
trust occurs where someone who holds property as trustee for another fails to carry out
the duties of his office, for example by making an improper investment or wrongfully
converting the trust property to his own use. He is then civilly liable to make good the
loss occasioned to those on whose behalf the property was held.
1.5 The foregoing account of civil wrongs should be sufficient to indicate the two impor-
tant respects in which they differ from crimes. In each instance the wrongdoer’s liability
is based (with very limited exceptions) on the loss which the wrongdoer has occasioned,
and in each instance the law is brought into play (and proceedings can be discontinued)
at the option of the injured party. Generally speaking, no one can be obliged to sue for
damages for a breach of contract, a tort or a breach of trust. On the other hand, where a
crime has been committed, the wrongdoer is liable to punishment, which is a very dif-
ferent thing from being ordered to compensate the victim of the wrong, 3 and as a general
2 It is possible for a prosecution for most offences to be instituted and conducted by a private individual on
behalf of the Crown, but this is rare. Prosecutions for some offences can only be instituted by or with the consent
of the Attorney General or the Director of Public Prosecutions (in effect the Crown Prosecution Service of which
the Director is the head).
3 If a convicted person is ordered to pay a fi ne, this is paid to the State and not to the victim. However, the
criminal courts do have power to order, instead of or in addition to the punishment imposed, that a convicted
person pay compensation to the victim.
1.8 the purposes of the criminal law | 
rule a criminal prosecution may proceed although the victim has been fully compensated
and desires it to be discontinued.4
1.6 As already indicated, the same conduct may be both a civil wrong and a crime. There
are many cases in which someone who commits a tort is also guilty of a crime. Assaults
and collisions between vehicles are two out of numerous examples. Where a crime is also
a civil wrong, criminal and civil proceedings may usually take place concurrently and the
one is normally no bar to the other.5
An exception of general importance to this rule is that, where criminal proceedings are
taken in a magistrates’ court in respect of an assault or battery by or on behalf of the vic-
tim (ie a private prosecution), civil proceedings in respect of it against the defendant are
barred if the defendant obtains the magistrates’ court’s certificate of the dismissal of the
complaint or, having been convicted, undergoes the punishment imposed.6 A certificate
of dismissal must be issued if the magistrates decide that the offence is not proved, or if
proved is so trifling as not to merit any punishment.
1.7 The principal criticism of the definition of a crime for the purposes of the law of
England and Wales set out in para 1.2 is that it fails to indicate what types of conduct are
included in the category of crimes. The answer is that a definition is not the same thing
as a description; its aim is simply to draw attention to the features which distinguish that
which is being defined from other things of the same kind. In any event, it is impossible
to find a concise formula which will cover every kind of criminal conduct. As Lord Atkin
said in 1931 in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v A-G for Canada,7 ‘The criminal
quality of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor can it be discovered by reference to
any standard but one: is the act prohibited with penal consequences?’
The purposes of the criminal law

1.8 Views vary as to a precise list of purposes of the criminal law but the list contained
in the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, first published in 1962, 8 commands a
good deal of support9 since it reflects the fine balance between the punishment of offen-
sive behaviour and the exercise of individual autonomy:
‘(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threat-
ens substantial harm to individual or public interests;
(b) to subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that they are disposed
to commit crimes;
4 Smith v Dear (1903) 88 LT 664.

5 In many cases the exercise of the power of a court in criminal proceedings (which normally take place more
speedily than civil ones) to order a convicted person to compensate his victim renders separate civil proceed-
ings unnecessary.
6 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 44 and 45.
7 [1931] AC 310 at 324.
8 Proposed Official Draft , Art 1, 1.02(1). The Code has been adopted by a number of states in the USA.
9 But see Robinson ‘The Modern General Part – Th ree Illusions’ in Criminal Law Theory (2002) (Shute and
Simester (eds)) 79 for criticism.
 | 1.9 introduction
(c) to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal;

(d) to give warning of the nature of conduct declared to be an offence;
(e) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offences.’
A constant question in reading this book should be the extent to which our criminal law
satisfies these purposes.
The courts of criminal jurisdiction
Key points 1.2

There are two types of courts where cases against persons accused of criminal offences
are heard in the first instance. One is a magistrates’ court; the other is the Crown Court.
The chart on the opposite page shows the outline of the structure of trial and appellate
courts of criminal jurisdiction and the following paragraphs explain this, beginning at the
bottom.
Magistrates’ courts
1.9 The explanation which follows is based on the law as it will be when amendments
made by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 are in force throughout England and Wales.
Magistrates’ courts have two functions in criminal matters. The first is that of a court
of summary jurisdiction, which determines cases without a jury. Over 95 per cent of
all criminal cases which come before the courts are determined by magistrates’ courts.
Leaving aside the special provisions relating to defendants under 18, magistrates’ courts
deal with two types of offence under this jurisdiction:
• Summary offences These are offences which, if committed by an adult, are by statute
triable only summarily (ie without a jury in a magistrates’ court).10 They comprise a
large number of relatively minor offences, such as wilful obstruction of a constable
in the execution of his duty, drink-driving offences and sexual activity in a public
lavatory, as well as a host of regulatory offences.
• Offences triable either way These are offences, such as theft and unlawful wounding,
which, if committed by an adult, are triable either in the Crown Court on indict-
ment11 or summarily in a magistrates’ court. The following procedure applies when
the defendant (D) appears or is brought before a magistrates’ court charged with an
either-way offence.
10 If it is one of the handful of offences in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 40 an offence normally triable sum-
marily only may be tried on indictment in the Crown Court if it is linked with an indictable offence charged in
the indictment: see paras 7.35 and 10.114 for examples of these offences.
11 The indictment is the formal legal document containing a list of the charges against a defendant in the
Crown Court.
1.9 the courts of criminal jurisdiction | 
THE CRIMINAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
Supreme Court
Court of Appeal Queen’s Bench Division

Criminal Division of the
High Court
Case Case
stated stated
Crown Court
Trial on indictment Appeal by rehearing
Jury No jury
Sending
for trial
Sending for trial Summary
proceedings trial
Magistrates’ court
No jury
Appeal
If D indicates an intention to plead guilty to the either-way offence, the magis-

trates’ court proceeds straight to sentence (or commits D to the Crown Court for
sentence, if the magistrates’ court considers that the Crown Court – which has
greater sentencing powers – should deal with D).
If D indicates an intention to plead not guilty, ‘allocation of trial proceedings’ are
held to determine whether the offence should be tried by the magistrates’ court or in
the Crown Court. In the light of the representations made and of any information as
to D’s previous convictions (if any), the magistrates’ court may decide that the case
is so serious that it should not try it. If it decides that Crown Court trial is not neces-
sary, it cannot proceed to summary trial without D’s consent, since D has the right
to elect trial in the Crown Court.
In cases of serious or complex fraud or of child abuse, the above provisions can be
short-circuited by the service of a notice by the Director of Public Prosecutions (or
certain other people in the case of fraud), in which case D must be sent to the Crown
Court.
The second function of a magistrates’ court relates to sending D to the Crown Court
for trial where an offence triable only on indictment (ie only in the Crown Court), such
as murder, manslaughter, rape or robbery, is involved or where an offence triable either
way is not to be tried in a magistrates’ court. Sending for trial is a necessary preliminary
in most cases to a trial in the Crown Court. In sending for trial proceedings, the magis-
trates’ court does not consider the evidence against D; it must send D for trial regardless
of whether there is enough evidence on which a reasonable jury could find D guilty. The
 | 1.10 introduction
magistrates’ court determines the Crown Court location to which D is to be sent, and
whether to send D in custody or on bail. It can also make orders to ensure that the evi-
dence of a prosecution witness is available to the Crown Court where the witness will not
voluntarily provide it.
1.10 A magistrates’ court must normally be composed of at least two lay magistrates
unless a specific exemption applies. The maximum number is three.
The jurisdiction of a magistrates’ court may also be exercised by a legally qualified
District Judge (magistrates’ courts) sitting alone.
Lay magistrates are not required to possess any legal qualifications: for legal advice they
rely on a justices’ clerk or a member of the clerk’s staff who is an authorised legal adviser.
1.11 There are special provisions in respect of defendants under 18. Nearly all prosecu-
tions of those under 18 are conducted in youth courts in less formal proceedings before
a District Judge (magistrates’ courts) or a bench of two or three lay magistrates of whom
normally at least one must be a man and one a woman.
The Crown Court

1.12 The Crown Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all offences which are triable only
on indictment and over any offence triable either way which has been sent to it for trial.
The following judges sit in the Crown Court: High Court judges, Circuit judges, Recorders
(who are part-time judges) and District Judges (magistrates’ courts). As from a day to be
appointed, ‘qualifying judge advocates’ (who normally act as judges in the armed forces
legal system) will be able to sit in the Crown Court.
If D pleads not guilty in the Crown Court the case is tried by judge and jury.12 It is for
the jury to determine the facts and whether or not D is guilty, but they will do so on the
basis of a direction from the judge on the relevant law.
Another function which the Crown Court has is to hear appeals from magistrates’
courts. Juries are not used in these cases, but the judge sits with magistrates (the max-
imum number being four). Only D may appeal.13 An appeal may be against sentence or
(but only if D pleaded not guilty) against conviction on a point of fact or of law (or of
both). An appeal to the Crown Court against conviction takes the form of a complete
rehearing. Where an appeal is founded on a point of law alone it is usually thought prefer-
able to appeal by case stated to the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court, dealt with
below.
The Crown Court also deals with cases where a magistrates’ court commits for sen-
tence someone who has pleaded guilty to, or been found guilty of, an offence triable either
way, on the ground that its sentencing powers are inadequate. These cases are heard by a
judge sitting alone.
12 Exceptionally, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Pt 7 a judge may permit a trial without a jury in a case
of potential or actual jury tampering.
13 A case where a defendant has been convicted by a magistrates’ court may be referred to the Crown Court
by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, in which case it is treated as an appeal by D against conviction or
sentence or both, as appropriate.
1.17 the courts of criminal jurisdiction | 
Appellate courts
Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court
1.13 Judges in this Division hear appeals by case stated on points of law or jurisdic-
tion from magistrates’ courts and from the Crown Court when that court has heard an
appeal from a magistrates’ court. Either side may appeal. Cases are dealt with by the
Administrative Court, which is part of the Queen’s Bench Division. They are heard by a
single judge or by a Divisional Court. A Divisional Court consists of two or more judges,
almost invariably two, one of whom is usually a Lord Justice of Appeal, ie a member of the
Court of Appeal. An appeal by case stated simply consists of hearing legal argument and
a decision on that basis. There is no rehearing of the facts and witnesses.
1.14 Judges in the Queen’s Bench Division also deal with claims by a ‘person aggrieved’
for judicial review in relation to the jurisdiction of the Crown Court other than its juris-
diction in matters relating to trials on indictment, and in relation to magistrates’ courts.
As in an appeal by case stated, the court simply hears legal argument and decides on
that basis. It is not concerned with the correctness of the decision on its merits but with
whether it was lawfully and reasonably made. Claims for judicial review are not appeals
as such. Consequently, they do not appear in the chart on p 5.
Like appeals by case stated, judicial review cases are dealt with by judges sitting in
the Administrative Court. Permission from a single judge is required before a claim for
judicial review can be made. If it is granted, a claim for judicial review may be heard by a
single judge or a Divisional Court.
In cases where the facts are involved the appropriate course is to appeal by case stated,
so that they can be set out in the ‘case stated’.
Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal

1.15 The most important function of the Criminal Division is to hear appeals from the
Crown Court by D against conviction or sentence or both. Such appeal to the Court of
Appeal may only be brought with its leave or with a certificate from the trial judge that
the case is fit for appeal. In the case of an appeal against conviction the court must allow
the appeal if it thinks that the conviction is unsafe; otherwise it must dismiss the appeal.
A case where there has been a conviction in the Crown Court may be referred to the
Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, in which case it is treated as
an appeal by D against conviction or sentence or both, as appropriate.
1.16 The Court of Appeal also hears appeals by the prosecution against rulings by the
trial judge in the Crown Court (for example, that there is no case to answer or that pro-
ceedings should be stayed for abuse of process).
Where a person has been acquitted on indictment of a specified serious offence, the
Court of Appeal may quash the acquittal and order a retrial where new and compelling
evidence of guilt comes to light.
1.17 Under the Criminal Justice Act 1972, s 36, the Attorney General may refer to the
Court of Appeal for clarification a point of law involved in a case in which D was acquitted
 | 1.18 introduction
in the Crown Court. The opinion of the Court of Appeal does not affect the acquittal but
provides authoritative guidance for the future.
Under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 36, the Attorney General can refer a sentence
imposed in the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal if it appears to be unduly lenient.
This power exists only in relation to offences triable only on indictment and certain seri-
ous offences triable either way. On such a reference the court may increase the severity of
the sentence.
1.18 The Criminal Division usually sits in at least three and, on occasions, as many as
six courts. By way of exception to the general requirement that cases before it must be
heard by not less than three judges, a two-judge court may hear appeals against sentence.
The court will normally consist of the Lord Chief Justice or the President of the Queen’s
Bench Division or a Lord Justice of Appeal plus two High Court judges, but a single
Circuit judge may also sit as one of the judges of the court.
Supreme Court
1.19 Either side may appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the High Court
(whether by a single judge or a Divisional Court) in ‘a criminal cause or matter’ or from
a decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The Supreme Court came into
existence on 1 October 2009. It took over the appellate functions of the House of Lords.
Appeal to the Supreme Court is only possible if the necessary conditions are fulfilled
and leave is granted either by the court appealed from or by the Supreme Court. The
necessary conditions which must be fulfilled are:
• the court below must certify that a point of law of general public importance is
involved; and
• either the court below or the Supreme Court must be satisfied that the point of law is
one which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.
A point of law referred to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney General may be further
referred to the Supreme Court, and so may a point of law involved in a sentence referred
to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney General.
1.20 The Supreme Court consists of a President, Deputy President and 10 Justices of the
Supreme Court, although acting judges may be appointed. Cases before the Supreme
Court are normally heard by a court consisting of five or seven judges, headed by the
President or Deputy President.
Jurisdiction
Key points 1.3

The courts of England and Wales are only concerned with conduct which is an offence
against English law, or, to put it another way, with offences over which they have
jurisdiction.
1.22 jurisdiction | 
Generally, jurisdiction can only be exercised by the courts of England and Wales over an
offence if it was committed in England and Wales (territorial jurisdiction),14 but there are
exceptions where jurisdiction can be exercised over an offence committed wholly outside
England and Wales (extra-territorial jurisdiction).
A detailed examination of this matter is outside the scope of this book, but the following
should be noted.
Territorial jurisdiction
1.21 Normally, the application of the normal requirement that to be an offence against
English law an offence must be committed in England and Wales is easy since either
all the essential elements of an offence occur in England and Wales or they do not, and
this may be true even in situations where there is a foreign element. In Treacy v DPP,15
for instance, it was held by a majority of the House of Lords that a person who posts in
England and Wales an unwarranted demand with menaces addressed to a person abroad
can be convicted of blackmail because the offence is complete when the demand is posted,
with the result that the offence is wholly committed in England and Wales. Similarly, in
El-Hakkaoui,16 it was held that a person can be convicted of possessing a firearm with
intent by means thereof to endanger life, even though the intention relates to endanger-
ing life abroad, if the possession of the firearm is in England and Wales.
Partial commission in England and Wales

1.22 What is the situation where part of the essential elements of an offence takes place
in England and Wales and part abroad (including Scotland and Northern Ireland)? Until
2004, it appeared to be the law that an offence was committed in England and Wales (and
therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the English and Welsh courts) if its final essential
element (the specified consequence in the case of a result crime) occurred in England
and Wales,17 but not18 if some earlier requisite act or occurrence happened in England
and Wales but the final essential element occurred outside England and Wales.19 In 2004,
however, the Court of Appeal in Smith (Wallace) (No 4)20 held that a court of England
and Wales would have jurisdiction even though the final essential element did not occur
in England and Wales, if a substantial measure (ie part) of the activities constituting the
offence was committed in England and Wales and it could not reasonably be argued that
there were serious reasons of international comity (ie recognition of another State’s laws)
why the offence should be tried in another country.
14 In construing a statute, there is a well-established presumption that, in the absence of clear and specific
words to the contrary, an ‘offence-creating provision’ was not intended to make conduct outside the territorial
limits of England and Wales an offence triable in an English and Welsh court: Air India v Wiggins [1980] 2 All
ER 593, HL.
15 [1971] AC 537, HL.
16 [1975] 2 All ER 146, CA. Also see Berry [1985] AC 246, HL.
17 Ellis [1899] 1 QB 230; DPP v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55, HL.
18 Unless statute otherwise provided.
19 Harden [1963] 1 QB 8, CCA; Manning [1999] QB 980, CA.
20 [2004] EWCA Crim 631.
 | 1.23 introduction
Special rules
1.23 Jurisdiction over offences of a fraudulent or similar nature is subject to the provi-
sions of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, Pt 1, dealt with in Chapter 13.
There are also special rules relating to jurisdiction over the inchoate offences of encour-
aging or assisting crime, conspiracy and attempt. These are dealt with in Chapter 14.
Territorial limits
1.24 The territorial limits of England and Wales for the purposes of the territorial juris-
diction are as follows, depending on whether or not the offence is a summary one. For the
purpose of offences triable only on indictment and offences triable either way the bound-
ary of England and Wales is, round the coast, the outer limit of territorial waters.21 In the
case of summary offences, the boundary is where the land meets the open sea according
to the prevailing state of the tides, but tidal rivers, creeks and harbours within the jaws of
the land also fall within that boundary.22
Extra-territorial jurisdiction
1.25 ‘Extra-territorial jurisdiction’ refers to jurisdiction over an offence which has no
connection at all with the territory of England and Wales. The following are examples.
Various statutes giving effect to international conventions provide that the courts
of England and Wales shall have jurisdiction over offences covered by the conventions
by whomsoever and wheresoever they may be committed. One example is the Aviation
Security Act 1982, s 1 of which punishes with a maximum of life imprisonment the
unlawful seizure, by force or threats, of control of an aircraft while it is in flight, whether
or not the aircraft is registered in the United Kingdom. The Aviation Security Act 1982,
s 2 makes similar provision concerning acts of intentionally destroying, damaging or
endangering the safety of any aircraft.
Other examples of extra-territorial jurisdiction are murder and manslaughter com-
mitted by a person within one of the categories of British citizenship in any country
or territory outside the United Kingdom 23 and a long list of sexual offences against a
person under 18 committed by a United Kingdom national or United Kingdom resident
(or someone who is such a national or resident when the prosecution is brought) in any
country or territory outside the United Kingdom.24
Any offence committed by a person within one of the categories of British citizenship
in a foreign country outside the United Kingdom is triable in England and Wales if, at the
time of the offence, he was an employee of the Crown, and was acting (or purporting to
act) in the course of his employment.25
21 Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, s 2.

22 Keyn (1876) 2 Ex D 63 at 168, per Lord Cockburn CJ. See also Loose v Carlton (1978) 41 P & CR 19 at 34;
Anderson v Alnwick DC [1993] 3 All ER 613 at 620. Statute may provide that a particular summary offence can
be committed in territorial waters.
23 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 9.
24 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 72 and Sch 2 (para 9.123).
25 Criminal Justice Act 1948, s 31.
1.28 maximum sentences | 
Jurisdiction over offences on board ships and aircraft outside

the United Kingdom
1.26 The Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s 281 gives the courts of England and Wales juris-
diction over an offence charged as having been committed:
• by a person within one of the categories of British citizenship:
• on board any United Kingdom ship on the high seas;
• in any foreign port or harbour;
• on board a foreign ship ‘to which he does not belong’ (ie is not a crew member); or
• by any other person on board any United Kingdom ship on the high seas.26
Further discussion of this and of other ship-related provisions – such as that in the
Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s 282, which deals with the rules to be applied to offences
against property or persons committed ashore or afloat outside the United Kingdom
by persons who at the time of the offence are, or have been during the previous three
months, employed on a United Kingdom ship – is beyond the scope of this book. So is
the discussion of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, s 92,27 which extends our criminal law to
conduct in British-controlled aircraft or United Kingdom-bound foreign aircraft 28 while
in flight outside the United Kingdom.
Maximum sentences
1.27 Where an offence triable in the Crown Court, whether because it is indictable only
or triable either way, is referred to in this book, reference is made to the maximum term
of imprisonment which can be imposed by the Crown Court on conviction before it. That
term also applies to someone committed for sentence by a magistrates’ court. Except
in the case of murder and certain other cases, the Crown Court may fine the offender
instead of, or in addition to, imprisoning him. There is no limit on the fines which the
Crown Court may impose.
1.28 Where an offence triable summarily only is referred to in this book, the maximum
sentence is set out. Many summary offences are not imprisonable. Where they are the
maximum term varies from offence to offence but the maximum for any one offence is
six months’ imprisonment;29 it will be 51 weeks if, and when, an amendment, made by the
26 Although the draft ing of s 281 appears to limit its provisions to offences committed under the Merchant
Shipping Act 1995 (MSA 1995), the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 3A, and the Senior Courts Act 1981, s 46A,
both inserted by the MSA 1995, Sch 13, provide that s 281 applies to other offences under the law of England and
Wales as it applies in relation to offences under the MSA 1995. ‘High seas’ in s 281 means all oceans, seas, bays,
channels, rivers, creeks and waters below low water mark and ‘where great ships go’, unless they are within the
body of a county: R v Liverpool JJ, ex p Molyneux [1972] 2 QB 384, DC.
27 As amended by the Civil Aviation (Amendment) Act 1996, s 1.
28 In the case of a foreign aircraft the conduct must also be an offence under the law of the foreign country.
29 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 78(1).
 | 1.29 introduction
Criminal Justice Act 2003,30 comes into force. The maximum which can be imposed on
summary conviction for an either-way offence is normally six months’ imprisonment;31 it
will be 12 months if, and when, an amendment, made by the Criminal Justice Act 2003,32
comes into force.
There are also limits on the fines which magistrates’ courts may impose. The maxi-
mum fine which they may impose on conviction of most offences triable either way is
a standard sum, known as the ‘prescribed sum’ or ‘statutory maximum’. At the time of
writing that sum is £5,000.33 In the case of summary offences, the maximum fine is nor-
mally governed by the level (on the standard scale of fines) assigned to the offence in
question. The standard scale is as follows at the time of writing:34
Level on scale Amount of fine
1 £200
2 £500
3 £1,000
4 £2,500
5 £5,00035
If the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill, before Parliament at
the time of writing, is enacted, the two references above to a maximum fine of £5,000 will
be replaced by a reference to a fine of any amount.
Sources35
1.29 There are two main sources of English criminal law: common law and legislation.
EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights are increasingly becoming
important sources.
Common law
Key points 1.4

Virtually all the general principles of criminal liability are to be found in the common
law, ie judge-made law. On the other hand, very few offences are now governed by the
common law.
30See the Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss 280 and 281 (not in force at the time of writing).
31Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 32(1); Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 78(1). A lower
maximum may, however, be fi xed for a particular either-way offence.
32 See the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 282 (not in force at the time of writing).
33 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 32; Interpretation Act 1978, Sch 1.
34 Criminal Justice Act 1982, s 37; Interpretation Act 1978, Sch 1.
35 The Secretary of State has power to amend the amount of maximum fi nes.
1.30 common law | 
1.30 Common law is that part of English law which is not the result of legislation, ie it is
the law which originated in the laws applied by the royal courts after the Norman con-
quest. These decisions of the judges came to be recorded and published, and in due course
began to be cited in subsequent cases before the courts. This led to the development of
the doctrine of precedent, under which the reported decisions of certain courts are more
than just authoritative legal statements whose effect is persuasive since they can be bind-
ing (ie must be applied) in subsequent cases.
In the context of courts with criminal jurisdiction, it is the decisions of the Supreme
Court (or the House of Lords), the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), a Divisional
Court of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court and a judge sitting in the
Administrative Court of that Division which have binding effect. Whether or not such
a decision is binding in a particular case depends on the relative standing of the court
which made the decision and the court in which that decision is subsequently cited.
The reason is that the doctrine of precedent depends on the principle that the courts
form a hierarchy which, in the case of courts with criminal jurisdiction, is in the follow-
ing descending order: Supreme Court (or House of Lords); Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division); Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division; a judge in the Administrative
Court; Crown Court and magistrates’ courts. The basic rule is that a decision by any of
the courts above the Crown Court is binding on those courts below that in which it was
given. On the other hand, the Supreme Court is not bound by its own decisions or those
of the House of Lords, nor is a judge of the Administrative Court bound by decisions of
other High Court judges, although in both cases the previous decision will normally be
followed. In comparison, the Court of Appeal and a Divisional Court are bound by their
own previous decisions, except in a number of defined exceptional circumstances.
It is not every part of the judgment of an appellate court which constitutes the ‘decision’
for the purposes of the doctrine of precedent but only the reasons or principles applied by
the appellate court in resolving an issue before it (the ‘ratio decidendi’). Other statements
on the law by the appellate court which are not necessary to the resolution of an issue
before it (‘obiter dicta’) can never constitute a binding precedent, although they may be
of persuasive authority for subsequent cases, their strength depending on the eminence
of the court.
In terms of trial in the Crown Court, it must be borne in mind that it involves trial by
jury,36 and, subject to D’s right of appeal, their verdict is final. The jury are subject to the
trial judge, who directs them on the relevant law. The trial judge’s directions on the law do
not constitute a binding precedent for the future, but are merely of persuasive authority.37
It must be emphasised that the principles enunciated by the judge must be ascertained
solely by reference to his words and without reference to the verdict of the jury, which may
have been unexpected by the judge, or even contrary to his direction on the law. In cases
tried in a magistrates’ court, the decision of the magistrates or, on appeal, of the Crown
Court38 does not constitute a binding precedent, although an appellate decision of the
Crown Court is of persuasive authority.
36 For an exception, see para 1.12, n 12.

37 Ashworth ‘The Binding Effect of Crown Court Decisions’ [1980] Crim LR 402.
38 Cross and Harris Precedent in English Law (4th edn, 1991) 6; Ashworth, ibid.
 | 1.31 introduction
Reference will occasionally be made to decisions of the Judicial Committee of the

Privy Council, which is the final court of appeal from the British dependent territories
and certain Commonwealth countries. Except in the most exceptional circumstances,
decisions of the Judicial Committee do not bind English courts but are of very strong
persuasive authority. Reference will also be made to decisions by courts in Northern
Ireland, the Commonwealth or the United States. Such decisions are of persuasive
authority only.
Common law offences

1.31 From the twelft h to the fourteenth centuries the judges elaborated the rules relat-
ing to the more serious offences which came to be known as ‘felonies’. In the fourteenth
century less serious offences known later as ‘misdemeanours’ were similarly evolved. A
few misdemeanours were subsequently created by the rulings of the judges in particular
cases and by the Court of Star Chamber. After the Restoration some of the latter were
developed by the judges, who always claimed the right of defining certain acts as mis-
demeanours, although they never attempted to do so in the case of felonies. However,
in modern times statute has played a preponderant part in the criminal law. As a result
of the abolition of many common law offences by statute, often accompanied by their
replacement by statutory offences, fewer than 20 offences now exist at common law. Their
definition cannot be found in an Act of Parliament, but must be sought in the rulings of
the judges. Prima facie, not only the definition of the offence itself but also the punish-
ment to be awarded is contained in the common law, but several statutes prescribe spe-
cific punishments for certain common law offences. For example, murder is an offence
at common law; in no statute is there to be found a definition of it, but by reason of the
wealth of judicial pronouncements it is possible to construct a comprehensive definition
of the offence. The punishment for murder is, however, governed by statute; it is a manda-
tory sentence of life imprisonment. Manslaughter also remains an offence at common
law; imprisonment for life is laid down as the maximum punishment by statute but, by
way of contrast with the case of murder, a lesser sentence of imprisonment, a fine or even
a conditional or absolute discharge is possible. Other examples of common law offences
described in this book are public nuisance, outraging public decency and conspiracy to
defraud, for the first two of which the punishment on conviction on indictment is still
prescribed by the common law.
Where the punishment for a common law offence is not laid down by statute, the
judge may sentence D to be imprisoned for a period or fined an amount, or both, to
be fi xed at the judge’s discretion.39 In theory, this could lead to some very anomalous
results because, in the case of a common law offence for which no maximum punish-
ment is provided by statute, the court could impose a longer sentence than it could in
the case of a more serious offence, the punishment of which is dealt with by statute.
There is, however, an overriding requirement that the punishment should not be exces-
sive, and there is no reason to suppose that the present rule gives rise to any injustice
in practice.
39 Morris [1951] 1 KB 394, CCA, approved by the House of Lords in Verrier v DPP [1967] 2 AC 195, HL.
1.33 common law | 
General principles of criminal liability

1.32 The common law remains the source of virtually all the general principles of crimi-
nal liability. Examples of such principles are the defences of insanity and duress (whether
by threats or of circumstances) and the rules concerning participation in crime. These
general principles apply to offences in general (although they do not always apply to every
offence). In particular, when a new offence is created by legislation, it is assumed that they
apply to that offence unless the contrary is indicated.
Limits on judicial law-making

Key points 1.5
Although the judges have the power to make law, they do not have power to create new
offences or to widen existing offences so as to make punishable conduct of a type not
previously punishable.
1.33 Historically, the theory underlying the development of the common law was that
new cases simply illustrated the application of existing doctrine to varying facts, or, in
other words, that the role of the judge was to discover and declare what the law already
was, not to make it.
In the last 40 years or so the position has changed. It has become generally recognised
that judges do make law. As Lord Reid, one of the greatest judges of the twentieth century,
said in 1972, ‘We do not believe in fairy tales any more. So we must accept the fact that
for better or worse judges do make law.’40 The judges’ power to make law is, however, lim-
ited. It does not permit the judicial extension of the criminal law by the creation of new
offences or the widening of existing ones.
Until modern times, the judges did reserve the right to create new offences under the
guise of declaring what the law already was. However, in 1972, the House of Lords in
Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP41 unanimously rejected the
existence of a residual power vested in the courts to create new offences. It also rejected a
residual power so to widen existing offences as to make punishable conduct of a type not
hitherto subject to punishment. In 2005, these points were reaffirmed in Rimmington,
Goldstein.42 The next year, in Jones (Margaret),43 Lord Bingham (with whose speech Lords
Rodger and Carswell agreed) stated that it had become an important democratic princi-
ple in this country that it is for Parliament, and not the executive, or the judges, to decide
what conduct should be treated as lying so far outside the bounds of what is acceptable in
our society as to attract criminal penalties.
40 ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1972) 12 JSPTL 22.

41 [1973] AC 435, HL.
42 [2005] UKHL 63. Just as the courts have no power to create new offences, so they have no power to abolish
existing offences; that is a task for Parliament: ibid.
43 [2006] UKHL 16 at [29].
 | 1.34 introduction
1.34 The judicial creation of offences is open to the following further objections:
• there is a danger that the creation of new offences under the guise of developing old
law promotes uncertainty concerning the extent of the legal rule; and
• the existence of a judicial power to create new offences would contravene the prin-
ciple that no one should be punished for acts which were not criminal when they
were performed. This principle forms part of what is called the ‘principle of legal
certainty’. It is even more important from the point of view of the liberty of the
subject than other principles, such as those embodied in the doctrine that D’s con-
duct must be voluntary or in the rule that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The principle of legal certainty is enshrined in the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 7 which provides that ‘No one shall be held guilty
of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence . . . when it was committed.’
These objections are equally applicable to the judicial extension of existing offences
so as to make punishable conduct of a type not hitherto subject to punishment.
1.35 There is a fi ne line between widening existing offences so as to make punish-
able conduct of a type hitherto not punishable and the clarification and application
of established offences to new circumstances within their scope. The House of Lords
in Knuller recognised that the latter was permissible. This is a view shared by the
European Court of Human Rights which has interpreted the ECHR, Article 7 as not
outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial
interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant development is consistent
with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.44 Th is may seem to be
an appropriate way of resolving any tension which might otherwise exist between the
principle of legal certainty and the need for the law to develop so as to be responsive to
changing social conditions, but the fact remains that the law can always be changed by
Parliament and legislative changes can always be prospective, whereas judicial changes
are retrospective. 45
The question of where the ‘fine line’ referred to above is to be drawn was raised by the
decision in 1991 of the House of Lords in R, 46 a decision subsequently given statutory
effect, that a husband could be convicted of raping his wife if he had sexual intercourse
with her without her consent. This involved the abolition of the previous proposition
of law, formulated in the eighteenth century, whereby a husband could not be so con-
victed. That proposition, which had been subjected to a number of limited exceptions
in modern times, was based on the notion that a wife was a subservient chattel of her
husband and by marriage gave her irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with him.
The House of Lords held that, since that notion was now clearly unacceptable, the propo-
sition should be held no longer to be applicable. There is a strong case for saying that this
44 SW and CR v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 363, ECtHR.

45 By way of exception, in a wholly exceptional case where it is in the interests of justice to do so, the Supreme
Court may declare that one of its decisions is not to operate retrospectively: Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41.
46 [1992] 1 AC 599, HL. See Giles ‘Judicial Law-Making in the Criminal Courts: The Case of Marital Rape’
[1992] Crim LR 407. For another example, see Tan [1983] QB 1053, CA.
1.36 common law | 
decision involved an impermissible widening of the offence so as to make punishable

conduct of a type not hitherto punishable, rather than simply being an application of
the offence to new circumstances (the changed social position of wives) within its scope.
Subsequently, the European Court of Human Rights in SW and CR v United Kingdom47
had to consider a complaint that the House of Lords’ decision was in violation of the
ECHR, Article 7. The Court held that Article 7 had not been contravened. Its reason was
that there had been an ‘evident evolution’ of the law in the decisions of the English courts
which was consistent with the essence of the offence and it was reasonably foreseeable
to the complainants (if necessary, with legal advice) that the court might embark on the
adaptation of the offence in question. This bold decision indicates that decisions which
appear to change the law are unlikely to contravene Article 7, unless the development
was unforeseeable.
The House of Lords’ decision in R can be contrasted with its decision in Norris v
Government of the United States of America48 where the House of Lords reiterated the
importance of the principle that the courts do not have power to create new offences or
to widen existing ones so as to make punishable conduct of a type not hitherto subject
to punishment. The question before the House was whether an agreement for price-
fi xing constituted the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud, there being no
previous decision which even suggested that it did unless there were aggravating ele-
ments (notably misrepresentation and deception) bringing the agreement within the
existing boundaries of conspiracy to defraud. The House of Lords held that such an
agreement could not constitute a conspiracy to defraud unless there were such aggra-
vating elements; it would be wrong to extend the offence of conspiracy to defraud to
cover price-fi xing agreements in themselves. It distinguished SW and CR v United
Kingdom, on the ground that the extension of the law of rape to cover sexual inter-
course by a husband with his non-consenting, cohabiting wife was the culmination of
a gradual change in the law of marital rape. Thus, the extension had been reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the conduct in question, whereas it would not have been so
foreseeable in respect of an extension of conspiracy to defraud to cover price-fi xing
agreements (such an extension only having been fi rst suggested in an article long after
the conduct in question).
1.36 The introduction by judicial decisions of new defences, or the development of exist-
ing defences to meet new circumstances, is not open to the same objections as advanced
above, since this favours the defendant. In terms of new defences, Lord Mustill said this
in Kingston,49 where the House of Lords refused to recognise a defence of involuntary
intoxication:
‘I suspect that the recognition of a new general defence at common law [ie by judicial
decision] has not happened in modern times. Nevertheless, the criminal law must not
stand still, and if it is both practical and just to take this step, and if judicial decision
rather than legislation is the proper medium, then the courts should not be deterred sim-
ply by the novelty of it.’
47 (1996) 21 EHRR 363, ECtHR. 48 [2008] UKHL 16. 49 [1995] 2 AC 355 at 375.
 | 1.37 introduction
Despite Lord Mustill’s first sentence, it would seem that the defence of duress of cir-
cumstances, described in Chapter 16, is a new defence recognised in modern times by
judicial decision. With this it is interesting to contrast the refusal by the House of Lords
in Clegg50 to introduce a partial defence of excessive self-defence to murder, which would
have reduced that offence to manslaughter. Lord Lloyd, with whose speech the other Law
Lords agreed, said:
‘I am not averse to judges developing law, or indeed making new law, when they can see
their way clearly, even where questions of social policy are involved . . . But in the present
case I am in no doubt that your Lordships should abstain from law-making. The reduc-
tion of what would otherwise be murder to manslaughter in a particular class of case
seems to me essentially a matter for decision by the legislature, and not by this House in
its judicial capacity.’ 51
Parliament has now introduced a provision which will achieve such a reduction in some
cases of excessive self-defence, as will be seen in Chapters 8 and 16.
1.37 In C v DPP, 52 where the House of Lords refused to abolish the common law rebut-
table presumption that a child aged 10 to 13 was incapable of committing an offence, Lord
Lowry, with whom the rest of the House of Lords agreed, stated that judicial law-making
should be approached by the courts on the following basis:
‘(1) if the solution is doubtful, the judges should beware of imposing their own remedy;
(2) caution should prevail if Parliament has rejected opportunities of clearing up a known
difficulty or has legislated while leaving the difficulty untouched; (3) disputed matters of
social policy are less suitable areas for judicial intervention than purely legal problems; (4)
fundamental legal doctrines should not be lightly set aside; (5) judges should not make a
change unless they can achieve finality and certainty.’53
The common law presumption was subsequently abolished by statute, as explained in

para 15.3.
Textwriters
1.38 In criminal law, as in other branches of English law, statements in textbooks and
articles in legal journals have no binding force. This means that a court is not bound to
apply them in the same way as it must follow the directions contained in a statute or the
principle to be inferred from a decided case.
Nevertheless, some mention should be made of certain works which are treated with
great respect by the judges. To go back only so far as the seventeenth century, the writings
of Sir Edward Coke (d 1634) are as important in the sphere of crime, which is dealt with
in his Third Institute, as in other branches of the law. There is also the statement of the
50 [1995] 1 AC 482, HL. 51 Ibid at 500.

52 [1996] AC 1. See para 15.3. 53 Ibid at 28.
1.39 legislation | 
criminal law of a slightly later period in the unfi nished History of the Pleas of the Crown
by Sir Matthew Hale (d 1676).
In the eighteenth century, Sir Michael Foster (d 1763) left a valuable set of reports with
notes and appendices entitled Crown Law, while Hawkins (d 1746) wrote a treatise on Pleas
of the Crown which was used by Sir William Blackstone (d 1780) in the compilation of the
fourth book of his Commentaries, which deals with criminal law. Finally, Sir Edward Hyde
East (d 1847) published a general treatise on criminal law, known as Pleas of the Crown, in
1803; this book is regarded as the successor to the treatises of Coke, Hale and Foster.
All these works are regarded as of persuasive authority on the law as it stood when they
were written. Several of the standard works of the nineteenth century have been re-edited
and, although they are not authoritative in any strict sense of the word, some of them are
still relied on. They include Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law and Archbold’s Pleading,
Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases. Modern works which are frequently quoted
include Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law, Smith’s
Law of Theft and Blackstone’s Criminal Practice.
The increasing importance of writers is shown by the following quotation from the
speech of Lord Mustill in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994):54
‘Before leaving this part of the appeal I would acknowledge the extensive citation by coun-
sel of passages from learned writers, present and past. There is no space to name them all
here. All have proved valuable, even if not all of the opinions expressed have been adopted.
Notwithstanding the strong practical character of the criminal law it has over the years
gained immeasurably from systematic analysis by scholars who have had an opportunity
for research and reflection denied to those immersed in the daily life of the courts. I hope
that the practice of drawing on these materials will be continued and enlarged.’
Legislation
Key points 1.6

Statute is the principal source of specific offences. The source of many minor offences,
however, is to be found in subordinate legislation.
Statute
1.39 The vast majority of offences are defined and regulated by statutes, ie Acts of the
United Kingdom Parliament which have been duly passed through both Houses and
received the Royal Assent,55 or by subordinate legislation. There are at least 700 indictable
54 [1998] AC 245 at 262.

55 Since 2011, the National Assembly for Wales has had power to enact Acts of the National Assembly of Wales,
made under the Government of Wales Act 2006, Pt 4 and Sch 7, which require Royal Assent and only apply in
relation to Wales, on any matter within its legislative competence. That competence is limited to 20 devolved
areas, which include the environment, food safety, aspects of social welfare, town and country planning, and
 | 1.40 introduction
offences (ie offences triable in the Crown Court); all but the small number of common law
offences are regulated by statute. All summary offences, of which there are estimated to
be more than 10,000, are regulated by statute or by subordinate legislation.
1.40 Statute may create an entirely new offence. There are many instances of serious
offences being created by statute, from time to time in the history of the criminal law, to
punish acts which were not previously punishable. It is in the sphere of the less morally
reprehensible offences, however, that Parliament has been most active.
Apart from the creation of new offences by statute, it is also necessary to bear in mind,
in order to have a full and proper understanding of the criminal law, that many offences
which now exist by virtue of statute were originally common law offences.
1.41 It follows from what has been said that in England we have no single Criminal
Code such as exists in most countries. The result is that, with the exception of com-
mon law offences and those created by subordinate legislation, 56 the criminal law of
England is contained in a range of statutes. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
for example, covers a variety of offences which are broadly defined as being committed
against the person, including such crimes as wounding with intent to do grievous bodily
harm, administering poison, using explosives, assaults, bigamy and abortion. The Theft
Act 1968 and the Criminal Damage Act 1971 cover most offences against property. The
Sexual Offences Act 2003 covers all but a few sexual offences.
1.42 In addition to Acts of the kind mentioned in the last paragraph, there is a large
number whose main object is to regulate particular activities such as road traffic or the
sale of food or other trading activities, but which contain offences for which punish-
ments are prescribed. They are not essentially concerned with the criminal law, but
they certainly create offences (known as regulatory offences) and as far as they do so
must be regarded as one of the sources of the criminal law. Th is already large category
is increasing because in modern times the State has assumed the responsibility for
controlling and curtailing a range of activities which previously anyone was free to
undertake.
Subordinate legislation
1.43 A statute may give power to some body such as the Queen in Council, a government
minister or a local authority to make regulations and prescribe for their breach.
This method of creating minor criminal offences is much easier than enacting a stat-
ute. It is not new but is of increasing importance. In recent years over 60 per cent of newly
created offences have been made by subordinate legislation; they have been of a regula-
tory nature. A good example of the power to create offences by subordinate legislation
is the power of the Secretary of State for Transport under the Road Traffic Acts to make
regulations. Acting under this power, regulations have been made which cover a very
water and flood defence. The impact on the criminal law of Acts of the National Assembly of Wales will be lim-
ited, and it will almost invariably be in terms of regulatory offences.
56 Para 1.43.
1.44 legislation | 
large number of different subjects, contravention of which is an offence. Such matters

as the efficiency of brakes and the use of car horns are to be found not in the Acts them-
selves, but in the regulations.
Subordinate legislation made under statutory powers, otherwise known as delegated
legislation, is of two kinds in England. The more important kind are Orders in Council
made by the Queen in Council and regulations made by Ministers. Generally, these must
be made by statutory instrument and are subject to the rules governing publication and
procedure contained in the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. The other kind of subordi-
nate legislation, byelaws, are made by local authorities and certain other bodies author-
ised by statute and require ministerial confirmation. Although general in operation, they
are restricted to the locality or undertaking to which they apply.
The increase in statutory offences
1.44 Particularly in modern times Parliament’s response to a perceived social problem

has been to make its manifestation an offence. Since 1990, for example, a range of offences
has been introduced to deal with raves, collective trespasses, stalkers and keepers of dan-
gerous dogs. It was estimated in 200857 that between May 1997 and September 2008 just
over 3,600 criminal offences were created by Act of Parliament or by statutory instru-
ment, often for political effect in response to the latest headline in the popular press and
to limited, if any, effect.
In its consultation paper Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, published in 2010,58
the Law Commission has provisionally proposed that:
• The criminal law should only be employed to deal with wrongdoers who deserve the
stigma associated with criminal conviction because they have engaged in seriously
reprehensible conduct. It should not be used as the primary means of promoting
regulatory objectives.
• Harm done or risked should be regarded as serious enough to warrant criminalisa-
tion only if:
– in some circumstances (not just extreme circumstances), an individual could
justifiably be sent to prison for a first offence, or
– an unlimited fine is necessary to address the seriousness of the wrongdoing in
issue, and its consequences.
• Low-level criminal offences should be repealed in any instance where the introduc-
tion of a civil penalty (or equivalent measure)59 is likely to do as much to secure
appropriate levels of punishment and deterrence.
57 The Independent 4 September 2008 referring to a tally of new offences by the Liberal Democratic Party.
58 Law Com Consultation Paper No 195.
59 Ie penalties, orders and remedies that can be applied to someone without that application necessarily hav-
ing to be decided through a hearing in a criminal court; para 3.51 of the Consultation Paper.
 | 1.45 introduction
The Law Commission has taken the view that, if there are too many bodies with the
power to create criminal offences whenever they like, the first two provisional proposals
above will be insufficient to promote principled and restricted use of the criminal law.
Accordingly, it has provisionally proposed that criminal offences should be created and
(other than in minor details) amended only by statute.
EU law
1.45 Although EU legislation cannot of itself create offences punishable in England and
Wales, EU law is having an increasing impact on our criminal law, for example in areas
such as environmental matters, VAT evasion and carousel frauds, human trafficking and
child prostitution and child pornography, as well as regulatory matters such as the use of
tachographs in commercial vehicles.
In many instances where EU legislation has had an impact this has been the product of
a choice by the UK government to fulfi l its obligation to implement a piece of EU legisla-
tion by doing this by way of criminal offences and penalties. However, developments in
the last 20 years or so have meant that EU legislation can require Member States to create
criminal offences and penalties, as explained below.
1.46 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the ‘three pillars’ of the EU. Two pillars
have been relevant to the criminal law: the ‘first pillar’ and the ‘third pillar’.
The first pillar was the European Community (EC), covering a range of competences
including the single market, economic and monetary union, the common agricultural and
fisheries policies and environmental protection. Generally criminal law was outside the
competence of the EC. However, the decision of the European Court of Justice in 2005
in Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union60 was to
the effect that EC legislation made under the first pillar could require Member States to
enact criminal offences and penalties (although it could not specify the penalty range) for
breaches of EC environmental protection legislation when this was necessary to ensure
that that legislation was fully effective.61 The applicability of this decision to other essential
objectives of the EC was left unclear. More important for the criminal law was the third
pillar, ultimately named ‘Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters’ and given
the objective of creating an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. Some of the EU Council’s
framework decisions resulting from the pursuit of this objective, which Member States were
obliged to implement in their legislation by way of criminal offences and penalties, have
concerned matters of substantive criminal law. For example, the EU Council’s framework
decision of 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography
required Member States to enact a number of offences criminalising child prostitution and
the production, possession and distribution of child pornography, and set out minimum
penalties. To the extent that English criminal law was non-compliant, provisions in the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 ensured compliance with the framework decision.
60 Case C-176/03 [2005] 3 CMLR 20, ECJ.

61 See Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal proceedings, which has
been implemented by the United Kingdom.
1.48 echr and hra  | 
Under the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, which came into force on 1 December 2009, the three
pillars and the powers under them were merged. As a result, the EU was given strength-
ened powers to act in respect of the matters hitherto within the third pillar because EU
Council decisions in respect of them will no longer need to be unanimous, since they
merely require a qualified majority. The United Kingdom does, however, have the power
to opt in or out of any policies in respect of such matters.
1.47 EU legislation also has potential, which should not be ignored, as a source of defences
or rules. For example, a defendant would not be liable for an offence if it conflicted with
a directly applicable or effective rule62 of EU law, which would take precedence over the
offence to the extent that it was inconsistent.63 As a further example, for the purposes
of the offence of fraudulent evasion of a prohibition on importation, contrary to the
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s 170(2), the prohibition can be one imposed
by a directly applicable rule of EU law. 64
1.48 Lastly, it may be noted that domestic criminal legislation must be interpreted, so
far as possible, to accord with or facilitate EU legislation even if that EU legislation does
not have direct effect.65
European Convention on Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights
Act 1998
Key points 1.7

The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), taken
together with the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998), is of major importance.
The HRA 1998 gives teeth to the ‘Convention rights’ specified in it:
• by a special provision about statutory interpretation designed, so far as possible, to
give effect to legislation in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights;
• by providing for certain courts to make a declaration of incompatibility if legislation
cannot be interpreted so as to be compatible; and
• by making it unlawful for a public authority, such as a court, local authority or police
officer to act in a way incompatible with a Convention right.
62 A directly applicable rule is one which is part of domestic law without the need for implementation in
domestic law. Only EU Regulations are directly applicable. A directly effective rule is one which confers rights
enforceable in domestic law by an individual against the State, or by an individual or the State against an indi-
vidual without being so implemented; directives cannot have the latter effect.
63 See Case C-121/85 Conegate Ltd v Customs and Excise Comrs [1987] QB 254, ECJ and DC; Searby [2003]
EWCA Crim 1910.
64 Sissen [2001] 1 WLR 902, CA, provides an example.
65 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2006] QB 83, ECJ; Dabas v Spain [2007] UKHL 6.
 | 1.49 introduction
1.49 The criminal law can have considerable implications for the exercise of legitimate
rights and freedoms. However, it was not until the HRA 1998 that the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the ECHR66 were accorded special status under the law of England and
Wales.
1.50 The HRA 1998 ‘brings home’ the Convention rights. Essentially what this means
is that remedies are available in courts and tribunals (hereafter simply ‘courts’) in
England and Wales in respect of the Convention rights. Th is has not been achieved
by the incorporation of the Convention rights into English law. Unlike directly appli-
cable or effective EU legislation, the Convention does not automatically take prior-
ity over English law. Parliamentary sovereignty has been retained. Our domestic
courts have not been given a power to disapply (ie not enforce) incompatible Acts of
Parliament, 67 but the effect of the main provisions in the Act comes close to permit-
ting disapplication without disturbing parliamentary sovereignty. On the other hand,
subordinate legislation68 incompatible with a Convention right can be quashed unless
(leaving aside the possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the
incompatibility. 69
Impact of the HRA 1998

1.51 The Convention rights are highly influential in the draft ing of criminal legislation.
In addition, the HRA 1998 requires judges to interpret legislation, so far as possible, in a
way compatible with Convention rights and, if they cannot, the higher courts can declare
that legislation incompatible with the ECHR. So far, in terms of judicial decisions, the
ECHR and HRA 1998 have had more effect in respect of criminal procedure and evi-
dence than the substantive criminal law, but there have been cases where they have been
decisively influential in the latter respect. Examples are referred to at relevant points in
this book.
Statutory interpretation
1.52 The HRA 1998, s 3 provides that primary legislation and subordinate legisla-
tion must, ‘so far as it is possible to do so, be read and given effect in a way which
is compatible with the Convention rights’.70 The courts, where necessary, will prefer
a strained but possible interpretation which is consistent with Convention rights to
one more consistent with the statutory words themselves, by giving them a narrower
meaning than their ordinary meaning (called ‘reading down’). Th is is radically differ-
ent from traditional techniques of statutory interpretation. There are, however, limits,
66 The ECHR was concluded in 1950.

67 HRA 1998, s 3(2)(b).
68 For the purposes of the HRA 1998, Acts of the National Assembly of Wales are ‘subordinate legislation’:
HRA 1998, s 21(1) (as amended by the Government of Wales Act 2006, Sch 10).
69 HRA 1998, s 3(2)(c).
70 HRA 1998, s 3(1). See Lord Lester of Herne Hill ‘The Art of the Possible – Interpreting Statutes under the
Human Rights Act’ [1998] EHRLR 665; Kavanagh ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation
under the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24 OJLS 259.
1.56 echr and hra  | 
as indicated by ‘as far as possible’. A court cannot construe a statute in a way which
Parliament could not conceivably have intended. Perverse interpretation or extensive
redraft ing is not permissible. In the rare case where the mismatch between Convention
rights and the statute is this great, a competent court will have to make a declaration
of incompatibility.
1.53 The effect of s 3 is illustrated by Lambert,71 which was concerned with the excuse
available under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 28 to a person charged with possession of
a controlled drug (or certain other drugs offences). Section 28 provides that it is an excuse
for D ‘to prove that he neither knew of nor suspected nor had reason to suspect’ that the
substance in question was a controlled drug. A majority of the House of Lords held that,
in order to be compatible with the presumption of innocence in the ECHR, Article 6(2),
‘prove’ in s 28 had to be ‘read down’ as imposing an evidential burden rather than a per-
suasive burden on D, notwithstanding the apparently unequivocal nature of ‘prove’.
1.54 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza72 is the leading decision on the courts’ interpretative
obligation under s 3. There, the House of Lords held that the obligation under s 3 is the
core remedial function under the HRA 1998, and the making of a declaration of incom-
patibility is an exceptional course of last resort. The House stated that the operation of s
3 does not depend on any ambiguity in the legislative provision; it can require a provi-
sion to bear a meaning which departs from the unambiguous meaning which it would
otherwise bear. However, it stated that s 3 reached its limits if a compatible interpreta-
tion would be inconsistent with a fundamental feature of the legislation; to give such
an interpretation would be to cross the constitutional boundary, respect for the will of
Parliament, which s 3 seeks to demarcate and preserve. The House added that, provided
that boundary was not crossed, the obligation under s 3 authorises (and may require)
the court to insert or remove words which may change the meaning of the provision or
depart from Parliament’s intention in order to make the provision compatible, provided
that it does not conflict with a fundamental feature of the legislation. Th is approach was
referred to with approval by Lord Bingham in the criminal appeals in Sheldrake v DPP;
A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2002).73
1.55 A Minister of the Crown in charge of a Bill in Parliament must, before Second
Reading, make a written statement about the compatibility (or otherwise) of the Bill with
the Convention rights.74 In practice, such a statement is printed on the face of a Bill. This
might be expected to provide a strong assurance that a Bill certified as compatible with
Convention rights is in fact compatible but there have been instances where a Bill whose
compatibility is contentious has been so certified.
Declaration of incompatibility
1.56 If a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court is unable to interpret a statutory provi-
sion compatibly with a Convention right, it will have to proceed as normal. The issue of
incompatibility can then be raised on appeal. A judge of the High Court, a Divisional
71 [2001] UKHL 37. 72 [2004] UKHL 30.

73 [2004] UKHL 43 at [28]. 74 HRA 1998, s 19.
 | 1.57 introduction
Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, if satisfied that a provision of pri-
mary legislation is incompatible with a Convention right, may then make a declaration of
incompatibility.75 They may also make such a declaration in respect of a provision of sub-
ordinate legislation which is incompatible if satisfied that (disregarding the possibility of
revocation) the primary legislation prevents removal of that incompatibility,76 which it
normally will.
1.57 If a declaration of incompatibility is made, the validity of the provision is unaf-
fected. The government and Parliament are not required to take remedial action. A fast-
track route for taking remedial action is provided by the HRA 1998, s 10.
Unlawful actions
1.58 It is unlawful for a public authority, such as a court, government minister or depart-
ment, local authority or police officer, to act77 in a way incompatible with a Convention
right, unless:
• as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority could not
have acted differently; or
• in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which
cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention
rights, the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions.78
By the HRA 1998, s 9(1), unlawful action of this sort by a court is normally remediable
only by way of appeal or judicial review.
The Convention rights

1.59 The Convention rights are those rights under the ECHR and Protocols to it which
are specified by the HRA 1998, s 1 and set out in Sch 1.79 Those rights which particularly
have the potential to impact on the criminal law are:
• right to life (Article 2);
• right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment (Article 3);
• right to liberty and security (Article 5);
• right to a fair trial (Article 6);
• right not to be subjected to punishment without law (Article 7);
75 HRA 1998, s 4(1) and (2). For declarations of incompatibility in a criminal case, see R (on the application of
Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2002] UKHL 46; R (on the application of Uttley) v Secretary of
State for the Home Dept [2003] EWCA Civ 1130.
76 HRA 1998, s 4(3) and (4).
77 ‘Act’ includes a failure to act: HRA 1998, s 6(6).
78 HRA 1998, s 6(1)–(3).
79 As amended by the Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004.
1.63 echr and hra  | 
• right to respect for private and family life (Article 8);

• right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9);
• right to freedom of expression (Article 10);
• right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11);
• right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (First Protocol, Article 1);
• right not to be condemned to death or executed (Thirteenth Protocol, Article 1).
1.60 The Convention rights have relevance across the whole range of English criminal
law, for example, in relation to the fatal use of force in self-defence or the prevention of
crime, and euthanasia (Article 2), parental chastisement (Article 3), the defence of insan-
ity (Article 5), the imposition on D of the burden of proving a defence (Article 6), the
boundaries of consent in relation to sexual behaviour or bodily harm (Article 8), incite-
ment to racial or religious hatred, obscene publications and contempt of court (Article
10) and various public order offences concerning processions, assemblies and protests
(Articles 10 and 11).
Application of Convention rights

1.61 The HRA 1998, s 2(1) provides that, in determining a question which has arisen
in connection with a Convention right, a court must take into account the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights. The terms of s 2(1) make it clear that these deci-
sions are not binding on an English court;80 they are to be taken into account along with
other relevant decisions, such as those of the Privy Council or of courts in constitutional
cases elsewhere in the common law world. There is a right of individual petition to the
European Court of Human Rights, and a failure by the English courts to apply a decision
of that Court could lead to an application to it.
1.62 The strength of the Convention rights varies. For example, the rights in Article 2
(right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) and
Article 7 (no punishment without law) are absolute, permitting no interference without
exception, whereas the rights set out in Articles 8 to 11 are qualified rights because they
permit interference in specified circumstances.
1.63 Common to the analysis of a problem allegedly involving any of the Convention rights
is the requirement that there must have been an interference with that right; a Convention
80 Although the Supreme Court will normally apply principles clearly established by the European Court
of Human Rights, there will be rare occasions where the Supreme Court has concerns as to whether a decision
of the European Court of Human Rights sufficiently appreciated or accommodated a particular aspect of our
domestic process. In such a case it can decline to follow the European Court of Human Rights’ decision, giving
its reasons: Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14.
In Kay v Lambeth LBC [2006] UKHL 10, the House of Lords held that where a domestic court would normally
be bound to follow the decision of a court higher in the domestic hierarchy of courts, but that decision appears
to be inconsistent with a later decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the domestic court is bound to
follow the domestic precedent.
 | 1.64 introduction
right must have been ‘engaged’. In deciding this it must be borne in mind that the European
Court of Human Rights has often emphasised the importance of a broad approach to inter-
pretation of the Convention, according full weight to the object and purpose of the ECHR,
rather than a narrower, more literal approach, in order to make the rights accorded by the
ECHR effective.81 The case law of the European Court of Human Rights helps in many areas
in this task of interpretation. Where there is an interference with one of the absolute rights
that is the end of the matter in terms of whether there has been a breach of the ECHR.
1.64 Where a right in respect of which interference can be justified is engaged, that justi-
fication typically (see Articles 8 to 11) requires the following criteria to be satisfied:
• the interference must be ‘prescribed by law’ or ‘in accordance with the law’;
• any interference must have a legitimate aim; and
• the interference must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the interests of that
legitimate aim and proportionate to the pursuit of that aim.
Prescribed by law/in accordance with the law

1.65 ‘Lawfulness’ means more than merely ‘authorised’ by law. The European Court
of Human Rights has held that, in addition, for a rule to be ‘prescribed by law’ or ‘in
accordance with the law’, it must satisfy the following requirements, which are part of the
principle of legal certainty:
• Accessibility, ie the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have
adequate information, in the circumstances, of the legal rules applicable in a given case.
• Foreseeability, ie the law under which action is taken must be ‘formulated with a
sufficient degree of precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must
be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reason-
able in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail’. 82
The European Court of Human Rights has held that a law which failed to describe
the conduct covered by it otherwise than by reference to the standards of ordinary
people did not meet the present requirement, 83 whereas it has been held that a law
which described the behaviour covered ‘by reference to its effects’ did. 84
Interference for a legitimate aim

1.66 The legitimate aim of the interference referred to in Articles 8 to 11 must be one of
the aims specified as a potential justification in the article concerned, such as the preven-
tion of crime or disorder, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
81 See Wemhoff v Germany (1968) 1 EHRR 55, ECtHR; Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99, ECtHR.
82 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245, ECtHR (a case concerned with ‘prescribed by law’ in
Art 10). ‘Prescribed by law’/‘in accordance with the law’ in Arts 8, 9 and 11 are to be read in the same way: ibid,
para 48; Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347, para 85; Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 14, para
66; Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603, ECtHR.
83 Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 241, ECtHR; para 10.75.
84 Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603, ECtHR.
1.68 echr and hra  | 
Necessary in a democratic society

1.67 The reference to a ‘democratic society’ in Articles 8 to 11 means that regard must be
had not only to the legitimate aim which the interference was intended to protect but also
to the importance of the freedom in question in such a society. It is not enough that the
interference is simply reasonable or desirable; there must be a ‘pressing social need’ for it,
although it need not be indispensable.85 According to the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights, whether an interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’
involves the application of the principle of ‘proportionality’. ‘Proportionality’ requires
that the interference be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.86 It is intended to
ensure that a fair balance is struck between the relevant right of the individual and the
legitimate aim(s) which the interference sought to protect. The test of proportionality
was identified as follows by Lord Clyde in De Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing:87
‘whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a funda-
mental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally
connected to it, and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than
is necessary to accomplish the objective.’
Interference with a right may be disproportionate if, for example, it applies to more cases
than necessary or if it interferes more than necessary in cases where it properly applies.
Where there has been a prosecution and conviction the basic issue is whether the pros-
ecution, conviction or sentence (or any related order), taken individually or together, is or
are proportionate to a legitimate aim under the relevant Article.
The proportionality of a legislative interference is judged by looking at the current
effect and impact of the provision, not the position when it was enacted or came into
force.88
Articles 5 to 7: principle of legal certainty

1.68 The principle of legal certainty lies at the heart of Article 7 (no punishment without
law). Article 7 is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application of the law to the
defendant’s disadvantage, discussed in paras 1.34 and 1.35. It also makes requirements in
terms of the accessibility of the law and of the law being formulated with sufficient preci-
sion to ensure foreseeability of its application, as explained in para 1.65.89 So far challenges
to offences based on grounds of vagueness have failed in a number of cases.90 However,
such a challenge succeeded in Rimmington; Goldstein,91 where the House of Lords over-
85 Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49, ECtHR; Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR
347, para 85.
86 Ibid.
87 [1999] 1 AC 69 at 80. Th is statement was applied by Lord Steyn in A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25.
88 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2001] UKHL 40.
89 Kokkinakis v Gleece (1993) 17 EHRR 397, ECtHR.
90 See Cotter [2002] EWCA Crim 1033; Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375 (see para 8.107).
91 [2005] UKHL 63.
 | 1.69 introduction
ruled a number of decisions on the common law offence of public nuisance on the ground
that as interpreted and applied in them the offence lacked the clarity and precision which
Article 7 requires. As a result the offence now seems to satisfy the requirement.
1.69 The principle of legal certainty applies as well to Articles 5 (right to liberty and
security) and 6 (right to a fair trial), whose terms require reference to the principle.92
Codification
Key points 1.8

Codification refers to the formulation of a branch of the law in a single set of statements,
replacing and superseding all existing rules, whether derived from the common law or
from legislation, in that area. Reference has already been made to the fact that English law
does not contain a Criminal Code.
1.70 The criminal law desperately requires codification. Reference has already been
made to the multitude of statutory offences and to the huge increase in recent times.
There is also a mass of case law relating to the criminal law; often this consists of long
judgments, sometimes by individual appeal judges saying different things. As a result,
important parts of the criminal law are complex, ambiguous, uncertain, inconsistent or
difficult to discover. This has implications in terms of the principle of legal certainty.93 In
addition, some parts of the criminal law are archaic.
These defects could be cured by a Code containing the general principles of liability
and specific offences.
At the request of the Law Commission, a group of distinguished academic lawyers
prepared a report, published in 1985,94 formulating the general principles of liability
which should be contained in a Code, including a standard terminology to be used in it,
together with a draft Criminal Code Bill. In the light of the support shown for the princi-
ple of codification of the criminal law, the Law Commission published a report in 1989,95
including a revised and expanded version of the draft Criminal Code Bill. Much of this
draft Code simply restated in the standard terminology the then existing law. Parts of it,
however, resolved matters of inconsistency or uncertainty under the existing law, while
other parts incorporated various proposals for reform made in modern times. It became
clear that a Bill as large as the Criminal Code Bill would present logistical difficulties for
Parliament, and that this might increase the Government’s reluctance to give parliamen-
tary time to a Bill which offered it no political or strategic advantage. For this reason, the
Law Commission decided to put forward a number of shorter draft Bills dealing with
discrete areas of law as a way of making progress on the codification of the criminal law.
92 See, eg, Steel v United Kingdom (1998) 28 EHRR 603, ECtHR (Art 5).
93 Para 1.65.
94 Codification of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission (1985), Law Com No 143.
95 Law Commission A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989), Law Com No 177.
1.71 codification | 
The plan was that, when enacted, these Bills would eventually be consolidated into a
Criminal Code Act. However, despite a number of Law Commission reports since 1993
implementing this strategy, successive governments have dragged their feet in terms of
giving effect to them by introducing Bills in Parliament.96
1.71 The Law Commission announced in 2008 that it had removed the codification
project from its programme of work because of the increasing difficulty of the task due
to ‘the complexity of the common law, the increased pace of legislation, layers of legisla-
tion on a topic being placed one on another with bewildering speed, and the influence
of European legislation’. Instead the Commission’s current strategy is to focus on spe-
cific projects to reform the criminal law and to simplify and improve it, although the
Commission aims to return to the codification of the criminal law at some time in the
future.97 ‘Simplification’ involves:
• giving the law a clearer structure;
• using more modern terminology;
• making the law in a given area more consistent with other closely allied areas of
law; and
• making the law readily comprehensible to ordinary people by ensuring that it
embodies sound and sensible concepts of fairness.98
FURTHER READING
Cross and Harris Precedent in English Law Lamond ‘What is a Crime?’ (2007) 27 OJLS 609
(4th edn, 1991) Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (3rd
Duff ‘Rule Violations and Wrong Doings’ edn, 2011) Ch 10
in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the Stevenson and Harris ‘Simplification (of the
General Part (2002) (Shute and Simester Criminal Law) as an Emerging Human
(eds)) 47 Rights Imperative’ (2010) 74 JCL 516.
Emmerson, Ashworth and Macdonald Ward and Akhtar Walker and Walker’s
Human Rights and Criminal Justice (3rd English Legal System (11th edn, 2011) Pts I,
edn, 2011) II and IV
Hirst Jurisdiction and Ambit of the Criminal G Williams ‘The Definition of Crime’ (1955) 8
Law (2003) Current Legal Problems 107
96 30% of these reports have been fully implemented and 30% partially implemented.
97 Tenth Programme of Law Reform Law Com No 311, paras 1.2–1.6, 2.24 and 2.25.
98 Law Commission Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging Public Decency (2010),
Law Commission Consultation Paper No 193, para 1.1.
2
Criminal liability 1: actus reus
OVERVIEW
Liability for an offence requires that the defendant’s outward conduct satisfies the requirements
of that offence and that the defendant had the appropriate legally blameworthy state of mind.
This chapter concentrates on the former point.
Actus reus and mens rea

2.1 A cardinal principle of criminal law is embodied in the maxim actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea. In Haughton v Smith,1 Lord Hailsham LC stated that ‘the phrase means
“an act does not make a man guilty of a crime, unless his mind is also guilty” ’. He con-
tinued: ‘It is thus not the actus which is reus [ie guilty] but the man and his mind respec-
tively . . . it is as well to record this as it has frequently led to confusion.’
In this and the next chapter it is proposed to deal generally with what must be proved
in order to secure a conviction, although it may be that the defendant (D) can avoid
conviction by relying on a defence. Two points are involved: first, the outward conduct
which must be proved against D (which is customarily known as the actus reus, despite
objections of the type voiced by Lord Hailsham); and secondly, the state of mind which
D must be proved to have had at the time of the relevant conduct (customarily known as
the mens rea). Although the opinion has been expressed by at least two former members
of the House of Lords2 that it would be conducive to clarity of analysis of the ingredients
of an offence to avoid these Latin tags and to replace them with the terms ‘prohibited
conduct’ and ‘state of mind’, they continue to be used by the judges.3
2.2 It is convenient to begin with a few general observations before analysing the expres-
sions actus reus and mens rea. The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea has not
escaped criticism. When commenting on a similar phrase, non est reus nisi mens sit rea,
Stephen J said:
1 [1975] AC 476 at 491.

2 Miller [1983] 2 AC 161 at 174, per Lord Diplock; Courtie [1984] AC 463 at 491–492, per Lord Diplock. Also
see Shivpuri [1987] AC 1 at 11, per Lord Hailsham LC.
3 See, eg, Reid [1992] 3 All ER 673, HL; Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttall [1999] 3 All ER 833, HL; B v DPP [2000]
2 AC 428, HL; Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340, HL.
2.3 actus reus and mens rea | 
‘though this phrase is in common use, I think it most unfortunate, and not only likely
to mislead, but actually misleading, on the following grounds. It naturally suggests
that, apart from all particular defi nitions of crimes, such a thing exists as a “mens
rea”, or “guilty mind”, which is always expressly or by implication involved in every
defi nition. Th is is obviously not the case, for the mental elements of different crimes
differ widely.’ 4
This remains true today. Mens rea means in murder an intention unlawfully to kill or
cause grievous bodily harm to another human being; in theft that D acted ‘dishonestly’
and with the intention of permanently depriving another of the property; and in crimi-
nal damage an intention to damage property belonging to another, or recklessness as to
whether any such property would be damaged.
The maxim can also be criticised in that mens rea is not always required for criminal
liability; in many offences D can be convicted despite the fact of D’s blameless inadvert-
ence as to a particular element of the actus reus, and in some despite D’s blameless inad-
vertence as to all such elements.5
Notwithstanding these strictures, the significance of the maxim has been stressed in
a number of judgments, where it has been held by the House of Lords and other courts
that, unless a statute either by clear words or by necessary implication rules out mens rea
as a constituent part of a crime, a court should not find D guilty of an offence against the
criminal law unless D has a guilty mind.6
The maxim is also important, in that it reminds us that, save in exceptional offences
where no mens rea is required, the commission of the actus reus is not in itself criminal
but only becomes so if committed with the requisite mens rea.
2.3 Most people would agree that, as a general rule, the infliction of punishment is only
justified when D was at fault.
The requirement of mens rea is thus designed to give effect to the idea of just punish-
ment. For those who believe that everyone who does an act prohibited by the criminal law
should be liable to therapeutic treatment rather than punishment, the state of mind with
which an act is done is a relevant consideration only when the method of treatment falls
to be determined. A leading exponent of these beliefs was the eminent social scientist,
Baroness Wootton, who argued in favour of the abolition of the requirement of mens rea,
stating:
‘If . . . the primary function of the courts is conceived as the prevention of forbidden acts,
there is little cause to be disturbed by the multiplication of offences of strict liability. If
the law says that certain things are not to be done, it is illogical to confine this prohibition
to occasions on which they are done from malice aforethought; for at least the material
consequences of an action, and the reasons for prohibiting it, are the same whether it is
the result of sinister malicious plotting, of negligence or of sheer accident.’7
4 Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168 at 187. 5 See Ch 6.

6 Eg Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, HL; B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428, HL; K [2001] UKHL 41.
7 Crime and the Criminal Law (2nd edn, 1981) 46.
 | 2.4 criminal liability : actus reus
The holders of such beliefs have not supplied a blueprint of the practical means of giving
effect to their views.
Nonetheless, the fact that the requirement that an actus reus should always be proved is
even more important than the requirement of mens rea. Evil intentions only become suf-
ficiently dangerous to society to merit punishment when the agent has gone a consider-
able distance towards carrying them out. Even the most diehard believers in punishment
concede that a system of law according to which wishes were equivalent to deeds would
be even less satisfactory than one which punished deeds without considering the mental
state of the doer. As Stephen J put it:
‘The reasons for imposing this great leading restriction upon the law are obvious. If it
were not so restricted it would be utterly intolerable; all mankind would be criminals and
most of their lives would be passed in trying and punishing each other for offences which
could never be proved.’ 8
2.4 Not only does the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea serve the important
purpose of stressing two basic requirements of criminal liability, but it also suggests a use-
ful framework for the analysis of the definition of specific offences. This task is undertaken
in Chapters 7 to 14 and the discussion is generally divided into a consideration of the actus
reus and mens rea required in each case. It is, however, most important that the maxim
should not be allowed to become the master rather than the tool of the criminal lawyer. A
perfectly coherent account of the criminal law could be given without it. Sometimes, as in
the case of conspiracy, it is not easy to split an offence into its actus reus and mens rea.
Time is occasionally wasted by the consideration of pointless questions concerning
the heading under which certain undeniable requisites of criminal liability should be
discussed. Thus, there is no doubt that, even when D is sane, automatism is generally
a defence. This means that, if there is sufficient evidence that, because of non-insane
automatism, D did not know what he was doing at the material time, the prosecution will
fail unless it can satisfy the jury that D did know what he was doing. No useful purpose is
served by considering whether the requirement that D must generally have acted volun-
tarily, ie when not in a state of automatism, relates to actus reus or mens rea or to neither.
There can, however, be exceptional cases where the application of a rule depends on the
classification of the elements of an offence.9
Actus reus
Key points 2.1

The expression actus reus can be summarised as meaning an act (or sometimes an omis-
sion or state of affairs) indicated in the definition of the offence charged together with:
• any consequences of that act, and
8 Stephen History of the Criminal Law Vol II (1883), 78. 9 See paras 5.18 and 17.25.
2.6 actus reus | 
• any surrounding circumstances (other than references to the mens rea10 required on
the part of D, or to any excuse),11
which are indicated by that definition.
2.5 It is necessary to refer to the definition of the offence charged in order to ascertain
the precise nature of the prohibited conduct. The actus reus is every part of the defini-
tion of an offence other than references to the mens rea required or to any excuse. Even
the most cursory consideration of the different offences makes it plain that, if the phrase
‘actus reus’ is to be used as a description of the requisite external conduct, it must be given
a far wider meaning than ‘criminal act’. One reason is that an omission to act or the mere
existence of a state of affairs may suffice, no act on D’s part being required. Another rea-
son is that rarely is a mere act sufficient to constitute the actus reus of an offence.12 The
definitions of offences often specify surrounding circumstances, such as time or place,
which are essential to render the act criminal. Sometimes the definition requires a con-
sequence to result from the act, such as the consequence of the death of another human
being in murder, as an essential element in making it criminal.
Acts, omissions and states of affairs

Acts
2.6 An act (ie the doing of something) is the most common basis of criminal liability.
Of course, the nature of the requisite act varies from offence to offence. The defi nitions
of some offences indicate the requisite act precisely, so that in rape an act of vaginal,
anal or oral penetration by a penis is required, and in causing death by dangerous
driving, an act of driving. However, the relevant act is specified less precisely in the
defi nitions of other offences, particularly where they use words which comprise two
concepts, that of an act and that of a consequence flowing from it. For example, the
common law defi nitions of murder and manslaughter simply require the ‘killing’ of
another. Where the act is left undefi ned in this way, any act which results in the death
of another will suffice. Thus, murder can be committed by an act of shooting or hitting
or strangling or planting a bomb or poisoning or by any other of the many ways which
10 As was recognised in R (on the application of Young) v Central Criminal Court [2002] EWHC 548 (Admin),
sometimes an element of the actus reus may involve a mental element as well as a physical element. Eg, whether
an article is an offensive weapon for the purposes of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, s 1 may depend on
whether D intends to use it to cause injury. Likewise, there are a number of offences of possessing a specified arti-
cle. Possession of something cannot begin until the person with control of it is aware that it is under his control:
Lockyer v Gibb [1967] 2 QB 243, DC; Ashton-Rickardt [1978] 1 All ER 173, CA. In addition, whether something
is ‘sexual’ for the purposes of all but one of the offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 sometimes depends
on D’s purpose: para 9.6. Also see para 2.24. 11 See, further, paras 2.20–2.26.
12 For examples of offences where the actus reus consists simply of an act, see the offences of encouragement
or assistance of crime, conspiracy and attempt: Ch 14. Other examples are the offence of unlawful harassment
of a residential occupier, contrary to the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 1(3) (see para 2.9), and the offence
of encouragement or assistance of suicide (see paras 8.181–8.189).
 | 2.7 criminal liability : actus reus
men and women have devised for killing each other. Likewise, there are a number of
statutory offences involving the ‘obstruction’ of various types of public officer; such an
offence can be committed by any act which results in the ‘obstruction’ of an officer of
the appropriate type.
Omissions
Key points 2.2

An omission to act can suffice for criminal liability in two cases:
• where the definition of an offence is expressed in terms which refer to an omission;

• in other offences, unless otherwise precluded, where D was under a legal duty to
act and omitted to fulfil that duty.
2.7 An omission to act (ie failure to do something) is a less common basis of criminal
liability than a positive act. Historically, the criminal law has been concerned essentially
with prohibiting (and punishing) positive actions rather than with imposing duties to act
(and punishing failure to do so). In recent times, however, it has increasingly concerned
itself with failures to act.
It has to be admitted that the distinction between an act and an omission can be a fine
one, and the distinction in terms of culpability can sometimes be an even finer one, but
the courts continue to draw it. The results of the distinction are significant.13
Express offences of omission

2.8 An obvious instance where an omission to act can give rise to liability is where the
definition of an offence actually specifies an omission to act. Examples of statutory offences
of this type are the offence of wilful neglect, by a person with responsibility for it, of a child
in a manner likely to cause it unnecessary suffering or injury to health,14 the offence of
dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit,15 and the offence of failing to disclose information
which might materially assist in preventing an act of terrorism.16 These are serious offences
but most express statutory offences of omission are not, for example, the offence of failing
to accord precedence to a pedestrian on a ‘zebra’ pedestrian crossing,17 the offence of failing
to report a motor accident,18 and a host of other regulatory offences such as that of failing
without reasonable excuse to provide information required under the Gas Act 1986.19
Apart from the common law offences of misprision of treason (a failure to report a
treason) and of refusing a police officer’s request for assistance in preserving the public
13 See, eg, the effect of the distinction in relation to euthanasia: para 2.15; in relation to causation: para 2.60;
and in relation to obstruction of a constable: para 7.72.
14 Contrary to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 1(1).
15 Contrary to the Theft Act 1968, s 24A. 16 Contrary to the Terrorism Act 2000 s 38B.
17 Contrary to the Zebra, Pelican and Puffi n Pedestrian Crossings Regulations and General Directions 1997
and Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s 25(5). 18 Contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 170.
19 Contrary to the Gas Act 1986, s 38(2).
2.10 actus reus | 
peace,20 neither of which appears to have been charged in modern times, express offences
of omission are statutory.
Other offences
2.9 Leaving aside offences which by their express definition are (or may be) committed
by an omission, the issue of when an omission to act can give rise to criminal liability
can be explained as follows. The starting point is to note that the issue relates to offences
whose definition employs an active verb (otherwise the offence would expressly be an
omission offence or a state of affairs offence, described later) and that the determination
of the issue involves in part the construction of that verb. In the case of some offences it
is impossible to imagine their commission by an omission; examples are rape, offences
involving driving, and the offences of robbery and burglary. In addition, the words used
in the definition of an offence may indicate that it may only be committed by an act.
For example, in Ahmad,21 where the offence of harassment in question, provided by the
Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 1(3), requires a defendant landlord to do acts22 likely
to interfere with the peace or comfort of a residential occupier with intent to cause him to
give up occupation, it was held that a landlord was not guilty where he failed to rectify a
serious defect on the premises with the requisite intent.
2.10 Apart from offences which cannot conceivably be committed by an omission,
and any others whose defi nitions indicate that they are incapable of commission by an
omission, the situation is that, while an offence whose defi nition employs an active verb
(eg ‘kill’ or ‘obstruct’) may ordinarily require an act on D’s part, it can also in principle
be committed by an omission to act, provided D is under a duty to act, which is recog-
nised by the criminal law, and fails to fulfi l it.23 ‘In principle’ is used deliberately, since
there is nothing to stop a court, when an offence is fi rst construed authoritatively, from
giving the active verb in the defi nition a narrow construction so as to require an act on
D’s part.
Whereas some continental Codes provide a general duty on all persons to assist others
in peril according to their abilities, breach of which is a specific offence in its own right,
our criminal law does not impose a general duty to act to save other people or property
from harm, even if this could be done without any risk or inconvenience. For example, a
stranger who stands by and watches a child drown in a shallow pool when he could easily
rescue the child commits no offence, because he is not under a legal duty to rescue the
child.
20 As to these offences, see Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528, HL, and Brown (1841) Car & M 314, respectively. Also
see Nicholson ‘The Citizen’s Duty to Assist the Police’ [1993] Crim LR 611.
21 (1986) 84 Cr App R 64, CA. Also see DPP v Waite (1996) 160 JP 726, DC (offence of unauthorised use of
a receiver with intent to obtain information, contrary to the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, s 5(b)(i) (repealed
and re-enacted in Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, s 48(1)(a)), requires proof of an act, normally provided by the
deliberate tuning in to the wavelength). 22 A single act suffices: Polycarpou (1978) 9 HLR 129, CA.
23 Examples of offences which can be committed by a failure to fulfi l such a duty are murder and manslaugh-
ter (Ch 8) and the offence of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty (para 7.69).
It is for the judge to determine whether such a duty could exist on the facts and, if it could, to direct the jury
on what would be required to establish that it existed; it is for the jury to determine whether the requisite facts
to establish the duty are proved: see Evans (Gemma) [2009] EWCA Crim 650 at [39].
 | 2.11 criminal liability : actus reus
How may a legal duty to act arise?
Key points 2.3

Duties to act recognised by the criminal law may arise under statute, but more commonly
in the present type of case they arise under the common law. The common law has devel-
oped particularly in this respect in relation to a duty to act to protect another from physi-
cal harm, and it is on this duty that the following text concentrates.
The duty to protect another from physical harm can arise:
• under a contract;
• through the holding of a public office;
• through parenthood (and perhaps other close relationships); or
• through the voluntary undertaking of care for someone unable to care for himself.
2.11 The following examples of a common law duty to act to protect another from physi-
cal harm can be derived from the cases, most of which were concerned with the offence
of manslaughter:
• A duty to act to protect another from harm can arise under a contract, at least
where the failure to fulfil that duty is likely to endanger life, and maybe in other
cases. A duty recognised by the criminal law which arises under a contract can
be owed to third parties to it to whom the contractual obligation is not owed. In
Pittwood,24 for example, D, a level-crossing keeper, failed in breach of his contract
of employment to close the gate when a train was approaching with the result that
someone was killed on the crossing. D was convicted of manslaughter after Wright J
had held that a person might incur criminal liability from failure to perform a duty
arising out of a contract and that that duty could be owed to road users even though
the contractual obligation was only owed to the railway company. The duty of a doc-
tor to care for patients is owed under a contract with a patient or the medical insur-
ance company in the case of a private patient, or under a contract with the relevant
NHS body in the case of a NHS patient.
• A person is under a duty to act to protect another from harm if he holds a public
office which requires him to do so. For example, in Curtis,25 a relieving officer of
a local authority was held liable for manslaughter when he had failed to provide
medical assistance for a destitute person. Likewise, in Dytham, 26 where a uniformed
police officer had failed to intervene when he saw a man being kicked to death some
30 yards away, it was held that he could be convicted of the common law offence of
misconduct in a public office.
• A parent is under a duty to his or her child to protect it from harm. Consequently,
a parent who fails to feed his or her child, or who fails to get medical attention
for a child, with the result that the child dies can be convicted of murder or
24 (1902) 19 TLR 37. See Harrison ‘Manslaughter by Breach of Employment Contract’ (1992) 21 ILJ 31.
25 (1885) 15 Cox CC 746. 26 [1979] QB 722, CA.
2.11 actus reus | 
manslaughter, depending on his or her state of mind.27 Presumably, a child over

the age of criminal responsibility (ie 10) owes a corresponding duty to his or her
parents, 28 and other close relationships (eg husband and wife) possibly involve a
similar duty.29
• A person who voluntarily undertakes the care of another who is unable to care
for himself owes a duty to that person to protect him from harm. The undertak-
ing of care may be done by some express (or overt) act, as in Nicholls, 30 where D
received into her home her young grandchild after the death of the child’s mother.
On an indictment for manslaughter by neglect, Brett J directed the jury that, if
a person chooses to undertake the care of a person who is helpless either from
infancy, mental illness or other infi rmity, he is bound to execute that responsi-
bility and, if (with the necessary mens rea) he allows him to die, he is guilty of
manslaughter.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Stone and Dobinson31 shows that a voluntary
undertaking of care may be implied from D’s conduct generally towards the vic-
tim of D’s neglect, in which case a duty to act will arise. The importance of this is
that it is possible for a duty to a helpless person to arise where D and the victim (V)
of the neglect were initially in a relationship, for example as members of the same
household, where each was able to look after him or herself but where V has subse-
quently become helpless through mental or physical illness and become dependent
on D for care. In such a case it cannot be said that D has undertaken the care of V
by any express (or overt) act, such as the act of receiving the grandchild into the
home in Nicholls. In Stone and Dobinson, D1’s sister (V) came to live with D1 and
his partner (D2) in 1972. At the time V was able to look after herself but later, being
morbidly anxious about putting on weight, V denied herself proper meals and by
July 1975 became unable or unwilling to leave her bed. D1 and D2 made ineffectual
efforts to get a doctor and D2 undertook the task of trying to wash V and of tak-
ing such food to V as she required, but they made no effort to contact the social
services or similar agencies. V was found dead in bed in an emaciated and fi lthy
condition in August 1975. The Court of Appeal dismissed appeals by D1 and D2
against convictions for manslaughter. On the question of whether D1 and D2 had
been under a duty to care for V, it held that there was evidence on which the jury
could conclude that, by mid-July 1975, when V had become helplessly infirm, D1
and D2 were under a legal duty to summon help or care for her themselves. This
evidence was that D1 and D2 were aware of V’s poor condition and had attempted
to get a doctor, and (in D1’s case) that V was his sister and occupied a room in his
27 Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 82 JP 287, CCA (father of 7-year-old girl); Evans (Gemma) [2009] EWCA Crim
650 at [20] (mother of 16-year-old girl). There can be no doubt that a guardian is likewise under a duty.
28 Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (13th edn, 2011) (Ormerod (ed)) 70. If such a duty exists a boy of 14 would,
eg, owe a duty to take steps to save his mother if he found her drowning in a shallow pool: ibid.
29 In Evans (Gemma) [2009] EWCA Crim 650 at [20] the Court of Appeal accepted that D did not owe her
16-year-old half-sister such a duty. 30 (1874) 13 Cox CC 75.
31 [1977] QB 354, CA. Also see Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 82 JP 287, CCA (partner of father failed to feed his
children with fatal consequences and with mens rea for murder; held guilty of murder since, by taking money to
buy food, she had assumed a duty towards the child).
 | 2.12 criminal liability : actus reus
house, and (in D2’s case) that she had tried to wash V and provide food. From this
the undertaking of a duty to act could be inferred. Clearly, very little is needed for
such an undertaking to be inferred.
When does a duty to act come to an end?

2.12 A duty to act for another of the type referred to in para 2.11 will be extinguished
if, and when, the relationship giving rise to it ends.
In addition, a mentally competent adult can release someone who owes him a duty,
either before or at the time that the duty would otherwise require action, even if it is
contrary to his best interests.32
Thus, for example, if a mentally competent adult refuses all nutrition (as, for example,
in the case of a hunger-striking prisoner) those caring for him must respect his wishes,
whether his reasons are rational or irrational.33 The right of a mentally competent adult to
self-determination prevails over any countervailing interest of the State.34
Likewise, a mentally competent adult, 35 who has been informed of the consequences
of a refusal, may give an advance refusal of specified treatment should he lack the cap-
acity to consent to that treatment at a later date. The source of this principle was the
common law36 but it is now dealt with by the Mental Capacity Act 2005, ss 24 to 26.
Under these provisions an advance refusal of treatment need not be in writing, unless
it is an advance refusal of life-sustaining treatment in which case it must be in writing
and signed by the person making it in the presence of a witness. Thus, if a mentally com-
petent adult hospital patient who has suffered a number of heart attacks instructs the
hospital in the prescribed written form that next time he suffers a heart attack he does
not want specified resuscitatory treatment, the medical staff will be released from their
duty to provide that treatment when the next heart attack occurs if the patient then lacks
capacity to give or refuse consent to the treatment. Indeed, the Mental Capacity Act
2005, s 24 provides that if there is a valid advance refusal of the treatment in question
that treatment must not be carried out. A doctor who carries out treatment in such cir-
cumstances commits a battery, or a more serious offence against the person, depending
on what harm, if any, is caused by the treament, 37 just as would someone who force-fed
a hunger-striker or the like.
32 Re T [1993] Fam 95, CA; Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 857, 864,
882–883 and 891, per Lords Keith, Goff, Browne-Wilkinson and Mustill; St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S
[1998] 3 All ER 673, CA. 33 Secretary of State for the Home Dept v Robb [1995] Fam 127.
34 Ibid.
35 Ie someone who has reached 18 who does not lack ‘capacity’ under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 2. A
person lacks ‘capacity’ under s 2 if at the material time he is unable to make a decision for himself in relation to
the particular matter because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in, the functioning of the mind or brain. It
does not matter whether the impairment or disturbance is permanent or temporary.
36 Re T [1993] Fam 95; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 881–882, 891–892, per Lords Browne-
Wilkinson and Mustill; Re AK [2001] 1 FLR 129. There is no corollary, ie that an adult of sound mind can insist
on receiving a particular medical treatment: R (on the application of Burke) v General Medical Council [2005]
EWCA Civ 1003 at [31].
37 Re T above; Airedale NHS Trust v Bland above; Re AK above; Re B (consent to treatment: capacity) [2002]
EWHC 429 (Fam); see further as to consent para 7.2.
2.13 actus reus | 
A special situation
Key points 2.4

Where D does an act which creates, or contributes to a situation of in danger, D becomes
under a legal duty to take such steps as lie within D’s power to try to counteract the danger
before it materialises.
2.13 In one situation liability may be based on an omission to act even if the offence
is one which has been judicially construed as generally incapable of commission by an
omission, 38 although not where the express terms of the offence clearly require an act.39
Th is is the situation where D does an act creates, or contributes to a sotiation of danger.
In such a case D becomes under a legal duty to take such steps as lie within D’s power to
try to counteract the danger before it materialises. The leading authority for this princi-
ple is Miller, 40 where D had been convicted of arson (contrary to the Criminal Damage
Act 1971, s 1(1) and (3)) in relation to V’s house. D had claimed that he had started the
fi re accidentally, having fallen asleep while smoking a cigarette. On his own admission
he had woken up before the house was damaged and discovered that he had set his mat-
tress on fi re but had simply gone to another room to resume his slumbers. Dismissing
D’s appeal against conviction, Lord Diplock giving the opinion of the House of Lords,
and speaking in the context of the offence of arson, said that he could see:
‘no rational ground for excluding from conduct capable of giving rise to criminal liability,
conduct which consists of failing to take measures that lie within one’s power to coun-
teract a danger that one has oneself created, if at the time of such conduct one’s state of
mind41 is such as constitutes a necessary ingredient of the offence. . . . I cannot see any
good reason why, so far as liability under criminal law is concerned, it should matter at
what point of time before the resultant damage is complete a person becomes aware42 that
he has done a physical act which, whether or not he appreciated that it would at the time
when he did it, does in fact create a risk that property of another will be damaged: pro-
vided that at the moment of awareness, it lies within his power to take steps . . . to prevent
or minimise the damage to the property at risk.’ 43
The principle is important where D inadvertently creates the situation of danger by an act,
and therefore does not have the necessary mens rea at the time of that act, but becomes
aware of the train of events caused by that act before the resulting harm is complete. If, in
such a case, D then has the relevant mens rea, D will be criminally liable.
38 See para 7.46. 39 Ahmad (1986) 84 Cr App R 64, CA

40 [1983] 2 AC 161, HL. See also para 3.68. For examples of the application of this principle in respect of bat-
tery see paras 7.47 and 7.48.
41 Including negligence in the case of an offence, such as gross negligence manslaughter, where negligence
suffices: Evans (Gemma) [2009] EWCA Crim 650 at [24].
42 Or, in the case of an offence where negligence suffices, ought reasonably to be aware: ibid at [31].
43 [1983] 2 AC 161 at 176.
 | 2.14 criminal liability : actus reus
In Evans (Gemma),44 the Court of Appeal extended Miller to the case where D does
something which contributes to (as opposed to creating) the dangerous situation, in that
case by supplying V, her half-sister, with heroin, after which V created the dangerous situ-
ation (by self-injecting an overdose) from which she died.45 The Court of Appeal upheld
a conviction for manslaughter which was based on D’s failure to seek medical assistance
on discovering that V had overdosed. This part of the decision is discussed further in
para 8.111.
Extent of duty to act

2.14 A general point which may be made about the extent of a duty arising under the
common law is that its extent varies depending on the circumstances and the nature of
the duty. For example, a person who owes a duty to save from harm a person who is help-
less must take steps to care for him, such as summoning medical help or providing food.46
Someone like Miller must take such steps as lie within his power to counteract the danger
he has accidentally created, either by trying to put out the fire himself or by calling out the
fire brigade. A person who is under a contractual duty to act must take such steps as the
contract expressly or impliedly requires; the extent of a doctor’s duty to care for a patient
is considered further below. It has not yet been decided whether a duty under a contract
can apply outside its strict operation; for example, would an ambulance driver who failed
to attend an emergency (or abandoned the journey en route) because his working day had
just ended be in breach of his duty to act? If there are no steps which the person under a
duty to act could take his omission is not culpable.47
As yet there is no clear authority on how much of a risk a person under a duty to act
can be expected to run in order to perform that duty, but there can be no doubt that a
common law duty requires reasonable steps to be taken to perform it (reasonableness
being assessed in the light of the circumstances, including that person’s age and other
relevant characteristics, and any risks to that person or others involved, but excluding
inconvenience or expense).
2.15 Further clarification on the extent of a doctor’s duty to care for a patient has been
provided by case law. A doctor is not obliged to continue with treatment which keeps
a patient alive at all costs; the doctor’s obligation is to take reasonable steps to keep a
patient alive.48 Indeed, a doctor may withdraw care from a patient who is in a persist-
ent vegetative state (PVS) or who is in a minimally conscious state (MCS), as explained
below.
The leading case is Airedale NHS Trust v Bland.49 B had been crushed in the
Hillsborough Stadium disaster. He never recovered consciousness. He remained in hos-
pital in a PVS, with no prospect of recovery or improvement. He was kept alive by a life
support system and fed and hydrated by a nasogastric drip, since he could not swallow. It
44 [2009] EWCA Crim 650.

45 D had not created the dangerous situation (the overdosed condition); V had done so by her free, voluntary
and informed self-injection. See paras 2.43–2.45. 46 Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354, CA.
47 Tilley [2009] EWCA Crim 1426.
48 R (on the application of Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] EWCA Civ 1003 at [32].
49 [1993] AC 789, HL.
2.15 actus reus | 
was known that the withdrawal of the artificial feeding would cause death by starvation
within a few weeks. The Trust applied for a declaration that its doctors might lawfully
discontinue all life-saving treatment, including the artificial feeding and hydration.
The House of Lords granted the declaration, holding that a doctor would not be behav-
ing unlawfully in discontinuing this treatment, including the artificial feeding. The
House regarded the withdrawal of the treatment and feeding as an omission, and not
as an act. It was probably right to do so, despite the fact that the withdrawal of feed-
ing involved the act of removing the nasogastric drip from B. Because an omission was
involved, the crucial question was whether the doctors would be in breach of their duty
to treat B by withdrawing treatment and feeding. The House held that, where a patient is
incapable of communicating, life-preserving treatment can be discontinued if respon-
sible and competent medical opinion is of the view that its continuation is not in the
patient’s interests because it is futile and cannot confer any benefit on him; in such a
case discontinuation of life-preserving treatment will not involve a breach of the doc-
tor’s duty. The House emphasised that the question is not whether the withdrawal is in
the patient’s best interests, but whether the artificial prolongation of life is, and that it is
not in the patient’s best interest to prolong life where there is no hope of any improvement
in his condition.
In W v M,50 Baker J said that the Bland principles are also applicable where a patient
is in a MCS, a state slightly higher than PVS. In such a case, the decision must be made
by weighing the relevant considerations, in particular the patient’s quality of life if treat-
ment continued and the importance of preserving life, but this is not necessary where the
patient is in a PVS where treatment is futile.51
In Bland, the House of Lords held that, before doctors discontinue life-prolonging
treatment in PVS cases, the guidance of the Family Division of the High Court should
be sought, although with the passage of time a body of experience and practice might
build up which would enable the President of that Division to relax the requirement. This
has not yet happened. The general practice of seeking guidance in PVS cases has been
extended to MCS cases.
In Bland, the House of Lords emphasised that euthanasia by means of a positive act to
end a patient’s life, such as administering a lethal drug, remains unlawful. It is for this
reason that the House considered it necessary to approach the issue before it from the
viewpoint of an omission. The distinction drawn by the House between an act and an
omission is dubious in moral terms, as Lords Lowry, Browne-Wilkinson and Mustill rec-
ognised in Bland.52 Arguably, euthanasia by a fast-acting drug is less deserving of pun-
ishment than a slow death by starvation in consequence of a failure to feed. Nevertheless,
in Inglis, 53 the Court of Appeal re-affirmed that, ‘[u]ntil Parliament decides otherwise,
the law recognises a distinction between the withdrawal of treatment supporting life,
which, subject to stringent conditions, may be lawful, and the active termination of life,
which is unlawful.’
50 [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).

51 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 868, per Lord Goff; W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam).
52 [1993] AC 789, 881–882, 887, per Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Mustill.
53 [2010] EWCA Crim 2637 at [38].
 | 2.16 criminal liability : actus reus
The principles set out in Bland in respect of withdrawing treatment from a PVS patient
were held not to be contrary to the ECHR by Butler-Sloss P in NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust
B v H.54 Her Ladyship held that an omission to provide medical treatment by a medical
team would only be incompatible with Article 2 (right to life) if the circumstances were such
as to impose an obligation on the State to prolong a person’s life, and there was not such an
obligation in the case of a PVS patient; where the continuation of life was not in his best
interests. Her Ladyship added that Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treat-
ment), which – she held – requires the victim to be aware of such treatment, does not apply
to protect an insensate patient against the withdrawal of treatment.55
States of affairs
2.16 Sometimes the definition of an offence simply requires the occurrence of a speci-
fied state of affairs in which D is involved, no act or omission on his part being required.
All offences where a mere state of affairs is sufficient are statutory. One example is provided
by the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, s 1, whereby a person is guilty of an offence if he has
with him in any public place any offensive weapon without lawful authority or reason-
able excuse. Another example is provided by the Licensing Act 1872, s 12, whereby it is an
offence to be found drunk in a public place. A third example is provided by the Road Traffic
Act 1988, s 4, whereby it is an offence to be in charge of a mechanically propelled vehicle on
a road or other public place when unfit to drive through drink or drugs. A last example is
provided by the Fraud Act 2006, s 6, whereby it is an offence to have in one’s possession or
under one’s control any article for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud.
Consequences and circumstances

Consequences
2.17 D’s act or omission may be required to cause a particular consequence. In murder
and manslaughter it must be proved that D’s act or omission resulted in the unlawful
killing of a human being, 56 and in criminal damage, contrary to the Criminal Damage
Act 1971, s 1(1), it must be proved that property belonging to another was destroyed or
damaged as the result of D’s behaviour.57 The rules relating to the issue of causation are
dealt with in paras 2.28 to 2.61.
Offences requiring a consequence to result from D’s act or omission are referred to as
‘result crimes’ and other offences as ‘conduct crimes’.58
54 [2001] Fam 348. See also A Hospital v W [2007] EWHC 425 (Fam) (Article 2) and W v M [2011] EWHC
2443 (Fam) (Article 3).
55 There would not be a breach of Article 8 (right to private life) if the decision to withold or withdraw treat-
ment had proper regard to the patient’s autonomy and the expressed wishes of the patient and the patient’s fam-
ily: W v M [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam). 56 Key points 8.1.
57 Para 13.4.
58 See, eg, Treacy v DPP [1971] AC 537 at 560, per Lord Diplock; Berry [1985] AC 246 at 254, per Lord Roskill;
Steer [1986] 3 All ER 611, CA; A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868. ‘Conduct crime’ would
seem to be an inappropriate term to describe offences based on an omission or a state of affairs.
2.20 actus reus | 
Circumstances
2.18 The circumstances in which the act, omission or state of affairs may be required to
occur vary widely from offence to offence. The sexual intercourse in the offences of sex
with an adult relative must be with someone who is a relative of a prescribed type;59 the
act of entry in burglary must be as a trespasser;60 and bigamy can be perpetrated only by
a person who is already married.61
2.19 Sometimes a circumstance of the actus reus is framed in negative terms, as in
the case of the statutory offences of using a motor vehicle on a road or other public
place without insurance62 and of carrying on a business of tattooing, semi-permanent
skin colouring, cosmetic piercing or electrolysis without being registered by the local
authority. 63 Such phrases are requisite circumstances of the actus reus because they are
an essential element in making the conduct criminal; it is, for example, no offence to use
a motor vehicle on a road, but it becomes so if there is no insurance in effect. Likewise,
there is no offence of carrying on a business of tattooing but it becomes an offence if it
is not registered. Negatively drafted phrases of the present type must be distinguished
from references in a statute to some matter which provides an excuse (ie a defence) to
conduct which tends to criminality in its own right, an example being the phrase ‘with-
out lawful excuse’ in respect of the offence of criminal damage to property belonging to
another.64 Deciding which side of the line a phrase falls can give rise to fine distinctions.
For example, in an offence of ‘knowingly making a record without the written consent
of the performers’ it was held that the words italicised were part of the actus reus of the
offence, 65 whereas in an offence of knowingly delivering intoxicating liquor to a child
under 14 except in a vessel sealed in the prescribed manner the italicised words indicated
an excuse. 66
Are justifications or excuses part of the actus reus?

Key points 2.5
Justifications referred to in the definition of an offence are part of its actus reus; excuses
referred to in the definition are not.
2.20 The defi nitions of many offences refer to justifications or to excuses. Sometimes,
the reference is to a justification or excuse specifically provided for the offence charged,
which may be defined in detail. In other definitions, reference is made to a number of
general justifications or excuses and is made by one word or phrase.
59 Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss 64 and 65; paras 9.99 and 9.100. 60 Theft Act 1968, s 9; para 11.2.
61 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 57. 62 Road Traffic Act 1988, s 143.
63 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, s 15. Th is offence only applies in the area of a local
authority which has adopted the relevant provisions. 64 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1.
65 Gaumont British Distributors Ltd v Henry [1939] 2 KB 711, DC; para 3.49.
66 Brooks v Mason [1902] 2 KB 743, DC; para 3.49.
 | 2.21 criminal liability : actus reus
Although it has been said that the criminal law does not make any clear-cut distinction
between a justification and an excuse, 67 a justification differs from an excuse in that it
renders D’s conduct lawful, whereas an excuse simply excuses D from liability for con-
duct which is nevertheless unlawful. Academic opinion differs as to whether defences
are part of the actus reus. Professor Williams took the view that:
‘
‘Actus reus includes . . . the absence of any ground of justification or defence, whether such
justification or excuse be stated in any statute creating the crime or implied by the courts
in accordance with general principles.’ 68
On the other hand, Professor Lanham’s view is that:
‘As a matter of analysis [a crime is] made up of three ingredients, actus reus, mens rea and
(a negative element) absence of a valid defence.’ 69
As explained below, the view taken in this book lies between these two views: actus
reus includes the absence of a justification but not the absence of an excuse.70
Justifications
2.21 Examples of justifications are the ‘public and private defences’ of prevention of
crime, self-defence and related ‘defences’.71 ‘Defences’ has been placed in inverted com-
mas because, as has been indicated in the Court of Appeal,72 none of these justifications
is properly to be regarded as a defence; instead, they are matters which, if they are raised,
the prosecution must disprove as an essential part of the prosecution case before a guilty
verdict is possible. In the definitions of murder and other offences against the person there
appear the words ‘unlawful’ or ‘unlawfully’, which indicate that no offence is committed if
one of these justifications exists, as where D kills V in lawful self-defence. This being so, it
would certainly be odd to say that, for example, a person who kills another in lawful self-
defence has committed the actus reus of murder. It is clear from modern cases, particularly
Gladstone Williams73 and Beckford v R,74 that references to these and other justifications in
the definition of an offence are to an element of its actus reus, being part of its prescribed
consequence. While D does not have to prove a justification, the prosecution does not have
to disprove it (and thereby prove the element of unlawfulness) unless there is sufficient evi-
dence – normally from D – to raise it.75 This is an exceptional situation where D has even
an evidential burden in relation to an element of the actus reus of an offence.
The public and private defences are general defences. They apply not only to offences
whose definition refers to them but also to offences which do not. In the case of the latter
type of offence these justifications are not part of the actus reus.
67 Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] Fam 147 at 237, per Brooke LJ.
68 Criminal Law: The General Part 20. 69 ‘Larsonneur Revisited’ [1976] Crim LR 276.
70 See also ATH Smith ‘On Actus Reus and Mens Rea’ in Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978) (Glazebrook
(ed)) 95 at 99. 71 These are described in detail in paras 16.1–16.38. For other examples, see para 7.50.
72 Wheeler [1967] 3 All ER 829 at 830; Abraham [1973] 3 All ER 694 at 696.
73 (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA; para 5.7. 74 [1988] AC 130, PC; para 5.7. 75 Paras 4.10 and 4.11.
2.23 actus reus | 
2.22 Another example of a justification is consent. In the defi nition of rape and a number
of other sexual offences D’s conduct is expressly required to be without V’s consent. In
these offences, ‘without consent’ is an essential element in making the conduct criminal
and is clearly part of the actus reus.76
2.23 In a number of non-fatal offences against the person in whose defi nition ‘unlawful’
or ‘unlawfully’ appears, the presence of a valid consent can render lawful what would
otherwise be unlawful. As with the elements of justification mentioned above, D will not
act ‘unlawfully’ (nor will what D does be ‘unlawful’) if D acts with a valid consent from V.
As with those elements of justification, D has an evidential burden in respect of the issue
of consent. The relevance of consent in these respects is dealt with in Chapter 7.
In Kimber,77 a case concerned with the repealed offence of indecent assault on a woman,
which required proof of an assault or a battery in circumstances of indecency, the Court
of Appeal took the view, as part of the ratio decidendi in that case, that absence of con-
sent, where it was relevant to liability, was an element of the actus reus of a non-fatal
offence against the person.78 This must be correct: it would be odd to treat consent as a
justification differently from other elements of justification or from the situations where
‘without consent’ appears in the definition of the offence. For this reason it is surprising
that in an obiter dictum in Brown,79 where none of their Lordships referred to Kimber,
Lord Jauncey, without deciding the point, preferred the view that (a valid) consent was
a defence, as opposed to the absence of consent being an element of the actus reus of an
offence. In Brown Lord Templeman, obiter, treated (a valid) consent as a ‘defence’ but he
did not say that the absence of consent was not an element of the actus reus of an offence;
he may simply have been using ‘defence’ in the way that term is loosely used in relation to
self-defence and the like. Lord Lowry also referred obiter to consent as a ‘defence’, but he
must have been using that term in its loose sense and regarded the absence of consent as
an element of the actus reus of an offence, because he referred with approval to the defi-
nition of common assault in the draft Criminal Code Bill, 80 which treats the absence of
consent as an element of the actus reus. Lords Mustill and Slynn were clearly of the view
obiter that the absence of (a valid) consent was an element of the actus reus, and not sim-
ply a defence. It is submitted that, overall, there is nothing in these obiter dicta in Brown
to affect the view taken as part of the ratio decidendi in Kimber.
Subsequent to Brown, in K, 81 a case concerned with indecent assault on a woman, Lord
Hobhouse took the same view as that taken in Kimber. In Barnes, 82 another later case,
the Court of Appeal appears to have taken the same view as in Kimber, stating that it is
a requirement of the offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 18 and
20, referred to in paras 7.75 to 7.94, that the conduct itself should be unlawful and that
where the offending act is done with V’s (valid) consent, D is not guilty of such an offence
because D’s conduct is not unlawful.
76 Olugboja [1981] 3 All ER 443 at 444. 77 [1983] 3 All ER 316, CA; para 5.7.
78 The same view was taken by the Court of Criminal Appeal in May [1912] 3 KB 572 at 575 and by the Court
of Appeal in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 at 718.
79 [1994] 1 AC 212, HL; para 7.3. Brown was concerned with offences under the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861, ss 20 and 47.
80 Law Commission: A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989), Law Com No 177; see para 1.70.
81 [2001] UKHL 41. 82 [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
 | 2.24 criminal liability : actus reus
What if D is unaware that a justification exists?

2.24 The principle that a reference to justifications in the definition of an offence is part
of its actus reus does not necessarily mean that a person who acts in circumstances justi-
fying his conduct, but without realising that they exist, does not commit the actus reus of
such an offence. The reason is that all that ‘unlawfully’ or some other word in the defini-
tion referring to justification does is to make it clear that the offence is not committed if
a relevant justification applies on the facts. Such a word says nothing about the nature of
the element of justification, and it may be that the element is only available if D knew of
the facts which justified his conduct (or believed that they existed). Authority that this
is the position in law is provided by the decision in the old case of Dadson, 83 where D, a
constable, was employed to guard a copse from which wood had been stolen. He saw V
come out carrying wood, which he was stealing. V refused to stop and D shot him in the
leg in order to stop him and arrest him. At the time, it was assumed that it was lawful to
shoot an escaping felon in order to arrest him. The theft of the wood was not itself a felony,
but V was committing a felony because (unknown to D) he had repeatedly been convicted
of stealing wood. It was held that D had rightly been convicted of unlawfully wounding V
with intent to do him grievous bodily harm since there was no justification for it, D being
ignorant of the facts making V a felon. In relation to a case where a constable makes an
arrest in ignorance of facts entitling him to make it, the solution remains the same as in
Dadson because the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 28(3) states that an arrest is
only lawful if the person arrested is informed of the ground of the arrest at the time or as
soon as practicable thereafter. As the Divisional Court in Chapman v DPP84 pointed out,
this means that if a person is unaware of the facts justifying the arrest he cannot comply
with s 28(3) and the arrest will be unlawful, as will force used in effecting it.
In practice, the point is not as important as it may seem. The reason is that if (contrary
to Dadson) a person who acted under circumstances of justification of which he is ignorant
did not commit the actus reus of an offence whose definition required him to act ‘unlaw-
fully’ or otherwise without justification, he could nevertheless be guilty of an attempt to
commit that offence85 if it was an indictable one (ie one triable only on indictment or one
triable either way).86 This is because the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(3) provides that,
on a charge of attempt, D is to be treated as if the facts were as D believed them to be. 87
Excuses
2.25 The definitions of many more offences refer to excuses (ie defences which excuse
D from liability for conduct which is nevertheless criminal) than refer to elements of
justification.
As already indicated, the view taken in this book is that under the law as it now stands
matters of excuse referred to in the definition of an offence are not part of its actus reus.
83 (1850) 3 Car & Kir 148. Also see Thain [1985] NI 457, NICA, and Christopher ‘Unknowing Justification and
the Logical Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defence’ (1995) 15 OJLS 229.
84 (1988) 89 Cr App R 190, DC.
85 Hogan ‘The Dadson Principle’ [1989] Crim LR 679.
86 Or a summary offence to which the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 applies; see para 14.141.
87 Para 14.130.
2.27 actus reus | 
That is why it was stated in Key points 2.1 that the circumstances of an actus reus do not
include excuses to which the definition of an offence refers.
2.26 For the sake of completeness it should be noted that many excuses are not con-
tained in the definition but are found elsewhere. An example is the defence of publication
for the public good provided by the Obscene Publications Act 1959, s 4(1) in respect of
the offences of publishing an obscene article and of having such an article for publication
for gain, contrary to the Obscene Publications Act 1959, s 2(1). By way of further exam-
ple, murder is defined by the common law, but the Homicide Act 1957, s 2 provides the
defence to a murder charge of diminished responsibility.
The excuses just mentioned are specific defences, in that they are limited to one offence
or to a narrow range of offences. There are, in addition, three general defences described
in Chapter 16 which operate as excuses: duress by threats, marital coercion and duress of
circumstances.
It follows from the view that excuses which are part of the definition of an offence are
not part of its actus reus that these non-definitional excuses, whether specific or gen-
eral, are clearly not part of the actus reus of an offence in a negative sense (eg ‘otherwise
than under duress’). In terms of the defence of duress by threats, for example, DPP for
Northern Ireland v Lynch88 can be cited in support. According to the House of Lords in
that case that defence is something superimposed on the other ingredients of an offence,
the actus reus and the mens rea, which by themselves would constitute the offence.
Whole of actus reus must be satisfied

2.27 There can be no criminal liability unless the whole actus reus is satisfied. A person
who had the mens rea for an offence cannot be convicted of that offence if he has not com-
mitted its actus reus. In White, 89 for instance, D put potassium cyanide in his mother’s
drink, intending to kill her. Shortly afterwards the mother was found dead with the glass,
partly full, beside her. The medical evidence was that she had died from a heart attack,
and not from poisoning, and that the quantity of potassium cyanide administered was
insufficient to cause her death. D was acquitted of murder (but convicted of attempted
murder) because, although the intended consequence – death – had occurred, it had not
been caused by his conduct and thus an element of the actus reus of murder was missing.
Similarly, someone who handles goods, mistakenly believing that they are stolen goods,
cannot be convicted of handling stolen goods (but only of attempted handling)90 since
the necessary circumstance that the goods are stolen is absent.
Causation
Key points 2.6
Where the actus reus of an offence requires a consequence to result from D’s conduct, the
prosecution must prove:
88 [1975] AC 653, HL. 89 [1910] 2 KB 124, CCA. 90 Para 14.133.

 | 2.28 criminal liability : actus reus
• that D’s conduct was a factual cause of that consequence (factual causation); and
• that the consequence is legally attributable to D’s conduct (legal causation).
2.28 For the purposes of causation, ‘cause’ simply means ‘accelerate’. Thus, it is no
defence, in itself, in offences of homicide that V was already dying from some mortal ill-
ness if D’s conduct has accelerated death.91
Factual causation
2.29 D’s conduct is not a factual cause of the specified consequence unless that conse-
quence would not have occurred, when and as it did, but for that conduct. This is often
described as the ‘but for’ test.
Application of the ‘but for’ test indicates whether or not the specified consequence can
be attributed to D’s conduct as a matter of fact. If it can be, the question of whether that
death can be attributed to D for the purposes of legal liability depends on whether or not
D’s conduct is a legal cause of the specified consequence; only if it is92 can that conse-
quence be attributed to D for that purpose.
All this can be illustrated as follows:
• D stabs V. The next day, X decapitates V.
• As in White, D administers a poison to V. Before it can take effect V dies of a heart
attack induced by natural causes.
In neither of these cases is D’s conduct a factual cause of death because it cannot be said
that the death would not have occurred, when and as it did, but for it.93 Contrast the
following:
• D stabs V who is later stabbed by X. V dies from the effects of both wounds.
• D stabs V who receives emergency treatment in hospital from which he dies.
In these two cases the death would not have occurred, when and as it did, but for D’s
conduct, which is therefore a factual cause of death. However, whether V’s death in these
cases is attributable to D for the purposes of liability (ie whether D’s conduct is a legal
cause of V’s death) depends on the principles of legal causation.
2.30 As part of the ‘but for’ test, there will be no factual causation if D was unable to
prevent the consequence occurring. This is shown by Dalloway94 where D was driving a
cart when a young child ran into the road a few yards in front of the horse. The child was
hit by one of the wheels and killed. At the time D was driving the cart carelessly because
91 Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454, CCA; Adams [1957] Crim LR 365; Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001]
Fam 147 at 199, per Ward LJ. See paras 2.32 and 3.23 in respect of the liability of doctors who hasten death by
medical treatment designed to relieve pain.
92 Whether it is depends on the principles set out in paras 2.31 to 2.60.
93 See White [1910] 2 KB 124 (para 2.27) in relation to the second example.
94 (1847) 2 Cox CC 273.
2.32 actus reus | 
the reins were not in his hands. The jury were directed that if D could have avoided killing
the child if he had had hold of the reins, he was guilty of manslaughter, but if D could not
have done so by the use of the reins, he was not guilty.
Legal causation
2.31 In the following paragraphs there is a set of principles relating to legal causation,
which have mainly been established in murder and manslaughter cases but which are
equally applicable to other types of offence.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that those principles always apply whenever
legal causation is in issue in other types of offence. In Kennedy (No 2), Lord Bingham giv-
ing the opinion of the House of Lords stated that:
‘Questions of causation frequently arise in many areas of the law, but causation is not a
single, unvarying concept to be mechanically applied without regard to the context95 in
which the question arises.’ 96
The same point had previously been made by Lord Hoffman, with whose speech three
other Law Lords agreed, in Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v
Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd.97 This is a fair point to make but it would be erroneous
to think that there are many contexts in the criminal law in which the principles of legal
causation applicable to murder and manslaughter do not apply to an offence where D’s
conduct is required to have caused a specified consequence. That said, it has to be admitted
that the nature of an offence may be such that many of those principles are irrelevant.
In para 2.46, reference is made to two different contexts where a different principle
applies from that which applies under the set of principles referred to above.
More than negligible contribution

2.32 Courts have often said that a specified consequence can only be attributed to D
(ie his conduct will be a legal cause of it) if his conduct was a substantial cause of it.98
‘Substantial’ in this context does not mean ‘principal’ or ‘predominant’; it merely
means that D’s contribution to the consequence must be more than a minimal, minute
or negligible contribution (which would be ignored anyway under the general de mini-
mis principle).99 The judge must explain to the jury what is meant by causation in the
context of the offence before the court. A simple reference to ‘substantial’100 may give
95 Ie the purpose and scope of the rule in question.

96 [2007] UKHL 38 at [15]. 97 [1999] 2 AC 22, HL.
98 See, eg, Smith [1959] 2 QB 35, Courts-Martial Appeal Court (renamed the Court Martial Appeal Court by
the Armed Forces Act 2006, s 272; this court’s powers correspond in general with those of the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division), as does its composition); Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133, CA; Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260, CA;
Notman [1994] Crim LR 518, CA.
99 Smith above; Hennigan above; Cato above; Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552; MH [2011] EWCA Crim 1508.
100 Or ‘significant’ (a term used in Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670, CA) which has the same meaning in causa-
tion as ‘substantial’: Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552 at [35].
 | 2.33 criminal liability : actus reus
rise to difficulties and may be insufficient, as the term may be misunderstood.101 A useful
way of explaining the word ‘substantial’ is to say that it requires ‘more than a slight or a
trifling’ contribution to the consequence.102
The present principle provides an explanation for a statement by Devlin J, as he then
was, in Adams.103 Dealing with the situation where a doctor administered drugs, which
would shorten life, in order to ease severe pain, he said:
‘If life were cut short by weeks or months it was just as much murder as if it were cut short
by years. But that does not mean that a doctor aiding the sick or dying has to calculate in
minutes or hours, or perhaps in days or weeks, the effect on the patient’s life of the medi-
cines which he administers. If the first purpose of medicine – the restoration of life – can
no longer be achieved, there is still much for the doctor to do, and he is entitled to do all
that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering even if measures he takes may
incidentally shorten life.’
The distinction between shortening life by ‘weeks or months’ and ‘by minutes or hours’
is that the former involves a more than negligible acceleration of death, whereas the latter
does not. The possible equation of shortening life by days or weeks with shortening it by
minutes or hours would seem to be generous and is of doubtful validity. Such a shorten-
ing would seem to be a more than negligible acceleration of death, particularly where it
is by weeks. Even with a liberal application, a defence based on causation for doctors in
the present situation has a very limited scope. The application of the doctrine of ‘double
effect’, referred to in para 3.23, provides a more generous defence.
Key points 2.7

In the event of one of the situations outlined below being involved, additional principles
of legal causation specific to it come into operation.
Contributions by third parties

2.33 As already indicated, D’s conduct need not be the sole, or even the main, cause of
the specified consequence.104 Thus, even though a third party has substantially con-
tributed to someone’s death, the death can be legally attributed to D if D’s act is also
a substantial cause. It is not the function of the jury to evaluate competing causes or to
choose which is dominant.105 In Benge,106 D, a foreman platelayer, misread the timetable
so that the track was up when a train arrived. D had placed a signalman with a flag up
the line but only half as far as he should have been sent under the company’s rules, and
the engine driver, who was not keeping a very sharp lookout, did not see the signal in
time to stop. The resulting accident caused several deaths. If the signalman had gone the
101 Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552.
102 Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35, CA; Barnes [2008] EWCA Crim 2726. 103 [1957] Crim LR 365.
104 Smith [1959] 2 QB 35, C-MAC (see para 2.32, n 98); Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279 at 288; Cheshire [1991]
3 All ER 670, CA. 105 Ibid.
106 (1865) 4 F & F 504.
2.36 actus reus | 
proper distance and the driver had been keeping a proper lookout there would not have
been an accident, but D was convicted of manslaughter after the judge had ruled that, if
D’s conduct was a substantial cause of the accident, it was irrelevant that the conduct of
others had contributed to it. Of course, in a case like this the other individual railwaymen
could also be convicted in relation to the same death if their individual contribution to it
was also substantial.
Victim’s contributory negligence

2.34 Unless it is so gross as to prevent D’s act being a substantial cause, V’s contribu-
tory negligence is no defence. In Longbottom,107 V, who was deaf, was walking in the
middle of the highway and was run over by D, who was driving too fast. It was held that
D could be convicted of manslaughter notwithstanding any contributory negligence on
V’s part in walking as V had done.
Cases where a victim contributes to the specified consequence by an intervening act
are dealt with below.
Pre-existing conditions in the victim

2.35 The existence of a medical condition which rendered V more susceptible to death
or injury, eg haemophilia, does not prevent legal attribution of that consequence to D.
D must take his victim as he finds him. In Hayward,108 D arrived home in a state of agita-
tion, saying that he was ‘going to give his wife something’ when she came home. On her
arrival there was an altercation and the wife ran into the road, closely pursued by D who
was making violent threats towards her. The wife fell down in the road and was found
to be dead when she was picked up. The medical evidence was that the wife was in good
health apart from a persistent thymus gland, but that in this condition death might result
from a combination of fright and physical exertion. The jury were directed that the wife’s
susceptibility to death, whether D knew of it or not, was irrelevant if they were satisfied
that her death was accelerated by his threats of violence. The judge directed the jury that
proof of actual physical violence was unnecessary, since death from fright alone, caused
by an illegal act, such as a threat of violence, was enough.
2.36 The rule that D must take his victim as D finds him is not limited to physical
conditions. It was established in Blaue109 that it also applies to the ‘whole person’ and
therefore applies to mental conditions and, even, to the victim’s religion. In Blaue, V,
who had been stabbed by D, was a Jehovah’s Witness and consequently refused to have
a blood transfusion which was required before surgery and which might have saved her
life. The Court of Appeal held that a victim’s refusal to have medical treatment could not
provide a defence. In such a case D would be liable if his act was still an operating and
substantial cause of death. D was liable because the physical cause of death was the bleed-
ing in the pleural cavity arising from the penetration of the lung. This was not brought
about by any decision of V, but by the stab wound. Rejecting an argument that V’s refusal
107 (1849) 13 JP 270. Also see Swindall and Osborne (1846) 2 Car & Kir 230.
108 (1908) 21 Cox CC 692. 109 [1975] 3 All ER 446, CA.
 | 2.37 criminal liability : actus reus
had been unreasonable and prevented the death being legally attributable to D, the Court
of Appeal said:
‘It has long been the policy of the law that those who use violence on other people must
take their victims as they find them. This in our judgment means the whole man, not
just the physical man. It does not lie in the mouth of the assailant to say that his victim’s
religious beliefs which inhibited him from accepting certain kinds of treatment were
unreasonable. The question for decision is what caused the death. The answer is the stab
wound.’110
Under the law of tort, V’s refusal of a transfusion would have broken the chain of cau-
sation (ie prevented legal attribution of the death) if it was not reasonably foreseeable,
but the Court of Appeal refused to adopt such a test for the criminal law, adopting the
argument that the criminal law is concerned with the maintenance of law and order and
the protection of the public generally. It has been observed111 that this argument ignores
the fact that D in Blaue could in any event have been convicted of the serious crime of
wounding with intent and the need for public protection could have been served by a con-
viction and sentence for that offence as much as by a conviction and sentence for man-
slaughter. On the other hand, it could be said that once one accepts the rule that D must
take his victim as he finds him there is no valid distinction between a physical condition
making V susceptible to death and a religious conviction which makes it impossible for
V to permit steps to be taken to save his life.
Intervening causes
2.37 An intervening act or event (ie an act or event occurring after D’s conduct) may
break the chain of causation. Whether or not it does so depends on the application of the
relevant legal principle referred to below.
Intervening natural events

2.38 The occurrence of an independent intervening natural event causing the specified
consequence, which would not have had that effect but for D’s act, will not prevent the
legal attribution of the consequence to D if the type of event (as opposed to the details
of the particular event) was reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course of things. In
such a case the specified consequence is said to be a ‘natural’ consequence of D’s act.112
Thus, if D injures V and leaves V lying incapacitated on the ground, it is immaterial that
V dies of exposure when the temperature drops that night. The same would be so, as in
the New Zealand case of Hart,113 if D injures V and leaves V incapacitated on the beach
below the high water line, and V is drowned by the incoming tide. Conversely, the death
would not be attributable to D if V was killed by an unlikely event such as an earthquake
or a lightning strike.
110 [1975] 3 All ER 446 at 450. 111 Williams ‘Criminal Law – Causation’ (1976) 35 CLJ 15.
112 Perkins Criminal Law (2nd edn) 722–723; Hallett v R [1969] SASR 141, S Australian Supreme Ct.
113 [1986] 2 NZLR 408, NZCA.
2.42 actus reus | 
2.39 A not dissimilar approach has been applied in a context far removed from that of
offences against the person, viz a strict liability114 offence based on a duty to guard against
natural events. In Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress
Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd,115 Lord Hoffmann (with whose speech three other Law Lords
agreed) said that in such an offence an intervening natural event only prevents legal attri-
bution if its occurrence is abnormal and extraordinary rather than a normal fact of life.
Lord Hoffmann thought that an event could be a normal fact of life ‘if it was in the general
run of things a matter of ordinary occurrence, even if it was not foreseeable that it would
happen to that particular defendant, or take that particular form’. There is no real differ-
ence between Lord Hoff mann’s test and that above116 because whether an event is in the
general run of things must depend on whether the event is of a type which is reasonably
foreseeable. The point that Lord Hoffmann was making seems simply to have been that
the details of the particular event need not have been foreseeable.
2.40 It would seem that a specified consequence can be legally attributed to D’s con-
duct notwithstanding that it was caused by an unforeseeable intervening occurrence, if
that occurrence was dependent on (ie caused by) his conduct. For example, if D intend-
ing to kill V, throws a fire bomb at V, and V is killed not by being burnt to death but
by an explosion when the bomb misses him and ignites a gas leak, V’s death is legally
attributable to D.
Intervening acts by the victim or a third party

2.41 This heading relates to cases where, although the required consequence would not
have occurred without D’s act, an intervening act by V or by a third party contributed
to it. In the case of an intervening act, whether by V or by a third party, the situation is
complicated by the fact that, while there are principles which apply to intervening acts in
general by V or by a third party, they give way to other principles which apply to specific
types of intervening acts:
• where V neglects treatment or maltreats himself;
• where V dies or injures himself in trying to escape; and
• where intervening medical treatment contributes to V’s death or injury.
Leaving aside these special cases, which are dealt with later, the position is as follows.
Where D’s act is an immediate cause

2.42 Where D’s act is an immediate cause (as well as a substantial cause) of the conse-
quence, that result is attributable legally to D even though the later act of V or a third
party was also a cause of it.
Suppose D stabs V and shortly afterwards X stabs V. V dies from the cumulative effect
of the two wounds, the second merely aggravating the effect of the first. The death can be
attributed to both D and X whether or not they were acting in combination and whether or
114 Para 6.1. 115 [1999] 2 AC 22, HL.

116 Support for this view can be found in Girdler [2009] EWCA Crim 2666 at [42].
 | 2.43 criminal liability : actus reus
not either wound was mortal in itself. Support for this principle can be found in Malcherek;
Steel.117 Both of these consolidated appeals concerned defendants who had injured their
victims so severely that they suffered irreversible brain damage. Both victims were put on
life-support machines. In both cases the machines were turned off after doctors diagnosed
brain stem death, although they had not carried out all the relevant tests. The victims were
declared dead soon afterwards. Both defendants were convicted of murder after the trial
judge in each case withdrew the issue of causation from the jury on the basis that there
was no evidence that the defendant had not caused the death of his victim. The question
in each case for the Court of Appeal, who proceeded on the basis that the victims died at
the latest soon after the machines were turned off, was whether the judge had been correct
in withdrawing the issue of causation because there was evidence on which the jury could
have found that the cause of death was the switching off of the machines. Dismissing the
appeals, the Court of Appeal said that this evidence was immaterial. Even if the switching
off had also been a cause of death, this would not have altered the fact that the defendants’
actions were a substantial and operating cause of death.
Where D’s act is not an immediate cause

2.43 Where D’s act is not an immediate cause of the required consequence but never-
theless contributes to it, by providing the setting for an intervening act by someone else
which is the immediate cause of the consequence, the situation is generally as follows.
According to the leading academic work on causation, Hart and Honoré’s Causation
in the Law:
‘The free, deliberate and informed intervention of a second person, who intends to exploit
the situation created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is normally held to
relieve the first actor of criminal responsibility.’118
The ‘fi rst person/actor’ is, of course, the defendant in question; the ‘second person’
may be the victim or a third party. The meaning of ‘not acting in concert with him
[the fi rst person]’ is not explained, but it must be meant to refer to cases where the
fi rst person would not be liable as an accomplice (eg an aider or abettor) to an offence
perpetrated by a second person. Otherwise the well-established rules about second-
ary liability119 would be greatly limited in their operation, something which Hart and
Honoré did not intend.
Under Hart and Honoré’s principle, an intervening act (sometimes referred to as a
novus actus interveniens) by V or a third party which is the immediate cause of the con-
sequence breaks the chain of causation from D’s act if it is free, deliberate and informed.
On the other hand, if the intervening act by V or a third party is not a free one, or is not a
deliberate act, or is not an informed act, the chain of causation from D’s act is not broken.
By way of example, an intervening act is not a ‘free’ one if done under compulsion or
duress or in self-defence; it is not ‘deliberate’ if it is done instinctively or in blind panic,
117 [1981] 2 All ER 422, CA.

118 (2nd edn, 1985) 326. For a critique of Hart and Honoré’s analysis, see Jones ‘Causation, Homicide and the
Supply of Drugs’ (2006) 26 LS 139. 119 These rules are set out in Ch 17.
2.45 actus reus | 
and it is not ‘informed’ if the intervening actor does not appreciate the situation in which
he acts (eg, because of mistake or youth or mental incapacity).
Hart and Honoré’s statement of principle received qualified approval from the Court of
Appeal in Pagett.120 In Pagett, D, in order to resist arrest, held V in front of him as a shield
and fired at armed policemen who fired back instinctively and killed V. Dismissing an appeal
against a conviction for manslaughter, the Court of Appeal held that, if a reasonable act of
self-defence, or in the execution of duty, by a third party against an act by D causes V’s death,
the causal link between D’s act and V’s death is not broken. Clearly, the policemen’s instinc-
tive act of firing back was neither free nor a deliberate one. Referring to Hart and Honoré’s
principle, Robert Goff LJ (as he then was) stated: ‘We resist the temptation of expressing
the judicial opinion whether we find ourselves in complete agreement with that definition;
though we certainly consider it to be broadly correct and supported by authority.’121
In Latif and Shahzad,122 the House of Lords was less hesitant and gave Hart and
Honoré’s principle unqualified approval. Lord Steyn, with whose reasons the other Law
Lords agreed, adopted Hart and Honoré’s principle, saying: ‘The general principle is that
the free, deliberate and informed intervention of a second person who intends to exploit
the situation created by the first, but is not acting in concert with him, is held to relieve
the first actor of criminal responsibility.’123
2.44 The general applicability of the Hart and Honoré principle was subsequently put
in doubt by Court of Appeal decisions in Rogers (Stephen)124 and Kennedy (No 2).125 In
these cases the Court of Appeal held that a person (D) who held a tourniquet while V self-
injected heroin with fatal effect (Rogers (Stephen)), or who supplied heroin to V for imme-
diate self-injection and V did so with fatal effect (Kennedy (No 2)), could be convicted of
constructive manslaughter (which requires death to have been caused by a criminal and
dangerous act).126 The basis for each decision was that the death had resulted from an
offence under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 23 which penalises the admin-
istering of a noxious thing or causing it to be administered or taken. Self-injectors do not
commit an offence under s 23, so D was not liable in either case as an accomplice to a s 23
offence. The only way in which D could be convicted in either case was as a perpetrator of
it. The Court of Appeal in both cases held that D had perpetrated the offence of admin-
istration under s 23 because in Rogers (Stephen) D had played a part in the mechanics of
the injection and in Kennedy (No 2) D had been involved in a joint activity with the self-
injector, and that as the death in each case had resulted from this administration D was
responsible for the death and guilty of manslaughter. When Kennedy (No 2) was appealed
to the House of Lords in 2007 the House held that both decisions were wrong. The House
allowed the appeal in Kennedy (No 2) and overruled Rogers (Stephen).
2.45 The House of Lords in Kennedy (No 2)127 reaffirmed the status of the Hart and Honoré
principle as ‘fundamental and not controversial’.128 The prosecution had conceded that, if it
could not show that D had committed the offence of administering a noxious thing, contrary
120 (1983) 76 Cr App R 279, CA. 121 Ibid at 289.

122 [1996] 1 All ER 353, HL. 123 Ibid at 364. 124 [2003] EWCA Crim 945.
125 [2005] EWCA Crim 685. 126 Paras 8.84–8.105. 127 [2007] UKHL 38.
128 Ibid at [14].
 | 2.46 criminal liability : actus reus
to s 23, it could not hope to show an offence of causing it to be administered or taken. The
House of Lords held that this concession had been rightly made. Referring to the statement
of Hart and Honoré quoted above, Lord Bingham, giving the opinion of the House, said:
‘Thee criminal law generally assumes the existence of free will. The law recognises certain
‘Th
exceptions, in the case of the young, those who for any reason are not fully responsible for
their actions, and the vulnerable, and it acknowledges situations of duress and necessity,
as also of deception and mistake. But, generally speaking, informed adults of sound mind
are treated as autonomous beings able to make their own decisions how they will act, and
none of the exceptions is relied on as possibly applicable in this case. Thus D is not to be
treated as causing V to act in a certain way if V makes a voluntary and informed decision
to act in that way rather than another . . .
. . . The finding that the deceased freely and voluntarily administered the injection to him-
self, knowing what it was, is fatal to any contention that the appellant caused the heroin to
be administered to the deceased or taken by him.’129
This left the argument that D had administered the injection to V. The House held that
he had not. It held that where D supplied the heroin and prepared the syringe, but V had
a choice whether to self-inject, and did so, ie did so freely and voluntarily, knowing what
he was doing, it was V’s act of administration. Having referred to Rogers (Stephen), Lord
Bingham went on to say:
‘ . . . the crucial question is not whether the defendant facilitated or contributed to the
administration of the noxious thing but whether he went further and administered it.
What matters, in a case such as R v Rogers and the present, is whether the injection itself
was the result of a voluntary and informed decision by the person injecting himself. In R
v Rogers, as in the present case, it was. That case was, therefore, wrongly decided.’130
Because D had not committed an offence under s 23 (nor any other criminal and dan-
gerous act), there was no basis for a conviction for constructive manslaughter, and D’s
conviction for it was quashed.
2.46 Kennedy (No 2) does not invariably apply. As pointed out in para 2.31, the prin-
ciples of causation developed in relation to murder and manslaughter do not necessarily
apply in other contexts. This is shown by the decision in 1998 of the House of Lords in
Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery)
Ltd,131 and the decisions of the Court of Appeal in 2010 in Girdler132 and MH,133 all of
129 [2007] UKHL 38 at [14]. Contrast the law in Scotland where it was held by the High Court of Justiciary
that ‘the adult status and deliberate conduct of a person to whom a controlled drug was recklessly supplied by
another would be important, and, in some cases, crucial factors, in determining whether the other’s act was or
was not, for the purposes of criminal responsibility, a cause of death following upon ingestion of the drug. But a
deliberate decision by the victim of the reckless conduct to ingest the drug would not necessarily break the chain
of causation’: MacAngus and Kane v HM Advocate [2009] HCJAC 8.
130 [2007] UKHL 38 at [20]. See also para 7.115.
131 [1999] 2 AC 22, HL. 132 [2009] EWCA Crim 2666.
133 [2011] EWCA Crim 1508.
2.47 actus reus | 
which were concerned with offences which required no mens rea at all as to anything
resulting from a defendant’s conduct.
2.47 Empress Car was concerned with the strict liability offence of causing polluting
matter to enter controlled water, contrary to the Water Resources Act 1991, s 85(1) (since
repealed). In that case, D Ltd kept diesel in a tank in their yard. An unknown person
entered the yard and opened the tank’s tap. As a result the contents of the tank escaped
down a storm drain into a river. There was nothing in Empress Car to suggest that the
act of the third party was anything other than a free, deliberate and informed one. Thus,
according to the Hart and Honoré principle, the pollution should not have been legally
attributable to D Ltd. Nevertheless, D Ltd were convicted. D Ltd appealed ultimately to
the House of Lords contending, inter alia, that, as the tap had been opened by a stranger,
the pollution of the river could not be legally attributable to D Ltd. The House of Lords,
without reference to Pagett or Latif and Shahzad,134 rejected that argument. As will be
seen, it held that the same test applied in the case of an intervening act by the third party
as has traditionally applied in the case of an intervening natural event.
Lord Hoffmann stated that whether or not to attribute to D a consequence immedi-
ately caused by a third party or natural event depended on the purpose and scope (ie the
context) of the rule in relation to which the question of causation was being asked. Lord
Hoffmann continued that if the rule imposed on D strict liability for the deliberate acts
of third parties or natural events, an intervening third party act or an intervening event
would not prevent attribution of the consequence to the conduct unless that act or event
was extraordinary, rather than a normal fact of life. Lord Hoff mann stated:
‘If the defendant did something which produced a situation in which the polluting mat-
ter could escape but a necessary condition of the actual escape which happened was also
the act of a third party or a natural event, the justices should consider whether that act or
event should be regarded as a normal fact of life or something extraordinary. If it was in the
general run of things a matter of ordinary occurrence, it will not negative the causal effect
of the defendant’s acts, even if it was not foreseeable that it would happen to that particular
defendant or take that particular form. If it can be regarded as something extraordinary, it
will be open to the justices to hold that the defendant did not cause the pollution.’135
Applying these principles, the House of Lords held, there was ample evidence to entitle a
finding that D Ltd had caused the pollution.
A telling criticism of the decision in Empress Car has been made as follows:
‘There was something almost perverse about reasoning which concludes that D should
be responsible for a result which he did not cause simply because the act of vandalism by
which it was caused was not so extraordinary as to be unforeseeable. There is a major dif-
ference between a natural event and the action of a third party: the act of the third party
is “free, deliberate and informed”. In the instant case it was also malicious. In such a case
D’s liability ends up depending on the choices and actions of others rather than his own
choices and actions.’136
134 Para 2.43. 135 [1999] 2 AC 22 at 36. 136 Allen Textbook on Criminal Law (11th edn, 2011) 45.
 | 2.48 criminal liability : actus reus
As explained in para 2.39, the formulation stated in Empress Car involves a test of
whether the type of intervening act, rather than the particular one, was reasonably fore-
seeable. The formulation is obviously a narrower ground of exemption than the Hart and
Honoré principle applied by the House of Lords in Latif and Shahzad and endorsed by it
in Kennedy (No 2).
It must be emphasised that Empress Car does not lay down a general rule about causa-
tion in the criminal law but is limited to the context of a strict liability pollution offence
based on a duty to guard against the deliberate acts of third persons.137 Any doubt on
this matter was settled by Kennedy (No 2) where the unanimous opinion of the House of
Lords was to the effect that:
‘The House [in Empress Car] was not in that decision purporting to lay down general
rules governing causation in criminal law. It was construing, with reference to the facts
of the case before it, a statutory provision imposing strict criminal liability on those
who cause pollution of controlled waters. Lord Hoff man made clear that common sense
answers to questions of causation will differ according to the purpose for which the
question is asked; that one cannot give a common sense answer to a question of causa-
tion for the purpose of attributing responsibility under some rule without knowing the
purpose and scope of the rule; that strict liability was imposed in the interests of protect-
ing controlled waters; and that in the situation under consideration the act of the defend-
ant could properly be held to have caused the pollution even though an ordinary act of
a third party was the immediate cause of the diesel oil flowing into the river. It is worth
underlining that the relevant question was the cause of the pollution, not the cause of
the third party’s act.
The committee [ie the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords] would not wish
to throw any doubt on the correctness of the Empress Carr case. But the reasoning in
that case cannot be applied to the wholly different context of causing a noxious thing
to be administered to or taken by another person contrary to section 23 of the 1861
Act.’138
2.48 In Girdler,139 the Court of Appeal held that, in the context of the offences of causing
death by dangerous driving or causing death by careless driving, the chain of causation
will be broken by an intervening act of another person which was not reasonably foresee-
able, even though that act may not have been ‘free, deliberate and informed’.
The facts in Girdler were as follows. On a three-lane carriageway of a main road D’s car
collided with a taxi, propelling it into the fast lane where it came to rest broadside on to
approaching traffic. A car collided with the taxi, killing both its driver (V1) and the taxi
driver (V2). D was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving, contrary to the Road
Traffic Act 1988, s 1.
137 Empress Car was applied a year after the House of Lords’ decision in Kennedy (No 2) in L [2008] EWCA
Crim 1970 in respect of the same offence as was in issue in Empress Car.
138 [2007] UKHL 38 at [15]. As a result, the House of Lords in Kennedy (No 2) held that in Finlay [2003]
EWCA Crim 3868 the Court of Appeal had been wrong to apply Empress Car in a case whose facts were similar
to those in Kennedy (No 2). See also Finlay (deceased) [2009] EWCA Crim 1493 where the Court of Appeal held
that, in the light of the decision in Kennedy (No 2), the defendant’s conviction in Finlay had been wrong.
139 [2009] EWCA Crim 2666.
2.48 actus reus | 
The Court of Appeal allowed D’s appeal against conviction on the ground that the trial
judge’s directions on causation had been inadequate. Dealing with the issue of whether
V1’s driving was such an intervening act that it could not be said that D caused the death
of V1 or V2, the Court of Appeal, having referred to Kennedy (No 2), said:
‘Applying Kennedy (No 2), if the immediate cause of the death is the “free, deliberate
and informed” intervention of another person, then the chain of causation will be bro-
ken. There are, it seems to us, problems in applying that test in this case. [V1’s] driving
which led to the collision with the taxi driver cannot readily be described as falling within
that category even if her driving was careless or dangerous (and we are not saying that it
was).
If the only test were to be the “free, deliberate and informed” test, then a driver who by
his dangerous driving causes a minor accident pushing another car on to the hard shoul-
der would be automatically liable for causing death by dangerous driving if the driver
of a vehicle travelling at speed on the hard shoulder accidentally collided with the car
on the hard shoulder whatever the circumstances, provided the jury took the view that
the “more than a trifling link” test140 was satisfied. In our view juries needed a tailored
direction to help them decide, in the appropriate case, whether there has been a new and
intervening act or event.
In devising such a test we remind ourselves that the offence of causing death by dan-
gerous and careless driving will punish the conduct of a person who has not intended or
necessarily foreseen the consequences of his driving. Such a person is in a very different
position to a person who has intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm or who has the
mens rea for manslaughter. As Lord Hoff mann said in Environment Agency (formerly
National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd
“ . . . common sense answers to questions of causation will differ according to the pur-
pose for which the question is asked. Questions of causation often arise for the purpose
of attributing responsibility to someone, for example, so as to blame him for something
which has happened.
. . . [O]ne cannot give a common sense answer to a question of causation for the purpose
of attributing responsibility under some rule without knowing the purpose and scope of
the rule.”
What we need is a form of words which sets out a test (comparatively easy to apply)
which places an outside limit on the culpability of a driver in circumstances where there
is more than a trifling link between the dangerous (or careless) driving and a death. It
seeks to exclude consequences which are simply “too remote” from the driver’s culpable
conduct.’141
The test which the Court of Appeal devised was one of reasonable foreseeability, the
same test as applied in Empress Car.
The same approach was held by the Court of Appeal in MH142 also to apply to an offence
of causing death by driving while unlicensed etc.
140 Para 2.32. 141 [2009] EWCA Crim 2666 at [34]–[36]. 142 [2011] EWCA Crim 1508.
 | 2.49 criminal liability : actus reus
Victim’s neglect of treatment or maltreatment of self

2.49 If, following D’s act, V neglects or maltreats himself this does not prevent V’s sub-
sequent death being legally attributable to D if D’s act is a substantial and operating cause
of the death.
2.50 In Wall,143 D, the governor of a colony was charged with the murder of V, a soldier
whom he had sentenced to an illegal flogging. It was argued that V might not have died if
he had refrained from drinking spirits while in hospital in consequence of the blows he
had received. The jury convicted D of murder after the judge had directed them that:
‘There is no apology for a man if he puts another in so dangerous and hazardous a situa-
tion by his treatment of him, that some degree of unskilfulness and mistaken treatment
of himself may possibly accelerate the fatal catastrophe.’
A case involving refusal of treatment by the victim is Holland.144 D deliberately inflicted

some wounds on V. One of these caused blood poisoning in a finger, and V was advised to
have it amputated. Had V done so, his surgeon stated, his life would probably have been
saved. However, lockjaw set in and death ensued. The jury were directed that it made
no difference whether the wound was instantly mortal of its own nature, or became the
cause of death only by reason of V’s not having adopted the best mode of treatment. A
verdict of guilty of murder was returned.
2.51 The dictum of the judge in Wall cited above did not preclude the possibility that V’s
neglect of treatment or maltreatment of himself might prevent legal attribution to D if it
was unreasonable.
In the last century it was argued that a direction of the type in Holland might have
become incorrect because, medical science having advanced greatly since 1841, a refusal
of an operation might be regarded as unreasonable, and might therefore prevent legal
attribution to the defendant. However, such an argument was rejected in 1975 by the
Court of Appeal in Blaue.145
That the law remains unchanged in relation to V’s maltreatment of himself was confirmed
by the Court of Appeal in Dear,146 a case where V had either maltreated himself or neglected
treatment. D, who had heard that V had sexually interfered with his daughter, slashed V
repeatedly with a knife. V died two days later as a result of the wounds. D argued that the
chain of causation was broken between his actions and the death because V had commit-
ted suicide either by reopening his wounds or, the wounds having reopened themselves, by
failing to staunch the consequent blood flow. It was argued that the suicide would have bro-
ken the chain of causation (ie prevented legal attribution of the death to D). Dismissing D’s
appeal against conviction for murder, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge’s direc-
tion that, if V had reopened his wounds or failed to stop the bleeding because of the fact of the
attack (which had horrifically disfigured him), the question for them was whether the inju-
143 (1802) 28 State Tr 51.
144 (1841) 2 Mood & R 351; for a full account of the facts see [1957] Crim LR 702.
145 [1975] 3 All ER 446, CA.
146 [1996] Crim LR 595, CA; the above is based on the transcript.
2.52 actus reus | 
ries inflicted by D were an operating and substantial cause of death. The Court stated that,
if the wounds were an operating and substantial cause of death, it was irrelevant whether V
had treated himself with mere negligence or gross neglect. The Court appears to have treated
it as immaterial whether or not V’s conduct in the present type of case was unforeseeable,
which may be contrasted with the rule in para 2.52 which applies where V injures himself
in trying to escape, but is consistent with the rule in para 2.35 which applies where V has a
medical condition rendering V susceptible to death or injury.
In Dear, the Court of Appeal accepted that, if V had reopened his wounds because of
shame over what he had done or some other reason unrelated to D’s conduct, there would
not have been a causal link between D’s acts and V’s death. D’s acts would not have been
a factual cause of death because it could not have been said that V would not have killed
himself but for the injuries inflicted by D.
Where V dies or injures himself in trying to escape

2.52 If D puts V in fear of harm and V is killed or injured in trying to escape, V’s death
or injury can be attributed legally to D, provided that V’s reaction was likely (ie within
the range of responses reasonably foreseeable as possible by a victim placed in the situ-
ation in which V was).147 An example of the present rule is provided by Roberts,148 where
D had tried to remove the coat of V, a girl, in a moving car, indicating that he meant to
take liberties with V against her will. V jumped out of the car and was injured. D appealed
against conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm on the ground that the jury
were not directed to consider whether he foresaw that V would jump and suffer injury.
The Court of Appeal rejected this, saying that the only issue was one of causation; the
question was whether V’s actions were the natural result of D’s conduct, in the sense that
they were something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of
what D was saying and doing.
Although this test has been described as being applied on the basis of what a reasonable
person ‘in [D’s] shoes’ would have foreseen,149 that reasonable person is not endowed with
D’s age or sex150 or any other of his characteristics.
The rationale for having an objective test was explained in Marjoram151 where the
Court of Appeal rejected the argument of D, aged 16, that the reasonable person for the
present purpose should be the same age and sex as D. It stated that, in the present type
of situation, the law was concerned with the effect of D’s conduct on V’s mind. If the test
were other than objective, one co-defendant might be held not to have caused an injury,
because he did not foresee V’s reaction; whereas another co-defendant, who did exactly
the same thing, might be held to have caused it because he foresaw it. That, it said, would
be an absurd position.
V’s reaction will not be likely if V’s fear of harm is an unreasonable one or, if V’s fear
is reasonable, V does something daft in trying to escape.152 In deciding whether V’s
147 Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95, CA; Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453, CA; Williams [1992] 2 All ER 183, CA;
Corbett [1996] Crim LR 594, CA.
148 (1971) 56 Cr App R 95, CA. 149 Williams [1992] 2 All ER 183, CA.
150 Marjoram [2000] Crim LR 372, CA. 151 Ibid.
152 Williams [1992] 2 All ER 183, CA; Lewis [2010] EWCA Crim 151.
 | 2.53 criminal liability : actus reus
response was likely the jury should bear in mind ‘any particular characteristics of the
victim and the fact that in the agony of the moment he may act without thought and
deliberation’.153
2.53 It may be that the present principle provides the answer to the question of causation
posed in a different type of case, that where physical or sexual abuse suffered at D’s hands
triggers a decision by V to commit suicide, which V succeeds in doing. In Dhaliwal,154 the
Court of Appeal recognised that if D’s unlawful conduct causes a psychiatric illness, with
resulting suicide, D is not excluded from liability for manslaughter, ‘subject always to the
law of causation’. The Court decided the case on another point and did not need to deal
with the law of causation. D’s conduct clearly constituted a factual cause of death, but the
applicable principle of legal attribution is undecided.155
An argument in favour of saying that the present principle is applicable is that V who
commits suicide is in a sense trying to escape D (or, at least, the consequences of the
abuse). An argument against is that a person who commits suicide necessarily aims to kill
himself, whereas a person who kills himself in trying to escape an attack does not. This
may be regarded as an important distinction. If the present principle is applied, the ques-
tion will be whether V’s actions in committing suicide were within the range of responses
reasonably foreseeable as possible by someone in V’s situation, taking into account the
victim’s characteristics; if it was, the chain of causation will not be broken and the death
will be attributable to D.
If the present principle is inapplicable to the situation in Dhaliwal, one must presum-
ably fall back on the general rule about intervening acts by V referred to in para 2.43,
whereby V’s intervening act resulting in V’s suicide will break the chain of causation from
D’s conduct to V’s death unless V’s intervening act was not deliberate, free or informed.
An act done to commit suicide would clearly seem to be deliberate and informed, but
(depending on the degree of trauma suffered by V) it could be found not to be free in
certain cases; if so the chain of causation would not be broken.
Depending on the facts, each of these two tests is liable to produce a different answer to
the question ‘is causation proved?’ in the Dhaliwal type of case.156
Intervening medical treatment

2.54 The fact that V subsequently receives medical treatment (whether a surgical opera-
tion or the administration of drugs) for his injury, which kills him, will not excuse the
person who injured him if that treatment is not negligent (ie if it is given with the care and
skill of a competent medical practitioner).157
2.55 Even if the treatment is negligent it is only in the most exceptional case that
it will break the chain of causation between the act which caused the injury and the
death.
153 Williams above. Italics supplied. 154 [2006] EWCA Crim 1139 (reported elsewhere as D).
155 The psychiatric illness could not be regarded as an operating cause of death, which distinguishes the
present type of case from that in Dear discussed in para 2.51.
156 See, further, paras 8.84–8.105, as to liability for manslaughter in respect of the type of case discussed
above. 157 Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670 at 674.
2.57 actus reus | 
In Smith,158 V, a person who had been stabbed by D in a barrack-room brawl was twice
dropped on the way to hospital and when V got there he was given treatment which was
‘thoroughly bad’ and might have affected his chances of recovery. V died some two hours
after being stabbed. The Courts-Martial Appeal Court held that these events did not
break the chain of causation between the stabbing and the death. Delivering the Court’s
judgment, Lord Parker CJ said:
‘It seems to this court that if at the time of death the original wound is still an operating
cause and a substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the result of the
wound, albeit that some other cause of death is also operating.159 Only if it can be said that
the original wound is merely the setting in which another cause operates can it be said
that the death did not result from the wound. Putting it another way, only if the second
cause is so overwhelming as to make the original wound merely part of the history can it
be said that the death does not flow from the wound.’160
2.56 The first sentence in the above dictum shows that, if at the time of death the origi-
nal wound is still an operating cause and a substantial cause, the death is legally attrib-
utable to D, albeit that some other cause of the death is also operating. The facts in
Smith clearly fell within the first sentence of this dictum, since D’s act was an operating
and substantial cause of death.
2.57 The second two sentences in Lord Parker’s statement are concerned with the situ-
ation where the wound or injury caused by D’s act is not an operating cause of death
because the original wound or injury is not (or is no longer) life-threatening and V dies
not from the wound or injury caused by D but from treatment given for it. In Jordan,161
where D had fatally stabbed the deceased, it was held that the death could not be attrib-
uted to D in the light of fresh evidence that it had been caused by the administration of
terramycin after the deceased had shown he was intolerant to it (which was described as
‘palpably wrong’ treatment) and when his wound was nearly healed.
Jordan was distinguished in Smith and in Blaue162 as ‘a very particular case depending
on its exact facts’, although in Blaue the Court of Appeal thought Jordan was probably
rightly decided on its facts.
Further explanation of the current law which applies where the wound or injury
inflicted by D is not an operating cause of death was given by the Court of Appeal in
Cheshire,163 where it was emphasised that it will only be in the most extraordinary and
unusual case that negligent medical treatment, however gross the negligence, for wounds
or injuries caused to V by D can break the chain of causation from his conduct. The Court
held that the chain of causation would not be broken unless the negligent treatment was
‘so independent’ of D’s conduct and in itself ‘so potent’ as to render the contribution
158 [1959] 2 QB 35, C-MAC (see para 2.32, n 98, in relation to this court).
159 If the other cause of death was the medical treatment, and that treatment was a substantial cause, the
person giving it would be guilty of manslaughter if the treatment was grossly negligent, although a prosecution
would be unlikely. 160 [1959] 2 QB 35 at 42–43.
161 (1956) 40 Cr App R 152, CCA. 162 [1975] 3 All ER 446, CA.
163 [1991] 3 All ER 670, CA. Also see Mellor [1996] 2 Cr App R 245, CA.
 | 2.58 criminal liability : actus reus
to death of D’s conduct insignificant. It is the consequences of the treatment, said the
Court, rather than possible degrees of fault attached to it, which are the essential issues.
A problem with this is that the Court did not explain what was meant by ‘so independent
of [the defendant’s] acts’ and ‘so potent’.
The operation of these statements can be demonstrated by reference to the facts of
Cheshire. In the course of an argument in a fish and chip shop, D shot V in the leg and
stomach, seriously wounding him. After an operation, V developed respiratory problems
and a tracheotomy tube was inserted to assist his breathing. V died in hospital over two
months after the shooting; the immediate cause of death was a narrowing of the wind-
pipe where the tracheotomy tube had been inserted, such a condition being a rare but
not unknown complication arising out of a tracheotomy. V had complained of further
breathing difficulties and suffered a chest infection after the tracheotomy. At D’s trial for
murder, there was evidence that V’s wounds no longer threatened V’s life at the time of
V’s death and that his death was caused by the negligence of the hospital staff in failing to
diagnose and treat V’s respiratory condition. The trial judge directed the jury to consider
the degree of fault in the medical treatment (rather than its practical consequences) in
deciding whether or not the death was to be legally attributed to D.
Dismissing D’s appeal against conviction for murder, the Court of Appeal held that,
while the judge had misdirected the jury, there had been no miscarriage of justice because,
even if more experienced doctors than those who attended V would have recognised the
rare complication in time to have prevented V’s death, that complication was a direct
consequence of D’s acts, which remained a significant cause of death. It was inconceivable
that a jury properly directed (ie along the lines indicated in the Court’s judgment above)
would have found otherwise.
2.58 The upshot of these cases is that negligent medical treatment for the original injury
which brings about death will only prevent legal attribution to D if the original wound is
no longer an operating cause of death and the negligent treatment is so independent of D’s
conduct and in itself so potent as to render the contribution of D’s conduct insignificant. It
will be extremely rare that negligent medical treatment will satisfy this test. If (as in Cheshire)
the negligent treatment consists solely of a failure to diagnose and give a treatment which
would have been effectual it seems inconceivable that the test could be satisfied. Examples of
extreme cases where the test might be satisfied are where the doctor misreads his notes and
performs an operation that is not required or where medical staff give a manifest overdose
of drugs or continue (as in Jordan) to give drugs to which V has shown himself intolerant. It
must not be forgotten that, whether or not the negligent treatment breaks the chain of causa-
tion, the death can also be legally attributed to the person giving the fatal medical treatment;
if that person is grossly negligent he can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
2.59 In Jordan and Cheshire, it was the medical treatment, not the injury, which was
alleged to be the immediate cause of death. The same principles apply where the injury
prevents medical treatment for a pre-existing condition, which would have saved V’s life.
In McKechnie,164 the injuries inflicted by D prevented V being treated for a duodenal
ulcer (since the doctors thought he might die under anaesthetic). The ulcer burst and V
164 (1991) 94 Cr App R 51.

2.61 actus reus | 
died. Dismissing D’s appeal against a conviction for manslaughter by reason of provoca-
tion, the Court of Appeal held that only an ‘extraordinary and unusual’ medical decision
that life-saving treatment was impossible would break the chain of causation.
Omissions
2.60 Doubts have sometimes been cast165 as to how one can say that an omission can cause
death or some other specified consequence, because a failure to act when one is under a
legal duty to do so, eg to save one’s young child from drowning, does not initiate the causal
process but is simply a failure to prevent other factors bringing about that harm.
This has not, however, prevented the convictions for homicide or other result crimes of
those whose wrongdoing has simply consisted of a failure to prevent the harm in breach of a
legal duty to do so, as the cases cited in para 2.11 show. Provided that if D had fulfilled his
legal duty to act D would have prevented the consequence, the consequence is factually
and legally attributable to D (subject to any of the general principles of legal causation); if
D could not have prevented the consequence it is not. Thus, if D fails to get medical atten-
tion for his sick child and the child dies, the death can be attributed to D if the child would
have survived if it had received medical attention, but not if it might have survived.166 What
distinguishes D from other people who stand by and fail to get the medical attention is that,
while their omissions will also satisfy the ‘but for’ test and are therefore a factual cause of
death, the absence of a legal duty to act on their part means that the death cannot be legally
attributable to them and therefore their omission to act is not a legal cause of death.
Causation: the function of judge and jury

2.61 This was dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Pagett,167 where, in line with the nor-
mal well-established principle, it was held that it is for the judge to direct the jury on the
relevant principles relating to causation, and then to leave it to the jury to decide, in the
light of those principles on which they are bound to act, whether or not the relevant
causal link has been established. In Pagett, it was stated that it is rarely necessary to give
the jury any direction on causation as such, because that issue is usually not in dispute.
Indeed, it was held in Blaue168 that ‘where there is no conflict in the evidence and all the
jury has to do is to apply the law to the admitted facts, the judge is entitled to tell the jury
what the result of that application will be’. However, although the judge may direct the
jury that they must acquit D because there is insufficient evidence that the requirement of
causation is satisfied, Pagett shows that the reverse is not true. The judge cannot withdraw
the issue of causation from the jury on the ground that the only reasonable conclusion is
165 See, eg, Hogan ‘Omissions and the Duty Myth’ in Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of JC Smith (1987)
(Smith (ed)) 85 at 88.
166 Morby (1882) 8 QBD 571, CCR. The Draft Criminal Code Bill, cl 17(1)(b) provides a wider test, viz: ‘a
person causes a result which is an element of an offence when . . . (b) he omits to do an act which might prevent
its occurrence and which he is under a duty to do according to the law relating to the offence’ (Law Commission:
A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989), Law Com No 177; see para 1.70). See Williams ‘What should the
Code do about Omissions?’ (1987) 7 LS 92 at 106–107. 167 (1983) 76 Cr App R 279, CA.
168 [1975] 3 All ER 446 at 450.
 | 2.61 criminal liability : actus reus
that the requirements of causation are satisfied. This is so despite the Court of Appeal’s
acceptance in the earlier case of Malcherek; Steel169 of the judge’s power to do so on such
a ground.
In Pagett, the Court of Appeal held that, where a direction on causation is necessary, it is
usually enough to direct the jury simply that in law D’s act or omission need not be the sole
cause, or even the main cause, of the relevant consequence, it being enough that it contrib-
uted substantially to that result. Occasionally, however, a specific issue of legal attribution
may arise. Where such a specific issue of causation arises, the judge should also direct the
jury in terms of the specific principles of legal causation which apply to that issue. Robert
Goff LJ (as he then was) giving the judgment of the Court in Pagett, continued:
‘It would then fall to the jury to decide the relevant factual issues which, identified with
reference to those legal principles, will lead to the conclusion whether or not the prosecu-
tion have established [the relevant causal link].’170
FURTHER READING
Alexander ‘Criminal Liability for Omissions’ Norrie ‘A Critique of Criminal Causation’
in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the (1991) 54 MLR 685
General Part (2002) (Shute and Simester Price ‘What Shape to Euthanasia after Bland?
(eds)) 121 Historical, Contemporary and Futuristic
Ashworth ‘The Scope of Criminal Liability for Paradigms’ (2009) 125 LQR 142
Omissions’ (1989) 105 LQR 424 Robinson ‘Should the Criminal Law Abandon
Beynon ‘Causation, Omissions and the Actus Reus/Mens Rea Distinction?’ in
Complicity’ [1987] Crim LR 539 Action and Value in Criminal Law (1993)
Finnis ‘Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?’ (1993) (Shute, Gardner and Horder (eds)) 187
109 LQR 329 Rogers ‘Death, Drugs and Duties’ [2009] 6
Gross ‘A Note on Omissions’ (1984) 4 LS 308 Archbold News 6
Hart and Honoré Causation in the Law (2nd Simester ‘Why Omissions are Special’ (1995)
edn, 1985) Chs XII–XIV 15 LS 311
Hogan ‘Omissions and the Duty Myth’ in JC Smith ‘Liability for Omissions in the
Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J C Smith Criminal Law’ (1984) 4 LS 88
(1987) (Smith (ed)) 85 JC Smith Justification and Excuse in Criminal
Keown ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Law (1989) Ch 2
Shape to the Law after Bland’ (1997) 113 Stannard ‘Medical Treatment and the Chain
LQR 481 of Causation’ (1993) 57 JCL 88
Lynch ‘The Mental Element in the Actus Reus’ G Williams ‘The Theory of Excuses’ [1982]
(1982) 98 LQR 109 Crim LR 732
Nkrumah ‘R v Kennedy Revisited’ (2008) 72 G Williams ‘Criminal Omissions: The
JCL 117 Conventional View’ (1991) 107 LQR 86
169 Para 2.42. 170 (1983) 76 Cr App R 279 at 290.

3
Criminal liability 2: mens rea
OVERVIEW
The term ‘mens rea’ refers to the state of mind expressly or impliedly required by the definition
of the offence charged. Typical instances are intention, recklessness and knowledge. These are
explained in this chapter, as is negligence.
Mens rea
3.1 Despite occasional judicial utterances to the contrary,1 it is clear from the application
of mens rea in the courts that mens rea has nothing necessarily to do with notions of an
evil mind, moral fault or knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct. The fact that
the defendant (D) was not morally at fault is not in itself a defence,2 nor is the fact that
D was ignorant that his conduct constituted an offence,3 nor generally is the fact that D
did not consider his conduct to be immoral or know that it was regarded as immoral by
the bulk of society.4 Moreover, it is generally irrelevant to liability whether D acted with
a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ motive.5
3.2 The expression ‘mens rea’ refers to the state of mind expressly or impliedly required 6
by the definition of the offence charged. This varies from offence to offence,7 but typical
instances are intention, recklessness and knowledge. In the course of our examination of
typical states of mind it will be necessary to refer to negligence, although it can hardly be
said to be a state of mind because it is concerned with whether a reasonable person would
have realised the risk in question.
3.3 In modern times, the courts have indicated a preference for judging a defendant
on the basis of what he intended or knew and so on, rather than on the basis of what
1 See, eg, Sherras v de Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918 at 921, per Wright J; Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 152, per
Lord Morris.
2 Yip Chiu-cheung v R [1995] 1 AC 111, especially at 117–118; Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355 at 364–366, per Lord
Mustill; Dodman [1998] 2 Cr App R 338, C-MAC (as to this court, see para 2.32, n 98).
3 Para 3.78. 4 Para 3.89. 5 Para 3.75.
6 There is a rebuttable presumption that in the absence of an express requirement of mens rea from a statutory
offence it is rebuttably presumed that mens rea is required: see paras 6.13–6.41.
7 Sometimes the mens rea for an offence may vary between different types of the offence. See, eg, W [2010]
EWCA Crim 372.
 | 3.4 criminal liability : mens rea
a reasonable person would have realised.8 This was described in G by Lord Steyn as a
‘shift . . . towards adopting a subjective approach’.9 While the ‘subjectivists’ are overall
winning the battle with the ‘objectivists’ in terms of this development of the law by the
judges, the battle is not going so well for them in Parliament, as the objective terms10 of
the vast majority of offences in the Sexual Offences Act 200311 indicate.
3.4 The mens rea required for an offence normally relates to the consequences or cir-
cumstances, or both, required for the actus reus of the offence charged.
Intention
Key points 3.1
A person intends a consequence of his act (or omission) if he acts (or fails to act) with the
aim or purpose of thereby bringing about that consequence. In addition, if a person fore-
sees that a consequence is virtually certain to result from his conduct, although it is not his
aim or purpose to achieve it, he can be found to have intended that consequence.
Sometimes the intention required by the definition of an offence relates not to a conse-
quence of the defendant’s conduct, but to something ulterior to it, which does not have
to be brought about. Such an intention is known as an ‘ulterior intention’.
3.5 Where the definition of the actus reus of the offence charged requires D’s conduct to
produce a particular consequence, D has a sufficient mental state as to that consequence
if he intends his act (or omission) to produce that consequence. In many offences where
D’s conduct is required to produce a particular consequence, liability can be based either
on his intention or his recklessness as to that consequence being produced by his act (or
omission). However, in the definitions of some offences, liability can be based only on
intention and it is in these that the question of what is meant in law by intention is of
crucial importance.
Like the other concepts of mens rea referred to in this chapter, ‘intention’ is not defined
as a general concept by any statute and its meaning must therefore be derived from judi-
cial decisions.12 Intention is something quite distinct from motive (ie a person’s reason
for acting as he did) or desire;13 if D kills V with great regret (but seeing no other way) in
order to take V’s money, his intention is to kill V but his motive is to take the money, and
it is irrelevant that D did not desire V’s death.
3.6 In terms of moral philosophy, there are two types of intention with regard to prohib-
ited consequences, ‘direct’ intention and ‘oblique’ intention, whereby a person directly
8 Eg DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182, HL; B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428, HL; K [2001] UKHL 41; G [2003]
UKHL 50. 9 [2003] UKHL 50 at [55].
10 Ie terms which are judged by reference to whether or not a reasonable person would have believed some-
thing or had some other state of mind. 11 Ch 9.
12 It is possible, but extremely rare, for a statute to set out the meaning of a mens rea term for the purposes
of an offence under it.
13 Moloney [1985] AC 905 at 926, per Lord Bridge with whose speech the rest of the Law Lords agreed.
3.8 mens rea | 
intends a consequence if he has decided to achieve it and a person obliquely intends a

consequence if he realises that it is likely to result as a side-effect of achieving his aim of
achieving some other consequence.14
The following paragraphs consider the extent to which the criminal law replicates this
view.
Direct intention
3.7 Direct intention is undoubtedly ‘intention’ for the purposes of the criminal law.
‘Intention’ was defined by the Court of Appeal in Mohan15 as: ‘a decision to bring about,
insofar as it lies within the accused’s power, [a particular consequence], no matter whether
the accused desired that consequence of his act or not’. As the Court recognised,16 this
can be described more briefly as D’s ‘aim’ or ‘purpose’. The definition in Mohan, which
refers, of course, to direct intention, could be described as a commonsense definition,
since it probably accords with most people’s idea of what constitutes intention, as well as
being the relevant meaning given by the dictionaries.17 As the Court of Appeal stated in
Walker and Hayles,18 ‘It has never been suggested that a man does not intend what he is
trying to achieve’. Provided that he has decided to bring about a particular consequence,
insofar as it lies within his power, a person acts with a direct intention in relation to it
even though he believes that he is unlikely to succeed in bringing it about. For example,
a person has a direct intention to kill if he fires at someone in an endeavour to kill him,
even if he believes him to be outside the normal range of his gun.
3.8 It follows, from the reference in the definition in Mohan to the fact that it is irrel-
evant that D did not desire a consequence which he had decided to bring about, that D
can be said to act with a direct intention to cause a particular consequence, even though
it is not desired in itself, if it is the means (ie a condition precedent) to the achievement
of a desired objective and D decides to cause that consequence, insofar as it lies within
his power. Not only is this implicit in that definition, but also support for it can be found
in the speech of Lord Hailsham in Hyam v DPP,19 decided by the House of Lords a year
before Mohan. Lord Hailsham, adopting a definition of intention very similar to that in
Mohan, stated that it should be held to include ‘the means as well as the end’ (ie that a per-
son who has decided to bring about a consequence as a means to a desired end or objective
falls within the definition of direct intention in relation to that consequence). Suppose
that D is charged with an offence which requires an intention to cause economic loss to
another, and that D admittedly acted to make a gain for himself by depriving another of
something. It is no defence for D to say that, since his desired objective was to make a gain
for himself, he did not intend to cause economic loss. Likewise, if D shoots at, and kills,
14 See, eg, Bentham Principles of Morals and Legislation (1948) (Harrison (ed)) 207.
15 [1976] QB 1 at 11. Th is statement in Mohan was endorsed in Pearman (1984) 80 Cr App R 259, CA. It had a
precursor in a similar statement by Asquith LJ in a civil case, Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237 at 253, which
was approved by Lord Hailsham in Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55 at 74. 16 [1976] QB 1 at 8.
17 See, eg Shorter Oxford English Dictionary; Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary. In Re A (conjoined
twins: surgical separation) [2001] Fam 147 at 256, ‘purpose’ was regarded as the ‘natural and ordinary’ meaning
of ‘intention’ by Robert Walker LJ. 18 (1989) 90 Cr App R 226 at 230.
19 [1975] AC 55 at 74.
 | 3.9 criminal liability : mens rea
an attacker with the objective of saving his own life, D will directly intend the attacker’s
death if he has decided to bring it about in order to save his own life.
The case law, however, is not wholly in accord with the principle just stated. In Steane,20
D made broadcasts in Germany during the Second World War in order to save his family
from a concentration camp. It was held on appeal that the broadcasts were not made ‘with
intent to assist the enemy’, even though D knew that his desired objective of saving his
family could only be achieved by doing acts assisting the enemy. This decision perverted
the concept of intention so as to excuse a defendant who was deserving. As we shall see
in Chapter 16, there may have been a more acceptable basis for Steane not being guilty,
namely the defence of duress by threats. Hard cases can make bad law and it is submitted
that Steane should not be allowed to cast doubt on the statements concerning intention in
the previous paragraph. It is inconceivable that the Court would have reached the same
conclusion if Steane had broadcast in order to obtain a packet of cigarettes.
Oblique intention
The case law before Woollin
3.9 Before the House of Lords’ decision in Moloney, 21 the general understanding from
the cases was that, for the purposes of most offences, a person would intend a conse-
quence of his conduct which he did not aim to achieve if he obliquely intended it, in
that he foresaw that that consequence was virtually certain to result as a side-effect from
achieving something which he did aim to achieve.22 Thus, if D, who wished to collect the
insurance money on an air cargo, put a time bomb on an aircraft to blow it up in flight,
realising that it was almost inevitable that those on board would be killed by the explo-
sion, D was regarded as having intended those deaths, even though D wished those on
board no harm and would have been delighted if they had survived.23
Indeed, before Moloney, the balance of judicial statements also supported the view
that, for the purpose of murder and some other offences, a person who foresaw a conse-
quence as a highly probable (or, perhaps, even probable)24 consequence of his act intended
it, although he did not aim to produce it.
3.10 The House of Lords in Moloney 25 decided, and affirmed in Hancock and Shankland,26
that foresight, even of virtual certainty, is not intention in a legal sense or the equivalent
of it. As a result, the authority to the contrary was impliedly overruled.
In Moloney, the House of Lords held that the mens rea for murder was an intention to
kill or do serious bodily harm, and that foresight of death or serious bodily harm was nei-
ther intention as to such a consequence nor the equivalent of intention. On the other hand,
the House of Lords held, the jury should be told that, if it was proved that D foresaw a con-
sequence of his act, they were entitled (but not obliged) to infer that D intended it. Thus,
20 [1947] KB 997, CCA. 21 [1985] AC 905, HL.

22 Eg Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200 at 221; Serné (1887) 16 Cox CC 311 at 313, per Stephen J.
23 See Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55 at 74, per Lord Hailsham, LC.
24 See the differing views of Lords Hailsham and Diplock and Viscount Dilhorne in Hyam v DPP [1975] AC
55, HL. 25 [1985] AC 905, HL.
26 [1986] AC 455, HL.
3.10 mens rea | 
although foresight was not itself intention, intention could be inferred from it. This raised
the question of the degree of risk of the consequence which had to be foreseen before it
could be inferred that D intended it. Lord Bridge, giving the lead judgment (with which the
other Law Lords agreed), was ambiguous, speaking at different points in terms of ‘moral
certainty’ (ie virtual certainty), of ‘probability little short of overwhelming’ (which is not
very different, if at all) and of what appears to be high probability (which is different).
It seems that Lord Bridge in reality opted for ‘moral certainty’. However, in a passage at
the end of his speech, which was clearly meant to embody the principles in it, Lord Bridge
said that, when elaboration was required about intention (ie in a case where the evidence
suggests that it was not D’s aim or purpose to bring about the consequence which must be
intended), two questions had to be asked:
‘First, was death or really serious injury in a murder case (or whatever relevant consequence
must be proved to have been intended in any other case) a natural consequence of the
defendant’s voluntary act? Secondly, did the defendant foresee that consequence as
being a natural consequence of his act? The jury should then be told that if they answer
yes to both questions it is a proper inference for them to draw that he intended that
consequence.’ 27
This passage was ambiguous: what did ‘natural consequence’ mean? ‘Natural’ can mean
‘causally connected to an act’, whether a morally (ie virtually) certain consequence or
not. Alternatively, it can mean a morally certain consequence. It seems from an earlier
passage in his speech that this is what Lord Bridge meant to require, ie that the conse-
quence must have been virtually certain and foreseen as virtually certain before it could
be inferred that D intended it.
The passage quoted above was particularly likely to cause confusion, and so it proved
in Hancock and Shankland, another murder case, where a taxi-driver taking a miner to
work during a miners’ strike was killed when two lumps of concrete projected from a
bridge by the defendant strikers hit his car (one of a convoy of cars) as it passed under
the bridge. At their trial for murder, the defendants said that they had intended simply
to block the road or to frighten members of the convoy but not to kill or do serious harm
to anyone. The trial judge directed the jury in terms of the statement in Moloney by Lord
Bridge quoted above, without explaining that ‘natural’ did not simply mean ‘causally con-
nected’. The defendants were convicted of murder but appealed successfully to the Court
of Appeal. Rejecting an appeal by the prosecution, the House of Lords held that the judge
had misdirected the jury by failing to explain to them what was meant by the ‘natural’
consequence which must be foreseen before an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm could be inferred. However, the water was muddied by Lord Scarman, with whom
the other Law Lords agreed. Lord Scarman said that Lord Bridge had included probabil-
ity in the meaning which he attributed to ‘natural’. He thought that, where the jury were
directed about inferring intention from foresight, they should be told that ‘the greater the
probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen, and
that if the consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that the consequence
27 [1985] AC 905 at 929.

 | 3.11 criminal liability : mens rea
was also intended’. According to this rather obscure statement, intent could be inferred
from foresight of high probability or a lesser degree of probability.
The disparity between Moloney and Hancock and Shankland left the law in a confused
state. It was unclear how a judge was to direct the jury.
3.11 In Nedrick,28 the Court of Appeal sought to resolve the confusion resulting from the
conflict between the statements in Moloney and Hancock and Shankland.
In Nedrick, D poured paraffin through the letterbox of X, against whom he had a
grudge, and set fire to it. A child died in the resulting blaze. D was convicted of murder
after the judge had directed the jury in terms equating foresight with intent. The Court
of Appeal allowed D’s appeal and substituted a conviction for manslaughter. Purporting
to crystallise Moloney and Hancock and Shankland, it said this about the situation where
achieving the prohibited purpose may not have been D’s purpose:
‘When determining whether the defendant had the necessary intent, it may be helpful
for a jury to ask themselves two questions. (1) How probable was the consequence which
resulted from the defendant’s voluntary act? (2) Did he foresee that consequence?
If he did not appreciate that death or serious harm was likely to result from his act, he
cannot have intended to bring it about. If he did, but thought that the risk to which he was
exposing the person killed was only slight, then it may be easy for the jury to conclude that
he did not intend to bring about that result. On the other hand, if the jury are satisfied that
at the material time the defendant recognised that death or serious harm would be virtu-
ally certain (barring some unforeseen intervention) to result from his voluntary act, then
that is a fact from which they may find it easy to infer that he intended to kill or do serious
bodily harm, even though he may not have had any desire to achieve that result.’
In what was regarded by the House of Lords in Woollin as the model direction the
Court of Appeal continued:
‘Where the charge is murder and in the rare case where [it is necessary to direct the jury
on the matter], the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary
intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty
(barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that
the defendant appreciated that such was the case . . . The decision is one for the jury to be
reached on a consideration of all the evidence.’29
Thus, the Court of Appeal ultimately endorsed the view that foresight of certainty is
required in order for the jury to be entitled to infer intention.
The law as it now is after Woollin

3.12 Nedrick model direction approved In Woollin, 30 the House of Lords approved the
model direction in Nedrick, with one change. In Woollin, D lost his cool when his baby
son choked on his food. D threw the baby four or five feet across a room. The baby died
28 [1986] 3 All ER 1, CA. 29 Ibid at 4. 30 [1999] 1 AC 82, HL.

3.14 mens rea | 
as a result. D was charged with murder. D said that he had not thought that he would kill
the baby, nor had he intended to. For some unexplained reason the prosecution case was
not that D had the aim or purpose to kill the baby or cause it serious bodily harm, but
that he must have realised that what he was doing was virtually certain to cause the baby
serious bodily harm. The judge directed the jury that it was open to them to find that D
had the necessary intent to cause serious bodily harm if they were satisfied that he must
have realised when he threw the child that there was a substantial risk that he would cause
serious bodily harm. D appealed against conviction to the Court of Appeal on the ground
that this was a misdirection because the judge had not directed the jury in accordance
with Nedrick. Dismissing D’s appeal, the Court held that a direction in terms of ‘virtual
certainty’ was only necessary in cases where the evidence of intent was limited to the
admitted actions of the defendant and the consequences of those actions, and was not
obligatory in cases where there was other evidence to be considered.
The House of Lords allowed D’s appeal. It held that the Court of Appeal had been
wrong to distinguish between the two types of case; there was no such distinction. The
use of ‘substantial risk’ blurred the line between intention and recklessness and enlarged
the scope of murder. If in either type of case it was necessary to give a direction in terms
of foresight, the direction should be in accordance with the model direction in Nedrick,
described by Lord Steyn as a ‘tried and tested formula’ which trial judges ought to con-
tinue to use. However, both Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, who gave the only substantive
speeches, thought that in the model direction ‘to find’ should be substituted for ‘to infer’
for the sake of clarity.
As indicated in Nedrick, it is rarely necessary to direct the jury in terms of the model
direction in that case as modified in Woollin. It is needed, however, where D denies that
he aimed to achieve the consequence which has to be intended,31 or where, on the facts,
and having regard to the way the case has been presented, further explanation is required
to avoid misunderstanding.32
3.13 Additional need for consequence which must be intended actually to be virtually cer-
tain The model direction in Nedrick approved by the House of Lords in Woollin contains
an additional precondition (to that of foresight of virtual certainty) to the entitlement to
find that D intended death or serious bodily harm (in the case of murder). This is that
death or serious bodily harm was actually a virtual certainty as a result of D’s actions.
Whether or not it was must be determined by asking whether a reasonable person would
have foreseen death or serious bodily harm as virtually certain to result from D’s actions.
It is not clear why this precondition, which can be traced back to Moloney, was thought
necessary. If there is evidence that, although the relevant consequence which must be
intended would not have been foreseen by a reasonable person as virtually certain, D
foresaw it as virtually certain, there is no reason in principle why a finding of intent
should not be made. D’s state of mind is the same as it would have been if the consequence
had objectively been virtually certain.
3.14 Woollin not limited to murder Although Woollin, like Moloney, Hancock and
Shankland and Nedrick, was concerned with murder, and although Lord Steyn, giving
31 MD [2004] EWCA Crim 1391; Phillips [2004] EWCA Crim 112. 32 Allen [2005] EWCA Crim 1344.
 | 3.15 criminal liability : mens reus
the lead judgment, recognised that intent does not necessarily have the same meaning
in every context of criminal law, the approach taken in Woollin is not limited to mur-
der. That approach, commenced in Moloney and explained in Woollin, has been taken
in respect of other offences.33 It would be extremely odd if the House of Lords’ emphatic
decision in terms of ‘virtual certainty’ (actual and foreseen) as the threshold degree of
risk before intention can be found from foresight, and its concern not to blur the distinc-
tion between intention and recklessness, were held not to be equally applicable to other
offences. In other offences, Woollin is applied on the basis of whether the consequence
(whatever it is) which must be intended was actually virtually certain to result from D’s
conduct and was foreseen by him as virtually certain to result.
3.15 Woollin not limited to cases where consequence foreseen as virtually certain side-
effect of achieving consequence D aims to achieve The principles in Woollin usually
come into operation where, although D’s purpose was to bring about some consequence
other than that which must be intended, D realised that the consequence which must be
intended was virtually certain to result as a side-effect of achieving his purpose. However,
those principles are not limited to that situation. It seems that they can also apply where D
acted without any purpose to bring about a consequence. In Woollin the prosecution did
not allege that D acted with the purpose of killing or seriously injuring the child (direct
intent) and, if he did not act with that purpose, it would appear that he did not act with
any purpose to bring about anything but acted simply in mindless anger. Nevertheless,
the House of Lords in Woollin did not dispute that the principles endorsed by it were
applicable in such a situation.
3.16 Is foresight of virtual certainty intention, or is it simply that intention may be found if
foresight of virtual certainty is proved? Moloney clearly decided that foresight of virtual
certainty did not constitute intention but was only evidence from which the jury could
infer intention. Lord Lane, who delivered the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Nedrick,
stated extra-judicially34 that he agreed with the definition of ‘intention’ in the draft
Criminal Code Bill35 whereby a person would act intentionally with respect to a result
when he acted either in order to bring it about or being aware that it would occur in the
ordinary course of events, ie such foresight would be intent as opposed to intent being
found from it. His Lordship added that this expressed clearly what, because of the con-
straints of precedent, ie Moloney and Hancock and Shankland, the Court of Appeal had
‘failed properly to explain’. No doubt in an effort to get as close to stating that foresight of
virtual certainty constituted intention as it could the Court of Appeal stated that:
‘Where a man realises that it is for all practical purposes inevitable that his actions will
result in death or serious bodily harm, the inference may be irresistible that he intended
that result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen.’36
33 Eg Bryson [1985] Crim LR 669, CA (wounding with intent); Walker and Hayles (1989) 90 Cr App R 226, CA
(attempt; note the reference in this case to a ‘very high degree of probability’ is now wrong).
34 HL Paper 78–1 (1989). 35 Para 3.20.
36 [1986] 3 All ER 1 at 4. A similar point was made by Lords Hailsham and Bridge in Moloney [1985] AC 905
at 913 and 920.
3.17 mens rea | 
These words were not part of the statement approved by the House of Lords in Woollin as
forming the model direction in Nedrick.
3.17 Woollin is open to at least 37 two interpretations. The first is that on proof of fore-
sight of virtual certainty as to a consequence a jury may find some unspecified type
of intention other than direct intention. This derives support in terms of the cases cul-
minating in the Nedrick model direction and from the fact that, even as amended, that
direction still speaks of an entitlement to find intention as opposed to stating that fore-
sight of virtual certainty is intention.
This was the interpretation given to Woollin by the Court of Appeal in Matthews and
Alleyne,38 where the defendants had been charged with murder. The prosecution case was
that the victim (who had told the defendants that he could not swim) had drowned after
they had pushed him off a bridge and that the defendants had intended to kill him. The
trial judge directed the jury that an intent to kill would only be proved against a defend-
ant if the prosecution proved that at the material time either he had a ‘specific intention’
(direct intention) to kill or that the victim’s death was a virtual certainty (barring an
attempt to save him) and he appreciated that this was the case (and did not intend to
save the victim and realised that no one else intended to do so). The jury convicted both
the defendants of murder. They appealed against conviction, arguing that the terms of
the second alternative in the judge’s direction indicated that it was a rule of law that if
they were satisfied that a defendant foresaw the virtual certainty of death he would have
intended to kill (ie the jury must fi nd an intent to kill), whereas in truth foresight of vir-
tual certainty etc of death merely gave rise to a rule of evidence (ie the jury might find
intention proved).
The Court of Appeal stated that the judge had been wrong in stating in the second
alternative that an appreciation of a virtual certainty of a consequence constituted inten-
tion as to it: ‘the law has not yet reached a definition of intent in murder in terms of appre-
ciation of a virtual certainty’.39 Such a conclusion, said the Court of Appeal, would be
inconsistent with the approved model direction which is in terms of ‘not entitled to find
the necessary intention unless . . . ’. Foresight of virtual certainty was merely evidence on
which the jury might find intention. Ultimately, however, the Court of Appeal dismissed
the appeals against conviction. It held that, if the jury were sure that the victim’s death
had been virtually certain to result and that the defendants appreciated this and had no
intention of the victim being saved, it was impossible that the jury would not have found
that the defendants intended the victim to die. The convictions were not unsafe.
The problem with this interpretation of Woollin is that (like the decision in Moloney) it
gives rise to a conundrum. If (as stated in cases like Moloney and Matthews and Alleyne)
foresight of virtual certainty in itself is not intention, and D did not act with what is estab-
lished in law as intention (ie D did not aim to achieve the particular consequence), how
can it be found from foresight of consequence on D’s part that D intended it, when any
additional type of ‘intention’ is left undefined by the law? The courts have not stated what
the mystery ingredient is that can be found from foresight so as to convert foresight into
intention. The only obvious ingredients are:
37 For another interpretation see Simester and Shute [2000] Crim LR 204 (letter).
38 [2003] EWCA Crim 192. 39 Ibid at [43].
 | 3.18 criminal liability : mens rea
• aim or purpose on D’s part, but that, of course, will have been ruled out – otherwise
one would not be concerned with the present point; and
• motive or desire on D’s part, but in Moloney the House of Lords said that intention is
something quite distinct from motive or desire.
Until the courts tell us what the mystery ingredient is, the proposition that intent can be
found from foresight must be regarded with scepticism as a matter of principle.40
Another defect is that giving the jury discretion – ‘moral elbow room’41 – to find that
a person who foresaw a consequence as virtually certain intended that consequence is
liable to lead to inconsistent verdicts on essentially the same facts.
3.18 A second interpretation of Woollin is that proof of foresight of virtual certainty is
proof of intention (oblique intention) itself, ie that foresight of virtual certainty is itself
a species of intention. At first sight this seems difficult to accept. After all, in Woollin
the House of Lords did not purport to overrule Moloney or Hancock and Shankland
and expressly applied Nedrick. Nevertheless, Lord Steyn, giving the lead judgment, pro-
vides indications of a new interpretation of Moloney (on which case, of course, the other
two cases were based) because on two occasions he refers to a statement by Lord Bridge
that ‘the probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must be little short
of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent’. On each occa-
sion, Lord Steyn emphasised the words ‘to establish’.42 Elsewhere, Lord Steyn referred to
Moloney adopting a ‘test of what may constitute intention which is similar to the “virtual
certainty test” in Nedrick’.43 Later, referring to Nedrick, he said that: ‘The effect of the
critical direction [in Nedrick, approved in Woollin] is that a result foreseen as virtually
certain is an intended result’.44 Although the substitution of ‘find’ in the Nedrick model
direction in itself supports this interpretation, that support is weakened by the reference
to foresight of virtual certainty giving rise to an ‘entitlement’ to find intention rather than
an obligation to do so.
It is submitted that the second interpretation of Woollin commands the most support
in that case, whatever the problems of reconciling it with the previous case law. In return-
ing the law full circle to approximately where it was before Moloney (leaving aside Lord
Steyn’s interpretation of that case) it avoids the intellectual difficulties of the first inter-
pretation and provides certainty of definition.
The second interpretation is supported by reference to Re A (conjoined twins: surgi-
cal separation)45 where the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal was concerned with
the legality of separating conjoined (‘Siamese’) twins, who were otherwise doomed to
die, probably within three to six months, in order to save the stronger twin, when it was
known that the proposed operation would result in the death of the weaker one. Dealing
40 Norrie ‘After Woollin’ [1999] Crim LR 532 has argued that a moral threshold must be passed before the
jury, having found that D foresaw a prohibited consequence as virtually certain to result, should attribute to D
an intention to cause it. On this argument, the jury’s entitlement to fi nd intention from proof of such foresight
would depend on the wickedness (or otherwise) of D’s motives. For an objection to this see Simester and Shute
[2000] Crim LR 204 at 205.
41 Horder ‘Intention in the Criminal Law – A Rejoinder’ (1995) 58 MLR 678 at 688.
42 [1999] 1 AC 82 at 91 and 93. 43 Ibid at 91. 44 Ibid at 93.
45 [2001] Fam 147, CA.
3.20 mens rea | 
with the issue of whether the doctors would intend to kill or do serious bodily harm to
Mary (the twin who would die), Ward LJ stated:
‘Woollin is binding upon us . . . The test I have to set myself is that established by that case.
I have to ask myself whether I am satisfied that the doctors recognise that death or serious
harm will be virtually certain (barring some unforeseen intervention) to result from car-
rying out this operation. If so, the doctors intend to kill or to do that serious harm even
though they may not have any desire to achieve that result. It is common ground that
they appreciate that death to Mary would result from the severance of the common aorta.
Unpalatable though it may be to stigmatise the doctors with “murderous intent”, that is
what in law they will have if they perform the operation and Mary dies as a result.’ 46
Brooke and Robert Walker LJJ regarded Woollin in the same way, although (as noted in
para 3.24) Robert Walker LJ (as he then was) thought that its application was excluded
on the facts.
Re A was not referred to by the Court of Appeal in Matthews and Alleyne.
3.19 In practical terms, it is unlikely in most cases that a jury would decline to find intent
from proof of foresight of virtual certainty if the first interpretation is correct. In Matthews
and Alleyne,47 the Court of Appeal stated that there was very little to choose between the
two interpretations. However, there can be hard cases where the jury might not wish to
find intent from proof of foresight of virtual certainty. An example would be where D has
no real choice in an emergency in which A will inevitably die if he acts one way and B will
inevitably die if he acts in the only other possible way, as D realises, and D acts in the way
which brings about A’s death. Consequently, the issue of which interpretation is correct is
an important one. The issue will not be resolved until the Supreme Court (or Parliament)
has the opportunity to do so. Until then, it is likely that the courts will follow the deci-
sion of the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal in Matthews and Alleyne where,
unlike Re A, the issue was the fundamental issue in the appeal.
Proposals for statutory provision about intention

3.20 Proposals for statutory guidance about intention have been made on a number of
occasions in modern times. For example, cl 14 of the draft Offences Against the Person
Bill contained in a Home Office Consultation Paper in 199848 set out a definition of ‘inten-
tion’ 49 as to consequence in relation to the non-fatal offences contained in the draft Bill
which is similar to that in cl 18 of the draft Criminal Code Bill.50 Clause 18 provided that
a person would act:
‘ “intentionally” with respect to a result when he acts either in order to bring it about or
being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events’.
46 [2001] Fam 147 at 198–199. 47 [2003] EWCA Crim 192 at [45].

48 Home Office Violence: Reforming the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
49 Th is defi nition is a reformulation of the defi nition contained in cl 1 of the Law Commission’s draft
Criminal Law Bill: see Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General Defences (1993),
Law Com No 218; see para 7.129. 50 Para 1.70.
 | 3.21 criminal liability : mens rea
Clause 14 differs in one important respect, as the italicised words below indicate. It
provides that a person acts:
‘(a) intentionally with respect to a result when:

(i) it is his purpose to cause it; or
(ii) although it is not his purpose to cause it, he knows that it would occur in the
ordinary course of events if he were to succeed in his purpose of causing some
other result; . . . ’
This formulation would bring certainty to the meaning of intention but, unlike cl 18, it
would not cover the type of intention described in para 3.15.
3.21 In its report, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, 51 published in 2006, the Law
Commission recommended that the existing law governing the meaning of intention is
codified as follows:
‘(1) A person should be taken to intend a result if he or she acts in order to bring it
about.
(2) In cases where the judge believes that justice may not be done unless an expanded
understanding of intention is given, the jury should be directed as follows: an
intention to bring about a result may be found if it is shown that the defendant
thought that the result was a virtually certain consequence of his or her action.’
Clause (2) would perpetuate the lack of certainty about the meaning of ‘intention’.
The Commission stated that the present law is not difficult for juries to apply and that
it is better to give juries some discretion in determining the limits of murder than to
try to constrain their decision-making by complex legal rules about the definition of
intention.
Doctrine of double effect

3.22 The speeches in Woollin do not deal expressly with the situation where someone
acts for a good purpose which he knows cannot be achieved without also having a bad
consequence. This raises what has been called in moral philosophy the doctrine of double
effect. Two classes of double effect, at least, can be distinguished.
3.23 The first class of double effect is where the good purpose and the foreseen (but
undesired) bad consequence both relate to the same individual. An example is where a
doctor, in the best interests of the patient, administers pain-killing drugs in appropriate
quantities for the purpose of relieving that patient’s pain, but realising that an incidental
effect of doing so will be to hasten death.
There is some authority that in law, as well as in moral philosophy, there is a doc-
trine of double effect which makes such conduct permissible if it is in the interests of the
51 Law Commission Report No 304, paras 3.9–3.27.

3.23 mens rea | 
victim.52 This appears to have been recognised as part of our law by Lord Donaldson MR
in Re J and by Lord Goff in Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland. In Re J, Lord
Donaldson identified the relevant principle as follows:
‘What doctors and the courts have to decide is whether, in the best interests of the child
patient, a particular decision as to medical treatment should be taken which as a side
effect will render death more or less likely. This is not a matter of semantics. It is funda-
mental. At the other end of the age spectrum, the use of drugs to reduce pain will often
be fully justified, notwithstanding that this will hasten the moment of death. What can
never be justified is the use of drugs or surgical procedures with the primary purpose of
doing so.’ 53
In Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland, Lord Goff referred to:
‘the established rule that a doctor may, when caring for a patient who is, for example,
dying of cancer, lawfully administer pain-killing drugs despite the fact that he knows
that an incidental effect of that application will be to abbreviate the patient’s life. Such a
decision may properly be made as part of the care of the living patient, in his best interests;
and, on this basis, the treatment will be lawful. Moreover, where the doctor’s treatment
of his patient is lawful, the patient’s death will be regarded in law as exclusively caused by
the injury or disease to which his condition is attributable.’54
Similar language to that of Lord Donaldson MR was used by Ognall J in his summing-up
to the jury in Cox,55 a case where a doctor administered potassium chloride to a dying
patient who was in extreme pain. The dose had the inevitable effect of killing the patient,
but would have alleviated her pain in the short period of remaining life. Ognall J indi-
cated that what mattered was the doctor’s ‘primary purpose’.
In Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation),56 Ward LJ thought that the doctrine of
double effect might be ‘difficult to reconcile with Woollin’, but recognised that it enjoyed
some judicial approval. Brooke LJ did not consider it necessary to decide whether the cor-
rect analysis of the doctrine of double effect was that it negated intention (or causation) or
that it simply rendered non-culpable the intention to kill and non-blameworthy the caus-
ing of death because the law permits the doctor to do the act in question. Neither judge
considered it necessary to go any further because in their view (correctly, it is submitted)
it could not be said that the surgeons would be acting for the purpose of benefiting Mary,
the weaker twin. It remains to be seen how far beyond the doctor–patient relationship the
courts are prepared to extend the law relating to the present class of double effect.57
52 For criticism of the doctrine of double effect, see Price ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect’ (1997)
17 LS 323. For argument that utilisation of a redefined defence of necessity would be a better way of dealing
with euthanasia in a medical context than the doctrine of double effect, see Ost ‘Euthanasia and the Defence of
Necessity: Advocating a More Appropriate Legal Response’ [2005] Crim LR 355.
53 [1991] Fam 33 at 46. 54 [1993] AC 789 at 867. 55 (1992) 12 BMLR 38.
56 [2001] Fam 147, CA.
57 Contrast the views expressed by Arlidge ‘The Trial of Dr David Moor’ [2000] Crim LR 31 and Smith ‘A
Comment on Moor’s Case’ ibid 41 with Cooper ‘Summing Up Intention’ (2000) 150 NLJ 1258. See also Goss ‘A
Postscript to the Trial of Dr David Moor’ [2000] Crim LR 568.
 | 3.24 criminal liability : mens rea
3.24 The second class of double effect is where the good purpose relates to A but it can-
not be achieved without having a foreseen (but undesired) consequence for B. The judg-
ments of Ward and Brooke LJJ in Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) indicate that
they did not consider that the doctrine of double effect is recognised in law in such a case.
On the other hand, Robert Walker LJ appears to have taken the opposite view, which can-
not be regarded as representing the law. He said:
‘The proposed operation would not be unlawful. It would involve the positive act of
invasive surgery and Mary’s death would be foreseen as an inevitable consequence of an
operation which is intended, and is necessary, to save Jodie’s [the stronger twin] life. But
Mary’s death would not be the purpose or intention of the surgery, and she would die
because tragically her body, on its own, is not and never has been viable.’58
Ulterior intention
3.25 This type of intention is alternatively known as ‘further intention’. These terms
are used to describe an intention which does not relate to a consequence required for
the actus reus of the offence charged, but relates instead to something ulterior to it (ie
something beyond it). Where the definition of an offence requires an ulterior intent as to
a particular thing, the offence cannot be committed unless that thing is intended; reck-
lessness, as opposed to intention, as to the ulterior thing occurring is insufficient.59 Since
the ulterior thing is not a requisite of the actus reus, it is irrelevant that it never occurs.
3.26 Certain acts which would not otherwise be criminal are made criminal if the actus
reus is performed with intent to do something ulterior to it. For example, it is normally not
an offence to enter a building as a trespasser, but, by the Theft Act 1968, s 9, a person who
does so with intent to steal anything in the building is guilty of burglary. Consequently,
if D enters a house, intending to steal jewellery there, he is guilty of burglary, and the fact
that he is arrested a split second later and never steals anything is irrelevant. Sometimes
the criminal law punishes what would otherwise be a comparatively minor offence with
much greater severity if it was committed with the ulterior intent of perpetrating a more
serious offence. For example, the offence of common assault is punishable with a very
modest period of imprisonment, but the offence of assault with intent to rob is punish-
able with imprisonment for life. In these and the fairly numerous similar cases, it must
be proved that, when D did the prohibited act, D’s purpose was to commit the further
act or offence. Reference to finding intent from foresight of virtual certainty would be
meaningless and confusing.
3.27 Sometimes the ulterior intent relates to an intended consequence of the prohibited
act committed by D which is not required to have been achieved. The offence of harass-
ment of a residential occupier provides an example. By the Protection from Eviction Act
1977, s 1(3), it is an offence for a landlord to do acts likely to interfere with the peace or
comfort of a residential occupier if he does so with intent to cause the residential occupier
to give up the occupation of the premises. Another example is the offence of sending letters
58 [2001] Fam 147 at 259. 59 Belfon [1976] 3 All ER 46, CA.

3.30 mens rea | 
etc with intent to cause distress or anxiety, contrary to the Malicious Communications
Act 1988, s 1(1). This provides that a person who sends to another a letter, electronic com-
munication or other article conveying an indecent or grossly offensive message, a threat,
or information which is false (to the sender’s knowledge or belief), is guilty of an offence
if his purpose or one of his purposes in sending it is to cause distress or anxiety.
Offences where only direct intent suffices

3.28 In some offences, only direct intention suffices as intention. Among these are those
offences which expressly require D to act with a specified purpose, such as an offence
under the Malicious Communications Act 1988, s 1 referred to above, and a number
of sexual offences which require D to have acted for the purpose of obtaining sexual
gratification.60
3.29 In addition, in the case of some other offences requiring ‘intention’, their word-
ing and/or nature may be such that only direct intention as to a particular element can
meaningfully be required. Examples are the inchoate offences of intentionally encourag-
ing or assisting an offence, statutory conspiracy and attempt, described in Chapter 14.
Alternatively, an offence may have been held to require a direct intent. The common law
offence of treason (at least in the form of treason by adhering to the Queen’s enemies) is
an example of such an offence.61 So is the offence under the Protection from Eviction Act
1977, s 1(3),62 referred to in para 3.27. So, it seems, is the offence of assisting offenders.63
Sometimes, as seen in para 3.26, the use of the words ‘with intent to . . . ’ in a statutory
definition of an offence is in a context where only a direct intention can meaningfully be
said to be possible. In such a case it is appropriate to say that the offence requires such an
intention.
Specific intent and basic intent

3.30 ‘Specific intent’ is used frequently in the reports and should be treated with caution
since, although it does not connote an additional species of intention, it can bear four dif-
ferent meanings which are not mutually exclusive:
• the intention which must be proved to secure a conviction for a particular offence for
which intention is the only state of mind specified in relation to an element;64
• a direct intention;65
• an ulterior intention or other form of ulterior mens rea;66 and
60 See, eg, paras 9.64 and 9.67.

61 Ahlers [1915] 1 KB 616, CCA. Also see Sinnasamy Selvanayagam v R [1951] AC 83, PC; Steane [1947] KB
997, CCA, para 3.8 (the decision in which necessarily ruled out foresight of virtual certainty of assisting the
enemy as sufficient to establish the intent to assist the enemy required for the offence in question).
62 Burke [1991] AC 135, HL. 63 Para 17.86.
64 Mohan [1976] QB 1, CA; Moloney [1985] AC 905, HL; Hancock and Shankland [1986] AC 455, HL.
65 Para 15.90. 66 Paras 15.90 and 15.91.
 | 3.31 criminal liability : mens rea
• a state of mind, required for particular offences only, in relation to which D may suc-
cessfully plead its absence by relying on evidence of voluntary intoxication.67
3.31 Some judges have added to the confusion by introducing the term ‘basic intent’. A
‘basic intent’ is not another type of intent and, surprisingly, it is not limited to intention at
all. ‘Basic intent’ bears at least three meanings which are not mutually exclusive:
• in the words of Lord Simon in DPP v Morgan:68 ‘By “crimes of basic intent” I mean
those crimes whose definition expresses (or, more often, implies) a mens rea [whether
intention, or recklessness or knowledge which are discussed later] which does not go
beyond the actus reus’;
• a state of mind in respect of whose absence evidence of D’s voluntary intoxication is
irrelevant;69 and
• an intent to do the act required for the actus reus, ie a deliberate or voluntary act.70
The variety of meanings of ‘specific intent’ and ‘basic intent’ means that, when confronted
with one of these terms, the reader must stop and consider what meaning or meanings it
bears in the particular context.
Recklessness
Key points 3.2
A person may be reckless as to a consequence or as to a circumstance.
A person is reckless:
• as to a circumstance if he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist;

• as to a consequence if he is aware of a risk that it will occur,
and, in the circumstances known to him, it is unreasonable to take the risk.
3.32 In many offences ‘recklessness’ on D’s part, as to a risk of his act (or omission)
resulting in the consequence (result) required for the actus reus or as to a risk that a
circumstance required for the actus reus exists or will exist, suffices for criminal liability
as an alternative to some other mental state such as intention or knowledge.
Sometimes the definition of an offence may require that D is reckless as to the risk of a
consequence occurring which is not required for the actus reus of the offence. For exam-
ple a person is guilty of an offence, contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(2) if he
intentionally or recklessly damages property and is reckless as to the risk of endangering
the life of another thereby; life does not actually have to be endangered.
67 Paras 15.73–15.76. 68 [1976] AC 182 at 216.

69 Paras 15.77–15.81.
70 James [1997] 34 LS Gaz R 27, CA. On a literal interpretation, the House of Lords in DPP v Newbury [1977]
AC 500, used ‘basic intent’ in this sense; see paras 8.89–8.91.
3.34 mens rea | 
What does recklessness mean?

3.33 Recklessness means the taking of an unreasonable risk of which the risk-taker is
aware. In G,71 Lord Bingham, giving the principal speech in the House of Lords, referred
with approval to the definition of recklessness contained in the draft Criminal Code Bill,
clause 18(c), viz that a person acts:
‘ “recklessly” with respect to:

(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist;
(ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur,
and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk.’72
Recklessness as defined above is sometimes called subjective recklessness. Provided that

it is proved that D was aware of a risk of a relevant circumstance or result, it is irrelevant
that for some reason, such as bad temper, D chose to disregard the risk or to put it to the
back of his mind or to close his mind to it,73 not caring whether the risk materialised or
not.74 Indeed, although it is normally the case that a person who consciously takes an
unreasonable risk does not care whether or not it materialises, it is not necessary that this
should be so. A person who consciously takes an unreasonable risk which he hopes will
not materialise is also reckless.
For recklessness the material risk, ie the risk which must be foreseen or realised, need
merely be foreseen or realised as a possible risk;75 it does not have to be an obvious and
significant risk.76 If the degree of risk foreseen is one of virtual certainty, D can be found
to have intended the consequence in question, as explained above. In such a case, there
will be to that extent an overlap between intention and recklessness.
Provided that D foresees or realises the material risk, it is irrelevant that that risk is not
the only or foremost risk in his mind when he takes it.77
3.34 All that can be said by way of generalisation about the requirement that the risk
must have been an unreasonable one to take is that it has to be judged objectively (ie by
reference to the standards of a reasonable person) and that it raises a variety of questions
to be answered by the jury if it is in issue in the Crown Court. How great was the risk?
How beneficial to society or to the victim was the object which D was seeking to achieve?
71 [2003] UKHL 50.

72 An earlier authority for this definition of recklessness, in respect of a consequence (result), is Stephenson
[1979] QB 695, CA. It will be noted that the frequently cited Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396, CCA does not contain
a complete defi nition of the present type of recklessness because it does not refer to the requirement that the
risk be unreasonable.
73 A person cannot close his mind to a risk unless he fi rst realises that there is a risk: Comr of Metropolitan
Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 358, per Lord Edmund-Davies; G [2003] UKHL 50 at [32], [58], per Lords
Bingham and Steyn.
74 Stephenson [1979] QB 695, CA; Comr of Metropolitan Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341 at 358, per Lord
Edmund-Davies; G [2003] UKHL 50 at [32], [58], per Lords Bingham and Steyn; Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 192
(Admin).
75 By way of exception, in involuntary manslaughter the relevant risk must be foreseen as highly probable: see
Lidar [2000] 4 Archbold News 3, CA; para 8.119. 76 Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413.
77 Booth v CPS [2006] EWHC 192 (Admin).
 | 3.35 criminal liability : mens rea
Every surgeon foresees the risk of the death of the patient upon whom he is operating but,
unless the surgeon takes an unreasonable risk, the surgeon cannot be regarded as being
reckless as to the patient’s death. As stated above, the unreasonableness of taking a risk
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances known to D.
A controversial decision overruled

3.35 For just over 20 years, recklessness could also consist of a failure to think about an
obvious risk in the case of offences of criminal damage and possibly a few other statu-
tory offences in whose definition recklessness was specified as mens rea. This type of
recklessness, called objective recklessness or Caldwell recklessness after the case, Comr
of Metropolitan Police v Caldwell,78 in which it was recognised, was widely criticised,79
in particular because the risk had to be obvious to a reasonable person who was not
endowed with D’s characteristics (and did not have to be obvious to D), and because fail-
ing to think about a risk (inadvertent risk-taking) would seem less culpable than advert-
ent risk-taking and can hardly be described as mens rea, a state of mind; it is quite the
contrary – the absence of a state of mind.
Caldwell was overruled in 2003 by the House of Lords in G, 80 where the House of Lords
held that ‘reckless’ in the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1 should be assessed in the subjec-
tive sense referred to in para 3.33, as it had been before Caldwell. In G, the defendants,
two boys aged 11 and 12, entered the back yard of a shop. They found some newspapers.
They set fire to some of them and threw them under a wheelie-bin. The newspapers set
fire to the wheelie-bin and the fire spread to the shop and then to adjoining commercial
buildings, causing about £1m worth of damage. It was accepted that neither boy appreci-
ated that there was any risk of the fire spreading in the way it eventually did. The boys
were charged with arson, ie causing damage by fire, to the commercial buildings, ‘being
reckless whether such property would be damaged’, contrary to the Criminal Damage
Act 1971, s 1(1) and (3).
The trial judge directed the jury in terms of Caldwell recklessness, telling them that,
in the alternative to awareness that there was some risk of building damage involved, the
boys would be guilty if they had not thought about the possibility of that risk and that risk
would have been obvious to a reasonable bystander.81 He also directed the jury that the
reasonable bystander was ‘an adult . . . [N]o allowance is made by the law for the youth of
these boys or their lack of maturity or their inability . . . to assess what was going on’. The
boys were convicted. The Court of Appeal, bound by Caldwell, dismissed their appeals.
They appealed to the House of Lords.
78 [1982] AC 341, HL. 79 See the 15th edition of this book.

80 [2003] UKHL 50. See Kimel ‘Inadvertent Recklessness in the Criminal Law’ (2004) 120 LQR 548.
81 The boys must surely have appreciated that throwing lighted newspapers under a wheelie-bin might dam-
age it. If so, they could certainly have been convicted of criminal damage to the wheelie-bin and another wheel-
ie-bin by the fire en route to the shop and other buildings. On this basis, if they had been appropriately charged,
a properly directed jury could have convicted them of the criminal damage by fire to the buildings, because they
would have had the necessary mens rea (recklessness as to the risk of their act of throwing the lighted newspa-
pers resulting in damaging by fire property belonging to another), as explained in para 3.38. Th is point was not,
however, adverted to by the trial judge or on appeal.
3.37 mens rea | 
The House of Lords unanimously allowed the boys’ appeals. It held that the House of
Lords in Caldwell had misinterpreted the law for the following reasons. It was a prin-
ciple of the criminal law that conviction of serious crime should depend on proof that
D’s conduct was accompanied by a culpable state of mind. It was not clearly culpable to
be doing something involving a risk of injury to another if, for reasons other than self-
induced intoxication, one did not perceive such a risk. Moreover, the facts of the case
illustrated the unfairness which Caldwell could cause. The House of Lords also noted the
criticism of Caldwell, which had been expressed by judges, practitioners and academ-
ics, that Caldwell recklessness involved a misinterpretation of Parliament’s intention. In
inserting ‘reckless’ in the statute, Parliament had been implementing a Law Commission
report which made plain that ‘reckless’ in the Act was intended to refer to a requirement
of foresight by D of a risk of damage.
3.36 Although it is, strictly, limited to the meaning of recklessness in the Criminal
Damage Act 1971, there can be no doubt that the decision in G also applies to reckless-
ness in the context of any other offence for which recklessness is sufficient mens rea. G
has been applied by the Court of Appeal outside the Criminal Damage Act 1971,82 and the
Court of Appeal has stated obiter that, since G, ‘recklessness’ bears the meaning approved
in that case. 83 It would, of course, be possible for a statute to give the term a different
meaning in respect of a particular offence.
General points concerning intention or

recklessness as to a consequence
Correspondence principle
3.37 Generally, D must intend, or be reckless as to, the consequence of the actus reus
of the offence in question as it is described in the definition of the offence, eg the
destruction of or damage to property belonging to another in the offence of criminal
damage. 84 This is called the correspondence principle. However, as Lord Ackner (with
whose speech the other Law Lords agreed) observed in Savage; Parmenter, 85 there is
no hard and fast principle to this effect. There are some exceptional offences where
intention or recklessness, or in some cases only intention, in relation to something
less than the actual consequence required for their actus reus suffices. For example,
in the offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 20 of unlawfully and
maliciously wounding another and of unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous
bodily harm on another, D has sufficient mens rea if he merely intended or was reckless
as to some unlawful physical harm to a person, albeit of a minor nature: he need not have
foreseen that his act might cause physical harm of the gravity described in the statute,
ie a wound or grievous bodily harm. Another example, already referred to, is murder
82 It was applied by the Court of Appeal in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868 in the
context of the common law offence of wilful misconduct in a public office.
83 Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125. 84 See, eg, Smith (David) [1974] QB 354, CA; para 3.85.
85 [1992] 1 AC 699, HL.
 | 3.38 criminal liability : mens rea
where the mens rea consists of an intention unlawfully to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm to another human being. 86
‘Transferred malice’
3.38 Provided that D acted intentionally or recklessly in the way required by the defini-
tion of the offence charged, it is irrelevant that the actual object (whether person or prop-
erty) was unintended or unforeseen. For example, if D does something intending that it
should damage X’s property, or being reckless as to this occurring, and quite unforesee-
ably V’s property is damaged instead, D can be convicted of criminal damage, contrary
to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1), since the mens rea for that offence is intention or
recklessness as to damaging property belonging to another, and D acted with such inten-
tion or recklessness. This is a simple application of the wording of the mens rea require-
ment of the offence. The general practice of writers to dignify it by calling it the doctrine of
‘transferred malice’, ‘transferred intention’ or ‘transferred fault’ seems unnecessary and, in
the case of the first two terms, inaccurate (since the ‘doctrine’ is not limited to ‘malice’ or
intention). The doctrine was affirmed, albeit unenthusiastically, by the House of Lords in
A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994),87 although it was held inapplicable to the facts subject to the
reference. More recently, the doctrine was applied in the leading judgment of the Supreme
Court in Gnango.88 Since it obscures the simple application of the mens rea requirement, the
doctrine is liable to lead to developments inconsistent with that requirement, as is shown by
the decision of the House of Lords in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), discussed below.
Latimer89 provides an example of the operation of the present point. D aimed a blow at
X which glanced off him and struck V who was standing beside X, wounding her severely.
It was held that D could be convicted of maliciously wounding V because he had an intent
to injure and it was irrelevant that he had not intended to injure V.
3.39 By way of contrast, and not surprisingly, D cannot be convicted if he acted with
the mens rea for one offence but unexpectedly commits the actus reus of another offence,
unless the offence is one where recklessness suffices and D is proved to have been reckless
as to the risk of the type of harm actually caused. This is shown by Pembliton,90 where D,
who had been fighting with persons in the street, threw a stone at them, which missed
but went through the window of a nearby public house. His conviction for maliciously
damaging the window was quashed because he had acted with intent to injure persons
and not with intent to injure property. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved pointed out
that, if the jury had been directed to consider whether D had been reckless as to the risk of
the window being broken, the conviction would have been upheld, because recklessness
was sufficient for the offence in question.
3.40 In A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994),91 the House of Lords limited the simple application
of the requirement of mens rea described above, on the basis of what was (it is submitted)
86 As to these examples, see paras 7.86 and 8.24. For further examples, see paras 7.61, 8.84–8.105 and 8.119.
87 [1998] AC 245, HL.
88 [2011] UKSC 59, per Lords Phillips P and Judge CJ, with whom Lord Wilson SCJ agreed. Their Lordships
preferred the term ‘transferred mens rea’. 89 (1886) 17 QBD 359, CCR.
90 (1874) LR 2 CCR 119, CCR. 91 [1998] AC 245, HL.
3.42 mens rea | 
a mistaken understanding of the doctrine of transferred malice. It held that that doctrine
could not apply in a case of murder where an unintended victim was not in being at the time
of the relevant act. In A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), D stabbed a pregnant woman, intend-
ing to do her serious bodily harm. He intended to do serious harm only to the woman. As
a result of the attack, the woman went into premature labour and her child, although born
alive, subsequently died owing to its prematurity. D had clearly committed the actus reus
of an offence of homicide, but the House of Lords held that he was not guilty of murder. Its
reason was that the doctrine of transferred malice could not apply because the effect of the
doctrine was that the intended victim and the actual victim were treated as if they were
one, as if the latter had been the intended victim from the start. Since a foetus cannot be the
victim of murder,92 it was impossible, the House held, to treat the intended victim and the
actual victim as one, as if the latter had been the intended victim from the start. Strangely,
the House of Lords held that D could have been convicted of involuntary manslaughter93 of
the child. Its reason was that D had the necessary mens rea for constructive manslaughter,
one type of involuntary manslaughter, when he stabbed the mother and, although the child
was a foetus then, the requisite mens rea was established, because, when she became a living
person, the child could be regarded as within the scope of the mens rea which D had when
he stabbed her mother. A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) is discussed further in Chapter 8.
Consequence occurring in unexpected manner

3.41 It is irrelevant, as far as the question of mens rea is concerned, that the consequence
in relation to which D acted intentionally or recklessly occurred in an unexpected man-
ner.94 If D, intending to cause V serious harm, throws a petrol bomb at him, it is irrelevant
that V is not injured by being burnt but is injured by an explosion caused when the bomb
misses him and ignites a gas leak.
Knowledge
Key points 3.3
‘Knowledge’ refers to a state of mind relating to a circumstance of an act, omission or
state of affairs.
Mental states other than ‘actual knowledge’ can suffice where the definition of an
offence requires the defendant to ‘know’ something.
3.42 Knowledge of the circumstances by virtue of which an act or omission or state of

affairs is criminal (ie those specified for the actus reus) is expressly required in the case
of many statutory offences on account of the inclusion of some such word as ‘know-
ingly’ in the definition. However, the use of ‘knowingly’ or the like is not essential since,
even when no appropriate word appears in the definition, a requirement of knowledge is
92 Para 8.7. 93 Para 8.97.
94 A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] QB 581, CA; this point was not dealt with in the speeches of the House
of Lords in the subsequent appeal, [1998] AC 245.
 | 3.43 criminal liability : mens rea
frequently implied by the courts, as explained in Chapter 6. In Sweet v Parsley,95 for exam-
ple, the House of Lords held that a person could not be guilty of ‘being concerned in the
management of premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis’ (an offence which
has subsequently been modified) in the absence of proof of knowledge of such use.
Actual knowledge
3.43 A person knows that a surrounding circumstance exists if he is certain that it
exists. This state of mind is known as ‘actual knowledge’.96 Actual knowledge is the
equivalent of intention in that if D acts, certain that a circumstance exists, he can be said
to act intentionally in respect of it. If this is all that ‘knowledge’ meant it would often be
difficult to prove it. There will be many cases where D is not absolutely certain about a
surrounding circumstance, but he has no substantial doubt about its existence or, at least,
realises the risk that it may exist.
From the point of view of the enforcement of the criminal law it is therefore a good
thing that knowledge also normally97 includes the case where D is virtually certain about
a surrounding circumstance or is wilfully blind about it, even where the statute uses the
word ‘knowingly’.
Belief
3.44 The state of mind of someone who is virtually certain about something can be
described as ‘belief’.98 According to the Court of Appeal in Hall:
‘Belief, of course, is something short of knowledge. It may be said to be the state of mind of
a person who says to himself: “I cannot say I know for certain that these goods are stolen,
but there can be no other reasonable conclusion in the light of all the circumstances, in
the light of all that I have heard and seen”.’99
‘Believe’ is a particularly useful word to cover the situation, relevant in conspiracy or

attempt, where a circumstance does not actually exist. One cannot be said to ‘know’
that a non-existent circumstance exists but one can believe it. If foresight of the virtual
certainty of a consequence is in itself intention in respect of it, a person who is virtually
certain of a circumstance in which he is acting could by way of parity be said to act inten-
tionally in relation to it.
‘Belief’ is discussed further in para 11.52.
Wilful blindness
3.45 Wilful blindness has been variously described by the judges. It has been said to
exist where D shuts his eyes to the obvious or refrains from inquiry because he suspects
95 [1970] AC 132, HL.
96 Roper v Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 284 at 288–289, per Devlin J.
97 For exceptions, see para 3.46.
98 It was recognised in Dunne (1998) 162 JP 399, CA, that someone who believes that something exists can be
said to act ‘knowingly’ in relation to it. 99 (1985) 81 Cr App R 260 at 264.
3.46 mens rea | 
the truth but does not want his suspicion confirmed,100 or to exist where D deliberately
refrains from making enquiries, the results of which D may not care to have.101 Wilful
blindness is a species of recklessness with reference to surrounding circumstances, and
it is often called connivance.102 The first reported instance of the recognition of wilful
blindness is Sleep,103 where several members of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved
would clearly have been prepared to treat it as a basis for liability. In a more modern case,
Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd,104 the House of Lords held that a person
could be convicted of the statutory offence of knowingly permitting the use of premises
as a sex establishment contrary to a prohibition of their use otherwise than with a licence
if he actually knew of their use as a sex establishment without a licence or was wilfully
blind as to this. Lord Bridge, with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, said:
‘[I]t is always open to the tribunal of fact, when knowledge on the part of a defendant is
required to be proved, to base a finding of knowledge on evidence that the defendant had
deliberately shut his eyes to the obvious or refrained from inquiry because he suspected
the truth but did not want to have his suspicion confirmed.’105
As seen in the next paragraph, Lord Bridge’s use of the word ‘always’ was not strictly accu-
rate. There are exceptional cases where ‘knowledge’ does not include wilful blindness.
Instances where ‘knowledge’ has restricted meaning

3.46 Some offences require D to know or believe something. For example, the offences
of handling stolen goods, of assisting offenders and of copying a false instrument require
D to know or believe, respectively, that the goods are stolen, that the person assisted
has committed a relevant offence and that the ‘instrument’ is false.106 The importance of
‘belief’ being required in the alternative to ‘knowledge’ is to limit ‘knowledge’ to cases
where D is certain of the relevant circumstance. While ‘believe’ covers the case where D is
virtually certain of a circumstance, it has been held that the effect of the use of ‘knowledge
or belief’ is to exclude wilful blindness from being sufficient.107 However, it has also been
held that knowledge or belief may be inferred from wilful blindness,108 which is some-
what difficult to understand if the suspicion involved in wilful blindness is not enough for
belief. What is it which is inferable from wilful blindness which constitutes ‘belief’? The
courts have not supplied the answer.
100 Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange [1986] 2 All ER 353, HL.

101 Roper v Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 284 at 288–289, per Devlin J.
102 Edwards Mens Rea in Statutory Offences (1955) 203; see also Somerset v Hart (1884) 12 QBD 360, DC; Ross
v Moss [1965] 2 QB 396, DC; Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttall [1999] 3 All ER 833 at 840, per Lord Steyn.
103 (1861) Le & Ca 44. 104 [1986] 2 All ER 353, HL.
105 [1986] 2 All ER 353 at 359.
106 See paras 11.51, 17.86 and 12.60. For a more recent example, see the Communications Act 2003, s 126(2).
107 Griffiths (1974) 60 Cr App R 14, CA; Moys (1984) 79 Cr App R 72, CA.
108 Griffiths above; Moys above; Forsyth [1997] 2 Cr App R 299, CA; Sheriff, Ali and others [2008] EWCA
Crim 2653.
 | 3.47 criminal liability : mens rea
Sometimes a requirement of ‘belief’ is expressed in the negative in respect of a particu-

lar offence. For example, the Perjury Act 1911, s 1(1) provides that a person is guilty of
perjury if he makes the material statement in question ‘without belief’ in its truth.
3.47 Some offences require D to know or be reckless about a particular circumstance.
For example, there are a large number of statutory offences which consist of making a
statement which, as D knows, or as to which he is reckless, is false in a material particu-
lar in a specified respect.109 The concept of ‘recklessness’ has already been discussed. In
offences such as these, the effect of the alternative of recklessness is to remove wilful
blindness from the normal meaning of ‘knowledge’, because wilful blindness is a species
of recklessness, so that only being certain or virtually certain as to the relevant matter
constitutes ‘knowledge’ as to it.
3.48 Some offences require D to know or suspect something. Examples are the various
money laundering offences under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, ss 327 to 329, which
(together with s 340(3)) require D to have known or suspected specified facts. ‘Suspicion’
is less than belief.110 It was defined for the first time in the context of a criminal offence
in Da Silva.111 In Da Silva, D had been convicted of the offence of assisting another to
retain the benefit of criminal conduct, knowing or suspecting that the other person was
or had been engaged in criminal conduct, contrary to the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s
93A, which was repealed and replaced by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Court of
Appeal held that in that context the essential element of ‘suspect’ and its affi liates is that
D must think that there is a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that the relevant
fact exists; a vague feeling of unease would not suffice but a suspicion need not be ‘clear’
or ‘firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts’.
‘Suspicion’ is a purely subjective matter; it does not matter whether there are reason-
able grounds for a suspicion.112 ‘Suspicion’ differs from ‘wilful blindness’. It can exist
even though there is no element of shutting one’s eyes to the obvious or failing to make
enquiries because one does not want to know the result. ‘Suspicion’ does not amount to
knowledge.113 The use of ‘suspicion’ in the alternative to ‘knowing’ clearly limits the latter
term to the case where D is certain or virtually certain about a circumstance.
How much must be known etc?

3.49 Where the definition of an offence requires D to have acted ‘knowingly’ or with
a similar state of mind, that state of mind is normally required as to all the circum-
stances of the actus reus prescribed by that definition. This is another application of the
correspondence principle114 . In Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange,115 for exam-
ple, Robert Goff LJ (as he then was) referred to ‘the ordinary principle that, where it is
109 Modern examples are provided by the Electricity Act 1989, s 59(1), the Railways Act 1993, s 146(1), and
the Broadcasting Act 1996, s 144(1).
110 Recent recognition of this is provided by R (on the application of Eastenders Cash and Carry plc) v South
Western Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWHC 937 (Admin) at [13], per Sullivan LJ.
111 [2006] EWCA Crim 1654.
112 Ibid.
113 See, eg, Saik [2006] UKHL 18 at [32], [78] and [120], per Lords Nicholls, Hope and Brown.
114 Referred to in para 3.37 115 [1985] 1 All ER 740 at 744; affd [1986] 2 All ER 353, HL.
3.50 mens rea | 
required that an offence should be knowingly committed, the requisite knowledge must
embrace all the elements of the offence’, a view affirmed by the House of Lords.
Thus, in relation to the statutory offence of knowingly permitting the use of premises
as a sex establishment without a licence, the House of Lords held in Westminster City
Council v Croyalgrange Ltd 116 that D must have knowledge not only of the premises’ use
as a sex establishment but also that that use is without a licence. Likewise, in Hallam,117
the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the offence of knowingly having possession of
any explosive substance, contrary to the Explosive Substances Act 1883, s 4, requires
proof that D knew not only that he possessed a substance but also that the substance was
an explosive. Lastly, in Gaumont British Distributors Ltd v Henry,118 the Divisional Court
held that, in order to be guilty of the statutory offence of knowingly making a record
without the consent in writing of the performers, D had to know of the absence of consent
as well as of the making.
These cases can be distinguished from Brooks v Mason,119 where the Divisional Court
held that a person could be convicted of the statutory offence of knowingly delivering
intoxicating liquor to a child under 14 except in a vessel sealed in the prescribed manner,
even though he lacked knowledge that the vessel was not so sealed, apparently because
the exception specified a matter of excuse (as opposed to being an element of the actus
reus of the offence). It is unfortunate that whether or not mens rea is required as to a mat-
ter should turn on such a fine distinction.
3.50 Knowledge etc need extend only to a circumstance as it is prescribed in the defini-
tion of the offence in question.120 Thus, on a charge of handling stolen goods, knowing or
believing that they are stolen, contrary to the Theft Act 1968, s 22, it would be irrelevant
that a handler who knew that the ring handled was stolen believed it contained imitation
stones whereas in fact they were diamonds. Likewise, on a charge of, being the occupier,
knowingly permitting premises to be used for the supply of a controlled drug, contrary
to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 8, it would be irrelevant that the defendant occupier
believed that heroin (a controlled drug) was being supplied whereas in fact it was cocaine
(another controlled drug) which was being supplied.121
In a few offences, knowledge of something less than the specified circumstances
suffices, as is shown by decisions relating to the Customs and Excise Management Act
1979, s 170(2), under which there are various offences122 of being knowingly concerned
116 [1986] 2 All ER 353, HL. 117 [1957] 1 QB 569, CCA.

118 [1939] 2 KB 711, DC. 119 [1902] 2 KB 743, DC.
120 McCullum (1973) 57 Cr App R 645, CA. 121 Bett [1999] 1 All ER 600, CA.
122 Th is is the effect of the rule laid down in Courtie [1984] AC 463, HL, whereby, if a greater maximum
punishment can be imposed if a particular factual ingredient can be established than if it is not, two or more dis-
tinct offences presumptively exist. Where the rule applies, the indictment must indicate which offence is being
charged, by referring to the specific factual ingredient where one is involved in the case: Button (1994) Times, 21
October, CA; Miller [2010] EWCA Crim 809.
In Shivpuri [1987] AC 1, HL, Lord Bridge, with whom the other Law Lords agreed, expressly regarded the
Courtie principle as applicable to s 170(2). In contrast, in Latif and Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 353, the House of
Lords held that there is one offence under s 170(2), which can be committed in two different ways, by an evasion
or by an attempt at evasion. This decision, made without reference to Courtie, can be reconciled with Courtie on
the ground that the House of Lords in Latif and Shahzad merely recognised that, in respect of a relevant type
of prohibited good, there is one offence of evading or attempting to evade a prohibition on import (which was
 | 3.51 criminal liability : mens rea
in the fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of a prohibition on the importation of

various types of goods. For example, it is an offence, punishable with a maximum of
life imprisonment, for a person knowingly to be concerned in the fraudulent evasion
of the prohibition on the importation of a Class A controlled drug, and it is also an
offence – a separate offence – knowingly to be concerned in the fraudulent evasion of
the prohibition on the importation of obscene material (for which offence the maxi-
mum imprisonment is seven years). There is clear authority that, provided a person
knows that the thing in question is something which is a prohibited good, he has
sufficient mens rea in this respect, even if he was mistaken as to its precise nature.123
Thus, eg, a person who has been concerned in the evasion of the prohibition on the
importation of a Class A controlled drug can be convicted of the former of the two
offences just mentioned even if he thought that the article in question (which was in a
sack) was obscene material, because he will have known that it was a prohibited good,
and even though on his understanding of the facts he was committing the latter, less
serious offence.
Negligence
Key points 3.4
A person is negligent if his conduct in relation to a risk, of which a reasonable person
would have been aware, falls below the standard which would be expected of a reason-
able person in the light of that risk.
3.51 Negligence suffices for criminal liability in more offences than is commonly real-
ised. For example, a survey published in 1996 of 540 offences triable in the Crown Court
revealed that in 23 of them negligence was their principal mens rea element, or one of
their mens rea elements.124 That number has now been increased substantially by the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 referred to below. The number is undoubtedly even higher in
the case of offences triable only in a magistrates’ court.
Negligence as to consequence
3.52 The risk in question as to which D is required to be negligent may concern a con-
sequence of his conduct or a circumstance in relation to which his conduct occurs. D is
negligent as to a consequence of an act or omission on his part if:
material to the case), and did not mean – in respect of all prohibited goods – that there was one offence of evad-
ing or attempting to evade a prohibition on their import (which was not material to the case). The House of Lords
did not advert to this issue in its later decision in Forbes, n 123 below (although in passing Lord Hutton referred
to ‘the offence created by s 170(2)’).
123 Hussain [1969] 2 QB 567, CA; Hennessey (1978) 68 Cr App R 419, CA; Shivpuri [1987] AC 1, HL; Forbes
[2001] UKHL 40.
124 Ashworth and Blake ‘The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law’ [1996] Crim LR 306.
3.54 mens rea | 
• the risk of it occurring would have been foreseen by a reasonable person; and
• D either fails to foresee the risk and to take steps to avoid it or, having foreseen
it, fails to take steps to avoid it or takes steps which fall below the standard of
conduct which would be expected of a reasonable person in the light of that
risk.
3.53 Negligence as to a consequence required to result from D’s conduct very rarely suf-
fices for criminal liability. An example is provided by the offence of putting people in fear
of violence, contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 4(1).125 Section 4(1)
provides that a person whose course of conduct causes another person to fear, on at least
two occasions, that violence will be used against him is guilty of an offence if he knows or
ought to know that his course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each of those
occasions.126 The only common law offences where negligence as to consequence suffices
seem to be involuntary manslaughter (provided the negligence is gross)127 and public
nuisance.128
In its consultation paper Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and
Outraging Public Decency,129 published in 2010, the Law Commission has provision-
ally proposed that the offence of public nuisance should require that D acted in the
relevant respect intentionally or recklessly with regard to the creation of a public nui-
sance; D would have to be proved to have intended to create, or realised that he might
generate, what ordinary people would regard as a public nuisance. Thus, if this pro-
posal was enacted, negligence would cease to suffice for criminal liability for public
nuisance.
3.54 In some statutory offences liability is based on the fact that there is a reasonably
foreseeable risk that some consequence may result from D’s conduct, although that
consequence need not be proved actually to have resulted. Examples are provided by a
number of offences where the word ‘likely’ is used in relation to such a risk. For instance,
the Public Order Act 1986, s 5 makes it an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting
words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely
to be harassed, alarmed or distressed thereby. Other examples are offences where D’s
conduct is required to be ‘calculated’ to cause a particular consequence (eg to deceive).
‘Calculated’ has been interpreted as meaning ‘likely’.130 ‘Likely’ bears an objective mean-
ing, although whether the reasonably foreseeable risk must be a probable risk or a lower
degree of risk, such as a real risk that should not be ignored, varies depending on the
particular context of the statutory words.131
125 For another modern example of an offence where negligence as to consequence suffices, see the Water
Industry Act 1991, s 73(1).
126 Para 7.144. Also see the offence under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 2; para 7.143.
127 Para 8.106.
128 Shorrock [1994] QB 279, CA; approved in Rimmington; Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63. For the defi nition of
public nuisance, see para 6.9.
129 Law Com Consultation Paper No 193. See also para 6.9.
130 Turner v Shearer (1972) 116 Sol Jo 800, DC; Davison [1972] Crim LR 786, CA.
131 Whitehouse (1999) Times, 10 December, CA.
 | 3.55 criminal liability : mens rea
Negligence as to circumstance
3.55 D is negligent as to a circumstance relevant to his conduct if D ought to have been
aware of its existence because a reasonable person would have thought about the risk
that it might exist and would have found out that it did. Negligence as to a circumstance
is otherwise known, rather misleadingly (because it does not constitute ‘knowledge’ in
criminal law),132 as constructive knowledge.133 Negligence as to circumstance is ‘a con-
ception which, generally speaking, has no place in the criminal law’.134 It suffices, how-
ever, for liability in statutory offences in two cases:
• where the statute expressly uses words connoting negligence;
• where appellate judges have implied into a statutory offence words connoting
negligence.
Express provision
3.56 Negligence as to circumstance suffices in statutory offences by whose definition
D can be convicted on the ground that he had ‘reasonable grounds to believe’, ‘rea-
sonable cause to believe’, ‘reason to believe’ or ‘reason to suspect’, or that he ‘could
reasonably be expected to know’ or ‘ought to know’ that a circumstance existed or did
‘not reasonably believe’ that it did not. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 introduced a wide
range of offences, described in Chapter 9, where negligence as to a circumstance suffices
for liability. Other examples are to be found in various statutes. For example, under the
Official Secrets Act 1989, s 5(2), a person who has come into possession, in one of certain
ways, of information protected against disclosure by the Act is guilty of an offence if he
discloses it without lawful authority, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that
it is protected against disclosure by the Act and that it has come into his possession in one
of those ways. Likewise, under the Firearms Act 1968, s 25, it is an offence for a person
to sell any firearm or ammunition to another person whom he knows or has reasonable
cause for believing to be drunk or of unsound mind.
3.57 In Saik,135 the House of Lords held that ‘reasonable grounds to suspect that any
property is . . . or represents another person’s proceeds of criminal conduct’ in the
Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 93C(2) (repealed by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) included
a requirement that D had actual suspicion as well as a requirement that there were reason-
able grounds for the suspicion, so that the test was not a purely objective one.136 Section
93C(2) provided:
132 Roper v Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd [1951] 2 TLR 284 at 288–289, per Devlin J. Thus, it cannot
suffice where a statute uses the word ‘knowingly’ in its defi nition: Flintshire CC v Reynolds [2006] EWHC 195
(Admin).
133 Roper v Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd above.
134 Ibid.
135 [2006] UKHL 18.
136 In Qureshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1584, a prosecution appeal against a ruling of no case to answer, the Court
of Appeal, without reference to Saik, held that the requirement of knowledge or having reasonable cause to
believe, made by the offence under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 1(3A), requires the prosecution to
prove a subjective state of mind on D’s part. It did not explain this statement.
3.58 mens rea | 
‘A person is guilty of an offence if, knowing or having reasonable grounds to suspectt that
any property is, or in whole or in part directly or indirectly represents, another person’s
proceeds of criminal conduct, he –
(a) conceals or disguises that property; or
(b) converts or transfers that property or removes it from the jurisdiction,
for the purpose of assistingg any person to avoid prosecution for an offence to which
this Part of this Act applies or the making or enforcement in his case of a confiscation
order.’
It would be unwise to assume that the decision on the above point is of general applica-
tion. Unless, and until, it is decided that it is, that decision should be regarded as limited
to the wording of the offence under s 93C(2). If extended, the decision would place a
major limitation on any offence to which it applied because someone who has reasonable
grounds for suspicion about a material fact may well not suspect it because of inexperi-
ence or foolishness. Only two members of the House of Lords dealt with the issue in
detail. Lord Hope, referring to a case137 relating to a statutory power of arrest on reasona-
ble grounds for suspecting that a person was concerned in acts of terrorism, where he had
held that the test was partly subjective and partly objective, opined that the words used
in s 93C(2) could be analysed in the same way. Lord Brown based his conclusion on the
view that D could not have acted with the required purpose of assisting a person to avoid
prosecution unless subjectively he either actually knew or suspected the property to be
‘hot’. Thus, it was necessarily implicit in s 93C(2) that not only must D have reasonable
grounds to suspect that the property was ‘hot’ but that he also did suspect it. Although
Lord Hope’s reasoning is of potentially general application to ‘reason to suspect’ or ‘rea-
sonable grounds to suspect’ or like terms when they are mens rea requirements, Lord
Brown’s is limited to the particular wording of s 93C(2) (ie the illogicality which would
arise if, in s 93C(2), ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ the ‘hotness’ of the property was a
purely objective requirement while at the same time s 93C(2) required a purpose to assist
a person to avoid prosecution).
Judicial implication
3.58 Negligence as to circumstance will suffice for an offence where its definition has
been judicially interpreted to that effect. There are a few instances where this has been
done,138 but the making of such an implication has been deplored.139 The emphasis on
a subjective approach to criminal liability by the House of Lords in B v DPP140 and G141
makes it most unlikely that such an implication would now be made or would survive an
appeal.
137 O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286, HL.
138 See, eg, Tolson (1899) 23 QBD 168, CCR (para 5.12); Browning v J W H Watson (Rochester) Ltd [1953] 2
All ER 775, DC.
139 Gray’s Haulage Co Ltd v Arnold [1966] 1 All ER 896, DC.
140 [2000] 2 AC 428, HL.
141 [2003] UKHL 50.
 | 3.59 criminal liability : mens rea
Are D’s mental and other capacities relevant?

3.59 Unqualified, phrases such as ‘reasonable cause to believe’, ‘reason to believe’ or ‘rea-
son to suspect’, when used to describe the mens rea for an offence, undoubtedly postulate
a wholly objective test.142 A case apparently to the contrary, Hudson,143 contains a dictum
that not only must there be an objective ‘reason to suspect’ but also D himself, taking into
account his mental and other capacities, ought to have suspected. However, this dictum
has not been followed in any other case.
It is, of course, possible for Parliament to provide for a subjective element. This has
been done, for example, by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in respect of the negligence ele-
ment in the non-consensual offences under ss 1 to 4 of that Act where account must be
taken of all the circumstances (including, it seems, D’s characteristics which affect his
perception of the relevant risk).144
Negligence as to the very essence of an offence

3.60 In most offences where negligence suffices for liability it only does so in relation to
a particular element, normally a circumstance of the actus reus of the offence, intention,
recklessness or knowledge normally being required as to any other elements. In such
offences the actus reus is established without reference to D’s negligence.
However, in a very limited number of offences, of which manslaughter by gross
negligence, corporate manslaughter, careless driving, causing death by careless driv-
ing, dangerous driving and causing death by dangerous driving are the most obvious
examples,145 negligence is the very essence of the offence, in that whether or not D’s
conduct constitutes the actus reus of the offence depends on whether it can be described
as negligent. D is guilty of careless driving if (and only if) the way D drives falls below
what would be expected of a competent and careful driver in the circumstances.146 In this
case the nature of the reasonably foreseeable risk is not specified; the matter is at large,
in that the question is whether the defendant driver fell below the requisite standard in
the light of any foreseeable and unjustifiable risk. D is guilty of dangerous driving, on
the other hand, if the standard of his driving falls far below the standard which would
be expected of a competent and careful driver and it would be obvious to such a driver
that driving in the way in question creates a danger of injury to any person or of serious
damage to property.147
In Loukes,148 the Court of Appeal held that in offences of dangerous driving, the
offence simply consists of the commission of the actus reus, and mens rea plays no part
in the commission of the offence. No doubt it would have held the same in respect of
careless driving or any other offence whose very essence is negligence. The practical
effects of the classification of all elements of an offence as part of its actus reus, so that
there are no mens rea elements, has important practical consequences, as seen in paras
15.39 and 17.25.
142 See, eg, Young [1984] 2 All ER 164 at 167; Colohan [2001] EWCA Crim 1251 (para 7.140).
143 [1966] 1 QB 448, CCA. 144 Para 9.33. 145 Paras 8.106, 8.130, 8.161 and 8.152.
146 Para 8.162. 147 Paras 8.154 and 8.156. 148 [1996] 1 Cr App R 444, CA.
3.64 mens rea | 
Other points about negligence

Degrees of negligence
3.61 As a comparison of the definitions of careless driving and dangerous driving shows,
there can be degrees of negligence. Dangerous driving requires a higher degree of negli-
gence, usually called gross negligence, than careless driving because D must fall far below
the standard of a reasonable person in relation to a risk to a person or serious damage to
property, and not simply below it. In manslaughter by gross negligence, the gross negli-
gence must be in relation to the risk of death.149
Distinction between negligence and intention etc

3.62 Negligence is distinguishable from intention, recklessness and knowledge, since it
does not require D to foresee or be aware of the risk in question; evidence of D’s state of
mind is not a prerequisite to a finding of negligence.150
Of course, where negligence suffices for an offence it is no defence for D to claim that he
was not negligent as to the risk in question but acted intentionally in relation to it. Where
an offence can be committed negligently in some respect, this simply means that the
prosecution does not need to prove any intention or the like on D’s part in that respect; it
does not mean that D cannot commit the offence if D actually has that state of mind.
Is negligence a species of mens rea?

3.63 At the start of this chapter it was stated that mens rea means the state of mind
expressly or impliedly required by the definition of the offence charged. Negligence
cannot properly be described as a state of mind, since it can exist where there is the
absence of a state of mind. For this reason, negligence cannot strictly be described as a
species of mens rea, despite the fact that it has on occasions been so described by judg-
es.151 Nevertheless, for convenience, whenever the term ‘mens rea’ is used in a general
sense in this book the reference to it should be understood as including negligence
(except where negligence is of the very essence of the offence),152 unless the context
indicates the contrary. There is much to be said for replacing the term ‘mens rea’ by that
of ‘fault element’.
3.64 The question of the inclusion of negligence under the head of mens rea also raises
the question of whether it should be a sufficient fault element for criminal liability.
Negligence involves fault, but usually it is less blameworthy than the fault displayed by
people who intend, or are aware of the risk of, their wrongdoing. Neither Parliament nor
the courts appear so far to have considered fully the answer to the question: ‘When is it
proper to punish a person because he has failed to match up to the standard expected of
a reasonable person?’ It would be easier to accept negligence as a basis of liability if it was
always the case that D could only be liable on that ground if he could, given his mental
ability, skill and experience, have avoided being negligent.
149 Paras 8.114, 8.154, 8.156 and 8.162.

150 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796 at 809 (manslaughter by gross negligence).
151 Eg Lord Rodger in Rimmington; Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63 at [56]. 152 Para 3.60.
 | 3.65 criminal liability : mens rea
Contemporaneity
Key points 3.5
It is a cardinal rule that the defendant’s mens rea must exist at the time of the relevant act,
omission or state of affairs on his part.153 This rule is mitigated or avoided in two ways.
There are also two exceptions to the rule.
3.65 A person cannot be convicted of an offence if he only acquires the relevant mens
rea after the culpable act, omission or state of affairs on his part has ceased. Provided that
D had the necessary mens rea at the time of his act or omission, D may be convicted of
the offence in question even though (for example, because of repentance or because he is
asleep) he lacks that mens rea when a consequence required for the actus reus occurs.154
In addition, it is irrelevant that D lacked mens rea at the inception of the conduct pro-
vided that he has the mens rea at some time during its continuance, as where D realises
the true situation before his conduct is complete. This can happen where conduct is con-
tinuing in nature, as is almost invariably so in the case of a state of affairs and can happen
in the case of an omission or an act.
Ways of satisfying the requirement

3.66 The requirement of contemporaneity can give rise to problems in the case of
offences which are normally based on some act on D’s part. This is because an act is
usually momentary, as opposed to continuing, in nature, in which case the time span
in which any accompanying mens rea must exist is limited. The courts have postulated
two different ways in which the difficulties which this could cause can be mitigated or
avoided.
3.67 The first way, which is illustrated by Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr,155 is that
where an act can be regarded as a continuing one it is enough if mens rea exists at some
stage during its continuance and that, in deciding whether an act is continuing, a liberal
approach should be taken. In Fagan, D, a motorist, having been asked by a police officer
to draw into the kerb, drove his car onto the officer’s foot. The officer requested D to
drive off his foot but D refused to do so for some little time thereafter. The question was
whether D’s conduct amounted to a battery, since it had not been proved that the original
driving onto the foot had been accompanied by the relevant mens rea. The majority of the
Divisional Court held that D’s conduct did amount to a battery because the driving of the
car onto the officer’s foot and allowing it to remain there could be treated as a continu-
ing act of application of force, with the result that D’s act was not spent and complete by
the time his mens rea began, as would have been the case if the driving onto the foot had
153 Fowler v Padget (1798) 7 Term Rep 509, per Lord Kenyon CJ. It is, of course, possible for a statute to make
an exception to this rule, as is shown by the Fraud Act 2006, s 11; see para 12.42.
154 Jakeman (1982) 76 Cr App R 223, CA.
155 [1969] 1 QB 439, DC.
3.70 mens rea | 
been treated as a single complete act. D’s mens rea could therefore be superimposed on
his existing continuing act.
3.68 The type of solution adopted in Fagan is clearly sensible where D’s act is truly con-
tinuing. However, the actual application of the approach in Fagan in a particular case
may be open to the objection that it may involve (as it did in that case) a certain degree
of artificiality in finding a continuing act. For these reasons the approach which was
preferred and adopted by the House of Lords in Miller,156 whose facts were set out in para
2.13, is better. As was stated, the rule adopted by the House of Lords is that, where D inad-
vertently and without the appropriate mens rea does an act which creates a situation
of danger, but before the resulting harm is complete D becomes aware157 of the train
of events caused by his act, D is under a duty to take such steps as lie within his power
to try to prevent or reduce the risk of harm. Consequently if, before the harm result-
ing from his act is complete, D realises what he has done and fails to take such steps
to prevent or reduce the risk, and provided D then has the relevant mens rea, D will
be criminally liable because his mens rea will be contemporaneous with his culpable
omission to act. In Evans (Gemma),158 the Court of Appeal extended Miller to the case
where D contributed to the dangerous situation, rather than actually creating it.
The adoption in Miller by the House of Lords of the above approach in preference to
the approach adopted in Fagan means that the latter is now unlikely to be utilised, unless
the act is truly of a continuing character or unless the offence is one which by its express
terms can only be committed by an act.
Exceptions to the requirement

3.69 The approaches discussed in paras 3.67 and 3.68 are not, of course, exceptions to
the requirement of contemporaneity but are methods of satisfying it. There are, however,
exceptions to the requirement of contemporaneity in two types of situation. One is dis-
cussed in the following paragraph; the other is dealt with later.159
3.70 If the requisite consequence of the actus reus is caused by one act in a series of
acts, it is irrelevant that D lacked the necessary mens rea when that act was done, if D
had that mens rea when an earlier act in the series was done. In Thabo Meli v R,160 the
defendants planned to kill V in a hut and thereafter to roll his body over a cliff so that
it might appear to be a case of accidental death. V was rendered unconscious by a blow
in the hut and, believing V to be dead, the defendants rolled him over the cliff. There
was medical evidence that V was not killed by the injuries received in the hut, but died
from exposure where he had been left at the bottom of the cliff. It was contended that the
defendants were not guilty of murder because, while the first act was accompanied by the
156 [1983] 2 AC 161, HL. See Sullivan ‘Cause and Contemporaneity of Actus Reus and Mens Rea’ (1993) 12
CLJ 487.
157 Or, in the case of an offence where negligence suffices, ought reasonably to be aware: Evans (Gemma)
[2009] EWCA Crim 650 at [31].
158 Ibid. See paras 2.13 and 8.111. 159 Para 15.104.
160 [1954] 1 All ER 373, PC. Also see Moore and Dorn [1975] Crim LR 229, CA.
 | 3.71 criminal liability : mens rea
mens rea for murder, it was not the cause of death;161 and because the second act, while it
was the cause of death, was not accompanied by the mens rea for murder, the defendants
believing their victim to be dead already. The Privy Council rejected this argument, hold-
ing that the two acts formed part of a series which could not be divided up. Accordingly,
the defendants were guilty of murder, and not of attempted murder or culpable homicide
(manslaughter) as would have been the case if the rejected argument had prevailed.
3.71 The advice of the Privy Council suggests that its decision might have been different
if the act done with intent to kill and the actual act which caused death had not formed
part of a preconceived plan. However, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in
Church,162 where Thabo Meli was applied in the context of manslaughter, shows that it
applies where the act which caused death was not part of a plan, being quite unforeseen
at the time of the act done with mens rea. In Church, D had a sudden fight with a woman
(V) and rendered her unconscious. Then, having tried for about half-an-hour to revive V
and believing that V was dead, D threw V’s body into a nearby river, where V drowned.
His conviction for manslaughter was upheld on appeal on the basis that his conduct con-
stituted a series of acts which culminated in V’s death.
The approach in Church was approved by the Court of Appeal in Le Brun.163 D and
his wife (V) had had an argument as they were walking home one night. D knocked V
unconscious. He then tried to drag V away from the scene, but V slipped from his grasp
and hit her head on the pavement; as a result V suffered a fractured skull from which she
died. There was no antecedent plan. On appeal against conviction for manslaughter, the
Court of Appeal held that the judge had been correct to tell the jury to convict D of mur-
der or manslaughter, depending on the intent with which he knocked V unconscious,
if he accidentally dropped her while trying to drag her home against her wishes or to
conceal what he had done.
3.72 The above principle raises the question of when an act can be said to be part of a
series. There must of course be some proximity in time but Church shows that the time
span need not be very short. In Le Brun, there is a suggestion that an act done while trying
to help V or to take V’s supposedly dead body to the police, as opposed to an act to conceal
the original act or to further the unlawful activity, will not form part of a series with the
first act. Applying Church, the Court held that, where the non-fatal act done with mens
rea and the eventual act causing death are parts of the same sequence of events, the fact
that there is an interval of time between the two does not serve to exonerate D. It stated
that this was certainly so where D’s subsequent actions which caused death, after the ini-
tial unlawful blow, were designed to conceal the commission of the original assault.
3.73 The above decisions seem to be right, although it will often be difficult to decide
whether D’s acts form a series.
161 Arguably, there was still a causal link between the fi rst act (the blow) and the death: Marston
‘Contemporaneity of Act and Intention in Crimes’ (1970) 86 LQR 208 at 218–219; McKinnon [1980] 2 NZLR 31
at 36–37. The Privy Council, however, did not consider this point.
162 [1966] 1 QB 59, CCA.
163 [1992] QB 61, CA; discussed by Sullivan ‘Cause and Contemporaneity of Actus Reus and Mens Rea’ (1993)
52 CLJ 487.
3.75 motive | 
3.74 What if one of two or more acts by D caused the requisite consequence but it is
impossible to prove which one? It was held by the Court of Appeal in A-G’s Reference
(No 4 of 1980),164 which was concerned with involuntary manslaughter, that there can be
a conviction for that offence if each act was accompanied by sufficient mens rea for that
offence.
Thus, to adopt the facts in that reference, if D pushes V downstairs and then, thinking
that V is dead, cuts her throat preparatory to dismembering her body, and it is not proved
which of these acts caused her death, D can be convicted of involuntary manslaugh-
ter if the jury are satisfied that, whichever act killed V, each of them was accompanied
by sufficient mens rea to establish involuntary manslaughter. Such a principle is equally
applicable on a charge of murder the necessary mens rea if each act is proved to have been
accompanied by or someother offence.
The Court of Appeal held that if it was not proved that each act was accompanied by
sufficient mens rea, the jury should acquit of manslaughter. This is open to doubt where
D had the requisite mens rea when he committed the first act in a series of acts; it would
not matter in such a situation whether the first act caused the requisite consequence (in
which case D would be guilty under the normal rules of liability) or not (in which case D
would be caught by the principle in Thabo Meli and Church).
Key points 3.6

In the rest of this chapter the relevance to liability of the defendant’s motive, ignorance
or mistake of law or ignorance of morals is considered. It will be seen that generally these
things are irrelevant to liability, but there are exceptions in each case.
Motive
3.75 A person’s motive is his reason for acting as he did. Thus A’s motive for killing B may
be financial gain, and C’s motive for stealing may be his wish to feed his starving children.
The general rule is that D’s motives, good or bad, are irrelevant to D’s criminal liability,
although they may affect the punishment imposed. In Sharpe,165 where D, motivated by
affection for his mother and religious duty, had removed her corpse from a grave in a cem-
etery belonging to Protestant Dissenters in order to bury it with the body of his recently
deceased father in a churchyard, it was held that D’s motives, however estimable they might
be, did not provide a defence to a charge of removing a corpse without lawful authority.
However, D’s ‘good’ motives were reflected in the punishment awarded, a fine of one shil-
ling (5p) being imposed. More recently, in A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2002),166 the Court of
Appeal held that a police officer who presented false evidence in the hope of securing the
conviction of someone whom she believed to be guilty of burglary could be convicted of
164[1981] 2 All ER 617, CA.

165(1857) 26 LJMC 47. For more recent authorities, see Chandler v DPP [1964] AC 763, HL; Hills v Ellis [1983]
QB 680, DC; X [1994] Crim LR 827, CA.
166 [2002] EWCA Crim 2392.
 | 3.76 criminal liability : mens rea
the offence of perverting the course of justice. She would have committed the actus reus of
that offence with the relevant mens rea. It was irrelevant that her motive would have been
to achieve a just result. In another modern case, A-G v Scotcher,167 the House of Lords held
that it was no defence to a contempt of court, committed by a juror who disclosed to a third
party particulars about the jury’s deliberations and criticised them, that the juror had been
motivated by a desire to expose a perceived miscarriage of justice.
3.76 Intention, whether relating to a consequence required for the actus reus or ulterior
to it, is clearly distinguishable from motive.168 A person’s intention has been defined by the
Privy Council as his immediate purpose, and his motive as his underlying purpose.169
An illustration of the distinction between intention and motive is provided by Smith.170
D was charged with corruptly offering a gift to the mayor of a borough. He had handed an
IOU to his agent with the intention that it should be given to the mayor to induce him to
promote the sale of land by the borough council to D; the agent had then given the IOU
to the mayor. D did not intend to go through with the transaction, his reason for causing
the offer to be made being his desire to expose what he believed to be the corrupt habits of
those connected with the local administration. It was held that ‘corruptly’ in the defini-
tion of the relevant offence meant ‘with intent that the donee should enter into a corrupt
bargain’ and that, even though his motive was not corrupt, D was guilty of the offence
since he had offered the money with that requisite ulterior intent.
3.77 Exceptionally, D’s motive may be relevant to his liability because the definition of
the offence expressly so provides. Examples are the various racially or religiously aggra-
vated offences described later in this book.171
Ignorance or mistake of law

3.78 It should be clear by now that mens rea does not mean that D must have been aware
of the illegality of his conduct.172 Ignorance or mistake of law is usually no defence,
although it may mitigate the punishment imposed.173 It is no defence, for example, for
someone charged with the offence of beating a rug in a street, contrary to the Town Police
Clauses Act 1847, s 28, to say that he did not know that such conduct was criminal.
3.79 Another aspect of the general rule that ignorance or mistake of law is no defence
is that a person, who makes a mistake of criminal law and consequently uses reasonable
force to prevent what he mistakenly believes constitutes an offence, cannot rely on the
defence of reasonable force in the prevention of crime.174
167 [2005] UKHL 36. 168 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2002) [2002] EWCA Crim 2392.
169 Wai Yu-tsang v R [1992] 1 AC 269 at 280. 170 [1960] 2 QB 423, CCA.
171 Paras 7.95, 7.150 and 13.27.
172 For modern recognition of this, see Official Solicitor v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1994] 2 FLR 174;
Reading Borough Council v Ahmad (1999) 163 JP 451, DC. See also Broad [1997] Crim LR 666, CA; para 14.72.
173 See, eg, Paul v Minister of Posts and Telecommunications [1973] RTR 245, DC.
174 Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546, HL; Baker and Wilkins [1997] Crim LR 497, CA.
3.82 ignorance or mistake of law | 
3.80 Sometimes ignorance or mistake of the criminal law prevents D realising that an
element of the actus reus exists or may exist. An example is where D who handles goods
given to him by X, not knowing the intricacies of the law of theft, does not realise that the
goods were stolen by X, although he knows how X acquired them; it would be possible to
convict D of handling stolen goods, the mens rea for which requires that D should know
or believe the goods are stolen. Another example would be where D, not knowing that the
relevant law requires a particular activity to be licensed, carries it out without a licence; D
can be convicted of an offence of carrying out the relevant activity without a licence, with
knowledge of the material circumstances. In such cases D will be aware of the factual
situation which constitutes the element in question, albeit not realising its legal signifi-
cance, and will therefore have the relevant form of mens rea as to it.175
Rationale
3.81 Various reasons have been given for the rule that ignorance or mistake of law is usu-
ally no defence. First, it is said that everyone knows the law, but this is palpably untrue.
Secondly, it can be argued that it is a duty of citizenship to know the law.176 Thirdly, it is
said that it would be difficult to prove that D knew the law; if this were the real reason for
the rule, ignorance of the law should be a defence when it can be clearly proved. However,
it has been held that a person who was on the high seas, in circumstances in which he
could not have been informed of the contents of a recent statute, might be convicted of
contravening it.177 The best reason for the rule is expediency:
‘Every man must be taken to be cognisant of the law, otherwise there is no knowing of
the extent to which the excuse of ignorance might be carried. It would be urged in almost
every case.’178
Even a foreigner who proves that he mistakenly believed his conduct to be lawful because it
is lawful in his homeland is not exempt from criminal liability in England and Wales.179
3.82 The general rule that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse (which is applied
more strictly in England and Wales than in many other countries) is only rendered com-
patible with most people’s idea of justice by the facts that many offences are also moral
wrongs and that even when this is not so the ordinary member of the public or, at least,
the ordinary member of the class most affected (as motorists are affected by traffic legisla-
tion) normally has a rough idea of the provisions of the criminal law.
The increasing volume and complexity of the criminal law make it ever harder to
justify the absolute nature of the general rule. For this reason, there is much to be said
for a defence of reasonable (or excusable) ignorance or mistake of the criminal law. The
175 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1995) [1996] 4 All ER 21, CA.

176 See Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (6th edn, 2009) 220–221.
177 Bailey (1800) Russ & Ry 1, CCR. 178 Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 2 East 469 at 472.
179 Esop (1836) 7 C & P 456.
 | 3.83 criminal liability : mens rea
existence of such a defence would promote the causes of the simplification and accessibil-
ity of the criminal law.
The general rule is liable to be particularly harsh where a person has reasonably relied
on the advice of a lawyer or someone in authority that a proposed course of action is not
criminal. It has been suggested that a person should have a defence to a charge concern-
ing that action in such circumstances,180 as is the position under French law.181
Stay of proceedings on ground of erroneous

legal advice by prosecuting body
3.83 Where the erroneous legal advice has been given by an official in the organisa-
tion which prosecutes D, a court has power to stay the prosecution as an abuse of
process if in the light of D’s reliance on it the prosecution is unfair. Th is was estab-
lished by the Divisional Court in Postermobile plc v Brent London Borough Council,182
where D, having been wrongly advised by members of the council’s planning depart-
ment that certain advertisements did not in law require planning consent, erected the
advertisements without such consent. The council prosecuted D. The Divisional Court
held that the prosecution was an abuse of process, as it would be unfair for D to be tried,
and should be stayed. It would seem that a stay can only be ordered if D has justifiably
relied on the advice. As Schiemann LJ said in Postermobile: ‘it is not as though [D]
had requested planning advice from one of the council’s gardeners’. It must be empha-
sised that the power to stay proceedings does not mean that D has a defence in the
present type of case. Unless a prosecution is stayed, reasonable reliance on erroneous
legal advice by the prosecuting body can only be reflected in mitigation of the sentence
imposed.183
Exceptions
Statutory instruments
3.84 By way of exception to the general rule, the Statutory Instruments Act 1946, s 3
provides that it is a defence for a person charged with an offence under a statutory instru-
ment184 to prove that it had not been issued by or under the authority of the Stationery
Office at the date of the alleged offence, unless it is proved that at that date reasonable
steps had been taken to bring the purport of the instrument to the notice of the public, or
of persons likely to be affected by it, or of D.
180 Ashworth ‘Excusable Mistake of Law’ [1974] Crim LR 652. See also the note by JC Smith [1988] Crim
LR 138, Williams ‘The Draft Code and Reliance on Official Statements’ (1989) 9 LS 177 and Ashworth ‘Testing
Fidelity to Legal Values: Official Involvement and Criminal Justice’ (2000) 63 MLR 633, esp at 635–642.
181 French Criminal Code 1992, arts 122–123; discussed by Kirsch (1999) 16 Amicus Curiae 25.
182 (1997) Times, 8 December, DC; see [1998] Crim LR 435.
183 Surrey County Council v Battersby [1965] 2 QB 194, DC. See also Arrowsmith [1975] QB 678, CA.
184 Para 1.43.
3.87 ignorance or mistake of law | 
Lack of mens rea due to ignorance or mistake of civil law

3.85 As a further exception to the general rule, ignorance or mistake of the civil law
does provide a defence where it precludes D from having the mens rea required for
the offence charged,185 as opposed simply to causing him to be ignorant that what he
knows he is doing constitutes an offence. This is shown by Smith (David).186 D, a ten-
ant, installed stereo wiring in his flat. With the landlord’s permission he covered the
wiring with panels and other materials. When the tenancy was terminated, D removed
the wiring. In doing so, he damaged the panels and other materials. Unknown to D, by
operation of the civil law, the panels and other materials had become part of the flat, and
so belonged to the landlord, when they were installed. Allowing D’s appeal against a con-
viction for criminal damage to the panels and other materials, contrary to the Criminal
Damage Act 1971, s 1(1), the Court of Appeal held that a person could not be convicted
of intentionally or recklessly damaging property belonging to another (the mens rea for
criminal damage) if, because of a mistake of civil law, he believed that it belonged to him.
Likewise, it has been held that a person who acts as an auditor for a company, in igno-
rance of a statutory provision whereby he is disqualified in the circumstances in question,
cannot be convicted of the statutory offence of acting as an auditor ‘knowing that he is
disqualified’.187
A problem with the present exception is determining when a mistake relates to the civil
law. In Grant v Borg,188 the House of Lords held that a person who was a visitor to this
country could be convicted of the offence of knowingly remaining without leave despite
wrongly believing that his leave had not expired because of a mistake of law; the question
of whether one has leave to remain would seem to be one of civil, rather than criminal
law. Someone who makes a mistake about the arrest powers of a police officer makes a
mistake of criminal law.189
3.86 Some offences contain mental elements which expressly envisage the defence of
mistake of civil law.190 For example, in the offence of theft, where D’s appropriation of
another’s property must be proved to have been dishonest, the Theft Act 1968, s 2(1) pro-
vides that an appropriation is not to be regarded as dishonest if the appropriator believed
that he had in law the right to deprive the other of it.191
Other exceptions
3.87 For another case where ignorance or mistake of law may be relevant to criminal
liability, the reader is referred to paras 15.34–15.36.
Of course, it is open to a piece of legislation to provide expressly that ignorance or mis-
take as to a matter of law is a defence, but such cases are likely to be rare.
185 As to mistake negativing mens rea, see paras 5.5–5.11.

186 [1974] QB 354, CA.
187 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Hart [1982] 1 All ER 817, DC.
188 [1982] 2 All ER 257, HL. 189 Bentley (1850) 4 Cox CC 406. See para 16.37.
190 Or a mistake of criminal law, as, eg, in the case of the offence under the Official Secrets Act 1989, s 5(2),
referred to in para 3.56. 191 Para 10.70.
 | 3.88 criminal liability : mens rea
Mistaken belief that conduct is criminal

3.88 A mistake of law cannot render D criminally liable. For example, if a man has inter-
course with a girl of 17, mistakenly believing that it is an offence to have sexual inter-
course with a girl under 18, he cannot be convicted of a substantive offence because,
contrary to his belief, he has not committed the actus reus of an offence, nor can he be
convicted of an attempt.192
Moreover, even if D has committed the actus reus of an offence, he is to be judged
(in terms of any requisite mens rea) on the facts as he believed them to be, regardless of
his understanding of their implications in criminal law. This was held by the House of
Lords in Taaffe,193 where D had mistakenly believed that he was bringing currency into
the country and that such importation was prohibited. In fact, he had been bringing in
cannabis resin, the importation of which was prohibited. The House of Lords held that D
was not guilty of the relevant offence (under the Customs and Excise Management Act
1979, s 170(2)) of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition
on the importation of a controlled drug. Its reason was that, on the facts as D believed
them to be the article was not prohibited goods and therefore he had not knowingly been
concerned in the importation of something that was prohibited goods; it was irrelevant
that he thought that the currency was the subject of a prohibition on its importation. Nor
would D have been guilty of an attempt to commit the above offence.
Ignorance of morals
3.89 The fact that D did not personally consider his conduct to be immoral or know
that it was regarded as immoral by the bulk of society is generally irrelevant to his
criminal liability. The principal exceptional cases where it is relevant that D was unaware
of the moral turpitude of his conduct relate to the various offences of dishonesty under
the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978, the offences of fraud and obtaining services dishonestly
under the Fraud Act 2006 and the offence of blackmail.194
FURTHER READING
Ashworth ‘Transferred Malice and Duff ‘The Politics of Intention: A Response to
Punishment for Unforeseen Consequences’ Norrie’ [1990] Crim LR 637
in Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978) Duff Answering for Crime (2007) Ch 3
(Glazebrook (ed)) 77
Lord Goff ‘The Mental Element in the Crime
Ashworth ‘Ignorance of the Criminal Law, of Murder’ (1988) 104 LQR 30
and Duties to Avoid It’ (2011) 74 MLR 1
192 Para 14.136. 193 [1984] AC 539, HL. 194 Chs 10, 11 and 12.
3.89 ignorance of morals | 
Hart Punishment and Responsibility (2nd edn, Norrie ‘Oblique Intention and Legal Politics’
2008), Introduction (by J Gardner), Chs 2, [1989] Crim LR 793
5 and 6 Norrie ‘Intention: More Loose Talk’ [1990]
Horder ‘A Critique of the Correspondence Crim LR 642
Principle in Criminal Law’ [1995] Crim LR Pedain ‘Intention and the Terrorist Example’
759 [2003] Crim LR 579
Horder ‘Intention in the Criminal Law – A Shute ‘Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal
Rejoinder’ (1995) 58 MLR 678 Law’ in Criminal Law: Doctrines of the
Horder ‘Questioning the Correspondence General Part (2002) (Shute and Simester
Principle – A Reply’ [1999] Crim LR 206 (eds)) 184
Horder ‘On the Irrelevance of Motive Simester ‘Moral Certainty and the Boundaries
in Criminal Law’ in Oxford Essays in of Intention’ (1996) 16 OJLS 445
Jurisprudence (4th series, 2000) (Horder Simester ‘Can Negligence be Culpable?’ in
(ed)) 173 Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (4th series,
Horder ‘Transferred Malice and the 2000) (Horder (ed)) 85
Remoteness of Unexpected Outcomes from ATH Smith ‘Error and Mistake of Law in
Intention’ [2006] Crim LR 383 Anglo-American Criminal Law’ (1985) 14
Kaveny ‘Inferring Intention from Foresight’ Anglo-American LR 3
(2004) 120 LQR 81 Sullivan ‘Knowledge, Belief and Culpability’
Kugler Direct and Oblique Intent in the in Criminal Law: Doctrines of the General
Criminal Law (2002) Part (2002) (Shute and Simester (eds)) 207
Lacey ‘A Clear Concept of Intention’ (1993) 56 Tadros Criminal Responsibility (2005) Ch 8
MLR 621 G Williams ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’
Lacey ‘In(de)terminable Intentions’ (1995) 58 (1983) 42 CLJ 85
MLR 692 G Williams ‘Oblique Intent’ (1987) 46 CLJ
Marston ‘Contemporaneity of Act and 417
Intention’ (1970) 86 LQR 208 G Williams ‘The Mens Rea for Murder – Leave
Matthews ‘Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse?’ it Alone’ (1989) 105 LQR 387
(1983) 3 LS 174 Wilson ‘Doctrinal Rationality after Woollin’
Mitchell ‘In Defence of a Principle of (1999) 62 MLR 448
Correspondence’ [1999] Crim LR 195
4
Proof
OVERVIEW
This chapter is concerned with an outline of:

• the burden of proof and the burden of adducing evidence;
• the use of presumptions as an aid to proof; and
• proof of a state of mind.
The two burdens
Key points 4.1

The general rule is that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the defendant beyond rea-
sonable doubt. This rule is reinforced by the presumption of innocence under the ECHR,
Article 6(2).1 The general rule means that the prosecution has the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the actus reus of an offence
with the mens rea required for it, but the burden of adducing sufficient evidence to raise
an issue may be borne by the defendant. Very exceptionally, the defendant may have the
burden of disproving an element of the offence.
In relation to excuses, the defendant has the burden of adducing sufficient evidence to
raise an excuse; if he does so it is, in principle, then for the prosecution to disprove the
alleged excuse beyond reasonable doubt. There are, however, exceptions whereby the
defendant not only has the burden of adducing sufficient evidence to raise an excuse but
also has the burden of proving it on the balance of probabilities.
Putting the burden of proof on the defendent may be held in a particular context to be
incompatible with the presumption of innocence under the ECHR, Article 6(2).
4.1 The burden of proof is sometimes described as the ‘persuasive burden’ (or ‘legal
burden’), while the burden of adducing evidence is sometimes described as the ‘evidential
burden’.
1 See para 4.8.

4.3 the two burdens | 
4.2 Although the great majority of criminal cases are tried before magistrates, and
therefore without a jury, it is convenient for the student to think in terms of a trial by
judge and jury when considering the following paragraphs. All questions of fact have
to be determined by the jury, but the judge exercises a considerable degree of control
in two ways in particular. One concerns the judge’s power to withdraw a case from the
jury, usually on the submission of the defence, on the ground that there is no case for
the defendant to answer on the prosecution’s evidence. Th is may be because no evidence
that the offence alleged to have been committed by the defendant has been produced
by the prosecution, or because, where some evidence has been produced, that evidence
(taken at its highest) is such that a reasonable jury properly directed could not properly
convict on it.2 A judge has no power to rule that there is no case to answer until the con-
clusion of the prosecution’s evidence.3 If the judge rules that there is no case to answer,
the judge must direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty and the case is at an end.
The other way in which the judge exercises control is by means of his summing up, where
the judge can withdraw from the jury an issue raised by way of defence if there is insuf-
ficient evidence in law to support it.
However strong the evidence is in respect of a matter which the prosecution must
prove, or however weak the evidence on a point which the defence must prove, the judge
is never entitled to direct the jury to return a verdict of guilty.4
The burden of proof

4.3 The party who bears the persuasive burden of proof on a given issue will lose
on that issue if, after reviewing all the evidence, the jury or magistrates entertain
the appropriate degree of doubt whether the proposition in question has been
established.
As the prosecution bears the burden of proving most issues in a criminal case
beyond reasonable doubt, it is generally true to say that the defendant’s guilt must
be established beyond reasonable doubt. Th is fundamental principle is enshrined in
the decision of the House of Lords in Woolmington v DPP, 5 where Viscount Sankey LC
made the following classic statement:
‘Throughout the web of the English criminal law one golden thread is always to be seen,
that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt . . . No matter what the
charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be
entertained.’ 6
The judges are currently advised to direct a jury that: ‘The prosecution proves its case
if the jury, having considered all the evidence relevant to the charge they are considering,
are sure that the defendant is guilty.’7
2 Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060, CA. 3 N Ltd [2008] EWCA Crim 1223.
4 Wang [2005] UKHL 9. 5 [1935] AC 462, HL. 6 [1935] AC 462 at 481–482.
7 Judicial Studies Board, Crown Court Bench Book, (2010), p 16.
 | 4.4 proof
4.4 In principle, the general rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
defendant (D) beyond reasonable doubt means not only that it must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that D committed the actus reus of an offence with the mens rea
required for that offence, but also that it must negative any excuse (ie a defence which
excuses a defendant from liability for conduct which is otherwise criminal) raised by
D. For example, the burden of negativing a plea of duress8 is borne by the prosecution.
In addition, the burden of negativing automatism,9 when it is not caused by insanity, is
likewise borne by the prosecution.10
Burden of proof on defendant

4.5 The general rule that the prosecution must prove D’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is weakened by the fact that in many offences D has the persuasive burden of proving
something, normally an excuse. In Woolmington v DPP, Viscount Sankey LC, having
referred to the general duty of the prosecution to prove D’s guilt, went on to note that it
has always been possible for Parliament to transfer the onus of proof of some matter to
D; such a provision is known as a ‘reverse onus provision’. When D bears the burden of
proof, the burden borne by him is lighter than that borne by the prosecution on the issues
on which it has to prove guilt, for D has only to prove the exculpating facts on the balance
of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt.11 D will succeed in doing this if the jury
are satisfied that it is more likely than not (or more probable than not) that the relevant
facts are made out.12 D will not succeed if the jury merely conclude that it is as likely as
not that the facts existed. Where an issue is raised in respect of which D has the burden
of proof, the issue is not automatically left to the jury; it is only left to them if there is evi-
dence, however weak, on which (if it is accepted and not contradicted) a jury could find
the matter proved.13 If the issue is left to the jury, it is then up to the defence to prove it as
explained above.
4.6 The prosecution must always prove the facts in respect of which it bears the burden
of proof (or they must be formally admitted) before D can be required to discharge a
burden of proof imposed on him in respect of an excuse or other matter. It follows that,
even if D fails to discharge a burden of proof placed upon him, D must still be acquitted
if the prosecution fails to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt as to the facts which
it must prove which give rise to the imposition of D’s burden. For example, in Gatland v
Comr of Metropolitan Police,14 D was charged with depositing, without lawful authority
or excuse, a skip on the highway whereby a user of the highway was endangered, con-
trary to the Highways Act 1959, s 140(1) (now the Highways Act 1980, s 161(1)). D failed
to prove any lawful authority or excuse for his actions, as the Divisional Court held was
required by statute, but it was held by the Divisional Court that D could not be convicted
8 Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688, CCA; Bone [1968] 2 All ER 644, CA. 9 Para 15. 66.
10 Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, HL; Stripp (1978) 69 Cr App R 318, CA.
11 Sodeman v R [1936] 2 All ER 1138, PC; Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607, CCA.
12 Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 at 373–374. 13 See para 4.10.
14 [1968] 2 QB 279, DC.
4.8 the two burdens | 
of the offence because the prosecution had not proved that the presence of the skip on the
highway caused any highway-user to be endangered.
When is the burden of proof on the defendant?

4.7 D bears the burden of proof in the following situations:
• Defence of insanity15 This is the only common law exception to Woolmington in

relation to an excuse. In Woolmington itself, it was confirmed that a defendant who
raises the defence of insanity has the burden of proving it.
• Express statutory provision It has been common for a statute to provide that it shall
be for D to prove certain facts. For example, a person charged with sexual activity
with a child family member aged 16 or over under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 25
has an excuse if he proves that he was lawfully married to, or the civil partner of, the
other person at the time.
• Implied statutory provision Even if a statute does not expressly place on D the persua-
sive burden of proving a particular matter, the statutory provision may, on its true
construction, place that burden on him. A statutory provision will have this effect
if, on its true construction, it contains any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse
or qualification, whether or not it accompanies the description of the offence in the
enactment creating the offence. The detail concerning this exception is outside the
scope of this book.
• Presumptions of law against D rebuttable by persuasive proof to the contrary
Sometimes a thing is presumed against D unless he rebuts the presumption by
proof to the contrary. This type of reverse onus provision is dealt with in para
4.14.
Compatibility with ECHR, Article 6(2)

4.8 Putting the burden of proving an issue on D is open to the grave objection that,
assuming that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof, a magistrates’ court or
jury may have to convict D although it thinks it as likely as not that he had an excuse or
is otherwise not guilty.
The position concerning provisions which apparently place a persuasive (as opposed
to an evidential)16 burden on D is complicated by the fact that they may be incompatible
with the ECHR, Article 6(2), which provides: ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.’ Article 6(2) does not,
however, create an absolute rule.17 There can be circumstances where the imposition of
15 See para 15.23.

16 Placing an evidential burden on D does not ordinarily contravene the ECHR, Art 6(2): Lingens v Austria 26
DR 171 (1981), EComHR; Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004); Edwards; Denton; Jackson;
Hendley; Crowley [2004] EWCA Crim 1025.
17 Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379, ECtHR; Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, PC.
 | 4.9 proof
a burden of proof on D is permissible under the ECHR.18 The question of compatibility

of an express or implied reverse onus provision has to be decided by the courts and if a
court finds that such a provision is otherwise incompatible with Article 6(2) it is required
by the Human Rights Act 1998, s 3,19 wherever possible, to ‘read down’ that provision so
as to impose only an evidential burden, even where Parliament appears clearly to have
intended to impose a persuasive burden on D.20 An explanation of how the courts decide
whether the imposition of a reverse onus provision is compatible with the ECHR is out-
side the scope of this book.
The burden of adducing evidence

4.9 The prosecution must adduce prima facie evidence of D’s guilt, for otherwise there is
no case to answer and the judge directs an acquittal. This means only that the prosecution
must adduce sufficient evidence of the actus reus and mens rea mentioned in the defin-
ition of the offence charged. There are rare exceptions to this where a statute expressly or
impliedly requires D to disprove a particular element of the actus reus or mens rea of the
offence or requires the prosecution to prove that such an element is satisfied only if suffi-
cient evidence to the contrary has been adduced by D or another witness.
4.10 It is not necessary for the prosecution to negative every type of defence that might
be available to D. In the words of Devlin J (as he then was):
‘It would be quite unreasonable to allow the defence to submit at the end of the prosecu-
tion’s case that the Crown had not proved affirmatively and beyond reasonable doubt
that D was at the time of the crime sober, or not sleepwalking or not in a trance or
blackout.’ 21
It follows that it is normally incumbent on D to adduce sufficient evidence to raise a par-

ticular defence and (where D does not have the burden of proving this defence) D satisfies
this burden if there is evidence, however weak,22 which (if believed and not contradicted)
could result in the jury determining that the defence was available.23 If D does this, the judge
must leave the issue to the jury. Unless the defence is one which D must prove (see paras 4.5
to 4.7), the judge must direct the jury that the defence must succeed (and D be acquitted)
unless the Crown disproves one or more elements of it beyond reasonable doubt.24
18 DPP, ex p Kebiline [2000] 2 AC 326, HL; Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28; A-G’s
Reference (No 1 of 2004); Edwards; Denton; Jackson; Hendley; Crowley [2004] EWCA Crim 1025; Sheldrake v
DPP [2004] UKHL 43.
19 Para 1.52.
20 See the cases cited in n 18.
21 Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277 at 284, per Devlin J.
22 Dinnick (1909) 3 Cr App R 77, CCA; Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752, CA; Bane [1994] Crim LR 134, CA.
23 Lee Chun-Chuen v R [1963] AC 220, PC; Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 416–417, per
Lord Morris; Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 at 623, PC. See also Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060, CA.
24 Abraham [1973] 3 All ER 694 at 697–698; Moore [1986] Crim LR 552, CA. Statements in Moore that it is
enough if some of the jury are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that one element is not made out, while the rest
are so satisfied that another element is not made out, must be regarded as wrong.
4.14 presumptions | 
For example, at a trial for murder the prosecution must dispel all reasonable doubt on
the availability of the defence of loss of control for otherwise a verdict of manslaughter
must be returned. However, this duty of the prosecution only arises if there is evidence
to raise the issue that the defence was satisfied at the material time. If there is no such
evidence, the judge must not leave the defence of loss of control to the jury. On the other
hand, if there is such evidence the judge must leave that defence to the jury, even though
D has not specifically raised it as a defence.
4.11 It is common practice to speak of D’s burden of adducing evidence, but it should
never be forgotten that the burden may have been discharged for D by the evidence of a
witness for the prosecution or of a co-defendant.25
Presumptions
Key points 4.2

Proof may be aided by the use of presumptions. A presumption is the product of a rule
according to which on proof of one fact the jury must or may find that some other fact
(often called the ‘presumed fact’) exists. The ‘must’ or ‘may’ in the last sentence gives the
clue to the classification of presumptions into presumptions of law and presumptions of
fact.
Presumptions of law
4.12 When the jury must find that the presumed fact exists, the presumption is a pre-
sumption of law. There are two kinds of presumption of law, rebuttable and irrebuttable
(otherwise called ‘conclusive’).
4.13 When a presumption of law is irrebuttable, no evidence can be received to contra-
dict the presumed fact. An example of an irrebuttable presumption of law is provided by
the rule26 that a child under 10 is incapable of committing an offence. Here the presumption
operates to prevent criminal liability. Sometimes an irrebuttable presumption can operate
against a defendant; examples are certain conclusive presumptions which can arise about
absence of consent and lack of reasonable belief in consent for the purposes of rape and cer-
tain other sexual offences, in the situations specified by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 76.27
Irrebuttable presumptions of law are rules of substantive law, rather than of evidence.
4.14 Where there is a rebuttable presumption of law, the jury must find that the pre-
sumed fact exists unless sufficient evidence to the contrary is adduced. The amount of
evidence required in rebuttal varies, since a rebuttable presumption of law may be of a
‘persuasive’ or ‘evidential’ type. Where it is of the persuasive type, it can only be rebutted
25 Bullard v R [1957] AC 635, PC; Rolle v R [1965] 3 All ER 582, PC. 26 Para 15.1. 27 Para 9.21.
 | 4.15 proof
by disproving the presumed fact to the appropriate standard of proof. On the other hand,
where it is of the evidential type, it can be rebutted by the introduction of evidence suf-
ficient to raise a doubt about the presumed fact, in which case the fact will be decided
according to the applicable rules relating to the burden and standard of proof.
An example of a persuasive rebuttable presumption of law is provided by the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 51. Section 51(1), as amended, provides:
‘A person commits an offence if –

(a) he does an act which intimidates, and is intended to intimidate, another person
(the “victim”);
(b) he does the act knowing or believing that the victim is assisting in the investiga-
tion of an offence or is a witness or potential witness or a juror or potential juror in
proceedings for an offence; and
(c) he does it intending thereby to cause the investigation or the course of justice to be
obstructed, perverted or interfered with.’
Section 51(7) provides that, if it is proved by the prosecution that D did an act within s 51(1)(a)
with the knowledge or belief in s 51(1)(b), D is to be presumed to have acted with the intention
required by s 51(1)(c), unless the contrary is proved. Section 51(7) of the 1994 Act has been
held not to be incompatible with Article 6(2) in placing the persuasive burden on D.28
An example of an evidential rebuttable presumption of law is provided by the rebut-
table presumption of the absence of consent and of reasonable belief in consent for the
purposes of rape and certain other sexual offences, in the situations specified by the
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 75.29
Presumptions of fact
4.15 When the jury may find that the presumed fact exists on proof of some other fact,
the presumption is one of fact. Presumptions (or inferences) of fact play a very important
part in the administration of the criminal law, because they are frequently the only means
by which the state of D’s mind can be proved, as will be seen.
Proof of a state of mind
Key points 4.3

Proof of the defendant’s state of mind at the material time is aided by reference to various
factors. Among them is the fact that, in the absence of a credible explanation, it may be
28 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004); Edwards; Denton; Jackson; Hendley; Crowley [2004] EWCA Crim 1025.
29 Paras 9.27 and 9.28.
4.18 proof of a state of mind | 
inferred that the defendant intended or foresaw the likely consequences of his conduct
but a court or jury is never legally bound to make such an inference.
4.16 The extent to which it is possible to prove the past state of D’s mind is apt to
trouble the student. Regard must be had to D’s statements at the time, or at a later date,
or in the course of D’s testimony. If the statements out of court amount to admissions,
great weight is attached to them on the assumption that what people say adverse to
their case is probably true. The presence or absence of motive is another important
consideration.
4.17 Regard must also be had to D’s conduct and circumstances. Proof that D commit-
ted the actus reus of the offence can justify an inference that D did so voluntarily, with
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, and, where relevant, with intent or fore-
sight as to its normal consequences, although it must never be forgotten that this is only
an inference, and the jury may well conclude that it is not warranted on the particular
facts of the case.30 If a credible explanation is offered, the jury must, of course, consider
the evidence as a whole and, if they entertain any reasonable doubt, the general rule that
the prosecution has the burden of proof obliges them to give D the benefit of that doubt.
If D does not offer a credible explanation the inference will usually be drawn. This point is
implicit in the following statement by Lord Steyn in B v DPP,31 where the House of Lords
held that an offence contrary to the subsequently repealed Indecency with Children Act
1960 required proof that D did not believe the child was 14 or over (which was then the
age limit for the offence). Lord Steyn said:
‘ . . . recklessness or indifference as to the existence of the prohibited circumstance would

be sufficient for guilt. And in practice the Crown would only have to shoulder the burden
of proving that D was aware of the age of the victim if there was some evidential material
before the jury or magistrates suggesting the possibility of an honest belief that the child
was over 14.’
4.18 Certain acts are known to be likely to produce particular consequences frequently
spoken of as the ‘natural and probable’ consequences of those acts. This fact, coupled with
the fact that people usually do foresee the normal consequences of their conduct, has led
people to talk of a presumption (or inference) that everyone intends or foresees the nat-
ural and probable consequences of his conscious acts. Such talk is harmless provided it
is always remembered that the presumption is one of fact. If this point is forgotten, it is
fatally easy to suggest that, once a particular act is proved against him, D must as a matter
of law adduce evidence to disprove that he intended or foresaw the natural and probable
consequences of that act; it may even come to be suggested that D bears the burden of
disproving such an intention or foresight.
30 Hallam [1957] 1 QB 569, CCA; Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 353 at 358 and
359, per Lords Bridge and Brightman. 31 [2000] 2 AC 428 at 477.
 | 4.18 proof
That the presumption is one of fact is made clear by the Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8,
which states:
‘A court or jury in determining whether a person has committed an offence (a) shall not
be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only
of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions, but (b) shall decide
whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such
inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.’
It must be borne in mind constantly that this provision is not concerned with when
intention or foresight is required for criminal liability but with how it is proved if
required.32
FURTHER READING
Munday Evidence (6th edn, 2011) Ch 2
32 See, eg, the speeches of Lords Diplock, Dilhorne and Edmund-Davies in Lemon [1979] AC 617 at 637, 642
and 656.
5
Mistake and related matters
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals with the situation where there is evidence that the defendant lacks the mens
rea for an offence because of accident, ignorance or mistake.
The chapter concludes by dealing with the law which applies where the defendant makes a mis-
take which does not prevent him having the mens rea for an offence but leads to him mistakenly
believing that circumstances exist which would provide an excuse.
5.1 In this chapter, it must be remembered that the jury’s role is undertaken by the mag-
istrates in a summary trial, as well as that of the judge.
This chapter is concerned with cases in which there is no doubt that the conduct of the
defendant (D) satisfied the actus reus requirements of an offence.
The question at issue in the first part of the chapter (paras 5.1 to 5.13) is whether the
prosecution can prove that D had the necessary mens rea. As seen, the normal inference
from D’s conduct and its surrounding circumstances is that he had the necessary state
of mind as to any circumstances or consequences prescribed for the actus reus. The jury
are very likely to make that inference unless there is evidence that D lacked that state of
mind. Amongst such evidence is evidence of accident, ignorance or mistake. Unless there
is evidence from whatever source such that there is room for the possibility of accident,
ignorance or mistake, the judge does not have to direct the jury on the legal effect of an
accident, ignorance or a mistake.1
For convenience, the situation where D had the necessary mens rea but mistakenly
believed that he was acting in circumstances which would provide him with an excuse is
dealt with in the latter part of this chapter (paras 5.14 to 5.23).
Accident
5.2 ‘Accident’ is a word which has several shades of meaning but, when we speak of a
consequence as accidental in a case where D’s conscious conduct constitutes the actus reus
of the crime charged, the allegation always is that D did not intend to produce the prohib-
ited consequence. A person does not intend an accidental consequence of his conduct.
1 See, eg, Adkins [2000] 2 All ER 185, CA.

 | 5.3 mistake and related matters
The typical instance is one in which someone, who was conscious of, and in control of,
his bodily movements and aware of all relevant circumstances, did not foresee that his
conduct would have the prohibited consequence. D aims a bullet at a bull’s-eye target,
but owing to the presence of a high wind or the fact that he is a poor shot he hits a house
pigeon. In either event, he is said to have killed the bird accidentally.2
When the prohibited consequence occurs in a way which would be described as acci-
dental because it was unintended, D can be convicted of an offence in which liability may
be based on recklessness or negligence if he has been reckless or negligent as to the risk of
that consequence; an accident caused by reckless or negligent conduct cannot constitute
a defence to a charge of such an offence.
Ignorance
5.3 D’s ignorance of something prevents him being criminally liable if it results in D
lacking the intention, recklessness, knowledge or other subjective mental element which
is expressly or impliedly required by the definition of the offence charged. It is most
exceptional for ignorance of law to have this effect, as opposed simply to causing D to be
unaware that what he is doing is criminal.3
Lack of intention, recklessness or knowledge etc caused by simple ignorance (ie where
D’s mind is a complete blank as to a particular matter) is comparatively rare. Normally,
lack of a subjective mental element is connected with a mistake, in that D has thought
about the possible existence of the matter but wrongly concluded that it does not exist.
Mistake
Key points 5.1

Mistakes of two types are relevant to D’s liability:
• a mistake which prevents D having the mens rea for an offence (mistake negativing
mens rea) prevents D being liable for it. Except where the mens rea consists of
negligence the mistake need not be reasonable; and
• a mistake which relates to an excuse can absolve D, but in the case of most excuses
the mistake must be reasonable.
5.4 Where there is evidence that D acted under a mistake it is of vital importance to
classify the matter to which the mistake relates. In particular, it is vital to determine
whether the alleged mistake negatives the mens rea required for the offence charged or
whether (although it does not have that effect) it relates to facts which, if true, would
2 Horton v Gwynne [1921] 2 KB 661, DC. 3 See paras 3.78–3.80 and 3.85 and 3.86.
5.6 mistake negativing mens rea | 
have given rise to an excuse (ie a defence which excuses D from liability for conduct
which is otherwise criminal).
If the alleged mistake has neither effect, it is immaterial and cannot affect D’s liability.4
For example, as said in para 3.50, if D handles a diamond ring, knowing that it is stolen,
it would be irrelevant that D believes the ring only contained imitation stones. Likewise,
if D shoots at (and kills) someone, intending unlawfully to kill him but mistakenly be-
lieving it is X whereas it is in fact V, D can be convicted of murder. In both cases, D’s
mistake is immaterial because it does not prevent D having the mens rea for the offence
and it does not relate to a matter of excuse. A mistake of law will rarely have either
effect, because usually its sole effect is to cause D to be unaware that he is committing
an offence.5
Where an offence is one of strict liability as to an element of its actus reus, ie no mens
rea is required as to that element, a mistaken belief, however reasonable, in respect of
that element is necessarily immaterial and cannot excuse.
Mistake negativing mens rea
Mistake negativing mens rea (other than negligence)

5.5 D cannot be convicted of an offence if, because of a mistake, D lacked the intention,
recklessness, knowledge, absence of belief or similar state of mind which the prosecution
is required to prove. The law does not require the mistake to be reasonable.
When there is evidence that D acted under a mistaken belief of the present type, the
mistake must be left to the jury and the jury must acquit D unless the prosecution proves
beyond reasonable doubt that D was not mistaken in the alleged way and that he had the
state of mind required for the offence.6
5.6 The rule that a mistake negativing a state of mind which the prosecution must prove
need not be reasonable was clearly implied in relation to mistakes negativing intention or
recklessness as to consequences by the Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8,7 and it was affirmed
in relation to mistakes negativing the requisite state of mind, whatever its description, by
the majority of the House of Lords in DPP v Morgan.8
In Morgan, which was concerned with the offence of rape contrary to the Sexual
Offences Act 1956, s 1 (since repealed), the majority held that, since he would lack the
mens rea which had to be proved by the prosecution, a defendant could not be convicted
if he believed9 (albeit unreasonably) that the woman was consenting. As Lord Hailsham
said:
4 Subject to the very limited rule in Tolson; paras 5.12–5.13. 5 See paras 3.78–3.80 and 3.85 and 3.86.
6 See, eg, Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd [1986] 2 All ER 353, HL; B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428, HL.
7 See para 4.18. 8 [1976] AC 182, HL. See also Smith (David) [1974] QB 354, CA.
9 It is not uncommon to insert ‘honestly’ or ‘genuinely’ before ‘believed’ when referring to the principle
affi rmed in Morgan. The insertion of such a word may be useful emphasis but in fact adds nothing: Albert v Lavin
[1981] 1 All ER 628 at 633, per Hodgson J.
 | 5.7 mistake and related matters
‘Once one has accepted . . . that the prohibited act in rape is non-consensual sexual inter-
course, and that the guilty state of mind is an intention to commit it, it seems to me to
follow as a matter of inexorable logic that there is no room either for a “defence” of hon-
est belief or mistake, or of a defence of honest and reasonable belief or mistake. Either
the prosecution proves that the accused had the requisite intention, or it does not. In the
former case it succeeds, and in the latter it fails.’10
5.7 In some subsequent cases, there were obiter dicta to the effect that the decision in
DPP v Morgan was confined (and intended to be confined) to the offence of rape,11 but this
view was not accepted by the Court of Appeal in Kimber12 nor in Gladstone Williams;13
in these cases the principle endorsed in Morgan was applied to two different offences of
assault.
Kimber was concerned with the statutory offence (since repealed)14 of indecent assault
on a woman. The mens rea required for the offence of indecent assault on a woman
was intentionally causing the woman to apprehend immediate, or to sustain, unlawful
personal violence. The Court of Appeal held that, since violence would not be unlawful if
the woman had consented to it, D was entitled to be acquitted if because of his mistaken
belief in consent he did not intend to lay hands on the woman without her consent,
whether or not his mistake was reasonable.
Gladstone Williams was concerned with the statutory offence of assault occasioning
actual bodily harm. V saw a youth seizing a woman’s handbag. V chased and caught
the youth and knocked him to the ground. D, who had only seen the later stages of the
incident, was told by V that he was arresting the youth for mugging and that he was a
policeman (which he was not). D asked V for his warrant card. When V could not produce
it, a struggle ensued, during which D punched V and injured V’s face. V was entitled to
arrest the youth and therefore his use of reasonable force against the youth was lawful.
Although it is lawful to use reasonable force in self-defence or the prevention of crime, a
person is not entitled to use force against someone using lawful force and therefore D’s
use of force was unlawful. At his trial for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, D said
that he had acted under the honest but mistaken belief that V was unlawfully attacking
the youth and that he must use force against V in order to protect the youth. The trial
judge directed the jury that D could have an excuse if he had a belief based on reasonable
grounds that V was acting unlawfully. The Court of Appeal held that that direction was
wrong. It said that a person who mistakenly believed that he had to act in self-defence or
in the prevention of crime had to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be, reason-
ably or not. Consequently, if, on the facts as he mistakenly believed them to be, reasonably
or not, he was entitled to use reasonable force in self-defence or the prevention of crime,
he would lack the necessary mens rea for the offence charged. The reason was that that
10 [1976] AC 182 at 214. The mens rea for the offence of rape, contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1, is
different from that for the offence of rape at issue in Morgan and a mistaken belief in consent must now be rea-
sonable to excuse someone charged with rape: see paras 9.29 and 5.11.
11 Phekoo [1981] 3 All ER 84, CA; Barrett and Barrett (1980) 72 Cr App R 212, CA.
12 [1983] 3 All ER 316, CA. Also see Jones (1986) 83 Cr App R 375, CA, and Blackburn v Bowering [1994] 3 All
ER 380, CA. 13 (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA.
14 By the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
5.11 mistake negativing mens rea | 
mens rea was not simply an intent to apply force to another; instead, it was an intention
to apply unlawful force to another15 (and, on the facts as D understood them, the force
which he intended to apply would not be unlawful).
The statement of law in Gladstone Williams may have been an obiter dictum, since the
conviction had to be quashed because of a misdirection concerning the onus of proof,
but it has been applied or referred to with approval in a number of cases.16 In particular,
it was followed by the Privy Council in Beckford v R,17 where it was held that an essential
element of the offence of murder was that the violence used by D was unlawful and that a
mistaken belief (albeit unreasonable) in facts which – if true – would justify self-defence
would negative the mens rea for murder (provided that the force was reasonable on the
facts believed to exist) because it would negative the requisite intent unlawfully to kill or
cause grievous bodily harm.
Subsequently, the House of Lords in B v DPP18 and in K19 endorsed the principle in
Morgan and the later cases as a general principle.
5.8 It follows from the general application of the principle in DPP v Morgan and subsequent
cases that, for example, on a charge of murder by shooting, D’s evidence that he believed
the gun with which he shot the deceased to be unloaded must be left to the jury, however
weak that evidence may be, and that the jury must be directed to acquit D of murder if
they are not sure that D knew it was loaded, even if they think that D’s alleged belief was
grossly unreasonable, since the prosecution will have failed to prove that D had the mens
rea for murder. (D could, however, be convicted of involuntary manslaughter by gross neg-
ligence, even though his alleged mistake is not disproved, if the prosecution satisfied the
jury beyond reasonable doubt that he was grossly negligent in acting as he did.)20
5.9 The fact that in the present context D’s mistaken belief is not required as a matter of
law to be a reasonable one does not mean that the reasonableness of a mistake is entirely
irrelevant. As was recognised in DPP v Morgan, in Gladstone Williams, in Beckford
v R and in K, the reasonableness of D’s alleged mistake is of considerable evidential
significance, because the more reasonable the mistake the more likely it is that the jury
(or magistrates) will accept his story that he was acting under a mistake.
5.10 Special rules apply where D’s mistake was attended by intoxication; they are
discussed in Chapter 15.
Mistakes in offences where negligence suffices

5.11 Where, because of a mistake, D does not realise a risk in relation to which proof of neg-
ligence suffices, his mistake must have been a reasonable one in order to negative negligence.
15 This formulation sufficed for the purposes of the Court of Appeal’s decision. See further paras 7.52 and 7.61.
16 Jackson [1985] RTR 257, CA; Fisher [1987] Crim LR 334, CA; Asbury [1986] Crim LR 258, CA; Owino [1996]
2 Cr App R 128, CA; para 16.15.
17 [1988] AC 130, PC. See also Blackburn v Bowering [1994] 3 All ER 380, CA; Faraj [2007] EWCA Crim
1033. 18 [2000] 2 AC 428, HL (para 6.14).
19 [2001] UKHL 41 (para 6.14).
20 Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981, CA. As to gross negligence, see paras 8.113–8.116.
 | 5.12 mistake and related matters
The reason is that a person who acts under a mistaken belief which is not based on reason-
able grounds is necessarily negligent, because a reasonable person would not, by defi nition,
have made the mistake and would have realised the risk. For example, even if he has thought
about the matter but wrongly concluded that his customer is sober, a person can be convicted
of the statutory offence of selling a firearm to a person whom he knows or has reasonable
cause to believe to be drunk21 unless his mistaken belief was based on reasonable grounds.
The Tolson rule

5.12 Mention must be made of a special rule, which is now only applicable to bigamy.
The leading authority for this special rule is Tolson.22 D married for a second time
within seven years of the disappearance of her first husband from whom she had not
been divorced. D was charged with bigamy, contrary to the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861, s 57, which is committed by a person who ‘being married, shall marry any other
person during the life of the former [sic] husband or wife’. Section 57 does not specify
any requirement of intention, recklessness or knowledge but subsequent to Tolson it has
been held that it requires an intent simply to go through the second ceremony.23 D was
found by the jury to have believed on reasonable grounds and in good faith that her first
husband was dead, and her conviction was quashed by a majority decision of the Court
for Crown Cases Reserved on the ground that a reasonable belief in such a fact would be
a defence. In accordance with Tolson, it has subsequently been held that a mistaken belief
on the part of someone charged with bigamy that his first marriage was void or had been
dissolved (and therefore that he was not married) is a defence provided that the mistake
was reasonable.24 This means that negligence suffices as to the element of ‘being mar-
ried’ in bigamy. Tolson was distinguished by the majority of the House of Lords in DPP v
Morgan on the ground that the mistake in question did not relate to the issue of whether
Mrs Tolson had the necessary mens rea required for bigamy.
5.13 In Sweet v Parsley, 25 Lord Diplock stated that Tolson laid down:
‘ . . . as a general principle of construction of any enactment, which creates a criminal

offence, that, even where the words used to describe the prohibited conduct [ie the actus
reus] would not in any other context connote the necessity for any particular mental
element, they are nevertheless to be read as subject to the implication that a necessary
element in the offence is the absence of a belief, held honestly and upon reasonable grounds,
in the existence of facts which, if true, would make the act innocent.’
On this view, the rule in Tolson was potentially of widespread application: it would have
applied to any offence whose definition did not contain a word connoting the need for
mens rea as to an element of its actus reus, and which was not interpreted as being one of
strict liability as to that element.
21 Para 3.56. 22 (1899) 23 QBD 168, CCR.

23 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 238, per Lord Fraser.
24 King [1964] 1 QB 285, CCA; Gould [1968] 2 QB 65, CA. 25 [1970] AC 132 at 163.
5.17 mistake relating to an excuse | 
Lord Diplock’s statement became increasingly doubtful after the decision in DPP v
Morgan and its endorsement as a general principle by a succession of cases. Ultimately, in
B v DPP,26 the House of Lords held that Lord Diplock’s dictum should be read in future as
though the reference to reasonable grounds was omitted.
As a result, it is no longer permissible to interpret an offence of the type referred to by
Lord Diplock according to the Tolson rule. It appears that Tolson has not been applied in
a reported decision after the decision in DPP v Morgan became generalised. Although not
yet overruled, the application of the Tolson rule to bigamy must now be open to doubt.
In the light of the modern emphasis on subjectivism in the criminal law in B v DPP and
K27 and G,28 it is unlikely that the application of the Tolson rule in bigamy would survive
reconsideration.
Mistake relating to an excuse

Excuses framed in terms of D’s own belief
5.14 In a small number of excuses contained in the definition of statutory offences, par-
ticularly modern ones, statute makes it clear that the excuse is determined by reference to
D’s own belief in a situation. For example, under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1) it
is an offence intentionally or recklessly to destroy or damage another’s property ‘without
lawful excuse’. The Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 5 provides, inter alia, that a person is to
be treated as having a lawful excuse if, at the material time, he believed that the person
whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruction or damage had so consented
to it or would have so consented if he had known of the destruction or damage and its
circumstances.29 Where there is this type of excuse it is no bar to the excuse succeeding
that the belief was based on unreasonable grounds.30
Other excuses
5.15 Some specific statutory excuses are framed in terms of D’s reasonable belief (or rea-
sonable suspicion) in a factual situation. The excuse in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 28
referred to in para 6.46 is an example. In such cases, a mere mistaken belief is obviously
insufficient; the belief must be reasonable.
5.16 For the reason given below the same is true in the case of a specific statutory excuse
framed in terms simply of a factual situation, with no reference to D’s state of mind as to it,
unless it has been held that not even a reasonable mistake as to the excuse can absolve.
5.17 The law has become increasingly complex in relation to general defences. In DPP
v Morgan,31 the House of Lords was concerned with mistakes negativing the mens rea
26 [2000] 2 AC 428, HL. 27 [2001] UKHL 41. 28 [2003] UKHL 50.

29 For another example, see para 10.122.
30 The Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 5(3) confi rms this; see para 13.9 at n 36. 31 [1976] AC 182, HL.
 | 5.18 mistake and related matters
required as to an element of the actus reus. The House of Lords did not overrule the pre-
existing traditional rule that a mistake as to a matter of excuse (ie a mistaken belief in
facts which if true would bring the case within an excuse) had to be reasonable; in fact,
their Lordships accepted the requirement of reasonableness in relation to mistaken belief
in facts which, if true, would constitute an excuse.
5.18 The traditional rule does not offend the ‘inexorable logic’ to which Lord Hailsham
referred in DPP v Morgan32 because the type of mistake covered by it does not prevent D
having the mens rea for the offence charged. However, it cannot be denied that fine dis-
tinctions can be involved in classifying that to which an alleged mistake relates. For ex-
ample, at the time that Morgan was decided, self-defence and the other ‘defences’ which
justify (render lawful) conduct, were not regarded as part of the actus reus of an offence
against the person as to which D had to have mens rea. Morgan did not disturb the rule
that, for example, in cases of self-defence any mistake about the circumstances had to be
reasonable.33 In Albert v Lavin,34 decided six years after Morgan, the Divisional Court
proceeded on the basis that the requisite mens rea for an assault was an intention to apply
force to another without his consent and held that a defendant who, with such a state of
mind, had hit someone mistakenly believing that he was acting in self-defence could be
convicted of an offence involving an assault, unless his mistaken belief was reasonable.
The Court’s reason was that the mistake related to a matter of defence (and therefore had
to be reasonable), as opposed to a ‘definitional element’ (ie part of the actus reus) of the
offence in relation to which D had to have subjective mens rea. On the other hand, the law
is now different as a result of Gladstone Williams,35 where the decision in Albert v Lavin
was disapproved, simply because the element of unlawfulness was classified in Gladstone
Williams as a definitional element of the offence in relation to which D must have the
required state of mind. Once the Court of Appeal in Gladstone Williams had held that
the mens rea for an assault was an intention to apply unlawful force, it would have been
inconsistent (and contrary to Morgan) for it to have required a mistaken belief that one
was acting in self-defence or the like to be reasonable, since such a mistake would nega-
tive the state of mind required.36 This brings us back to the point made earlier about the
importance of classifying that to which an alleged mistake relates.
5.19 In Graham, 37 decided seven years after DPP v Morgan, the Court of Appeal held
that, for the excuse of duress by threats to succeed, D’s belief that he was being subjected
to duress must have been reasonable. Subsequently, the House of Lords in Howe38 and
Hasan39 and the Court of Appeal in a number of cases 40 defined the excuses of duress by
threats and duress of circumstances in terms which endorse the approach in Graham.
In principle, as affirmed in Morgan, the same approach applies to mistakes relating to
other excuses where the mistake does not prevent D having the mens rea for the offence
in question.
32 See para 5.6.

33 See, eg, Rose (1884) 15 Cox CC 540; Chisam (1963) 47 Cr App R 130, CCA.
34 [1981] 1 All ER 628, DC. On appeal to the House of Lords [1982] AC 546, the House did not fi nd it necessary
to discuss the present issue. 35 (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA.
36 Also see Beckford v R [1988] AC 130, PC. 37 [1982] 1 All ER 801, CA. 38 [1987] AC 417, HL.
39 [2005] UKHL 22. 40 Eg Conway [1989] QB 290, CA; Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652, CA.
5.23 mistake relating to an excuse | 
Basis of requirement of reasonable mistake

5.20 The rule that a mistake as to a matter of excuse must be reasonable in order to
excuse seems to be based on judicial policy. Its effect is to convict a person on the grounds
of his negligence.41 So far the courts have not given any adequate explanation as to why
the rule is as it is. In particular they have not explained why a person who unreason-
ably believes that circumstances exist which would excuse him is any more deserving
of criminal liability than one whose mistake is reasonable, when a similar distinction
is not drawn in relation to mistakes negativing the intent, recklessness, knowledge or
similar state of mind which the prosecution must prove in order to prove the mens rea
of an offence.
Anomalous results
5.21 The different approaches to material mistakes negativing intent, recklessness,
knowledge and similar states of mind which the prosecution must prove and to mistakes
as to a matter of excuse can give rise to anomalous results. Suppose that D, unreasonably
mistakenly believing that he is being threatened with serious harm by X unless he com-
mits an offence, commits that offence; D cannot succeed with a plea of duress by threats
because, as stated above, an excuse of duress operates on the basis of the facts as D rea-
sonably believed them to be; its requirements are not applied on the basis of facts as they
are unreasonably mistakenly believed to be.42 Suppose, instead, that D, acting under the
same unreasonable mistake, hits X, D can succeed in a plea of self-defence because that
defence is applied on the basis of the facts as D thought they were regardless of whether
he made an unreasonable mistake.43 There is force in the argument that making the law
of mistake depend on whether or not the alleged mistake negatives the state of mind
required or relates to an excuse places legalism above substantive moral assessment.
Prospects of the traditional rule

5.22 There have been indications that the traditional common law requirement that a
mistaken belief in a matter of excuse must be reasonable is unlikely to survive much
longer. Arguments of the type just made are highly persuasive. Moreover, the courts
have already whittled down the rule’s application. Mention has already been made of the
change relating to mistaken belief in self-defence and so on44 (the change in the defin-
ition of the relevant mens rea was doubtless driven by a wish to escape the requirement of
reasonableness of the mistake) and of the increasing judicial preference for a subjective
basis of liability.45
5.23 Even in the context of the two excuses of duress there were clear signs that the
judges favoured dispensing with the requirement that a mistake be reasonable. In two
41 Paras 3.51–3.64. 42 See, further, paras 16.45 and 16.76.

43 See Elliott ‘Necessity, Duress and Self-defence’ [1989] Crim LR 611.
44 Para 5.18. The situation is the same in respect of a claim of mistaken belief in self-defence in an offence
whose mens rea does not refer to an element of lawfulness: paras 16.15–16.19.
45 Para 3.3.
 | 5.24 mistake and related matters
cases more recent than Howe on the point, appellate courts held that these defences
were to be judged on the facts as D believed them to be, whether reasonably or not.
In DPP v Rogers46 the Divisional Court stated this in relation to duress of circum-
stances, although it based this statement on a false assumption that the existing law was
accurately defi ned by a proposal, framed in terms of D’s belief, in a Law Commission
report. In Martin (David Paul), 47 the Court of Appeal held that the defence of duress
by threats was to be judged on the facts as D believed them to be, reasonably or not, but
this was based on a misunderstanding of the previous case law. Despite these flaws, the
readiness of the appeal courts in DPP v Rogers and Martin (David Paul) to embrace a
subjective approach to the issue of mistake as to duress suggested that when the ques-
tion next arose in the House of Lords the House would depart from the approach laid
down in Howe. Such a suggestion was, however, dismissed by the House of Lords in
Hasan, 48 where the trial judge had directed the jury along the lines adopted in DPP v
Rogers and Martin (David Paul). The House of Lords held that this was incorrect. Lord
Bingham giving the leading judgment, whose reasoning was approved by Lords Steyn,
Rodger and Brown, said this about the judge’s direction that the question was what D
‘genuinely believed’:
‘But the words used in Graham and approved in Howe were “he reasonably believed”. It is,
of course, essential that the defendant should genuinely, ie actually, believe in the efficacy
of the threat by which he claims to have been compelled. But there is no warrant for relax-
ing the requirement that the belief must be reasonable as well as genuine.’ 49
5.24 The law relating to the effect of an alleged mistake on criminal liability can be sum-
marised as follows in the table below.
Type of mistake Effect of mistake

General rule Exception
Mistake negativing mens rea D not guilty, even if mistake is Where mens rea in question is
unreasonable negligence, D not guilty only if
mistake is reasonable
Mistake not negativing mens D not guilty only if mistake is If defence is framed in terms of
rea but relating to an excuse reasonable D’s own belief, D not guilty, even
if mistake is unreasonable
Mistake of some other type, Mistake is immaterial and cannot excuse D
eg relating to an element of an
actus reus as to which mens rea
is not required
46 [1998] Crim LR 202, DC. 47 [2000] 2 Cr App R 42, CA.

48 [2005] UKHL 22. 49 Ibid at [23].
5.24 mistake relating to an excuse | 
FURTHER READING
Horder ‘Cognition, Emotion and Criminal Tur ‘Subjectivism and Objectivism: Towards
Culpability’ (1990) 106 LQR 469 Synthesis’ in Action and Value in Criminal
Simester ‘Mistakes in Defence’ (1992) 12 OJLS Law (1993) (Shute, Gardner and Horder
295 (eds)) 213
6
Strict liability
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals principally with:
• the meaning of strict liability;

• strict liability and the presumption of innocence under the ECHR, Article 6(2);
• offences of strict liability at common law;
• statutory offences of strict liability, and how it is determined whether a statutory offence is
one of strict liability;
• the justification for strict liability; and
• the reduction of the operation of strict liability in the criminal law.
The meaning of strict liability
Key points 6.1

An offence is one of strict liability if mens rea is not required in respect of one or more ele-
ments of the actus reus of that offence.
6.1 It was stated in para 2.3 that, although the argument has been made that the
state of mind with which a person acts should be irrelevant to his criminal liability
(as opposed to whether and how he should be dealt with on conviction), this does not
represent the law.
In many1 offences, particularly regulatory ones, however, the defendant (D) may be
convicted even though his conduct was not intentional, knowing, reckless or negligent
with reference to a requisite element of the offence charged. In such cases, a person is
liable to punishment in the absence of any fault on his part in respect of the element(s)
in question and is said to be under strict liability2 (of which there are many critics).
1 See Ashworth and Blake ‘The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law’ [1997] Crim LR 306.
2 Lemon [1979] AC 617 at 656, per Lord Edmund-Davies (contrast at 639–640, 657, and 662, per Viscount
Dilhorne, Lord Russell and Lord Scarman); K [2002] 1 AC 462 at [18], per Lord Bingham.
6.4 the meaning of strict liability | 
6.2 Most cases of strict liability are ones in which it has been held that ignorance or mistake,
however reasonable, in relation to a particular element of the actus reus of an offence is no
excuse, since no mens rea is required as to that element, although it is required in relation
to one or more other elements. This can be shown by reference to Prince3 and Hibbert.4 In
Prince, the charge was one of taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out of the posses-
sion of her father against his will, contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 55
(an offence which no longer exists). D knew that the girl was in the custody of her father, but
he believed, on reasonable grounds, that she was 18. Had this been so, the offence would not
have been committed; but D was held by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved to have been
rightly convicted since knowledge that the girl was under 16 was not required. The Court
clearly took the view that knowledge that the girl was in the possession of her father was
required to be proved, proof of which knowledge was not disputed. Prince is distinguishable
on this ground from Hibbert, where D’s conviction for an offence under the same section was
quashed, because D did not know that the girl he abducted was in anybody’s possession. The
jury appear to have found that D did not know that she was in anybody’s guardianship.
6.3 There have, however, also been isolated instances in which the courts have held that
an offence does not require any mens rea at all. An example relates to the offence of driv-
ing with excess alcohol, contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 5, which was stated in
DPP v H5 not to require proof of any mens rea. Another example is provided by Bezzina, 6
dealt with in para 6.41.
6.4 Quite inexplicably, the Court of Appeal in Sandhu7 held that strict liability as to an
element or elements of an actus reus does not simply mean that proof of mens rea in that
respect is not required but that the prosecution must not prove it or seek to prove it. It
quashed D’s conviction for the strict liability offence of causing unauthorised alterations
to a listed building on grounds that the evidence in respect of mens rea was inadmissible
and prejudicial to D’s interests. The result is that, where the prosecution has evidence of
mens rea as to a strict liability element of the actus reus, it should not adduce it. This seems
an artificial and unnecessary limitation, especially as evidence of fault will be relevant at
the sentencing stage.
Strict liability and absolute liability distinguished

Key points 6.2
‘Strict liability’ refers to liability despite the absence of any mens rea in relation to one or
more elements of the actus reus of an offence. ‘Absolute liability’ refers to liability despite
the absence of any mens rea in relation to the elements of the actus reus and without the
availability of any defence other than that the defendant is under 10 (the age of criminal
responsibility).
3 (1875) LR 2 CCR 154, CCR.

4 (1869) LR 1 CCR 184, CCR. For another example, see Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong; para 6.14.
5 [1997] 1 WLR 1406, DC. See also Harrison and Francis [1996] 1 Cr App R 138, CA.
6 [1994] 3 All ER 964, CA. 7 [1997] Crim LR 288, CA.
 | 6.5 strict liability
6.5 Strict liability is sometimes spoken of as ‘absolute liability’ and the corresponding
expressions of ‘absolute prohibition’ and ‘absolute offence’ are occasionally used.8 Such
statements involve a confusion between strict liability and absolute liability, a concept
which generally has no part in the criminal law. ‘Absolute liability’ refers to liability des-
pite the absence of any mens rea in relation to the actus reus and without the availability
of any defence such as duress by threats or circumstances, compulsion, automatism or
insanity, other than the fact that D is under 10 (in which case D is irrebuttably presumed
incapable of crime). Absolute liability is a concept which offends any idea of justice. In
an Australian case it has been criticised as a ‘throwback to a highly primitive form of
concept’.9
6.6 The nature of the judicial process means that it is difficult to be certain which
offences, if any, are ones of absolute liability in the proper sense of the term. However,
the wording of a small number of offences would seem to indicate that they are ones of
absolute liability. Certainly, the wording of some so-called ‘status offences’ or ‘situational
offences’, such as those in issue in Larsonneur10 and Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent,11
may lead to such a conclusion.
In Larsonneur, D, an alien who had not got leave to land in the United Kingdom was
deported from Ireland. She was brought to Holyhead in the custody of the Irish police, was
handed over to the police there, and was ‘found’, still in custody, in a cell at Holyhead. She
was convicted of an offence under orders made under the Aliens Restriction Acts, accord-
ing to which it was an offence for an alien, to whom leave to land in the United Kingdom
had been refused, to be found in any place within the United Kingdom.12 D appealed
unsuccessfully against conviction. Normally, someone is not guilty of an offence if the
event is involuntary on his part, but the Court of Criminal Appeal took the view that D
came precisely within the wording of the relevant order and that the circumstances of her
entry and confinement were ‘perfectly immaterial’. This decision has rightly been criticised
as the ‘acme of strict injustice’.13 It is a matter of speculation whether Larsonneur might
not equally have been held guilty if she had been brought to Holyhead unconscious and
been ‘found’ in that state, or had been parachuted from an aeroplane against her will.
In Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent, the Divisional Court adopted the same attitude
as in Larsonneur. D was taken to hospital on a stretcher. The doctor discovered that D
was drunk and D was told to leave. Later, D was seen slumped on a seat in a corridor. The
police were called and they removed him to their car on the highway. D’s conviction of
the offence, under the Licensing Act 1872, s 12, of being found drunk in a highway was
8 For modern examples of such use, see Loukes [1996] 1 Cr App R 444, CA; Roberts and George [1997] RTR
462, CA; M and B [2009] EWCA Crim 2615. Also see Lord Reid’s statement in Sweet v Parsley, para 6.13.
9 Mayer v Marchant (1973) 5 SASR 567 at 585, per Zelling J.
10 (1933) 149 LT 542, CCA. For a defence of this decision on the basis that the case involved the prior fault of
the defendant, since she was the author of her own misfortune, see Lanham ‘Larsonneur Revisited’ [1976] Crim
LR 276. Prior fault was not relied on by the Court of Criminal Appeal as a ground of its decision. For another
defence of Larsonneur see Doegar ‘Strict Liability in Criminal Law and Larsonneur Reassessed’ [1998] Crim
LR 791, but see the persuasive response at [1999] Crim LR 100 by JC Smith. See also the response by Lanham at
[1999] Crim LR 683. 11 (1983) Times, 28 March, DC.
12 Th is offence has since been repealed.
13 Hall General Principles of Criminal Law (2nd edn, 1960) 329, n 14.
6.8 strict liability and the presumption of innocence | 
affirmed by the Divisional Court on the ground that, as the purpose of the offence was to
deal with the nuisance of drunkenness in public, it was enough to establish guilt simply
to prove that D was found drunk in a public place; the fact that the police had procured
the offence was immaterial.
6.7 Apart from rare offences of the type just referred to in para 6.6, the general defences
of the criminal law14 are normally available to a person accused of an offence of strict
liability.15 It is very doubtful, to say the least, whether there are any offences, except those
whose wording is similar to that of the offences in Larsonneur and in Winzar v Chief
Constable of Kent, to which the general defences such as duress by threat or of circum-
stances, compulsion and non-insane automatism16 would not apply.
It had been doubted whether, apart from rare offences of the type just referred to, there
were any offences to which the defence of insanity did not apply. However, in DPP v H17
the Divisional Court held that the defence of insanity could only apply in a case where
mens rea was in issue and therefore that it could not apply to a strict liability offence for
which no mens rea was required. Thus, it held, the defence of insanity was not available
on a charge of driving with excess alcohol, contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 5. For
criticism of this decision, see para 15.39.
Strict liability and the presumption of

innocence
Key points 6.3

Strict liability does not infringe the presumption of innocence under the ECHR,
Article 6(2).
6.8 As explained in Chapter 4,18 the presumption of innocence contained in the ECHR,
Article 6(2) may be contravened where the persuasive burden is imposed on the defendant
to prove the absence of mens rea. On the other hand, Article 6(2) is not contravened where
no mens rea is required as to all or some of the elements of an offence (ie strict liability).
The starting point is Salabiaku v France,19 where the European Court of Human Rights
stated that:
‘[I]n principle the Contracting States remain free to apply the criminal law to an act
where it is not carried out in the normal exercise of one of the rights protected under the
Convention and, accordingly, to define the constituent elements of the resulting offence.
14 See Chs 15 and 16.

15 Eg, the general defences of involuntary conduct and of duress are available on a charge of committing a
strict liability offence: Leicester v Pearson [1952] 2 QB 668, DC (para 15.58 (involuntary conduct)); Eden District
Council v Braid [1999] RTR 329, DC (duress by threats); Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652, CA; Gregory [2011]
EWCA Crim 1712 (duress of circumstances). 16 Paras 15.54–15.66, 16.40–16.62 and 16.70–16.85.
17 [1997] 1 WLR 1406, DC. 18 Para 4.8. 19 (1988) 13 EHRR 379, ECtHR.
 | 6.8 strict liability
In particular, and again in principle, the Contracting States may, under certain conditions,
penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether it results from criminal
intent or from negligence.’ 20
The Court did not specify what those conditions are.

Salabiaku v France has been referred to on a number of occasions by English appellate
courts. They have held that Article 6(2) is restricted to the fairness of the trial in pro-
cedural terms and not with the fairness of the substantive law, with the result that strict
liability does not infringe Article 6(2).
In Barnfather v Islington Education Authority, 21 for example, the Divisional Court
held that the fact that an offence was one of strict liability was not incompatible with
Article 6(2) because Article 6(2) provided a criterion against which only procedural
(including evidential) matters could be tested and not the substantive requirements of
an offence.22
More recently, Salabiaku was referred to in G,23 where the House of Lords unani-
mously held that construing the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 5 (rape of a child under 13)24
as an offence of strict liability did not infringe the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1)
or the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) because Article 6 was not concerned
with the substantive law but with the fairness of the procedure, and strict liability did
not affect procedural fairness. Lord Hope explained the passage from Salabiaku quoted
above as follows:
‘It contains a clear affirmation of the principle that the contracting States are free to apply
the criminal law to any act, so long as it is not one which is carried out in the exercise of
one of the rights protected under the [ECHR]. Accordingly they are free to defi ne the
constituent elements of the offence that results from that act. So when the court said in
the next sentence that the contracting States may “under certain conditions” penalise a
simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether it results from criminal intent
or negligence, it was reaffirming the same principle. As in the previous sentence, the
certain conditions that are referred to indicate that objection could be taken if the offence
was incompatible with other articles of the [ECHR]. But they have no wider signifi-
cance . . . The substantive content of the criminal law does not raise issues of the kind to
which [Article 6] is directed.’25
The European Court of Human Rights rejected in G v UK26 a complaint that construing
an offence under s 5 of the 2003 Act as one of strict liability was incompatible with
the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2). It stated that it was not the Court’s
role under Article 6(1) or (2) to dictate the content of domestic criminal law, including
whether mens rea should be required or whether there should be any particular defence
available to D.
20 Ibid at [27]. 21 [2003] EWHC 418 (Admin).

22 In Muhamad [2002] EWCA Crim 1856, the Court of Appeal, having referred to Salabiaku, held that
offences of strict liability were not in themselves objectionable under the ECHR.
23 [2008] UKHL 37. See also Deyemi and Edwards [2007] EWCA Crim 2060, CA. 24 Para 9.35.
25 [2008] UKHL 37 at [28] and [29]. 26 (2011) 53 EHRR SE25, ECtHR. See also para 9.38.
6.9 strict liability at common law | 
Offences of strict liability
Key points 6.4

There are very few common law offences of strict liability. For the most part it is in statu-
tory offences that strict liability in criminal cases is imposed, normally as the result of the
courts’ interpretation of the particular statute.
Strict liability at common law

6.9 The list of these offences only includes the following.
• Public nuisance Although liability for committing the ancient offence of public nuis-
ance depends on proof of negligence, 27 a person may be vicariously liable for such an
offence committed on his property or on the highway by his employee, even if the
latter was disobeying orders.28 In such a case the employer is said to be strictly liable
because he can be convicted even if he was reasonably unaware of the employee’s
conduct.
A public nuisance is an act not warranted by law, or an omission to discharge a
legal duty, whose effect is to endanger the life, health, property or comfort of the
public, or to obstruct a substantial section of the public in the exercise or enjoyment
of rights common to all members of the public.29 Typical examples are the obstruc-
tion of the highway or the emission of noise or smells from a factory in such a way
as to cause serious inconvenience to the neighbourhood. Many instances of public
nuisance now also constitute statutory offences with limited maximum sentences,
and often with time limitations on prosecutions and defences unavailable on a charge
of public nuisance. In 2005, the House of Lords held that, ordinarily, conduct falling
within a statutory offence and under public nuisance should no longer be prosecuted
as the common law offence of public nuisance.30
• Outraging public decency This offence requires proof of conduct of such a lewd,
obscene or disgusting nature as to result in an outrage to public decency.31 It does
not have to be proved that D intended his conduct to have the effect of outraging
public decency or was reckless as to the risk of this effect (or, indeed, that D had any
type of mens rea as to this).32
• Criminal contempt of court Subject to various limitations, liability for contempt
in relation to publications which interfere with the course of justice in particular
proceedings is strict.33
27 Shorrock [1994] QB 279, CA; approved in Rimmington; Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63.
28 Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702, CCR.
29 Th is defi nition was approved in Rimmington; Goldstein [2005] UKHL 63. 30 Ibid.
31 See further para 14.98. 32 Gibson and Sylveire [1990] 2 QB 619, CA.
33 Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 1.
 | 6.10 strict liability
In its consultation paper Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging
Public Decency,34 the Law Commission:
• has made provisional proposals about public nuisance (see para 3.53) which, if imple-
mented, would abolish vicarious liability for public nuisance; and
• has provisionally proposed that the offence of outraging public decency should
cease to be an offence of strict liability and should require proof that D intended
that his conduct would outrage public decency or was reckless as to the risk of
this.35
Strict liability in statutory offences
Key points 6.5

Strict liability in statutory offences normally results from the courts’ refusal to read into a
provision which does not contain a mens rea term in respect of an element of the actus reus
a requirement that mens rea in relation to it is required.
6.10 Most of the statutory offences of strict liability are ‘regulatory offences’ which arise
under the regulatory legislation controlling such matters as the sale of food and other
types of trading activity, health and safety at work and other public welfare matters,
which are usually investigated and prosecuted by a regulatory authority rather than the
police and the Crown Prosecution Service.36 Similarly, many of the offences in statutes
regulating road traffic have also been held to be of strict liability. Offences of the above
types do not normally involve any inherently immoral conduct. The conduct subject to
them is criminal simply because it is prohibited, and the offences are known as mala
prohibita. People who are convicted of them are not normally regarded as criminals. It
must be emphasised, however, that strict liability can arise even in respect of offences
described as ‘real crimes’, ie crimes dealing with things which are inherently immoral
(mala in se).
6.11 When enacting statutory offences, Parliament often stipulates a requirement of
mens rea as to the elements of the actus reus. However, although it is almost unknown
for a statutory provision expressly to state that mens rea is not required as to such an
34 (2010) Law Com Consultation Paper No 193.

35 The Law Commission has provisionally proposed that, with these amendments, the two offences should
be restated as statutory offences.
36 Research has shown that prosecution for a regulatory offence is usually a weapon of last resort against
persistent offenders against a regulatory offence because the preference of regulatory authorities is to seek com-
pliance by advice and persuasion: Richardson ‘Strict Liability for Regulatory Offences’ [1987] Crim LR 295. See
also para 6.44.
6.13 strict liability in statutory offences | 
element, 37 it has been common for Parliament simply to defi ne the prohibited con-
duct without any reference to the mens rea in relation to an element. Strict liability
in statutory offences normally results from the courts’ refusal to read into a statutory
provision which does not use a word like ‘intentionally’, ‘recklessly’ or ‘knowingly’ in
relation to an element of the actus reus of a particular offence a requirement of mens
rea in relation to it.
6.12 Some statutory offences are made subject by their parent statute to a defence whereby
D is not guilty if he proves that he neither believed, nor suspected, nor had reason to sus-
pect that one or more of the specified elements of the offence existed, or whereby he
proves some other defence of a ‘no fault’ type.38 Where such a defence is provided in
relation to a particular offence, its effect is to make it clear that D can be convicted even
though no mens rea as to the specified element or elements to which the defence applies
is proved by the prosecution.
Presumption that mens rea is required

Key points 6.6
The absence of an express requirement of mens rea does not automatically mean that a
statutory offence is one of strict liability, since it is rebuttably presumed that mens rea is
required.
6.13 In modern times, judicial opinion has grown less favourable to the recognition of
strict liability offences. In particular, the decision of the House of Lords in 1969 in Sweet v
Parsley,39 indicated a significant shift in the judicial approach to statutory offences which
do not clearly require mens rea by categorically reaffirming a principle which had increas-
ingly appeared to be of little importance. This is the principle that, in interpreting a statu-
tory provision which is silent on the point, there is a presumption that mens rea is required,
unless this is rebutted by clear evidence that Parliament intended the contrary. In Sweet v
Parsley the House of Lords held that a person could not be convicted of the offence of ‘being
concerned in the management of premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis’ in
the absence of knowledge of such use, the presumption that mens rea was required not hav-
ing been rebutted. (Parliament subsequently made the requirement of knowledge doubly
sure by inserting the word ‘knowingly’ in the definition of the corresponding offence in
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which replaced the previous provision.)
In a passage regarded as an authoritative and accurate statement of the law, Lord Reid said
this about the interpretation of a statutory provision and whether it required mens rea:
37 A modern example of where this has been done is the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 53A (added by the
Policing and Crime Act 2009, s 14) which provides, in relation to the offence of paying for the sexual services of a
prostitute who has been subjected by a third party to exploitative conduct likely to induce the prostitute to pro-
vide the sexual services, that it is irrelevant whether D is, or ought to be aware, that the third party has engaged
in exploitative conduct.
38 See paras 6.45–6.47. 39 [1970] AC 132, HL.
 | 6.14 strict liability
‘Our first duty is to consider the words of the Act; if they show a clear intention to create
an absolute offence,40 that is the end of the matter. But such cases are very rare. Sometimes
the words of the section which creates a particular offence make it clear that mens rea is
required in one form or another. Such cases are quite frequent. But in a very large number
of cases there is no clear indication either way. In such cases there has for centuries been
a presumption that Parliament did not intend to make criminals of persons who were in
no way blameworthy in what they did. That means that, whenever a section is silent as to
mens rea, there is a presumption that, in order to give effect to the will of Parliament, we
must read in words appropriate to require mens rea . . .
[I]t is firmly established by a host of authorities that mens rea is an essential ingredient
of every offence unless some reason can be found for holding that that is not necessary . . . .
In the absence of a clear indication in the Act that an offence is intended to be an absolute
offence, it is necessary to go outside the Act and examine all relevant circumstances in
order to establish that this must have been the intention of Parliament.’ 41
6.14 The presumption that mens rea is required was again affirmed in 1984 by the Privy
Council in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong,42 although on that occasion it
was found to be rebutted. The defendants were charged with diverging in a material way
from approved building plans, contrary to the Hong Kong Building Ordinance. They
claimed that they were not guilty because they did not know that the divergence from
the plans was a material one. Applying the approach set out in para 6.22 and subsequent
paragraphs, the Privy Council held that, although mens rea was required as to other ele-
ments of the offence, the presumption that mens rea was required was rebutted in relation
to the alleged need to prove knowledge of the materiality of the divergence.
In 2000, in B v DPP,43 the House of Lords, reversing the Divisional Court, expressed
the presumption in terms which gave further strength to it. It held that a person could
not be convicted of an offence under the subsequently repealed Indecency with Children
Act 1960, s 1(1) (gross indecency with or towards a child under 14, or incitement of a child
under 14 to such an act) unless the prosecution proved the absence of a genuine belief on
his part that the child was 14 or over. Section 1(1) did not expressly rule out mens rea as
a constituent element of the offence; it simply made no reference one way or the other to
any mental element in respect of the victim’s age. The House of Lords could not find, in
the statutory context or otherwise, any necessary implication to rebut the presumption
that mens rea was required as to the fact that the victim was under 14.
The strength of the presumption was reaffirmed in 2001 by the House of Lords in K44
in respect of the subsequently repealed offence of indecent assault on a female, contrary
to the Sexual Offences Act 1956, s 14. This section provided that a girl under 16 or a men-
tally defective woman could not consent to the indecency so as to prevent there being an
indecent assault but that D would not be guilty (in the case of a girl under 16) if he rea-
sonably believed that he was married to the girl or (if a woman was a defective) he did not
know or have reason to suspect that she was a defective. Section 14 made no provision
for the case where D was ignorant that a girl was under 16. The House of Lords held that
40 In this context this means a strict liability offence; see para 6.5.
41 [1970] AC 132 at 148–149. 42 [1985] AC 1, PC.
43 [2000] 2 AC 428, HL. 44 [2001] UKHL 41.
6.17 strict liability in statutory offences | 
the words of the section did not exclude by necessary implication the presumption that
mens rea was required as to the girl’s age. Lord Steyn stated that the applicability of the
presumption was not dependent on finding an ambiguity in the text; the presumption
operated to supplement the text.45
6.15 The first paragraph of the quotation from Lord Reid’s speech in Sweet v Parsley, set
out in para 6.13, was considered by Lord Bingham in DPP v Collins.46 In that case, the
House of Lords was concerned with the offence under the Communications Act 2003, s
127(1)(a), which provides that a person is guilty of any offence if he ‘sends by means of a
public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly of-
fensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character’. Lord Bingham, with whom the
other Law Lords agreed, held that the above first paragraph was relevant to the offence
before the House, because Parliament could not have intended to criminalise the conduct
of a person using language which was, for reasons unknown to him, grossly offensive to
those to whom it related or which was thought by that person, however unreasonably, to
represent a polite or acceptable usage. Lord Bingham therefore concluded, as part of his
reasons for determining the appeal, that, in addition to an intention to send the message
in question, D must intend his words to be grossly offensive to those to whom they relate,
or be aware that they may be taken to be so.
What is the mens rea that is presumed to be required?

6.16 Where a mens rea requirement is read in under the presumption that mens rea is
required, it will be a subjective mental element of some kind, eg intention or reckless-
ness as to a consequence-element or knowledge or recklessness as to a circumstance-
element.47 It should not be read in that negligence is sufficient.48
Does Parliament really have an intention in respect of mens rea?

6.17 The presumption that mens rea is required is one of the rules of statutory inter-
pretation, rules whose purpose is rather inaccurately said to be to discover Parliament’s
intention. In K, Lord Millett, in holding that the presumption that mens rea is required
was not rebutted, stated that he did so ‘without reluctance but with some misgiving, for I
have little doubt that we shall be failing to give effect to the intention of Parliament’.49 In
truth, the presumption that Parliament intended mens rea to be required is a somewhat
artificial rule. Devlin J (as he then was) wrote in respect of strict liability:
‘The fact is that Parliament has no intention whatever of troubling itself about mens rea.
If it had, the thing would have been settled long ago. All that Parliament would have to
do would be to use express words that left no room for implication. One is driven to the
conclusion that the reason why Parliament has never done that is that it prefers to leave
the point to the judges and does not want to legislate about it.’50
45 [2001] UKHL 41 at [32]. 46 [2006] UKHL 40. 47 Ch 3.

48 Gray’s Haulage Co Ltd v Arnold Ltd [1966] 1 All ER 896, DC (para 3.58); B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428, HL (see
para 5.13). 49 [2001] UKHL 41 at [41].
50 Samples of Lawmaking (1962) 71.
 | 6.18 strict liability
Attention paid to the presumption by the courts

6.18 Despite what was said by the House of Lords in Sweet v Parsley, by the Privy Council
in Gammon and by the House of Lords in B v DPP and in K, it would be wrong to leave
the reader with the impression that there has been a massive reduction in recent years
in the number of occasions on which the courts have held that an offence is one of strict
liability. Sweet v Parsley was concerned with a drugs offence, and, as B v DPP and K
indicate, the shift of approach has clearly been maintained in relation to the more serious
types of offence. In Phekoo,51 for instance, the Court of Appeal held that the offence of
harassment of a residential occupier (contrary to the Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s
1(3)) was not one of strict liability as to the fact that the person harassed was a residential
occupier, and in Sheppard52 the House of Lords, overruling well-established decisions to
the opposite effect, held that the offence of wilful neglect of a child in a manner likely to
cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health was not one of strict liability as to the
risk of suffering or injury to health.
However, as far as regulatory offences are concerned, the change of attitude towards
strict liability revealed in Sweet v Parsley has had less effect. On a considerable number of
subsequent occasions in the 40 years after Sweet v Parsley, appellate courts, including the
House of Lords in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward53 and Wings Ltd v Ellis, 54 have paid little or
no regard to the weight of the presumption that mens rea is required in holding that, on
the true interpretation of a statutory offence, Parliament intended to rule out the need for
mens rea in relation to an element of its actus reus.
6.19 Despite the fact that the suggestion in the decision in Sweet v Parsley that any further
expansion of strict liability would be closely scrutinised and confined within narrow lim-
its has not wholly borne fruit, it nevertheless remains true that the general approach
reaffirmed in Sweet v Parsley, and equally emphatically in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v
A-G of Hong Kong, and given even greater force in B v DPP and K, remains the correct
approach to the interpretation of whether a statutory provision imposes strict liability.
6.20 B v DPP and K raised hopes that the courts would review decisions imposing strict
liability and would also give greater weight to the presumption.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Muhamad55 one year after K does not excite opti-
mism in the latter respect in relation to offences which might be regarded as regulatory.
D, charged with materially contributing to his insolvency by gambling, contrary to the
Insolvency Act 1986, s 362(1) (since repealed), argued that the offence required mens
rea, viz that he knew or was reckless as to whether his act of gambling would materially
contribute to his insolvency. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument; the offence
was one of strict liability in this respect. The Court doubted that the offence was truly
criminal (despite the maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment), and it held that
51 [1981] 3 All ER 84, CA. The terms of the offence were amended by the Housing Act 1988, s 29.
52 [1981] AC 394, HL. 53 [1972] AC 824, HL; para 6.36.
54 [1985] AC 272, HL. The House of Lords held that the offence under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968,
s 14(1)(a) (since repealed), whereby a person committed an offence if he made a statement ‘which he knows to be
false’, was an offence of strict liability as to the making of the statement (but not as to its falsity).
55 [2002] EWCA Crim 1856.
6.21 strict liability in statutory offences | 
the language of the statute (other offences in the statute specifically requiring mens rea
generally carried a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment), the maximum sentence and
social concern provided support for the rebuttal of the presumption. In addition, making
the offence one of strict liability would promote the objects of the statute by encouraging
greater vigilance to prevent gambling which would or might contribute to insolvency.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Matudi56 soon afterwards is to like effect. On a charge of
importing animal products without border inspection, contrary to the Products of Animal
Origin (Import and Export) Regulations 1996, reg 21 (since revoked), D’s defence was that
he had no idea that the items contained meat (ie animal products) because they were only
supposed to contain vegetables. The Court of Appeal held that it was compellingly clear
that Parliament had not intended mens rea to be a requirement of an offence under reg 21.
The wording of reg 21 itself gave no indication of whether it required mens rea or created a
strict liability offence, whereas the wording of other offences in the Regulations expressly
made a requirement of knowledge. Moreover, the unmonitored importation of animal
products was of public concern as it created significant dangers to public and animal
health, which could also have serious economic consequences. The greater the social risk,
the more likely that the court would infer an intention to create a strict liability offence.
The imposition of strict liability, the Court of Appeal added, was effective in promoting
the objectives of the legislation as it deterred importers from bypassing the provisions of
the Regulations and encouraged the use of reputable suppliers.
6.21 Muhamad and Matudi were both cases where the statutory provisions in question
had not been the subject of an authoritative interpretation. In Deyemi and Edwards, 57
decided in 2007, the Court of Appeal regarded itself as unable to review, in the light of
the emphatic statements in B v DPP and K, the interpretation of a provision which had
already been interpreted in a decision binding on the court. In Deyemi and Edwards, D1
and D2 had pleaded guilty to the possession of a prohibited weapon (a stun gun), con-
trary to the Firearms Act 1968, s 5, after the judge had ruled that the offence was one of
strict liability. They did not know that the article was a stun gun and were each given
a conditional discharge. Their appeals against conviction were rejected by the Court
of Appeal. The Court recognised the importance of B v DPP and K but held that it was
bound by its decision in 1990 in Bradish 58 that the offence under s 5 was one of strict
liability as to the nature of the thing possessed. It stated that its conclusion as to the
binding effect of Bradish meant, at least for the Court of Appeal, that the decisions in B
v DPP and K did not assist. The Court went on to say: ‘Each of [those decisions] is con-
cerned with the proper meaning to be attributed to the statutory provisions in question;
the statutory provisions with which we are concerned have been construed by decisions
binding on us.’ 59 Thus, unless an existing interpretation of an offence is not binding on
the court under the rules of precedent, the effect of B v DPP and K is limited to provi-
sions which have not yet been interpreted by an appellate court. Hopes that B v DPP and
K would lead to a review by the courts of decisions imposing strict liability have there-
fore been dashed.
56 [2003] EWCA Crim 697. 57 [2007] EWCA Crim 2060.

58 [1990] 1 QB 981, CA. Also applied in Zahid [2010] EWCA Crim 2158.
59 [2007] EWCA Crim 2060 at [25].
 | 6.22 strict liability
Rebutting the presumption

Key points 6.7
The presumption that mens rea is required can be rebutted by clear words in the statute
or by necessary implication.
6.22 In Sweet v Parsley the House of Lords held that clear evidence to the contrary was
required before the presumption that mens rea was required could be rebutted. Further
guidance was given in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong where Lord
Scarman, giving the opinion of the Privy Council, said:
‘In their Lordships’ opinion, the law relevant to this appeal may be stated in the follow-
ing propositions . . . (1) there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a
person can be held guilty of a criminal offence; (2) the presumption is particularly strong
where the offence is “truly criminal” in character; (3) the presumption applies to statutory
offences, and can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect
of the statute; (4) the only situation in which the presumption can be displaced is where
the statute is concerned with an issue of social concern; public safety is such an issue; (5)
even where a statute is concerned with such an issue, the presumption of mens rea stands
unless it can also be shown that the creation of strict liability will be effective to promote
the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the commission of
the prohibited act.’ 60
6.23 The requirement that the presumption can only be rebutted by clear words (ie express
provision) or ‘necessary implication’ was emphasised and strengthened by the House of
Lords in B v DPP.61 As Lord Hutton (with whom Lords Mackay and Steyn agreed) stated,
‘the test is not whether it is a reasonable implication that the statute rules out mens rea as
a constituent part of the crime – the test is whether it is a necessary implication’.62 Lord
Nicholls (with whom Lords Irvine and Mackay agreed) took an equally tough approach
in giving the leading speech: ‘ “Necessary implication” connotes an implication which is
compellingly clear.’ 63 Lord Steyn regarded the presumption that mens rea is required,
unless Parliament has expressly or by necessary implication indicated the contrary,
as a constitutional principle. He quoted with approval Lord Hoffmann’s statement in
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms:
‘But the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is
doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general
or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full implications of
their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the
absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore
60 [1985] AC 1 at 14. Th is was applied, eg, in Wings Ltd v Ellis [1985] AC 272, HL; Wells Street Metropolitan
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Westminster City Council [1986] 3 All ER 4, DC; Blake [1997] 1 All ER 963, CA.
61 [2000] 2 AC 428, HL. 62 Ibid at 481. 63 Ibid at 464.
6.26 strict liability in statutory offences | 
presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights
of the individual.’64
Lord Steyn then said: ‘In other words, in the absence of express words or a truly necessary
implication, Parliament must be presumed to legislate on the assumption that the prin-
ciple of legality will supplement the text.’ 65 If the presumption of mens rea is regarded as
a constitutional principle its rebuttal will be made even more difficult.
Lord Steyn’s statement about ‘a constitutional principle’ were echoed by the Court of
Appeal in 2009 in M and B. The Court stated:
‘The default position is that, despite the absence of any express language, there is a pre-
sumption, founded in constitutional principle, that mens rea is an essential ingredient of
the offence. Only a compelling case for implying the exclusion of such an ingredient as a
matter of necessity will suffice.’ 66
6.24 From B v DPP and K67 the Court of Appeal in Kumar concluded:
‘[F]irstly that in all statutory offences whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a
presumption that the mental element is an essential ingredient of the offence. Secondly,
in the absence of express statutory provision the presumption of the mental element
can only be excluded if the necessary implication is “compellingly clear”, “truly neces-
sary” and free from ambiguity. Further, the presumption must not involve an internal
inconsistency.’ 68
6.25 In deciding whether the effect of the statutory provision is ‘by necessary implica-
tion’ to rebut the presumption that mens rea is required in respect of the elements of the
offence, the court can look at the words of the statute and various extrinsic factors (such
as the nature of the offence and the mischief sought to be prevented) and must consider
whether strict liability would promote the object of the provision.69
6.26 Lord Scarman’s fourth proposition in Gammon, that the presumption can only be
displaced where the statute is concerned with an issue of social concern (public safety in
that case), is of little significance. It is hard to think of many statutes containing criminal
offences which are not concerned with such an issue. Subsequent cases indicate that the
courts have not spent much time considering the matter, and have held, for instance, that
Acts relating to town and country planning,70 broadcasting71 and the National Lottery72
64 [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131. 65 [2000] 2 AC 428 at 470.

66 [2009] EWCA Crim 2615 at [23]. 67 Para 6.14.
68 [2004] EWCA Crim 3207 at [25].
69 Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 163, per Lord Diplock; Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong
[1985] AC 1, PC; Wings Ltd v Ellis [1985] AC 272, HL.
70 Wells Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Westminster City Council [1986] 3 All ER 4, DC.
71 Blake [1997] 1 All ER 963, CA.
72 Harrow London Borough Council v Shah [1999] 3 All ER 302, DC.
 | 6.27 strict liability
dealt with issues of social concern. There are, of course, many offences in statutes dealing
with matters of social concern which are not strict liability: rape and theft are obvious
examples.
Lord Scarman’s last proposition in Gammon (presumption that mens rea required not
rebutted unless strict liability would aid enforcement of the law) is also, generally, easily
satisfied, as shown in para 6.41.
It is unfortunate that courts, having found Lord Scarman’s fourth and last proposi-
tions satisfied, have often given too much weight to them in finding the presumption of
mens rea rebutted;73 satisfaction of these requirements only means that an offence may be
one of strict liability, not that it must be.
Words of the statute

6.27 Certain words which commonly appear in statutory offences have been considered
by appellate courts on a sufficient number of occasions as to indicate whether they are
likely to be held to support or rebut the presumption that mens rea is required in a par-
ticular offence. Examples of such words are as follows:
‘Permitting’ or ‘suffering’
6.28 There is a substantial number of statutory offences of ‘permitting’ or ‘suffering’
(which terms have been held to be synonymous).74
‘Permit’ has been held by the House of Lords in Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttall75 to be
capable of having at least two types of meaning, a narrow meaning, ‘allow’, ‘agree to’ or
‘authorise’, and a wider one, ‘fail to take reasonable steps to prevent’, its meaning in any
particular offence depending on its context. No guidance was given as to how a court is
to approach the question of context.
It has been stated by a Divisional Court that ‘It is of the very essence of the offence of
permitting someone to do something that there should be knowledge.’76 Consistent with
this, it has been held, for example, on a charge of committing the statutory offence of per-
mitting a motor vehicle to be used in breach of the Construction and Use Regulations or
of permitting an employee to drive in excess of lawful hours, that liability depended on
proof that the defendant knew about the contravention in question.77
The courts have not always taken the same approach. It has been held that the statu-
tory offences of permitting another to use a motor vehicle on a road without insurance,
or permitting another to drive on a road without a driving licence, are strict liability
73 See, eg, Blake [1997] 1 All ER 963, CA.

74 Somerset v Wade [1894] 1 QB 574, DC; Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814, DC.
75 [1999] 3 All ER 833, HL.
76 Gray’s Haulage Co Ltd v Arnold Ltd [1966] 1 All ER 896 at 898, per Lord Parker CJ with whom the other
judge, Winn LJ, entirely agreed. As in other contexts, knowledge in this context includes wilful blindness: Gray’s
Haulage Co Ltd v Arnold Ltd [1966] 1 All ER 896 at 898, per Lord Parker CJ. Also see James & Son Ltd v Smee
[1955] 1 QB 78, DC; Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttall [1999] 3 All ER 833 at 840, per Lord Steyn.
77 James & Son Ltd v Smee above; Gray’s Haulage Co Ltd v Arnold Ltd above.
6.29 strict liability in statutory offences | 
offences in respect of the uninsured use or lack of a licence.78 Likewise, it has been held
that the statutory offence of permitting an animal to be carried so as to be likely to cause
unnecessary suffering is one of strict liability as to this risk.79 These cases are, how-
ever, isolated exceptions to a general rule that ‘permit’ or ‘suffer’ are to be interpreted
as requiring mens rea. In Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttall80 the House of Lords (or at least
a majority of it) held that, on a charge of the statutory offence of permitting a driver
to contravene rules restricting driving hours, ‘knowledge’ is required, so that at the
very least recklessness in the sense of not caring whether a contravention occurred is
necessary.81
‘Wilfully’
6.29 The appearance of the adverb ‘wilfully’ in a statutory offence might be thought
clearly to indicate a requirement of mens rea as to all the elements of its actus reus, but
the courts have not always been willing to accept such an indication. 82 Some cases have
appeared to hold that ‘wilfully’ requires no more than proof of a voluntary act, in which
case it added nothing to the general principle that such an act is required. In Cotterill v
Penn,83 for example, the Divisional Court held that the offence of unlawfully and wilfully
killing a house pigeon, contrary to the Larceny Act 1861, s 23 (since repealed), merely
required that D should intend to do the act forbidden, which was that of shooting at the
bird in that case, and did not also require that D should realise that what he was shooting
at was a house pigeon, so that a belief that it was a wild pigeon was immaterial. 84 In other
cases the approach has been to interpret ‘wilfully’ so as to require mens rea as to all the
elements of the actus reus.85
A particularly important decision is that of the House of Lords in 1980 in Sheppard 86
which was concerned with the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 1. Th is makes it
an offence where someone having the responsibility for a child or young person under
16 ‘wilfully assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons or exposes him . . . in a manner likely
to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to health’. By a majority of three to two, the
House of Lords, overruling previous decisions to the contrary, held that in the offence
of wilfully neglecting under s 1 there was an element of mens rea as to the risk of caus-
ing unnecessary suffering or injury to health. Dealing with the case, where the charge
involved failure to provide adequate medical aid, it held that the requirement of wilful-
ness could be satisfied (a) where D was aware the child’s health might be at risk if it was
78 Lyons v May [1948] 2 All ER 1062, DC.

79 Cheshire County Council v Alan Helliwell & Sons (Bolton) Ltd (1991) 155 JP 425, DC; Greener v DPP (1996)
160 JP 265, DC.
80 [1999] 3 All ER 833, HL. ‘Permit’ was held to bear the wider meaning referred to above.
81 The speeches in Vehicle Inspectorate v Nuttall are not noteworthy for their clarity but the Divisional Court
in Yorkshire Traction Co Ltd v Vehicle Inspectorate [2001] RTR 518, DC subsequently confirmed that the offence
in question in Nuttall was not one of strict liability and required ‘knowledge’.
82 Andrews ‘Wilfulness: A Lesson in Ambiguity’ (1981) 1 LS 303. 83 [1936] 1 KB 53, DC.
84 For further examples see Arrowsmith v Jenkins [1963] 2 QB 561, DC; Maidstone Borough Council v
Mortimer [1980] 3 All ER 552, DC; Millward [1985] QB 519, CA.
85 See, eg, Eaton v Cobb [1950] 1 All ER 1016, DC; Bullock v Turnbull [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 303, DC; Gittins
[1982] RTR 363, CA; Hills and Ellis [1983] QB 680, DC (para 7.71). 86 [1981] AC 394, HL.
 | 6.30 strict liability
not provided with medical aid, or (b) where D was unaware of this risk because he did
not care whether the child’s health was at risk or not. Part (b) seemed to suggest that it
referred to objective (ie Caldwell)87 recklessness, but in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) 88
the Court of Appeal held that the approach to recklessness in G 89 could be incorpo-
rated into a direction on wilfulness under the test in Sheppard. The Court held that
there was no material difference between the two cases; the alternative test in Sheppard
(unawareness due to not caring) was, like the fi rst, one of subjective recklessness as in
G. In the light of Sheppard and A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2003), cases which have appar-
ently held that ‘wilfully’ simply requires a voluntary act in the context of particular
statutory offences are unlikely to be followed.
‘Cause’
6.30 Some statutory offences are framed in terms of causing some event to happen or of
causing someone to do something.
Where a statutory offence is defined simply in terms of causing some event to hap-
pen, the courts have traditionally been very likely to interpret it as an offence of strict
liability as to the occurrence of that thing. An example is provided by Alphacell Ltd v
Woodward,90 whose facts are set out in para 6.36. On the other hand, where the offence is
defined in terms of causing someone else to do something, ‘cause’91 has been interpreted
as requiring mens rea as to the thing being done.92
Wording of other offences in statute

6.31 Another way in which the wording of the statute can be important is that the
appearance in the definition of other offences in the statute (or, indeed, in another statute
to which it may be regarded as an appendix),93 but not in the definition of the offence in
question, of words such as ‘knowingly’ has the potential to lead or contribute to a find-
ing that mens rea is not required in relation to an element or elements of the offence in
question. This is a significant point because it is common for different provisions, or even
different offences in the same provision, to be expressed in a way which expressly requires
full mens rea for one but not for another.
87 Para 3.35. 88 [2004] EWCA Crim 868. 89 [2003] UKHL 50 (para 3.33).
90 [1972] AC 824, HL. See also Price v Cromack [1975] 2 All ER 113, DC and Loukes [1996] 1 Cr App R 444,
CA (para 8.159).
91 D ‘causes’ someone else to do something if it is done on the actual authority, express or implied, of D or
in consequence of D exerting some influence on the acts of the other person: A-G of Hong Kong v Tse Hung-Lit
[1986] AC 876, PC.
92 Lovelace v DPP [1954] 3 All ER 481, DC; Ross Hillman Ltd v Bond [1974] QB 435, DC; A-G of Hong Kong v
Tse Hung-Lit [1986] AC 876, PC. Contrast Sopp v Long [1970] 1 QB 518, DC.
93 In B v DPP [2000] 2 AC 428, the House of Lords, in considering whether the offence of inciting a child
to commit an act of gross indecency, contrary to the Indecency with Children Act 1960 (since repealed by the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003)), which did not contain a word such as ‘knowingly’, was an offence of strict
liability, considered the wording of other sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (repealed by SOA
2003). However, it concluded that a comparison of the wording of the offences did not give rise to a necessary
implication that the presumption of mens rea was rebutted in respect of the 1960 Act.
6.33 strict liability in statutory offences | 
6.32 A famous case in the present context is Cundy v Le Cocq,94 which concerned the
offence under the Licensing Act 1872, s 13 (since repealed) of sale by a publican of liquor
to a drunken person. It was held that the defendant licensee’s belief, even if founded on
reasonable grounds, in the sobriety of his customer was no defence. Th is conclusion was
reached in the light of the general scope of the Act, which was for the repression of drunk-
enness, and of a comparison of the various sections in the relevant part of the Act, some
of which, unlike the section in question, contained the word ‘knowingly’.
The same conclusion as in Cundy v Le Cocq was reached by the House of Lords in
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain Ltd,95 which was concerned with the
offence of supplying specified medicinal products except in accordance with a prescrip-
tion by an appropriate practitioner, contrary to the Medicines Act 1968, s 58(2)(a). The
House of Lords relied principally on the fact that other offence-creating provisions in
the Act expressly required mens rea in holding that the presumption that mens rea was
required was rebutted in relation to s 58(2)(a), which did not make such express provi-
sion. Consequently, it upheld convictions under s 58(2)(a) of retail pharmacists who had
supplied drugs after being given forged prescriptions which they believed to be genuine.
The above cases were decided before B v DPP and K.96 More recently, the presumption
that a criminal statute requires mens rea was held by the Court of Appeal in 2006 in G97 to
be rebutted by necessary implication in respect of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 5 (rape
of a child under 13)98 in relation to the child’s age. The Court of Appeal held that:
‘Such an implication arises in respect of s 5 . . . from the contrast between the express refer-
ences to reasonable belief that a child is 16 or over in, for instance, s 9, and the absence of
any such reference in relation to children under 13. Thus, on its actual meaning, s 5 creates
an offence even if the defendant reasonably believes that the child was 13 or over.’99
This issue was not argued when the case was unsuccessfully appealed to the House of
Lords but the speeches in the House confirmed that the offence was one of strict liability
as to the age of the child.100
6.33 By way of comparison, reference may be made to Sherras v De Rutzen,101 where
D, a licensee, had supplied liquor to a police officer who was on duty, contrary to the
Licensing Act 1872, s 16(2) (since repealed). D reasonably believed that the officer was off
duty because he had removed his armlet which at that time, to D’s knowledge, was worn
by police officers in the locality when on duty. D was convicted by the magistrates but
his conviction was quashed on appeal, the Divisional Court holding that D could not be
convicted if he did not know that the police officer was on duty, even though the defin-
ition in s 16(1) of another offence contained the word ‘knowingly’ and s 16(2) did not. One
of the two judges, Day J, thought that the only effect of the presence of ‘knowingly’ in s
94 (1884) 13 QBD 207, DC.

95 [1986] 2 All ER 635, HL; see Jackson ‘Storkwain: A Case Study in Strict Liability and Self-regulation’ [1991]
Crim LR 892.
96 Paras 6.14 and 6.23. 97 [2006] EWCA Crim 821. See also Unah [2011] EWCA Crim 1837.
98 Para 9.35. 99 [2006] EWCA Crim 821 at [17].
100 [2008] UKHL 37. 101 [1895] 1 QB 918, DC.
 | 6.34 strict liability
16(1) and its absence in s 16(2) was to shift the burden of proof (in s16(2)) on the issue of
knowledge to D (ie D had to prove that he did not know). Day J’s approach has, however,
not been generally adopted.
The approach taken by the Divisional Court in Sherras v De Rutzen was taken in
modern times by the Court of Appeal in Berry (No 3)102 which was concerned with the
Explosive Substances Act 1883, s 4(1). Section 4(1) provides that any person who ‘makes or
knowingly has in his possession or under his control’ any explosive substance (including
any apparatus or part of an apparatus for causing an explosion) commits an offence pun-
ishable with up to 14 years’ imprisonment. The Court held that, although ‘knowingly’
only qualified the second and third categories of offence (possessing or controlling), the
first category (making) must be interpreted as requiring proof by the prosecution that an
alleged ‘maker’ acted with knowledge that the substance was an explosive substance.
The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in M and B103 indicates that it will now be
exceptional for the appearance of a word like ‘knowingly’ in other offences in the statute,
but not in the definition of the offence in question, alone to influence a court to find that
the presumption that mens rea is required is rebutted. In that case, the issue arose as to
whether the offence of bringing a prohibited article into a prison, contrary to the Prison
Act 1952, s 40C(1)(a), was one of strict liability or required proof of mens rea. The Court
held that s 40C(1)(a) required mens rea, despite the fact that some other offences in the
Act, including other parts of s 40C(1), expressly required mens rea but s 40C(1)(a) did not.
The Court stated:
‘[T]he absence of express language, even in the presence of express language elsewhere in
the statute, is not enough to rebut the presumption unless the circumstances as a whole
compel such a conclusion.’104
Lord Reid took an even stricter approach in Sweet v Parsley:
‘It is also firmly established that the fact that other sections of the Act expressly require
mens rea, for example because they contain the word “knowingly”, is not in itself suffi-
cient to justify a decision that a section which is silent as to mens rea creates an absolute
offence.’105
As G, in particular, indicates, this would seem to go further than the present case law
allows.
6.34 There is a further qualification to the approach taken in cases like Cundy v Le Cocq,
Storkwain and G. According to Lord Steyn in B v DPP,106 the argument that comparisons
or contrasts can be drawn between different provisions in a statute (or between a parent
102 [1994] 2 All ER 913, CA. 103 [2009] EWCA Crim 2615. 104 Ibid at [23].
105 [1970] AC 132 at 149. More recently the point was made by the Court of Appeal in Muhamad [2002]
EWCA Crim 1856 at [18].
106 [2000] 2 AC 428 at 473. Also see Lords Nicholls and Hutton [2000] 2 AC 428 at 465 and 481 for a similar
approach. Lord Bingham echoed this approach in K [2001] UKHL 41 at [4].
6.36 strict liability in statutory offences | 
statute and a statute to which it is an appendix) is considerably weakened where the

statute contains a motley of offences of diverse origins, gathered together by the statute
with little or no change in their phraseology and with no clear or coherent pattern or
consistent theme.
Extrinsic factors
6.35 Where no clear indication as to the need for mens rea or otherwise is given by
the words of the statute, the courts can go outside the Act and examine all the relevant
circumstances to determine whether, by necessary implication, Parliament intended to
displace the need for mens rea. In K, Lord Steyn stated that the presumption ‘can only
be displaced by specific language, ie an express provision or a necessary implication
[from that language]’.107 However, his fellow Law Lords did not comment on this and,
as reference to Muhamad and to Matudi in para 6.20 shows, extrinsic factors are not
yet excluded from being taken into account. Some of these factors are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
The subject matter of the enactment

6.36 An offence is more likely to be construed as one of strict liability if it falls within the
three classes enumerated by Wright J in Sherras v De Rutzen:108
‘Apart from isolated and extreme cases [such as Prince], the principal classes of exceptions
[to the general rule that mens rea is required] may perhaps be reduced to three. One is a class
of acts which . . . are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest
are prohibited under a penalty. Several such instances are to be found in the decisions on
the Revenue Statutes, eg A-G v Lockwood,109 where the innocent possession of liquorice by
a beer retailer was held to be an offence. So under the Adulteration Acts, Woodrow110 as to
innocent possession of adulterated tobacco; Fitzpatrick v Kelly111 and Roberts v Egerton112 as
to the sale of adulterated food . . . to the same head may be referred Bishop113 where a person
was held rightly convicted of receiving lunatics in an unlicensed house, although the jury
found that he honestly and on reasonable grounds believed that they were not lunatics.
Another class comprehends some, and perhaps all, public nuisances114 . . . Lastly, there may
be cases in which, although the proceeding is criminal in form, it is really only a summary
mode of enforcing a civil right: see per Williams and Willes JJ in Morden v Porter, r 115 as to
unintentional trespass in pursuit of game . . . But except in such cases as these, there must
in general be guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant . . . ’
This dictum was referred to by the House of Lords in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward,116 where
the defendant company, whose settling tanks overflowed into a river, was held to have
107 [2001] UKHL 41 at [32]. Italics supplied. 108 [1895] 1 QB 918 at 921.
109 (1842) 9 M & W 378. 110 (1846) 15 M & W 404. 111 (1873) LR 8 QB 337.
112 (1874) LR 9 QB 494. 113 (1880) 5 QBD 259.
114 Th is refers to statutory offences in the nature of a public nuisance. 115 (1860) 7 CBNS 641.
116 [1972] AC 824, HL.
 | 6.37 strict liability
been rightly convicted of causing polluted matter to enter a river contrary to the Rivers
(Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951, s 2 (since repealed), despite the fact that there was
no evidence that it knew that pollution was taking place from its settling tanks or had
been in any way negligent. In construing the offence as one of strict liability, Viscount
Dilhorne and Lord Salmon regarded the statute as dealing with acts falling within the
first class, ie acts which ‘are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public
interest are prohibited under a penalty’, while Lord Pearson thought that the offence fell
within the second class enumerated, saying ‘mens rea is generally not a necessary ingre-
dient in an offence of this kind, which is in the nature of a public nuisance’.117
6.37 The first of Wright J’s three classes is particularly important since it covers many
statutes regulating particular activities involving potential danger to public health or
safety which a person may choose to undertake, such as those relating to the sale of food,
pollution, dangerous substances and the condition and use of vehicles. The fact that an
offence is not truly criminal (ie falls within the category of mala prohibita, and not mala
in se) has often been given by a court as a reason (or one of the reasons) for concluding
that it is one of strict liability.118 In contrast, as Lord Scarman said in Gammon,119 the
presumption of mens rea is particularly strong where the offence is ‘truly criminal’ in
character.
This prompts one to ask what the criteria of ‘true criminality’ are. The courts have
yet to supply an answer. Indeed, they do not appear to share a consistent approach. In
modern cases, in which the offences in question were punishable with a maximum of
two years’ imprisonment, the Court of Appeal said in one case that because the offence
was imprisonable it was ‘truly criminal’ in character,120 while in another the Divisional
Court said that the offence was ‘not truly criminal’ despite the severity of the maximum
punishment.121 In a third case, the Court of Appeal doubted that an offence punishable
with two years’ imprisonment was ‘truly criminal’.122 More recently, however, the Court
of Appeal in M and B,123 holding that the offences of bringing a prohibited article (List A
and List B articles respectively) into a prison, under the Prison Act 1952, ss 40B(1)(a) and
40C(1)(a), which carry maximum punishments of 10 and two years respectively were not
ones of strict liability, stated that:
‘[T]he offences with which ss 40A [an interpretation section], B and C are concerned have
nothing in common with the typical health and safety provisions which may be matters of
absolute liability124 in the context of the regulation of business activities. It therefore mat-
ters not that it could be argued that absolute liability might be an extra spur to vigilance
on the part of prison visitors. It seems to us to be impossible to argue that the bringing or
throwing into prison of a List A article (controlled drugs, explosives, firearms etc) with
the statute’s potential ten year penalty is not truly criminal. If that is so in relation to s
40B(1)(a), the same must be so also in relation to the identical language in s 40C(1)(a).’125
117 [1972] AC 824 at 842.

118 See, eg, Chilvers v Rayner [1984] 1 All ER 843 at 847, per Robert Goff LJ. 119 Para 6.22.
120 Blake [1997] 1 All ER 963 at 968; para 6.41.
121 Harrow London Borough Council v Shah [1999] 3 All ER 302 at 306.
122 Muhamad [2002] EWCA Crim 1856; para 6.20. 123 [2009] EWCA Crim 2615.
124 Ie strict liability, and not absolute liability in its true sense. 125 [2009] EWCA Crim 2615 at [31].
6.38 strict liability in statutory offences | 
The seriousness of the offence

6.38 Quite apart from the relevance of offence-seriousness to the issue of ‘true crimin-
ality’, the seriousness of an offence can operate as a separate factor. Offence-seriousness is
of particular importance where an offence is not regarded as truly criminal.
In B v DPP,126 Lord Nicholls stated:
‘The more serious the offence, the greater is the weight to be attached to the presumption
[that mens rea is required], because the more severe is the punishment and the graver the
stigma which accompany a conviction.’
The offence in B v DPP was punishable with 10 years’ imprisonment, and a conviction
for it carried an undoubted stigma. These factors reinforced, rather than negatived, the
application of the presumption in that case.
On occasions, however, the courts have construed offences carrying a lengthy max-
imum term of imprisonment as not requiring mens rea. In Warner v Comr of Metropolitan
Police127 a pre-Sweet v Parsley case, the offence of unauthorised possession of drugs was
held not to require proof that D knew that what he was in possession of was a drug, des-
pite the fact that the offence in question was punishable with a maximum of two years’
imprisonment, and could, if the drug had been of a different type, have been punished
with a maximum of 10 years. (The law on this subject has been changed since Warner.)128
Similarly, in the post-Sweet v Parsley (but pre-B v DPP) cases involving the offences of
possessing a firearm without a certificate (Howells),129 of possessing a prohibited weapon
(Bradish),130 and of having a loaded firearm in a public place (Harrison and Francis),131
the offences were held to be ones of strict liability as to their circumstances that the article
possessed was respectively a firearm, a prohibited weapon, or a loaded shotgun (or, indeed,
a firearm at all), although the maximum punishment on conviction on indictment for
these offences was respectively three (or in some cases five)132 years’ imprisonment, five
years133 and seven years. In Gammon v A-G of Hong Kong,134 the maximum imprison-
ment was three years, and in Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Storkwain Ltd135
it was two years. Both cases were decided after Sweet v Parsley but before B v DPP. Since
the decisions in B v DPP and K, the Court of Appeal in Muhamad 136 has held that the
offence of materially contributing to one’s insolvency by gambling was ‘not a particularly
serious’ offence, and was one of strict liability, despite the fact that it is punishable with
two years’ imprisonment.
126 [2000] 2 AC 428 at 464. The seriousness of the offence is one way in which an offence can be said to be of
‘truly criminal’ character. Also see Lord Steyn ibid at 472, and Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 149 and 156, per
Lords Reid and Pearce. Contrast para 6.37, nn 120–122.
127 [1969] 2 AC 256, HL. 128 Para 6.46.
129 [1977] QB 614, CA. See also Hussain [1981] 2 All ER 287, CA.
130 [1990] 1 QB 981, CA.
131 [1996] 1 Cr App R 138, CA.
132 Now five years or – in some cases – seven.
133 Now 10 years. 134 Para 6.14. 135 Para 6.32. 136 Para 6.20.
 | 6.39 strict liability
The mischief of the crime

6.39 Where an offence is aimed at the prevention of some particularly serious social
danger, such as to public health or the environment, this may be a factor which contrib-
utes to persuading the court that the need for mens rea is displaced.
A recent example of this factor being relied on by a court is Matudi, referred to in para
6.20.137
The presence of a grave social danger is not alone enough to rebut the presumption that
mens rea is required.138
Whether strict liability would assist the enforcement of

the law
6.40 In Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong,139 Lord Scarman, giving the
Privy Council’s opinion, said that, even where a statute is concerned with an issue of
social concern, the presumption of mens rea stands unless it can be shown that strict
liability will be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigi-
lance to prevent the commission of the prohibited act.
This point was initially developed by Devlin J in Reynolds v GH Austin & Sons Ltd140
and by the Privy Council in Lim Chin Aik v R.141
In Reynolds v GH Austin & Sons Ltd, D Ltd, a private hire coach company, contracted to
take members of a women’s guild on a trip to the seaside. Six seats on the coach remained
unbooked and the organiser of the trip advertised tickets for them to the general public.
The effect of doing so was that the use of the coach to carry the passengers on the trip
would be as an ‘express carriage’, which would require a road service licence to be held
by D Ltd. D Ltd did not have such a licence and, being unaware of the advertisement (and
hence of the need for one), performed the contract. D Ltd was charged with using the
coach as an express carriage without a road service licence, contrary to the Road Traffic
Act 1930, s 72 (since repealed). The Divisional Court held that the offence was not one of
strict liability. Devlin J stated:
‘If a man is punished because of an act done by another, whom he cannot reasonably be
expected to influence or control, the law is engaged, not in punishing thoughtlessness or
inefficiency and thereby promoting the welfare of the community, but in pouncing on the
most convenient victim. Without the authority of express words, I am not willing to con-
clude that Parliament can intend what would seem to the ordinary man to be the useless
and unjust infliction of a penalty. . . . I think it a safe general principle to follow (I state it
negatively, since that is sufficient for the purposes of this case), that where the punishment
of an individual will not promote the observance of the law either by that individual or by
others whose conduct he may reasonably be expected to influence, then, in the absence of
clear and express words, such punishment is not intended.’142
137 Also see Howells [1977] QB 614, CA. 138 See Lim Chin Aik v R [1963] AC 160 at 174.
139 Para 6.22. 140 [1951] 2 KB 135, DC.
141 [1963] AC 160, PC. 142 [1951] 2 KB 135 at 149–150.
6.41 strict liability in statutory offences | 
In Lim Chin Aik v R, a case concerned with Singapore immigration regulations, the
Privy Council observed that, in considering whether the presumption that mens rea was
required was rebutted, it is ‘not enough merely to label the statute before the court as one
dealing with a grave social evil, and from that to infer that strict liability was intended’.143
It is also necessary to inquire whether putting D under strict liability will assist the
enforcement of the law. There must be something he could do
‘directly or indirectly, by supervision or inspection, by improvement of his business

methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control, which
will promote the observance of the regulations . . . Where it can be shown that the impos-
ition of strict liability would result in the prosecution and conviction of a class of persons
whose conduct would not in any way affect the observance of the law, their Lordships
consider that, even where the statute is dealing with a grave social evil, strict liability is
not likely to be intended.’144
Lim Chin Aik had been convicted under a Singapore Immigration Ordinance which
made it an offence for someone prohibited from entering Singapore to enter or remain
there. He had been prohibited from entering Singapore, but the prohibition had not been
published or made known to him. The Privy Council advised that his conviction should
be quashed on account of the futility of imposing punishment in such a case.
6.41 These decisions can be contrasted with those in Blake and Bezzina.
In Blake145 the Court of Appeal, holding that the offence of establishing or using any
station, or using apparatus, for wireless telegraphy without a licence, contrary to the
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, s 1(1) (since repealed),146 was one of strict liability as to
the lack of a licence, stated that the imposition of strict liability would encourage greater
vigilance on the part of those establishing or using a station, or using equipment, to avoid
committing the offence, eg in the case of users by carefully checking whether they were
on the air.
Bezzina147 was concerned with the offence under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, s 3(1),
whereby, if a dog is dangerously out of control in a public place, its owner or handler is
guilty of an offence. Dismissing appeals against conviction, the Court of Appeal held that
the presumption that mens rea was required for this offence was rebutted and that no mens
rea need be proved on the part of the owner or handler. It had no doubt that strict liability
would be effective to promote the objects of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 by encouraging
greater vigilance among dog owners or handlers to prevent the offence being committed.
These and other cases148 indicate that with isolated exceptions the present requirement
will normally be easily satisfied. It must be emphasised that its satisfaction does not auto-
matically rebut the presumption that mens rea is required.
143 [1963] AC 160 at 174. 144 Ibid.

145 [1997] 1 All ER 963, CA.
146 A corresponding offence is now contained in the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006, ss 8(1), 35(1).
147 [1994] 3 All ER 964, CA.
148 Eg Brockley (1993) 99 Cr App R 385, CA; Muhamad [2002] EWCA Crim 1856 and Matudi [2003] EWCA
Crim 697; para 6.20.
 | 6.42 strict liability
The justification for strict liability

Key points 6.8
The arguments for and against strict liability commonly put forward centre on the effective
enforcement of the law and the maintenance of standards.
6.42 One justification for strict liability is that the commission of many regulatory
offences is very harmful to the public and, as it is very difficult to prove that the defendant
had acted with mens rea as to all the elements of the actus reus, such offences would often
go unpunished and the legislation rendered ineffective.149 Again, it is sometimes said that
too many bogus defences would succeed if excusable ignorance or mistake were always
accepted as defences. It is also argued that the great pressure of work upon the minor
criminal courts nowadays makes it impractical to inquire into mens rea in each prosecu-
tion for a regulatory offence.150 Moreover, it is urged that the imposition of strict liability
does something towards ensuring that the controllers of business organisations do every-
thing possible to see that important regulatory legislation is carried out.151 Repeated con-
victions may discourage or oblige the incompetent to refrain from certain undertakings
and ensure that the competent stay competent.
6.43 There are many who remain unconvinced by these arguments152and who reply that
the fact that the prosecution may find proof of mens rea as to a particular element or
elements of the actus reus difficult is of itself no reason for depriving the defendant of
his customary safeguards.153 They argue, in any event, that it does not follow that, even
if proof of mens rea is impossible in certain types of cases, the only solution is to go to
the other extreme by denying that D’s mental state is relevant to the question of respon-
sibility, since there are other possibilities such as a defence of no negligence. They add
that it is improper to jettison the requirement of mens rea simply to facilitate the flow of
judicial business, that the courts’ time is taken up anyway by considerations of mens rea
in determining sentence, particularly because, if D’s state of mind is a matter of dispute,
there will have to be a post-conviction hearing to determine this, and that it is not a sat-
isfactory answer to say that it is always possible to subject the offender to a small fine (or
even to grant him an absolute discharge), since the ‘mere’ stigma of a conviction may have
serious consequences for D. For example, it may lead to loss of a professional status. In
addition, critics of strict liability point out that strict liability is particularly unjust where
D has taken all reasonable precautions to avoid infringing regulatory legislation and
therefore cannot reasonably be expected to take further steps to improve his systems. It
serves no useful purpose, and may either discourage efficient operators from continuing
to trade etc or may encourage them to take precautionary steps which go beyond the
149 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824 at 839 and 848, per Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon.
150 Sayre ‘Public Welfare Offences’ (1933) 33 Columbia Law Review at 69.
151 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824 at 848, per Lord Salmon.
152 For instance, Howard Strict Responsibility (1963) 9–28.
153 See Thomas v R (1937) 59 CLR 279 at 309, per Sir Owen Dixon, for a statement to this effect by one of the
great judges of the twentieth century.
6.44 strict liability in statutory offences | 
reasonable (with consequent costs which will be passed on to the consumer). It is ques-
tionable, however, whether the imposition of strict liability results in higher standards of
care. In a case before the Supreme Court of Canada, it was observed that:
‘There is no evidence that a higher standard of care results from [strict] liability. If a person
is already taking every reasonable precautionary measure, is he likely to take additional
measures, knowing that however much care he takes, it will not serve as a defence in the
event of breach? If he has exercised care and skill, will conviction have a deterrent effect
upon him or others?’154
6.44 There is much to be said for removing regulatory offences from the scope of the
criminal law and leaving them to be dealt with by civil sanctions. Such a system would
leave our criminal courts free to deal with ‘real’ criminal offences, most of which do not
involve strict liability. It would greatly reduce the criticisms made of strict liability in the
criminal law.
The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, Part 3 (ss 36–65)155 goes some
way to achieving this. It provides a range of civil administrative sanctions which can be
imposed by the regulator of a regulated activity in respect of which the regulatory offence
of a specified type was committed. Schedule 5 to the Act specifies the regulators who can
use these sanctions if granted the relevant power to do so. The implementation of this
scheme depends on subordinate legislation. At the time this book went to press, Part
3 of the Act had been implemented in respect of prescribed environmental offences by
Orders and Regulations made by the relevant Ministers in 2010. These measures permit
the Environment Agency and (in England) Natural England, as regulators, to impose
civil administrative sanctions in relation to the environmental offences prescribed by
them. Implementation in respect of other areas of the specified types of regulatory legis-
lation is awaited.
Where they are available the civil administrative sanctions do not replace the criminal
sanction of a prosecution and conviction in the courts, but a prosecution will only be
instituted where the breach in question is a serious one. The civil administrative sanc-
tions will be appropriate for cases where advice and persuasion to comply have failed or
would otherwise be inadequate.
Under Part 3 of the Act, a regulator can impose the following civil administrative
sanctions where the offence is specified by subordinate legislation in respect of the par-
ticular sanction:
• a fi xed monetary penalty, ie a penalty of an amount prescribed by subordinate
legislation;
• one or more of the following discretionary requirements, viz:
(a) a variable monetary penalty, ie a penalty of an amount determined by the
regulator;
154 City of Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161 at 171, per Dickson J.
155 The provisions of Part 3 of the Act are based on the Final Report of the Macrory Review of Regulatory
Penalties (2006).
 | 6.45 strict liability
(b) a compliance notice, ie a requirement that steps specified by the regulator be

taken to secure that the offence does not continue or recur;
(c) a restoration notice, ie a requirement by the regulator to restore the position as it
would have been if the offence had not been committed;
• a stop notice, which requires the offender to cease the offending activity until he has
taken the steps specified in the notice;
• an enforcement undertaking, ie an undertaking to take such action as may be speci-
fied in the undertaking within such period as may be specified in it.
Reducing operation of strict liability in the criminal law

Key points 6.9
The injustice involved in strict liability is increasingly being mitigated in statutory offences
by the provision of various types of defences.
Statutory defences
6.45 In a limited number of offences, mostly concerned with fi nancial or commercial
matters, a defence of ‘no intention’ is provided. For example, in the offence of destruction
by an officer of a company of company documents, contrary to the Companies Act 1985,
s 450, D has a defence if he proves that he had no intention to conceal the company’s state
of affairs or to defeat the law. However, by far the most common statutory defences are ‘no
negligence’ and ‘due diligence’ defences.
Although most statutory defences of these types expressly require D to prove them, a
particular provision may be interpreted as merely imposing an evidential burden rather
than a persuasive one. Exceptionally, the statute expressly states that D merely bears an
evidential burden in respect of such a defence: an example is provided by the Tobacco
Advertising and Promotion Act 2002, s 17, in respect of no-negligence defences (under s
5) to specified offences under that Act.
6.46 The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 28, which applies to offences of possession of a
controlled drug and certain other drugs-related offences, provides an example of a ‘no
negligence’ defence. It provides that D shall be acquitted if he proves156 that he nei-
ther believed, nor suspected, nor had reason to suspect (ie was not negligent), that the
substance involved was a controlled drug.157
6.47 An example of a due diligence defence is in the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s 24(1),
which provides D with a defence if he proves that the commission of an offence under the
Act was due to a mistake, or to reliance on information supplied to him or to the act or
156 In Lambert [2001] UKHL 37, ‘proves’ in s 28 was interpreted, obiter, as simply requiring the defendant to
adduce evidence (as opposed to prove on the balance of probabilities) so as to comply with the ECHR, Art 6(2).
157 For another example, see para 18.37.
6.49 strict liability in statutory offences | 
default of another person, an accident or some other cause beyond his control, and that he
exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence in question.158
An example of a second type of due diligence defence is provided by the Weights and
Measures Act 1985, s 34,159 which provides that it is a defence for a person charged with
an offence under Part IV of the Act to prove that he took all reasonable precautions and
exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.
Another type of due diligence defence is provided by the Bribery Act 2010, s 7(2),
referred to in para 18.20.160
6.48 It must be emphasised that there is no general ‘no intention’, ‘no negligence’ or
‘due diligence’ defence. Instead, a statutory offence is only subject to such a defence if the
statute in question expressly creates it and applies it to that offence.
In comparison, the courts in Australia and Canada have developed a general no neg-
ligence defence to offences which do not require proof of mens rea as to one or more
elements of the actus reus, the persuasive burden of proving which is borne by D.161
Although such a defence found some favour with three Law Lords in Sweet v Parsley,162 it
has yet to be implied by our courts into a statutory offence. Likewise, our courts have not
adopted another possibility referred to by Lord Reid in Sweet v Parsley: the substitution
of a requirement for negligence to be proved instead of subjective mens rea when a statu-
tory offence was silent as to the need for mens rea.163 Indeed, a variation on this, preferred
by Lord Diplock in Sweet v Parsley,164 the implication of a defence of reasonable mistake
under the so-called Tolson rule, has been expressly rejected by the House of Lords in B v
DPP,165 as explained in para 5.13.
Proposal for a judicial power to apply a due diligence defence

6.49 In its consultation paper Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts,166 the Law
Commission has made the following provisional proposal: when interpreting a statutory
offence which does not expressly require proof that D was at fault (ie had mens rea), the
courts should be able to apply to that offence a due diligence defence, in relation to which
D would have the burden of proof. The Commission comments that:
‘[W]ere the courts to have power to apply a defence of due diligence in all the circum-
stances to an offence of strict liability, they would no longer be required to exercise their
minds over the question of whether Parliament by necessary implication (if not expressly)
requires proof of fault if the offence itself is to be established. Further, such a defence
would not come into play by presumption irrespective of statutory context. It applies
158 For a similar example, see the Video Recordings Act 1984, s 14A.
159 Similar examples of this provision are provided by the Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 39; Criminal
Justice Act 1988, s 141A; Food Safety Act 1990, s 21; and Property Misdescriptions Act 1991, s 2(1).
160 Due diligence defences have been examined recently by V Smith ‘Due Diligence and State of Mind’ (2011)
175 JPN 89, 177.
161 Maher v Musson (1934) 52 CLR 100, HC of Australia; Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536, HC of
Australia; City of Sault Ste Marie (1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161, SC of Canada.
162 [1970] AC 132 at 150, 158 and 164 per Lords Reid, Pearce and Diplock.
163 Ibid at 150. 164 Ibid at 163–164. 165 [2000] 2 AC 428, HL.
 | 6.49 strict liability
when, in the court’s view, considering the purpose and operation of the statute in context,
the application of the defence would lead to use of the criminal law in that context that
was fair to defendants without placing unnecessarily obstructive obstacles in the way of
prosecuting authorities (this can be called the fairness objective).’167
The Commission also notes that:
‘Clearly, the courts would not apply the defence of due diligence where to do so would
defeat the purpose of the statute. A related point is that we would expect the courts not to
apply it if, despite the absence of a requirement for proof of a positive fault requirement,
there are specific defences applicable to the offence that mean that the fairness objective
has been met.’168
The Commission has provisionally proposed that, if the above proposal is accepted, the
defence of due diligence should take the form of showing that due diligence was exer-
cised in all the circumstances to avoid the commission of the offence. The Commission
recognises, however, that it may be preferable for the defence to have the same wording
and to impose the same stricter standards as those under the Weights and Measures Act
1985, s 34 (and other provisions) referred to at n 159 above, which is the most commonly
encountered statutory form of the due diligence defence.
The Commission recognises that there may be some contexts, eg the road traffic con-
text, where a due diligence defence would be inappropriate and that it might be better
right from the outset to state that the power to apply the due diligence defence has no
application to offences in specified contexts.
FURTHER READING
Brett ‘Strict Responsibility: Possible Solutions’ Sayre ‘Public Welfare Offences’ (1933) 33
(1974) 37 MLR 417 Columbia LR 55
Horder ‘Strict Liability, Statutory Construction Simester (ed) Appraising Strict Liability
and the Spirit of Liberty’ (2002) 118 LQR 459 (2005)
Leigh Strict and Vicarious Liability (1982) JC Smith ‘Responsibility in Criminal Law’ in
Manchester ‘Knowledge, Due Diligence and Barbara Wootton, Essays in Her Honour
Strict Liability in Statutory Offences’ [2006] (1986) (Bean and Whynes (eds)) 141
Crim LR 213 Smith and Pearson ‘The Value of Strict
Paulus ‘Strict Liability for Public Welfare Liability’ [1969] Crim LR 5
Offences’ (1978) 20 Crim LQ 445 Stanton-Ife ‘Strict Liability: Stigma and
Richardson ‘Strict Liability for Regulating Regret’ (2007) 27 OJLS 151
Crime: the Empirical Research’ [1987]
Crim LR 295
167 At para 6.7. 168 At para 6.93.

7
Non-fatal offences against the person
OVERVIEW
The various kinds of offence against the person, non-fatal, fatal and sexual, are considered in this
and the next two chapters. This chapter commences with an examination of the relevance of the
victim’s consent to the liability for a non-fatal offence against the person. It then deals with the
following non-fatal offences against the person:
• assault and battery;
• assault occasioning actual bodily harm and other aggravated assaults;
• offences of wounding or inflicting or causing grievous bodily harm;
• offences relating to administering poison or the like;
• racially or religiously aggravated assaults; and

• offences requiring a course of conduct which amounts to harassment or which puts a
person in fear of violence.
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861) deals in detail with most offences against
the person which are not fatal but provision is also made by a number of other statutes referred
to in this chapter: the Police Act 1996, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998.
Consent
Introduction
7.1 Many offences against the person, such as common assault and battery, cannot be
committed if the victim gives a valid consent. On the other hand, if a mentally competent
adult refuses consent to what is done, an offence against the person will be commit-
ted (unless some other excuse is available, as it may be if the refusal relates to medical
treatment and the person refusing is compulsorily detained in a mental hospital under
statute for such treatment).1 Thus, if an adult patient 2 who is mentally competent refuses
to consent to medical treatment, a doctor will commit an offence against the person if
1 Mental Health Act 1983, s 63. 2 As to children, see para 7.25.

160 | 7.2 non-fatal offences against the person
he performs the treatment on the patient.3 This is so however unreasonable or dangerous

the refusal is, provided that it was freely and independently made, even where the refusal
might lead to the patient’s death.4
7.2 An offence against the person can be committed, despite the fact that the victim is
mentally competent and consents to what is done, if that consent is invalid. While one
can validly consent to an application of force which does not cause ‘actual bodily harm’,
or in some cases even if it does, no one can lawfully consent to his own death at the
hands of another.5 Although suicide is no longer an offence, euthanasia by a positive act at
the victim’s request remains so. However excellent his motives may be, someone who by
some positive act kills another at that other’s request is guilty of murder unless he acted
in pursuance of a suicide pact, in which case his offence is manslaughter.6 On the other
hand, a doctor or someone else with care of an adult who is mentally competent does not
commit an offence if, at the request of that adult, he fails to look after him and thereby
allows him to die or suffer other harm. The reason is that, as stated in para 2.12, his duty
to act has been extinguished by the other’s request.
Key points 7.1

Consent can validly be given to an act which does not cause actual bodily harm.
Consent cannot validly be given if the defendant’s act causes actual bodily harm which
the defendant intended or foresaw unless the case falls within one of a number of recog-
nised exceptions or a new exception is recognised on public interest grounds.
Validity of consent to actual bodily harm:

the general rule
7.3 In A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980)7 the Court of Appeal stated that, generally, a per-
son’s consent is irrelevant and cannot prevent criminal liability for an offence if actual
bodily harm was ‘intended and/or caused’. ‘Actual bodily harm’ means an injury which
is not so trivial as to be wholly insignificant; it is explained further in paras 7.57–7.60.
The statement in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) was based on the view that ‘it is not in
the public interest that people should try to cause or should cause each other actual bod-
ily harm for no good reason’. In some cases there may be a good reason, and the Court
of Appeal was at pains to emphasise that the rule did not affect the accepted legality of
certain situations, referred to below, in which the consent of the victim is legally relevant
and renders the conduct in question lawful.
3 Para 2.12.
4 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 All ER 673, CA. Also see Airedale National Health Service
Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 891, per Lord Mustill.
5 Young (1838) 8 C & P 644; Cuddy (1843) 1 Car & Kir 210. 6 Para 8.37.
7 [1981] QB 715, CA.
7.5 consent | 161
The Court of Appeal’s views were approved, applied and developed by the majority
of the House of Lords in Brown8 which is the leading case in this area. In Brown,9 the
defendants belonged to a group of sado-masochistic homosexuals who willingly par-
ticipated in private in acts of violence against each other, including genital torture by
the insertion of fish-hooks through the penis, for the sexual pleasure engendered in the
giving and receiving of pain. The passive partner in each case consented to what was
done and the bodily harm suffered was not permanent. The defendants were convicted of
assault occasioning actual bodily harm and unlawful wounding, contrary to the OAPA
1861, ss 47 and 20 respectively. Their convictions were upheld by the Court of Appeal. The
defendants appealed to the House of Lords, contending that a person could not be guilty
of offences under the OAPA 1861, ss 47 and 20 in respect of acts carried out in private with
the victim’s consent.
By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords dismissed the appeals.
It held that, since actual bodily harm was intended and caused, consent was irrelevant
unless it could find that it was in the public interest to permit the intentional causing of
actual bodily harm in the course of sado-masochistic practices, 10 and there were several
good reasons why it should not do so. First, it was only luck that the participants had not
suffered any serious harm or infection. Second, there was a risk of spreading diseases
such as AIDS. Third, there was the danger that young people could be drawn into the
unnatural practices.
7.4 Three of the defendants in Brown unsuccessfully complained to the European Court
of Human Rights that their convictions constituted an unjustified intrusion into their
right to respect for their private lives under the ECHR, Article 8. In Laskey, Jaggard and
Brown v United Kingdom,11 the name of the case before the European Court of Human
Rights, the Court held that, while Article 8 was engaged, the interference with the right
to respect for private life was justified under Article 8(2) because it was necessary in a
democratic society for the protection of health and, possibly, of morals. It held that, in the
first instance, it was within the competence of each State, including its courts, to deter-
mine the degree of physical harm which should be tolerated where a victim consented.
Because the harm inflicted was not insignificant, even though no hospital treatment was
required, and because public health considerations were also in issue, the complainants’
behaviour did not form part of their private sexual behaviour which it was not the State’s
function to regulate.
7.5 The statement in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980), approved in Brown, about consent
being invalid if actual bodily harm is ‘intended and/or caused’ has been problematic. One
thing is clear, however, and this is that under the statement a valid consent to conduct
8 [1994] 1 AC 212, HL.

9 For discussion of Brown, see Mullender ‘Sado-Masochism, Criminal Law and Adjudicative Method: R v
Brown in the House of Lords’ (1993) 44 NILQ 380; Giles ‘R v Brown: Consensual Harm and the Public Interest’
(1994) 57 MLR 101; Allen ‘Consent and Assault’ (1994) 58 JCL 183.
10 The same view was taken about the validity of consent in an earlier case involving heterosexual sado-
masochism, Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498, CCA, where D beat a 17-year-old girl with her consent for the purposes
of sexual gratification: the Court held her consent would be invalid if the blows were intended or likely to cause
bodily harm. 11 (1997) 24 EHRR 39, ECtHR.
cannot generally be given to an act where, as in Brown, the defendant (D) intentionally
causes actual bodily harm (or worse).
7.6 One difficulty with the statement in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) is that it suggested
that consent was invalid if actual bodily harm (or worse) was intended but did not actu-
ally result. On this basis, if the dominant partner in a sado-masochistic partnership has
only landed a few harmless blows and is then stopped before he can cause the intended
actual bodily harm, his partner’s consent will not prevent him being liable for a battery.
This would be consistent with suggestions in dicta in two appeal court decisions.12 On
the other hand, in Brown the majority of the House of Lords were of the view that consent
was a defence to a charge of common assault (a term which covers the offences of assault
and battery, which do not require actual bodily harm to be caused). More importantly,
in Barnes,13 the Court of Appeal stated, obiter, that: ‘When no bodily harm is caused, the
consent of the victim is always a defence to a charge.’14 On this basis, the law now seems
to be that if D intends to cause the victim (V) actual bodily harm, but does not cause it,
V’s consent is valid.
7.7 Another difficulty with the reference to actual bodily harm being ‘intended and/or
caused’ arose where V consented to D’s act and that act unintentionally and unexpectedly
caused actual bodily harm (or worse). Read literally, the wording of the phrase seemed
to mean that it was irrelevant that actual bodily harm was unintended, unforeseen or
even unforeseeable by D; V’s consent would be invalid. However, as explained below, the
courts have found a way round such an unreasonable outcome.
Initially, it seemed that V’s consent to conduct which caused unintended actual bodily
harm was only invalid if such harm was objectively likely. This supposition was based on
Boyea,15 where D had engaged in vigorous sexual activity with V. During it D caused V
harm by inserting his hand into her vagina and twisting it. D’s conviction for indecent
assault was affirmed on the ground that D was guilty of an assault because his conduct
was likely to cause actual bodily harm, even if D did not intend or foresee that harm was
likely to be caused. This suggested that if D’s conduct was objectively likely to cause actual
bodily harm, consent to it was invalid, even if D did not intend or foresee it.
The Crown Court ruling of Judge J (as he then was) in Slingsby16 went further because
it provided authority that, where unintended actual bodily harm occurred, V’s consent
to D’s conduct was only invalid if the risk of such harm was foreseen. In Slingsby, D and
V also engaged in vigorous sexual activity, involving D penetrating V’s vagina and rec-
tum with his hand. V consented to this use of force. V suffered cuts from D’s signet ring,
and subsequently died from septicaemia. At D’s trial for manslaughter by an unlawful
and dangerous act, Judge J ruled that, as V’s injury had not been anticipated by D or V, it
would be contrary to principle to treat as an unlawful act conduct which would not oth-
erwise constitute an ‘assault’ simply because injury occurred. Consequently, this was not
a case where a consent was invalid under the rule in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980), and
12Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498, CCA; Boyea (1992) 156 JP 505, CA. 13 [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
14Ibid at [7]. 15 (1992) 156 JP 505, CA.
16 [1995] Crim LR 570, Crown Ct. What follows is based on the transcript of the judge’s ruling cited in
Meachen [2006] EWCA Crim 2414 at [39].
7.7 consent | 163
V had given a valid consent to the force involved: there was therefore no unlawful act for
the purposes of manslaughter.
The approach in Slingsby was applied by the Court of Appeal in Meachen,17 another
case where, according to D, unforeseen actual bodily harm had been caused to V in the
course of consensual sexual activity. Quashing D’s convictions for inflicting grievous
bodily harm and indecent assault, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had been
wrong not to direct the jury that V’s consent could excuse D in these circumstances. It
concluded that if D does not intend, or foresee the risk of, actual bodily harm, and V
consents to the acts done from which such harm unexpectedly results, V’s consent to
those acts is valid. Following a dictum in Dica,18 discussed later, the Court regarded
Boyea as having been decided on the basis that V had not in fact consented and that there-
fore the issue which arose in Slingsby and in Meachen was not before the court in Boyea.
Thus, despite the statement with which this discussion began, the law relating to when
a valid consent to the defendant’s conduct can be given for the purposes of the law relat-
ing to non-fatal offences against the person can be summarised as follows:
ABH intended or foreseen as risk but not caused: Consent valid

ABH intended or foreseen as risk and caused: Consent invalid unless case falls
within an exception
ABH caused but not intended or foreseen as risk: Consent valid
Exceptions to the general rule

Key points 7.2
Recognised exceptions to the general rule that consent cannot validly be given to an act
which causes actual bodily harm as intended or foreseen as a risk are in the cases of:
• properly conducted games or sports;
• reasonable surgical interference;
• tattooing, ear piercing and personal adornment;
• horseplay;
• dangerous exhibitions;
• religious mortification; and

• consensual non-violent sexual conduct carrying the risk of the transmission of
disease.
Further exceptions may be recognised by the courts.
17 [2006] EWCA Crim 2414. 18 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 at [44].

7.8 As the House of Lords recognised in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) and in Brown,
there may be ‘good reason’ for the infliction of actual bodily harm, in which case a valid
consent to it may be given by way of exception to the general rule. The exceptional cases
where a person may validly consent to actual bodily harm (or the risk of it) are situations
where the law considers that the public interest requires the exception. In other words,
like the general rule, the exceptions are based on public policy and have no separate juris-
prudential basis for each of the contexts in which they apply.19 This means that changing
public attitudes can affect the number and extent of exceptions.20 In respect of two of the
exceptional cases that have been recognised, a properly conducted game or sport and
reasonable surgical interference,21 what is a ‘properly conducted game or sport’ or ‘rea-
sonable surgical interference’ itself turns on the public interest.
Properly conducted games or sports

7.9 A participant in a contact sport, such as a football or rugby match, impliedly and
validly consents to conduct which carries the risk of such accidental actual bodily harm,
even serious harm, as can reasonably be expected during the match because these are
regarded as properly conducted sports; if such harm is caused the valid consent prevents
it being criminal.22 On the other hand, the participant does not consent to conduct which
cannot reasonably be expected and, anyway, he cannot validly consent to the intentional
infliction of actual bodily harm. A footballer or rugby player, for example, does not, and
could not, consent to being intentionally punched or kicked.23
In Barnes,24 the Court of Appeal gave the following guidance on whether or not the
risk of what has occurred could reasonably be expected. The fact that the play is within
the rules of the game gives a firm indication that what has happened could reasonably be
expected. In judging whether conduct could reasonably be expected, it must be remem-
bered that, in highly competitive sports, conduct outside the rules can be expected to
occur in the heat of the moment, and even if the conduct justifies a sending off, it still
may not reach the threshold level required for it to be criminal. That level is an objective
one and does not depend upon the views of individual players. The type of the sport, the
level at which it is played, the nature of the act, the degree of force used, the extent of the
risk of injury and D’s state of mind are all likely to be relevant in determining whether
D’s actions go beyond the threshold. Whether conduct reaches the required level depends
on all the circumstances. However, there will be cases that fall within a ‘grey area’, and
then the jury will have to make its own determination as to which side of the line the case
falls.
7.10 Apart from boxing under the Queensberry Rules and martial arts, it is difficult
to think of a game or sport where the participants consent to intentional actual bodily
harm, as well as to the risk of serious bodily harm, which would be regarded as properly
19 Th is was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246 at [11].
20 Th is was also recognised in Barnes above.
21 These two exceptions were recognised in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715, CA, and Brown
[1994] 1 AC 212, HL. 22 Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, CCR; Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
23 Bradshaw (1878) 14 Cox CC 83; Barnes above at [14].
24 [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
7.12 consent | 165
conducted. For example, a prizefight (a fight with bare fists until one participant is unable
to continue) is not regarded as a properly conducted sport, whereas boxing and wrestling
are, because the serious physical risks which attach to the former are against the public
interest,25 while the latter are ‘manly diversions, they intend to give strength, skill and
activity, and may fit people for defence, public as well as personal, in time of need’. 26 The
consent in boxing is only to intentional harm within the rules; a boxer does not consent
to being intentionally harmed by, for example, a blow delivered between rounds.
In Brown, there were obiter dicta by four Law Lords indicating that they were clearly
of the opinion that boxing is lawful. Lord Mustill thought that it was impossible ‘to
arrive at an intellectually satisfying account of the apparent immunity of professional
boxing from the criminal process’. He suggested that this was a ‘special situation which
for the time being stands outside the ordinary law of violence because society chooses
to tolerate it’.27
Reasonable surgical interference

7.11 A valid consent can be given to actual bodily harm caused by reasonable surgi-
cal interference. It may seem odd to refer to surgical interference causing ‘actual bodily
harm’ since benefit rather than harm will normally be its purpose. However, surgical
interference will often involve permanent harm to the body (as in the case of an amputa-
tion) or a short-term wound or other harm to the body.
7.12 The question whether a surgical operation is ‘reasonable surgical interference’ is
answered in the case of female genital mutilation by legislation which declares that it is
unlawful28 (and therefore not reasonable surgical interference), even if done with con-
sent, save in specified circumstances.
In other cases, the question whether a surgical operation is ‘reasonable surgical inter-
ference’ clearly admits only of the answer ‘yes’ where it is performed for therapeutic
reasons. It appears, for example, that a sex-change operation29 performed for genuine
therapeutic reasons is not open to legal objection.
On the other hand, the answer may be different in some cases where an operation is
performed for non-therapeutic reasons. A prime example of such an operation is one
involving the mutilation of the body in accordance with religious or tribal ritual or cus-
tom, or in order to secure a discharge from military service. Operations which may not be
performed for therapeutic reasons include sterilisation and cosmetic surgery. Whether a
non-therapeutic operation is contrary to the public interest in this area may give rise to
differences of opinion, and opinions may change with the times. For example, in Bravery
v Bravery,30 a civil case decided in 1954, Denning LJ (as he then was) held that a sterili-
sation operation performed on a man for non-eugenic reasons (to enable him to enjoy
sexual intercourse without the risk of becoming a father) would be unlawful as being
25 Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 at 537, per Cave J. 26 Foster Crown Law (3rd edn, 1792) 259.
27 [1994] 1 AC 212 at 265.
28 Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, s 1. Contravention of the statute is in itself an offence, quite apart
from invalidating any consent on the part of the ‘patient’.
29 Corbett v Corbett [1971] P 83 at 99.
30 [1954] 3 All ER 59, CA.
injurious to the public interest, whereas the other two Lords Justices expressly dissoci-
ated themselves from this view, saying that they were not prepared ‘in the present case’
to hold that such operations were injurious to the public interest. There can be no doubt
that a sterilisation operation for such a purpose would now be held to be reasonable sur-
gical interference so that a valid consent could be given to it.31 The same is no doubt true
about a cosmetic operation performed for a non-therapeutic reason, except presumably
for a cosmetic operation performed for some purpose contrary to the public interest, eg
to enable a criminal to avoid detection. In addition, ritual male circumcision has been
held to be an interference to which consent can validly be given.32 On the other hand, for
example, the surgical mutilation of someone in order to secure his discharge from mili-
tary service or to enable him better to beg would seem to be against the public interest,
and therefore not reasonable surgical interference, in which case a valid consent could
not be given to it.33
Tattooing, ear piercing and personal adornment

7.13 These activities can be regarded as involving actual bodily harm. In Brown, 34 Lord
Templeman and Lord Slynn (in his dissenting speech) regarded tattooing and ear pier-
cing as activities to which a valid consent could be given. However, whether or not a con-
sent to being tattooed or ear pierced is valid depends on an evaluation in public interest
terms of the circumstances,35 such as who carries out the procedure (an amateur or pro-
fessional?) and the way in which the procedure is carried out (eg is adequately sterilised
equipment or material used to prevent the spread of hepatitis, HIV and so on?). Tattooing
of someone under 18 (otherwise than by a doctor for medical reasons) is an offence under
the Tattooing of Minors Act 1969. There can be no doubt that contravention of the statute
would invalidate any consent on the part of the minor.
In Wilson, dealt with in para 7.19, the Court of Appeal regarded branding as not logi-
cally different from tattooing. However, it is clear from that decision that whether or not
a consent to being branded is valid likewise depends on the circumstances. A similar
point may be made about body piercing done for the purposes of adornment, rather than
sado-masochism (see Brown).36
Horseplay
7.14 Another exception, recognised by the Court of Appeal in Jones, 37 but not referred
to in Brown (except by Lord Mustill), is that, if V is caused actual bodily harm by
31 In Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 at [41] the Court of Appeal, obiter, described Denning LJ’s approach as
dated.
32 Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 at 231, per Lord Templeman; Re J [2000] 1 FCR 307, CA.
33 There is old persuasive authority in support: Coke 1 Institutes 127a and 127b, Hawkins 1 Pleas of the Crown
108, Stephen Digest of Criminal Law (3rd edn) 142.
34 [1994] 1 AC 212 at 231 and 277.
35 Th is statement is in line with the approach taken in Wilson, discussed in para 7.19.
36 The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, s 15, referred to in para 2.19, assumes that
cosmetic piercing can be legally performed with consent with a licence, but whether it is legally performed in
such a case remains dependent on the circumstances.
37 (1986) 83 Cr App R 375, CA.
7.17 consent | 167
rough and undisciplined horseplay which is not intended to cause injury, V’s consent
to run the risk of it is legally relevant and prevents the conduct being unlawful. In
that case, boys who had been tossed in the air by others were accidentally injured when
the others failed to catch them. The trial judge did not leave the issue of consent to the
jury on the ground that it was irrelevant. The Court of Appeal held that he had been
wrong: if the boys had consented that consent would have been valid and relevant. In
Aitken, 38 discussed in para 15.80, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court assumed that V’s
consent would have provided a defence to horseplay which gave rise to a risk of serious
bodily harm. Where the risk is of serious bodily harm and is reasonably foreseeable (as
it was in Aitken), it is difficult to see how the public interest test is satisfied.
Dangerous exhibitions
7.15 Another exception which has been recognised is that a person who takes part
in a dangerous exhibition can give a valid consent to the risk of being unintentionally
harmed.39
Religious mortification
7.16 In Brown, 40 Lord Mustill recognised that a valid consent could be given to religious
mortification, ie the infliction of pain on a penitent with his consent as part of his reli-
gious repentance.
Consensual non-violent sexual conduct carrying the risk of

transmission of disease
7.17 A further exception, recognised by the Court of Appeal in Dica, 41 is that someone
can validly consent to run the known risk of infection, as well as all the other risks
inherent in, and possible consequences of, sexual intercourse, just as he can validly
consent to run the risks inherent in other aspects of everyday life. Thus, as the Court
recognised, if D, who has a serious sexual disease, has sexual intercourse with V, who
knows of D’s disease but nevertheless consents to run the risk of contracting it, and V
becomes infected and suffers serious bodily harm in consequence, V will have given
a valid consent to the risk of being infected and suffering grievous bodily harm. The
Court of Appeal distinguished Brown in the following terms:
38 [1992] 1 WLR 1006, C-MAC (as to this court see para 2.32, n 98). Also see Richardson and Irwin [1999] 1
Cr App R 392, CA.
39 A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715, CA.
40 [1994] 1 AC 212 at 267.
41 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 at [47]–[50]. The Court distinguished Brown (para 7.3) on the ground that it
involved serious violence and the intentional infl iction of serious injury. It stated, obiter, that, in the case of the
intentional transmission of serious disease, the consent of the infected party would be no defence: see [46] and
[58]. For another issue in Dica, see para 7.31. For commendation of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Dica, see JR
Spencer ‘Retrial for Reckless Infection’ (2004) 154 NLJ 762; for criticism, see Weait ‘Dica: Knowledge, Consent
and the Transmission of HIV’ (2004) 154 NLJ 826.
‘In our judgment the impact of the authorities dealing with sexual gratification can too
readily be misunderstood. It does not follow from them, and they do not suggest, that
consensual acts of sexual intercourse are unlawful merely because there may be a known
risk to the health of one or other participants. These participants are not intent on spread-
ing or becoming infected with disease through sexual intercourse. They are not indulging
in serious violence for the purposes of sexual gratification. They are simply prepared,
knowingly, to run the risk – not the certainty – of infection, as well as all the other risks
inherent in and possible consequences of sexual intercourse, such as, and despite the most
careful precautions, an unintended pregnancy.’ 42
As indicated in Dica, and confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Konzani, 43 to be valid the
consent must be an informed consent, which it will not be if D has concealed his disease
(unless V knows of it through another source).
Further exceptions
7.18 According to the approach of the Court of Appeal in A-G’s Reference (No 6 of 1980)44
and of the majority of the House of Lords in Brown,45 consent to actual bodily harm will
be invalid unless there is held to be good reason (ie to be in the public interest) for the
activity in question.
The approach of the majority in Brown may be contrasted with that of Lord Mustill,46
one of the minority in Brown, to the effect that a consent to an act which caused actual
bodily harm would be valid unless there was good reason to stop the activity in question.
This more liberal approach would result in the recognition of a wider range of activities
in which a valid consent to bodily harm could be given.
7.19 Lord Mustill’s approach was taken by the Court of Appeal in Wilson, 47 although
the Court thought that it was taking the approach of the majority. In Wilson, D burned
his initials on his wife’s buttocks with a hot knife. He did so with her consent and at her
instigation. D was convicted of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The Court of
Appeal allowed his appeal against conviction. It stated that there was no evidence that
the method of branding adopted by D was more dangerous than tattooing and that there
was no logical difference between it and tattooing. Having asked the question whether
the public interest demanded that D’s activity should be criminal, it concluded that it was
not in the public interest that the consensual activity of branding carried out between
husband and wife in the privacy of the matrimonial home should be criminal where
there was no aggressive intent. Consequently, the wife’s consent to the branding was a
valid one.
42 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 at [47].

43 [2005] EWCA Crim 706, discussed by Weait ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ [2005]
Crim LR 763.
44 [1981] QB 715, CA.
45 [1994] 1 AC 212, HL.
46 Ibid at 273–274. In Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246 at [9], the Court of Appeal considered that Lord
Mustill’s analysis of the case law was of the highest authority.
47 [1997] QB 47, CA. See Roberts ‘Consent to Injury: How Far Can You Go?’ (1997) 113 LQR 27.
7.20 consent | 169
The Court of Appeal considered that the case before it could be distinguished from Brown
in the following ways, none of which is very convincing as a ground of distinction:
• Mrs Wilson had not only consented to the branding but had instigated it. (It is hard
to see why this should be relevant).
• There was no ‘aggressive intent’ in Wilson. (Given that it was done with consent, what
was done in Brown could hardly be said to have been done with ‘aggressive intent’).
• Brown was a case about sado-masochism, unlike Wilson. (But why should the fact
that something is done in private for a sexual motive as opposed to the motive in
Wilson make a difference?).
• What was done in Wilson was not logically different from tattooing.
• Wilson involved consensual activity between a husband and wife in the privacy of
their own home.
The Court of Appeal’s reference to the circumstances of the case raises interesting specu-
lation in terms of the public interest: what if the couple had not been married, and what if
a homosexual man brands his casual male partner, for example?
The Court of Appeal said in Wilson that in the area of consent the law should develop
on a case-by-case basis, rather than upon general propositions. Th is is an unsatisfactory
approach in the light of the vagueness of the public interest and the consequent variabil-
ity in the application of that concept. It makes it difficult to predict the result of a case.
7.20 The preference of the courts to develop the law on a case-by-case basis, rather than
through developing general propositions, was shown again by the Court of Appeal in
Emmett,48 another sado-masochism case. D and V, the woman with whom he was cohab-
iting, were apparently involved in an energetic and very physical sexual relationship. On
one occasion, D had tied a plastic bag over V’s head during sexual activity. As a result V
had suffered restriction of oxygen to the brain. During the next day V’s eyes had become
increasingly bloodshot. V’s doctor diagnosed a subconjunctival haemorrhage in both
eyes. No treatment was necessary. If D had allowed the restriction of oxygen to have gone
on for too long brain damage and ultimately death might have resulted. On a second
occasion, D poured lighter fuel on V’s breasts and set light to it. According to D, V then
panicked, so he could not extinguish the flames immediately. As a result V suffered a
burn measuring 6cm × 4cm; contrary to early expectations, a skin graft was not required.
Neither of these incidents was reported by V. The doctor reported them. D was charged
with assault occasioning actual bodily harm in respect of both incidents. He alleged that
V had consented to what was done on both occasions. D was convicted by the jury in
respect of the first incident on the judge’s direction that V’s consent on that occasion was
invalid, and in the light of that direction D pleaded guilty in respect of the second.
The Court of Appeal dismissed D’s appeals against conviction. D did not intend to
cause V bodily harm; he had simply taken a risk of it on both occasions when harm had
resulted, aware of the dangers. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal, applying the approach
of the majority in Brown, held that the trial judge had been correct to conclude that
48 (1999) Times, 15 October, CA. Th is is a brief report. See the transcript for a full report.
consent was no defence. It distinguished Wilson on the ground that the ‘actual or poten-
tial damage to which [V] was exposed’ in Emmett ‘plainly went beyond that which was
established in Wilson . . . This was not tattooing’. The Court expressed a reluctance to say
where the line should be drawn on the ground that it was plain that the activities involved
went well beyond that line wherever it was drawn.
Further points
7.21 One consequence of the legal rules just described is that, while a boxer validly
consents to intentional bodily harm (and to the risk of serious bodily harm), a person
who consents to intentional bodily harm (and to the risk of serious bodily harm) occur-
ring during a sado-masochistic session or during sexual activity cannot. Can this be
justified?
7.22 Brown and the other cases referred to above raise in an acute form the question of
the extent to which mentally competent adults should be able to consent to what is done
to their bodies in private when there has been no external impact; they raise the ques-
tion of the weight to be given to paternalism on the one hand, and personal autonomy
on the other. The balance between these two concepts comes down firmly in favour of
paternalism. The conduct in Brown would be found to be repulsive by the vast majority
of the population, but – even though interference may be justifiable under the ECHR –
should that be enough to justify interfering with the sexual autonomy and privacy of
those involved by making it criminal?
7.23 In 1995, 49 the Law Commission provisionally proposed that the intentional or reck-
less causing of seriously disabling injury should be criminal, even if the person injured
consents to such injury or to the risk of such injury.50 A ‘seriously disabling injury’ was
defined as one which ‘causes serious distress and involves the loss of a bodily member or
organ or permanent bodily injury or permanent functional impairment, or serious or
permanent disfigurement, or severe and prolonged pain, or serious impairment of health
or prolonged unconsciousness’. The victim’s consent would be invalid here because such
harm is contrary to his interests.
Where the injury failed to meet the test of seriously disabling injury, a valid consent
could be given (except in the case of fighting otherwise than in the course of a recognised
sport), and no offence committed, except that someone under 18 could not validly con-
sent to intentional injuries caused for sexual, religious or spiritual purposes (and possibly
in certain other cases, such as below-the-neck body piercing).
A possible defect with this proposal is that it draws the level of the harm to which
someone can consent at a high point, well beyond minor harm, and that it seems to ignore
the fact that personal injury prognosis often cannot be evaluated quickly or easily. On the
other hand, if one accepts that the Commission is right to propose drawing the line as
49 Consent in the Criminal Law, Law Com Consultation Paper No 139.

50 The proposal would not affect the statutory limitations on female genital mutilation and the tattooing of
minors (although the Commission sought views on the age limit). A valid consent could be given to any degree
of seriously disabling injury if it was caused during the course of proper medical treatment or care. There would
be similar exceptions for injuries caused in the course of properly approved medical research.
7.25 consent | 171
it has, the proposal can be criticised on the ground that the definition of serious bodily
harm ignores whether or not the injury is remediable by surgery or otherwise.
The adoption of the above proposal would redress to some extent the balance between
paternalism and personal autonomy, but the balance would still come down in favour of
the former.51
Apparent consent invalid 52
Key points 7.3

Sometimes a person may appear to consent to conduct to which a valid consent can be
given under the above rules but his consent is invalidated because:
• he lacks the capacity to consent on grounds of his youth, intoxication or mental

incompetence;
• he gives the consent under duress; or
• he gives the consent under a mistake which invalidates it.
Lack of capacity
7.24 An apparent consent is invalid where the person giving it is so young, intoxicated
or mentally disordered or retarded that his knowledge or understanding is such that he
is unable to make a rational decision whether or not to consent.53 However, the act will
nevertheless be lawful in such a case if the physical contact is generally acceptable in the
ordinary conduct of daily life.54
7.25 Consent can generally be given on behalf of a child by a person with parental
responsibility for the child.55 In respect of surgical, medical or dental treatment a minor
of 16 or 17 can, by statute, 56 give a valid consent. The House of Lords in Gillick v West
Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority57 held that a minor under 16 can also give a
valid consent to treatment if he has sufficient maturity and understanding to understand
what is involved. However, the wishes of a competent minor under 16 can be overrid-
den by consent being given by someone with parental responsibility or by a civil court
exercising its wardship over children.58
51 For different evaluations of what was proposed in the consultation paper, see Ashworth ‘The Revisiting of
Consent’ [1996] Crim LR 73; Shute ‘Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: Th ree Aspects of the
Project’ [1996] Crim LR 684; Ormerod and Gunn ‘Consent – A Second Bash’ [1996] Crim LR 694 and Roberts
‘The Philosophical Foundations of Consent in the Criminal Law’ (1997) 17 OJLS 389.
52 Th is issue arises most commonly in respect of sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and is
dealt with in Ch 9 in relation to them. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 contains special provisions.
53 Burrell v Harmer [1967] Crim LR 169, DC; Howard [1965] 3 All ER 684, CCA; Lang (1975) 62 Cr App R 50, CA.
54 See para 7.33.
55 See Cretney Principles of Family Law (8th edn, 2009) (Masson, Bailey-Harris and Probert (eds)) 548.
56 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s 8. 57 [1986] AC 112, HL.
58 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment: court’s jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64, CA.
A court can overrule a giving or refusal of consent by someone with parental

responsibility.59
Duress
7.26 The victim’s apparent consent may be invalid if it has been procured by an express
or implied threat. In Day,60 D was charged with an assault on a girl of nine. The girl
had not resisted D’s conduct and it was argued that, since she had submitted to his acts,
she must be taken to have consented and that therefore D was not guilty. The jury were
directed that if the girl had submitted to D’s acts out of fear there would have been no real
consent on her part and they would be without her consent. What constitutes sufficient
duress remains undecided. Clearly, a threat of violence does and so would a threat of
imprisonment. Probably any pressure which the victim cannot reasonably be expected to
withstand from the particular defendant will suffice for duress.
Mistake
Mistake as to nature of act or defendant’s identity
7.27 There is no valid consent if a person, apparently consenting, is induced to do so
by a mistake, whether induced by D’s deception or self-induced, 61 as to the nature of
the act or as to D’s identity.62 For example, if V consents in the dark to being embraced
by D, having been fooled by D into thinking that he is X, her boyfriend, there is no valid
consent by V to being touched by D. V’s mistake as to D’s identity invalidates her appar-
ent consent. A mistake as to the nature of an act is one which relates to the essence of the
act. The purpose with which an act is done clearly goes to the essence of an act and it is
submitted that, whether or not it can be said to involve a mistake as to the nature of the
act, a mistake as to its purpose is not a valid consent.
Mistake as to collateral matter

7.28 Until fairly recently, the courts have been consistent in stating that, provided that
V knew the nature of the act and the identity of who was doing it, it was irrelevant that V
was mistaken about a collateral detail relating to the act.
Thus, it was held that no assault had occurred in Clarence63 where D had intercourse
with V, his wife, knowing that he had venereal disease, and thereby infected her. V did
not know of D’s disease. D was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary
to the OAPA 1861, s 20, an offence which was then regarded as requiring the grievous
bodily harm to result from an ‘assault’ (ie assault or battery). It was argued that D’s
concealment of his condition amounted to a fraud which negatived V’s consent to the
intercourse and thus rendered the bodily contact an ‘assault’. It was held that even if D’s
59 Re B [1990] 3 All ER 927, CA.

60 (1841) 9 C & P 722.
61 Richardson [1999] QB 444 at 450. If D is unaware of a self-induced mistake he will lack the mens rea for the
assault or other non-fatal offence in question: Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328, CA.
62 Case (1850) 4 Cox CC 220; Williams [1923] 1 KB 340, CCA.
63 (1888) 22 QBD 23, CCR.
7.30 consent | 173
conduct did amount to a fraud it would not vitiate V’s consent to the sexual intercourse
because V understood the nature of the act; her ignorance of D’s disease was not enough.
Similarly, in Richardson, 64 it was held that there was no assault occasioning actual bod-
ily harm on patients by a dentist who had given them dental treatment while suspended
from practice (which suspension she had not disclosed to them). The Court of Appeal
held that the ‘identity’ of a person did not include his qualifications or attributes. The
mistake had not been about the identity of the defendant (ie who she was) but about what
she was.
7.29 In Tabassum, 65 the Court of Appeal adopted a more liberal approach than that set
out above. It held that, in addition to a mistake as to identity, a mistake as to the nature
or quality of an act would vitiate an apparent consent. In that case, three women, who
had been asked by D to participate in what he said was a breast cancer survey to enable
him to prepare a soft ware package for sale to doctors, consented to D feeling their naked
breasts (in two cases) and to putting a stethoscope under her bra (in the third case). All
three women gave their consent, wrongly believing that D had either medical qualifica-
tions or relevant training (as he had alleged). None of the women would have allowed
D to touch her if she had known the truth. D was convicted on three counts of indecent
assault on a woman, contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 1956, an offence now replaced by
offences of sexual assault under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Court of Appeal dis-
missed D’s appeal against these convictions. There was no true consent, it held, because
the women ‘were consenting to touching for medical purposes not to indecent behaviour,
that is there was consent to the nature of the act but not its quality’.
The actual decision in Tabassum is acceptable because the women’s mistake related
to the purpose of the acts in question. The problem with the case is the reference to the
fact that a mistake as to ‘quality’ can vitiate consent. The Court of Appeal in Tabassum
does not appear to have realised that it was extending the range of cases in which mistake
can invalidate consent to bodily contact. It is doubtful whether the approach taken by
it would survive an appeal to the House of Lords. In the later case of Dica, 66 where an
HIV-infected man had sexual intercourse with two women, the Court of Appeal stated
that, if the man had concealed his disease, the women would have consented to the bod-
ily contact involved for the purpose of negating the offence of rape. There is a strong case
for saying that the women would have been mistaken as to the quality of the act of bodily
contact.
7.30 A difficulty with the decision in Tabassum is what constitutes the ‘quality’ of an
act.
The Court of Appeal in Tabassum distinguished Clarence on the ground that in
Clarence the wife consented to the sexual intercourse knowing both the nature and qual-
ity of her husband’s act despite the ‘additional unexpected consequences of infection’. It
is admittedly true that a consequence of an act is not appropriately described as a ‘quality’
of it, a term which seems to refer to something co-existing with the act. It is, however,
difficult to accept that the wife’s ignorance of her husband’s sexual disease did not result
in a mistake on her part as to the quality of the act of sexual intercourse.
64 [1999] QB 444, CA. 65 [2000] 2 Cr App R 328, CA. 66 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103.
Likewise, the Court of Appeal in Tabassum distinguished Linekar,67 where it was held
that a prostitute who had been tricked by D’s false pretence that he would pay her for hav-
ing sex with him had validly consented to the intercourse and that D was therefore not
guilty of rape contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 1956, s 1 (since repealed). The Court of
Appeal in Tabassum held that ‘the additional unexpected consequence’ of non-payment
did not detract from the prostitute’s consent.
On the other hand, it may be that the Court of Appeal in Tabassum thought that
Richardson did involve a mistake of quality because it noted that that case had proceeded
solely by reference to whether there was a mistake of identity, and not on whether there
was a mistake as to the nature or quality of the act in question.
Clearly, if Tabassum is correct, the law will need to be developed further by the courts
if we are to be able to understand what makes something a ‘quality’ of an act for present
purposes.
Risk of transmission of disease

7.31 A criticism of the decision in Clarence is that, while it may have been correct in
terms of the issue of consent as to the bodily contact involved, it did not address the issue
of consent as to the risk of grievous bodily harm resulting from the sexual intercourse by
way of a sexually transmitted disease. There is obviously a significant difference in answer
(where V has consented to sexual intercourse in ignorance of the other party’s sexually
transmitted disease) between the question ‘Did V consent to sexual intercourse?’ and the
question ‘Did V consent to the risk of being infected and suffering grievous bodily harm in
consequence?’. While someone who is ignorant of the disease may consent to the inter-
course (bodily contact), it does not mean that that person has consented to run the risk
of grievous bodily harm. This point was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Dica.68
The matter was considered further in Konzani,69 where D, who had the HIV virus,
had sexual intercourse with three women, concealing his disease from them. All three
women were infected with the virus as a result of the intercourse. Upholding D’s convic-
tions for inflicting grievous bodily harm on the women, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 20,
the Court of Appeal said that it was implicit from the reasoning in Dica, and confirmed
by observations in Barnes,70 that for a sexual partner’s consent to the risks of contract-
ing the HIV virus to be valid that partner’s consent must be an informed consent. It
added that concealment by D of the fact that he is suffering from the HIV virus almost
inevitably means that D’s sexual partner is deceived. The sexual partner is not properly
informed, and the sexual partner cannot give an informed consent to something if igno-
rant of it. It would only be in rare circumstances, the Court stated, that there could be an
informed consent by a sexual partner from whom the defendant had concealed his HIV
virus; an example would be where the sexual partner had known D while he was being
treated in the hospital for the HIV virus.
67 [1995] QB 250, CA.

68 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. For criticism see Weait ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v
Dica’ (2005) 68 MLR 121; contrast JR Spencer ‘Retrial for Reckless Infection’ (2004) 154 NLJ 762.
69 [2005] EWCA Crim 706. For criticism see Weait ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani’ [2005]
Crim LR 763. 70 [2004] EWCA Crim 3246.
7.33 consent | 175
Implied consent
7.32 Consent to bodily contact (or even the risk of bodily harm) may be express or
implied in the circumstances. One impliedly consents to the risk of accidental bodily
contact in ordinary activities in the street, in queues or on buses, to name a few places.
Likewise, one impliedly consents to a person seizing one’s hand to shake it in friendship
or to having one’s back slapped (within reason) in congratulation.71 As stated in para 7.9,
someone who participates in a contact sport like football impliedly consents to the risk of
such accidental harm as can reasonably be expected.
Of course, consent cannot be implied if it is clear, by words or conduct, that the victim
is positively not consenting or would refuse consent if asked.
7.33 A drawback with the concept of implied consent is that consent cannot be implied
if the victim is mentally incapable, on grounds of youth or mental incompetence, of giv-
ing consent.72 For this reason, a test put forward by Lord Goff (Robert Goff LJ, as he then
was), when giving the judgment of the Divisional Court in Collins v Wilcock, has much to
commend it. His Lordship said:
‘Generally speaking, consent is a defence to battery; and most of the physical contacts of
ordinary life are not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move
in society and expose themselves to the risk of bodily contact. So nobody can complain of
the jostling which is inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an under-
ground station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his hand
is seized in friendship, or even if his back is (within reason) slapped . . . Although such cases
are regarded as examples of implied consent, it is more common nowadays to treat them as
falling within a general exception embracing all physical contact which is generally accept-
able in the ordinary conduct of daily life.73 Among such forms of conduct . . . is touching a
person for the purpose of engaging his attention, though of course using no greater degree
of physical contact than is reasonably necessary in the circumstances for that purpose.’74
Lord Goff repeated this view in Re F.75 Lord Goff ’s test of ‘social acceptability’ has the
effect of widening the range of cases in which force is not unlawful in other ways beyond
that cited above. For example, it can cover a second touching of someone who has not
indicated a consent. In Collins v Wilcock, Lord Goff said:
‘We do not say that more than one touch is never permitted; for example, the lost or dis-
tressed may surely be permitted a second touch, or possibly even more, on a reluctant or
impervious sleeve, as may a person who is acting reasonably in the execution of a duty.
In each case the test must be whether the physical conduct so persisted in has in the
71 Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod Rep 149; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 378. On the other hand, eg, a
teacher at a school for children with special needs including behavioural problems does not impliedly consent
to the use of violence against him by the children: H v CPS [2010] EWHC 1374 (Admin), DC.
72 For recognition of this, see T v T [1988] Fam 52 at 62.
73 Surgical operations and medical treatment do not fall within this phrase: T v T [1988] Fam 52 at 66; Re F
[1990] 2 AC 1 at 73, per Lord Goff.
74 [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 378. 75 [1990] 2 AC 1 at 72.
circumstances gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct; and the answer to
that question will depend on the facts of the particular case.’76
Lord Goff ’s ‘social acceptability’ test was applied by the Divisional Court in McMillan v
Crown Prosecution Service,77 where it was held that physical contact for the purposes of
steadying a drunken person fell within the bounds of what was generally acceptable in
the ordinary conduct of daily life.
Whether the physical contact goes beyond what is acceptable in the ordinary conduct
of daily life is for the jury or magistrates,78 as the case may be.
Assault and battery
Key points 7.4

Assault and battery are separate offences.
• A person is guilty of an assault if he intentionally or recklessly causes another person

to apprehend the application to his body of immediate, unlawful force.
• A person is guilty of battery if he intentionally or recklessly applies unlawful force to
the body of another person.
7.34 Assault and battery are the most minor offences in a scale of non-fatal offences, of
which the most serious are wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent.
Assault and battery were originally common law offences, triable only on indictment
as common assault. However, according to DPP v Taylor; DPP v Little,79 since 1861 assault
and battery have been statutory offences. A contrary view, viz that battery (and, by impli-
cation, assault) remains a common law offence, was taken in Haystead v Chief Constable
of Derbyshire, 80 where DPP v Taylor; DPP v Little was not referred to by the court. There
is much to be said for this view. The definition of the two offences is provided by the
common law; all that statute, currently the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 39, does is to pro-
vide for their mode of trial and maximum sentence. However, the view in DPP v Taylor;
DPP v Little forms part of the ratio decidendi, whereas the statement in Haystead v Chief
Constable of Derbyshire was only obiter.
7.35 By the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 39, assault and battery (described by the section
as ‘common assault and battery’ but generally described simply, and misleadingly, as
‘assault’ or ‘common assault’)81 are purely summary offences. The maximum punishment
76 [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 378. 77 [2008] EWHC 1457 (Admin), DC.

78 Mepstead v DPP (1995) 160 JP 475, DC. 79 [1992] QB 645, DC.
80 [2000] 3 All ER 890, DC.
81 They are so described, eg, in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 40, as recognised by the Court of Appeal in
Lynsey [1995] 3 All ER 654.
7.37 assault and battery | 177
is six months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.82
However, by the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 40(1), a count charging a person with assault
(or a count charging battery) may be included in an indictment if the charge:
• is founded on the same facts or evidence as a count charging an indictable offence;
or
• is part of a series of offences of the same or similar character as an indictable offence
which is also charged,
but only if (in either case) the facts or evidence relating to the offence were disclosed to the
person charged in material served on him as required.
If a count for assault or for battery is included in an indictment under s 40 of the 1988
Act, the maximum punishment available on conviction is limited to the maximum for
the offence available in a magistrates’ court. 83
7.36 Assault and battery are separate offences, and for that reason a conviction of ‘assault
and battery’ or of ‘assault or battery’ will be quashed because of the rule against duplicity,
viz that a person cannot be convicted on a count, information or written charge which
alleges more than one offence or alternative offences.84 Somewhat confusingly, a charge
of battery is formulated as one of ‘assault by beating’.85
A person is guilty of an assault if he intentionally or recklessly causes another person
to apprehend the application to his body of immediate, unlawful force; for this reason
the assault is sometimes referred to as ‘psychic assault’. A person is guilty of battery if
he intentionally or recklessly applies unlawful force to the body of another person. 86
A battery generally includes an assault but this is not always so. Someone who hit
another without having previously caused him to fear that unlawful force was about to be
used against him, for example, because he had crept up behind him or because the victim
was asleep, would commit battery even though no assault had been committed.
Actus reus of assault

7.37 The actus reus of assault is causing87 V to apprehend the immediate application
of unlawful force to his body; for what constitutes ‘force to the body’, see para 7.43. A
mere omission to act which creates such an apprehension is generally not enough.88
The only exception is where D has created or contributed to a dangerous situation (even
inadvertently) in which case D is under a duty to take such steps as lie within D’s power to
82 The maximum imprisonment will be increased to 51 weeks if, and when, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s
281(4) and (5) comes into force.
83 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 40(2).
84 Jones v Sherwood [1942] 1 KB 127, DC; DPP v Taylor; DPP v Little [1992] QB 645, DC.
85 A phrase suggested in DPP v Taylor; DPP v Little.
86 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 1 QB 439, DC; Venna [1976] QB 421, CA; Kimber [1983] 3 All ER
316, CA; Savage; Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699, HL; Ireland [1998] AC 147, HL.
87 The rules of causation are described in paras 2.28–2.61.
88 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 1 QB 439, DC.
counteract the danger, and a failure (with the appropriate mens rea) to do so can suffice if
it results in the necessary apprehension.89
An assault can be committed by words alone if they cause the necessary apprehen-
sion. Until 1997 it was a moot point whether they could, but the matter was resolved in
the decision of the House of Lords in Ireland90 where the same view was taken as had
been taken earlier in that year by the Court of Appeal in Constanza,91 viz that mere words
alone can suffice for an assault. In both cases the view was also taken that an assault can
be committed even though V cannot see D, as where a threat is made in total darkness or
over the telephone. Even silence can suffice if it has the necessary result, as it can in the
case of a ‘silent telephone call’.92 In Constanza, the Court of Appeal stressed that what is
important for the prosecution to prove is what is in V’s mind:
‘how it got there, whether by seeing an action or hearing a threat and whether that threat
was conveyed verbally through words spoken either directly in the presence of [V] or over
the telephone or whether the fear was aroused through something written whether it be a
letter or fax seems to us wholly irrelevant’.93
These words indicate the width of the offence of assault, many applications of which are
also covered by various public order offences and the offences under the Protection from
Harassment Act 1997.94
Apprehension of immediate application of force

7.38 The requirement that the immediate application of force must be apprehended
means that:
• pointing an unloaded gun or an imitation gun at one who is unaware of its harmless-
ness may amount to an assault;95
• inviting another to touch the invitor cannot amount to an assault on the invitee;96
and
• someone may be guilty of assault if he shakes his fist at another in a threatening
manner, although he thereafter is prevented from touching him.97
The question is not whether V is immediately put in fear, but whether D’s conduct causes
V to fear immediate unlawful force. Clearly, if the circumstances are such that there
cannot possibly be any fear that the threats will be carried out immediately, as where a
person on a rapidly moving train shakes his fist at someone who is standing on a station
89 Miller [1983] 2 AC 161, HL; para 2.13. See DPP v Santana-Bermudez [2003] EWHC 2908 (Admin), DC;
para 7.48.
90 [1998] AC 147, HL. 91 [1997] 2 Cr App R 492, CA.
92 Ireland [1998] AC 147, HL; see especially at 166, per Lord Hope.
93 [1997] 2 Cr App R 492 at 495. 94 See paras 7.143 and 7.144.
95 St George (1840) 9 C & P 483; Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121, DC; cf James (1844) 1 Car & Kir 530;
Kwaku Mensah v R [1946] AC 83, PC.
96 Fairclough v Whipp [1951] 2 All ER 834, DC.
97 Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C & P 349.
platform, there is no assault. Moreover, the threatening gesture may be accompanied by

words indicating that there is no intention to carry it out, as in the old case of Tuberville
v Savage.98 There, a man put his hand menacingly upon his sword but said ‘If it were
not assize time I’d run you through the body’; it was held that an assault had not been
committed.
7.39 The importance of the requirement that immediate unlawful force must be appre-
hended is reduced by the fact that the courts have taken a generous view of what is
‘immediate’. For example, in Smith v Chief Superintendent, Woking Police Station,99 it
was held that it had been open to magistrates to infer that a woman, who had been fright-
ened (as D had intended) by seeing D looking at her through the window of her bed-
sitting room at 11pm, had apprehended the immediate application of force.
In this case there was physical proximity between D and the woman such that she
could have feared that he would then and there apply force to her. More extreme examples
are provided by two later cases involving ‘stalking’: Constanza100 and Ireland.101 In both
cases the female victims suffered psychiatric harm: in Constanza as a result of repeated
telephone calls (in some of which D spoke and in others he kept silent), of over 800 letters
and of other unusual behaviour by him; and in Ireland as a result of repeated telephone
calls in which D remained silent. In both cases the defendants were convicted of assault
occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 47, and appealed against
their convictions. Their appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal and House of
Lords respectively.
7.40 In Constanza, where the indictment indicated that the assault relied on was con-
stituted by the last letter, the Court of Appeal held that the judge was entitled to leave to
the jury the question whether or not the woman had a fear of immediate violence, and
that the jury were entitled to find that she had. It emphasised that D, who was known to
the woman, lived near her and she thought that something could happen at any time.
In a curious statement, the Court of Appeal, albeit accepting the requirement of the
apprehension of immediate force, said that it was enough if the prosecution proved a
fear of force ‘at some time not excluding the immediate future’. This rather ambiguous
statement cannot mean that a fear of force some time in the distant future can suffice,
because this would deprive ‘immediate’ of any meaning. Instead, it must mean that it is
enough that the victim fears force at some time in the future, including the immediate
future.102
7.41 In Ireland’ D had pleaded guilty and therefore, as Lords Slynn and Hope pointed
out, the question as to how the concept of immediacy is to be applied, and whether it was
satisfied in D’s case, did not arise for decision by the House of Lords. Nevertheless, Lord
98 (1669) 1 Mod Rep 3.

99 (1983) 76 Cr App R 234, DC. Also see Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121, DC.
100 [1997] 2 Cr App R 492, CA.
101 [1998] AC 147, HL. See Ormerod and Gunn ‘In Defence of Ireland’ [1997] 3 Web JCLI; Gardner ‘Stalking’
(1998) 114 LQR 33.
102 See commentary by Professor Sir John Smith in [1997] Crim LR 576 at 577.
Steyn, with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, rejected the submission that a tel-
ephone caller, even a silent one, can never be guilty of an assault. Lord Steyn said:
‘The answer to this question [may a silent caller be guilty of an assault?] seems to me to be
“Yes, depending on the facts” . . . After all, there is no reason why a telephone caller who
says to a woman in a menacing way “I will be at your door in a minute or two” may not
be guilty of an assault if he causes his victim to apprehend immediate personal violence.
Take now the case of the silent caller. He intends by his silence to cause fear and he is so
understood. The victim is assailed by uncertainty about his intentions. Fear may domi-
nate her emotions, and it may be the fear that the caller’s arrival at her door may be immi-
nent. She may fear the possibilityy of immediate personal violence. As a matter of law the
caller may be guilty of an assault: whether he is or not will depend on the circumstance
and in particular on the impact of the caller’s potentially menacing call or calls on the
victim.’103
It is submitted that Constanza and Ireland went too far in their liberal interpretation of
the concept of apprehending immediate force. The dictionary definition of ‘immedi-
ate’ suggests that what must be apprehended is the application of force without delay,
as where the victim fl inches at, or seeks to dodge, the force which he apprehends as the
result of the defendant’s act. What was said on the point in the two decisions seems to
equate ‘immediate’ with ‘imminent’, ie ‘liable to happen soon’, a less stringent test.104
Indeed, in his speech in Ireland Lord Steyn twice referred to the issue in terms of whether
the defendant had caused the victim to apprehend an imminent application of force. In
fact, on the second occasion, he thought that a fear of the possibility of imminent force
would suffice.
7.42 The view taken in Constanza and by Lord Steyn in Ireland was doubtless influ-
enced by a desire that the criminal law should punish ‘stalkers’. With this all would
agree, but achieving this result by the extension of assault is questionable. A number
of offences can cover stalking, and by the time that Ireland was decided by the House
of Lords an offence primarily designed to deal with stalking was in force under the
Protection from Harassment Act 1997.105 Cases of stalking are now generally dealt with
under the 1997 Act, but the views expressed in the above two cases are of general appli-
cation. One may question the appropriateness of the courts, as opposed to Parliament,
enlarging the extent of criminal liability in respect of the making of threats to the
person.
Actus reus of battery

7.43 The actus reus of battery is causing106 the application of unlawful force to the
body of another.
103 [1998] AC 147 at 162.

104 ‘Imminent’ is used in the defi nition of ‘assault’ in the draft Offences against the Person Bill (see
para 7.130).
105 Para 7.143. 106 The rules of causation are described in paras 2.28–2.61.
The application of ‘force’ means the application of ‘strength, energy or violence, as an

attribute of physical action or movement’.107 The slightest degree of force, even mere
touching, will suffice.108 Blackstone justified this by saying that the law cannot distin-
guish between criminal and non-criminal violence and therefore prohibits the lowest
degree of it.109 It is not necessary that the victim should feel the force through his clothes:
a touching of a person’s clothes is the equivalent of touching him.110 In some cases the
courts have used the term ‘violence’ instead of ‘force’ in describing the offences of assault
and battery,111 but this does not indicate any difference in degree in what is required. The
force applied does not have to be personal contact. Consequently, for example, throwing
water (or swinging a weapon or releasing a dog) at someone112 can be a battery if the water
(or weapon or dog) makes contact with him.113
Without the application, however, of some force there cannot be a battery. Thus, it has
been held that D who put Spanish fly (a toxic substance, sometimes taken as an aphro-
disiac) into the guests’ beer at a wedding reception was not guilty of a battery.114 (Such
conduct could, however, result in a conviction for the offence of causing a noxious thing
to be taken with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 24.)
Likewise, causing someone psychiatric harm by a threat does not constitute a battery115
because it does not involve the application of any force to the victim, although – depend-
ing on the circumstances (see paras 7.39–7.41) – it may constitute an assault. Similarly,
the use of force merely to pull away from another does not constitute a battery.116
Direct or indirect application

7.44 The force may be applied directly, which requires that the assailant has direct physi-
cal contact with the victim, for example, hitting the victim with a fist or cosh, or throwing
a stone at him, or treading or driving on to his foot,117 or indirectly.
7.45 Force will be applied indirectly for this purpose where D creates an obstruction or
places an object or does something else which results in force being applied to V when V
(unaware of what D has done) does an act. Examples are where V falls into a hole which D
has dug,118 or where V is hit by a bucket of water, placed by D on top of a door as a ‘booby
trap’, when V opens the door, or where D causes a theatre audience to panic and rush
107 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Th is was the meaning given to ‘force’ in relation to the statutory power
to enter premises by force to arrest someone in Swales v Cox [1981] QB 849, DC.
108 Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod Rep 149.
109 Blackstone 4 Commentaries (1769) 217, referring to 3 Commentaries (1768) 120.
110 Thomas (1985) 81 Cr App R 331 at 334.
111 Eg Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 1 QB 439, DC; Kimber [1983] 3 All ER 316, CA; Savage;
Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699, HL.
112 Pursell v Horn (1838) 8 Ad & El 602.
113 If the water, weapon or dog misses, there could be an assault.
114 Walkden (1845) 1 Cox CC 282.
115 Ireland [1998] AC 147 at 161, per Lord Steyn.
116 Sherriff [1969] Crim LR 260, CA.
117 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 1 QB 439, DC.
118 Th is last example was given by Stephen J in Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23, CCR.
down an unlighted staircase across whose exit doorway D has placed an iron bar and
against which those at the front of the crowd are injured.119
DPP v K120 provides a modern authority that a battery can be committed by an indi-
rect application of force. D, a schoolboy had been carrying out an experiment using sul-
phuric acid during a chemistry class. D was given permission to go to the toilet to wash
some acid off his hand. He surreptitiously took with him a test tube of the acid to test its
reaction on toilet paper. While D was in the toilet he heard some footsteps in the cor-
ridor. In a panic D poured the acid into a hot air drier to conceal it. D then returned to
class, intending to remove the acid from the drier and to wash it out. Before D could do
so, another pupil used the drier and had acid squirted in his face; he was permanently
scarred. The Divisional Court held that D was guilty of assault occasioning actual bodily
harm, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 47.121 It had no doubt that, if a defendant placed acid
in a machine and the acid was ejected on to the next user of the machine, the defendant
(provided that he had the appropriate mens rea at the time of his act) would commit a bat-
tery on the next user just as if the defendant had himself switched on the machine.
A more recent affirmation that there can be a battery by the indirect application of force
is provided by a statement to that effect in Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire.122
The statement was, however, obiter because on the facts there was a direct application
of force. D hit a woman who was holding a baby, causing her to drop the baby onto the
floor. The Divisional Court dismissed D’s appeal against conviction for a battery on the
baby. There was a clear causal link123 between D’s act and the consequence that force was
applied to the baby when it hit the floor, and the Divisional Court saw no difference in
logic or good sense in terms of actus reus between the facts of this case and one where D
might have used a weapon to fell the baby to the floor.
It has been argued124 that the decisions in favour of battery by an indirect application
of force are inconsistent with the apparent approval by the House of Lords in Wilson125
of a passage in Salisbury,126 an Australian case which implicitly asserted that an indirect
application of force could not suffice. However, neither of these cases was concerned with
defining what constitutes a battery (so that the implicit assertion was obiter).
Can a battery be committed by an omission to act?

7.46 In Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr,127 the Divisional Court was adamant that a
mere omission to act which results in force to another, eg failing to stop a baby from fall-
ing from a height to the floor or failing to remove an obstruction in a darkened corridor,
over which V trips, will not suffice for battery. However, the decisions of the Divisional
119 Stephen J in Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23, CCR, referring to Martin (1881) 8 QBD 54, CCR (this case concerned
an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 20, which at the time required proof of
an assault or battery (see para 7.81)). Contrast the view taken of Martin in Clarence, per Hawkins J (dissenting).
120 [1990] 1 All ER 331, DC. 121 Para 7.55.
122 [2000] 3 All ER 890, DC
123 The woman’s involuntary dropping of the child would not have broken the causal link: para 2.43.
124 Hirst ‘Assault, Battery and Indirect Violence’ [1999] Crim LR 557.
125 [1984] AC 242, HL (para 7.81).
126 [1976] VR 452, (1983) 76 Cr App R 261n, SC of Victoria.
127 [1969] 1 QB 439, DC.
Court in DPP v K128 and DPP v Santana-Bermudez129 indicate that liability may be based
on an omission (with the appropriate mens rea) to take such steps as lie within his
power to counteract a dangerous situation created (even if inadvertently) by D himself.
This is an application of the principle in Miller, discussed in para 2.13, which also applies
where D contributed to the dangerous situation.
7.47 In DPP v K, the Divisional Court recognised that if D had lacked the appropriate
mens rea at the time of his act, but realised the risk before V was hit by the acid, liability
for battery could be based on an omission by D (with mens rea) to rectify the inadvert-
ently created dangerous situation.
7.48 In DPP v Santana-Bermudez, a police officer, V, approached D and told him that
she intended to carry out a full body search. V asked him to turn out his pockets. He did
so and produced some syringes without needles. V asked D if he had any needles on him
and he replied ‘No’. When V searched one of D’s pockets her finger was pierced by a hypo-
dermic needle, at which D smirked. D was convicted by a magistrates’ court of assault
occasioning actual bodily harm but appealed successfully to the Crown Court, which
ruled that there was no case to answer because an omission to act could not amount to
an assault or battery. On an appeal to the Divisional Court by the prosecution, the only
question was whether the Crown Court had been correct in law in concluding that there
was no evidence that D had committed the actus reus of an assault or battery.
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal. Applying Miller and DPP v K, it held that
where D (by act or word or a combination of the two) creates a danger and thereby exposes
someone to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury which materialises, there is an eviden-
tial basis for the actus reus of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm (and therefore for
the assault or battery required for such an offence). The offence would be committed if D
had the necessary mens rea at the time of the failure to counteract the danger. On the facts
of the case, the Divisional Court held, D, by giving V a dishonest assurance about the
contents of his pockets, thereby exposed her to a reasonably foreseeable risk of the injury
which materialised. Clearly, D had failed to counteract a danger, which his assurance had
created, by not warning V not to put her hand in the pocket.
7.49 In the light of the emphatic statement in Fagan that a mere omission will not suffice for
a battery, it would seem that an omission to fulfil a legal duty other than that arising under
the Miller principle cannot constitute a battery if force to another results from it.130 This is
not easy to understand in the light of the fact that, if someone died from the force in such a
case, the person who had failed to act in breach of duty could be convicted of murder or man-
slaughter if his omission to act was accompanied by the mens rea for one of those offences.
Unlawful force
7.50 A threat or use of force cannot constitute an assault or a battery if the force threat-
ened or used is lawful. It will be lawful if one of the following justifications apply:
128 [1990] 1 All ER 331, DC. 129 [2003] EWHC 2908 (Admin), DC.
130 Contrast the view of Harrison and Bell ‘Assaulting our Common Sense’ (1990) 53 MLR 518 at 522–523.
• V validly consents to it;131

• D threatens or uses reasonable force in public or private defence, as where D threat-
ens or uses reasonable force in self-defence, the defence of another or of property, the
prevention of crime or the furtherance of lawful arrest;132
• in very limited circumstances, D’s conduct is justified by the principle of necessity133
or by self-help;134
• D is acting under statutory authority to use the force;135 or
• D is acting in the exercise of the power to use force to discipline a child.
D does not have to prove that the force used or threatened was lawful on one of these
grounds. Instead, if, but only if, there is evidence that it may have been, D must be acquit-
ted unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the force was not lawful
under the relevant rules of law.136
7.51 Parents137 and other persons in loco parentis are entitled as a disciplinary meas-
ure138 to apply a reasonable degree of force to their children or charges old enough to
understand its purpose.139 However, this power is severely limited by the Children Act
2004, s 58(1) and (2), which provides that, in relation to the following offences:
(a) wounding, or causing grievous bodily harm with intent, or unlawful wounding or
infliction of grievous bodily harm;140
(b) assault occasioning actual bodily harm;141
(c) cruelty to a person under 16,142
battery143 of a child cannot be justified on the ground that it constituted reasonable pun-
ishment. In addition, battery of a child causing actual bodily harm144 cannot be justified
in any civil proceedings on the ground that it constituted reasonable punishment.145 The
131 Paras 7.1–7.33. 132 Paras 16.2–16.34. 133 Paras 16.87–16.99.

134 Para 16.39.
135 See, eg, the Education and Inspections Act 2006, s 93 (para 7.51).
136 Para 16.12; May [1912] 3 KB 572 at 575, per Lord Alverstone CJ; Smith [1985] LS Gaz R 198, CA. If the issue
of consent is raised, lack of consent may be inferred from evidence other than that given by V: CPS v Shabbir
[2009] EWHC 2754 (Admin), DC.
137 A father who was not married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth is not a ‘parent’ for this pur-
pose, unless he has subsequently acquired parental responsibility (ie parental rights, duties etc) and not ceased
to have it: Children Act 1989, s 2.
138 Cleary v Booth [1893] 1 QB 465; Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 at 509; Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453, CA.
139 Griffin (1869) 11 Cox CC 402. When considering the question of reasonableness a jury or magistrates’
court must consider: the nature and context of D’s behaviour; the duration of the behaviour; the physical and
mental consequences for the child; the child’s age and personal characteristics, and D’s reasons for administer-
ing the punishment: H (assault of child: reasonable chastisement) [2001] EWCA Crim 1024, decided before the
Children Act 2004, s 58, relying on factors identified in A v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 611, ECtHR.
140 Ie an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 18 or s 20; see paras 7.90 and 7.75 respectively.
141 Ie an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 47; see para 7.55.
142 Ie an offence under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 1.
143 See para 7.36.
144 ’Actual bodily harm’ has the same meaning as it has for the purposes of the OAPA 1861, s 47; see paras
7.57–7.60. 145 Children Act 2004, s 58(3).
result of these provisions is that, for the purposes of both criminal law and civil law, the
justification of reasonable chastisement is not available if the physical punishment results
in actual bodily harm but is available if such harm is not caused, as in the case of transient
and trifling harm resulting from a moderate slap.
A teacher or other member of staff at a school is no longer entitled by virtue of his
position as such to apply corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure.146
The prohibition of corporal punishment by teachers does not affect the power of
members of staff of a school to use reasonable force to restrain a pupil from:
• committing an offence or continuing to do so;
• causing or continuing to cause personal injury or damage to property; or
• behaving or continuing to behave in a way prejudicial to good order and discipline
at the school or among its pupils.
Th is power, originally based on the common law, is now conferred by the Education
and Inspections Act 2006, s 93.147 The power under s 93 may be exercised only where
the member of staff and the pupil are on school premises or are elsewhere and the
member of staff has lawful control or charge of the pupil. It permits teachers and other
members of staff to use reasonable force to break up playground fights or to quell
classroom disruption or disruption on a school trip, for example, but it expressly does
not authorise anything to be done in relation to a pupil which constitutes corporal
punishment.
Mens rea in assault and battery

7.52 An intention to injure is not required, nor need D act with any sort of hostile state
of mind. Instead what must be proved is that D:
• in the case of an assault, intended to cause another person to apprehend the
immediate application to his body of unlawful force, or was reckless as to whether
another person might so apprehend;148
• in the case of a battery, intended to apply unlawful force to the body of another
person, or was reckless as to whether such force might be applied.149
It follows, for example, that if D lays hands on V, whom he wrongly believes is consent-
ing to a piece of innocent horseplay, D must be acquitted of committing an assault or a
battery.150 In relation to a battery, the reason is that, while D intends to apply force to
146 Education Act 1996, s 548, as substituted by the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, s 131.
147 The Education and Inspections Act 2006, s 165 (not yet in force in Wales) inserts a provision (s 85C) in the
Further and Higher Education Act 1992 corresponding to s 93 in respect of a member of staff of an institution
within the further education sector.
148 Fagan v Metropolitan Police Comr [1969] 1 QB 439, DC; Venna [1976] QB 421, CA; Kimber [1983] 3 All
ER 316, CA.
149 Venna above; Kimber above; Gladstone Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411, CA; D v DPP [2005] EWHC 967
(Admin), DC.
150 Jones (1986) 83 Cr App R 375, CA; Aitken [1992] 1 WLR 1006, C-MAC (as to this court see para 2.32, n 98);
Boyea (1992) 156 JP 505, CA; Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328, CA.
V, he does not (because of his mistake as to V’s consent) intend to apply unlawful force
to V, nor is he reckless as to this.151 (Similar reasoning applies in relation to an assault.)
The same would be true if D hit V, wrongly believing that he must do so in self-defence,
provided his force was reasonable on the facts as he believed them.152 On the other hand,
if D, a sexual pervert, beats V severely and causes actual bodily harm, wrongly believing
that V is consenting, D can be convicted because, even if V had consented, the consent
would have been invalid and therefore D would not merely have intended to apply force
but would have intended to apply force which was unlawful on the facts as he understood
them.
Element of hostility
7.53 It was said in para 7.52 that there is no need for a hostile state of mind. An
embrace by a rejected lover may be a battery.153 Th is is true despite its apparent con-
tradiction in the civil case of Wilson v Pringle154 where the Court of Appeal held that
for a battery ‘touching must be proved to be a hostile touching’. However, it seems
that this does not require a hostile state of mind, since the Court of Appeal said that
‘hostile’
‘cannot be equated with ill-will or malevolence. It cannot be governed by the obvious

intention shown in acts like punching, stabbing or shooting. It cannot be governed solely
by an expressed intention, although that may be strong evidence. But the element of hos-
tility . . . must be a question of fact.’155
Unfortunately, having said what ‘hostility’ does not mean, the Court of Appeal said little
about what it does mean. Indeed, it provided only one example of its meaning, stating
that in Collins v Wilcock,156 where a police officer touched a woman, intending simply
to restrain her temporarily, there was a hostile touching because the officer was acting
unlawfully, having no power to restrain her.
In Brown,157 the majority of the House of Lords seem to have accepted that ‘hostility’
is required for a battery, but the interpretation which they gave to it, that if an act was
unlawful it was hostile, is circular and adds nothing to the law.
In Re F,158 Lord Goff doubted that it was correct that a touching had to be hostile for
it to amount to a battery, and in Faulkner v Talbot159 Lord Lane CJ denied the need for
hostility.
In the light of the above, the reference in Wilson v Pringle to hostility is redundant and
is merely another way of saying that the use of force must be unlawful.
151 Kimber [1983] 3 All ER 316, CA; K [2001] UKHL 41.

152 Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA.
153 Depending on the facts, it may also constitute a sexual assault, para 9.45.
154 [1986] 2 All ER 440, CA. 155 Ibid at 447–448.
156 [1984] 3 All ER 374, DC. 157 [1994] 1 AC 212, HL.
158 [1990] 2 AC 1 at 73. See also Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 378, per Robert Goff LJ.
159 [1981] 3 All ER 468 at 471. In T v T [1988] Fam 52, Wood J did not regard a requirement of a hostile act
with favour.
7.57 aggravated assaults | 187
Aggravated assaults
Key points 7.5

There are several statutory offences of assault which by virtue of defined aggravating
elements are generally subject to higher penalties than common assault and battery.
Common offences of aggravated assault include assault occasioning actual bodily harm,
assault with intent to resist arrest and assault on a constable in the execution of his duty.
7.54 ‘Assault’ in offences of aggravated assault is not limited to an assault in its strict
sense but also includes a battery.160 It follows from the fact that assault and battery are
separate offences that each offence of ‘aggravated assault’ involves two separate offences:
aggravated assault in its strict sense and aggravated battery. For convenience, ‘aggravated
assault’ will be used to describe both types of offence.
Offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm

7.55 These are governed by the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861), s
47, which simply makes it an offence to commit ‘any assault occasioning actual bodily
harm’. These offences are triable either way161 and punishable with a maximum of five
years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.
Actus reus
7.56 The prosecution must prove the commission of the actus reus of an assault or bat-
tery, as the case may be, and that that assault or battery caused162 actual bodily harm.
Actual bodily harm

7.57 In Donovan,163 the Court of Criminal Appeal stated that:
‘ “bodily harm” has its ordinary meaning and includes any hurt or injury calculated to
interfere with health or comfort of the victim. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent
but must, no doubt, be more than merely transient and trifling.’164
The essence of the first of these two sentences was given by way of definition of actual
bodily harm by Lynskey J in Miller.165 The effect of the second sentence in the quotation
from Donovan is to exclude from being actual bodily harm, harm which is both transient
and trifling, and not simply harm which is transient or trifling.166
160 DPP v Taylor; DPP v Little [1992] QB 645, DC. Cf Notman [1994] Crim LR 518, CA, and commentary.
161 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1.
163 [1934] 2 KB 498, CCA. 164 Ibid at 509. 165 [1954] 2 QB 282 at 292.
166 T v DPP [2003] EWHC 266 (Admin), Maurice Kay J.
7.58 The meaning of ‘actual bodily harm’ was explained further by the Court of Appeal
in Chan-Fook.167 The Court held that ‘harm’ is a synonym for ‘injury’ (so that it would
not be enough that the victim’s health or comfort had been interfered with, if no injury
had been caused), and that ‘actual’ indicates that the injury should not be so trivial as to
be wholly insignificant (although there was no need for it to be permanent). The Court
of Appeal also held that ‘bodily harm’ is not limited to harm to the skin, flesh and bones
of the victim. The body of the victim includes all parts of his body, including his organs,
his nervous system and his brain. Bodily harm, therefore, it held, includes injury to any
of those parts of his body responsible for his mental or other faculties. Accordingly, it
held, ‘actual bodily harm’ is capable of including an identifiable psychiatric injury, ie
a medically recognised illness (such as post-traumatic stress disorder, or battered wife
syndrome, or reactive depression), but not panic or a hysterical or nervous condition.168
The Court of Appeal stated that, where psychiatric injury was alleged but not admitted
by the defence, the question whether or not the assault occasioned psychiatric injury
should not be left to the jury in the absence of expert evidence.169 In Ireland,170 the House
of Lords held that Chan-Fook was correctly decided; psychiatric injury could amount to
actual bodily harm. Lord Steyn, with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, said that
the OAPA 1861 had to be interpreted in the light of the current scientific appreciation of
the link between the body and psychiatric injury.171
In Dhaliwal,172 the Court of Appeal, applying the statements in Chan-Fook and Ireland,
declined to hold that a psychological injury not amounting to an identifiable psychiatric
injury could constitute bodily harm. It stated that the distinction, between an identifi-
able psychiatric injury and any other psychological condition, drawn in respect of the
criminal law was consistent with the civil law in respect of claims for damages for per-
sonal injury. It considered that to extend ‘bodily harm’ to cover a medically diagnosed
psychological condition not resulting in an identifiable psychiatric injury, as the prosecu-
tion had argued, would introduce an element of uncertainty about the true ambit of the
relevant legal principle to which the concept of ‘bodily harm’ in the OAPA 1861 applied.
This would be compounded by the inevitable problems of conflicting medical opinion in
a developing area.
7.59 Further clarification of ‘actual bodily harm’ has been given in two subsequent
cases.
In T v DPP,173 it was held in the Administrative Court by Maurice Kay J (as he then
was) that loss of consciousness falls within the meaning of ‘harm’, because it involves an
injurious impairment to the victim’s sensory functions. His Lordship added that it was
axiomatic that, even though the loss of consciousness was momentary, the bodily harm
was ‘actual’.
167 [1994] 2 All ER 552, CA.

168 Lynskey J’s ruling in Miller [1954] 2 QB 282 at 292 that an hysterical or nervous condition was within the
defi nition of actual bodily harm does not therefore represent the law today.
169 Also see Morris [1998] 1 Cr App R 386, CA.
170 [1998] AC 147, HL. 171 [1998] AC 147 at 158.
172 [2006] EWCA Crim 1139 (reported elsewhere as D). 173 [2003] EWHC 266 (Admin).
In DPP v Smith (Michael),174 the Divisional Court held that ‘harm’ is not limited to
‘injury’ but extends to ‘hurt’ or ‘damage’ and that ‘bodily’ meant ‘concerned with the
body’ in the sense defined in Chan Fook. It followed, it said, that physical pain consequent
on an assault is not a requirement. It concluded that a person’s hair is an attribute and
part of the human body, and that therefore D’s actions in cutting off a substantial part of
his former girlfriend’s hair (her pony tail) without her consent were capable of amount-
ing to an assault occasioning actual bodily harm. This does not mean that any cutting of
hair will always amount to actual bodily harm; a substantial amount would have to be cut
for there to be actual (as opposed to trivial) bodily harm.
7.60 The test of ‘actual bodily harm’ sets a low threshold for an offence under the OAPA
1861, s 47, given that it carries a maximum of five years’ imprisonment. In practice charges
of a s 47 offence may be inhibited in marginal cases by the Charging Standard for s 47,175
agreed by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, which does not, however, have
any legal force. The Charging Standard states that s 47 should be charged where there is
loss or breaking of a tooth, temporary loss of sensory function, which may include loss
of consciousness, extensive or multiple bruising, displaced broken nose, minor fractures,
minor, but not merely superficial, cuts probably requiring medical attention (eg stitches),
and psychiatric injury. The Charging Standard also states that although any injury that
is more than transient or trifling can be classified as actual bodily harm, the appropriate
charge will normally be contrary to the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 39 (assault or bat-
tery) where injuries amount to no more than the following – grazes, scratches, abrasions,
minor bruising, swelling, reddening of the skin, superficial cuts or a ‘black eye’.
Mens rea
7.61 Although D’s assault or battery must have been causally related to the actual bodily
harm, the mens rea required to be proved is simply that for assault or battery, as the case
may be, and bodily harm to another does not have to have been intended or foreseen as
a risk by D. Authority for this proposition of law was originally provided by the decision
of the Court of Appeal in Roberts,176 whose facts are set out in para 2.52. Rejecting an
argument that the jury should have been directed to consider whether D foresaw that V
would suffer injury, the Court of Appeal said that the only issue was one of causation.
The view taken by the Court of Appeal in Roberts was confirmed by the House of Lords
in 1991 in Savage,177 where D committed a battery on V, a former girlfriend of D’s husband,
when she threw a pint of beer over her. Not only was V soaked, but she was also cut by a
piece of flying glass, because D had let go of the glass and it had shattered. It was not clear
whether D had deliberately thrown the glass or whether it had accidentally slipped from
her grasp. The question for the House of Lords was whether a s 47 offence would only have
174 [2006] EWHC 94 (Admin), DC.

175 Crown Prosecution Service Offences against the Person, incorporating the Charging Standard available at
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/offences_against_the_person/#P189_1438. The aim of the Standard is to
improve fairness to defendants, through greater uniformity of approach to charging, and to make the criminal
justice system more efficient by ensuring that appropriate charges are laid at the start of the process. It is difficult
to assess its practical effect.
176 (1971) 56 Cr App R 95, CA. 177 [1992] 1 AC 699, HL.
been established if it was proved that D had foreseen the risk of bodily harm resulting
from the battery. The House of Lords, approving Roberts, answered ‘no’; the prosecution
did not have to prove that a person charged with an offence under s 47 intended to cause
some actual bodily harm or was reckless as to whether such harm would be caused. The
policy behind this lack of correspondence between the consequence which the defendant
must have occasioned in order to commit the actus reus and the mens rea which must be
proved was not explained by the House of Lords.
Offences of assault with intent to resist arrest

7.62 The OAPA 1861, s 38 makes it an offence for someone to ‘assault any person with
intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of himself or of any other
person for any offence’. An offence under s 38 is triable either way178 and punishable with
a maximum of two years’ imprisonment. D must be proved to have committed the actus
reus of an assault or battery, as the case may be, with the appropriate mens rea for that
offence and with the requisite intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or
detainer of himself or another.
7.63 The lawful arrest which D must intend to resist or prevent is required to be for an
offence. Consequently, it is not an offence under s 38 to assault someone with intent to
resist an arrest for a breach of the peace179 or in civil process, although if a wound or seri-
ous harm results there could be a conviction for the major offence under the OAPA 1861,
s 18.180
D will intend to resist lawful arrest if the arrest is lawful and, knowing that the victim
of the assault is trying to arrest him, D intends to resist that arrest.181 A mistake as to
the arrester’s power (ie authority) to arrest him, so that D thinks the arrest is unlawful,
is a mistake of criminal law and irrelevant.182 So, it has been held,183 is a mistaken belief
which leads D to think that the facts do not satisfy the requirements for a lawful arrest, as
where D knows or believes he has not committed an offence.184 Although there are sound
policy grounds for not permitting those who are lawfully arrested, but who think they are
innocent, to challenge the arrest by a threat or use of force, it is doubtful that the mistake
in this type of case is one of law. It looks like a mistake of fact, whose effect is that D does
not intend to resist lawful arrest.
On the other hand, if – because of a mistake as to V’s capacity (eg a mistaken belief that
he is not a police constable) or conduct – D does not know that he is being arrested, for
example because D thinks he is being attacked by a thug, D will lack the intent to resist a
lawful arrest. Here, the mistake is one of fact which prevents D knowing that he is being
arrested.185 If, however, on the facts as D believes them to be, his force (actual or threat-

179 A breach of the peace is not in itself an offence under English law: Williamson v Chief Constable of the
West Midlands [2003] EWCA Civ 337.
180 See paras 7.90–7.94. 181 Lee [2001] 1 Cr App R 293, CA.
182 Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428, CA. 183 Lee [2001] 1 Cr App R 293, CA.
184 See further para 16.37.
185 Brightling [1991] Crim LR 364, CA; Lee [2001] 1 Cr App R 293, CA.
ened) is unreasonable, D may be convicted of assault, battery, assault occasioning actual

bodily harm or affray186 (as the circumstances warrant).187
Offences of assault on a constable in the

execution of his duty
7.64 These offences are provided by the Police Act 1996, s 89(1), which re-enacted an
earlier identical offence. Under s 89(1):
‘Any person who assaults a constable in the execution of his duty, or a person assisting a
constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence.’
An offence under s 89(1) is triable only summarily and currently punishable with a max-
imum of six months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale
or both.188
Actus reus
7.65 Proof of the actus reus requires proof of the actus reus of assault, or of battery, as
appropriate, and that the victim was a constable acting in the execution of his duty (or
someone assisting such a constable).
A ‘constable’ is anyone holding the office of constable, whatever his rank in his
force.189
7.66 To be acting in the execution of his duty a constable need not be doing something
which he is compelled by law to do,190 but his conduct must fall within the general scope
of a duty imposed on him by law (such as his duties to protect life and property, to keep
the peace, to prevent and investigate crime and to prevent obstruction of the highway)
and he must not be acting unlawfully at the time.191 The test as to whether a constable
is acting lawfully is objective, with the result that the legality of his conduct is judged on
186 A person is guilty of aff ray if he uses or threatens unlawful violence towards another and his conduct is
such as would cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety: Public
Order Act 1986, s 3(1). The offence is triable either way and punishable on conviction on indictment with a
maximum of three years’ imprisonment: s 3(2).
187 See Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428, CA.
188 Police Act 1996, s 89(1). The maximum imprisonment will be increased to 51 weeks if, and when, the
Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 281(4) and (5) comes into force.
189 By the Police Act 1996, s 89(3), s 89 also applies to a Northern Irish or Scots constable when he is execut-
ing a warrant or otherwise acting in England or Wales under a statutory power to do so. Section 89 also applies
to a constable of the British Transport Police Force in the same way as it applies to other constables in England
and Wales (Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, s 68(1)). A foreign police or customs officer carrying out
surveillance in England and Wales under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, s 76A is treated as if
he were acting as a constable in the execution of his duty: Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, s 84(1).
See also the Energy Act 2004, s 68(1).
190 Coffin v Smith (1980) 71 Cr App R 221, DC.
191 Waterfield and Lynn [1964] 1 QB 164, CCA; Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414 at 419; Ludlow v Burgess [1971]
Crim LR 238, DC; Pedro v Diss [1981] 2 All ER 59, DC; Edwards v DPP (1993) 97 Cr App R 301, DC.
the facts as they actually were and not on the facts as the constable mistakenly believed
them to be.192
It frequently happens that a constable performing one of his duties does something to
a person or his property, such as detaining him or entering his house without consent to
search it, which would be unlawful unless authorised by a positive legal power. In such
a case, the question arises whether he has such a power (either at common law or under
a statute) and, if he has, whether he has exercised it correctly and without exceeding it;
if his conduct does not fall within the proper execution of a power he is not acting in the
execution of his duty.193 For example, as a constable has no power physically to detain
a person for questioning without making an arrest, he will be acting unlawfully194 and
therefore not in the execution of his duty if he does so.195 On the other hand, since physi-
cal contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of everyday life is not
unlawful,196 taking hold of a person’s arm or tapping him on the shoulder not in order to
detain him, but to speak to him or draw something to his attention, does not take a con-
stable outside the execution of his duty because his act is not unlawful.197 Turning to cases
where a constable does have a relevant power but fails to exercise it correctly, an arrest
without warrant in circumstances where the constable has such a power is nevertheless
unlawful, generally speaking, if he does not inform the person of his reasons,198 and the
same is true if he exercises a power of search without giving his reasons.199
Where a constable has acted unlawfully, eg by making an unlawful stop, it does not fol-
low that the constable’s subsequent exercise of his powers is also unlawful (and therefore
outside the execution of the constable’s duty).200
If a constable purports to exercise some power which he does not possess or makes an
improper use of one of his powers and therefore is not acting in the execution of his duty,
the threat or use of force against him, eg to escape an unlawful detention for question-
ing, is not an assault on him in the execution of his duty.201 However, if force is used or
threatened in order to escape, which is unreasonable on the facts as D believes them to be,
D may be convicted of assault, battery, assault occasioning actual bodily harm or affray
(as the circumstances warrant).202
7.67 The reference to ‘a person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty’ includes
reference to any person who is neither a constable nor in the company of a constable but
192 Kerr v DPP (1994) 158 JP 1048, DC.

193 Waterfield and Lynn [1964] 1 QB 164, CCA.
194 He will be committing a battery.
195 Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510, DC; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, DC. Where a constable
physically detains a person, but does not at that time intend or purport to arrest him, he is acting unlawfully,
even if an arrest would have been justified: Wood v DPP [2008] EWHC 1056 (Admin), Underhill J.
196 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, DC; para 7.33.
197 Donnelly v Jackman [1970] 1 All ER 987, DC; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, DC; Mepstead v DPP
(1995) 160 JP 475, DC; cf Bentley v Brudzinski [1982] Crim LR 825, DC.
198 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 28(3).
199 McBean v Parker [1983] Crim LR 399, DC; Brazil v Chief Constable of Surrey [1983] 3 All ER 537, DC.
200 R (on the application of Rutherford) v Independent Police Complaints Commission [2010] EWHC (Admin)
2881, Ouseley J.
201 Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510, DC; Pedro v Diss [1981] 2 All ER 59 at 64.
202 Purdy [1975] QB 288, CA. As to aff ray, see para 7.63, n 186.
who is a member of a joint investigation team (ie an investigation team established under
an EU framework decision or a specified treaty) led by a member of a police force.203
Mens rea
7.68 It must be proved that D had the mens rea for assault or battery, as the case may
be. It is unnecessary for the prosecution to prove that D knew that his Victim was a con-
stable acting in the execution of his duty.204 Suppose, however, that D, not knowing that
his victim is a constable, and thinking that he must act in self-defence, applies force to a
constable, who is exercising one of his powers, and that force would be reasonable if the
victim had not been a constable (because he would not have had the power in question).
In this situation, D does not commit an offence under the Police Act 1996, s 89(1). The
reason is that D lacks the mens rea required for the assault (ie battery), since he neither
intends, nor is he reckless as to, the application of unlawful force to his victim.205 (This
is important because in many cases where someone assaults a constable in the execution
of his duty, not knowing that the victim is a constable, that person may think that he is
being attacked.) On the other hand, if D knows that his victim is a constable but mistak-
enly believes that the constable is acting in excess of his powers, D is not excused; it has
been held that his mistake is not one of fact but one of criminal law relating to the powers
of the constable.206 As indicated in para 7.63, while this is undoubtedly correct where the
mistake relates to the powers of a constable, the correctness of this is open to doubt where
the mistake about the excess of the constable’s powers is based on a mistaken belief that
the facts do not satisfy the requirements for the exercise of the power.
Related offences of wilful obstruction or resistance of constable in the

execution of his duty
7.69 Under the Police Act 1996, s 89(2), which re-enacted an earlier identical provision:
‘A person who resists or wilfully obstructs a constable in the execution of his duty, or a
person assisting a constable in the execution of his duty, shall be guilty of an offence.’
An offence under s 89(2) is triable only summarily and punishable by a maximum of one
month’s imprisonment or a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale or both.207
These offences are mentioned for the sake of completeness. They do not require any-
thing in the nature of an assault or battery.
203 Police Act 1996, s 89(4) and (5), inserted by the Police Reform Act 2002, s 104; s 89(4) amended by the
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, Sch 4.
204 Forbes and Webb (1865) 10 Cox CC 362; Maxwell and Clanchy (1909) 2 Cr App R 26, CCA; McBride v
Turnock [1964] Crim LR 456, DC; Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510, DC; Howard ‘Assaulting Policemen in the
Execution of their Duty’ (1963) 79 LQR 247.
205 Blackburn v Bowering [1994] 3 All ER 380, CA. See Fairweather and Levy ‘Assaults on the Police: A Case
of Mistaken Identity’ [1994] Crim LR 817.
206 Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428, CA.
207 The maximum term of imprisonment will be raised to 51 weeks if, and when, the Criminal Justice Act
2003, s 280(2) and Sch 26 come into force.
Wilful obstruction
7.70 In general, any conduct which actually prevents a constable from carrying out his
duty or makes it more difficult for him to do so amounts to obstructing him.208 Where
a positive act has this effect it constitutes an obstruction, even though it is not unlawful
independently of its operation as an obstruction. Thus, a person who consumes alcohol
in order to frustrate a breath test under the Road Traffic Act 1988 may be convicted of the
present offence.209 Other examples of obstruction are hampering a constable in making
an arrest or in interviewing a witness or suspect, hampering a constable in finding drugs
by telling the constable a false story,210 running away with intent to avoid arrest when
approached for questioning by the police,211 refusing to remove an obstruction from the
highway when lawfully required to do so by a constable,212 and refusing to open a door
when lawfully required to do so by a constable seeking to exercise a power of entry.213
It amounts to an obstruction to give a warning to someone who is already commit-
ting an offence214 or who is likely to commit an offence.215 On the other hand, it is not an
obstruction where a warning is given to a person who is not committing an offence or
likely to do so in order to discourage him from doing so.216 It follows that an obstruction
cannot be proved where D has warned other drivers of a speed trap if it cannot be proved
that those warned were either exceeding the speed limit or likely to do so at the location
of the speed trap.217
7.71 The requirement of ‘wilfulness’ has been interpreted to mean that D’s conduct
which resulted in the obstruction must have been deliberate and intended by him to
bring about a state of affairs which, regarded objectively, prevented or made it more
difficult for the constable to carry out his duty, whether or not D appreciated that that
state of affairs would have that effect or that it would in law amount to an obstruc-
tion.218 Thus, to do something deliberately which in fact makes it more difficult for a con-
stable to carry out his duties is not enough; there must be an intention that the deliberate
conduct should result in that state of affairs. There is no need for any hostility towards the
constable,219 nor need the conduct be ‘aimed at’ him.220
The above is well illustrated by Hills v Ellis221 where D intervened in a lawful arrest
by a constable in order to draw his attention to the fact that, as D believed, he was
208 Hinchcliffe v Sheldon [1955] 3 All ER 406, DC; Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414, DC; Lewis v Cox [1985]
QB 509, DC.
209 Dibble v Ingleton [1972] 1 QB 480, DC.
210 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414 at 420, per Lord Parker CJ.
211 Sekfali v DPP [2006] EWHC 894 (Admin), DC.
212 See Tynan v Balmer [1967] 1 QB 91, DC.
213 Lunt v DPP [1993] Crim LR 534, DC.
214 Betts v Stevens [1910] 1 KB 1, DC; DPP v Glendinning [2005] EWHC 2333 (Admin), DC.
215 Green v Moore [1982] QB 1044, DC; DPP v Glendinning above.
216 Bastable v Little [1907] 1 KB 59, DC; Green v Moore above; DPP v Glendinning above.
217 See the cases cited at nn 214 and 215.
218 Hills v Ellis [1983] QB 680, DC; Moore v Green [1983] 1 All ER 663, DC.
219 Hills v Ellis above. Also see Moore v Green above.
220 Lewis v Cox [1985] QB 509, DC (not following a statement to the contrary by Griffiths LJ in Hills v Ellis
[1983] QB 680 at 685, DC).
221 [1983] QB 680, DC. Also see Lewis v Cox above.
arresting the wrong man. The Divisional Court held that as D’s deliberate conduct
had resulted in a situation which made it more difficult for the constable to carry out
his duty, and as D had intended that situation, D was guilty of wilful obstruction,
despite the fact that he was actuated by good motives and not by hostility towards the
constable.
Unlike the offence of assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty, 222 there
cannot be a conviction for wilful obstruction unless D knew or believed that that per-
son was a constable.223 It remains to be decided whether D must also know or believe
(leaving aside any mistake of law) that the constable was acting in the execution of his
duty.
7.72 In Rice v Connolly,224 it was held that ‘wilfully’ meant not only ‘intentionally’ but
also ‘without lawful excuse’. This is rather surprising since ‘wilfully’ seems to refer to D’s
state of mind, whereas the question of ‘lawful excuse’ generally relates to factual matters
surrounding conduct which excuse it.
The requirement that the obstruction must be without lawful excuse means that,
unless a constable has a legal right to require a person to do something (and thereby
to impose a legal duty on him to do it), a failure by that person to do the thing when
requested by the constable cannot constitute a wilful obstruction because, although it
makes it more difficult for the constable to carry out his duties, there will be a lawful
excuse for that failure. Thus, as there is no general legal duty to assist the police (eg by
answering questions put by a constable), a mere refusal to answer such questions is not
a wilful obstruction 225 (unless a special duty to answer exists in the circumstances).
Nor, according to the Divisional Court in Green v DPP, 226 is it a wilful obstruction to
advise someone else not to answer police questions, even if that advice is given in an
abusive way.
Resistance
7.73 The wide meaning given to ‘obstruction’ probably renders ‘resistance’ otiose, since
anyone who resists seems to obstruct (although the converse is not true). However, ‘resist-
ing’ is a more appropriate word in certain cases, such as where a person arrested by a
constable tears himself away.
The resistance is not required to be wilful. There can be no doubt that an intent to resist
must be proved, but it remains to be seen what mens rea, if any, is required as to the fact
that the person resisted is a constable. Analogy with the offence of obstructing a consta-
ble suggests that a person must know or believe that the person resisted is a constable,
although it is uncertain whether he must also know or believe (leaving aside any mistake
of law) that the constable is acting in the execution of his duty.
222 Para 7.64.

223 Ostler v Elliott [1980] Crim LR 584, DC. Th is point is not clear from this brief report but appears in the
transcript.
224 [1966] 2 QB 414, DC.
225 Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414, DC; Sekfali v DPP [2006] EWHC 894 (Admin), DC.
226 (1991) 155 JP 816, DC.
Other offences of aggravated assault

7.74 Other offences of aggravated assault include:
• assault with intent to rob;227 and

• racially or religiously aggravated assault.228
Although it is not strictly an aggravated assault, an assault or battery which would
cause a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety
can amount to the more serious offence of affray.229
The offences of assault by penetration and sexual assault under the Sexual Offences
Act 2003230 are not true offences of aggravated assault because, despite their names, they
require a touching and therefore cannot be committed by an ‘assault’ alone in the strict
sense of that term.
Wounding and grievous bodily harm
Key points 7.6

The offences under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861), ss 18 and 20
discussed below deal with cases where V has been wounded or suffered grievous bodily
harm as a result of D’s conduct. Apart from specifying different mens rea requirements,
the two sections are virtually identical.
Section 20
7.75 The OAPA 1861, s 20 provides that:
‘Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm
upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty
of [an offence] . . . ’.
The phrase ‘either with or without any weapon or instrument’ adds nothing to the defini-
tion but was presumably added for the avoidance of doubt. An offence under s 20 is triable
either way231 and punishable on conviction on indictment with a maximum of five years’
imprisonment.232 The fact that the maximum punishment is the same as for an assault
occasioning actual bodily harm under s 47 fails to reflect the greater seriousness of an
offence under s 20.
227 Theft Act 1968, s 8(2); para 10.99. 228 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 29(1)(b) and (c); para 7.96.
229 See para 7.63, n 186. 230 Paras 9.39–9.49.
231 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1. 232 OAPA 1861, s 20.
7.79 wounding and grievous bodily harm | 197
Actus reus
7.76 Section 20 creates two offences. The actus reus of one is an act resulting in the
unlawful infliction of grievous bodily harm on another, and of the other an act result-
ing in the unlawful wounding of another.233
Inflicting grievous bodily harm

7.77 Grievous bodily harm ‘Grievous bodily harm’ was defi ned by the House of Lords in
DPP v Smith.234 Lord Kilmuir LC, giving the only reasoned speech (with which the other
Law Lords agreed), said that ‘grievous bodily harm’ is to be given its natural meaning
and that ‘grievous’ means ‘really serious’. ‘Really’ seems to mean no more than that the
harm must actually be serious. It is not always necessary for a judge’s direction to refer the
jury to ‘really’ in conjunction with ‘serious bodily harm’.235 In Janjua and Choudhury,236
the Court of Appeal held that on any sensible view of the facts of the case (deep stab
wounds with a knife with a five-and-a-half-inch blade), the use by the judge of ‘really’
before ‘serious’ was not required. It added that it is a matter for the judge in the light of the
facts of the case to decide whether the use of ‘really’ is required before ‘serious’.
7.78 As in the case of ‘actual bodily harm’, 237 ‘bodily harm’ includes an identifiable psy-
chiatric injury. This was finally settled in 1997 by the House of Lords in Burstow.238 It also
includes lack of consciousness.239
7.79 Whether harm is grievous is a question for the jury. It must be judged objectively,
according to the ordinary standards of usage and experience, not subjectively from the
standpoint of how the victim would describe it.240 Although the test of whether bodily
harm is grievous is objective, in deciding whether or not the harm is serious regard must
be had to the effect of the injury on the particular victim, taking account of the victim’s
age, health and any other particular factors.241 Injuries to a six-foot adult in good health
may be less serious than the same injuries to, for instance, an elderly or unwell person,
or to someone physically or psychiatrically vulnerable, or very young.242 Where D has
caused a number of injuries to V, whether there is grievous bodily harm can be judged
by looking at the totality of those injuries; injuries which individually are not serious can
amount to serious harm when aggregated.243
233 As to whether an omission to act can suffice instead of an act, see para 7.83. The rules of causation are
described in paras 2.28–2.61.
234 [1961] AC 290, HL.
235 Saunders [1985] Crim LR 230, CA; Bryan (1984) unreported, CA; McMillan (1984) unreported, CA; Doyle
[2004] EWCA Crim 2714.
236 [1999] 1 Cr App R 91, CA; discussed by Beaumont ‘The Reality of Really Serious Harm’ [1998] 10 Archbold
News 4.
237 Para 7.58.
238 [1998] AC 147, HL. As in the case of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm, where serious psychiatric
injury is alleged but not admitted by the defence, the question whether or not D caused such injury should not
be left to the jury in the absence of expert evidence (see para 7.58).
239 See T v DPP [2003] EWHC 266 (Admin), Maurice Kay J .
240 Brown and Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485, CA.
241 Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846. 242 Ibid.
243 Birmingham [2002] EWCA Crim 2608.
7.80 The ambit of grievous bodily harm is potentially wide; harm need not be life-
threatening or permanent or have lasting consequences or even require treatment.244 The
Charging Standard245 for inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s 20, however, refers
to the following as examples of grievous bodily harm: injuries resulting in permanent
disability or permanent loss of sensory function; injuries resulting in non-minor per-
manent visible disfigurement, broken or displaced limbs or bones (including fractured
skull); compound fractures, broken cheek bone, jaw, ribs etc; injuries which cause sub-
stantial loss of blood; injuries resulting in lengthy treatment or incapacity; and psychi-
atric injury.
7.81 Inflicting Until relatively recently the courts have taken a restricted view of how
grievous bodily harm could be ‘inflicted’ for the purposes of the OAPA 1861, s 20.
In a number of cases, including the particularly well-known decision in Clarence,246
the courts held that grievous bodily harm was not inflicted for the purposes of s 20 unless
it was caused by an ‘assault’, ie an assault or battery. In Clarence, D, as already mentioned,
knowing that he had venereal disease but concealing this fact from her, had intercourse
with his wife, V, as a result of which V contracted that disease. The majority of the Court
for Crown Cases Reserved held that D could not be convicted of unlawfully inflicting
grievous bodily harm on V because ‘inflict’ implied the need for an assault and, since V
had consented to the bodily contact involved, there had been no assault.
In 1983, the House of Lords in Wilson247 declined to take this narrow approach and
held that there could be an infliction of grievous bodily harm contrary to s 20 without an
‘assault’. Wilson, however, seemed to leave ‘inflict’ with a restricted meaning because it
quoted with apparent approval a passage in the Australian decision in Salisbury248 which
stated that ‘inflict’ required the grievous bodily harm to result from force being violently
applied to the body of the victim.
7.82 It is now clear from the decision of the House of Lords in Burstow249 that the appli-
cation of force is not required for ‘infliction’. In Burstow the question of law of general
public importance which had been certified by the Court of Appeal for consideration by
the House of Lords was: ‘Whether an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm under
s 20 can be committed where no physical violence is applied directly or indirectly to
the body of the victim.’ The House of Lords’ answer was in the affirmative. As a result,
Clarence must now be regarded as wrongly decided on the meaning of ‘inflict’ in s 20,
although the House did not expressly overrule it.
The facts of Burstow were that D, refusing to accept that his social relationship with
a woman, V, had come to an end, had pestered her in various ways and had been dealt
244 Bollom [2003] EWCA Crim 2846.

245 Crown Prosecution Service Offences against the Person, incorporating the Charging Standard (see para
7.60, n 175). A Charging Standard has no legal force.
246 (1888) 22 QBD 23, CCR; para 7.28. Also see Taylor (1869) LR 1 CCR 194, CCR; Beasley (1981) 73 Cr App
R 44, CA.
247 [1984] AC 242, HL.
248 [1976] VR 452, (1983) 76 Cr App R 261n, SC of Victoria. In this case an Australian offence practically
identical to s 20 was considered and the English cases on s 20 examined.
249 [1998] AC 147, HL. See S Gardner ‘Stalking’ (1998) 114 LQR 33.
with for this on more than one occasion by the courts, and this had culminated in his
imprisonment. On his release, D continued to pester V. During the period February to
July 1995 (which formed the basis of the charge) D’s conduct included telephone calls
(some silent, and some abusive), the sending of letters and photographs and frequent, and
unnecessary, visits to V’s home and to her workplace and distributing offensive cards in
the street where V lived. He also sent V a note which was intended to be menacing, and
was so understood. V was badly affected by this campaign of harassment. As a result she
suffered a severe psychiatric injury. D was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm,
contrary to s 20. D appealed unsuccessfully against conviction to the Court of Appeal,
and thence to the House of Lords.
Dismissing the appeal, the House held that the contextual interpretation of ‘inflict’
could embrace the idea of one person inflicting serious psychiatric injury on another,
and that (as already stated) ‘inflict’ did not require any physical force to be applied to the
victim.
As a result of this decision, there can be no doubt that any act which causes grievous
bodily harm constitutes inflicting such harm. Thus, causing someone to suffer grievous
bodily harm by infecting him with a disease now constitutes an infliction of that harm
for the purposes of s 20, 250 and so does causing someone grievous bodily harm by giving
him poison (although a prosecution for administering, or causing to be administered or
taken, a poison, or other destructive or noxious thing, so as thereby to endanger life or
thereby to inflict grievous bodily harm, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 23, would be more
appropriate).
7.83 The decision in Burstow is not without its difficulties. First, the speeches in the House
of Lords gave no weight to the apparent approval in Wilson of the passage in Salisbury
referred to above. This is not a major defect because, as the trial judge in Burstow251 stated,
the quotation of that passage did not necessarily mean that the House in Wilson accepted
it and, anyway, even if it had, that approval would have been an obiter dictum, whereas
the statement that there can be an ‘infliction’ without an assault was part of the ratio
decidendi of Wilson.
A second difficulty is whether, after Burstow, an omission to act which results in griev-
ous bodily harm can amount to ‘inflicting’ grievous bodily harm and therefore liability
under s 20, assuming that there was a legal duty to prevent the harm. In such a case, the
failure to act can be said to ‘cause’ the grievous bodily harm (as required in the OAPA
1861, s 18), and in the absence of any authority on the point a failure to act doubtless suf-
fices for liability for the s18 offence. In Burstow, Lord Hope252 stated that ‘for all practical
purposes there is, in my opinion, no practical difference between [“cause” and “inflict”]’.
In contrast, Lord Steyn253 was of the view that the two terms were not synonymous. He
did not explain why, but a good reason would be that one cannot inflict grievous bodily
harm by an omission. The natural meaning of ‘inflict’ would seem to imply the need for
some sort of act.
250 Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. The Court confirmed that the reasoning which led the majority in Clarence
to hold that there could not be a conviction under s 20 on the facts of that case has no continuing application. The
infliction will not be unlawful if the victim has given an informed consent to the risk of being infected: para 7.31.
251 [1996] Crim LR 331, Crown Ct. 252 [1998] AC 147 at 160. 253 Ibid at 164.
Wounding
7.84 To constitute a wound, the inner and outer skin must actually be broken. 254 A
bruise or internal rupturing of blood vessels alone is not sufficient,255 nor is a broken bone
alone.256 The wound need not be serious; a minor cut of both layers of skin will do. The
threshold for a wound is therefore lower than for grievous bodily harm. Where only a
minor wound is caused a prosecution for an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 47257 would
be more appropriate than under s 20.258
It was thought that there could not be a wounding unless the wound resulted from an
‘assault’259 in the sense of an assault or battery.260 The decision in Wilson did not, strictly,
affect this, although it suggested that there could be a wounding even though there was
no assault, provided that D did something deliberately which directly resulted in force
being applied violently to V’s body so that V was wounded. In Savage; Parmenter,261 the
Court of Appeal was of the opinion that, although almost inevitably a wounding would
result from an assault, it would not do so if the facts were ‘quite extraordinary’. On appeal,
Lord Ackner, with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, was of the same opinion as
the Court of Appeal.262
Unlawfully
7.85 The reference to ‘unlawfully’ in the definition of the offences is simply a reference to
the fact that D cannot be convicted of an offence under s 20 if his conduct is legally justi-
fied, eg because D is using reasonable force in self-defence or to prevent crime or effect a
lawful arrest, 263 or because V has given a valid consent to being wounded or caused griev-
ous bodily harm (or to the risk of this occurring). In such a case the wounding or grievous
bodily harm will be lawful, not unlawful.
Mens rea
7.86 The mens rea required for both offences is comprised by the word ‘maliciously’,
which does not connote spite or ill-will.264 It was confirmed by the House of Lords in 1991
in Savage; Parmenter265 that, in order to prove that D acted maliciously, it is sufficient to
prove that D intended his act to result in some unlawful266 bodily harm267 to some other
254 M’Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635; C (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331, DC. In Waltham (1849) 3 Cox CC
442, the lining membrane of the victim’s urethra was ruptured and bled. There was evidence that the membrane
is precisely the same in nature as the membrane which lines the cheek and the external and inner and outer skin
of the lip. It was held that there had been a wound. 255 C (a minor) v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331, DC.
256 M’Loughlin (1838) 8 C & P 635. 257 See paras 7.55–7.61.
258 Crown Prosecution Service Offences against the Person, incorporating the Charging Standard (see para
7.60, n 175). 259 Taylor (1869) LR 1 CCR 194, CCR.
260 Beasley (1981) 73 Cr App R 44, CA. 261 (1990) 91 Cr App R 317, CA.
262 Savage; Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699, HL. There is no authority on whether there can be a ‘wounding’ by
omission. 263 Ch 16.
264 Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396, CCA. 265 [1992] 1 AC 699, HL.
266 Jones (1986) 83 Cr App R 375, CA.
267 As defi ned in para 7.58.
person, albeit of a minor nature, or was reckless as to the risk that his act might268 result
in such harm.
7.87 Thus, for no articulated policy reason, and contrary to the normal rule that mens
rea as to a consequence of conduct must correspond with the consequence as defined for
the actus reus,269 it is not necessary to prove that D intended, or was reckless as to, the
infliction of a wound or grievous bodily harm.270 On the other hand, it is not enough to
prove that D ought to have foreseen the risk of bodily harm to another; D must be proved
actually to have foreseen the risk of such harm.271
The fact that intent or foresight as to something less than the degree of harm required
for the actus reus of the offence charged suffices is a matter of criticism. (So is the anal-
ogous rule referred to in para 7.61 in respect of the mens rea required for offences of
assault occasioning actual bodily harm.) Nevertheless, despite the low level of the mens
rea requirement, it may often be difficult to satisfy it where D’s conduct causes serious
psychiatric injury, but not any physical injury.
7.88 The fact that recklessness as to the risk of causing some unlawful bodily harm to
another suffices for s 20 means that if D, knowing that he has (or may have)272 a serious
sexually transmitted disease, and therefore aware of the risk of infecting her, has inter-
course with V who consents to the intercourse in ignorance of D’s disease, as D knows,
D will be guilty of the present offence if V becomes infected with the disease and suffers
grievous bodily harm in consequence.273
7.89 Because D must have been aware that his act might cause some unlawful bodily
harm, a defendant who mistakenly believes, eg, that he is acting in self-defence, or that
his victim(V) has consented to the horseplay which seriously injures accidentally, is
not guilty of the present offence if he wounds or inflicts grievous bodily harm on V.274
Likewise, a man who mistakenly believes that his sexual partner is aware that he has the
HIV virus is not guilty of an offence under s 20 because he will not have been reckless as
268 It was affi rmed in Rushworth (1992) 95 Cr App R 252, CA, that it need only be foreseen that harm might
(as opposed to would) result. To require foresight that harm would result, where it was not D’s purpose (ie direct
intent) to cause it, would greatly limit the scope of s 20.
269 Para 3.37.
270 Savage; Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699, HL. For earlier authority, see, eg, Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421, CA; Flack
v Hunt [1980] Crim LR 44, DC; Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46, CA.
271 Confi rmed in Savage; Parmenter above.
272 There is no direct authority in the Court of Appeal decisions, Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103 and Konzani
[2004] EWCA Crim 706, where convictions under s 20 for infecting someone with the HIV virus were upheld,
as to whether it would suffice that D knows that he may have HIV etc, but in principle there is no reason why it
should not. For a discussion of this matter see Ryan ‘Reckless Transmission of HIV: Knowledge and Culpability’
[2006] Crim LR 981. The author concludes that this is the present position in law, ie that wilful blindness to one’s
HIV status is sufficient. In the article the author examines (1) whether actual knowledge of HIV positive status
is (or should be) necessary in order to impose liability under the OAPA 1861, s 20 for the reckless transmission
of HIV, and (2) whether actual knowledge of the risks of transmission of HIV is (or should be) required for such
liability.
273 Dica above. See Weait ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’ (2005) 68 MLR 121
at 129 et seq.
274 Jones (1986) 83 Cr App R 375, CA; Aitken [1992] 1 WLR 1006, C-MAC (as to this court, see para 2.32, n 98).
to the risk that his partner is not consenting to the risk of infection by the virus. However,
as the Court of Appeal pointed out in Konzani,275 where D who knows that he is suffering
from the HIV virus deliberately conceals it from a sexual partner, D’s silence is incongru-
ous with a genuine belief that there was an informed consent to the risk of contracting
the disease. The Court of Appeal nevertheless recognised that there could be rare excep-
tions, as where the sexual partner knew D while D was in hospital being treated for the
HIV virus or where D believed that his new sexual partner had been told of his disease by
someone who knew them both.
Section 18
7.90 The OAPA 1861, s 18276 provides:
‘Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause
any grievous bodily harm to any person, with intent to do some grievous bodily harm to
any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any
person, shall be guilty [of an offence] . . . ’.
There are two offences under s 18: wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm or
to resist etc lawful apprehension and causing grievous bodily harm with one of these
intents. Because the two types of intent do not create separate offences, a count charging
wounding (or one charging causing grievous bodily harm) is not bad for duplicity if it
specifies both intents in the alternative.277 An offence under s 18 is triable only on indict-
ment and punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment.278
Actus reus
7.91 ‘Wound’ and ‘grievous bodily harm’ mean the same as in s 20. Section 18 speaks of
‘causing279 by any means whatsoever’, as opposed to ‘inflicting’, grievous bodily harm. As
seen above, the two terms are identical, save that ‘cause’ doubtless covers, and ‘inflict’ may
not, the case where a person deliberately fails to do something which he is under a legal
duty to do and thereby grievous bodily harm is caused to another. Otherwise the actus
reus of the offences under s 18 is identical to the corresponding actus reus under s 20.
Mens rea
Intent to do some grievous bodily harm or to resist etc lawful apprehension
7.92 The OAPA 1861, s 18 differs significantly from the s 20 offences in relation to its
mens rea because the prosecution must prove that D had the intent to do (unlawful)
275 [2005] EWCA Crim 706.

276 As amended by the Criminal Law Act 1967, ss 10(2) and 12(5) and Sch 3.
277 Naismith [1961] 2 All ER 735, C-MAC (as to this court, see para 2.32, n 98).
278 OAPA 1861, s 18.
grievous bodily harm or to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension (ie arrest) or
detainer of himself or another.
While a person who causes grievous bodily harm by means of a practical joke will be
guilty of an offence under s 20 if he merely foresaw the risk of some harm, he cannot be
convicted of an offence under s 18 on account of the absence of an intention to do griev-
ous bodily harm. ‘Intention’ bears its normal meaning, outlined in Chapter 3, so that it is
irrelevant whether or not D desired to cause grievous bodily harm or to resist or prevent
arrest.280 The requirement of an intent to cause grievous bodily harm does not mean that
D should regard his intended consequence as grievous (ie serious) bodily harm. Provided
that, in the view of the jury, D’s intended consequence amounts to grievous bodily harm
D will have an intent to cause such harm. Thus, if the jury decides that D intended to
break V’s wrist and that a broken wrist is serious bodily harm, it is irrelevant that D
did not think that a broken wrist was serious harm; the necessary intent will have been
proved.
In cases of harassment and the like where serious psychiatric injury is caused, but
not any physical injury, it will normally be difficult to prove an intent to cause griev-
ous bodily harm in the absence of evidence of a clear determination to bring it about or
of knowledge of a special susceptibility to serious psychiatric injury on the part of the
defendant.
7.93 Unlike the corresponding intent under the OAPA 1861, s 38 referred to in para 7.63,
the intent to resist lawful arrest need not relate to an arrest for an offence, so that an intent
to resist a lawful arrest for a breach of the peace or in civil process suffices. Otherwise
what is said there is equally applicable here, except that it is an open question whether a
mistaken belief of law which led to the belief that an arrest for a breach of the peace or
in civil process was unlawful could in itself negative the necessary intent. A mistake as
to a civil power of arrest cannot be described as a mistake of criminal law and normally
a mistake of civil law does excuse the defendant if it prevents him having the specified
mens rea.281
Maliciously
7.94 Section 18 requires D to wound or cause grievous bodily harm ‘maliciously’.
‘Maliciously’, however, is redundant in s 18 where D has the intent to do grievous bod-
ily harm, but probably not where D does not have that intent and only intends to resist
etc lawful apprehension or detainer.
The reason why ‘maliciously’ is redundant in the former case is that causing grievous
bodily harm or wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm must, given the nature
of the requisite intent, include foresight of the possibility of some bodily harm which, as
stated in para 7.86, is the meaning to be attached to ‘maliciously’ in s 20.
On the other hand, it is possible to attach some force to the word ‘maliciously’ in s 18
when the alleged intent is to resist or prevent lawful apprehension or detainer. If D gently
seizes a policeman’s jacket, or even gently trips him up, in order to prevent him giving
instant chase to X, an escaping criminal, D would undoubtedly have acted with intent to
280 Bryson [1985] Crim LR 669, CA; Purcell (1986) 83 Cr App R 45, CA. 281 Para 3.85.
prevent X’s apprehension, but, if the policeman suffered serious injury wholly unforeseen
by D, D would not have acted ‘maliciously’, ie with foresight of the risk of some bodily
harm to the policeman. It is submitted that that meaning should be given to ‘maliciously’
in this context, since it would seem unduly harsh to convict a person of the serious offence
under s 18 where he accidentally but seriously injured another in trying to resist or pre-
vent a lawful arrest.282 It was said in Mowatt283 that ‘ “maliciously” adds nothing’ in s 18,
but the case was concerned with a charge of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily
harm.284
‘Racially or religiously aggravated assaults’
Key points 7.7

A person is guilty of an offence if he commits:
• an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 20;
• an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 47; or

• common assault,
which is ‘racially or religiously aggravated’.
7.95 A substantial increase in incidents of racial violence and harassment led to a number
of racially aggravated offences being introduced by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998
(CDA 1998). These offences were extended to deal with religious aggravation as well by
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
All the racially or religiously aggravated offences in the CDA 1998 are based, as
aggravated versions carrying a higher maximum punishment, on pre-existing offen-
ces.285 In all other offences, racial or religious aggravation is a factor aggravating the
seriousness of the offence (and thus the sentence).286 It is questionable whether the
various racially or religiously aggravated offences are necessary. Would it not have
been enough simply to leave the matter as an aggravating factor in determining sen-
tence in every case?
7.96 Racially or religiously aggravated assaults are governed by the CDA 1998, s 29.
Section 29(1) provides that:
282 Such a person could, of course, be convicted of one or more of the offences already discussed in this chap-
ter, the particular offence(s) depending on the facts of the case.
283 [1968] 1 QB 421, CA.
284 It seems to have been assumed in Morrison (1988) 89 Cr App R 17, CA, that ‘maliciously’ in the context
of a charge under s 18 involving an intent to resist etc arrest does bear some meaning, that given to it in relation
to s 20.
285 For the other offences dealt with in this book, see paras 7.150 and 13.27. There are also racially and reli-
giously aggravated public order offences under CDA 1998, outside the scope of this book.
286 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 145.
7.97 ‘racially or religiously aggravated assaults’ | 205
‘A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he commits –

(a) an offence under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (malicious
wounding or grievous bodily harm);
(b) an offence under section 47 of that Act (actual bodily harm); or
(c) common assault,
which is racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section.’
Section 29(1) does not create one offence which can be committed in various ways but a
number of separate ones. Given that an offence under the Offences Against the Person
Act 1861, s 20 does not require an assault or battery, the marginal note to s 29 (which
describes the offences covered by the section as ‘assaults’) is not strictly accurate.
A racially or religiously aggravated offence under the Offences Against the Person Act
1861, s 20 or s 47 is triable either way; the maximum imprisonment on conviction on
indictment is seven years (as opposed to five for the ‘simple’ offence).287
It is submitted that, as in the case of ‘common assault’ in other contexts, a common
assault in s 29 can be committed either by an assault or by a battery. An offence of racially
or religiously aggravated common assault is a significantly more serious one than a ‘sim-
ple’ common assault. It is triable either way and punishable on conviction on indictment
with a maximum of two years’ imprisonment.288 The increase in the maximum term of
imprisonment for what will normally be a threat or push which has caused no harm is
significant. Apparently two years was chosen on the ground that this is the normal lowest
maximum specified for either-way offences.
Definition of racial or religious aggravation

7.97 On a charge of an offence under the CDA 1998, s 29 the prosecution must prove that
D has committed one of the relevant specified basic offences and that it (the offence) was
racially or religiously aggravated. Sometimes one of the offences will be both racially and
religiously aggravated.
The CDA 1998, s 28(1) provides that, for the purposes of the various racially and reli-
giously aggravated offences under the Act:
‘An offence is racially or religiously aggravated . . . if:

(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the
offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the vic-
tim’s membership of (or presumed membership of) a racial or religious group; or
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial
or religious group based on their membership of that group.’
‘Racial or religious aggravation’ can exist notwithstanding that D is of the same racial or
religious group as the object of the offence.289
287 CDA 1998, s 29(2). 288 CDA 1998, s 29(3). 289 White [2001] EWCA Crim 216.
Racial group
7.98 The CDA 1998, s 28(4) provides that, for the purposes of s 28, ‘ “racial group”
means a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including
citizenship) or ethnic or national origins’. The wording of the definition must be given
a broad, non-technical interpretation.290 Most of the terms used in the definition have a
fairly obvious meaning, but the following does need to be made clear.
First, applying the broad, non-technical approach referred to above, a group of people
will be a racial group defined by reference to race if, in ordinary speech, those people
would be regarded as belonging to a named race.291 In White,292 it was held that ‘African’
described a racial group defined by reference to race because in ordinary language
‘African’ denotes a limited group of people regarded as of common stock and as one of the
major divisions of humankind having distinct physical features in common; it ‘denotes
a person characteristic of the blacks in Africa’. This was said to be so despite the fact that
strictly ‘African’ is capable of covering Egyptians and White South Africans who would
not commonly be described as ‘Africans’.
This broad, non-technical approach was confirmed and taken further in Rogers
(Philip),293 where the victims of the words ‘bloody foreigners’ were Spanish. The House
of Lords held that these words were capable of satisfying the requirements of s 28(1)(a). It
held that people who are not of British origin constitute a racial group for the purposes
of the definition of ‘racial group’ in the CDA 1998, s 28(1). Thus, a racial group can be
defined exclusively by reference to what its members are not in terms of race, colour,
nationality, or ethnic or national origins, eg non-British or non-White, as well as inclu-
sively by reference to what they are in such terms, eg Spanish or black. The broad non-
technical approach confirmed in Rogers (Philip) was justified by Baroness Hale, delivering
the unanimous decision of the House, as follows:
‘This flexible, non-technical approach makes sense, not only as a matter of language,
but also in policy terms. The mischiefs attacked by the aggravated versions of these
offences are racism and xenophobia. Their essence is the denial of equal respect and
dignity to people who are seen as “other”. This is more deeply hurtful, damaging
and disrespectful to the victims than the simple versions of these offences. It is also
more damaging to the community as a whole, by denying acceptance to members
of certain groups not for their own sake, but for the sake of something they can do
nothing about. This is just as true if the group is defined exclusively as if it is defined
inclusively.
. . . Fine distinctions depending upon the particular words used would bring the law into
disrepute.’294
290 Ibid; Rogers (Philip) [2007] UKHL 8.

291 White [2001] EWCA Crim 216.
292 [2001] EWCA Crim 216. The Court accepted that ‘African’ did not refer to a racial group defi ned by refer-
ence to ethnic origins.
293 [2007] UKHL 8. 294 Ibid at [12]–[13].
Second, the term ‘ethnic’ is construed relatively widely and, although a cultural or reli-
gious group is not in itself defined by reference to its ethnic origins, ‘ethnic’ is used in
a sense wider than the strictly racial or biological. This was held by the House of Lords
in Mandla v Dowell Lee,295 where Lord Fraser, with whose speech the other Law Lords
agreed, said this about the concept of an ethnic group in the identical definition of racial
group in the Race Relations Act 1976, s 3 (since repealed):
‘For a group to constitute an ethnic group in the sense of the Race Relations Act 1976, it
must, in my opinion, regard itself, and be regarded by others, as a distinct community by
virtue of certain characteristics. Some of these characteristics are essential; others are not
essential but one or more of them will commonly be found and will help to distinguish the
group from the surrounding community. The conditions which appear to me to be essen-
tial are these: (1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing
it from other groups, and the memory of which it keeps alive; (2) a cultural tradition
of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not necessarily
associated with religious observance. In addition to these two essential characteristics the
following characteristics are, in my opinion, relevant: (3) either a common geographical
origin, or descent from a small number of common ancestors; (4) a common language,
not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a common literature peculiar to the group; (6)
a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general com-
munity surrounding it; (7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a dominant group
within a larger community, for example a conquered people . . . and their conquerors
might both be ethnic groups.’296
Pursuant to the above dictum, it is clear that Sikhs (as the House held in Mandla) and
Romany gypsies are groups defined by reference to their ethnic origins.297 On the other
hand, tinkers or travellers are not.
Religious group
7.99 The CDA 1998, s 28(5) provides that, for the purposes of s 28, ‘ “religious group”
means a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious
belief’. ‘Religious belief’ is not defined. It is, however, clear, eg, that Sikhs, Muslims and
Rastafarians are religious groups, although the last two are not racial groups.298
As can be seen from the references to Sikhs, it is possible for a group to be both a racial
and a religious one.
Two types of racial or religious aggravation

7.100 Under the CDA 1998, s 28(1), there are two types of racial or religious aggrava-
tion, the first based on the demonstration towards the victim of hostility based on the
295 [1983] 2 AC 548, HL. 296 Ibid at 562.

297 Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton [1989] QB 783, CA. As to the Jewish ethnic group and member-
ship of it, see R (on the application of E) v Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15.
298 Malik v Bartram Personnel Group (1990), an Employment Tribunal decision, No 4343/90 (in respect of
Muslims); Crown Suppliers (Property Services Agency) v Dawkins [1993] ICR 517, CA (in respect of Rastafarians).
victim’s membership or presumed membership of a racial or religious group and the

second based on motivation by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group
based on their membership of that group. The first type is ‘concerned with the outward
manifestation of racial or religious hostility, the other with the inner motivation of the
offender’.299
Both types of racial or religious aggravation refer to the concept of membership of a
racial or religious group, which is not always an easy one to apply where a racial group is
identified by reference to its ethnic or national origins.
Clearly, a religious group includes converts and excludes those who have abandoned
the religion. The same is true, according to Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, obiter, in Mandla
v Dowell Lee300 in the case of an ethnic group. He said: ‘Provided a person who joins the
group [eg by marriage] feels him or herself to be a member of it, and is accepted by other
members, he is . . . a member’.
7.101 The importance of the precise meaning of ‘membership’ in s 28(1)(a) is lessened
by s 28(2)(a), which provides that in s 28(1)(a) ‘membership’ in relation to a racial or reli-
gious group includes association with members of that group. Thus, a person who has not
converted to a religious or ethnic group but is the spouse or adopted child of a member
of the group and thereby in association with that member and members of his family etc
who are members of the group is also a member of the group. Consequently, if a white
woman who is married to a Pakistani is attacked or abused because of her association
with Pakistanis the offence will be racially aggravated.
7.102 Demonstration of hostility based on V’s membership etc of a racial or religious
group The first alternative meaning of ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ is contained
in the CDA 1998, s 28(1)(a). This requires that ‘at the time of committing the offence,
or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim
hostility based on the victim’s membership or presumed membership of a racial or
religious group’. The fact that the victim was unconcerned by the hostility demonstrated
is irrelevant.301
7.103 Unlike s 28(1)(b), s 28(1)(a) does not require the offence committed by D to be
motivated wholly or mainly by racial or religious hostility; the issue is simply whether,
objectively, D demonstrated such hostility.302 In DPP v Woods,303 D assaulted a club door-
man (V) who refused to admit D’s friend. D also called V a ‘black bastard’ a few moments
before he hit V. The magistrates found that D’s hostility arose from his frustration and
annoyance as a result of his friend being denied entry and was not based on V’s mem-
bership of a racial group; they believed that he would have abused anyone in V’s shoes
by reference to an obvious physical characteristic that that individual had. Accordingly
they found that the battery was not racially aggravated. Maurice Kay J (as he then was)
299 Rogers (Philip) [2007] UKHL 8 at [6], per Baroness Hale.

300 [1983] 2 AC 548 at 562.
301 DPP v Woods [2002] EWHC 85 (Admin), Maurice Kay J.
302 Ibid; DPP v Green [2004] EWHC 1225 (Admin), DC; R (on the application of Jones) v Bedford and Mid
Bedfordshire Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 523 (Admin), Ouseley J; SH [2010] EWCA Crim 1931.
303 [2002] EWHC 85 (Admin), Maurice Kay J.
allowed the prosecution’s appeal. He held that s 28(1)(a) did not apply solely to cases
where D’s only motivation was racial malevolence. It extended to cases where there was
a racially neutral gravamen but in which hostility was demonstrated towards V based on
his membership of a racial group.304 The fact that D would have abused anyone who had
been in V’s position by reference to an obvious physical characteristic was an irrelevant
consideration.
Likewise, in DPP v M (A Minor), 305 the fact that the hostility demonstrated was based
more on a dispute over food at a kebab shop than on racial hostility did not prevent racial
aggravation being proved under s 28(1)(a). Another example is provided by Johnson v
DPP, 306 where it was held that it was irrelevant that D’s hostility was based partly on Vs’
membership of a racial group and partly on hostility towards parking attendants gener-
ally. However, the more incidental the words or other conduct with a racial or religious
content, the more difficult it will be to prove that D has demonstrated racial or religious
hostility. In this context it must be emphasised that it is not enough simply to refer, eg, to
V’s race or religion; the defendant must be proved to have demonstrated ‘hostility’.
7.104 For the test under s 28(1)(a) to be satisfied, D must have formed the view that V was
a member of a racial or religious group and D must have done or said something which
demonstrated hostility towards V based on that membership. Such demonstrations will
normally be made by words, but they can be made in other ways, eg by the wearing of
swastikas.307
7.105 Words used need not expressly identify the racial or religious group to which V
belongs nor explicitly demonstrate racial or religious hostility. In A-G’s Reference (No 4
of 2004),308 V was Indian and brown-skinned. He was called an ‘immigrant doctor’ by
D immediately before D assaulted him. The Court of Appeal held that it was open to the
jury to conclude that D had identified V as falling within the racial groups of Indian
and brown-skinned and that the use of ‘immigrant’ demonstrated hostility based on V’s
membership of such groups. Reference may also be made to Johnson v DPP, 309 where D,
who was black, had said to two white parking attendants during an argument ‘why don’t
you get up [a white area] with your white uncles and aunties?’. The Divisional Court held
that it was reasonably open to the magistrates’ court to conclude that these words dem-
onstrated racial hostility.310
7.106 In relation to the requirement that the racial or religious hostility must be dem-
onstrated at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so,
304 Or, of course, religious group.

305 [2004] EWHC 1453 (Admin), DC.
306 [2008] EWHC 509 (Admin), DC. See also Kendall v South East Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 1848
(Admin), DC; Rogers (Philip) above at [11], per Baroness Hale.
307 Rogers (Philip) above at [13], per Baroness Hale.
308 [2005] EWCA Crim 889.
309 [2008] EWHC 509 (Admin), DC.
310 See also SH [2010] EWCA Crim 1931 (D made repeated references to V as a ‘monkey’ or ‘black monkey’
in the course of an altercation. Held: material on which jury could properly conclude that this went beyond
mere vulgar abuse unconnected with race and constituted demonstration of hostility based wholly or partly
on race).
reference can be made to case law on the offence of robbery, which requires a use or threat
of force ‘immediately before or at the time of’ the stealing.311 It has been held for the pur-
poses of that offence that ‘the time’ of the stealing is not limited to the period (possibly
a split second of time) during which the material act with mens rea of theft occurs, and
that ‘the time’ of the stealing lasts as long as the theft can be said to be still in progress in
commonsense terms, ie so long as D is ‘on the job’.
The word ‘immediately’ in s 28(1)(a) qualifies ‘after’ as well as ‘before’; s 28(1)(a) strikes
at words uttered or acts done in the immediate context of the basic substantive offence.312
Thus, it was held in Parry v DPP313 that a racially aggravated offence was not made out
where D demonstrated racial hostility to V only 20 minutes after committing the basic
offence, while being questioned by the police. V, however, does not need to be in D’s pres-
ence at the time of the demonstration of racial hostility.314
Words used at a time not immediately before the basic offence is committed can colour
D’s behaviour at the time of the offence and justify the conclusion that D demonstrated
racial or religious hostility at the time of the offence. In Babbs, 315 D had described V and
his companion as ‘foreign fuckers’ and during a second confrontation 15 minutes later
assaulted V; the Court of Appeal held that the jury were entitled to find that racial hostil-
ity had been demonstrated at the material time.
7.107 Sometimes hostility may be demonstrated towards someone in the mistaken belief
that he is a member of a racial or religious group, as where a Bangladeshi (or atheist) is
the victim of hostility intended to be directed at a Pakistani (or a Catholic). In such a
case the offence will be racially or religiously aggravated because s 28(2)(b) provides that
the reference to ‘presumed membership’ in s 28(1)(a) means presumed by the offender.
Similarly, if a racist threatens a white woman whom he mistakenly believes is associated
with a Pakistani and his family, and the hostility he demonstrates is based on that asso-
ciation, his offence is racially aggravated because of the definition of ‘membership’ and
‘presumed membership’.
7.108 Motivation by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on
their membership of that group The second alternative meaning of ‘racially or reli-
giously aggravated’ is contained in the CDA 1998, s 28(1)(b). This requires that ‘the
offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial
or religious group based on their membership of that group’. The words used (or
other conduct) do not need to have any racial (or religious) connotation at all for
an offence to be committed if the words (or other conduct) were in fact motivated
by racial (or religious) hostility.316 Section 28(1)(b) has the effect in relation to the
specified offences of making motive relevant to criminal liability, something which
is exceptional. 317
7.109 Section 28(1)(b) does not require D to be motivated by racial or religious hostil-
ity towards the victim (V) of the offence but ‘merely’ by hostility ‘towards members of
311 Para 10.103. 312 Parry v DPP [2004] EWHC 3112 (Admin), DC.
313 Ibid. 314 Ibid. 315 [2007] EWCA Crim 2737.
316 R (on the application of Jones) v Bedford and Mid Bedfordshire Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 523
(Admin), Ouseley J. 317 Para 3.75.
7.112 administering poison etc | 211
a racial or religious group’. Hostility towards one member of a racial or religious group
based on his membership of that group is sufficient to qualify under s 28(1)(b) so long
as it forms part of the motivation for the conduct. Normally V will be a member of that
group (and thus included within the ambit of that hostility) or at least be associated
with it but this is not a requirement of s 28(1)(b). A person who, motivated by hostility
towards members of the Jewish religious community, attacked a bricklayer whom he
knew was not Jewish who was working on the building of a synagogue would fall foul
of s 28(1)(b), for example. It is for this reason that it was not necessary to extend to s
28(1)(b) the provision that membership of a racial or religious group includes associa-
tion with it.
7.110 Proof of motivation by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group
based on their membership of that group under s 28(1)(b) can be established by evidence
relating to what D may have said or done on other occasions.318
7.111 General Section 28(3) provides that:
‘It is immaterial for the purposes of paragraph (a) or (b) of [s 28(1)] whether or not the
offender’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in that
paragraph.’
Administering poison etc
Key points 7.8

The OAPA 1861, ss 23 and 24 provide offences specifically dealing with ‘poisoning’:
• administering etc poison or other destructive or noxious thing and thereby

endangering life or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
• administering etc such a substance with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy.
7.112 The OAPA 1861, s 23 provides:
‘Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be administered

to or taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, so as
thereby to endanger the life of such person, or so as thereby to inflict upon such person
any grievous bodily harm, shall be guilty of [an offence] . . . ’.
An offence under s 23 is triable only on indictment and punishable with a maximum of

10 years’ imprisonment.319
318 RG v DPP; LT v DPP [2004] EWHC 183 (Admin), DC. 319 OAPA 1861, s 23.
The OAPA 1861, s 24 provides:
‘Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously administer to or cause to be administered

to or taken by any other person any poison or other destructive or noxious thing, with
intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy such person, shall be guilty of [an offence] . . . ’.
An offence under s 24 is less serious than that under s 23 since, although it is triable only
on indictment, its maximum punishment is five years’ imprisonment.320
In Kennedy (No 2),321 the House of Lords held that s 23 creates three distinct offences
whose bases are:
• administering a poison etc;
• causing a poison etc to be administered to another person;
• causing a poison etc to be taken by another person.
The same is obviously true in respect of s 24.
The distinction between the wording of the two sections is that s 23 requires life
endangerment or grievous bodily harm actually to result (D’s intention being irrel-
evant) and that s 24 requires D to intend to injure, aggrieve or annoy the person to
whom the poison etc is administered etc (whether or not anything results from what
he has done).
Administer, or cause to be administered or taken

7.113 The meaning of these terms is a matter for the judge and is not to be left to the jury
as a question of fact.322 In Kennedy (No 2),323 a case where s 23 was in issue, the House of
Lords provided guidance about these terms which is equally applicable to s 24.
Administer
7.114 In Kennedy (No 2), the House of Lords held that the offence of administration
under s 23 ‘is committed where D administers the noxious thing directly to V, as by
injecting V with the noxious thing, holding a glass containing the noxious thing to V’s
lips, or (as in Gillard)324 spraying the noxious thing in V’s face’.325 There is no neces-
sity when ‘administer’ is in issue to postulate any form of entry into the victim’s body,
whether through any orifice or through absorption.326
7.115 For a few years it was the law that someone who participated in the self-injection of
a drug by another person (V), by holding a tourniquet while V did so (Rogers (Stephen))327
or by handing V the syringe for immediate voluntary and informed self-injection by V
320 OAPA 1861, s 24. 321 [2007] UKHL 38 at [9]. 322 Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App R 189 at 194.
323 [2007] UKHL 38. 324 (1988) 87 Cr App R 189, CA. 325 [2007] UKHL 38 at [10].
326 Gillard (1988) 87 Cr App R 189, CA; Walford (1899) 34 L Jo 116, per Wills J. The contrary view, that a thing
is not administered until it is ingested, taken by trial judges in Cadman (1825) Carrington’s Supplement 237 and
Harley (1830) 4 C & P 369, would seem to be wrong. 327 [2003] EWCA Crim 945.
(Kennedy (No 2)),328 administered the drug to V. These actions were held by the Court of
Appeal to be ‘administration’ on the ground that in the former case D had played a part
in the mechanics of the injection and that in the latter case D had been involved in a joint
activity with V, the self-injector. These decisions raised major problems in respect of the
previous law of causation which, as under the current law, regarded the chain of causation
from holding the tourniquet or providing the drug as broken by the self-injector’s free,
deliberate and informed act of self-injection.
Fortunately those decisions were overruled by the House of Lords in Kennedy (No 2).
The House held that, although it was possible to imagine factual scenarios in which two
people could properly be regarded as acting together to administer an injection, where
D supplies a drug to V who, knowing the facts, and by choice, ie freely and voluntarily,
self-injects it, D does not jointly administer it.329 The House also considered that a person
who holds a tourniquet around another’s arm so as to raise a vein is not engaged in joint
administration. It stated that:
‘There is, clearly, a difficult borderline between contributory acts which may properly be
regarded as administering a noxious thing and acts which may not. But the crucial ques-
tion is not whether the defendant facilitated or contributed to administration of the nox-
ious thing but whether he went further and administered it. What matters, in a case such
as R v Rogers and the present, is whether the injection itself was the result of a voluntary
and informed decision by the person injecting himself. In R v Rogers, as in the present
case, it was.330 That case was, therefore, wrongly decided.’331
The House of Lords did not give an example of the ‘imaginable factual scenarios’ in which
two people could properly be regarded as acting together to administer an injection. A
case which may fall on the ‘administration’ side of the ‘difficult borderline’ referred to by
the House of Lords was suggested by the Court of Appeal in Burgess; Byram, although
the decision in that case was on a different factual basis on which D had pleaded guilty.
The Court of Appeal said:
‘If a defendant may be convicted on the basis that the fatal dose was jointly administered,
then it follows that he is not automatically entitled to be acquitted if the deceased rather
than the defendant physically operated the plunger on the syringe and caused the drug to
enter his body. In the present case there was evidence which might reasonably have lead
[sic] a jury to conclude that this appellant had indeed jointly participated in the adminis-
tration of the fatal dose of heroin. From the interviews as they developed, it emerged that
he supplied the deceased with the heroin, which he, the appellant, drew into the syringe.
He did not hand the syringe to the deceased but he took it and the needle to the deceased’s
arm, where he found an appropriate vein. He laid the tip of the needle against the skin of
the deceased above that vein. It is not clear from the interview that he ever in fact let go of
the syringe, but on his account the deceased depressed the plunger. Having done so, the
appellant assisted in the physical withdrawal of the plunger from the deceased’s arm.’332
328 [2005] EWCA Crim 685. 329 [2007] UKHL 38 at [24].

330 See paras 2.44 and 2.45. 331 [2007] UKHL 38 at [20].
332 [2008] EWCA Crim 516 at [12].
Cause to be administered
7.116 In Kennedy (No 2), the House of Lords held that the ‘causing to be administered’
offence under s 23 ‘is typically committed where D does not directly administer the
noxious thing to V but causes an innocent third party (TP) to administer it to V. If
D, knowing a syringe to be fi lled with poison, instructs TP to inject V, TP believing the
syringe to contain a legitimate therapeutic substance, D would commit the offence’.333 If
TP had known the true nature of the substance and acted with the necessary mens rea,
TP would be guilty of the administration offence as its perpetrator and D would be guilty
of it as an accomplice.
Cause to be taken
7.117 In Kennedy (No 2), the House of Lords held that the ‘causing to be taken’ offence
under s 23 ‘covers the situation where the noxious thing is not administered to V but
taken by him, provided D causes the noxious thing to be taken by V and V does not
make a voluntary and informed decision to take it. If D puts a noxious thing in food
which V is about to eat and V, ignorant of the presence of the noxious thing, eats it D com-
mits the offence’.334 In Gillard,335 the Court of Appeal stated that ‘taking’, for the purposes
of ‘causing to be taken’ in s 24, requires ingestion into the digestive system.
Poison or other destructive or noxious thing

7.118 For the purposes of the offence of administering a poison or other noxious sub-
stance with intent to procure a miscarriage, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 58, ‘poison’ has
been said to mean a recognised poison, and it has been stated in the same case that if the
thing administered is a recognised poison the offence may be committed, even though
the quantity given is so small as to be incapable of doing harm.336 This must be equally
applicable to the offences under ss 23 and 24.
7.119 ‘Noxious thing’ means something different in quality from, and of less impor-
tance than, poison or other destructive thing, which is ‘noxious’ in the dosage in which
it was administered, even though it is innocuous in small quantities. 337 The leading
authority is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Marcus.338 The Court held that, since
the offence under s 24 involved an intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy, the concept of
‘noxious thing’ in s 24 involved not only the quality or nature of the substance but also
the quantity administered. A substance which might be harmless in small quantities
could therefore be noxious for the purposes of s 24 if the quantity administered was
sufficient to injure, annoy or aggrieve. The Court added that the meaning of ‘noxious’
333[2007] UKHL 38 at [11].

334Ibid at [12].
335 (1988) 87 Cr App R 189 at 193–194.
336 Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 at 309–310, per Field J; see also Stephen J, at 310. See also Hennah (1877) 13 Cox
CC 547 at 549, per Lord Cockburn CJ.
337 Marcus [1981] 2 All ER 833, CA, following Hennah (1877) 13 Cox CC 547 and Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307.
338 [1981] 2 All ER 833 at 837.
was not limited to substances which caused injury to bodily health. Referring to the
defi nition of ‘noxious’ in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: ‘injurious, hurtful,
harmful, unwholesome’, the Court stated that the meaning of ‘noxious’ was clearly
very wide.
Whether ‘noxious’ in s 23 is, as in s 24, not limited to substances which cause injury
to bodily health is open to debate in the light of the fact that the Court of Appeal
in Marcus339 was clearly addressing the meaning of that term in the context of s 24
and was influenced by the requirement that s 24 involves an intent to injure, annoy or
aggrieve. The point is, however, somewhat academic because, unless the substance is
administered in a sufficient quantity to be injurious to bodily health, it is difficult to see
how grievous bodily harm could be infl icted by it or life endangered by it, as required
by s 23.
In Cato,340 where s 23 was in issue, it was held that heroin is always a noxious thing
– even if administered to a person with high tolerance and therefore unlikely to suffer
any particular harm. The Court of Appeal based this conclusion on the fact that heroin
is liable to cause injury in common use. Ecstasy has likewise been held to be a noxious
thing.341
7.120 It has been argued 342 that bodily fluids containing HIV are ‘noxious things’ and
that their transmission through sexual activity can amount to an ‘administration’ of
them. However, a charge under the OAPA 1861, s 20 is more likely in such a case.
Unlawfully
7.121 An administration etc will not be unlawful if V has given a valid consent. In
accordance with the principles discussed earlier in this chapter, V’s consent will not be
valid where the administration is not in the public interest. It was held in Cato, eg, that a
valid consent cannot be given to the administration of heroin or other dangerous drug
unless the administration is done for bona fide medical reasons.
Section 23
Actus reus
7.122 The actus reus for the offence under the OAPA 1861, s 23 requires D unlawfully
to administer to, or cause to be administered to or taken by, another person any poison
or other destructive or noxious thing so as thereby to endanger the life of the person to
whom it is administered etc, or so as to inflict upon him any grievous bodily harm. For
convenience, ‘poison or other destructive or noxious thing’ is referred to hereafter simply
as ‘noxious thing’.
339 [1981] 2 All ER 833, CA. 340 [1976] 1 All ER 260, CA. 341 Gantz [2004] EWCA Crim 2862.
342 Ormerod and Gunn ‘Criminal Liability for the Transmission of HIV’ [1996] Web JCLI.
7.123 It would seem that the endangerment of life or infliction of grievous bodily
harm must result from the noxious thing itself and not from any condition caused by
it. Therefore, if the administration of a substance causes V to fall asleep while working
machinery and he is injured as a result, an offence would not be committed.
Mens rea
7.124 The only mens rea expressly required by the words of s 23 is that D should have
maliciously administered etc the noxious thing. The words do not expressly require any
mens rea as to the consequence of endangering life or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
they simply require that consequence to be caused by the administration etc.343 How have
the courts interpreted s 23?
7.125 In Cunningham, 344 a case under s 23, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that
‘maliciously’ meant that D must act with intent or recklessness as to ‘the particular
kind of harm done’. The words quoted are ambiguous. They could simply require D
to intend, or be reckless as to, the administration etc to the body of a noxious thing,
which states of mind D will not have if D does not know that the thing is noxious. On
this basis, D need not be proved to have had any mens rea as to endangering life or
infl icting grievous bodily harm. At the other extreme, the words quoted could refer to
intent or recklessness as to the consequence of endangering life or infl icting grievous
bodily harm. Th irdly, the words could simply refer to some injury (but not its degree).
Support for this can be found in the Court’s statement at the end of its judgment that
the jury should have been told to decide whether D foresaw that someone might be
caused injury by the noxious thing.
The issue was resolved by the Court of Appeal in Cato, where it was held that where
the endangering of life or grievous bodily harm is caused directly (eg by injection)
the requirement of malice is satisfied by its deliberate administration; no mens rea is
required to be proved as to the risk of injury. The Court stated that where the endan-
gering of life etc was caused indirectly (eg by causing the victim to inhale gas) the
element of foresight of injury must be proved. The reason for this distinction was not
explained.
As will be seen, the mens rea requirement is lower for an offence under s 23 than for the
less serious offence under s 24.
Section 24
Actus reus
7.126 The actus reus of an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 24 is the same as that under
s 23 except that it does not require the administration etc to result in endangering life or
inflicting grievous bodily harm.
343 Spite or ill-will is not required: Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396, CCA. 344 Ibid.
7.129 draft offences against the person bill | 217
Mens rea
Maliciously
7.127 The OAPA 1861, s 24 requires D maliciously to have administered etc the noxious
thing. ‘Maliciously’ has the same meaning as in s 23. Where D acts with an ulterior intent
to injure (below), ‘maliciously’ is redundant.
Ulterior intent
7.128 Section 24 also requires D to act with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy. In Hill,345 the
House of Lords held that an intent to injure depends not only on the effect which D intends
to produce but also on whether D’s purpose is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ one. In Hill, D administered
slimming tablets to two boys, aged 11 and 13, telling them that they would make them feel
cheerful and happy. Both boys suffered from vomiting and diarrhoea the next day. On arrest
D admitted that he was a homosexual interested in young boys. The House of Lords upheld
D’s conviction under s 24. Lord Griffiths, giving the opinion of the House of Lords said:
‘The defence conceded that the tablets were a noxious thing and that [D] had unlawfully
administered them to the boys. In these circumstances the only issue that the jury had to
determine was whether he did so with the intent to injure them . . . Here was a man who
admitted being sexually attracted to young boys plying them with a drug which he knew
would overstimulate and excite them and doing so with reckless disregard for what might
be the safe dosage, and, in fact, giving them a gross overdosage. The only reasonable infer-
ence to draw from such conduct was an intention that the drug should injure the boys in
the sense of causing harm to the metabolism of their bodies by overstimulation with the
motive of either ingratiating himself with them or, more probably, rendering them sus-
ceptible to homosexual advances.’346
A different view would no doubt have been taken if someone slipped stimulants into
another’s tea, with similar effect, in order to help him complete a sponsored race for
charity.
Draft Offences Against the Person Bill

7.129 Even after the clarification of the law by the House of Lords in the 1990s, the law
on non-fatal offences against the person is open to serious criticism in that it does not
deal adequately with modern situations, that its language is unclear and that its struc-
ture is unsatisfactory as there is no clear hierarchy of offences in respect of OAPA 1861,
ss 20 and 47 (whose maximum punishments are the same). The state of this area of the
law was strongly criticised in 1993 by the Law Commission in the report347 in which it
345 (1986) 83 Cr App R 386, HL. 346 Ibid at 388.

347 Law Commission Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General Principles
(1993), Law Com No 218.
promulgated the draft Criminal Law Bill containing provisions to reform the law relating
to non-fatal offences.348 The appellate courts have also agreed and called for reform.349
The government partially accepted the Law Commission’s reform proposals in 1997
and announced that it proposed to introduce legislation to reform the law of non-fatal
offences. A consultation paper350 was published in 1998 as the first stage in the process.
The government’s reaction to the responses to the consultation was never published.
The consultation paper contains a draft Offences Against the Person Bill whose pro-
visions are based on the draft Criminal Law Bill, although there are some significant
differences. In particular, the draft Offences Against the Person Bill does not contain
provisions defining general defences such as duress by threats and self-defence; it simply
provides that all existing defences shall continue to apply to its offences. Because the
Law Commission had not completed its study of the issue of consent, the draft Offences
Against the Person Bill does not deal with that issue, which would continue to be dealt
with under the rules described at the start of this chapter if the draft Bill is ever enacted.
7.130 Under the draft Offences Against the Person Bill the law relating to common
assault and battery would be replaced by the following provision (cl 4), which would cre-
ate a single offence of assault:
‘(1) A person is guilty of an offence if –

(a) he intentionally or recklessly applies force to or causes an impact on the
body of another, or
(b) he intentionally or recklessly causes the other to believe that any such
force or impact is imminent.
(3) No such offence is committed if the force or impact, not being intended or
likely to cause injury, is in the circumstances such as is generally acceptable in
the ordinary conduct of daily life and the defendant does not know or believe
that it is in fact unacceptable to the other person.’
Like the existing offences of common assault and battery, the offence would be a purely
summary one.
For the sake of completeness, clauses 5 and 7 respectively of the draft Bill replicate the
offences of assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty and of assault with intent
to resist lawful arrest.
The draft Bill preceded the introduction of the offences of racially or religiously aggra-
vated assault and therefore does not refer to them.
7.131 Clauses 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the draft Offences Against the Person Bill would replace
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 18, 20 and 47 with four new offences. The
substance of the four offences would be:
348 For a discussion of the Law Commission’s proposals see Clarkson ‘Law Commission Report on Offences
Against the Person and General Principles: (1) Violence and the Law Commission’ [1994] Crim LR 324, and
J Gardner ‘Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person’ (1994) 53 CLJ 502.
349 See, eg, Lynsey [1995] 3 All ER 654 at 654–655; Mandair [1995] 1 AC 208 at 221, per Lord Mustill.
350 Home Office: Violence: Reforming the Offences against the Person Act 1861. See JC Smith ‘Offences Against
the Person: The Home Office Consultation Paper’ [1998] Crim LR 317.
7.131 draft offences against the person bill | 219
• Intentionally causing serious injury to another. This would be triable only on indict-
ment and punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment. As in the case of the
next two proposed offences, the distinction between wounding and grievous bodily
harm would disappear.
• Causing serious injury with intent to resist arrest, triable and punishable in the same
way as the above offence. No mens rea would need to be proved as to serious injury
or, indeed, any injury.
• Recklessly causing serious injury to another. This either-way offence would be pun-
ishable with up to seven years’ imprisonment. It would replace the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861, s 20, but the mental element would be stricter, since the defend-
ant would have to be aware that he was taking the risk of causing serious injury and
persist in taking it.
• Intentionally or recklessly causing injury to another. This either-way offence would
replace the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 47. It would be punishable with a
maximum of five years’ imprisonment.
‘Injury’ is defined by cl 15 as meaning physical injury or mental injury. ‘Physical injury’
includes pain, unconsciousness and any other impairment of a person’s physical con-
dition. ‘Mental injury’ includes any impairment of a person’s mental health. Except in
relation to the offence of intentionally causing serious injury, ‘injury’ does not include
anything caused by disease. Thus, a person who transmits a disease would only commit
an offence under the draft Bill if the disease causes serious injury and he intends to cause
serious injury.351
The draft Bill provides that a person would commit the offence of intentionally caus-
ing serious injury if he omitted to do an act which he had a common law duty to do, the
omission resulted in serious injury and he intended it to have that result. On the other
hand, an omission would not suffice for any of the other proposed offences described
above. Th is is in line with the approach taken in the draft Criminal Law Bill, which
was based on a policy of only punishing omissions in the case of the more serious
offences.352
The main reason why the draft Offences Against the Person Bill contains separate
offences of intentionally causing serious injury and recklessly causing serious injury is
that there is a moral and psychological distinction between the two offences which it
is appropriate for the criminal law to reflect. On the other hand, the moral distinction
between intention and recklessness is not an easy one for the police, magistrates and
juries to make, and, with regard to acts of violence amounting to injury but not serious
injury, it was thought that the law need not be altered to require the distinction in mental
element to be made in every case (which would be necessary if there were two separate
offences of causing injury).353
351 Contrast the position under the existing law described earlier in this chapter; see in particular para 7.88.
The government did not consider that such conduct would fall within cl 11 (para 7.132).
(1993), para 11.2.
353 Th is was the reasoning of the Criminal Law Revision Committee (14th Report (1980), Cmnd 7844) whose
report provided the basis for the Law Commission’s recommendations.
7.132 Clause 11 of the draft Offences Against the Person Bill would replace the offences
under the OAPA 1861, ss 23 and 24 (poisoning etc). Under cl 11 it would be an offence,
punishable with a maximum of five years’ imprisonment, if a person, ‘knowing that a
substance was capable of causing injury’, administered it to another or caused it to be
taken by him and (in either case) did so intentionally or recklessly, and it was unreasona-
ble to administer the substance or cause it to be taken having regard to the circumstances
as he knew or believed them to be.
7.133 If enacted, the provisions in the draft Offences Against the Person Bill would sim-
plify and modernise the law of non-fatal offences against the person. It is to be regretted
that they have not yet been enacted.
Protection from Harassment Act 1997
Key points 7.9

The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 penalises those who pursue a course of conduct
which amounts to harassment or causes the victim to fear violence.
7.134 This Act was initially passed to deal with the problem of ‘stalkers’ but the Act is not
confined to them. As well as an offence of harassment, which centres on breach of one or
other of two prohibitions of harassment contained in s 1 of the Act, the Act also provides
a more serious offence of putting people in fear of violence.
Prohibitions of harassment
7.135 The first prohibition is concerned with the harassment of another person, no ulte-
rior intent being specified. It is framed as follows by the Protection from Harassment Act
1997 (PHA 1997), s 1(1):
‘A person must not pursue a course of conduct –

(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and
(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.’
The second prohibition of harassment is concerned with the harassment of two or more
persons and the ulterior intent to prevent lawful conduct. It is contained in PHA 1997, s
1(1A) (inserted by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s 125):
‘A person must not pursue a course of conduct –

(a) which involves harassment of two or more persons, and
7.136 protection from harassment act 1997 | 221
(b) which he knows or ought to know involves harassment of those persons, and
(c) by which he intends to persuade any person (whether or not one of those mentioned
above) –
(i) not to do something that he is entitled or required to do, or
(ii) to do something that he is not under any obligation to do.’
References in the PHA 1997 to a person, in the context of the harassment of a person, are
references to a person who is an individual.354 Thus, the complainant cannot be a company
or other corporate body, although the defendant can.355 Conduct includes speech.356
Course of conduct
7.136 By PHA 1997, s 7(3),357 a ‘course of conduct’ must involve:
‘(a) in the case of conduct in relation to a single person (see s 1(1)), conduct on at least
two occasions in relation to that person, or
(b) in the case of conduct in relation to two or more persons (see s 1(1A)), conduct on
at least one occasion in relation to each of those persons.’
This is true of ‘course of conduct’ whenever it appears in the following provisions. It

is not simply a matter of counting the number of incidents. There must be a sufficient
connection between the acts in type and context as to justify the conclusion that they
amount to a course of conduct, 358 taking into account all the circumstances. The fewer
the incidents and the wider apart they were spread the less likely it is that a finding of
harassment can reasonably be made.359 Nevertheless, the Divisional Court has stated,
obiter, that incidents as far apart as a year could constitute a course of conduct, eg a
threat made once a year on a person’s birthday.360 At the other extreme, the Divisional
Court held in one case that a finding by magistrates that three separate and distinct
phone calls to a former partner within the space of five minutes constituted a course of
conduct was not irrational; the time interval between the calls was only one factor to
be taken into account.361 Likewise, where D followed V and tried to stop her entering a
shop, and then confronted her when she left the shop shortly afterwards, the Divisional
Court held that this was capable of amounting to conduct on two separate occasions and
to a course of conduct.362 The incidents do not have to be similar in nature but it may
be more difficult to prove a course of conduct if they are different. It will be particularly
354 PHA 1997, s 7(5) (inserted by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s 125). Th is provision
ousts the normal meaning of ‘person’ under the Interpretation Act 1978, s 5 and Sch 1, whereby unless the con-
trary intention appears ‘person’ includes a corporate body.
355 Kosar v Bank of Scotland plc (trading as Halifax) [2011] EWHC 1050 (Admin), Silber J.
356 PHA 1997, s 7(4).
357 As amended by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, s 125.
358 Lau v DPP [2000] 1 FLR 799, DC; Patel [2004] EWCA Crim 3284.
359 Lau v DPP above; Patel above. 360 Lau v DPP above.
361 Kelly v DPP [2002] EWHC Admin 1428, DC.
362 Wass v DPP (2000) unreported, DC. See also Buckley and Smith v DPP [2008] EWHC 136 (Admin), DC.
difficult to establish a course of conduct if the parties have been reconciled during a part
of the period.363
If an individual is continually abusive to someone who makes telephone calls to him or
comes within his vicinity, that will amount to a course of conduct, even if the victim has
chosen to make the telephone calls or come within his vicinity.364
Harassment
7.137 The PHA 1997, s 1(1) requires D’s course of conduct to amount to harassment of
another, and s 1(1A) requires it to involve harassment of two or more persons. The ele-
ment of harassment is concerned with the effect of the course of conduct rather than with
the types of conduct that produce that effect.365 It is the course of conduct which must
amount to or involve harassment, rather than individual instances forming part of the
course of conduct. This was held by the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in Iqbal v Dean
Manson Solicitors, 366 where Rix LJ stated:
‘Take the typical case of stalking, or of malicious phone calls. When a defendant, D, walks
past a claimant C’s door, or calls C’s telephone but puts the phone down without speak-
ing, the single act by itself is neutral, or may be. But if that act is repeated on a number of
occasions, the course of conduct may well amount to harassment. That conclusion can
only be arrived at by looking at the individual acts complained of as a whole. The course
of conduct cannot be reduced to or deconstructed into the individual acts, taken solely
one by one.’367
Thus, conduct which begins innocuously may become harassment by reason of the man-
ner and frequency with which it is repeated.368
Section 7(2) provides that the reference to harassment of a person here, and else-
where in the Act, includes alarming that person or causing that person distress. This
has been held to be a non-exhaustive definition.369 It does not change the essential nature
of harassment.370 ‘To harass’ means ‘to torment by subjecting to constant interference or
intimidation’.371 The Court of Appeal has held that, in addition to the statutory require-
ment, the conduct must be unacceptable to a degree that would sustain criminal liability
363 H (Gavin Spence) [2001] 1 FLR 580, CA.

364 James v CPS [2009] EWHC 2925 (Admin) DC.
365 Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233; Curtis [2011] EWCA Crim 123.
366 [2011] EWCA Civ 123.
367 Ibid at [45].
368 DPP v Hardy [2008] EWHC 2874 (Admin), DC. In this case, D made a telephone call to fi nd out why his
partner had not got a job. When D did not receive an explanation, he made a further 95 telephone calls in 90
minutes, setting the telephone to automatic redial, during the course of which he stated that he was ‘set for the
night’. The Divisional Court held that this conduct was capable of constituting harassment for the purposes of
PHA 1997.
369 DPP v Ramsdale [2001] EWHC Admin 106, DC; Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ
1233; Curtis [2011] EWCA Crim 123.
370 Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd above; Curtis above.
371 Oxford English Dictionary (10th edn, 1999) cited in Curtis above at [29].
and also must be oppressive;372 it must be targeted at an individual, and it must be cal-
culated to cause harrasment.373 The reference to ‘conduct unacceptable to a degree that
would sustain criminal liability’ introduces an element of circularity, because it states
that a course of conduct amounts to a crime of harassment if it is so unacceptable as to
be criminal.374
In R (on the application of Jones) v Bedford and Mid Bedfordshire Magistrates’ Court, 375
the course of conduct proved in respect of a charge of an offence under PHA 1997, s 2
(breach of the prohibition of harassment)376 simply consisted of a threat by D that she
would paint the door of a garage, which she rented from V, pink or blue depending on
the sex of the unborn child of V and his wife, and a statement by D that she had reported
V to the police for spreading rumours about her (D) in the village (which there was no
evidence that V had done).
The magistrates convicted D of an offence under s 2. Ouseley J allowed D’s appeal
against this conviction. Recognising that whether a course of conduct is of sufficient
gravity to amount to harassment (and to be a crime) depends on its context (what may
harass someone and be grave in a hospital may not be in a barracks), Ouseley J said:
‘In my judgment, even though the context was domestic, viewing those two incidents
together . . . no reasonable bench could conclude that they amounted to harassment. The
fewer the incidents there are in the course of conduct, the more severe each is likely to
have to be for the offence to be made out.’377
Ouseley J rejected an argument that each individual act forming part of a course of con-
duct must be of sufficient gravity in itself to be an offence. He stated that, if such an argu-
ment was correct,
‘it would seriously undermine the purpose and effectiveness of the PHA 1997. It would add
little to the sequence of offences already committed and would fail to deal with a serious
and common aspect of harassment which is the repetition of acts which singularly would
be inoffensive and not really troubling but which become harassment in repetition.’378
372 Whether conduct is unacceptable and oppressive is to be judged objectively; what is unacceptable and
oppressive may depend on the social or other context in which it occurs: Dowson v Northumbria Police [2010]
EWHC 2612 (QB).
373 Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233; Curtis [2011] EWCA Crim 123; Haque
[2011] EWCA Crim 1871. In Haque the Court of Appeal stated at [72] that conduct will be calculated to cause
harassment if D intends his conduct to cause harassment (or, perhaps, is reckless as to such a consequence).
Contrast Dowson v Northumbria Police above, a civil case, where Simon J held that ‘calculated’ bore its normal
objective meaning, ie ‘likely’. The latter view is clearly preferable. To require intention or recklessness as to
causing harassment would conflict with the rule (see para 7.140) that it is enough that D ought to know that his
conduct amounts to harassment.
In Thomas v News Group Newspapers Lord Phillips MR (as he then was), with whom Jonathan Parker LJ and Lord
Mustill agreed, stated that the conduct must be unreasonable. If he meant that the prosecution must prove this, this
cannot be correct in the light of PHA 1997, s 1(3) (see para 7.142) which provides that the prohibitions of harassment
do not apply if the defendant shows that his conduct was reasonable. Th is was recognised in Haque at [73].
374 Ormerod [2010] Crim LR 638. 375 [2010] EWHC 523 (Admin), Ouseley J.
376 Para 7.143. 377 [2010] EWHC 523 (Admin) at [35]. 378 Ibid at [27].
Ouseley J also held that such facts of a separately charged offence (in the instant case, a
racially aggravated public order offence) as the magistrates may find proved, whether
they lead to conviction or not, are capable of forming part of the course of conduct which
amounts to harassment.
7.138 Although the PHA 1997, s 1(1) refers to ‘harassment of another’, it was recognised
by the Divisional Court in DPP v Dunn379 that this does not mean that a breach of the
prohibition of harassment under s 1(1) cannot be committed where two or more indi-
viduals are subjected to a course of conduct amounting to harassment. The reason is that
there is nothing in the Act to indicate a contrary intention to oust the normal rule under
the Interpretation Act 1978, s 6 that words in the singular in a statute should be read as
including their plural forms. Thus, more than one person can be named as a complainant
in one charge under s 2, referred to in para 7.143, alleging a breach of the prohibition of
harassment under s 1(1). Moreover, it was held in DPP v Dunn, it is not inappropriate to
include more than one complainant in a charge alleging a course of conduct amounting
to harassment, even though only one of the complainants might have been present dur-
ing any one incident of harassment relied on, if they were members of a ‘close knit defin-
able group’ and the conduct complained of was clearly aimed at both (or all) of them on
each occasion. Bell J left open for future decision what the situation would be if a large
number of victims were specified in the charge, not every one of whom was present at the
time of the harassment. In DPP v Dunn, the complainants were a married couple living
together in the same property, who were engaged in a boundary dispute with D (their
neighbour). The Divisional Court held that there was sufficient nexus between them to
constitute a close-knit definable group. On the other hand, in DPP v Dziurzynski,380 the
Divisional Court held that 60 employees of a company, not all of whom were present on
the two occasions referred to in the charge and none of whom were present on both, did
not constitute a close-knit and definable group. Despite the addition of s 1(1A) the above
case law remains important in respect of s 1(1) where the intention in s 1(1A)(c) cannot
be proved.
7.139 Before the PHA 1997, s 7(3A) was added by the Criminal Justice and Police Act
2001, proving a course of conduct was difficult where the defendant used other people to
take part in the harassment. This problem has been dealt with by s 7(3A), which provides
that a person’s (X’s) conduct on any occasion which is aided, abetted, counselled or pro-
cured by another (Y) is taken:
(a) also to be on that occasion the conduct of Y; and
(b) to be conduct in relation to which Y’s knowledge and purpose (and what Y ought
to have known) are the same as they were in relation to what was contemplated or
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the aiding, abetting etc.
This means in relation to the wording of s 1(1) or 1(1A) that there can be a breach of the
prohibition on harassment thereunder by Y if, eg, on one occasion the harassing conduct
is by X aided and abetted by Y and on the second occasion it is by Y himself provided that
the two pieces of conduct can be regarded as a ‘course’ and that (b) is satisfied.
379 [2001] 1 Cr App R 352, DC. 380 [2002] EWHC 1380 (Admin), DC.
Know or ought to know

7.140 Because it is enough that D ought to know that his conduct amounts to or
involves harassment, it is no defence that D did not know that his conduct would
amount to or involve harassment, if a reasonable person would know that it does.
‘Knowledge’ bears its ordinary meaning. 381 The objective nature of ‘ought to know’ in
the PHA 1997, s 1(1)(b) and s 1(1A)(b) is given a subjective aspect by s 1(2), 382 which
provides that the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that
it amounts to or involves harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession
of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to or involved
harassment of the other. It was held in Colohan383 that the ‘reasonable person’ in this
context is, however, a hypothetical reasonable person; he is not endowed with D’s
standards or characteristics. Thus, D’s schizophrenia could not be taken into account
in deciding whether a reasonable person would think that D’s conduct amounted to
harassment.
Conduct covered
7.141 The breadth of the prohibitions of harassment means that they apply to a wide
range of activities. Conduct involved in disputes between neighbours (as in DPP v Dunn)
or in industrial disputes, racial harassment, bullying in the workplace,384 protests of vari-
ous kinds, the activities of the ‘paparazzi’, the sending of a series of threatening letters
demanding payment of a debt385 and the publication of press articles calculated to incite
hatred or contempt of the victim386 are all liable to amount to a breach of the prohibi-
tion of harassment in the PHA 1997, s 1(1). In Howlett v Holding, 387 Eady J held that the
instigation at various times of secret surveillance of a woman of which she was aware
(although she did not know exactly when it was taking place) constituted a course of con-
duct amounting to a breach of the prohibition of harassment under the PHA 1997, s 1(1),
because she was caused distress by her awareness that the secret surveillance was taking
place, or was likely to take place at any moment. Although the PHA 1997, s 1(1A) was
introduced to deal with the particular problem of the harassment by animal rights pro-
testers of people connected with organisations engaged in the use of animals for scientific
research with intent to cause the cessation of such use, it is not limited to such conduct.
On the other hand, a High Court judge has held that s 1 should be given a restric-
tive interpretation, so as not to cover conduct involved in the conduct of litigation by a
claimant.388
381 Para 3.43.

383 [2001] EWCA Crim 1251 (reported elsewhere as C).
384 Majrowski v Guys and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 24.
385 Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46.
386 In Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233, a civil case, it was held that the publica-
tion of articles and letters in The Sun newspaper calculated to incite racial hatred of an individual was a course
of conduct capable of amounting to harassment.
387 [2006] EWHC 41 (QB).
388 Tuppen v Microsoft Corpn Ltd (2000) Times, 15 November.
Exceptions
7.142 By the PHA 1997, s 1(3), the prohibitions of harassment s 1(1) and s 1(1A) do not
apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows:389
‘(a) that it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime [eg by a police
officer];390
(b) that it was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to comply with any con-
dition or requirement imposed by any person under any enactment [eg by a court
bailiff ]; or
(c) that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was
reasonable’.
In Howlett v Holding, 391 Eady J thought that the exception relating to the prevention
or detection of crime was framed with law enforcement agencies in mind. He added that,
even if a private individual was entitled to rely on it, he would have to show that there
was, objectively judged, some rational basis for the conduct to be undertaken to prevent
or detect crime.
The last exception involves an objective test, and therefore D’s characteristics must
be ignored in determining whether his course of conduct was reasonable.392 It is an
important, albeit vague, curb on the width of the prohibition of harassment. Eady J
stated in Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd v Curtin393 that the PHA 1997 was not intended
by Parliament to be used to clamp down on the discussion of matters of public interest
or upon the rights of public protest and public demonstration which was so much part
of our democratic tradition, and that he had little doubt that the courts would resist any
wide interpretation of the Act.
In DPP v Moseley,394 Collins J stated that in determining whether conduct was reason-
able a court had to balance V’s interests against the purpose and nature of the course
of conduct pursued, including the right to peaceful protest. However, the Divisional
Court agreed in that case that, if the course of conduct in question involved breach of
an injunction, it could not be reasonable conduct, at least unless the circumstances were
very special.
In determining whether the exception of reasonable conduct applies, a court must also
have regard to the ECHR, Articles 10(2) and 11(2), which set out the grounds on which the
freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association, respectively,
may be interfered with.
389 In Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233, the Court of Appeal stated that the
persuasive burden of proof was on the defendant.
390 The defence under s1(3) is only available where crime–prevention or detection was D’s sde purpose; if
it was one of his purposes D may succeed with a defence under s1(3)(c): Hayes v Willoughby [2011] EWCA Civ
1541.
391 [2006] EWHC 41 (QB).
392 Colohan [2001] EWCA Crim 1251.
393 (1997) Times, 11 December.
394 (1999) Times, 23 June, DC.
Offence of harassment
7.143 The PHA 1997, s 2(1)395 makes it an offence to pursue a course of conduct in
breach of the prohibition of harassment in s 1 or s 1(1A). The offence is summary only,
and punishable with six months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the
standard scale or both.396 This penalty may be inadequate where V suffers serious psy-
chiatric injury.397 In such a case it may be possible to secure a conviction for an offence
under s 4 (below) or for one of the offences under the Offences Against the Person Act
1861 discussed earlier in this chapter.
Because the offence is summary only, it is not an offence to attempt to commit it. 398
Thus, no case of an apprehended breach of the prohibition of harassment can result in a
conviction for attempting to commit a s 2 offence.
Breach of the prohibition of harassment is also a tort.399
Offence of putting people in fear of violence

7.144 The Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 4(1) provides a more serious offence,
which does not centre on a course of conduct in breach of the prohibition of harassment,
but on a course of conduct putting people in fear of violence.
‘A person whose course of conduct causes another to fear, on at least two occasions, that
violence will be used against him is guilty of an offence if he knows or ought to know that
his course of conduct will cause the other so to fear on each of those occasions.’
The course of conduct referred to in s 4(1) is a course of conduct which amounts to the
harassment of another within the meaning of the PHA 1997, s 1.400 It will be noted that
the fear of violence need not be of ‘immediate’ violence, even in the watered-down sense
accorded to that term elsewhere in the criminal law.401 V, however, must fear that violence
will be used against him; a fear that violence may be used will not suffice, nor will a fear of
violence against a third party.402 This may make it difficult, eg, to get a conviction against
a silent telephone caller who on at least two occasions causes V to fear violence, because V
may only be caused to fear the potential, as opposed to definite, use of violence.403
7.145 The provisions relating to the s 4 offence are markedly similar to the provisions
relating to the prohibition of harassment, in that:
396 PHA 1997, s 2(2). The maximum term of imprisonment will be increased to 51 weeks if, and when, the
Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 281(4) and (5) comes into force.
397 As Lord Steyn observed in Ireland; Burstow [1998] AC 147 at 153.
398 Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1) and (4).
399 PHA 1997, s 3.
400 Curtis [2010] EWCA Crim 123; Widdows [2011] EWCA Crim 1500; Haque [2011] EWCA Crim 1871.
401 Paras 7.39–7.41.
402 Henley [2000] Crim LR 582, CA.
403 Th is point was made by Lord Steyn in Ireland; Burstow [1998] AC 147 at 153.
• there must be a ‘course of conduct’; ‘conduct’ includes ‘speech’.404 However, for the
purposes of s 4, the course of conduct must cause another person to fear, on at least
two occasions, that violence will be used against him;
• the objective nature of ‘ought to know’ is given a subjective aspect by s 4(2), which
provides that the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that
it will cause another to fear that violence will be used against him on any occasion if
a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of
conduct would cause the other so to fear on that occasion;
• it is a defence for D to show that:
– his course of conduct was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting
crime,
– his course of conduct was pursued under any enactment or rule of law or to com-
ply with any condition or requirement imposed by any person under any enact-
ment, or
– the pursuit of his course of conduct was reasonable for the protection of himself or
another or for the protection of his or another’s property;405 and
• the PHA 1997, s 7(3A)406 applies.
7.146 The distinguishing feature between the offence under s 4 and that under s 2 is, of
course, that the course of conduct must cause another to fear that violence will be used
against him. It is not enough that on one occasion V1 fears violence against himself (but
V2 does not) and that on another occasion V2 fears such violence (but V1 does not).407
Direct evidence from V that he was caused to fear such violence is not essential, because a
court may infer such fear if there is other evidence entitling it to do so, but without direct
evidence from V proof may be difficult.408
7.147 Fear of violence only against property is not enough. On the other hand, the fact
that D’s words or conduct were directed ostensibly against property or a third party does
not prevent proof of an offence under s 4; if they cause V to fear, on at least two occasions,
that violence will be used against him and D knows or ought to know that his conduct
will cause V so to fear on each of those occasions, D is guilty of that offence.409
7.148 The prosecution does not have to prove that the violence feared was unlawful vio-
lence, but under the third defence referred to above it will be a defence, in effect, for D to
show that the violence feared was not unlawful violence.
404 PHA 1997, s 7(4).

405 PHA 1997, s 4(3). The first two of these defences correspond to the first two of the exceptions from the
prohibition of harassment (para 7.142). The third defence is narrower than the third exception (conduct reason-
able). It remains to be seen whether the requirement for a s 4 offence that the conduct must amount to harass-
ment contrary to s 1 has the effect of importing the ‘conduct reasonable exception’ into s 4. The Court of Appeal
in Haque [2011] EWCA Crim 1871 at [73] seems to have assumed that it does, but if this is so why did Parliament
enact the narrower third defence referred to in the text?
406 Para 7.139.
407 Caurti v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 867, DC.
408 R (a child) v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 17, DC.
409 Ibid.
7.152 racially or religiously aggravated harassment | 229
7.149 The offence under s 4 is an either-way offence. A person guilty of it is liable on

conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.410 Given
that the prohibited conduct is not required to result in psychiatric injury, and that D
is not required to have intended that V would fear violence, this is a surprisingly high
maximum.
The Court of Appeal411 has stated that s 4 is not normally appropriate for use as
a means of criminalising conduct, not charged as violence, during incidents in a
long and predominantly affectionate relationship in which both parties persisted
and wanted to continue. Description of a number of acts of violence spread over
nine months during a close and affectionate relationship does not, it said, satisfy the
course of conduct requirement or the requirement that it is conduct amounting to
harassment.
Racially or religiously aggravated harassment

7.150 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA 1998), s 32(1), as amended by the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, provides that:
‘A person is guilty of an offence under this section if he commits –

(a) an offence under s 2 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (offence of harass-
ment); or
(b) an offence under s 4 of that Act (putting people in fear of violence),
which is racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section.’
Section 32(1) does not create one offence which can be committed in more than one way;
it creates two separate racially or religiously aggravated offences which are offences in
their own right.
7.151 On a charge of either of these aggravated offences the prosecution must prove
that D has committed the relevant specified basic offence (set out above) and that it was
racially or religiously aggravated (as defined in para 7.97).
7.152 The aggravated offences within the CDA 1998 both have higher maximum sen-
tences than the basic offence to which they refer. An aggravated offence within the CDA
1998, s 32(1)(a) is triable either way412 and on conviction on indictment is punishable with
a maximum term of imprisonment of two years. The maximum imprisonment on con-
viction on indictment for the aggravated offence within the CDA 1998, s 32(1)(b), which
is also triable either way, is seven years.413
410 PHA 1997, s 4(4).

411 Widdows [2011] EWCA Crim 1500.
412 Th is can be contrasted with the basic offence under the PHA 1997, s 2, which is only triable summarily.
413 CDA 1998, s 32(3) and (4).
FURTHER READING
Addison and Lawson-Cruttenden Harassment Idriss ‘Religion and the Anti-terrorism,

Law and Practice (1998) Crime and Security Act 2001’ [2002] Crim
Allen ‘Consent and Assault’ (1994) 58 JCL LR 890
193 Keating ‘Protecting or Punishing Children:
Bamforth ‘Sado-Masochism and Consent’ Physical Punishment, Human Rights and
[1994] Crim LR 661 English Law Reform’ (2006) 26 LS 394
Cherkassy ‘Being Informed: The Complexities Lidstone ‘The Offence of Obstruction’ [1983]
of Knowledge, Deception and Consent Crim LR 29
When Transmitting HIV’ (2010) 74 JCL McCutcheon ‘Sports, Violence, Consent and
242 the Criminal Law’ (1994) 45 NILQ 267
Cooper and Read ‘Informed Consent and Malik ‘Racist Crime: Racially Aggravated
the Transmission of Disease: Dadson Offences in the Crime and Disorder Act
Revivified’ (2007) 71 JCL 461 1998 Part II’ (1998) 62 MLR 409
Edge ‘Extending Hate Crime to Religion’ Ormerod and Gunn ‘Criminal Liability for
(2003) 8 J Civ Lib 5 the Transmission of HIV’ [1996] 1 Web
Elliott and de Than ‘The Case for a Rational JCLI
Reconstruction of Consent in Criminal Ormerod and Gunn ‘In Defence of Ireland’
Law’ (2007) 70 MLR 225 [1997] 3 Web JCLI
Finch The Criminalisation of Stalking (2001) Roberts ‘The Philosophical Foundations of
Finch ‘Stalking the Perfect Stalking Law: An Consent in the Criminal Law’ (1997) 17
Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Protection OJLS 389
from Harassment Act 1997’ [2002] Crim Rogers ‘A Criminal Lawyer’s Response to
LR 703 Chastisement’ [2003] Crim LR 98
J Gardner ‘Rationality and the Rule of Law Ryan ‘Reckless Transmission of HIV:
in Offences against the Person’ in Offences Knowledge and Culpability’ [2006] Crim
and Defences (2007) (J Gardner (ed)) Ch 2 LR 981
Gibbons ‘The Offence of Obstruction’ [1983] Skegg ‘Medical Procedures and the Crime of
Crim LR 21 Battery’ [1974] Crim LR 693
Gunn and Ormerod ‘The Legality of Boxing’ Stannard ‘Sticks, Stones and Words:
(1995) 15 LS 181 Emotional Harm and the English Criminal
Hare ‘R v Savage, DPP v Parmenter – A Law’ (2010) 74 JCL 533.
Compelling Case for the Code’ (1993) 56 Wells ‘Stalking: the Criminal Law Response’
MLR 74 [1997] Crim LR 463
Horder ‘Reconsidering Psychic Assault’ [1998] G Williams ‘Force, Injury and Serious Injury’
Crim LR 392 (1990) 140 NLJ 1227
Horder ‘Re-thinking Non-fatal Offences
against the Person’ (1994) 14 OJLS 392
8
Homicide and related offences
OVERVIEW
The offences of murder, manslaughter and infanticide are dealt with in the first part, the major
part, of this chapter. Corporate manslaughter and various offences of causing death by driving
are then dealt with. The chapter concludes by dealing with a number of offences related to
homicide.
Introduction
8.1 Homicide may be lawful or unlawful. An example of lawful homicide is killing by
using reasonable force in self-defence.1 If the homicide is unlawful, it may be:
• murder;
• manslaughter (of which there are two generic types: voluntary manslaughter and
involuntary manslaughter);
• infanticide;
• corporate manslaughter;
• causing death by dangerous driving;
• causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving;
• causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving when under the influence of
drink or drugs; or
• causing death by driving when unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured.
8.2 Murder and manslaughter are common law offences. The others are statutory.
1 See further as to lawful homicide, para 8.16.

232 | 8.3 homicide and related offences
Murder, manslaughter and infanticide
Key points 8.1

The actus reus for murder is unlawfully killing a human being under the Queen’s peace.
Essentially, this is also the actus reus required for manslaughter and infanticide except that
two types of involuntary manslaughter require additional elements to be proved, as does
infanticide.
Quite apart from these distinctions, murder, involuntary manslaughter and infanticide
are distinguished by the fact that the fault element which the last two offences require
is less than the mens rea for murder. A person who would otherwise be guilty of murder
has his liability reduced to voluntary manslaughter if one of three mitigating defences is
available on the facts.
8.3 According to Coke, ‘murder is when a man of sound memory, and of the age of
discretion, unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm any reasonable creature in
rerum natura [ie in existence] under the King’s peace, with malice aforethought . . . ’.2 The
reference to a ‘man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion’ excludes those who are
legally insane or under the age of criminal responsibility, matters dealt with in Chapter
15. The reference to a killing ‘in any county of the realm’ is no longer accurate because by
way of exceptions to the general rule that our courts only have jurisdiction over offences
committed in England and Wales:3
• a British citizen4 who commits murder or manslaughter in any country or ter-
ritory outside the United Kingdom is subject to the jurisdiction of our courts; 5
and
• proceedings for murder or manslaughter may be brought against a person irrespec-
tive of his nationality at the time of the alleged offence if it was committed as a war
crime in Germany or German occupied territory during the Second World War,
provided that on or after 8 March 1991 he was or has become a British citizen or
resident in the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands.6 Only one
of the very few prosecutions on this basis has been successful. Human mortality
means that it will soon become irrelevant. The death of suspects or the insufficiency
of evidence have been the reasons for the paucity of prosecutions.
2 3 Institutes 47. Coke’s defi nition is given as amended by the Law Reform (Year and A Day Rule) Act 1996:
para 8.15. 3 Para 1.21. As to offences on ships or aircraft , see para 1.26.
4 Or a British Overseas citizen, citizen of British Overseas Territories or British National (Overseas): see
the British Nationality Act 1948, s 3(1), the British Nationality Act 1981, s 51, and the Hong Kong (British
Nationality) Order 1986.
5 Th is is the effect of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 9, and the British Nationality
Act 1948, s 3.
6 War Crimes Act 1991, s 1. A prosecution may only be instituted by or with the consent of the Attorney
General. For criticism of the War Crimes Act 1991, see (1997) 147 NLJ 81.
8.6 common elements of murder, manslaughter and infanticide | 233
8.4 In modern language, the actus reus of murder which can now be derived from
Coke’s words is unlawfully killing a human being under the Queen’s peace. Essentially,
this is also the actus reus for manslaughter and infanticide but there are the following
variations. The actus reus of constructive manslaughter (a form of involuntary man-
slaughter) also requires proof that the killing was caused by an unlawful and dangerous
act. The actus reus of manslaughter by gross negligence (another form of involuntary
manslaughter) also requires proof that D’s conduct fell so far below the standard to be
expected of a reasonable person as to be judged criminal. Where infanticide is charged,
its actus reus also requires proof that the victim was under 12 months old and that the
defendant mother’s mind was mentally disturbed consequent on its birth.
Common elements of murder, manslaughter

and infanticide
The victim
8.5 Before any question of D’s liability for homicide can arise, it must be established that
D killed a ‘reasonable creature’. On rare occasions the offspring of human parentage may
be so deformed as to be unrecognisable as a human being, or barely so recognisable. Such
offspring are usually a freak of nature, but they can result from radiation or the use of
drugs. They may be anencephalic (ie lacking all or most of the cerebral hemispheres but
capable of breathing). Sometimes they belong to the fish stage of development with gills,
webbed arms and feet and sightless eyes. Such ‘monsters’ are usually stillborn, but some
do survive for a short period ranging from minutes to days or, even, a couple of weeks. If
D kills such a being the question may arise whether D has committed an offence of homi-
cide. Although at one time a ‘monster’ may not have been protected by the law,7 it is now
clear that a ‘reasonable creature’ means a person (ie a human being) however deformed
or disabled.8 In Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation),9 conjoined (ie Siamese) twins,
each with a brain (although one was so undeveloped as to be practically useless) and
nearly complete bodies, were regarded by the Court of Appeal as separate persons in the
eyes of the law.
8.6 The issues of when life begins and ends for the purposes of the law are clearly relevant
to homicide. It is not homicide to destroy a baby who is not yet born alive, nor to cause it
to be stillborn,10 or to destroy the corpse of a person already dead. On the other hand, if
a person is alive, however brief the time left for him, or however disabled he may be, that
person is protected by the law. In a case involving the ‘mercy killing’ of V who had suf-
fered catastrophic head injuries, the Court of Appeal emphasised that:
7 Williams The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (1958) 31–35.
8 Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587 at 621, per Brooke J; Re A (conjoined twins: surgical
separation) [2001] Fam 147, CA. 9 [2001] Fam 147, CA.
10 Coke 3 Institutes 50; Blackstone 4 Commentaries 198. Th is point was recognised in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of
1994) [1998] AC 245 at 254 and 267, per Lords Mustill and Hope.
‘[T]he law does not recognise the concept implicit in the defence statement that [V] was
already dead in all but a small physical degree. The fact is that he was alive, a person in
being. However brief the time left for him, that life could not lawfully be extinguished.
Similarly, however disabled [V] might have been, a disabled life, even a life lived at the
extremes of disability, is not one jot less precious than the life of an able-bodied per-
son. [V’s] condition made him especially vulnerable, and for that among other reasons,
whether or not he might have died within a few months anyway, his life was protected by
the law, and no one, not even his mother, could lawfully step in and bring it to a premature
conclusion.’11
When life begins

8.7 The law states that a child is born alive when two requirements are satisfied:
• the whole body of the child must have emerged into the world;12 and
• thereafter the child must have breathed and lived by reason of its breathing through
its own lungs, without deriving any of its living or power of living through any
connection with its mother.13 This latter requirement is subject to the qualification,
in the case of conjoined twins where one of them (X) has impaired lungs and cannot
breathe but depends on the breathing of the other (Y), that X is a life in being as well
as Y.14
An Australian court has held that the common law does not require that unas-
sisted breathing is required before a baby can be said to be born alive, and that live
birth for the purposes of the ‘born alive’ rule could be proved by many different overt
acts including crying, breathing and the presence of a heart beat;15 this has not yet
been considered by our courts and does not yet represent English law on the matter.
Provided both requirements are satisfied a child is born alive regardless of whether
the umbilical cord has been severed.16 There is no requirement that the child should
be viable, ie capable of sustained survival.
8.8 Although the destruction of an unborn child cannot amount to an offence of homi-
cide (or, indeed, any other offence against the person, since such a child is not a ‘person’
in law),17 the wilful destruction of a child capable of being born alive before it is born
alive may amount to the offence of child destruction, while the intentional procuring of a
miscarriage may constitute the offence of abortion.
8.9 If a child is born alive, and dies wholly or partly because of antenatal injuries to the
mother or child, the person who inflicted them cannot be convicted of murder18 but may
be convicted of manslaughter.19 This includes the case where the antenatal injuries result
11 Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2637 at [38]. 12 Poulton (1832) 5 C & P 329.
13 Enoch (1833) 5 C & P 539; Handley (1874) 13 Cox CC 79; C v S [1988] QB 135, CA; Rance v Mid-Downs
Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587.
14 Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] Fam 147, CA
15 Iby [2005] NSWCCA 178, [2005] Crim LR 742.
16 Reeves (1839) 9 C & P 25. 17 Tait [1990] 1 QB 290, CA. 18 Paras 8.30 and 8.31.
19 A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245, HL.
in a premature birth which fatally affects the child’s ability to withstand the ordinary
perils of infancy.20
When life ends

8.10 Medical science recognises that death is not instantaneous but is a continu-
ing process, since different parts of the body die at different times. At one time, the
medical view was that death occurred when the heart stopped beating and breathing
ended. Th is was not very satisfactory since these symptoms can occur in conditions
like barbiturate overdosage, drowning and hypothermia, from all of which recovery
is possible. The concept of ‘heart death’ was established before the technology was
developed whereby heart beats and breathing can be artificially maintained by ven-
tilating a body on a respirator. Because of the medical dilemma of determining when
a respirator may be switched off in the case of comatose and unresponsive patients,
the Conference of Royal Medical Colleges and their Faculties of the United Kingdom
adopted in 1976 the concept of ‘brain stem death’ as the determinant of death. 21 Th is
occurs where irremediable structural brain damage is diagnosed by tests establish-
ing that none of the vital centres of the brain stem is still functioning. In 1995, a
Working Group of the Royal College of Physicians, stating that ‘brain stem death is
equivalent to the death of the individual’, agreed the following defi nition of ‘death’:
‘The irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness, combined with irreversible
loss of the capacity to breathe.’22 Th is defi nition was repeated in a Code published by
the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges in 2008. 23 A patient in a ‘persistent vegetative
state’ is not suffering from ‘brain stem death’ since in this condition only the higher
brain is destroyed; such a patient can breathe unaided and has reflex actions to sound
and light, but he has no awareness of his environment and no swallowing reflex (so
that he has to be fed nasogastrically).
8.11 In Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland,24 Lords Keith, Goff and Browne-
Wilkinson were of the opinion, obiter, that ‘brain stem death’ is the legal definition of
death,25 although the matter was not disputed before them.
Under the Queen’s peace

8.12 Any human being can be the victim of murder, manslaughter or infanticide with
the exception of persons who are not ‘under the Queen’s peace’, ie alien enemies killed
in the actual heat and exercise of war and, perhaps, rebels who are at the time actually
20 Ibid.
21 [1976] 2 British Medical Journal 1187. For a discussion of the question of ‘death’ and the timing of death
in law, see Price (1997) 23 Journal of Medical Ethics 170; Mason ‘Death’ in Principles of Medical Law (3rd edn,
2010) (Grubb, Laing and McHale (eds)) Ch 22.
22 Royal College of Physicians’ Working Group ‘Criteria for the Diagnosis of Brain Stem Death’ (1995) 29
Journal of the Royal College of Physicians 381.
23 A Code for the Diagnosis and Confirmation of Death; discussed by Burns ‘How Certain is Death?’ (2009)
159 NLJ 459. 24 [1993] AC 789 at 856, 863 and 878. See also Re A [1992] 3 Med LR 303.
25 The same view was taken in Mail Newspapers plc v Express Newspapers plc [1987] FSR 90 and in Re A [1992]
3 Med LR 303.
engaged in hostile operations against the Crown.26 The deliberate and unjustified shoot-
ing of prisoners of war amounts to murder.27
The killing
8.13 Murder, manslaughter and infanticide may be punishable even if the death is the
outcome of an omission to act, rather than a positive act, provided the omission consists
of a failure to perform a duty to act recognised by the criminal law. As was explained in
Chapter 2, duties to act can be imposed by the common law or by statute. However, up
to the present, the law has been slow to impose duties to do positive acts. Almost all the
prosecutions for homicide by omission have been prosecutions for manslaughter, but if a
person who is under a legal duty to act (as where a parent is under a duty to provide food
for his or her helpless child) omits to perform that duty intending thereby to cause death
(and death does result), that person can be convicted of murder.28 Proving the necessary
intent in such a case is not easy. The possibility of infanticide by omission is expressly
contemplated by the Infanticide Act 1938.29
8.14 The prosecution must prove that D’s act (or omission, if D was under a legal duty to
act) resulted in the victim’s death. The rules of causation were explained in paras 2.28 to
2.61.
8.15 At common law, the death with which it was sought to charge D had to be shown to
have occurred within a year and a day of the infliction of the injury by which it is alleged
to have been caused.30 This rule evolved, latterly as an irrebuttable presumption of law
about causation, because of the difficulty in proving that an injury outside the period did
cause the death in question. It is now possible to diagnose the cause of death even though
it occurred a substantial time afterwards, and it became a matter of concern that the rule
allowed a person to escape liability for a homicide which he was scientifically shown to
have caused. The rule meant that a person who severely injured another escaped any
criminal liability for homicide if his victim was kept alive, say in a coma, for more than a
year and a day before dying as a result of his injuries, although he could be convicted of
a non-fatal offence, such as attempted murder or an offence under the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861, ss 18 or 20. This, however, hardly reflected the gravity of what had
occurred (and, leaving aside attempted murder or an offence under s 18 or a few other
offences, the maximum punishment was below that available for homicide). Moreover,
where a victim of gross negligence died more than a year and a day later, the perpetrator
26 Hale Pleas of the Crown Vol I, 433; Page [1954] 1 QB 170, C-MAC (as to this court, see para 2.32,
n 98).
27 Maria v Hall (1807) 1 Taunt 33 at 36. It has been argued by Hirst ‘Murder under the Queen’s Peace’ [2008]
Crim LR 541 that the ‘Queen’s peace’ element does not bear the sense in the text, in which it has traditionally
been understood. He argues that it is simply a reference to the fact that the killing must be by a person to whom,
and in circumstances to which, the English law of murder applies.
28 Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 82 JP 287, CCA. 29 Para 8.123.
30 Coke 3 Institutes 47; Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454, CCA; Inner West London Coroner, ex p De Luca [1989] QB
249, DC.
might have escaped criminal liability completely, since there is no general non-fatal
offence based on negligence.
Following a Law Commission proposal,31 the Law Reform (Year and A Day Rule) Act
1996, s 1 abolished the year and a day rule in respect of offences involving death and of
suicide. This abolition, however, does not affect the continued application of the rule
where the act or omission (or the last act or omission) which caused death occurred
before 17 June 1996, 32 the day of Royal Assent.
Section 2(1) and (2) provides that proceedings may only be instituted in respect of a
‘fatal offence’33 by or with the consent of the Attorney General:
(a) where the injury alleged to have caused the death was sustained more than three
years before the death occurred; or
(b) where D has previously been convicted of an offence committed in circumstances
alleged to be connected with the death.
The purpose of (a) ‘is to protect a proposed defendant from prosecutions being brought
after a substantial interval of time, when his memory might not be reliable, and when
other evidence might have disappeared’.34 This factor has not been thought to require
the Attorney General’s consent to a prosecution for other offences, and it is questionable
whether it should in respect of fatal offences. A similar comment can be made in respect
of (b), which is widely drafted.
Unlawful killing
8.16 The killing of another is unlawful unless it falls within one of the following catego-
ries of lawful homicide:
• Public or private defence Here D kills by using reasonable force in self-defence, in
prevention of crime or in certain other similar situations. This is explained in paras
16.1 to 16.37.35
• Misadventure Death is caused by misadventure where it results, by an accident not
involving gross negligence, from the doing of a lawful act. An obvious instance is
where death results from a lawful operation carried out with due care by a surgeon.
Another example is death resulting from lawful acts done in the course of lawful
games, such as football and boxing.36
31 Legislating the Criminal Code: The Year and a Day Rule (1995), Law Com No 230.
32 Law Reform (Year and A Day Rule) Act 1996, s 3(2).
33 Ie murder, manslaughter, infanticide or any other offence of which an element is causing a person’s death,
encouraging or assisting suicide in connection with the death of a person, or an offence contrary to the Domestic
Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, s 5 of causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult: Law
Reform (Year and A Day Rule) Act 1996, s 2(3) (as amended by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act
2004, Schs 10 and 11; the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Sch 21).
34 Legislating the Criminal Code: The Year and a Day Rule, para 5.28.
35 In the very rare situation where a killing is justified by necessity (see para 16.98) the killing will also be
lawful. 36 Paras 7.8–7.20.
Murder
Key points 8.2

Murder consists of unlawful homicide with malice aforethought.
Malice aforethought consists of intention on the defendant’s part:
• unlawfully to kill another human being; or

• unlawfully to cause grievous bodily harm to another human being.
8.17 The only punishment for murder is imprisonment for life. It is triable only on
indictment.
8.18 There is no exception to the mandatory life sentence for murder, even in the case of
‘mercy killings’. However, verdicts of murder are quite commonly avoided where long-
term carers have caused the death by a conviction of manslaughter on grounds of dimin-
ished responsibility. Strictly, such cases may not have satisfied all the requirements of the
defence but this problem has been swept under the carpet by the benevolent evidence of
medical witnesses coupled with the prosecution’s acceptance of a plea of guilty of man-
slaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility.37
8.19 Murder was a purely capital offence (ie the only sentence was death) until the law
was modified by the Homicide Act 1957, which drew a distinction between capital and
non-capital murder. Capital murder included murders done in the course or furtherance
of theft; by shooting or causing an explosion; in resisting, avoiding or preventing lawful
arrest, and murders of police officers acting in the execution of their duty. Non-capital
murder was punished with life imprisonment. The distinction between capital and non-
capital murder did not prove satisfactory.
8.20 The death penalty for murder was abolished by the Murder (Abolition of Death
Penalty) Act 1965, under which the only sentence for murder is imprisonment for life.
Where the convicted murderer was under 18 at the time of the offence, he is ordered to
be detained during Her Majesty’s pleasure, in effect a mandatory life sentence, instead of
being sentenced to life imprisonment.38 There have been various attempts in Parliament to
restore the death penalty for murder, in some cases at least, but they have all been unsuc-
cessful. The ratification by the United Kingdom of Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol
to the ECHR, a Convention right under the Human Rights Act 1998, which prohibits the
death penalty, means that the death penalty could only be re-introduced by amending the
Human Rights Act 1998.
8.21 A mandatory sentence of life imprisonment does not necessarily mean that the
offender has to remain in prison for the rest of his life, but it does mean that the sentence
of imprisonment is not for a fi xed period at the outset. However, unless the trial judge
37 See para 8.56. 38 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 90.
8.23 murder | 239
decides not to do so, because of the seriousness of the murder or of the murder and an
associated offence or offences, the judge must specify a minimum term to be served in
custody which the judge considers appropriate, taking into account the seriousness of the
murder (and any associated offence(s)).39 The offender must be released on licence, once
that term has been served, if the Parole Board has recommended that continued confine-
ment is no longer necessary for public protection. It will be noted that the judge only has
power to specify a minimum term, not a maximum term. The rules are essentially the
same in relation to someone convicted of a murder committed while under 18 who has
been ordered to be detained during Her Majesty’s pleasure. The mandatory life sentence
in itself has been held by the House of Lords not to be incompatible with the ECHR,
Articles 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) or 5 (right to liberty) on the
ground that the operation in practice of an indeterminate sentence for murder does not
constitute an arbitrary and disproportionate punishment.40
8.22 It can be argued that the mandatory life sentence for murder is necessary for
the purposes of prevention and deterrence, and also in order to maintain the stigma
attached to murder and to reassure the public as to the gravity of the offence. The man-
datory sentence can also be supported by the argument that at the time of sentence
neither the judge nor the Court of Appeal can have the foresight to know when the
murderer can be released compatibly with the safety of society. On the other hand,
murders can vary greatly in their gravity, and so can murderers in their dangerousness.
Many people would agree, eg, that committing murder by intentionally killing under
extreme duress 41 is less heinous, and the offender less dangerous, than where someone
makes a cold-blooded attempt to kill someone which fails but leaves the victim com-
pletely paralysed for life. Many would doubtless also agree that the intentional killer
under duress may be less dangerous than an intentional killer whose liability is reduced
on grounds of diminished responsibility to manslaughter. Nevertheless, a convicted
murderer has to be given a life sentence whereas the person convicted of attempted
murder or manslaughter may be given any sentence at the judge’s discretion up to a
maximum of life. A similar point in terms of heinousness may be made in respect of the
convicted murderer whose liability is based on a serious injury, not intended to cause
more than serious harm, which would not have proved fatal if the hospital to which the
victim was taken had provided adequate treatment. The mandatory life sentence may
also be criticised on the ground that a jury, knowing of it and considering it too severe
a sentence, may decide to acquit a defendant whom they consider guilty of murder in
order to avoid it.
8.23 The arguments in favour of the mandatory life sentence are unconvincing. In 1989
a Select Committee of the House of Lords (the Nathan Committee)42 recommended that
the mandatory sentence be abolished and replaced by a maximum sentence of life impris-
onment, which would permit the judge, as in other offences, to impose a lower sentence if
that was appropriate in the circumstances. The same recommendation was made in 1993
39 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 269. 40 Lichniak; Pyrah [2002] UKHL 47.
41 Duress is not a defence to murder (paras 16.55–16.59 and 16.83).
42 Report of the Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment (Session 1988–89) HL Paper 78–1.
by a committee chaired by a former Lord Chief Justice.43 On neither occasion, did this
recommendation receive government support. It seems unlikely that the mandatory life
sentence for murder will be abolished in the foreseeable future. When the Government.
asked the Law Commission in 2005 to review the law of murder (see para 8.33) the request
was prefaced by a commitment to the mandatory life sentence. Opposition to that sen-
tence continues, however, to be expressed.44
Malice aforethought
8.24 Malice aforethought consists of intention on the part of D:
• unlawfully to kill another human being; or

• unlawfully to cause grievous bodily harm to another human being.45
Nothing less, such as recklessness as to death, suffices.46 Malice aforethought does not
imply either premeditation or ill-will. The sudden intentional killing of one’s nearest and
dearest is no less murder than the cunningly contrived assassination of a deadly enemy.
Malice aforethought is thus a misleading term and the abolition of that term would
improve the precision and lucidity of the law of murder.47
8.25 Before the Homicide Act 1957 came into force, there were three kinds of malice
aforethought. It might have been ‘express’, ‘implied’ or ‘constructive’. Constructive mal-
ice aforethought was abolished by the Homicide Act 1957, s 1, but malice aforethought
may still be express or implied. Although the terms ‘express malice’ and ‘implied malice’
had not been used in any consistent sense by the courts prior to that Act coming into
force, the judgment soon afterwards of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Vickers, 48 which
has been endorsed by the House of Lords on three subsequent occasions,49 made it clear
that ‘express malice’ means an intention to kill and ‘implied malice’ an intention to cause
grievous bodily harm.
There were two types of constructive malice aforethought, for it was murder to cause
death in furtherance of a felony50 or when resisting lawful arrest, even though D might not
have intended to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm, provided D had the mens rea for
the felony or (as the case might have been) intended to resist lawful arrest. Consequently,
the doctrine was capable of operating very harshly, for it meant that someone would be
technically guilty of murder if, when committing robbery or trying to resist lawful arrest,
43 Lane Committee on the Penalty for Homicide (Prison Reform Trust).

44 See Public Opinion and the Penalty for Murder: Report of the Homicide Review Advisory Group on the
Mandatory Sentence of Life Imprisonment for Murder (2011).
45 For a modern authority that murder is an offence requiring intention, see Moloney [1985] AC 905, HL.
46 Leung Kam Kwok v R (1984) 81 Cr App R 83, PC.
47 Stephen History of the Criminal Law Vol III, 83; Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55 at 66, per Lord Hailsham LC;
A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 at 250, per Lord Mustill. 48 [1957] 2 QB 664, CCA.
49 DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, HL; Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55, HL (Lords Diplock and Kilbrandon dissenting);
Cunningham [1982] AC 566, HL. For criticism of these terms, see Cunningham ibid, per Lord Hailsham LC.
50 Until the Criminal Law Act 1967, there were distinctions between offences classified as felonies and mis-
demeanours. Th is was one of them.
8.28 murder | 241
he gave his victim a slight push which happened to prove fatal through an unforeseen
contingency such as a heart attack.
Intention unlawfully to kill, or cause grievous

bodily harm to, another human being
8.26 That D must intend unlawfully51 to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to another
human being was implicit in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gladstone Williams52 and
put beyond doubt by the decision of the Privy Council in Beckford v R,53 where the Privy
Council held that a person could not be convicted of murder, even if he intentionally
killed someone, if he did so in a mistaken belief in facts which, if true, would justify him
in using reasonable force in self-defence and he had not exceeded such force, because he
would not have intended unlawfully to kill his victim.54
Intention unlawfully to kill another human being

8.27 Not surprisingly there is uncontradicted authority55 to support the proposition that
an intention unlawfully to kill another human being constitutes malice aforethought.
Intention unlawfully to cause grievous bodily harm to another

human being
8.28 ‘Grievous bodily harm’ was defined by the House of Lords in DPP v Smith.56 Lord
Kilmuir, giving the only reasoned speech (with which the other Law Lords agreed), said
that ‘grievous bodily harm’ is to be given its natural meaning and that ‘grievous’ means
‘really serious’. ‘Really’ seems to mean no more than that the harm must actually be seri-
ous.57 In relation to intent to cause grievous bodily harm, if D is proved to have intended
to cause bodily harm and that harm is regarded as serious (ie grievous) by the jury, it is
irrelevant that D did not so regard it.58
It was only in 1981 in Cunningham59 that it was settled beyond doubt by the House
of Lords that an intention to cause grievous bodily harm to another constitutes malice
aforethought.
In Rahman, Lord Bingham explained the rationale behind this type of malice afore-
thought as follows:
‘The rationale of that principle plainly is that if a person unlawfully assaults another with
intent to cause him really serious injury, and death results, he should be held criminally
responsible for that fatality, even though he did not intend it. If he had not embarked on
51 For the meaning of ‘unlawfully’, see para 8.16. Doubtless, a soldier who intentionally killed someone,
mistakenly believing that his victim was a person who would be outside the Queen’s peace (para 8.12), would
also not intend unlawfully to kill. 52 (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA; para 5.7.
53 [1988] AC 130, PC.
54 Such a person would not be guilty of manslaughter or any other offence against the person: see Ch 16.
55 Moloney [1985] AC 905, HL, can now be regarded as the leading authority. 56 [1961] AC 290, HL.
57 See further paras 7.77–7.79. 58 See para 7.92. 59 [1982] AC 566, HL.
a course of deliberate violence, the fatality would not have occurred. This rationale may
lack logical purity, but it is underpinned by a quality of earthy realism.’ 60
8.29 The result of the present rule is that a defendant who only intended to cause
grievous bodily harm and did not foresee death even as a remote possibility, and
who could only have been guilty of unlawfully causing grievous bodily harm with
intent, contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 18, if death had not
unexpectedly resulted, is guilty of murder and subject to the mandatory life sentence.
On the other hand, a defendant who lacked that intent but realised that there was a
probability (but not a virtual certainty) that death might result from his conduct but
was indifferent to that risk cannot be so convicted. The former state of mind does not
fall within the popular conception of murder and is a conspicuous exception to the
normal rule that mens rea should correspond to the consequence of the actus reus. 61
On the other hand, the latter state of mind may well fall within the popular concep-
tion of murder.
Antenatal injury to child or mother: malice

aforethought
8.30 Inflicting an injury on a foetus, which is intended to destroy it in the womb but
which results in the child being born alive and then dying, cannot constitute murder,
although it can constitute involuntary manslaughter. 62 True, the actus reus of homicide
is committed but the person who commits it does not act with intent to kill or do grievous
bodily harm to a human being.63
8.31 What if D acted instead with intent to do grievous bodily harm to the mother, and
with no intent to injure the foetus or the child it would become? Can D be convicted
of murder? The answer ‘no’ is provided by the decision of the House of Lords in A-G’s
Reference (No 3 of 1994);64 the House held that D could, however, be convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter.
D had stabbed a woman who was between 22 and 24 weeks’ pregnant. On his own
admission D intended to do the woman grievous bodily harm but there was no evi-
dence that he intended to destroy the foetus or to cause injury to the woman which
would cause harm to the baby after it was born. The woman went into labour 17 days
later and a baby was born alive but grossly premature. D pleaded guilty to wounding
60 [2008] UKHL 45 at [25].

61 A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 at 250, per Lord Mustill; Powell and Daniels; English [1999] 1
AC 1 at 12 and 15, per Lords Mustill and Steyn. 62 Paras 8.82–8.121.
63 In West (1848) 2 Car & Kir 784, it was held that there could be a conviction for murder on these facts but
this decision depended on the application of the doctrine of constructive malice aforethought abolished by the
Homicide Act 1957; para 8.25. The House of Lords declined to rule on the correctness or otherwise of West in
A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 on the ground that the question did not arise on the facts of the
reference, but it is submitted that when the question does arise for a judicial ruling the answer will be as set out
in the text. For support for this, see an obiter dictum by the Court of Appeal in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)
[1996] QB 581 at 594. 64 [1998] AC 245, HL.
8.31 murder | 243
the woman with intent to cause her grievous bodily harm, and was sentenced to four
years’ imprisonment. Subsequently, the baby died from broncho-pulmonary dyspla-
sia consequent on the effects of its premature birth. D was then charged with the
murder of the baby. He pleaded not guilty. The trial judge ruled that there could be
no conviction for murder or manslaughter on these facts, and directed the jury to
acquit D.
The Attorney General referred the following points of law to the Court of Appeal,
whence the case was referred to the House of Lords on the following points:
‘1. Subject to the proof by the prosecution of the requisite intent in either case: whether
the crimes of murder or manslaughter can be committed where unlawful injury is
deliberately inflicted: (i) to a child in utero (ii) to a mother carrying a child in utero
where the child is subsequently born alive, enjoys an existence independent of the
mother, thereafter dies and the injuries inflicted while in utero either caused or
made a substantial contribution to the death.
2. Whether the fact that the death of the child is caused solely as a consequence of
injury to the mother rather than as a consequence of direct injury to the foetus can
negative any liability for murder or manslaughter in the circumstances set out in
question 1.’
The House of Lords declined to answer part (i) of point 1 because it did not arise
on the facts of the case. Its answer to part (ii) of point 1 was ‘no’ in respect of mur-
der, but ‘yes’ in respect of manslaughter. Its answer to point 2 was that in relation
to murder the point was superseded by its answer to point 1 and ‘no’ in relation to
manslaughter.
The question of liability for manslaughter is dealt with in para 8.97. We are concerned
here with why the House of Lords considered that the mens rea for murder was not satis-
fied on the facts, although the actus reus was.
Disagreeing with the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords held that the foetus could
not be identified with the mother. Consequently, an intention to cause grievous bodily
harm to the mother was not equivalent to an intent to cause grievous bodily harm to the
foetus, since when the foetus – if born alive – becomes a life in being it is a separate organ-
ism from the mother.
The House of Lords also rejected an argument that an intent to do grievous bodily
harm to the mother could be added to the contemporaneous train of events from D’s acts
resulting in the death of the baby. It regarded such an argument as involving an extension
of the law. While it acknowledged that it had to accept that an intention to do grievous
bodily harm was malice aforethought, it was not prepared to apply it to what it regarded
as a new situation, where the actual victim was not alive at the time of the conduct in
question and died not of an injury inflicted on it but as a result of premature birth brought
about by an injury to its mother. In particular, it did not think that the offence of murder
could be extended in such a case by using the doctrine of ‘transferred malice (or intent)’.65
65 Para 3.38.
Lord Mustill, with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, said that to do so would
require a double transfer of intent:
‘first from the mother to the foetus and then from the foetus to the child as yet unborn.
Then one would have to deploy the fiction (or at least the doctrine) which converts
an intention to commit serious harm into the mens rea of murder. For me, this is too
much.’66
His Lordship also gave another reason:
‘The effect of transferred malice, as I understand it, is that the intended victim and the
actual victim are treated as if they were one, so that what was intended to happen to the
fi rst person (but did not happen) is added to what actually did happen to the second
person (but was not intended to happen), with the result that what was intended and
what happened are married to make a notionally intended and actually consummated
crime. The cases are treated as if the actual victim had been the intended victim from
the start. To make any sense of this process there must, as it seems to me, be some
compatibility between the original intention and the actual occurrence and this is,
indeed, what one fi nds in the cases. There is no such compatibility here. The defendant
intended to commit and did commit an immediate crime of violence to the mother. He
committed no relevant violence to the foetus, which was not a person, and intended
no harm to the foetus or to the human person which it would become. If fictions are
useful, as they can be, they are only damaged by straining them beyond their limits. I
would not overstrain the idea of transferred malice by trying to make it fit the present
case.’67
This decision is open to criticism in that it involves a misunderstanding of the require-

ment of mens rea: mens rea for murder is an intent unlawfully to kill or do grievous bodily
harm to another person, and not an intent to bring about such a consequence in relation
to a particular person. As previously explained, the doctrine of transferred malice is sim-
ply a recognition that the mens rea of an offence is framed in a way non-specific to the
victim.68 As already indicated, the defendant in a case like A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)
can be convicted of manslaughter. This adds to the oddity of the decision. If not murder,
why manslaughter? To which, one may add: ‘Why only manslaughter, if the defendant
has killed with the mens rea for murder?’
8.32 In A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), the House of Lords did not directly deal with the
situation where D injures a pregnant woman (but not her foetus), intending to kill her,
and the foetus is born prematurely as a result of the mother’s injury and dies in conse-
quence of the premature birth. This situation is not caught by the House of Lords’ reluc-
tance to extend intent to do grievous bodily harm as a species of malice aforethought, but
it is open to the same arguments against double transfer of intent and about the effect of
‘transferred malice’ put forward by Lord Mustill.
66 [1998] AC 245 at 262. 67 Ibid. 68 Para 3.38.

8.33 murder | 245
Reform
8.33 In 2005, the Government asked the Law Commission to review the law of mur-
der, other than the mandatory life sentence. The Law Commission published Murder,
Manslaughter and Infanticide, its report, in 2006. 69 Its recommendations circumvent
the difficulty of the mandatory life sentence to some extent by proposing the introduc-
tion of a three-tier ladder of general homicide offences to reflect different degrees of
culpability and proposing that that sentence should only apply to the most serious, ‘first
degree murder’.
There would be two degrees of murder. ‘First degree murder’ would encompass:
‘(1) intentional 70 killings, and

(2) killings with the intent to cause serious injury where the killer was aware that his
or her conduct involved a serious risk of causing death’.71
The Commission rightly regarded the worst cases of reckless killing as morally equiva-
lent to intentional killing.
‘Second degree murder’ would encompass:
‘(1) killings intended to cause serious injury; or

(2) killings intended to cause injury or fear or risk of injury where the killer was aware
that his or her conduct involved a serious risk of causing death; or
(3) killings intended to kill or to cause serious injury where the killer was aware that
his or her conduct involved a serious risk of causing death but successfully pleads
provocation, diminished responsibility or that he or she killed pursuant to a sui-
cide pact’.72
Second degree murder would be punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment.

Below the two degrees of murder there would be the third tier on the ladder of general
homicide offences: a redefined offence of manslaughter.73
In January 2011, the Government informed the Law Commission that it would not
implement these recommendations, stating that the time was not right to take forward
such a substantial reform of the criminal law.74 The rejection of the Commission’s pro-
posals is unfortunate, to say the least.
69 Law Com No 304. For previous recommendations for the reform of the law of murder see 14th Report of
the Criminal Law Revision Committee: Offences against the Person (1980) Cmnd 7844, paras 14–31, adopted in
the draft Criminal Code Bill cl 54: Law Commission: A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989), Law Com
No 177; see para 1.70. 70 See para 3.21.
71 Law Com No 304, para 2.69. For the Law Commission’s discussion of fi rst and second degree murder and
the three-tier structure, see Part 2, and Appendix A, paras A.5–A.15, of the Report.
72 Law Com No 304, para 2.70. The defence of provocation has since been replaced by that of loss of control:
para 8.58. 73 See para 8.122.
74 Law Commission Annual Report 2010–2011, Law Com No 328, para 3.64.
Manslaughter
Key points 8.3

There are two generic types of manslaughter – voluntary and involuntary. Corporate man-
slaughter is a separate offence and is dealt with later.
Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing where D has killed with malice aforethought,
but has a partial defence which mitigates the gravity of his offence. Partial defences are
the defences of:
• suicide pact;
• diminished responsibility; or
• loss of control.
Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing where D does not have malice afore-
thought 75 but some other, less blameworthy, fault element is proved.
8.34 The maximum punishment for manslaughter is imprisonment for life.76
8.35 The rationale behind voluntary manslaughter is that it provides a way in the circum-
stances just described to avoid the mandatory sentence for murder. It is arguable that if the
mandatory sentence for murder was abolished, there would be no justification for having
distinct offences of murder and voluntary manslaughter. Under the recommendations of
the Law Commission referred to in para 8.33, voluntary manslaughter would cease to exist
as a type of manslaughter and would become part of second degree murder.
8.36 A person cannot be charged with voluntary manslaughter. A verdict of voluntary
manslaughter is only possible by means of a successful plea of one of the three mitigating
circumstances by way of defence to a murder charge. An offence of involuntary man-
slaughter, on the other hand, can be charged in its own right; alternatively a verdict of
guilty of such an offence may be returned at a murder trial where the prosecution fails
to prove the mens rea for murder.77 Like a murder charge, a charge of involuntary man-
slaughter may only be tried on indictment.
Voluntary manslaughter
Suicide pacts
8.37 It is not murder intentionally to kill a person in pursuance of a suicide pact. A ‘sui-
cide pact’ means a common agreement between two or more persons whose object is the
death of all of them, whether or not each is to take his own life.78
75 Taylor (1834) 2 Lew CC 215. 76 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 5.
77 Criminal Law Act 1967, s 6(2). See also Saunders [1988] AC 148, HL. 78 Homicide Act 1957, s 4(3).
8.38 voluntary manslaughter | 247
At common law, a survivor of such a pact which had been put into partial effect was
guilty of murder, but the Homicide Act 1957, s 4(1)79 now provides that:
‘It shall be manslaughter, and shall not be murder, for a person acting in pursuance of a
suicide pact between him and another to kill the other or be a party to the other being
killed by a third person.’
On a charge of murder, D has the persuasive burden of proving that he was acting pursu-
ant to a suicide pact between him and the other.80 This has been held not to be incompat-
ible with the ECHR, Article 6(2).81
Prosecutions for an offence under the Homicide Act 1957, s 4 are rare.
8.38 Although the Homicide Act 1957, s 4 was intended to be a compassionate meas-
ure to reduce an intentional killing below murder, it can theoretically cover cases which
are not deserving of compassion, as where D, the leader of a religious cult, persuades its
members to meet to commit suicide together. At the meeting he hands each of them an
instantly lethal poison which they all take with the exception of D who loses his nerve at
the last moment. For this reason, the Law Commission’s provisional proposal in 200582
that the defence of suicide pact should be repealed, leaving deserving cases of killing pur-
suant to a suicide pact to be covered by a reformed defence of diminished responsibility,
had much to commend it, although a rational and deserving person who can currently
rely successfully on the Homicide Act 1957, s 4 would have been unable to succeed with a
defence of diminished responsibility. In its subsequent report, Murder, Manslaughter and
Infanticide, 83 the Law Commission recommended that s 4 should be retained, pending
the outcome of a public consultation (which it recommended but which has never taken
place) on whether and, if so, to what extent the law should recognise either an offence of
‘mercy’ killing or a partial defence of ‘mercy’ killing.
Diminished responsibility
Key points 8.4
A defendant (D) who would otherwise be guilty of murder (whether as a perpetrator or an
accomplice) has a partial defence if D proves the defence of diminished responsibility. If D
does so D’s liability is reduced to manslaughter.
Where at a murder trial D pleads insanity, the prosecution may adduce or elicit evidence
that D was suffering from diminished responsibility, in which case the prosecution must
prove the requirements of the defence.
79 As amended by the Suicide Act 1961, s 3(2), Sch 2. 80 Homicide Act 1957, s 4(2).
81 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2004); Edwards; Denton; Jackson; Hendley; Crowley [2004] EWCA Crim 1025;
para 4.8.
82 Law Commission Consultation Paper No 177 A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? paras 8.1–8.38,
8.68–8.94. 83 Law Com Report No 304 (2006), paras 7.38–7.39, 7.50.
Introduction
8.39 The concept of diminished responsibility, which had been known to Scots law for
some time, was introduced into English law by the Homicide Act 1957 (HA 1957), s 2. The
partial defence of diminished responsibility is quite different from that of insanity dealt
with in Chapter 15. Insanity covered by the M’Naghten Rules84 is a complete defence to
most offences and leads to an acquittal. Diminished responsibility, on the other hand, is
merely a mitigating factor limited to charges of murder. It applies only where D would
otherwise be guilty of murder (and given the mandatory life sentence) because the actus
reus and mens rea of that offence have been proved or admitted.85 If successfully pleaded,
it reduces D’s liability to manslaughter.86 This means that the court has a discretion in
the matter of punishment which may vary from imprisonment for life to an absolute
discharge; where considered appropriate, a hospital order (with or without restriction
of time), a hospital direction and a limitation direction (which can only be made if the
offender is suffering from psychopathic disorder and is sentenced to imprisonment), or a
guardianship order, may be made under the Mental Health Act 1983.
8.40 A defence of diminished responsibility is not required for other offences because
they do not carry a fi xed penalty, so that the judge has a discretion as to the punishment
imposed. In Campbell,87 Sedley J, as he then was, rejected an argument that diminished
responsibility could be a defence on a charge of attempted murder.
8.41 The terms of the defence of diminished responsibility are less strict than those of insan-
ity. For this reason, it has historically been pleaded successfully far more often than insanity
in murder cases. However, there has been a marked decline in the figures in recent years.88
8.42 Among the reasons why it is appropriate that there should be a partial defence of
diminished responsibility which gives the judge a discretion in passing sentence are:
• the need to enable jurors to convict a defendant of a homicide offence in cases where,
if the only conviction available to them was for murder, they might otherwise (per-
versely) acquit altogether;
• the fact that in some cases diminished responsibility may be the only defence to
murder available to an abused woman who kills her partner.
Quite apart from arguments based on the existence of the mandatory sentence for mur-
der, the existence of the defence of diminished responsibility can be supported on the
ground of the importance of ‘fair and just labelling’, ie that it is unjust to label as murder-
ers those not fully responsible for their actions.
8.43 As originally enacted, the HA 1957, s 2(1) provided that a person who killed or was
a party to the killing was not to be convicted of murder if:
• he was suffering from an abnormality of mind;
• the abnormality of mind was due to a condition of arrested or retarded development
of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury; and
84 (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200. 85 Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340, HL. 86 Homicide Act 1957, s 2(3).
87 [1997] Crim LR 495, Crown Ct. Also see para 14.109. 88 Home Office Statistical Bulletin 01/04.
• the abnormality of mind was such as to have substantially impaired his mental
responsibility for his acts or omissions in killing or being a party to the killing.
8.44 In its original form s 2(1) was unsatisfactory. ‘Abnormality of mind’ and ‘sub-
stantial impairment of mental responsibility’ were imprecise terms which created
problems for judges and juries. ‘Abnormality of mind’ was not a psychiatric term,
which caused problems for medical expert witnesses (whose evidence is crucial to the
legal viability of a plea of diminished responsibility), so its meaning had to be devel-
oped by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, diagnostic practice in dimin-
ished responsibility cases had developed beyond identification of the fi xed range of
permissible causes of mental abnormality stipulated by the defi nition. In addition,
the specified permissible causes never had an agreed psychiatric meaning. 89 Section 2
as enacted did not explain what was involved in a ‘substantial impairment of mental
responsibility’. The implication was that the effects of the abnormality of mind had
substantially to reduce D’s culpability, but s 2 did not make this clear, nor indicate
how the effects of an abnormality could reduce culpability for what would otherwise
be murder.
8.45 Points such as these were noted in the various reports90 in the last four decades in
which proposals for the reform of diminished responsibility have been made.
In its consultation paper, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform
of the Law,91 the Government proposed the replacement of the existing partial defence of
diminished responsibility with a new defence whose terms owe much to the recommen-
dations of the Law Commission in 2006,92 although they departed from them in some
aspects. The Government’s proposals were enacted with some structural changes by the
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 52, which provides that HA 1957, s 2(1) as originally
enacted provisions is substituted by a new s 2(1), (1A) and (1B). As will be indicated, these
changes may have the effect of narrowing the defence of diminished responsibility, and
thereby reducing its utility as a way round the mandatory sentence for murder.
Requirements of the defence

8.46 HA 1957, s 2(1) and (1A) provides:
‘(1) A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted
of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which –
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition,
(b) substantially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in
subsection (1A), and
(c) provides an explanation for D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to
the killing.
89 Law Com No 304, para 5.111.

90 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (1975), Cmnd 6244, paras 19.1–19.21; Law
Commission Partial Defences to Murder (2004), Law Com No 290, paras 5.1–5.105; Law Commission Murder,
Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006), Law Com No 304, paras 5.83–5.142.
91 Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper 19/08. 92 Law Com No 304.
(1A) Those things are –

(a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgment;
(c) to exercise self-control.’
8.47 The wording of the HA 1957, s 2(1) can be broken down into four requirements
which by s 2(2) D has the persuasive burden of proving. It has been held that placing the
burden of proof on D does not breach the presumption of innocence in the ECHR, Article
6(2) because someone charged with murder is not required to prove anything unless he
seeks to rely on s 2, and if he can take advantage of s 2 it is to his benefit.93 The burden of
proof is discharged by proof on the balance of probabilities.94
The Court of Appeal in Campbell95 held, obiter, that the wording of the HA 1957, s
2(2) is such that only D can raise the defence of diminished responsibility. The result is
that, if there is prima facie evidence of the requirements of diminished responsibility, the
judge cannot leave that defence to the jury without D’s consent.
There is one exception to the imposition of the burden of proof on D and to the rule
that only D can raise the defence of diminished responsibility. It is provided by the
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 6. Section 6 provides that, where, at a murder
trial, D contends that he was insane under the M’Naghten Rules, the prosecution may
adduce or elicit evidence that D was suffering from diminished responsibility. In such
a case, it is for the prosecution to prove the requirements of diminished responsibility
beyond reasonable doubt.96
Abnormality of mental functioning

8.48 The first of the four requirements for diminished responsibility is that D must have
been suffering from an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ at the material time. ‘Mental
functioning’ is a term preferred to ‘mind’ by psychiatrists,97 although there does not appear
to be any difference of substance between the two terms. In respect of the original version of
s 2(1), the Court of Criminal Appeal in Byrne98 held that ‘abnormality of mind’ meant a state
of mind so different from that of an ordinary person that the reasonable man would term it
abnormal. It is submitted that ‘abnormality’ should be understood in the sense of the words
italicised in respect of the new requirement of abnormality of mental functioning.
Recognised medical condition

8.49 The second requirement for diminished responsibility is that the abnormality of
mental functioning must arise from a recognised medical condition,99 whether psychi-
atric, psychological or physical. Thus, the defence is no longer governed by a fi xed and
out-of-date set of causes from which the mental abnormality must stem.
93 Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002] QB 1112, CA; McQuade [2005] NICA 2, [2005] NI 331, NICA.
94 Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1, CCA.
95 (1986) 84 Cr App R 255, CA. Also see Kooken (1981) 74 Cr App R 30, CA.
96 Grant [1960] Crim LR 424. 97 Law Com No 304, para 5.114. 98 [1960] 2 QB 396, CCA.
99 HA 1957, s 2(1)(a).
The reference to ‘recognised medical condition’ is intended to ensure that a success-

ful plea of diminished responsibility is grounded on a valid medical diagnosis linked
normally to the accepted international classificatory systems of mental conditions which
together encompass the recognised psychiatric, psychological or physical conditions.100
Conditions not listed in one of the systems are not excluded, however, if the evidence
indicates that a condition is a professionally recognised one, as in the case of a condition
of which understanding and diagnosis are emerging. Psychotic disorders are recognised
medical conditions, for instance, and so are neurotic disorders. An example of the latter
would be post-traumatic disorder or depressive illness suffered by a woman due to violent
abuse suffered over many years. Particularly relevant examples of physical conditions
include epilepsy and diabetes.
The requirement of a recognised medical condition means that a plea of diminished
responsibility based on an idiosyncratic diagnosis by a medical expert witness is unlikely
to succeed.101 The requirement will serve to exclude those cases of mercy killing where a
plea of diminished responsibility succeeded under the original version of s 2 as a result
of the benevolent evidence of medical witnesses in a case where no recognised medical
condition, such as depressive illness, could be proved.
8.50 The HA 1957, s 2(1), does not incorporate the Law Commission’s recommenda-
tion102 that the definition of diminished responsibility should include abnormality of
mental functioning arising from developmental immaturity in a defendant under 18, as
an alternative cause of impairment to that of abnormality of mental functioning arising
from a recognised medical condition. This alternative was designed to address the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between mental conditions and differing stages of maturity where
juveniles are concerned and to respond to the Commission’s view that it was unrealistic
and unfair to assume that all children above the age of legal responsibility (10) who kill
with malice aforethought must have had the kind of developed sense of judgement, con-
trol and understanding that makes a murder conviction right. The Government decided
against implementing this recommendation. It was not persuaded that the absence of a
provision along the lines recommended was causing significant problems in practice, and
it thought that there was a risk that such a provision would open up the defence too widely
and catch inappropriate cases.103 In any event, it argued, the accepted classificatory sys-
tems cover conditions such as learning disabilities and autistic spectrum disorders which
can be particularly relevant in the context of those under 18, so that those who have
such conditions have the opportunity to run the defence of diminished responsibility.
Because developmental immaturity is not in itself an alternative to a recognised medical
condition it would seem that the following scenario given by the Law Commission104 falls
outside the defence:
100 There are two such systems: the World Health Organisation International Classification of Diseases
(ICD-10) and the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV).
101 Law Com No 304, paras 5.114, 5.116. 102 Ibid, paras 5.125–5.131.
103 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law Ministry of Justice Consultation
Paper 19/08, para 53. 104 Law Com No 304, para 5.121.
‘A boy aged 10 who has been left to play very violent video games for hours on end for
much of his life, loses his temper and kills another child when the child attempts to take a
game from him. When interviewed, he shows no real understanding that, when a person
is killed they cannot simply be later revived, as happens in the games he has been continu-
ally playing.’
The boy certainly has an impaired capacity to understand the nature of his conduct aris-
ing from an abnormality of mental functioning and this may be regarded as an explana-
tion for his conduct but his abnormality of mental functioning arises from developmental
immaturity and not from a recognised medical condition. He cannot succeed in a defence
of diminished responsibility. This seems harsh.
Substantial impairment of D’s ability

8.51 The third requirement for diminished responsibility is that the abnormality of
mental functioning arising from a recognised medical condition must have substan-
tially impaired D’s ability to do one or more of the following:
(a) to understand the nature of D’s conduct;
(b) to form a rational judgement;
(c) to exercise self-control.105
This is narrower than the original version of s 2(1)106 because it limits the aspects of D’s
mental functioning which must be affected in order for the defence to succeed. Element
(a) is similar to the ‘ignorance of nature and quality of act’ element under the defence of
insanity.107 The relationship between the two defences turns on the distinction between
their other elements.
‘Substantially impaired has the same meaning as in the original version of s 2(1). It
means that the impairment of D’s ability in one of the relevant respects need not be
‘total’ but it must be more than ‘trivial’ or ‘minimal’. ‘Substantial’ means something in
between.108
As can be seen from the above list, substantially impaired self-control, though irrel-
evant to the defence of insanity,109 is highly relevant to the question whether D was suf-
fering from diminished responsibility; and, unlike the defence of insanity, D may rely on
the defence although he knew what he was doing and knew that it was wrong.
The following scenarios based, with some amendment, on those given by the Law
Commission110 are examples of facts where a plea of diminished responsibility would be
capable of success:
105 HA 1957, s 2(1)(b), (1A).

106 As interpreted in Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 403 which stated that s 2(1) (as originally enacted) was
concerned with the mind’s activities in all its aspects, eg the ability to perceive reality, which is not in the
above list.
107 Paras 15.32 and 15.33.
108 It was confi rmed by the Court of Appeal in Brown [2011] EWCA Crim 2796 that ‘substantially impaired’
has the same meaning as in the original version of s 2(1). As to that meaning, see Lloyd [1967] 1 QB 175, CCA;
Egan [1992] 4 All ER 470, CA; Ramchurn [2010] EWCA Crim 194. 109 Para 15.26.
110 Law Com No 304, para 5.121.
Substantially impaired ability to ‘understand the nature of his or her conduct’ A man,
aged 30, with learning difficulties who has been left to play very violent video games for
hours on end for much of his life, loses his temper and kills a child when the child attempts
to take a game from him. When interviewed, he shows no real understanding that, when
a person is killed that person cannot simply be later revived, as happens in the games he
has been continually playing.
Substantially impaired ability to ‘ form a rational judgment’:
• a woman suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, consequent upon violent
abuse suffered at her husband’s hands, comes to believe that only burning her hus-
band to death will rid the world of his sins;
• a boy with learning difficulties believes that he must follow his older brother’s
instructions, even when they involve taking part in a killing. He says, ‘I wouldn’t
dream of disobeying my brother and he would never tell me to do something if it
was really wrong’;
• a depressed man who has been caring for many years for a terminally ill spouse, kills
her, at her request. He says that he had found it progressively more difficult to stop
her repeated requests dominating his thoughts to the exclusion of all else, so that
‘I felt I would never think straight again until I had given her what she wanted’.
Substantially impaired ability to ‘control him or herself ’ A man who suffers from schiz-
ophrenia says that sometimes the devil takes control of him and implants in him a desire
to kill, a desire that must be acted on before the devil will go away.
Explanation for D’s acts and omissions

8.52 The fourth requirement for diminished responsibility is that there must be some
connection between the abnormality of mental functioning which arose from a recog-
nised medical condition, and substantially impaired D’s ability in a specified way, and
the killing. The abnormality of mental functioning must provide an explanation for
D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.111 By HA 1957, s 2(1B), ‘an
abnormality of mental functioning provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes,
or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct’. Section
2(1B) does not say that this is the only way in which an abnormality of mental function-
ing provides an explanation for D’s conduct. It is therefore arguable that there may be
other ways, although if this is so why did the Act not make this clear? The Government
certainly thought that there was only one way: that in s 2(1B).112
Section 2(1B) means that abnormality of mental functioning need not be the sole cause
of D’s conduct. It would be impractical to require it so to be. As the Government stated
in its consultation paper:
‘It is rare that a person’s actions will be driven solely from within to such an extent that
they would not otherwise have committed the offence, regardless of the influence of
111
HA 1957, s 2(1)(c).
112
Th is was made particularly clear by Maria Eagle MP, Minister of State at the Ministry of Justice, at the
Committee stage of the Bill: see col 410 of the report of the Committee’s debates (3 March 2009).
external circumstances, and a strict causation requirement of this kind would limit the
availability of the partial defence too much.’113
Thus, for example, the fact that other explanations or causes were also operative does not
in itself negative the defence of diminished responsibility. Proof of the necessary link may
be difficult, if not impossible, from the psychiatric point of view.
This requirement is another reason why the new s 2(1) is liable to make the defence of
diminished responsibility stricter than its predecessor.
Where drink or drugs are involved

8.53 An abnormality of mental functioning which arises from intoxication through drink
or drugs is outside the defence of diminished responsibility because it does not arise from
a recognised medical condition. On the other hand, the defence of diminished responsi-
bility can be available to an intoxicated defendant in the following two types of case.
8.54 The fi rst type of case is where at the time of the killing D is suffering from two or
more conditions, one of which is a recognised medical condition (other than alcohol
dependency syndrome (alcoholism) or a cognate disorder such as drug addiction) and
the other of which is voluntary intoxication. In such a case, D is not deprived of the
defence of diminished responsibility merely because he might not have killed if he had
not been intoxicated. Th is was held by the House of Lords in Dietschmann114 in rela-
tion to the defence of diminished responsibility under the original HA 1957, s 2(1) and
the same is no doubt true in respect of the new s 2(1). It would appear by analogy from
Dietschmann that the defence will succeed if the jury are satisfied that, disregarding
D’s voluntary intoxication, he suffered an abnormality of mental functioning arising
from a recognised medical condition, that D’s ability in a specified respect was sub-
stantially impaired by the abnormality of mental functioning arising from the medical
condition and that this provided an explanation for his acts in doing or being a party
to the killing (ie was a cause, or significant contributory factor, of D’s conduct). If these
requirements are satisfied, it is irrelevant that D might not have killed if he had not been
intoxicated.
Such an approach is not an easy one for the jury to apply but it does recognise that
there is a moral difference between an intoxicated person with an abnormality of mental
functioning arising from a recognised medical condition who kills and a killer who is
simply intoxicated. It will be noted that the question of whether one of the competing
causes is the immediate cause of D’s mental state is irrelevant, a different approach from
that taken in relation to the defence of insanity and non-insane automatism dealt with
in Chapter 15.
The second type of case is where at the time of the killing D is intoxicated and suffers
from alcohol dependency syndrome, a recognised medical condition, or a cognate medically
recognised condition such as drug addiction. Here, too, the approach would seem to be the
same as in respect of the original version of s 2(1).115 The jury must be satisfied that there was
113 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law (n 103).
114 [2003] UKHL 10. 115 Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305; Stewart [2010] EWCA Crim 2159.
either damage to the brain or that the drinking (ie intoxication) was involuntary; in the lat-
ter respect not every drink has to be consumed involuntarily, but any voluntary intoxication
must be ignored in addressing the effect of D’s involuntary intoxication. The defence will
succeed if the jury are satisfied on this basis that D suffered an abnormality of mental func-
tioning arising from a recognised medical condition, that D’s ability in a specified respect
was substantially impaired by the abnormality of mental functioning arising from a recog-
nised medical condition and that this provided an explanation for D’s acts in doing or being
a party to the killing (ie was a cause, or significant contributory factor, of D’s conduct).
Function of jury
8.55 Although, unlike the defence of insanity, there is no statutory requirement of medi-
cal evidence, medical evidence in support of the defence of diminished responsibility is ‘a
practical necessity if the defence is to begin to run at all’.116
Whether or not the requirements of the defence are established is for the jury to
decide.117 It would seem that, as with the original version of the HA 1957, s 2(1), the jury
should approach these issues in a broad, commonsense way,118 taking into account not
only the medical evidence but all the evidence, including D’s acts or statements and
D’s demeanour.119 The medical evidence in support of the defence is important but the
jury are not bound to accept it, even though it is uncontradicted, if there is other mat-
erial before them which, in their opinion, conflicts with and outweighs it.120 In Eifinger,
decided under the original s 2(1),121 D had been convicted of murder despite the fact that
the medical evidence was that, at the time of the killing, D was suffering from a depres-
sive illness amounting to an abnormality of mind. Dismissing D’s appeal against convic-
tion, the Court of Appeal held that the jury were entitled to evaluate the medical evidence
along with all D’s evidence in the light of all the surrounding circumstances and come to
a conclusion about whether the medical evidence was reliable and accurate, particularly
as it was based on what D had told the psychiatrists concerned.
The jury must, however, found their verdict on the evidence, and, if medical evidence
in support of the defence is clear, unanimous and unchallenged and there is no other
evidence which would justify the jury in rejecting the medical evidence, the jury are
bound to accept the medical evidence and a verdict against D (ie of murder) contrary to
the medical evidence will be set aside on appeal.122 Sometimes the jury are faced with the
difficult task of weighing conflicting medical evidence.123
116 Dix (1981) 74 Cr App R 306 at 311.

117 Th is was the position in relation to the original s 2(1): Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 402–403; and there is
no reason to doubt that it continues to be the case. The aetiology of the abnormality of mental functioning (ie
whether it arose from a recognised medical condition) would seem to be a matter to be determined on medi-
cal evidence, as it was in respect of the issue of whether abnormality of mind was due to a permissible cause in
respect of the original s 2(1).
118 Walton v R [1978] AC 788, PC; Stewart [2009] EWCA Crim 593.
119 Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 402–403; Walton v R [1978] AC 788, PC; Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 1569.
120 Byrne above at 403; Walton v R above; Sanders (1991) 93 Cr App R 245, CA; Salmon [2005] 3 Archbold
News 2, CA. 121 [2001] EWCA Crim 1855, CA.
122 Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87, CCA; Bailey (1977) 66 Cr App R 31n, CCA; Vernege [1982] 1 WLR 293, CA;
Sanders (1991) 93 Cr App R 245, CA. 123 Jennion [1962] 1 All ER 689, CCA.
General
8.56 The judge may accept a plea of not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter
on grounds of diminished responsibility, in which case a verdict from the jury will not
be required, but this should only be done where there is clear and undisputed medical
evidence of diminished responsibility.124 In practice, the prosecution often concedes the
issue of diminished responsibility at the outset and the acceptance of such a plea by the
judge is common.125 If it happens, it means that medical evidence that D was suffering
from a recognised medical condition such as substantially to impair his ability, as speci-
fied in s 2(1) and (1A), will not be tested, and that, provided medical witnesses are willing
to give a sympathetic diagnosis to D’s condition in order to get round the mandatory sen-
tence for murder, what may be no more than an ordinary reaction to a stressful situation
(eg the mercy killing of a terminally ill relative) may result in a conviction for manslaugh-
ter on a murder charge. Diagnoses such as reactive depression or post-traumatic stress
disorder or dissociation are apt, if not probed too closely, to cover such a reaction. In this
way, a condition whose cause is external to D, having been diagnosed as a psychiatric
disorder, can be viewed as satisfying s 2(1).
If the prosecution does not concede the issue, the judge should accept a plea of not
guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility
at the close of evidence only in very exceptional cases.126
8.57 Although there will be cases where the defence of diminished responsibility may
overlap with the defence of loss of control (a more attractive defence since D does not
have to prove it), the two defences are different in important respects. This can be seen
by comparing the requirements of diminished responsibility set out above with those of
the loss of control defence set out in paras 8.58 to 8.81. One obvious difference is that,
unlike loss of control, the defence of diminished responsibility does not depend on facts
external to D.
Loss of control
Key points 8.5
While evidence of loss of control on the defendant’s part is something which the jury must
take into account at a murder trial, along with all the other circumstances, in deciding
whether a party to the killing had the necessary mens rea,127 the partial defence of loss of
control is concerned with the situation where a party had that mens rea but acted under
a loss of self-control.
124 Cox [1968] 1 All ER 386, CA; Vinagre (1979) 69 Cr App R 104, CA.
125 A research study conducted for the Law Commission indicated that of the 157 cases studied the prosecu-
tion conceded a diminished responsibility plea in 77.1% of them: Law Commission: Partial Defences to Murder
(2004) Law Com No 290, para 5.34, Appendix B.
126 Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 1569: the judge must be satisfied that, on the evidence (including the medical
evidence), no reasonable jury could fail to conclude that D had proved the essential requirements of the defence:
Khan. 127 Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8; Ives [1970] 1 QB 208, CA.
Previous defence of provocation

8.58 The predecessor of the partial defence of loss of control was the common law par-
tial defence of provocation.
8.59 The test of whether the defence of provocation was entitled to succeed was a dual
one. The alleged provocative conduct:
• had to cause in D a sudden and temporary loss of self-control (the subjective test); and
• had to be ‘enough to make a reasonable person do as D did’, ie enough to cause a
reasonable person to suffer such a loss of self-control and, having lost self-control,
to do as D did (the objective test). This test was applied on the basis of a person with
the powers of self-control of an ordinary person of D’s age and sex, disregarding any
characteristics of D which might affect D’s powers of self-control.
8.60 At the time of its abolition there were the following problems with the defence of
provocation:
• lack of judicial control If there was any evidence – however trivial the conduct to which
it related (eg the crying of a baby, the innocent conduct of an ex-partner or a failure
to cook D’s steak medium rare as ordered)128 – which raised more than a speculative
possibility that D was provoked to lose self-control, the judge had to leave the defence
to the jury no matter how unlikely it was that the defence would succeed;
• sudden and temporary loss of self-control The concept of loss of self-control lacks
clarity or a clear foundation in psychology. The requirement of a sudden loss of self-
control tended to favour the typical reactions of men to provocation, namely to lose
their temper and respond violently; the typical reactions of women to provocation are
more likely to take the form of anger, fear, frustration and a sense of desperation.129
Because women typically have this ‘slow burn’ reaction it could be difficult or impos-
sible for the defence of provocation to succeed in domestic abuse cases, for example.
This was not always the case because ‘sudden’ had been interpreted so as not to mean
‘immediate’ but it was still necessary that when the loss of self-control occurred it
was abrupt. This could present problems for a woman defendant whose case was
deserving but who carried out a self-protection plan to kill her abuser (eg while he
was asleep); she could not easily be described as acting under loss of self-control. In
such a case, no other defence was available unless the woman satisfied the require-
ments of diminished responsibility or there was a fear of imminent attack;130
• over-reaction to fear of serious violence Neither provocation nor any other defence
was available, eg, to the householder who had killed by over-reacting when in fear of
serious violence at the hands of a burglar.131
128 An example given by the Law Commission in Law Com No 304, para 1.47. 129 Ibid, para 5.18.
130 Self-defence would not be available unless there was a fear of imminent attack and the force used would
have to be reasonable: para 16.9.
131 Excessive self-defence is not a defence (partial or otherwise) to murder under the rules relating to that
defence: see para 16.35.
Proposals for reform

8.61 In its report in 2006, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide,132 the Law Commission
made recommendations which involved the radical reform of the defence of provocation.
In particular:
• The defence would cease to be based on the idea that D’s culpability is reduced simply
because of a loss of self-control by D. Loss of self-control, which the Commission
regarded as lacking sharpness or a clear foundation in psychology, would no longer
have been a requirement for the defence.
• There would be a new test of provocation which required that D acted in response to
– a fear of serious violence; or
– gross provocation (ie words or conduct which caused D to have a justifiable sense
of being seriously wronged); or
– both; and
a person of D’s age and of ordinary temperament in D’s circumstances might have
reacted in the same or a similar way.
• The judge would not be required to leave the defence to the jury unless there was evi-
dence on which a reasonable jury properly directed could conclude that it might apply.
The Law Commission’s recommendations addressed all the problems referred to in para
8.60. They were taken forward, with some important amendments, by the Government
in its consultation paper, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of
the Law. The Government proposed the abolition of the defence of provocation and its
replacement by what it described as two new partial defences (better viewed as two limbs
of the same defence), both of which would require a loss of self-control and have an objec-
tive element, to cover:
• killing in response to a fear of serious violence; and
• killing in response to words and conduct which amounted to an exceptional hap-
pening and caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
With some amendments, the Government’s proposals in its consultation paper are now
contained in a somewhat complex form in the C&JA 2009, ss 54 and 55.
8.62 The partial defence of provocation was abolished by C&JA 2009, s 56(1), and
replaced by the partial defence of loss of control enacted by ss 54 and 55.
Requirements of defence of loss of control

8.63 The C&JA 2009, s 54(1) provides:
‘Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V”), D is not to be
convicted of murder if:
(a) D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D’s loss
of self-control,
132 Law Com No 304. See paras 5.1–5.82 of the Report.

(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and

(c) a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint
and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way
to D.’
A person who, but for the defence of loss of control, would be liable to be convicted of
murder is liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter.133 The defence does not apply
to other offences, not even attempted murder.134 The reason is that in other offences the
judge has a sentencing discretion which makes it possible to reflect the loss of control in
the sentence itself.
8.64 The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of the defence of loss of control not
liable to be convicted of murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted
to murder in the case of any other party to it.135
Loss of self-control
8.65 The requirement that D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing
of V must have resulted from D’s loss of self-control represents the principal difference
between the new defence and the Law Commission’s recommendations for a reformed
defence of provocation. It means that one of the problems identified with the defence
of provocation is perpetuated in the defence of loss of control. The Law Commission
presented powerful arguments against the retention of the concept of self-control on
the grounds that it was unnecessary and undesirable.136 The Government, however,
remained
‘concerned that there is a risk of the partial defence being used inappropriately, for
example in cold-blooded gang-related or “honour” killings. Even in cases which are less
obviously unsympathetic, there is still a fundamental problem about providing a partial
defence in situations where a defendant has killed while basically in full possession of his
or her senses, even if he or she is frightened, other than in a situation which is complete
self-defence.’137
It is hard to see how cold-blooded gang-related or ‘honour killings’ would satisfy the
other requirements of the defence. An ‘honour killing’, eg, would seem to fall foul of the
bar (below) that the killing was done in a considered desire for revenge. It is regrettable
that the Government took the above view. It did not accord with its proclaimed intention
to correct the imbalance between men and women which existed under the defence of
provocation.
8.66 Even if D has lost self-control, under s 54(4) the defence does not apply ‘if, in doing
or being a party to the killing, D acted in a considered desire for revenge’. ‘Considered’
remains to be explained. Is the term redundant (one cannot desire something without
133 C&JA 2009, s 54(7). 134 See para 14.109. 135 C&JA 2009, s 54(8).
136 Partial Defences to Murder Law Com No 290, paras 3.28–3.30, 3.135–3.137.
137 Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper No 19/08, para 36.
giving the matter some consideration), or does it refer to a particular degree of considera-
tion (so that an immediate and unpremeditated desire for revenge is not excluded by s
54(4))? If the latter, what degree of deliberation is required for s 54(4) to apply? This is one
of the questions in ss 54 and 55 left for determination by the courts.
8.67 The C&JA 2009, s 54(2) makes explicit what is implicit in s 54(1)(a): that it does not
matter whether or not the loss of self-control was sudden. This raises the interesting ques-
tion whether there can be a loss of self-control which is not abrupt; it will certainly not be
easy to establish such loss if it is not. Nevertheless, although s 54(2) ‘softens’ the require-
ment and permits it to be satisfied where D’s loss of self-control or builds up gradually,
the requirement of loss of self-control is liable to exclude cases deserving of relief from the
mandatory sentence of murder. It seems wrong, eg, to exclude the battered woman who,
because of fear of serious violence in a future confrontation, uses excessive force against
her abusive partner simply because there is no evidence of loss of self-control. Indeed,
the application of the concept of ‘loss of self-control’ to cases where D acts under fear of
serious violence seems problematic. It would have been preferable to have omitted the
reference to self-control and to have left undeserving cases to be dealt with via the judge’s
duty to withdraw cases from the jury if there is insufficient evidence of the other require-
ments of the defence.
8.68 The longer the delay between the alleged trigger and the alleged loss of self-control,
the more likely it is that an aspect of the defence is not satisfied, eg because D was acting
in a considered desire for revenge or had not lost self-control. This is of obvious relevance
in ‘slow burn’ cases.
8.69 Another problem with the requirement of loss of self-control is the meaning of that
term. As pointed out above, it lacks clarity (as well as a clear foundation in psychology).
According to Devlin J in Duffy,138 in the context of the defence of provocation, D must
be rendered ‘so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of
his mind’. This statement was subsequently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal.139 Even
under this strict test, it is not necessary, however, that there should be a complete loss of
control to the extent that D does not know what he is doing.140 It would completely defeat
the defence otherwise; a killer who does not know what he is doing would lack the mens
rea for murder, and the defence of loss of control only comes into play as a defence where
D admits that he had the mens rea for murder or is proved to have had it. It was not clear
under the law on provocation, nor is it clear in respect of the new defence, whether ‘loss
of self-control’ refers to a failure to exercise self-control or an inability to exercise self-
control. As the Law Commission noted:
‘To ask whether a person could have exercised self-control is to pose an impossible moral
question. It is not a question which a psychiatrist could address as a matter of medical
science . . . ’141
138 [1949] 1 All ER 932n.

139 Eg Ibrams and Gregory (1981) 74 Cr App R 154, CA; Richens [1993] 4 All ER 877, CA.
140 Richens above.
141 Partial Defences to Murder Law Com No 290, para 3.28.
Qualifying trigger
8.70 Section 54(1)(b) requires that D’s loss of self-control must have had a qualify-
ing trigger. By s 55(2), a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger if s 55(3), (4) or (5)
applies, ie:
• if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V
against D or another identified person (s 55(3)); or
• if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both)
which –
(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and
(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged (s 55(4)); or
• if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a combination of the matters men-
tioned in s 55(3) and (4) (s 55(5)).
The first trigger: fear of serious violence from V against D or another

identified person
8.71 Whereas the second trigger has an ancestry in the old defence of provocation, this
trigger is novel. It is intended, inter alia, to rectify the defect with the defence of provo-
cation, referred to in para 8.60, that it discriminated against women in its application
to cases where an abused woman killed her abuser. As already indicated, however, the
requirement of loss of self-control may rule out many defendants who would otherwise
satisfy this trigger and the other requirements of the defence. This is especially true in
the second type of case below. Assuming that there was a loss of self-control, the present
trigger would be satisfied in the following two types of case:142
• Protection against non-imminent serious violence Suppose, for example, that V has
frequently hit his partner, D, when he comes home drunk. One night V comes home
drunk and D fears that V would hit her yet again. D goes to the kitchen, fetches a
knife and intentionally and fatally stabs V in the chest. D is not suffering from an
abnormality of mental functioning arising from a medically recognised condition
and therefore cannot rely on the partial defence of diminished responsibility. Nor is
the complete defence of self-defence available because serious violence by the part-
ner is not imminent but merely anticipated and, in any event, the force used by D is
disproportionate to the threatened violence.
• Unreasonable force in self-defence or defence of another Suppose, for example, that
D, an armed police officer, is sent to a house where a neighbour has reported that V
has what looks like a gun. When D enters the house he sees V with something in his
hand. V does not respond to D’s request to show what it is. D intentionally shoots V
in the chest. V dies. It transpires that V, who was stone deaf, had something harm-
less in his hand. D could plead self-defence but, although that defence is based on the
facts as D believed them to be, that defence will fail if the jury find that the force used
was unreasonable on those facts.
142 These examples are based on ones given by the Law Commission in Law Com No 304, para 5.50.
The present trigger is intended to avoid the unfairness which would be engendered if, in
the event that the complete defence of self-defence failed, D had to be convicted of murder
(and given the mandatory life sentence). If the present trigger and the requirements of s
54(1)(a) and (c) are satisfied, the proper verdict will be a manslaughter verdict. It is for D
to decide how to run his defence, but if D is not confident that a self-defence plea will suc-
ceed D can plead the defence of loss of self-control via fear of serious violence instead of,
or in addition to, the defence of self-defence.
8.72 There are two limits to this trigger:
• the fear of serious violence must be of violence from V, the person killed, and
• the fear must be of such violence to D or some other identified person.
Presumably, the fear of violence must have been induced by V or a third party, and a
self-induced fear will not suffice. It would be irrelevant that D’s fear is an unreasonably
mistaken one, except where D is intoxicated (since the law normally does not excuse
intoxicated mistakes).
If D kills V, a wholly innocent person, because X has threatened D that he will do D’s
son serious violence if he does not, the trigger is not satisfied and D has no defence.143 Nor
is the trigger satisfied if D kills V after a threat that V will ‘cripple someone’. Nor is the
trigger satisfied if D kills X by accident in trying to kill V.
8.73 Section 55(6)(a) provides that, in determining whether a loss of self-control had a
qualifying trigger, D’s fear of serious violence must be disregarded to the extent that it
was caused by a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing
an excuse to use violence.144 The good sense of this is obvious.
8.74 It is not a bar that D is partly responsible for the situation in which he found
himself.
One example would be where D started the quarrel during which he suffered the fear
of serious violence.
Another would be where D voluntarily puts himself in a position where he might be
threatened with serious violence, as where he joins a criminal gang, knowing that members
of that gang or another gang may threaten him with serious violence. If such a threat is made
and D loses self-control and kills by way of pre-emptive strike he is not debarred from rely-
ing on the defence of loss of control. It is noteworthy that such a bar does not operate in this
type of case in respect of the defence of self-defence145 but it does in respect of the defence of
duress by threats.146 The Law Commission thought that in many cases of this type, however,
the defence of loss of control would fail under the third, objective requirement.147
The second trigger: gross provocation

8.75 The second trigger is that D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things
done or said (or both) which –
143 D will not have the defence of duress by threats: see paras 16.55 and 16.56.
144 See para 16.34 for the law which applies in a corresponding situation where self-defence is pleaded.
145 Paras 16.1–16.37. 146 Para 16.51. 147 Law Com No 304, para 5.82.
• constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and

• caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
As with the law of provocation, a loss of self-control which is attributable to the circum-
stances (rather than things done or said) does not suffice. The things need not be done
or said directly to D. Whether D had a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged must
be an objective question; it remains to be seen whether it is to be answered purely objec-
tively or by reference to a reasonable person with those of D’s characteristics and external
circumstances, present or past, which affect the gravity to D of the things done or said.
The latter approach would be consistent with the approach in the defence of provocation
and with the intention of the Law Commission and (to some extent) the Government. An
unreasonable mistake as to things done or said would be disregarded because it could not
give rise to a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. Arguably, the same is true in
respect of circumstances of ‘extremely grave character’.
This trigger deals with cases of gross provocation. Its two requirements, not made
by the old defence of provocation, mean that many cases where a defence of provoca-
tion under the old law would have succeeded will not succeed under the new defence.148
The terms of this trigger are strict; it will only be satisfied in a small number of cases.
Examples might be where a rape-victim loses self-control and kills the rapist who has
taunted her, or where a father loses self-control and kills a man whom he finds trying to
rape his daughter. Many defendants who snap under extreme pressure and whose culpa-
bility is far removed from the stereotype cold, calculating murderer will receive a murder
conviction and concomitant mandatory life sentence.
8.76 Section 55(6)(b) and (c) provide that, in determining whether a loss of self-con-
trol had a qualifying trigger:
• a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not justifiable if D
incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use
violence (s 55(6)(b));
• the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity must be disregarded
(s 55(6)(c)).
The first of these bars corresponds to that in s 55(6)(a) referred to in para 8.73 in rela-
tion to the first trigger.
The second bar is oddly drafted: how can a ‘thing said’ constitute sexual infidelity?
Presumably, Parliament was referring to a report of sexual infidelity. It would seem that
‘sexual infidelity’ refers to a lack of faithfulness to someone with whom one is already in a
‘sexual relationship’ (a term which must mean more than a one-night stand or casual rela-
tionship). This bar was highly controversial in Parliament. Ultimately the Government’s
view that it should be included prevailed. The Government’s view was that it was quite
unacceptable for a defendant who killed an unfaithful partner to seek to blame the victim
for what occurred; sexual infidelity could never justify reducing murder to manslaughter.
148 The duty of the judge to withdraw a loss of control claim from the jury on the ground that it could not
reasonably accept it (see para 8.81) is a further protection against such a claim succeeding in cases of provoca-
tion which is not gross.
This seems to be an extreme view. The requirements of the trigger and the other provi-
sions relating to the defence would have been enough to limit the defence to exceptional
cases of sexual infidelity killings. Why should this one situation be singled out for express
exclusion?
When sexual infidelity is linked with other things done or said, as where one partner
finds the other sexually abusing their child, the sexual infidelity must be disregarded but
not any other things done or said (the child abuse in this case).149 It may be difficult to
decide whether D’s loss of self-control is attributable to things done or said other than
sexual infidelity.
The third trigger: combination of first and second triggers

8.77 An example would be where D kills V who is threatening to stab D’s daughter unless
the daughter lets V have sex with her.
Objective requirement
8.78 Assuming that the other two requirements are satisfied, D is not guilty of murder
if a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and
in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D. This
requirement is provided by s 54(1) (c) which provides an important limitation on the
defence of loss of control.
Presumably, ‘reacted’ refers to whether the hypothetical person would have both lost
self-control and acted in the same or in a similar way to D.
8.79 The reference to a person of D’s sex and age (the latter in particular may be relevant
to tolerance and self-restraint) and in D’s circumstances means that this requirement is
not wholly objective.
Not all of D’s circumstances, however, can be taken into account. This is because s 54(3)
provides that the reference in s 54(1)(c) to ‘the circumstances of D’ is a reference to all
of D’s circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D’s conduct is that they
bear on D’s general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. Clearly, D’s circumstances
to which reference may be made under s 54(1)(c) include not only D’s external circum-
stances, present or past (such as a history of abuse), but also those of his characteristics
which affect the gravity of the ‘triggering conduct’ to D. For example, the fact that D is
a dwarf (or exceptionally disfigured, of black skin or a paedophile) and D killed V after
being taunted by insults relating to his height (or looks, skin colour or sexual proclivities)
can be referred to. This is obviously correct. It is this characteristic which puts the ‘sting’
into the taunts. The same would be true in the absence of a taunt or other conduct specifi-
cally directed at a characteristic. Thus, if D kills V, her partner, who was roaring drunk
at the time, reference can be made to the matter that the effect of V’s conduct on D was
aggravated by the fact that D suffered battered woman syndrome as a result of V’s past
behaviour to D when drunk.
The closing words of s 54(3) make it clear that characteristics or other circumstances
whose only relevance to D’s conduct is that they bear on D’s general capacity for tolerance
149 Explanatory notes to the C&JA 2009.

or self-restraint cannot be referred to in applying the present requirement. Thus, the fact
that D was intoxicated or intolerant or irritable or excessively jealous or had problems
in controlling his impulses or otherwise had impaired powers of self-control must be
ignored.150 If it could be taken into account it would subvert the essential function of the
objective requirement, viz to mark the distinction between a partially excusable loss of
self-control and an inexcusable one by reference to an objective standard of self-control.
Taking into account those characteristics of D which affected the gravity of the ‘trig-
gering conduct’ to him does not affect that essential function. It simply recognises as a
matter of common sense that the effect of the conduct on a reasonable person can only be
assessed in the light of those characteristics of D which are relevant to the effect of that
conduct.
8.80 What D did by way of reaction need not be proportionate to the serious vio-
lence feared by D, or the things said or done which caused D to have a justifiable sense
of being wronged. Th is is obviously sensible. How could someone who had lost self-
control be required to keep his response proportionate? Under s 54(1)(c) the question
is not whether someone of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in D’s circumstances (as explained above), would have reacted as D did,
but a less strict test of whether that person might have reacted in the same or similar
way as D did.
Although what D did by way of reaction need not be proportionate to the serious vio-
lence feared by D, or the things said or done which caused D to have a justifiable sense
of being wronged, proportionality is a factor to be taken into account in considering
whether a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint
and in D’s circumstances, might have reacted in the same way or a similar way to D.
Function of judge and jury

8.81 Section 54(5) provides that, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with
respect to the defence under s 54(1), the jury must assume that the defence is satisfied
unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. For these pur-
poses, sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to the defence if evi-
dence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the trial judge, a jury, properly directed,
could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.151
What this means is that the judge may only leave the defence of loss of control to the
jury if there is evidence (normally, but not necessarily, from D, and whether or not D
has pleaded the defence) on which, in the judge’s opinion, a properly directed jury could
reasonably conclude that the three requirements of the defence might be satisfied. If the
judge is not of this opinion, the judge must withdraw the defence of loss of control from
the jury. If the judge is of this opinion the judge must leave the defence to the jury with
an appropriate direction, and the jury must find that the defence is satisfied unless the
prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it (ie one or more of its requirements)
is not.
150 If the factor affecting tolerance or self-restraint was due to a recognised medical condition, the defence of
diminished responsibility (see paras 8.39–8.57) may apply. 151 C&JA 2009, s 54(6).
Involuntary manslaughter
Key points 8.6

A person who causes the death of another is guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he
does so:
• by an act which is unlawful and dangerous;152

• with gross negligence; or
• with recklessness as to the risk of death or serious bodily harm.
8.82 Important distinctions between involuntary manslaughter by an unlawful or dan-

gerous act and the other two types of involuntary manslaughter listed above are that in
the last two types it is irrelevant whether or not D’s act would have constituted an offence
if death had not resulted,153 and that in the last two types liability can be based on an
omission to act (but only if D was under a duty to act recognised by the criminal law).154
Despite these distinctions the three types of involuntary manslaughter are not mutually
exclusive; in some circumstances D may be guilty of involuntary manslaughter by more
than one route.155
8.83 Following the obscure decision of the House of Lords in 1983 in Seymour156 it
appeared that the last two types of involuntary manslaughter listed above no longer
survived and had been replaced by a new type of involuntary manslaughter based on
the concept of objective (ie Caldwell) recklessness157 as to an obvious and serious risk
of injury to the person, despite the fact that manslaughter by gross negligence had been
affirmed in 1937 by the House of Lords in Andrews v DPP.158 There was, however, uncer-
tainty about the effect of Seymour on the pre-existing law, since the House of Lords did
not consider the point.
The matter was resolved in 1994 in relation to manslaughter by gross negligence, by the
House of Lords in Adomako.159 The House affirmed the continued existence of such an
offence and overruled the decision in Seymour and, thus, the type of involuntary man-
slaughter postulated in it. It has subsequently become clear that ‘reckless manslaughter’
also survives.
152 Most involuntary manslaughter cases are of this type: Mitchell and Mackay ‘Investigating Involuntary
Manslaughter: An Empirical Study of 127 Cases’ (2011) 31 OJLS 190.
153 Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217 at 219 (the passage in question does not appear in [1943] KB 174); Gray v Barr
[1971] 2 QB 554 at 576–577, per Salmon LJ.
154 Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354, CA.
155 See Willoughby [2004] EWCA Crim 3365, where this was recognised in relation to the fi rst two types in
the text.
156 [1983] 2 AC 493, HL. 157 Para 3.35.
158 [1937] AC 576, HL. 159 [1995] 1 AC 171, HL.
8.85 involuntary manslaughter | 267
Manslaughter by killing by an unlawful and

dangerous act
Key points 8.7
To secure a conviction of D on the above basis, the prosecution must prove three things:
• the commission of an unlawful act by D;
• that that act was dangerous, in the sense that it was likely to cause harm to another;
and
• that the unlawful and dangerous act caused death.
It is irrelevant that D is unaware that his act is unlawful or dangerous.160
8.84 This mode of committing manslaughter is commonly known as ‘constructive

manslaughter’ because liability is constructed (ie based) on another offence in the
course of which death results.
Commission of an unlawful act

8.85 At one time the unlawful act could consist of a tort161 but now only a criminally
unlawful act will suffice;162 this has been confirmed in the last decade or so by the Court
of Appeal in Dias and Andrews and by the House of Lords in Kennedy (No 2), all of which
are referred to in para 8.86. There are two further qualifications on the nature of the
unlawful act.
• An act which has become criminally unlawful simply because it was negligently
performed, eg dangerous or careless driving, does not constitute an unlawful act
for the purposes of ‘constructive manslaughter’. In other words where negligence is
the very essence of the offence163 the offence cannot be an ‘unlawful act’ for the pur-
poses of constructive manslaughter. The authority is Andrews v DPP164 where D had
killed another while committing the offence of dangerous driving and was convicted
of manslaughter. On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Atkin (with whom the rest
of the House of Lords agreed) said that ‘There is an obvious difference in the law of
manslaughter between doing an unlawful act and doing a lawful act with a degree
of carelessness which the legislature makes criminal’,165 and that the latter type of
160 DPP v Newbury [1977] AC 500, HL; Ball [1989] Crim LR 730, CA.
161 Fenton (1830) 1 Lew CC 179.
162 Franklin (1883) 15 Cox CC 163; Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981, CA.
163 Para 3.60.
164 [1937] AC 576, HL.
165 Ibid at 585. For an alternative interpretation of these words, viz that only offences which require more
than mere negligence will suffice for constructive manslaughter (which would prohibit reliance on an offence
of strict liability as well as an offence of negligence as the basis of the unlawful act), see Ormerod [2003] Crim
LR 479. Th is would seem to put an interpretation on Lord Atkin’s words which they cannot bear. In Andrews
[2002] EWCA Crim 3021, where D had injected V, who was prone to alcohol abuse, with insulin to give her
a ‘rush’, liability for constructive manslaughter was confi rmed on the basis of the commission of the strict
act did not necessarily make the driver guilty of manslaughter if death resulted; the
doctrine of ‘constructive manslaughter’ did not apply to such an act, although there
might be liability for manslaughter on the basis of gross negligence.166
• As we have seen, there are a number of statutory offences which are constituted by
an omission to do something, rather than a positive act. An example is the neglect
of a child by a person with responsibility for the child in a manner likely to cause the
child unnecessary suffering or injury to health, which, if wilful, is an offence under
the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 1. It was thought that the unintentional
causing of death as a result of the commission of such a statutory offence of omis-
sion could constitute constructive manslaughter. In Senior,167 for instance, where
owing to D’s religious belief his child was not provided with medical attendance and
died in consequence, it was held that manslaughter had been committed. However,
the Court of Appeal in Lowe168 held that Senior was no longer good law and that an
omission does not suffice for constructive manslaughter. D’s baby died some 10
weeks after birth and at the time of her death was grossly dehydrated and emaciated.
D was convicted of wilfully neglecting the child and of manslaughter after the judge
had told the jury that a conviction for manslaughter must follow if wilful neglect had
caused the child’s death. D’s appeal against the latter conviction was allowed by the
Court of Appeal, who held that a finding of manslaughter did not inexorably follow
from a finding of wilful neglect. There was a clear distinction between an omission
likely to cause harm and an act likely to cause harm:
‘[I]f I strike a child in a manner likely to cause harm it is right that if the child dies I may
be charged with manslaughter. If, however, I omit to do something with the result that
it suffers injury to health which results in death, we think that a charge of manslaughter
should not be an inevitable consequence, even if the omission is deliberate.’169
It is difficult to see the distinction between the person who causes the death of his
child by deliberate inaction and the one who does so by positive action.
Proof of an unlawful act requires proof of the actus reus of an offence

8.86 It will be remembered that an act is never criminally unlawful in itself. One of the
things which is required to render an act criminally unlawful is that it should occur in
those circumstances and/or lead to those consequences prescribed by law as constituting
the actus reus of an offence. For instance, an act of punching is not criminal but it may
become so (as a battery) if it results in the consequence that someone is unlawfully hit.
Thus, if a boxer unexpectedly dies from a blow delivered by D within the Queensberry
liability offence of administering a prescription-only drug otherwise than on medical direction, contrary to the
Medicines Act 1968, ss 58 and 67. There was, however, no argument on the relevance of the fact that the offence
was one of strict liability.
166 Paras 8.106–8.118.
167 [1899] 1 QB 283. Also see Watson and Watson (1959) 43 Cr App R 111, CCA.
168 [1973] QB 702, CA. For criticism of Lowe, see [1976] Crim LR 529.
169 [1973] QB 702 at 709.
rules at a boxing match, there will be no unlawful act by D (and consequently no man-
slaughter) because V will have validly consented to being so hit.170 On the other hand, if
V is hit by D outside the rules (eg ‘after the bell’ when he was returning to his corner), the
force is unlawful and D commits a battery (and, doubtless, other offences); since D’s act
is unlawful, D will be guilty of constructive manslaughter if death unexpectedly results.
(Of course, if D intended grievous bodily harm, D would be guilty of murder.) In some
cases, the unlawfulness of an act may turn on whether a consent to it given by V is a valid
consent, a matter dealt with in paras 7.1 to 7.23.
There were indications in the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Cato171 and the later
case of Kennedy (No 1)172 that there could be an unlawful act even if the actus reus of an
offence has not been committed. It is now clear that this does not represent the law. In
Dias,173 the Court of Appeal held that ‘in [the present] context “unlawful” means that the
act has to be a criminal offence’. A differently constituted Court of Appeal in Andrews174
agreed with this. The matter has been put beyond doubt by the House of Lords in Kennedy
(No 2), where Lord Bingham, giving the opinion of the House, said that: ‘To establish the
crime of unlawful act manslaughter it must be shown . . . : (1) that the defendant commit-
ted an unlawful act; (2) that such unlawful act was a crime . . . ’175
8.87 Common examples of unlawful acts for the purposes of constructive manslaughter
are offences involving a battery, but the fatal commission of the actus reus of an assault
(in its strict sense)176 or of some other offence besides an offence of the types referred to
in para 8.85 can suffice.177 In Cato, for instance, the Court of Appeal, upholding a con-
viction for manslaughter, relied on the fact that D, who had administered heroin to the
deceased at the latter’s request, had committed the actus reus of the offence of unlawfully
and maliciously administering a noxious thing so as thereby to endanger life or inflict
grievous bodily harm, contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 23. Many
offences, however, will not satisfy one or both of the other requirements of constructive
manslaughter, viz that the unlawful act must be dangerous and a cause of death. For
example, although it is an offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 4(3) unlawfully
to supply a controlled drug to another, this cannot amount to constructive manslaughter
if the person supplied dies as a result of taking it because the supply is not itself danger-
ous; any danger which arises will be due to what the recipient of the drug does with it.178
In any event, if what the recipient does with the drug is free, deliberate and informed
there would be no chain of causation between the offence of supplying and the death.
The importance of proving that D has committed the actus reus of an offence was
emphasised by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Arobieke,179 where D had been convicted
of the manslaughter of V who had been electrocuted while trying to cross an electri-
fied railway line. Fearing that D was looking for him, V had gone to a railway station to
escape. There was evidence that D had gone to the station and looked in the windows of
170 Paras 7.9 and 7.10. 171 [1976] 1 All ER 260, CA. 172 [1999] Crim LR 65, CA.
173 [2001] EWCA Crim 2986 at [9]. 174 [2002] EWCA Crim 3021. 175 [2007] UKHL 38 at [7].
176 As, eg, in Larkin [1943] KB 174, CCA; para 8.96.
177 The prosecution should specify the unlawful act alleged: Jennings [1990] Crim LR 588, CA. Th is has not
always been done in the past: see Kennedy (No 1) [1999] Crim LR 65, CA.
178 Dalby [1982] 1 WLR 425 at 429; Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38 at [7].
179 [1988] Crim LR 314, CA.
carriages. Allowing D’s appeal, the Court of Appeal held (inter alia) that, although the
jury could properly conclude that D had gone to the station to injure or threaten V, there
was no evidence of any criminally unlawful act by D; in particular, there was no assault,
since D would not have put V in fear of immediate force.180 Consequently, there could be
no conviction on the basis of constructive manslaughter. It would have been different if D
had put V in fear of immediate force, for example by chasing him.
Must D have the mens rea for the offence whose actus reus he has committed?
8.88 The fact that D has committed the actus reus of an offence does not in itself make
D’s act criminally unlawful; it only does so if D has the mens rea required for that offence.
To take the example of punching given above, to punch another is only criminally unlaw-
ful (a battery) if the puncher intends that his fist should hit another or is reckless as to
whether it does. This means that, as a matter of principle, D’s fatal act cannot be an
‘unlawful act’ for the purposes of constructive manslaughter unless he had the requi-
site mens rea for an offence whose actus reus he has committed.
8.89 Until the House of Lords’ decision in 1976 in DPP v Newbury,181 it seemed clear
that the law of constructive manslaughter corresponded with this statement of principle.
Lamb,182 decided in 1967, was a strong authority to this effect. In that case D pointed a
loaded revolver at his friend, V, as a joke. D and V knew that there were two bullets in the
revolving cylinder of the revolver. They believed that it was safe to pull the trigger because
neither of the chambers containing a bullet was opposite the barrel and they did not
know that, when the trigger was pulled, the cylinder would rotate clockwise before the
firing pin struck. When D pulled the trigger, and the firing pin struck, the pin detonated
a bullet in one of the two loaded chambers and V was killed. The question for the Court
of Appeal was whether the trial judge had been correct to direct the jury that there had
been an unlawful act for the purposes of constructive manslaughter. The Court of Appeal
answered ‘no’. There had been no assault or battery, which would have been required for
an unlawful act, because D did not foresee that V would be alarmed or shot. (Obiter, the
court held that, if properly directed, it might have been open to the jury to convict of
involuntary manslaughter on another ground: killing by gross negligence.)
In Newbury, two teenage boys pushed part of a paving stone off a railway bridge as a
train approached. The stone came through the window of the cab and killed the guard.
The House of Lords, upholding the boys’ conviction for manslaughter, held that a defend-
ant is guilty of manslaughter if it is proved that he intentionally did an act which was
unlawful and dangerous. Lord Salmon, with whose speech the other Law Lords con-
curred, held that a conviction for constructive manslaughter required proof of mens rea
but that, as manslaughter was a crime of ‘basic’ as opposed to ‘specific’ intention, the
necessary mens rea was simply ‘an intention to do the acts which constitute the crime’. In
his speech, Lord Edmund-Davies stated that ‘what is required is no more than the inten-
tional committing of an unlawful act of the designated type or nature’.
180 The decision on the above ground might be different now in view of the liberal approach taken in recent
cases to the requirement for an assault of ‘fear of immediate force’; see paras 7.38–7.42.
181 [1977] AC 500, HL. 182 [1967] 2 QB 981, CA.
These statements appeared to be inconsistent with the previous case law. That law,
however, was not expressly overruled. Lord Salmon referred to Lamb with approval, but
only to the effect that it showed that a ‘guilty mind’ was required for constructive man-
slaughter. He did not indicate what he understood by that term in the present context.
8.90 In subsequent cases the Court of Appeal has not been uniform in its approach.
In Mitchell,183 it said that, for constructive manslaughter, ‘there must be an act which
is unlawful’ and ‘the act must be intentional’ or, as it later expressed it, ‘deliberate or
intentional’. In two other cases, however, it has proceeded on the basis that the mens rea
of the unlawful act (offence) must be proved on a charge of constructive manslaughter.
For example, in Scarlett,184 the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis that, where the
unlawful act in question was a battery, the full mens rea for a battery had to be proved,
viz an intention to apply unlawful force to another or recklessness as to such force being
applied. On the other hand, statements by Lord Hope in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994),185
with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, are in line with those in Newbury. Lord
Hope said that ‘All that need be proved is that he intentionally did what he did’ and that
‘As Lord Salmon put it in DPP v Newbury, manslaughter is one of those crimes in which
only what is called a basic intention need be proved – that is an intention to do an act
which constitutes the crime’. Lord Hope said that this was ‘clear from the authorities’
but he made no reference to Lamb or Scarlett, neither of which were cited to the House of
Lords, and relied principally on Lord Salmon’s speech in Newbury.
8.91 The statements in Newbury and A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) are open to two
interpretations. The first, which seems to be better supported by the actual words used
in the speeches, is that the only state of mind that must be proved on D’s part is that D
deliberately or consciously did the act, ie that there was a voluntary act on D’s part, and
that it is irrelevant whether or not D had the requisite mens rea for an offence whose
actus reus D has committed. As such, the use of the word ‘intention’ is otiose: it merely
states what is normally implied as a defence, viz that involuntary conduct is not criminal.
It is noteworthy that Lord Salmon’s definition of ‘basic intent’ differs from that adopted in
other contexts, where it has been defined as involving foresight of the consequences of the
actus reus in question. One is prompted to ask whether this difference in definition was a
considered one. If the first interpretation is the correct one, the question of the unlawful-
ness of an act in this context must be assessed on a different basis to that otherwise used in
the criminal law. It is also open to the objection that under it D can be convicted of man-
slaughter without the mens rea required for the unlawful act (offence) on which his liabil-
ity is based. It would certainly be odd that, whereas a person who committed the actus
reus of (say) a battery could not be convicted of that offence if he lacked the mens rea for
it, he might nevertheless be convicted of manslaughter if death unexpectedly resulted.
The second interpretation, which is preferable but somewhat strained on the word-
ing of the speeches in Newbury and A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), is that, since an act
183 [1983] QB 741, CA.

184 [1993] 4 All ER 629, CA. Note this case must now be read in the light of Owino [1996] 2 Cr App R 128, CA;
para 16.15. See also O’Driscoll (1977) 65 Cr App R 50, CA, which decision also proceeds on the basis that the
mens rea of the unlawful act (offence) must be proved on a constructive manslaughter charge.
185 [1998] AC 245, HL.
can only be unlawful if accompanied by the relevant mens rea, their Lordships must
have meant to imply the requirement that D must have the mens rea for the unlawful
act (offence) and that their reference to intention to do the unlawful act is simply an
unnecessary reference to the need for voluntary conduct and does not purport to define
exhaustively the state of mind required on the part of the defendant. If this is so, it is
a great pity that their Lordships did not make the point clear. The second interpretation
gains support from the fact that the case law in support of it, and inconsistent with the
first interpretation, was not expressly overruled by the House of Lords in either of its
two decisions. There is also some support for it in one passage in Lord Hope’s speech
in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), where he said that he considered it sufficient for man-
slaughter that D had the mens rea required for an assault (the unlawful act in question).
It would have been an even more supportive statement had ‘necessary’ been used instead
of ‘sufficient’. This would clearly have countered Lord Hope’s other statements referred to
above. The statements in Dias, Andrews and Kennedy (No 2) that there must be a ‘criminal
offence’ for an act to be ‘unlawful’ also lend support to the second interpretation.
No unlawful act if D has defence to offence

8.92 An act will not be an ‘unlawful act’ for the purposes of constructive manslaughter if
D has available to him a legally recognised defence to the offence in question.186
Unlawful act need not be directed at the victim

8.93 In 1981, in Dalby,187 the Court of Appeal stated that the unlawful act in construc-
tive manslaughter had to be directed at the victim. In Dalby, D was a drug addict who
unlawfully supplied a controlled drug to a friend, V, in whose flat he was staying. D and V
both injected themselves with the drug. Later that night someone else helped V to inject
two quantities of an unspecified substance. V died the next day. In the Crown Court, D
pleaded guilty to supplying a controlled drug, but not guilty to manslaughter. Dealing
with constructive manslaughter, the judge directed the jury that D could be convicted if
he had intentionally supplied the drug and that unlawful act had been a dangerous one
and had caused V’s death. The jury convicted D. Allowing D’s appeal, the Court of Appeal
held that, where a charge of manslaughter is based on an unlawful and dangerous act,
that act must be directed at the victim, and the unlawful act of supplying drugs had not
been. As stated in para 8.87, there were also other reasons why D was not guilty.
8.94 Subsequently, the import of what had been held in Dalby was thrown into doubt
by two decisions of the Court of Appeal, Mitchell188 and Goodfellow,189 where that Court
explained that the statement in Dalby did not mean what it appeared to mean. In Mitchell,
the Court stated that ‘the court [in Dalby] was concerned with the quality of the act rather
than the identity of the person at whom it was aimed’, whatever that may mean. It added
that if the court in Dalby was saying that the unlawful act had to be directed at the victim,
then that was not part of the ratio decidendi of the case; this is hard to accept. In Mitchell,
D hit X, causing him to fall against V who died as a result. The Court of Appeal dismissed
186 See, eg, Jennings [1990] Crim LR 588, CA. 187 [1982] 1 All ER 916, CA.
188 [1983] QB 741, CA. 189 (1986) 83 Cr App R 23, CA.
D’s appeal against conviction for manslaughter on the ground that it did not matter that
D’s act was directed at someone other than the actual victim on whom it unexpectedly
took effect. In Goodfellow, the Court said that Dalby simply meant that there must be ‘no
fresh intervening cause’ between the unlawful act and death.190 This explanation was not
easily reconciled with the actual words of the Court of Appeal in Dalby but is a convenient
way out. It was confirmed by Lord Hope in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) that the unlaw-
ful act need not be directed at the victim.191 This is to be welcomed, although it has to be
said that bad decisions force subsequent courts into artificial explanations of them!
A requirement that D’s act be directed at the victim would exclude a substantial
number of unlawful acts from the ambit of constructive manslaughter. It would also
make a number of leading cases difficult to explain. For example, it is by no means obvi-
ous that the unlawful act in DPP v Newbury was directed at the victim.
8.95 The importance of the rule that the unlawful act need not be directed at the victim
is shown by reference to the facts of A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994), described in paras 8.31
and 8.97, and of Goodfellow. In Goodfellow, D lived in a council house. He was harassed by
two men and wanted to move. He had no chance of exchanging his house, so he conceived
the idea of setting the house on fire as if it had been caused by a firebomb. He poured
petrol over the furniture and ignited it. His wife, his girlfriend and his young son were
killed. Dismissing D’s appeal against conviction for manslaughter, the Court of Appeal
held that a person could be convicted of constructive manslaughter despite the fact that
his unlawful act was not directed at his victim.
Unlawful act must be dangerous

8.96 Not every unlawful act will suffice. At one time it was thought that death occa-
sioned by any unlawful act would amount to manslaughter, although it was not likely to
cause physical harm to anyone. It is now clear that an unlawful act causing death must
be dangerous, in the sense that there is a risk that it will cause some physical harm to
someone else, as well as being unlawful.
This requirement was introduced in its initial form by the Court of Criminal Appeal
in Larkin in 1942. In Larkin,192 D produced a razor at the house of a man with whom his
partner had been associating; D did so in order to frighten him. D’s partner, who was
drunk, blundered against the razor and was killed. The Court of Criminal Appeal, in
dismissing an appeal against conviction for manslaughter, held that where the act which
D is engaged in performing is unlawful, then, if at the same time it is an act likely to injure
another person, and that person dies, D is guilty of manslaughter.
The present requirement was further explained in Church where the Court of Criminal
Appeal said:
‘An unlawful act causing the death of another cannot, simply because it is an unlawful
act, render a manslaughter verdict inevitable. For such a verdict inexorably to follow, the
unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise
190 As to this, see paras 2.37–2.59. 191 [1998] AC 245 at 274.

192 [1943] KB 174, CCA. Also see Hall (1961) 45 Cr App R 366, CCA.
must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom,
albeit not serious harm.’193
This objective test, which was approved in DPP v Newbury,194 is not concerned with prov-
ing a risk which D must foresee, but with delimiting the type of unlawful act which will
suffice for liability for manslaughter. Thus, the test is unaffected by the Criminal Justice
Act 1967, s 8, which is not concerned with when foresight has to be proved but with how it
is to be proved when it is required.195 The test is satisfied where D has considered whether
there was a risk of harm and wrongly concluded there was none, unless a reasonable per-
son would also have reached that conclusion.
There is a significant difference between the formulation in Larkin, where the Court of
Criminal Appeal referred to the likelihood of injury, and that in Church, where the Court
of Criminal Appeal referred to a risk of some harm, which is a lower level of chance. In
Carey,196 the Court of Appeal adopted the Church formulation on the ground that it was
more recent, was expressly approved in Newbury and was more satisfactory. Thus, Larkin
should not now be regarded as a definitive statement but simply as an important step
towards the law as it now is.
The fact that an objective risk of some physical197 harm suffices means that this thresh-
old is relatively low. If the law has to have constructive manslaughter it would be better if
the objective test under our law was held to relate to the appreciable risk of serious harm,
as has been required in the Australian case of Wilson v R.198
8.97 Although the test in Church was framed in terms of an objective risk that the
act ‘must subject the other person [ie the victim (V)] to the risk of some harm’, the
House of Lords in A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)199 held that where the objective
risk of harm is of harm not to V but to another person this will also render the act
dangerous, and this is so even if V is outside any category of persons whom a reason-
able person might consider potentially at risk. The question was ‘was it foreseeable
that the act might harm somebody?’ No doubt the reason why the formulation was
expressed as it was in Church was the fact that the objective risk there was to V and the
Court had that situation in mind when expressing it. As already explained, in A-G’s
Reference (No 3 of 1994), D stabbed a pregnant woman with the intention of harming
her alone. As a result of the attack, the woman went into premature labour and the
child, although born alive, subsequently died as a result of being born prematurely.
The House of Lords held that, although the defendant in such a case could not be con-
victed of murder, he could be convicted of constructive manslaughter. On the facts of
the case there was a dangerous unlawful act (stabbing the mother) because it was likely
to cause harm to somebody (the mother) and the other requirements of constructive
manslaughter were satisfied.
193 [1966] 1 QB 59 at 70. Emphasis added. Also see Mackie (1973) 57 Cr App R 453, CA.
194 [1977] AC 500, HL; para 8.89.
195 Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152, CA; DPP v Newbury [1977] AC 500 at 510, per Lord Edmund-Davies.
196 [2006] EWCA Crim 17. 197 See para 8.101.
198 (1992) 174 CLR 313, High Ct of Australia.
199 [1998] AC 245, HL.
8.98 The objective test is applied on the basis of the facts known to D at the time of his
unlawful act, ie the question is whether – on the facts known to D at that time – a reason-
able person would have realised that the act must subject somebody to, at least, the risk of
some harm resulting therefrom.200 It follows that if, unknown to D, V had some special
susceptibility to death in the circumstances in question, this must not be taken into account
in applying the objective test. In Dawson,201 V, a filling station attendant, had suffered a fatal
heart attack following an armed robbery by D in the course of which V was threatened with
violence. There was no evidence that D knew that V suffered from a serious heart condition
from which V was likely to die at any time. The Court of Appeal quashed convictions for
manslaughter because the jury might have been given to understand by the judge that they
could take into account the heart condition in reaching their verdict.
8.99 For the purpose of the rule that the reasonable person is endowed with such knowl-
edge as D had at the time of his unlawful act, the duration of that act is not the time, possi-
bly very brief, when the ‘unlawful act’ offence is technically committed but instead is that
period in which the act can be said in commonsense terms to continue. In Watson,202 D
had entered a house as a trespasser with intent to steal (and thereby committed an unlaw-
ful act, a burglary) and, while in the house, had discovered that it was occupied by V, a
frail, 87-year-old man, who died from a heart attack an hour and a half later. The Court of
Appeal held that the unlawful act comprised the whole of the burglarious intrusion and
did not end with D’s entry. Consequently, it held, the trial judge had correctly directed
the jury that D’s knowledge of V’s age and frailty, acquired during that intrusion, could
be attributed to the reasonable person.
8.100 By way of limitation on Dawson, it must be remembered that the reasonable per-
son does not make unreasonable mistakes. Thus, in Ball,203 D’s unreasonably mistaken
belief that the live cartridge which he loaded into a gun was a blank was not imputed into
the reasonable person’s appreciation of the risk.
8.101 The ‘harm’ referred to in the test in Church is physical harm. This was affirmed by
the Court of Appeal in Dawson,204 where it was held that the risk of emotional disturbance
produced by terror is not enough; but it assumed that it would be if the risk of physical harm
(eg a heart attack) from shock emanating from fright was reasonably foreseeable. In Carey,205
refered to in para 8.104, the Court of Appeal noted the difference between emotional dis-
turbance and shock and stated that, had the evidence supported it, the jury could have
been allowed to consider whether there was a risk of physical harm emanating from shock.
Dawson and Carey can be contrasted with other decisions to the effect that where actual bod-
ily harm is in issue in other contexts it includes an identifiable psychiatric injury.206
8.102 One result of Dawson is that, although it is possible to commit constructive man-
slaughter by frightening a person (an assault) with fatal consequences, such cases will
not be very common in practice because in normal circumstances a reasonable person
200 Dawson (1985) 81 Cr App R 150, CA. 201 Ibid.

204 (1985) 81 Cr App R 150, CA. See Stallworthy ‘Can Death by Shock be Manslaughter?’ (1986) 136 NLJ 51;
Busuttil and McCall-Smith ‘Fright, Stress and Homicide’ (1990) 54 JCL 257.
205 [2006] EWCA Crim 17 at [37]. 206 Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552, CA; para 7.58.
would not realise that frightening a person gave rise to a risk of causing somebody physi-
cal harm.
8.103 Very often, a person who commits an unlawful and dangerous act will himself
realise the risk of some physical harm to another resulting, but the important thing about
the present requirement is that a person (D) who commits an unlawful and dangerous
act can be convicted of constructive manslaughter even though he does not realise this
risk, provided that a reasonable person with D’s knowledge of the facts would realise the
risk of physical harm.
Unlawful and dangerous act must cause death

8.104 Not only must an unlawful and dangerous act on D’s part be proved, but it must also
be proved that that unlawful and dangerous act, as opposed to any other act by D, caused
V’s death.207 There must be no intervening act or event which would break the chain of cau-
sation between the unlawful act and the death.208 The unlawful and dangerous act need not
have been the only cause, but it must have been a substantial cause of the death of another
human being, in the sense that it contributed more than negligibly to it. This is, of course,
in line with the normal rules of causation. The present requirement was stated as follows by
Lord Woolf MR (as he then was) in Inner South London Coroner, ex p Douglas-Williams:209
‘[I]t is an essential ingredient that the unlawful . . . act must have caused the death at least
in the manner described [ie more than a minute or negligible contribution]. If there is a
situation where, on examination of the evidence, it cannot be said that the death in ques-
tion was caused by an act which was unlawful . . . as I have described, then a critical link in
the chain of causation is not established.’
The point was repeated by the House of Lords in Kennedy (No 2).210
The present point was in issue in Carey,211 where the defendants had been convicted
of affray (which requires a person to use or threaten another in such a way as to cause
a person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety) and
manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, after they had confronted the deceased
(V) and her friends. During the confrontation one of them had punched V who fled. Later
V, an apparently healthy 15-year-old, died from a heart attack which was most likely
to have been precipitated by her flight. The Court of Appeal quashed the manslaughter
convictions because the punch, which certainly was an unlawful and dangerous act, had
not caused the death, and the act and threats used in the course of the affray were not in
themselves dangerous acts.
8.105 The Court of Appeal’s decision in DJ and others212 illustrates the difficulty that can
arise in proving a causal link between an unlawful and dangerous act and the deceased’s
death. In that case a gang of youths, including the five defendants, approached V while V
207 See, eg, Mitchell [1983] QB 741, CA; Williams [1992] 2 All ER 183, CA; Evans [1992] Crim LR 659, CA;
Carey [2006] EWCA Crim 17. 208 See paras 2.28–2.61.
209 [1999] 1 All ER 344 at 350. 210 [2007] UKHL 38 at [7]. 211 [2006] EWCA Crim 17.
212 [2007] EWCA Crim 3133.
was playing cricket with his son on a tennis court at a leisure centre. An exchange of words
took place between members of the gang and V which led to abuse being directed towards
V and his son. This escalated into some of the gang spitting at V and ultimately stones
and pieces of wood being thrown at V; at least one of the stones hit V on the head. Very
shortly after being hit, V died of a heart attack. There was no real doubt that the defend-
ants had caused V’s death but there was doubt as to whether the irregular heart rhythm
(arrhythmia) that led to the heart attack was triggered by the unlawful and dangerous
acts involved in the throwing of the stones and wood or whether it had already been
triggered by the earlier spitting and verbal abuse which, although it may have involved
unlawful acts, did not involve dangerous acts. The Court of Appeal quashed Ds’ convic-
tions for manslaughter because the possibility that the earlier spitting and verbal abuse
was the sole cause of the arrhythmia and consequent death could not safely be excluded.
Manslaughter by killing with gross negligence

Key points 8.8
The requirements for manslaughter by gross negligence are:
• the defendant must have owed a duty of care to the victim; and
• there must have been a gross breach of that duty by the defendant; and
• that breach must have caused the death.
8.106 As stated in para 8.83, the continued existence of this type of involuntary man-
slaughter was affirmed by the House of Lords in Adomako.213 In Adomako, D was the
anaesthetist during an eye operation. A disconnection occurred in a tube which enabled
the patient (V) to breathe by mechanical means. D failed to notice or remedy this. As
a result the supply of oxygen to V ceased and nine minutes later V had a cardiac arrest
and died. Four-and-a-half minutes after the disconnection, an alarm sounded on the
machine which monitored V’s blood pressure. D checked the equipment and adminis-
tered atropine, but at no stage before the cardiac arrest did D check the tube connection.
At D’s trial for manslaughter, at which two expert witnesses had described D’s conduct
as ‘abysmal’ and ‘as a gross dereliction of duty’, the judge directed the jury that the test
to be applied was whether D was guilty of gross negligence. The jury convicted D, who
appealed on the ground that the judge had been wrong so to direct the jury. The Court of
Appeal dismissed the appeal, and so did the House of Lords, on the ground that a direc-
tion in terms of gross negligence had been the appropriate direction.
Lord Mackay LC, with whom the rest of the House of Lords agreed, having reviewed
Bateman214 and Andrews v DPP,215 the previous leading cases on manslaughter by gross
negligence, concluded that those two cases provided a satisfactory basis for the offence.
According to Lord Mackay’s speech:
213 [1995] 1 AC 171, HL. 214 (1925) 19 Cr App R 8, CCA. 215 [1937] AC 576, HL.
‘ …the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the
‘…the
defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim who has died. If such
breach of duty is established the next question is whether that breach of duty caused the
death of the victim. If so, the jury must go on to consider whether that breach of duty
should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a crime.’216
As a result, gross negligence manslaughter can be proved without the need to inquire into
D’s state of mind.217
8.107 Lord Mackay’s statement in Adomako gives rise to the following requirements,
which he derived from Bateman and Andrews v DPP and which have been held to be
sufficiently precisely defined to satisfy the principle of legal certainty enshrined in the
ECHR, Article 7.218
Duty of care to the victim

8.108 Under the ‘ordinary principles of the law of negligence’ referred to by Lord Mackay
in Adomako, the determination of the existence of a duty of care has been summarised as
follows by Lord Bridge in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman:
‘ . . . in addition to the foreseeability [ie reasonable foreseeability] of damage, necessary

ingredients in any situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist between
the party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship characterised by
the law as one of “proximity” or “neighbourhood” and that the situation should be one in
which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of
a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other’.219
As has been pointed out,220 only very rarely can it be said that even though the victim’s
death was reasonably foreseeable there was no proximity between them, or that it was not
fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care.
In Winter and Winter,221 D1 and D2 were employees of a fireworks company.
Exceptionally dangerous fireworks were stored in a container at the company’s premises
(a farm). The company did not have a licence to store such dangerous fireworks. There was
a fire at the farm. When firefighters arrived, D2 warned them of the dangers of the fire
reaching the container, but did not state that it contained fireworks capable of causing a
large explosion. The fire set off an explosion which killed two men: a firefighter who was
setting up a ground monitor under instructions from his superior officers, and a civilian
216 [1995] 1 AC 171 at 187.

217 Th is was confirmed in A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796, CA.
218 Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375. As to the principle of legal certainty in this context see
para 1.68. 219 [1990] 2 AC 605 at 617–618.
220 Herring and Palser ‘The Duty of Care in Gross Negligence Manslaughter’ [2007] Crim LR 24 at 30. Indeed,
as the authors point out, there are dicta that where the nature of the harm suffered is direct physical harm, as in
manslaughter by gross negligence cases, reasonable foreseeability of the risk is the only test that need be applied
to determine whether a duty of care exists: Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 at
396, per Lord Keith; Perrett v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 255 at 262, per Hobhouse LJ.
221 [2010] EWCA Crim 1474.
employee of the fire service who was fi lming the firefighting operation (the cameraman).
The cameraman had ignored a number of instructions from officers and firefighters to
withdraw from the site of the fire. The trial judge ruled that D1 and D2 owed a duty of
care to take reasonable care in the storage and handling of the fireworks and that duty
was owed to everyone on the site or surrounding vicinity, including both victims. D1 and
D2 were convicted of their manslaughter by gross negligence. They applied unsuccess-
fully for leave to appeal against these convictions in respect of the cameraman. The trial
judge had considered the test of fairness, justice and reasonableness in Caparo Industries
plc v Dickman and had concluded that there should not be any difference in imposing a
duty to a fireman, sent back in to set up a ground monitor, and a cameraman who went
in to record what was going on, even if he did so in breach of advice, orders or instruc-
tions. The Court stated that the judge had been correct in reaching this conclusion. The
Court held that it was reasonably foreseeable that civilian employees of the fire service
in the position of the cameraman might come close to the site of a fire in order to film or
photograph it. That duty did not cease to be owed because the cameraman might have
disobeyed instructions.
8.109 Despite Lord Mackay’s unqualified reference to the ‘ordinary principles of the law
of negligence’, it is clear from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wacker222 and in
Winter and Winter223 that that reference is not to be understood to mean that the duty of
care in manslaughter should automatically correspond with that in tort, whose existence
is influenced by considerations of public policy about who should bear the loss.
In Wacker, 60 illegal Chinese immigrants were loaded into D’s container lorry near
Rotterdam. The only way that air could get into the container was through a vent. Shortly
before arriving at Zeebrugge D closed the vent. By the time that the container was
searched on disembarkation at Dover, 58 of those inside it had died of suffocation. D
was charged with 58 offences of manslaughter and convicted of all of them. He appealed
unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal against these convictions. D contended that he did
not owe a duty of care to any of the 58 for the purposes of manslaughter because he and
they were participants in the criminal activity of seeking to enter the United Kingdom
illegally and one of the ‘ordinary principles of the law of negligence’ was that it did not
recognise a duty of care between participants in a criminal activity; this is undoubtedly
an ordinary principle of the law of tort under the principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio
(an action cannot be founded on an illegal cause).
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. It held that the criminal law should not
be disapplied simply because the civil law was (as a matter of policy) disapplied. The
criminal law had its own public policy aim (the protection of citizens and giving effect
to the state’s duty to try those who have deprived citizens of life, limb or property) which
might require it to be applied where public policy did not require the law of tort to apply.
There was no justification for concluding that the criminal law should decline to hold a
person criminally liable for the death of another simply because he and the victim were
engaged in some joint unlawful activity, or, indeed, because there might have been some
element of acceptance of risk by the victim in order to advance the joint unlawful activity.
It added that:
‘In so far as Lord Mackay referred to “ordinary principles of the law of negligence” we do
not accept for one moment that he was intending to decide that the rules relating to ex
turpi causa were part of those ordinary principles. He was doing no more than holding
that in an “ordinary” case of negligence, the question whether there was a duty of care was
to be judged by the same legal criteria as governed whether there was a duty of care in the
law of negligence. That was the only issue relevant to the case . . . ’224
The decision of the Court of Appeal provides a useful example of the application
of the ‘ordinary principles of the law of negligence’ referred to by Lord Mackay in
Adomako.
As already noted, in Winter and Winter the Court of Appeal held that the duty of care
to the cameraman did not cease to be owed because he might have disobeyed instruc-
tions. The Court stated that, although such a failure might have been be relevant in a civil
case under the principles of volenti non fit iniuria (no legal wrong is done to a willing per-
son: voluntary assumption of risk) and contributory negligence, it was not arguable that
any failure to comply with instructions in this case had the consequence that no duty of
care was owed to the cameraman for the purposes of criminal liability for manslaughter
by gross negligence.
8.110 In practice it will normally not be difficult to establish whether there was a duty of
care, where it is alleged that a duty of care existed and manslaughter is in issue.
8.111 Where the allegation is that death was caused by a failure to act, it must not be for-
gotten that it is not enough simply that D owed V a duty of care because D must also have
been legally obliged to do the act which he is alleged to have failed to have done.225
A person (D) who owes a duty of care to another (V) because it is reasonably foresee-
able that D’s omission to act would cause V harm may well not be under a legal duty to
act. D, a student who does not seek help when his flatmate suffers a life-threatening ill-
ness, cannot be convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence if the illness proves fatal.
Although D would owe a duty of care, D would not be under a legal duty to act because D’s
relationship with his flatmate falls outside the range of situations described in Chapter
2 where a legal duty to act arises. On the other hand, it would be a most exceptional case
where someone under a legal duty to act did not also owe a duty of care.
In Evans (Gemma),226 below, the Court of Appeal, while recognising the need for the
two duties, did not always distinguish between them. Indeed, in some cases the Court of
Appeal has not referred to the distinction and has ignored the need for a duty to act.227
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Evans (Gemma) provides an example of a situ-
ation where a legal duty to act (and a duty of care) can arise for the purposes of man-
slaughter by gross negligence. The Court held that, for the purposes of gross negligence
manslaughter, when a person had created or contributed to the creation of a state of
affairs which he knew, or ought reasonably to have known, had become life-threatening
to another person, a consequent duty would normally arise on him to act by taking rea-
sonable steps to save the other’s life.
224 [2002] EWCA Crim 1944 at [37]. 225 Khan and Khan [1998] Crim LR 830, CA. See para 2.11.
226 [2009] EWCA Crim 650. 227 Eg Singh [1999] Crim LR 582, CA; Dean [2002] EWCA Crim 2410.
In Evans (Gemma), D purchased some heroin which she handed to V, her 16-year-
old half-sister. V self-injected the heroin in the house where she lived with D and their
mother and she then proceeded to develop and complain of symptoms consistent with an
overdose. D appreciated that V’s condition was very serious and indicative of an overdose
and, together with her mother, she believed that she was responsible for V’s care. D and
her mother decided not to seek medical assistance because they feared that they, and pos-
sibly V, would get into trouble. They put V to bed, hoping that she would recover spon-
taneously, and remained at the house, checking on V periodically and then sleeping in
the same room as her. The following morning V was dead. The cause of death was heroin
poisoning. D was charged with manslaughter.
D could not have been guilty of manslaughter on the basis of her act of supplying the
heroin, because V took it freely, voluntarily and informedly and therefore broke the chain
of causation between D’s act and her death. Thus, the question was whether D was guilty
of gross negligence manslaughter on the basis of her subsequent omission to get medical
help for V. The jury convicted D of gross negligence manslaughter after the judge had
ruled that on the facts D could owe a duty of care to V.
D appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal. The question for the Court of
Appeal was whether, notwithstanding that D and V’s relationship lacked the features of
familial duty which marked the relationship of D’s mother (who had also been convicted
of manslaughter) with V, D was under a duty to take reasonable steps for V’s safety once D
appreciated that the heroin she had procured for V was having a potentially fatal effect on
V. Relying on Miller, discussed in para 2.13, a full (ie five-judge) Court of Appeal held that
D was under such a duty. It held that, for the purposes of gross negligence manslaughter,
if a person created or contributed to the creation of a state of affairs which he knew, or
ought reasonably to have known, had become life-threatening, a consequent duty on him
to act by taking reasonable steps to save the other’s life would normally arise. This part
of the judgment involved an extension in the law because Miller lays down a principle
which applies where someone creates a dangerous situation (which D had not in Evans,
because just as D had not caused V’s death after V’s self-infliction so D had not caused the
life threatening state of affairs). The Court of Appeal got round the problem by adding the
alternative of contributing to a dangerous situation, which D had.228
8.112 Before Evans (Gemma), it was a matter of dispute whether the existence of a duty
of care in a particular case was purely a question of law for the judge,229 or whether the
judge’s task was simply to rule whether a duty of care could arise on the facts, leaving it to
the jury to decide in the light of the judge’s direction whether it actually did arise.230 In
principle, the latter is preferable; it is normally the jury’s function to determine whether
or not an element of an offence is proved (albeit on the basis of a direction on the relevant
law from the judge).
228 For critical discussions of the aspect of Evans (Gemma) dealt with in this paragraph see Rogers ‘Death,
Drugs and Duties’ [2009] 6 Archbold News 6; Williams ‘Gross Negligence Manslaughter and Duty of Care in
“Drugs” Cases’ [2009] Crim LR 631; Dobson ‘Omissions Liability for Homicide Offences’ (2010) 74 JCL 310.
229 The view taken in Singh [1999] Crim LR 582, CA.
230 The view favoured in Khan and Khan [1998] Crim LR 830, CA; Sinclair (1998) 148 NLJ 1353, CA; and
Willoughby [2004] EWCA Crim 3365.
The conflict between the cases was resolved by the Court of Appeal in Evans (Gemma),
where it was held that the correct view of the law was the latter one. The Court of Appeal
held that, although the existence, or otherwise, of a duty of care, ie whether a duty could
arise on the facts, was a stark question of law, the question whether the facts actually
established the existence of the duty was for the jury. It added that in some cases, such as
those arising from a doctor/patient relationship where the existence of the duty was not
in dispute, the judge might well direct the jury that a duty existed. Such a direction would
be proper. However, it said, in any cases where the issue was in dispute, and assuming that
the judge had found that it would be open to the jury to find that there was a duty of care,
ie a duty could arise on the facts, the jury should be directed that if facts (a) plus (b) and/
or (c) or (d) were established, then in law a duty would arise, but if facts (x) or (y) or (z)
were present, the duty would be negatived. On the facts, the Court of Appeal held, D was
under a plain and obvious duty of care in relation to V. The remaining ingredients of the
offence were proved. D’s appeal was therefore dismissed.
Gross breach of duty of care

8.113 Normally, proof of negligence simply involves proof that, whether or not he real-
ised the risk (of which he should have been aware), D, the person subject to the duty, did
something, or failed to do something, in a way which fell below the standard of conduct
expected of a reasonable person in all the circumstances (including D’s expertise and
training, if they are relevant in the context). In the case of gross negligence, however,
it is not enough that D’s conduct fell, however slightly, below the standard of care to be
expected, where as it would be in an action in tort or in a prosecution for careless driving.
In Bateman231 the Court of Criminal Appeal stated that gross negligence required that:
‘the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between sub-
jects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others, as to amount to a crime
against the State and conduct deserving of punishment.’232
8.114 For there to be liability for manslaughter by gross negligence:
• D’s conduct must have involved a reasonably foreseeable risk of the death of
another. This point, which can be gathered from Lord Mackay’s speech in Adomako,
was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Singh,233 where the Court approved the
judge’s direction that a risk merely of injury or even of serious injury would not do,
and in Misra and Srivastava,234 where the Court held that the relevant risk had to be
of death, not merely a risk of bodily injury or injury to health. It is not enough that
the reasonably foreseeable risk of death was a remote risk; the circumstances must
be such that a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen a serious and obvious
risk of death.235 Indeed, according to the Privy Council in Brown (Uriah) v R,236
D’s conduct must be such as to create a very high degree of risk of death.
231 (1925) 19 Cr App R 8, CCA. 232 Ibid.
233 [1999] Crim LR 582, CA. Also see R (on the application of Lewin) v CPS [2002] EWHC 1049
(Admin), DC. 234 [2004] EWCA Crim 2375. See also Yaqoob [2005] EWCA Crim 2169.
235 Singh [1999] Crim LR 582, CA; Yaqoob above. 236 [2005] UKPC 18.
The requirement of a risk of death can be compared with the lower requirement of
a risk of some physical harm in constructive manslaughter. The objective nature of
manslaughter by gross negligence would be particularly open to objection if the risk
required had only to relate to the risk of non-fatal injury.
• As Lord Mackay’s speech in Adomako indicates, in respect of the reasonably fore-

seeable risk of death, D’s conduct in all the circumstances in which D was placed
must have fallen so far below the standard to be expected of a reasonable person, ie
be so bad, that it should be judged criminal. There is force in the argument 237 that,
since careless driving is also criminal, the question must be whether the conduct was
so bad as to be condemned as the very grave crime of manslaughter. Otherwise, the
element of grossness of the negligence is inadequately conveyed.
8.115 In Adomako, Lord Mackay LC said that whether there has been a gross breach of
duty of care:
‘will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the defendant in all
the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred. The jury will
have to consider whether the extent to which the defendant’s conduct departed from the
proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as it must have done a risk of
death . . . , was such that it should be judged criminal.’238
Lord Mackay continued:
‘It is true that to a certain extent this involves an element of circularity, but in this branch
of the law I do not believe that is fatal to its being correct as a test of how far conduct
must depart from accepted standards to be characterised as criminal. This is necessar-
ily a question of degree and an attempt to specify that degree more closely is I think
likely to achieve only a spurious precision. The essence of the matter, which is supremely
a jury question, is whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of
the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in their judgment to a
criminal act or omission.’239
While the above approach may be a workable one, it does mean that what constitutes
gross negligence comes down to a moral judgment by the jury.
8.116 Although evidence of D’s state of mind is not a prerequisite to liability for man-
slaughter by gross negligence, there may be cases where D’s state of mind is relevant to
the issue of the criminality of his conduct.240 For example, a defendant who is reckless
as to a risk to his victim, even if he only foresaw a risk of injury to that person’s health
and welfare, ‘may well be the more readily found to be grossly negligent to a criminal
degree’.241
237 See commentary to Litchfield [1998] Crim LR 507 at 508. 238 Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 at 187.
239 Adomako above. 240 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796 at 809.
241 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) above; DPP, ex p Jones [2000] IRLR 373, DC.
Breach of duty must cause death

8.117 This, the third limb of negligence, according to the ‘ordinary principles of negli-
gence’, simply involves the application of the rules on causation discussed in paras 2.28
to 2.61. As Lord Woolf MR (as he then was) said in Inner South London Coroner, ex p
Douglas-Williams:
‘[I]t is an essential ingredient that the . . . negligent act must have caused the death at least
in the manner described [ie more than a minute or negligible contribution]. If there is a
situation where, on examination of the evidence, it cannot be said that the death in ques-
tion was caused by an act which was . . . negligent as I have described, then a critical link in
the chain of causation is not established.’242
It must not be forgotten that there will not be a causal link if the death would still have
occurred even if there had not been the grossly negligent conduct on D’s part.243
Abolition of corporate liability for manslaughter by gross negligence

8.118 The common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence has been abolished
in its application to corporations, or any other organisation which can commit the offence
of corporate manslaughter, except in relation to an offence committed wholly or partly
before 6 April 2008.244
Manslaughter by killing with recklessness as

to death or serious bodily harm
8.119 It will be recalled that a person is reckless as to a risk if he himself foresees that risk
as a consequence of his conduct and he takes that risk, and in all the circumstances it is an
unreasonable risk for him to take.245 Prior to the House of Lords’ decision in Seymour246
there was authority that it was manslaughter to kill another with the appropriate degree
of recklessness.247 As with manslaughter by gross negligence, Seymour threw doubt on the
survival of this species of manslaughter. Just as the overruling of Seymour led the House
of Lords in Adomako248 to recognise the continued existence of manslaughter by gross
negligence, so, it seemed, did it have to be recognised that recklessness of the appropriate
degree could still provide the mens rea for involuntary manslaughter. Support for this
statement could be found in an obiter dictum by Lord Mackay LC in Adomako.249 Doubt
seemed to be cast, however, on this submission in two post-Adomako decisions where
the Court of Appeal, without a discussion of the matter, appeared to regard involun-
242 [1999] 1 All ER 344 at 350.

243 Dalloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273; para 2.30.
244 Or 1 September 2011 in one type of case. See paras 8.129 and 8.133, n 285.
245 Paras 3.32–3.34. 246 [1983] 2 AC 493, HL.
247 Pike [1961] Crim LR 547, CCA; Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554 at 577, per Salmon LJ; Stone and Dobinson
[1977] QB 354, CA. 248 [1995] 1 AC 171, HL.
249 [1995] 1 AC 171 at 187.
tary manslaughter as consisting only of two types: constructive manslaughter and man-
slaughter by gross negligence.250 Subsequently, however, in Lidar,251 the Court of Appeal
affirmed that there remained a separate species of involuntary manslaughter based on
recklessness.
In Lidar, D, as a result of a dispute, drove his car away from a pub. V, who was hanging
from the window, with his body half in the car, was carried 225 metres before his feet
were caught in a wheel and he fell to the ground. V was run over and died from his inju-
ries. D appealed unsuccessfully against his conviction for manslaughter on the ground
that the trial judge had been wrong to direct the jury in terms of recklessness and should
have directed them in terms of gross negligence. The Court of Appeal held that nothing in
Adomako suggested that recklessness could no longer be a basis for proving involuntary
manslaughter, and that – since a recklessness direction was necessary – a gross negli-
gence direction would have been ‘superfluous and unnecessary’.
Lidar clarified the risk which D must actually foresee in order to be guilty of the
present type of involuntary manslaughter. According to the case law preceding
Seymour referred to above, it was not necessary that D should have been reckless as
to the risk of death resulting since it sufficed that D foresaw bodily harm as a risk;252
indeed, in one case the Court of Appeal held that foresight of the risk of an injury to
health and welfare sufficed.253 In Lidar, however, the Court of Appeal held that D must
have been reckless as to the risk of serious injury. In addition, the Court indicated
that recklessness bears a special meaning in the present context. Normally, D satis-
fies the defi nition of recklessness, in terms of foresight of risk, if D foresees the risk in
question as a possible consequence of his conduct and takes the unreasonable risk of
it occurring. In Lidar, it was held that, for present purposes, D must foresee the risk
of serious injury as highly probable and take the unreasonable risk of it. Of course,
someone who foresees the risk of death as highly probable and unreasonably runs it
satisfies this test.
8.120 The present type of involuntary manslaughter will often overlap with construc-
tive manslaughter and manslaughter by gross negligence, but it will not do so where
the fatal act is not otherwise ‘unlawful’ (as that term is defi ned for the purposes of
constructive manslaughter) and, although D knowingly takes the unreasonable risk
of serious bodily harm, there is no risk of death and/or no gross breach of a duty of
care (which will be unusual). No doubt the overlap with the other two types of invol-
untary manslaughter is the reason why this species of involuntary manslaughter is not
commonly prosecuted and the reason why Lord Bingham, giving the opinion of the
House of Lords in Kennedy (No 2), regarded it as ‘well-established and not in any way
controversial that a charge of manslaughter may be founded either on the unlawful
act of the defendant (“unlawful act manslaughter”) or on the gross negligence of the
defendant’.254
250 Khan and Khan [1998] Crim LR 830, CA; Inner South London Coroner, ex p Douglas-Williams [1999] 1
All ER 344, CA. 251 [2000] 4 Archbold News 3, CA.
252 Pike [1961] Crim LR 547, CCA. 253 Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354, CA.
254 [2007] UKHL 38 at [6].
Conclusions on involuntary manslaughter

8.121 Similar problems are raised by each of the fi rst two types of involuntary man-
slaughter. Why should someone be liable to a maximum punishment of life imprison-
ment if he inadvertently causes death by a common assault for which he could not receive
more than a minimal term of imprisonment if he had not caused death? Why should
someone who grossly negligently causes death be liable to be convicted of manslaughter
whereas, had he ‘merely’ caused serious bodily harm, he would not have been guilty of
any offence against the person (since there is no general offence of causing non-fatal bod-
ily harm by negligence) and probably of no offence at all, particularly when whether or
not the victim dies may depend on pure chance, such as the skill of a surgeon?
Reform
8.122 In its report, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, 255 the Law Commission rec-
ommended that there should be two offences of manslaughter which would replace the
existing offences of involuntary manslaughter:
‘(1) killing another person through gross negligence (“gross negligence manslaugh-
ter”); or
(2) killing another person:
(a) through the commission of a criminal act intended by the defendant to cause
injury, or
(b) through the commission of a criminal act that the defendant was aware involved
a serious risk of causing some injury (“criminal act manslaughter”)’.256
Manslaughter would continue to be punishable with a maximum of imprisonment for life.

The definition of causing death by gross negligence would be as follows. It would be
manslaughter of this type if:
‘(1) a person by his or her conduct causes the death of another;

(2) a risk that his or her conduct will cause death would be obvious to a reasonable
person in his or her position;
(3) he or she is capable of appreciating that risk at the material time; and
(4) his or her conduct falls far below what can reasonably be expected of him or her in
the circumstances’.257
The reference to D’s capability to appreciate the risk of death avoids the rigours of the
wholly objective approach inherent in the current law of manslaughter by gross negli-
255 Law Com No 304 (2006), paras 2.159–2.165 and 3.41–3.60, and Appendix A, paras A.3–A.4. For previous
recommendations for the reform of involuntary manslaughter see the Law Commission Legislating the Criminal
Code: Involuntary Manslaughter, Law Com No 237 (1996). 256 Law Com No 304, para 2.163.
257 Ibid, para 3.60.
8.123 infanticide | 287
gence. The last part of the definition of the recommended offence avoids the circularity of
the existing definition of gross negligence. A satisfactory answer has yet to be given to the
question why gross negligence should suffice for liability when it has resulted in death but
not when it has resulted in some personal injury, including serious injury.
While the recommendation relating to criminal act manslaughter is slightly less dra-
conian than unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter, because it replaces the objective
test of dangerousness with a requirement that D must at least be aware of a serious risk
of causing injury, the need for this offence has not satisfactorily been demonstrated. The
illegal violence in question can be dealt with by the armoury of non-fatal offences. Why
should D be guilty of manslaughter because of the unforeseen, and unforeseeable, occur-
rence of death, if he was merely aware of the risk of serious injury?
Given that manslaughter is the third tier of its proposed ladder of general homicide
offences,258 it is puzzling that the Law Commission ultimately recommended against
a fi xed maximum period of imprisonment and settled instead for a maximum of life
imprisonment, the same maximum as would apply to the offence of second-degree mur-
der under its recommendations.
In January 2011, the Government informed the Law Commission that the time was not
right to take forward these recommendations.259
Infanticide
8.123 The Infanticide Act 1938 (IA 1938), s 1, as amended by the Coroners and Justice
Act 2009, s 57 (the amendments are italicised), provides:
‘(1) Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child being
a child under the age of 12 months, but at the time of the act or omission the bal-
ance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from
the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation conse-
quent upon the birth of the child, then, iff the circumstances were such that but for
this Act the offence would have amounted to murder or manslaughter, r she shall be
guilty of an offence, to wit of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and
punished as if she had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the child.
(2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder or manslaughter 260 of her child,
being a child under the age of 12 months, the jury are of opinion that she by any
wilful act or omission caused its death, but that at the time of the act or omission
the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered
from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation
258 Para 8.33. 259 See n 74.

260 There is some doubt about whether these italicised words were added as part of the amendments made by
s 57 of the 2009 Act because it states that ‘or manslaughter’ is added after ‘murder’ in IA 1938, s 1(2) and ‘murder’
appears twice in s 1(2). Normally, a provision would say that the addition applies in both places. It would not
make sense for the addition not to be made after the second reference to ‘murder’. Consequently, if the addition
was only intended to apply in one place, s 1(2) does not contain the above italicised words. It would be unfor-
tunate if an infanticide verdict could not be returned (as an alternative to murder or manslaughter) where only
manslaughter was charged in a case where such a verdict could be returned if murder was charged.
consequent upon the birth of the child, then the jury may, iff the circumstances were
such that but for the provisions of this Act they might have returned a verdict of
murder or manslaughter, r return in lieu thereof a verdict of infanticide.’
Thus, infanticide can either be charged in the fi rst instance as the offence of
infanticide (s 1(1)) or serve as a partial defence reducing liability from murder or
manslaughter to infanticide (s 1(2)). The offence, and defence, of infanticide were
originally created by the Infanticide Act 1922 to mitigate the rigours of the law relat-
ing to murder, especially the mandatory death sentence which then applied. They
have no application to unborn children, but only to those who attain an existence
independent of the mother.
8.124 Prior to the amendments to the IA 1938, the Court of Appeal in Gore 261 had
ruled that there was no requirement that the offence of infanticide only applied where
the mens rea for murder was proved. It held that the mens rea of the offence was con-
tained expressly in the fi rst few words of the IA 1938, s 1(1), viz a requirement of proof
that the act or omission was wilful. There was no reference to any intention to kill or
cause serious bodily harm; and if there was such a requirement, the use of the word
‘wilful’ would be superfluous. Further, the Court of Appeal held, the section created an
offence in s 1(1) and it also provided a partial defence and possible alternative verdict
to murder in s 1(2). If s 1(1) had been intended to be used only where the mens rea for
murder was proved, s 1(2) would be superfluous since the offence created by s 1(1) could
always have been left open to the jury as an alternative charge to murder. The view
adopted in Gore came as a surprise; it had previously been assumed that the offence
under s 1(1) required proof of the mens rea for murder. Gore extended the offence to a
much wider range of cases where a child dies. It took the offence far beyond its original
mischief.
8.125 An effect of Gore was to make it possible for a woman to be charged with infanti-
cide in cases which would not otherwise be an offence of homicide at all. This was because
the phrase ‘wilful act or omission’ in the IA 1938, s 1(1) in its original form was open to
the interpretation that it included negligence falling below the level of gross negligence –
or, even, that it simply referred to a mere voluntary act or omission without reference to
negligence – neither of which would involve liability for involuntary manslaughter. The
amendments to s 1(1) were designed to make it clear that infanticide cannot be charged in
cases that would not otherwise be murder or manslaughter.262
8.126 The defence of infanticide under the IA 1938, s 1(2), as amended, enables a woman
to plead as a defence to murder or manslaughter mental disturbance of such a nature as
would not amount to insanity under the rule in M’Naghten’s Case,263 although it would
now often amount on a murder charge to a defence of diminished responsibility. Legally,
infanticide is strictly limited to the conditions laid down in the Act, and the fact that the
261 [2007] EWCA Crim 2789.

262 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law Ministry of Justice, Consultation
Paper 19/08, para 125. 263 Paras 15.21–15.51.
8.128 other homicide offences: corporate manslaughter | 289
deceased child was less than 12 months old is not sufficient unless there is also evidence
that the balance of the mother’s mind was disturbed for one of the stated reasons.264
Although the mother who raises infanticide as a defence on a murder or manslaughter
charge must adduce evidence sufficient to raise the defence, the burden of disproving it rests
on the Crown. Infanticide as a defence differs from the defences of insanity and dimin-
ished responsibility where the burden of proving the defence is on the defendant.265
8.127 In Kai-Whitewind, 266 the Court of Appeal regarded the law of infanticide as unsat-
isfactory and outdated because IA 1938, s 1(1) does not include the common case where
the balance of the mother’s mind is disturbed by environmental or other stress subse-
quent to the birth and connected with it, but not consequent on the effect of the birth
or the effect of lactation. It called for urgent reform. However, it will be noted that no
amendment has been made to address this concern.
Other homicide offences: (1) corporate

manslaughter
Key points 8.9

A corporation (or other organisation of a specified type) is guilty of the offence of cor-
porate manslaughter if the way in which its activities are managed or organised causes
a person’s death and amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the
organisation to the deceased person.
8.128 A corporation, such as an incorporated company, a limited liability partnership

under the Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000 or a local authority, is a separate person
in law. A limited company, eg, is distinct from its shareholders (or other members), its
directors and its employees. Until the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide
Act 2007 came into force a corporation could only be convicted of the common law
offence of manslaughter by gross negligence by attributing to it the gross negligence of
someone who was part of the directing mind and will of the corporation.267 However,
it was difficult to secure such a conviction, especially if the corporation was a large- or
medium-sized one.
The failure of prosecutions against corporations after the capsizing of the Herald of
Free Enterprise and the Paddington and Hatfield train crashes, and the failure of man-
slaughter prosecutions against corporations in 24 other cases between 1992 and 2005,
heightened awareness of the difficulty of convicting a corporation of manslaughter,
on the basis of gross negligence, because of the need to find the elements of the offence
proved on the part of an individual controlling officer. The immediate cause of the death
will usually be an operational failure of systems controlling the risk associated with the
264 Soanes [1948] 1 All ER 289, CCA. 265 Paras 4.7 and 8.47.
266 [2005] EWCA Crim 1092. 267 Paras 18.24–18.43.
carelessness of individuals who are junior employees; while this may result from the cor-
poration’s failure to have effective management control systems, that failing cannot be
‘pinned’ on an individual identifiable with the corporation. Corporations have only been
convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence in eight cases (all of which have concerned
small companies).268
It was for this reason that the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide269
Act 2007 (CMCHA 2007) was enacted. The first conviction under the 2007 Act was in
February 2011.270 The Act can trace its roots back to a Law Commission report, published
in 1996,271 which recommended a new offence of corporate manslaughter. In 2005, the
Government published for consultation a draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill,272 from
which the CMCHA 2007 differs in a number of significant respects. The CMCHA 2007,
s 1 established the offence of corporate manslaughter whose terms avoid the difficulties
experienced under the general principles of corporate liability by abandoning the need to
pin the guilt on an individual identifiable with the corporation in favour of liability based
on gross management failure. The name of the offence273 is misleading because it can
also be committed by certain organisations other than corporations.
8.129 Under the CMCHA 2007, s 20, the common law offence of manslaughter by gross
negligence is abolished,274 except in relation to an offence committed wholly or partly
before 6 April 2008, 275 in its application to corporations, and in any application it had
to other organisations to which the offence of corporate manslaughter applies.276
The offence
8.130 The CMCHA 2007, s 1(1) provides:
‘An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its
activities are managed or organised –
(a) causes a person’s death, and
(b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to
the deceased.’
268 See <http://www.corporateaccountability.org/manslaughter/cases/main.htm>. Prior to these cases it had

been held in judicial review proceedings that a corporation could be held guilty of manslaughter: HM Coroner
for East Kent, ex p Spooner (1989) 88 Cr App R 10, DC, and it had been ruled at a criminal trial that a charge of
manslaughter against a corporation was recognised in law, although the judge subsequently directed acquittals
on the ground that there was no case to answer on the facts: P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App
R 71, Crown Ct. There is implicit recognition in the decision of the Court of Appeal in A-G’s Reference (No 2 of
1999) [2000] QB 796 that a corporation could be convicted of manslaughter. 269 See n 273.
270 The case is referred to in n 312.
271 Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter Law Com No 237.
272 Home Office Corporate Manslaughter: the Government’s Draft Bill for Reform Cm 6497. For a detailed review
of the draft Bill, see Clarkson ‘Corporate Manslaughter: Yet More Government Proposals’ [2005] Crim LR 677.
273 The name is given by the CMCHA 2007, s 1(5)(a). The name ‘corporate homicide’ is given to the corre-
sponding offence in Scottish law: CMCHA 2007, s 1(5)(b). 274 CMCHA 2007, s 27(4).
275 Or 1 September 2011 in the case referred to in n 285.
276 There is no authority that the common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence applied to any
such organisation other than a corporation.
By s 1(3), an organisation is guilty of an offence under the CMCHA 2007, s 1 only if the
way in which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a sub-
stantial element in the breach referred to in s 1(1). Because the offence requires a gross
breach of a duty of care this offence is one requiring proof of gross negligence within its
terms.
Section 1 does not apply to anything done or omitted before 6 April 2008.277
Organisations to which s 1 applies

8.131 By the CMCHA 2007, s 1(2):
‘The organisations to which s 1 applies are:

(a) a corporation;
(b) a government department or other body listed in Schedule 1;278
(c) a police force;
(d) a partnership,279 or a trade union or employers’ association, that is an employer.’280
The effect of s 1(2), coupled with s 11,281 is that the normal presumption that a statute does not
apply to the Crown282 is rebutted in respect of the offence of corporate manslaughter. Among
the government departments and bodies listed in Sch 1 (as amended) are the Ministry of
Defence, the Home Office, HM Revenue and Customs and the Ministry of Justice.
Senior management
8.132 The CMCHA 2007, s 1(4)(c) provides that
‘ “senior management”, in relation to an organisation, means the persons who play sig-
nificant roles in –
(i) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities
are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those
activities’.
Although the definition of ‘senior management’ is wider than the definition of those
(persons part of the corporation’s directing mind and will) who could have involved a
277 CMCHA 2007, s 27(3). In the case referred to in n 285 the relevant date is 1 September 2011.
278 The Secretary of State has power to amend Sch 1: CMCHA 2007, s 22.
279 Ie a partnership within the Partnership Act 1890 or a limited partnership registered under the Limited
Partnerships Act 1907, or a firm or entity of a similar character formed under the law of a country or territory
outside the United Kingdom: CMCHA 2007, s 25.
280 The Secretary of State has power to amend s 1 so as to extend the categories of organisation to which s 1
applies: CMCHA 2007, s 21.
281 Section 11 expressly removes Crown immunity.
282 Tamlin v Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 18, CA; Lord Advocate v Dumbarton District Council [1990] 2 AC 580, HL.
corporation in criminal liability for the common law offence of manslaughter by gross
negligence, it still restricts the range of people whose misconduct can result in liability
for corporate liability. It is arguable that the definition of ‘senior management’ is too nar-
row. There is a risk that cynical organisations will delegate their decision-making and
management and organisation in areas related to health and to safety to people falling
outside the definition.
Relevant duty of care

8.133 The meaning of ‘relevant duty of care’ for the purposes of the CMCHA 2007, s 1, is
provided by the CMCHA 2007, s 2. Section 2(1) and (2) provides that:
‘(1) A “relevant duty of care” in relation to an organisation, means any of the following
duties owed by it under the law of negligence:283
(a) a duty owed to its employees or to other persons working for the organisation
or performing services for it;
(b) a duty owed as occupier of premises;
(c) a duty owed in connection with –
(i) the supply by the organisation of goods or services (whether for considera-
tion or not);
(ii) the carrying on by the organisation of any construction or maintenance
operations;
(iii) the carrying on by the organisation of any other activity on a commercial
basis; or
(iv) the use or keeping by the organisation of any plant, vehicle or other
thing;
(d) a duty owed to a person who, by reason of being a person within subsection
(2),284 is someone for whose safety the organisation is responsible.285
(2) A person is within this subsection if –
(a) he is detained at a custodial institution or in a custody area at a court, police
station or customs premises;286
(aa) he is detained in service custody premises;287
283 ‘The law of negligence’ includes the Occupiers’ Liability Acts 1957 and 1984 and the Defective Premises
Act 1972: CMCHA 2007, s 2(7).
284 As amended by the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (Amendment) Order 2011.
285 By the CMCHA 2007, s 2(4), a reference in s 1(1) to a duty owed under the law of negligence includes a
reference to a duty that would be owed under the law of negligence but for any statutory provision under which
liability is imposed in place of liability under that law.
The CMCHA 2007, s 20 (abolition of common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence in its
application to corporations and other organisations) does not apply in relation to anything done or omit-
ted in respect of a duty referred to in s 2(1)(d) before s 2(1)(d) came into force: Corporate Manslaughter and
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (Commencement No 1) Order 2008. Section 2(1)(d) came into force on 1
September 2011: Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (Commencement No 3) Order
2011.
286 Premises wholly or partly occupied by persons designated under the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration
Act 2009, s 3 or 11, ie custody areas of the UK Border Agency: CMCHA 2007, s 2(7), as amended.
287 As defi ned by the Armed Forces Act 2008, s 300(7): CMCHA 2007, s 2(7), as amended. Such premises are
the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.
(b) he is detained at a removal centre or short-term holding facility;

(c) he is being transported in a vehicle, or being held in any premises, in pursuance of
prison escort arrangements or immigration escort arrangements;
(d) he is living in secure accommodation288 in which he has been placed;
(e) he is a detained patient.’289
Whether a particular organisation owes a duty of care to a particular individual is a ques-

tion of law (and therefore is determined by the judge).290
Any rule of the common law that has the effect of preventing a duty of care from being
owed:
• by one person to another by reason of the fact that they are jointly engaged in unlaw-
ful conduct; or
• to a person by reason of his acceptance of a risk of harm,
is to be disregarded.291 Thus, the rules of ex turpi causa non oritur actio (an action cannot
be founded on an illegal cause) and volenti non fit iniuria (no legal wrong is done to a will-
ing person: voluntary assumption of the risk) which exist in the law of tort do not apply
to the offence of corporate manslaughter.
Exclusions from ‘relevant duty of care’

8.134 The CMCHA 2007, ss 3 to 7 set out a number of exceptions from the ‘relevant duty
of care’. Essentially, but not entirely, these relate to bodies in the public sector.
8.135 Public policy decisions, exclusively public functions and statutory functions Any
duty of care owed:
• by a public authority in respect of a decision as to matters of public policy (including
in particular the allocation of public resources or the weighing of competing public
interests) is not a ‘relevant duty of care’;
• in respect of things done in the exercise of an exclusively public function292 is not a
‘relevant duty of care’ unless it falls within s 2(1)(a), (b) or (d);
• by a public authority in respect of inspections carried out in the exercise of a statu-
tory function293 is not a ‘relevant duty of care’ unless it is owed by an employer or
occupier under s 2(1)(a) or (b).294
288 Ie accommodation, outside a custodial institution, provided for the purpose of restricting the liberty of
persons under 18: CMCHA 2007, s 2(7).
289 ‘Detained patient’ means someone detained under specified mental health legislation or someone deemed
to be in legal custody by it: CMCHA 2007, s 2(7).
290 Ibid, s 2(5). 291 Ibid, s 2(6).
292 Ie a function falling within the prerogative of the Crown or, by its nature, exercisable only with authority
conferred by the exercise of that prerogative, or by or under a statutory provision: ibid, s 3(4).
293 Ie a function conferred by or under a statutory provision: ibid, s 3(4).
294 Ibid, s 3(1)–(3).
8.136 Military activities In addition, any duty of care owed by the Ministry of Defence
in respect of:
• operations, including peacekeeping operations and operations for dealing with ter-
rorism, civil unrest or serious public disorder, in the course of which members of the
armed forces come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance;
• activities carried on in preparation for, or directly in support of, such operations;
• training of a hazardous nature, or training carried out in a hazardous way, which it is
considered needs to be carried out, or carried out in that way, in order to improve or
maintain the effectiveness of the armed forces with respect to such operations; or
• activities carried out by members of the special forces,295
is not a ‘relevant duty of care’.296
8.137 Policing and law enforcement Any duty of care owed by a public authority in
respect of:
• operations for dealing with terrorism, civil unrest or serious disorder, which involve
policing or law enforcement activities in the course of which officers or employees of
the authority come under attack or face the threat of attack or violent resistance;
• activities carried on in preparation for, or directly in support of, such operations; or
• training of a hazardous nature, or training carried out in a hazardous way, which it
is considered needs to be carried out, or carried out in that way, in order to improve
or maintain the effectiveness of officers or employees of the public authority with
respect to such operations,
is not a ‘relevant duty of care’.297
In addition, any duty of care owed by a public authority in respect of other policing or
law-enforcement activities is not a ‘relevant duty of care’ unless it is owed by an employer
or occupier under s 2(1)(a) or (b) or by a custodian under s 2(1)(d).298
8.138 Emergencies Any duty of care owed by:
• a fire and rescue authority;
• any other organisation providing a service of responding to emergency circumstances
either in pursuance of arrangements made with a fire and rescue authority, or (if not
in pursuance of such arrangements) otherwise than on a commercial basis;
• a relevant NHS body;
• an organisation providing ambulance services;
• an organisation providing services for the transport of organs, blood, equipment or
personnel under arrangements with an ambulance-services organisation;
• an organisation providing a rescue service;
• the armed forces,
295 As defi ned by CMCHA 2007, s 4(4), eg the SAS. 296 Ibid, s 4(1)–(3).
297 Ibid, s 5(1) and (2). 298 Ibid, s 5(3).
in respect of the way in which they respond to emergency circumstances299 is not a rel-
evant duty of care unless it falls within s 2(1)(a) or (b).300
Any duty of care owed in respect of the carrying out, or attempted carrying out, of a
rescue operation at sea in emergency circumstances is not a ‘relevant duty of care’ unless
it falls within s 2(1)(a) or (b).301
Any duty of care owed in respect of action taken to comply with a safety direction
under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 or in lieu of such a direction is not a ‘relevant duty
of care’ unless it falls within s 2(1)(a) or (b).302
8.139 Child protection and probation functions A duty of care that a local authority or
other public authority owes in respect of the exercise of its functions under the Children Act
1989 relating to the care and supervision, and protection, of children is not a ‘relevant duty
of care’ unless it falls within as 2(1)(a), (b) or (d); and the same is true in respect of the duty of
care that a local probation board, a provider of probation services or other public authority
owes in respect of its exercise of specified functions and activities.303 Thus, eg, a local author-
ity which failed to identify that a child was at risk and therefore did not take the child into
care, with the result that the child was killed, would not owe a relevant duty of care because
its duty of care in this case would not be owed as an employer or occupier or custodian.
Gross breach of duty

8.140 The CMCHA 2007, s 1(4)(b) provides that:
‘a breach of a duty of care by an organisation is a “gross” breach if the conduct alleged to

amount to a breach of that duty falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the
organisation in the circumstances.’
This is a matter to be determined by the jury.

8.141 To help the jury to determine whether this test is satisfied, s 8(1) and (2) provide
that, where:
• it is established that an organisation owed a relevant duty of care304 to a person, 305
and
• it falls to the jury to decide whether there was a gross breach of that duty,
299 ‘Emergency circumstances’ means circumstances that are present or imminent and are causing, or are
likely to cause, serious harm or a worsening of such harm, or are likely to cause the death of a person: ibid, s 6(7).
For these purposes, ‘serious harm’ means (a) serious injury to or the serious illness (including mental illness) of
a person; (b) serious harm to the environment (including the life and health of plants and animals); (c) serious
harm to any building or other property: ibid, s 6(7). A reference in s 6 to emergency circumstances includes a
reference to circumstances that are believed to be emergency circumstances: ibid, s 6(8).
300 Ibid s 6(1) and (2). For these purposes, the way in which an organisation responds to emergency circum-
stances does not include the way in which medical treatment is carried out or decisions within s 6(4) are made:
ibid, s 6(3). Decisions within s 6(4) are decisions as to the carrying out of medical treatment, other than decisions
as to the order in which persons are to be given such treatment.
301 Ibid, s 6(5). 302 Ibid, s 6(6). 303 Ibid, s 7(1)–(3).
304 Para 8.133. 305 See para 8.133.
the jury must consider whether the evidence shows that the organisation failed to comply
with any health and safety legislation that relates to the alleged breach, and if so how seri-
ous that failure was and how much of a risk of death it posed.306
Without prejudice to having regard to other matters, the jury may also:
• consider the extent to which the evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies, sys-
tems or accepted practices within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged
any failure to comply with health and safety legislation, or to have produced tolerance
of it, for example consistently failing to ensure that building workers wore ‘hard hats’
on site or systems which meant that employees had to take unnecessary risks;
• have regard to any health and safety guidance307 that relates to the alleged
breach.308
Causing death
8.142 The death in question must be caused 309 by the way in which the activities are
managed or organised, that way amounting to a gross breach of duty.310
Prosecution, trial and punishment

8.143 A prosecution for corporate manslaughter may not be instituted without the con-
sent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.311
The offence of corporate manslaughter is triable only on indictment and an organisa-
tion guilty of it is liable to an unlimited fine.312
In addition, under the CMCHA 2007, s 9, the court has power on the application of
the prosecution to impose a remedial order against an organisation convicted before it
of corporate manslaughter requiring it to take specified steps within a specified period
to remedy:
• the breach;
• any matter appearing to have resulted from it and to have been a cause of the death;
• any health and safety deficiency in the organisation’s policies, systems or practices
appearing to be indicated by the breach.313
306 CMCHA 2007, s 8(1) and (2).

307 Ie any code, guidance, manual or similar publication concerned with health and safety matters and made
or issued by an authority responsible for the enforcement of health and safety legislation: ibid, s 8(5). Examples
of such guidance would be Health and Safety Executive guidance or a code of practice approved by the Health
and Safety Commission. 308 Ibid, s 8(3) and (4).
309 Paras 2.28–2.61. The Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996 (para 8.15, n 33) applies to the offence
of corporate manslaughter. 310 CMCHA 2007, s 1(1).
311 Ibid, s 17(a).
312 Ibid, s 1(6). In Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 1337, which was an appeal
against sentence in relation to the first conviction under CMCHA 2007, the Court of Appeal upheld a fi ne of
£385,000, which was 250% of the defendant company’s turnover and would inevitably force the company into
liquidation.
313 CMCHA 2007, s 9(1), (2) and (4).
Under CMCHA 2007, s 10 the court can make a publicity order, which requires the
convicted organisation to publish in a specified manner the fact that it has been convicted
of corporate manslaughter, specified particulars of the offence, the amount of the fine
and the terms of the remedial order made.314 The resulting damage to the organisation’s
reputation and the knock-on effects of that mean that the publicity order must not be
underestimated as a sanction.
An organisation which fails to comply with a remedial order or a publicity order com-
mits an offence triable only on indictment and punishable with an unlimited fine.315
No individual liability
8.144 The CMCHA 2007, s 18(1) provides that an individual cannot be guilty of aiding
and abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence of corporate man-
slaughter. Nor can he be liable for corporate manslaughter on any other basis.
On the other hand, an individual whose gross negligence contributed to the organi-
sation’s liability for corporate manslaughter, and was a cause of the death, may be con-
victed of the common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence. However, it
may be impossible to prove this against a member of senior management in the case of
a large- or medium-sized organisation. Alternatively, if an individual is a director or
similar senior officer of a corporation, and the corporation is guilty of an offence under
the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974,316 it may be possible to prove an offence
against him by virtue of s 37 of that Act,317 whereby if an offence under the 1974 Act has
been committed with the consent or connivance of such a person, or is attributable to
neglect on his part, he is guilty of that offence without proof that he was grossly neg-
ligent. However, the maximum term of imprisonment for a person convicted under s
37 is only two years. A company director convicted of common law manslaughter by
gross negligence or of an offence under the 1974 Act can be disqualified from acting as
a director for up to 15 years.318
There are many who think that the CMCHA 2007 should have incorporated a recom-
mendation by a joint report of two parliamentary committees319 that individual directors
or managers should be liable for an offence of corporate manslaughter punishable with
up to 14 years’ imprisonment if the offence was committed with their consent or conniv-
ance or attributable to their neglect. The exclusion of individual liability for corporate
manslaughter has been described as a grave shortcoming.320
The CMCHA 2007, s 18(1A)321 provides that an individual cannot be guilty of an
offence of encouraging or assisting crime contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2
(which offences do not require an offence encouraged or assisted to be committed) by
reference to an offence of corporate manslaughter.
314 Ibid, s 10(1)–(3). 315 Ibid, ss 9(5), 10(4).

316 Eg the offence referred to in para 18.23. 317 Referred to in para 18.44.
318 For a review of the operation of the 1974 Act, s 37 and the power to make disqualification orders (very few
have been made so far in respect of company directors convicted under s 37), see Wright ‘Criminal Liability of
Directors and Senior Managers for Deaths at Work’ [2007] Crim LR 949.
319 First Joint Report: Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committee: Draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill.
320 Clarkson ‘Corporate Manslaughter: Yet More Government Proposals’ [2005] Crim LR 677 at 689.
321 Inserted by the Serious Crime Act 2007, s 62.
Jurisdiction
8.145 The CMCHA 2007, s 1 applies if the harm resulting in death is sustained in the
United Kingdom or:
• within the seaward limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom;
• on a British registered ship;
• on a British-controlled aircraft;
• on a British-controlled hovercraft;
• in, on or above, or within 500 metres of, an offshore installation in United Kingdom
territorial waters or a designated area of the United Kingdom’s continental shelf.322
The limited nature of these jurisdictional provisions is unfortunate in the light of the
increasing globalisation of corporate activities, particularly in respect of activities in the
European Union.
Related offences
8.146 A corporation which is not liable for a death under CMCHA 2007 may be crimi-
nally liable under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 or other legislation in
respect of a breach of a duty owed to an employee or to the public. In addition, there can
be a conviction in the same proceedings for an offence under health and safety legisla-
tion and for corporate manslaughter. 323 A conviction for corporate manslaughter does
not preclude a subsequent conviction for a health and safety offence.324
Other homicide offences: (2) causing death

by dangerous or careless driving etc
Key points 8.10

Four types of offence fall within this heading:
• causing death by dangerous driving;
• causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving;
• causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving when under the influence of

drink or drugs; or
• causing death by driving when unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured.
322 CMCHA 2007, s 28(3). 323 Ibid, s 19(1). 324 Ibid, s 19(2).
8.148 causing death by dangerous or careless driving etc | 299
Common elements
Driving
8.147 The offences below refer to driving a mechanically propelled vehicle or a motor
vehicle on a road or other public place. Whether a person is ‘driving’ is essentially a ques-
tion of fact; the test of ‘driving’ is whether the person concerned is in a substantial sense
controlling the movement and direction of the vehicle,325 provided that what occurs can
in any ordinary meaning of the word be regarded as ‘driving’.326 Thus, a person who
releases the handbrake and ‘coasts’ downhill in a car is ‘driving’ it (and this is so even
though the steering is locked).327 On the other hand, a person who is pushing a car and
steering it with his hand through the window is not driving it, 328 nor is someone who, not
intending to exercise any control over the vehicle, accidentally causes it to move (eg by
accidentally touching the accelerator during a struggle).329 A person in the driver’s seat of
a vehicle which is being towed is driving it if he has the ability to control its movements or
direction by means of the brakes or steering,330 and so is a person sitting astride a motor
cycle, propelling it with his feet, with his hands on the handlebars but without the engine
running.331
Mechanically propelled vehicle and motor vehicle

8.148 A ‘mechanically propelled vehicle’ is not specifically defined by the legislation but
it has been held to include a vehicle whose engine has been removed, where there is a pos-
sibility that it may soon be replaced,332 and a vehicle which has broken down because of
mechanical failure.333 Thus, someone who coasts dangerously down a hill in an engine-
less or broken down vehicle and kills someone can be convicted of causing death by dan-
gerous driving.
‘Motor vehicle’ has a more limited meaning. It is defi ned by the Road Traffic Act 1988
(RTA 1988), s 185 as ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on
roads’ (other than a mechanically propelled invalid carriage of a prescribed type) but by
the RTA 1988, s 189 certain mechanically propelled vehicles controlled by a pedestrian
and certain electrically assisted pedal cycles are deemed not to be motor vehicles. The
Divisional Court has held that whether or not the definition in s 185 is satisfied depends
on whether a reasonable person looking at the vehicle would say that one of its uses would
325 MacDonagh [1974] QB 448, CA; Burgoyne v Phillips (1983) 147 JP 375, DC; McKoen v Ellis (1986) 151 JP 60,
DC; Gunnell v DPP [1994] RTR 151, DC. Also see Tyler v Whatmore [1976] RTR 83, DC; para 17.3.
326 MacDonagh above; Jones v Pratt [1983] RTR 54, DC; McKoen v Ellis above.
327 Burgoyne v Phillips (1983) 147 JP 375, DC. Also see Saycell v Bool [1948] 2 All ER 83, DC.
328 MacDonagh [1974] QB 448, CA.
329 Blayney v Knight (1974) 60 Cr App R 269, DC.
330 McQuaid v Anderton [1980] 3 All ER 540, DC; Whitfield v DPP [1998] Crim LR 349, DC; R (on the applica-
tion of Traves) v DPP [2005] EWHC 1482 (Admin), Bean J.
331 Gunnel v DPP [1994] RTR 151, DC.
332 Newberry v Simmonds [1961] 2 QB 345, DC.
333 Paul [1952] NI 61, NI CCA.
be use on a road, whether or not it is suitable for such use.334 On this basis, for example, it
has been held335 that a motorised scooter known as a ‘Go-ped’ was a motor vehicle within
s 185. The Go-ped consisted of a small foot platform attached to a subframe on which the
person using it would stand. Its maximum speed was 20mph. Its brakes and steering were
inadequate. The Divisional Court said that the capability of a vehicle to be used safely
on a road was not conclusive. There was no obvious place in which a Go-ped could be
used, other than on a road. It could not travel on rough ground, soft or uneven surfaces.
Regardless of the fact that the manufacturers said that it was not to be used on a road, a
reasonable person would say that one of its uses would be on the roads. In comparison,
by an application of the same test, a go-kart has been held not to be a motor vehicle,336
although it is undoubtedly a mechanically propelled vehicle.
Road or other public place

8.149 The RTA 1988, s 192 provides that ‘road’ means ‘any highway337 and any other
road to which the public has access, and includes bridges over which a road passes’.
There is an element of circularity in this definition, in that it says that a ‘road’ means ‘any
other road to which the public has access’. This leaves open the question of what exactly
is meant by a ‘road’ in the italicised quotation. In Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd;
Clarke v Kato,338 the House of Lords held that one obvious feature of a ‘road’ as com-
monly understood was that its physical limits are defined or at least definable as a route
or way, and that another feature was its function as a means of access leading from one
place to another. As a matter of ordinary language, a car park did not qualify as a road. In
character and more especially in function the two were distinct. The proper function of a
road was to enable movement along it to a destination, whereas the proper function of a
car park was to enable vehicles to stand and wait. On the other hand, in Barrett v DPP, 339
the Divisional Court held that a roadway in a private caravan site which followed a route
and had defined edges, road markings and signs, and which was used by members of the
public, including those who had no other business within the caravan park, as a route to
a beach, was a road.
Whether a ‘road’ which is not a highway is a road for the purposes of s 192 depends on
whether the public has ‘access to it’. What is said below about the corresponding phrase
in the definition of ‘public place’ is equally applicable in the present respect. Where a road
traffic offence can alternatively be committed in a ‘public place’, it is irrelevant whether or
not the place in question is a ‘road’ if it can be categorised as a ‘public place’.
8.150 A ‘public place’ means a place, such as a sports field or a car park or the ‘airside’
part of an airport terminal, to which members of the public, whether on payment or
334 Burns v Currell [1963] 2 QB 433, DC.

335 DPP v Saddington (2001) 165 JP 122, DC.
336 Burns v Currell [1963] 2 QB 433, DC.
337 Basically, a highway is a way over which all members of the public have the right to pass and repass by foot,
on horseback, or accompanied by a beast of burden or with vehicles or cattle. It follows that the term embraces
carriageways, bridleways and footpaths.
338 [1998] 4 All ER 417, HL.
339 [2009] EWHC 423 (Admin), DC.
otherwise, have access at the material time340 with at least the tolerance of the landowner
or proprietor.341 It is irrelevant that the public could have had access; the question is
whether they have actually had access to the place in question.342
Access must be by virtue of being a member of the public. If people only have access to a
place because of some special qualification not possessed by members of the public in gen-
eral, such as membership of a club, the place is not a public place because access is not by vir-
tue of their membership of the public.343 Thus, a caravan park open only to members of the
Caravan Club, or a car park at a factory to which only employees and customers are admit-
ted or have access, is not a public place, whereas a caravan park or car park to which any
member of the public is admitted, or has access, on payment of a fee is a public place.344
Trial and punishment

8.151 The mode of trial and the maximum punishments for the offences described below
are provided by the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, Sch 2, as amended on a number of
occasions. The provisions relating to disqualification from driving referred to are set out
in s 34 of, and Sch 2 to, that Act. When s 35A (added by the C&JA 2009, Sch 16) comes into
force, where the offender has been sentenced to an immediate term of imprisonment for
the offence for which he is to be disqualified, the court must add to the period of disquali-
fication determined under s 34 an extension period (broadly, the custodial period which
must be served). This is designed to require that the former period of disqualification
takes effect after the offender’s release from imprisonment.
Causing death by dangerous driving

8.152 The RTA 1988, s 1, as substituted by the Road Traffic Act 1991 (RTA 1991), s 1,
provides that:
‘A person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically propelled
vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.’
The offence is punishable with up to 14 years’ imprisonment and is triable only on indict-
ment. Unless there are special reasons, disqualification from driving for a minimum of
two years is obligatory. In addition, the driver must also be ordered to take an extended
driving test and he will remain disqualified after the period of disqualification until he has
passed the test. The offence replaced the offence of causing death by reckless driving.345
340 Collinson (1931) 23 Cr App R 49, CCA; Elkins v Cartlidge [1947] 1 All ER 829, DC; DPP v Vivier [1991] 4
All ER 18, DC; DPP v Neville [1996] NLJR 992, DC. 341 Deacon v AT (A Minor) [1976] RTR 244, DC.
342 Spence [1999] RTR 353, CA.
343 DPP v Vivier [1991] 4 All ER 18, DC; DPP v Coulman [1993] RTR 230, DC.
344 DPP v Vivier above; Havell v DPP (1993) 158 JP 680, DC; Spence [1999] RTR 353, CA.
345 When the RTA 1988, s 1A, inserted by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill (if
enacted), is in force there will be a separate offence of causing serious injury (ie grievous bodily harm) to another
person by driving a mechanically propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place. Except that
the maximum imprisonment is five years, this offence will be triable and punishable in the same way as that of
8.153 Off-road authorised motoring events are excluded from the offence of causing
death by dangerous driving by the RTA 1988, s 13A. Section 13A provides that a person
is not guilty of causing death by dangerous driving if he proves that he was driving in a
public place other than a road in accordance with an authorisation for a motoring event
given under regulations346 made under that section.
Dangerous driving
8.154 Dangerous driving is defined by the RTA 1988, s 2A (which was introduced by the
RTA 1991).
Section 2A(1) provides that a person is to be regarded as driving dangerously if:
‘(a) the way he drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful
driver; and
(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving in that way
would be dangerous.’
The test in s 2A(1)(a) is a purely objective one; it would be no defence that D was doing
his incompetent best, nor that D did not intend to drive dangerously.347 The reference to
the way the vehicle is driven falling far below what would be expected of a competent and
careful driver sets a high threshold.348 It is what distinguishes this offence from that of
causing death by driving without due care and attention, where merely falling below the
standard of such a driver suffices.
8.155 The test in s 2A(1) is concerned with the manner of D’s driving. However, driving
may also be rendered dangerous by virtue of the current state of the vehicle, since the
RTA 1988, s 2A(2) provides that:
‘A person is also to be regarded as driving dangerously . . . if it would be obvious to a compe-

tent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous.’
In determining the state of the vehicle, regard may be had to anything attached to or car-
ried on or in it, and to the manner in which it is attached or carried.349 Because the danger
involved in driving the vehicle in its current state must be obvious, the offence will not
be committed if the defect involved is a latent one.350 ‘Current state’ in s 2A(2) implies a
causing death by dangerous driving, and the provisions referred to in the text relating to that offence also apply
to an offence under s 1A. The Bill is before Parliament at the time of writing.
346 Motor Vehicles (Off Road Events) Regulations 1995.
347 A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2000) [2001] EWCA Crim 780 (a bus driver unintentionally pressed the accelera-
tor when he meant to press the brake; as a result the bus travelled across a pedestrian island and pedestrians were
killed. Lack of intention to drive dangerously was no defence).
348 Conteh [2003] EWCA Crim 962: A breach of the Highway Code does not necessarily mean that an offence
has been committed content. However, the Code’s provisions can be considered by a jury provided that it is
clearly explained that those provisions do not provide a ‘standard’: Taylor [2004] EWCA Crim 213.
349 RTA 1988, s 2A(4).
350 Marchant [2003] EWCA Crim 2099.
state different from the original or manufactured state.351 Thus, where the alleged danger
relates solely to something inherent in the original design of the vehicle (eg spikes form-
ing part of a grab unit at the front of an agricultural vehicle) dangerous driving is not
committed.352 It would be different if the original, unaltered state of the vehicle made the
manner of the driving dangerous.353
8.156 For the purposes of both types of dangerous driving, ‘dangerous’ is defined by
the RTA 1988, s 2A(3). It refers to danger either of injury to any person or of serious
damage to property.
8.157 Section 2A(3) adds that, in determining what would be expected of, or obvious
to, a competent and careful driver, regard must be had not only to the circumstances
of which he could be expected to be aware (eg the obvious unroadworthiness of the
vehicle or the icy condition of the road) but also to any circumstances shown to have
been within D’s knowledge (eg a dangerous defect in the vehicle of which D was aware,
although it would not have been obvious). On the other hand, regard should not be had to
any circumstance which D wrongly believed to exist. Consequently, it has been held that,
where D, a police officer, pursued a stolen car at speed through traffic lights at red, his
mistaken belief that the junction was being controlled by other officers (so that he could
cross safely) was irrelevant to the issue of dangerous driving.354
D’s special skill as a driver (eg that D had taken an advanced police driving course) is
an irrelevant consideration when considering whether driving was dangerous.355 This
somewhat surprising rule has been justified on the ground that to take into account the
driver’s special skill would be inconsistent with the objective standard of the competent
and careful driver.356
8.158 The definition of dangerous driving clearly indicates that the offence can only
be committed if the manner of the driving or the condition of the vehicle is dangerous
within s 2A(1) or s 2A(2) respectively. It follows that, since driving in a dangerously defec-
tive state through drink or drugs is not in itself dangerous driving, evidence of intoxica-
tion cannot by itself prove dangerous driving.357
On the other hand, where there is evidence of the amount of alcohol consumed, regard
must be had to it under s 2A(3) (as a circumstance within D’s knowledge) if it tends to
show that the amount taken was such as would have adversely affected a driver or had
adversely affected the particular driver.358 This applies even if D was not over the statu-
tory drink-drive limit.359
Surprisingly, it has been held that evidence of the consumption of cocaine shortly
before driving is admissible even if there is no evidence as to the quantity consumed or as
351 Ibid. 352 Ibid. 353 Ibid.

354 Collins [1997] RTR 439, CA.
355 Bannister [2009] EWCA Crim 1571, CA. See Goudkamp ‘Negligence and Defendants with Special Skills’
(2010) 69 CLJ 8.
356 Bannister [2009] EWCA Crim 1571 at [16].
357 Webster [2006] EWCA Crim 415, explaining Woodward [1995] 3 All ER 79, CA, on this point.
358 Woodward above.
359 Mari [2009] EWCA Crim 2677.
to the particular driver having been adversely affected.360 The reason for this distinction
between alcohol and drugs was not explained.
Causing of death
8.159 The prosecution must prove a causal link between D’s dangerous driving and the
death of the other person. What was said in Chapter 2361 and earlier in this chapter about
the victim of an offence of homicide and the requirement of causation applies to the
present offence.362 In particular, it should be noted that D’s dangerous driving need not
be the sole cause of death; it is enough that it is a substantial (ie more than minute or neg-
ligible) contribution to the death.363
No mens rea need be proved as to the risk of death resulting from the dangerous driv-
ing; it follows that it is irrelevant that that risk was unforeseen or even unforeseeable.
In Loukes,364 the Court of Appeal held that the offence of causing death by dangerous
driving consisted only of an actus reus and that mens rea played no part in it. Reference is
made later to the practical effects of this decision.365
Relationship with manslaughter by gross negligence

8.160 Some cases of causing death by dangerous driving may also amount to man-
slaughter by gross negligence, although Lord Mackay LC considered in Adomako366 that
charges of gross negligence manslaughter would be rare in such cases. The fact that proof
of gross negligence manslaughter requires proof that D’s conduct gave rise to a risk of
death, whereas proof of causing death by dangerous driving only requires proof that D’s
driving gave rise to a risk of injury to a person or of serious damage to property, is a dis-
incentive to a prosecution for manslaughter by gross negligence unless the risk of death
is clear cut. The Crown Prosecution Service’s policy is to charge manslaughter by gross
negligence only if the evidence shows a very high risk of death, making the case one of
utmost gravity.367
Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving

8.161 The RTA 1988, s 2B, inserted by the Road Safety Act 2006, s 20(1), provides:
‘A person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically propelled
vehicle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reason-
able consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.’
360 Pleydell [2005] EWCA Crim 1447.

361 Paras 2.28–2.61.
362 The Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996 (para 8.15, n 33) applies to the present offence and the
other offences of causing death by driving.
363 Curphey (1957) 41 Cr App R 78; Hennigan [1971] 3 All ER 133, CA; Skelton [1995] Crim LR 635, CA.
364 [1996] 1 Cr App R 444, CA; para 3.60.
365 Paras 15.39 and 17.25.
366 [1995] 1 AC 171, HL.
367 Crown Prosecution Service Policy for Prosecuting Cases of Bad Driving (2007).
An offence under the RTA 1988, s 2B is triable either way and punishable with up to five
years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment. Unless there are special reasons, dis-
qualification for a minimum of 12 months is obligatory.
Section 2B creates two offences – causing death by careless driving and causing death
by driving without reasonable consideration.
Careless, or inconsiderate, driving

8.162 The definitions of careless driving and inconsiderate driving under the RTA 1988,
s 3ZA368 apply to an offence under the RTA 1988, s 2B.369
Section 3ZA(2) encapsulates the definition of careless driving established by case law.
It provides:
‘A person is to be regarded as driving without due care and attention if (and only if) the
way he drives falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver.’
This is a purely objective test. Consequently, a person whose driving simply falls below
the standard of a competent and careful driver and who thereby causes the accidental
death of another person (see below) is guilty of a serious offence, even though he is doing
his incompetent best. Section 3ZA(3) mirrors s 2A(3) by providing that in determining
for the purposes of s 3ZA(2) what would be expected of a careful and competent driver
in a particular case, regard shall be had not only to the circumstances of which he could
be expected to be aware but also to any circumstances shown to have been within the
knowledge of the defendant.
The RTA 1988, s 3ZA(4) provides:
‘A person is to be regarded as driving without reasonable consideration for other persons

only if those persons are inconvenienced by his driving.’
The justification for making a driver who would otherwise only be guilty of one or other
of the non-imprisonable offences of careless, or inconsiderate, driving guilty of a much
more serious offence simply because death has accidentally resulted is not obvious.370
Causing of death
8.163 What was said in para 8.159 is equally applicable, with the substitution of ‘careless
or inconsiderate driving’ for ‘dangerous driving’, to the present offence.
Analogy with the offence of causing death by dangerous driving indicates that no mens
rea need be proved as to the risk of death resulting from the careless or inconsiderate driv-
ing; it follows that it is irrelevant that that risk was unforeseen or even unforeseeable.
368 Inserted by the Road Safety Act 2006, s 30.

369 The defi nitions are applied to the RTA 1988, s 2B by the RTA 1988, s 3ZA(1).
370 For arguments that the offences under the RTA 1988, s 2B are undesirable and ought not to have been cre-
ated, see Cunningham ‘Punishing Drivers Who Kill: Putting Road Safety First?’ (2007) 27 LS 288.
Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving

when under the influence of drink or drugs
8.164 The relevant provision is the RTA 1988, s 3A, which was inserted by the RTA 1991,
s 3 and amended by the Road Safety Act 2006, s 31. Section 3A(1) provides that:
‘If a person causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically propelled vehi-
cle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable
consideration for other persons using the road or place, and:
(a) he is, at the time when he is driving, unfit to drive through drink or drugs; or
(b) he has consumed so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath, blood or
urine at that time exceeds the prescribed limit; or
(c) he is, within 18 hours after that time, required to provide a specimen for analysis in
pursuance of s 7 of this Act, but without reasonable excuse fails to provide it, or
(d) he is required by a constable to give his permission for a laboratory test of a speci-
men of blood taken from him under s 7A of this Act, but without reasonable excuse
fails to do so,
he is guilty of an offence.’
An offence under s 3A is triable only on indictment and is punishable with a maximum of

14 years’ imprisonment. Unless there are special reasons, disqualification for a minimum
of two years is obligatory.
8.165 The elements of an offence under s 3A have largely been explained already. As
with the offence under s 2B, the prosecution must prove that D drove a mechanically
propelled vehicle on a road or other public place and that he did so without due care
and attention (as defi ned by the RTA 1988, s 3ZA), 371 or without reasonable considera-
tion for other users of the road or other public place, depending on which offence is
charged. The prosecution must also prove that the careless, or inconsiderate driving
caused the death of another (see paras 8.159 and 8.163) and that D falls within one of
four categories of case.
The first is that, at the time that D was driving, D was unfit to drive through drink
or drugs. ‘Drink’ means alcoholic drink and ‘drug’ means any intoxicant other than
alcohol, 372 and includes medicines373 and glue.374 ‘Unfitness to drive’ means impairment
of the ability to drive properly.375
The second, third and fourth categories only operate in relation to a person driving
a motor vehicle,376 as opposed to any other type of mechanically propelled vehicle. The
second category of case is where D had consumed so much alcohol that the proportion of
it in his blood, breath or urine, at the time when he was driving, exceeded the prescribed
limit. The provisions relating to that limit and to the taking of specimens for analysis are
contained in the RTA 1988, ss 6 to 9.
371 Applied to the RTA 1988, s 3A, by the RTA 1988, s 3ZA(1). 372 RTA 1988, s 11(2).
373 Armstrong v Clark [1957] 2 QB 391, DC. 374 Bradford v Wilson (1983) 147 JP 573, DC.
375 RTA 1988, s 3A(2). 376 Ibid, 3A(3).
8.166 offences related to homicide | 307
The third category of case is where D, within 18 hours of the time of his careless driv-
ing, was required to provide a specimen for analysis in pursuance of s 7 of the Act but
without reasonable excuse failed to do so.
The fourth category of case is where it appeared to a constable that D had been involved
in an accident and that he might be incapable for medical reasons of giving a valid con-
sent to the taking of a specimen of blood for analysis under the Act, and a medical prac-
titioner was requested to take a blood specimen which D subsequently refused without
reasonable excuse to permit to be subjected to a laboratory test.
In the third and fourth categories it is irrelevant that D had not taken any drink (or
drugs) or was not ‘over the limit’ (or did not have impaired driving ability).377
Causing death by driving: unlicensed,

disqualified or uninsured drivers
8.166 The RTA 1988, s 3ZB, inserted by the Road Safety Act 2006, s 21(1), provides that
a person will be guilty of an offence if he causes the death of another person by driving a
motor vehicle on a road and, at the time when he is driving, the circumstances are such
that he is committing an offence of:
• driving otherwise than in accordance with a licence;378
• driving while disqualified;379
• using a motor vehicle while uninsured or unsecured against third party risks.380
Such an offence is triable either way and punishable with a maximum of two years’ impris-
onment on conviction on indictment. Unless there are special reasons, disqualification
from driving for not less than 12 months is obligatory.
There is no need for there to be any fault or other blameworthy conduct on the part of
the driver,381 but the driving must have caused382 the death. The objections to the offences
of causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving apply even more strongly to s 3ZB.
Further discussion of s 3ZB is outside the scope of this book.
Offences related to homicide
Key points 8.11

The last part of this chapter deals with the following offences related to homicide:
• causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable person;

• solicitation of murder;
377 Th is rather obvious point was confi rmed in Coe [2009] EWCA Crim 1452.
378 Contrary to the RTA 1988, s 87(1). 379 Contrary to ibid, s 103(1)(b).
380 Contrary to ibid, s 143. 381 Williams [2010] EWCA Crim 2552. 382 See para 8.159.
• threats to kill;
• encouraging or assisting suicide;
• abortion; and
• child destruction.
Causing or allowing death of a child or

vulnerable adult
8.167 Where a child or vulnerable adult has died and it is clear that this was non-acci-
dental and caused by someone who was a member of the same household, it may be dif-
ficult or impossible to prove which household-member caused the death, or impossible
to prove that one household-member was an accomplice to the fatal conduct of another
household-member. Only if it can be proved in such a case that household-member A
must have been an accomplice to household-member B causing the death or that house-
hold-member B must have been an accomplice to household-member A causing the
death, can A and B be convicted of murder or manslaughter.
Similar problems can arise where a child or vulnerable adult suffers a non-fatal injury
in the circumstances referred to above.
8.168 Where a child or vulnerable adult has died, these problems have been resolved by
the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (DVCVA 2004), s 5, which imple-
mented, with significant differences, recommendations made by the Law Commission.383
If the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims (Amendment) Bill, before Parliament at the
time of writing, is enacted, s 5 will be extended to cases where a child or vulnerable adult
has suffered serious physical harm; all references in this part of the text to death or to
dying will thereafter be to death or serious physical harm or to dying or suffering serious
physical harm respectively.
Section 5(1) provides:
‘A person (D) is guilty of an offence if –

(a) a child or vulnerable adult (V) dies384 as a result of the unlawful act of a person
who –
(i) was a member of the same household as V, and
(ii) had frequent contact with him;
(b) D was such a person at the time of that act,
383 Law Commission Children: Their Non-Accidental Death or Serious Injury (Criminal Trials) (2003), Law
Com No 282.
384 The Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996 applies to an offence under s 5: see para 8.15, n 33.
8.169 causing or allowing death of a child or vulnerable adult | 309
(c) at that time there was a significant risk of serious physical harm385 being caused to
V by the unlawful act of such a person, and
(d) either D was the person whose act caused V’s death or –
(i) D was, or ought to have been, aware of the risk mentioned in paragraph (c),
(ii) D failed to take such steps as he could reasonably have been expected to take
to protect V from the risk, and
(iii) the act occurred in circumstances of the kind that D foresaw or ought to have
foreseen.’
The offence is triable only on indictment; the maximum term of imprisonment is 14

years.386
The victim
8.169 The victim (V) must be a child or vulnerable adult and must have died as a result
of an unlawful act.387 For these purposes:
• ‘child’ means a person under 16;388
• ‘vulnerable adult’ means a person aged 16 or over whose ability to protect himself
from violence, abuse or neglect is significantly impaired through physical or men-
tal disability or illness, through old age or otherwise.389 The state of vulnerability
need not be long-standing. It may be short, or temporary.390 A fit adult may become
vulnerable as a result of accident, or injury, or illness.391 The Court of Appeal 392
has not ruled out the possibility that an adult who is utterly dependent on others,
even if physically young and apparently fit, may fall within the protective ambit of
s 5(1). All these points indicate the breadth of the offence, which is compounded
by the apparent lack of any need for D to realise that a vulnerable adult is in fact
vulnerable;
• an ‘unlawful act’ is an act that (a) constitutes an offence, or (b) except in relation to
an act of D, would constitute an offence but for being the act of a person who is under
10 or who has the defence of insanity.393 ‘Act’ includes a course of conduct and also
includes an omission.394 Typical examples of an unlawful omission in the context of
the present offence would be a failure to feed, or to clothe, or to seek medical atten-
tion for, a child contrary to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 1. Another
example would be a fatal omission constituting gross negligence manslaughter. It
is noteworthy that, in terms of omissions to act, s 5 imposes criminal liability on a
wider range of people than would, at common law or otherwise under statute, be
under a legal duty to take steps to care for the victim.395
385 By the DVCVA 2004, s 5(6), ‘serious’ harm means harm that amounts to grievous bodily harm for the
purposes of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; para 7.77.
386 DVCVA 2004, s 5(7). The maximum will be 10 years in the case of serious physical harm.
387 Ibid, s 5(1)(a). 388 Ibid, s 5(6). 389 Ibid, s 5(6).
390 Khan [2009] EWCA Crim 2 at [27]. 391 Ibid. 392 Ibid at [26].
393 DVCVA 2004, s 5(5). 394 Ibid, s 5(6). 395 See paras 2.8, n 14 and 2.11.
The killer and the defendant

8.170 The person whose unlawful act, course of conduct or omission results in V’s death
must be a person who:
• was a member of the same household as V, and
• had frequent contact with V.396
D must have been such a person at the time of the unlawful act.397
Every person living in a household is clearly a member of it. In addition, by DVCVA
2004, s 5(4)(a), a person is to be regarded as a ‘member’ of a particular household, even
if he does not live in that household, if he visits it so often and for such periods of time
that it is reasonable to regard him as a member of it. The fact that a person has a caring
responsibility for V, as in the case of a social worker or babysitter, is not in itself enough
to satisfy s 5(4)(a). Section 5(4)(b) provides that where V lived in different households at
different times, ‘the same household as V’ refers to the household in which V was living
at the time of the act that caused V’s death.
‘Frequent contact’ is not defined. In Khan,398 the Court of Appeal rejected the argu-
ment that the frequency of contact must be examined in the context of the risk against
which V required protection, and D’s awareness of that risk.399 It held that the question
whether contact between D and V was frequent was free-standing; these matters were
irrelevant to its determination.
Significant risk of serious physical harm

8.171 The DVCVA 2004, s 5(1)(c) requires that at the time of the unlawful act there was a
significant risk of serious physical harm being caused to V by the unlawful act of a person
who was a member of the same household as V and had frequent contact with V.
In Stephens,400 the Court of Appeal held that ‘significant risk of serious physical harm’
in s 5(1)(c) is intended to bear its ordinary, normal meaning, and that the decision as to
whether the risk of serious physical harm was significant is one of fact for the jury, apply-
ing their collective understanding of the word. To leave the meaning of ‘significant’ to
the jury is fraught with the danger that they may understand ‘significant’ as involving
a relatively low level of risk, whereas it was intended to set ‘quite a high threshold’.401 In
Stephens, it was held by the Court of Appeal that the trial judge had been wrong to tell the
jury that significant meant ‘more than minimal’ (as it does in causation) but the decision
of the Court is, somewhat paradoxically, that the judge should not define it to the jury.
The threshold involved in ‘significant’ is an important one, given that the offence is one of
negligence, not requiring the defendant actually to be aware of the risk.
396 DVCVA 2004, s 5(1)(a). 397 Ibid, s 5(1)(b). 398 [2009] EWCA Crim 2.
399 Ie the factors specified in DVCVA 2004, s 5(1)(d)(i) and (iii).
400 [2007] EWCA Crim 1249.
401 Th is was stated by the government minister responsible for the legislation during debates in the House of
Lords: HL Deb, col 1158.
8.172 causing or allowing death of a child or vulnerable adult | 311
Section 5(1)(c) and (d) indicate that the offence is essentially one of negligence as to the
risk of serious harm.
Section 5(1)(d)
8.172 The DVCVA 2004, s 5(1)(d) provides the last condition for liability for an offence
under s 5(1):
‘[E]ither D was the person whose act caused V’s death or –

(i) D was, or ought to have been, aware of the risk mentioned in [s 5(1)(c)],
(ii) D failed to take such steps as he could reasonably have been expected to take
to protect V from the risk, and
(iii) the act occurred in circumstances of the kind that D foresaw or ought to have
foreseen.’
By s 5(2), the prosecution does not have to prove whether it is the first alternative in
s 5(1)(d) or the second (sub-paras (i) to (iii)) that applies. The fact that the prosecution
need only prove that D either satisfies the first alternative or the second is of considerable
importance.
Section 5(1)(d) was discussed by the Court of Appeal in Khan.402 V, a 19-year-old woman,
was brought from Pakistan to England in order to marry X. She spoke no English, had
no friends here and did not leave the house. V suffered at least three incidents of serious
violence from X, the last of which caused her death. X was convicted of V’s murder and
four other members of the same household (including D1, D2 and D3) were subsequently
charged with allowing the death of a vulnerable adult contrary to s 5(1). The prosecution’s
case against the four was that X had been beating V during the three-week period before her
death and that V’s condition during that period was such that it must have been apparent
to the four that she was being subjected to serious violence. The four were convicted of the
offence under s 5(1). D1, D2 and D3 appealed unsuccessfully against their convictions.
One of the grounds of appeal in Khan arose from the fact that the fatal beating of V
occurred at night in a garage outside the house when D1, D2 and D3 were asleep, and
involved violence which was markedly different and more extreme than that inflicted
during the previous three weeks. The circumstances, it was argued, were utterly different
and none of the individual defendants foresaw or ought to have foreseen such an attack.
Section 5(1)(d)(iii) states that the fatal unlawful act must have occurred in circumstances
of the kind that the defendant foresaw or ought to have foreseen. It was argued that the
judge’s direction was defective because he had simply followed the terms of s 5(1)(d)(iii)
whereas he should have provided a more informative direction. The Court of Appeal
rejected this. It held:
‘The act or conduct resulting in death must occur in circumstances of the kind which were
foreseen or ought to have been foreseen by the defendants. They need not be identical. The
402 [2009] EWCA Crim 2.

violence to which [V] was subjected on the night she was killed was of the same kind but
it was violence of an even more extreme degree than the violence to which her husband
had subjected her on earlier occasions. The place where the fatal attack took place was
irrelevant. Although ultimately a jury question, the circumstances would probably have
been the same kind, if not identical, if the fatal attack had occurred while the couple were
on holiday, away from their home.’ 403
8.173 It is important to note that, although s 5 was introduced to deal with the case
where it is unclear which of two defendants killed the child or vulnerable adult, its draft-
ing is not limited to this type of case. Consequently, as Khan shows, it can apply to make
D guilty under it where it is clear that X killed a child or vulnerable adult and that D failed
to protect him. As Herring has pointed out,404 most of the prosecutions so far under s 5
have involved women who have ‘stood by’ while their male partner has killed a child.
Rightly, he argues that this use of s 5 is a matter of grave concern where the woman has
been the victim of domestic violence. His grounds are, among other things, that domes-
tic violence very often has a significant psychological impact on the victim, and this can
mean that little or no blame should attach to her for failing to protect the child, and that
the use of s 5 in such a case involves the prosecution of women when they and their chil-
dren have been let down by the State’s failure to provide adequate protection and support
for battered women. He concludes that the law should focus on protecting mothers and
children from violent men, rather than punishing women who are themselves the victims
of violence.
In Khan, the Court of Appeal noted Herring’s concern but pointed out that D cannot
be convicted unless D failed to take the steps which could reasonably have been expected
to protect V (s 5(1)(d)(ii)). This precondition, it said, requires close analysis of D’s personal
position. By way of example, it added:
‘In the present case, if either of the female appellants [D1 and D2] had herself been subjected
by [X] to serious violence of the kind which engulfed [V], the jury might have concluded
that it would not have been reasonable to expect her to take any protective steps, or that
any protective steps she might have taken, even if relatively minor, and although in the end
unsuccessful to save the deceased, were reasonable in the circumstances.’ 405
Where D is under 16 at the material time

8.174 Section 5(3) provides that if D was not the mother or father of V –
• D may not be charged with an offence under s 5 if he was under the age of 16 at the
time of the act that caused V’s death;
• for the purposes of s 5(1)(d)(ii), D could not have been expected to take any such step
as is referred to there before attaining that age.
403 Ibid at [39].

404 ‘Familial Homicide, Failure to Protect and Domestic Violence: Who’s the Victim?’ [2007] Crim LR 923.
405 [2009] EWCA Crim 2 at [33].
8.179 solicitation of murder | 313
Solicitation of murder
8.175 The Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 4, as amended by the Criminal Law
Act 1977, s 5(10), provides:
‘Whosoever shall solicit, encourage, persuade or endeavour to persuade, or shall pro-

pose to any person, to murder any other person, whether he be a subject of her Majesty
or not, and whether he be within the Queen’s dominions or not, shall be guilty of [an
offence], and being convicted thereof shall be liable to [a maximum of] imprisonment
for life.’
The offence is triable only on indictment. It applies not only to inciting another to per-
petrate a murder, but also to soliciting someone to be an accomplice to murder. This was
held by the Court of Appeal in Winter,406 upholding the conviction of a man who had
solicited another to assist him in murdering his wife. As the Court pointed out, and as
stated in para 17.8, an accomplice to murder is guilty of murder, but it nevertheless seems
strange that he can be said to be ‘solicited to murder’ a person as s 4 requires.
8.176 The solicitation need not be directed to a particular person; it can, eg, be made to
the world at large by an article in a newspaper.407
8.177 There can be an offence under s 4 even if the solicitation to murder relates to
the murder of members of a class of people, provided that the class is a sufficiently
well-defined one. In Antonelli and Barberi, 408 where the indictment for solicitation
to murder referred to the proposed murder of ‘sovereigns and rulers of Europe’,
Phillimore J considered ‘rulers’ a somewhat vague term, but thought that as there
were 18 or 20 sovereigns in Europe, ‘sovereign’ referred to a sufficiently well-defined
class. There can be a solicitation to murder, contrary to s 4, even though the proposed
victim is still in the womb if it relates to the killing of the child after birth, as where
D solicits a pregnant woman to kill her child when it is born, 409 but not if the solici-
tation was to destroy the child in the womb (because that destruction would not be
murder).410
8.178 The solicitation must come to the notice of the person intended to act on it, though
it need not be effective in any way,411 but, if it is and the person incited agrees to commit
the offence, he and the inciter may be guilty of statutory conspiracy. Where the solicita-
tion does not reach the mind of another because, for instance, the letter soliciting the
commission of murder never arrives, the person making it may be guilty of an attempt
to solicit to murder.
8.179 Not only does s 4 expressly provide that it applies whether or not the person to
be murdered is a British subject and wherever the proposed murder is to take place,
but it was held in Abu Hamza 412 that on its natural meaning it covers the soliciting
406 [2007] EWCA Crim 3493. 407 Most (1881) 7 QBD 244, CCR.
408 (1905) 70 JP 4. 409 Shephard [1919] 2 KB 125, CCA. 410Para 8.8.
411 Krause (1902) 18 TLR 238. 412 [2006] EWCA Crim 2918.
of a foreign national in England and Wales to commit murder abroad (even though a
murder abroad is only indictable in England and Wales if it is committed by a British
citizen).413
Threats to kill
8.180 The Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 16, as substituted by the Criminal Law
Act 1977, Sch 12, provides:
‘A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other
would fear it would be carried out, to kill that other or a third person is guilty of [an
offence] and liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing ten years.’
The offence is triable either way.414

The threat may be conditional and it may be implied as well as express.415 It may be
made by any means.416 A threat to kill in England and Wales made from abroad (eg by
telephone or e-mail) can suffice.417 A threat to ‘kill’ a foetus in the womb is not an offence
under s 16, since the foetus is not another person distinct from its mother.418
‘Without lawful excuse’ is not defined, but self-defence, the prevention of crime or
related justifications constitute a lawful excuse provided that it was reasonable in the
circumstances to make the threat.419
Encouraging or assisting suicide

8.181 At common law, a person who aided, abetted, counselled or procured another
to kill himself was guilty of murder as an accomplice, because suicide was self-murder.
Under the Homicide Act 1957, s 4, as originally enacted, the liability of one who aided,
abetted etc the suicide of another was reduced to manslaughter, provided that he had
agreed to die also. However, when the Suicide Act 1961 (SA 1961), s 1 abolished criminal
liability for suicide (and therefore for attempted suicide, since there was no longer an
413 Or a British Overseas citizen, citizen of British overseas territories or British National (Overseas): see
the British Nationality Act 1948, s 3(1), the British Nationality Act 1981, s 51, and the Hong Kong (British
Nationality) Order 1986.
415 Solanke [1969] 3 All ER 1383, CA.
416 See eg Williams (1986) 84 Cr App R 299, CA (threatening telephone calls).
417 M (Rizwan) [2003] EWCA Crim 3067.
418 Tait [1990] 1 QB 290, CA; para 8.8. A threat to kill the child after its birth made at a time when it was still
a foetus appears to amount to an offence under s 16: Tait at 688–689.
419 Cousins [1982] QB 526, CA. Lawful excuse does not depend on whether the life of the defendant was in
immediate jeopardy when he made the threat.
8.183 encouraging or assisting suicide | 315
offence which could be attempted), the SA 1961, s 2(1) created a lesser offence of aiding,
abetting, counselling or procuring suicide, which required suicide actually to have been
committed or attempted.
In 2008, a report to the Prime Minister by a leading child psychologist stated that
there was some confusion about how this offence applied to websites promoting suicide.
It recommended an investigation of the matter to see if it could be usefully clarified.420
As a result of a government review, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 59 amended the
SA 1961. In particular, it substituted s 2(1)–(1C) for s 2(1) so as to replace the offence of
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring suicide with that of encouraging or assisting
suicide, whose terms indicate that criminal liability for such activity applies as much to
the Internet as to offline activities.421 The wording of this offence takes into account the
view of the Law Commission in 2006 that there was a strong case for updating the lan-
guage of s 2.422
The offence
8.182 As substituted, the SA 1961, s 2(1) provides:
‘(1) A person (“D”) commits an offence if –

(a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted
suicide of another person, and
(b) D’s act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.’
The offence is triable only on indictment and punishable with a maximum of 14 years’
imprisonment.423 If, on a trial for murder or manslaughter, it is proved that V committed
suicide, and D committed an offence under s 2(1) in relation to that suicide, there may be
a conviction for the offence under s 2(1).424
8.183 It will be noted that an act is required on D’s part; an omission which has the capa-
bility referred to does not suffice.
The SA 1961, s 2A425 elaborates on what constitutes an ‘act capable of encouraging or
assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person’. It provides that:
• If D arranges for D2 to do an act that is capable of encouraging or assisting the
suicide or attempted suicide of another person and D2 does that act, D is also to
be treated as having done it. Thus, if D arranges for D2 to assist in the commission
of suicide by T, and D2 does so, D is treated as having done the act of assistance
420 Byron Report Safer Children in a Digital World para 3.126.

421 HC Deb, vol 479 col 142 WS.
422 Inchoate Liability for Assisting or Encouraging Crime (2006), Law Com No 300, Appendix B, para 8.28.
423 SA 1961, s 2(1C). The Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996 applies to encouraging or assisting
suicide in connection with the death of a person: see para 8.15, n 33.
424 SA 1961, s 2(2), amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 59.
425 The SA 1961, ss 2A and 2B were added by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 59.
done by D2. Both of them can be convicted of an offence of encouraging or assist-

ing suicide. If D2 does not do as he was told by D, neither of them can be so con-
victed. The reason for this provision is not obvious because D can be convicted of
an offence under s 2 under the rules relating to secondary liability if D2 carries out
the arranged act.
• Where the facts are such that an act is not capable of encouraging or assisting suicide
or attempted suicide, it is to be treated as so capable:
– if the act would have been so capable had the facts been as D believed them to be
at the time of the act (as where D wrongly believes that the harmless drugs which
he supplies to assist another’s suicide are lethal); or
– had subsequent events happened in the manner D believed they would happen (as
where D posts a lethal drug to another to assist the other’s suicide but this is lost
in the post); or
– both.
• Doing an act that is capable of encouraging the suicide or attempted suicide of
another person includes a reference to doing so by threatening another person or
otherwise putting pressure on another person to commit or attempt suicide.
By s 2B, a reference in the SA 1961 to an act ‘includes a reference to a course of conduct,
and a reference to doing an act is to be read accordingly’.
Section 2(1A) provides that the person referred to in the SA 1961, s 2(1)(a) need not be
a specific person (or class of persons) known to, or identified by, D. Thus, provided the
necessary mens rea can be proved, a person who posts information about how to commit
suicide to a suicide chat room may be convicted of the present offence.
By s 2(1B), D may commit an offence under s 2 whether or not a suicide, or an attempt
at suicide, occurs; it may be difficult, eg, in the case of information posted to a suicide chat
room, to prove that any reader committed suicide or attempted to do so.
8.184 There is no intrinsic reason why the term ‘suicide’ in the SA 1961, s 2(1) should
not cover a person’s intentional killing of himself by a refusal to have medical treat-
ment, but it has been stated in the House of Lords that there is no question of that per-
son having committed suicide.426 By analogy, a person who intentionally brings about
his death by some other omission does not commit suicide, and therefore someone who
encourages or assists him in this does not do an act capable of encouraging or assisting
suicide.427
Even if it could be said that a mentally competent patient or the like who kills himself
by refusing nutrition or medical treatment does commit suicide, a doctor or the like who
did not give treatment etc which might have saved or prolonged life – in response to the
refusal – would not do an act capable of encouraging or assisting suicide, and in any event
his omission would not be culpable because he would be released from his duty to do so
by the competent refusal.428
426 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 864, per Lord Goff.
427 For a discussion of the issues, see Alldridge ‘Let Me Die – My Mother Insists’ (1992) 142 NLJ 1691.
428 Para 2.12. Indeed, if the doctor etc forced food on the patient or continued treatment after such a refusal
he would commit a battery on the patient: see para 2.12.
8.187 encouraging or assisting suicide | 317
Jurisdiction
8.185 Because the offence under the SA 1961, s 2(1) is a ‘conduct’ crime, ie doing an
act capable of encouraging or assisting suicide or attempted suicide, if D in England
and Wales does an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide
abroad D commits an offence under s 2(1). On the other hand, under the general rules of
jurisdiction,429 and subject to a special rule for information service providers established
in England and Wales described in the next paragraph, D would not commit an offence
under s 2(1) if his relevant conduct occurred wholly abroad. It is a moot point whether
an act done abroad by D which is capable of encouraging or assisting suicide (eg send-
ing an encouraging e-mail or the means for suicide) can suffice if the encouragement or
assistance (eg the e-mail or parcel) is received in England and Wales. It would seem that
it could if the act of encouragement or assistance could be described as a continuing one
and continued in England or Wales.430
Information service providers

8.186 In order to ensure that the SA 1961, s 2 is compatible with the United Kingdom’s
obligations under the EU’s E-Commerce Directive, Sch 12 to the Coroners and Justice
Act 2009 makes special provision in connection with the operation of the SA 1961 (as
amended) in relation to persons providing ‘information society services’, otherwise
known as ‘service providers’.
In addition to any liability under the rules described above, a service provider estab-
lished in England and Wales can also be liable under the SA 1961, s 2(1) for doing an act
in another European Economic Area State which is capable of encouraging or assisting
the suicide or attempted suicide of another person.
A service provider established in an EEA State other than the United Kingdom may not
be prosecuted for an offence under s 2(1) unless this is necessary for the ‘public interest
objective’ (ie the pursuit of public policy), relates to a service that prejudices that objective
(or seriously and gravely risks doing so), and is proportionate to that objective.
A service provider cannot be guilty of an offence under s 2(1) where the service pro-
vider is acting as a mere conduit for the information in question or where it is simply
involved in caching or hosting information.
The details of Sch 12 to the 2009 Act are outside the scope of this book.
Prosecution
8.187 The offence under the SA 1961, s 2(1) covers a wide range of cases, from the greedy
son who urges a parent to commit suicide so that he can inherit the parent’s estate to the
distraught husband who, at her request, helps his terminally ill wife to kill herself to end
her pain and misery.
429 Para 1.21.

430 See Baxter [1972] 1 QB 1, CA; Hirst ‘Assisted Suicide after Purdy: The Unresolved Issue’ [2009] Crim LR
870 at 875–876.
8.188 The original offence under the SA 1961, s 2(1) of aiding or abetting suicide was
thought to be necessary to plug what would otherwise be an unacceptable gap in the law
resulting from the abolition of the crimes of suicide and attempted suicide, since it was
thought that there might be good reasons for punishing someone who encouraged or
assisted someone to commit suicide. This remains the rationale of the offence. A pros-
ecution for an offence under s 2(1) may only be instituted by or with the consent of the
Director of Public Prosecutions.431
8.189 The offence clearly inhibits the exercise of the right to self-determination by those
who wish to commit suicide by prohibiting others from encouraging or assisting them
to do so. The original s 2(1) was held not incompatible with a person’s rights under the
ECHR. The only right which was engaged was Article 8 (right to respect for private life)
which applies to a person’s choice as to how to pass the closing moments of life, but s 2(1)
was held to be justifiable under Article 8(2) in regulating suicide for the protection of
public morals.432 This decision is equally applicable to the new s 2(1).
In 2009, the Director of Public Prosecutions was required by the House of Lords433 to
promulgate an offence-specific policy identifying the facts and circumstances which he
would have taken into account in deciding whether or not to consent to a prosecution
for assist incouraging or suicide contrary to the original s 2(1) where the assisted suicide
was in a country where assisted suicide was lawful. Without such a statement, said the
House of Lords, the requirement under Article 8(2) that the interference with the Article
8 right be ‘in accordance with law’ would not be satisfied because that phrase involves
the requirements that ‘the law’ (a term which included the Code for Crown Prosecutors)
should be accessible and should be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the indi-
vidual, if need be with appropriate advice, to regulate his conduct.
The Director complied with this requirement by issuing the Policy for Prosecutors in
Respect of Cases of encouraging or assisting suicide 434 which relates to all cases of assist-
ing Encouraging or suicide. Although each case is to be considered on its own facts and
merits, the Policy outlines 16 public interest factors in favour of a prosecution and six
public interest factors against a prosecution. Factors tending in favour of prosecution
include where the victim was under 18, or lacked capacity to reach an informed deci-
sion, where the suspect was not wholly motivated by compassion, and where the suspect
pressured the victim to commit suicide. Factors tending against prosecution include
where the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision, where
the suspect was motivated wholly by compassion, and where the suspect’s encourage-
ment or assistance was reluctantly given in the face of a determined wish on the part of
the victim to commit suicide.
431 SA 1961, s 2(4).

432 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRLR 1, ECtHR. The House of Lords in R (on the application of
Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61 had previously held that Article 8 was not engaged. The House of Lords in R (on
the application of Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45 declined to follow its decision in Pretty and applied the decision
of the European Court of Human Rights in that case.
433 R (on the application of Purdy) v DPP above.
434 Available on the Crown Prosecution Service’s website. See Daw and Solomon ‘Assisted Suicide and
Identifying the Public Interest in the Decision to Prosecute’ [2010] Crim LR 737.
8.190 abortion and child destruction | 319
In the first 18 months after the issue of the Policy, none of the 30 or more people referred
to the Director on suspicion of assisting a friend or relative to commit suicide had been
prosecuted.435
Abortion and child destruction
Abortion
8.190 The OAPA 1861, s 58 provides the offence of attempting to procure a miscarriage,
which is popularly known as abortion. It states:
‘Every woman being with child who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall
unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully
use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with
intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman whether she be or be not with child, shall
unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious
thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like
intent, shall be liable to [a maximum of] imprisonment for life.’
The offence is triable only on indictment. As can be seen, it is committed in two cases:
• where a woman ‘being with child’, with intent to procure her own miscarriage,
unlawfully administers to herself any poison or noxious thing or unlawfully uses
any instrument or other means; or
• where any other person, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether
or not she is ‘with child’, unlawfully administers to her or causes to be taken by her
any poison or noxious thing or unlawfully uses any instrument or other means.
In neither case is a miscarriage required to result from D’s conduct. However, there are
these distinctions between the woman who tries to procure her own miscarriage and any
other persons who try to procure another’s miscarriage:
• A woman who administers poison etc to herself can only be guilty if she is in fact
‘with child’; if she merely believes herself to be pregnant, but is not, she is not guilty
under the OAPA 1861, s 58. If another person administers etc, it is irrelevant that the
woman concerned was not in fact ‘with child’ provided that the intent to procure a
miscarriage can be proved. The importance of this distinction is diminished by the
fact that if the non-pregnant woman conspires with another to administer to herself
a noxious thing, or to use something, to procure her miscarriage she may be con-
victed of conspiracy436 to commit an offence under s 58.437
435 Times, 5 September 2011.

436 Whitchurch (1890) 24 QBD 420, CCR.
437 A non-pregnant woman can also be convicted as an accomplice to an offence under s 58 if she aids, abets,
counsels or procures another to perpetrate an offence under s 58 in respect of her: Sockett (1908) 72 JP 428, CCR.
• A person other than the woman herself can commit the offence by causing to be
taken by the woman any poison or noxious thing. This will occur, eg, where the
woman is deceived by D into thinking that the substance in question is harmless and
takes it on D’s directions.438
Means
8.191 The OAPA 1861, s 58 is concerned with the unlawful administration of poison or
a noxious thing or the use of an instrument or any other means with intent to procure a
miscarriage. ‘Poison’ has been said to mean a recognised poison, and it has been stated
in the same case that if the thing administered is a recognised poison the offence may
be committed, even though the quantity given is so small as to be incapable of doing
harm.439 ‘Noxious thing’ has been defined as something, other than a recognised poison,
which is harmful in the dosage in which it was administered, even though it might be
harmless in small quantities.440 ‘Any other means’ is obviously a wide term, covering
digital interference with a foetus and hitting a woman in the lower part of her body441
among other things. It is irrelevant that, unknown to D, the means used were incapable
of procuring a miscarriage.442 Although in most cases the woman will be a consenting
party, the offence also covers non-consensual conduct.443
With intent to procure a miscarriage

8.192 What is required for a ‘miscarriage’? Must the fertilised ovum have become
implanted in the endometrium of the uterus or does the term include failure or preven-
tion of implantation? The issue arose in R (on the application of Smeaton) v Secretary
of State for Health444 where a ministerial order enabling pharmacists to dispense the
‘morning-after pill’, which prevents implantation of a fertilised ovum, was challenged in
judicial review proceedings on the ground that the use of such a pill involved an intent
to procure a miscarriage. Munby J (as he then was) held that the answer was the former
of the two possibilities: in the light of modern medical knowledge, ‘miscarriage’ had
to be construed as presupposing that the fertilised ovum had become implanted in the
endometrium of the uterus. The use of a pill to prevent implantation of a fertilised ovum
would therefore not be done with intent to procure a miscarriage.445 Munby J entirely
agreed with the only previous decision directly on the point, the unreported decision
of Wright J in Dhingra.446 In that case Wright J had held that the use of an intra-uterine
device which prevents the implantation of a fertilised ovum did not involve an intent to
procure a miscarriage.
438 See para 7.117.

439 Cramp (1880) 5 QBD 307 at 309–310, per Field J; see also Stephen J, at 310. See also Hennah (1877) 13 Cox
CC 547 at 549, per Lord Cockburn CJ. 440 Cramp above.
441 Spicer (1955) 39 Cr App R 189. 442 Ibid; Marlow (1964) 49 Cr App R 49.
443 See Price ‘Selective Reduction and Feticide: The Parameters of Abortion’ [1988] Crim LR 199 at 206.
444 [2002] EWHC 886 (Admin), Munby J.
445 For criticism of this decision see Keown ‘ “Morning-aft er Pills”, “Miscarriage” and Muddle’ (2005)
25 LS 296. 446 (1991), unreported.
In Dhingra, Wright J held that a ‘miscarriage’ required the ‘spontaneous expulsion of the
contents of the products of pregnancy’ and that there could be no pregnancy until implanta-
tion of a fertilised ovum. On the basis of this decision, and the agreement with it expressed
by Munby J in Smeaton, the selective reduction of a multiple pregnancy (where one or more
foetuses is destroyed in the womb) in early pregnancy in the interests of the remaining
foetuses and the mother is not normally caught by the OAPA 1861, s 58, because it usually
results not in the expulsion of the foetus(es) but in its (or their) natural absorption into
the womb. However, there appears to be an inconsistency between this view and the latter
part of the Abortion Act 1967, s 5(2), referred to in para 8.195, which assumes that selective
reduction of a multiple pregnancy does constitute a miscarriage for the purposes of s 58.
Unlawfully
8.193 By the Abortion Act 1967, s 5(2), anything done with intent to procure a woman’s
miscarriage (or, in the case of a woman carrying more than one foetus, her miscarriage of
any foetus) is unlawfully done unless authorised by the Abortion Act 1967, s 1. The effect
of this is to prevent the justification of an abortion as lawful under the common law prin-
ciples relating to necessity. On the other hand, it does not preclude the application of the
general defence of duress of circumstances in cases where it is impossible to comply with
the procedural requirements of the Act (as where a foreign doctor who is not a registered
medical practitioner performs an abortion on a train stuck in deep snow drifts in order
to save the mother from immediate death).
8.194 Under the Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1), an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 58 is not
committed when:
‘a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical

practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith –
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week447 and that the con-
tinuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were
terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or
any existing children of her family; or
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical
or mental health of the pregnant woman;448 or
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant
woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped’.
Whether the necessary opinions were formed in good faith is a question for the jury; the
medical evidence, although important, is not conclusive.449
447 The Act does not defi ne the point of time at which pregnancy begins.
448 In the determination of (a) or (b), account may be taken of the mother’s actual or reasonably foreseeable
environment: Abortion Act 1967, s 1(2).
449 Smith [1974] 1 All ER 376, CA.
8.195 The Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1) refers to the termination of a pregnancy. As indi-
cated in para 8.192, the existing case law indicates that the selective reduction of a
multiple pregnancy does not usually constitute a miscarriage for the purposes of the
OAPA 1861, s 58. Even if it did, the latter part of the Abortion Act 1967, s 5(2), which
is not limited to selective reduction, provides that, in the case of a woman carrying
more than one foetus, anything done with intent to procure miscarriage of any foetus
is authorised by s 1 if the ground for termination of the pregnancy specified in s 1(1)(d)
applies in relation to any foetus and the thing is done for the purpose of procuring the
miscarriage of that foetus, or if any of the other grounds for termination of the preg-
nancy specified in s 1 applies.
8.196 By the Abortion Act 1967, s 1(3) and (3A), any treatment for the termination
of pregnancy is lawful only if it is carried out in an NHS hospital, a Primary Care
Trust, NHS Trust or NHS Foundation Trust hospital or other approved place (or class
of place). Th is limitation and the requirement for the opinion of two registered medical
practitioners 450 do not apply in an emergency where a registered medical practitioner
performs an abortion, having formed the opinion in good faith that this is immediately
necessary to save the mother’s life or to prevent grave permanent injury to her physical
or mental health.451
A modern method of abortion is ‘early medical abortion’, a term used to describe the
termination of a pregnancy of up to nine weeks by means of abortifacient drugs taken
in two stages, six to 72 hours apart. Currently, the first-stage drug and the second-stage
drug are both taken in a hospital or approved place. In British Pregnancy Advisory Service
v Secretary of State for Health,452 the question was whether it would be lawful under the
Abortion Act 1967 to pilot and, if successful, adopt, subject to regulation, a process of
providing abortions where, after a pregnant woman had taken the first-stage drug at a
hospital or approved place, she took the second-stage drug at home. Supperstone J, sit-
ting in the Administrative Court, answered the question in the negative. Referring to
the Abortion Act 1967, s 1(3) and (3A), Supperstone J held that ‘treatment’ for this pur-
pose included the use of the second-stage abortifacient drug and did not end with its
prescription.
8.197 The reference in the Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1) 453 to the termination of pregnancy
was held by the House of Lords in Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v
Department of Health and Social Security454 to mean the whole process of treatment
undertaken to terminate a pregnancy. Two results follow from this. First, as their
Lordships admitted, provided the various conditions are satisfied, s 1(1) applies where
the thing administered or used to abort fails to procure a miscarriage or for some
reason the operation is not completed. Second, provided a registered medical practi-
tioner has prescribed the treatment for the termination of a pregnancy, remained in
charge and accepted responsibility throughout, and the treatment was carried out in
accordance with his directions, the ‘termination’ will have been by a registered medi-
cal practitioner for the purposes of the Abortion Act 1967 and the exemption from
450 Para 8.194 451 Ibid, s 1(4).

452 [2011] EWHC 235 (Admin). 453 Para 8.194. 454 [1981] AC 800, HL.
liability provided by s 1(1) will extend to any person, such as a nurse, participating in
that treatment. Th is is of particular importance because of a method of termination,
known as medical induction, in which a very significant part in the treatment is played
by nurses.
8.198 The Abortion Act 1967, s 4(1) provides that no one shall be under a legal duty to
participate455 in any treatment authorised by the Act to which he has a conscientious
objection, but s 4(2) provides that nothing shall affect any duty to participate in treatment
which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or
mental health of the pregnant woman.
Child destruction
8.199 The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (IL(P)A 1929), s 1 provides:
‘any person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive, by
any wilful act causes a child to die before it has an existence independent of its mother,
shall be guilty of an offence, to wit of child destruction, and shall be liable on conviction
thereof on indictment to [a maximum of] imprisonment for life . . . ’
Like abortion, the offence is triable only on indictment.

8.200 The offence under the IL(P)A 1929 can be distinguished from that under the
OAPA 1861, s 58 since it requires the actual destruction of the child, while the latter
offence is constituted by the act which is intended to procure a miscarriage.
8.201 Another distinction is that child destruction can be committed only in respect of
a child capable of being born alive. ‘Capable of being born alive’ means capable of being
‘born alive’ if delivered at the time when the act was done. A child is ‘capable of being
born alive’ when it has reached such a stage of development in the womb that it is capable,
if born then, of living and breathing through its lungs alone456 without any connection
with its mother.457 Provided that this test is satisfied, it is irrelevant that the child is not
viable, in the sense that it has no capacity for sustained survival, but only has the capacity
to live for a short time after extrusion from the mother.458
455 ‘Participate’ refers to actually taking part in treatment in an NHS hospital, a Primary Care Trust, NHS
Trust or NHS Foundation Trust hospital or other approved place (or class of place) for the purpose of terminat-
ing a pregnancy, as opposed to making arrangements preliminary to, and intended to bring about measures
aimed at, terminating a pregnancy, such as typing letters of referral: Janaway v Salford Area Health Authority
[1989] AC 537, HL. The act of referral for abortion by a general practitioner would therefore seem not to be a
participation in treatment for the purposes of s 4(1), but see Foster ‘When Two Freedoms Collide’ (2005) 155 NLJ
1624 for arguments to the contrary.
456 Either naturally or aided by a ventilator: C v S [1988] QB 135, CA; McDonald [1999] NI 150, NI Crown Ct.
457 Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587. Also see C v S above.
458 Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority above; McDonald [1999] NI 150, NI Crown Ct; Wright ‘Capable
of Being Born Alive?’ (1981) 131 NLJ 188; Wright ‘Legality of Abortion by Prostaglandin’ [1984] Crim LR 347
The IL(P)A 1929, s 1(2) provides that the fact that the pregnancy has lasted for 28 weeks
is prima facie evidence that the child was capable of being born alive within the defini-
tion of child destruction. However, if it is proved that a foetus of less than 28 weeks was
nevertheless so developed as to be capable of being born alive it is protected by the offence
of child destruction.
8.202 Although the woman will normally be a consenting party, it appears that the
offence also covers non-consensual conduct.459 While the act in question will normally
be some sort of surgical interference, any act done with the relevant intent and effect will
do, eg hitting the woman. The IL(P)A 1929, s 1 contains a proviso that the prosecution
must prove ‘that the act which caused the death of the child was not done in good faith
for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother’, which has been construed as
including preserving the mother’s physical or mental health.460 This construction is to be
found only in directions by trial judges, and is therefore not binding on any other judge.
Arguably, it ignores the word ‘only’ which appears in the provision.461 In addition, the
Abortion Act 1967, s 5(1) provides that no offence under the IL(P)A 1929 is committed
by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the
provisions of the 1967 Act.
8.203 The offence under the IL(P)A 1929 was not originally intended to prevent late
abortions. Instead, it was introduced to fill the gap between abortion and homicide by
providing for the conviction of a person who destroys a child in the process of birth in
circumstances where it could not be proved that the child had had an existence inde-
pendent of the mother462 so as to be in law the object of murder. However, as a result of
the language used, the offence covers the termination of a pregnancy by a method which
destroys a foetus capable of being born alive.
Interrelation of abortion and child destruction

8.204 In spite of the distinctions between them, there is an obvious overlap between
child destruction and abortion. A successful abortion can be charged as child destruc-
tion if it can be proved that the child was capable of being born alive and, except when
the destruction occurs while the child is being born, all child destruction can be charged
as abortion.
and [1985] Crim LR 140. Contrast Tunkel ‘Late Abortions and the Crime of Child Destruction’ [1985] Crim LR
133 and Keown ‘The Scope of the Offence of Child Destruction’ (1988) 104 LQR 121 who argue that viability of
the foetus is an essential requirement of ‘being born alive’, a view which can only be justified by reading words
into the statute. Th is is only permissible if (a) the words are necessarily implied by words already in the statute
(Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1974] 2 All ER 97, HL) or (b) if it is neces-
sary to imply the words to make it compatible with the ECHR (see para 1.52). Neither (a) nor (b) applies here.
For a third approach, see Price ‘How Viable is the Present Scope of the Offence of Child Destruction?’ (1987) 16
Anglo-American LR 220.
459 See Price ‘Selective Reduction and Feticide: The Parameters of Abortion’ [1988] Crim LR 199 at 206.
460 Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687; Newton and Stungo [1958] Crim LR 469.
461 See Poole [1985] Crim LR 807 (letter).
462 Para 8.7.
FURTHER READING
Ashworth ‘Principles, Pragmatism and the Keown ‘The Scope of the Offence of Child
Law Commission’s Recommendations on Destruction’ (1988) 104 LQR 121
Homicide Law Reform’ [2007] Crim LR Mackay ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009
333 – Partial Defences to Murder: (2) The New
Ashworth and Mitchell (eds) Rethinking English Diminished Responsibility Plea’ [2010]
Homicide Law (2000) Crim LR 290.
Beaumont ‘The Unborn Child and the Limits Maier-Katkin and Ogle ‘A Rationale for
of Homicide’ (1997) 61 JCL 86 Infanticide Laws’ [1993] Crim LR 903
Elliott ‘What Future for Voluntary Man- Miles ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009: a
slaughter?’ (2004) 68 JCL 253 “Dog’s Breakfast” of Homicide Reform’
Elliott ‘Liability for Manslaughter by Omis- [2009] 10 Archbold News 6
sion’ (2010) 74 JCL 163 Mitchell ‘More Thoughts about Unlawful and
S Gardner ‘Manslaughter by Gross Negli- Dangerous Act Manslaughter and the One-
gence’ (1995) 111 LQR 22 Punch Killer’ [2009] Crim LR 502
Gibson ‘Intoxicants and Diminished Res- Norrie ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009
ponsibility: the Impact of the Coroners and – Partial Defences to Murder: (1) Loss of
Justice Act 2009’ [2011] Crim LR 909 Control’ [2010] Crim LR 275
Gobert ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and O’Donovan ‘The Medicalisation of Infanticide’
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 – Thirteen [1984] Crim LR 259
Years On Was it Worth the Wait?’ (2008) 71 Ormerod and Taylor ‘The Corporate
MLR 413 Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide
Goff ‘The Mental Element in the Crime of Act 2007’ [2008] Crim LR 589
Murder’ (1988) 104 LQR 30 Price ‘How Viable is the Present Scope of the
Grubb ‘The New Law of Abortion: Clarification Offence of Child Destruction?’ (1987) 16
or Ambiguity?’ [1991] Crim LR 659 Anglo-American LR 220
Herring and Palser ‘The Duty of Care in Gross Price ‘Selective Reduction and Feticide: The
Negligence Manslaughter’ [2007] Crim LR Parameters of Abortion’ [1988] Crim LR
24 199
Horder ‘The Criminal Liability of Organi- Seaborne Davies ‘Child-Killing in English
sations for Manslaughter and Other Law’ in Modern Approach to Criminal
Serious Offences’ in Halsbury’s Laws of Law (1945) (Radzinowicz and Turner
England Centenary Essays 2007 (2007) (eds)) 301
(Hetherington (ed)) 103 Seneviratne ‘Pre-Natal Injury and Transferred
Kennefick ‘Introducing a New Diminished Malice: The Invented Other’ (1996) 59 MLR
Responsibility Defence for England and 884
Wales’ (2011) 74 MLR 750 Taylor ‘The Nature of “Partial Defences” and
Keown ‘ “Miscarriage”: A Medico-Legal Ana- the Coherence of (Second Degree) Murder’
lysis’ [1984] Crim LR 604 [2007] Crim LR 345
Keown ‘Selective Reduction of Multiple Preg- Tunkel ‘Late Abortions and the Crime of
nancy’ (1987) 137 NLJ 1165 Child Destruction’ [1985] Crim LR 133
Virgo ‘Reconstructing Manslaughter by Withey ‘Loss of Control, Loss of Opportunity’

Defective Foundations’ (1995) 54 CLJ 14 [2011] Crim LR 263
G Williams The Sanctity of Life and the Wright ‘Capable of Being Born Alive?’ (1981)
Criminal Law (1958) Ch 6 131 NLJ 188
G Williams ‘The Mens Rea for Murder: Leave Wright ‘Legality of Abortion by Prostaglandin’
It Alone’ (1989) 105 LQR 387 [1984] Crim LR 347 and [1985] Crim LR
Wilson ‘A Plea for Rationality in the Law of 140
Murder’ (1990) 10 LS 307 Yale ‘A Year and a Day in Homicide’ (1989) 48
Wilson ‘The Structure of Criminal Homicide’ CLJ 202
[2006] Crim LR 471
9
Sexual offences
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals with most of the sexual offences contained in the Sexual Offences Act 2003:
• rape, sexual assault and other non-consensual sexual offences;
• sexual offences involving children under 16;
• abuse of a position of trust where a child is under 18;
• familial sex offences;
• sex with an adult relative;
• sexual offences against people with a mental disorder;
• preparatory offences.1
Introduction
9.1 The law of sexual offences was thoroughly overhauled and modernised by the Sexual
Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003), which (by an unnecessarily complex set of provisions)
governs virtually all offences relating to sexual behaviour. Until the SOA 2003, the law
relating to sexual offences lacked coherence or structure; it did not offer adequate protec-
tion for the vulnerable and many maximum penalties were too low.
9.2 Much of the old law reflected the social attitudes of the latter part of the nineteenth
century towards sexual behaviour and the roles of men and women. In particular, many
of its offences were gender-specific in terms of the sex of the offender and the victim.
Where a sex was specified, it was, with one exception, the masculine sex in the case of the
offender and, normally, the feminine sex in the case of the other party. The old law was
also discriminatory because it treated male homosexual activity in a different way from
other types of sexual activity. The SOA 2003 is gender-neutral in terms of offender and
victim and treats people equally, regardless of their sexual orientation.
1 For special rules relating to extra-territorial jurisdiction over many of the offences described in this chapter,
see paras 9.123 and 9.124.
328 | 9.3 sexual offences
Age of consent
9.3 The general age of legal consent to sexual activity (whether heterosexual or homo-
sexual) is 16. Subject to what is said below about a child under 13, the fact that a child is
under the age of legal consent does not in itself mean that he or she is incapable of actu-
ally consenting for the purposes of offences, such as rape, which require the absence of
consent on the part of the victim; it simply means that a child’s consent is irrelevant for
those offences, such as sexual activity with a child, where the absence of consent is not
an element.
9.4 The SOA 2003 introduced a lower age, 13, beneath which a child cannot in law con-
sent to any sexual activity,2 ie is legally incapable of actually consenting to any sexual
activity. It did so in order to provide absolute protection for younger children in respect
of non-consensual sexual offences on the ground that there must be an age below which
there should be no question whether the child consented or not. The thinking behind the
minimum age of actual consent is implemented by having a number of sexual offences
with a child under 13 which are parallel to the non-consensual offences of rape, assault
by penetration, sexual assault and causing a person to engage in sexual activity without
consent and which make no reference to the absence of consent.3
9.5 Other than the age of criminal responsibility (10), there is no minimum age for the
perpetrator of any sexual offence based on the fact that the other party is under 16 (or 13).
The blanket criminalisation of all consensual sexual activity, or related conduct, involving
a child under 16 is controversial. It is particularly controversial when both participants
are under 16, especially when that activity can simply consist of kissing or cuddling, or of
A causing B to look at a pornographic video for A’s sexual gratification. Speaking of the
age of consent in 2001, Lord Millett said in K:4
‘ . . . the age of consent has long ceased to reflect ordinary life, and in this respect Parliament
has signally failed to discharge its responsibility for keeping the criminal law in touch
with the needs of society.’
Is it sensible to make non-exploitative sexual experimentation between two youngsters an

offence – especially when the offence is a serious one? The case for saying ‘no’ is particu-
larly strong where the activity does not involve penetration. The fact that, if the conduct is
truly consensual, the Crown Prosecution Service is most unlikely to prosecute may make
the youngsters think that the law is an ass and can generally be ignored with impunity.
On the other hand, the fact that engaging in experimentation in what comes naturally
is technically criminal may deter children from seeking advice and assistance about
their sexual development or about contraception, pregnancy and sexually-transmitted
diseases.
Arguments in favour of criminalisation where both parties are under 16 centre round
the need to protect under-16-year-olds against coercion, exploitation, abuse or sexual
2 Th is was confirmed in A-G’s Reference (Nos 74 and 83 of 2007) [2007] EWCA Crim 2550.
3 Paras 9.35, 9.44, 9.49 and 9.55. 4 [2001] UKHL 41 at [44].
9.8 introduction | 329
harassment, but, depending on the circumstances, this could be dealt with by a prosecu-
tion for an offence under the general law, such as an offence contrary to the Protection
from Harassment Act 1997.5
By way of some recognition of the above arguments, the SOA 2003 provides that
where the defendant to a charge involving sexual activity with someone under 16 is
himself under 18 a lesser offence is committed than in the case of a defendant aged 18
or over. 6
Sexual
9.6 ‘Sexual’ is a recurring adjective in the SOA 2003. The SOA 2003, s 78 provides that
for the purposes of the various sexual offences in the SOA 2003, Pt 1 (ss 1 to 79), except
sexual activity in a public lavatory7:
‘penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would con-
sider that –
(a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of
its nature sexual, or
(b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the pur-
pose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.’
Section 78 requires penetration, touching or any other activity to pass one or other of two
tests in order to be sexual.
9.7 The fi rst test (s 78(a)) concentrates on the nature of the act. Would a reasonable
person consider that because of its nature the act is sexual? If so, the act is sexual. The
jury or magistrates must look at the act itself, and not at its surrounding circumstances
or the purpose with which it is done. The first test is not satisfied if objectively the nature
of the act is simply capable of being (ie may or may not be) sexual; it is only satisfied if
objectively the act is such that it is because of its nature sexual. Examples of conduct
which because of their nature would always satisfy the present test would be anal or
vaginal sexual intercourse, oral sex, and inserting a vibrator into a woman’s vagina or a
person’s anus.
9.8 The second test (s 78(b)) deals with the case where, although a reasonable person
would not consider that an activity is because of its nature sexual, the reasonable person
would nevertheless consider that because of its nature it may be sexual. Examples of
such a case would be inserting a finger into a woman’s vagina or someone’s anus or where
someone removes another person’s clothes, or where someone touches the genital organs
of himself, or another person or of an animal, or kisses another person, or strokes an-
other person’s knee (whether clad or not).
5 Paras 7.135–7.143. 6 Para 9.70.

7 For the purposes of that offence, an activity is sexual if a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances
but regardless of any person’s purpose, consider it to be sexual: SOA 2003, s 71(2).
The second test contains two requirements. 8 The first is whether a reasonable person
would consider that because of its nature the actual act may be sexual. In relation to this
requirement, the circumstances before or after the act took place, or any evidence as to
the purpose of any person in relation to it, are irrelevant. If the answer to the question
posed by this requirement is ‘No’, the act is not sexual. If the answer to the question is
‘Yes’, the second requirement comes into play, and requires the jury or magistrates to
ask themselves whether because of the circumstances of the activity or the purpose of
any person in relation to it (not just the person who does the act, but (eg) someone who
encourages the act to be done), or both, the activity is sexual.9
By way of example of the operation of the second test, a reasonable person might con-
sider that the removal of a shoe may be sexual by nature10 and that because of the shoe
remover’s fetishistic purpose it is sexual, whereas he would consider that the removal of
the shoe for legitimate purposes by an assistant in a shoe shop is not sexual in the light
of the assistant’s purpose and the circumstances. Likewise, a reasonable person would
consider that any touching of a woman’s breast may because of its nature be sexual, and
would consider that ‘groping’ a woman’s breast for sexual gratification was sexual in the
light of the purpose with which the touching is done. On the other hand, a reasonable
person would not consider that touching a woman’s breasts was sexual if it was done as
part of acts of self-defence against an attack by the woman or by a doctor who was making
a bona fide medical examination and touched the breasts for medical reasons.
Another example is where a mother tells her young child to strip in her presence be-
fore the child takes a bath; a reasonable person would consider that the child’s act of
stripping by its nature may be sexual, but no reasonable person would conclude from its
circumstances or the purpose of anyone (including the mother) that it is sexual. Suppose,
on the other hand, that a man bribed a young child into stripping in front of him in his
bed-sit for purposes of sexual gratification. A reasonable person would consider that the
act because of its nature may be sexual, and would consider (by reference to its circum-
stances and the man’s purpose) that it is sexual.
By way of two further examples, reference may be made to the facts of two cases decided
under the law before the SOA 2003. If, to adopt the facts of Beal v Kelly,11 a man exposes
himself to a 14-year-old boy and invites the boy to handle him, but the boy refuses, where-
upon the man reaches out and grabs the boy, a jury might find that a reasonable person
would consider that by its nature the grabbing may be sexual. If so, it would undoubtedly
find it sexual in the light of its circumstances and the man’s purpose. If, to adopt the facts
of Court,12 a man spanks a clothed 11-year-old child, a reasonable person would consider
that by its nature that act may be sexual. If the man’s purpose is sexual gratification (as it
was in Court where the man was a buttock-fetishist), a reasonable person would clearly
think that the act was sexual. On the other hand, if the man’s purpose was to chastise the
child whom he has found shoplifting in his store, a reasonable person would not find the
8 H (Karl Anthony) [2005] EWCA Crim 732. 9 See ibid at [12] and [13].
10 In H (Karl Anthony), ibid at [11], the Court of Appeal expressed reservations as to whether or not the
removal of shoes was capable, by the nature of the act, of being sexual. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal
was unduly cautious. 11 [1951] 2 All ER 763, DC.
12 [1989] AC 28, HL.
9.10 introduction | 331
act sexual in the light of its purpose. The man would, of course, be guilty of a battery or of
assault occasioning actual bodily harm, depending on whether such harm was caused.13
Where an act is done for a sexual purpose but does not satisfy the first requirement of
the second test, it may result in liability for committing an offence with the intention of
committing a relevant sexual offence, contrary to the SOA 2003, s 62.14
‘Not reasonably believe’

9.9 In many offences under the SOA 2003 a defendant will only be guilty if he did not
reasonably believe a specified fact, such as that the victim is consenting or is over 16. A
defendant will not reasonably believe that ‘the victim’ consents or is 16 or over and so on,
if he:
• knows,
• believes,
• is aware of the risk (but runs it),
• has thought about the risk but wrongly and unreasonably concluded that there is no
risk, or
• has not thought about whether there is a risk,
that the victim is not consenting or under 16, and so on.
‘Not reasonably believe’ postulates an objective test, just like ‘reasonable cause to
believe’, ‘reason to believe’, ‘reason to suspect’ or ‘no reason to suspect’.15
9.10 Whether an alleged belief in consent or age, and so on, was reasonable must be
answered by reference to the surrounding circumstances and the antecedent history
of the case. What about the defendant’s characteristics insofar as they affect his per-
ception of the relevant facts? Can they also be taken into consideration in assessing
the reasonableness of that belief? We saw in para 3.59 that the answer is normally ‘no’,
although it is possible for Parliament to provide that ‘not reasonably believe’ should be
assessed by taking into account the defendant’s characteristics. Such provision appears
to have been made in relation to ‘not reasonably believe that B [the victim] consents’ in
the defi nitions of rape and the other non-consensual offences under ss 1–4 of the SOA
2003 dealt with below by a provision that: ‘Whether a belief is reasonable is to be deter-
mined having regard to all the circumstances.’16 These words appear to include relevant
characteristics of the defendant which affect his perception and understanding.17 On
the other hand, the appearance of these words in these sections of the Act and their
non-appearance in other sections would seem to exclude any argument that ‘not rea-
sonably believe’ elsewhere in the Act should be assessed by reference to the defendant’s
characteristics.
13 The defendants in Beal v Kelly and Court were held guilty of offences of indecent assault abolished by SOA
2003. 14 Para 9.120.
15 See, eg, Young [1984] 2 All ER 164, C-MAC. As to this court, see para 2.32, n 98.
16 Italics supplied. 17 See further para 9.33.
9.11 The objectivity of ‘not reasonably believe’ (even when subjectivised in the cases of
the above non-consensual sexual offences) means that the fault element of the offences in
which the words appear is negligence. It is easier to accept negligence as a basis of liability
if the defendant is only liable where he could, given his mental ability and other relevant
characteristics, have avoided being negligent.
Non-consensual sexual offences
Key points 9.1

The SOA 2003, ss 1 to 8 provides the following non-consensual offences:
• rape (s 1);
• rape of a child under 13 (s 5);
• assault by penetration (s 2);
• assault of a child under 13 by penetration (s 6);
• sexual assault (s 3);
• sexual assault of a child under 13 (s 7);
• causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent (s 4); and
• causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity (s 8).
The offences under ss 5 to 8 against a child under 13 are non-consensual because the
child is deemed in law to be incapable of actually consenting.
The absence of consent by the complainant to the relevant activity is an element
of the offences under ss 1 to 4. For those purposes, and for the purposes of any other
offence under the SOA 2003 where the absence of consent is an element, a person
consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.
Where the circumstances fall within the terms of s 75 or s 76, proof of lack of consent
and of the mens rea relating to it is assisted by evidential and conclusive presumptions
as to the lack of consent and the lack of a reasonable belief in consent. Sections 75 and
76 do not apply to any other offence under the Act where the absence of consent is an
element.
Consent
9.12 Whether or not there has been consent to the relevant activity in respect of a
non-consensual offence under the SOA 2003 must be answered by reference to s 74 which
defines ‘consent’ for the purposes of the offences under ss 1 to 4 and other non-consensual
offences under the Act as follows:
9.14 non-consensual sexual offences | 333
‘ . . . a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make
that choice.’
An agreement can be express or implied, and may be evidenced by words or conduct,

past or present.
Where the definition in s 74 is satisfied, the consent may be invalid on public policy
grounds if actual bodily harm is caused as intended or foreseen by the defendant, since it
is clear that the relevant principles discussed in Chapter 7 (Non-fatal offences against the
person) apply equally to charges of sexual assault or sexual assault by penetration.18
If the complainant has made it clear that he or she would only agree to the relevant activity
if a factual precondition was satisfied by the defendant before or during the activity, there
would be no consent if, without the complainant’s agreement, the defendant does not fulfil
the condition. For example in Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority,19 a European Arrest
Warrant case where it was alleged that a woman had agreed to sex with Assange only on
the basis that Assange used a condom throughout, the Divisional Court rejected Assange’s
contention that a woman’s agreement to sexual intercourse on condition that he wore a
condom throughout remained a consent, even if he had not used a condom or, during the
sexual intercourse, had removed or damaged the condom he had used. It stated:
‘It would plainly be open to a jury to hold that, if [the woman] had made clear that she
would only consent to sexual intercourse if Mr Assange used a condom, then there would
be no consent if, without her consent, he did not use a condom, or removed or tore the
condom without her consent. His conduct in having sexual intercourse without a condom
in circumstances where she had made clear she would only have sexual intercourse if he used
a condom would therefore amount to an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 . . .’20
9.13 If there appears to be an agreement, it may be vitiated by incapacity or lack of
freedom of choice. In some cases, an apparent agreement is (by s 76), or may be, vitiated
by mistake. In other cases, the absence of consent is rebuttably presumed. These matters
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Capacity to choose
9.14 The SOA 2003, s 74 speaks of a person agreeing by choice and having the capacity to
make that choice. A person’s agreement to sexual activity is invalid if he lacks the mental
capacity to choose to engage in it. ‘Capacity to make a choice’ implies that the person
must be aware of the proposed sexual activity; one cannot choose something of which
one is unaware. A person may lack the capacity to choose if he lacks the mental capacity
to consent because, eg, he is mentally impaired,21 drugged, seriously intoxicated, hypno-
tised or semi-comatose.
18 See paras 7.3–7.7. Cf the view of Murphy ‘Flogging Live Complainants and Dead Horses: We May No
Longer Need to be in Bondage to Brown’ [2011] Crim LR 758.
19 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin), DC. 20 Ibid.
21 Special provision is made for persons with a mental disorder impeding choice by the offences described
in paras 9.103–9.109.
9.15 Neither the SOA 2003, s 74 nor any other section in the SOA 2003 lays down a
specific test of capacity. In X City Council v MB,22 a civil case, Munby J (as he then was)
regarded the common law test of capacity to consent as being preserved by s 74. A person
will thus lack capacity to consent if he or she has no real understanding of what is
involved, or has such limited knowledge, awareness or understanding as to be in no
position to decide whether to agree.23 In Morgan the Supreme Court of Victoria held that
for a woman to be found to lack capacity to consent to intercourse:
‘ . . . it must be proved that she has not sufficient knowledge or understanding to compre-
hend (a) that what is proposed to be done is the physical fact of penetration of her body by
the male organ or, if that is not proved, (b) that the act of penetration proposed is one of
sexual connection as distinct from an act of a totally different character.’24
The Court went on to say:
‘That knowledge or understanding need not, of course, be a complete or sophisticated

one. It is enough that she has sufficient “rudimentary knowledge” of what the act com-
prises and of its character to enable her to decide whether to give or withhold consent.’25
In X City Council v MB, Munby J held that Morgan was ‘an essentially correct summary
and statement of the common law rule’. He continued:
‘The . . . question is whether she (or he) lacks the capacity to understand the sexual nature
of the act. Her knowledge and understanding need not be complete or sophisticated. It is
enough that she has sufficient rudimentary knowledge of what the act comprises and of its
sexual character to enable her to decide whether to give or withhold consent.’26
Munby J also pointed out that not only is capacity to consent ‘issue-specific’ in relation
to different types of transaction (so that someone may have capacity for one purpose
but not for another), but it is also issue-specific in relation to different transactions of
the same type (so that a vulnerable adult (B) may have the capacity to consent to one
type of sexual activity whilst lacking the capacity to consent to some other (and to B
unfamiliar) type of sexual activity).
9.16 In X City Council v MB, Munby J went on to say that capacity to consent is not ‘per-
son-specific’. The Court of Appeal in C27 agreed, and added that capacity to choose is also
not ‘situation-specific’, and that an irrational fear which prevents the exercise of choice
cannot be equated with lack of capacity to choose. However, when C went on appeal to
it, the House of Lords disagreed with these statements.28 In C, the House of Lords was
concerned with the offence under the SOA 2003, s 30 (sexual activity with a person with
22 [2006] EWHC 168 (Fam) at [82]. 23 Howard [1966] 1 WLR 13, CCA.
24 [1970] VR 337 at 341. 25 Ibid at 342. 26 [2006] EWHC 168 (Fam) at [74].
27 [2008] EWCA Crim 1155.
28 [2009] UKHL 42 (reported elsewhere as Cooper). See further para 9.107 as to irrational fear.
a mental disorder impeding choice)29 but what it said about capacity to choose in that
context is equally relevant to ‘capacity to make a choice’ in s 74.
The House of Lords held that capacity to choose can be ‘person-specific’ or ‘situation-
specific’ as well as ‘issue-specific’; a person may be quite capable of exercising choice in
one situation with regard to one person but not in another situation or with a different
person. It was difficult to think of an activity which was more person- and situation-
specific than sexual relations. One did not consent to sex in general; one consented to
‘this act of sex with this person at this time and in this place’. Autonomy entailed the
freedom and capacity to make a choice of whether or not to do so. That was entirely
consistent with the respect for autonomy in matters of private life as guaranteed in the
ECHR, Article 8. The Court of Appeal had therefore been wrong in holding that a lack of
capacity to choose could not be person- or situation-specific. The House of Lords held
that the Court of Appeal had also been wrong to hold that an irrational fear prevent-
ing an exercise of choice cannot be equated with lack of capacity to choose; it can. In
D County Council v LS,30 a civil case, Roderic Wood J held that the above statements
were not limited to the SOA 2003, s 30 but applied to the question of capacity to consent
to sexual relations in both criminal and civil contexts. The judge therefore applied the
House of Lords’ approach in C.
The above statements of the House of Lords may be obiter in respect of the concept of
capacity to choose in the SOA 2003, s 74. They were so regarded by Mostyn J in D Borough
Council v AB,31 another civil case about capacity to consent to sexual relations. Declining
to follow D County Council v LS, the judge held that C had not changed the issue-specific
test of capacity in X City Council v MB which he adopted, although he developed it by
requiring the person to have an awareness and understanding of the mechanics of the
fact that there are health risks involved, particularly the acquisition of sexually trans-
mitted and sexually transmissible infections, and the fact that sex between a man and a
woman may result in the woman becoming pregnant. If this decision was followed there
would be a difference between the concept of capacity for choice for the purposes of the
SOA 2003, s 74 and that concept in s 30 where what was said in C is clearly part of the ratio
decidendi and binding on courts below.
The law relating to capacity to consent to sexual relations is clearly in a state of con-
fusion. Is it necessary for that law to be the same in both criminal law and civil law? Is
the purpose served by incapacity in both spheres the same? As far as the criminal law is
concerned, the balance must be in favour of the approach of the House of Lords in C.
9.17 In Bree, 32 the Court of Appeal dealt with the case where the complainant (B) is
drunk at the time of sexual intercourse. It held that if through drink (or for any other
reason) B has temporarily lost capacity to choose whether to have intercourse on the rele-
vant occasion, B is not consenting, and, subject to questions about whether the defendant
had mens rea, if intercourse takes place, this will be rape. However, it said, where B has
voluntarily consumed even substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remains
capable of choosing whether or not to have intercourse, and in drink agrees to do so,
this will not be rape. The Court stated that as a matter of practical reality, capacity to
29 See paras 9.107 and 9.108 where C is dealt with further. 30 [2010] EWHC 1544 (Fam).
31 [2011] EWHC 101 (Fam). 32 [2007] EWCA Crim 804. See also H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056.
consent may evaporate well before B becomes unconscious. It said that whether this is so
or not depends on the actual state of mind of the individuals involved on the particular
occasion. This is equally applicable in the context of offences involving other types of
non-consensual conduct under the SOA 2003.
Freedom to choose
9.18 A person (B) may not have freedom to choose whether or not to agree if violence
is being used against B, or B is caused to fear that it is being used against another, at
the time of the relevant conduct or immediately beforehand. The same is the case if B is
caused to fear at the time of the relevant act or beforehand that violence would be used
against B or another person.
B may lack freedom of choice for reasons other than violence or a fear of violence. An
example would be where B has been abducted or is unlawfully detained. Another example
might be the use of violence, or threat of violence, to destroy property which was of spe-
cial value, financially or emotionally. Other examples would be a threat of dismissal by
an employer to an employee, a threat to remove children or deny access, a threat to report
a serious offence to the police or a threat to withdraw economic support from an illegal
immigrant who was being sheltered by the defendant. It would all depend on the nature
of the threat and the other circumstances (including B’s age and mental capacity, whether
there was a realistic expectation that it would or could be carried out and whether B could
have taken steps to neutralise the threat), and B’s perception, and whether in the light of
these factors B was not in reality free to agree or disagree.
If B was free to choose to agree and did so, B will have consented, however reluctant the
choice. This point was made as follows by Pill J in directing the jury in Zafar:33
‘A female partner may not particularly want sexual intercourse on a particular occasion,
but because it is her husband or her partner who is asking for it, she will consent to sexual
intercourse. The fact that such consent is given reluctantly or out of a sense of duty to her
partner is still consent.’
9.19 It would seem that, provided that it is rational (and therefore there is capacity to
choose), self-induced fear cannot suffice. On the other hand, there is no reason why a fear
induced by an implied threat by another should not suffice, nor why the threatening or
other conduct should not come from a third party or external circumstances. In Kirk and
Kirk,34 B, aged 14, who had been sexually abused by A’s brother, and to a lesser extent by
A, from the age of eight, agreed to have sex with A in exchange for £3.25 for food at a time
when she was homeless, tired, dirty and hungry, having run away from home and lived
on the streets for some time. The Court of Appeal accepted that B had not consented to
have sex with A.
It remains to be decided whether it is enough simply that B has placed his trust in
another who has then taken unfair advantage of B. It is submitted that, while such conduct
has relevance in the law of contract, it has no relevance to the law of sexual offences where
33 (1992) unreported. 34 [2008] EWCA Crim 434.

B is a mentally sound adult, deserving as it is of moral censure. The special need for
protection against abuse of positions of trust in relation to children and the mentally
infirm is recognised by offences dealt with later in this chapter35 which do not require
proof of the absence of consent.
Deception and mistake

9.20 A mistake may sometimes vitiate an apparent agreement, especially if it is induced
by deception. Most mistakes are induced by deception, rather than being self-induced. It
has been argued that there is no agreement whenever a person consents to a sexual activity
under a mistake as to any fact which is such that that person would not have consented if
he had known the truth,36 but this does not represent the current state of the law.
Two kinds of deception are specifically addressed in the SOA 2003, s 76, by means of
‘conclusive presumptions’, but only in the context of alleged offences under the SOA 2003,
ss 1 to 4. The effect of other kinds of deception must be determined by reference to s 74.
Conclusive presumptions about the absence of consent and

about the absence of belief as to consent
9.21 The SOA 2003, s 76(1) provides:
‘If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies [ie one of the non-consensual
offences under ss 1 to 4]37it is proved that the defendant did the relevant act 38 and that any
of the circumstances specified in subs (2) existed, it is to be conclusively presumed –
(a) that the complainant did not consent to the relevant act, and
(b) that the defendant did not believe that the complainant consented to the relevant
act.’39
The circumstances specified in s 76(2) are that:
‘(a) the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose
of the relevant act;
(b) the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant act
by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant.’
The relevant act

9.22 By the SOA 2003, s 77, in relation to an offence to which ss 75 (below) and 76 apply,
references to the relevant act and to the complainant are to be read as follows:
35 See paras 9.76–9.84 and 9.113–9.119. 36 Herring ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Crim LR 511.
37 SOA 2003, ss 1(3), 2(3), 3(3) and 4(3). 38 See para 9.22.
39 Because the provisions require proof that the defendant ‘did’ the relevant act, they have no application
to an attempt to do the relevant act and therefore are inapplicable on a charge of attempt to commit one of the
offences to which they apply: see Rodwell ‘Problems with the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ [2005] Crim LR 290.
Offence Relevant act
Under s 1 (rape) The defendant intentionally penetrating,

with his penis, the vagina, anus or mouth of
another person (‘the complainant’)
Under s 2 (assault by penetration) The defendant intentionally penetrating, with
a part of his body or anything else, the vagina
or anus of another person (‘the complainant’)
where the penetration is sexual
Under s 3 (sexual assault) The defendant intentionally touching another
person (‘the complainant’), where the
touching is sexual
Under s 4 (causing person to engage in sexual The defendant intentionally causing another
activity without consent) person (‘the complainant’) to engage in an
activity, where the activity is sexual
The two deceptions

9.23 The two deceptions covered by s 76 are going to be rare, as will be seen.
Impersonating someone known personally to complainant For the purposes of s
76(2)(b), it is not enough merely to impersonate someone, or to assume a fictitious iden-
tity. The person impersonated must be personally known to the complainant and the
complainant must intentionally have been induced to consent by the impersonation.
Deception as to nature or purpose of relevant act A case falling within s 76(2)(a) would
be where A, a singing teacher, deceives B, a naïve teenage girl, into submitting to sexual
intercourse with him on the pretext that it is some kind of operation which would
improve her breathing. Another case would be where A, a medical professional (or
someone pretending to be one), tricks B into ‘consenting’ to an intimate examination
on the pretext that he is checking for an ailment, whereas in fact A is merely acting for
the purposes of his own sexual gratification. Clearly, in these cases, A has deceived B
as to the nature or purpose (respectively) of the act; the conclusive presumption under
s 76 applies.
Because it gives rise to a conclusive presumption, the courts have construed s 76 strin-
gently.40 No conclusive presumption arises because the complainant was intentionally
deceived in some other way. Thus, s 76 does not apply to an intentional deception as to
the quality of the relevant act (eg that penetrative sex will be protected by the use of a
condom); this does not relate to the ‘nature or purpose’ of the act.41 Nor does s 76 apply
to an intentional deception as to the intentions of the defendant. Support can be found in
Jheeta,42 where the Court of Appeal stated that a man who intentionally deceived a prosti-
tute into believing that he intended to pay would not have deceived her as to the ‘nature or
purpose’ of the act (sexual activity) which took place in consequence. The prostitute had
40 Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699; Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin),
DC. 41 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority above.
42 [2007] EWCA Crim 1699.
been deceived as to the defendant’s intentions about payment but not about the purpose
of the act (sexual gratification).43
9.24 In the context of alleged offences under the SOA 2003, ss 1 to 4, the reference in
s 76 to ‘nature or purpose’ means the defendant’s purpose in doing the ‘relevant act’.
In relation to an offence under s 4, it might have been thought that the ‘relevant act’
must be the sexual activity that the complainant engages in, but this is not so; s 77
provides that the ‘relevant act’ is the defendant’s act in causing the complainant so to
engage. The complainant need not be deceived as to the nature or purpose of his own
act. In Devonald,44 A sought to exact revenge on B, his daughter’s former boyfriend,
by humiliating B. A contacted B online, pretending to be a 20-year-old woman who
wanted B to expose himself to the webcam and masturbate for her. B was deceived
(deceived of course as to A’s purpose), and did so. Upholding A’s conviction under s 4,
the Court of Appeal said:
‘It is difficult to see how the jury could have concluded otherwise than that the com-
plainant [B] was deceived into believing that he was indulging in sexual acts with, and
for the sexual gratification of, a 20-year-old girl with whom he was having an on-line re-
lationship. That is why he agreed to masturbate over the sex cam. In fact, he was doing so
for the father of his ex girlfriend who was anxious to teach him a lesson, doubtless by later
embarrassing him or exposing what he had done’.45
9.25 The conclusive (ie irrebuttable) presumptions under s 76 might at first glance be
thought to raise questions about their compatibility with the presumption of innocence
under the ECHR, Article 6(2) or the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1); but they do
not. Where they apply, they merely operate as rules of substantive law to remove from the
offence the need to prove absence of consent or mens rea as to it.46
Deception or mistake not covered by s 76

9.26 Whether or not there is an effective consent in cases of deception falling outside s
76, or in cases of self-induced mistake, must be determined by the jury by applying the
terms of the SOA 2003, s 74. The statement in s 74 that ‘a person consents if he agrees by
choice and has the freedom . . . to make that choice’ requires an informed choice. A decep-
tion about the use of a condom or about the intent to pay for sex, eg, are factors which can
be considered by a jury when assessing whether the complainant freely agreed to the act.
In Assange, eg, the Divisional Court held that, if the defendant deceived the complainant
as to whether he was wearing a condom or one that he had not damaged, that would be
relevant to the issue of the complainant’s consent.47
43 Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 at [27]. 44 [2008] EWCA Crim 527. 45 Ibid at [7].
46 Articles 6(1) and (2) do not prevent domestic criminal law from providing conclusive presumptions to be
drawn from facts proved by the prosecution, thereby absolving the prosecution from having to establish separ-
ately all the elements of the offence, provided such presumptions remain within reasonable limits which take
into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence: Salabiaku v France (1988)
13 EHRR 379, ECtHR. 47 [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) at [90].
One limit on the application of s 74, is B,48 where the Court of Appeal held that non-
disclosure by the defendant that he is suffering a sexually transmitted disease (HIV in
that case) could not in any way be relevant to the issue of consent under s 74. The Court
noted that the party suffering from the sexually transmissible disease will not have any
defence to a charge (eg under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 20) which
may result from harm created by that sexual activity, merely by virtue of that consent,
because such consent does not include consent to the risk of infection by the disease.49
In Assange, the Divisional Court emphasised that B ‘goes no further than deciding that
a failure to disclose HIV infection is not of itself a relevant consideration under s 74’.50
This leaves open the possibility that if the defendant lies, when asked about his HIV status
by the complainant, this may be viewed as a relevant consideration. It is difficult to see
a material distinction between lying about the absence of a condom and lying about the
absence of a disease.
There must also be limits to the matters to which a deception (or mistake) relates which
can be relevant considerations under s 74. A false promise of marriage or deceptions
about wealth or status, eg, cannot be regarded as affecting freedom of choice under s 74.
Evidential presumptions as to lack of consent or the

mens rea relating to it
‘If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved –

(a) that the defendant did the relevant act [as defined by s 77: see para 9.22],
(b) that any of the circumstances specified in subs (2) existed, and
(c) that the defendant knew51 that those circumstances existed,
the complainant is to be taken not to have consented to the relevant act unless sufficient
evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he consented, and the defendant is to
be taken not to have reasonably believed that the complainant consented unless sufficient
evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he reasonably believed it.’
Thus, if the prosecution proves (a), (b) and (c) a rebuttable presumption arises that the
complainant (B) did not consent to the relevant act and that the defendant (A) did not
reasonably believe that B consented. Rebuttal of either presumption does not require A to
prove the opposite; A does not have a persuasive burden. Instead, the presumptions will
be rebutted if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether the presumed
fact existed; the presumptions are, therefore, evidential presumptions.52 Sufficient evi-
dence to raise an issue will normally be adduced by A, but it does not have to be; it can be
adduced by any other witness.
It is for the judge to decide whether sufficient evidence has been adduced. There will
be sufficient evidence if there is evidence which (if believed and not contradicted) could
48 [2006] EWCA Crim 2945. 49 Para 7.31. 50 [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) at [90].
51 Para 3.43. 52 As noted in Ciccarelli [2011] EWCA Crim 2665.
result in the jury being in reasonable doubt as to whether B consented or whether A

reasonably believed that B consented. Accordingly, some evidence beyond the fanciful
or speculative to this effect must be adduced.53 The decision of the Court of Appeal in
Ciccarelli54 provides an example of a case where there was insufficient evidence to raise an
issue as to whether B consented or A reasonably believed that B consented.
A went to a house party with his girlfriend. B was also at the party. A had met her on
three prior occasions when there had been nothing to suggest an attraction between them
and no sexual activity had occurred. B appeared to become drunk. She sat at a table with
A, his girlfriend and others. According to A, B made a sexual advance towards him
whilst at the table. She fell asleep at the table and, later, A and his girlfriend took her
home to their flat, the intention being that she would sleep off the alcohol. Once at
the flat, B fell asleep in the spare room and A and his girlfriend went to sleep in their
room. Later, A went to the spare room to check on B. He left the room, but returned
a second time. While B was fast asleep (B being asleep is one of the circumstances in
s 75(2)), A climbed into the bed and kissed and cuddled her. He touched B with his
erect penis from behind. He climbed on top of B. B woke up and told A to get out,
which he did. A denied sexually assaulting B.
At A’s trial for sexual assault (an offence to which s 75 applies), it was not in dispute
that A had touched B sexually without her consent when she was asleep and that A
knew that B was asleep. The issue was whether A reasonably believed that B had con-
sented. A contended that he had a reasonable belief in B’s consent from her actions at
the party earlier on the night in question. The judge held that sufficient evidence had
not been adduced to raise the issue as to reasonable belief in consent, pursuant to s
75. Subsequently, A pleaded guilty to sexual assault. A appealed against conviction,
submitting that the judge had wrongly ruled that there was not sufficient evidence
to raise reasonable belief in consent, and that accordingly, his plea had been entered
on an incorrect basis.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that, before the question of A’s rea-
sonable belief in B’s consent could be left to the jury, some evidence, beyond the fanciful
or speculative, had to be adduced as to the reasonableness of A’s belief in consent. It was
not enough for a defendant to give evidence that he believed the complainant was con-
senting; s 75 required some evidence that the belief was reasonable. The Court noted
that A and B were two strangers. A had a girlfriend with whom he shared a flat. He had
touched B without making any attempt to wake her up, eg by touching her in a non-
sexual way. Taking A’s case at its highest, the reasonableness of his belief that the sleeping
B had consented was based on a single advance B had made when she had been awake at
a different place before going to his flat. The judge’s conclusion that there was insufficient
evidence of a reasonable belief in consent was entirely justified.
Where the judge is satisfied that an issue has been raised on the evidence, the judge must
leave it to the jury and in the normal way it will be for the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the matter which had been (but is no longer) rebuttably presumed, ie
the prosecution will have a persuasive burden in such a case to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that B did not consent and/or that A did not reasonably believe that B consented (as
53 Ibid at [19]. 54 Ibid.

the case may be).55 The jury will have to be directed to this effect. They will also, of course,
have to be directed about the need for the other elements of the offence to be proved.
On the other hand, if the judge does not think that the evidence adduced is sufficient
to raise an issue (or if no evidence is adduced in this respect), the judge will direct the
jury to convict A if they are sure that A intentionally did the relevant act, that one of the
six circumstances in s 75(2) is proved and that A knew that. The question of whether B
consented or whether A reasonably believed that B consented will not arise for consider-
ation by the jury.
9.28 The circumstances specified in the SOA 2003, s 75(2), one of which the prosecution
must prove as one of the preconditions of the rebuttable presumptions arising, are that:
• any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began, using
violence against B or causing B to fear that immediate violence would be used
against B. The person using or threatening the violence need not be A. It remains to
be seen how the courts interpret ‘immediately’. It will be noted that a threat of some-
thing other than violence, eg to damage property or to reveal something discredit-
able, is not covered. An example of rebuttal of this presumption would be where A,
who is proved to have penetrated B vaginally immediately after deliberately using
violence on her, adduces sufficient evidence that he and B had in accordance with
their customary practice been engaging in sado-masochistic conduct and thereby
raises the issues as to whether B consented and whether A reasonably believed that
B consented;
• any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began,
causing B to fear that violence was being used, or that immediate violence would
be used, against another person. An example would be where violence is threatened
against B’s child unless B agrees to have sexual intercourse. The other person need
not be related in any way to B. The comments made in respect of the first circum-
stance are equally applicable here;
• B was, and A was not, unlawfully detained at the time of the relevant act. A need not
be the person detaining B but A must not be another unlawfully detained person;
• B was asleep or otherwise unconscious at the time of the relevant act. ‘Otherwise
unconscious’ covers people who are, eg, unconscious through drink or drugs. An
example of rebuttal of this presumption would be where A, who is proved to have
had oral sex with B when B was asleep, adduces sufficient evidence that B had asked
her (A) to wake him (B) on his birthday by performing this act on him and thereby
raises the issues as to whether B consented and whether A reasonably believed that B
consented. Another example might be where, although B was asleep at the material
time, it could be implied from previous practice that there was a consent to sex in
such a circumstance, as where a couple have routinely engaged in ‘sleepy sex’ in
which the other slowly wakes the other by making love to him or her.56 However, this
55As noted in Ciccarelli above.

56 The Canadian courts have, held, in cases where the victim was asphyxiated or intoxicated at the time, that
under the Canadian Criminal Code there is no concept of free and voluntary prior consent (by the victim when
possibility would not be available to A if B’s consent had in the past been given only
on terms of the use of a condom and on the occasion in question the penetration had
been without a condom;57
• because of B’s physical disability, B would not have been able at the time of the
relevant act to communicate to A whether B consented. It will be noted that this
circumstance is limited to physical disability; it does not apply to mental disability;58
• any person had administered to or caused to be taken59 by B, without B’s consent, a
substance which, having regard to when it was administered or taken, was capable
of causing or enabling B to be stupefied or overpowered at the time of the relevant
act.60 This provision is obviously designed to deal with date rape drugs. It does not
cover the case where B is induced voluntarily to consume alcohol in a quantity cap-
able of stupefying or overpowering B. A need not be the person who administers or
causes the substance to be taken.
As can be seen, the circumstances specified in s 75(2) are ones in which B was vulnerable
or disadvantaged. They have to be seen in the context of the definition of consent in s 74,
namely agreement by choice, made in circumstances where B had freedom and capacity
to choose. They are circumstances where as a matter of reality the likelihood was that B
might not have consented or A might not have believed that B consented.61
Rape
‘A person (A) commits an offence if –

(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with
his penis,
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’
An offence under s 1 is triable only on indictment. The maximum punishment is life

imprisonment.62
conscious) to the agreed sexual activity; consent would be vitiated by the victim’s unconsciousness: JA [2011]
SCC 28, SC of Canada; Ashlee (2006) 212 CCC (3d) 477, Alberta CA.
57 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] 2849 (Admin), DC.
58 The SOA 2003, ss 30–33 provide special offences to deal with those who engage in sexual activity with
a person who because of, or for a reason related to, mental disorder are incapable of communicating a choice
whether to agree to it: see paras 9.103–9.109.
59 Presumably these terms bear the same meaning as under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 23
and 24: paras 7.114, 7.115 and 7.117.
60 For a detailed analysis of the circumstance in the last bullet point, indicating the need for interpretation
and clarification, see Finch and Munro ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Intoxicated Consent and Drug Assisted
Rape Revisited’ [2004] Crim LR 789. 61 Ciccarelli [2011] EWCA Crim 2665.
62 SOA 2003, s 1(4).
Actus reus
9.30 There must be ‘penetration’ of the vagina, anus or mouth by the defendant’s
penis. For the purposes of the SOA 2003, ‘penetration’ is a continuing act from
entry to withdrawal. 63 It follows that, if B consents to penetration by A at the time
of entry, but withdraws consent and the penetration continues, the continuing pene-
tration will be without consent. 64 It also follows that if A only acquires mens rea as to
the fact that B is not consenting after A has penetrated B but intentionally continues
the intercourse, A can be convicted of rape. 65 The slightest degree of penetration is
enough. 66
References in the SOA 2003 to ‘penis’, ‘vagina’ and other parts of the body include
references to a part surgically constructed (in particular through gender reassignment
surgery).67 It is for this reason that vaginal rape can be committed by a female to male
transsexual or in respect of a male to female transsexual.
9.31 The penetration must occur without B’s consent. As already indicated, the absence
of consent does not have to be demonstrated by offering resistance or by communicating
it to A, 68 but if it is not communicated the mens rea as to the absence of consent may be
more difficult to prove. Consent to penetration of one of the bodily orifices referred to is
not consent to penetration of another of them.
Mens rea
9.32 The defendant (A) must intentionally (ie deliberately)69 penetrate B’s vagina, anus
or mouth with his penis. It will be a most exceptional case where, once penetration has
been proved, it will not be inferred that the penetrator intended it.
9.33 In addition, A must not reasonably believe that B consents to the penetration. We
saw in para 9.9 that ‘not reasonably believe’ is an objective test.
The SOA 2003, s 1(2) provides that:
‘Whether a belief [in consent] is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the
circumstances, including any steps A [the defendant] has taken to ascertain whether B
[the complainant] consents.’
The words ‘all the circumstances’ must refer to those which might be relevant to the issue,
including a personal characteristic of A, permanent or transient, which might affect his
ability to perceive or understand whether or not B is consenting. Examples would be a
63 Ibid, s 79(2). 64 Cooper and Schaub [1994] Crim LR 531, CA.

65 Kaitamaki v R [1985] AC 147, PC. 66 Hughes (1841) 9 C & P 752; Lines (1844) 1 Car & Kir 393.
67 SOA 2003, s 79(3).
68 Th is was held by the Court of Appeal in Malone [1998] 2 Cr App R 447 in relation to the common law
offence of rape under SOA 1956; it was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in H [2007] EWCA Crim 2056 in re-
spect of all the non-consensual offences under SOA 2003.
69 Para 9.47. Thus, in the unlikely event that A accidentally or recklessly penetrated B, A would not be guilty
of rape.
learning disability, mental illness,70 deafness, blindness, immaturity, extreme youth and
sexual inexperience. One characteristic which clearly cannot be taken into account under
the general principles about evidence of intoxication discussed in Chapter 15 is volun-
tary intoxication through alcohol or ‘dangerous drugs’. It is arguable that there must be
some limits on the extent to which consideration of personal characteristics can make a
difference. The delusions of an extremely vain defendant or the psychotic delusions of a
mentally ill defendant, however understandable in medical terms, cannot be described as
being ‘reasonable’ without doing violence to the English language.
The same point could be made about circumstances other than the characteristics of A.
For example, it is submitted that the circumstance that B was provocatively dressed or where
the incident occurred should not be taken into account by a jury because it could not reason-
ably affect A’s perception or understanding of whether or not B is consenting. On the other
hand, B’s behaviour, at least at the time, or B’s relationship with A, even if it had ceased, would
seem to be circumstances which could reasonably affect A’s perception or understanding of
whether or not B is consenting.
Presumptions
9.34 The presumptions in the SOA 2003, ss 75 and 76 referred to in paras 9.21–9.25 and
9.27 and 9.28 about the absence of consent and of reasonable belief as to consent must be
borne in mind.
Rape of a child under 13

9.35 The principle in the SOA 2003 that a child under 13 cannot consent in law to any
sexual activity, ie is legally incapable of actually consenting,71 is implemented in respect
of penile penetration by s 5.
The SOA 2003, s 5(1) provides:

(a) he intentionally72 penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person with his
penis,73 and
(b) the other person is under 13.’

imprisonment.74
9.36 Other offences dealing with sexual activity in respect of children under 16 or chil-
dren under 18 have detailed provisions as to their mens rea in respect of the child’s age but
70 In M [2011] EWCA Crim 1291 at [54], the Court of Appeal took an unduly cautious approach when it said
that it was arguable that ‘the circumstances’ in s 1(2) ‘may include a mental illness which materially affected the
defendant’s ability to interpret the complainant’s lack of consent’. It did not pursue the argument because it was
not necessary to do so. 71 Para 9.4.
72 See para 9.32. 73 See para 9.30. 74 SOA 2003, s 5(2).
s 5 contains nothing about mens rea in this respect. In G,75 where A, aged 15, had pleaded
guilty to the offence under the SOA 2003, s 5 in respect of a girl of 12 but only on the basis
that she had been willing and that on the basis of what she had told him he had reason-
ably believed that she was 15, the Court of Appeal upheld his conviction. It held that the
offence under s 5 is an offence of strict liability as to age; a defendant can be convicted of
it even if he reasonably believed that the child was 13 or over. This was confirmed in the
speeches in the House of Lords when it heard an appeal.76
Exceptions to aiding, abetting and counselling

9.37 An offence under s 5 is one of the offences in respect of which, under the SOA 2003,
s 73, there are exceptions from criminal liability on the basis of aiding, abetting or coun-
selling the commission of the offence if a person acts for the purpose of:
• protecting the child from sexually transmitted infection;
• protecting the physical safety of the child;
• preventing the child from becoming pregnant; or
• promoting the child’s emotional well-being by the giving of advice,
and not for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification or for the purpose of causing or
encouraging the activity constituting the offence or the child’s participation in it.
The rationale for these exceptions is that one of the aims of the SOA 2003 is to protect
from sexual abuse those who are vulnerable. This aim might be defeated if people were
prevented from giving sex education or counselling or contraceptives to a child because
of fear that they might be convicted of being a secondary party to a sexual offence sub-
sequently committed with that child on the ground that they had assisted or encouraged
that offence.
Child offenders
9.38 Like any other sexual offence, the minimum age at which someone can commit this
offence is the age of criminal responsibility, which is the tenth birthday. If A and B, aged
between 10 and 13, consensually experiment together and A intentionally penetrates B with
his penis, it follows that he is guilty of raping a child, even if he is younger and less expe-
rienced or knowledgeable than B, and acts in accordance with B’s instructions. Many of
the more absurd consequences of this can, however, be avoided by the proper exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. It is recognised that the prosecution of a young offender may not
always be appropriate, and an inappropriate decision to prosecute may be open to judicial
review. Even if some form of prosecution is appropriate, a charge under s 5 may be con-
sidered unduly heavy-handed if it is clear that B fully understood and consented to what
took place. The Court of Appeal acknowledged this in G77 and the House of Lords does
not appear to have dissented from that. The initial complaint in G had been one of forcible
rape, which would fully have justified the charge under s 5, but (as already noted) A pleaded
75 [2006] EWCA Crim 821. 76 [2008] UKHL 37 at [55]. See para 6.32.
77 [2006] EWCA Crim 821.
guilty on the basis of the girl’s willingness and his belief that she was 15. A majority of the
House of Lords (3–2) held that the prosecution, conviction and sentence (a conditional dis-
charge) of A in such circumstances for an offence under s 5 (rather than the less serious
offence under s 13)78 did not breach A’s right to respect for private life under the ECHR,
Article 8 because, even if his Article 8 rights were engaged, his prosecution, conviction and
sentence were proportionate in the pursuit of the legitimate aims of the protection of health
and morals and the rights and freedoms of others. Baroness Hale observed:
‘The word “rape” does indeed connote a lack of consent. But the law has disabled children
under 13 from giving their consent. So there was no consent. In view of all the dangers
resulting from under age sexual activity, it cannot be wrong for the law to apply that label
even if it cannot be proved that the child was in fact unwilling. The fact that the appellant
was under 16 is obviously relevant to his relative blameworthiness and has been reflected in
the second most lenient disposal available to a criminal court. But it does not alter the fact of
what he did or the fact that he should not have done it. In my view the prosecution, convic-
tion and sentence were both rational and proportionate in the pursuit of the legitimate aims
of the protection of health and morals and of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 79
Subsequently, the European Court of Human Rights in G v UK80 rejected a claim by A that
his continued prosecution, conviction and sentence breached his right to respect for private
life under the ECHR, Article 8. It held that, although A’s Article 8 rights had been engaged,
the interference could be justified as being proportionate in the pursuit of the legitimate
aims of crime prevention and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Assault
9.39 The SOA 2003, ss 2, 3, 6 and 7 provide four offences which their headings describe as:
• assault by penetration (s 2);

• assault of a child under 13 by penetration (s 6);
• sexual assault (s 3); and
• sexual assault of a child under 13 (s 7).
The headings to each of the four sections are misleading. The sections require bodily
contact, either through penetration or some other form of touching. Such conduct con-
stitutes a battery if it is done with the requisite mental element. It does not necessarily
involve an assault. If A causes B to apprehend that he is about to touch her breast, eg, but
B stops him before he can do so, A will be guilty of an assault but not of sexual assault,
although he may be guilty of an attempt to commit that offence.
Pursuant to the general principle in the SOA 2003 that a child under 13 cannot consent
in law to any sexual activity, ss 6 and 7 provide offences of sexual assault by non-penile
penetration of a child under 13 and by touching a child under 13, where the absence of
consent is not an element.
78 See para 9.70. 79 [2008] UKHL 37 at [55]. 80 (2011) 53 EHRR SE25, ECtHR.
Assault by penetration

(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person81 (B) with a part of
his body or anything else,
(b) the penetration is sexual, 82
(c) B does not consent to the penetration, and
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’
The offence is triable only on indictment. The maximum punishment is life imprison-
ment, 83 the same as for rape.
9.41 The penetration of the vagina or anus may be by any part of A’s body, eg a finger or
a fist. Alternatively, the penetration of the vagina or anus may be achieved by A by any-
thing else, eg by A’s use of part of the body of an unwilling third party or of an animal or
by A’s use of a bottle or other article.
There is no need for a hostile intent to be proved on A’s part, but the penetration must
be done without B’s consent.
9.42 The mens rea is similar to that for rape contrary to s 1.
The prosecution must prove that A intentionally (ie deliberately)84 penetrated B’s vagina
or anus. In addition, the prosecution must prove that A did not reasonably believe 85 that
B consented to the penetration. As in the case of rape contrary to s 1, whether a belief
is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any
steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.86
9.43 The presumptions in the SOA 2003, ss 75 (paras 9.27 and 9.28) and 76 (paras 9.21–
9.25) as to the absence of a reasonable belief as to consent must be borne in mind.
Assault of a child under 13 by penetration


(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person87 with a part of his
body or anything else,
(b) the penetration is sexual, 88 and
(c) the other person is under 13.’
81 As to ‘penetrates the vagina or anus of another person’ see para 9. 30. 82 Para 9.6.
83 SOA 2003, s 2(4). 84 Para 9.32. 85 Paras 9.9–9.11. 86 SOA 2003, s 2(2). See para 9.33.
87 As to ‘intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person’ see paras 9.30 and 9.32.
88 Para 9.6.
The offence, like that under s 5 (rape of a child under 13), is one of strict liability as to
age.
imprisonment.89 Under the SOA 2003, s 73, the exceptions from liability for aiding, abet-
ting or counselling (para 9.37) apply to an offence under s 6.
Sexual assault

(a) he intentionally touches another person (B),
(b) the touching is sexual,90
(c) B does not consent to the touching, and
An offence under s 3 is triable either way and punishable with a maximum of 10 years’
imprisonment on conviction on indictment.91
9.46 The use of ‘touch’ in s 3(1)(a) means that the most minimal contact with B suf-
fices under s 3. As elsewhere in the SOA 2003 whenever the term appears, ‘touching’
includes:
‘touching –
(a) with any part of the body,
(b) with anything else,
(c) through anything,
and in particular includes touching amounting to penetration’.92
An example of a touching by something other than a part of anyone’s body would be

holding a sex toy against a private part of the victim’s body. The Court of Appeal in H
(Karl Anthony),93 where A had approached a woman and said ‘Do you fancy a shag?’
before grabbing her tracksuit bottom and pulling her towards him, held that ‘touching’
includes touching a person’s clothing without applying any form of pressure to his
body.
The touching must be without B’s consent. Because no hostile intent is required, a man
who tries (somewhat misguidedly) to ‘win over’ his partner after a quarrel by touching
her sexually without her consent will commit the present offence, subject to the mens rea
as to lack of consent being proved.
89 SOA 2003, s 6(2). 90 Para 9.6. 91 SOA 2003, s 3(4). 92 Ibid, s 79(8).
93 [2005] EWCA Crim 732.
9.47 A must intentionally touch the complainant. In Heard, 94 the Court of Appeal
held that ‘intentional touching’ in s 3 simply means a deliberate touching which is in
fact sexual; it was not necessary to prove that A intended to touch sexually.95 There
can be no doubt that what was held in Heard is true in respect of other offences in
the SOA 2003 which require that A ‘intentionally’ touches or penetrates another.
Because there must be a deliberate touching, not only will an accidental touching not
suffice but nor will a reckless touching (as where A intends to avoid actual physical
contact by a very slight margin, but realises that he may not do so).96 As can be seen,
intention in the present context bears a much more limited meaning than it normally
does.97
In addition, A must not reasonably believe98 that B consents to the sexual touching. As
in the case of rape contrary to s 1, whether a belief is reasonable must be determined with
regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B
consents.99
Sexual assault of a child under 13

9.49 As with the offences of rape and assault by penetration, a separate offence of sexual
assault of a child under 13 is provided, in which absence of consent is not an element.
The SOA 2003, s 7(1) provides:

(a) he intentionally touches another person,100
(b) the touching is sexual,101 and
(c) the other person is under 13.’
The offence under s 7 is triable either way and is punishable with a maximum of 14
years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.102 The exceptions under the SOA
2003, s 73 from liability for aiding, abetting or counselling (para 9.37) apply to an
offence under s 7.
As in the case of the offences under ss 5 and 6, there is no exemption for the case
of consensual sexual touching, including kissing or fondling over clothes, where the
toucher is also a youngster, perhaps under 13 as well, and no exploitation or abuse is
involved.
The offence, like that under s 5 (rape of a child under 13), is one of strict liability as
to age.
94 [2007] EWCA Crim 125. See, further, para 15.82.

95 A’s purpose may, of course, be relevant in respect of whether the touching was sexual: para 9.8.
96 Th is rather obvious point was confi rmed in Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125. 97 Paras 3.5–3.19.
98 Paras 9.9–9.11. 99 SOA 2003, s 3(2). See para 9.33. 100 See paras 9.46 and 9.47.
101 Para 9.6. 102 SOA 2003, s 7(2).
Causing a person to engage in sexual activity

without consent
9.50 Compelling or otherwise causing someone to engage in a sexual activity without
consent is potentially a very serious infringement of that person’s sexual autonomy, and
is clearly deserving of the label ‘criminal’.
It was noted in para 9.30 that rape can only be physically committed by non-consen-
sual penile penetration. The result is that where a woman compels a man to penetrate her
without his consent, the woman cannot be convicted of rape. Such conduct is covered by
the offences of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent, contrary to
the SOA 2003, s 4.
Section 4 also covers the case where A causes B to perform the sexual activity on
himself or herself without consent, eg self-penetration with a vibrator, self-mastur-
bation or stripping for A’s sexual gratification. In addition, it covers the case where A
causes B to engage in sexual activity, to which B does not consent, with a third party
or an animal or corpse, eg to masturbate X or be penetrated by an animal.

(a) he intentionally causes another person (B) to engage in an activity,
(b) the activity is sexual,103
(c) B does not consent to engaging in the activity, and
Where the activity caused involved:

(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina (whether by a penis, other part of the body or
anything else);
(b) penetration of B’s mouth with a person’s penis;
(c) penetration of a person’s anus or vagina with a part of B’s body or by B with
anything else; or
(d) penetration of a person’s mouth with B’s penis,
the offence is triable only on indictment and punishable with a maximum of life impris-
onment.104 It will be noted that penetration of an animal by B’s penis is not included in
this list, nor is penetration of B’s mouth by an animal’s penis, whereas penetration of B’s
anus or vagina by an animal’s penis is.
In any other case, an offence under s 4(1) is triable either way and punishable with a
maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment on conviction.105
103 Para 9.6. 104 SOA 2003, s 4(4). 105 Ibid, s 4(5).
Because there are two separate maxima dependent on a difference in the facts estab-
lished, there are two separate offences under s 4: causing another to engage in penetrative
sexual activity in one of the above ways, and causing another to engage in ‘non-penetra-
tive’ sexual activity. This is the effect of the rule in Courtie.106
9.52 A person (A) causes another (B) to engage in sexual activity without consent if B
engages in the activity in consequence107 of A exerting a capacity which he possesses to
control or influence B’s acts.108 It is not enough simply to prove that some antecedent
event or condition produced by A contributed to B deciding to engage in the sexual
activity, or that in producing that antecedent event or condition A was actuated by desire
that B should engage in it.109 Cause requires proof of an act.110 It would not be enough
if A simply allowed (ie failed to stop) someone (X) engaging in sexual activity with B
without B’s consent, even if A owed a legal duty of care in respect of B or had a right of
control over X111 (although in these cases A could be convicted as a secondary party to
the offence committed by X if he failed to take reasonable steps to prevent that offence
being committed).112
9.53 In addition to an intent to cause B to engage in the sexual activity, A must also not
reasonably believe113 that B consents to engaging in the activity.114 As in the case of rape
contrary to s 1, whether a belief is reasonable must be determined with regard to all the
circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether the complainant
consents.115
Causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in

sexual activity

(a) he intentionally causes or incites another person (B) to engage in an activity,
(b) the activity is sexual,116 and
(c) B is under 13.’
Absence of consent is not an element of such an offence.

Under s 8(2), an offence under s 8 is triable only on indictment if the activity caused
or incited involved ‘penetration’ (in one of the same ways as in s 4). In such a case, the
106 [1984] AC 463, HL; para 3.50, n 122. 107 As to causation see paras 2.28–2.61.
108 O’Sullivan v Truth and Sportsman Ltd (1957) 96 CLR 220, High Ct of Australia; approved in A-G of Hong
Kong v Tse Hung-lit [1986] AC 876, PC. 109 Ibid.
110 Price v Cromack [1975] 2 All ER 113, DC. 111 Ibid. 112 Para 17.13.
113 Paras 9.9–9.11. 114 SOA 2003, s 4(1)(d). 115 Ibid, s 4(2). See para 9.33. 116 Para 9.6.
maximum punishment is life imprisonment. Otherwise, an offence under s 8 is triable

either way and punishable with a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment on conviction on
indictment.117
There are four offences under s 8:118
• causing a child under 13 to engage in penetrative sexual activity (in one of the ways
stated in s 8(2));
• inciting a child under 13 to engage in such activity;
• causing a child under 13 to engage in ‘non-penetrative’ sexual activity; and
• inciting a child under 13 to engage in such activity.
9.56 The offences are directed at A who intentionally causes or incites the child (B) to
engage in sexual activity; they are is not concerned with whether A engages in sexual
activity.119 The sexual activity may be with A himself (as where A incites B to masturbate
him), with a third party (as where A incites B to have sexual intercourse with A’s friend,
C) or by B on himself (as where A incites B to masturbate himself or to strip for A’s sexual
gratification).
As to the ‘causing offences’ see para 9.52.
The ‘inciting offences’ under s 8 are important where an incitement of a child to engage
in sexual activity does not achieve that result (either because the child is not persuaded
to so engage or because things do not progress sufficiently far) and where, although the
child does engage in sexual activity, it cannot be proved that this was caused by the person
who incited it.
Incitement requires an element of persuasion or encouragement120 (eg offering a bribe)
or of threats or other pressure,121 which may be implied as well as expressed. The mere
expression of a desire that someone should do the prohibited activity, for instance, does
not suffice because it does not amount to encouragement or persuasion. The persuasion,
encouragement, threats or other pressure must come to the notice of the child incited,122
though it need not be effective in any way.123 If the persuasion etc does not come to the
child’s notice there can be a conviction of an attempt to commit an offence under the SOA
2003, s 8 on appropriate facts.
Provided that A does something which in specific terms directly incites a child or chil-
dren under 13 to engage in sexual activity, it does not matter if it is not possible to identify
any specific or identifiable child to whom the incitement was addressed. This was held by
the Court of Appeal in Jones (Ian Anthony),124 where the Court stated the criminality at
which the offence was directed was the incitement. It mattered not that that was directed
at a particular child, a very large group of children or whether they could be identified or
not. This decision would appear to be equally applicable (save for the reference to a child
117 SOA 2003, s 8(2) and (3).

118 Th is results from the application of the Courtie principle: para 3.50, n 122, as was confi rmed by the Court
of Appeal in Grout [2011] EWCA Crim 299. 119 As pointed out in Grout ibid.
120 Hendrickson and Tichner [1977] Crim LR 356, CA; Marlow [1997] Crim LR 897, CA.
121 Race Relations Board v Applin [1973] QB 815 at 825, per Lord Denning MR; Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare
[1976] RTR 251, DC. 122 Banks (1873) 12 Cox CC 393. See also Walker [2006] EWCA Crim 1907 at [37].
123 De Kromme (1892) 66 LT 301, CCR. 124 [2007] EWCA Crim 1118.
or children under 13) to other offences of incitement to sexual activity in the SOA 2003.
It is of obvious importance, eg, where D (as in Jones (Ian Anthony)) writes graffiti on the
wall of a public toilet seeking sex with a person of the specified type.
9.57 Where an offence of incitement is in issue, it must be proved that A intentionally
incited B to engage in sexual activity. It might have been thought that it would have to be
proved that A intended that the sexual activity incited should take place, but in Walker125
the Court of Appeal rejected this proposition. It held that the requirement that the incite-
ment to engage in sexual activity must be intentional simply meant that the incitement
must be deliberate, or done on purpose, and A must know what he is saying or doing. In
Grout,126 the Court of Appeal was of the same view; ‘intentional’ meant ‘deliberate’; reck-
lessness or less would not do. This is a surprising conclusion. It means, eg, that a mere joke
or put-down can constitute an incitement for the purposes of s 8.
Where an offence of causing is in issue, it must be proved that A intended to cause
the child to engage in sexual activity. In Grout, the Court of Appeal stated that this also
meant that the causing must be deliberate; recklessness or less would not do. It is diffi-
cult to see how one can deliberately cause something unless one aims to bring it about or
foresees that it is virtually certain to result from one’s conduct.
There can be no doubt that the above definitions are equally applicable to the other
offences of causing or incitement under the SOA 2003.
The offence under s 8, like that under s 5 (rape of a child under 13), is one of strict
liability as to age.
Child sex offences
Key points 9.2

The SOA 2003, ss 9 to 15 provide the following sex offences which are committed against
children under 16:
• sexual activity with a child (s 9);
• causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity (s 10);
• engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child (s 11);
• causing a child to watch a sexual act (s 12);
• child sex offences committed by a child or young person (s 13);
• arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sex offence of the above types
(s 14);
• meeting a child following sexual grooming etc (s 15).
The child’s consent is irrelevant because the absence of consent is not an element of these
offences.
9.60 child sex offences | 355
Sexual activity with a child

‘A person aged 18 or over (A) commits an offence if –

(a) he intentionally touches another person (B),
(b) the touching is sexual,127 and
(c) either –
(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over, or
(ii) B is under 13.’
The exceptions from liability for aiding, abetting or counselling under the SOA 2003,
s 73 (para 9.37) apply to an offence under s 9. An offence under s 9(1) where B is under 13
is also an offence under s 5, s 6 or s 7 depending on the nature of the touching.
An offence under s 9(1) is triable only on indictment, with a maximum punishment of
14 years’ imprisonment, if the touching involved:
(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina with a part of A’s body or anything else;
(b) penetration of B’s mouth with A’s penis;
(c) penetration of A’s anus or vagina with a part of B’s body; or
(d) penetration of A’s mouth with B’s penis.128
In other cases, an offence under s 9 is triable either way, the maximum punishment on
conviction on indictment also being 14 years’ imprisonment.129
9.59 ‘Touching’ covers all forms of physical contact, including penetration.130 Because
of the requirement of ‘touching’, if an under-16-year-old (B) takes the only active part in
sexual activity (so that he is not touched by A, an adult), as where B masturbates a supine
A, A does not commit an offence under s 9(1), although A would commit an offence under
s 10 if he caused or incited B to engage in the activity.
9.60 A must intentionally touch B. By analogy with the SOA 2003, s 3, all that is required
is a deliberate touching which is in fact sexual, and it is not necessary to prove that A
intended to touch B sexually.131
As to the requirement that A must not reasonably believe that B was 16 or over, see
paras 9.9 to 9.11. Unlike corresponding requirements in respect of the offences of abuse
of trust and familial child sex offences mentioned later,132 A does not have an evidential
burden in respect of this requirement.
Where B is under 13 at the time of the touching an offence under s 9(1) is one of strict
liability as to age, like the offences under the SOA 2003, ss 5 to 8, so that not even a
reasonable belief that B is aged 16 or over will provide an excuse. The structure of s 9(1)(c)
makes it clear beyond doubt that the presumption that mens rea (as to age) is required is
rebutted in this type of case. This is also the case in respect of the offences under ss 10–12
described in paras 9.61–9.69.
127 Para 9.6. 128 SOA 2003, s 9(2). 129 Ibid, s 9(3). 130 Para 9.46.
131 See para 9.47. 132 See paras 9.83 and 9.92.
Causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity


(a) he intentionally causes or incites another person (B) to engage in an activity,
(c) either –
(i) B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe134 that B is 16 or over, or
Any offence under s 10(1) involving a child under 13 is also an offence under s 8(1).
Like an offence under s 9, an offence under s 10 is triable only on indictment if the
activity caused or incited involved:
(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina (with a part of the body or anything else);
(b) penetration of B’s mouth with a person’s penis;
(c) penetration of a person’s anus or vagina with a part of B’s body or by B with any-
thing else; or
(d) penetration of a person’s mouth with B’s penis.135
In such a case, the maximum punishment is 14 years’ imprisonment.136 In other cases, a
s 10 offence is triable either way, the maximum punishment on conviction on indictment
also being 14 years’ imprisonment.137
There are separate offences under s 10 of ‘causing’ and of ‘inciting’. ‘Intentionally caus-
ing’ and ‘intentionally inciting’ were discussed in paras 9.52, 9.56 and 9.57. Whether or
not the child consented to the activity is irrelevant.
9.62 Examples of an offence of causing under s 10(1) are where A, aged 18, not reasonably
believing that B is 16 or over:
• causes B, aged 14, to masturbate him (A). In such a case, there is an overlap with an
offence under s 9(1), if A touches B during the activity;
• causes B, aged 14, to masturbate himself (B); or
• causes B, aged 14, to masturbate A’s friend, C.
For ‘masturbate’ in the above list one could of course substitute any other form of sexual
activity, eg ‘have sexual intercourse with’ or ‘strip’.
Engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child

9.63 This offence covers the case where, instead of engaging in sexual activity with the
child, or causing (or inciting) a child to engage in sexual activity, A engages in a sexual
133 Para 9.6. 134 Paras 9.9–9.11. 135 SOA 2003, s 10(2). 136 Ibid, s 10(2).
137 Ibid, s 10(3).
activity (eg masturbation) with himself or with a third party in the presence of a child,
B, or when he can be observed by B, provided A engages in it in B’s presence etc for the
purpose of obtaining sexual gratification.

(a) he intentionally engages in an activity,
(b) the activity is sexual,138
(c) for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification, he engages in it –
(i) when another person (B) is present or is in a place from which A can be
observed, and
(ii) knowing or believing that B is aware, or intending that B should be aware, that
he is engaging in it, and
(d) either –
Unlike an offence under the SOA 2003, s 9 or s 10, the present offence is always triable
either way and punishable with a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment on conviction on
indictment.140
9.65 A must engage in the sexual activity for the purpose of deriving sexual gratifica-
tion from the facts that B is present or in a place from which A can be observed and must
know or believe that B is aware, or intend that B should be aware, that A is engaging in
it. The words italicised remove the necessity in many cases to engage in argument about
the meaning of being ‘present’. ‘Observed’ is defined by the SOA 2003, s 79(7) to mean
‘observation whether direct or by looking at an image’ produced by any means. The itali-
cised words cover the case where B is at a distance but can observe A through a telescope
or where B is miles away but can see A masturbating by watching an image created by a
webcam or other remote viewing system. B must be present or able to observe at the time
that A is engaging in sexual activity.
A’s purpose (or presumably one of his purposes) in engaging in the sexual activity
in B’s presence must be the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification from doing so in
B’s presence.141 If A, aged 21, has sexual intercourse with his 18-year-old partner in the
presence of B, his one-year-old daughter, who is lying awake in her cot alongside them,
he may know that the child is aware that he is engaging in the activity (presumably B
is not required to understand that the activity is sexual, otherwise the offence could
not be committed where B is young), but he would be most unlikely to be engaging in
intercourse in B’s presence for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification from being
watched.
138 Para 9.6. 139 Paras 9.9–9.11. 140 SOA 2003, s 11(2).
141 See para 9.69.
Causing a child to watch a sexual act

9.66 The SOA 2003, s 11 deals with an adult who, for sexual gratification, engages in a
sexual activity in the presence of, or which is observable by, a child under 16. The SOA
2003, s 12 deals with an adult (A) who, for the purpose of sexual gratification causes a
child under 16 to watch sexual activity by a third party or to look at an image of any person
engaging in such an activity.
9.67 Section 12(1) provides:

(a) for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification, he intentionally causes142 another
person (B) to watch a third person engaging in an activity, or to look at an image143
of any person engaging in an activity,
(c) either –
Like an offence under s 11, the present offence is triable either way. On conviction on
indictment, the maximum punishment is ten years’ imprisonment,146 the same max-
imum as a s 11 offence.
9.68 The actus reus of an offence under s 12 requires that A, an adult:
• causes a child under 16 to watch sexual activity by a third party (eg forcing B, a child
under 16, to watch C masturbate himself) or by third parties (eg persuading B to
watch C and D have sexual intercourse); or
• causes a child to look at an image of a person (who may be A) engaging in a sexual
activity, as where A persuades B to look at a pornographic video or pornographic
cartoon as he downloads them from the Internet.
‘Watch’ includes watching a person engaging in sexual activity in front of a webcam.
Section 12(1) does not require the sexual activity seen by B to be contemporaneous; A will
commit the offence if he causes B to look at an image of any person (real or imaginary)
engaging in sexual activity.
9.69 It is an important requirement that A must not only intentionally cause the watch-
ing or looking; A must also do so for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification. The
Court of Appeal held in Abdullahi147 that that gratification does not have to be taken
immediately, ie it is not required that the purposed sexual gratification and the viewed
sexual act, or display of images, are simultaneous, or contemporaneous or synchronised.
142 See para 9.52.

143 By the SOA 2003, s 79(4), ‘image’ means a moving or still image, however produced, and, where – as here
– the context permits, a three-dimensional image. It does not include written material. By s 79(5), references to
an image of a person include references to an image of an imaginary person. 144 Para 9.6.
145 Paras 9.9–9.11. 146 SOA 2003, s 12(2). 147 [2006] EWCA Crim 2060.
The Court held that the offence can be committed where A’s purpose involves immediate
or deferred or immediate and deferred gratification. Thus, the offence can be committed,
eg, where A causes a child to watch a sexual act to put the child in the mood for future
sexual abuse, as well as where A does so because he derives enjoyment from seeing him
watch the sexual act. This means that there is a degree of overlap between the offence
under the SOA 2003, s 12 and the offence of arranging or facilitating the commission of a
child sex offence, contrary to the SOA 2003, s 14 (referred to in para 9.71).
Child sex offences committed by children or

young persons
‘A person under 18 commits an offence if he does anything which would be an offence

under any of sections 9 to 12 [paras 9.58–9.69] if he were aged 18.’
An offence under s 13 is less serious than an offence under ss 9 to 12. It is triable either way
and punishable with a maximum of five years’ imprisonment on conviction on indict-
ment.148 The exceptions from liability for aiding, abetting or counselling under the SOA
2003, s 73 (para 9.37) apply to an offence under s 13 if what is done would be an offence
under s 9 if the offender were aged 18 or over.
Arranging or facilitating the commission of a

child sex offence

(a) he intentionally arranges or facilitates something that he intends to do, intends another
person to do, or believes that another person will do, in any part of the world, and
(b) doing it will involve the commission of an offence under any of ss 9 to 13.’
An offence under s 14(1) is triable either way and punishable with a maximum of 14 years’
imprisonment on conviction on indictment.149 It is a species of preparatory offence, as
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R.150 In R, the Court stated that s 14 covered taking
preparatory steps (with the necessary intent) to commit an offence under ss 9 to 13 even if
the defendant’s conduct had not got as far as amounting to an attempt to commit such an
offence. It noted that s 14 did not further define or limit those steps other than by requiring
their object to involve the commission of a relevant child sex offence. It stated that:
‘An arrangement may be made without the agreement or acquiescence of anyone else. A
defendant may take steps by way of a plan with the criminal objective identified in [s 14]
148 SOA 2003, s 13(2). 149 Ibid, s 14(4).

150 [2008] EWCA Crim 619 (reported elsewhere as Robson).
without involving anyone else and the mere fact that no-one else is involved would not
necessarily mean that no arrangement was made.’151
The Court of Appeal in R also held that, although the offence under s 14 covers pre-
paratory conduct, it remains a substantive offence and there is nothing in the Criminal
Attempts Act 1981 that precludes the application to s 14 of the offence of attempt. In R,
A was alleged to have asked a prostitute to find a girl of 12 or 13 for sex. On the evidence
the prostitute did not say that she would do so, nor did she give A any reason to believe
that she would do so. Allowing the prosecution’s appeal against a ruling given by the trial
judge that those facts did not constitute an offence under s 14 or an attempt to commit
it, the Court of Appeal held that a mere request was capable of amounting to an attempt
to commit an offence under s 14, although whether there actually had been a more than
merely preparatory act to the commission of such an offence would have to be left to the
jury. It did not need to decide whether the acts constituted the substantive offence under s
14, but it stated that nothing it had said was meant to indicate that what was alleged might
not constitute the substantive offence of arranging contrary to s 14.
If a person agrees to the defendant’s request to find a child with whom the defendant
can engage in sexual activity, the defendant will have made an arrangement for the
purposes of s 14; it is not necessary for the child to agree.152
Exceptions
9.72 Section 14(2) provides that:
‘a person does not commit an offence under s 14 if:

(a) he arranges or facilitates something that he believes another person will do, but
that he does not intend to do or intend another person to do; and
(b) any offence [within ss 9 to 13] which the doing of that thing would involve would be
an offence against a child for whose protection he acts.’
Section 14(3) provides that, in this context:
‘a person acts for the protection of a child if he acts for the purpose of –
(a) protecting the child from sexually transmitted infection,
(b) protecting the physical safety of the child,
(c) preventing the child from becoming pregnant, or
(d) promoting the child’s emotional well-being by the giving of advice,
and not for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification or for the purpose of causing or
encouraging the activity constituting [an offence within ss 9 to 13] or the child’s partici-
pation in it.’
151 Ibid at [8]. 152 Robson (John Paul) [2009] EWCA Crim 1472.
Examples would be giving an under-age boy a condom (if done for the purpose of pro-
tecting the boy against a sexually transmitted infection, but not if done to protect the
boy against the risk of his 16-year-old girlfriend becoming pregnant); giving an under-
age girl, or her boyfriend, a condom (if done for the purpose of protecting her against a
sexually-transmitted infection or pregnancy); and giving advice (eg by an ‘agony aunt’ or
counsellor) to an under-age child or children about protected sex (if done for the purpose
of protection against sexually-transmitted infection, or, where the advice is given to a
girl, pregnancy, or to promote the child’s emotional well-being).
Meeting a child following sexual grooming etc

9.73 ‘Grooming’ occurs where paedophiles gain the trust and confidence of children and
thereby befriend them for their own purposes. Typically, the paedophiles have deceived
children in chatrooms into believing that they are also children or teenagers sharing the
same interests and have then arranged meetings with them with a view to engaging or
involving the child in sexual activity.
The SOA 2003, s 15(1), as amended,153 provides:

(a) A has met or communicated with another person (B) on at least two occasions and
subsequently –
(i) A intentionally meets B,
(ii) A travels with the intention of meeting B in any part of the world or arranges
to meet B in any part of the world, or
(iii) B travels with the intention of meeting A in any part of the world,
(b) A intends to do anything to or in respect of B, during or after the meeting men-
tioned in paragraph (a)(i) to (iii) and in any part of the world, which if done will
involve the commission by A of a relevant offence,
(c) B is under 16, and
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over.’
An offence under s 15 is triable either way and punishable with a maximum of 10 years’
imprisonment on conviction on indictment.154 It is a species of preparatory offence.
Although its mischief is grooming via the Internet, it is not limited to those who groom
in that way.155
9.74 The requirements of s 15(1)(a) can be expressed as follows. Having met or communi-
cated (eg by chatroom conversation or by telephone or text communication) with B (aged
under 16) on at least two earlier occasions, A (aged 18 or over) must have intentionally
met B, or arranged to meet B or travelled with the intention of meeting B. Alternatively,
after A (aged 18 or over) has met or communicated with B (aged under 16) on at least two
153 By the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Sch 15. 154 SOA 2003, s 15(4).
155 As confi rmed in HG; see para 9.74.
occasions, B must have travelled with the intention of meeting A. The effect of s 15(1)(c) is
that, if B was under 16 at the time of the previous meetings or communications, but has
had his sixteenth birthday at the time of the meeting, arranging to meet or travelling to
meet, an offence under s 15 is not committed.
The reference to A having met or communicated with B is a reference to A having met
B in any part of the world or having communicated with B by any means from, to or in
any part of the world.156 Thus, if A meets B in England and Wales157 after communicating
with her on a number of occasions from Berlin via the Internet or by telephone or after
meeting her on two occasions during a holiday in Turkey the offence can be committed.
The past meetings or communications need only amount to two; one meeting and
one communication, will do. This is a minimal requirement for an offence aimed at
grooming.
The meetings or communications need not have an explicitly sexual content. They
could consist, eg, simply of A meeting B to swap CDs or chance meetings through a
friend or chatroom conversations about ‘pop’ music. This was confirmed by the Court of
Appeal in HG.158 It stated:
‘On the face of it, the fact that the description of the offence in the heading is “meet-
ing a child following sexual grooming etc” might be taken to suggest that the behaviour
antecedent to any arranged meeting must itself be sexual in nature. The phrase “sexual
grooming”, however, does not appear in the section and although the origin of the offence
might have been a concern that paedophiles could use the internet to contact and groom
children, the language of the provision is far wider than “virtual” sexual contact. Thus,
the only requirement prior to the intentional meeting during which A (over 18) intends to
do anything to B (under 16) which, if carried out, would involve the commission by A of
a relevant offence is meeting or communication “on at least two occasions”. There is ab-
solutely no requirement that either communication be sexual in nature . . . [T]his reflects
the fact that persons in this position will (or . . . may) seek to secure the confidence of their
target by discussing innocuous issues in earlier conversation. Indeed, at that time, B need
not necessarily be a sexual target at all; the word “etc” clarifies that the heading should
not be used to derive the conclusion that the earlier meetings need be sexual. The aim of
the statute is to penalise those who use a relationship which they have developed (whether
innocently or otherwise) as a platform from which to launch sexual offending.’159
Although it is not necessary that A should actually have met (or arranged to meet) B,
A or B must at least have travelled with intent to meet the other; s 15 does not require the
journey to be completed or that a meeting (actual or intended) be pre-arranged. Thus, eg,
travelling by A with the intention of meeting B on B’s way home from school, unknown
to B, will suffice.
9.75 At the time of the meeting, or travelling, A must intend to do anything to or in respect
of B, during or after the meeting and in any part of the world, which if done will involve the
156 SOA 2003, s 15(2)(a).

157 Or outside the United Kingdom if the extra-territorial jurisdiction rules described in paras 9.123 and
9.124 are satisfied. 158 [2010] EWCA Crim 1693 (also reported as G [2011] Crim LR 340).
159 Ibid at [16].
9.77 abuse of position of trust | 363
commission by A of a relevant offence. It is this requirement which excludes those whose

conduct is innocent. A ‘relevant offence’ means an offence under the SOA 2003, Pt 1 (which
includes all the sexual offences referred to in this chapter) and also anything done outside
England and Wales which is not an offence under Pt 1 but would be if done in England and
Wales.160 Thus, an offence will be committed if A meets B in Newcastle intending to take B
to Scotland (or travels from London to Dover to meet B and to take B to France) and there to
engage in sexual activity with B which would be a Pt 1 offence if done in England and Wales.
A does not commit an offence if he reasonably believes B is 16 or over (even if B is under
13); the prosecution must prove that A does not so believe.161
Abuse of position of trust
Key points 9.3

The SOA 2003, ss 16 to 19 provide offences to deal with abuse by an adult of a position of
trust by sexually related behaviour involving a child under 18.
The prohibited behaviour in each offence is identical to that prohibited by the child
sex offences in the SOA 2003, ss 9 to 12,162 except that for the abuse of position of trust
offences the child may be 16 or 17 and, of course, the defendant must be in a position of
trust in relation to the child.
There are exceptions from these offences where the two parties are spouses or civil part-
ners and in the case of relationships which preceded the position of trust.
9.76 Sexual behaviour involving a child is inappropriate within relationships of trust.

This is not simply because the power differentials make consent problematic, but also
because such sexual behaviour is incompatible with the ethical and moral responsibil-
ities of those in a position of trust. The SOA 2003, ss 16 to 19 are designed to punish such
activity. The consent of the child is, of course, irrelevant.
The offences under ss 16 to 19 are triable either way and punishable with a maximum of
five years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.163 No distinction is drawn in any
of the offences between penetrative and non-penetrative activity.
The offences
9.77 The offences in the SOA 2003, ss 16 to 19 deal with cases where:
• A intentionally sexually touches B (s 16);

• A intentionally causes or incites B to engage in sexual activity (s 17);
160 SOA 2003, s 15(2)(b) (as amended by the Sexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Consequential Amendments
Order 2008). 161 SOA 2003, s 15(1)(d). See paras 9.9–9.11.
162 Paras 9.58-9.69. The exceptions from liability for aiding, abetting or counselling an off ence, provided by
the SOA 2003, s 73 (para 9.37), apply to the offence of intentional sexual touching referred to in para 9.77 if the
child is under 16. 163 SOA 2003, ss 16(5), 17(5), 18(5) and 19(5).
• A intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, engages in sexual

activity in the presence of B (s 18);
• A intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, causes B to watch
a sexual act (s 19), where A is in a position of trust in relation to B and B is
under 18.
Position of trust
9.78 The SOA 2003, s 21(1) provides that, for the purposes of the above offences, a person
(A) is in a position of trust in relation to another person (B) if:
• any of sub-ss (2) to (13) of s 21 applies; or
• any condition specified in an order made by the Secretary of State is met. No order
has yet been made.
9.79 Section 21(2) to (13) lists situations in which A is in a position of trust in respect of
B. These include where:
(a) A looks after persons under 18 who are detained in an institution, such as a secure
training centre or a young offenders institution, by virtue of a court order or under
an enactment, and B is so detained in that institution;
(b) A looks after persons under 18 who are resident in a home for children in residen-
tial care, and B is in residential care there;
(c) A looks after persons under 18 who are accommodated and cared for in a hospital,
a care home, a community home, or the like, and B is accommodated and cared
for in that institution;
(d) A looks after persons under 18 who are receiving full- or part-time education at
an educational institution and B is receiving, and A is not receiving, education at
that institution;
(e) A is engaged in the provision of a careers service or similar service and, in that
capacity, looks after B on an individual basis;
(f) A regularly has unsupervised contact with B (whether face to face or by any other
means) in the provision of accommodation for children in need thereof or in police
protection or detention or on remand; or
(g) B is subject to a care order, a supervision order or an education supervision order
and A looks after B on an individual basis.
‘Looking after’
9.80 For the purposes of (a), (b), (c) and (d) above, a person looks after persons under 18
at an institution or the like if he is regularly involved in caring for, training, supervising
or being in sole charge of such persons there,164 not necessarily the child abused.
164 Ibid, s 22(2).

9.83 abuse of position of trust | 365
Points (e) and (g) refer to a person looking after another on an individual basis. A
person (A) looks after another (B) on such a basis if:
(a) A is regularly involved in caring for, training or supervising B; and
(b) in the course of his involvement, A regularly has unsupervised contact with B
(whether face to face or by any other means).165
A number of other people who have (or may have) a relationship of trust with a youngster
fall outside the categories in s 21. Examples are doctors; clergymen; sports coaches; youth
and community workers; voluntary group leaders, and scout masters.
Mens rea
9.81 In addition to requiring A intentionally to do the thing specified in para 9.77, the
SOA 2003, ss 16 to 19 make further provision in a somewhat involved way as to the mens
rea required in respect of the child’s age and the existence of a position of trust.
As to age
9.82 In terms of the mens rea as to the age of the child (B), the SOA 2003, ss 16(1)(e),
17(1)(e), 18(1)(f) and 19(1)(e) provide that A must not reasonably believe that B is 18 or
over.166 However, this provision does not apply if B is under 13 at the material time; in
such a case the offences are undoubtedly ones of strict liability as to age. Although the
prosecution ultimately has the persuasive burden of proof of the requisite mens rea as to
the age of B where B is aged 13 to 17, the prosecution is assisted by ss 16(3), 17(3), 18(3) and
19(3) which all provide:
‘Where in proceedings for an offence under this section it is proved that the other person
was under 18, the defendant is to be taken not to have reasonably believed that that person
was 18 or over unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he rea-
sonably believed it.’
If such evidence is adduced, the prosecution must prove the requisite mens rea as to age.
As to position of trust
9.83 The SOA 2003, ss 16(1)(d), 17(1)(d), 18(1)(e) and 19(1)(d) deal with the mens rea
required in relation to the existence of a position of trust in cases to which sub-s (2)
of each section applies. Sections 16(2), 17(2), 18(2) and 19(2) apply where A is in a
position of trust in relation to B by virtue of circumstances within points (a) to (d) in
para 9.79, ie:
(a) B detained in an institution by virtue of a court order or under an enactment;
(b) B in residential care;
165 Ibid, s 22(3). 166 See paras 9.9–9.11.

(c) B accommodated and cared for in a hospital, care home, community home or the
like; or
(d) B receiving education at an educational institution,
and, in each case, A is not also in a position of trust by virtue of other circumstances.
These four circumstances are ones where A looks after persons under 18 at an institu-
tion and B is at that institution (but not necessarily looked after by A).
Sections 16(1)(d), 17(1)(d), 18(1)(e) and 19(1)(d) provide that in these cases, it must be
proved that A knew or could reasonably be expected to know of the circumstances by
virtue of which he is in a position of trust in relation to B. Proof of this mens rea is aided
by ss 16(4), 17(4), 18(4) and 19(4), which provide that, where it is proved that A was in a
position of trust in relation to the other person by virtue of one of the four circumstances
just referred to, and it is not proved that he was in such a position of trust by virtue of
other circumstances, it is to be presumed that A knew or could reasonably have been
expected to know of the circumstances by virtue of which he was in such a position of
trust unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he knew or
could reasonably have been expected to know of those circumstances. If such evidence is
adduced the prosecution will have to prove the mens rea as to a position of trust.
9.84 Where a position of trust arises wholly or partly by virtue of the other categories of
circumstance referred to in the SOA 2003, s 21, it does so on the basis of an individual’s
personal relationship of trust between A and B. Not surprisingly, the Act does not require
proof of any mens rea as to the position of trust where such a position of trust is involved.
Exceptions for spouses and civil partners and for

pre-existing relationships
9.85 The SOA 2003, ss 23 and 24 set out exceptions from liability for the above offences
under ss 16 to 19.
They provide that conduct by A which would otherwise be one of the above offences
against B is not such an offence if, respectively:
(a) B was 16 or over, and the defendant proves that at the time of the conduct A and B
were lawfully married or civil partners of each other;167 the defendant’s mistaken
belief that a marriage or civil partnership had been validly concluded appears to
be no defence, however reasonable it may be; or
(b) the defendant proves that immediately before the position of trust arose, a sexual
relationship existed between A and B,168 as where A and B were in a sexual rela-
tionship immediately before B became a hospital patient or pupil of A. This excep-
tion does not apply if at that time sexual intercourse between A and B would have
been unlawful, eg because B was under 16.169
167 SOA 2003, s 23(1) and (2) (as amended by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch 27). As to civil partnership
(ie registered same-sex partnership) see the Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 1. 168 SOA 2003, s 24(1), (3).
169 SOA 2003, s 24(2).
9.87 familial child sex offences | 367
9.86 Placing a persuasive burden on the defendant to prove one of the present excep-
tions would appear not to be incompatible with the presumption of innocence under the
ECHR, Article 6(2).170 If it was, it would be possible to read down the provisions under the
Human Rights Act 1998, s 3, so as to impose an evidential burden.
Familial child sex offences
Key points 9.4

The SOA 2003, ss 25 and 26 provide offences dealing with sexual activity involving two
members of a family, at least one of whom is under 18:
• sexual activity with a child family member aged under 18 (s 25); and
• inciting a child family member aged under 18 to engage in sexual activity (s 26).
The family relationships covered are widely defined.

There are exceptions from these offences where the two persons are spouses or civil
partners and in the case of relationships which preceded the family relationship.
Sexual activity with a child family member


(a) he intentionally touches171 another person (B),
(c) the relation of A to B is within s 27,
(d) A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that his relation to B is of a de-
scription falling within that section, and
(e) either –
The exceptions from liability for aiding, abetting or counselling an offence, provided by
the SOA 2003, s 73 (para 9.37), apply to an offence under s 25 if B is under 16.
Where A is 18 or over at the time of the offence and the touching involved:
(a) penetration of B’s anus or vagina with a part of A’s body or anything else;
(b) penetration of B’s mouth with A’s penis;
170 See Card, Gillespie and Hirst Sexual Offences (2008) 5.41–5.43. 171 Paras 9.46 and 9.47.
172 Para 9.6.
(c) penetration of A’s anus or vagina with part of B’s body (but not with anything else); or
(d) penetration of A’s mouth by B’s penis,173
an offence under s 25 is triable only on indictment and punishable with a maximum of 14
years’ imprisonment.174 In any other case where A was 18 or over at the material time, the
offence is triable either way. The maximum punishment on conviction on indictment is,
however, the same as in a case of penetration.175
Where A was 18 under at the material time, an offence under s 25 is triable either way and
punishable with a maximum of five years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.176
There are two separate offences under s 25:177
• sexual touching of someone under 18 in a familial relationship by someone aged 18
or over; and
• sexual touching of someone under 18 in a familial relationship by someone
under 18.
9.88 Where it is proved that the relation of A to B was of a description falling within the
SOA 2003, s 27, it is to be taken that A knew or could reasonably have been expected to
know that his relation to B was of that description unless sufficient evidence is adduced to
raise an issue as to whether A knew or could reasonably have been expected to know that
it was.178 If sufficient evidence to raise the issue is adduced, it will be for the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that A knew or could reasonably have been expected to
know that his relation to B was of a description falling within s 27. Thus, if A, adopted soon
after birth, meets B, his natural younger sister, aged 17, when he is 22 and has sexual inter-
course with her without realising that she is his natural sister, he will not be guilty under s
25 if he did not know and could not reasonably be expected to know that his relation to B
was that of brother–sister or any other prescribed relationship, but A will be taken to have
had the requisite mens rea as to familial relationship unless sufficient evidence is adduced
to raise an issue as to whether he knew or could reasonably have been expected to know
that his relation to B was of a description within s 27. If such evidence is adduced, it will be
for the prosecution to prove the requisite mens rea as to familial relationship.
9.89 The prosecution must also prove that either:
(a) B is under 18 and A did not reasonably believe179 that B was 18 or over, or
(b) B is under 13.
There can be no doubt from this formulation that where B is under 13 an offence under
s 25 (like that under s 5) is one of strict liability as to age. Otherwise, where it is proved
that the other person (ie B) was under 18, A is to be taken not to have reasonably believed
that that person was 18 or over, unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as
to whether he reasonably believed it.180
173 SOA 2003, s 25(6). As to ‘penetration’, ‘vagina’ and ‘anus’ see para 9.30.
174 Ibid, s 25(4). 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid, s 25(5).
177 Th is results from the application of the Courtie principle: para 3.50, n 122. There is nothing to rebut the
presumption to this effect. 178 SOA 2003, s 25(3).
179 Ibid, s 25(1)(e). See paras 9.9–9.11. 180 Ibid, s 25(2).
9.92 familial child sex offences | 369
Inciting a child family member to engage in

sexual activity

(a) he intentionally incites another person (B) to touch,181 or allow himself to be
touched by, A,
(c) the relation of A to B is within s 27,
(d) A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that his relation to B is of a de-
scription falling within that section, and
(e) either –
An offence under s 26 is triable and punishable in the same way as an offence under
s 25.183 There are two offences under s 26 of inciting a child family member to engage in
sexual activity (one committed by someone aged 18 or over and the other committed by
someone aged under 18).184
9.91 The mens rea in respect of the fact that the relation of A to B is within s 27 is the same
as that in s 25. Where it is proved that the relation of A to B was of a description falling
within s 27, it is to be taken that A knew or could reasonably have been expected to know
that his relation to B was of that description unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an
issue as to whether A knew or could reasonably have been expected to know that it was.185
Likewise, in respect of the mens rea in s 26(1)(e)(i) (no reasonable belief (where B is not
under 13) that B is 18 or over), where it is proved that B was under 18, A is to be taken not
to have reasonably believed that that person B was 18 or over unless sufficient evidence is
adduced to raise an issue as to whether he reasonably believed it.186 As in the case of an
offence under s 25, an offence under s 26 is one of strict liability as to age if B is under 13.
Family relationships
9.92 Under the SOA 2003, ss 25 and 26 the relation of A and B must be within s 27. The
relation of A to B is within s 27 if:
(a) it is within s 27(2) to (4), including an adoptive relationship; or
(b) it would be but for the fact that one (or both) of them is adopted.187
The effect of (b) is that the categories of relationship set out in s 27(2) to (4) continue
to apply to an adopted child’s biological family relationships if the child is adopted.
181 As to these terms, see paras 9.46, 9.56 and 9.57. 182 Para 9.6.
183 SOA 2003, s 26(4), (5) and (6). 184 Note 177 also applies here. 185 SOA 2003, s 26(3).
186 Ibid, s 26(2).
187 Ibid, s 27(1) (as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Sch 15).
Thus, contrary to the normal legal rule that an adopted child is the child of the adoptive
parent(s), and not the biological parents, a child is treated as the child of both sets of par-
ents and as the sibling of both biological and adoptive siblings.
9.93 The relation of A and B is within s 27(2) if:
‘(a) one of them is the other’s parent, grandparent, brother, sister, half-brother, half-
sister,188 aunt or uncle, or
(b) A is or has been B’s foster parent.’
‘Aunt’ means the sister or half-sister, and ‘uncle’ the brother or half-brother, of a person’s
parent.189
9.94 The relation of A to B is within s 27(3):
‘if A and B live or have lived in the same household, or A is or has been regularly involved
in caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of B, and –
(a) one of them is or has been the other’s step-parent,190
(b) A and B are cousins,
(c) one of them is or has been the other’s stepbrother or stepsister,191 or
(d) the parent or present or former foster parent of one of them is or has been the
other’s foster parent.’
A ‘step-parent’ includes someone who is neither married to, nor the civil partner of, a par-
ent, if that person is a parent’s ‘partner’.192 This is not as wide as may at first seem because a
person is another’s ‘partner’ (whether they are of different sexes or the same sex) only if they
live together as partners in an enduring family relationship.193 In s 27(3)(b), ‘cousin’ means
the child of an ‘aunt’ or ‘uncle’, as defined above.194 In s 27(3)(c), ‘stepbrother’ and ‘stepsister’
are not limited to the case where one child’s parent is married to, or the civil partner of, the
parent of the other child; the terms include the child of a parent’s ‘partner’,195 as defined
above. Section 27(3)(d) refers to foster siblings. Like step-siblings they are particularly vul-
nerable to peer sexual abuse when they live, or have lived, in the same household.
For a case to fall within s 27(3) something more is required than the simple relationship
referred to in s 27(3)(a) to (d); A and B must live or have lived in the same household, or
A must be or have been regularly involved in caring for, training or supervising or being
in sole charge of B. It is not enough, eg, simply for A to be the partner of B’s parent or a
cousin of B.
188 Ie a son or daughter of either of one’s parents by another partner. 189 SOA 2003, s 27(5)(a).
190 In (a) and (c) references to a step-parent or stepbrother/stepsister are to be read as follows: the step-parent
of a person (X) includes someone who is the civil partner of X’s parent (but is not X’s parent), and X’s step-
brother/stepsister includes someone who is the son/daughter of the civil partner of X’s parent (but is not the
son/daughter of either of X’s parents): Civil Partnership Act 2004, ss 246, 247, Sch 21 (amended by the Civil
Partnership Act 2004 (Relationships Arising Through Civil Partnership) Order 2005). 191 See n 190.
192 SOA 2003, s 27(5)(e). 193 Ibid, s 27(5)(d). 194 Ibid, s 27(5)(b). 195 Ibid, s 27(5)(e).
9.98 sex with an adult relative | 371
9.95 The relation of A and B is within s 27(4) if:
‘(a) A and B live in the same household, and

(b) A is regularly involved in caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge
of B.’
The definition in s 27(4)(a) can be satisfied by someone who would not normally be
regarded as being in a family relationship with other members of the household, eg a
lodger or au pair.
Exceptions for spouses and civil partners and

for pre-existing relationships
9.96 Conduct by A which would otherwise be an offence under the SOA 2003, ss 25 or
26 against B is not an offence if one of the two following exceptions apply. The exceptions
correspond (the second broadly) with those which apply to offences of abuse of trust.196
9.97 The first exception is that B is 16 or over at the time of the conduct and A and B
are lawfully married or civil partners of each other at that time.197 It is for the defendant
to prove that A and B were lawfully married or civil partners at the time.198 A’s mistaken
belief that a marriage or civil partnership has been validly concluded is apparently no
defence, however reasonable the mistake.
9.98 The second exception is where the defendant proves that:
• the relation of A to B is not within s 27(2);

• where A or B (or both) is adopted, the relationship would not be within s 27(2) if
there had been no adoption; and
• immediately before the relation of A to B first became such as to fall within s 27, a
sexual relationship existed between A and B.199
This does not apply if immediately before the relation of A to B first became such as to fall
within s 27 sexual intercourse between A and B would have been unlawful,200 as where
B was under 16.
Sex with an adult relative
Key points 9.5

The SOA 2003, ss 64 and 65 provide offences to deal with those who engage in consen-
sual penetrative sex with an adult relative.
196 Para 9.85. 197 SOA 2003, s 28(1) (as amended by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch 27).
198 Ibid. 199 SOA 2003, s 29(1), (3). 200 Ibid, s 29(2).
9.99 By s 64(1):

(a) he intentionally penetrates another person’s vagina or anus with a part of his body
or anything else, or penetrates another person’s mouth with his penis,201
(b) the penetration is sexual,
(c) the other person (B) is aged 18 or over,
(d) A is related to B in a way mentioned in subs (2), and
(e) A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that he is related to B in that
way.’

(a) another person (B) penetrates A’s vagina or anus with a part of B’s body or anything
else, or penetrates A’s mouth with B’s penis,
(b) A consents202 to the penetration,
(c) the penetration is sexual,203
(d) B is aged 18 or over,
(e) A is related to B in a way mentioned in subs (2), and
(f) A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that he is related to B in that
way.’
Both offences are triable either way and punishable with a maximum of two years’
9.100 Sections 64(2) and 65(2) define the ways that A may be related to B. The list of
relationships is much narrower than the list which applies to offences under ss 25 and 26.
The ways that A and B may be related to each other for the purposes of ss 64 and 65 are:
as a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle,
aunt, nephew or niece. ‘Uncle’ means the brother of a person’s parent, and ‘aunt’ has a
corresponding meaning. Consequent on the definition of ‘uncle’ and ‘aunt’, ‘nephew’ and
‘niece’ mean the child of a person’s brother or sister.205
Subject to what is said below, where a person is adopted, adoptive relationships are
excluded from the application of s 64 or s 65 but biological ones are not. Thus, an offence
is not committed where, eg, A and B are adoptive brother and sister, adoptive grand-
parent and grandchild or adoptive uncle and niece. There is an exception in respect of
penetration involving an adoptive parent and his or her adopted child. This is because
ss 64(3) and 65(3) each provide that ‘parent’ includes an adoptive parent and that ‘child’
201 See paras 9.30 and 9.32. 202 Paras 9.12–9.28. 203 Para 9.6
204 SOA 2003, ss 64(5) and 65(5). 205 Ibid, ss 64(3) and 65(3).
9.101 offences against people with a mental disorder | 373
includes an adopted person.206 However, s 64(3A) and s 65(3A)207 each go on to provide

that, where s 64(1) or s 65(1) applies in a case where A is related to B as B’s child by virtue
of being B’s adopted child, A does not commit an offence under s 64(1) or s 65(1), as the
case may be, unless A is 18 or over.208
Unlike the corresponding provisions in s 25, ss 64 and 65 are limited to penetrative
sexual activity. The requirement that a penetration be sexual is clearly going to be satis-
fied with ease where the penetration is by a penis. In the case of other penetration, it will
depend on the circumstances. An example of a case where the requirement would serve
to exclude conduct from the offence would be where one sibling helps another to insert a
pessary for medical reasons.
9.101 In terms of the requirement that the prosecution must prove that the defendant
(A) knew or could reasonably be expected to know that he is related to B in a way men-
tioned in s 64(2) or s 65(2), as the case may be, s 64(4) and s 65(4) provide an evidential
presumption in identical terms. They provide:
‘Where in proceedings for an offence under this section it is proved that the defendant
was related to the other person in any of [the ways prescribed by s 64(2) or s 65(2), as the
case may be], it is to be taken that the defendant knew or could reasonably be expected to
know that he was related in that way unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue
as to whether he knew or could reasonably be expected to know that he was.’
Offences against people with a mental

disorder
Key points 9.6

The SOA 2003, ss 30 to 41 provide a range of offences specifically aimed at protect-
ing people with a mental disorder (whether permanent or temporary). The offences are
grouped as follows under three headings:
• offences against persons with a mental disorder impeding choice (ss 30 to 33);
• inducements etc to persons with a mental disorder (ss 34 to 37); and
• offences by care workers against persons with a mental disorder (ss 38 to 41).
Conduct may well fall within more than one of these groups of offences.
206 Ibid, ss 64(3)(za), (zb), 65(3)(za), (zb) (inserted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008,
Sch 15).
207 Inserted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Sch 15.
208 By the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010, reg 5 and Sch 4, any ref-
erence in SOA 2003, s 64 or 65 to an adoptive relationship is to be read as including a reference to the correspond-
ing relationship arising by virtue of a parental order made under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act 2008. Such an order may be granted by a court in respect of a child who is born as a result of a surrogacy
arrangement and who is the genetic child of at least one of the applicants for the parental order. It provides that
the surrogate child in question is to be treated in law as the child of the applicants.
9.102 For the purposes of these offences, ‘mental disorder’ has the meaning given by the
Mental Health Act 1983, s 1,209 viz ‘any disorder or disability of the mind’.210
Offences against persons with a mental disorder

impeding choice
9.103 The offences in the SOA 2003, ss 30 to 33 deal with cases where:
• A intentionally touches B sexually, a person with a mental disorder (s 30);211

• A intentionally causes or incites B, a person with a mental disorder, to engage in
sexual activity (s 31);
• A intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, engages in sexual activity
in the presence of B, a person with a mental disorder (s 32);
• A intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, causes B, a person with a
person with a mental disorder, to watch a sexual act (s 33),
and, because B has a mental disorder or for a reason related to it, B is unable to refuse.
Each offence requires that A knows or could reasonably be expected to know that B has a
mental disorder and that because of it or for a reason related to it B is likely to be unable
to refuse.
The offence under s 30 or an offence under s 31 of ‘intentionally causing’ might be
thought to be redundant because of its apparent overlap with the non-consensual sexual
offences under the SOA 2003, ss 1 to 4, because if B is unable to refuse under s 30 or s 31,
B will also lack capacity to consent under ss 1 to 4. However, this is not so because the
definition of inability to refuse covers some people who have capacity to consent (see
para 9.108), and because the mens rea may be easier to prove.
9.104 Where a person is unable to refuse because of a mental disorder there is a direct
causal link between the disorder and the inability to refuse. The alternative, that a person
is unable to refuse consent for a reason related to a mental disorder, widens the test to cover
other people who are equally vulnerable. This is because the alternative covers people
who are unable to refuse partly for a reason other than the fact of their mental disorder as
such but related to their mental disorder. One example would be where someone taking
medication for a mental disorder was rendered unable to refuse. Another would be where
someone has spent all his life in an institutional environment, and has become very com-
pliant with requests that staff make of him, or has had no opportunity to become aware
of what sexual activity entails, or does not know that there is a choice to be made when it
comes to engaging in sexual activity.
9.105 An offence under s 30 or s 31 is triable only on indictment and punishable with
a maximum of life imprisonment if penetration212 is involved.213 Otherwise the above
209 As amended by the Mental Health Act 2007, s 1. 210 SOA 2003, s 79(6).
211 The exceptions from liability for aiding, abetting or counselling an offence, provided by the SOA 2003,
s 73 (para 9.37), apply to an offence under s 30 if B is under 16.
212 Ie in the same way as in SOA 2003, s 25(6): see para 9.87 at n 173. 213 SOA 2003, ss 30(3), 31(3).
offences are triable either way and punishable with a maximum of 14 years’ imprison-
ment (ss 30 and 31) or 10 years’ (ss 32 and 33).214
9.106 Subsection (2) of each section defines what is meant by the requirement of
inability to refuse in the context of the particular section in terms of:
(a) the absence of the capacity to choose whether to agree to the material conduct; or
(b) inability to communicate such a choice to the defendant.
9.107 Absence of the capacity to choose whether to agree to the material conduct Under
this heading, ss 30(2)(a) and 31(2)(a) provide that B is unable to refuse if:
‘he lacks the capacity to choose whether to agree to the [material conduct]215 (whether
because he lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or foreseeable consequences of
what is being done, or for any other reason).’
Sections 32(2)(a) and 33(2)(a) make the same provision in respect to the material
conduct,216 except that (for obvious reasons) they do not contain the words ‘or foreseeable
consequences of what is being done’.
Further explanation of ‘inability to refuse’ was given in C,217 where the House of Lords
was concerned with s 30(2). B was a 28-year-old woman with schizo-affective disorder and
an emotionally unstable personality disorder. The effects and manifestations of the disorders
were intermittent. B had met A while she was suffering from a relapse. B was in a distressed,
agitated state, and told A that she wanted to leave the area in which she was living for her
own safety. B alleged that A offered to help her and took her to his friend’s house, where she
was given crack cocaine and asked by A to engage in a sexual activity. B stated that she had
been ‘really panicky and afraid’ and had wanted to leave the premises, but that, through fear
of death, she had stayed and complied with A’s request. In his summing up, the trial judge
stated that B would have been unable to refuse to consent under s 30(2)(a) if she lacked the
capacity to choose whether to agree to the sexual touching ‘for any reason’, which included
an irrational fear or such confusion of mind arising from her mental disorder that she felt
unable to refuse any request by A for sex. The Court of Appeal allowed A’s appeal against con-
viction. It held that an irrational fear resulting from a mental disorder could not be equated
with a lack of capacity to choose. It further ruled in respect of s 30(2)(a) that a lack of capacity
to choose to agree to sexual activity could not be person-specific or situation-specific. The
House of Lords allowed the prosecution’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision.
The House held that the words ‘for any other reason’ in s 30(2)(a) were clearly cap-
able of encompassing a wide range of circumstances in which a person’s mental disorder
might rob him or her of the ability to make an autonomous choice, even though he or
she might have sufficient understanding of the information relevant to making it. Those
circumstances could include the kind of compulsion which drove a person with anorexia
214 Ibid, ss 30(4), 31(4), 32(3), 33(3).

215 Ie the touching (s 30) or engaging in the activity caused or incited (s 31).
216 Ie being present (s 32) or watching or looking (s 33).
217 [2009] UKHL 42 (reported elsewhere as Cooper).
to refuse food, the delusions which drove a person with schizophrenia to believe that she
had to do something, or the phobia or irrational fear which drove a person to refuse a life-
saving injection. Irrational fear plainly was capable of depriving a person of capacity; the
question was whether it did in a particular case. The Court of Appeal had therefore been
wrong in holding that an irrational fear that prevented the exercise of choice could not be
equated with a lack of capacity to choose.
As noted in para 9.16, the House of Lords held in C that capacity to choose in s 30(2)(a)
can be ‘person-specific’ or ‘situation-specific’ as well as ‘act-specific’. It stated that, once
it was accepted that choice was an exercise of free will, and that a mental disorder might
rob a person of free will in a number of different ways, and in a number of different situ-
ations, then a mentally disordered person might be quite capable of exercising choice in
one situation but not in another.
As can be seen, this first type of inability to refuse amounts to the same thing as
inability to consent.
9.108 Inability to communicate choice Sections 30(2)(b), 31(2)(b), 32(2)(b) and 33(2)(b)
each provide, as an alternative, that B is unable to refuse if he is unable to communicate
a choice whether to agree to the material conduct. This second type of inability to refuse
covers people who may be able to make a choice but are unable, because of mental dis-
order or a reason related to it, to communicate it. In C, the trial judge had also directed
the jury that B would have been unable to refuse under s 30(2)(b) if, through her mental
disorder, she was unable to communicate that choice to A, even if she was physically
able to communicate with him. The Court of Appeal held that this was wrong; s 30(2)
(b) required that B was physically unable to communicate because of or by reason of
mental disorder. The House of Lords disagreed; it was quite clear that in the SOA 2003,
Parliament had had in mind an inability to communicate which was the result of or asso-
ciated with a disorder of the mind. There was no warrant at all for limiting it to a physical
inability to communicate. (In a case of physical inability to communicate, a rebuttable
presumption of the absence of consent arises under s 75(2) and there can alternatively be
a conviction of the appropriate offence under ss 1 to 4 where the defendant’s conduct falls
within s 30 or (in a case of ‘intentionally causing’) s 31.)
Hulme v DPP 218 provides an example of a case falling within head (b) which did not
involve physical inability to communicate. B, a woman aged 27, suffered from cerebral
palsy and had a mental age well below 27. A touched B on her private parts and caused
her to touch his penis. A was convicted of sexual activity with a person with a mental
disorder impeding choice, contrary to s 30. On appeal to the Divisional Court by case
stated, the question was whether there was evidence on which the magistrates could
conclude that B was unable to refuse to be touched sexually. The Divisional Court
answered ‘yes’. Although the magistrates’ fi ndings indicated that B did not want A
to act in the way that he did (ie she was capable of choosing whether to agree to his
conduct), their fi ndings also indicated that B was unable effectively to communicate
her choice to A because of her mental condition. There was evidence to support that
fi nding because:
218 [2006] EWHC 1347 (Admin), DC.

• in her evidence, B had said that when A touched her private parts and pressing hard,
she did not know what to do or say, and that, said the Divisional Court, could only
reasonably be because of her mental condition; and
• in her evidence, B had said that when she touched A’s penis she did so because A
made her and because he wanted her to, although she did not want to, and that,
said the Divisional Court, was explicable on the basis that, because of her mental
condition, B was unable effectively to communicate her wishes in the way that
a woman of 27, not suffering from her disabilities, would have done in similar
circumstances.
Because there was evidence to support the finding, A’s conviction was proper.
9.109 As can be seen from the list of offences, each of the offences in the SOA 2003, ss 30
to 33 is concerned with a different type of sexually related conduct, each type of which
replicates the type of conduct dealt with by each of the sections dealing with child sex
offences (ss 9 to 12) and abuse of trust offences (ss 16 to 19).
Inducement, threat or deception to a person with a

mental disorder
9.110 The SOA 2003, ss 34 to 37 provide the following offences under this heading:
• intentionally touching sexually a person with a mental disorder with that person’s
agreement, where that agreement is obtained by inducement, threat or deception
(s 34);219
• intentionally causing a person with a mental disorder to engage in or agree to engage
in sexual activity by inducement, threat or deception (s 35);
• intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, engaging in sexual activity
in the presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of a person with a
mental disorder (s 36); and
• intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, causing a person with a
mental disorder to watch a sexual act by inducement, threat or deception (s 37).
These offences require that the defendant knows or could reasonably be expected to know
of the person’s mental disorder.
9.111 The key difference between these offences and those in ss 30 to 33 is that in these
offences it is not necessary to prove that the mentally disordered person (B) was unable
to refuse. Indeed it is an element of each offence that B agrees. Instead, it is necessary
to prove that B’s agreement was procured by the defendant by inducement, threat or
deception. It is this element which puts the ‘sting’ in what has occurred in respect of
a person whose mental disorder may not be of the same depth as that required for an
offence under ss 30 to 33.
s 73 (para 9.37), apply to an offence under s 34 if the mentally disordered person is under 16.
9.112 An offence under s 34 or s 35 is triable only on indictment and punishable with

a maximum of life imprisonment if penetration220 is involved.221 Otherwise the above
ment (ss 34 and 35) or 10 years’ (ss 36 and 37).222
Offences by care workers with persons with

a mental disorder
9.113 A person with a mental disorder but who nevertheless has the capacity to consent
to sexual activity may not be able to make rational decisions about sexual relationships
and, because of familiarity with, and dependency on, a carer may be likely to be strongly
influenced by such a person. Mentally disordered people are, therefore, vulnerable to
sexual exploitation by their carers because their sexual autonomy – the right to choose
whether or not to engage in sexual activity – is constrained in such a situation.
9.114 The SOA 2003, ss 38 to 41 create a set of offences to deal with care workers who
involve persons with a mental disorder in sexual activity in a range of ways. The offences
in ss 38 to 41 are particularly important where the mentally disordered person is over
the age of legal consent (or, if aged 16 or 17, there is no relationship of trust, as defined
by the SOA 2003, s 21), so that there may not be any other criminal liability for involving
the victim in sexual activity.
The offences mirror those offences under ss 9 to 12 and ss 16 to 19 relating to an abuse
of trust in respect of a child. The offences are:
• care worker intentionally touching sexually a person with a mental disorder
(s 38);223
• care worker intentionally causing or inciting sexual activity with a person with a
mental disorder (s 39);
• care worker intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, engaging in
sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder (s 40); and
• care worker intentionally, and for the purpose of sexual gratification, causing a
person with a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act (s 41).
The offences require that the care worker knows or could reasonably be expected to know
of the person’s mental disorder.
There is no need to prove that the care worker exercised any form of undue influence.
An offence under s 38 or s 39 is triable only on indictment and punishable with a max-
imum of 14 years’ imprisonment if penetration 224 is involved.225 Otherwise the above
ment (ss 38 and 39) or seven years’ (ss 40 and 41).226
220 Ie in the same way as in the SOA 2003, s 25(6): see para 9.87 at n 175.
221 SOA 2003, ss 34(2), 35(2). 222 Ibid, ss 34(3), 35(3), 36(2), 37(2).
s 73 (para 9.37), apply to an offence under s 38 if the mentally disordered person is under 16.
224 Ie in the same way as in SOA 2003, s 25(6): see para 9.87 at n 175. 225 SOA 2003, ss 38(3), 39(3).
226 Ibid, ss 38(4), 39(4), 40(3), 41(3).
Care worker
9.115 The offences under ss 38 to 41 are concerned with the situation where a person (A)
is involved in the care of another person (B), a person with a mental disorder, in a way
which falls within the SOA 2003, s 42. For this purpose, a person (A) is involved in the
care of another (B) (‘care worker’ for short) if s 42(2), (3) or (4) applies.227 The definition
of a care worker is a wide one.
9.116 Section 42(2) applies if:
‘(a) B is accommodated and cared for in a care home, community home, voluntary
home or children’s home, and
(b) A has functions to perform in the home in the course of employment which have
brought him or are likely to bring him into regular face to face contact with B.’
An example would be where A is a member of staff at a care home and B is a resident there.
The requirement of ‘regular face to face contact’ will have the effect of excluding people
whose functions in the home do not bring them into regular face to face contact with B,
eg, a finance officer.
9.117 Section 42(3) applies:
‘if B is a patient for whom services are provided –

(a) by a National Health Service body or an independent medical agency,
(b) in or,
(c) in Wales, in an independent clinic,
and A has functions to perform for the body or agency or in the clinic or hospital in the
course of employment which have brought A or are likely to bring A into regular face to
face contact with B.’
This definition deals with cases where B is not a resident in a care home or children’s
home but is an in- or out-patient at a hospital etc. An example would be where B attends
a clinic every week and A is a receptionist there whom B sees every week.
9.118 Section 42(4) applies if A:
‘(a) is, whether or not in the course of employment, a provider of care, assistance or
services to B in connection with B’s mental disorder, and
(b) as such, has had or is likely to have regular face to face contact with B.’
‘Care, assistance or services’ is a wide description. It would, eg, include someone pro-
viding training, a complementary therapist, a psychotherapist or a volunteer counsellor.
This definition is of particular importance where B is not being cared for in any form of
institution but lives at home.
227 Ibid, s 42(1).
Exceptions for spouses and civil partners and for pre-existing relationships
9.119 Like the abuse of trust offences, two exceptions are provided from the offences
under the SOA 2003, ss 38 to 41. The exceptions are set out in the SOA 2003, ss 43 and 44,
which provide that conduct by A which would otherwise be an offence under ss 38 to 41
against B is not such an offence if respectively:
(a) B was 16 or over at the time of the conduct and the defendant proves that A and
B were lawfully married or civil partners at that time.228 This exemption applies
even if the marriage or registration of the civil partnership only took place after the
care relationship began;229 or
(b) the defendant proves that immediately before A became involved in B’s care
in a way falling within s 42, a sexual relationship existed between A and B, 230
as where A and B were in a sexual relationship before B became a patient at the
care home where A works. Th is exception does not apply if at that time – ie the
‘immediately before’ time – sexual intercourse between A and B would have
been unlawful, 231 eg because B was under 16 or was A’s granddaughter who had
a learning disability.
It follows from (b) that, although a care worker who starts an affair with a mentally dis-
ordered patient a day after he starts a job at a care home can be convicted of an offence
under s 38, a care worker who was involved in a sexual relationship with such a person
when he became her care worker cannot, even if he became a care worker in order to have
better access to, and influence over, that person.
Preparatory offences
9.120 The SOA 2003, ss 61 to 63 provide preparatory offences of:
(a) intentionally administering a substance to, or causing a substance to be taken

by, 232 another person (B), knowing that B does not consent, and with the intention
of stupefying or overpowering B so as to enable any person to engage in sexual233
activity involving B (s 61), eg putting a date rape drug in a woman’s drink with the
necessary intent;
(b) committing an offence with intent to commit a relevant sexual offence (s 62);
and
228 Ibid, s 43(1) and (2) (as amended by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch 27).
229 A’s mistaken belief that he is lawfully married to B, or that a civil partnership with B has been legally
registered, is apparently no defence, however reasonable the mistake.
230 SOA 2003, s 44(1) and (3). 231 Ibid, s 44(2).
232 As to ‘administering’ and ‘causing to be taken’, see paras 7.114, 7.115 and 7.117.
233 See para 9.6.
9.121 other offences | 381
(c) knowingly or recklessly trespassing234 on any premises235 with intent to commit a

relevant sexual offence (s 63).
In respect of s 62, obvious examples of an offence which may be committed with intent to
commit a relevant sexual offence are kidnapping and false imprisonment but it is possible
to think of a wide range of other offences which could be committed with that intent. The
principal reason for the offence under s 62 is to make notification requirements which
apply to sex offenders (‘signing on the sex offenders’ register’) applicable to people who
are convicted of the offence.
For the purposes of ss 62 and 63, a ‘relevant sexual offence’ is any offence under the SOA
2003, Pt 1 (ss 1 to 79), ie any of the offences under the SOA 2003 referred to in this chapter,
including aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring such an offence.236
Of course, the intended sexual activity or sexual offence referred to in ss 61 to 63 need
not occur or be committed, as the case may be, or be attempted. However, proof of the ne-
cessary intent may be difficult if the defendant has not got near to attempting the sexual
activity or offence.
Other examples of preparatory offences in the Act are the offences of arranging or
facilitating the commission of a child sexual offence, contrary to s 14 (in some of its appli-
cations) and meeting a child etc following sexual grooming etc, contrary to s 15. These
preparatory offences bite at an earlier point of time than the law of attempt in relation
to the intended sexual offence (and therefore catch people who are thwarted or give up
before getting as far as an attempt).
The offences under ss 61 to 63 are, with one exception, triable either way and punish-
able with a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. The exception is that if an offence under
s 62 involves false imprisonment or kidnapping with intent to commit a sexual offence it
is triable only on indictment and punishable with life imprisonment.
Other offences
9.121 The SOA 2003 also contains offences relating to:
• abuse of children through prostitution and pornography (ss 47 to 50);

• exploitation of prostitution (ss 52 and 53);
• trafficking for sexual exploitation (ss 57 to 60);
• exposure (s 66);
234 As to ‘trespassing’, see para 11.6. Unlike burglary the entry to the premises need not be as a trespasser, so
that the offence can be committed by someone who enters lawfully but becomes a trespasser when his permis-
sion to be there terminates.
235 ‘Premises’ is not limited to a building. It can include land in the open air, so that a playing field or school
playground is included. In addition, ‘premises’ includes a structure or part of a structure, and ‘structure’ includes
a tent, vehicle or vessel or other temporary or movable structure: s 63(2).
236 SOA 2003, ss 62(2), 63(2).
• voyeurism (ss 67 to 68);

• intercourse with an animal (s 69);
• sexual penetration of a corpse (s 70); and
• sexual activity in a public lavatory (s 71).
By the Protection of Children Act 1978, s 1 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 160
there are offences relating to:
• taking, making, distributing, showing or possession with intent to distribute or
show (1978 Act, s 1), or
• possessing (1988 Act, s 160)
an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of a child.
Jurisdiction over paedophile offences

outside the United Kingdom
Key points 9.7

The normal rule that our courts only have jurisdiction over offences committed in England
and Wales237 would result in an unacceptable gap in the law in respect of those who or-
ganise or engage in ‘sex tourism’, ie a practice whereby adults, usually male, visit under-
developed countries for sexual pleasure on a commercial basis with young children.
Statute has intervened to correct this defect. The principal provision is SOA 2003, s 72.
Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act 1996

9.122 A modest approach to deal with the problem of jurisdiction was made by the Sexual
Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement) Act 1996, which extended the jurisdiction of the
courts of England and Wales to conspiracy or incitement in England and Wales to com-
mit outside the United Kingdom one of a number of specified sexual offences238 against
a person under 16. The provisions of the Act relating to conspiracy were repealed 239 in
1998 and subsumed within the Criminal Law Act 1977, s 1A, dealt with in para 14.77.
The provisions about incitement (which offence was abolished by the Serious Crime Act
2007, s 59) now apply in respect of an offence of encouragement or assistance of crime.240
However, they were rendered largely otiose by a much more extensive provision now con-
tained in the SOA 2003, s 72 and Sch 2. The Sexual Offences (Conspiracy and Incitement)
237 Key points 1.3.
238 As a result of an amendment by the SOA 2003, the specified offences are those under the SOA 2003,
ss 1–12, 14–26. 239 By the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, Sch 2.
240 References to incitement in the 1996 Act have effect instead as references to the offence of encouraging or
assisting crime contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2: Serious Crime Act 2007, s 63(1), Sch 6, Pt 1.
9.123 jurisdiction over paedophile offences outside uk | 383
Act 1996 continues to be the only available provision to deal with the case of the defend-
ant’s encouragement or assistance in this country of the commission abroad of a specified
sexual offence by a foreign national who is not resident in the United Kingdom 241 and
who would not himself be subject to English criminal law were he to act as the defendant
encourages or assists him to do.
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 72

9.123 The SOA 2003, s 72, as substituted and amended in 2008, 242 provides:
‘(1) If –
(a) United Kingdom national does an act in a country outside the United Kingdom,
and
(b) the act, of done in England and Wales, would constitute a sexual offence to
which this section applies,
the United Kingdom national is guilty in England and Wales of that sexual
offence.
(2) If –
(a) a United Kingdom resident does an act in a country outside the United
Kingdom,
(b) the act constitutes an offence under the law in force in that country, and
(c) the act, if done in England and Wales, would constitute a sexual offence to
which this section applies,
the United Kingdom resident is guilty in England and Wales of that sexual
offence.
(3) If –
(a) a person does an act in a country outside the United Kingdom at a time when
the person was not a United Kingdom national or a United Kingdom resident,
(b) the act constituted an offence under the law in force in that country,
(c) the act, if done in England and Wales, would have constituted a sexual offence
to which this section applies, and
(d) the person meets the residence or nationality condition at the relevant time,
proceedings may be brought against the person in England and Wales for that
sexual offence as if the person had done the act there.
(4) The person meets the residence or nationality condition at the relevant time if the
person is a United Kingdom national or a United Kingdom resident at the time
when the proceedings are brought.’
For the above purposes, a ‘United Kingdom national’ is defined by the SOA 2003, s 72(9)
as an individual who is –
241 And who has not become a United Kingdom national or resident by (and at) the time proceedings are
brought.
242 As substituted by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 72(1), and amended by the Sexual
Offences (Northern Ireland Consequential Amendments) Order 2008.
(a) a British citizen, a British Overseas Territories citizen, a British National (Overseas)
or a British Overseas citizen;
(b) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 is a British subject; or
(c) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act.
Country’ includes territory (s72(9)).
In respect of the condition in s 72(2)(b) or s 72(3)(b) there is a presumption that it is
satisfied unless the defence serves on the prosecution a notice stating that in their opinion
it is not satisfied, and giving the grounds for that opinion. If this is done, the prosecution
must prove that the condition is satisfied.243 In the Crown Court, whether the condition
is satisfied is to be decided by the judge alone.244
9.124 The list of offences to which the SOA 2003, s 72 applies is contained in Sch 2 to the
SOA 2003.245 The offences are restricted (either by their own requirements or by Sch 2) to
offences involving a person under 18, except where 16 (or 13) is the upper limit in respect
of the offence itself. Schedule 2 provides that the following are sexual offences to which
s 72 applies:
• an offence under any of the following sections of the SOA 2003:
– s 5 (rape of a child under 13);
– s 6 (assault of a child under 13 by penetration);
– s 7 (sexual assault of a child under 13);
– s 8 (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity);
– s 9 (sexual activity with a child);
– s 10 (causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity);
– s 11 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child);
– s 12 (causing a child to watch a sexual act);
– s 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons);
– s 14 (arranging or facilitating commission of a child sex offence);
– s 15 (meeting a child following sexual grooming etc);
– ss 16 to 19 (offences of abuse of position of trust);
– ss 25 and 26 (familial child sex offences);
– ss 47 to 50 (abuse of children through prostitution or child pornography);
• an offence under any of the following sections of the SOA 2003:
– s 1 (rape);
– s 2 (assault by penetration);
– s 3 (sexual assault);
– s 4 (causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent);
– ss 30 to 41 (offences against persons with a mental disorder impeding choice,
offences relating to inducements etc to persons with a mental disorder, and
offences committed by care workers with such persons);
243 SOA 2003, s 72(6). 244 Ibid, s 72(8).

245 As amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 72(2), (3), and the Order referred to in
n 242.
9.124 jurisdiction over paedophile offences outside uk | 385
– s 61 (administering a substance with intent),

where the victim of the offence was under 18 at the time of the offence;
• an offence under the SOA 2003, s 62 or s 63 (committing offence with intent to com-
mit a sexual offence or trespass with intent to commit a sexual offence, respectively),
where the intended offence was an offence against a person under 18; and
• an offence under the Protection of Children Act 1978, s 1 (taking, making, distribu-
tion etc of indecent photographs of children), or the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 160
(possession of indecent photograph of child).
References to one of these offences also include a reference to an attempt, a conspiracy, or
an encouragement or assistance,246 to commit that offence and to secondary participa-
tion in it (aiding, abetting, etc), so that extra-territorial jurisdiction also exists under s 72
in respect of such activities.
FURTHER READING
Card, Gillespie and Hirst Sexual Offences JR Spencer ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003:
(2008) Child and Family Offences’ [2004] Crim
Elvin ‘The Concept of Consent under the LR 347
Sexual Offences Act 2003’ (2008) 72 JCL Temkin Rape and the Legal Process (2002)
519 Temkin and Ashworth ‘The Sexual Offences
Power ‘Towards a Redefinition of the Mens Act 2003: Rape, Sexual Assault and the
Rea of Rape’ (2003) 23 OJLS 379 Problems of Consent’ [2004] Crim LR 328
Rook and Ward Sexual Offences: Law and Wallerstein ‘A Drunken Consent is Still
Practice (4th edn, 2010) Consent – Or is It?’ (2009) 73 JCL 318
246 SOA 2003, Sch 2 refers to ‘incitement’ but this now has effect as a reference to an offence of encouraging or
assisting crime contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2: Serious Crime Act 2007, s 63(1), Sch 6, Pt 1.
10
Theft and related offences
OVERVIEW
The Theft Act 1968 and what remains of the Theft Act 1978 are dealt with in this and the next
chapter. This chapter deals with theft and the following related offences:
• robbery;
• removal of an article from a place open to the public;
• taking a conveyance;
• aggravated vehicle-taking; and
• making off without payment.
10.1 Before the Theft Act 1968 came into force, the law concerning theft and related
offences (almost wholly contained in the Larceny Act 1916) was quite different. It is for-
tunately unnecessary to say anything about it because the Theft Act 1968, which is based
on the Eighth Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee,1 and what remains of
the Theft Act 1978 are an entirely new code. Together with the Theft Act 1978, the Theft
Act 1968 also made provision for a number of offences involving deception. These have
been repealed by the Fraud Act 2006 and replaced by an offence of fraud and an offence of
obtaining services dishonestly, which are dealt with in Chapter 12. The offence of making
off without payment is the only offence under the Theft Act 1978 which survives.
Theft
Key points 10.1

Theft is governed by the Theft Act 1968 (TA 1968), ss 1 to 7.2 The TA 1968, s 1(1) provides
that:
‘A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another

with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it . . . ’
1 Theft and Related Offences (Cmnd 2977) (1966).

2 For special rules relating to jurisdiction over theft , see paras 12.69–12.71.
10.3 actus reus of theft | 
10.2 Theft is triable either way.3 By the TA 1968, s 7, it is punishable with a maximum of
seven years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.
The actus reus of theft is the appropriation of property belonging to another. The
mens rea is dishonesty coupled with the intention of permanently depriving the other
of the property appropriated.
Actus reus of theft
Appropriation
Key points 10.2
An appropriation of property:
• involves an assumption of any of the rights of the owner;

• need not have any effect on the property or the owner’s enjoyment of it;
• may occur even though the owner consents to or authorises what the defendant (D)
does;
• may occur:
– simply by taking possession of the property; or
– even though D is already in possession of the property; or
– even though D never possesses the property; or
– even though what D does with the property is not unlawful in civil law; or
– even though D acquires a right to the property which cannot be annulled in civil
law;
• cannot occur simply by deceiving someone (V) into doing something with V’s
property.
10.3 The TA 1968, s 3(1) provides that:
‘Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and

this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it,
any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner.’
As will be seen, this provision has been interpreted by the House of Lords in ways which
give ‘appropriation’ a very wide meaning and which seem inconsistent with the clear
meaning of s 3(1) but which must be accepted as binding.

 | 10.4 theft and related offences
Assumption of any of the rights of the owner

10.4 The essence of the TA 1968, s 3(1) is an ‘assumption . . . of the rights of an owner’.
An owner of property has many rights in relation to it; they include the rights to use the
property in question, to destroy it, to give it away, to sell it and so on.
In the consolidated appeals, Morris; Anderton v Burnside 4 (hereafter simply referred
to as Morris), where the rest of their Lordships simply agreed with the speech of Lord
Roskill, the House of Lords held that, despite the use of the words ‘the rights’ in the above
phrase, s 3 as a whole indicated that an appropriation does not require an assumption
of all the rights of an owner and that it is enough that there has been an assumption of
any of the rights of the owner. Thus, it held that D’s conduct in switching price labels in
a shop was an appropriation because the right to fi x the price of goods on sale was one of
the owner’s rights. This interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the clear words of s 3,
but it must now be regarded as representing the interpretation of the words in question, 5
particularly in the light of the acceptance of this aspect of Morris by the House of Lords
in Gomez.6 Although it seems odd that the phrase ‘assumption of the rights of an owner’
should mean ‘assumption of any of the rights of the owner’, it must be admitted that the
offence of theft would be unworkable if all the rights of an owner had to be assumed. We
shall see later on that it is possible for an owner of property to steal it from someone (like
a hirer) who is not the owner but to whom the property ‘belongs’ for the purposes of theft.
Presumably, ‘the owner’ in the House of Lords’ formulation must be read as including
‘another person to whom the property belongs’ where the alleged theft is not from the
owner.
10.5 The importance of the interpretation given to s 3(1) in Morris is shown by Governor
of Pentonville Prison, ex p Osman.7 In ex p Osman the Divisional Court was concerned
with the situation where V’s bank account is in credit, and D dishonestly presents a
cheque or sends instructions to V’s bank to draw on that account. It held that such con-
duct would constitute an appropriation of the bank credit. The reason was that presenting
the cheque 8 or sending the instruction is the exercise of one of the rights of the owner of
the bank credit, the right to have his cheques or instructions relating to the account met 9
(which is more appropriately expressed as assuming the right of the owner of the bank
credit to destroy or diminish it). It would not matter, it held, that the account was never
in fact debited. In so holding, it did not follow an obiter dictum by the Court of Appeal in
Kohn,10 to the effect that ‘the completion of the theft does not take place until the trans-
action has gone through to completion’.
4 [1984] AC 320, HL.

5 Th is was accepted by the Privy Council in Chan Man-sin v A-G of Hong Kong [1988] 1 All ER 1.
6 [1993] AC 442, HL. 7 [1989] 3 All ER 701, DC.
8 Merely signing the cheque is only a preparatory act and insufficient: Ngan [1998] 1 Cr App R 331, CA.
9 Cf Tomsett [1985] Crim LR 369, CA, where the contrary view was taken by the Court of Appeal after pros-
ecuting counsel had declined to argue the point. In Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex p Osman the Divisional
Court held that consequently the decision in Tomsett was not a binding authority on the point.
10 (1979) 69 Cr App R 395, CA.
10.7 actus reus of theft | 
Appropriation need not have any effect

10.6 It follows from ex p Osman that it is irrelevant that the assumption of a right of the
owner has no effect on the owner’s property or his enjoyment of it. This being so, the view
of the Court of Appeal in Hilton,11 where the Court upheld the conviction for theft of the
chairman of a charity who, in order to settle his personal debts, had caused its bank to
transfer sums from the charity’s account to another account on a number of occasions,
twice by faxing instructions to the bank and once by the presentation of a cheque, is
surprising in the following respect. The Court stated that the chairman had appropri-
ated the credit balance by assuming the rights of the owner by causing the transfer to be
made. His instructions by fax or cheque were the key which set the relevant inter-account
machinery in motion. It then added, unnecessarily and oddly, and without appearing
to realise the inconsistency with previous authority, that ‘the fact that the transfer was
made was enough to complete the offence’. Subsequently, the Court of Appeal in Ngan 12
approved and applied what was said in ex p Osman without reference to Hilton or any
need for a resulting transfer to complete the theft. It held that the act of presenting the
cheque was ‘the act of theft’. More recently, it has been confirmed that it is not necessary
that any person to whom the property belongs should be the poorer because of the appro-
priation; ‘deprivation’ is not required.13
Owner’s consent or authorisation irrelevant

10.7 There may be an assumption of a right of the owner, and therefore an appropriation
of property belonging to another, even though the owner consents to or authorises the act
in question. This was held by the House of Lords by a majority of four to one in Gomez,14
where an irreconcilable conflict on this point between two earlier House of Lords’ deci-
sions, Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Comr 15 and Morris,16 was resolved. In Lawrence
v Metropolitan Police Comr, Viscount Dilhorne, giving the judgment of the House of
Lords, stated that the words ‘without the consent of the owner’ are not to be implied into
the definition of the offence. However, in Morris, Lord Roskill, giving the judgment of the
majority of the House of Lords and having referred to the decision in Lawrence, stated
that, for there to be an assumption of the rights (or any right) of the owner, there must be
an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of those rights (or any of them),
and there would not be such an interference or usurpation if what was done with the
property was expressly or impliedly authorised by the owner of it.
Despite the fact that Morris had generally been followed on the present point, the
majority of the House of Lords in Gomez held that Lawrence represented the correct
view, and not (on this point) Morris. The majority did not discuss in detail the merits of
11 [1997] 2 Cr App R 445, CA. 12 [1998] 1 Cr App R 331, CA.

13 See R (on the application of A) v Crown Court at Snaresbrook [2001] EWHC 456 (Admin) at [25]; Wheatley
v Commissioner of Police of the British Virgin Islands [2006] UKPC 24 at [10]–[11].
14 [1993] AC 442, HL. See Cooper and Allen ‘Appropriation after Gomez’ (1993) 57 JCL 186; Shute and Horder
‘Th ieving and Deceiving: What is the Difference?’ (1993) 56 MLR 548; Clarkson ‘Theft and Fair Labelling’ (1993)
56 MLR 554. 15 [1972] AC 626, HL.
16 [1984] AC 320, HL.
 | 10.8 theft and related offences
the two views, but relied on the fact that Viscount Dilhorne’s statement in Lawrence was
part of the ratio decidendi,17 while Lord Roskill’s statement was only an obiter dictum. In
Gomez the certified question related to the situation where consent had been obtained by
fraud. However, as was recognised by Lord Steyn, giving the judgment of the majority of
the House of Lords in Hinks,18 the majority in Gomez did not differentiate between cases
of consent induced by fraud and consent given in other circumstances.
The interpretation in Gomez seems to strain the meaning of ‘appropriation’ and
‘assumption’ as those terms are normally understood. If the owner has consented to, or
authorised, the exercise of one of his rights to property, one would not ordinarily describe
that exercise as an appropriation or as an assumption of that right. The interpretation in
Gomez is also open to the objection that the Criminal Law Revision Committee intended
‘appropriation’ and ‘assumption’ to have the meaning given in Morris, as Lord Lowry
demonstrated in his dissenting speech in Gomez.19 Indeed, the TA 1968 itself assumes
this because in s 2(1)(b) it states that a person is not dishonest if he believes that the victim
would have consented to the appropriation. Parliament would not have provided this if it
did not think that actual consent would prevent an appropriation. The consequences of
Gomez are returned to below, especially para 10.18.
10.8 The facts of Gomez were that D, an assistant manager of an electrical goods shop,
induced his manager to authorise the supply of goods to a rogue in exchange for two
building society cheques which were worthless because they were stolen. D and the rogue
knew that the cheques were stolen but D concealed this from the manager, telling him
that the cheques were ‘as good as cash’. D and the rogue were convicted of the theft of the
goods.
The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to hold that, on these facts,
there had been an appropriation of the goods by the rogue when he took possession of
them. Its reason, following the dictum in Morris that appropriation required an unauthor-
ised exercise of one of the owner’s rights, was that the rogue was entitled (ie authorised)
to take possession of the goods under the voidable contract of sale. It declined to follow
Dobson v General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn plc, 20 where a rogue induced
the sale to him of a watch and a ring in a telephone conversation with their owner. A day
later he paid with a stolen and worthless cheque and took the articles away with him. On
the question of whether the rogue had stolen the articles (which was material because the
owner’s insurance policy covered loss by theft), the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) held
that the articles had been stolen. One of the arguments put against this conclusion had
been that the contract of sale had been made over the telephone, ie before delivery, and
that accordingly the rogue would have taken delivery of his own property because own-
ership would have passed to him at the time of the contract. Parker LJ doubted that the
property was intended to pass on contract, but held that if ownership had passed by that
17 It is doubtful that the statement was part of the ratio decidendi since, in Viscount Dilhorne’s opinion, the
facts of the case fell far short of establishing consent on the part of the owner. 18 [2001] 2 AC 241 at 251.
19 For contrasting views on whether or not Gomez is a good decision, see JC Smith [1993] Crim LR 304 and S
Gardner ‘Appropriation in Theft: The Last Word?’ (1993) 109 LQR 194.
20 [1990] 1 QB 274, CA. Th is decision is discussed in an article by Heaton ‘Deceiving without Th ieving’ [2001]
Crim LR 712.
10.10 actus reus of theft | 
time,21 he would hold that, by making the contract, the rogue had assumed the rights of
the owner over the articles and at that time they did belong to another (the owner).22 The
other judge did not deal with this point.
The prosecution in Gomez appealed successfully to the House of Lords, the majority
of whom, as indicated above, held that a person could appropriate property even though
he had the owner’s consent or authority to exercise the right in question. In doing so, the
House placed considerable reliance on what Parker LJ had said in Dobson v Accident Fire
and Life Assurance Corpn plc.
Appropriation by controllers of corporations

10.9 A corporation, such as an incorporated company, a limited liability partnership
under the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 or a local authority is a separate person
in law and can own property. In law, a corporation is distinct from its members (eg its
shareholders, limited liability partners or councillors, as the case may be). Thus, eg, a
shareholder can steal the company’s property from it, just as an employee can.
One of the points clarified by Gomez is that those who control a company can appro-
priate the company’s property, and thereby commit theft in relation to it. Previously,
the authorities had been in conflict.23 In Gomez Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that the
approach taken to ‘appropriation’ by the majority in that case meant that, even if those
who control a company consent or purport to consent to a dealing with its property by
them (or one of them), that dealing will be an appropriation of property belonging to
another (the company)24 and, provided the appropriation is made dishonestly and with
intent permanently to deprive the company, theft will be committed. Proof of dishonesty
may not be easy. As was said in the later case of R (on the application of A) v Snaresbrook
Crown Court,25 the reason why directors who dispose of a company’s property are not in
the normal way guilty of theft is because their appropriation is not dishonest.
Relevance to appropriation of defendant’s state of mind

10.10 In Gomez Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that ‘appropriation’ is an ‘objective
description of the act done irrespective of the mental state’ of the defendant.26 It is, how-
ever, difficult to accept that the state of mind with which D acted in relation to property
can never be relevant to the question of whether D appropriated it. In some cases, it may
be crucial; an example appears towards the end of para 10.21.
Aside from the issue of appropriation, D’s state of mind is of crucial importance in
other ways. The effect of the House of Lords’ decisions in Lawrence, Gomez and Hinks 27
is to make ‘appropriation’ an extremely wide concept; almost any dealing with property
21 Under a sale of goods contract of the type in question, ownership can pass under such a contract as soon
as it is made and before the price has been paid, depending on the parties’ intention: Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
18, r 1. 22 [1990] 1 QB 274 at 280.
23 McHugh and Tringham (1988) 88 Cr App R 385, CA (cannot be appropriation); cf A-G’s Reference (No 2 of
1982) [1984] QB 624, CA; Philippou (1989) 89 Cr App R 290, CA (can be appropriation).
24 [1993] AC 442 at 496. 25 [2001] EWHC Admin 456, DC.
26 [1993] AC 442 at 495. See also Gallasso (1992) 98 Cr App R 284, CA. 27 See para 10.18.
 | 10.11 theft and related offences
amounts to an ‘appropriation’.28 It is the requirements that D should act dishonestly

and with the intention of permanently depriving the victim which control the potential
width of the offence of theft. In Hinks, 29 Lord Steyn expressed the opinion that they pro-
vided adequate protection against injustice. However, the uncertainty of what constitutes
‘dishonestly’30 means that this is questionable.
Examples of appropriation
10.11 The most common type of appropriation is that of taking possession of prop-
erty; taking possession is clearly one of the rights of the owner. A pickpocket who takes
someone’s wallet clearly appropriates it. A shopper who removes goods from a shelf in
a supermarket thereby appropriates them, 31 since the moving of the goods is one of the
rights of the owner, and if he does so dishonestly and with the intention of permanently
depriving the other of them he commits theft. Of course, if the shopper intends to pay at
the checkout, he would not be found to be dishonest.32 In Gallasso, 33 which was decided
by the Court of Appeal a fortnight after Gomez, the Court of Appeal held that there could
not be an appropriation without a ‘taking’, but there is nothing in Gomez to warrant this,
and it is inconsistent with other decisions referred to in this chapter, which are still good
law in the light of Gomez. Since it cannot be squared with Gomez, in particular, the point
must be regarded as wrongly decided.
A person can appropriate property even though he does not take possession of it in
a technical sense but merely assumes control of it, however momentarily. This is shown
by the decision in Corcoran v Anderton,34 where it was held that a robbery (which requires
a theft, and therefore an appropriation) was committed where a woman’s handbag was
wrested from her grasp, even though it then fell to the ground and was not made off with.
Indeed, it would seem that the robber appropriated the handbag merely by taking hold of
it because thereby he assumed a right of the owner.
The right to price goods is a right of the owner. Thus, in Pilgram v Rice-Smith 35 it was
held that a supermarket assistant, who, in league with a customer, wrapped goods and
understated their price on the wrapper so that the customer would be charged less than
the true price at the checkout, had thereby appropriated the goods.
Appropriation by a person in possession

10.12 As previously indicated, a person can appropriate property even though he is al-
ready in possession or control of it. This is made clear by the latter part of the TA 1968, s
3(1), which provides that ‘appropriation’:
‘includes, where he [the defendant] has come by property (innocently or not) without
stealing it,36 any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner.’
28 For a situation where there is not an appropriation, see para 10.15. 29 [2001] 2 AC 241 at 253.
30 Paras 10.69–10.75. 31 McPherson (1972) 117 Sol Jo 13, CA. 32 Para 10.74.
33 (1992) 98 Cr App R 284, CA. 34 (1980) 71 Cr App R 104, DC. 35 [1977] 2 All ER 658, DC.
36 See, further, para 10.22. ‘Stealing’ here refers to theft in terms of English law whether the conduct in
question occurred in this country or abroad: Atakpu [1994] QB 69, CA. This is surprising in relation to conduct
abroad since, on a correct application of the law of jurisdiction, conduct abroad cannot constitute the offence
10.14 actus reus of theft | 
Suppose that D helps himself to V’s umbrella in order to go out during a shower but
intending to return it when he comes back. D does not steal it at that stage because, al-
though there is an appropriation of the umbrella, it is not accompanied by an intention
permanently to deprive V. However, if D subsequently decides to keep the umbrella or to
sell it, and does so, he may be convicted of theft because his later assumption of a right to
it, by keeping or dealing with it as owner, constitutes an appropriation which is accom-
panied by an intention permanently to deprive V. Likewise, a person who finds V’s lost
property and picks it up, intending to return it to V, but later dishonestly decides to keep
it, commits theft by keeping it because he thereby dishonestly appropriates it with the in-
tention of permanently depriving V of it.
A common type of theft is theft by a bailee of property; a bailee is someone such as
a borrower of goods or a person to whom goods have been hired.37 If, eg, D hires a car
from V and later purports to sell it as his own to X, he thereby appropriates it because V
will have retained some of the rights of the owner and D will have assumed one of those
retained rights, the right to sell. The same would be true if D simply offered to sell the car
because he would have assumed a right retained by V.
Appropriation by a person not in possession

10.13 There can be an appropriation by D even though D never possesses the property
concerned, as where:
• D enters V’s house in V’s absence and offers to sell V’s furniture to X, since the right
to sell is one of the rights of ownership;38 or
• D destroys V’s property without touching it, eg by throwing stones at a window or
shooting domestic animals, since the right of destruction is one of the rights of the
owner. However, such conduct would also constitute an offence under the Criminal
Damage Act 1971 and would be more appropriately charged under that Act.
Other examples are provided by reference to Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex p Osman
and Dobson v Accident Fire and Life Assurance which were dealt with in paras 10.5 and
10.8 respectively.
Obtaining ownership by deception or duress: an appropriation?

39
10.14 It seems to have been accepted by the House of Lords in Gomez that, where a
person receives physical possession of property simultaneously with the transfer of
of theft under English law and English courts would lack jurisdiction to try someone on a charge of such a theft
abroad. In Atakpu the Court of Appeal considered that such conduct did constitute theft under English law but
that an English court would lack jurisdiction to try it. For a critical analysis of this decision, see Sullivan and
Warbrick ‘Territoriality, Theft and Atakpu’ [1994] Crim LR 650.
37 See para 10.41.
38 Pitham and Hehl (1976) 65 Cr App R 45, CA. The actual decision in this case is open to criticism on its facts
because, as the offeror knew, the offeree knew that the offeror was not the owner of the furniture and did not have
the owner’s authority to sell the property, so that in reality D was not offering to sell the furniture but making a
proposal for the joint theft of it: see Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod and Williams (eds)) para 2.79.
39 [1993] AC 442, HL.
 | 10.15 theft and related offences
ownership of it to him as a result of a deception, he appropriates it by taking physical

possession of it. An example would be where D has deceived V into making a gift to him.
The ownership of the gift would pass on delivery to D, the time that D receives physical
possession of the gift. At the split second of time that D receives the property from V it
will belong to V, although a split second later it will not. The same would be true if the
obtaining of ownership had been by duress. Indeed, a person who has acquired anoth-
er’s full proprietary interest with consent appropriates it if he simultaneously receives it,
even if no deception or duress is involved. Lord Steyn, giving the majority judgment in
Hinks,40 and relying on Lawrence and Gomez, rejected a submission that a person does
not appropriate property unless the other (the owner) retains, beyond the instant of the
alleged theft, some proprietary interest or the right to recover some proprietary interest.
Deceiving V into doing something with V’s property

10.15 The defi nition of appropriation requires D’s conduct in relation to property to
manifest an assumption of any of the rights of the owner. Th is being so, does D thereby
appropriate property if he induces V to do something in respect of V’s property in rela-
tion to which D does not then have possession, control or physical contact? In Briggs 41
the Court of Appeal answered ‘no’. In that case, D deceived her elderly relatives to
transfer to her the proceeds of the sale of their house. She did this by getting them to
give her a letter of authority which she presented to the licensed conveyancers hand-
ling the sale. The letter authorised the licensed conveyancers to transfer £49,500 from
the proceeds of the sale of the house to D’s solicitors’ bank account. Th is was done by
the licensed conveyancers and the sum was used to purchase a house in the name of
D and her father. D was convicted of the theft of the credit balance representing the
£49,500 transferred by the licensed conveyancers to D’s solicitors’ bank account. The
trial judge had directed the jury that it was open to them to conclude that there had
been an appropriation of the credit balance when D caused the licensed conveyancers
to transfer the £49,500 to her solicitors for her own purposes, notwithstanding that
it had been transferred with the consent of D’s elderly relatives. The Court of Appeal
disagreed and allowed D’s appeal against conviction. It held that, where V causes a
payment to be made in reliance on deceptive conduct by D, there is no ‘appropri-
ation’ by D.
The Court distinguished its decision that there had been an appropriation in Hilton,42
where it had held that the chairman of a charity who had caused a bank transfer from the
charity’s account to another account on a number of occasions by issuing instructions to
the bank had appropriated the charity’s bank balance by assuming the charity’s right to
the balance. It did so on the ground that the chairman had direct control of the charity’s
bank balance and had caused payments from it to be made by his bank (which was, of
course, an innocent agent) to settle his personal debts.
The Court of Appeal was ‘fortified’ in coming to its decision by a number of factors
including the following:43
40 [2001] 2 AC 241 at 253. 41 [2003] EWCA Crim 3662. 42 [1997] 2 Cr App R 445, CA.
43 [2003] EWCA Crim 3662 at [13].
10.17 actus reus of theft | 
• ‘No case has been cited to us where it has been held that an “appropriation” occurs
where the relevant act is committed by the victim albeit as a result of deception.’ It is
unfortunate that Gomez was not cited to the Court of Appeal because, while it is not
absolutely inconsistent with Briggs, it results in a distinction which is hard to explain
between the case where, with V’s consent which has been obtained by deception, D
does an act in relation to property which he possesses or controls (appropriation:
Gomez), and the case where D by deception causes V to transfer V’s property or to
do some other act with it which would be an appropriation if done by D personally
(not an appropriation: Briggs).44
• ‘The word “appropriation” in s 3(1) of the Theft Act 1968 . . . is a word which con-
notes a physical act rather than a more remote action triggering the payment which
gives rise to the charge. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “appropriation” as
“to take possession for one’s own, to take to oneself”. It is not easy to see why an act
of deceiving an owner to do something would fall within the meaning of “appropri-
ation”.’ This statement must be treated with caution. While, as a general rule, an act
is required for an appropriation, the case law referred to in this chapter shows that
that act need not be a physical one.
Innocent obtaining of ownership

10.16 Where an owner transfers his full proprietary interest to D simultaneously with D
taking delivery (ie possession) of the property, and D acts innocently (ie without the mens
rea for theft), D cannot be convicted of theft because of his lack of mens rea at that point
in time. In addition, any subsequent dealing with the property done with the mens rea for
theft will not amount to theft. The reason is that the owner’s consent to the transfer of his
full proprietary interest will mean that, at the time of the later appropriation, the prop-
erty will not belong to another. Thus, if D fills his tank at a self-service station, intending
to pay, but changes his mind en route to the cashier and drives off, he cannot be convicted
of theft of the petrol because at the time of any appropriation with the mens rea for theft
the petrol does not belong to another.45 D could, however, be convicted of making off
without payment, contrary to the Theft Act 1978, s 3.46
A lawful act can be an appropriation

10.17 Despite the arguments of an eminent academic lawyer,47 an act which is lawful
in civil law may nevertheless constitute an appropriation and, if done dishonestly and
with intent permanently to deprive, theft. The TA 1968, s 1(1) requires an appropriation,
not an unlawful appropriation. The whole tenor of the decisions in Lawrence and Gomez
is against implying ‘unlawful’ before ‘appropriation’ in s 1(1), although the point was
not specifically addressed in them. In Hinks,48 the majority of the House of Lords (Lord
44 See, further, the commentary to Briggs in [2004] Crim LR 495, CA, and Heaton ‘Cheques and Balances’
[2005] Crim LR 747. 45 Edwards v Ddin [1976] 3 All ER 705, DC.
46 See para 10.129. 47 Williams ‘Theft , Consent and Illegality’ [1977] Crim LR 127.
48 [2001] 2 AC 241, HL.
 | 10.18 theft and related offences
Hobhouse dissenting) held that such an implication should not be made; to do so would
run counter to the decisions in those two cases.
Where a person acquires an indefeasible right to property:

can there be an appropriation?
10.18 As indicated above, a person who obtains ownership of property by deception or
duress thereby appropriates it. Such a person does not acquire an indefeasible right (ie a
right not liable to be annulled) to the property. Nor, eg, does someone who receives prop-
erty, by gift, from a person who is mentally incapable of making the gift, or someone who
has exercised undue influence over the donor.
On the other hand, someone who obtains ownership of property under a mistake on
the part of its owner, which was not induced by misrepresentation, normally acquires an
indefeasible right to it. So does someone who receives a gift from a donor whose mental
capacity is impaired, but not to the extent of rendering the donor mentally incapable of
making a valid gift. The case where the recipient of property acquires an indefeasible right
to it was not specifically addressed in Lawrence or Gomez. However, in Hinks,49 where a
conflict in the previous authority50 was resolved, the majority of the House of Lords (Lord
Hobhouse dissenting) held that such a recipient does appropriate the property because,
following Lawrence and Gomez, it is irrelevant that the receipt was made with the consent
of the owner. Thus, provided that such a recipient was dishonest and intended perman-
ently to deprive the transferor at the time of the acquisition, the recipient is guilty of
theft, even though in civil law he has an indefeasible right to receive the property and
thereafter to retain it (or to recover it if taken from him).
In Hinks, D was convicted of four counts of theft of money. The prosecution alleged
that she had encouraged V, a naive, gullible man of limited intelligence, to withdraw
sums amounting to £60,000 from his building society, which were then deposited to her
account. D was also convicted on another count of theft, which alleged that D had taken
a television set by similar means. D’s defence was that the money and the television had
been handed over as valid gifts, that the title in them had passed to her and that there-
fore there could be no theft. Having appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal
against these convictions, D appealed to the House of Lords, the certified question being
‘whether the acquisition of an indefeasible title to property is capable of amounting to
an appropriation of property belonging to another for the purposes of s 1(1) of the Theft
Act 1968’.
By a majority of three to two, the House of Lords dismissed D’s appeal. The three Law
Lords in the majority plus Lord Hutton51 answered the certified question in the affirmative.
49 [2001] 2 AC 241, HL.

50 Mazo [1997] 2 Cr App R 518, CA (Court of Appeal accepted that a person who acquires indefeasible right to
property does not steal it, apparently because he does not appropriate it); Kendrick and Hopkins [1997] 2 Cr App
R 524, CA (Court of Appeal implicitly disapproved the proposition accepted in Mazo). See S Gardner ‘Property
and Theft’ [1998] Crim LR 35 at 36, and the reply by JC Smith, ibid, 80.
51 Lord Hutton dissented from the dismissal of D’s appeal on the ground that the trial judge had misdirected
the jury on dishonesty. The majority did not consider it appropriate to review the judge’s summing-up on dis-
honesty for a number of reasons, in particular because it did not have adequate information as to how the de-
10.19 actus reus of theft | 
Lord Steyn, with whose speech Lords Slynn, Jauncey and (on this point) Hutton agreed,
held that it was clear from Lawrence and Gomez that the consent or authorisation of the
owner was irrelevant to the issue of whether or not there had been an appropriation. Lord
Steyn refused to restrict those decisions by interpolating ‘unlawfully’ before ‘appropri-
ates’ or by accepting an argument that a person does not appropriate property unless the
owner retains, beyond the instant of the alleged appropriation, some proprietary interest
or the right to resume or recover some proprietary interest. Lord Steyn was not persuaded
that there were convincing reasons for such a restriction. He was content that the mental
elements of the offence provided adequate protection from injustice, and that the wider
definition of appropriation eliminated the need for judges to give directions about the
civil law ‘in an overly complex corner of the law’.
10.19 While the decision in Hinks may be a logical conclusion from the decision of
the majority in Gomez, and while one may view D’s conduct with distaste, it seems
bizarre that a person who lawfully receives a gift may be convicted of the theft of
it (if he is dishonest and intends permanently to deprive the transferor of it). 52 The
same comment applies to those who obtain an indefeasible right to property by way
of contract, to whom the reasoning in Hinks is equally applicable. Thus, the receipt
of property accompanied by the acquisition of an indefeasible right to it, in accord-
ance with the transferor’s intentions, amounts to an appropriation of property which,
apparently, at that split second of time, belonged to the transferor. Indeed, the cul-
mination of the reasoning in Lawrence and Gomez in Hinks leads to the conclusion
that, apart from the notable exception of conduct of the type to which the decision
in Briggs53 refers, there are almost no limits to what can constitute an ‘appropriation’
of property belonging to another.54 Although it can be accepted that an act need not
be unlawful in civil law in order to be an appropriation, there is a material difference
between this and agreeing that a person can be said to appropriate property (and to
be liable to be convicted of theft if he has the mens rea) when he has acquired an in-
defeasible right to it.
There is much to be said for the view expressed by Lord Hobhouse in his dissent-
ing judgment in Hinks. Lord Hobhouse considered that the words and phrases in ss 1
to 6 of the TA 1968 had an interrelationship with each other and should be read as a
whole, rather than being interpreted in isolation. He also thought that the application
of the law of theft in the present context should involve a consideration of the law of
gift . In the light of these matters, he concluded that if there is a valid gift there can be
no theft .
It must be emphasised that the majority decision in Hinks related to the question posed
in the certified question. It does not mean that all recipients of gifts in like circumstances
fence case had been deployed in the Crown Court. A summing-up ‘must always be tailored to the particular facts
of each case’: per Lord Steyn [2001] 2 AC 241 at 253.
52 For a refutation of the criticisms of the decision in Hinks, see Shute ‘Appropriation and the Law of Theft’
[2002] Crim LR 445. Also see Bogg and Stanton-Ife ‘Protecting the Vulnerable: Legality, Harm and Theft’ [2003]
23 LS 402. 53 See para 10.15.
54 See Parsons ‘Dishonest Appropriation after Gomez and Hinks’ (2004) 68 JCL 520.
 | 10.20 theft and related offences
commit theft. As already implied, and as recognised by Lord Steyn, a jury could find that
the transferee of the gift was not dishonest.
An exception for the bona fide purchaser 55

10.20 The TA 1968, s 3(2) excludes a particular type of case which falls within the defin-
ition of appropriation in s 3(1) from sufficing for theft. Section 3(2) provides that:
‘where property or a right or interest in property is or purports to be transferred for value

to a person acting in good faith, no later assumption by him of rights which he believed 56
himself to be acquiring shall, by reason of any defect in the transferor’s title, amount to
theft of the property.’
The effect of the subsection is that, if A steals goods from B and sells them to D who acts
in good faith (ie D neither knows nor suspects that they are stolen), a refusal by D to re-
store the goods (or his disposal of them) after his discovery of the theft by A is not theft
by him from B. Although the refusal or disposal in itself would be no offence, if D, having
discovered the truth, offered to sell the goods to an innocent person this would amount
to the offence of fraud, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1. 57 In addition, if D’s offer was
accepted and D gave the purchase price to someone else, D could also be convicted of
handling stolen goods.58
It must be emphasised that the exception in s 3(2) is limited to cases where the goods
were transferred for value to D who acted in good faith. If D receives goods as a gift and
later, on discovering that they are stolen, decides to keep them, he may be convicted of
theft; so may D if he buys stolen goods, aware that they are or may be stolen.
Although the above examples have referred to the case where the defect in the trans-
feror’s title is due to the fact that the goods are stolen, it must not be forgotten that the
exception in s 3(2) is not limited to such a case; it applies to defects in the transferor’s title
in general.
Section 3(2) is not limited to the buyers of property. A pawnbroker, eg, with whom
goods are pledged (ie possession is transferred in exchange for a loan) will satisfy the
terms of s 3(2) if he receives the goods without realising a defect in the pledgor’s title
and, on learning the truth, retains them or sells them when the pledgor fails to redeem
the pledge on the due date. On the other hand, it would seem that the pawnbroker would
appropriate them if he sells them before that time because this would not be a right which
he believed himself to be acquiring.
Appropriation by omission
10.21 As a general rule, the ‘assumption of the rights of an owner’ required for an
appropriation requires that D does an act manifesting such an assumption; the natural
55 See the articles cited in para 11.51, n 114.

56 Ie at the time of the initial acquisition: Adams (1993) 15 Cr App R (S) 466, CA.
57 Paras 12.3–12.28 (see especially paras 12.4–12.19). 58 Paras 11.34–11.56.
10.23 actus reus of theft | 
meaning of ‘assumption’ in the present context is an active one, viz the act of taking for or
upon oneself any of the rights of an owner, as illustrated by the examples already given.
By way of exception to the general rule, an appropriation can be made by a mere omis-
sion to restore property to its owner or other person entitled to its possession. This is im-
plicit in the TA 1968, s 3(1) which speaks of a person appropriating by ‘keeping as owner’
property which he has come by innocently, since ‘keeping’ does not necessarily involve
doing any act but may be effected by a person failing to return property. Whether or not
a particular omission in relation to property can constitute ‘keeping it as owner’ depends
on the circumstances and D’s state of mind. Merely ‘keeping’ the thing is insufficient.
There must be a ‘keeping as owner’. There can be no ‘keeping as owner’ by D during a
period while he remains undecided about what to do with the property.59
Other points
Appropriation once-and-for-all happening
10.22 Once a person has appropriated property belonging to another with the necessary
mens rea he is guilty of theft. Such an appropriation, even though it may continue for
a short period of time, is a once and-for-all happening and subsequent appropriations
of the property by the thief do not constitute fresh commissions of theft. As has been
said: ‘Otherwise it would be possible, in theory, to convict a thief of theft of a silver teapot
every time he uses it to make the tea’.60 This view is supported by the statement in the TA
1968, s 3(1) that a later assumption of a right to the property may amount to an appropri-
ation where D has come by the property ‘without stealing’ it, which implies that where
someone has come by property by stealing it, any later assumption by him of a right to it
by keeping or dealing with it as owner does not amount to a fresh appropriation. It was
affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Atakpu61 that ‘if goods have once been stolen, they
cannot be stolen again by the same thief’.
Duration of appropriation
10.23 As indicated above, an appropriation need not be instantaneous: it may con-
tinue for a short period of time. This is important, eg, in relation to the offence of rob-
bery. 62 Case law 63 before Gomez supported the view that an appropriation could be a
continuing act, but those cases were not referred to by the House of Lords in that case
and, on a strict reading of Gomez, since any dishonest assumption of a right of the owner
with the necessary intent constitutes theft, little room seems to be left for an appropri-
ation by a continuous course of action. However, in Atakpu 64 the Court of Appeal, hav-
ing reviewed Gomez and the other case law on the point, held, obiter, that it remained
the law that an appropriation could be a continuous course of action; it considered that
59 Broom v Crowther (1984) 148 JP 592, DC.

60 Williams ‘Appropriation: A Single or Continuous Act?’ [1978] Crim LR 69. See also [1978] Crim LR 313.
61 [1994] QB 69 at 80. Cf Ascroft [2003] EWCA Crim 2365, where the Court of Appeal, in upholding a confi s-
cation order imposed after a conviction for conspiracy to steal, reached a different conclusion.
62 Para 10.103. 63 Hale (1978) 68 Cr App R 415, CA; Gregory (1982) 77 Cr App R 41, CA.
64 [1994] QB 69 at 80.
 | 10.24 theft and related offences
it should be left to the common sense of the jury to decide that the appropriation could
continue for so long as the thief can sensibly be regarded as in the act of stealing, ie so
long as he is ‘on the job’. Subsequently, in Lockley, 65 the Court of Appeal confi rmed that
the view that an appropriation could be a continuing act had not been overruled by
Gomez.
Theft only of specific property

10.24 A person cannot be convicted of theft unless it is proved that he appropriated a
specific piece of property belonging to another with the appropriate mens rea. It is not
in itself enough that D’s conduct leads (as D realises) to someone else becoming indebted
to another. This is shown by Navvabi, 66 where D, by unauthorisedly issued cheques for
£50 or £100 backed by a cheque card, obtained gaming chips in a casino. Because the
cheques were backed by the cheque card, which guaranteed payment, the bank was
bound to honour them, ie it became indebted to the casino. The Court of Appeal quashed
D’s convictions on counts of the theft of £50 or £100 from the bank, since there was no
appropriation by him of that part of the bank’s funds to which the sums specified in the
cheques corresponded. Clearly, it was impossible to point to any specific property of the
bank which had been appropriated.67 On the other hand, if D takes V’s cheque made out
in V’s favour by X, and presents it for payment, D commits the actus reus of theft of V’s
credit balance (V’s right to sue the bank, a debtor, for that amount is a piece of property)
or of V’s right to overdraw (V’s right to the overdraft is a piece of property).68 The reason
is that D has assumed the rights of the owner over the intangible piece of property (the
right) in question. If, as appears to be the case, he has the mens rea of theft he can be con-
victed of that offence.69
10.25 A person charged with stealing a part of specific property can be convicted on
that charge even though it emerges at the trial that he is guilty of stealing all of it,70 and it
seems that the converse is also true.71
Property
Key points 10.3
‘Property’ means anything which is capable of being owned, but electricity is not prop-
erty for the purposes of theft, and there are restrictions on when land and things forming
part of it, and wild creatures and their carcases, can be stolen.
65 [1995] Crim LR 656, CA.

66 [1986] 3 All ER 102, CA. Cf Monaghan [1979] Crim LR 673, CA, and commentary.
67 On the other hand, such a person could be convicted of the offence of fraud, contrary to the Fraud Act
2006, s 1. 68 Para 10.28.
69 Hallam and Blackburn [1995] Crim LR 323, CA. 70 Pilgram v Rice-Smith [1977] 2 All ER 658, DC.
71 Certainly on a charge of stealing several specific items there can be a conviction of stealing some of them
if theft of all of them is not proved: Machent v Quinn [1970] 2 All ER 255, DC.
10.28 actus reus of theft | 
10.26 By the TA 1968, s 4(1),
‘“property” includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in
action and other intangible property.’
There is an element of circularity in this definition, in that ‘property’ is defi ned as

including ‘all other property’. In this respect it may be helpful to remember that the
appropriate definition of property is that it means something which may be the subject
of ownership.
10.27 ‘Money’ refers to current coins and bank notes (including foreign ones), and
‘personal property’ refers in a tangible sense to goods and other movable property.
The reference to ‘real property’ means that land, things forming part of it, and rights
in it, are included in the definition of ‘property’. However, there are special provisions
restricting the theft of land and things forming part of it, which are dealt with later.72
Likewise there are special provisions restricting the theft of wild creatures and their
carcases.73
10.28 A ‘thing in action’ (normally described by its traditional title ‘chose in action’)
is a personal right of property which can only be claimed or enforced by a legal action
and not by taking physical possession,74 and its inclusion in the defi nition of property
means that one who dishonestly assumes a right of ownership over a thing in action,
such as a debt, a copyright or a registered trade mark, with the intention of perman-
ently depriving the person entitled to it, is guilty of theft. Thus, if D dishonestly pur-
ports to assign to X a debt owed to D and his partner, V, in order to defeat V’s rights,
D is guilty of the theft of a thing in action belonging to V. Likewise, if D dishonestly
purports to sell to X the copyright owned by V in a book, this is theft by D of a thing in
action belonging to V.
A bank account in credit is a thing in action because it constitutes a debt owed by the
bank to the customer.75 Thus, eg, if a company accountant dishonestly draws a cheque on
his employer’s bank account and presents it for payment, he is guilty of the theft of the thing
in action (the amount of the bank balance) belonging to his employer.76 The exercise of the
right to destroy or diminish the thing in action (bank credit) is the equivalent of an appro-
priation of tangible property by destroying it.77 There would also have been a theft in the
above example, even if the bank account is not in credit, provided that, or to the extent that,
the amount drawn is within the limit of an agreed overdraft facility, because the account
holder’s right to draw within that limit under such a facility is a thing in action.78 Likewise,
it has been held that, if D, who has control of another’s bank account, gives instructions
for the transfer of funds from that account to another bank account, he appropriates the
72 Paras 10.34 and 10.35. 73 Para 10.36.

74 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 at 430, per Channell J.
75 Davenport [1954] 1 All ER 602 at 603. The money represented by the account is the money of the banker
and not of the customer.
76 Kohn (1979) 69 Cr App R 395, CA; Graham [1997] 1 Cr App R 302 at 325. As to the time of the appropri-
ation, see para 10.5. 77 Kohn above; Graham above (addendum).
78 Kohn above at 410.
 | 10.29 theft and related offences
bank balance represented by the amount transferred.79 Similarly, someone who dishonestly
obtains a cheque from V and presents it for payment appropriates the amount of V’s bank
credit represented by the cheque, 80 or V’s right to overdraw, as the case may be.
‘Other intangible property’ covers such things as gas stored in pipes, which is
undoubtedly capable of being owned. It also covers patents.81 In A-G of Hong Kong
v Chan Nai-Keung,82 the Privy Council held that export quotas, which could be freely
bought and sold and which gave an expectation of an export licence to the amount of the
quotas (although no enforceable right to it), were ‘intangible property’.
Things which are not property

10.29 In spite of the broad definition of property in the TA 1968, s 4(1), there are some
things which do not, or may not, come within the definition of property and hence can-
not be stolen.
Human corpse
10.30 A human corpse, or a part of a corpse, is not property, 83 since it cannot be owned.
On the other hand, the shroud in which a dead body is wrapped remains the property of
the person to whom it previously belonged, and continues to belong. Consequently, grave
robbers who take a body wrapped in a shroud can be convicted of theft of the shroud,
although not of the body.84
A qualification of the above rule is that a corpse or part of a corpse becomes property if
it has acquired different attributes by the application of human skill, such as embalming
or dissection. 85 Thus, an anatomical or pathological specimen which has been embalmed
or dissected for teaching purposes or exhibition is property. On the other hand, a body or
part of a body which has been preserved at a post mortem, eg by fi xing a brain in paraffin,
is not property because such preservation is not on a par with embalming or dissecting a
corpse.86
While it is clear that a live human body is not property, people have been convicted of
the theft of products of the human body, such as hair or urine.87 Although these convic-
tions have never been tested in an appellate court, the Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
79 At least, when the transfer is made: Hilton [1997] 2 Cr App R 445, CA, see para 10.6. There would not,
however, be an appropriation where D simply procured a bank account holder (X) by deception to initiate the
transfer from his (X’s) bank account to another: Naviede [1997] Crim LR 662, CA; Briggs [2003] EWCA Crim
3662; para 10.15.
80 Williams (Roy) [2001] 1 Cr App R 362, CA; see Heaton ‘Cheques and Balances’ [2005] Crim LR 747. As to
the time of the appropriation, see para 10.5.
81 These are declared not to be things in action: Patents Act 1977, s 30. 82 [1987] 1 WLR 1339, PC.
83 Haynes’ Case (1613) 12 Co Rep 113; Handyside’s Case (1749) 2 East PC 652; Sharpe (1857) 26 LJMC 47 at
48, per Erle CJ; Kelly and Lindsay [1999] QB 621 at 630. See Smith ‘Stealing the Body and its Parts’ [1976] Crim
LR 622; Harris ‘Who Owns My Body?’ (1996) 16 OJLS 55. It is a common law offence to remove a corpse from a
grave without lawful authority: Lynn (1788) 2 Term Rep 733. 84 Haynes’ Case above.
85 Kelly and Lindsay [1999] QB 621, CA, applying Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, High Ct of Australia,
and Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority [1996] 4 All ER 474 at 479, per Peter Gibson LJ. The matter is dis-
cussed by Pavlowski ‘Dead Bodies as Property’ (1996) 146 NLJ 1828.
86 Dobson v North Tyneside Health Authority above.
87 Herbert (1960) 25 JCL 163; Welsh [1974] RTR 478, CA (sentencing appeal).
10.33 actus reus of theft | 
has held that a sperm sample from a person undergoing chemotherapy, which a hospital
stored in case he became infertile after the treatment, was owned by that person and was
therefore property.88
Confidential information
10.31 It has been held that confidential information, such as an official secret, a trade
secret or the contents of a future examination paper, is not property for the purposes
of theft,89 so that the mere abstraction of it (eg by photocopying it) is not theft. However,
the borrowing90 or outright taking of a piece of paper on which the secret information is
recorded may well amount to the theft of the piece of paper. In addition, if the informa-
tion is stored in a computer its dishonest abstraction will involve an offence under the
TA 1968, s 13 of abstracting electricity (which is described in para 10.33) or, more appro-
priately, under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 1. Official secrets are protected by the
Official Secrets Act 1911, s 1.
The use or disclosure of trade secrets can have more serious consequences for a business
than the theft of its property. The law of theft offers adequate protection against the ap-
propriation of a patent or registered trade mark, but it does not offer any against the
misuse of a trade secret, although the sanctions available in the civil law for breach of
confidence may often provide a sufficient deterrent for the type of people involved in
the ‘theft’ of trade secrets.91 If the person who misuses a trade secret occupies a position
in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of the
owner of a trade secret he can be convicted of fraud contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1, if
the terms of s 492 thereof are satisfied.
Services
10.32 Rides in cars, coaches or trains are not property, nor are lodgings for the night
and other services, but those who obtain them dishonestly may be guilty of an offence of
obtaining services dishonestly, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 11.93
Electricity
10.33 Electricity is not property within the TA 1968, s 4, and cannot be stolen,94 but under
the TA 1968, s 13, it is an offence for a person dishonestly95 to use without due authority,
88 Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 37.

89 Oxford v Moss (1978) 68 Cr App R 183, DC. See Tettenborn ‘Stealing Information’ (1979) 129 NLJ 967;
Hammond ‘Theft of Information’ (1984) 100 LQR 252; Coleman ‘Trade Secrets and the Criminal Law: The Need
for Reform’ (1985) Comp L & P 111. 90 Para 10.89.
91 In 1997 the Law Commission provisionally proposed that there should be a new offence to punish the
misuse of trade secrets. It would have been committed by any person who used or disclosed a trade secret belong-
ing to another (ie the person entitled to the secret) without that other’s consent. See Legislating the Criminal
Code: Misuse of Trade Secrets (1997), Law Com Consultation Paper No 150. The proposal attracted majority
support but strong opposition from a minority. See Hull ‘Stealing Secrets: A Review of the Law Commission’s
Consultation Paper on the Misuse of Trade Secrets’ [1998] Crim LR 246 for a valuable critique of the proposals.
The Law Commission concluded that it would not be right to continue with the project for a number of reasons:
see Law Commission Annual Report 2004/05, para 5.12. 92 Paras 12.24–12.28.
93 Paras 12.35–12.42. 94 Low v Blease (1975) 119 Sol Jo 695, DC.
95 See paras 10.73–10.75. The TA 1968, s 2 (paras 10.69 and 10.79) does not apply to an offence under s 13.
 | 10.34 theft and related offences
or dishonestly to cause to be wasted or diverted, any electricity. This offence is triable either
way, and punishable with a maximum of five years’ imprisonment on conviction on indict-
ment. The ‘use’ of any electricity means the consumption of electricity which would not
occur but for D’s act.96 The use, diversion or wastage of electricity can constitute a serious
offence, as where someone reconnects his electricity supply after it has been cut off for non-
payment, or where a malicious prankster enters someone’s empty house, switches on all the
electrical gadgets and leaves them running, or where someone runs electrical equipment
after interfering with the electricity meter so that it does not record how much electricity has
been used. However, it is possible to think of many trivial examples. If D turns on V’s radio
without V’s authority, he may be convicted of an offence under s 13, as may someone who
inserts a false disc in an electrical weighing machine and weighs himself.
Someone who dishonestly uses a telephone system without authority is guilty of an
offence under s 13, but it is more likely that the prosecution would be brought under the
Communications Act 2003, s 125, by which a person who dishonestly obtains ‘an elec-
tronic telecommunication service’ (a term which can include simply making a telephone
call) with intent to avoid payment is guilty of an offence triable either way. On conviction
on indictment the maximum punishment is five years’ imprisonment.
Land and things forming part of it

10.34 Severe restrictions on the theft of land and things forming part of land are
imposed by the TA 1968, s 4(2) and (3). These restrictions do not apply to incorporeal
hereditaments,97 another form of real property, examples of which are easements and
profits à prendre (both of which are user rights over the land of another). Thus, incor-
poreal hereditaments are capable of being stolen by anyone.
The soil and plants and other growing things are clearly things forming part of land, as
are houses, walls and other similar permanent structures (or parts of them, such as bricks
or fi xtures) built into the land. At the other extreme, a workman’s hut temporarily resting
on the land while the workmen are there does not form part of the land, nor does a pile
of gravel, stones or other material on the land. In borderline cases, the issue is decided by
looking at the degree of annexation (ie attachment or integration) and the object of that
annexation, and deciding whether these are sufficient for it to be said that the thing forms
part of the land.98 A mobile home or Portakabin which can fairly easily be removed,
albeit connected to mains services such as water and electricity, does not form part of the
land, whereas (eg) a timber-framed bungalow resting on concrete foundation blocks in
the ground which can only be moved by destroying it does.99 A houseboat resting above
high water level on, but not attached to, a platform supported by posts driven into the
harbour bed has been held not to form part of the land where it was located because it
could have been removed without being dismantled or destroyed, and also fell within
the category of items like mobile homes which, as designed, are movable.100 Likewise a
houseboat attached to the river bed, a pontoon and the river wall by mooring lines has
96 McCreadie and Tume (1992) 96 Cr App R 143, CA. 97 TA 1968, s 4(2).

98 Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 2 All ER 513, HL. Also see Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328 at 334, per
Blackburn J. 99 Elitestone Ltd v Morris above.
100 Mew v Tristmire Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 912.
10.35 actus reus of theft | 
been held not to form part of the land.101 Quite apart from the question of ‘which land?’,
all the attachments could simply be undone and the houseboat moved, and the object of
the attachment was to prevent the vessel moving rather than to enable it to be used as a
home. Consequently, neither the degree nor the object of the annexation was sufficient
for it to form part of the land.
10.35 The TA 1968, s 4(2) and (3) provides:
‘(2) A person cannot steal land, or things forming part of land and severed from it by
him or by his directions, except in the following cases, that is to say:
(a) when he is a trustee or personal representative, or is authorised by power of
attorney, or as liquidator of a company, or otherwise, to sell or dispose of land
belonging to another, and he appropriates the land or anything forming part
of it by dealing with it in breach of the confidence reposed in him; or
(b) when he is not in possession of the land and appropriates anything forming
part of the land by severing it or causing it to be severed, or after it has been
severed; or
(c) when, being in possession of the land under a tenancy, he appropriates the
whole or part of any fi xture or structure let to be used with the land.
...
(3) A person who picks mushrooms growing wild on any land, or who picks flowers,
fruit or foliage from a plant growing wild on any land, does not (although not in
possession of the land) steal what he picks, unless he does it for reward or for sale
or other commercial purpose . . . ’
The effect of these provisions is as follows

• Land as a whole cannot be stolen except where the appropriator is of a defined class
and acts in a defined way (TA 1968, s 4(2)(a)). The class of appropriators comprises
a trustee or personal representative, or a person authorised by power of attorney,
or as a liquidator of a company, or otherwise, to sell or dispose of land belonging to
another. The defined mode of appropriation is dealing with the land in breach of the
confidence reposed in him. The result is that a person cannot steal land as a whole by
moving a boundary fence or by occupying it as a squatter; if, in moving the boundary
fence, he resorts to any false representation in order to obtain the land or damages
his neighbour’s property, he may be guilty of fraud or criminal damage respectively,
but as the law is at the time of writing he commits no offence merely by squatting.
(If, however, the relevant clause in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Bill is enacted squatting in a residential building will become a summary
offence. The offence would be, of course, quite distinct from that of theft.)
• Things forming part of land can only be stolen in the following cases:
– As for land as a whole, by the defi ned persons in the defi ned way (TA 1968,
s 4(2)(a));
– Where a person not in possession of the land appropriates the thing by severing
it or causing it to be severed (TA 1968, s 4(2)(b)). If a trespasser or other person
101 Chelsea Yacht and Boat Club Ltd v Pope [2001] 2 All ER 409, CA.
 | 10.35 theft and related offences
not in possession of the land digs gravel, removes tiles and bricks from a building
or part of a wall, cuts turf, digs up flowers or other growing things, picks a flower
from a cultivated plant or cuts down a tree or saws off one of its branches, or causes
such severance to be done (eg letting loose a pig on the land where it uproots veg-
etables), he may be convicted of theft.
This provision does not apply to the picking of wild mushrooms or fungi nor
to picking from wild plants and the like. Such conduct is governed instead by
the special provisions of the TA 1968, s 4(3), as follows. First, the picking of wild
mushrooms or other fungi 102 by a person not in possession of the land is not
theft (although clearly there has been a severance) unless it is done for reward or
for sale or other commercial purpose. Second, where a person not in possession
of the land picks flowers, fruit or foliage from a plant, shrub or tree,103 growing
wild, he cannot commit theft (although, again, there has clearly been a sever-
ance) unless the picking is done for reward or for sale or other commercial pur-
pose. ‘Picking from’ is a narrow term. It does not include uprooting a wild plant
or lopping off a branch from a wild shrub; these are covered by s 4(2)(b) and are
unaffected by s 4(3).
The operation of these provisions is as follows: shortly before Christmas a florist
and an electrician go out in their cars; both pick holly from a tree which is culti-
vated in a garden and both may be convicted of theft because the tree is not wild.
They continue and both pick holly from a tree which is wild; the florist is intend-
ing to sell it in his shop and may be convicted of theft, whereas the electrician is
intending to decorate his home and cannot be so convicted. Both dig up small fir
trees growing wild and both may be convicted of theft, whatever their purpose,
because the severance by them has gone beyond ‘picking from’.
– Where a tenant appropriates a fixture or structure let to be used with the land
(TA 1968, s 4(2)(c)). Generally, a person in possession of land under a tenancy 104
cannot steal things forming part of it; consequently, if he extracts gravel from the
land and sells it, or digs up a plant on the land and gives it to a friend, or picks
blackberries from a wild bush on the land and sells them, he cannot be convicted
of theft. The only exception is provided by s 4(2)(c). It relates to the whole or part
of any structure or fi xture let to be used with the land; such is capable of being
stolen by a tenant and is capable of being stolen by any means (ie a severance is not
necessary). The obvious example of a ‘structure’ is a building, but the term also
includes things such as a wall or a bridge. Basically, a ‘fi xture’ is an object which is
attached to land or to a building for the purpose of making a permanent improve-
ment to the land or building, as opposed to the purpose of better enjoyment of the
object, eg a washbasin or fireplace but not a display of stuffed birds or a notice. By
the ordinary law of land it becomes part of the land. It follows from all this that
if a tenant demolishes a coal shed on the land of which he is a tenant, or removes
102 By the TA 1968, s 4(3), ‘mushroom’ includes a fungus.

103 By ibid, ‘plant’ includes any tree or shrub.
104 By ibid, s 4(2), ‘tenancy’ means a tenancy for years or any less period and includes an agreement for such
a tenancy. In addition, someone who after the end of the tenancy remains in possession is to be treated as having
possession under the tenancy. ‘Let’ is construed accordingly: ibid.
10.36 actus reus of theft | 
an antique fireplace there in order to sell it, or sells the fireplace with a promise to
remove it later, he may be convicted of theft.
Of course, once a thing has been severed from land it ceases to form part of it and is no
longer subject to any restriction on its being stolen.
Wild creatures
10.36 The TA 1968, s 4(4) provides:
‘Wild creatures tamed or untamed shall be regarded as property; but a person cannot
steal a wild creature not tamed nor ordinarily kept in captivity, or the carcase of any such
creature, unless either it has been reduced into possession by or on behalf of another
person and possession of it has not since been lost or abandoned, or another person is in
course of reducing it into possession.’
While they are alive, wild creatures which are neither tamed nor ordinarily kept in
captivity are not owned by anyone. On being killed or taken, however, they become the
property of the owner of the land on which they are killed or taken, or, if he has granted
the sporting rights to someone else, the grantee of those rights.105 Section 4(4) distin-
guishes two groups of wild creatures:
Wild creatures which have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captivity Such a crea-
ture can be stolen in the same ways as any other property. Thus, a person may be guilty
of theft by dishonestly appropriating a tamed fox or a bear from a zoo.
Wild creatures neither tamed nor ordinarily kept in captivity Such a creature or its
carcase cannot normally be stolen but becomes capable of being stolen:
• if reduced into possession by or on behalf of another (in which case it remains
‘capable of being stolen’ so long as possession has not subsequently been lost or
abandoned);106 or
• if another person is in course of reducing it into possession.
Thus, it is not theft to poach game on another’s land, unless for instance the game is taken
from a sack into which another, even another poacher, has put the product of his own
shooting (because there has been a reduction into possession by another) or the game is
picked up from the ground where it is lying after it has been shot by another but not yet
picked up by him (because another is in the course of reducing it into his possession).107
Poaching is subject to its own legislation.
105 Blades v Higgs (1865) 11 HL Cas 621, HL.

106 Possession of a live wild creature is abandoned if the possessor allows it to escape from his possession;
it is lost if a wild creature not ordinarily kept in captivity escapes of its own volition. Possession of the carcase
of a wild creature is not lost by a person who mislays it: see para 10.40 and Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007)
(Ormerod and Williams (eds)) para 2.155.
107 In Cresswell v DPP; Currie v DPP [2006] EWHC 3379 (Admin), DC, which was concerned with ‘in the
course of reducing into possession’ in the similarly worded provision in the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s
10(1)(a), Keene LJ held that merely to entice a wild animal to a particular spot from time to time by providing
food there, even with the ultimate object of killing it in due course, does not form part of a course normally of
reducing it into possession and that where a trap has been set one cannot identify a wild creature as being in the
 | 10.37 theft and related offences
The term ‘reduced into possession by or on behalf of another’ covers (among other things)
the shooting and taking of game by a gamekeeper on his employer’s behalf, since by doing
so the gamekeeper reduces the game into possession on behalf of his employer (‘another’),
and the gamekeeper can be convicted of theft if he subsequently appropriates it.
Deciding whether or not a wild creature has been reduced into possession may involve
the drawing of fine distinctions. There can be no doubt that, if a person stocks tanks on
his fish farm with trout, the trout are reduced into his possession. On the other hand,
unless it is a very small pond, a person who stocks open water with trout for the purpose
of fly fishing would not seem to have sufficient control over them for the trout to be in his
possession.108
Other offences relating to wild creatures

10.37 The Eighth Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended that
the whole law with regard to poaching should be considered by an appropriate commit-
tee.109 This has not occurred. As a result, certain provisions of the Larceny Act 1861 pun-
ishing summarily the unlawful taking or destroying of fish in private waters or in waters
in which there is a private right of fishery, which were inserted on a temporary basis in a
modified form in the TA 1968, Sch 1,110 remain in force. Various Victorian statutes pro-
vide summary offences relating to the poaching of game (including rabbits), whose gist is
trespassing in pursuit of game and which do not require any actual taking or destroying
of game. The Deer Act 1991, s 1 provides summary offences relating to the intentional
taking, killing or injuring of deer without the consent of the owner or occupier of the land
or other lawful authority.
These offences relating to fish, game and deer are separate offences and are quite dis-
tinct from the offence of theft.
Under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s 1(1) it is a summary offence intention-
ally to kill, injure or take away any wild bird, and under s 9(1) it is a summary offence in-
tentionally to kill, injure or take away certain wild animals. These offences are also quite
distinct from that of theft.
Belonging to another
Key points 10.4
Property belongs to another if anyone other than D has possession or control of it, or owns
it or has any proprietary right or interest in it less than complete ownership.
course of being reduced into possession until the stage at least when it is in the process of entering the set trap.
Walker J did not reach a conclusion on this point.
108 Arguably, the trout in the fi rst example are kept in captivity, but those in the second example retain far
too much freedom for there to be any possibility of this. 109 Cmnd 2977, para 53.
110 As amended by the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, s 228.
10.39 actus reus of theft | 
10.38 The property appropriated must belong to another at the time of its appropriation.
In ordinary language property is frequently said to belong to someone only when he owns
it, but under the TA 1968, s 5(1) property is also regarded as belonging to any person who
has possession or control of it, or any proprietary right or interest in it falling short of
complete ownership. This raises questions of civil law.
Ownership and possession

10.39 Before discussing s 5(1), it is necessary to say something about ownership and pos-
session. Ownership of goods or money or other property is the ultimate right to con-
trol. It lasts longer than any other right to control, but ownership does not necessarily
entail physical control. For example, A may have hired his car to B for a day and C’s £10
note may have been taken by E, a pickpocket, who placed it in his wallet; A and C are still
the owners of their car and £10 note respectively, although B and E have possession. Even
if C’s £10 note were mixed with E’s other money, C would remain its owner (although he
would probably not be able to identify it) but E could make someone who gave value and
received the £10 note in good faith its owner. This is because money is negotiable; a thief
can give a better title to it than he has got. Goods are not negotiable: hence, if G steals H’s
watch and sells it to J who acts in good faith, H remains the owner of the watch (and can
sue J for its return).
Mention may also be made of the rules which determine when ownership passes on
the sale of goods. The principal rule is that ownership passes when the parties intend
it to pass. If their intention is not clear, special rules apply. For example, in the case of
an unconditional sale of specific goods (ie goods identified and agreed on at the time
of the contract of sale, eg Ford Focus registration number XY 59 ABC) in a deliverable
state, ownership passes when the contract is made, even if payment or delivery is made
afterwards. Whereas, in the case of a sale of non-specific goods (eg a retail sale of petrol),
ownership cannot pass until the goods are irrevocably earmarked as the goods to be used
to perform the contract, as where the petrol is put in the tank, but it will pass then even
though payment is only made later.111
Generally speaking, if a person intends to transfer ownership to another, the own-
ership passes even though the transferor acts under a mistake. The only exceptions are
where the transferor acts under a mistake, known to the transferee, as to the identity of
the transferee or of the property transferred, or as to the quantity of money paid.
Since the owner of a vending (or gaming) machine only intends to pass ownership to
someone who inserts appropriate coins, the ownership of property (or money) issued
by such a machine does not pass if it is obtained by a jemmy, a false token or foreign
coins.112
An example of the fine detail which questions of ownership can raise can be illustrated
by reference to the apparently simple example of a train ticket or a car park ticket. If
someone sells or, even, gives a used but still-valid ticket for use by another, he may, to his
surprise, be guilty of theft.113 He will thereby have appropriated the ticket, he will have
111 For the basic provisions, see the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 16, 17 and 18.
112 Goodwin [1996] Crim LR 262, CA. 113 See Smith ‘Stealing Tickets’ [1998] Crim LR 723.
 | 10.40 theft and related offences
intended permanently to deprive the original seller114 and he may be found to have appro-
priated the ticket dishonestly. The case will turn on whether the original seller retained
ownership of the ticket. This will depend on whether under the terms of the contract the
original seller has retained ownership. If the original seller has purported to retain own-
ership, eg by a statement on the ticket or in a notice, the statement will only be a term of
the contract if reasonable notice of it was given.115 If it was, it is irrelevant that the original
buyer had not read the words giving the notice.
10.40 Possession is essentially physical control, but:
• Possession may mean something more than mere physical control; eg, a guest has
not got possession of the cutlery with which he eats a meal in his host’s house; nor
has a customer who examines goods in a shop, nor an employee in a shop in control
of the employer’s goods. In each of these cases, the host, shopkeeper or employer, as
the case may be, retains possession (as well as ownership, if he is the owner).
• Possession may also mean less than physical control; eg, a householder possesses
that which is in his house when he is at his office.
Possession cannot begin until the person with control is aware that the thing is under
his control, although this can include the case where property is left for him in a place (eg
his home) under his control by prior arrangement with him. Once begun, possession can
continue despite the fact that the possessor forgets about the thing.
A person does not lose possession (or ownership, if he has it) of a thing simply by
mislaying it, but he will lose possession (but not ownership, if he has it) if (and when)
someone else assumes physical control of it. Thus, if a purse falls out of a woman’s bag in
the street, she continues to possess it until someone else assumes control.
On the other hand, if property is abandoned by someone, he loses any rights to pos-
session of the property, including ownership if he is the owner. The result is that, unless
the property also belongs to another person or unless and until the abandoned property
falls into the control or possession of another,116 it cannot be stolen by D.117 ‘Abandonment’
occurs where someone discards property ‘without any specific intention of putting a
person in his place (a case naturally exceptional with things of value)’.118 It can alterna-
tively be described as discarding property being completely indifferent as to what hap-
pens to it. Someone who leaves his no-longer-wanted bicycle at the roadside for subsequent
collection by a friend does not abandon it, but someone who litters a street with a half-eaten
pizza does abandon the pizza. The test of abandonment is a strict one; a person does not, eg,
abandon rubbish which he puts in his dustbin, because he has put the goods there for collec-
tion by the local authority.119 Lord Goddard CJ explained why in Williams v Phillips:120
114 See para 10.87.

115 Parker v South Eastern Rly Co (1877) 2 CPD 416, CA. The issue of whether London Underground had
retained ownership of the tickets in Marshall [1998] 2 Cr App R 282, CA, para 10.87, was not the subject of the
subsequent appeal in that case.
116 For a review of the criminal and civil authorities on the issue of abandoned goods and a proposal for a new
approach, see Hickey ‘Stealing Abandoned Goods: Possessing Title in Proceedings for Theft’ (2006) 26 LS 584.
117 See para 10.44 in respect of the abandonment of property on occupied land.
118 Pollock and Wright An Essay on Possession in the Criminal Law (1888) 44.
119 Williams v Phillips (1957) 41 Cr App R 5, DC. 120 (1957) 41 Cr App R 5 at 8.
10.43 actus reus of theft | 
‘If I put refuse in my dustbin outside my house, I am not abandoning it in the sense that I am
leaving it for anybody to take it away. I am putting it out so that it may be collected and taken
away by the local authority, and until it has been taken away by the local authority it is my
property. It is my property and I can take it back and prevent anybody else from taking it away.
It is simply put there for . . . the local authority . . . to come and clear it away. Once the [local
authority] come and clear it away, it seems to me that because I intended it to pass from myself
to them, it becomes their property. . . . It is a wholly untenable proposition to say that refuse
which a householder puts out to be taken away is abandoned. Very likely he does not want it
himself and that is why he puts it in the dustbin. He puts it in the dustbin, not so that anybody
can come along and take it, but so that the [local authority] can come along and take it.’
A person who mislaid property does not abandon it by giving up looking for it.121
Where a person has left items in bags outside a charity shop, it is open to a court or jury
to infer that the items had not been abandoned by him but that he intended them to be a
gift to the charity and had attempted to effect delivery.122 Delivery will only be complete,
however, when the charity takes possession of the items; until that time, although the
would-be donor has divested himself of possession of the items, he has not given up his
ownership of them.123
10.41 As already indicated, ownership and possession may be vested in different people. An
example is provided by reference to a bailment. Bailment embraces all situations in which
possession of goods is given by one person (A) to another (B) upon the condition that they
shall be restored to A by B (as where goods are hired or lent or left for repair), or dealt with as
he directs, upon expiry of the agreed period of possession.124 B (the bailee) obtains posses-
sion but A (the bailor) retains ownership. (A loan of money, however, involves the transfer of
ownership, as well as of possession, by the lender since by the nature of the thing he does not
expect the very notes or coins transferred to be returned, although, of course, he expects to
be repaid. The same is true about the ‘loan’ of a bag of sugar or a pint of milk or the like.)
10.42 In law, the ownership of goods is often spoken of as ‘the property in the goods’.
This use of the word ‘property’ is confusing and it is simpler to use that word only in its
other sense, which is the one used earlier in this chapter, namely to cover those things
which may be the subject of ownership. It is in the latter sense that the word ‘property’ is
used in the TA 1968.
Section 5(1)
‘Property shall be regarded as belonging to any person having possession or control of

it, or having in it any proprietary right or interest (not being an equitable interest arising
only from an agreement to transfer or grant an interest).’
121 Hibbert v McKiernan [1948] 2 KB 142, DC.

122 R (on the application of Ricketts) v Basildon Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 2358 (Admin).
123 Ibid. In this case, the court also dealt with the situation where someone left items in a bin provided by a
charity shop. It held that it could be inferred that the charity had taken delivery of the items once placed within
the bin. 124 TRM Copy Centres (UK) Ltd v Lanwall Services Ltd [2009] UKHL 35 at [10] per Lord Hope.
 | 10.44 theft and related offences
Possession or control
10.44 Possession or control is not required to be lawful.125 It follows that property can
be stolen from someone who is not in lawful possession or control of it. For example, in
Smith, Plummer and Haines,126 the Court held that the fact that the victim had been in
unlawful possession of the heroin, a Class A controlled drug, which had been appropri-
ated did not prevent that appropriation constituting theft of the heroin.
‘Control’ covers cases where a person in physical control of property is nevertheless
not in possession of it, such as the guest using his host’s cutlery or the customer exam-
ining goods in a shop. It also covers cases where it is doubtful whether a person in control
of property can be said to be in possession of it.
In Woodman,127 it was held that the knowledge that the thing is under one’s control
is not necessary for one to come into control of it; as already stated, such knowledge is
necessary for possession. In Woodman, D took some scrap metal from a disused factory
belonging to V. Originally there had been a substantial amount of scrap metal on the site.
This had been sold to a company which removed the bulk of it but some was too inaccess-
ible to be removed in such a way as to be attractive to the company. After the company had
removed the bulk of the scrap, V erected a barbed wire fence and put up notices such as
‘Private Property, Keep Out’ and ‘Trespassers will be prosecuted’. Subsequently, D entered
the site and removed a quantity of scrap metal from it. Dismissing an appeal against a con-
viction for theft of the scrap, the Court of Appeal held that there was ample evidence that V
was in control of the site and therefore in control of articles which were on the site, in spite
of the fact that V was not aware of the existence of the scrap. The Court stated that
‘[T]he fact that it could not be shown that [V was] conscious of the existence of this or
any particular scrap iron does not destroy the general principle that control of a site by
excluding others from it is prima facie control of articles on the site as well.’128
The fact that an occupier can be in control of items of property on the land even though
unaware of their existence is of significance where the owner of the items has abandoned
them on occupied land (and thereby lost ownership and possession of them). In such a
case the fact that the items can nevertheless belong to another, the occupier in control of
them, means that someone else who dishonestly appropriates them can be convicted of
their theft. In Rostron and Collinson,129 the Court of Appeal dismissed appeals against
conviction for theft of golf balls which had been hit into a lake by golfers and abandoned
by them. The Court of Appeal held that there was evidence to justify the finding that the
balls belonged to another, the club.
Proprietary right or interest

10.45 The best example of a ‘proprietary right or interest’ is complete ownership of
property, but the phrase also covers proprietary rights or interests falling below that of
complete ownership.
125 Celly and Lindsay [1999] QB 621, CA. See also Turner (No 2) [1971] 2 All ER 441 at 443.
126 [2011] EWCA Crim 66. 127 [1974] QB 754, CA. 128 Ibid at 758.
129 [2003] EWCA Crim 2206.
10.46 actus reus of theft | 
Whether a person other than D had a proprietary right or interest in the property at the
time of the appropriation is not determined by the Act but depends on the complexities
and niceties of the civil law. A full examination of these is outside the scope of this book,
but an example of a proprietary interest less than complete ownership is the interest
(called a beneficial interest) which a beneficiary of a trust has in the trust fund or a
legatee has under the will of a deceased person. Whether or not there is a trust on given
facts is for the judge to decide as a matter of law.130 Where the transaction is in writing,
it is for the judge to decide whether it creates a trust and to direct the jury whether or not
it does.131 If the transaction is not in writing (or not wholly in writing), the judge should
direct the jury that, if they find that the relevant facts are proved, they should conclude
that there is a trust.132
10.46 One type of trust is a constructive trust. This is a trust imposed by the law of equity
without reference to any presumed intention of the parties in order to do justice in cases
of breach of a fiduciary duty or some other unconscionable dealing. The principal cat-
egory of constructive trust is that referred to by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council,133 viz: ‘Although it is diffi-
cult to find clear authority for the proposition, when property is obtained by fraud equity
imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is recoverable and
traceable in equity.’ In A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1985),134 the Court of Appeal was of the
view that an interest under a constructive trust was not a proprietary interest for the pur-
poses of the TA 1968, s 5(1). Dealing with a case where a pub manager had made secret
profits by selling his own beer in his employer’s pub, the Court held that, even if an em-
ployee did hold a secret profit on constructive trust for his employer (see below), that con-
structive trust did not give the employer a proprietary interest for the purposes of s 5(1).
Such an interpretation involves adding words to s 5(1) and it can be contrasted with the
decision of another Court of Appeal in Shadrokh-Cigari,135 where it was held an interest
which could only have arisen under a constructive trust was a proprietary interest for the
purposes of s 5(1). This decision renders doubtful that in A-G’s Reference on the present
point. In Holmes v Governor of Brixton Prison,136 the Divisional Court, obiter, took the
provisional view that property subject to a constructive trust is regarded as belonging to
the person entitled to the beneficial interest for the purposes of s 5(1). It distinguished
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) on the ground that it concerned a secret profit whereas
Holmes v Governor of Brixton Prison concerned a fraudulent taking of property.
If property subject to a constructive trust can belong to another under s 5(1) in all or
some cases, the question arises as to when there can be a constructive trust. An explan-
ation of the law of constructive trusts is outside the scope of this book,137 but it should be
noted that an employee who receives a bribe, or who makes a secret profit by the misuse
130 Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316, CA. 131 Ibid.

132 Such an approach has been taken in respect of the TA 1968 s 5(3): see para 10.55.
133 [1996] AC 669 at 716.
134 [1986] QB 491, CA; see also para 10.56. The Court of Appeal did not consider the applicability of the TA
1968, s 5(2): para 10.51. 135 [1988] Crim LR 465, CA; see also para 10.61.
136 [2004] EWHC 2020 (Admin), DC.
137 For an account of the law of constructive trusts, see Pearce, Stevens and Barr The Law of Trusts and
Equitable Obligations (5th edn, 2010) Ch 9.
 | 10.47 theft and related offences
of his employer’s time and/or property, is not a constructive trustee of that money for his
employer.138 It follows that an employee cannot be convicted of the theft of the bribe or
secret profit if he appropriated it.139 An employee who receives a bribe or makes a secret
profit can, however, be convicted of the offence of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006, s 1 by
virtue of s 4 of that Act.
10.47 Section 5(1) says that ‘proprietary right or interest’ in the present context does
not include ‘an equitable interest arising only from an agreement to transfer or grant an
interest’. This needs to be explained to those who have not yet encountered the rules of
equity. When a person makes a specifically enforceable contract to buy, eg, a unique piece
of personal property, he thereby receives what is called an equitable interest in it although
legally the person contracting to sell retains the legal ownership until that is transferred.
The above words are designed to ensure that an owner who contracts to sell his property
to A, and then contracts to sell it to B, does not steal it from A.
Property may belong to more than one person

10.48 The result of the defi nition of ‘belonging to another’ in the TA 1968, s 5(1) is that
property may ‘belong’ to more than one person. If A delivers goods to B with instructions
to keep them safely for him, and D appropriates them dishonestly and with intent per-
manently to deprive A and B of them, he will commit theft from both A and B.
10.49 Another result is that a person to whom property ‘belongs’ under s 5(1) may steal
the goods from someone else to whom they ‘belong’. For instance, in the above example,
if it is B who dishonestly appropriates the goods, he can be convicted of theft from A.
Indeed, an owner may be convicted of stealing his own property. If D lets a car to V for a
month and the next week surreptitiously takes it away, he can be convicted of theft – even
though he is still the owner of the car – because the car is in V’s possession; the same would
be true if D removed his goods, without redeeming them, from V’s pawnbroker’s shop, or
if D removed his shoes from V’s shoe repair shop without paying for the repairs. Another
example that an owner can steal his own property is provided by Turner (No 2),140 where
D, whose car had been repaired, took the car from outside the repairer’s garage with
the object of evading payment of the repairer’s charges. The Court of Appeal dismissed
D’s appeal against conviction for theft of the car because he had appropriated property
belonging to another; it held that the car had clearly been in the ‘possession or control’ of
the repairer when D had appropriated it by taking it. This decision shows the width of the
TA 1968, s 5(1) because although the repairer presumably had a lien (a right to retain until
payment) over the car, the trial judge had told the jury to ignore questions of lien and the
Court of Appeal had to decide the appeal on the basis that there was no lien. If there was
no lien, the repairer would only have been in possession of the car as a bailee at will
138 According to Lister & Co v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1, CA, which was relied on in A-G’s Reference (No 1 of
1985), the employee is not a constructive trustee of the money received as a bribe or secret profit but merely has to
account to the employer as a debtor for it. Lister & Co v Stubbs has recently been followed by the Court of Appeal
in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 347, where the Court of Appeal
rejected the decision of the Privy Council in A-G of Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324, PC, according to which
there would be a constructive trust in such circumstances.
139 Powell v MacRae [1977] Crim LR 571, DC. 140 [1971] 2 All ER 441, CA.
10.50 actus reus of theft | 
(ie under a bailment immediately terminable at any time by the bailor). The Court of
Appeal rejected an argument that possession as a bailee at will was insufficient. It said:
‘There is no ground for qualifying the words “possession or control” in any way. It is suf-
ficient if it is found that the person from whom the property is taken, or to use the words
of the Act, appropriated, was at the time in fact in possession or control.’141
The somewhat surprising result of Turner (No 2) is that someone with a better right to
possession than the possessor can be convicted of theft if he dishonestly appropriates the
property with the intent permanently to deprive the possessor of it.142
A partner may likewise be held guilty of stealing partnership property, for partners are
co-owners of their property and each of them has a proprietary right in it.143 A thief may
steal from another thief, as where he appropriates goods whose ownership and possession
the latter has obtained by deception.144
As was said in paras 10.45 and 10.46, a beneficiary under a trust (with the possible
exception of certain types of a constructive trust) has a proprietary right or interest under
s 5(1), and therefore the trust property is regarded as belonging to the beneficiary as well
as to the trustees who are the legal owners. If D holds goods, money or shares in trust for
V, D as trustee has the legal ownership of the goods, money or shares, but V has a propri-
etary interest in them. Thus, D will be guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates them
with the intention of defeating the trust by permanently depriving V of them.145
Property of defendant’s spouse or civil partner

10.50 Spouses and civil partners146 may be guilty of stealing each other’s property,
although in many instances their possession, and in some instances their ownership, is
joint. However, a prosecution may not be instituted against a person for the theft of prop-
erty which belonged to his or her spouse or civil partner at the time of the offence except
by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. The only exceptions are:
• where the property also belonged to a third party and both spouses or both civil
partners are charged with its theft;
• in the case of spouses, where the spouses were, by virtue of a judicial decree or order,
not obliged to cohabit at the time of the offence;147
• in the case of civil partners, where an order is in force providing for their
separation.148
141 [1971] 2 All ER 441 at 443.

142 Cf Meredith [1973] Crim LR 253, Crown Ct, where a Circuit judge ruled that it was not theft , where a car
owner recovered the car from a police yard where it had been impounded, because the police had no right to
retain possession of it; their power to remove a vehicle which was obstructing the highway did not extend to
keeping it from the owner. This seems inconsistent with Turner (No 2) but lacks the authoritative force of that
decision. 143 Bonner [1970] 2 All ER 97n, CA.
144 Meech [1974] QB 549, CA; para 10.55. 145 See Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316, CA.
146 As to civil partnerships (ie registered same-sex partnerships), see the Civil Partnership Act 2004, s 1.
147 ‘Judicial decree or order’ includes a non-molestation order: Woodley v Woodley [1978] Crim LR 629, DC.
148 TA 1968, s 30(4) (amended by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch 27). The provisions of s 30(4) also apply
to a charge of attempting or conspiring to commit theft of property belonging to the defendant’s spouse or civil
 | 10.51 theft and related offences
Special cases
Key points 10.5

The TA 1968, s 5 contains four subsections other than s 5(1). These deal with specific
situations where either the property does not belong to another under s 5(1) or where,
although it does so belong by virtue of complicated rules of civil law, the matter is simpli-
fied by a special rule. By virtue of the rules laid down by these four subsections, property is
deemed to belong to another in the specified situations for the purposes of the definition
of theft in s 1.
Trusts
10.51 As we have seen, property subject to a trust is regarded under s 5(1) as belonging
to the beneficiaries as well as to the trustees. However, there are some trusts where there
are no individual beneficiaries (in the legal sense of persons owning a beneficial interest
in the trust property). Charitable trusts are an example.149 Without special provision, a
dishonest appropriation of property subject to a charitable trust by a sole trustee or all
the trustees would not be theft because the property would not belong to another. For this
reason, special provision is made by the TA 1968, s 5(2), which provides that:
‘Where property is subject to a trust, the persons to whom it belongs shall be regarded as
including any person having a right to enforce the trust, and an intention to defeat the
trust shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive of the property any person
having that right.’
Therefore, if trustees hold property on trust for charitable purposes, the Attorney-
General, as a person who, though not a beneficiary, has the right to enforce such a trust,
is someone to whom the property ‘belongs’, and the trustees may be convicted of theft if
they dishonestly appropriate it.
Property received under an obligation to retain and deal

with it in a particular way
10.52 The TA 1968, s 5(3), which is in terms which include property received from an-
other under an obligation short of actual trusteeship,150 provides that:
‘Where a person receives property from or on account of another, and is under an obliga-
tion to the other to retain and deal with that property or its proceeds in a particular way,
the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the other.’
partner and to a charge of encouraging or assisting such a theft contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2:
Serious Crime Act 2007, s 63(1), Sch 6, Pt 1.
149 Another example is a discretionary trust for a very large class: Vestey v IRC [1980] AC 1148, HL.
150 Arnold [1997] 4 All ER 1 at 9.
10.54 actus reus of theft | 
Slightly more fully, s 5(3) can be expressed as follows. If:

• D has received property (usually money) from or on account of another (V, the
person from whom the property is alleged to have been stolen), and
• D is under an obligation in civil law151 (as opposed to a moral obligation) to V to
retain and deal with the property or its proceeds in a particular way,
that property or its proceeds is regarded (as against D) as belonging to another (ie V).
‘Proceeds’ refers to money or other property (including a bank credit) representing
what was originally received.
The existence of a legal obligation to retain and deal with the property or its proceeds
in a particular way is not enough for s 5(3) to apply. In addition, D must have personal
knowledge of the obligation and its extent.152 The knowledge of an agent cannot be
imputed to him for this purpose.153 Thus, if an assistant of D receives a cheque payable to
D’s business from a client, the money to be used in a specified way, and D, not knowing
of the client’s instructions, uses the cheque for the ordinary purposes of the business, D
is not guilty of theft. This is because, as against D, the money does not belong to another
under s 5(3) in view of D’s ignorance of the obligation.
Receipt of property from or on account of another

10.53 The TA 1968, s 5(3) requires that D should have ‘received’ the property ‘from or on
account of’ another to whom he is under a legal obligation to retain and deal with it in a par-
ticular way. This requirement is clearly satisfied where D receives money from V which he
is legally obliged to V to use in a particular way. It is also satisfied where D (a shop assistant)
receives money from a customer for some of his employer’s goods since he has received the
money on account of another (the employer) and is legally obliged to the employer to retain
and deal with it in a particular way (eg to put it in the till). It will be noted that an ‘obligation
to retain and deal with’ property in a particular way may be owed to the person from whom
it was received (in which case it will belong to him under s 5(3)) or to the person on whose
account it was received (in which case it will belong to that person under s 5(3)). Which, if
any, is the case depends on the facts and the applicable civil law.
10.54 The requirement that D must have ‘received’ the property from or on account of
another would seem not to be satisfied where a sum of money is credited to D’s account
by a bank transfer (as opposed to being credited by the paying in of a cheque received by
D). The credit is new property, a thing in action belonging to D which has never belonged
to anyone else.154 Consequently, D has not ‘received’ it and the property cannot, under s
5(3), belong to another from or on whose account it was received.155 The Court of Appeal
in Klineberg and Marsden 156 did not advert to this point when it failed to distinguish
151 Meech [1974] QB 549, CA; Mainwaring (1981) 74 Cr App R 99, CA; Wakeman v Farrar [1974] Crim LR 136,
DC; DPP v Huskinson (1988) 20 HLR 562, DC; Breaks and Huggan [1998] Crim LR 349, CA.
152 Wills (1990) 92 Cr App R 297, CA. Presumably, he need not know that it is a legal obligation.
153 Ibid. 154 Preddy [1996] AC 815, HL.
155 The credit would belong to another under s 5(1) if the person whose bank account has been debited as a
result of the transfer has an equitable interest in the credit: see JC Smith [1999] Crim LR 419.
156 [1999] 1 Cr App R 427, CA.
 | 10.55 theft and related offences
between separate sums provided by cash or cheque received from another and those pro-
vided by bank transfer.157
Obligation to the other to retain and deal with the money or

its proceeds in a particular way
10.55 Where the transaction is in writing, it is for the judge to decide whether it creates
a legal obligation of the above type and to direct the jury whether or not it does.158 Where
the transaction is not in writing (or not wholly in writing), it cannot be known whether
or not the relevant circumstances existed until the facts have been established. It is for
the jury to establish these circumstances if the facts are in dispute and, where they are,
the judge must direct the jury to make their findings on the facts and then say to them:
‘If you find the facts to be such-and-such, then I direct you as a matter of law that a legal
obligation arose to which s 5(3) applies.’159
The judges (including appellate judges) have on occasions reached surprising conclu-
sions on whether or not a legal obligation of the type referred to in s 5(3) would arise in
given circumstances. Meech 160 provides an example. V fraudulently obtained a cheque
for £1,450 from a finance company. He asked D to cash the cheque for him. D agreed
and paid it into his own bank account. Two days later, having discovered V’s fraud, D
withdrew £1,410 from his account. This represented the £1,450 less a debt of £40 which
V owed him. D had arranged with F and G to stage a fake robbery with him as victim, so
that he could give an excuse for not returning the money to V, and this was carried out.
D, F and G were convicted of the theft of the £1,410 and appealed unsuccessfully to the
Court of Appeal. The Court held that at the time of the appropriation, which (it held) was
when the money was divided up after the fake robbery,161 the money (the proceeds of the
cheque) belonged to another, V, under s 5(3) because D had initially received the cheque
from V under an obligation to retain and deal with it or its proceeds in a particular way.
This obligation was not affected by the fact that V, having acquired the cheque illegally,
could not have enforced it in a court.
It is difficult to see how there was a legal obligation of the type specified in s 5(3). The
Court of Appeal held that there was an initial obligation owed to V by D to retain and
deal with the cheque and its proceeds in a particular way and that this sufficed for the
purposes of s 5(3), even if the obligation ceased on D’s discovery of V’s fraud. The Court
based this initial obligation on the fact that on D’s knowledge of the facts there was an
obligation to V, but s 5(3) does not talk in terms of an obligation believed by the defendant
to exist, but of an actual obligation. Moreover, it appears to require the existence of such
an obligation at the time of the appropriation. It is certainly odd that, on the view taken
157 See also Re Kumar [2000] Crim LR 504, DC, where the court was likewise inadvertent to the present
point.
158 Clowes (No 2) [1994] 2 All ER 316, CA.
159 Mainwaring (1981) 74 Cr App R 99, CA. Also see Dubar [1995] 1 All ER 781, C-MAC (as to this court, see
para 2.32, n 98); Breaks and Huggan [1998] Crim LR 349, CA. Where the relevant facts are not in dispute, the
judge should normally rule on them before, or at the commencement of, the trial: Breaks and Huggan ibid.
160 [1974] QB 549, CA.
161 Following Gomez, D would now have appropriated the money when he withdrew it from the bank; see
para 10.7.
10.56 actus reus of theft | 
by the Court of Appeal, an obligation which may never have existed and which did not
exist at the time of the appropriation could be held to suffice for the purposes of s 5(3). It
is submitted that the view taken in Meech is wrong and would not now be followed by the
Court of Appeal.
10.56 It cannot be over-emphasised that, for property to belong to another under the TA
1968, s 5(3), D must be under a specific legal obligation to the person from or on whose
account he received the property to retain and deal with that property or its proceeds
in a particular way. The fact that D is under some contractual obligation to that person
to do something will not normally mean that he is obliged to retain and deal with the
property received in a particular way. For example, where an employee receives money
from a customer for goods which (contrary to his terms of employment) he is selling on
his own account on the employer’s premises (as where the manager of a pub is selling his
own beer),162 or where an employee receives money as a result of misusing his employer’s
property on his own account (such as out of hours use of a taxi by an employed taxi
driver),163 the money will not belong to another under s 5(3). The reason is that in neither
of these cases is the money received from or on account of another to whom the employee
is legally obliged to retain and deal with it in a particular way. Likewise, a person who
receives and cashes a cheque for housing benefit to which he is entitled and who dishon-
estly uses the money for his own purposes instead of paying rent arrears does not satisfy
the requirement of s 5(3) because there is no obligation on him, statutory or contractual,
to retain and deal in a particular way with the money received.164
By way of further example, if V makes a contract with D, a decorator, to have his house
painted and pays D a down payment of £500, the £500 will belong only to D. It will not
belong to V under s 5(3) because, although D is under a legal (contractual) obligation to
paint the house, he is not under a legal obligation to retain and deal with the £500 (or its
proceeds) in a particular way; he can do what he likes with it. It would be different if the
£500 is handed over specifically to enable D to buy the necessary materials to paint the
house. Here D is under a legal obligation to retain and deal with the money or its pro-
ceeds (eg the paint) in a particular way; therefore it belongs to V under s 5(3) and D can
be convicted of theft if he dishonestly appropriates it. This distinction can be illustrated
by reference to Hall.165
D, a travel agent, received money from clients as deposits and payments for air trips to
America: in some instances a lump sum was paid by schoolteachers in respect of charter
flights for their pupils; in other instances individuals made payments in respect of their
own projected flights. In none of the seven cases covered by the charges did the flights
materialise and in none was there any refund. D claimed to have paid into his firm’s gen-
eral trading account all sums received by him and asserted that those sums had become
his own property and had been applied by him in the conduct of the firm’s business.
162 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1985) [1986] QB 491, CA; Cooke [1986] AC 909, HL. If two or more agree to do
this, they can be convicted of conspiracy to defraud: Cooke. 163 Cullen (1873) LR 2 CCR 28, CCR.
164 DPP v Huskinson (1988) 20 HLR 562, DC.
165 [1973] QB 126, CA. Also see Hayes (1976) 64 Cr App R 82, CA. Note: the statements in these cases that
it is for the jury to determine not only the facts but also whether, on those facts, an obligation arose have been
disapproved and are not to be followed: Dubar [1995] 1 All ER 781, C-MAC. The correct approach is that given
in the first paragraph of para 10.55: ibid.
 | 10.57 theft and related offences
D submitted that he could not be convicted of theft just because the firm had not pros-
pered and there was no money. D was convicted but appealed successfully to the Court
of Appeal who held that, although D was under a legal obligation to fulfil the customers’
expectations under the contracts, it was not established, in the absence of some further
arrangement, that D had been under an obligation to the clients concerned to retain and
deal with the money in a particular way; therefore the money did not belong to another
under s 5(3) at the material time.
It would have been different if D had been required by the terms of the contracts to pay
the money into a separate account and use it to purchase the tickets. In that case D would
have been under a legal obligation to retain and deal with the money or its proceeds in
a particular way and it would have belonged to another under s 5(3). It would also have
been different if D had been obliged to the customers or the airline to retain in the firm’s
general trading account funds (less any commission) representing the amount received
from the customers and paid in by him, and to pay it to the airline. In such a case, a failure
by D to maintain the level of the account at or above the amount payable would amount
to the appropriation of the bank balance (a thing in action) which was the proceeds of the
money received from the customers (or on account of the airline, as the case might be)
which he was under an obligation to the customers (or the airline, as the case might be) to
retain and deal with in a particular way.166
Care must be taken in framing the terms of an indictment, information or charge. In
Dyke and Munro,167 two trustees of a charitable trust were convicted of stealing money
which had been collected in collecting tins by street collectors but had not been paid
into the charity’s bank account by the two trustees; instead the money had been taken
by them. The indictment alleged that they had stolen ‘monies belonging to a person or
persons unknown’ (viz those who had contributed). Allowing their appeal against con-
viction, the Court of Appeal held that they could not be convicted of theft as charged. The
ownership of the money had passed to the charitable trust when the money was put in the
tins and, although the trustees had been legally obliged to retain and deal with the money
in a particular way, that obligation had not been owed to the individual contributors. The
money therefore did not belong to the individual contributors under s 5(3). On the other
hand, the trustees could have properly been convicted if the indictment had alleged that
the money had belonged to the Attorney General to whom the trustees were obliged to
retain and deal with the money in accordance with the terms of the charitable trust.168
10.57 The operation and limits of the TA 1968, s 5(3) can also be demonstrated as fol-
lows. If D is engaged by V to collect rent from V’s tenants, and to account to V for the
money he receives (less any commission or other reward), the money collected will be-
long to another (V) under s 5(3) if under their arrangement the circumstances are such
that D is legally obliged to hand over the actual money received or to maintain a distinct
fund containing the money received or other money or a bank credit representing it (its
proceeds) or to retain in his general account a sum representing it. In such a case a dis-
honest appropriation by D of any of the money or its proceeds to which he is not entitled
can be theft. Another example is provided by Wain169 below. On the other hand, the
166 See Re Kumar [2000] Crim LR 504, DC. 167 [2001] EWCA Crim 2184. 168 Para 10.51.
169 [1995] 2 Cr App R 660, CA, disapproving Lewis v Lethbridge [1987] Crim LR 59, DC.
10.59 actus reus of theft | 
money or its proceeds will not belong to V under s 5(3) if the relationship between D and
V is simply one of debtor and creditor (ie D is not obliged to V to hand over the actual
money received or to keep the money or its proceeds in a particular fund or to retain
in his general bank account a sum representing the money received, and merely has to
account in due course to V for an equivalent sum). In such a case, D will not commit theft
by dishonestly appropriating the money.
In Wain, D, by organising events, raised money for a company which distributed
money among charities. D paid what he had raised into a special bank account which
he had opened and thereafter, with the consent of a representative of the company, into
his own account. D then dishonestly dissipated the credit in his account. The Court of
Appeal held that D thereby appropriated property belonging to another because he was
under an obligation to retain the proceeds of the money collected (the money credited in
the successive bank accounts) and deal with them in a particular way (to hand them over
to the company).
Utility of s 5(3)
10.58 Where D has received the property as a bailee or trustee, it belongs to another
under s 5(1) (or under s 5(2) in the case of some trusts) for reasons already explained.
Consequently, although property which has been bailed or handed over subject to a
trust clearly belongs to another under the TA 1968, s 5(3), recourse to that subsection is
unnecessary.
In fact, it may be that s 5(3) is virtually otiose since, in nearly every other case covered
by it, it can be established that, under the civil law, someone other than the recipient (ie
the defendant) had a ‘proprietary interest’ in the property or proceeds in question, so that
it belonged to another under s 5(1). In Klineberg and Marsden 170 the Court of Appeal
described s 5(3) as ‘essentially a deeming provision by which property or its proceeds
“shall be regarded” as belonging to another, even though, on a strict civil law analysis, it
does not’. One case which may be covered by s 5(3), but not by s 5(1), is where V sells D
a non-transferable ticket on terms that D will return it at the end of a journey. In such a
case, the entire proprietary interest in the ticket may pass to D171 but D’s retention of the
ticket after the journey, with intent permanently to deprive V of it, could be theft of the
ticket by virtue of s 5(3) on the basis that D was under an obligation to ‘retain and deal
with it in a particular way’.
Even if s 5(3) is virtually otiose, the civil law in this area is complex and s 5(3) plays a
useful role in making it quite clear that, in the circumstances fairly simply specified by it,
the property or its proceeds shall be regarded as ‘belonging to another’ for the purposes
of theft.
Property transferred under a mistake

10.59 As already explained, a person (D) who, despite a mistake on the transferor’s part,
obtains ownership of property at the time he takes delivery (ie possession) of the property
thereby appropriates that property. At that point of time the property will still belong to
170 [1999] 1 Cr App R 427 at 432. Also see Floyd v DPP [2000] Crim LR 411, DC. 171 See para 10.39.
 | 10.60 theft and related offences
another (the transferor) under the TA 1968, s 5(1), although a split second later the trans-
feror will lose ownership and possession of it. If D has the necessary mens rea he can be
convicted of theft.
10.60 We are concerned here with the situation where an appropriation with mens rea
only occurs after D has obtained ownership and possession of the property, as where
property is transferred under a mistake which D only discovers subsequently. In such a
case D will only commit theft if D then appropriates the property by keeping or dealing
with it as owner with the necessary mens rea and the property belongs to another at that
point of time.
Section 5(1)
10.61 Although s 5(1) does not make express provision for mistake, property will still
belong to the transferor in such a case under s 5(1) if the facts fall within a rule of civil
law of restitution which was applied to the law of theft in Shadrokh-Cigari.172 The rule
is that, where an action will lie under the law of restitution to recover money or other
property which is transferred under a mistake, the person paying or transferring it
under the mistake has a proprietary interest in it, at least once the recipient knows of
the mistake.173 In Shadrokh-Cigari, $286,000 was transferred from an American bank to
the English bank account of X, a boy, instead of the $286 actually due. X’s guardian, D,
procured X to authorise the English bank to issue banker’s drafts drawn in favour of D for
most of the sum of $286,000. D then used the drafts for his own purposes. The Court of
Appeal upheld D’s conviction for theft of the drafts from the English bank; D had appro-
priated the drafts and they belonged to another (the English bank) for the purposes of s
5(1) because, having transferred them to D under a mistaken belief that D could properly
deal with the funds in the account, the bank, although it transferred ownership, retained
a proprietary interest in them.
Under the rules of equity, where the transferor (T) of money or other property trans-
ferred under a mistake retains a proprietary interest in it, and that money or other prop-
erty is used to acquire property or is combined with other money to do so, T can ‘trace’ 174
his interest in that property or fund. As a result T will have a proprietary interest in those
proceeds to the extent that they represent the original money or other property, and they
will also belong to T for the purposes of s 5(1).
Too much must not be made of the decision in Shadrokh-Cigari, since the situations in
which an action will lie to recover money or other property transferred under a mistake,
or, in other words, situations where the transferee is under a legal obligation to make res-
toration of such money or property, are limited. This is a point dealt with in slightly more
detail in para 10.63. What is said there about an obligation to restore is equally applicable
in the present context.
172 [1988] Crim LR 465, CA. See also Gresham [2003] EWCA Crim 2070.
173 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105; Westdeutsche
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 715, per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson.
174 Subject to the normal restrictions on tracing; see Pearce, Stevens and Barr The Law of Trusts and Equitable
Obligations (5th edn, 2010) Ch 31.
10.64 actus reus of theft | 
Section 5(4)
10.62 Section 5(1) does not make express provision for mistake. The TA 1968, s 5(4), on
the other hand, does.
‘Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make
restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof,
then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against
him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make
restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the
property or proceeds.’
To bring s 5(4) into play it is not enough simply that V has acted under a mistake; in
addition, the transferee, D, must be under a legal175 obligation under the law of restitu-
tion176 to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property received from V or its
proceeds or its value. Only then, and to the extent of that obligation, is the property or
proceeds regarded under s 5(4) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration. It is a
matter of law for the judge whether or not an obligation to restore existed in particular
circumstances. It is for the jury to establish whether or not these circumstances existed
if the transaction was not wholly in writing and the facts are in dispute, and the judge
should direct them in a similar way to that described in para 10.55 in relation to s 5(3).
10.63 When does a legal obligation to make restoration arise for the purposes of the TA
1968, s 5(4)? The answer to this could only be exhaustively attempted by a lengthy discussion
of the civil law of restitution, which would not be appropriate for a book such as this. Suffice
it to say that the most obvious case where an obligation to make restoration arises in a case
where the mistake has not prevented ownership passing is where V transfers money under
a mistake (whether of fact or of law)177 which leads him to believe that D is legally entitled
to the money.178 It is this type of case which s 5(4) was principally intended to cover. For ex-
ample, if V, an employer, pays D, an employee, a week’s wages of £480, forgetting that he has
already paid D £160 as an advance against wages, this mistake does not prevent ownership
of the £480, which V intended to pay, passing to D, but D is under an obligation in civil law
to make restoration to V of the £160 excess and, to the extent of that obligation, the money
is regarded as belonging to V. If D spends the excess on becoming aware of the mistake, he
can be convicted of the theft of £160, since it belongs to another (to V) under s 5(4).
10.64 The application of the TA 1968, s 5(4) is illustrated by Davis.179 D was entitled to
housing benefit from the local authority. Because of an administrative mistake, D was
175 Gilks [1972] 3 All ER 280, CA.

176 In A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182, CA, the Court held that ‘make restoration’ in s 5(4) meant
make restitution. 177 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, HL.
178 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54. An example would be where money is paid under a void contract under
the mistaken belief (whether the mistake was one of fact or of law) that it was valid: Kleinwort Benson Ltd v
Lincoln City Council above. There are various bars to restitution for mistake: see Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms
Son & Cooke (Southern) Ltd [1980] QB 677 at 695–696. 179 (1988) 88 Cr App R 347, CA.
 | 10.65 theft and related offences
sent two housing benefit cheques (which we shall call ‘duplicate cheques’) every month
for eight months; each cheque was for the full amount due. D then ceased to be entitled to
housing benefit but he still received a single housing benefit cheque each month. Instead
of returning the cheques, D dishonestly endorsed them.
Some of the duplicate cheques were endorsed to D’s landlord for rent. The Court of
Appeal quashed D’s conviction of theft of money in relation to this conduct because D had
not thereby received, and therefore could not appropriate, money.
In relation to one set of duplicate cheques and some of the single cheques, D had
endorsed these to shopkeepers for cash. The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction of
theft of money in relation to these, as follows.
Dealing with the single cheques, it held that, since the cheques (ie the cheque forms as
opposed to the thing in action which they represented) had been got by mistake in circum-
stances where D was under a legal obligation to make restoration of them, and since the
cash into which D converted the cheques was the ‘proceeds’ of that property (the cheques)
which D had received under a mistake, D was under a legal obligation to make restoration
of those proceeds and therefore they belonged to another (the local authority) under s 5(4).
In the case of the set of duplicate cheques which had been cashed, it could not be proved
which was the one to which D was entitled and which one had been sent under a mistake.
The Court of Appeal dealt with this by holding that they were to be treated together as
‘got’ by another’s mistake in the same way as if the excessive payment had been made in
a single cheque, and that D was under a legal obligation to make restoration to the local
authority in part of them or their proceeds to the extent of that obligation, and that there-
fore the proceeds to that extent belonged to another (the local authority) under s 5(4).
10.65 Another example is provided by A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1983).180 D was a police
officer. She was paid by her employer by direct debit. Once she was overpaid by £74. When D
realised this, she decided to do nothing about it, although she did not withdraw any of this
money. At D’s trial for theft, the judge directed an acquittal. On a reference by the Attorney
General, the Court of Appeal held that, to the extent of the overpayment, the debt due to
D from her bank (a thing in action) was property which belonged to another under the TA
1968, s 5(4). This was because D had got that property under another’s (the employer’s) mis-
take as to her legal entitlement and was under an obligation in civil law to make restoration.
This obligation to make restoration did not relate to the property (the debt), since it was not
something which could be restored, nor did it relate to the proceeds of that property, since
there were no proceeds to restore. Instead, it related to the value of the property – £74; under
the civil law of restitution D was obliged to restore or pay for the value of the benefit which
she had received. Therefore, as against D, the property (the debt) was regarded as belonging
to another, the person (the employer) entitled to restoration, under s 5(4).
Utility of s 5(4)
10.66 As seen,181 in Shadrokh-Cigari182 the Court of Appeal applied to the law of theft
the rule of civil law that, where an action will lie to recover money or other property
180 [1985] QB 182, CA. See also Stalham [1993] Crim LR 310, CA. 181 Para 10.61.
182 [1988] Crim LR 465, CA.
10.68 mens rea of theft | 
transferred under a mistake, the transferor has a proprietary interest in it, at least once
the recipient knows of the mistake, which can be ‘traced’ into things into which it is
converted.183 Consequently, the original money or other property or its proceeds will
belong to another (the transferor) for the purposes of the TA 1968, s 5(1). In the light of
the application of this principle, situations covered by s 5(4) will, for practical purposes,
also be covered by s 5(1). A similar point was made in para 10.58 about s 5(3) and a similar
comment can be made here as there. This is that the TA 1968, s 5(4) makes clear in fairly
simple terms that, in the circumstances specified by it, property is regarded as belonging
to another and avoids the need for the criminal courts to get involved in esoteric points of
law relating to proprietary interests. Since, as the Court of Appeal admitted in Shadrokh-
Cigari, s 5(4) was an alternative route to a finding in that case that the property in ques-
tion belonged to another, it seems an unnecessary complication for it to have based its
decision primarily on s 5(1) by an application of such points of law.
Corporation sole
10.67 The TA 1968, s 5(5) deals with a different kind of special case from those covered
by s 5(2) to (4). It provides that the property of a corporation sole, examples of which are a
bishop, a police and crime commissioner and the Treasury Solicitor, shall be regarded as
belonging to the corporation notwithstanding a vacancy in the corporation. This is simply
to guard against the possibility that, eg, the property of a bishopric might be regarded as
belonging to no one, and therefore incapable of being stolen, during a vacancy in the
see.
Mens rea of theft

10.68 The TA 1968, s 1(2) states that it is immaterial that the appropriation is not made
with a view to gain or is not made for the thief’s own benefit (so that D can be convicted
of theft if he throws V’s ring into a river or tears to pieces V’s clothing, although a charge
of criminal damage would be more appropriate in the latter case).
The mens rea required for theft by the TA 1968, s 1(1) is that the appropriation must
have been made dishonestly and with the intention of permanently depriving another
person to whom the property belongs.184
The extreme width of the requirement of ‘appropriation’ means that these require-
ments of mens rea, particularly that of dishonesty, play a crucial role in the offence in
limiting the offence of theft within reasonable bounds.
183 Subject to the normal restrictions on tracing: see Pearce, Stevens and Barr The Law of Trusts and Equitable
Obligations (5th edn, 2010) Ch 31.
184 D must, of course, have this mens rea at the time of the appropriation alleged; see Hayes (1976) 64 Cr App
R 82, CA; Vinall [2011] EWCA Crim 2652.
 | 10.69 theft and related offences
‘Dishonestly’
Key points 10.6
By the TA 1968, s 2(1), D does not appropriate property dishonestly if he acts with one of
three beliefs. If one of these beliefs is alleged, the judge will tell the jury that, as a matter
of law, D’s appropriation of property is not to be regarded as dishonest, unless the alleged
belief is disproved. In any other case, the question of dishonesty is one of fact for the jury
and not of law for the judge. In answering the question of fact the jury will apply the tests
laid down by the Court of Appeal in Ghosh.
Section 2(1)
10.69 The TA 1968, s 2(1) provides:
‘A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as

dishonest:
(a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive
the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or
(b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent
if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or
(c) (except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if
he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property
belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps.’
Where one of these beliefs is alleged, it is irrelevant that it was unreasonable,185

although, of course, the reasonableness of an alleged belief is of evidential importance
when the issue of its genuineness is being considered.186
10.70 Under the TA 1968, s 2(1)(a) D’s appropriation is not dishonest if he acts under a
claim of right (ie a belief in a legal right to deprive). This means that a mistake of civil law
may excuse, as where a creditor seizes property belonging to his debtor, intending to recoup
himself thereby, under the erroneous belief that the law permits debts to be recovered in
this way. The concluding words of s 2(1)(a) make it plain that someone who appropriates
property in the belief that he is entitled to do so on behalf of, eg, the company by which he is
employed is not guilty of theft. If D genuinely believes that he has the right in law to deprive
another of the property, D cannot be convicted of theft even though he knows that he has no
legal right to appropriate it in the way which he does, eg by the use of force.187
Section 2(1)(a) is limited to beliefs in a legal right to deprive another of property, as
opposed to beliefs in a moral right to do so (such as Robin Hood had when he stole from
185 Holden [1991] Crim LR 478, CA. 186 Para 5.9.

187 Robinson [1977] Crim LR 173, CA; para 10.98.
10.73 mens rea of theft | 
the rich to feed the poor). Where D believes that he has a moral right to deprive, the ques-
tion of his dishonesty depends on the tests outlined in para 10.74.
10.71 The TA 1968, s 2(1)(b) (belief that the person to whom the property belongs would
have consented if he had known of the appropriation and its circumstances) would clearly
cover the case of a student who takes a bottle of lager from a friend’s room, leaving the
price behind him and believing that his friend would have consented had he known of all
the circumstances. D’s belief that he would have had the other’s consent must be a belief
that he would have had a ‘true consent, honestly obtained’.188
10.72 The TA 1968, s 2(1)(c) (belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot
be discovered by taking reasonable steps) does not apply where the property came to D
as trustee or personal representative. It aims principally at protecting the honest finder
as long as he remains honest. There is no dishonesty, and therefore no theft , if, believing
that the owner of goods or money found by him cannot be discovered by taking reason-
able steps, the finder appropriates the goods or money during the currency of that belief.
It is important to appreciate the extremely limited nature of the immunity conferred on
the honest finder. In the first place property may, as we have seen, belong to more than one
person for the purpose of the Act. Although someone who finds goods on or embedded in
another’s land may well believe that their owner, the loser, cannot be discovered by tak-
ing reasonable steps, the goods would probably be held to belong also to the occupier of
the land on the ground that he has possession or control of them.189 Appropriation with
knowledge of the occupier’s rights would be theft. Secondly, if, while he is in possession of
the goods, the finder becomes aware of the person to whom they belong, he may be guilty
of theft in consequence of any subsequent appropriation by keeping or disposing of the
goods with the intention of permanently depriving that person. There is no equivalent to
the protection of honest purchasers from thieves conferred by the TA 1968, s 3(2).190
Section 2(1)(c) is not limited to honest finders. For example, it also protects a shoe re-
pairer who, believing that he cannot find the owner of some uncollected shoes, appropri-
ates them.
Cases not covered by section 2(1)

10.73 The negative definition of dishonesty in the TA 1968, s 2(1) is only a partial defin-
ition. Consequently, D’s appropriation may not have been made dishonestly even though
the case falls outside s 2(1). This was held by the Court of Appeal in 1973 in Feely.191
Moreover, as the court made clear in that case, in situations other than those referred to
in s 2(1) the meaning of dishonesty is not a matter of law for the judge to decide but a mat-
ter of fact for the jury. Th is means that in such situations it is not for the judge to tell the
jury whether or not D’s appropriation, assuming his version of the facts is not disproved,
was made dishonestly but for the jury to decide this. In doing so, a jury is determining
the scope of the offence, which elsewhere in the criminal law is a question of law to be
decided by the judge.
188A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1982) [1984] QB 624 at 641. 189 Paras 10.40–10.44. 190 Para 10.20.
191[1973] QB 530, CA. For a criticism of this decision, see Elliott ‘Law and Fact in Theft Act Cases’ [1976]
Crim LR 707.
 | 10.74 theft and related offences
In Feely, D was employed by a firm of bookmakers as a manager of one of their

branches. D’s employers sent a circular to all their managers stating that the practice of
borrowing from tills was to stop and after receiving that circular D knew that he had no
right of any kind to take money from a till or safe for his own purposes. Subsequently, D
took about £30 from a safe at his branch in order to give it to his father. When the defi-
ciency was discovered, D gave an IOU to his successor as branch manager and said that
he intended to repay the sum, taking it out of money due to him by his employers, who
owed him about twice that amount. The judge in his summing up told the jury ‘ . . . as a
matter of law . . . I am bound to direct you, even if he were prepared to pay back the fol-
lowing day and even if he were a millionaire, it makes no defence in law to this offence’.
The Court of Appeal held that this was wrong: it may happen that an employee is acting
dishonestly when he removes money from a till but it is for the jury to decide. ‘We do not
agree’, it said, ‘that judges should defi ne what “dishonestly” means’. Instead, the ques-
tion of whether the defendant’s appropriation was dishonest should be left to the jury
to decide and the jury should apply to that question the current standards of ordinary
decent people.
‘Dishonestly’ is not intended to characterise a course of conduct but to describe a
state of mind.192 What this means, for the purpose of the above test, is that the jury (or
magistrates), having determined D’s state of mind at the time of the appropriation, must
ask themselves whether, given that state of mind (eg an intention to repay coupled with a
belief, whether reasonable or not,193 that he will be able to do so), D was acting dishonestly
according to the current standards of ordinary decent people.
10.74 In Ghosh,194 a case concerned with other (subsequently repealed) offences of dis-
honesty under the Act, but the decision in which is expressly applicable to theft, the Court
of Appeal added a second, subjective, test to the objective test laid down in Feely. It held
that:
‘In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dis-
honestly, a jury [or magistrates] must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary
standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If it was not
dishonest by those standards, that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it
was dishonest by those standards, then the jury [or magistrates] must consider whether
the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was by those standards
dishonest.’195
This two-fold test can be summarised as follows: Was what D did dishonest according
to the ordinary standard of reasonable and honest people? If so, did D realise that what
he was doing was dishonest by those standards? If the answer to both questions is ‘yes’,
D’s appropriation was dishonest.
192 Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 at 1063. 193 Lewis (1975) 62 Cr App R 206, CA.
194 [1982] QB 1053, CA. The approach to ‘dishonesty’ in this case has been held to be of general application,
even outside the Theft Acts: Lockwood [1986] Crim LR 244, CA.
195 These tests are discussed by Campbell ‘The Test of Dishonesty in R v Ghosh’ (1984) 43 CLJ 349 and Halpin
‘The Test for Dishonesty’ [1996] Crim LR 283.
10.75 mens rea of theft | 
If D did not realise that what he was doing was dishonest by the ordinary standards of
reasonable and honest people, then, however irrational or bigoted his state of mind may
be,196 D’s appropriation will not have been dishonest. Of course, the more outrageous D’s
alleged understanding of those standards is the less likely D is to be believed.
It must be emphasised that the second test is not whether D believed that his behaviour
was not dishonest by his standards. It is no defence for D to say: ‘I knew that what I was
doing is generally regarded as dishonest, but I did not regard it as dishonest myself.’ 197
On the other hand, it is a defence to say – unless disproved: ‘I did not know that ordinary
people would regard what I was doing as dishonest.’ In other words, under this test ‘dis-
honestly’ is not governed by D’s own moral standards but by D’s understanding of the
moral standards of ordinary, decent people.
In Ghosh, the Court of Appeal stated that Robin Hood would act dishonestly because
he would know that ordinary people would consider his actions to be dishonest. However,
assuming that the jury did consider that Robin Hood’s actions were dishonest by the
current standards of ordinary decent people, it is by no means certain that a claim by
Robin Hood that he thought an ordinary person would not regard his actions as dis-
honest would easily be disproved.198
10.75 The approach laid down in Ghosh is liable to create an additional ground for con-
tested trials, to complicate the judge’s direction, and to lead to arbitrary and inconsist-
ent199 verdicts by different juries or benches of magistrates as to what is dishonest.200 It
would be much better if statute laid down as a matter of law a full definition of what is
(or what is not) dishonesty. Because the element of ‘dishonestly’ has a crucial function
in determining whether conduct with property is or is not theft, the law should state in
advance what is and what is not forbidden. That task should not be left to the moral stand-
ards of the jury or magistrates in a particular case.
It may be that the Ghosh approach contravenes the principle of legal certainty
enshrined in the ECHR, Article 7 (no punishment without law), which is infringed if D
was unable – even with appropriate advice if necessary – to foresee to a reasonable de-
gree whether or not his conduct was criminal. Th is requirement was applied, eg, by the
European Court of Human Rights in Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom, 201 where
the applicants (anti-hunt protesters) had been bound over to keep the peace and be of
good behaviour after a fi nding that they had acted contra bonos mores. Contra bonos
196 Mitchell (1990) unreported, CA. 197 Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 at 1064.
198 For a critical evaluation of the position after Ghosh, see Elliott ‘Dishonesty in Theft: A Disposable Concept’
[1982] Crim LR 395. Also see Williams ‘The Standard of Honesty’ (1983) 133 NLJ 636. For suggestions for re-
form, see Elliott, above; Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod and Williams (eds)), paras 2.310–2.314;
Williams ‘Innocuously Dipping into Trust Funds’ (1985) 5 LS 183; Glazebrook ‘Revising the Theft Acts’ (1993)
52 CLJ 191; Halpin ‘The Test for Dishonesty’ [1996] Crim LR 283; Glover ‘Can Dishonesty be Salvaged? Theft and
the Grounding of MSC Napoli’ (2010) 53 JCL 74.
199 In a heterogeneous society, it cannot be supposed that there is a single, shared standard of dishonesty.
A jury or bench’s standards about a particular type of behaviour may vary, eg, depending on the part of the
country where they sit.
200 These and other objections are neatly summarised by Griew ‘Dishonesty: Objections to Feely and Ghosh’
[1985] Crim LR 341. Alternatively, the Ghosh approach may inhibit a charge of theft being made because a fi nd-
ing of dishonesty cannot confidently be anticipated: see Glover ‘Can Dishonesty be Salvaged? Theft and the
Grounding of MSC Napoli’ (2010) 53 JCL 74. 201 (2000) 30 EHRR 241, ECtHR.
 | 10.76 theft and related offences
mores means ‘wrong rather than right in the judgment of the majority of citizens’. The
European Court held that this defi nition failed to the satisfy the requirement because
it failed to describe the behaviour covered by it, even by reference to its effects.202 The
same could clearly be said of the Ghosh approach. However, the European Court in
Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom said that the offences of ‘dishonesty’ under
the Theft Acts were different from binding over for behaviour contra bonos mores be-
cause dishonesty (ie the Ghosh approach) was ‘but one element of a more comprehen-
sive defi nition of the proscribed behaviour’. In the light of the width of ‘appropriation’
in theft , this would appear to underestimate the importance of the element of dishon-
esty in the case of the offence of theft. Despite what was said in Hashman and Harrup
about ‘dishonesty’, a quality of law challenge to the Ghosh approach would not neces-
sarily be doomed.
General
10.76 The judge is not required to direct the jury about the TA 1968, s 2(1), unless there
is evidence that D appropriated the property with one of the beliefs specified in that
provision. In such a case the jury should be directed about the effect of that belief. The
judge must tell the jury that as a matter of law they must acquit D unless the prosecution
disproves D’s alleged belief beyond reasonable doubt.203
10.77 Where the evidence is otherwise than in the last paragraph, a Ghosh direction
is not always necessary; the Court of Appeal has emphasised on a number of occasions
that it is not necessary to give a Ghosh direction in every case.204 Essentially, a Ghosh
direction is necessary where ordinary people might take a different view from D about
whether his appropriation was dishonest. On the other hand, if this is not the issue but
the issue simply relates to a belief in facts which, if true, would undoubtedly negative
dishonesty, as where D alleges that he believed the property was abandoned, a Ghosh
direction is unnecessary; in such a case, the jury should be directed that if D believed
(or might have believed) those facts they should acquit him.205 Nor is a Ghosh direction
necessary if D simply denies the alleged conduct and there is nothing to suggest that D
was not dishonest.206
10.78 Where a Ghosh direction is necessary, the judge must tell the jury to determine
what D’s state of mind actually was (ie what his beliefs and intentions were); unless D’s
alleged state of mind is disproved by the prosecution the jury will, of course, have to find
that it existed. In giving a Ghosh direction the judge should use the precise form of words
in that case.207 The judge must tell the jury that they must acquit D unless the prosecution
satisfies them that D’s appropriation was dishonest.
202 Provisions which describe behaviour by reference to its effects are acceptable: Steel v United Kingdom
(1999) 28 EHRR 603, ECtHR.
203 See Wootton and Peake [1990] Crim LR 201, CA, where this point is made, albeit rather weakly.
204 See, eg, Roberts (1987) 84 Cr App R 117, CA; Price (1989) 90 Cr App R 409, CA; Buzaleck and Schiffer [1991]
Crim LR 130, CA; O’Connell (1991) 94 Cr App R 39, CA. 205 Wood [2002] EWCA Crim 832.
206 Cobb [2005] EWCA Crim 1549. 207 Hyam [1997] Crim LR 439, CA.
10.81 mens rea of theft | 
Section 2(2)
10.79 For the sake of completeness it should be noted that the TA 1968, s 2(2) expressly
says what has already been implied:
‘A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another may be dishonest notwith-

standing that he is willing to pay for the property.’
Someone who knows that the owner of a picture does not wish to sell it might well be
held to have acted dishonestly and to be guilty of theft if he took the picture, intending
to deprive the owner permanently of it, but leaving the price behind. On the other hand,
a student who takes a bottle of lager from a friend’s room, leaving the price, might not
be held to have acted dishonestly under Ghosh, even if he did not believe that his friend
would have consented to the appropriation (so that the case would not be covered by the
provisions of s 2(1)).
In Wheatley v Commissioner of Police of the British Virgin Islands,208 the Privy Council
held that, for the purposes of the offence of theft within the meaning of the Criminal
Code of the British Virgin Islands, ss 203 to 208, which were closely modelled on the
Theft Act 1968, ss 1 to 6, the prospect of loss was not determinative of dishonesty. The
Privy Council held that, although in most cases of theft there would be an original owner
of money or goods who would be poorer because of D’s appropriation, the provision in
s 204(2) of the Code (the equivalent of the TA 1968, s 2(2)) that an appropriation might
be dishonest despite a willingness to pay showed that the prospect of loss was not deter-
minative of dishonesty.
Intention of permanently depriving

Key points 10.7
The TA 1968, s 1(1) requires that D ‘dishonestly appropriates property belonging to an-
other with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it’. In some cases, D is
deemed by the TA 1968, s 6 to intend permanently to deprive the other person of the
property even though D does not mean the other permanently to lose the thing.
10.80 Actual permanent deprivation is not required for theft, but it must be proved
that, at the time when D appropriated property belonging to another (V), D intended
to deprive V permanently of it. If D dishonestly takes V’s watch, intending to deprive
V permanently of it, D is guilty of theft, even though he is arrested almost immediately
afterwards and the watch is returned to V.
10.81 Because D must intend permanently to deprive the other ‘of it’, ie the actual thing
appropriated, an appropriator of money who intends to spend it but to repay it with other
208 [2006] UKPC 24.

 | 10.82 theft and related offences
notes nevertheless has an intention permanently to deprive (although he may be found

not to have acted dishonestly).209 The same is, of course, true where other property, such
as some milk, is appropriated with the intention of consuming it and of replacing it with
its equivalent.
10.82 Normally, D will intend permanently to deprive V by the act of appropriating V’s
property itself, but this is not necessary. Provided that it exists at the time of the appropri-
ation, an intent to deprive V in the future by some subsequent act will do.210
10.83 The question of whether or not there was an intention permanently to deprive
the person to whom the property belongs gives rise to no difficulty in the ordinary
case because D’s conduct with the property will often provide a clear inference as to his
intention. For example, if D takes V’s bricks and builds them into a wall on his property,
or if D takes V’s money and spends it in a pub, the inference of an intention permanently
to deprive is very strong indeed (although it would be a misdirection for a judge to tell
a jury that they must draw it). On the other hand, if D picks up V’s copy of this book in
the student work room and takes it over to his desk and reads it, or if D takes V’s tennis
racquet and, after using it, leaves it elsewhere at the tennis club, it is unimaginable that an
inference could be drawn on these facts that D appropriated the property with an inten-
tion permanently to deprive.
10.84 In one case a person can intend permanently to deprive even though at first sight
it may appear that he only intends a purely temporary borrowing. Th is is where a victim
of an appropriation has a limited interest in the property. For example, if V hires a power
tool for a week from X and during that week D, knowing these facts, takes the tool, intend-
ing to return it to X ten days later, D can be convicted of the theft of the tool from V (since
he intended permanently to deprive V of the whole of his interest in the property) but not
of the theft of it from X (because he did not so intend in relation to X).
Section 6
10.85 In certain exceptional cases D can be convicted of theft even though D did not
mean permanently to deprive anyone to whom the property belonged, and even though
D positively intended to return the actual property at some future date (or did actually
return it). A conviction in such a case is possible if the case falls within the TA 1968, s 6,
which extends the meaning of ‘intention of permanently depriving’.
It cannot be emphasised too much that s 6 does not provide a complete definition of
‘intention of permanently depriving’; instead it simply extends or clarifies that phrase.
In the vast majority of cases it need not be referred to at all, and it certainly should not
be referred to if the issue of whether or not D had the intention of permanently de-
priving can be determined without reference to it.211 The Court of Appeal in Lloyd 212
209 Velumyl [1989] Crim LR 299, CA.

210 Th is follows from the decision in Morris; Anderton v Burnside [1984] AC 320, HL, where the appropri-
ation consisted of label-swapping but the intended deprivation would only have occurred through an act of
buying at the checkout.
211 Lloyd [1985] QB 829 at 835–836. Also see Warner (1970) 55 Cr App R 93, CA; Cocks (1976) 63 Cr App R 79,
CA; Coffey [1987] Crim LR 498, CA. 212 [1985] QB 829, CA.
10.87 mens rea of theft | 
said that reference to s 6 should be made in exceptional cases only, and these are cases
where D does not mean V permanently to lose the thing itself but has acted in a way which
may fall within s 6. Despite such statements, s 6 continues to be invoked in inappropriate
cases by students in their answers. The message that s 6 should only be referred to in the
type of case outlined in Lloyd is clearly one which is not easy to get across.
10.86 Despite a statement by the Court in Lloyd213 that s 6 should be interpreted in such
a way as to ensure that nothing is construed as an intention permanently to deprive which
would not have been so construed before the TA 1968, it is now clear that the courts in-
terpret the words of s 6 without reference to the law before the Act. Indeed, in Bagshaw, 214
the Court of Appeal stated that what was said in Lloyd on the present point was obiter
and that there might be other occasions on which s 6 applies. Subsequently, the Court of
Appeal in Fernandes215 stated that s 6 was not limited in the way indicated in Lloyd. This
view was confirmed recently by the Court of Appeal in Vinall.216
Section 6(1): Part 1

10.87 The first part of the TA 1968, s 6(1) provides that:
‘A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other per-
manently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of
permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to
dispose of regardless of the other’s rights, . . . ’
These words are the key part of s 6. They deem an appropriator of another’s property
to have intended permanently to deprive the other of it if he intends to treat the thing
as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights, even though he does not mean
(ie intend) the other permanently to lose the thing itself. The following are examples of
cases which are caught by the above words of s 6(1).
D takes V’s Ming vase, intending to sell it back to V (or to hold it to ransom) and to
return it to V only if V pays the asking price (or ransom). D clearly intends to treat the
thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the other (V), since he intends
that V should only get back what he is already entitled to 217 by paying for it, even though
he does not mean V to be permanently deprived because he hopes that V will pay the ask-
ing price (or ransom).218 This was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Raphael,219 where
the defendants had taken V’s car by force and demanded payment for its return. Rejecting
appeals against convictions for conspiracy to rob (robbery requires the commission of
theft), the Court of Appeal stated that an intention on the part of a taker of property ‘to
treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights’ includes the situ-
ation where D makes an offer to sell the other’s own property back to him subject to a
213 [1985] QB 829 at 836. 214 [1988] Crim LR 321, CA. 215 [1996] 1 Cr App R 175 at 198.
216 [2011] EWCA Crim 2652.
217 Section 6(1) would not apply if V was not entitled to the property without paying for it: Johnstone [1982]
Crim LR 454 and 607, Crown Ct. 218 Such an example was given in Lloyd [1985] QB 829, CA.
219 [2008] EWCA Crim 1014.
 | 10.87 theft and related offences
condition or conditions (eg payment of the price demanded) for its return inconsistent
with his right to possession of his own property.
In Downes,220 D was in possession of vouchers in his name. The vouchers belonged to
the Inland Revenue. They could be used to obtain tax advantages. D sold the vouchers to
others who, as he knew, would submit them for this purpose. The Court of Appeal held
that, by doing so, D had committed theft. Although he knew that the vouchers would
return to the Inland Revenue when submitted by the buyers, he had treated them as his
own to dispose of regardless of the other’s (Inland Revenue’s) rights by selling them.
Marshall 221 provides another example of the operation of the first part of s 6(1). There,
the defendants had collected from people exiting London Underground stations tickets
which had been used but were still valid, and resold them to others. The issue addressed by
the Court of Appeal 222 was whether, in respect of charges of theft of the tickets, the trial
judge had been correct to take the view that there was evidence of an intention permanently
to deprive London Underground by virtue of s 6(1). The Court of Appeal answered ‘yes’: by
acquiring and reselling the tickets the defendants had intended to treat the tickets as their
own to dispose of regardless of the rights of London Underground (who had the exclusive
right to sell its tickets). It was irrelevant that the tickets might find their way back into the
possession of London Underground, albeit with their usefulness or ‘virtue’ exhausted.
In DPP v Lavender,223 where D had surreptitiously removed two doors from a nearby
council house to replace doors in his own council house, the Divisional Court held that he
had acted with an intent permanently to deprive the council of the doors, by virtue of s 6(1).
This is not easy to accept. D had certainly acted with intent to treat the doors as his own
regardless of the rights of the council, but it is far from obvious that he acted with intent to
treat the doors as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the council. The only way
in which this decision can be justified is if ‘treat as one’s own to dispose of’ means ‘to have
the disposal of ’, ie to deal with regardless of the rights of the other. This may be what the
Divisional Court meant when it said that ‘to dispose of’ should not be given a narrow dic-
tionary definition. However, such a narrow definition (ie ‘To deal with definitely; to get rid
of; to get done with, finish. To make over by way of sale or bargain, sell’) was approved in
Cahill,224 which was not referred to by the Court in DPP v Lavender. Moreover, if ‘to dispose
of’ is to be understood in the wider sense referred to, the requirement that D must ‘intend to
treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the other’ is redundant.
Another type of case which can fall within the above words of s 6(1) is where D aban-
dons the property and does not care whether it is recovered by the person to whom it
belongs (or may even hope that it is). If, by the circumstances of the abandonment and/
or the nature of the property, it is (to D’s knowledge) unlikely that the property will be
recovered, D can be said to intend to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of
the rights of the other.225 An obvious example of a case which would be caught by s 6(1)
220 (1983) 77 Cr App R 260, CA.

221 [1998] 2 Cr App R 282, CA. See JC Smith ‘Stealing Tickets’ [1998] Crim LR 723.
222 For another issue raised by the case but not discussed by the Court of Appeal, see para 10.39.
223 [1994] Crim LR 297, DC. 224 [1993] Crim LR 141, CA.
225 In Fernandes [1996] 1 Cr App R 175, the Court of Appeal stated that s 6(1) may apply to a person in pos-
session or control of another’s property who dishonestly and for his own purpose deals with property in such a
manner that he knows he is risking its loss.
10.89 mens rea of theft | 
would be where D takes V’s watch in Leicester and abandons it in Newcastle. At the other
extreme D, who took and used V’s tennis racquet and then left it elsewhere at the tennis
club, would not be caught by s 6(1), and neither, generally speaking, would a person who
takes another’s motor vehicle and then abandons it, because it is a well-known fact that
motor vehicles which are abandoned are almost invariably returned to their owners. See
also para 10.90.
If D appropriates V’s piano by pretending to be its owner and purporting to sell it
to X, knowing that V’s imminent return will prevent the removal of the piano, D can
be convicted of its theft since he intends to treat it as his own to dispose of regardless
of V’s rights and is therefore deemed by s 6(1) to intend permanently to deprive V of it.
(However, it would be more appropriate to charge D with the offence of fraud, contrary
to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1.) The decision of the Privy Council in Chan Man-sin v A-G
of Hong Kong 226 provides an interesting example of the fact that the requirements of s
6(1) can be satisfied even where D knows that the person to whom the property belongs
will not lose anything. D, a company accountant, drew and presented forged cheques in
his favour on the company’s account. The Privy Council held that there was evidence
from which it could be inferred that D’s appropriations of a thing in action (the credit
in the company’s bank account) had been accompanied by an intention permanently
to deprive the company of that thing because D intended to treat the bank credit as his
own to dispose of regardless of the company’s rights, and it would not matter if he had
realised that the fraud would be discovered and that the company’s credit balance would
be unaffected.
10.88 The first part of s 6(1) expresses the critical notion of s 6. The second part of s 6(1)
and also s 6(2) provide specific illustrations of the application of that notion.227
Section 6(1): Part 2

10.89 Section 6(1) of the TA 1968 goes on to provide that:
‘a borrowing or lending of it [the property appropriated] may amount to so treating it [ie

treating it as the defendant’s own to dispose of regardless of the rights of the other] if, but
only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equiva-
lent to an outright taking or disposal.’
In Lloyd, 228 the Court of Appeal held that this part of s 6(1) ‘is intended to make clear
that a mere borrowing is never enough to constitute the necessary [mens rea] unless
the intention is to return the “thing” in such a changed state that it can truly be said
that all its goodness or virtue has gone’. This test was not satisfied in Lloyd itself. In that
case, D removed fi lms from a cinema, for a few hours on each occasion, in order to make
‘pirate’ copies of them. The Court of Appeal held that this did not constitute theft of the
fi lms because, although great financial harm would be caused to the copyright owner
and others, the goodness and virtue of the fi lms would not have gone out of them on
226 [1988] 1 All ER 1, PC. Also see Hilton [1997] 2 Cr App R 445, CA.
227 Fernandes [1996] 1 Cr App R 175 at 188. 228 [1985] QB 829 at 836, CA.
 | 10.90 theft and related offences
their return; they could still be projected to cinema audiences. Therefore, the borrowing
was not for a period, or in circumstances, making it equivalent to an outright taking or
disposal.
It is clear from what was said in Lloyd that ‘changed state’ does not mean that the
thing’s physical state must have changed.
An example of a case covered by the second part of s 6(1), which is based on an
example given by the Court of Appeal in Lloyd, is where D takes V’s football season
ticket, intending to return it at the end of the season. D’s borrowing is clearly for a
period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking since, when it is
returned as he intends, the season ticket will be a virtually worthless piece of paper. D’s
intention to borrow the season ticket in this way amounts to the intention to treat the
thing as his own to dispose of regardless of V’s rights and is thereby deemed by s 6(1) to
be an intention permanently to deprive V of it. Likewise, in DPP v SJ, 229 Silber J, sitting
in the Administrative Court, held that a magistrates’ court had been wrong to accept
a submission of no case to answer where D had snatched V’s stereo headphones and
snapped them before returning them to V. The judge noted that the headphones had no
conceivable use after being broken.
If D took a battery from V’s shop for his torch, intending to return it when the battery
was exhausted, he would be deemed to intend permanently to deprive V of the battery.
(He could, of course, also be convicted of the offence of abstracting electricity, which
might be a more appropriate charge.) By way of further example, although confiden-
tial information in an examination paper is not property and cannot be stolen, if a stu-
dent surreptitiously borrows a college examination paper a week before the examination,
intending to copy it and then to return it, his appropriation of the piece of paper will be
regarded under s 6(1) as done with the intention of permanently depriving the college
authorities of it (the paper). The borrowing is clearly for a period and in circumstances
making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal because, if the paper is returned as
intended, all its goodness or virtue will have gone.
10.90 In these cases the property would have lost all its virtue at the time of the intended
return. According to the test in Lloyd, s 6 would not catch the case where the property at
the time of its intended return would have some goodness or virtue, albeit that it would
have substantially or essentially lost its virtue (as where D intended to return a monthly
season ticket a day before it expired).
Clinton (Chief Inspector of RUC) v Cahill is to like effect.230 D was a tenant of a prop-
erty heated by a district heating system under which hot water from a heating station
passed through radiators in properties and returned to the station. Seals on D’s meter
were broken and she received hot water for which she had not paid. The Court of Appeal
of Northern Ireland held that, although D had dishonestly appropriated water belonging
to another, the appropriation consisting in the abstraction of heat from the water, she had
not intended permanently to deprive the other of it. Clearly, D had not meant the other
permanently to lose the water itself, and she was not caught by s 6(1) because, on the
facts found, the virtue in the water had not wholly (or even substantially or essentially)
229 [2002] EWHC 291 (Admin). 230 [1998] NI 200, NICA.

10.91 mens rea of theft | 
disappeared when the water returned from her radiators to the system. Some heat was
still retained in it. Therefore D’s use of it was not the equivalent of an outright taking or
disposal.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Mitchell231 confirms that a person who takes
another’s motor vehicle and then abandons it does not, generally speaking, intend by
virtue of s 6(1) permanently to deprive the owner of it. Referring to the second part of
s 6(1), it held that, because a ‘borrowing or lending’ could only be deemed by s 6(1) to
amount to an ‘intention of permanently depriving’ the owner of the article if the inten-
tion of the borrower or lender was that the article be returned to the owner in such a
changed state that it had lost all its practical value, the offence of theft was not made out
in the above circumstances.
10.91 In principle, it would appear that, where D appropriates a cheque intending to
pay it into his bank account, the case would be covered by the second part of s 6(1).
However, in Preddy 232 Lord Goff, with whose speech the rest of the House of Lords
agreed, held that if by deception D obtains a cheque form belonging to the drawer of
the cheque there would be ‘no intention on the part of [D] permanently to deprive the
drawer of the cheque form, which would on presentation of the cheque for payment
be returned to the drawer via his bank’.233 Lord Goff seems to have assumed that D
was aware of what ultimately happens to a cheque after presentation; if D was not,
there should be no problem in establishing the necessary intent. The case for fi nding
an intent permanently to deprive where D is aware that the cheque will return to the
drawer’s bank is arguably stronger than in respect of the tickets which were resold
in Marshall.234 When the cheque is returned to the drawer’s bank after payment and
is available to him, it will have changed its nature. Before it is paid it is a valuable
security,235 a ‘key’ to payment of the amount specified in it; after payment it is a worth-
less piece of paper. Although D may not mean the drawer of the cheque permanently
to lose that thing itself, it would seem in principle that D is to be regarded as intend-
ing permanently to deprive the drawer of the cheque by reference to both parts of s
6(1). Th is argument fi nds support in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Arnold.236
Dealing with a case where D had appropriated a bill of exchange (another form of
valuable security) handed over on the basis that he would retain and deal with it in a
particular way, the Court stated:
‘there is good reason for the application of s 6(1) if the intention of the transferee at the
time of the appropriation is that the document should find its way back to the trans-
feror only after all the benefit to the transferor has been lost or removed as a result of its
use.’ 237
231 [2008] EWCA Crim 850. 232 [1996] AC 815 at 836–837.

233 It does not appear to be the modern practice for cheques to be returned to the drawer, although – once
cleared – they are available to the drawer via his bank. 234 Para 10.87.
235 A ‘valuable security’ means any document creating, transferring, surrendering or releasing any right to,
in or over property, or authorising the payment of money or delivery of any property, or evidencing such cre-
ation etc, or such payment etc, or the satisfaction of any obligation. 236 [1997] 4 All ER 1, CA.
237 [1997] 4 All ER 1 at 15.
 | 10.92 theft and related offences
However, in Clark,238 where Arnold was not referred to, the Court of Appeal held that ‘the
decision’ in Preddy (ie Lord Goff ’s statement about cheques) was not merely an obiter dictum,
particularly as it had been followed by the Court of Appeal in Graham.239 Consequently,
with some apparent reluctance, it declined to hold that there is an intent permanently to
deprive where the property in question is a cheque. Clark is an unfortunate decision. It is
by no means obvious that what was said about cheques by Lord Goff was part of the ratio in
Preddy and the fact that a case is subsequently followed is not in itself relevant to whether
a statement is part of its ratio decidendi. Moreover, Graham is not a strong authority in
support because the Court of Appeal simply relied on Lord Goff ’s statement without dis-
cussion. As explained above, the case of cheques seems to fall four-square within s 6(1).240
In Mitchell,241 where Preddy, Graham and Clark do not appear to have been considered, the
Court of Appeal in an obiter dictum took the contrary view to that taken in those cases.
10.92 So far, we have been concerned with ‘borrowings’; an example of a lending falling
within s 6(1) would be where D, assistant to a florist (V), lends some cut flowers to X for a
flower display, telling X that he can have them for a week. If the short life of the cut flowers
means that when they are returned as intended they will have lost all their goodness and
virtue, the lending is for a period and in circumstances equivalent to an outright disposal
and D is deemed by s 6(1) to intend permanently to deprive V of the flowers, even though
he does not mean V to be so deprived.
Section 6(2)
10.93 The TA 1968, s 6(2) provides a further explanation of ‘treating as one’s own to dis-
pose of regardless of the other’s rights’. It provides that:
‘Without prejudice to the generality of [s 6(1)], where a person, having possession or con-
trol (whether lawfully or not) of property belonging to another, parts with the property
under a condition as to its return which he may not be able to perform, this (if done for
purposes of his own and without the other’s authority) amounts to treating the property
as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights.’
Thus, where D, who is in possession or control of V’s property, pawns it, intending to
redeem it and return it if he wins a bet, this amounts to ‘treating as his own to dispose
of regardless of the rights of the other [V]’ and his intention to do so is deemed by s 6(1)
to be an intention permanently to deprive V of it. The wording of s 6(2) seems clearly to
indicate that it applies even though D is convinced that he will be able to perform the
condition for return (ie to redeem the property) if, in fact, he may not be able to do so.242
In such a case, however, the circumstances may be such that he would be found not to
have been dishonest.
238 [2002] 1 Cr App R 141, CA. See JC Smith’s commentary in [2001] Crim LR 573.
239 [1997] 1 Cr App R 302, CA.
240 For an analysis of the problems posed by the law in relation to the theft of cheques, see Heaton ‘Cheques
and Balances’ [2005] Crim LR 747. 241 [2008] EWCA Crim 850.
242 For a contrary view see Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod and Williams (eds)) paras
2.339–2.343.
10.96 robbery | 
Conditional intention
10.94 This rather misleading term is commonly used to describe D’s state of mind in the
type of case where he looks for something to steal, as where D rifles through V’s handbag,
intending to keep anything worth keeping but finds nothing worthwhile. In such a case D
cannot be convicted of the theft of the handbag or any of its actual contents,243 although
he may be convicted of attempted theft of some or all of the contents of the handbag.244
The true reason why D cannot be convicted of theft in such a case, and the reason why
‘conditional intention’ is a misleading description of D’s state of mind in relation to the
handbag and its actual contents, is that D has no intention permanently to deprive V of
the handbag or its actual contents. On the other hand, if D finds something which may,
on further examination be worth keeping and he retains it for further examination, it
is arguable, at least where D expects that the thing will be worth keeping, that D does
commit theft of it because his appropriation at that stage is accompanied by an intention
permanently to deprive V of the thing.245
Comment
10.95 Except to the extent that s 6 applies, the requirement of an intention of permanent
deprival excludes from the law of theft dishonest borrowing, which many think should
be included, but this is a question of the proper sphere of the criminal law. Are people to
be punished for simply being a nuisance to others? Is it wise to have prohibitory laws (and
there are plenty of them as it is) which work only provided that there are no prosecutions
in venial cases?246 Such offences of unauthorised borrowing as exist are covered in paras
10.108–10.128.
Robbery
Key points 10.8

Robbery is stealing aggravated by the use of force or the threat of force immediately be-
fore or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so.
‘A person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately before or at the time of doing
so, and in order to do so, he uses force on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in
fear of being then and there subjected to force.’
243 Easom [1971] 2 QB 315, CA. 244 Para 14.119.

245 See Griew Theft Acts 1968 and 1978 (7th edn, 1995) paras 2.114–2.187.
246 For argument in favour of abolishing the requirement of intention permanently to deprive, see Williams
‘Temporary Appropriation Should be Theft’ [1981] Crim LR 129.
 | 10.97 theft and related offences
Robbery is triable only on indictment. The maximum punishment is life imprisonment.247
Need for a theft

10.97 Although the Court of Appeal 248 once regarded it as an open question whether the
reference in the TA 1968, s 8 to ‘steals’ is to be regarded as subject to the definition of theft
in TA 1968, ss 1 to 6, it is now settled that it is to be so regarded.249 It would have been most
surprising if the TA 1968, having established in ss 1 to 6 a detailed definition for the pur-
poses of the offence of theft, had used ‘steals’ in s 8 with some other, undefined, meaning.
10.98 Because the necessary ingredients of the offence of theft must be proved on a rob-
bery charge, a person who, eg, forces another to hand over money, believing that he has
a legal right to it, is not guilty of robbery since, not being dishonest,250 he is not guilty of
theft, and this is so even though he does not believe he was entitled to use force to get the
money.251
10.99 Where D has used force on another (or put another person in fear of force) in order
to steal but has not achieved the appropriation of any property, and is therefore not guilty
of robbery, D can be convicted of assault with intent to rob, which is triable only on in-
dictment and punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment.252
Additional elements
10.100 To constitute robbery, a thief must immediately before or at the time of steal-
ing, and in order to do so, use force on any person or put or seek to put any person in
fear of force being there and then applied.
10.101 The words ‘puts or seeks to put any person in fear’ in the TA 1968, s 8(1), make
it clear that it is irrelevant whether or not the person threatened is actually put in fear
of being subjected to force. This was confirmed by the Divisional Court in B v DPP; R v
DPP,253 where a submission of no case to answer on a robbery charge on the ground that
V had given evidence that he had not felt threatened or been put in fear had been rejected.
The Divisional Court held that this rejection had been correct. It was D’s intention rather
than V’s fortitude which was the touchstone of whether there had been a robbery. The fact
that V was not put in fear had no bearing on the question of whether D sought to put any
person in fear of force being then and there subjected to force.
10.102 The force used or threatened need not be used or threatened against the owner
or possessor of the property stolen, nor need the theft be carried out in his presence.254
Consequently, if a gang uses force against a signalman only in order to stop and steal from
247 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1; TA 1968, s 8(2).
248 Forrester [1992] Crim LR 793, CA.
249 Raphael [2008] EWCA Crim 1014; Mitchell [2008] EWCA Crim 850; Vinall [2011] EWCA Crim 2652.
250 Para 10.70. 251 Skivington [1968] 1 QB 166, CA; Robinson [1977] Crim LR 173, CA.
252 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1; TA 1968, s 8(2).
253 [2007] EWHC 739 (Admin), DC. 254 Taylor [1996] 10 Archbold News 2, CA.
10.106 robbery | 
a train, its members are guilty of robbery. Difficult questions of degree can arise. If the
signalman was bound and gagged by force an hour before the stealing from the train, the
gang having operated the signals in the meantime, it could be argued that the force was
used immediately before the theft, but there must be some limit unless the word ‘imme-
diately’ becomes meaningless. Questions of degree are, however, difficult to avoid if the
definition of robbery is not to be unduly wide.
10.103 It is clear that there is no robbery if the force is used or threatened after ‘the
time’ of the stealing (ie the theft). The thief who uses force to defend his possession after
he has taken the goods is guilty of robbery only if it can be established that he is doing so
at ‘the time’ of the theft. This is not limited to the period (possibly a split second of time)
during which the appropriation with the mens rea for theft initially occurs, since an act of
appropriation may be a continuing one.255 ‘The time’ of the theft lasts as long as the theft
can be said to be still in progress in commonsense terms, ie so long as the defendant is
‘on the job’.256
10.104 Where force is used, it must be used ‘on’ a person. In Clouden,257 the Court of
Appeal held that this does not require that force be used on the actual person to over-
power his resistance, and that force used only to get possession of property can be used
‘on’ a person. In this case a man who had wrenched a shopping basket from the hands of
a woman was held to have been rightly convicted of robbery. The Court of Appeal’s view
was consciously different from that of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, who did
not regard the mere snatching of property, such as a handbag, from an unresisting owner
as using force for the purpose of the definition of robbery, though they thought that it
might be so if the owner resisted.258
10.105 In the case of a threat of force, a threat of future force is insufficient: the threat
must be ‘then and there’ to subject another to force. Whether what D has done or threat-
ened is ‘force’ is a question of fact for the jury.259
10.106 The force must be used or threatened in order to steal; a man who knocks a
woman to the ground to rape her and comes close to doing so, but then changes his
mind and instead takes her handbag which she has dropped, is not guilty of robbery,260
although he may be convicted of theft and of attempted rape. Likewise, if D knocks a
cyclist to the ground and takes the bicycle without intending permanently to deprive the
cyclist of it, but shortly afterwards steals the bicycle by dishonestly appropriating it with
that intention, a conviction for robbery261 would be ‘fatally undermined’; leaving aside
the question of whether the force was used immediately before or at the time of stealing,
D has not used the force in order to steal.262
255 Hale (1978) 68 Cr App R 415, CA; Gregory (1982) 77 Cr App R 41, CA; para 10.23.
256 Hale above; Atakpu [1994] QB 69 at 80; Lockley [1995] Crim LR 656, CA.
257 [1987] Crim LR 56, CA.
258 Eighth Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee: Theft and Related Offences (Cmnd 2977) (1966),
para 65. 259 Dawson and James (1976) 64 Cr App R 170, CA; Clouden [1987] Crim LR 56, CA.
260 Nor is he guilty of assault with intent to rob. 261 Or of assault with intent to rob.
262 Vinall [2011] EWCA Crim 2652.
 | 10.107 theft and related offences
It follows from the requirement that force must be used or threatened in order to steal
that an unintentional use or threat of force cannot suffice. Where a threat of force is
involved the intention must be to put another in fear for himself; an intent to put someone
in fear for another is not enough.263
10.107 Robbery is an extremely broad offence. The use of slight force (eg a push) or the
threat of slight force in order to steal property suffices to convert a theft into robbery,
and constitutes the same single offence as the use of extreme violence or the threat of
it. Professor Ashworth has argued that, just as the law of non-fatal offences against the
person differentiates between degrees of harm and culpability by a ladder of offences,
so as to mark out particularly serious cases from less serious ones, so should robbery.
Alternatively, and more radically, robbery could be abolished as an offence, leaving its
theft and offence against the person ingredients to be charged separately. 264
Unauthorised borrowing
Key points 10.9

Whereas theft and robbery require an appropriator of property belonging to another to
intend permanently to deprive the other of it, in the following offences under the TA 1968,
ss 11, 12 or 12A, an intention temporarily to deprive is enough.
Removal of an article from a place open to public

‘where the public have access to a building in order to view the building or part of it, or
a collection or part of a collection housed in it, any person who without lawful authority
removes from the building or its grounds the whole or part of any article displayed or kept
for display to the public in the building or that part of it or in its grounds shall be guilty
of an offence.’
Such an offence is triable either way 265 and punishable on conviction on indictment with
a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.266
10.109 The removal of an article must be either from a building to which the public
have access in order to view267 the building or part of it, or a collection or part of a col-
lection housed in it, or from the grounds of such a building. The offence is concerned
263 Taylor [1996] 10 Archbold News 2, CA.

264 Ashworth ‘Robbery Re-Assessed’ [2002] Crim LR 851.
265 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1. 266 TA 1968, s 11(4).
267 ‘In order to view’ is construed by reference to the purpose(s) of the person(s) responsible for the public
being given access and not the purpose(s) of those who visit: Barr [1978] Crim LR 244, Crown Ct.
10.111 unauthorised borrowing | 
with removals of articles from stately homes, national or local authority galleries, his-
toric buildings, etc, provided they are open to the public in the above sense, or from their
grounds. A person who removes the portrait of an Edwardian mayor from the entrance
of the town hall does not commit the present offence because, although the public have
access to the town hall (or, at least, to the part in question), it is only for the purpose of
paying council tax, making inquiries or seeing their councillors; they do not have access
in order to view the building, or any collection in it, or any part of the building or collec-
tion. If someone removes a painting from a collection in a stately home, access to which
is limited to members of the Women’s Institute, he does not commit the present offence
because the public do not have access to the building in question – only a particular sec-
tion of the public does.
Where an article is removed from a building to which the public have access in order
to view a collection or part of a collection housed in it, the offence is not committed if
the collection has been made or exhibited for the purpose of effecting sales or other com-
mercial dealings.268 Thus, removals of paintings from commercial art galleries are not
caught by s 11. Subject to this, it does not matter that the collection in question is one got
together for a temporary purpose.269 The annual art exhibition in the village hall is there-
fore caught by s 11.
Generally, an offence under s 11 can be committed whether or not the building is open
to the public at the time of the removal. There is one exception: if the thing removed is
there otherwise than as forming part of, or being on loan for exhibition with, a collection
intended for permanent exhibition to the public, 270 it must be removed on a day when the
public has access to the building or grounds.271 Thus, if a painting is removed from the
collection at the National Gallery it is irrelevant that the Gallery is then closed over the
Christmas period, whereas it is not an offence to remove a painting from the annual art
exhibition in the village hall on a day when the hall is closed.
10.110 The offence under s 11(1) only applies where the thing removed is the whole or
part of any article displayed or kept for display to the public in the building, or part of
it, to which the public have access or in its grounds. The purpose of this is to separate
those things which are there for display (ie exhibited in the sense that an art gallery exhib-
its a painting)272 and those which are not. If a visitor takes an old vase which forms a part
of the display, he commits the offence. If he takes the attendant’s coat on the way out he
does not, as the coat is not part of the display.
10.111 There must be a removal from the building or its grounds. A visitor who moves
an exhibit from one room to another does not commit the offence, but one who takes it
out of the building does. The grounds are protected because many stately homes will have
articles in the grounds for display to the public.
268 TA 1968, s 11(1). 269 Ibid.

270 ‘A collection intended for permanent exhibition to the public’ means a collection intended to be perman-
ently available for exhibition to the public; it may be so intended where only part of the building’s permanent
collection is displayed to the public in the building at any point of time: Durkin [1973] QB 786, CA.
271 TA 1968, s 11(2).
272 Barr [1978] Crim LR 244, Crown Ct (cross placed in church purely as an aid to worship not ‘displayed’).
 | 10.112 theft and related offences
10.112 Section 11(1) makes it clear that no offence is committed where the person
removing an article covered by it has lawful authority for doing so.
10.113 D’s belief that he had lawful authority for the removal of the thing in ques-
tion or that he would have it if the person entitled to give it knew of the removal and
its circumstances is a defence.273 Therefore, a furniture remover who was removing
articles on behalf of their owner would not commit an offence if he took one of the
exhibited articles, believing that it was one of the articles he had to remove. Likewise,
a restorer of oil paintings who carried out work for the owner from time to time would
not commit an offence if in the owner’s absence he took a painting for its five-yearly
restoration, believing that, had the owner been present, he would have consented.
The belief in question does not have to have been a reasonable one, and the burden of
proving it is not borne by D (although D does have an evidential burden in respect of
it). 274
Taking conveyance without authority

‘a person shall be guilty of an offence if, without having the consent of the owner or other
lawful authority, he takes any conveyance for his own or another’s use . . . ’
The offence is triable only summarily and punishable with imprisonment for up to six
months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.275
Although an offence under s 12(1) is a summary one, the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s
40(1) provides that a count charging a person with it may be included in an indictment
if the charge:
• is founded on the same facts or evidence as a count charging an indictable offence; or
• is part of a series of offences of the same or similar character as an indictable offence
which is also charged,
but only if (in either case) the facts or evidence relating to the offence were disclosed to
the person charged in material served on him as required. If convicted on indictment for
an offence under s 12(1) an offender is punishable in the same way as he could have been
on summary conviction.276
Where a conveyance has been taken and driven away there can be a charge of stealing
the fuel consumed, but usually the prosecution relies simply on a charge under s 12(1).
As an offence under s 12(1) is a summary one, an attempt to commit it is not an
offence.277 However, the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 9 provides a separate preparatory
offence of interference with a motor vehicle with the intention that an offence under the
273 TA 1968, s 11(3). 274 Ch 4.

275 TA 1968, s 12(2). The maximum imprisonment will be increased to 51 weeks if, and when, the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, s 281(4) and (5) comes into force. 276 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 40(2).
277 Para 14.105.
10.116 unauthorised borrowing | 
TA 1968, s 12 shall be committed. There is no corresponding offence in relation to other

types of conveyance.
Conveyance
10.115 Although a dictionary definition of a conveyance confines it to a vehicle or car-
riage, there is no such limitation for the purposes of the TA 1968, s 12, which defines it as
‘any conveyance constructed or adapted for the carriage of a person or persons whether
by land, water or air, except that it does not include a conveyance constructed or adapted
for use only under the control of a person not carried in or on it’.278 Thus, an aeroplane or
boat is a conveyance, as well as something (like a motor car or motor cycle) which is purely
land-based. As the definition implies, a thing can be a ‘conveyance’ even though it lacks
either wheels or engine, but it has been held that a horse is not a conveyance for the pur-
pose of s 12 and that s 12 is directed towards artefacts rather than towards animals.279 It is
clear that a conveyance cannot include either a handcart or a trailer because, although pas-
sengers can be carried in them, they are not constructed or adapted for this purpose and
anyway, even if they are, they are constructed for use only under the control of a person not
carried in or on them. For this latter reason, perambulators, pedestrian-controlled trolleys
and most lawnmowers are not conveyances. However, a conveyance would undoubtedly
include a lawnmower constructed or adapted for use under the control of a person carried
on it; it would also include an invalid carriage, whether powered or not, constructed or
adapted for use under the control of the occupant. Read literally, the definition includes
roller-skates, ice-skates or skis. Such an interpretation would doubtless be avoided if the
issue arose, although powered roller-skates (which are powered by a small, integral petrol
engine controlled by the skater) would seem to be a different proposition.
Taking
10.116 The mere unauthorised assumption of possession of a conveyance (eg to shelter
in it or to make love in it) is not enough to constitute a taking; some movement, however
small, must also take place,280 and the movement must not be accidental.281 If someone
assumes possession of, and moves, a conveyance which has been taken without consent
or other authority and then been abandoned, he can be convicted of taking it contrary
to the TA 1968, s 12 because there will be a fresh assumption of possession and there-
fore a ‘taking’.282 It remains to be seen whether there would also be a ‘taking’ contrary
to s 12 if the previous ‘taker’ had not abandoned the conveyance. As explained in para
10.123, there is a separate offence of driving a conveyance, knowing that it has been taken
without authority. It may be that it will be held to exclude the application of the offence of
‘taking’ where the taker had the requisite knowledge. On the other hand, it would be sur-
prising if a person who assumes possession of, and moves, a conveyance which (unknown
to him) has already been ‘taken’ by another, and not been abandoned, did not commit
any offence under s 12.
278 TA 1968, s 12(7)(a). 279 Neal v Gribble [1978] RTR 409, DC.
280 Bogacki [1973] QB 832, CA. 281 Blayney v Knight (1974) 60 Cr App R, 269, DC.
282 DPP v Spriggs [1994] RTR 1, DC.
 | 10.117 theft and related offences
10.117 Unauthorised use of a conveyance by a person already in lawful possession or

control of a conveyance may amount to a taking.
An employee who uses his employer’s lorry for his own purposes after the expiry of the
period for which he is authorised to use it, usually the working day, thereby takes it.283 So
does an employee who, during the period for which he is authorised to use it, appropriates
the employer’s lorry to his own use in a manner which is inconsistent with the rights of the
employer and shows that he has assumed control of it for his own purposes. Consequently,
a serious deviation from the employee’s proper route may be a taking. In McKnight v
Davies,284 D crashed his employer’s lorry while driving back to the depot after making
some deliveries. Scared by this, he drove to a public house for a drink, then took three men
to their houses, then drove to another public house for another drink, parked the lorry near
his house and only on the following day returned it to the depot. The Divisional Court,
upholding D’s conviction under s 12, said that not every brief unauthorised diversion from
his proper route by an employed driver during the working day would necessarily involve
taking; however, it would if he appropriated the vehicle to his own use in a manner which
repudiated the rights of the true owner and showed that he had assumed control of the
vehicle for his own purposes, which D had done on leaving the first public house.
A similar principle applies to a bailee. A bailee of a conveyance takes it if he uses it for
a purpose other than that for which he has been given permission or after the end of the
bailment. In McGill,285 D asked the owner of a car if he could borrow it to take his (D’s)
wife to a London station. The owner agreed on the express condition that D returned the
car immediately after doing so. Instead of returning the car immediately, D drove it to
Hastings and did not return it until two days later. The Court of Appeal held that D had
taken the car as soon as he drove it outside the purpose or condition of the bailment.
For the defendant’s or another’s use

10.118 The taking must be for the D’s use or that of another. In Bow, 286 the Court of
Appeal held that this required that the conveyance should actually be used as a convey-
ance, as it will be if D drives a car, or coasts downhill in it, or is carried away in a boat as
it drifts with the tide. It is clear from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Marchant 287 that,
despite what was said in Bow, a conveyance is also taken for D’s use or that of another
where, even though it is not used as a conveyance, it is taken for later use as a conveyance.
Consequently, as in Pearce,288 a person who puts another’s dinghy on a trailer and tows it
away for later use as a conveyance thereby takes it for his own use, as does someone who
pushes a car a few feet, intending to use it later as a conveyance.289 Provided someone
acts in one of the two ways referred to in this paragraph, his motive is irrelevant; thus,
a person who drives another’s vehicle a few yards to remove it as an obstruction may be
convicted of the present offence.290
283 See, for instance, Wibberley [1966] 2 QB 214, CA. 284 [1974] RTR 4, DC.
285 (1970) 54 Cr App R 300, CA. Also see Singh v Rathour [1988] 2 All ER 16, CA.
286 [1977] RTR 6, CA. Also see Stokes [1983] RTR 59, CA. 287 (1985) 80 Cr App R 361, CA.
288 [1973] Crim LR 321, CA; applied in Marchant (1985) 80 Cr App R 361, CA, where it was assumed that the
defendant in Pearce intended to make later use of the dinghy. 289 See Marchant above.
290 Bow (1976) 64 Cr App R 54, CA; Stokes [1983] RTR 59, CA.
10.121 unauthorised borrowing | 
Examples of cases where there is no taking for the use of D or another are where D
releases the handbrake of a car so that it runs downhill empty or where D pushes an
obstructing vehicle out of the way. Of course, if an intent permanently to deprive can be
proved, as where D casts adrift a boat on tidal waters in stormy conditions, there can be
a conviction for theft.
Without consent or other lawful authority

10.119 The taking must be without the consent of the owner or other lawful authority.
The offence will not be committed if the owner has actually consented to the taking; if
there is no actual consent at the time of the taking, the fact that the owner would have
consented if he had been asked does not prevent the taking being without consent.291
A consent obtained by means of a deception is nevertheless valid and prevents the
offence under the TA 1968, s 12(1) being committed. Unlike the situation elsewhere in the
criminal law,292 this is so even if the mistake induced is as to the identity of the deceiver.293
There is no obvious reason why the law is different here. In Whittaker v Campbell,294 D
found a driving licence belonging to X, and used it to hire a motor vehicle from V, represent-
ing that he was X. The Divisional Court held that, even if V had made a mistake of identity
which would have rendered void the contract of hire between him and D, this did not render
invalid his consent to D’s taking of the conveyance for the purposes of s 12(1). Peart 295
provides another example. D in Newcastle obtained the owner’s consent to the loan of a
van by falsely saying that if he were not in Alnwick by 2.30pm he would lose an important
contract, whereas his actual intention was to drive to Burnley which is much further away.
It was held that the initial taking was with the consent of the owner. Of course, as McGill 296
shows, once D used the vehicle outside the terms of the bailment the taking became without
consent. In addition, those who obtain consent to their taking a conveyance by a false repre-
sentation may be convicted of fraud contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1.297
It remains to be decided whether a consent obtained by force or the threat of force is
nevertheless valid so as to prevent an offence under s 12 being committed, but the better
view is that it would not be valid.298
10.120 The TA 1968, s 12(7)(b) provides that, in relation to a conveyance which is subject
to a hiring agreement or a hire-purchase agreement, ‘owner’ means the person in posses-
sion of it under that agreement. It follows that during the currency of the agreement such
a person cannot commit the present offence since he can hardly be said to act without the
consent of the owner.
10.121 A taking is not without lawful authority where it is by police or local authority
officers in the exercise of statutory powers to remove vehicles which constitute obstruc-
tions or are dangerous, or where bailors of conveyances recover them under a term in the
bailment.
291 Ambler [1979] RTR 217, CA. 292 See, eg, para 7.27.
293 Peart [1970] 2 QB 672, CA; Whittaker v Campbell [1984] QB 318, DC. 294 [1984] QB 318, DC.
295 [1970] 2 QB 672, CA. 296 (1970) 54 Cr App R 300, CA; para 10.117. 297 Para 12.3.
298 Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod and Williams (eds)) para 10.43; Hogdon [1962] Crim LR
563, CCA.
 | 10.122 theft and related offences
Belief in lawful authority or that owner would have consented

10.122 Under the TA 1968, s 12(6):
‘a person does not commit an offence under [s 12] by anything done in the belief that he
has lawful authority or that he would have the owner’s consent if the owner knew of his
doing it and of the circumstances of it’.
Such a belief does not have to be reasonable; D does not bear the burden of proving it, but
D does have an evidential burden in relation to it.299 One case where D will believe that he
has lawful authority is where he believes the conveyance is his.300
Other offences under section 12

Driving or allowing oneself to be carried on conveyance
taken contrary to the TA 1968, s 12
10.123 The TA 1968, s 12(1) contains an ancillary offence which is committed where the
defendant,
‘knowing that any conveyance has been taken without [the owner’s consent or other law-
ful authority], drives301 it or allows himself to be carried in or on it’.
This offence covers cases where the driving is done with the consent of the ‘taker’ as
well as those where it is not. It is triable and punishable in the same way as the ‘taking’
offence.
In order to be ‘carried in or on’ a conveyance there must be some movement of it; it is
not enough merely to be in or on it.302
No doubt the requisite knowledge includes wilful blindness, 303 as it normally does in
other statutes.
A person may be guilty of the present offence if the conveyance has, to his knowledge,
been stolen and not merely taken temporarily.304
Corresponding offences relating to pedal cycles

10.124 Although a pedal cycle falls within the defi nition of ‘conveyance’, referred to in
para 10.115, the above offences under the TA 1968, s 12(1) do not apply to them.305 Instead,
two similar offences, triable only summarily and punishable with a fine not exceeding
level 3 on the standard scale, apply to pedal cycles.306 A bicycle, tricycle or other vehicle
propelled (by pedals) solely by human energy is clearly a pedal cycle. It is a moot point
299 MacPherson [1973] RTR 157, CA; Briggs [1987] Crim LR 708, CA; Gannon [1988] RTR 49, CA.
300 Gannon above. 301 Para 8.147.
302 Miller [1976] Crim LR 147, CA; Diggin (1980) 72 Cr App R 204, CA. 303 See para 3.43.
304 Tolley v Giddings [1964] 2 QB 354, DC. 305 TA 1968, s 12(5). 306 Ibid.
10.127 unauthorised borrowing | 
whether ‘pedal cycle’ also includes an electrically assisted pedal cycle (if it does not, s
12(1) will apply to such a cycle).
Aggravated vehicle-taking
10.125 The TA 1968, s 12A, which was added by the Aggravated Vehicle-Taking Act
1992, s 1, is aimed at joy-riders who pose a particular danger to society in terms of the risk
of death, injury or damage to property. It is limited to mechanically propelled vehicles, 307
and does not cover other types of conveyance. The TA 1968, s 12A provides that:
‘(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, a person is guilty of aggravated vehicle-taking of a

vehicle if –
(a) he commits an offence under s 12(1) (in this section referred to as “the basic
offence”) in relation to a mechanically propelled vehicle; and
(b) it is proved that, at any time after the vehicle was unlawfully taken (whether
by him or another) and before it was recovered, the vehicle was driven, or
injury or damage was caused, in one or more of the circumstances set out in
paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (2) below.
(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1)(b) are –
(a) that the vehicle was driven dangerously 308 on a road or other public place;309
(b) that, owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident 310 occurred by which in-
jury was caused to any person;
(c) that, owing to the driving of the vehicle, an accident occurred by which dam-
age was caused to any property, other than the vehicle;
(d) that damage was caused to the vehicle.’
10.126 Under s 12A(1)(b) and (2), the prosecution does not have to prove that the dan-
gerous driving was by D, or that the injury, damage or accident was caused by D’s driv-
ing or by D at all. Nor, under s 12A(2)(b) or (c), need it be proved that there was any fault
in the driving of the vehicle.311 Thus, in Marsh,312 where D, who had taken a pub land-
lord’s car without consent in order to give a barmaid a lift home, hit a woman through
no fault of his own when she ran into the road, the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal
against conviction of a s 12A offence. The terms of s 12A(2)(b) had been satisfied, since
there was a causal connection between the moving of the car and the accident, and no
fault in the driving of the car was required.
10.127 Once it is proved that that driving, injury or damage was caused during the
period between the taking of the vehicle contrary to s 12(1) and its recovery,313 D is fi xed
307 Para 8.148.

308 Th is has the same meaning as ‘dangerous driving’ under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 2A(1) (see para
8.154): TA 1968, s 12A(7). 309 Paras 8.149 and 8.150.
310 ‘Accident’ in this context includes a situation where a person has deliberately caused injury: Branchflower
[2004] EWCA Crim 2042. 311 Marsh [1997] 1 Cr App R 67, CA.
312 Ibid.
313 A vehicle is recovered when it is returned to its owner or other lawful possession or custody, and for this
purpose ‘owner’ means the same as in s 12 (see para 10.120): TA 1968, s 12A(8).
 | 10.128 theft and related offences
with liability for an offence contrary to s 12A, unless D can prove one of the defences
under s 12A(3) in relation to any driving, injury or damage proved by the prosecution.
Section 12A(3) provides:
‘A person is not guilty of an offence under this section if he proves that, as regards any such
proven driving, injury or damage as is referred to in subsection (1)(b) above, either –
(a) the driving, accident or damage referred to in subsection (2) occurred before he
committed the basic offence; or
(b) he was neither in nor on nor in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle when that
driving, accident or damage occurred.’
10.128 An offence under s 12A(1) is triable either way. It is punishable on conviction

on indictment with a maximum of two years’ imprisonment, or 14 years if the death
of a person is caused by an accident falling within s 12A(2)(b).314 However, if the only
aggravating feature is damage to the vehicle or to other property, which is under £5,000
in value, the offence must be treated as if it was only triable summarily,315 the maximum
punishment being six months’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding the statutory max-
imum, or both. Unless there are special reasons, a person convicted of an offence under s
12A must be disqualified from driving for not less than 12 months.316
Because of the different maxima, s 12A creates two offences, one with a maximum
of two years, and one (where death is caused in the specified way) with a maximum of
14.317
Making off without payment
Key points 10.10

The offence of making off without payment differs from those dealt with so far in this
chapter because it does not require anything to be done with property. Instead, it pun-
ishes those who dishonestly make off without payment for goods supplied or services
done, knowing that payment on the spot is required or expected and intending never to
pay. In everyday speech they are often referred to as ‘bilkers’.
10.129 The definition of the offence is set out in the TA 1978, s 3(1), which provides
that:
‘ . . . a person who, knowing that payment on the spot for any goods supplied or service
done is required or expected from him, dishonestly makes off without having paid as
314 Ibid, s 12A(4). 315 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 22 and Sch 2.
316 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s 34 and Sch 2. See also s 35A; para 8.151.
317 Sherwood; Button [1995] RTR 60, CA.
10.133 making off without payment | 
required or expected and with intent to avoid payment of the amount due shall be guilty
of an offence.’
An offence under s 3(1) is triable either way and punishable on conviction or indictment
with a maximum of two years’ imprisonment.318
Actus reus
10.130 D must make off without paying as required or expected, in circumstances where
payment on the spot for any goods supplied or service done is required or expected.
Making off
10.131 ‘Makes off ’ refers to making off from the spot where payment is required or
expected; what is the ‘spot’ depends on the circumstances of each case. It is clear that the
following are examples of this offence: walking out of a restaurant without paying the bill
or jumping out of a taxi and running off without paying the fare.319 On the other hand,
walking towards the exit of the restaurant or moving towards the door of the taxi, with
intent to leave and avoid payment, will not suffice for an offence under the TA 1978, s 3,
since there has not yet been a ‘making off ’ from the spot where payment is required or
expected (although it may constitute an attempt to commit that offence).320
10.132 A moot point is whether a person ‘makes off ’ if he leaves without payment with
the consent of the creditor (albeit that it is procured by a false representation). We are not
concerned here with the type of case where a taxi driver allows a passenger to leave his
taxi in order to go into a house to collect the fare and the passenger never returns, because
the driver has not consented to the passenger leaving without paying him and there is no
difficulty in saying he makes off without payment. The difficulty is where someone leaves
without payment, having deceived the creditor into believing that payment has been made,
as where X walks out of a hotel with his suitcases, having told the proprietor that he has paid
the receptionist. A Circuit judge appears to have held that one cannot make off if the cred-
itor consents to one’s leaving without paying him,321 but this interpretation is not warranted
by the wording of the section and, it is submitted, is not the correct view. However, a charge
of fraud contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1 would be more appropriate in such a case.
Without payment
10.133 Making off without payment is only an offence if payment on the spot (ie there
and then)322 is required or expected of D for any goods supplied or service done, as in
the above examples. ‘Goods’ has the same meaning323 as in the TA 1968.324
318 TA 1978, s 4. 319 Moberly v Allsop (1992) 156 JP 514, DC.

320 McDavitt [1981] Crim LR 843, Crown Ct; Brooks and Brooks (1982) 76 Cr App R 66, CA.
321 Hammond [1982] Crim LR 611, Crown Ct. See also [1983] Crim LR 205 and 573.
322 Th is paraphrase was referred to by the Court of Appeal in Aziz [1993] Crim LR 708, CA.
323 Ie the meaning given by the TA 1968, s 34(2)(b): see para 11.44. 324 TA 1978, s 5(2).
 | 10.134 theft and related offences
‘Payment on the spot’ includes cases where payment is required or expected at the
time of collecting goods on which work has been done or in respect of which service has
been provided.325 It is not necessary that payment by cash is required or expected; cases
where the common understanding is that payment on the spot will be by cheque or credit
card or debit card are therefore covered. Normally, the spot on which payment is initially
required or expected is the spot from which D makes off without payment but s 3 does not
require this. If payment there and then continues to be required, the ‘spot’ can move from
one place to another. This is shown by Aziz 326 where D1 and D2, passengers in a taxi,
refused to pay the fare on arrival at their destination. The driver said that he would drive
them back to their hotel but he then headed for the police station. En route, D1 and D2
made off without payment. The Court of Appeal dismissed D1 and D2’s appeals against
conviction for making off without payment since, when they made off from the taxi, pay-
ment ‘on the spot’ (ie there and then) was required, as they knew.
10.134 The Court of Appeal has held that the requirement that D must make off ‘without
having paid as required or expected’ is not satisfied if the creditor (or his agent) has
agreed that payment would be postponed, because there will be no expectation of pay-
ment on the spot, even if that agreement has been procured by a dishonest deception.327
A moot point is whether a person who purports to pay but does so with a cheque which
‘bounces’ or with a forged cheque makes off without payment when he leaves the spot
where payment is required. Assuming that a person who leaves with the creditor’s con-
sent can nevertheless be said to ‘make off ’, the better view is that in the case of a bouncing
cheque the person will not make off without payment (because by giving the cheque he
discharges, conditionally at least,328 his liability to pay), whereas in the case of a forged
cheque he will make off without having paid as required or expected (because a forged
cheque is void and, just like payment with counterfeit money or forged notes, does not
operate even as a conditional discharge of the obligation to pay).329 These points, however,
are somewhat academic since the appropriate offence to charge in such a case is generally
that of fraud, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1.
10.135 An offence is not committed under the TA 1978, s 3 if the payment avoided
relates to the supply of goods or the doing of services which is contrary to law, or
where the service done is such that payment is not legally enforceable.330 For example, a
325 Ibid, s 3(2). 326 [1993] Crim LR 708, CA. 327 Vincent [2001] EWCA Crim 295.
328 Where a cheque is accepted in payment of a debt it is rebuttably presumed that the parties intend it to
be only a conditional discharge of the debt: Re Romer and Haslam [1893] 2 QB 286, CA. So far the debt has
been satisfied (ie payment has been made) but if the cheque is dishonoured (ie bounces) the right to sue on the
original debt revives: Sayer v Wagstaff (1844) 5 Beav 415; Re Romer and Haslam above. If the creditor expressly
or impliedly promises, in accepting the cheque, to discharge the debtor from his liability to pay the debt re-
gardless of whether the cheque is honoured, the debt is not only satisfi ed but it does not revive if the cheque is
dishonoured, with the result that the creditor’s right to sue on the debt does not revive (although he can sue
on the cheque): Sard v Rhodes (1836) 1 M & W 153. The case is even stronger where a credit card or debit card
is used, but for some reason payment to the creditor is not made by the card company, because there is a pre-
sumption that the use of the card is accepted by the creditor as an absolute discharge: Re Charge Card Services
Ltd [1989] Ch 497, CA.
329 Syrota ‘Are Cheque Frauds Covered by Section 3 of the Theft Act 1978?’ [1981] Crim LR 412. Also see
Hammond [1982] Crim LR 611, Crown Ct. 330 TA 1978, s 3(3).
10.139 making off without payment | 
contract with a prostitute for her services is illegal and unenforceable in civil law; in con-
sequence a man who has intercourse with a prostitute and then leaves, having refused to
pay her the agreed fee, does not commit an offence under s 3. However, if, unknown to the
prostitute, he did not intend to pay when he received the prostitute’s services, he could be
convicted of obtaining services dishonestly, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 11.331
10.136 An offence is not committed under s 3 if the payment required or expected is
not legally due; eg, the offence is not committed by a passenger who refuses to pay any-
thing to a taxi driver, and makes off, after the driver has in breach of contract abandoned
the journey before reaching its destination.332
Mens rea
10.137 The mens rea required of a person charged with making off without payment is
that, knowing 333 that payment on the spot was required or expected, he made off dis-
honestly and with intent to avoid payment of the amount due.
10.138 In Allen, 334 the House of Lords held that an intent permanently to avoid pay-
ment is required; an intent to defer or delay payment is not sufficient. In this case, D left a
hotel without paying. At D’s trial for making off without payment, he put forward the de-
fence that he had been prevented from paying the bill by temporary financial difficulties
but had expected to be able to do so subsequently. The House of Lords held that the trial
judge had been wrong to tell the jury that an intent not to pay on the spot would suffice,
since D could only be convicted if he was proved to have intended never to pay.
10.139 Whenever it is in issue, dishonesty is a question of fact, to be determined by
answering the questions set out by the Court of Appeal in Ghosh.335
FURTHER READING
Arlidge and Parry on Fraud (3rd edn, 2007) ATH Smith Property Offences (1994) Chs 1–9,
Ch 9 12–14 and paras 20.69–20.105
Griew The Theft Acts 1968 and 1978 (7th edn, JN Spencer ‘The Aggravated Vehicle-Taking
1995) Chs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 13 Act 1992’ [1992] Crim LR 699
Simester and Sullivan ‘The Nature and Thomas ‘Do Freegans Commit Theft?’ (2010)
Rationale of Property Offences’ in Defining 30 LS 98
Crimes (2005) (Duff and Green (eds))
Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod
and Williams (eds)) Chs 1, 2, 6, 7, 10 and 11
331 See paras 12.35–12.42. 332 Troughton v Metropolitan Police [1987] Crim LR 138, DC.
333 No doubt ‘knowing’ includes being wilfully blind; para 3.43. 334 [1985] AC 1029, HL.
335 See para 10.74.
11
Other offences under the
Theft Act 1968
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals with burglary, aggravated burglary, blackmail, handling stolen goods, dishon-
estly retaining a wrongful credit and going equipped for stealing or burglary.
11.1 Unless otherwise indicated the offences discussed in this chapter are triable either
way.1 The maximum punishments stated relate to convictions on indictment.2
Burglary and aggravated burglary
Key points 11.1

There are two types of burglary:
• entering a building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to steal in the

building or part trespassed in or to inflict grievous bodily harm on any person
therein or to do unlawful damage to the building or anything therein;
• having entered a building or part of a building as a trespasser, stealing anything in
the building or part trespassed in or inflicting grievous bodily harm on any person
therein or attempting to do so.
It is aggravated burglary for a person to commit burglary of either type when he has with
him a firearm, imitation firearm, explosive or weapon of offence.

2 For special rules relating to jurisdiction over blackmail, handling stolen goods and retaining a wrongful
credit, see paras 12.69–12.71.
11.4 burglary and aggravated burglary | 455
Burglary
11.2 The Theft Act 1986 (TA 1968), s 9, as amended by the Sexual Offences Act 2003,
provides:
‘(1) A person is guilty of burglary if –

(a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to
commit any such offence as is mentioned in sub-s (2) below; or
(b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals
or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or
attempts to infl ict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm.
(2) The offences referred to in sub-s (1)(a) above are offences of stealing anything in
the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein
any grievous bodily harm therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building
or anything therein.’
There are two separate types of burglary, under s 9(1)(a) and (b) respectively.3 Both are
punishable with a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment if committed in respect of a
building or part of a building which is a dwelling but otherwise with a maximum of 10
years.4 Because the maximum punishment for each type of burglary depends on whether
or not a dwelling is alleged and proved to have been involved, each type consists of two
distinct offences: burglary in a dwelling and burglary in any other type of building.5
Burglary comprising the commission of, or an intention to commit, an offence triable
only on indictment is itself triable only on indictment. So is burglary in a dwelling if a
person there was subjected to violence or the threat of violence6 or if D was over 18 and
had two previous convictions for burglary in a dwelling at the time of the burglary.7
The first type of burglary

11.3 This is defined by the TA 1968, s 9(1)(a), whose effect is that a person is guilty of
burglary if he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent
to commit one of the offences specified in s 9(2).
Actus reus
Entry
11.4 The TA 1968 does not define what constitutes an ‘entry’ into a building (or part) for
the purposes of s 9. In Collins,8 it was said by the Court of Appeal that there had to be an
‘effective and substantial’ entry, which seemed narrower than the rule which had applied
to ‘entry’ under earlier legislation, viz that the insertion, however minimal, of any part of
3 Downer [2009] EWCA Crim 1361. 4 TA 1968, s 9(3).

5 Miller [2010] EWCA Crim 809. Th is is the effect of Courtie [1984] AC 463, HL; para 3.50, n 122. In order
for a burglary to be treated as a burglary in a dwelling, the word ‘dwelling’ must appear in the particulars of the
offence: Miller. 6 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1.
7 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 111(4). 8 [1973] QB 100 at 106.
456 | 11.5 other offences under the theft act 1968
the body, whether to commit the further offence or to effect entry, sufficed.9 However, in
Brown,10 the Court of Appeal rejected the ‘substantial’ requirement, saying that an entry
need only be ‘effective’ and that this was a question for the jury. It held that there could
be an entry, for the purpose of s 9, by a person whose whole body had not been inside the
building (or part) and that consequently there had been an entry by D who had been seen
half inside a shop window, rummaging inside it. In fact, the Court of Appeal held that
it would be astounding if it was held that there was not an entry by a smash-and-grab
raider who inserted a hand through a shop window to grab goods. Brown was followed
in Ryan,11 which shows that ‘effectiveness’ does not require that the insertion of D’s body
should be effective for the purpose of committing the relevant further offence. In Ryan,
where D had become trapped in a window after only his head and right arm had been
inserted, the rest of his body remaining outside the building, the Court of Appeal held
that it was clear from Brown12 that a person could enter a building even if only part of his
body was within it and that it was totally irrelevant that he was incapable of committing
his intended crime (stealing) because he had become trapped. The Court therefore dis-
missed D’s appeal against conviction of burglary.
While the meaning of the word ‘effective’ in this context is unclear, minimal intru-
sions, as where D’s fingers are inserted through a gap between a window and its frame
in order to open the window, would be very unlikely to be held to be effective entries by
a jury.
11.5 Under the pre-Theft Act law on burglary, an entry could be effected merely by the
insertion of an instrument without the intrusion of any part of the body provided it was
inserted to commit a relevant further offence (eg a hooked instrument to extract (steal) a
ring), but not if it was inserted merely to facilitate access by a person’s body.13 It remains
to be decided to what extent, if any, such an insertion, even if effective, can be an entry,
but it would seem that, at least, an insertion to facilitate entry cannot be (although it could
amount to an attempt to enter). If the insertion of an instrument to commit a relevant
further offence can be an entry, there would seem no reason why sending in a trained
animal to achieve such an objective should not be capable of being an ‘entry’.14
As a trespasser
11.6 Trespass is a concept of the civil law. In civil law a person enters a building or part
of a building as a trespasser if he enters a building or part of a building in the possession
of another and he enters without a right by law or permission to do so.15 A person who
involuntarily enters a building, as where he is dragged in, cannot be a trespasser.
11.7 Rights of entry are granted by statute to certain people for certain purposes. For
instance, a police officer entering a building with a search warrant authorised under
some statute is not a trespasser if he enters with the intention of searching pursuant to
9 Bailey (1818) R & R 341.

10 [1985] Crim LR 212, CA. This report does not contain all the points contained in the transcript of the Court
of Appeal’s judgment. 11 (1996) 160 JP 610, CA.
12 [1985] Crim LR 212, CA. 13 Anon (1584) 1 And 117.
14 As to entry by an innocent agent, see para 17.6.
15 See Murphy Street on Torts (12th edn, 2007) Ch 10.
such a warrant, but he is if he enters with the intention of stealing something inside the
building or for some other purpose.
11.8 Likewise, a permission to enter will be granted for a particular purpose or purposes.
If someone, who has permission to enter for a particular purpose or purposes, enters for
some purpose for which he does not have permission, he enters in excess of permission
and, therefore, as a trespasser. For example, in Jones and Smith,16 it was held that a man
who had a general permission to enter his father’s home entered it as a trespasser when he
entered it to steal his father’s television set because he entered in excess of his permission.
Clearly, his permission did not extend to entering the house to steal.
11.9 The person in possession of a building or part of a building is entitled to give per-
mission to enter it. If the building (or part) is let, that person is the tenant, and not the
landlord, because it is the tenant who is in possession. A licensee, such as a lodger or
hotel guest, is not in possession of his room. The licensor (eg the landlord or hotel owner)
retains possession of the room and can give permission to enter it.
It appears that permission to enter for a particular purpose may also be given by some-
one (X) other than the person (Y) in possession of the premises if that person (X) has Y’s
authority (express or implied) to do so. In the famous case of Collins,17 the Court of Appeal
said that it was unthinkable that an 18-year-old woman was unable to give such permission
to enter her mother’s house, whatever the position in the law of tort. The issue is of some
importance because, eg, members of a family, lodgers and employees are impliedly (and
often expressly) authorised to invite other people generally, or particular classes of persons
or particular persons to enter the family home, lodging house or business premises. Thus, if
a lodger is authorised by her landlord to invite women, but not men, to her room and Jill and
Jack come to her room at her invitation, Jill is not a trespasser but Jack is. Such an authority
can, of course, be withdrawn or altered in terms of who may be invited. In addition, it would
be most unlikely to be found that a very young child had any implied authority.
11.10 Permission to enter may be express or implied. For instance, in the case of shops
there is an implied permission during opening hours for members of the public to enter
for the purposes of inspecting goods on display or making purchases. A person who
enters a building with permission, intending to commit a relevant offence, enters in
excess of his permission and enters as a trespasser.
A permission to enter may not necessarily extend to every part of the building. Thus,
a person may lawfully enter a building, such as an hotel or shop, but enter the manager’s
office or stockroom as a trespasser; equally he may be a lawful guest at a meal in a private
house but enter a bedroom as a trespasser. In both of these cases the entry as a trespasser
will be into a ‘part of a building’.18 On the other hand, if a person lawfully enters a build-
ing (or part of a building) and then stays on after the expiry of his entitlement (as where
someone, who has entered a shop for a lawful purpose, decides to hide and stay on after
the shop closes, and does so, in order to steal) he cannot be convicted of burglary because,
although he becomes a trespasser by staying ‘after hours’, he has not entered the building
16 [1976] 3 All ER 54, CA. See, further, Pace ‘Burglarious Trespass’ [1985] Crim LR 716.
17 [1973] QB 100, CA.
18 Hillen and Pettigrew v ICI (Alkali) Ltd [1936] AC 65 at 69–70, per Lord Atkin.
(or part) as a trespasser.19 If, however, he then moves into another part of the building to
carry out the theft, he will then commit burglary because he will have entered that part
as a trespasser with the requisite intent.
Building or part of a building

11.11 The TA 1968, s 9(4) states that references to a building also apply to an inhabited
vehicle or vessel (whether or not the person having a habitation in it is there at the time).
Clearly, a caravan or boat which is someone’s permanent home is an ‘inhabited vehicle or
vessel’, even though he is not there at the time; so is a caravan or boat which is used as a
holiday home during the summer during those weeks or weekends in which it is being so
used, but whether it is inhabited during the rest of the summer is open to doubt. Certainly,
a ‘holiday home’ caravan or boat is not inhabited when it is closed up for the winter.
Apart from s 9(4), the Act is silent about the term ‘building’. It seems, however, that the
term should be given its everyday meaning of a structure of some size with walls and
a roof and of a permanent or semi-permanent nature, whatever the construction mat-
erial. It follows that dwelling houses, warehouses, shops, office premises and the like
are all buildings; so are outhouses and greenhouses (provided they are at least semi-
permanent). On the other hand, tents and open-sided barns are not.
It seems that a substantial portable structure with most of the attributes normally
found in buildings can be a ‘building’ for the purpose of burglary, provided there is an
element of permanence in the site which it occupies. In B and S v Leathley,20 a decision
by the Crown Court in its appellate capacity, it was held that a freezer container measur-
ing 25ft by 7ft by 7ft and weighing three tons, which had occupied the same position for
three years and was likely to remain there for the foreseeable future, had doors and was
connected to mains electricity, was a ‘building’ for the purposes of burglary. This deci-
sion can usefully be contrasted with Norfolk Constabulary v Seekings, 21 where articulated
trailers which had been used as temporary stores for about a year, and which had electric
power, steps and lockable shutters, were held by the Crown Court in its appellate capacity
not to be ‘buildings’ for the purposes of burglary.
It has not yet been decided when a partially erected house or similar structure becomes
a building.
11.12 A ‘part of a building’ refers to a particular area of a building. The term does not
necessarily mean a separate room; it also includes a physically marked-out area in a room,
such as the area behind a counter in a shop, from which the defendant is plainly excluded,
whether expressly or impliedly.22
Mens rea
As to entry as a trespasser
11.13 Part of the mens rea required for an offence of burglary under the TA 1968,
s 9(1)(a) is that D must know that he is entering as a trespasser (ie he must know he is
19 Laing [1995] Crim LR 395, CA. 20 [1979] Crim LR 314, Crown Ct.
21 [1986] Crim LR 167, Crown Ct. 22 Walkington [1979] 2 All ER 716, CA.
entering without a right by law or permission to do so) or be reckless as to this fact.

Negligence as to the trespass is insufficient. This was established by the Court of Appeal
in Collins,23 decided at a time (before the Sexual Offences Act 2003 amended s 9) when
entry as a trespasser with intent to rape was burglary. About two o’clock early one morn-
ing in June an 18-year-old woman (V) went to bed. V was naked and the bed was very near
the open lattice-type window of her room. V awoke about two hours later and saw in the
moonlight a vague form crouched in the open window. V leapt to the conclusion that her
boyfriend was paying her an ardent nocturnal visit. V sat up in bed, and (according to D,
who had arrived to have intercourse with her, by force if necessary) helped D to enter the
room, after which they had full intercourse. V then realised that D was not her boyfriend.
D was later convicted of burglary. The Court of Appeal, allowing D’s appeal, held that the
prosecution had to prove that D entered as a trespasser and knew it or was reckless as to
this, and that, on the basis that D had not entered the room before he was helped in by V,
the trial judge had not directed the jury adequately on the need for D’s entry to have been
accompanied by knowledge on his part that he was entering as a trespasser, or recklessness
as to this. In a case such as Jones and Smith,24 D must know that he is entering in excess of
the permission given to him or be reckless as to this. Likewise, in a case where permission
to enter is given by someone who does not have authority to invite D to enter, D must know
or be reckless as to this lack of authority.
Ulterior intent
11.14 D’s entry must be accompanied by the ulterior intent to commit one of the offences
specified in the TA 1968, s 9(2), viz:
• to steal anything in the building or, as the case may be, the part of the building
trespassed in; or
• to inflict grievous bodily harm on any person in the building or, as the case may
be, the part of the building trespassed in; or
• to do unlawful (ie criminal) damage to the building or anything therein (whether
or not D has trespassed in the part in which the damage is intended to occur).
Although the wording of the provision is not entirely free from doubt, it would seem that
D’s intention at the time of entry must relate to property or a person then in the building
(or part) entered as a trespasser;25 eg, to steal property then in the building trespassed in.
Consequently, it is not burglary to enter a bank as a trespasser, intending to steal some bul-
lion when it is delivered to the bank; nor is it burglary to enter a building as a trespasser,
intending to inflict grievous bodily harm on someone who is being dragged in behind.
The requisite intent will exist only if D’s intended conduct would, if carried out in
accordance with his intentions, amount to the offence allegedly intended. Thus, a person
23 [1973] QB 100, CA.

24 [1976] 3 All ER 54, CA; para 11.8. In Collins [1973] QB 100, CA, the Court of Appeal did not discuss
whether Collins knew or was reckless as to whether he was entering in excess of the supposed permission. The
case is not easy to reconcile with Jones and Smith.
25 For a discussion of this point, see White ‘Lurkers, Draggers and Kidnappers: The Further Offence in
Burglary’ (1986) 150 JPN 37 and 56.
who trespasses in a building to take something to which he believes he has a legal right
lacks an intent to steal and does not commit burglary.
11.15 Where a person is charged with entry into a building or part of a building with
intent to steal, and the indictment does not assert an intention to steal a specific or identi-
fied object, D can be convicted if at the time of entry he had the necessary intent to steal
something therein, even though he did not intend to steal a specific thing but merely
intended to steal anything that he might find worth stealing, or even though there was in
fact nothing there worth his while to steal.26 Thus, a person who enters part of a depart-
ment store, intending to steal from the till, can be convicted of burglary even though the
till is empty. This is an example of the fact that it is irrelevant that it is impossible for D to
carry out his ulterior intention.27
11.16 The punishment for burglary by entry with intent is a branch of preventive jus-
tice, like the punishment of attempts to commit crime. It goes further than an offence of
attempt, however, because it punishes mere preparation for crime, whereas an attempt
requires conduct which is more than merely preparatory.28
The second type of burglary

11.17 A person is guilty of the second type of burglary, defi ned by the TA 1968, s
9(1)(b), if, having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser, he steals
or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to
inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm.
‘Trespasser’ and ‘building’ have the same meanings as in the other type of burglary.
The important distinction is that this type of burglary requires D, having entered the
building or part as a trespasser, actually to have committed or attempted the offence of
theft or the offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861, s 20,29 in terms both of the actus reus and mens rea of the relevant
offence;30 on the other hand D is not required to have had the intent to commit such an
offence when he entered. D must know or be reckless that he has entered as a trespasser
when he commits or attempts one of these offences. It is irrelevant whether or not D real-
ised at the time of entry that he was entering as a trespasser. Thus, if D enters a building,
thinking that he has permission, and later realises that he has not and then steals some-
thing inside or inflicts grievous bodily harm on someone inside (eg the occupier who is
trying to eject him), D is guilty of burglary of the present type. Of course, if D’s conduct
26 Walkington [1979] 2 All ER 716, CA; A-G’s References (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979) [1980] QB 180, CA.
27 For another example, see Ryan (1996) 160 JP 610, CA; para 11.4.
28 See para 14.104.
29 Or an offence of administering etc poison etc so as thereby to endanger life or infl ict grievous bodily harm,
contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 23; para 7.112.
30 The suggestion, in an unanswered question by the Court of Appeal in Jenkins [1983] 1 All ER 1000, that the
infl iction of grievous bodily harm need not amount to an offence (so that a trespasser could be guilty of burglary
if his entry caused unforeseen harm to an occupant, such as a heart attack through shock) was not commented
on by the House of Lords on appeal ([1984] AC 242). It would be unfortunate if it ever became the law, since it
would extend a serious offence to cover something which is not in itself an offence.
does not constitute theft (eg because he thought he had a right in law to the property) or
an offence of infliction of grievous bodily harm (eg because he was acting in reasonable
self-defence against a lethal attack by another trespasser), or an attempt to commit such
an offence, D is not guilty of burglary of the present type.
11.18 There is no obvious reason why s 9(1)(b) does not cover trespassory entrants who
proceed to commit criminal damage in the building; depending on the circumstances
criminal damage may be subject to a much lower maximum punishment than burglary.31
General
11.19 Both types of offence require a trespassory entry into a building or part of a building.
To be guilty of the first (s 9(1)(a)) type of offence, it must be proved that, at the time of his
trespassory entry, D intended to commit one of the specified offences. Someone who enters
a building as a trespasser with the intention of going to sleep inside is not guilty of bur-
glary of the first type if he subsequently forms the intention of stealing something from the
premises, but if he actually steals or attempts to steal the thing in question, he is then guilty
of burglary of the second (s 9(1)(b)) type by virtue of the commission or attempted commis-
sion of theft. Where a person enters a building, or part, as a trespasser with intent to steal or
inflict grievous bodily harm, and commits the intended offence or attempts to do so, he can
be charged with either type of offence, since the two types are not mutually exclusive.32 In
practice he will normally be charged with the second type of offence in such a case.
Aggravated burglary
11.20 By the TA 1968, s 10(1):
‘A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he commits any burglary and at the time has
with him any firearm or imitation firearm, any weapon of offence, or any explosive.’
Aggravated burglary is punishable with a maximum of imprisonment for life, 33 and is

triable only on indictment.
To commit aggravated burglary, a person must have with him a firearm or imitation
firearm, a weapon of offence or an explosive at the time he commits burglary. Where the
burglary alleged is entry as a trespasser with intent to steal etc, this means the time of the
entry into a building, or part, as a trespasser with an appropriate ulterior intent. Where the
burglary alleged is that, having entered as a trespasser, D stole etc, it means the time when,
having entered a building or part as a trespasser, a person actually steals or inflicts grievous
bodily harm, or attempts such, whether or not he had with him the article when he entered.34
Thus, a trespasser who uses a weapon of offence, which he has found after entry, to inflict
grievous bodily harm can be convicted of aggravated burglary of the second type.
31 Para 13.2. 32 Taylor [1979] Crim LR 649, CA. 33 TA 1968, s 10(2).

34 Francis [1982] Crim LR 363, CA; O’Leary (1986) 82 Cr App R 341, CA; Kelly (1992) 97 Cr App R 245, CA.
Definitions of articles specified in s 10(1)

11.21 ‘Firearm’ includes an airgun or air pistol, and ‘imitation firearm’ means anything
which has the appearance of being a firearm, whether capable of being discharged or
not.35
11.22 ‘Explosive’ means any article manufactured for the purpose of producing a
practical effect by explosion, or intended by the person having it with him for that
purpose. 36
11.23 A ‘weapon of offence’ means any article made or adapted for use for causing
injury to or incapacitating a person, or intended by the person having it with him for
such use.37 A rubber hose fi lled with metal would be an article adapted for use for
causing injury and a screwdriver would be a ‘weapon of offence’ if intended for use
for causing injury. Handcuffs are an example of an article made for incapacitation,
and rope is an example of one intended for such use if it is intended to use it to tie up
someone in the building. Where there is an issue as to whether the article was made
or adapted for one of the specified purposes, it is for the jury to decide.38 In the case of
fl ick-knives, butterfly knives and certain similar articles, judicial notice has been taken
of the fact that they are made for the purpose of causing injury, and the judge can direct
the jury to fi nd them to be made for use for causing injury.39 In the case of an article
made or adapted for one of the specified purposes, it is irrelevant that D did not intend
to use it for such a purpose.
There is authority that an article not made or adapted for an offensive purpose which
D did not have with him for the purpose of injury or incapacitation will become an
article ‘intended for such use’ if, having formed the intention so to use it, D instantly
uses it for such a purpose. 40 On this basis, if D uses a screwdriver in order to gain
entry to a house and then, when confronted by its occupier as he steals something,
he decides to use it (and he does use it) to injure the occupier, D can be convicted of
aggravated burglary. Th is can be contrasted with the situation in respect of the cor-
responding defi nition of ‘offensive weapon’ under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953,
s 1, under which a person commits an offence if he has with him an offensive weapon
in a public place. There, an article not made or adapted to cause injury and which was
not previously intended to cause injury does not become an offensive weapon if the
person who has it with him suddenly forms the intent to use it to injure and then and
there does so.41
For the purposes of being an article intended for use for causing injury to or
incapacitating someone, it is not necessary that D intended to use the article to injure
or incapacitate someone in the course of the burglary itself. It suffices that D had it with
him for such use on another occasion.42
35 TA 1968, s 10(1)(a). 36 Ibid, s 10(1)(c). 37 Ibid, 10(1)(b).

38 Williamson (1977) 67 Cr App R 35, CA.
39 Simpson [1983] 3 All ER 789, CA; DPP v Hynde [1998] 1 All ER 649, DC.
40 Kelly (1992) 97 Cr App R 245, CA. 41 Ohlson v Hylton [1975] 2 All ER 490, DC.
42 Stones [1989] 1 WLR 156, CA. For a criticism of this decision, see Reville ‘The Mischief of Aggravated
Burglary’ (1989) 139 NLJ 835.
11.26 blackmail | 463
Has with him

11.24 The aim of s 10 is to punish more severely than for burglary those who are armed
with a relevant article while committing burglaries. If a weapon is carried not by a bur-
glar but by an accomplice waiting outside the building, aggravated burglary is not com-
mitted.43 Reference to the case law on other similarly worded offences relating to firearms
and offensive weapons44 suggests that, in order for a burglar to have with him a firearm
etc, the article need merely be near to him and be readily accessible to him, but in Klass45
the Court of Appeal took a stricter approach in respect of aggravated burglary, which
requires the burglar to be carrying (ie armed with) the relevant article at the time of the
burglary.
11.25 The case law on other offences also suggests that ‘has with him’ means ‘knowingly
has with him’ the thing which is a firearm, imitation firearm, weapon of offence or explo-
sive46 (so that, eg, a burglar whose swagbag contains a revolver is not guilty of aggravated
burglary if he thought the bag was empty). However, it would appear from such cases that
D does have sufficient knowledge if he knows that he has something with him although
he does not know that it is a firearm, imitation firearm etc.47 If the courts follow this case
law, an offence carrying a maximum of life imprisonment will be one of strict liability as
to the nature of the thing which D has with him.
Blackmail
Key points 11.2

Blackmail consists of making an unwarranted demand with menaces with a view to gain
for oneself or another or an intent to cause loss to another.
11.26 By the TA 1968, s 21(1):
‘A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent
to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this
purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in
the belief –
(a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and
(b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand.’
Blackmail is an offence triable only on indictment and punishable with imprisonment for
a maximum of 14 years.48
43 Klass [1998] 1 Cr App R 453, CA. 44 Pawlicki [1992] 3 All ER 902, CA.
45 [1998] 1 Cr App R 453, CA. 46 Cugullere [1961] 2 All ER 343, CCA.
47 See, eg, Hussain [1981] 2 All ER 287, CA (possession of fi rearm without a certificate); Bradish [1990] 1 QB
981, CA (possession of a prohibited weapon). 48 TA 1968, s 21(3).
Actus reus
Demand
11.27 The essence of the offence is a demand. Nothing is required to result from the
demand, so that if the other ingredients of blackmail are present a person whose demand
is unsuccessful is guilty of blackmail and not merely of an attempt. The demand need
not be express, since (taken together with the menaces) it may be implied by a request
or suggestion49 or other conduct. In Lambert,50 the Court of Appeal held that, for black-
mail, a demand does not have to be made in terms of a requirement or obligation, but can
be couched in terms that are by no means aggressive or forceful. It added that the more
suave and gentle the request the more sinister it might be. The Court of Appeal held that
there had clearly been a demand where D had telephoned V, pretending to be V’s grand-
son and pretending that he was being held prisoner by people who would do him harm
unless V handed over £5,000.
The nature of the act or omission demanded is immaterial;51 the offence is not lim-
ited to a demand for the transfer of property, although this represents the usual type of
blackmail.
In Treacy v DPP,52 the House of Lords held by a majority that a demand by letter is made
when the letter is posted; it is therefore irrelevant that the letter is never delivered (or that
its recipient is illiterate). A similar rule probably applies to an oral demand, so that it is
irrelevant that the addressee is, for instance, deaf or cannot understand what is said (at
least, if an ordinary person would have understood).
Menaces
11.28 When the word was first used in this branch of the law, ‘menaces’ was limited to
threats of violence, but it has long since come to include ‘threats of action detrimental to
or unpleasant to the person addressed’.53
It is immaterial whether the menaces do or do not relate to action to be taken by the
person making the demand.54 The thug who says ‘Give me money or the boys will beat
you up’, and the man who says ‘Give up your claim to my Picasso or my daughter will tell
the world that you seduced her’, are both as guilty of blackmail as the man who reinforces
his demands with threats of action by himself.
In Lambert, referred to in para 11.27, the Court also stated that it is irrelevant whether
the person making the demand intends to carry out the menaces or is in any position to
effect them.
In Lambert, where the pretended threat of harm to the grandson was clearly unpleasant
to the grandmother, the Court of Appeal held that it is also irrelevant that what is threat-
ened by the person making the demand is not that he will do something or allow others
to do something, but rather that he will suffer violence from others. The Court stated that
49 As in the pre-Act cases of Studer (1915) 11 Cr App R 307, CCA, and Collister and Warhurst (1955) 39 Cr
App R 100, CCA. 50 [2009] EWCA Crim 2860, applying Collister and Warhurst above.
51 TA 1968, s 21(2). 52 [1971] AC 537, HL.
53 Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797 at 817, per Lord Wright. 54 TA 1968, s 21(2).
11.29 blackmail | 465
the essence of the offence is that the offender intends to impose, and does impose, ‘men-
acing pressures’, and what D had been seeking to do was to impose upon V the pressure
that if she did not hand over the money then her grandson would suffer violence.
Trivial threats will not suffice. Subject to the two special rules mentioned below, the
threat must be of ‘such a nature and extent that the mind of an ordinary person of normal
stability and courage might be influenced or made apprehensive so as to accede unwill-
ingly to the demand’. These words, uttered in a blackmail case under the Larceny Act
1916,55 were applied in respect of the present offence by a Circuit judge in Harry, 56 where
D, an organiser of a college rag, had written to shopkeepers, asking them to buy indem-
nity posters to protect them from inconvenience from rag activities. The judge directed
the jury to acquit D; on the evidence there had not been any ‘menaces’.
There are two occasions57 when a special direction may be required:
• If, on the facts known to D, his threats might have affected the mind of an ordinary
person of normal stability, although they did not affect V, the addressee, the jury
should be told that they would amount to menaces.58
• If, although they would not have affected the mind of a person of normal stability,
the threats affected the mind of V, the jury should be told that the menaces would be
proved if D was aware of the likely effect of his actions on V, eg because he knew of
some unusual susceptibility on the victim’s part.
Mens rea
11.29 The demand with menaces must be made by D with a view to gain for himself
or another, or with intent to cause loss to another. Under the TA 1968, s 34(2)(a) ‘gain’
and ‘loss’ are confined to money or other property.59 Consequently, it is not blackmail
to demand with menaces that a person should cease committing adultery or should com-
mit adultery or should surrender the custody of a child. On the other hand, it is not
necessary that D should be motivated by the desire to achieve economic gain or to cause
economic loss. In Bevans,60 eg, a man in severe pain, who threatened to shoot a doctor
if he did not give him an injection of morphine, was held guilty of blackmail. The Court
of Appeal upheld the conviction because the man had demanded the drug with menaces
(and thereby acted with a view to gaining it for himself); it was irrelevant that his motive
had been to gain relief from pain rather than economic gain.
‘A view to gain’ must mean a direct intent (ie purpose) to gain. A person who does not
act for such a purpose but who foresees that a gain will inevitably result from achieving
some other purpose does not act with a view to gain, still less does he do so if he is simply
reckless as to making a gain. Although D is not required, in the alternative, to act with a
view to causing loss, it would be surprising if ‘intent to cause loss’ was not limited to a
direct intent to cause loss. It would certainly be odd if the requisite mens rea differed in
55 Clear [1968] 1 All ER 74 at 80. 56 [1974] Crim LR 32, Crown Ct.

57 Garwood [1987] 1 All ER 1032, CA. 58 See Clear [1968] 1 QB 670, CA.
59 ‘Property’ bears the meaning given by the TA 1968, s 4(1) (see para 10.26): TA 1968, s 34(1).
60 (1988) 87 Cr App R 64, CA.
relation to ‘gain’ and ‘loss’, particularly as they are normally correlatives. On this basis,
D would not be guilty of blackmail if, for the purpose of humiliating V, D demands with
menaces that V strips and throws his clothes over a bridge into a fast-flowing river. D
foresees V’s loss of his clothes if he achieves his purpose of humiliation but D does not act
for the purpose of causing V’s loss of his clothes.
11.30 The gain in view or loss intended need not be permanent. 61 This differentiates
blackmail from theft and robbery. Hence, D, who tells V that she will reveal details
of V’s sexual aberrations to V’s fiancé unless V lends her a dress for a ball, is guilty of
blackmail.
11.31 ‘Gain’ includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well as getting what one has
not; ‘loss’ includes a loss by not getting what one might get, as well as losing what one
has. 62 The width of these terms means that blackmail extends to a wide variety of demands
with menaces which do not involve a demand for the transfer of property. For example,
a demand that V should forgo payment of a debt owed by D can constitute blackmail if
it is accompanied by menaces, because D has a view to gain by keeping what he has; of
course, D also has an intent to cause loss to the victim by V not getting what he might get.
A person who demands with menaces that compromising letters be destroyed acts with
an intent to cause loss to another (by the latter losing what he has) and therefore he can
be convicted of blackmail.
A person who demands with menaces a job can be convicted of blackmail since he acts
with a view to gain for himself. A person acts with a view to gain if he seeks to recover a
debt, for he is endeavouring to get money which he has not got although it is legally due
to him,63 but so long as the menaces go no further than the threat of legal proceedings no
offence is committed since it is inconceivable that the demand with menaces would be
found to be unwarranted.
Unwarranted demand with menaces

11.32 As stated above, the demand with menaces must be unwarranted. For this pur-
pose the TA 1968, s 21(1) provides that a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless
the person making it does so in the belief that he has reasonable grounds for mak-
ing the demand and that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the
demand. Legally, it is irrelevant whether or not D’s beliefs are reasonable; the question
is whether D had such beliefs, but, of course, the reasonableness of his alleged belief is
evidentially important in relation to his credibility. D does not have to prove these beliefs,
but this does not mean that the prosecution must negative the existence of a belief for
which there is no evidence. Instead, D has an evidential burden and, unless D adduces
evidence (or there is evidence from another source) which raises the issue that he had
the beliefs required, the jury will be obliged to find that the demand with menaces was
unwarranted.64
61 TA 1968, s 34(2)(a). 62 Ibid.

63 Parkes [1973] Crim LR 358, Crown Ct; approved in A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) [2002] 3 All ER 840, CA.
64 Lawrence and Pomroy (1971) 57 Cr App R 64, CA.
11.34 handling | 467
Assuming that the issue is raised, the prosecution must negative either D’s alleged belief
that he had reasonable grounds for making the demand, or his alleged belief that the use
of the menaces was a proper means of reinforcing it; otherwise the jury must find that
the demand with menaces was not unwarranted and must acquit D. Normally, it will be
easier to negative the second of these alleged beliefs, since a person who makes a demand
with menaces may well believe he has reasonable grounds for making the demand but
realise that the use of the menaces in question was not a proper means of reinforcing the
demand. For example, a prostitute may well believe that she has reasonable grounds for
demanding payment of a debt by a customer (although she knows the debt is not legally
enforceable), but realise that her threat to have the customer beaten up otherwise is not a
proper means of reinforcing the demand.
11.33 It seems clear that, subject to what was said in Harvey, below, and unlike the tests
of dishonesty under Ghosh,65 D is to be judged solely according to his own understanding
of general moral standards. It follows that the person whose understanding of general
moral standards is of standards which are low may succeed in a defence in a case where
another person who understands standards to be higher may not, even though the jury
thinks that he acted reasonably.
It was held by the Court of Appeal in Harvey66 that no threat of an act known or sus-
pected by D to be unlawful could be believed by him to be proper, even though he might
regard it as justified. This seems incontrovertible where the act is a serious crime since
D cannot credibly say that he believed that a threat of murder or rape, as in Harvey, was
proper according to general moral standards. On the other hand, it is less acceptable where
the threatened act involves a minor illegality since D may well believe that to threaten a
minor offence is proper according to his understanding of general moral standards.
Handling
Key points 11.3

The offence of handling stolen goods can be committed in 18 different ways. ‘Stolen
goods’ are not limited to goods obtained by theft. In particular, they also include goods
obtained by blackmail or fraud, and the proceeds of goods obtained by theft, blackmail
or fraud. The goods must remain stolen at the time of handling. The handling must occur
after the end of the course of ‘stealing’ and must be done dishonestly and with knowledge
or belief that the goods are ‘stolen’.
11.34 By the TA 1968, s 22:
‘A person handles stolen goods if (otherwise than in the course of the stealing) knowing
or believing them to be stolen goods he dishonestly receives the goods, or dishonestly
65 Para 10.74. 66 (1981) 72 Cr App R 139, CA.

undertakes or assists in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the ben-
efit of another person, or if he arranges to do so.’
Handling stolen goods is punishable with imprisonment for a maximum of 14 years.

11.35 There is a considerable overlap between handling and theft. In many instances,
a person who ‘handles’ stolen goods is thereby appropriating property belonging to
another and is also guilty of theft if he has the necessary mens rea.67 Nevertheless, there
are two reasons for having the separate offence of handling. One is that sometimes han-
dling stolen goods does not involve the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to
another with the intention of permanently depriving that person; eg, because the dealing
with them does not constitute an appropriation (as in the case of handling by ‘arranging’
to do something with them, which is discussed below). The other reason is that profes-
sional receivers or disposers of stolen property (otherwise known as ‘fences’ and ‘placers’,
respectively) are a serious nuisance and it is widely believed that without them there
would be fewer thieves.68 Many ‘professional’ thieves would be deterred if they could not
pass on to others the task of disposing of stolen goods at a profit or the task of laundering
them. The existence of the separate offence of handling, which is more severely punish-
able than theft, ensures that large-scale fences and placers can be punished more severely
than the thieves for whom they act.
Actus reus
Forms of handling
11.36 The TA 1968, s 22(1) states that handling consists of receiving stolen goods, or
undertaking or assisting in their retention, removal, disposal or realisation by or for the
benefit of another, or arranging to do one of these things. As will be shown later, this
definition comprises 18 different forms of handling.69 However, although Lord Bridge
stated, obiter, in Bloxham70 that s 22(1) creates two distinct offences (one of receiving, and
the other capable of being committed in the other ways specified in s 22(1)), the weight
of authority71 is in favour of the view that s 22(1) creates only one offence, which can be
committed by receiving or by any of the other ways specified.
If Lord Bridge’s view was correct, an indictment alleging an unparticularised offence
of handling would be bad for duplicity, but it has been held by the Court of Appeal72 and
by the Divisional Court73 that such an indictment is not defective, although the better
practice is to particularise the form of handling relied on, and, if there is any uncer-
tainty about the form of handling in question, it will be advisable to have more than one
count in the indictment. In the case of uncertainty, only two counts should generally
be inserted since they will normally cover every form: one count for receiving, and the
67 Dolan (1975) 62 Cr App R 36, CA; Sainthouse [1980] Crim LR 506, CA.
68 A point made by the Court of Appeal in Shelton (1986) 83 Cr App R 379, CA.
69 Nicklin [1977] 2 All ER 444, CA. 70 [1983] 1 AC 109 at 113.
71 Nicklin [1977] 2 All ER 444, CA; Griffiths v Freeman [1970] 1 All ER 1117, DC. 72 Nicklin above.
73 Griffiths v Freeman [1970] 1 All ER 1117, DC.
other either for the other forms of handling or for one or two of those forms (eg assist-
ing in the removal or disposal of stolen goods by another).74 Similar principles apply to
charges before a magistrates’ court.75 If D is charged solely with receiving, he may not be
convicted on that count of some other form of handling.76
The various forms of handling are set out below.
Receiving
11.37 Receiving consists of a ‘single fi nite act’ whereby ‘the defendant came into
possession’ of the goods.77 ‘Possession’ here means exclusive control. ‘Receiving’ also
involves a receipt from someone else, so that a person who fi nds stolen goods and
helps himself to them does not receive them.78 It is possible for a receiver to be in joint
possession with the thief or another receiver if he shares exclusive control with such a
person.
It follows from the requirement of possession that a person who holds goods while he
inspects them during negotiations with the thief does not receive them, nor does some-
one who helps the thief to unload the goods from a lorry.79 In order to be in possession
(and therefore to be a receiver), a person need not have physical contact with the goods so
long as he takes them under his exclusive control or an agent or employee does so acting
under his orders, in which case the agent or employee is also a receiver if he has the neces-
sary mens rea.80 Of course, D can only be convicted of handling if at the relevant time,
here the time of the receiving, he had the requisite mens rea. If he did not, but later discov-
ers that the goods are stolen, any subsequent dealing with them by him may constitute a
handling of the types outlined in paras 11.40 to 11.43.
Arranging to receive
11.38 Th is requires preparation by D, or a concluded agreement between D and
another (eg the thief), for the receiving of stolen goods by D. A mere offer to receive
stolen goods, or the participation in negotiations for their receipt by D (as where D
negotiates to purchase stolen goods), will not suffice. However, certainly in the case of
an offer, it may amount to an attempt to handle (in that it is an attempt to arrange to
receive).
11.39 The other forms of handling set out below differ in one vital respect from
receiving or arranging to receive in that they all relate to something being done ‘by
another’ or ‘for the benefit of another’. If D1 and D2 are jointly charged in one count of
an indictment with an act of handling ‘by or for the benefit of another’, the other person
must be someone other than D1 and D2.81
74 Nicklin [1977] 2 All ER 444, CA; Willis [1972] 3 All ER 797, CA.
75 Griffiths v Freeman [1970] 1 All ER 1117, DC. 76 Nicklin [1977] 2 All ER 444, CA.
77 Smythe (1980) 72 Cr App R 8 at 13. 78 Haider (1985) unreported, CA.
79 Hobson v Impett (1957) 41 Cr App R 138, DC. 80 Smith (1855) Dears CC 559.
81 Roberts [1993] 9 Archbold News 2, CA; Gingell [2000] 1 Cr App R 88, CA. Th is restriction does not apply
to a conspiracy to handle where one co-defendant has agreed to commit one of these forms of handling by or for
the benefit of another co-defendant: Slater and Suddens [1996] Crim LR 494, CA.
Undertaking the retention, removal, disposal or

realisation of stolen goods for the benefit of another
11.40 These four forms of handling are appropriate to cover the case where it is D,
either alone or with another, who retains, removes, disposes of or realises the stolen
goods for the benefit of another. A person who undertakes one of the four activities
solely for his own benefit cannot be convicted of handling, unless he has received the
goods with the relevant mens rea. Thus, if D who has innocently received the goods sim-
ply retains them for his own benefit, he cannot be convicted of handling, although (unless
he paid for them) he may be guilty of theft.
The four activities can be explained as follows.
• ‘Retention’ means ‘keeping possession of, not losing, continuing to have’. 82
• ‘Removal’ clearly refers to the movement of stolen goods from one place to another.
Thus, a person undertakes the removal of stolen goods for the benefit of another if
he transports the goods to a hideout for the benefit of the thief or some other person.
However, a very slight movement of goods probably does not suffice.
• ‘Disposal’ covers not only the dumping or giving away of stolen goods but also
their destruction or transformation, as where D melts down stolen candlesticks for
the benefit of the thief or some other person.83
• ‘Realisation’ means the exchange of stolen goods for money or some other prop-
erty; the realisation is by the seller, not the buyer. 84 A person who sells stolen
goods as agent for a third party (eg the thief) undertakes their realisation for the
benefit of another. However, as was held by the House of Lords in Bloxham, 85 a
person who sells stolen goods on his own behalf does not undertake their realisa-
tion for the benefit of another because the buyer benefits from the purchase and
not from the realisation (which benefits the seller only). In such a case, the seller
can only be convicted of handling if he received the stolen goods with the relevant
mens rea.
Assisting in the retention, removal, disposal or realisation

of stolen goods by another
11.41 These four forms of handling are appropriate to cover cases where D provides
assistance to another person who is undertaking or going to undertake the retention,
removal, disposal or realisation of stolen goods.
‘Assist’ was construed in a wide way by the Court of Appeal in Kanwar.86 Here, D was
charged with assisting in the retention of stolen goods but the Court’s statement would
seem to apply to the other three forms of assistance. ‘Assistance’, the Court held, requires
that something be done by D for the purpose of enabling the goods to be retained etc
82 Pitchley (1972) 57 Cr App R 30, CA.

83 Griew The Theft Acts 1968 and 1978 (7th edn, 1995) paras 15–26; cf Williams Textbook of Criminal Law
(2nd edn, 1983) 687 (‘disposal’ limited to alienation). 84 Bloxham [1983] 1 AC 109, HL.
85 Ibid. 86 [1982] 2 All ER 528, CA.
by another. It is not limited to physical acts since verbal representations, whether oral or
written, for the purpose of enabling stolen goods to be retained etc can suffice. The requi-
site assistance, the Court stated, need not be successful in its object. Further elucidation
of ‘assist’ was provided by the Court of Appeal in Coleman, 87 where it was held that the
term includes helping or encouraging.
Although the decision in Kanwar does not refer to the possibility of assisting by failing
to do something, there is authority (as will be seen shortly) that in one case a person can
assist in the retention of stolen goods by another by an omission to act.
There is some overlap with cases of ‘undertaking’. For example, a person who joins
with another in removing stolen goods for the latter’s benefit not only undertakes their
removal for the benefit of another, but also assists in that removal by another.
‘Retention’, ‘removal’, ‘disposal’ and ‘realisation’ have already been defined, but the
following are examples of these terms in the context of assistance.
11.42 D assists in the retention of stolen goods by another if he puts the thief in touch
with a warehouse keeper, or covers stolen goods in the possession of a handler in order to
conceal them, or tells lies so as to make it more difficult for the police to find stolen goods
retained by the thief. On the other hand, a refusal to answer questions put by the police as
to the whereabouts of stolen goods does not amount to handling,88 even though it may well
assist in their retention by another. However, if the goods have been left on D’s premises by
the thief or a handler such a refusal may be evidence that D has permitted them to remain
there, which does constitute assisting in their retention. 89 Where the permission has not
been communicated to the other but D passively allows the goods to remain under his
control, there is only an omission to get rid of the goods on his part. Nevertheless, it has
been held that this constitutes assistance in their retention.90 This is the exceptional case
where an omission can constitute ‘assistance’. Merely to use stolen goods does not suffice,
since it does not in itself amount to assistance in their retention.91
There will be assistance in the removal of stolen goods by another if D lends a lorry for
their removal. An example of assistance in the disposal of stolen goods by another occurs
where D advises the thief as to how to get rid of stolen goods. On the other hand, merely
to accept the benefit of a disposal by another does not in itself suffice, since it does not
amount to assistance in the disposal,92 although if the benefit consists of the proceeds93
of the original stolen goods and they are received by D he may be convicted of handling
by receiving.
D assists in the realisation of stolen goods by another if he puts a thief in touch with a
fence.
Arranging to undertake or assist in the retention, removal, disposal

or realisation of stolen goods by or for the benefit of another
11.43 These eight forms of handling require no explanation in the light of what has been
said in paras 11.40 to 11.42. An example covered by these forms is agreeing to send a
87 (1985) 150 JP 175, CA. 88 Brown [1970] 1 QB 105, CA. 89 Ibid.

90 Ibid; Pitchley (1972) 57 Cr App R 30, CA. 91 Sanders (1982) 75 Cr App R 84, CA.
92 Coleman (1985) 150 JP 175, CA. 93 Para 11.46.
van to collect the thief and the stolen goods, which constitutes arranging to assist in the
removal of stolen goods by another.
Because the offence of handling can only be committed if the goods are already stolen
at the time of the alleged act of handling, any arrangement, including an arrangement to
receive, made before goods are stolen will not constitute handling stolen goods.94 It may,
however, constitute the separate offence of conspiracy to handle.95
Stolen goods
11.44 The TA 1968, s 34(2)(b) states that ‘goods’:
‘includes money and every other description of property,96 except land, and includes
things severed from the land by stealing.’
It will be noted that, although it would not normally be so described, a thing in action is
‘goods’ for the present purpose because it falls within ‘every other description of property’.
11.45 By the TA 1968, s 24, as amended by the Fraud Act 2006 (FA 2006), Sch 1, ‘stolen
goods’ is not limited to goods which have been stolen (contrary to the TA 1968, s 1); the
term also includes goods obtained by blackmail (contrary to the TA 1968, s 21)97 or by
fraud (within the meaning98 of the FA 2006).99 References hereafter to ‘steal’, ‘stolen’,
‘theft’ and ‘thief’ must be understood in this extended sense.100
Because a child under the age of criminal responsibility (10) cannot be guilty of an
offence, someone of the age of criminal responsibility cannot handle goods ‘stolen’ by such
a child.101 The same would be true when the goods were ‘stolen’ by someone who lacked the
necessary mens rea or who had the defence (incapacity) of insanity. (The person handling
the goods in such a case would normally, however, be guilty of the theft of them.)
On the other hand, where the goods were stolen by someone who committed the rel-
evant actus reus with the necessary mens rea but who had an excuse such as duress by
threats, they would be stolen goods. This is because the fact that a person has an excuse
does not mean that an offence has not been committed, but simply that that person is
excused from liability for it.102
In addition, goods which have not been stolen in England or Wales are stolen goods
if they have been the subject of an act elsewhere (including Scotland and Northern
Ireland) and that act:
(a) was criminal when and where it occurred, and
(b) if it had occurred in England and Wales would have satisfied the requirements of
the TA 1968, s 1 or 21 or of fraud within the meaning of the FA 2006.103
94 Park (1987) 87 Cr App R 164, CA.

95 Ibid at 173. For conspiracy, see Ch 14.
96 ‘Property’ has the meaning given by the TA 1968, s 4(1) (see para 10.26): TA 1968, s 34(1).
97 Paras 11.26–11.33. 98 Paras 12.3–12.28. 99 TA 1968, s 24(4). 100 Ibid, s 24(4).
101 Walters v Lunt [1951] 2 All ER 645, DC. 102 See para 2.20.
103 TA 1968, s 24(1).
Lastly, references to stolen goods also include money which is dishonestly withdrawn
from an account to which a ‘wrongful credit’ has been made, but only to the extent that the
money derives from the credit.104 ‘Wrongful credit’ is defined by s 24A(2A); see para 11.60.
The fact that the goods were stolen may be proved by evidence of the conviction of
the thief; in such a case he must be taken to have stolen the goods unless the contrary is
proved.105
The fact that no one has been convicted, or that someone has been tried but has been
acquitted, in respect of the alleged theft does not prevent the goods being found to be
stolen on a handling charge if the evidence persuades the jury that the goods were stolen.
That evidence may consist of admissions by D of facts within his knowledge (such as how
he acquired the goods) from which the jury may legitimately infer that the goods were
stolen.106 On the other hand, D’s belief that the goods were stolen is not enough on its own
to permit an inference by the jury that the goods were stolen.107
Proceeds of original stolen goods

11.46 For the purpose of the offence of handling stolen goods, references to ‘stolen
goods’ include the proceeds of such goods within the terms of the TA 1968, s 24(2)(a)
and (b). Section 24(2) states that:
‘references to stolen goods include, in addition to the goods originally stolen and parts of
them (whether in their original state or not), –
(a) any other goods which directly or indirectly represent or have at any time rep-
resented the stolen goods in the hands of the thief as being the proceeds of any
disposal or realisation of the whole or part of the goods stolen or of goods so repre-
senting the stolen goods; and
(b) any other goods which directly or indirectly represent or have at any time repre-
sented the stolen goods in the hands of a handler of the stolen goods or any part of
them as being the proceeds of any disposal or realisation of the whole or part of the
stolen goods handled by him or of goods so representing them.’
‘The thief’ means the person by whose conduct, with the appropriate mens rea, the goods
were originally stolen or obtained by fraud or blackmail. ‘A handler’ means any per-
son who has committed the actus reus of handling with the appropriate mens rea. The
requirement that the goods must directly or indirectly represent or have at any time rep-
resented the stolen goods ‘in the hands’ of the thief or a handler is wider than it may seem
because ‘in the hands of’ means ‘in the possession or under the control of’.108
11.47 The operation of s 24(2) can be illustrated as follows. A steals a car (or obtains it by
fraud or blackmail). He sells it to B for £1,000 and receives that sum in cash. The car and
104 Ibid, s 24A(8), inserted by the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996, s 2(1), provides this. Section 24A(7) applies
this to all references to ‘stolen goods’ in the TA 1968.
105 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 74(1) and (2).
106 McDonald (1980) 20 Cr App R 288, CA.
107 A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 1979) (1980) 71 Cr App R 341, CA.
108 Forsyth [1997] 2 Cr App R 299, CA.
cash are now both stolen goods, the latter because it directly represents the original sto-
len goods (the car) in the hands of the thief (A) as the proceeds of the car’s realisation or
disposal. Therefore, if A then gives £500 of the £1,000 to C, who dishonestly receives the
money knowing that it has represented part of the original stolen goods, C can be con-
victed of handling. If C buys a camera with the £500, the camera becomes stolen goods
once it is in his hands because it indirectly represents the original stolen goods in the
hands of a handler as the proceeds of the realisation or disposal of goods representing the
original stolen goods. Consequently, if E dishonestly receives the camera from C, know-
ing that it has represented part of the stolen goods in the hands of C, E can be convicted
of handling stolen goods. However, if F receives the camera from E, unaware that it rep-
resents the original stolen goods, and then sells it for cash, the cash which F receives will
not become stolen goods because, lacking mens rea, F is not a handler and therefore that
cash does not represent the original stolen goods in the hands of a handler as proceeds of
their realisation or disposal. Thus, if G receives that cash from F, G cannot be convicted
of receiving stolen goods, even though he knows all the material facts.
When goods cease to be stolen

11.48 For the offence of handling to be committed the goods must not only have been
stolen, but remain stolen at the time of their handling. In this context the TA 1968, s
24(3) is important. It provides that no goods which have been stolen are to be regarded as
having continued to be stolen after one of the following events has occurred:
• After they have been restored to the person from whom they were stolen or to other
lawful possession or custody These words were not satisfied in Greater London
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Streeter,109 where cartons of cigarettes stolen
from V were seen on the thief’s lorry by V’s security officer. The security officer
marked the cartons for future identification and informed the police. The police then
followed the lorry to D’s shop where D took delivery of the cartons. The Divisional
Court held that neither the security officer nor the police had purported to exercise
possession or control over the cartons, but had merely waited to see what happened.
The cartons had therefore not ceased to be stolen when they were handled by D. It
is often difficult to decide whether goods have been restored to lawful possession or
custody, particularly when the police have traced the goods. The crucial question
here is whether the police officer has reduced the stolen goods into his possession,
and this depends upon the intention with which he has acted. In A-G’s Reference
(No 1 of 1974),110 it was held that a police officer, who had removed the rotor arm of
a car containing goods about which he wished to question the driver, would have
reduced them into his possession if he had acted with intent to take charge of them
so that they could not be removed and so that he could have the disposal of them.
On the other hand, the Court held, if the police officer had retained an open mind
as to whether he should take possession and merely removed the rotor arm in order
that the driver should not get away without interrogation, he would not have reduced
them into his possession.
109 (1980) 71 Cr App R 113, DC. 110 [1974] QB 744, CA.

• After the person from whom they were stolen and any other person claiming through
him have otherwise ceased, as regards those goods, to have any right to restitution in
respect of the theft An illustration of this provision is where A, the thief, obtains the
goods from B under a contract which is voidable because of A’s misrepresentation. If
B, on realising the misrepresentation, affirms the contract, he thereby ceases to have
any right to restitution of the goods and they therefore cease to be stolen goods at
that point of time.
Limitation
11.49 The requirement that the handling must have been ‘otherwise than in the course
of the stealing’ (ie the stealing by which the goods originally became stolen goods)
means that the original thief cannot commit handling so long as the stealing contin-
ues, nor can an accomplice to the theft (ie someone who had aided, abetted, counselled
or procured it). The purpose of the limitation seems to be to protect a perpetrator of, or
an accomplice to, a stealing from being liable for handling on the basis of acts done as part
of their enterprise of stealing. Suppose that D1 steals a leather coat at D2’s request. He
walks 20 yards to D2’s car and hands the coat to D2. D1 and D2 are arrested a few seconds
later. D1 has undertaken the removal of the stolen goods for the benefit of another (D2)
and D2 has received those goods. However, if both these forms of conduct were in the
course of D1’s stealing neither can be convicted of handling the stolen coat.
It is difficult to define exactly when the course of the stealing finishes, but clearly, as in
the case of the ‘time’ of stealing in robbery,111 it is not limited to the period (possibly a split
second of time) during which the act of appropriation with mens rea whereby the goods
were stolen initially occurs. It would seem that, by analogy with robbery, ‘the course of
the stealing’ lasts as long as the stealing can be said to be still in progress in commonsense
terms.112 If so, any handling of goods which have been stolen by a person will be done in
the course of the stealing if it is done at the scene of the crime or while he is leaving the
immediate vicinity of the theft with the goods. On the other hand, handling goods four
hours later after they have been driven 200 miles from the scene of the crime is clearly not
done in the course of the stealing. The difficulty, of course, comes in drawing the line in
between; this may be more difficult, however, in the abstract than in a concrete case.
111 Para 10.103.

112 See further the comments in para 10.103, which would seem to be equally applicable here. Depending
on the facts, the ‘course of the stealing’ may be very brief, as in Pitham and Hehl (1976) 65 Cr App R 45, CA.
In that case, X offered to sell V’s furniture to D1 and D2. D1 and D2 inspected the furniture and agreed to buy
it. They paid X and then removed the furniture. They were convicted of handling stolen goods and appealed
unsuccessfully against conviction, contending that their acts did not take place ‘otherwise than in the course
of stealing’. The Court of Appeal dismissed their appeals on the ground that X’s offer to sell amounted to
appropriation (see para 10.13) and the off ence of theft was complete at that stage. What D1 and D2 had done
thereafter had been done after the course of the stealing had concluded. Although this decision has been
criticised (see Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod and Williams (eds)) para 13.77), it can be sup-
ported on the ground that X’s part in the stealing (theft) was complete and there was no evidence that D1 and
D2 had aided, abetted, counselled or procured X to commit that stealing. Therefore, the involvement of the
only party to the enterprise of stealing the furniture was complete. See Allen Criminal Law (11th edn, 2011)
539 for a similar argument.
It must be emphasised that, once the course of the stealing has ended, even the origi-
nal thief of the goods can be convicted of handling them. An example would be if, after
the course of the stealing, he helps a fence to whom he has sold them to move the stolen
goods from one hiding place to another, since he would be assisting in their removal by
another.
11.50 Unless there is an issue on the evidence that D was the thief or that the handling
was in the course of the stealing, the prosecution does not have to prove that the handling
was ‘otherwise than in the course of the stealing’; indeed, the judge should not even tell
the jury about these words.113
Mens rea
Knowledge or belief 114
11.51 None of the actions described above is enough to amount to the offence of han-
dling stolen goods unless D either knows or believes that the goods are stolen at the
time of the act of handling alleged.115 It follows that, goods being received at the moment
when they come into the possession of a person, the subsequent acquisition of knowledge
by that person that they are stolen does not of itself make him a handler,116 although if he
then goes on to commit some other act of handling, such as undertaking their disposal
for the benefit of another, he can be convicted of handling on that ground. ‘Undertaking’
and ‘assisting’ can be continuing forms of conduct, and where this occurs it is enough
that D only discovers that the goods are stolen after he began to handle them in one of
these ways, provided he has not yet ceased to do so.
It must be remembered that if a person, who has innocently received stolen goods
as a gift , subsequently decides to keep them when he discovers that they are stolen, he
commits theft , since his keeping them as owner amounts to an appropriation under
the TA 1968, s 3(1). It would be different if the goods were transferred to him for value
in good faith because the TA 1968, s 3(2) would prevent him being guilty of theft (see
para 10.20).
11.52 A person ‘knows’ that goods are stolen if he is certain of this, as where he is told
by the thief or someone else with first-hand knowledge that they are stolen.117 The Court
of Appeal stated in Hall118 that ‘belief’ was something short of ‘knowledge’, and might
be said to be the state of mind of a person who said to himself: ‘I cannot say I know for
certain that those goods are stolen, but there can be no other reasonable conclusion in
113 Cash [1985] QB 801, CA.

114 JR Spencer ‘Handling, Theft and the Mala Fide Purchaser’ [1985] Crim LR 92; G Williams ‘Handling,
Theft and the Purchaser who Takes a Chance’ [1985] Crim LR 432; JR Spencer ‘Handling and Taking Risks – A
Reply to Professor Williams’ [1985] Crim LR 440.
115 Brook [1993] Crim LR 455, CA. See para 3.65. For an analysis of the position of the innocent receiver with
subsequent mens rea, see Tunkel (1983) 133 NLJ 844. 116 Brook above.
117 Hall (1985) 81 Cr App R 260, CA. The test of ‘knowledge or belief’ being subjective, it is not enough that a
person ought to have known the goods were stolen: Atwal v Massey [1971] 3 All ER 881, DC.
118 (1985) 81 Cr App R 260, CA.
the light of all the circumstances, in the light of all that I have heard and seen.’119 In other
words, for ‘belief’ D must be virtually certain. It is clear that suspicion – even a very
strong one – that goods are stolen is not enough,120 nor is wilful blindness.121 However,
it has been held that knowledge or belief may be inferred from wilful blindness,122 which
is somewhat difficult to understand if the suspicion involved in wilful blindness is not
enough for ‘belief’. What is it which is inferable from wilful blindness which constitutes
‘belief’? The courts have not supplied an answer.
Clearly, there is little difference between ‘knowing’ and ‘believing’ in this context (as in
others). It has been held that ‘knowledge or belief’ are words in ordinary usage in English
and that it is not necessary in every case for the jury to be given any definition of them,123
which is rather surprising in the light of what has just been said about these terms. It has
also been held, however, that in cases ‘where much reference is made to suspicion, it will
be prudent to give [a direction]’.124
11.53 The answer to the question, ‘How much must D know or believe?’ is this. D need
not know the nature of the goods,125 an important point if they are in a locked trunk, for
example, but he must know or believe enough facts about the way in which the goods have
been acquired or dealt with as to indicate that, in law (whether or not he realises this),126
they have been ‘stolen’. Where the charge relates to the proceeds of the original stolen
goods D must know the relevant history of those proceeds.
Proof of knowledge or belief

11.54 This may be assisted by the so-called ‘doctrine of recent possession’. This common
law ‘doctrine’ applies where D received or otherwise handled127 recently stolen goods.
Under the ‘doctrine’, the judge may direct the jury that they may, if they think fit, in the
absence of an explanation by D or if they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that any
explanation given is untrue, infer that D knew or believed that they were stolen.128 Of
course, the jury are not obliged to draw the inference, and the onus of proving knowledge
or belief remains on the prosecution throughout.129
The ‘doctrine of recent possession’ is misnamed,130 since it has nothing to do with
goods recently possessed but concerns the possession or handling of recently stolen
goods. Moreover, it is not even a doctrine since it is merely an application of the ordinary
rules of circumstantial evidence.
119 The Court of Appeal in Hall continued that this was enough for belief even if the defendant said to him-
self: ‘Despite all that I have seen and all that I have heard, I refuse to believe what my brain tells me is obvious.’
The Court of Appeal in Forsyth ([1997] 2 Cr App R 299, CA) held that this was potentially confusing because a
jury might conclude that a defendant was guilty if there were circumstances of great suspicion from which the
only reasonable conclusion was that the goods were stolen but which the defendant could not bring himself to
believe. 120 Grainge [1974] 1 All ER 928, CA; Moys (1984) 79 Cr App R 72, CA.
121 Griffiths (1974) 60 Cr App R 14, CA; Moys above. As to ‘suspicion’ and ‘wilful blindness’ see further paras
3.48 and 3.45. 122 Griffiths above; Moys above; Forsyth [1997] 2 Cr App R 299, CA.
123 Smith (1976) 64 Cr App R 217, CA; Harris (1986) 84 Cr App R 75, CA; Reader (1977) 66 Cr App R 33, CA.
124 Toor (1986) 85 Cr App R 116, CA. 125 McCullum (1973) 57 Cr App R 645, CA.
126 Ignorance of the criminal law is no defence: para 3.78. 127 Ball [1983] 2 All ER 1089, CA.
128 Schama and Abramovitch (1914) 11 Cr App R 45, CCA; Aves [1950] 2 All ER 330, CCA.
129 Schama and Abramovitch above; Aves above. 130 Ball [1983] 2 All ER 1089 at 1092.
11.55 Quite apart from the common law ‘doctrine’, the TA 1968, s 27(3)131 lays down a
special rule to assist in the proof of knowledge or belief. The rule supplements the gen-
eral rules about the admissibility of ‘bad character evidence’. It applies where D is being
prosecuted at the trial in question132 only for handling stolen goods and evidence has
been given of his having or arranging to have in his possession the goods in question,
or of his undertaking or assisting in, or arranging to undertake or assist in, their reten-
tion, removal, disposal or realisation. In such a case s 27(3) provides that the following
evidence is admissible:133
‘for the purpose of proving that [D] knew or believed the goods to be stolen goods:
(a) evidence that he has had in his possession, or has undertaken or assisted in the
retention, removal, disposal or realisation of, stolen goods from any theft taking
place not earlier than 12 months before the offence charged; and
(b) (provided that seven days’ notice in writing has been given to him of the intention
to prove the conviction) evidence that he has within the five years preceding the
date of the offence been convicted of theft or of handling stolen goods.’
Section 27(3) does not authorise the introduction of evidence which goes beyond what
it specifically describes.134 Thus, evidence given under para (a) is limited to the fact that
D has had in his possession, or has undertaken or assisted in the retention etc of, stolen
goods from any theft taking place not earlier than 12 months before the offence of han-
dling charged and to the description of those goods. The result is that evidence may not be
given under s 27(3) that D knew or believed those goods to be stolen or as to the circum-
stances whereby he came by them.135 Likewise, evidence given under para (b) is limited to
a recital of the conviction, when and where it occurred, and a description of the goods136
(with the result that evidence of other details may not be given under that paragraph).
Dishonesty
11.56 Knowledge or belief that the goods were stolen is not enough. D must handle the
goods dishonestly. Whenever it is in issue, dishonesty is a question of fact, to be deter-
mined by answering the questions set out in Ghosh by the Court of Appeal.137 The pro-
visions of the TA 1968, s 2(1) do not apply to ‘dishonestly’ in the offence of handling stolen
goods because they only apply to the offence of theft.138 No doubt, on the ground that he
was not dishonest, D would not be found to have dishonestly handled stolen goods, even
131 For a discussion of this provision, see Munday ‘Handling the Evidential Exception’ [1988] Crim LR 345.
132 Bradley (1979) 70 Cr App R 200, CA.
133 Subject to the judge’s discretion to exclude it if the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its proba-
tive value: Knott [1973] Crim LR 36, CA; Hacker [1995] 1 All ER 45, HL.
134 The evidence described in (a) and (b) cannot be used for any other purpose, eg to prove dishonesty (Duff us
(1994) 158 JP 224, CA) or an act of handling. Thus, if D admits knowledge or belief that the goods were stolen,
evidence of type (a) or (b) is inadmissible: ibid.
135 Bradley (1979) 70 Cr App R 200, CA; Wood [1987] 1 WLR 779, CA.
136 Hacker [1995] 1 All ER 45, HL. 137 Paras 10.74, 10.77 and 10.78.
138 See the TA 1968, s 1(3).
if he knew them to be stolen, if he acquired them in order to return them to the owner, or
to hand them over to the police. Likewise, it would be most unlikely for D to be found to
have dishonestly handled stolen goods if he induced a thief to hand a stolen gun over to
him in order to prevent the thief committing suicide by shooting himself.
Overlap with money laundering offences

11.57 The offence of handling stolen goods is, strictly, no longer necessary in virtually
every case covered by it because of the wider money laundering provisions of the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 (PCA 2002), Pt 7 (ss 327 to 340), which refer to ‘criminal property’.
Stolen goods in all their forms fall within the definition of ‘criminal property’ within
the PCA 2002, s 340(3) which provides that:
‘Property is criminal property if –

(a) it constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or it represents such a benefit
(in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly), and
(b) the alleged offender knows or suspects that it constitutes or represents such a
benefit.’
The PCA 2002, s 327 makes it an offence to conceal, disguise, convert or transfer criminal
property, or to remove it from England and Wales. The PCA 2002, s 328 provides that it is an
offence for a person to enter into or become concerned in an arrangement which he knows
or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of crim-
inal property by or on behalf of another person. By the PCA 2002, s 329, it is an offence for a
person to acquire, use or possess criminal property, unless he did so for adequate considera-
tion. Although many instances of handling fall outside the popular conception of money
laundering, the offences in ss 327 to 329 are, between them, capable of covering virtually
anything139 which constitutes handling stolen goods. In addition, although the maximum
sentences for these offences are the same as for handling (14 years’ imprisonment), their
mens rea requirement is less demanding since D is not required to know or believe that the
property constitutes or represents the benefit from criminal conduct, but is simply required
to know or suspect this. In addition, there is no requirement of ‘dishonesty’.140
These offences clearly have the potential to be more attractive to a prosecutor than that
of handling stolen goods.
In R (on the application of Wilkinson) v DPP,141 the Divisional Court considered the
increasingly common practice of the Crown Prosecution Service to charge offences
under the PCA 2002, s 329 as opposed to charging the offence of handling stolen goods.
139 One exception would be where the offence of handling consisted of ‘acquisition, use or possession’ of the
stolen goods for adequate consideration. Because of the adequate consideration there would not be an offence
under the PCA 2002, s 329.
140 The offences under the PCA 2002, ss 327–329 are, however, subject to a limitation whereby an offence is
not committed in the case of making an authorised disclosure to a police officer or other specified authority
before the conduct in question (or intending to do so but failing with reasonable excuse to do so).
141 [2006] EWHC 3012 (Admin), DC.
Recognising that the offence under s 329 is easier to prove in terms of mens rea, it held
that:
• when the offence under the PCA 2002, s 329 was created it was in the context of leg-
islation directed primarily at money laundering and matters of serious criminality;
• the PCA 2002, s 329 should be resorted to only in serious cases, as is clear from the
Crown Prosecution Service’s guidance;
• if an offence was inappropriately charged, the judge could encourage the prosecu-
tion to charge handling stolen goods, but could do no more than that.
This clearly offers little protection against inappropriate charges of money laundering.
Theft Act 1968, s 23

11.58 The TA 1968, s 23 punishes as a summary offence, with a fi ne not exceeding level
3 on the standard scale, public advertisements of a reward for the return of stolen or lost
goods with statements to the effect that no questions will be asked, or that the person
returning them will be safe from apprehension or inquiry, or that money paid or loaned
for the goods will be returned. It is not obvious why it should be an offence for an adver-
tisement simply to state that no questions will be asked. What is being proposed would
not be an offence under the Criminal Law Act 1967, s 5(1) (concealing an offence for
reward)142 or otherwise. Indeed, the need for the offence as a whole is doubtful. It was
inserted because it was thought that the advertisements covered by it might encourage
dishonesty.143 This may provide a justification where advertisements are addressed to
the thief (because they would offer a safe route for the realisation of the goods), but it
hardly justifies criminalising advertisements directed to innocent members of the public
or bona fide purchasers of the stolen goods.
It was held by the Divisional Court in Denham v Scott144 that the offence is one of strict
liability in relation to the publication of such an advertisement, so that someone who
publishes such an advertisement without knowledge of its publication can be convicted
of the offence.
Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit
Key points 11.4

The offence of handling is not committed by someone to whose bank account a ‘wrongful
credit’, as defined below, has been made because that credit itself is not stolen goods; but
142 Para 17.89.

143 Eighth Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee: Theft and Related Offences (Cmnd 2977) (1966),
para 144. 144 (1983) 77 Cr App R 210, DC.
11.60 dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit | 481
this gap has been filled by the offence of dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit, contrary
to the TA 1968, s 24A.
11.59 The TA 1968, s 24A was inserted by the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996, s 2. Section
24A(1) provides that:
‘A person is guilty of an offence if –

(a) a wrongful credit has been made to an account kept by him or in respect of which
he has any right or interest;
(b) he knows or believes that the credit is wrongful; and
(c) he dishonestly fails to take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to
secure that the credit is cancelled.’
The maximum punishment is 10 years’ imprisonment.145 This can be compared with the
maximum of 14 years for the offence of handling.
Actus reus
11.60 What is required is the failure by D to take such steps as are reasonable in the
circumstances to secure the cancellation of a wrongful credit made to an account kept
by D or in respect of which D has any right or interest. Nothing need be done by D. The
mere omission to take reasonable steps to secure the cancellation of a wrongful credit suf-
fices. For this purpose, ‘cancellation’ means cancelling the original credit so as to achieve
the same effect as if it had not been made in the first place; it does not occur where D
withdraws money to spend for his own benefit.146
A ‘credit’ refers to a credit of an amount of money in an account.147 By the TA 1968,
s 24A(2A), a credit to an account is wrongful to the extent that it derives from:
• theft;
• blackmail;
• fraud (contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1); or
• stolen goods.148
A wrongful credit of the above type is not stolen goods because it has not represented the
original stolen goods, directly or indirectly, ‘in the hands of the thief or a handler’ as the
proceeds of their disposal or realisation but is a new thing in action which has never been
in those hands. In determining whether a credit to an account is wrongful, it is immate-
rial whether the account is overdrawn before or after the credit is made.149
145 TA 1968, s 24A(6). 146 Lee [2006] EWCA Crim 156. 147 TA 1968, s 24A(2).
148 TA 1968, s 24A(2A) was inserted by the FA 2006, Sch 1. ‘Stolen goods’ has been amended for the purposes
of the TA 1968 in general by the TA 1968, s 24A(7) (as amended by the FA 2006, Sch 1) and (8); see para 11.45.
149 TA 1968, s 24A(5).
Mens rea
11.61 D must know or believe150 that the credit is wrongful; D must know or believe the
facts which make the credit ‘wrongful’ in law, although D need not know that they have
this effect.151
Because failing to take steps is an omission which can continue over a period of time, it
suffices that mens rea exists at some point during it; it need not exist from the outset.152 It
follows that those who only become aware of a wrongful credit after it has been made can
commit an offence under the TA 1968, s 24A if they continue to fail to take such steps.
11.62 D must dishonestly fail to take such steps which are reasonable in the circum-
stances to secure that the wrongful credit is cancelled. The approach to the question of
dishonesty is the same as in the offence of handling.153
Width
11.63 The TA 1968, s 24A covers a range of situations. It catches the thief, blackmailer,
fraudster or handler who pays into his own account the proceeds of his offence, if he dis-
honestly fails to take reasonable steps to secure its cancellation, because the credit which
he has failed to cancel is wrongful under s 24A(2A).
Section 24A is not, however, aimed at this type of case but at the following. Suppose
that Y pays money which he has stolen (or obtained by blackmail or by selling stolen
goods) into his bank account, and that Y then transfers the credit thereby created to D’s
bank account. If D dishonestly fails to take reasonable steps to cancel that credit he can be
convicted of an offence under s 24A, because the credit will be wrongful under s 24A(2A).
It would be likewise if the credit transferred to D’s account had derived from a fraud com-
mitted by Y, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1.
Going equipped for stealing or burglary

11.64 The TA 1968, s 25(1), as amended by the Fraud Act 2006, Sch 1, provides that:
‘A person shall be guilty of an offence if, when not at his place of abode, he has with him
any article for use in the course of or in connection with any burglary or theft.’
For this purpose, ‘theft’ includes an offence under the TA 1968, s 12(1) (ie taking
a conveyance other than a pedal cycle).154 The offence under s 25(1) is a species of
150 As to the meaning of these terms, see para 11.52. There is no equivalent, in respect of proof of knowledge
or belief, of the TA 1968, s 27(3); para 11.55. 151 Ignorance of the criminal law is no defence: para 3.78.
152 Para 3.65.
153 Paras 10.74 and 11.56. The provisions of the TA 1968, s 2(1) do not apply to an offence under s 24A: see s
1(3). 154 TA 1968, s 25(5).
11.69 going equipped for stealing or burglary | 483
preparatory offence. Generally, the law does not penalise mere preparation for crime155
but the offence under s 25(1) is an exception. It is punishable with a maximum of three
years’ imprisonment.156
11.65 The side-note to the TA 1968, s 25 describes the offence as ‘going equipped for
stealing etc’. Consequently, the decision of the Divisional Court in In the matter of
McAngus,157 that D who had had with him counterfeit shirts in a warehouse for use in
connection with a cheat (a form of the offence abolished by the Fraud Act 2006) had prop-
erly been convicted of an offence under s 25 may seem surprising. However, it undoubt-
edly falls within the words of s 25 and a side-note cannot restrict the clear meaning of the
section to which it relates.158
The phrase ‘has with him’ has not been judicially considered in a reported case, but it
would seem to bear the same meaning as in offences relating to firearms and offensive
weapons, ie that the article is near to D and readily accessible, rather than the narrower
meaning it has in aggravated burglary.159
11.66 It is not an offence for a person to have at his place of abode articles which are for
use in the course of any burglary or theft, but if he is away from his place of abode he
commits an offence if he has with him any such article. Where a person lives, and drives
around, in a car in which he keeps his tools for burglary, the car is his place of abode for
the present purpose only when it is on a site where he intends to abide.160
11.67 Some articles are specifically and clearly made or adapted for use in commit-
ting a burglary or theft, and possession of these is evidence that they were intended for
such use,161 but there must be very few of them, since most articles have both innocent
and criminal uses. In all cases, the jury must be satisfied that the article in question was
intended for one of the specified uses.
11.68 D must intend that the article be used in the course of or in connection with a
burglary or theft .162 It is not necessary, however, to prove that D intended the article
to be used in the course of or in connection with any particular burglary or theft ;
it is enough to prove a general intention that it should be used for some burglary or
theft if the opportunity arises.163 On the other hand, the offence is not committed
if D does not have a fi rm intention to use the thing for a burglary or theft , given the
opportunity.164
11.69 It is not necessary to prove that D intended to use the article himself; it is sufficient
that he has the article with him for future use by another in the course of or in connection
with burglary or theft.165 However, it is not enough to prove that the article had been used
before D came into possession of it.166 Nor is it enough to prove that the articles were used
to get a job which would give the opportunity to steal.167
155 See para 14.104. 156 TA 1968, s 25(2). 157 [1994] Crim LR 602, DC.
158 Chandler v DPP [1964] AC 763, HL. 159 See para 11.24.
160 Bundy [1977] 2 All ER 382, CA. 161 TA 1968, s 25(3). 162 Ellames [1974] 3 All ER 130, CA.
163 Ibid. 164 Hargreaves [1985] Crim LR 243, CA.
165 Ellames [1974] 3 All ER 130, CA; In the matter of McAngus [1994] Crim LR 602, DC.
166 Ellames above. 167 Mansfield [1975] Crim LR 101, CA.
11.70 The phrase ‘for use . . . in connection with’ extends the scope of the offence, since
it covers the case where the article is intended for use while making preparations for a
burglary or theft, or while making an escape after it has been committed.168
11.71 The Divisional Court has held that a person who has embarked on the commis-
sion of a burglary or theft and, for the first time, comes into possession of, and decides
to make immediate use of, some implement to help him do so (eg something which he
has just found) can be convicted of the present offence.169 This is odd; it cannot be said in
commonsense terms that he has the thing with him for use in the course of or in connec-
tion with a burglary or theft.
FURTHER READING
Alldridge ‘Attempted Murder of the Soul: Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod
Blackmail, Piracy and Secrets’ (1993) 13 and Williams (eds)) Chs 8, 9 (paras 9.01–
OJLS 368 9.26), 12 and 13
Griew The Theft Acts 1968 and 1978 (7th edn, ATH Smith Property Offences (1994) Chs 15,
1995) Chs 4, 14, 15 and 16 28, 30 and 31
Lamond ‘Coercion, Threats and the Puzzle of JR Spencer ‘The Mishandling of Handling’
Blackmail’ in Harm and Culpability (1996) [1981] Crim LR 682
(Simester and ATH Smith (eds)) 215
168 Ellames [1974] 3 All ER 130, CA. 169 Minor v DPP (1987) 86 Cr App R 378, DC.
12
Fraud and related offences
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals principally with the offence of fraud and related offences contrary to the
Fraud Act 2006 and with the offence of forgery and related offences under the Forgery and
Counterfeiting Act 1981. It also deals briefly, between the discussion of these two Acts, with a
number of offences under the Theft Act 1968 which are fraudulent in nature.
The chapter concludes with an account of the special jurisdictional provisions relating to these
offences1 and to theft and certain other offences under the Theft Act 1968.
Fraud Act 2006
Key points 12.1

The following offences under the Fraud Act 2006 are dealt with below:
• fraud;
• possession or control of an article for use in the course of, or in connection with, any
fraud;
• making, adapting or supplying such an article; and
• obtaining services dishonestly.2
12.1 The Fraud Act 2006 (FA 2006) was the culmination of law reform proposals stretch-
ing back over more than 30 years. The group of offences provided by the FA 2006 enabled
the criminal law to address problems hitherto posed by developments in technology,
commercial transactions and property transfer. The offences of fraud and of obtaining
1 Besides that in para 12.46.

2 The FA 2006 also provides an offence of participating in a fraudulent business carried on by a sole trader etc
(s 9), which corresponds to the offence of fraudulent trading by a company contrary to the Companies Act 2006,
s 993. Both offences are outside the scope of this book.
486 | 12.2 fraud and related offences
services dishonestly are based, with some amendments, on offences recommended by the
Law Commission in its report, Fraud, 3 published in 2002.
Fraud
Key points 12.2

There is one offence of fraud. It can be committed in three different ways:
• by false representation;
• by failing to disclose information;
• by abuse of position,
in each of which the defendant’s conduct must occur dishonestly and with intent to gain
for himself or another or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.
12.2 The FA 2006, s 1 created the offence of fraud which can be committed in the
three different ways specified in ss 2 to 4. The offence replaced a total of eight decep-
tion offences under the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978: obtaining property by deception,
obtaining a money transfer by deception, obtaining a pecuniary advantage by decep-
tion, procuring the execution of a valuable security by deception, obtaining services
by deception, obtaining the remission of an existing liability to make a payment by
deception, inducing a creditor to forgo or wait for payment of an existing liability to
pay by deception, and obtaining the exemption from, or abatement of, a liability to
make a payment by deception. The replacement of these offences was welcomed by
lawyers, since they posed difficult problems in practice. These problems resulted in part
from the need to prove a deception (a computer or other machine cannot be deceived). 4
They also resulted from the need to prove that the deception was an operative cause
of the property, money transfer, pecuniary advantage etc, as the case might be, being
obtained or induced (which could only be proved by an artificiality in most cases where
the use of a credit or debit card involved a false representation). In addition, the law
about deception was criticised on the grounds that there were too many offences and
too much overlap, and on the ground that they were over-particularised (with the result
that some conduct deserving of punishment fell into gaps between offences). Where
two or more people agreed to pursue a course of conduct which fell into a gap, the prob-
lem could be resolved by a prosecution and conviction for the much-criticised offence
of conspiracy to defraud, dealt with in paras 14.84 to 14.95, but if only one person was
involved the law was powerless.5 The offence of fraud should reduce the need to rely on
conspiracy to defraud.
3 Law Com No 276. 4 Holmes v Governor of Brixton Prison [2004] EWHC 2020 (Admin), DC.
5 Unless, as could happen, the conduct constituted an offence under other legislation.
12.5 fraud | 487
12.3 The FA 2006, s 1(1) and (2) provides:
‘(1) A person is guilty of fraud 6 if he is in breach of any of the sections listed in subs (2)
(which provide for different ways of committing the offence).
(2) The sections are:
(a) section 2 (fraud by false representation);
(b) section 3 (fraud by failing to disclose information), and
(c) section 4 (fraud by abuse of position).’
As will be seen, the offence is a ‘conduct crime’;7 no consequence is required by ss 2 to 4 to

result from D’s fraudulent conduct.
The offence of fraud is triable either way and punishable with a maximum of 10 years’
The three ways of committing fraud

Fraud by false representation
12.4 By the FA 2006, s 2(1), a person is in breach of the FA 2006, s 2 if he:
‘(a) dishonestly makes a false representation, and

(b) intends, by making the representation –
(i) to make a gain for himself or another, or
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.’
This is the widest of the three ways of committing fraud. It covers virtually all the conduct
that previously fell within the eight deception offences under the Theft Acts 1968 and
1978. It is the most common way by which fraud is committed.
Actus reus
12.5 The actus reus is a simple one: making a false representation (ie making a rep-
resentation in the circumstance that it is false). No one is required to be deceived by it
or to have acted on it. Indeed, it is irrelevant that the intended recipient is never aware
of the representation because, eg, D’s false begging letter never arrives. Nothing (in
particular, no gain or loss or risk of loss) is required to result from the representation,
although doubtless in most cases it will have done. The offence is complete as soon as the
false representation is made with the requisite mens rea. There is merit in the claim9 that
s 2 appears to criminalise lying.
6 For a special provision relating to the liability of its controlling officers when this offence is committed by
a corporation, see para 12.47. 7 Para 2.17.
8 FA 2006, s 1(3).
9 Ormerod ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying?’ [2007] Crim LR 193 at 196.
12.6 ‘Representation’ The FA 2006, s 2(3) provides:

‘ “Representation” means any representation as to fact or law, including a representation
as to the state of mind of –
(a) the person making the representation, or
(b) any other person.’
It will be noted that s 2(3) does not actually define what amounts to a ‘representation’ but
defines what a ‘representation’ must be about.
The FA 2006, s 2(4) provides that a representation may be express or implied.
12.7 An obvious example of a representation of fact (ie a past or present verifiable thing)
would be a statement that a worthless ring was a diamond ring. A statement as to the
meaning of a statute is clearly a representation of law. Representations of facts are com-
mon; representations of law are not.
12.8 Because ‘representation’ includes a representation as to the state of mind of the
representor or another, the making of a false statement of the present intentions of the
person making the statement or another person (eg a false promise) can amount to a false
representation. The intention may, of course, be implied from the nature of the transac-
tion in which D engages. A request for a loan of money implies an intention to repay, and
the ordering of a meal in a restaurant implies a representation that the representor (or,
possibly, another) intends to pay for it.
12.9 The requirement that the representation must be as to fact or law, or as to a state of
mind, means that a statement which merely expresses an opinion does not in itself con-
stitute a false representation if the opinion turns out to be unjustified. By way of example,
if a statement that a picture is worth £1,000, or that the profits of a business in the next
financial year will be £1m, turns out to be unjustified there is no false representation.
However, if the person making the statement is aware that the opinion is unjustified he
will at the same time by his conduct make a false representation as to his state of mind,
because he will impliedly represent that he believes the opinion is justified when in fact
he does not so believe.
12.10 There is no limit on how an express representation may be made. Thus, it can
be stated by words, whether oral or written (eg on an application form for a job, or in
a ‘phishing’ e-mail,10 or posted on a website), or communicated by conduct (as where a
rogue dresses up in a security guard’s uniform in order to convey the impression that he
is a security guard).
12.11 An implied representation may be made by words or by conduct, such as the
implied representation by conduct, referred to above, made by someone who orders a
meal in a restaurant that he (or, possibly, another) intends to pay for it, or such as that
10 Explanatory notes to the FA 2006. ‘Phishing’ occurs where a person disseminates an e-mail to large groups
of people falsely representing that it has been sent by a legitimate fi nancial institution and seeking to prompt
readers of the e-mail to provide information, such as credit or bank account numbers, so that he can make use
of the information obtained for personal gain.
12.13 fraud | 489
made by someone who sells property that he has a right to do so. Similarly a person
who proffers an obsolete foreign banknote for exchange at a bureau de change impliedly
represents the fact that it is valid as currency in its country of origin.11
Another example of an implied false representation by conduct concerns ‘bouncing
cheques’. The giver of a cheque impliedly represents that the state of facts existing at
the date of the delivery of the cheque is such that the cheque will be honoured in the
ordinary course of events on presentation for payment on or after the date specified on
the cheque.12 If the facts are not as represented, a false representation is made.
If a credit card or debit card is used, then, provided any conditions referred to by
the card are complied with, the card company or bank is legally obliged to honour the
transaction, because a contract to this effect is brought into being between the payee and
the card company or bank. It is irrelevant that the user’s authority to use the card has
been withdrawn or that he is exceeding it, or that the user has stolen the card.13 In such a
case, there will not be a false representation about payment. However, a person who uses
a credit card or debit card, impliedly represents by his conduct that he has actual author-
ity from the card company or bank to use the card to make a contract with the payee on
behalf of the bank that it will honour the transaction. If he has no such authority the
representation as to it is false.14
12.12 By the FA 2006, s 2(5), a representation may be regarded for the purposes of s 2 as
made if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any form to any system or device designed
to receive, convey or respond to communications (with or without human intervention). As
a result of the wording of the FA 2006, s 2(1) (absence of a requirement that someone be
deceived) and s 2(5), s 2 can be breached where the false representation is submitted to
a computer or other machine, rather than being addressed to a human being. Examples
are where a person unauthorisedly enters someone else’s number into a ‘CHIP and PIN’
machine or where a person feeds an imitation coin into a car park machine.
12.13 False representation By the FA 2006, s 2(2):
‘A representation is false if –
(a) it is untrue or misleading, and
(b) the person making it knows that it is, or might be, untrue or misleading.’
According to the explanatory notes to the FA 2006, ‘misleading’ refers to something ‘less
than wholly true and capable of an interpretation to the detriment of the victim’.15
It has been suggested16 that ‘trade puffs’, such as may be used by second-hand car sales-
men and street traders, eg false statements that a car has ‘always been well maintained’
or that a mobile phone is ‘as good as a Nokia’, can be false representations under the FA
2006, s 2. There is merit in the suggestion. The statements could be regarded as ones of
11 Williams [1980] Crim LR 589, CA. Also see Hamilton (1991) 92 Cr App R 54, CA.
12 Gilmartin [1983] QB 953, CA. 13 First Sport Ltd v Barclays Bank plc [1993] 3 All ER 789, CA.
14 Lambie [1982] AC 449, HL. 15 Home Office Explanatory Notes, para 19.
16 Ormerod ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying?’ [2007] Crim LR 193 at 198.
fact and, if not completely untrue, they would seem to be misleading. Their maker would
probably know that they were, or might be, untrue or misleading. This does not, how-
ever, mean that such persons will necessarily be guilty of fraud by way of s 2. It might be
difficult to prove the mens rea required,17 as will be seen.
12.14 The definition of ‘false representation’ does not deal with whether a failure to
state the truth can constitute a false representation. Three types of case, at least, can be
identified for examination:
• A representation may be a half-truth because, although it is literally true, it omits a
material matter, as where an applicant for a job correctly states that he does not have
a criminal record but fails to state that he has been charged with theft to which he
intends to plead guilty. Such a statement constitutes a misrepresentation (ie a false
representation) in civil law18 and there seems no reason why a half-truth should
not also be so for the purposes of the FA 2006, s 2, particularly as it makes the
representation misleading.
• A representation may be true when made, but, to the representor’s knowledge,
become untrue while it is still operative, as where a person orders a meal in a
restaurant, intending to pay but changes his mind before being served. His represen-
tation that he intends to pay is true when made but it is a continuing representation
which becomes false. It is submitted that, as was the law in respect of the repealed
offences of deception,19 there is a false representation if the representor knowing
of the change does not inform the representee (the waiter, in the example). The
initially true representation made by the representor is continuing in effect and has
become a false one in such circumstances. If this is not accepted, reliance will have
to be placed on the second way of committing fraud, ie under the FA 2006, s 3 (fraud
by failure to disclose information one is legally obliged to disclose), because once a
person becomes aware of the change from truth to falsehood he becomes under a
duty in civil law to disclose the truth.20
• In the above instances there is a representation, by words or by conduct, which is or
becomes false. Under the old offences of deception, someone who simply refrained
from stating something which it was his legal duty to disclose committed a decep-
tion if it led the person to whom the duty was owed being deceived.21 This seemed to
stretch the concept of deception. Section 2 speaks not of ‘deception’ (which requires
that someone was deceived by D) but simply of ‘making false representation’. In the
present type of case the person who simply fails to disclose has not done anything;
how can he have made a false a representation? Cases of the present type clearly fall
within s 3 and it is submitted that the courts should avoid the temptation to give an
artificial interpretation to s 2 so as to bring within that section a failure to discharge
a legal duty to disclose which conveyed a false impression.
17 Paras 12.15–12.19. 18 Dimmock v Hallett (1866) 2 Ch App 21.

19 DPP v Ray [1974] AC 370, HL. 20 With v O’Flanagan (1936) Ch 575, CA.
21 Firth (1990) 91 Cr App R 217, CA.
12.18 fraud | 491
Mens rea
12.15 The mens rea required for a breach of s 2 consists of three elements.
12.16 D must know that his representation is, or might be, untrue or misleading.22 It
will be noted that D need not know that his misrepresentation is untrue or misleading;
it is enough that D knows that it might be (ie that there is a risk that it is). This extends
the ambit of the offence. It is similar to the concept of recklessness but differs from that
concept because it does not require that the risk is an unreasonable one to take.
12.17 D must make the false representation dishonestly.23 Whenever it is in issue
under the FA 2006, ss 2 to 4, the question of dishonesty will have to be determined by
answering the questions set out in Ghosh, 24 in the same way as in a trial for theft. It might
be difficult to prove dishonesty against those who make false trade puffs. Since the actus
reus of the form of fraud under the FA 2006, s 2 consists simply of making an untrue or
misleading representation, ‘dishonesty’ is liable to play a crucial role in the determina-
tion of whether making such a representation in a particular case is or is not an offence.
‘Dishonesty’ plays a similar crucial role in the two other ways in which fraud can be com-
mitted. On this ground, it might be thought that the offence of fraud would fail to satisfy
the requirement, under the principle of legal certainty enshrined in the ECHR, Article 7,
of foreseeability as to whether a particular piece of conduct is criminal. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights concluded that the offence
had a sufficient conduct element to be compatible with Article 7.25
12.18 D must intend, by making the representation,
• to make a gain for himself or another, or

• to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.26
Presumably the necessary intent can be proved by proving that D’s aim or purpose in
making the false representation was thereby to make a gain or cause a loss or expose to
loss or by proving that a gain or loss or exposure to the risk of loss was virtually certain
to result from his making of the false representation and that he foresaw this virtual
certainty.27 If so, a person who tells a lie for the purpose of admission to an association
can be convicted of fraud if he knows that all members automatically receive a gift on
admission, because, as he foresees, he is virtually certain to make that gain by making
the representation. Likewise a person can be convicted of fraud if he makes a false rep-
resentation on an insurance application form because, although his purpose is to secure
insurance, he will realise that by making the representation he is exposing the insurance
company to the risk of loss, even though he hopes that it never has to ‘pay up’.
Normally, if a person has one of the above two intentions he will also have the other,
but there can be cases where this is not so. Suppose D knows that V is looking after
some compromising letters for X. If D imitates X over the telephone and tells V that he
22 FA 2006, s 2(2)(b). 23 Ibid, s 2(1)(a). 24 [1982] QB 1053, CA; para 10.74.

25 Fourteenth Report of the Joint Committee, para 2.14.
26 FA 2006, s 2(1)(b). It will be noted that D is not required to act with a view to gain, as is required for black-
mail (para 11.29). 27 Paras 3.5–3.19.
(supposedly X) wants the letters destroyed, D will act with intent to cause loss to another
but not with intent to make a gain for himself or another.
It will be noted that D must intend, by making the representation, to make a gain or
cause a loss or expose to loss. This might be difficult to prove against someone who makes
false trade puffs because customers normally take no notice of trade puffs and are there-
fore unconcerned about their veracity. It follows that, unless he is aware that this will not
be so in the instant case (as where the customer has shown that the content of the puff is
important), the maker of the puff will not intend, by making his false representation, to
make a gain or cause a loss or expose to loss.28
Th is type of case can be distinguished from that where D makes use of a credit card
or debit card which is unauthorised, eg because it has been stolen by him. Th is – as
seen – constitutes an implied false representation of his authority to use it. The other
party, knowing that he will be paid by the card company or bank, may act without a
positive belief that that representation is true but unless he is a highly unusual person
he would not accept payment by the card if he knew the truth. If D realises this he will
intend, by making the false representation, to make a gain.
12.19 By the FA 2006, s 5(1), the reference to gain and loss in s 2 is to be read in accord-
ance with s 5 which defines ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ in the same way as in the Theft Act 1968, s
34(2)(a). By s 5(2), ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ are confined to gain or loss (whether temporary or
permanent) in money or other property.29 Because an intended gain or loss need only be
temporary D, who tells a lie in order to induce someone to let him borrow his car, can be
convicted of fraud even though he intended to return the car as promised.
Under s 5(3) ‘gain includes a gain by keeping what one has, as well as a gain by getting
what one does not have’, and under s 5(4) ‘loss includes a loss by not getting what one
might get, as well as a loss by parting with what one has’. The width of these terms means
that fraud extends to cases where the intended outcome of the false representation is not
the transfer of property. For example, a false representation made with intent to induce the
representee to forgo a debt owed by D (or X) can constitute fraud because the representor
(D) has an intention that he (or X) should keep what he has and therefore has an intent to
make a gain for himself (or another, X, as the case may be); of course, D also has an intent
to cause loss to the representee by that person not getting what he might get. A person who
tells a lie in order to get a job can be convicted of fraud because he intends by the lie to
make a gain for himself. Likewise, so can someone who tells a lie in order to get a debtor of
his to pay up, for he intends by the lie to get money which he has not got (although he may
well be acquitted of fraud on the ground that he is not dishonest). In both cases, of course,
he also has an intent by the representation to cause loss to another.30
These definitions of ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ have the effect of ensuring that, as in the case of
blackmail, fraud is an economic crime; it does not cover the case where someone intends
to obtain a non-economic benefit, such as sexual intercourse, by a false representation.
28 See S Gardner [2007] Crim LR 661 (letter).

29 ‘Property’ means any property whether real or personal (including things in action and other intangible
property): FA 2006, s 5(2).
30 Support for the statements in this paragraph can be derived from the case law on the corresponding provi-
sions relating to blackmail: para 11.31.
12.22 fraud | 493
Fraud by failing to disclose information

12.20 A person is in breach of the FA 2006, s 3 if he:
‘(a) dishonestly fails to disclose to another person information which he is under a legal
duty to disclose, and
(b) intends, by failing to disclose the information –
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.’31
Actus reus
12.21 The actus reus consists simply in a failure by D to disclose to another person
information which D is under a legal duty to disclose. Nothing (in particular, no gain or
loss) is required to result from the failure to disclose.
‘Legal duty to disclose’ is not defined by the FA 2006. ‘Legal duty’ refers to a duty in
civil law. Such a duty of disclosure may derive from:
• statute (eg the provisions governing company prospectuses);
• the fact that the transaction in question is one of the utmost good faith (eg an insur-
ance contract);32
• the express or implied terms of a contract;
• the custom of a particular trade or market;
• the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties (eg in certain well-
established relationships such as solicitor (or other professional person) and client,
trustee and beneficiary, director and company, partner and partner, and principal
and agent, or where one person has placed himself in such a position that he becomes
obliged to act fairly and with due regard to the interests of the other party);33 or
• a change in circumstances whereby an initially true (positive) representation has
become untrue to the representor’s knowledge while it is still operative.
The Law Commission had proposed that the present form of fraud should also apply
to non-disclosure in breach of a moral duty to disclose, as where an art dealer knows that
a prospective purchaser (X) of a painting thinks that it is by Picasso, whereas in fact it is
a painting of little value by an artist called Piccolo, and the dealer does not disabuse X of
his mistake. This was rejected by the Government, as a result of its consultation process,
as too uncertain and as productive of an undesirably wide offence which would render a
person criminally liable for the non-disclosure of information which he was not obliged
by the civil law to disclose.
12.22 If a false representation could be made under s 2 in the absence of any positive
representation by D but simply on the ground of a failure to fulfil a legal duty of disclosure
which created a false impression, there would be few, if any, cases under s 3 which would
31 FA 2006, s 3.
32 See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract (15th edn, 2007) (Furmston (ed)) 372–379.
33 See ibid, 379–380. Most of these instances were given by the Law Commission (Fraud (2002), Law Com No
276, para 7.28) and are reproduced in the explanatory notes to the FA 2006, para 18.
not also fall within s 2. Quite apart from the linguistic argument made in para 12.14, this
strongly indicates that s 2 is not meant to cover cases dealt with by s 3 where no positive
representation is made. On this basis, the only area of overlap would be where D has made
a positive representation which to his knowledge becomes false while it is still operative
and which he does not disclose in breach of his legal duty to do so. One can be confident
that the courts will hold that this constitutes the making of a false representation (on the
ground that what was true has become false) under s 2. To this extent there is clearly an
overlap between the two sections.
Mens rea
12.23 The mens rea expressly required by the FA 2006, s 3 is that D must:
• fail to disclose the information dishonestly;34

• intend, by failing to disclose the information:
– to make a gain for himself or another, or
– to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.35
Section 3 does not expressly require D to know that he is under a legal duty to disclose the
information to the other person or be aware that he might be, but it is submitted that such a
requirement should be read into s 3 on the basis that the presumption that mens rea is required
as to this element of the actus reus36 is not rebutted clearly or by necessary implication. In any
event, dishonesty could be difficult to prove if D neither knew of the circumstances giving
rise to the duty to disclose the information nor was aware that they might exist.
Fraud by abuse of position

12.24 By the FA 2006, s 4(1), a person is in breach of the FA 2006, s 4 if he:
‘(a) occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the
financial interests of another person,
(b) dishonestly abuses that position, and
(c) intends, by means of the abuse of that position –
(ii) to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.’
Actus reus
12.25 The actus reus consists of an abuse by D of a position in which he is expected
to safeguard, or not to act against, the fi nancial interests of another person. The abuse
34 FA 2006, s 3(a). As to ‘dishonestly’, see para 12.17.

35 Ibid, s 3(b). As to this, see paras 12.18 and 12.19.
36 Ch 6. It could be argued that the presence of a ‘knowledge-requirement’ in the FA 2006, s 2, and its absence
in s 3 (and in s 4) tells against this submission but it is submitted that it would be unlikely to succeed: see, in
particular, para 6.33.
12.27 fraud | 495
need not be secret37 but doubtless it will normally be so. In its report on fraud the Law
Commission stated that the difference between a case under s 4 and the case of non-
disclosure under s 3 was that in a case under s 4:
‘the defendant does not need to enlist the victim’s co-operation in order to secure the
desired result. An example would be the employee who, without the knowledge of
his employer, misuses his or her position to make a personal profit at the employer’s
expense [eg the barman who sells his own drink, and not his employer’s, and pockets the
proceeds].’ 38
It also covers the rather more serious case where an employee of a software company uses
his position to clone software products with the intention of selling the products on, and
the case where a person employed to care for an elderly person has access to that person’s
bank account and abuses his position by transferring funds to invest in shares in a high-risk
business venture of his own.39 Also covered is the case of a company director who diverts a
contract that he is legally obliged to obtain for the company for his own personal gain.40
12.26 By the FA 2006, s 4(2), a person may be regarded as having abused his position
even though his conduct consisted of an omission rather than an act, as, eg, where an
employee fails to take up the chance of a crucial contract in order that a rival company
can take it up instead at the expense of his employer.41
Apart from this, the Act leaves ‘abuse of position’ undefined because it is intended to
cover a wide range of conduct.42
12.27 The Act also provides no guidance as to when a person occupies a position in
which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another
person. The Law Commission stated:
‘The essence of the kind of relationship [to which s 4 refers] is that the victim has vol-
untarilyy43 put the defendant in a privileged position, by virtue of which the defendant
is expected to safeguard the victim’s financial interests or given power to damage those
interests. Such an expectation to safeguard or power to damage may arise, for example,
because the defendant is given authority to exercise a discretion on the victim’s behalf, or
is given access to the victim’s assets, premises, equipment or customers. In these cases the
defendant does not need to enlist the victim’s further co-operation in order to secure the
desired result, because the necessary co-operation has been given in advance.
37 The Law Commission (Fraud, Law Com No 276, para 7.40) had recommended a requirement of secrecy but
this was not included in the Bill presented to Parliament by the Government.
38 Ibid, para 7.36.
39 Explanatory notes to the FA 2006, paras 22 and 23.
40 Th is example is given by Sullivan in ‘Fraud – The Latest Law Commission Proposals’ (2003) 67 JCL 139 at
145. 41 Th is example is given in the explanatory notes to the FA 2006, para 21.
42 Ibid.
43 Although the victim will normally have voluntarily put the defendant in the privileged position, s 4 does not
require this. As pointed out in Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (4th edn, 2010) (Simester,
Spencer, Sullivan and Virgo (eds)) 618, the defendant may be placed in this position by operation of law, as where a
civil court has made an order authorising him to manage the affairs of the victim, a mentally incapable person.
The necessary relationship will be present between trustee and beneficiary, director and
company, professional person and client, agent and principal, employee and employer, or
between partners. It may arise otherwise, for example, within a family, or in the context
of voluntary work, or in any context where the parties are not at arm’s length. In nearly all
cases where it arises, it will be recognised by the civil law as importing fiduciary duties,
and any relationship that is so recognised will suffice. We see no reason, however, why the
existence of such duties should be essential. This does not of course mean that it would be
entirely a matter for the fact-finders whether the necessary relationship exists. The ques-
tion whether the particular facts alleged can properly be described as giving rise to that
relationship will be an issue capable of being ruled upon by the judge and, if the case goes
to the jury, of being the subject of directions.’ 44
Unless the appellate courts give the present requirements a narrow interpretation, this
form of the offence is potentially a wider one than one might expect to find in an offence
of fraud, particularly in the light of the non-definition of ‘abuse’.
Nothing (in particular, no gain or loss) is required to result from the abuse of
position.
Mens rea
12.28 The mens rea required is that D must:
• dishonestly abuse the position which he occupies in which he is expected to

safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another;45
• intend, by means of the abuse of that position:
– to make a gain for himself or another, or
– to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss.46
Section 4 does not expressly require D to know that he is in a position where he is expected
to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another or be aware that he
might be, but it is submitted that such a requirement should be read into s 4.47 In any
event, dishonesty would be difficult to prove if D neither knew that he was in such a
position nor was aware that he might be.
Possession etc of articles for use in frauds

12.29 The FA 2006, s 6(1) provides that:
‘A person is guilty of an offence48 if he has in his possession or under his control any article
for use in the course of or in connection with any fraud.’
44 Law Commission Fraud, Law Com No 276, paras 7.37–7.38.

45 FA 2006, s 4(1)(b); given the potential width of this form of fraud ‘dishonestly’ has a particularly crucial
function. As to ‘dishonesty’, see para 12.17. 46 Ibid, s 4(1)(c). As to this see paras 12.18 and 12.19.
47 For the same reason as given in respect of ibid, s 3 (para 12.23).
a corporation, see para 12.47.
12.32 possession etc of articles for use in frauds | 497
This offence is a species of preparatory offence. It is triable either way and punishable with
a maximum of five years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.49 It is, therefore, a
more serious offence than that of going equipped for stealing or burglary, contrary to the
Theft Act 1968 (TA 1968), s 25, referred to in para 11.64, whose maximum punishment is
three years’ imprisonment.
12.30 ‘Possession’ and ‘control’ are not defined by the Act but ‘possession’ when used in
the alternative to ‘control’ seems to bear the meaning set out in para 10.40, and ‘control’
seems to cover the case where a person in physical control of the article is nevertheless not
in possession of it or where it is doubtful whether he can be said to be. A person would be
in possession or control of data held on a computer in his possession or control, but would
not be in possession or control of an article stored, with his knowledge and permission, in
the matrimonial home by his spouse.50 It remains to be seen what element, if any, of mens
rea the courts read in regarding ‘possession or control’.
As has been pointed out,51 virtually any ‘article’ might be used in the course of or in
connection with a fraud. Obvious examples would be credit card cloning devices, equip-
ment to be inserted at ATM machines to skim bank details and devices to cause a gas or
electricity meter to under-record consumption. Paper, pens, PCs, printers and identity
badges are other obvious examples. For these purposes, ‘article’ includes any programme
or data held in electronic form.52 Thus, programmes for generating credit card numbers
or e-mails for use in phishing attacks are ‘articles’.53
Presumably, ‘fraud’ refers to the offence contrary to the FA 2006, s 1, described in
para 12.3.
12.31 Unlike the offence under the TA 1968, s 25, there is no requirement that the thing
possessed or controlled by D should be outside his place of abode. Thus, a person who
has a computer programme stored on his PC at home for use in connection with the per-
petration of a fraud is caught by the FA 2006, s 6. D need not have begun to commit any
fraud. For these reasons, the offence is a particularly wide one.
12.32 It is to be hoped that, by analogy with the interpretation given to the correspond-
ing offence under the TA 1968, s 25, D must possess or control the article with the intention
that it is used in the course of, or in connection with, a fraud, although D need not intend
this in relation to a particular fraud; if so a general intention that the article be used for
a fraud if the opportunity arises suffices.54 The Government intended that this approach
should apply but, unfortunately it refused to insert a provision to this effect when the Act
was before Parliament.55 If the courts are not prepared to read in such a requirement the
offence would be a wide one, and would be intolerably so if they also refused to read in a
full mens rea requirement in respect of what is possessed or controlled.
49 FA 2006, s 6(2).
50 See, eg, Kousar [2009] EWCA Crim 139 (which concerned an offence under the Trade Marks Act 1994, s
92). However, if it could be proved that spouse A has assisted or encouraged spouse B’s possession of the article,
spouse A could be convicted as an accomplice to the offence committed by spouse B.
51 Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod and Williams (eds)) para 9.64. 52 FA 2006, s 8(1).
53 Yeo ‘Bull’s-eye (2)’ (2007) 157 NLJ 418. 54 See Ellames [1974] 3 All ER 130, CA; para 11.68.
55 See Ormerod ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying?’ [2007] Crim LR 193 at 211.
Making or supplying articles for use in frauds

12.33 The FA 2006, s 7(1) provides that:
‘A person is guilty of an offence56 if he makes, adapts, supplies or offers to supply any

article –
(a) knowing that it is designed or adapted for use in the course of or in connection
with fraud, or
(b) intending it to be used to commit, or assist in the commission of, fraud.’
The offence is triable either way and punishable with a maximum of 10 years’ imprison-
ment on conviction on indictment.57
12.34 Authorities on the offence of supplying a controlled drug suggest that ‘supply’
connotes more than the mere transfer of physical control from one person to another; it
means to furnish to another the article for the purpose of enabling the other to use it for
his own purposes.58
Presumably, ‘fraud’ refers to the offence contrary to the FA 2006, s 1. ‘Article’ includes
any programme or data held in electronic form.59 Examples of types of article covered by
the FA 2006, s 7 appear in para 12.30.
In some cases, the offence of making under s 7(1) overlaps with the offence of forgery,
dealt with later.60 Like forgery, it is a preparatory offence.
Obtaining services dishonestly
Key points 12.3

The offence of dishonestly obtaining services deals with the person who, by a dishonest
act, obtains services for himself or another, without paying the price for them and intend-
ing not to do so.
12.35 The FA 2006, s 11(1) and (2) provides:
‘(1) A person is guilty of an offence61 under this section if he obtains services for him-
self or another –
(a) by a dishonest act, and
(b) in breach of subsection (2).
a corporation, see para 12.47. 57 FA 2006, s 7(2).
58 Maginnis [1987] AC 303, HL. 59 FA 2006, s 8(1). 60 Paras 12.49–12.59.
a corporation, see para 12.47.
12.37 obtaining services dishonestly | 499
(2) A person obtains services in breach of this subsection if –

(a) they are made available on the basis that payment has been, is being or will be
made for or in respect of them,
(b) he obtains them without any payment having been made for or in respect of
them or without payment having been made in full, and
(c) when he obtains them, he knows –
(i) that they are being made available on the basis described in paragraph (a), or
(ii) that they might be,
but intends that payment will not be made, or will not be made in full.’
The offence of obtaining services dishonestly is triable either way and punishable with a
maximum of five years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment.62 Unlike the offence
of fraud, contrary to the FA 2006, s 1, the offence is a ‘result crime’; services must be
obtained as a result of D’s act.
Actus reus
12.36 A person commits the actus reus of the offence if he does an act and thereby
obtains services for himself or another by an act and in breach of s 11(2)(a) and (b), ie
where
• the services are made available on the basis that payment has been, or is being or
will be, made for or in respect of them, 63 and
• he obtains them without any payment having been made for or in respect of them
or without payment having been made in full.64
12.37 Unlike the repealed offence of obtaining services by deception, contrary to the
Theft Act 1978 (TA 1978), s 1, the s 11 offence does not require the services to be obtained
by deception. It simply requires them to be obtained by an act. Thus, someone who sneaks
into a cinema and watches a fi lm without paying can be convicted of the offence, although
he would not have committed the offence under the TA 1978, s 1. If a person obtained an
admission ticket without payment by a false representation, he would not only be com-
mitting an offence under the FA 2006, s 11, but also the offence of fraud contrary to the
FA 2006, s 1 (by virtue of the FA 2006, s 2).
Because no deception is required, the s 11 offence can be committed where D obtains
services through a machine. Examples are where D downloads, via the Internet, soft ware
or data for which a charge is made, or which is only available to those who have paid a
subscription for the service, by giving false identification details, or where D receives sat-
ellite television transmissions by using a cloned decoder. The offence also catches people
who obtain a free train ride by feeding imitation coins into an electronic ticket machine.
In this case, however, there could also be a conviction for fraud, contrary to the FA 2006,
s 1 (by virtue of s 2).
62 FA 2006, s 11(3). 63 Ibid, s 11(2)(a). 64 Ibid, s 11(2)(b).

Act
12.38 The requirement of an act would seem to exclude the possibility of an offence
under the FA 2006, s 11 being committed by a failure to do something which one is legally
obliged to do. A person who obtains services by failing to disclose a material fact would,
therefore, not fall within s 11. Nor would a person who, having innocently gone to a
lecture, thinking it was free, stayed on to hear the lecture without paying after hearing
a request that those who had not paid the fee should do so immediately. He would lack
the necessary mens rea for the offence at the time of his act of entering the lecture room,
and his subsequent failure to leave when he knew the truth and had the mens rea for the
offence cannot suffice.
Obtaining services
12.39 The FA 2006 does not provide a definition of ‘services’, but the concept of ‘services’
is unlikely to cause many problems to the courts. The services must be obtained for D
or another by D’s act. There is, therefore, a requirement of causation. It follows that, if D
obtains services not because of what he has done but because of a mistake by the service-
provider, D does not commit the present offence. As noted in para 10.32, ‘services’ are not
property within the Theft Act 1968 (TA 1968), s 4(1) and therefore cannot be the subject of
theft, contrary to the TA 1968, s 1, but the offence under FA 2006, s 11 is a ‘theft-like’ one.
12.40 The requirement that the services must be made available on the basis that pay-
ment has been, is being or will be made for or in respect of them means that obtaining
free services by a dishonest act, as where a teenager by such an act sneaks into a free film
show open only to old age pensioners at a cinema and watches the fi lm, is not caught by
the FA 2006, s 11.
‘On the basis’ seems to relate to the basis on which the service-provider provides them,
and does not require any form of agreement on D’s part. The reference to ‘payment’ seems
to be to an identifiable payment or payments made by or on behalf of the person obtain-
ing the benefit to the person providing the benefit, as opposed to some indirect commer-
cial advantage to the service-provider.
It remains to be seen whether the references to ‘payment’ are limited to payment in a
monetary sense (by cash or otherwise), or whether they also include payment in kind or
by the performance of services in return for the services. There is no intrinsic reason why
they should not.
If a service-provider is deceived into agreeing to waive the charge which would nor-
mally be required for a service, the service will not be provided on the requisite ‘basis of
payment’. Nor will it be so provided if a free service is obtained with a view to a future gain,
as where a bank account is opened (a service) free of charge (banks do not charge to open
an account) by a dishonest act with a view to running up an unauthorised overdraft.65 In
both of the examples just given of the obtaining of a free service, a false representation
65 However, if the account holder then proceeds to run up the unauthorised overdraft or dishonestly makes
use of some other facility of the bank for which a bank charge is made he thereby obtains a service which is not
free and may thereby become liable under s 11 if he does not pay the charge in full.
12.42 obtaining services dishonestly | 501
is involved, with the result that an offence of fraud, contrary to the FA 2006, s 1 may be
committed.
12.41 The effect of the requirement that D must obtain the services without any payment
having been made for or in respect of them or without payment having been made in full
is to exclude from s 11 cases where payment has been made in full. This means that the
dishonest obtaining of ‘to-be-paid-for’ services is not caught if D pays for them by cash,
‘plastic’ or cheque at the relevant time, however dishonest the act by which D obtains
them.
Two other types of case are excluded by the present requirement. The first is where D
gains admission to a keep-fit class which is open only to residents of a particular locality by
pretending to be such a resident and paying the fee. The second is where a parent ‘lies about
a child’s religious upbringing in order to obtain a place at a fee-paying school, with every
intention of paying the fee’.66 Nor could there be a conviction for fraud contrary to the FA
2006, s 1 in either case because, although there is a false representation in each case, there
is no intent to make a gain or to cause loss in the sense required for that offence.
Mens rea
12.42 The mens rea requirement is threefold:
• D’s act must be done dishonestly. Although the FA 2006, s 11(1) uses the phrase
‘dishonest act’, ‘dishonest’ must refer to D’s state of mind just as ‘dishonestly’ does in
the TA 1968 and TA 1978 (see the first sentence of the last paragraph of para 10.73)
and the approach laid down in Ghosh67 applies to it.
• When D obtains them, D must know68 that the services are being made available
on the basis that payment has been, is being or will be made for or in respect of
them, or must know that they might be.
• When D obtains the services, D must intend that payment will not be made, or
will not be made in full. These words seem to require an intent to make permanent
default (in whole or in part) of the expected payment. This is another reason why the
offence under s 11 is ‘theft-like’.
Although the second and third elements of mens rea must exist at the time of the obtain-
ing of the services, and are not required to exist at the time of the act by which they are
obtained, it will often be difficult to prove that D’s act was dishonest if those two elements
are lacking at the time of that act. Thus, a man who engages the services of a prostitute
by promising to pay her but who has changed his mind by the time that he receives her
sexual services might well not be convicted of an offence under s 11 on the ground that his
act of promising payment was not dishonest. On the other hand, if he had also induced
the prostitute to give her services by falsely reassuring her that he was not HIV positive
that act would doubtless be found dishonest and he would be convicted under s 11.
66 Th is example was given by the Law Commission Fraud, Law Com No 276, para 8.12.
67 [1982] QB 1053, CA; para 10.74. 68 Para 3.43.
Fraudulent offences under the Theft Act 1968
Key points 12.4

The Theft Act 1968, ss 17, 19 and 20 deal with offences of false accounting, false statements
by officers of corporations or unincorporated associations, and the destruction, deface-
ment or concealment of a valuable security, will or court or government document.
12.43 All the above offences are triable either way and punishable with a maximum of
seven years’ imprisonment on conviction on indictment. They do not call for detailed
discussion.
False accounting
12.44 The Theft Act 1968 (TA 1968), s 17 punishes the dishonest destruction, deface-
ment, concealment or falsification of any account ‘or any record or document made or
required for any accounting purpose’ with a view to gain for oneself or another or with
intent to cause loss to another. Section 17 also punishes a person who, with such a view or
intent, dishonestly in furnishing information for any purpose produces or makes use of
any account, or any such ‘record or document’, which to his knowledge is or may be mis-
leading, false or deceptive in a material particular. No gain or loss need actually result.
This is a very convenient section to use where there has been an elaborate and compli-
cated system of fraud in which it is not easy to identify the particular sums of money and
other property of which the owner has been deprived, although it is certainly not limited
to this. Like the TA 1968, s 20, below, this is one of those sections in which the definitions
of gain and loss in the TA 1968, s 34, which are discussed in paras 11.30 and 11.31, are
incorporated, so that it suffices that merely a temporary gain or loss is intended.
False statements by company directors etc

12.45 The TA 1968, s 19 punishes the publishing of a written statement known to be (or
possibly to be) misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular by an officer of a
body corporate or unincorporated association (or person purporting to act as such), with
intent to deceive its members or creditors about its affairs.
Suppression of documents etc

12.46 The TA 1968, s 20, as amended by the Fraud Act 2006, makes it an offence for a
person to destroy, deface or conceal any valuable security, any will or any original docu-
ment of or belonging to, or filed or deposited in, any court or any government depart-
ment, provided that the defendant acted dishonestly and with a view to gain for himself
or another or with intent to cause loss to another.
12.47 forgery and related offences | 503
A ‘valuable security’ means any document creating, transferring, surrendering or

releasing any right to, in or over property, or authorising the payment of money or deliv-
ery of any property, or evidencing such creation etc, or such payment etc, or the satisfac-
tion of any obligation.69
Liability of controlling officer for fraud or

falsification offence by corporation
12.47 Under the TA 1968, s 18,70 a director, manager or other similar officer of a corpo-
ration (eg a limited company) is liable for offences under the TA 1968, s 17 which have
been committed by the body corporate with his connivance or consent.71
The Fraud Act 2006, s 12 makes the same provision in respect of an offence under that
Act.72
If the affairs of a corporation are managed by its members, the above provisions apply
in relation to the acts and defaults of a member in connection with his functions of man-
agement as if he were a director of the corporation.73
Forgery and related offences
Key points 12.5

The following offences under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 are dealt with
below:
• forgery;
• copying a false instrument;
• using a false instrument;
• using a copy of a false instrument,
all of which require the defendant to intend to induce somebody to accept the false instru-
ment (or copy) as genuine (or as a copy of a genuine instrument) and by reason of so
accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or another’s prejudice.
The treatment of these offences is followed by a description of offences relating to the
custody or control of money orders, share certificates, cheques and various other instru-
ments, or to the making, custody or control of a machine, implement or material designed
or adapted to make such an instrument. The more serious version of each of these offences
requires proof of the above intentions; the less serious version does not.
69 TA 1968, s 20(3). 70 As amended by the FA 2006.

71 TA 1968, s 18(1). See, further, paras 18.44–18.46. Corporate criminal liability is dealt with in Ch 18.
72 FA 2006, s 12(1) and (2). 73 TA 1968, s 18(2); ibid, s 12(3).
12.48 Forgery and its related offences are complementary to the offence of fraud and a
number of other offences dealt with in this and the two previous chapters, in that they
penalise overt preparation involving false documents or other instruments. Forgery and
related offences are another exception to the general rule that the law does not penalise
mere preparation for crime. The reason seems to be the social and commercial necessity
that documents and other instruments which are relied on are authentic.
The law relating to forgery and related offences is governed by the Forgery and
Counterfeiting Act 1981 (FCA 1981). This is a codifying Act based largely on the Law
Commission’s report, Forgery and Counterfeit Currency.74 The Act repealed the whole of
the Forgery Act 1913, the whole of the Coinage Offences Act 1936, and a number of other
statutory provisions, and abolished the common law offence of forgery. The FCA 1981, Pt
I deals with forgery and related offences, and Pt II with counterfeiting. Like the Theft Acts
1968 and 1978, the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and the Fraud Act 2006, the FCA 1981 is
a completely new code.
All the offences under the FCA 1981 mentioned hereafter are triable either way, the
maximum punishment on conviction on indictment being 10 years’ imprisonment
(unless otherwise stated).
Forgery
12.49 This offence is defined by the FCA 1981, s 1 which states that:
‘A person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument, with the intention that he or
another shall use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accept-
ing it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.’
Actus reus
12.50 The actus reus of this offence is making a false instrument. By the FCA 1981, s 9(2)
this includes altering an instrument so as to make it false in any respect.
Instrument
12.51 For the purposes of s 1 and other sections in the FCA 1981, an ‘instrument’ is
defined by the FCA 1981, s 8(1) as:
(a) any document, whether of a formal or informal character (other than a currency
note);75
(b) any stamp issued or sold by a postal operator (or a metered postage mark);76
(c) any Inland Revenue stamp;77 or
74 Law Com No 55 (1973). 75 FCA 1981, s 8(2). 76 Ibid, s 8(3).

77 As defi ned by the Stamp Duties Management Act 1891, s 27: FCA 1981, s 8(4).
12.51 forgery | 505
(d) any disc, tape, soundtrack or other device on or in which information is recorded
or stored by mechanical, electronic or other means. To be ‘recorded’ or ‘stored’
the information must be preserved for an appreciable time with the object of sub-
sequent retrieval or recovery.78 Examples of items covered are microfi lm records
and information on computer discs, but not electronic impulses in a computer
or its ‘user segment’ (which retains or stores information momentarily while the
computer searches its memory, eg to check a password).79 Unauthorised manipula-
tion of such electronic impulses (by computer hacking or otherwise) is covered by
the offence of unauthorised access to computer material, contrary to the Computer
Misuse Act 1990, s 1.
Until 1987, a difficulty with this definition related to the word ‘document’ in (a). The
Forgery Act 1913 and its predecessor dealt with the forgery of documents but did not
define what constituted a ‘document’ for its purposes. However, judicial decisions sug-
gested that if a thing was intended to have utility apart from the fact that it conveyed
information or recorded a promise it was not a document;80 a document for the purpose
of the law of forgery was, it was thought, a writing which was only intended to convey
information or record a promise. This view was based on a rationalisation of the difficult
decisions in Closs81 (where a picture falsely bearing the signature of a well-known artist
was held not to be a document) and Smith82 (where two of the judges held that wrappers
made in the same distinctive form as those in which Borwick’s baking powder was sold
were not documents).
In their report, the Law Commission concluded that only things which conveyed two
messages: a message about the thing itself (eg that it is a cheque) and a message to be
found in its words or other symbols that is to be accepted and acted on (eg the message
in a cheque to the banker to pay a specified sum), needed to be protected by the law of
forgery. Thus, they sought to make clear that things like those in Closs and Smith were
excluded from forgery by limiting the forgery of documents to ‘instruments’, which were
defined as ‘any instrument in writing whether of a formal or informal character’. In the
view of the Commission, ‘instrument’ was the appropriate term to convey this meaning.
However, although the new offence of forgery is concerned with making a false instru-
ment, Parliament, in its wisdom, chose to change the proposed definition of ‘instrument’
and that is why the Act defines an instrument as including ‘any document, whether for-
mal or informal’. This left open the question of the extent of the offence of forgery and left
unanswered the difficulties attached to Closs and Smith.
In 1987, in Gold and Schifreen, 83 the Court of Appeal adopted the Law Commission’s
view that only instruments containing both types of message needed to be protected by
the law of forgery, a view which Lord Brandon, delivering the opinion of the House of
Lords on appeal, referred to, obiter, with apparent approval.84
Applying the two-messages concept, paintings (even if purporting to bear the signature of
an artist), a false autograph, and any writing on manufactured articles indicating the name
of the manufacturer or country of origin, are not documents and therefore not ‘instruments’,
78 Gold and Schifreen [1988] AC 1063, HL. 79 Ibid.

80 Williams ‘What is a Document?’ (1948) 11 MLR 150 at 160. 81 (1857) Dears & B 460.
82 (1858) Dears & B 566. 83 [1987] QB 1116, CA. 84 [1988] AC 1063 at 1071.
whereas, eg, letters, wills, title deeds and cheques are. Of course, paintings and other things
which are not ‘instruments’ are not necessarily beyond the reach of the criminal law if they
are falsified, since their use (or attempted use) to deceive will usually involve an offence of
fraud under the Fraud Act 2006, s 1 (or an attempt to commit such an offence).
False instrument
12.52 The FCA 1981, s 9(1) provides an exhaustive defi nition of the word ‘false’ for the
purpose of forgery and related offences. An instrument is false for this purpose:
‘(a) if it purports to have been made in the form in which it is made by a person who did
not in fact make it in that form; or
(b) if it purports to have been made in the form in which it is made on the authority of
a person who did not in fact authorise its making in that form; or
(c) if it purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made by a person who
did not in fact make it in those terms; or
(d) if it purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made on the authority of
a person who did not in fact authorise its making in those terms; or
(e) if it purports to have been altered in any respect by a person who did not in fact alter
it in that respect; or
(f) if it purports to have been altered in any respect on the authority of a person who
did not in fact authorise the alteration in that respect; or
(g) if it purports to have been made or altered on a date on which, or at a place at which,
or otherwise in circumstances in which, it was not in fact made or altered; or
(h) if it purports to have been made or altered by an existing person but he did not in
fact exist.’
Although it is irrelevant, for the purposes of the above definition, whether the falsity in
question is or is not material, the nature of the requisite ulterior intent to prejudice is such
that an immaterial falsity will not normally suffice.
12.53 A crucial element in this definition is that, to be false, an instrument must pur-
port to have been made or altered in a way (specified in s 9(1)(a) to (h) above) in which
it was not made or altered. An instrument is not false merely because it tells a lie (ie
contains a false statement); it must tell a lie about itself and it must tell a lie about
itself by purporting to have been made or altered in a way specified by the FCA 1981,
s 9(1), ie to have been made or altered by (or on the authority of) a person who did not
make or alter it (or authorise its making or alteration), or by otherwise purporting to be
made or altered in circumstances in which it was not made or altered. This requirement,
sometimes described as the requirement of automendacity, was made by the old law
relating to forgery.85 The wording of the FCA 1981, s 9(1) indicates that this continues to
be a requirement of the law, and it was affirmed by the House of Lords in 1987 in More86
that it does.
85 Re Windsor (1865) 10 Cox CC 118 at 123, per Blackburn J; Dodge [1972] 1 QB 416, CA.
86 [1987] 3 All ER 825, HL.
12.55 forgery | 507
In More, D intercepted a cheque drawn in favour of ‘MR Jessel’. D then opened a build-
ing society account in the name of Mark Richard Jessel and paid in the cheque. Later,
D presented a withdrawal form, signed ‘MR Jessel’, for most of the amount paid in and
was paid by the building society. D was convicted of the forgery of the withdrawal form.
He appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, which held that the form was a false
instrument within s 9(1)(h), since it purported to have been made by an existing person
who did not exist, notwithstanding that it did not tell a lie about itself because it was com-
pleted by the account holder (albeit he had chosen to be known by a false name). Allowing
D’s appeal, the House of Lords held that the form was not a false instrument because D
was a real person. It was he who was the holder of the account and in that capacity he had
signed the withdrawal form. That form clearly purported to be signed by the person who
originally opened the account and in this respect it was wholly accurate. Consequently,
the House of Lords held, the withdrawal form did not tell a lie about itself and was there-
fore not a false instrument.
12.54 Despite the affirmation in More of the requirement of automendacity, the decision
of the Court of Appeal in Donnelly87 in 1984 (which was not referred to by the House of
Lords in More) appeared to remove its force. This is because that decision suggests that
any instrument which tells a lie about a past fact tells a lie about itself and is false within
the above definition.
In Donnelly, D was the manager of a jeweller’s shop. He completed and signed what
purported to be a written valuation of jewellery for insurance purposes. The certificate
stated that D had examined the items in question. In fact, the items of jewellery did not
exist and the valuation was intended to be used to defraud the insurance company. D was
convicted of forgery and appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed his appeal.
The Court of Appeal’s reasoning was that the valuation certificate, the instrument in
question, did tell a lie about itself because (within s 9(1)(g), above) it ‘purported to be
made in circumstances in which it was not made’. However, that phrase must be read
in the context of the rest of s 9(1)(g)88 (which refers to the date on which, or the place
at which, the instrument was made); consequently, it must refer to other circumstances
directly related to the making of the instrument, eg the presence of witnesses. To give the
phrase an unlimited meaning would render redundant all the other provisions set out in
s 9(1)(a) to (h), since instruments covered by them and many other instruments telling
lies would also be covered by it. In particular, any instrument telling a lie about a past fact
would be a forgery because it would purport to be made after the fact occurred.
12.55 The status of Donnelly in the light of More was uncertain, given that the House did
not refer to it in More. That uncertainty was increased by two decisions of the Court of
Appeal in 1994, Jeraj89 and Warneford and Gibbs.90
In the first of the two cases, Jeraj, D, a bank manager, signed a document on bank note-
paper to the effect that he had received a certain letter of credit and that, on behalf of his
87 [1984] 1 WLR 1017, CA. Th is decision was criticised by JC Smith [1984] Crim LR 491–492, but supported
by Leng ‘Falsity in Forgery’ [1989] Crim LR 687 at 697–699.
88 See, eg, Pengelley v Bell Punch Co Ltd [1964] 2 All ER 945, CA. 89 [1994] Crim LR 595, CA.
90 [1994] Crim LR 753, CA.
bank, he had fully endorsed it. He could not have received the letter of credit or endorsed
it, because it did not exist. Dismissing D’s appeal against conviction for forgery, the Court
of Appeal held that the trial judge had been correct in considering that he was bound by
Donnelly, which (it said) had not been undermined by More. The Court of Appeal seems to
have regarded the reasoning in Donnelly as applying in Jeraj (ie that the document was false
within s 9(1)(g), above) because, since the letter of credit had never existed, the document
had not been made after the letter had been received and endorsed, and therefore ‘purported
to be made in circumstances in which it was not made’. The Court went on to find a further
point which, it said, did not turn on s 9(1)(g), viz that D’s document was such as to represent
that it, together with the letter of credit, amounted to some kind of articulated document,
the letter of credit being subject to an endorsement by reason of D’s document which was to
be read with it. D’s document thus told a lie about itself because it could not be an endorse-
ment of a non-existent letter of credit. If this point did not turn on s 9(1)(g), and since there
is no other paragraph in the FCA 1981, s 9(1) which is relevant, this explanation would seem
not to involve the document telling a lie about itself in one of the specified ways. Jeraj, then,
is noteworthy, not only for its affirmation of the standing of Donnelly, but also because of its
statement to the effect that an instrument can be false if it tells a lie about itself in a way other
than that specified in s 9(1). That statement’s validity is dubious, to say the least.
In Warneford and Gibbs, where Jeraj was not cited, a differently constituted Court of
Appeal held that Donnelly was wrongly decided and incapable of standing alongside More.
D1 and D2 were charged with using a false instrument contrary to the FCA 1981, s 3. The
alleged false instrument was ‘a purported employer’s reference’, given to a building society
in support of a mortgage application, relating to a person who had never been employed
by the establishment in question. It was alleged by the prosecution that the reference was a
false instrument within s 9(1)(g) because the fact that the person had never been employed
by the establishment was a ‘circumstance’ in which the document on its face purported to
have been made but was not in truth so made. The Court of Appeal allowed D1 and D2’s
appeals against conviction. It held that s 9(1)(g) was not to be construed so as to bring within
its compass every document which contains a falsehood. The expression ‘otherwise in cir-
cumstances in which it was not in fact made’ in s 9(1)(g) referred to the circumstances of
the making of the document, just as the references to date and places in s 9(1)(g) concerned
the date and place of the making of the document. If, eg, it said, the document on its face
purported to have been made in the presence of named individuals who were not in fact
present, it would fall within s 9(1)(g). The lie had to relate to the actual circumstances of the
document’s making. A lie about other facts extraneous to the document did not suffice.
There was no way that Jeraj (approving Donnelly, and indeed going further) and
Warneford and Gibbs (disapproving Donnelly) could be reconciled.
12.56 In 2000, the conflict was resolved by the Court of Appeal in A-G’s Reference (No 1
of 2000)91 where the Court held that, in view of Jeraj, Donnelly was binding on it and that
Warneford and Gibbs, Jeraj not having been cited, had to be regarded as wrongly decided.
The Court of Appeal, however, sought to limit its effects. It held that an instrument can
be false within s 9(1)(g), on the basis that ‘it purports to have been made or altered . . . in
91 [2001] 1 WLR 331, CA.

12.56 forgery | 509
circumstances in which it was not in fact made or altered’, if the past fact to which it
falsely refers is one which was required to exist (or to have existed) before the instru-
ment could properly (or honestly) be made or altered. In this case, D, a coach driver, who
was not taking a break, operated his tachograph machine in a way which indicated that he
was taking a break and therefore that the coach was being driven by a second driver. As
a result the tachograph sheet indicated that D was taking a break required by law when
he was not, and that part of the sheet was therefore false. To make that part of the sheet
it was essential for there to be a second driver during the period when the tachograph
was operated in the second driver’s position. At D’s trial for forgery, the trial judge ruled
that the tachograph sheet did not amount to a false instrument and D was acquitted. The
Court of Appeal held that the tachograph sheet did amount to a false instrument within
s 9(1)(g). Applying Donnelly and Jeraj, it held that Donnelly could be adopted without
going so far as to make any instrument which told a lie about some alleged past fact a for-
gery. In Donnelly, it said, the falsity related to an event (an examination) which must have
occurred before a genuine valuation could be made. A similar comment could be made
about Jeraj; there had to be a letter of credit which could be endorsed before the note could
honestly be written. The Court admitted that the same was true of the facts in Warneford
and Gibbs (there had to be an employer/employee situation before an employer’s reference
could be written) but it took the view that the Court of Appeal in that case would not have
formed its view as to the correctness of Donnelly if it had been aware of Jeraj. The Court of
Appeal concluded that Donnelly could be justified on the basis that it decided that if the
falsity related to some past fact required to exist before an instrument could be ‘properly
made or altered’, and those circumstances did not exist, the instrument would tell ‘a lie’
about itself because it was saying that it was made in circumstances which did not exist.
In terms of the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal accepted that there would not have
been a false instrument within s 9(1)(g) if the record had been produced by the driver
writing it out, as opposed to being produced by the tachograph being operated. In the
former case, the falsity would not have related to the making of the instrument, but sim-
ply as to its contents, whereas the tachograph record made continuously over the period
indicated by the record was capable of being a false instrument during the period when it
showed that the driver in question was not driving and that a second driver must there-
fore have been driving. To make that part of the instrument properly, it was essential for
there to be a second driver during the period the tachograph was operated in the second
driver position. There was no second driver and therefore the instrument was false. The
circumstance which was false was that the record was made during a period when there
purported to be a second driver who was driving.
Although A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2000) restricts Donnelly to some extent, that restric-
tion still leaves Donnelly (as explained) with a wide ambit; there are many cases where
it will be satisfied. Moreover, the Court of Appeal’s explanation of Donnelly involves a
highly artificial way of squaring that case with More, and one which gives rise to fine
distinctions. To state in writing, ‘My examination of the painting has revealed that it is
by Constable’, when no examination has taken place, can render the document a forgery
because of the lie about the antecedent circumstance which must have existed before the
statement could properly be made, but a written statement, ‘The painting is by Constable’,
cannot.
One thing which is surprising about A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2000) is that forgery
(with all its complexity) was ever charged. It was, and still is, an either-way offence under
the Transport Act 1968, s 99(5) knowingly to make a false entry on a tachograph record
sheet.
Mens rea
12.57 The FCA 1981, s 1 states that D must have the ulterior intent ‘that he or another
shall use [the false instrument] to induce somebody92 to accept it as genuine’, and the
ulterior intent to induce that person ‘by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some
act to his own or any other person’s 93 prejudice’ (besides that of D); 94 these intents must
exist when D makes the false instrument.95 It follows that it is not enough simply to intend
to induce a person to believe that an instrument is genuine. Thus, making a false birth
certificate solely to induce the belief that one comes from a noble family is not forgery.
D need not intend to induce another human being; it suffices that D intends to induce
a machine to respond to the instrument as if it were genuine.96
If D makes a false instrument with the necessary intent, it is irrelevant whether or not
it is communicated to anyone, and it is irrelevant whether anyone is induced to accept the
instrument as genuine or whether prejudice (within the meaning set out below) is caused,
except perhaps in an evidential sense.97
Provided that the maker of the false instrument has the necessary intents at the time of
making it, it is irrelevant that he has not at that time made up his mind about the method
of communicating the false instrument to the victim.98 It must be proved, however, as s 1
requires, that he intends it (the false instrument made by him)99 to be used to induce some-
body to accept it as genuine and intends to induce that person by reason of so accepting it
to do something to his own or another’s prejudice. This being so, the actual decision of the
Court of Appeal in Ondhia,100 where the point just made was stated, is difficult to accept. In
that case D had on three occasions made false instruments with intent that his agent would
receive a facsimile of each of them from him by fax and transmit it to V, anticipating that V
would accept it and treat it as a duplicate of the false original. The Court of Appeal rejected
D’s appeal against conviction for forgery in respect of the three original false instruments.
This is odd because, when he made each of the three original false instruments, D did not
intend to use it to induce anyone to do anything. He simply intended to use it to make a
facsimile which could be used to induce someone to do something.
12.58 The act or omission intended to be induced must be to the prejudice of the per-
son induced or anyone else besides D.101 ‘Prejudice’ is exhaustively defined by the FCA
92 It is not necessary that the person should be identifiable: Johnson [1997] 8 Archbold News 1, CA.
93 Besids D’s: Utting [1987] 1 WLR 1375, CA.
94 It was accepted by the Court of Appeal in Campbell (1985) 80 Cr App R 47 that intention is required as to
both elements. Th is has been affi rmed in a number of subsequent cases, eg Garcia (1987) 87 Cr App R 175, CA,
where it was stated in relation to the intent as to the second element that the question was whether D was aware
of the prejudice alleged, and whether he intended it.
95 Ondhia [1998] 2 Cr App R 150, CA. 96 FCA 1981, s 10(3).
97 Ondhia [1998] 2 Cr App R 150, CA. 98 ibid at 156. 99 Ibid.
100 [1998] 2 Cr App R 150, CA. 101 Utting [1987] 1 WLR 1375, CA.
12.58 forgery | 511
1981, s 10. Section 10(1) states that, for the purposes of the offences under the FCA 1981
described in this chapter, an act or omission intended to be induced is only to a person’s
prejudice if it is one which, if it occurs:
• will102 result:
– in his temporary or permanent loss of property (including a loss by not getting
what he might get as well as a loss by parting with what he has),103 as where a false
cheque or will is made to cause another either to part with property or not to get
property he might have got; or
– in his being deprived of the opportunity to earn remuneration or greater remu-
neration, as where a letter falsely purporting to come from someone asked to give
a character reference for an applicant for a job states that he is dishonest; or
– in his being deprived of an opportunity to gain a financial advantage otherwise
than by way of remuneration, as where a false testimonial is made to obtain a
contract for which a number of different tenders have been made and a genuine
tenderer is deprived of what would have been his contract if it had not been for the
false statement; or
• will104 result in somebody being given an opportunity:
– to earn remuneration or greater remuneration from him, as where a false testimo-
nial or degree certificate is made in order to obtain a job or better pay in a job; or
– to gain a financial advantage from him otherwise than by way of remuneration,
as where a false aeroplane or theatre ticket is made in order to gain from him a
flight or admission; or
• will105 be the result of his having accepted a false instrument as genuine, or a copy
of a false instrument as a copy of a genuine one, in connection with his perform-
ance of any duty. An example would be where a cheque is falsely endorsed to induce
a bank to accept it as genuine in connection with its performance of its duty to pay
out only on a valid cheque.106 Another example would be where a false tachograph
record sheet is made to induce a relevant law enforcement officer to be satisfied with
the compliance of the record with legal requirements. This last definition shows that
the prejudice intended need not have any financial connotation at all.
An act which a person has an enforceable duty to do and an omission to do an act which
a person is not entitled to do are to be disregarded.107 Consequently, it is not forgery to
make a false instrument to induce another to do what he is obliged to do, eg to pay a debt,
or to refrain from doing what he is not entitled to do.
Where the intended inducement to respond to the instrument as if it were genuine is of
a machine (eg a cash dispenser at a bank), the act or omission intended to be induced by
the machine is treated as an act or omission to a person’s prejudice.108
102 Ie ‘must’ and not merely ‘may potentially’: Garcia (1987) 87 Cr App R 175, CA.
103 FCA 1981, s 10(5).
104 Ie ‘must’ and not merely ‘may potentially’: Garcia (1987) 87 Cr App R 175, CA.
105 As for ‘will’, see previous note. 106 Campbell (1985) 80 Cr App R 47, CA.
107 FCA 1981, s 10(2). 108 Ibid, s 10(4).
12.59 The above definition of the mens rea for forgery is an exclusive one. Dishonesty
is not an element of the offence.109 It follows, eg, that it is irrelevant that D believed that
he was legally entitled to a gain which he intended to make as a result of falsifying the
instrument. Thus, D commits forgery if, believing that he is legally entitled to property
in the possession of another, he makes a false document of title to it in order to obtain
the property. Indeed, it is not a defence in itself that D might actually have been entitled
to have the property transferred to him if he had made a true claim (but not if he made
a false statement). If, as would normally be so in such a case, the maker of a false instru-
ment is proved to have had the two intentions he can be convicted of forgery.110
Copying a false instrument

12.60 By the FCA 1981, s 2:
‘It is an offence for a person to make a copy of an instrument which is, and which he
knows or believes to be, a false instrument, with the intention that he or another shall use
it to induce somebody to accept it as a copy of a genuine instrument, and by reason of so
accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.’
Actus reus
12.61 The actus reus of this offence is making a copy of a ‘false instrument’; the defini-
tion of these two words is the same as for the offence of forgery.111 The fact that the instru-
ment must be false but need not be forged means that a person who, with the necessary
intent, copies a false instrument will be liable, even though the instrument may have been
made innocently.
There are no limits on the method of making the copy. Photocopying a false instru-
ment is an obvious and easy method.
Mens rea
12.62 The mens rea required is that:
• D must know or believe112 that the instrument copied is false.

• D must have the ulterior intent that he or another shall use the copy of the false
instrument to induce somebody113 to accept it as a copy of a genuine instrument,
and the ulterior intent to induce that person by reason of so accepting it to do
or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.114 The elements
109 Campbell (1985) 80 Cr App R 47, CA; Horsey v Hutchings (1984) Times, 8 November, DC.
110 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) [2002] EWCA Crim 1768. 111 Paras 12.51–12.56.
112 For guidance as to these terms, see paras 3.43 and 3.44. 113 See para 12.57, n 92.
114 By analogy with the FCA 1981, ss 1 and 3 (see paras 12.57 and 12.63), it is clear that an ulterior intention
is required in both respects.
12.64 offences relating to money orders, share certificates etc | 513
of these ulterior intents have already been discussed in relation to forgery,115 and
what is said there applies equally here, except that references to ‘false instrument’
and ‘genuine instrument’ should be read as ‘copy of a false instrument’ and ‘copy
of a genuine instrument’. It follows from the present requirement that the present
offence is not committed by making a copy of a false instrument if the copy-maker
intends to represent it as a copy of a false statement.
Using a false instrument or a copy

of a false instrument
12.63 By the FCA 1981, s 3:
‘It is an offence for a person to use an instrument which is, and which he knows or believes
to be, false, with the intention of inducing somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason
of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.’
D must be proved not only to have intended to induce somebody116 to accept the false
instrument as genuine, but also to have intended to induce that person by reason of so
accepting it to do or not to do something to his or another’s prejudice.117
The FCA 1981, s 4 provides a similarly worded offence of using a copy of an instrument
which is, and which he knows or believes to be, a false instrument, with the intention of
inducing somebody to accept it as a copy of a genuine instrument, and by reason of so
accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.
In the light of the explanations already given, no more need be said about these offences
except to point out that ‘use’ is a wide term and covers (among other things) a person
who offers, delivers, tenders in payment or exchange, or exposes for sale or exchange, an
instrument.
Offences relating to money orders, share

certificates, cheques etc
12.64 The FCA 1981, s 5118 provides a number of offences119 relating to the following
instruments:
• money orders;
• postal orders;
115 Paras 12.57 and 12.58. 116 See para 12.57, n 92. 117 Tobierre [1986] 1 All ER 346, CA.
118 As amended by the Identity Cards Act 2006, s 44(2).
119 The Identity Documents Act 2010, ss 4 to 6 provide similar offences in relation to false identity
documents.
• United Kingdom postage stamps;

• Inland Revenue stamps;
• share certificates;
• cheques and other bills of exchange;
• travellers’ cheques;
• bankers’ drafts;
• promissory notes;
• cheque cards;
• debit cards;
• credit cards;
• certified copies relating to an entry in a register of births, adoptions, marriages, civil
partnerships or deaths and issued by the Registrar General, the Registrar General
for Northern Ireland, a registration officer or a person lawfully authorised to issue
such certified copies; and
• certificates relating to entries in such registers.
Any such instrument is hereafter referred to as a ‘specified instrument’.
12.65 By the FCA 1981, s 5(1):
‘It is an offence for a person to have in his custody or under his control a [specified instru-
ment] which is, and which he knows or believes to be, false, with the intention that he or
another shall use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accept-
ing it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.’
‘Custody’ and ‘control’ are not explained by the Act, but it appears that ‘custody’ is
intended to mean ‘physical custody’ and ‘control’ to import the notion of the power to
direct what shall be done with the thing in question. The other elements of the offence
have the same meaning as they have where they appear in FCA 1981, ss 1 to 4.
The relationship between this offence and some of those just described can be illus-
trated as follows. If D makes out a false cheque with intent to induce someone to accept it
as genuine, and with intent to induce that person by reason of so accepting it to do some-
thing to his own prejudice, D commits forgery contrary to s 1. If D walks through the
streets to a bank, with the false cheque, in order to cash it, D commits the present offence
under s 5(1). If D then passes the cheque to a bank official in order to induce her to part
with money, D commits the offence of ‘using’ contrary to s 3. Of course, it may be that dif-
ferent people will commit different offences in the cycle, as where the person who makes
the false instrument gets other people to engage in the use of such false instruments.
12.66 If the intents required for an offence under the FCA 1981, s 5(1) cannot both be
proved, but custody or control of one of the specified instruments can be proved, D can be
convicted of an offence under the FCA 1981, s 5(2). By s 5(2), it is an offence for a person
merely to have in his custody or control, without lawful authority or excuse, a specified
12.69 jurisdiction | 515
instrument which is, and which he knows or believes to be, false. The maximum pun-
ishment on conviction on indictment is two years’ imprisonment.120
The only part of this offence which requires further elaboration is ‘without lawful
authority or excuse’, which does not appear in s 5(1). D does not have the burden of prov-
ing this but merely has an evidential burden. A person who has a settled intention to take
a false instrument to the police has a lawful excuse, even if he does not hand the instru-
ment over at the earliest opportunity.121 On the other hand, a solicitor in possession of a
false instrument on behalf of a client in order to prepare his client’s defence to a criminal
charge does not have a lawful authority or excuse;122 nor does a person who is in a state of
indecision as to what to do with an instrument recently discovered to be false.123
12.67 The FCA 1981, s 5(3) provides:
‘It is an offence for a person to make or have in his custody or under his control a machine
or implement, or paper or any other material, which to his knowledge is or has been spe-
cially designed or adapted for the making of [a specified instrument], with the intention
that he or another shall make [a specified instrument] which is false and that he or another
shall use the instrument to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so
accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice.’
This offence strikes at the would-be forger even before he starts to make a false instru-
ment, and before he has got as far as committing attempted forgery.124 Like an offence
under FCA 1981, s 5(1), an offence under s 5(3) is a species of preparatory offence.
12.68 The FCA 1981, s 5(4) is important where the intents required under s 5(3) cannot
be proved, since it makes it an offence for a person merely to make or have in his custody
or under his control any such machine, implement, paper or material, without lawful
authority or excuse. This offence is punishable with a maximum of two years’ imprison-
ment on conviction on indictment.125
Jurisdiction
12.69 The traditional approach126 to jurisdiction over offences where the final essential
element occurred abroad caused serious difficulties in relation to offences of a fraudulent
or similar type which increasingly tend to be transnational in nature. These difficulties
led to the enactment of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, Pt I of which amended the rules
relating to territorial jurisdiction in respect of the offences governed by it, but not other
offences, so as to enable the courts of England and Wales to try transnational offences of
a fraudulent or similar type.
120 FCA 1981, s 6(4).

121 Wuyts [1969] 2 QB 474, CA; Sunman [1995] Crim LR 569, CA (this case was concerned with a correspond-
ing offence in relation to counterfeits). 122 Peterborough Justices, ex p Hicks [1978] 1 All ER 225, DC.
123 Sunman [1995] Crim LR 569, CA. 124 Paras 14.120–14.129. 125 FCA 1981, s 6(4).
126 Para 1.22.
12.70 Part I applies to what it calls Group A and Group B offences.

Group A offences are:
• theft, false accounting, false statements by an officer of a body corporate or unin-
corporated association, blackmail, handling stolen goods and retaining a wrongful
credit, all of which are offences under the Theft Act 1968;
• fraud, possession etc of articles for use in frauds, making or supplying articles for
use in frauds, participating in a fraudulent business carried on by sole trader etc and
obtaining services dishonestly, all of which are offences under the Fraud Act 2006;
• forgery, copying a false instrument, using a false instrument or a copy of a false instru-
ment, offences relating to money orders, share certificates, passports etc, and various
counterfeiting offences, contrary to the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981;
• possession of a false identity document etc; and
• the common law offence of cheating the public revenue.127
Group B offences are:
• encouraging or assisting the commission of a Group A offence;
• conspiracy to commit a Group A offence;
• attempt to commit a Group A offence; and
• common law conspiracy to defraud.128
12.71 The Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 2(3) provides that a person may be guilty of a
Group A offence if any of the events which are ‘relevant events’ in relation to the offence
occurred in England and Wales. For this purpose, a ‘relevant event’ is defined by s 2(1)
as meaning any act, omission or other event (including any result of one or more acts or
omissions) proof of which is required for conviction of the offence. In addition, in relation
to an offence of fraud under the Fraud Act 2006, s 1, ‘relevant event’ includes:
• if the fraud involved an intention to make a gain and the gain occurred, that
occurrence;
• if the fraud involved an intention to cause a loss or to expose another to a risk of loss
and the loss occurred, that occurrence.129
Consequently an offence is regarded as committed in England and Wales if any one such
element is committed or results there.
Section 3(1) provides that it is immaterial whether or not D was a British citizen at any
material time or was in England and Wales at any such time, or whether the offence is an
offence under the law of the foreign country in which part of it occurs.
127 Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 1(2), as amended by the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996, s 3, the Criminal Justice
Act 1993 (Extension of Group A Offences) Order 2000, the Fraud Act 2006, Sch 1 and the Identity Documents
Act 2010, Sch.
128 Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 1(3), as amended by the Serious Crime Act 2007, s 63(1) and Sch 6, Pt 1.
129 Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 2(1A), inserted by the Fraud Act 2006, Sch 1.
12.72 jurisdiction | 517
12.72 The rules relating to jurisdiction over Group B offences are dealt with at the appro-
priate points in Chapter 14.
FURTHER READING
Arlidge and Parry on Fraud (3rd edn, 2007) Smith’s Law of Theft (9th edn, 2007) (Ormerod
Chs 2–6, 10–12 and Williams (eds)) Chs 3, 4 and 9 (paras
Arnheim ‘Forgery and Negligence’ (1988) 132 9.27–9.113)
SJ 350 ATH Smith Property Offences (1994) Ch 23
Leng ‘Falsity in Forgery’ [1989] Crim LR 679 Sullivan ‘Fraud – The Latest Law Commission
Proposals’ (2003) 69 JCL 139
13
Offences of damage to property
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals with the following offences relating to the destruction or damaging of
property:
• destroying or damaging property belonging to another;

• destroying or damaging property, intending to endanger life thereby, or being reckless as
to life being endangered thereby;
• arson;
• racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage;
• threats to destroy or damage property; and
• possessing anything with intent to destroy or damage property.
All but the racially or religiously aggravated offence are governed by the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
13.1 The law of criminal damage was reformed by the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (CDA
1971) which implemented in the main the Law Commission’s report, Offences of Damage
to Property.1 The CDA 1971 replaced the complex provisions of the Malicious Damage
Act 1861, only a few of whose provisions (which are outside the scope of this book) remain
in force. Like the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978, the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 and
the Fraud Act 2006, the CDA 1971 is a completely new code, and no further reference
needs to be made here to the repealed legislation.
Destroying or damaging property

belonging to another
Key points 13.1

The CDA 1971, s 1(1) provides that:
‘A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to
another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether
any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.’
1 Law Com No 29 (1970).

13.2 destroying or damaging property belonging to another | 

13.2 The offence under the CDA 1971, s 1(1) (‘simple criminal damage’) is punishable on
conviction on indictment with imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years.2
Offences under the CDA 1971, s 1(1) are triable either way.3 This is subject to the fol-
lowing important qualification. The qualification is that, where the value of the property
destroyed or of the alleged damage does not exceed £5,000, a magistrates’ court must pro-
ceed as if the offence was triable only summarily,4 in which case the maximum punish-
ment is three months’ imprisonment5 or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale
or both.6 The same applies7 where the charge is that a person is an accomplice to such an
offence or has encouraged or assisted its commission contrary to the Serious Crime Act
2007, Pt 2 or has attempted its commission.8
Where:
(a) a defendant is charged on the same occasion with two or more offences of the
above types relating to criminal damage9 not in excess of £5,000 which form part
of a series of two or more offences of the same or a similar character; or
(b) the offence charged consists in encouraging or assisting the commission of two or
more such offences contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2,
the above qualification has effect as if any reference in it to the values involved were a
reference to the aggregate values involved.10
The fact that ‘low value’ criminal damage has to be proceeded with ‘as if’ it was triable
summarily does not mean that it is a summary offence. On the contrary, like any other
offence under the CDA 1971, s 1(1) it is an ‘either-way’ offence (and therefore an ‘indict-
able offence’) for purposes other than trial, such as the offence of attempt.11
Although the effect of the qualification is to prevent a magistrates’ court sending a
defendant for trial in the Crown Court for the offence of criminal damage contrary to the
CDA 1971, s 1(1), where the value is not in excess of £5,000, the offence may, nevertheless,
be tried on indictment if the requirements of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA 1988),
2 CDA 1971, s 4.
4 Ibid, s 22 and Sch 2, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 46; Serious Crime Act
2007, s 63(1) and Sch 6, Pt 1. If it is not clear whether or not the value of the property destroyed or of the damage
allegedly done exceeds £5,000, the magistrates’ court must permit the defendant to choose summary trial or trial
on indictment: R (on the application of DPP) v Prestatyn Magistrates’ Court [2002] EWHC 1177 (Admin), DC.
5 Th is will be increased to 51 weeks if, and when, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, Sch 32, para 27, comes into
force.
6 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 33.
7 Ibid, s 22 and Sch 2, as amended by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 46; Serious Crime Act
2007, s 63(1) and Sch 6, Pt 1.
8 The qualification referred to in the text does not apply to statutory conspiracy to commit such an offence:
paras 14.79 and 14.80.
9 Or aggravated vehicle-taking only involving damage (whether to the vehicle or to other property) (para
10.125).
10 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 22(11), inserted by the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 38; Serious Crime Act
2007, s 63(1), Sch 6, Pt 1.
11 Interpretation Act 1978, Sch 1; Bristol Magistrates’ Court, ex p E [1998] 3 All ER 798, DC; Fennell (2000)
164 JP 386, CA.
 | 13.3 offences of damage to property
s 40(1) are satisfied. The CJA 1988, s 40(1) provides that a count charging a person with
such an offence (or with being an accomplice to such an offence or with encouraging or
assisting it or attempting it) may be included in an indictment if the charge:
(i) is founded on the same facts or evidence as a count charging an indictable offence;
or
(ii) is part of a series of offences of the same or similar character as an indictable
offence which is also charged;
but only if (in either case) the facts or evidence relating to the offence were disclosed to the
person charged in material served on him as required.
By the CJA 1988, s 40(2), if a count is included in an indictment under s 40(1) the
maximum punishment available on conviction is limited to the maximum for the offence
available in a magistrates’ court.
A limit on prosecutions
13.3 A prosecution may not be instituted against someone for any offence of ‘doing
unlawful damage to property’ which belonged to his or her spouse (or civil partner) at the
time of the offence except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
The only exceptions are:
• where the property also belonged to a third party and both spouses (or civil part-
ners) are charged with damaging it;
• in the case of spouses, where, by virtue of a judicial decree or order,12 the spouses
were not obliged to cohabit at the material time;
• in the case of civil partners, where an order is in force providing for their
separation.13
Actus reus
13.4 The actus reus is that the defendant must destroy or damage property belonging
to another. The definitions which follow are equally applicable to the other provisions of
the Act.
12 ‘Judicial decree or order’ includes a non-molestation order: Woodley v Woodley [1978] Crim LR 629, DC.
13 Theft Act 1968, s 30(4) (amended by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch 27), whose provisions apply to
a charge under the CDA 1971, s 1(1) or s 1(1) and (3) (para 13.24) and to a charge of attempting or conspiring
to commit such an offence. They also apply to a charge of encouraging or assisting the commission of such an
offence contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2: Serious Crime Act 2007, s 63(1), Sch 6, Pt 1.
The provisions of the Theft Act 1968, s 30(4) would not seem to apply to the offences under the CDA 1971,
s 1(2) or s 1(2) and (3) referred to in paras 13.20 and 13.24. Those offences involve more than unlawful damage
and the defendant (D) can be convicted of them even if the damaged property only belongs to him. It would be
odd if there was a limit on prosecution when the property also belonged to D’s spouse or civil partner.
13.5 destroying or damaging property belonging to another | 
Damage and destruction

13.5 Property may be damaged if it suffers permanent or temporary physical harm
or permanent or temporary impairment of its usefulness or value.14 If part of a
machine is removed, without which it cannot work, the machine (but not the part)
may be damaged15 because its usefulness is impaired; likewise if the horizontal bars
of scaffolding are removed from the vertical parts, the scaffolding (but not the parts
removed) may be damaged.16 On the other hand, simply to deprive someone of the
use of property, eg, by wheel-clamping his aeroplane, does not amount to damage,17
apparently because there is no intrusion into the integrity of the property.18 A wall
may be damaged if slogans are painted on it, as may beer if water is poured into it,19
because its value is impaired. Grass may be damaged by trampling on it 20 and land
may be damaged by tipping loads of rubbish on it; such conduct impairs the useful-
ness and value of the grass or land (in the latter case the cost of removing the rubbish
reduces its present value).21 Although the property damaged must be tangible, the
damage itself need not be tangible. 22 Thus, the erasure or alteration of the magnetic
particles on an audio or video tape or disc may constitute damage to the tape or disc if
it impairs the value or usefulness of the tape or disc, even though there is no physical
harm to the tape or disc itself.23
The test of physical harm or impairment of the property’s usefulness or value does
not conclude the matter because, if the harm or impairment is minimal, it is likely to be
found that there is no ‘damage’ for the purposes of the Act. Since it is not necessary that
the effect of what has been done should be permanent, the fact that it is rectifiable does
not prevent the property being damaged. However, where it is rectifiable the amount (and
any cost) of rectification are relevant factors in determining whether there is damage;24
if these are minimal it may be found that what has occurred is not ‘damage’. In Roe v
Kingerlee,25 the Divisional Court held that graffiti smeared in mud on the wall of a police
cell could be damage, even though it could be washed off. A case where it might be found
as a matter of fact and degree that there was no damage might be spitting on someone’s
raincoat.26
14 Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48, DC; Whiteley (1991) 93 Cr App R 25, CA; Fiak [2005] EWCA Crim
2381. 15 Fisher (1865) LR 1 CCR 7, CCR; Getty v Antrim County Council [1950] NI 114.
16 Morphitis v Salmon [1990] Crim LR 48, DC.
17 Stear v Scott [1992] RTR 226 (note), DC; Lloyd v DPP [1992] 1 All ER 982, DC; Drake v DPP [1994] RTR
411, DC. 18 Drake v DPP above.
19 Roper v Knott [1898] 1 QB 868, DC. 20 Gayford v Chouler [1898] 1 QB 316, DC.
21 Henderson and Battley (1984) unreported, CA. 22 Whiteley (1991) Times, 6 February, CA.
23 Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App R 54, DC; Whiteley above. Note the actual decisions in these cases insofar as
they related to computers would now be different because of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 10(5).
24 See Cox v Riley above, for an example of this.
25 [1986] Crim LR 735, DC. See also Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary [1986]
Crim LR 330, Crown Ct; Fiak [2005] EWCA Crim 2381.
26 A (a juvenile) v R [1978] Crim LR 689, Crown Ct. (Crown Court held on appeal, acquitting the defend-
ant, that such spitting did not damage the raincoat where the spittle could be removed by a wipe with a damp
cloth.)
 | 13.6 offences of damage to property
Whether what is done to property amounts to ‘damage’ under the above principles is a
question of fact for the jury or magistrates.27
A modification of the contents of a computer is not regarded as damaging any compu-
ter or computer storage medium unless its effect on that computer or computer storage
medium impairs its physical condition.28 It may, however, constitute an offence under the
Computer Misuse Act 1990, s 3 (unauthorised act with intent to impair, or with reckless-
ness as to impairing, operation of computers, etc).
The destruction of property requires something more than damage. Examples
of destruction are the demolition of a machine, the pulling down of a wall or other
structure, reducing a dinghy to ashes by setting fire to it or the killing of an animal.
It would be most unusual for the process of destruction not to involve damage to the
property.
Property
13.6 For the purposes of the CDA 1971, ‘property’ is defined by s 10(1) as:
‘property of a tangible nature, whether real or personal, including money and –

(a) including wild creatures which have been tamed or are ordinarily kept in captiv-
ity, and any other wild creatures or their carcasses if, but only if, they have been
reduced into possession which has not been lost or abandoned or are in the course
of being reduced into possession;29 but
(b) not including mushrooms growing wild on any land or flowers, fruit or foliage of a
plant growing wild on any land.’30
This definition is very similar to the definition in the Theft Act 1968, s 4 of property
which can be stolen; but there are three differences. First, land itself cannot generally
be stolen, but there are no limits on when land can be the subject of criminal damage. If
someone moves his fence to capture a little of his neighbour’s lawn, he cannot be convicted
of theft of the lawn,31 but he can be convicted of criminal damage if he damages the lawn in
replacing the fence. Second, although intangible property can be stolen, intangible prop-
erty is not property for the purposes of criminal damage. Third, unlike theft (where they
can be stolen if picked for sale, reward or other commercial purpose) wild mushrooms and
the flowers, fruit or foliage of any wild plant cannot be the subject of criminal damage.
Belonging to another
13.7 The property destroyed or damaged must ‘belong to another’. Th is phrase is defined
by the CDA 1971, s 10(2)–(4). Section 10(2) provides:
27 Roe v Kingerlee [1986] Crim LR 735, DC; Henderson and Battley (1984) unreported, CA; Cox v Riley (1986)
83 Cr App R 54, DC.
28 CDA 1971, s 10(5), inserted by the Police and Justice Act 2006, s 52, Sch 14, para 2.
29 See para 10.36.
30 ‘Mushroom’ includes any fungus, and ‘plant’ includes any shrub or tree: CDA 1971, s 10(2). In relation to
various terms in s 10(1), see paras 10.26–10.36. 31 Para 10.35.
13.9 destroying or damaging property belonging to another | 
‘Property shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as belonging to any person –
(a) having the custody or control of it;
(b) having in it any proprietary right or interest (not being an equitable interest arising
only from an agreement to transfer or grant an interest); or
(c) having a charge on it.’
This definition is similar to that of ‘belonging to another’ in the Theft Act 1968, s 5(1),
dealt with in paras 10.38 to 10.49.
There are only two divergences from the Theft Act provision. First, the CDA 1971, s
10(2)(a) speaks of ‘custody or control’, as opposed to ‘possession or control’. These terms
are not defined by the CDA 1971, but it seems that ‘custody’ is intended to mean ‘physical
custody’ and ‘control’ to import the notion of the power to direct what shall be done with
the thing in question. These terms consequently avoid the technicalities connected with
the concept of possession. Second, s 10(2)(c) states that property belongs to a person who
has a charge on it (as where land is mortgaged by way of charge to a building society);
such a person (eg the building society) will have a proprietary right or interest in the
property and it is not obvious why special provision was made for charges by the Act.
The CDA 1971, s 10(3) and (4) provides that, as in the case of theft, where property is
subject to a trust, the person to whom it belongs shall include any person having the right
to enforce the trust; and that property belonging to a corporation sole is to be treated as
belonging to the corporation notwithstanding a vacancy in the corporation.32
The requirement that the property destroyed or damaged must belong to another
means that a person to whom alone the property belongs cannot be convicted under
the CDA 1971, s 1(1), if he destroys or damages it, however dishonest his motive (eg to
defraud an insurance company). On the other hand, as in the case of theft , an owner (or
someone else to whom the property belongs) can be convicted under s 1(1) if the property
also belongs to another.
Mens rea
13.8 The CDA 1971, s 1(1) requires that the defendant (D) must intend, or be reckless as to,
the destruction or damage of property belonging to another. As was confirmed by the Court
of Appeal in Smith (David),33 it is not enough for D to intend, or be reckless as to, the destruc-
tion or damaging of property; D must intend, or be reckless as to, the destruction or damag-
ing of property belonging to another, which D will not if he believes that the property is his.
‘Intention’ and ‘recklessness’ are discussed in paras 3.5 to 3.36.
‘Without lawful excuse’

13.9 A defendant who has committed the actus reus of an offence under the CDA 1971,
s 1(1) with the requisite mens rea is not guilty of that offence if he has a ‘lawful excuse’.
32 See the explanation of the corresponding provisions in paras 10.51 and 10.67.
33 [1974] QB 354, CA; see para 3.85.
 | 13.9 offences of damage to property
The CDA 1971, s 5(2) provides that:
‘A person [charged with an offence under s 1(1), or s 1(1) and (3), or with an offence under
s 2 or s 3 other than one of a specified type] shall, whether or not he would be treated for
the purposes of this Act as having a lawful excuse apart from this subsection, be treated
as having a lawful excuse –
(a) if at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed that
the person or persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to the destruc-
tion of or damage to the property in question had so consented, or would have
consented to it if he or they had known of the destruction or damage and its
circumstances; or
(b) if he destroyed or damaged or threatened to destroy or damage the property in
question or, in the case of a charge of an offence under s 3 above, intended to use
or cause or permit the use of something to destroy or damage it, in order to protect
property34 belonging to himself or another35 or a right or interest in property which
was or which he believed to be vested in himself or another, and at the time of the
act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed –
(i) that the property, right or interest was in immediate need of protection; and
(ii) that the means of protection adopted or proposed to be adopted were or would
be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances.’
Section 5(2) lays down two statutory grounds of lawful excuse:

• belief in consent; and
• belief in need to act in defence of property or a right or interest in property.
For these purposes, it is immaterial whether a necessary belief is reasonable or not,
provided it is genuinely held.36 In relation to both grounds, D has the burden of adducing
evidence to raise the issue.37 If there is some evidence, however tenuous or nebulous, it
must be left to the jury with a direction about it and the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the requirements of the ground in question are not satisfied; on no
account should the judge direct the jury to convict.38
34 Damage or destruction in order to protect oneself or another person is obviously not covered by this provi-
sion: Baker and Wilkins [1997] Crim LR 497, CA.
35 In Cresswell v DPP; Currie v DPP [2006] EWHC 3379, Keene LJ held that s 5(2)(b) cannot apply where both
the destroyed property and the thing sought to be protected are in the ownership of the same person; the other
judge (Walker J) left the point open.
36 CDA 1971, s 5(3). Even a drunken belief will suffice: Jaggard v Dickinson [1981] QB 527, DC; para 15.97.
37 Hill and Hall (1988) 89 Cr App R 74, CA. Th is requirement was interpreted strictly in Jones (Iorwerth)
[2003] EWCA Crim 894 at [14] where the Court of Appeal, in rejecting a claim that the judge should have left
the defence under s 5(2)(b) to the jury, said: ‘Before the defence can leave the ground, it is necessary . . . for the
defendant to assert in his evidence, and not merely through the mouth of his counsel and not merely through a
defence statement, that he had the necessary belief.’
38 Wang [2005] UKHL 9, disapproving Hill and Hall (1988) 89 Cr App R 74, CA on this point.
13.13 destroying or damaging property belonging to another | 
Belief in consent
13.10 The operation of the CDA 1971, s 5(2)(a) can be exemplified as follows. In Denton, 39
D set fire to some machinery on his employer’s premises and thereby damaged the
premises and their contents. D gave evidence that he had acted at his employer’s request,
so that the latter could make a fraudulent insurance claim. The Court of Appeal held
that D’s belief (which was conceded), that the person (his employer) whom he honestly
believed to be entitled to consent to the damage had so consented, provided him with a
lawful excuse under s 5(2)(a), despite the employer’s dishonest motive.
13.11 Blake v DPP40 shows the limits of s 5(2)(a). D, a vicar, took part in a demon-
stration against the Gulf War of 1991. He wrote a Biblical quotation with a marker
pen on a pillar outside the Houses of Parliament. D claimed that he was carrying out
the instructions of God and that he had a lawful excuse under s 5(2)(a) because he
believed that God was the person entitled to consent to the damage of the property.
The Divisional Court held that a belief that God had consented to the pillar being
damaged and that God was entitled to consent could not amount to a lawful excuse
under English law.
Belief in need to act in defence of property

or a right or interest in property
13.12 In relation to the CDA 1971, s 5(2)(b), the thing intended to be protected, unlike
that damaged, need not always be tangible; it can also consist of ‘a right or interest in
property’ (a term which includes any right or privilege in or over land, whether created
by grant, licence or otherwise).41 Just as a person is entitled in appropriate circumstances
to shoot a dog attacking his sheep, so is he entitled to demolish a wall barring a right of
way which he has (or believes he has).42
13.13 D has a lawful excuse within s 5(2)(b) if:
• D destroyed or damaged the property in question in order to protect property or a

right or interest in it;
• the property belonged to D or another or, as the case may be, the right or interest was
or was believed by D to be vested in himself or another;
• D believed the property to be in immediate need of protection; and
• D believed that the means adopted to protect it were reasonable, having regard to all
the circumstances.
Sometimes, the defence under s 5(2)(b) will overlap with the defence of prevention of
crime under the Criminal Law Act 1967 or the common law defence of defence of prop-
erty but it is available even if the threatened harm is not itself criminal or unlawful,43
39 [1982] 1 All ER 65, CA. Other aspects of this decision were criticised in Appleyard (1985) 81 Cr App R 319,
CA. 40 [1993] Crim LR 586, DC.
41 CDA 1971, s 5(4). 42 Chamberlain v Lindon [1998] 2 All ER 538, DC.
43 Jones (Margaret) [2004] EWCA Crim 1981. This point was not dealt with on appeal: [2006] UKHL 16.
 | 13.14 offences of damage to property
whereas the other defences are not.44 Thus, eg, a person who damages the equipment of
a council (which is being used in pursuance of the council’s power to abate a public nui-
sance), in order to protect his property but knowing that the threatened harm is lawful,
can invoke the defence under s 5(2)(b).
13.14 In order to protect property Although this requirement would seem to refer solely
to D’s purpose, ie what D was aiming to achieve, and nothing else, it has been held
that it has an objective aspect to be determined on the facts as D believed them to be.
In Hunt,45 D, who assisted his wife in her job as deputy warden of a block of old people’s
flats, set fire to some bedding in a relatively isolated part of the block. D said that he did
so in order to demonstrate that the fire alarm was not working (despite requests that it
be repaired) and thereby to protect the flats from the risks posed to them. Affirming D’s
conviction for arson, contrary to the CDA 1971, s 1(1) and (3), the Court of Appeal held
that, while D had acted in order to draw attention to the defective alarm, he had not done
so in order to protect property. It said:
‘The question whether or not a particular act of destruction or damage or threat of destruc-
tion or damage was done or made in order to protect property belonging to another must
be, on the true construction of the statute, an objective test. Therefore we have to ask our-
selves whether, whatever the state of this man’s mind and assuming an honest belief, that
which he admittedly did was done in order to protect this particular property, namely the
old people’s home in Hertfordshire?
If one formulates the question in that way, . . . it admits of only one answer: this was not
done in order to protect property; it was done in order to draw attention to the defective
state of the fire alarm. It was not an act which in itself did protect or was capable of pro-
tecting property.’ 46
This is tantamount to rewriting the present requirement.

Hunt was followed by the Court of Appeal in two cases where the facts were essentially
the same, Ashford and Smith47 and Hill and Hall, 48 In Hill and Hall D1 and D2 had been
convicted of possessing articles with intent to damage the perimeter fence of a naval base
without lawful excuse, contrary to the CDA 1971, s 3.49 They claimed that they had a law-
ful excuse because the base was an obvious target for a nuclear strike and consequential
damage to surrounding property and that they acted to have the base abandoned and
thus the danger removed. In the course of dismissing D1 and D2’s application to appeal,
the Court of Appeal held that the question was whether, on the facts as believed by D1
and D2, their intended act could amount to something done to protect people’s homes
adjacent to the base. It concluded that it could not.
Further authority for the present point is provided by Johnson v DPP, Blake v DPP and
Chamberlain v Lindon, referred to in para 13.16.
In Johnson v DPP,50 D, a squatter, chiselled off locks from the door of the house. His
defence was that he had done so to replace them with a lock of his own, in order to protect
44 Para 16.2. 45 (1977) 66 Cr App R 105, CA. 46 Ibid at 108.

47 [1988] Crim LR 682, CA. 48 (1988) 89 Cr App R 74, CA. 49 See para 13.31.
50 [1994] Crim LR 673, DC.
13.16 destroying or damaging property belonging to another | 
his property in the house which he believed to be in immediate need of protection, and
that therefore he had a lawful excuse under s 5(2)(b). The Divisional Court held that,
judged objectively, the damage caused in changing the locks could not have the effect
of protecting property. Applying the third and fourth, subjective, tests (paras 13.16 and
13.17) the Court also held that D had no belief that his property was in immediate need
of protection and that the means of protection were reasonable.
In Blake v DPP, referred to in para 13.11, D also claimed that he had a lawful excuse
under s 5(2)(b) because he damaged the pillar to protect property in the Gulf States. The
Divisional Court held that, judged objectively, D’s conduct could not be said to be done to
protect property in the Gulf States, as such protection was too remote from his conduct.
13.15 Property belonging to D or another D cannot rely successfully on s 5(2)(b) if what
he seeks to protect is neither property belonging to himself or another nor a right or
interest in property which is (or which he believes is) vested in himself or another. This
was the crucial point in Cresswell v DPP; Currie v DPP.51 D1 and D2 went onto farmland
and destroyed badger traps in order to protect wild badgers. On appeal to the Divisional
Court against conviction under the CDA 1971, s 1(1), Keene LJ held that, because badg-
ers had not yet entered a set trap (and thereby been reduced into possession) they were
not ‘property’ as defined by s 10(1)(a).52 Walker J did not come to a concluded view on
this point. However, both judges were agreed that the badgers did not belong to anyone
within the terms of s 10(2) because no one had possession or control of them, or any pro-
prietary right or interest in them. Thus, D1 and D2 could not rely on s 5(2)(b).
It is odd that, according to the wording of s 5(2)(b), where D acts in order to protect a
right or interest in property it is irrelevant that the right or interest is not vested in him or
another if he believes that it is, whereas if D acts in order to protect property itself it must
actually belong to D or another. The emphasis on D’s beliefs in much of s 5(2)(b) might
encourage a court to imply that a mistaken belief that the property for whose protection
D acts belongs to him or another (as where D acts to protect property which has been
abandoned and is ownerless, believing that it belongs to another) can satisfy the present
requirement under s 5(2)(b).
13.16 Belief that the property or right or interest is in need of immediate protection
Whether D believes that the property etc is in need of protection is a subjective ques-
tion. On the other hand, it has been held that whether the property etc is in need of
‘immediate’ protection is an objective question, to be determined by the court or jury
in the light of all the circumstances as D believed them to be. One such authority is Hill
and Hall, referred to in para 13.14, where the Court of Appeal went on to hold that there
was no evidence on which it could be said that, on the facts as they believed them to be,
D1 and D2 believed that the houses near the base were in need of immediate protection.
Whether there is a need of immediate protection will depend partially, at least, on whether
the perceived threat has taken shape or is merely speculative. Recognition of this may be
derived from the decision of the Divisional Court in Chamberlain v Lindon,53 where D
had destroyed a wall built on V’s land nine months previously, believing that doing so
was necessary to protect his own right of vehicular access across that land and that the
51 [2006] EWHC 3379 (Admin), DC. 52 Paras 10.36 and 13.6. 53 [1998] 2 All ER 538, DC.
 | 13.18 offences of damage to property
means adopted were reasonable in the circumstances. The Divisional Court held that the
magistrates had been entitled to find that D had a lawful excuse for the purposes of s 5(2)
(b). On the facts believed by D, his demolition of the wall could, it held, amount objec-
tively to something done to protect his right of way (and therefore it was done in order to
protect that right); the fact that D had chosen to demolish the wall to protect his right of
way because he hoped to avoid litigation did not mean that the act of destroying the wall
was not done by D in order to protect his right of way on the facts as he believed them.
Moreover, the Court held, the fact that the wall had stood for nine months did not prevent
there being, on the facts as D believed them, an immediate need for its removal; there was
a present need to remove the wall, and the longer it remained the more urgent the need to
remove it so as to avoid any suggestion of acquiescence in the obstruction. Referring to Hill
and Hall, Sullivan J (with whose conclusions and reasoning Rose LJ agreed) said:
‘The appellants in [Hill and Hall] had professed to be concerned as to the potential con-
sequences of a possible nuclear attack in the future. Here, on the facts, as believed by the
respondent, his right of way was actually being obstructed . . . [I]t was not a case of a risk
of there being an obstruction at some future speculative date, there was a present need
to remove the obstruction. The respondent was not destroying or damaging property as
some sort of pre-emptive strike to prevent some future obstruction.’54
13.17 Belief that the means adopted were reasonable This is a purely subjective require-
ment. In Chamberlain v Lindon, Sullivan J said:
‘[T]he question is not whether the means adopted by the defendant were objectively rea-
sonable having regard to all the circumstances, but whether the defendant believed them
to be so.’55
Th is is more liberal than the approach taken in respect of the private and public
defences, eg prevention of crime and self-defence, referred to in Chapter 16, which
requires D’s force to be objectively reasonable on the facts as he believed them to be,
regardless of whether he believes the force was reasonable.56 The Law Commission
considers that it is anomalous that a more stringent rule should apply when a person
injures another in defending himself than when he damages property to protect other
property. It has recommended that s 5 should be brought into line with self-defence
in this respect.57
Other types of defence

13.18 The CDA 1971, s 5(5) provides that the provisions in s 5 are not to be construed
as casting doubt on any defence recognised by law as a defence to a criminal charge, eg
the excuses of duress by threats or of circumstances, the justifications of prevention of
54 [1998] 2 All ER 538 at 544.

55 Ibid at 546. See also Jones (Iorwerth) [2003] EWCA Crim 894. 56 Para 16.23.
57 Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General Principles (1993), Law Com No 218,
para 37.6.
13.20 destroying etc property intending thereby to endanger life | 
crime and of defence of property,58 or statutory authority. A police officer, eg, in execut-
ing a search warrant, may, if denied entry, break a lock, thereby committing damage. He
would fall outside s 5(2)(a) or (b), but nevertheless he would have a lawful excuse for his
actions because the statutes under which search warrants may be granted authorise entry
by force, if necessary.
It will be noted that s 5(5) refers to a defence recognised by law. Thus, a person who
damages property in the belief that he has the consent of God to do so does not have a
lawful excuse because such a belief does not constitute a defence recognised by English
law. This was decided by the Divisional Court in Blake v DPP.59 Nor does a motorist have
a lawful excuse if he damages a car park barrier to free his car, having parked on property
with knowledge of the risk of being barred,60 since his conduct does not fall within any
recognised defence.
Destroying or damaging property intending

thereby to endanger life or being reckless as to
life being endangered thereby
Key points 13.2

By the CDA 1971, s 1(2):
‘A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, whether belong-
ing to himself or another –
(a) intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any
property would be destroyed or damaged; and
(b) intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being
reckless whether the life of another would be thereby endangered,
shall be guilty of an offence.’61
13.19 An offence under the CDA 1971, s 1(2) (‘aggravated criminal damage’) is triable
only on indictment62 and punishable with a maximum of imprisonment for life.63
13.20 There are two separate offences under s 1(2):
• criminal damage with intent to endanger life; and

• criminal damage reckless as to whether life would be endangered.64
58 Ch 16. 59 [1993] Crim LR 586, DC. Also see Hipperson v DPP [1996] CLY 1445, DC.
60 Lloyd v DPP [1992] 1 All ER 982, DC.
61 For the defi nition of various terms in s 1(2), see paras 13.5 and 13.6.
62 But see the correspondence in [1979] Crim LR 266 and 607 and [1980] Crim LR 69.
63 CDA 1971, s 4. 64 Roberts [1998] 1 Cr App R 441, CA.
 | 13.21 offences of damage to property
As a result the jury’s verdict of guilty of one of the above offences provides a more spe-
cific basis of the facts on which their verdict has been based and thereby assists the judge
in sentencing; the two types of mens rea involved in the present offences involve very
different degrees of mens rea. The prosecution should charge two counts, one alleging
an offence committed with intent to endanger life and one an offence committed reck-
lessly as to such endangerment, where there is reliance in the alternative on intention and
recklessness.65
Actus reus
13.21 The actus reus of an offence under s 1(2) consists in destroying or damaging any
property, whether belonging to D or another. It is not necessary that anyone’s life is
actually endangered by the destruction or damage caused. 66
Mens rea
13.22 D must intend to destroy or damage property or be reckless as to this.
In addition, D must intend by that destruction or damage to endanger the life of
another or be reckless as to whether that destruction or damage endangers the life of
another.
It was held by the House of Lords in Steer67 that it is not enough merely that D intends
to endanger life, or is reckless as to whether life would be endangered, by the act which
causes the destruction or damage. Accordingly, it held, a person who fires a gun from
outside a house at a person standing behind a window in it cannot be convicted under
s 1(2), even though he may have intended to endanger the life of that person, if he did not
intend his intended damaging of the window to endanger life (and was not reckless as to
that damage endangering life). Likewise, in Wenton,68 where D had smashed a window
in V’s house in which V and others were present, and then tried unsuccessfully to cause a
fire by throwing a petrol can and a lighted piece of paper through the window, the Court
of Appeal quashed D’s conviction for criminal damage to the window, being reckless as
to whether life would be endangered. It held that, although D might have been reckless
as to endangering life by fire, D had clearly not been reckless as to endangering life by the
act of damaging the window.
These decisions can be contrasted with Dudley,69 Webster and Warwick.70 In Dudley,
D set fire to V’s house with a fire bomb but V was able to extinguish the fire. Only triv-
ial damage was caused and life was not endangered. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal
upheld D’s conviction for arson being reckless as to endangering life, contrary to s 1(2) and
(3) (below). When D threw the firebomb he had clearly been reckless as to life being endan-
gered by the damage which the bomb might cause, and it was irrelevant that life had not in
fact been endangered by the damage caused. In Webster, the defendants pushed a coping
65 Hoof (1980) 72 Cr App R 126, CA. Also see Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848 at 853–854.
66 Dudley [1989] Crim LR 57, CA; Parker [1993] Crim LR 856, CA. 67 [1988] AC 111, HL.
68 [2010] EWCA Crim 2361. 69 [1989] Crim LR 57, CA.
70 Webster and Warwick are both reported at [1995] 2 All ER 168.
13.24 arson | 
stone from a bridge onto a passenger train. It hit the roof of a carriage and passengers were
showered with bits of the damaged roof. The trial judge had told the jury that they could
convict a defendant of aggravated criminal damage if he had intended to damage the train
and had intended to endanger the life of any passenger on whom the stone might fall. The
Court of Appeal held that this was a misdirection and quashed the defendants’ convic-
tions for intentional aggravated criminal damage. However, it substituted convictions for
aggravated criminal damage, being reckless as to endangering life, because the finding of
an intent by each of the defendants to endanger life by causing the stone itself to penetrate
the roof carried the implication that they were each reckless as to endangering life by what-
ever damage the stone might do when it fell. In Warwick, a passenger in a stolen car threw
a brick at a police car. The brick smashed a window, showering the officers with glass. The
Court of Appeal held that the broken glass (ie the damage to the vehicle) was capable of
causing the driver to lose control thereby endangering life and there was evidence from
which the jury could infer an intention to endanger life or recklessness as to this.
Lawful excuse
13.23 The question whether D had a lawful excuse for the purposes of the CDA 1971,
s 1(2), for acting as he did is dependent on the general law, whereas, as we have seen, there
are by virtue of s 5 of the CDA 1971 additional statutory defences of lawful excuse in
respect of offences of criminal damage contrary to s 1(1).
Arson
Key points 13.3

By the CDA 1971, s 1(3), if the destruction or damage contrary to s 1 (ie contrary to s1(1)
or s1(2)) is by fire, the offence ‘shall be charged as arson’.71
13.24 Arson contrary to the CDA 1971, s 1(1) and (3) is triable either way;72 the qualifica-
tion relating to ‘small value’ destruction or damage73 does not apply to it. Arson contrary
to s 1(2) and (3) is triable only on indictment. Arson, whether contrary to s 1(1) and (3) or
s 1(2) and (3), is punishable with a maximum of imprisonment for life. The higher maxi-
mum penalty for arson contrary to s 1(1) and (3) than is available for an offence under s
1(1) may be justified by the exceptional danger to life and property involved in the use of
fire for the destruction or damaging of property.
71 It is uncertain whether this means that, in the Crown Court, it is mandatory to use the word ‘arson’, or
whether it suffices to allege that the destruction or damage was by fi re: see Drayton [2005] EWCA Crim 2013,
where the point was left open, despite the view taken in Booth [1999] Crim LR 144, CA, that the use of ‘arson’ is
mandatory. In a magistrates’ court, the use of ‘arson’ is not mandatory, although it may be helpful if that word
is used: Drayton.
72 Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1. 73 Para 13.2.
 | 13.25 offences of damage to property
13.25 The requirements for arson contrary to s 1(1) and (3) and s 1(2) and (3) respec-
tively are the same as for s 1(1) and s 1(2) respectively, except that it must be proved that
the destruction or damage was caused by fire. The provisions of s 5 apply to the defence
of lawful excuse in respect of the offence of arson contrary to s 1(1) and (3), but not to
arson contrary to s 1(2) and (3).
13.26 There are two offences of arson contrary to s 1(2) and (3):
• arson with intent to endanger life; and

• arson reckless as to whether life would be endangered.74
There are therefore three separate offences of arson. As in the case of an offence contrary
to s 1(2), an allegation of an offence contrary to s 1(2) and (3) should contain two separate
counts: arson with intent to endanger life and arson being reckless as to life being endan-
gered, where there is reliance in the alternative on intention and recklessness.75
A typical example of an offence under the CDA 1971, s 1(2) and (3) is where D sets fire
to his own house, in order to make an insurance claim, despite being aware that someone
is asleep inside it.
Racially or religiously aggravated

criminal damage
13.27 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 30(1), as amended by the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act 2001, s 39, makes it an offence to commit an offence under the
CDA 1971, s 1(1) which is racially or religiously aggravated. The ‘racially or religiously
aggravated element’ is similar to that which applies to the offences of racially or religiously
aggravated assault, referred to in paras 7.95 to 7.111. However, because of the nature of
the offence of simple criminal damage, the definition of racial or religious aggravation
in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 28(1) has needed some modification, and this is
achieved by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 30(3). As modified – the modification
is in italics – s 28(1) provides that an offence is racially or religiously aggravated for the
purposes of s 30 if:
• at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so,
D demonstrates towards the person to whom the property belongs or is treated as
belonging for the purposes of the CDA 197176 hostility based on that person’s actual
or presumed membership of, or association with members of, a racial or religious
group; or
• the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial
or religious group based on their membership of that group.
74 Roberts [1998] 1 Cr App R 441, CA.

75 Hoof (1980) 72 Cr App R 126, CA. See also Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848 at 853–854.
76 See para 13.7.
13.29 threats to destroy or damage property | 
In addition to the requirement of racial or religious aggravation, the prosecution must

prove the elements of the offence of criminal damage contrary to the CDA 1971, s 1(1),
viz that D has intentionally or recklessly, and without lawful excuse, destroyed or dam-
aged property belonging to another. Because criminal damage by fire must be charged
as arson, punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment, contrary to the CDA 1971,
s 1(1) and (3), and is therefore not merely an offence under s 1(1), the offence of racially
or religiously aggravated criminal damage cannot be committed by fire.
13.28 An offence under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 30 is triable either way. The
maximum punishment on conviction on indictment is imprisonment for 14 years77 (as
opposed to 10 for an offence under the CDA 1971, s 1(1)).
It is noteworthy that the qualification (referred to in para 13.2) relating to the trial of
cases of damage or destruction not exceeding £5,000 in value in the case of an offence
under the CDA 1971, s 1(1) does not apply to racially or religiously aggravated criminal
damage. While the qualification is appropriate for the ‘ordinary’ case of simple criminal
damage it is not for the more serious conduct inherent in racially or religiously aggra-
vated criminal damage.
Threats to destroy or damage property

13.29 The CDA 1971, s 2 provides that:
‘A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other
would fear it would be carried out,
(a) to destroy or damage any property belonging to that other or a third person; or
(b) to destroy or damage his [ie the defendant’s] own property in a way which he knows
is likely to endanger the life of that other or a third person;
shall be guilty of an offence.’
The threat must be to do something which would be an offence against the CDA 1971, s 1.
It must be made with the intention of inducing a fear in the mind of the recipient that it
would be carried out.
In relation to the requirement in a case involving s 2(a) of a threat to destroy or dam-
age the property belonging to a recipient or a third party, the threat must be considered
objectively. The first issue is whether a threat was made. The second is in two parts:
• whether the threat, objectively considered, was capable of amounting to a threat to
destroy the property of another (a question of law, for the judge in the Crown Court);
and
• whether it was, in fact, such a threat (a question of fact, for the jury in the Crown
Court).78
77 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 30(2). 78 Cakmak [2002] EWCA Crim 500.
 | 13.30 offences of damage to property
A similar approach applies to the requirement of a threat in a case involving s 2(b).79

It does not matter how the threat is conveyed; a letter, a telephone call or any other
method of communication will do. Nor does it matter that the person making the threat
does not intend to carry it out, provided that he intends that the addressee should fear
that he would. It is irrelevant whether or not the addressee is actually put in such fear.
Where the threat is of the type described in s 2(a) ‘without lawful excuse’ is subject to
s 5 in the same way as the offence under s 1(1), but in the case of a threat falling within s
2(b) ‘without lawful excuse’ is not.80
13.30 An offence under the CDA 1971, s 2 is triable either way;81 the maximum punish-
ment on conviction on indictment is 10 years’ imprisonment.82
Possessing anything with intent to

destroy or damage property
13.31 The CDA 1971, s 3 provides that:
‘A person who has anything in his custody or under his control intending without lawful
excuse to use it or cause or permit another to use it –
(a) to destroy or damage any property belonging to some other person; or
(b) to destroy or damage his own or the user’s property in a way which he knows is
likely to endanger the life of some other person;
shall be guilty of an offence.’
The offence as described is a species of preparatory offence. Examples of it are possession

of a terrorist arsenal, the possession of pickaxe handles by protection racketeers, and
even the possession of paint or sprays by those who intend to write graffiti on the walls
of buildings.
Although the word ‘possession’ does not appear in the definition in s 3, the terms ‘in
his custody or under his control’ cover the same situations as possession, but their use
avoids the technicalities of the concept of ‘possession’. The explosives contained in a
warehouse may be in the custody of the keeper of that warehouse but they may also be
under the control of the leaders of the terrorist group, who can order their removal and
use at any time.
Provided that the requisite intention exists, it is immaterial that there is no immediate
intention to use the thing; a so-called conditional intent, ie an intention to use the thing
to cause damage should it prove necessary, will suffice.83
It would appear that the offence is committed if the thing, eg a stone, is picked up on
the spur of the moment with the intention of using it immediately to cause damage.
79 Ibid. 80 CDA 1971, s 5(1). 81 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1.
82 CDA 1971, s 4. 83 Buckingham (1976) 63 Cr App R 159, CA.
13.32 possessing anything with intent to destroy etc | 
Where the offence involves an intent falling within the CDA 1971, s 3(a) ‘without law-
ful excuse’ is subject to s 5, 84 but in the case of an intent falling within s 3(b) ‘without
lawful excuse’ is not.85
13.32 An offence under the CDA 1971, s 3 is triable either way;86 the maximum punish-
ment on conviction on indictment is 10 years’ imprisonment.87
FURTHER READING
Elliott ‘Endangering Life by Destroying or ATH Smith Property Offences (1994) Ch 27
Damaging Property’ [1997] Crim LR 69
84 In para (b) of the defi nition in s 5(2) set out in para 13.9, the question in s 3 is whether D intended to use or
cause or permit the use of something to destroy or damage property in order to protect property etc.
85 CDA 1971, s 5(1). 86 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1. 87 CDA 1971, s 4.
14
Inchoate offences
OVERVIEW
Criminal liability is not limited to those who actually commit or participate in substantive
offences. The criminal law also deals with a person who encourages or assists the commission of
an offence, or conspires with others to commit an offence or attempts to commit an offence. If D
does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission by P of a burglary at V’s house,
this constitutes encouraging or assisting burglary. If P agrees with D to commit the burglary,
this amounts to a conspiracy to commit burglary. If P then goes as far as attempting to enter V’s
house, but fails because he is discovered as he turns a picklock in the front door, P can be con-
victed of attempted burglary. As these examples show, a defendant may well be guilty of more
than one of these offences. They play an important role in modern crime control where there is
an increasing emphasis on the detection and apprehension of those engaged in serious crime at
an early stage before harm is caused.
The statutory offences of encouraging or assisting crime, conspiracy and attempt are known as
inchoate (ie incomplete or undeveloped) offences since they may be committed notwithstanding
that the substantive offence to which they relate is not committed. Indeed, if the substantive
offence is committed, no question of attempt normally arises, and where there has been encour-
agement or assistance the person encouraging or assisting becomes a party (as an accomplice)
to the substantive offence and will normally be proceeded against for that offence and not for an
offence of encouraging or assisting crime. Where conspirators have committed the substantive
offence a charge of conspiracy is generally undesirable because it tends to complicate the trial.
For convenience, common law conspiracy is also discussed in this chapter although it is not strictly
an inchoate offence since it includes agreements for objects which are not in themselves criminal.
Encouraging or assisting crime
Key points 14.1

There are three offences of encouraging or assisting crime:
• intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence;

• encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed; and
• encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed.
14.3 the offences | 537
14.1 Under the Serious Crime Act 2007 (SCA 2007), Pt 2 the common law offence of
incitement (which was limited to the intentional encouragement of crime) was abolished1
and replaced by the above three offences of encouraging or assisting crime. The SCA 2007,
Pt 2 is based on a Law Commission report, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging
Crime,2 although it differs from it in a number of respects. The Law Commission consid-
ered that the main defect of the previous law was that D1 who encouraged a crime was
instantly guilty of inciting it whether or not it took place, while D2 who actively sought to
assist a crime could only become guilty of an offence (as a party to the crime assisted) if
the crime assisted was subsequently committed or attempted by someone.3
The abolished common law offence of incitement was relatively simple and straight-
forward. The three offences which have replaced it are governed by 24 sections and two
Schedules of the SCA 2007, a set of provisions which are unnecessarily technical and
complex and which significantly extend the scope of liability.
14.2 The three offences of encouraging or assisting crime provided by the SCA 2007, Pt 2
apply to encouraging or assisting the commission of any offence by another person with
the exception of a number of offences, mainly of an inchoate nature, referred to later. In
addition, an individual cannot be guilty of an offence under the SCA 2007, Pt 2 in respect
of encouraging or assisting an offence of corporate manslaughter.4
Many of the provisions of the SCA 2007, Pt 2 apply to all three offences under it. Most
of those provisions are dealt with below after the terms of the offences have been set out.
The offences
Intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence

14.3 The SCA 2007, s 44 provides:
‘(1) A person commits an offence if –

(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence;
and
(b) he intends to encourage or assist its commission.
(2) But he is not to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the commission
of an offence merely because such encouragement or assistance was a foreseeable
consequence of his act.’
An example of an offence under s 44 would be where D sends P a lethal poison pill,

knowing that P wants it to murder V and intending to assist the commission of murder.
1 Serious Crime Act 2007, s 59. 2 Law Com No 300 (2006).

3 Ibid, paras 3.1–3.8. The need to plug this gap had been convincingly argued by JR Spencer ‘Trying to Help
Another Person to Commit a Crime’ in Essays in Honour of JC Smith (1987) (Smith (ed)) 148.
4 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 18(1A) (inserted by the SCA 2007, s 62).
538 | 14.4 inchoate offences
Another example would be where D exhorts P to burgle V’s home, intending to encour-
age P to do so.
Actus reus
14.4 D must do an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an
offence, other than an offence of encouraging or assisting suicide, contrary to the Suicide
Act 1961, s 2(1).5
Act capable of encouraging or assisting

14.5 The SCA 2007 does not offer a definition of the words ‘an act capable of encourag-
ing or assisting the commission of an offence’, but s 65 clarifies their meaning:
‘(1) A reference in this Part [ie Pt 2] to a person’s doing an act that is capable of encour-
aging the commission of an offence includes a reference to his doing so by threaten-
ing another person or otherwise putting pressure on another person to commit the
offence.
(2) A reference in this Part to a person’s doing an act that is capable of encouraging or
assisting the commission of an offence includes a reference to his doing so by –
(a) taking steps to reduce the possibility of criminal proceedings being brought in
respect of that offence;
(b) failing to take reasonable steps to discharge a duty.
(3) But a person is not to be regarded as doing an act that is capable of encouraging
or assisting the commission of an offence merely because he fails to respond to a
constable’s request for assistance in preventing a breach of the peace.’
14.6 Section 67 provides that any reference in Pt 2 to an act includes a reference to a

course of conduct, and that doing an act is to be read accordingly.
Indirectly encouraging or assisting

‘If a person (D1) arranges for a person (D2) to do an act that is capable of encouraging or
assisting the commission of an offence, and D2 does the act, D1 is also to be treated for the
purposes of this Part [ie Pt 2] as having done it.’
This covers the type of case where D1 tells D2 to assist in the commission of an offence,
and D2 does so; D1 is to be treated as having done the act of assistance done by D2. Both
of them can be convicted of an offence of assisting or encouraging crime. If D2 does not
do as he was told by D1, neither of them can be.
The reason for this provision is not obvious because D1 can be convicted of the ‘encour-
aging or assisting offence’ as an accomplice to it if D2 carries out the arranged act, as
explained in Chapter 17.
5 SCA 2007, s 51A (inserted by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Sch 21).
Mens rea
14.8 The mens rea, required by the SCA 2007, s 44(1)(b), is that D must intend to
encourage or assist the commission of the offence which his act is capable of encourag-
ing or assisting.
14.9 According to the explanatory notes to the Act,6 the statement in s 44(2) (that a person is
not to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the commission merely because such
encouragement or assistance was a foreseeable consequence of his act) is intended to make
clear that foresight of consequences is not sufficient to establish intention, ie that intention
in s 44 is limited to direct intention. While the wording of s 44, when contrasted with s 45,
supports the view that intention is so limited, it is unfortunate that ‘foreseeable’, and not
‘foreseen’, was used in s 44(2), because ‘foreseeable’ seems to refer to an objective concept.
14.10 The SCA 2007, s 47(2) provides that if it is alleged under s 44(1)(b) that D intended
to encourage or assist the commission of an offence, it is sufficient to prove that D intended
to encourage or assist the doing of an act which would amount to the commission of that
offence. D is not required to have known that that act constituted an offence; D does not
have to have knowledge of the relevant criminal law. Nor does D need to know who would
do the act or the identity of any potential victim. By s 47(8), reference in s 47 to the doing
of such an act
‘includes reference to:

(a) a failure to act,
(b) the continuation of an act already begun, and
(c) an attempt to do an act (except an act amounting to the commission of the offence
of attempting to commit anotherr offence).’7
The effect of s 47(8)(c) (taken together with s 47(2)) is that it is an offence under s 44 inten-
tionally to encourage or assist a substantive offence which is expressed as an attempt, such
as the offence of attempt to choke with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary
to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 21, or intentionally to encourage or assist
an attempt to commit a substantive offence (since such an attempt is itself an offence), but
not intentionally to encourage or assist an attempt to attempt to commit a substantive
offence (because this is excluded by the bracketed words in s 47(8)(c)).
Further provision about the mens rea for an offence under s 44 is made by s 47(5), set
out in para 14.24.
Supplemental provision
14.11 If a person’s act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of a number
of offences, the SCA 2007, s 44 applies separately in relation to each offence that he intends
to encourage or assist to be committed. 8 Thus, if D lends P a jemmy, intending P to use it
6 Para 146. 7 Italics supplied. 8 SCA 2007, s 49(2)(a).

to enter two houses (burglary) and to smash shop windows (criminal damage), D can be
convicted of three offences of encouraging or assisting under s 44. If D only believed that
P would use the jemmy in this way he would be guilty of encouraging or assisting these
offences under s 45.
Encouraging or assisting an offence believing

it will be committed

(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence;
and
(b) he believes –
(i) that the offence will be committed; and
(ii) that his act will encourage or assist its commission.’
Actus reus
14.13 The actus reus requirement is identical to that under s 44. The provisions of the
SCA 2007, ss 65–67 referred to in paras 14.5 to 14.7 apply likewise to s 45.
14.14 The SCA 2007, s 49(4)(a) provides that, in reckoning whether (for the purposes of
s 45 or s 46, below) an act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an
offence:
• offences under ss 44, 45 or 46; and
• ‘listed offences’
are to be disregarded. As a result, a person cannot be guilty under s 45 of encouraging
or assisting an offence under ss 44, 45 or 46 or a listed offence. ‘Listed offences’ are the
offences listed in the SCA 2007, Sch 3, Pts 1, 2 or 3.9 They are mainly statutory offences of
incitement and include the following offences referred to elsewhere in this book:
• solicitation of murder (Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 4);
• encouraging or assisting suicide (Suicide Act 1961, s 2(1));
• assisting an offender (Criminal Law Act 1967, s 4(1));
• concealing an offence for reward (Criminal Law Act 1967, s 5(1));
• statutory conspiracy (Criminal Law Act 1977, s 1(1));
• common law conspiracy, falling within the Criminal Law Act 1977, s 5(2) and (3);
• attempt (Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 1(1));
9 Ibid, s 49(5)(a).
• attempt under a special statutory provision,10 (ie a statutory offence expressed as an

attempt to commit another offence).
It will be noted that there is no corresponding exclusion of offences in respect of s 44. The var-
ious offences of incitement under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 are not included in the list in
Sch 3 and are therefore capable of being the subject of an offence under s 45 (or s 46 below).
Mens rea
14.15 The crucial distinction between an offence under the SCA 2007, s 45 and that
under s 44 is the mens rea required by s 45(b). Section 45 deals with the case where D
does not intend the substantive offence to be committed but believes that the substan-
tive offence will (and not simply might) be committed and that his act will encourage
or assist its commission.
Section 49(7) provides that, in relation to the former of these two beliefs, it is sufficient
if D believes that the offence will be committed if certain conditions are met. Thus, if D
encourages P to beg some money from V and tells him that, if V refuses, P should take
some money from V by force, the case is covered by s 49(7) and D can be convicted under
s 45 of encouraging or assisting robbery because D believes that the offence (of robbery)
will be committed if certain conditions are met (ie if V refuses to hand over money).
14.16 The SCA 2007, s 47(3) provides that if it is alleged under s 45(b) that D believed that
an offence would be committed and that his act would encourage or assist its commis-
sion, it is sufficient to prove that D believed:
• that an act would be done which would amount to the commission of that offence;
and
• that his act would encourage or assist the doing of that act.
D is not required to have known that the act which he believed would be done by another
person and which he believed his act would encourage or assist constituted an offence, nor
need he have known who was going to do the act or the identity of any potential victim.
Reference in s 47 to the doing of such an act includes a reference to a failure to act, the con-
tinuation of an act already begun, and an attempt to do an act (except an act amounting to
the commission of the offence of attempting to commit another offence).11 The reference to
‘an attempt to do an act’ does not mean that a person can be guilty under s 45 if he encour-
ages or assists an attempt merely believing that it will be committed. As stated in para
14.14, a person cannot be guilty under s 45 or s 46, below, of encouraging or assisting an
attempt to commit an offence. The phrase in this context refers only to situations where an
attempt to do an act suffices for the commission of the actus reus of a substantive offence
which is expressed as an attempt (as opposed to an attempt to commit another offence).
Further provision about the mens rea for an offence under s 45 is made by s 47(5), set
out in para 14.24.
10 The reference to ‘attempt under a special statutory provision’ has the same meaning as it has for the pur-
poses of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (see para 14.141): SCA 2007, Sch 3, Pt 3. It therefore refers to a statutory
offence ‘expressed as an offence of attempting to commit another offence’. 11 SCA 2007, s 47(8).
Supplemental provision
14.17 If a person’s act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of a number
of offences, the SCA 2007, s 45 applies separately in relation to each offence that he believes
will be encouraged or assisted to be committed.12
Encouraging or assisting offences believing

one or more will be committed
14.18 By the SCA 2007, s 46:
‘(1) A person commits an offence if –

(a) he does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of one or
more of a number of offences; and
(b) he believes –
(i) that one or more of those offences will be committed (but has no belief as
to which); and
(ii) that his act will encourage or assist the commission of one or more of
them.
(2) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (1)(b)(ii) whether the person has any
belief as to which offence will be encouraged or assisted.’
Section 46(3)(a) requires an indictment for an offence under s 46 to specify the offences
alleged to be the ‘number of offences’ mentioned in s 46(1)(a) that D believed might be
committed. For example, if the prosecution allege that D’s act was capable of encouraging
or assisting the commission of offences X, Y and Z, the indictment must specify all three
offences. However, by s 46(3)(b) this does not mean that every offence that D could have
encouraged or assisted must be specified.
The indictment in respect of a s 46 offence is discussed further in para 14.41.
14.19 In S13 the Court of Appeal explained when an offence under s 46 should be charged
as follows:
‘Section 46 should only be used when the prosecution allege that D’s act is capable
of encouraging or assisting more than one offence. Th is requirement is imposed by
s 46(3)(a). . . . If the prosecution wish to allege that D’s act was capable of encouraging
or assisting the commission of offences X, Y and Z, those three offences must be identi-
fied in the indictment (or count). . . .
Although the indictment need only specify two offences and could specify any number
greater than two, we shall assume for the purposes of explaining the s 46 offence that the
indictment specifies offence X, which is punishable by life imprisonment, offence Y which
is punishable by 14 years’ imprisonment and offence Z which is punishable by 10 years’
imprisonment.
12 Ibid, s 49(2)(b). 13 [2011] EWCA Crim 2872 at [37]–[40].

Section 46 should only be used, and needs only to be used, when it may be that D, at the
time of doing the act, believes that one or more of either offence X, orr offence Y or offence
Z will be committed, but has no belief as to which one or ones of the three will be com-
mitted. To take an example. D gives P a gun. Giving P a gun is, we shall assume, capable
of encouraging or assisting the commission of offences X, Y and Z and the prosecution
specify those three offences in the indictment. If it may be that D, at the time of giving the
gun, believes that one or more of offences X, Y and Z will be committed, but has no belief
as to which will be committed, s 46 should be used.’
Actus reus
14.20 D must do an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of one or
more of a number of offences. The provisions of the SCA 2007, ss 65 to 67 referred to in
paras 14.5 to 14.7 apply likewise to s 46.
The SCA 2007, s 49(4)(b) provides that an offence under s 44, 45 or 46, or a ‘listed
offence’, is to be disregarded in reckoning whether an act is capable of encouraging or
assisting the commission of one or more of a number of offences. See further para 14.14.
Mens rea
14.21 The SCA 2007, s 46(1)(b) requires that D must believe:
• that one or more of the offences which his act is capable of encouraging or assisting
will14 be committed (but has no belief as to which); and
• that his act will encourage or assist the commission of one or more of them.
By s 46(2), it is immaterial whether D has any belief as to which offence will be encour-
aged or assisted.
14.22 For the purposes of the first bullet point above, it is sufficient for D to believe that
one or more of the offences will be committed if certain conditions are satisfied.15
14.23 The SCA 2007, s 47(4) provides that if it is alleged under s 46(1)(b) that a person
believed that one or more of a number of offences would be committed and that his act
would encourage or assist the commission of one or more of them, it is sufficient to prove
that he believed:
• that one or more of a number of acts would be done which would amount to the com-
mission of one or more of those offences; and
• that his act would encourage or assist the doing of one or more of those acts.
D is not required to have known that the act or acts which he believed would be done by
another person and which he believed that his act was encouraging or assisting consti-
tuted an offence. Nor does D need to know who was going to commit the offence or the
14 In S [2011] EWCA Crim 2872 at [56] the Court of Appeal confirmed that the present requirement should
not be read as simply requiring a belief that one or more of those offences might be committed.
15 SCA 2007, s 49(7).
identity of any potential victim.16 Reference in s 47(4) to the doing of an act includes a
reference to a failure to act, the continuation of an act already begun, and an attempt to
do an act (except an act amounting to the commission of the offence of attempt).17 As to
the meaning of ‘attempt to do an act’, see para 14.16.
Further provision about the mens rea for an offence under s 46 is made by s 47(5),
below.
Common provisions
Further provisions about mens rea

14.24 The SCA 2007, s 47(5) sets out the mens rea that must be proved under s 44, 45
or 46 if an offence that it is alleged D intended or believed would be committed requires
proof of fault (ie mens rea) or proof of circumstances or consequences.
‘In proving for the purposes of [s 44, 45 or 46] whether an act is one which, if done, would
amount to the commission of an offence –
(a) if the offence is one requiring proof of fault, it must be proved that –
(i) D believed that, were the act to be done, it would be done with that fault;
(ii) D was reckless as to whether or not it would be done with that fault; or
(iii) D’s state of mind was such that, were he to do it, it would be done with that
fault; and
(b) if the offence is one requiring proof of particular circumstances or consequences
(or both), it must be proved that –
(i) D believed that, were the act to be done, it would be done in those circum-
stances or with those consequences; or
(ii) D was reckless as to whether or not it would be done in those circumstances or
with those consequences.’
In the case of an offence under s 44, s 47(5)(b)(i) is to be read as if the reference to ‘D believed’
were a reference to ‘D intended or believed’, but D is not to be taken to have intended
that an act would be done in particular circumstances or with particular consequences
merely because its being done in those circumstances or with those consequences was a
foreseeable consequence of his act of encouragement or assistance.18
It follows from s 47(5)(a) that, if an offence that D is alleged to have intended or believed
would be encouraged or assisted requires mens rea, D must believe or be reckless that, if the
act encouraged or assisted is done, it would be done with the necessary mens rea for it by
the person encouraged or assisted, or (by s 47(5)(a)(iii)) D himself must have the necessary
mens rea for that offence. The latter point is important where D thinks that the other person
16 These statements were confi rmed in S [2011] EWCA Crim 2872 at [56]. 17 SCA 2007, s 47(8).
18 Ibid, s 47(7).
14.24 common provisions | 545
will lack the mens rea. Thus, the offences under ss 44, 45 and 46 apply to the encouragement
or assistance of an innocent agent. Section 47(6) provides that, for the purposes of s 47(5)
(a)(iii), D is assumed to be able to do the act in question. Thus, D cannot escape liability
in respect of s 47(5)(a)(iii) simply because it is impossible for him to commit the offence
encouraged or assisted. Suppose that D (a woman) encourages P to penetrate V with his
penis, believing that if P were to do so it would be without V’s consent. D knows that P will
reasonably believe that V is consenting if P acts on D’s encouragement. Although a woman
cannot perpetrate rape, D can be convicted of encouraging or assisting rape.
It follows from s 47(5)(b) that a requirement to prove mens rea applies in respect of any
circumstances or consequences of the actus reus of the offence that D is alleged to have
intended or believed would be encouraged or assisted, and that this is so even though that
offence is one of strict liability as to that particular element. For example, the offence of
driving a motor vehicle on a road or other public place with excess alcohol, contrary to
the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 5, is one of strict liability, for which no mens rea is required.19
If D asks P to drive him to the station, in ignorance that P has been drinking and is ‘over
the limit’, D cannot be convicted of an offence of encouraging or assisting crime (the only
relevant one would be that under s 44) because he neither believes nor is he reckless that if P
complies with his request the driving would be in the circumstance that P is over the limit,
despite the fact that if P did drive D as requested P would commit the substantive offence.
Sometimes, as in the example just given, the mens rea requirement is higher for an
offence under ss 44 to 46 than for the substantive offence, but in other cases it will be
lower. In the offence of handling stolen goods, eg, D must know or believe that the cir-
cumstance that the goods are stolen exists,20 but on a charge under s 44, 45 or 46 it is
enough, by virtue of s 47(5), that D believes or is reckless that they are. Suppose that, at
P’s request, D drives P to T’s house so that P can pick up some laptops. D knows that T is
a ‘shady character’. He does not believe that the laptops are stolen but, if he is aware that
there is a possibility that they are, D can be convicted of the offence under s 45. It is open
to question why a person who is simply reckless as to a circumstance or consequence of
the substantive offence should be liable for encouraging or assisting that offence when it
may never be committed.
The operation of s 47(5) can also be illustrated as follows. Suppose that D encourages
P to beat V up. D clearly believes that P will act with the mens rea for assault occasioning
actual bodily harm and intends or believes that if the beating up is done the consequence
of actual bodily harm would result. D has therefore encouraged or assisted assault occa-
sioning actual bodily harm and can be convicted under s 44. If, however, P actually gives
V a particularly severe beating up, intending to cause him serious harm, and kills V, and
is thereby guilty of murder, D would not be guilty of encouraging or assisting murder
because he would lack the necessary mens rea under s 47(5).
In the case of an offence under s 46:
• it is sufficient to prove the matters referred to in s 47(5) by reference to one offence
only, 21 in which case there can be a conviction under s 46 by reference to that one
offence;
19 See para 15.39. 20 Para 11.51. 21 SCA 2007, s 48(2).

• the offence or offences by reference to which those matters are proved must be one of
the offences specified22 in the indictment,23 but this is subject to any rule whereby a
person charged with one offence may be convicted of another.24
Commission of offence encouraged or

assisted not required
14.25 The SCA 2007, s 49(1) provides that:
‘A person may commit an offence under [the SCA 2007, s 44, 45 or 46] whether or not any
offence capable of being encouraged or assisted by his act is committed.’
Like the other inchoate offences, the offences under ss 44, 45 and 46 are conduct crimes.
An offence under ss 44 to 46 is complete on the doing of an act capable of encouraging or
assisting an offence (whether or not anyone is actually encouraged or assisted, or is even
aware that he is being encouraged or assisted). It follows that subsequent withdrawal by
the person who gave the encouragement or assistance is no defence.
14.26 Where an offence encouraged or assisted has been committed, the offences under
the SCA 2007, ss 44, 45 and 46 exist alongside the rules about secondary liability for
the offence encouraged or assisted under the common law rules about aiding, abetting,
counselling or procuring crime. The Law Commission25 considered that there were
compelling reasons for retaining secondary liability and not confining liability to that
of encouraging or assisting the offence if it was committed. To do otherwise, as it had
earlier provisionally proposed,26 would not accurately label and condemn the encourager
or assister for his conduct. It would appear that in practice a person is normally charged
as a secondary party to the offence encouraged or assisted if it is committed, and not with
an offence under s 44, 45 or 46.
Overlap between offences

14.27 The potential overlap between the offences under the SCA 2007, s 44, 45 or 46 in
a given case is obvious. Section 49(3) provides that a person may, in relation to the same
act, commit an offence under more than one of s 44, 45 or 46. The following is an exam-
ple: D lends P a knife and believes that he will enter a building and commit burglary. D
also believes that P will use it to commit another offence which will either be to enter
another building and commit another burglary or to attack V in the street and wound
him. D could be convicted under s 45 of encouraging and assisting burglary. D could also
be prosecuted and convicted under s 46 of encouraging and assisting burglary or unlaw-
ful wounding.
22 Ie specified in the indictment by virtue of the SCA 2007, s 46(3)(a) (para 14.18): SCA 2007, s 46(4).
23 SCA 2007, s 48(3). 24 Ibid, s 48(4). 25 Law Com No 300, paras 2.1–2.26.
26 Assisting and Encouraging Crime (1993), Law Commission Consultation Paper No 131.
Defence of acting reasonably

14.28 The SCA 2007, s 50 provides two defences:
‘(1) A person is not guilty of an offence under [s 44, 45 or 46] if he proves –

(a) that he knew certain circumstances existed; and
(b) that it was reasonable for him to act as he did in those circumstances.
(2) A person is not guilty of an offence under [s 44, 45 or 46] if he proves –
(a) that he believed certain circumstances to exist;
(b) that his belief was reasonable; and
(c) that it was reasonable for him to act as he did in the circumstances as he believed
them to be.’
Section 50(1) applies where the circumstances referred to actually exist and D knows
this. Section 50(2) applies where the circumstances referred to may or may not exist but
D believes that they do; in such a case his belief must be reasonable.
Section 50(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining
whether it was reasonable for D to act as he did:
‘Factors to be considered in determining whether it was reasonable for a person to act as

he did include –
(a) the seriousness of the anticipated offence (or, in the case of an offence under section
46, the offences specified in the indictment);
(b) any purpose for which he claims to have been acting;
(c) any authority by which he claims to have been acting.’
The defence of acting reasonably is wide enough to cover cases where D acts in order
to prevent the commission of crime and can operate to avoid D being liable for an offence
under s 44, 45 or 46 in respect of conduct consisting of normal and commonplace activi-
ties or, more broadly, activities that might be thought to be within D’s rights to engage
in. An example given by the Law Commission 27 of the type of case which s 50 is designed
to cover is where D is driving at 70 miles per hour in the outside lane of a motorway.
P, driving faster, comes up behind D. D, not intending that P should continue speed-
ing, but knowing that pulling over will assist P to continue speeding, pulls over to let
P overtake.
Whether it was reasonable for D to act as he did may be a matter on which different
juries or magistrates’ courts have different views in a particular type of case and therefore
the operation of s 50 may be unpredictable.
It appears that s 50(1) and (2) imposes the persuasive burden of proof, but it would be
open to a court to read down the provision so as only to impose an evidential burden if
this is necessary to render it compatible with the ECHR, Article 6(2) (presumption of
innocence).
27 Law Com No 300, para 6.18.

Protective offences: victims not liable

14.29 The SCA 2007, s 51 provides that:
‘(1) In the case of protective offences, a person does not commit an offence under [s 44,
45 or 46] by reference to such an offence if –
(a) he falls within the protected category; and
(b) he is the person in respect of whom the protective offence was committed or
would have been if it had been committed.
(2) “Protective offence” means an offence that exists (wholly or in part) for the protec-
tion of a particular category of persons (“the protected category”).’
As a result of s 51, eg, a 12-year-old girl who encourages an adult to have sexual inter-
course with her cannot be convicted of an offence of encouraging or assisting the offence
of rape of a child under 13 because that offence is a ‘protective offence’; she falls within the
protected category of persons and she is the person in respect of whom the offence was or
would have been committed.
The exemption under s 51 mirrors that under the Tyrrell28 principle which applies to
victims of statutory offences under the law relating to secondary liability (aiding and
abetting etc), although unlike that law it is clear that it is not limited to protective offences
of a sexual nature.
Impossibility
14.30 The SCA 2007, Pt 2 does not provide that the impossibility of committing the
offence encouraged or assisted is a defence. The apparent unavailability of a defence
of impossibility is consistent with the situation in respect of statutory conspiracy and
of attempt, although in those cases the statute makes express provision about impos-
sibility. The fact that express provision is not made by the SCA 2007, Pt 2 about the
issue is unfortunate since it leaves it open for defendants to argue that impossibil-
ity is a defence to an offence under Pt 2 (just as it was to the common law offence of
incitement).29
Uncertainty
14.31 The SCA 2007, s 56 deals with the case where it is proved that D must have com-
mitted an offence under s 44, 45 or 46 or have committed the ‘anticipated offence’30 as
a perpetrator but it is not proved which of those offences he has committed. Section 56
28 See para 17.62. SCA 2007, s 51 gives effect to the recommendation of the Law Commission Inchoate Liability
for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (2006) Law Com No 300, para 6.44 that the Tyrrell principle should apply to
offences of encouraging or assisting crime.
29 See Whitehouse [1977] QB 868, CA; Fitzmaurice [1983] QB 1083, CA.
30 For the purposes of s 56, a person is not to be treated as having committed the anticipated offence because
he aided, abetted, counselled or procured its commission: s 56(2).
provides that in proceedings for an offence under s 44, 45, or 46 (‘the inchoate offence’) D
may be convicted of the inchoate offence if:
• it is proved that D must have committed the inchoate offence or perpetrated the
anticipated offence; but
• it is not proved which of those offences D committed.
The ‘anticipated offence’ is the offence mentioned in s 47(2),31 in relation to an offence
under s 44, or s 47(3),32 in relation to an offence under s 45, or an offence specified in the
indictment, in relation to an offence under s 46.33
Jurisdiction
Substantive offence anticipated to take place wholly or partly
in England or Wales
14.32 By the SCA 2007, s 52(1), if D knows or believes that what he anticipates might take
place wholly or partly in England or Wales, D may be guilty of an offence under s 44, 45
or 46 no matter where he was at any relevant time. Thus, if D in France e-mails P in Wales
encouraging him to kill V in Cardiff, D can be tried and convicted of any offence under
s 44 in England and Wales.
Substantive offence not anticipated to take place wholly or partly

in England or Wales
14.33 The SCA 2007, s 52(2) provides that, if it is not proved that D knows or believes that
what he anticipates might take place wholly or partly in England or Wales, he is not guilty
of an offence under s 44, 45 or 46 unless Sch 4, para 1, 2 or 3 applies.
Relevant behaviour by D within the jurisdiction

14.34 The SCA 2007, Sch 4, para 1 provides:
‘(1) This paragraph applies if –

(a) any relevant behaviour of D’s takes place wholly or partly in England or
Wales;
(b) D knows or believes that what he anticipates might take place wholly or partly
in a place outside England and Wales; and
(c) either –
(i) the anticipated offence34 is one that would be triable under the law of
England and Wales if it were committed in that place; or
(ii) if there are relevant conditions, it would be so triable if it were committed
there by a person who satisfies the conditions.
31 See para 14.10. 32 See para 14.16. 33 SCA 2007, ss 47(9), 56(3).
34 In relation to an offence under s 46, a reference in Sch 4 to the anticipated offence is to be read as a reference
to any of the offences specified in the indictment: SCA 2007, Sch 4, para 4.
(2) “Relevant condition” means a condition that –

(a) determines (wholly or in part) whether an offence committed outside England
and Wales is nonetheless triable under the law of England and Wales; and
(b) relates to the citizenship, nationality or residence of the person who commits
it.’
Thus, if D in London e-mails P (a British citizen) in France, encouraging P to kill V

in Paris, D can be tried and convicted in England and Wales of an offence under s 44
because the murder would be triable there, but not if the encouragement was simply to
disfigure V because the offence of causing grievous bodily harm would not be triable in
England and Wales in such a case.
14.35 The SCA 2007, Sch 4, para 2(1) provides:
‘This paragraph applies if –

(a) paragraph 1 does not apply;
(b) any relevant behaviour of D’s takes place wholly or partly in England or Wales;
(c) D knows or believes that what he anticipates might take place wholly or partly in a
place outside England and Wales; and
(d) what D anticipates would amount to an offence under the law in force in that
place.’
For example, if D in Newcastle sends P in New Zealand a picklock to be used in perpetrat-

ing a burglary there which would also be an offence under New Zealand law, D can be
convicted of an offence under s 44. The condition in para 2(1)(d) is deemed to be satisfied
unless the defence serve on the prosecution a notice denying this, showing the grounds
for that opinion and requiring the prosecution to show that it is satisfied.35 The ques-
tion whether the condition is satisfied is to be decided by the judge alone in the Crown
Court.36
Relevant behaviour by D wholly outside the jurisdiction

14.36 The SCA 2007, Sch 4, para 3(1) provides:
‘This paragraph applies if –

(a) any relevant behaviour of D’s takes place wholly outside England and Wales;
(b) D knows or believes that what he anticipates might take place wholly or partly in a
place outside England and Wales; and
(c) D could be tried under the law of England and Wales if he committed the antici-
pated offence in that place.’37
35 Ibid, Sch 4, para 2(2). 36 Ibid, Sch 4, para 2(3).

37 For the purposes of sub-para (c), D is to be assumed to be able to commit the anticipated offence: ibid,
Sch 4, para 3(2).
Thus, if D (a British citizen) in Canada sends a parcel of poison to P in France encour-

aging P to use it to murder V (also in France), it would be possible to try and convict D
of an offence under s 44 in England because, as he is a British citizen, the anticipated
offence (murder) would be triable in England and Wales if D committed it himself in
France.38
General
14.37 By the SCA 2007, s 52(3), a reference in s 52 and in Sch 4, paras 1 to 3 to what D
anticipates is to be read as follows:
‘(a) in relation to an offence under section 44 or 45, it refers to the act which would
amount to the commission of the anticipated offence;39
(b) in relation to an offence under section 46, it refers to an act which would amount to
the commission of any of the offences specified in the indictment.’
14.38 The rules contained in the SCA 2007, s 52 and Sch 4 do not restrict the operation
of any special jurisdictional rules under other statutes,40 such as those under the Sexual
Offences Act 2003, s 72, referred to in para 9.123, and those under the Criminal Justice
Act 1993 (CJA 1993), Pt I.
Under the CJA 1993, ss 5(4) and 6(2), D may be convicted of encouraging or assisting
the commission of a Group A offence41 (viz one of the offences under the Theft Act 1968,
Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, Fraud Act 2006 and related offences listed in CJA
1993, s 1: see para 12.70) if:
• the encouraging or assisting takes place in England and Wales;
• the encouraging or assisting would be triable in England and Wales but for what
the person charged had in view not being an offence triable in England and Wales
because it is not wholly or partly committed there (as where D in Cardiff encourages
P in Rome to commit theft there); and
• what D had in view would be an offence under the law in force where the whole or
part of it was intended to take place.
This condition is deemed to be satisfied unless the defence serve a notice on the
prosecution stating that in their opinion it is not, giving their grounds for that opin-
ion and requiring the prosecution to show that it is satisfied.42 The question whether
the condition is satisfied is to be decided by the judge alone.43 It is irrelevant whether
or not D was a British citizen at any material time or was in England and Wales at
any such time.44
38 Th is example is given in the explanatory notes to the Act.

39 For the meaning of ‘the anticipated offence’ see para 14.31. 40 SCA 2007, s 52(5).
41 Section 5(4) refers to the repealed common law offence of inciting the commission of a Group A offence but
that reference now has effect as a reference to the offences under the SCA 2007, Pt 2: SCA 2007, s 63(1), Sch 6, Pt
1. Encouraging or assisting the commission of a Group A offence is a Group B offence under the CJA 1993, Pt 1:
CJA 1993, s 1(3)(d) (as amended by the SCA 2007, s 63(1), Sch 6, Pt 1).
42 CJA 1993, s 6(4). 43 Ibid, s 6(7). 44 Ibid, s 3(1).

Prosecution
14.39 No proceedings for an offence triable by virtue of any provision of the SCA 2007,
Sch 445 may be instituted except by, or with the consent of, the Attorney General.46
14.40 Any statutory provision that proceedings may not be instituted or carried on oth-
erwise than by, or on behalf or with the consent of, any person, eg the Attorney General
or Director of Public Prosecutions, has effect with respect to an offence under the SCA
2007, s 44, 45 or 46 as it has effect with respect to the anticipated offence.47
Trial
14.41 An offence under the SCA 2007, s 44 or 45 is triable in the same way as the antici-
pated offence. An offence under s 46 is triable only on indictment.48
In S,49 the Court of Appeal stated that, where there is to be a trial on a charge of a s 46
offence, the better practice is to have separate counts (of encouraging or assisting, as the
case may be) in the indictment for each of the offences (eg X, Y and Z), each alleging a s 46
offence by reference to one of those offences (eg count 1: assisting in offence X, count 2:
assisting in offence Y, and count 3: assisting in offence Z). The particulars, the Court held,
should be the same and should allege, eg, that D did a specified act which was capable of
assisting one or more offences of offence X, offence Y and offence Z believing that one or
more of those offences would be committed but having no belief as to which and that his
act would assist in the commission of one or more of those offences.50 It continued:
‘D cannot be convicted of count 1 (the other ingredients being satisfied) unless at the time
of doing the act [specified in the count]:
(a) either:
(i) D believes that X will be committed; or
(ii) D believes that one or more of the offences specified in the indictment (X, Y
and Z) will be committed but has no belief as to which; and
45 Paras 14.33–14.36.
46 SCA 2007, s 53(1).
Section 53(1) does not apply to an offence under SCA 2007, s 44, 45 or 46 committed in relation to an offence
under the Bribery Act 2010: SCA 2007, s 53(2) (inserted by the Bribery Act 2010, Sch 1). In respect of such an
offence under SCA 2007, s 44, 45 or 46, a prosecution for an offence triable by virtue of SCA 2007, Sch 4 may
only be instituted by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of the Serious
Fraud Office or the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions, which function must be exercised person-
ally by the relevant Director. The only exception is where the relevant Director is unavailable, in which case a
designated deputy authorised in writing by that Director for this purpose may exercise that function, but must
do so personally.
47 SCA 2007, s 54(1) and (2)(a). In relation to an offence under s 46: (a) this reference to the anticipated offence
is to be read as a reference to any offence specified in the indictment; and (b) each of the offences specified in
the indictment must be an offence in respect of which the prosecutor has power to institute proceedings: SCA
2007, s 54(3). 48 Ibid, s 55.
49 [2011] EWCA Crim 2872. 50 Ibid at [45]–[48] and [83]–[86].
(b) D believes that his act [ie the act specified in the count] will encourage or assist the
commission of X; and
(c) D believes that X will be committed with the necessary fault for X.’ 51
Likewise, D can only be convicted of count 2 or count 3 if these requirements are fulfilled
in relation to offence Y or Z respectively.52
The Court of Appeal concluded that interpreted in the above way the s 46 offence
was neither vague nor uncertain and therefore was not incompatible with the ECHR,
Article 7.53
Punishment
14.42 The following provisions apply if:
• a person is convicted of an offence under the SCA 2007, s 44 or 45; or

• a person is convicted of an offence under s 46 by reference to only one offence (‘the
reference offence’).54
If the anticipated or reference offence is murder, the maximum punishment is imprison-
ment for life.55 In any other case the maximum punishment is the same as for the antici-
pated or reference offence.56 Suppose that D gives P an axe and he is charged under s 46,
it being alleged that he believed that either criminal damage or murder would be com-
mitted with it. D is convicted under s 46 in relation to the criminal damage but acquitted
in relation to the murder. The maximum sentence will be that for criminal damage.
14.43 Where a person is convicted under the SCA 2007, s 46 by reference to more than
one reference offence (‘the reference offences’), the situation is as follows:
• if one of the reference offences is murder, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment;
• otherwise, if one or more of the reference offences is punishable with imprisonment,
the maximum punishment is the maximum term of imprisonment for any of the
offences or the longer (or longest) maximum if the terms differ. Alternatively, a fine
may be imposed;
• in any other case, a fine may be imposed.57
Thus, if D lends P a van believing that P may use it to traffic people for sexual exploitation
and that P may also use it for theft, and D is convicted under s 46 of encouraging or
51 Ibid at [49] and [87].

52 Ibid at [88]. Relevant offences alternative to offences X, Y and Z (lesser included offences) must be dealt
with in the same way: ibid at [89].
If the indictment includes one count covering offence X, offence Y and offence Z, the same principles apply
and the jury must determine whether D is guilty by reference to offence X and/or Y and/or Z as appropriate:
ibid at [90]. 53 Ibid at [91].
54 SCA 2007, s 58(1). 55 Ibid, s 58(2).
56 Ibid, s 58(3). In the case of encouraging or assisting ‘small value criminal damage’, the maximum is the
lower maximum for small value damage: see para 13.2.
57 SCA 2007, s 58(4)–(7). If a reference offence is ‘small value criminal damage’, the comment at n 46 is
equally applicable here.
assisting both offences, the maximum sentence will be 14 years’ imprisonment (the max-
imum for the trafficking offence), as opposed to seven years’ (the maximum for theft).
Conspiracy: general
Key points 14.2

There are statutory and common law offences of conspiracy:
• It is a statutory conspiracy to agree with any other person or persons for the
commission of an offence or offences.
• It is a common law conspiracy to agree with any person or persons to defraud or,
possibly, to corrupt public morals or to outrage public decency.
14.44 Until the Criminal Law Act 1977 (CLA 1977), Pt I (551 to 5) came into force, the
common law offence of conspiracy was the only general offence of conspiracy known to
the criminal law. An agreement was a common law conspiracy if it had one of five types
of object:
• to commit a criminal offence;
• to pervert the course of justice. Generally, this did not add much to the first type,
since normally the perversion of justice was a criminal offence;
• to commit a tort, such as trespass, provided the execution of the agreement had as
its object either:
– the invasion of the ‘public domain’, eg trespass in an embassy; or
– the infliction of injury or damage which was more than nominal;
• to defraud; or
• to corrupt public morals or to outrage public decency.
The width of the non-criminal objects of a conspiracy was open to severe criticism, par-
ticularly since it was not obvious why, if a particular act was not criminal when done,
an agreement to do it should be criminal. Following the recommendations of the Law
Commission, 58 the CLA 1977, Pt I introduced the statutory offence of conspiracy contrary
to s 1 of that Act, which basically penalises agreements for the commission of a criminal
offence and greatly altered the extent of the common law offence of conspiracy since,
with limited exceptions, that offence was abolished by the CLA 1977, s 5(1). Conspiracies
to defraud and, to the extent that the conduct agreed on does not in itself amount to or
involve a criminal offence, conspiracies to corrupt public morals or to outrage public
decency are the only common law conspiracies excepted from the abolition. The rules for
statutory conspiracy under the CLA 1977 do not apply to common law conspiracy.
58 Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform (1976), Law Com No 76.
14.46 conspiracy: general | 555
14.45 Before discussing the separate requirements of statutory conspiracy and what
remains of common law conspiracy, reference must be made to some matters which are
common to both types of conspiracy.
Agreement 59
14.46 There cannot be a conspiracy unless there is a concluded agreement for a par-
ticular purpose; mere negotiations are insufficient,60 as is an uncommunicated intention
to enter into an agreement.61 There may be any number of parties to the agreement. The
offence is complete as soon as the parties agree 62 and it is immaterial that they never
begin to put it into effect.63 In Saik, 64 Lord Hope said:
‘A conspiracy is complete when the agreement to enter into it is formed, even if nothing is
done to implement it. Implementation gives effect to the conspiracy, but it does not alter
its essential elements. . . . The question whether its requirements are fulfi lled is directed to
the stage when the agreement is formed, not to the stage when it is implemented.’
The repentance and withdrawal of a party after the agreement has been made cannot
affect his liability for conspiracy, 65 although it may mitigate the sentence imposed.
It is not necessary that all the parties to the agreement should all have been in commu-
nication with each other, provided they entertained a common purpose, communicated
to at least one other party, expressly or tacitly, in relation to the object of the conspiracy.66
This can occur, eg, in a ‘chain’ or ‘wheel’ conspiracy. In a chain conspiracy D1 agrees with
D2, D2 agrees with D3, D3 agrees with D4 and so on. In a wheel conspiracy, D1 is the
‘hub’ of the wheel, who recruits D2, D3, D4 and so on into his plan. This could occur, for
instance, with members of a society who had each worked for the same end under some
common superior but had never communicated with each other.67 However, for D1 and
D4, for example, to be parties to the same agreement (and therefore to be parties to the
same conspiracy), they must be aware of each other’s involvement (although not of their
identities); otherwise there will be separate agreements (conspiracies) involving those
who are aware of each other’s involvement.68
Although conspiracy is committed as soon as the agreement for the ‘unlawful’ object is
made, conspiracy is a continuing offence and is committed not only when agreement is
first reached but also as long as the agreement to effect the unlawful object continues, ie
until the agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment
59 Orchard ‘ “Agreement” in Criminal Conspiracy’ [1974] Crim LR 297 at 335.

60 Jones (1832) 4 B & Ad 345 at 349, per Denman CJ. 61 Scott (1978) 68 Cr App R 164, CA.
62 Hobbs [2002] EWCA Crim 387.
63 Poulterer’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 55b; Bolton (1992) 94 Cr App R 74, CA.
64 [2006] UKHL 18 at [75].
65 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1888) 21 QBD 544 at 549; affd [1892] AC 25, HL; Bolton
(1992) 94 Cr App R 74, CA.
66 Ardalan [1972] 2 All ER 257, CA; Scott (1978) 68 Cr App R 164, CA; Chrastny (No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 189, CA.
67 See summing up of Fitzgerald J in Parnell (1881) 14 Cox CC 508 at 516. See also Meyrick and Ribuffi (1929)
21 Cr App R 94, CCA. 68 Griffiths [1965] 2 All ER 448, CCA.
or frustration or however it may be.69 The most important result of this is that a number
of persons may be held parties to the same conspiracy although they joined it at differ-
ent times.70
14.47 The fact that there must be two or more parties to constitute an agreement
means that:
• A director who is the ‘one man’ of a ‘one-man company’ cannot be convicted of
conspiring with the company in spite of the fact that a company can be held guilty
of conspiracy and is in law a separate entity from its directors.71 This is because,
in order that there should be a conspiracy, there must be an agreement between
two minds, and the director’s mind is that of the company only in a purely artifi-
cial sense. A company can be convicted of conspiring with several of its directors,
but presumably the rule with regard to the one-man company would prevent two
‘one-man companies’ with the same ‘one man’ from being convicted of conspiring
together.
• If the only parties to an agreement are husband and wife neither can be convicted
of conspiracy. A person is not guilty of conspiracy if the only other person with
whom he or she agrees is his or her spouse.72 This rule stems from the outmoded
principle that spouses are regarded as one person in law,73 which has been held by the
Court of Appeal no longer to apply to the tort of conspiracy.74 It remains undecided
whether the rule applies to a husband and wife whose marriage is of a type which is
actually or potentially polygamous.75 If the only parties to an agreement are civil
partners of each other neither can be convicted of statutory conspiracy. A person
is not guilty of statutory conspiracy if the only other person with whom he or she
agrees is his or her civil partner.76
These rules serve no useful purpose and should be abolished.
It seems anomalous that if spouses or civil partners agree between themselves to
commit an offence they cannot be convicted of conspiracy, whereas if the substan-
tive offence is committed by one of them pursuant to the agreement they can both be
convicted of that offence as perpetrator and accomplice respectively.
A husband and wife (or civil partner and civil partner in the case of a statutory
conspiracy) can be convicted of conspiring together with a third party,77 even if one
of them does not know the identity of the third party. However, if A, a spouse or (in
69 DPP v Doot [1973] AC 807, HL; Reilly [1982] QB 1208, CA. See also Khalil [2003] EWCA Crim 3467
(D became involved after a contract killer (an undercover police officer) had apparently committed the murder;
held D could not be convicted of conspiracy to murder).
70 Murphy and Douglas (1837) 8 C & P 297 at 311; Sweetland (1957) 42 Cr App R 62 at 67.
71 McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233.
72 Mawji v R [1957] AC 126, PC (common law conspiracy); CLA 1977, s 2(2)(a) (amended by the Civil
Partnership Act 2004, Sch 27) (which provides that a person is not guilty of statutory conspiracy if the only
other person with whom he agrees is (both initially and at all times during the currency of the agreement) his
spouse or civil partner). 73 1 Hawkins c 27, s 8.
74 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1982] Ch 529, CA.
75 Th is point was left open in Mawji v R [1957] AC 126, PC, in relation to the rule at common law.
76 CLA 1977, s 2(2)(a): see n 72. There is no ‘one person in law’ principle in relation to civil partners.
77 Whitehouse (1852) 6 Cox CC 38.
14.48 conspiracy: general | 557
the case of statutory conspiracy) civil partner of B, agrees with B for a relevant object
in ignorance of an agreement for that object between B and another (C), A cannot be
so convicted. Not knowing of B’s agreement with C, A cannot be said to have agreed
with C but only with his or her spouse or civil partner.78 This makes the above rules
even more anomalous.
Acquittal of all save one

14.48 Suppose D1 and D2 (or D1, D2 and D3) are charged with conspiracy and that
D2 is (or D2 and D3 are) acquitted, can D1 nevertheless still be convicted?
In answering this question two situations must be distinguished.
The first is where a conspiracy is charged as being between two or more accused per-
sons (eg D1 and D2 or D1, D2 and D3) and a person or persons unknown, dead or simply
not charged. Here, it has long been established that the acquittal of D2 (or D2 and D3)
does not prevent the conviction of D1.79
The second situation is where two or more persons (eg D1 and D2 or D1, D2 and D3) are
charged in the same indictment with conspiracy together (but not with others), and all
but one of them (eg D1) are acquitted. This can happen, eg, where evidence is admissible
against one conspirator but not against another. At common law, D1 could nevertheless
be convicted if he was tried separately from D2 (or D2 and D3)80 but not if he was tried
together with them.81 However, the CLA 1977, s 5(8) now provides that:
‘The fact that the person or persons who, so far as appears from the indictment on which
any person has been convicted of conspiracy, were the only other parties to the agreement
on which his conviction was based have been acquitted of conspiracy by reference to that
agreement (whether after being tried with the person convicted or separately) shall not be
a ground for quashing his conviction unless under all the circumstances of the case his
conviction is inconsistent with the acquittal of the other person or persons in question.’
The effect of this provision was explained by the Court of Appeal in Longman, 82 as fol-
lows. Where, in a case where D1 and D2 are tried together for conspiracy together but
with no one else, the evidence against D1 and D2 is of equal weight or nearly equal weight,
so that a verdict of guilty against D1 and of not guilty against D2 would be inexplicable
and therefore inconsistent, the judge must direct the jury that the only verdicts open to
them are to convict both or to acquit both. The judge must add that, if the jury are unsure
about the guilt of one of them, they must acquit both. On the other hand, where the
strength of the evidence against D1 and D2 in such a case is (in the view of the judge)83
markedly different, the judge must direct the jury to consider each case separately and
78 Chrastny (No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 189 at 192.

79 For an authority, see Anthony [1965] 2 QB 189, CCA. Also see Nichols (1745) cited in 13 East 412n; Cooke
(1826) 5 B & C 538. 80 DPP v Shannon [1975] AC 717, HL.
81 Plummer [1902] 2 KB 339; Coughlan (1976) 64 Cr App R 11, CA. In DPP v Shannon above, obiter dicta on
this point differed. 82 (1980) 72 Cr App R 121, CA. See also Testouri [2003] EWCA Crim 3735.
83 Roberts (1983) 78 Cr App R 41, CA.
direct them that they may conclude that the prosecution has proved that D1 conspired
with D2 but has not proved any such conspiracy against D2, in which event they should
convict D1 but acquit D2.
Statutory conspiracy
Key points 14.3

Although a number of statutes specially provide that a particular type of conspiracy is an
offence, the term ‘statutory conspiracy’ is used here to describe the offence of conspiracy
to commit a criminal offence contrary to the CLA 1977, s 1.
A person is guilty of a statutory conspiracy if he agrees with one or more persons that
a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance
with their intentions, will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence
or offences by one or more of them (or would do so but for the existence of facts rendering
the commission of the offence or any of the offences impossible).
The CLA 1977, s 2 sets out a number of exemptions from liability.
14.49 The rules laid down for statutory conspiracy by the CLA 1977, ss 1 and 2 also apply
for determining whether a person is guilty of an offence of conspiracy under any other
enactment, but conduct which is an offence under such an enactment is excluded from
being an offence under s 1.84
Because a statutory conspiracy to commit an offence is a separate offence from the
substantive offence to which it relates, special rules provided in relation to that offence,
such as a reverse onus provision or about orders which can be made on conviction, do
not apply to a conspiracy for the commission of that offence, 85 unless statute has decreed
otherwise.86
14.50 The CLA 1977, s 1(1), as substituted by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s 5(1),
provides:
‘Subject to [the other provisions of the CLA 1977, Pt I], if a person agrees with any other
person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is
carried out in accordance with their intentions, either –
(a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by
one or more of the parties to the agreement, or
84 CLA 1977, s 5(6).

85 Cuthbertson [1981] AC 470, HL (forfeiture provision in respect of substantive offence inapplicable on con-
viction of conspiracy to commit it); McGowan [1990] Crim LR 399, CA (defence under Misuse of Drugs Act 1971
inapplicable on charge of conspiracy to produce a controlled drug); A-G, ex p Rockall [1999] 4 All ER 312, DC
(presumption of corruption provided by Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, s 2 (since repealed), in respect of
offence under Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, s 1 (since repealed), inapplicable on charge of conspiracy to
commit that offence). 86 For examples where statute has so decreed, see para 14.78 (c) and (d).
14.53 statutory conspiracy | 559
(b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the
offence or any of the offences impossible,
he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in question.’
Unlike the offences of encouragement or assisting crime there is no defence of acting

reasonably.
It is particularly difficult to divide the defi nition of statutory conspiracy into actus
reus and mens rea because even the element of agreement involves a mental state on
the part of the defendant. Nevertheless, for the purposes of exposition some division
must be made, although it is not pretended that the division made here is the only
possible one.
Actus reus
14.51 There must be an agreement (as explained above) between two or more people
which satisfies the terms of the CLA 1977, s 1(1).
The key issue, derived from s 1(1)(a), is whether the course of conduct agreed on
by the parties will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence
or offences by one or more of them if it is ‘carried out in accordance with their inten-
tions’. If D1 and D2, visitors to this country, agree to persuade someone they have met to
engage in a ‘threesome’ with them, mistakenly believing that their intended conduct is an
offence, they are not guilty of statutory conspiracy, because if their agreement is carried
out it will not amount to the commission of an offence. On the other hand, if D1 and D2
agree to have sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, there is a statutory
conspiracy to rape because the course of conduct agreed on – sexual intercourse – will
necessarily amount to or involve the commission of rape if it was carried out in accord-
ance with their intentions.
14.52 Because the CLA 1977, s 1 expressly contemplates that a conspiracy may involve
the commission of a substantive offence by one or more, but not all, of the conspirators,
a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy where he is the intended ‘object’ of the sub-
stantive offence.87 An example would be where D agrees with another, or others, for the
supply to him of a controlled drug or the publication to him of an obscene article.88 This
rule does not apply if the person who is the intended object could not be convicted of the
substantive offence as a perpetrator or accomplice; see para 14.74.
14.53 In Hollinshead, 89 the Court of Appeal held that ‘the commission of any offence . . . by
one or more of the parties to the agreement’ meant commission by one or more of them
as a perpetrator and not simply as an accomplice, so that there could not be a statutory
conspiracy to aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence by someone not
party to the agreement. On appeal, the House of Lords did not consider it necessary to
decide whether or not this view was correct. It was, however, endorsed by the Court of
87 Drew [2000] 1 Cr App R 91, CA; Jackson [2000] 1 Cr App R 97n, CA. 88 Jackson above.
89 [1985] 1 All ER 850, CA; revsd [1985] AC 975, HL.
Appeal in Kenning.90 This endorsement was clearly right; in the context of s 1(1)(a) the
natural meaning of ‘commission of any offence’ must be ‘commission of an offence by
one or more of the parties as perpetrator’ with the result that there cannot be a statutory
conspiracy to aid and abet.91 As a result, if D1 and D2 agree to assist X (not a party to the
agreement) to rape a woman they are not guilty of a statutory conspiracy to rape because
the course of conduct agreed on would not amount to or involve the commission of rape
by one or more of the parties (ie D1 or D2) to the agreement if it was carried out in accord-
ance with their intentions. The same would be true if D1 and D2 agree to encourage X
to commit the rape. However, in both cases D1 and D2 could be convicted of a statutory
conspiracy to commit (ie perpetrate) the offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007, s 44
of intentionally encouraging or assisting the commission of rape.
Parliament has, from time to time, created offences whose actus reus consists of aiding,
abetting, counselling or procuring something, so that the perpetrator of such an offence
is the aider, abettor, counsellor or procurer. An example is the offence of aiding, abetting,
counselling or procuring a girl to mutilate her own genitalia, contrary to the Female
Genital Mutilation Act 2003, s 2. People who conspire for one (or more) of them to per-
petrate such an offence can therefore be convicted of a statutory conspiracy to commit it
because it amounts to a substantive offence.
14.54 ‘Carried out in accordance with their intentions’ refers not only to the physical
course of conduct (and its surrounding circumstances) intended but also to any intended
consequences of it; otherwise it would be impossible to convict a person of conspiring
to commit an offence whose actus reus requires a consequence to result from conduct.
Suppose that two terrorists, D1 and D2, agree that D2 should destroy an army tank by
putting inside it a time bomb to be supplied by D1. There is a statutory conspiracy to com-
mit criminal damage because the course of conduct agreed on (planting the bomb) would
necessarily amount to or involve the commission of criminal damage if it was carried out
in accordance with their intentions of causing criminal damage.
Impossibility
14.55 The CLA 1977, s 1(1)(b) deals with agreements which are impossible of fulfilment,
as where D1 and D2 agree to murder V by poisoning him, not knowing that he is already
dead, or where D1 and D2 agree to have intercourse with a girl of 16, thinking that she is
15. Section 1(1)(b) provides that an agreement on a course of conduct which, if the agree-
ment is carried out in accordance with the parties’ intentions, would necessarily amount
to or involve the commission of an offence or any offences by one or more of the parties
but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence or any of the
offences impossible is a statutory conspiracy.
Section 1(1)(b) may not have been strictly necessary to deal with agreements which are
impossible of fulfi lment. In cases of impossibility, such as the two examples just given,
it would seem that there is a conspiracy within s 1(1)(a), because if the course of conduct
90 [2008] EWCA Crim 1534.

91 It may be noted that, under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, an attempt to aid and abet an offence is not
criminal; see para 14.106(d).
agreed on is carried out in accordance with the parties’ intentions this will necessar-
ily amount to or involve the commission of an offence. Nevertheless, s 1(1)(b) is useful
because it puts the matter beyond doubt. Moreover, the use of the word ‘would’ [neces-
sarily amount to or involve the commission of an offence] seems more appropriate than
‘will’ where the existence of facts renders it impossible to commit an offence.
Ifs and buts

Agreement whose object is the achievement of an offence subject to a condition
precedent
14.56 Often parties to an agreement for the commission of an offence make the car-
rying out of their agreed course of conduct subject to a condition precedent (as where
they agree to rob a bank, provided that on arrival there it seems safe to do so, or where
they agree to kill a person, if he arrives at a rendezvous with them). In such a case they
can be convicted of statutory conspiracy to rob and of statutory conspiracy to murder,
respectively, since they have agreed on a course of conduct which, if it is carried out in
accordance with their intentions, will necessarily amount to or involve the commission
of an offence.92 In Saik,93 Lord Nicholls said:
‘An intention to do a prohibited act is within the scope of s 1(1) even if the intention
is expressed to be conditional on the happening, or non-happening, of some particular
event. The question always is whether the agreed course of action, if carried out in accord-
ance with the parties’ intentions, would necessarily amount to or involve an offence. A
conspiracy to rob a bank tomorrow if the coast is clear when the conspirators reach the
bank is not, by reason of this disqualification, any less a conspiracy to rob.’
It was stated by the Court of Appeal in Jackson94 that:
‘“Necessarily” [in s 1] is not to be held to mean that there must inevitably be the carrying
out of an offence; it means, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with the plan,
there must be the commission of the offence referred to in the conspiracy count.’
In Jackson, the defendants had agreed with X, who was on trial for burglary, that if X was
convicted they would shoot him in the leg; they believed that he would receive a more
lenient sentence if they did so. The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants’ appeals
against conviction for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.
In Reed,95 the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal where D1 and D2 had been
convicted of conspiring to commit the substantive offence of aiding and abetting sui-
cide after they had agreed that D1 would visit people contemplating suicide and either
discourage them or assist them, depending on his assessment of the appropriate course
of action.
92 Reed [1982] Crim LR 819, CA. 93 [2006] UKHL 18 at [5]. 94 [1985] Crim LR 442, CA.
95 [1982] Crim LR 819, CA.
In O’Hadhmaill,96 it was held by the Court of Appeal that D, a member of the IRA,
who had agreed with others to cause explosions if the results of the Northern Ireland
peace process did not satisfy them, could be convicted of a conspiracy to cause an
explosion.
Agreement whose object is not the commission of an offence but in whose

achievement an offence may be committed
14.57 In the cases just discussed the actual object of the agreement is an offence. The posi-
tion is different where the object of the agreement is not criminal, although (as the parties
know) the achievement of that object may involve the commission of an offence. In such a
case the commission of the offence is only incidental to the object of the agreement, which
may be achievable without it; it cannot be said that the parties have agreed on a course of
conduct which, if carried out in accordance with their intentions, will or would necessarily
amount to or involve the commission of an offence, as required by the CLA 1977, s 1(1).
An example of this was given by the Court of Appeal in Reed:97
‘A and B agree to drive from London to Edinburgh in a time which can be achieved with-
out exceeding the speed limits, but only if the traffic which they encounter is exceptionally
light. Their agreement will not necessarily involve the commission of any offence, even
if it is carried out in accordance with their intentions, and they do arrive from London
to Edinburgh within the agreed time. Accordingly the agreement does not constitute the
offence of statutory conspiracy or indeed of any offence.’
The Court of Appeal distinguished this type of case from two of the situations referred to
in para 14.56 (viz where there is an agreement to rob a bank, if on arrival there it is safe to
do so, and the actual facts of Reed), on the ground that in both situations the agreements
would necessarily involve the commission of the substantive offences of robbery and aid-
ing and abetting suicide respectively.
Agreement to commit an offence and, if necessary, another offence

14.58 This heading is concerned with the type of case where D1 and D2 agree to commit
an armed robbery on V and agree that, if necessary, eg to rob him or to escape, they will
shoot to kill. The CLA 1977, s 1(1) seems to indicate that they can be convicted of conspiracy
to rob but not of conspiracy to murder because, as in the type of case just dealt with in para
14.57, if the agreed course of conduct is carried out in accordance with their intentions, it
will necessarily amount to or involve robbery but not necessarily murder. The only differ-
ence seems to be that, whereas in the type of case in para 14.57 the object of the agreement
is not the commission of an offence, the object of the agreement here is itself an offence.
Despite what appears to be the clear meaning of s 1(1), the Court of Appeal in Suchedina
(A-G’s Reference (No 4 of 2003)) was sympathetic to the view that: ‘if conspirators agree
that they will steal a particular item and that they will, if necessary, either commit bur-
glary or commit robbery in order to obtain that item, that will amount to an agreement to
96 [1996] Crim LR 509, CA. Th is point does not appear in the brief report, but is referred to in the
commentary. 97 [1982] Crim LR 819, CA.
commit the offences of theft, burglary and robbery.’98 To reach such a view is tantamount
to rewriting s 1(1) because if the agreement is carried out in accordance with the parties’
intentions it will not necessarily amount to or involve the commission of an offence of
burglary or robbery. The sooner the Supreme Court can consider this matter, the better.
Conditions subsequent
14.59 What is the answer where the completion of the substantive offence depends on a
condition subsequent to the carrying out of the agreed course of conduct? Such a situation
is common. It occurs where the parties to an agreement agree that a course of conduct be
pursued which, if carried out according to their intentions, will necessarily amount to or
involve the commission of an offence only if some contingency occurs after the course of
conduct has been carried out. An example is where there is an agreement to kill some-
one by shooting him. The course of conduct agreed on – firing a gun – will necessarily
amount to or involve the offence of murder only if the bullet thereafter hits the victim
and kills him. In such a case, there can be a conviction for conspiracy to commit the
substantive offence if the parties intended that the element(s) necessary to complete that
offence should occur, despite the fact that they realised that that occurrence depended on
some contingency subsequent to their agreed course of conduct. This point is of obvious
importance in respect of ‘result crimes’.
‘Offence’
14.60 The ‘offence’ which the agreed course of conduct must necessarily amount to or
involve if it is carried out in accordance with the parties’ intentions may be an offence
which is only triable summarily. However, where in pursuance of the agreement the acts
are to be done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute (within the meaning of
the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992) that offence is not an
‘offence’ for the purposes of conspiracy if it is triable only summarily and not punishable
with imprisonment.99
For further discussion of ‘offence’ for the purposes of statutory conspiracy see para
14.77.
Mens rea
Key points 14.4
The mens rea requirements for statutory conspiracy are that:
• if the actus reus of the substantive offence (ie the agreed offence) requires for its
commission the existence of a fact or circumstance a defendant and at least one
other party to the agreement must intend or know that it shall or will exist;
98 [2004] EWCA Crim 1944 at [14]. See also Hussain, Bhatti and Bhatti [2002] EWCA Crim 6 at [27].
99 Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 242.
• two parties to the agreement must intend that the agreement be carried out and
the substantive offence be committed. Technically, provided that this can be proved,
another party who is a defendant can be convicted even though he lacked that
intention, if he knew of the course of conduct agreed on and what it would involve;
but in practice the technical position is ignored and the above intent is required to
be proved against an individual defendant; and
• a defendant and at least one other party must have any additional mens rea required
for the substantive offence.
14.61 As will be explained, this offence is unusual in that liability does not depend
merely on the state of mind of an individual defendant but also on the state of mind of
other parties to the agreement. There cannot be a conspiracy unless at least two par-
ties satisfy the requirements of mens rea. This is not surprising, given the nature of the
offence.
Mens rea as to any fact or circumstance necessary for commission of

substantive offence
14.62 D cannot be convicted of statutory conspiracy unless he and at least one other
party to the agreement intend or know that any fact or circumstance necessary for the
commission of the actus reus of the substantive offence shall or will exist when the con-
duct constituting the offence is to occur.100
This general rule is not stated expressly in the CLA 1977 but is implied by s 1(2), which
states:
‘Where liability for any offence may be incurred without knowledge on the part of the
person committing it of any particular fact or circumstance necessary for the commis-
sion of the offence, a person shall nevertheless not be guilty of conspiracy to commit that
offence by virtue of [s 1(1)] unless he and at least one other party to the agreement intend
or know that that fact or circumstance shall or will exist at the time when the conduct
constituting the offence is to take place.’
In Saik101 the House of Lords confirmed that the requirement of intention or knowl-
edge in the CLA 1977, s 1(2) was not confined to conspiracies to commit substantive
offences which do not require knowledge of any fact or circumstance necessary for the
commission of the substantive offence. Although s 1(2) did not on its face apply where the
substantive offence required D to know of a material fact or circumstance, s 1(2) was to be
read as applicable whenever an ingredient of the substantive offence was the existence of
a particular fact or circumstance.
100 Saik [2006] UKHL 18. 101 Ibid. Baroness Hale gave a dissenting speech.
14.63 The decision in Saik was an important one. It clarified the meaning of ‘knowledge’
in s 1(2) because some Court of Appeal102 decisions had held that it was sufficient for
conspiracy that D had the mens rea, as to a fact or circumstance, required for the substan-
tive offence, even though that requirement could be satisfied by proof that D suspected
(recklessness), or had reason to suspect it (negligence). The House of Lords held that this
was wrong: both were insufficient in s 1(2).
An example of the present rule can be given by reference to the offence under the
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 9 of sexual activity with a child under 16. As noted in paras
9.11 and 9.60, this offence is one of negligence as to the child’s age (if the child is 13 or
over). The effect of the CLA 1977, s 1(2) is that if D1 and D2, both aged 30, agree to have
sexual intercourse that night with V, a girl aged 14, they can only be convicted of con-
spiracy to commit the s 9 offence if they both know that she is under 16.
Another example can be given by reference to the offence of handling stolen goods,
which requires knowledge or belief that the goods are stolen. The effect of s 1(2) is that if
D1 and D2 agree to handle some goods which are to be acquired by X and they claim that
they thought that that acquisition would be a legitimate one, they can only be convicted
of conspiracy to handle stolen goods if it is proved that they both ‘intend or know’ that
the goods shall or will be stolen when the handling occurs.
Intention or knowledge as to fact or circumstance

14.64 Often, whether or not a fact or circumstance required for the substantive offence
exists will be a matter quite independent of the parties to the agreement and outside their
control. In such a case, it is difficult to appreciate how a party, when agreeing to a course
of conduct, can intend that a fact or circumstance shall exist at the time that the conduct
constituting the substantive offence is to occur.
It is submitted that, for the purposes of the CLA 1977, s 1(2), the reference to ‘inten-
tion’ that a fact or circumstance shall exist when the substantive offence is to take place
describes the mens rea for conspiracy where a fact or circumstance required for the actus
reus of the substantive offence does not exist at the time of the agreement but it is known
that it will have to exist at the time that the conduct constituting the substantive offence
occurs, as where D1 and D2 agree to have intercourse without her consent with a woman
who is to be delivered to D1’s house the next day by a kidnapper.
It is submitted that reference to ‘knowledge’ that a fact or circumstance will exist when
the substantive offence is to take place describes the case where a fact or circumstance
required for the actus reus of the substantive offence exists at the time of the agreement, as
where the woman has already expressed her dissent to intercourse, as D1 and D2 know.
14.65 Although generally ‘knowledge’ includes wilful blindness (a species of
recklessness),103 this is not the case here. As noted in para 14.63, the House of Lords held
in Saik104 that in the context of the CLA 1977, s 1(2) the requirement of ‘knowledge’ as
to a fact or circumstance of the actus reus is not satisfied by proof of suspicion (another
species of recklessness) as to a relevant fact or circumstance. Lord Nicholls said that
102 See Rizvi and Christi [2003] EWCA Crim 3575, and Sakavickas [2004] EWCA Crim 2686.
103 Para 3.45. 104 [2006] UKHL 18.
there was no doubt that the requirement in s 1(2) ‘was designed to eliminate the risk that
someone could be guilty of conspiracy just because he was reckless as to the existence or
otherwise of the circumstances that would make the conduct criminal’.105 In Saik D, the
sole proprietor of a bureau de change which had a turnover of £1,000 a week until 2001,
started purchasing large quantities of $100 bills. Between May 2001 and February 2002, D
exchanged some $8 million. He was seen by surveillance officers meeting another alleged
conspirator near his office on many occasions, and at these times sacks of sterling were
observed. D was charged with a conspiracy to launder the proceeds of crime, contrary to
the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 93C(2) (which offence has been replaced by an offence
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s 327). He pleaded guilty on the basis that he
suspected that his dealings involved ‘dirty’ money.106 The House of Lords (Baroness Hale
dissenting) allowed D’s appeal against conviction on the ground that D’s suspicion about
the source of the money was an insufficient basis for a conviction of conspiracy to launder
the proceeds of crime, since the CLA 1977, s 1(2) required D to intend or know that the
money shall or will be the proceeds of crime and that requirement was not fulfilled. Lord
Nicholls stated that the distinction drawn by s 1(2) between knowledge and lesser states
of mind such as recklessness or suspicion
‘is not altogether satisfactory in terms of blameworthiness. But this does not entitle the
House to erode the distinction clearly drawn in s 1(2) . . . [T]he desire to avoid an unattrac-
tive outcome in the present case cannot justify a distorted interpretation of s 1(2). It is not
for the courts to extend the net of conspiracy beyond the reach set by Parliament.’107
14.66 In paras 3.43 and 3.44, it was stated that ‘knowledge’ normally includes ‘belief’. In
Saik Lord Nicholls, with whose reasoning Lord Steyn agreed, stated108 that ‘know’ in the
CLA 1977, s 1(2) should be interpreted strictly and not watered down, and went on to reject
the notion that ‘belief’ could suffice for ‘knowledge’ in s 1(2). If this represented the law, so
that an untrue belief would not suffice for conspiracy, it would present problems in respect of
agreements to commit an offence which was impossible by virtue of the non-existence of a
circumstance because one cannot know something which does not exist but one can believe
it, and because if the parties believe that that thing already exists they do not intend that it
shall exist. The CLA 1977, s 1(1) contemplates that there can be a conviction in such a case.
Lord Brown thought109 that ‘belief’ would suffice for the purposes of knowledge in the
CLA 1977, s 1(2).
14.67 Because ‘suspicion’ will not suffice in CLA 1977, s 1(2), if D1 and D2 merely sus-
pect that a necessary fact or circumstance will exist when the agreed course of conduct
is executed but are prepared to carry out the agreed course of conduct whether or not the
fact or circumstance exists at that time, they are not guilty of statutory conspiracy. This
was recognised by the majority of the House of Lords in Saik. An example would be where
D1 and D2 agree to have intercourse with a woman, suspecting that she will not consent
and agreeing to have the intercourse whether she consents or not.
105 Ibid at [58]. 106 Th is account of the facts appears in [2004] EWCA Crim 2936.
107 [2006] UKHL 18 at [33]. 108 Ibid at [26]. 109 Ibid at [119].
However, in the course of her dissenting speech in Saik, Baroness Hale considered that
D1 and D2 could be convicted of conspiracy to rape. Her Ladyship considered that what
she called a ‘conditional intent’ should suffice in s 1(2) just as it does in s 1(1), and that D1
and D2 would be guilty of rape because ‘when they agree they have thought about the
possibility that [the woman] may not consent. They have agreed that they will go ahead
even if at the time when they go ahead they know that she is not consenting. If so, that will
not be recklessness; that will be intent to rape.’110 This is a different type of conditional
intent from the type of conditional intent referred to in paras 14.56 and 14.58111 which
suffices for the purposes of s 1(1). Baroness Hale’s view cannot be regarded as represent-
ing the law, in the light of the view taken by the other members of the House of Lords in
Saik.
Intent that agreement be carried out and substantive offence be

committed
14.68 The wording of the CLA 1977, s 1(1) seems unequivocally to indicate that, as a sec-
ond element of mens rea, D and at least one other party to the agreement must intend that
the agreement be carried out to completion and that the substantive offence or offences
to which their agreed course of conduct will (or would) necessarily amount, or which it
will (or would) involve, will be committed. Consequently, it is amazing that the House of
Lords in Anderson112 held that such an intention need not be proved against an individual
defendant; it sufficed that a defendant knew the course of action agreed on and what it
would involve. This decision has been overlooked or ignored in a number of subsequent
appellate decisions on statutory conspiracy,113 where courts have held that an intention
that an agreement be carried out is part of the mens rea of a conspirator. In Edwards,114 eg,
where D had been charged with a conspiracy to supply amphetamine (a controlled drug),
D may have intended to supply ephedrine (not a controlled drug) instead. The Court of
Appeal, without reference to Anderson, held that the trial judge had been correct to direct
the jury that they could only convict D if he had intended to supply amphetamine.
In McPhillips,115 the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland held that s 1(1) required an
intention on the part of a defendant that the agreement be carried out. As a result, D,
who had joined a conspiracy to plant a bomb timed to go off during a disco, was held not
guilty of conspiracy to murder because he intended to give a warning before the bomb
went off. Anderson was distinguished on the ground that in that case the defendant had
not intended to frustrate the plans of the other conspirators. It is not obvious why this was
a material distinction.
In Yip Chiu-cheung v R,116 an appeal from Hong Kong concerning the common law
offence of conspiracy to commit an offence, the Privy Council took a view which conflicts
with that in Anderson. In Yip Chiu-cheung an undercover enforcement officer entered into
110 Ibid at [99].

111 Ie where D has no doubt that any facts or circumstances required for the actus reus of the substantive
offence ‘shall or will’ exist if the contingency occurs.
112 [1986] AC 27, HL. For the facts of this case, see para 14.71.
113 Edwards [1991] Crim LR 45, CA; Ashton [1992] Crim LR 667, CA; Harvey [1999] Crim LR 70, CA.
114 [1991] Crim LR 45, CA. 115 [1989] NI 360, NICA. 116 [1995] 1 AC 111, PC.
an agreement with D to carry out a drug trafficking offence. The trial judge told the jury
to convict D of conspiracy to commit the trafficking offence if they found that the under-
cover officer had intended to carry out the trafficking offence, because he would be a co-
conspirator (so that there would be a conspiracy). The Privy Council held that the judge’s
direction was correct since: ‘The crime of conspiracy requires an agreement between two
or more persons to commit an unlawful act with the intention of carrying it out.’117
Although Yip Chiu-cheung was concerned with common law conspiracy, the require-
ment in it of an intention on the part of a defendant and at least one other party that the
agreement be carried out and the substantive offence committed accords with s 1(1) in a
way that Anderson does not. If such an intent is required for a common law conspiracy to
commit an offence, why should it not for a statutory conspiracy, especially in the light of
the clear words of s 1(1)? In principle, the approach in Yip Chiu-cheung is right and that in
Anderson is wrong in relation to s 1(1). Support for the view that to be guilty of conspiracy
D must intend that the agreement be carried out and the substantive offence committed
can also be found in the speech of Lord Nicholls, with whose legal analysis Lord Steyn
agreed, in Saik.118 Nevertheless, until it is overruled the approach in Anderson is binding,
although in practice it seems likely to continue to be overlooked or ignored or to be dis-
tinguished. In any event, a party to a conspiracy who does not intend that the substantive
offence be committed but plays a part in the agreed course of conduct can be convicted of
the appropriate offence of encouraging or assisting crime.
It may be that the House of Lords thought that not even one party must have had
an intention that the agreement be carried out and the substantive offence committed.
However, since it did not clearly indicate this, and since such an interpretation would do
further violence to the wording of the Act and to the intentions of the Law Commission,
it can be assumed – especially in the light of the Privy Council’s statement in Yip Chiu-
cheung – that at least two of the parties to the agreement must have had such an intention
and that otherwise there cannot be a statutory conspiracy. If this is so, there cannot be
a conviction for statutory conspiracy of either D1 and D2 who are the only parties to an
agreement for the commission of an offence if only D1 intends that the agreement be car-
ried out and the substantive offence committed.
14.69 On the assumption made in the last paragraph, where the actus reus of the sub-
stantive offence requires a specific consequence to be caused, the present requirement
necessitates proof of an intention on the part of two or more parties to the agreement that
that consequence should result. Three points arise in relation to this. First, the intent may
be conditional, as indicated in paras 14.56 and 14.58. Second, although an intention to
cause some lesser consequence may suffice for the substantive offence, such an intention
will not suffice on a charge of conspiracy.119 Consequently, on a charge of conspiracy to
murder, an intention that someone be unlawfully killed must be proved, although an
intention unlawfully to cause grievous bodily harm suffices for murder itself.120 Third,
there can be little doubt that only a direct intent will do.
It follows from the present requirement that if D1 gives D2 a parcel and tells him to
deliver it to V’s empty house, which D2 agrees to do, and the parcel contains a bomb with
117 [1995] 1 AC 111 at 118. 118 [2006] UKHL 18 at [4].
119 Siracusa (1989) 90 Cr App R 340, CA. 120 Ibid at 350.
which D1 intends to cause criminal damage (an offence where recklessness suffices) to V’s
house, neither D1 nor D2 can be convicted of conspiracy to commit criminal damage,
unless D2 also knows that the parcel contains a bomb and intends that V’s property be
damaged or destroyed.
Additional mens rea

Additional mens rea required for substantive offence
14.70 In addition to any mens rea relating to a specified circumstance or consequence
of the actus reus of the substantive offence, D and at least one other party to the agree-
ment must be proved to have had any ulterior intent or other mens rea required for that
offence. This was recognised in Saik121 by Lord Nicholls, with whose analysis Lord Steyn
agreed. For example, on a charge of conspiracy to steal, the intended course of conduct
must be dishonest on their part and they must intend permanently to deprive the other
person to whom the property belongs.
Likewise, on a charge of conspiracy to commit an offence of criminal damage being
reckless as to life being endangered122 it is necessary that D and at least one other party
have agreed to damage property, being reckless as to whether life will be endangered
thereby. A decision to the contrary is that of the Court of Appeal in Mir and Beg123 where
it was held that, on a charge of conspiracy to commit such an offence, recklessness as to
life being endangered was insufficient. The Court’s reason was that the endangerment of
life is a fact or circumstance required for the actus reus of that offence and that therefore
only knowledge or intention on the part of the alleged conspirators that their agreed
course of conduct would create a risk to life would do. This decision may be regarded as
not binding on the Court of Appeal, because Court of Appeal decisions indicating that
the actual endangerment of life is not required and is therefore not a fact or circumstance
required for the actus reus of this type of criminal damage offence124 were not cited to
the Court of Appeal. Although Mir and Beg has been applied in two unreported Court
of Appeal decisions,125 they are open to the same objections. It would seem that they and
Mir and Beg can now be safely ignored. In Saik Lord Nicholls said:
‘Damaging property, being reckless as to whether life is endangered thereby, is a crimi-

nal offence: Criminal Damage Act 1971, section 1(2). Conspiracy to commit this offence
requires proof of an intention to damage property, and to do so recklessly indifferent as to
whether this would endanger life.’126
Must D intend to play a part in agreed course of conduct?

14.71 In Anderson,127 Lord Bridge, with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, speci-
fied an additional element of mens rea which always had to be proved against a person
charged with statutory conspiracy. He stated:
121 [2006] UKHL 18 at [4]. 122 See para 13.20. 123 (1994) unreported, CA.
124 Para 13.21. 125 Browning and Dixon (1998) unreported, CA; Ryan (1999) unreported, CA
126 [2006] UKHL 18 at [4].
127 [1986] AC 27, HL.
‘[T]he necessary mens rea of the crime is, in my opinion, established if, and only128 if, it is
shown that the accused, when he entered into the agreement, intended to play some part in
the agreed course of conduct in furtherance of the criminal purpose which the agreed course
of conduct was intended to achieve. Nothing less will suffice; nothing more is required.’129
This implication of this mens rea requirement (on the part, presumably, of each party to the
agreement if he is to be guilty) was not supported by any authority and is in no way war-
ranted by s 1(1) or any other part of the CLA 1977. It is pure judicial invention. It does further
violence to the unequivocal wording of s 1(1) and to the intentions of the Law Commission.
If Lord Bridge’s statement represented the law, a person would not be guilty as a per-
petrator of criminal conspiracy who, for thoroughly bad motives, entered into an agree-
ment with others that a course of conduct be pursued which would necessarily amount to
the commission of an offence if it was carried out in accordance with their intentions, if
he did not himself intend to play some part in the agreed course of conduct. Conversely, if
a police officer or the like who joined a conspiracy in order to entrap the conspirators did
intend to play a minor part in the furtherance of the agreed conduct in order to maintain
his credibility as a conspirator and to obtain sufficient evidence against them, he would
(according to Lord Bridge’s statement) be guilty of statutory conspiracy, even though
(according to the decision in Anderson referred to in para 14.68) he did not intend the
substantive offence to be committed. The application of that statement would clearly give
rise to some unfortunate results.
Reference to the facts and decision in Anderson indicates that Lord Bridge’s statement in
Anderson quoted above was not necessary to the decision130 and was merely an obiter dic-
tum. In Anderson, D had agreed with others to participate, in return for a fee, in a scheme
to effect X’s escape from prison by providing cutting wire, a rope ladder, transport and safe
accommodation. According to D, he had never intended the escape plan to be carried into
effect and had only intended to supply the cutting wire, whereafter he was going to go abroad
with the part of the fee which had been paid on account and another part he expected to have
paid on account. The House of Lords held that on these facts D had correctly been convicted
of statutory conspiracy to effect the escape of X. Its reason was that D (as already discussed)
did not have to be proved to have intended that the substantive offence be committed and
that, in agreeing that a course of conduct be pursued that would, if successful, necessarily
involve effecting X’s escape from prison, D clearly intended, by providing the wire, to play
a part in the agreed course of conduct in furtherance of that criminal objective. Neither the
fact that D intended to play no further part in attempting to effect the escape, nor that he
believed the escape to be impossible, would have afforded him any defence.
In view of the unfortunate consequences of Lord Bridge’s obiter statement, it is pleas-
ing to note that it has been explained by the Court of Appeal in Siracusa131 that Lord
Bridge did not mean that the prosecution must prove that D intended to play an active
128 The word ‘only’ must be read subject to the comments in para 14.68.
129 [1986] AC 27 at 39. Presumably, this meant that nothing more is required against an individual defendant,
but not that nothing more is required against two or more other parties to the agreement.
130 See commentaries by JC Smith in [1986] Crim LR at 54 and 247.
131 (1989) 90 Cr App R 340, CA. Also see Edwards [1991] Crim LR 45, CA (commentary).
part in the agreed course of conduct. The Court held that D can ‘play a part’ merely by
continuing to concur in the criminal activity of another or others. This explanation of
what Lord Bridge said is a highly artificial one, driven by a desire to avoid the unfortunate
consequences of that statement while paying the necessary lip-service to it. So explained,
the point becomes meaningless in the light of the rule132 that once one is guilty of agree-
ment one cannot escape liability by changing one’s mind and withdrawing from it. One
can be confident that the interpretation in Siracusa will be followed.
It is unfortunate that the other part of the House of Lords’ decision, discussed in para
14.68, must be regarded as part of the ratio decidendi and therefore binding.
No need for knowledge that agreed course of conduct criminal

14.72 A person charged with conspiracy need not know that the course of conduct
agreed on and what it would involve constitute a criminal offence. This was the position
in relation to common law conspiracy to commit an offence,133 and the wording of s 1(1)
Summary: The above mens rea requirements are summarised in the table below which shows
when D and other parties, R, S, T, U and Z with different mens rea, are guilty of statutory
conspiracy.
Mens rea First If the only other party is

party
D R S T U
Re facts or circumstances of ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
substantive offence
As to agreement being carried ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗
out and substantive offence
committed
Additional MR required for ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
substantive offence
Who is guilty of statutory conspiracy? D: ✓ D: ✗ D: ✗ D: ✗
R: ✓ S: ✗ T: ✗ U: ✗
But if there is a third party besides the two with full mens rea
D R Z
Re facts or circumstances of ✓ ✓ ✓
substantive offence
As to agreement being carried ✓ ✓ ✗
out and substantive offence
committed
Additional MR required for ✓ ✓ ✓
substantive offence
Who is guilty of statutory conspiracy? D: ✓ D: ✓
R: ✓ R: ✓
Z: ✓ Z: ✗
Technically according In practice ignoring
to Anderson Anderson
132 Para 14.46. 133 Churchill v Walton [1967] 2 AC 224, HL.

of the CLA 1977 makes it clear that this continues to be the case for statutory conspiracy.
Thus, it is a statutory conspiracy to agree to manufacture a particular drug which, in law,
is categorised as a Class A controlled drug, even though the parties are ignorant of the
criminal legislation on drugs and therefore not aware that they are conspiring to commit
an offence.134 Ignorance of the criminal law is no defence.135
Conspiracy to do what?
14.73 Liability for conspiracy relates only to the offence or offences which will necessar-
ily be committed if the agreement to pursue a course of conduct is carried out in accord-
ance with the parties’ intentions. If D1 and D2 agree to attack and kill V they are guilty of
conspiracy to murder, even though there is a chance that V may survive the attack, since
the offence of murder will necessarily be committed if the course of conduct agreed by
them is carried out in accordance with their intentions. If D1 and D2 agree to do serious
harm to V they can be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offence of causing grievous
bodily harm with intent, but not of conspiracy to murder, even though if they carried out
their plan and V died of his injuries they could be convicted of murder, since that offence
is not one which will necessarily be committed if the agreement is carried out in accord-
ance with their intentions.
Exemptions from liability for statutory conspiracy

14.74 The CLA 1977, s 2 provides the following exemptions:
• The intended victim The CLA 1977, s 2(1) provides that a person cannot be guilty
of a conspiracy to commit any offence if he is the intended victim of that offence.
Unlike the corresponding exemption under the Serious Crime Act 2007 (SCA
2007), s 51, in respect of offences of encouraging or assisting crime, there is no
defi nition of who is a ‘victim’. As Lords Phillips P and Judge CJ, with whom Lord
Wilson agreed, said obiter in the leading judgment of the Supreme Court in
Gnango,136 if ‘victim’ in s 2(1) is given the wide meaning of any person who will
be harmed by the offence it would seem to produce the surprising result that a
conspiracy by two persons that one will commit a terrorist atrocity as a suicide
bomber, or to set fi re to a house owned by one of them in furtherance of some
ulterior motive, would not subject either to criminal liability. Their Lordships
thought that there is a case for confi ning the meaning of victim to persons of a
class that the relevant Act is intended to protect, thus bringing s 2(1) into accord
with the ‘victim rule’ which applies in respect of statutory offences under the law
relating to accomplices to crime under the Tyrrell principle.137 To understand s
2(1) in this way would be in line with the more restricted terms of the SCA 2007,
s 51. Th is adds support to confi rming the meaning of ‘victim’ in the way just
described.
134 Broad [1997] Crim LR 666, CA. 135 Para 3.78.

136 [2011] UKSC 59 at [49]. 137 Para 17.62.
• Section 2(2) This provides that a person is not guilty of a conspiracy to commit any
offence if the only other person or persons with whom he agrees are (both initially
and at all times during the currency of the agreement):
– his spouse or civil partner;138
– under the age of criminal responsibility (ie under 10);139 or
– an intended victim or victims of the substantive offence.140
Thus, if D1, aged 20, agrees with a 12-year-old girl to have intercourse with her
he cannot be convicted of conspiracy to rape a child under 13 since the only other
party to the agreement is an intended victim. It would, of course, be different if D1
and D2 had agreed with the girl that they should have intercourse with her because
the exemption only applies where the only other party or parties to the agreement
are under 10 or intended victims or a spouse or a civil partner; in that case D1
and D2 could be convicted of conspiracy, although the girl would be exempt from
liability under s 2(1).
While this rule can be supported where the only other party is under the age
of criminal responsibility, for there can be no ‘criminal’ agreement between two
persons if one of them is legally incapable of agreeing for the purposes of criminal
liability, the exemption is difficult to defend in the other two cases and (as said earl-
ier) anomalous in the case of the first.
14.75 By way of comparison, it may be noted that, provided that at least one party to
the agreement is capable of being convicted of perpetrating the substantive offence, the
fact that another party (X) is not capable of perpetrating it does not mean that X or any
other party to the agreement cannot be convicted of conspiracy to commit that offence.141
Thus, a woman, lacking a penis, cannot perpetrate the offence of rape (although she can
be convicted of that offence as an accomplice) but, if she agrees with a man that he will
rape V, they can both be convicted of conspiracy to rape. Likewise, the mere fact that
an individual party to an agreement (Y) is exempt from prosecution for the substantive
offence agreed to does not prevent another party to the agreement (Z) being liable for
a conspiracy to commit it.142 It remains to be determined whether Y’s exemption also
applies to a conspiracy charge.
Jurisdiction
Conspiracy abroad to commit offence in England and Wales
14.76 Under the common law rules of jurisdiction, the courts of England and Wales
have jurisdiction over a conspiracy formed abroad provided that it was intended to result
in the commission of an offence under English law in England and Wales, even though
138 CLA 1977, s 2(2)(a) (amended by the Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch 27); para 14.47.
139 CLA 1977, s 2(2)(b) and (3). 140 Ibid, s 2(2)(c).
141 Whitchurch (1890) 24 QBD 420, CCR; Sherry and El-Yamani [1993] Crim LR 536, CA.
142 Duguid (1906) 70 JP 294, CCR; B [1984] Crim LR 352, CA.
no overt act, omission or consequence pursuant to the conspiracy actually takes place in
England and Wales.143
Special provision to much the same effect is made by the Criminal Justice Act 1993,
s 3(2) in relation to conspiracy to commit a Group A offence, ie one of the offences
under the Theft Act 1968, Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, Fraud Act 2006 and
related offences listed in s 1 of the 1993 Act (see para 12.70).144 It provides that D may
be convicted of such a conspiracy whether or not D became a party to the conspiracy in
England and Wales, and whether or not any act, omission or other occurrence in rela-
tion to the conspiracy actually occurred in England and Wales. It is immaterial whether
or not a person was a British citizen at any material time or was in England and Wales
at any such time.145
Conspiracy to commit offence outside England and Wales

14.77 Although the CLA 1977, s 1(4) provides that ‘offence’ in CLA 1977, Pt I means
an offence triable in England and Wales, the importance of this has been much reduced
by the CLA 1977, s 1A. Section 1A, inserted by the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Act 1998, s 5(1) and amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 72(1),
deals with a conspiracy to commit an act outside England and Wales that (if committed
in accordance with the conspiracy) would amount to an offence under the law of the
country or territory concerned and would have constituted an offence under English law
if committed in England and Wales.
Section 1A provides that, where four conditions in s 1A(2) to (5) are satisfied in respect
of an agreement, the provisions relating to the offence of statutory conspiracy under the
CLA 1977, Pt I (ie ss 1 to 5, described in this chapter) have effect in relation to the agree-
ment in the same way as they have effect in relation to an agreement falling within the
CLA 1977, s 1(1). The four conditions are that:
(a) the pursuit of the agreed course of conduct would at some stage involve:
(i) an act by one or more of the parties, or
(ii) the happening of some other event,
intended to take place in a country or territory outside England and Wales;146
(b) that act or other event constitutes an offence under the law in force in that country
or territory;
(c) the agreement would fall within the CLA 1977, s 1(1) as an agreement relating
to the commission of an offence but for the fact that the offence would not be an
offence triable in England and Wales if committed in accordance with the parties’
intentions; and
143 Liangsiriprasert v Government of the United States of America [1991] 1 AC 225, PC; Sansom [1991] 2 QB
130, CA; Al Fawwaz [2001] UKHL 69.
144 Conspiracy to commit a Grade A offence is a Group B offence under the Criminal Justice Act 1993, Pt I:
CJA 1993, s 1(3)(a).
145 CJA 1993, s 3(1).
146 Scotland and Northern Ireland are covered by this provision, as well as countries or territories outside
the United Kingdom.
(d) (i) a party to the agreement, or a party’s agent, did anything in England and
Wales in relation to the agreement before its formation, or
(ii) a party to the agreement became a party in England and Wales (by joining it
either in person or through an agent), or
(iii) a party to the agreement, or a party’s agent, did or omitted anything in
England and Wales in pursuance of the agreement.147
In respect of condition (b) there is a presumption that this condition is satisfied unless
the defence serve on the prosecution a notice stating that in their opinion it is not satis-
fied, and giving the grounds for that opinion, in which case the prosecution must prove
that it is satisfied.148 Whether condition (b) is satisfied is to be decided by the judge
alone.149
The Court of Appeal has confi rmed that the CLA 1977, s 1A does not create a dis-
tinct offence of conspiracy; its purpose was to give English and Welsh courts extra-
territorial jurisdiction in relation to conspiracies to commit offences outside England
and Wales by extending to them the provisions of the CLA 1977, Pt I relating to statu-
tory conspiracy contrary to s 1, provided that the four conditions set out above were
satisfied.150
As a result of the CLA 1977, s 1A, eg, those who agree in England and Wales to damage
property abroad are caught by the CLA 1977, s 1 if their agreed conduct is both an offence
under the foreign law and would have been an offence under English law if committed
in England and Wales. It is immaterial whether or not D was a British citizen at the time
of any act or other event whose proof is required by s 1A.151 Likewise, if D1 and D2 agree
in France to take indecent photographs of children in a particular Far Eastern State and
D1 comes to this country to collect the necessary equipment they are caught by s 1A,
provided that taking the photographs constitutes an offence under the law of that State,
because taking the photographs would have been an offence under English law if it had
taken place in England and Wales.
If the conditions in s 1A are satisfied, a reference to an offence in the CLA 1977, Pt I is
to be read as a reference to what would be the offence in question but for the fact that it is
not an offence triable in England and Wales.

Prosecution
14.78 The following restrictions on the institution of prosecutions for statutory con-
spiracy are provided by CLA 1977:
(a) proceedings for conspiracy to commit any offence or offences cannot be instituted
except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions if the offence
or (as the case may be) each of the offences in question is a summary offence;152
147 CLA 1977, s 1A(2)–(5). 148 Ibid, s 1A(8). 149 Ibid, s 1A(10).
150 Patel [2009] EWCA Crim 67. 151 CLA 1977, s 1A(12).
152 Ibid, s 4(1). Sometimes the Attorney General’s consent is required instead: ibid, s 4(2).
(b) proceedings for an offence triable by virtue of CLA 1977, s 1A cannot be instituted
except by or with the consent of the Attorney General;153
(c) proceedings for conspiracy to commit an offence (other than a summary offence),
for which a prosecution cannot be instituted otherwise than by, or on behalf of or
with the consent of, the Director of Public Prosecutions or any other person, may
only be instituted by, or on behalf of or with the consent of, the relevant person;154
and
(d) where an offence has been committed pursuant to any agreement and any time
limit applicable to the institution of a prosecution for that offence has expired, the
institution of a prosecution for conspiracy to commit that offence is also barred.155
Trial
14.79 Statutory conspiracy is triable only on indictment, even if it relates to the com-
mission of a summary offence (since a conspiracy charge is thought to raise too many
difficulties of substance and procedure for magistrates to try); the restriction on prosecu-
tions for conspiracy to commit a summary offence mentioned in para 14.78 is an attempt
to ensure that such prosecutions are only brought in appropriate cases.
Punishment
14.80 The penalties for statutory conspiracy are set out in a somewhat involved fashion
by the CLA 1977, s 3. Where the substantive offence, or one of them, is:
• murder, or any other offence whose sentence is fi xed by law;
• an offence for which life imprisonment may be awarded, eg robbery; or
• an indictable offence punishable with imprisonment but for which no maximum
term is provided,
the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.
In any other case, provided the substantive offence, or one of them, is punishable with
imprisonment, the maximum sentence on conviction for statutory conspiracy is the
maximum for the substantive offence or the longer (or longest) maximum in the case of
different substantive offences.
If none of the substantive offences is punishable with imprisonment, a person con-
victed of statutory conspiracy is not punishable with imprisonment, although he may
be fined.
The maximum punishment in respect of ‘small value criminal damage’, which is
lower than for criminal damage in general,156 does not apply to a charge of statutory
153 CLA 1977, s 4(5), inserted by the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, s 5(2).
154 CLA 1977, s 4(3). If consent has already been given for a prosecution for the substantive offence, a separate
consent is nevertheless necessary for a prosecution for conspiracy to commit it: Pearce (1980) 72 Cr App R 295,
CA. 155 CLA 1977, s 4(4).
156 Para 13.2.
conspiracy to commit such criminal damage; the normal maximum for conspiracy
applies.157
The maximum penalty for a statutory conspiracy to commit an offence outside the
United Kingdom, which conspiracy is triable in England and Wales by virtue of the CLA
1977, s 1A,158 is the maximum for the equivalent substantive offence under English law,
and not the maximum for the offence under the law of the foreign country or territory
which was the object of the conspiracy.159
Where the substantive offence has been committed

14.81 A conspiracy to commit an offence does not merge with the substantive offence
when the latter is committed. However, where there is an effective and sufficient charge
of a substantive offence or offences, the addition of a charge for conspiracy is generally
undesirable because it tends to prolong and complicate the trial.160 An exception is where
the case is complex and the interests of justice can only be served by presenting an overall
picture which cannot be achieved by charging a series of substantive offences.161 Another
exception is where a charge of a substantive offence or offences does not represent the
overall criminality of the case, ie where the agreement to commit the substantive offence
is more wicked than that offence.162 Where an indictment contains substantive counts
and a related conspiracy count or counts, the court will expect the prosecution to jus-
tify the joinder. If the judge is not satisfied that the joinder is justified, the prosecution
must elect to proceed either on the substantive counts or on the conspiracy count or
counts.163
Recommendations for reform

14.82 In 2006, primarily because of the House of Lords’ decision in Saik,164 the
Government requested the Law Commission to review the offence of statutory conspir-
acy. In 2009 the Law Commission responded by publishing its report Conspiracy and
Attempts,165 in which it makes recommendations for the reform of statutory conspiracy.
It also contains recommendations in relation to attempt166 which the Law Commission
had aimed to review in any event. The recommendations are intended to ensure that the
law relating to the various inchoate offences is consistent and coherent. The report does
not review any aspect of common law conspiracy.
In March 2011 the Government indicated that it accepted the recommendations in the
reports but that they would not be implemented. It said that, while they were worthwhile
projects for the future, they could not be considered a priority in the shorter term because
of the pressure on resources.167
157 Ward [1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 442, CA.

158 See para 14.77. 159 Patel [2009] EWCA Crim 67.
160 Verrier v DPP [1967] 2 AC 195 at 223–224. 161 Hammersley (1958) 42 Cr App R 207, CCA.
162 Ward [1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 442, CA.
163 Practice Direction [2002] 3 All ER 904 at IV. 34.3, as substituted by Practice Direction [2008] 1 WLR 154.
164 Paras 14.63 and 14.65–14.67. 165 Law Com No 318. 166 Para 14.143.
167 Law Commission Annual Report 2010–2011, Law Com No 328, para 3.58.
The report includes the following recommendations for the reform of statutory
conspiracy:
(a) A conspiracy must involve an agreement by two or more persons to engage in
the conduct element of an offence and (where relevant) to bring about any conse-
quence element.
(b) A conspirator must be shown to have intended that the conduct element of the
offence, and (where relevant) the consequence element (or other consequences),
should respectively be engaged in or brought about. This would reverse the much
criticised decision in Anderson.168
(c) An alleged conspirator must be shown at the time of the agreement to have been
reckless whether a circumstance element of a substantive offence (or other relevant
circumstance) would be present at the relevant time, when the substantive offence
requires no proof of fault, or has a requirement for proof only of negligence (or its
equivalent), in relation to that circumstance.
(d) Where a substantive offence has fault requirements not involving mere negligence
(or its equivalent), in relation to a fact or circumstance element, an alleged con-
spirator may be found guilty if shown to have possessed those fault requirements
at the time of his or her agreement to commit the offence. Recommendations (c)
and (d) would widen the mens rea as to circumstance in statutory conspiracy.169
(e) The defence of ‘acting reasonably’ provided by the Serious Crime Act 2007 (SCA
2007), s 50 in respect of offences of encouraging or assisting crime should be
applied in its entirety to the offence of conspiracy.
(f) The anomalous immunity for spouses and civil partners referred to in paras 14.47
and 14.74 should be abolished.
(g) The present exemption for a non-victim co-conspirator referred to in para 14.74170
should be abolished but the present exemption for a defendant (D) who is a victim
should be retained if:
• the conspiracy is to commit an offence that exists wholly or in part for the pro-
tection of a particular category of persons;
• D falls within the protected category; and
• D is the person in respect of whom the offence agreed upon would have been
committed.
(h) On the other hand, the rule that an agreement involving a person of or over the age
of criminal responsibility and a child under the age of criminal responsibility gives
rise to no criminal liability for conspiracy should be retained because there is no
meeting of two ‘criminal minds’.
(i) The present requirement for the Director of Public Prosecutions to give consent
if proceedings to prosecute a conspiracy to commit a summary offence are to be
initiated need not be retained.
168 [1986] AC 27, HL; para 14.68. 169 Paras 14.62–14.67.

170 Ie the exemptions provided by CLA 1977, s 2(1) and s 2(2)(c).
14.83 common law conspiracy | 579
(j) It should be possible to convict D of conspiracy to commit a substantive offence

regardless of where any of D’s relevant conduct (or any other party’s relevant con-
duct) occurred so long as D knew or believed that the conduct or consequence ele-
ment of the intended substantive offence might occur, whether wholly or in part, in
England or Wales. This would be broadly consistent with the SCA 2007, s 52(1).
(k) By analogy with the relevant provisions of the SCA 2007, Sch 4, it should be possi-
ble to convict D of conspiracy to commit a substantive offence, regardless of where
any other party’s relevant conduct occurred, if:
• D’s relevant conduct occurred in England or Wales;
• D knew or believed that the intended substantive offence might occur wholly or
partly in a place outside England and Wales; and
• the substantive offence, if committed in that place, would be an offence triable in
England and Wales (or would be so triable if committed by a person satisfying
relevant citizenship, nationality or residence conditions).
(l) By analogy with the relevant provisions of the SCA 2007, Sch 4, it should be possi-
ble to convict D of conspiracy to commit a substantive offence, regardless of where
any other party’s conduct occurred, if:
• D’s relevant conduct (ie any communication forming part of the process which
led up to the final agreement) occurred in England or Wales;
• D knew or believed that the conduct or consequence element of the intended
substantive offence might be committed wholly or partly in a place outside
England and Wales; and
• the substantive offence, if committed in that place, would also be an offence
under the law in force in that place (however described in that law).
(m) By analogy with the relevant provisions of the SCA 2007, Sch 4, it should be pos-
sible to convict D of conspiracy to commit a substantive offence, where D’s relevant
conduct occurred outside England and Wales, if:
• D knew or believed that the intended substantive offence might occur wholly or
partly in a place outside England and Wales; and
• D could be tried in England and Wales (as the perpetrator) if D committed the
substantive offence in that place.
(n) By analogy with the SCA 2007, and as is the case with the CLA 1977, s 1A, in cases
where it cannot be proved that D knew or believed that the intended substantive
offence might be committed wholly or partly in England and Wales, no proceed-
ings may be instituted except with the consent of the Attorney General.
The proposals made in respect of jurisdiction reflect the need to respond to the growth of
organised, cross-border crime.
Common law conspiracy

14.83 As stated in para 14.44, this offence has now been reduced to conspiracy to
defraud and, to the extent that the conduct agreed on does not in itself amount to or
involve a criminal offence, conspiracies to corrupt public morals or to outrage public

decency.
Conspiracy to defraud
Key points 14.5
There are two types of conspiracy to defraud:
• an agreement by dishonesty to deprive a person of something which is his or to

which he is, or would be or might be, entitled or an agreement by dishonesty to
injure some proprietary right of his; and
• an agreement dishonestly to deceive a public official performing public duties into
acting contrary to such a duty.
In addition to dishonesty, the mens rea of conspiracy requires an intention to defraud.
14.84 This type of common law conspiracy is expressly preserved by the CLA 1977,
s 5(2), although its preservation was intended only to be temporary since it was intended
to abolish it once certain unacceptable gaps in the law relating to fraud had been closed by
legislation which was expected after the Law Commission had completed its review of the
matter. In 2002, the Law Commission completed its review. It concluded that conspiracy
to defraud is too wide to offer adequate guidance on the difference between fraudulent
and lawful conduct and should be abolished. It proposed the introduction of two new
general offences, fraud and obtaining services dishonestly, which could form the object
of a statutory conspiracy. However, although the Fraud Act 2006171 introduced the two
offences proposed by the Law Commission, it does not contain a provision abolishing
conspiracy to defraud because the Government thought that it would be premature to do
so before there had been an opportunity to consider the operation of the new offences.172
It had concerns that the abolition of conspiracy to defraud would impair the ability to
prosecute multiple offences and the largest and most complex cases of fraud.
Because there can be a conspiracy to defraud even though the fraud would not consti-
tute an offence if achieved173 (in fact it need not even be tortious), the offence is currently
an important weapon against those who agree to achieve a fraudulent, non-criminal
object, as where there is an agreement dishonestly to prejudice another’s financial inter-
ests (eg depriving him of future income) where no specific property belonging to that
person has actually been stolen and no offence of fraud is involved. The introduction of
the offence of fraud by the Fraud Act 2006 has greatly reduced the number of cases where
the object of a conspiracy to defraud will not be an offence.
171 See para 12.1.

172 Lord Goldsmith, Attorney General, HL Deb Vol 673 col 1447. For an account of the views, almost wholly
in favour of abolishing conspiracy to defraud, expressed in the parliamentary debates on the Fraud Act 2006, see
Ormerod ‘The Fraud Act 2006 – Criminalising Lying?’ [2007] Crim LR 193 at 216–218.
173 See, eg, Scott v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [1975] AC 819, HL, below.
Fraud involving economic loss or prejudice

14.85 In Scott v Comr of Police of the Metropolis,174 the House of Lords held that there
may be a conspiracy to defraud without any element of deception. D agreed with the
employees of cinema owners to borrow fi lms for a short period of time without the
permission of the cinema owners and in return for payment to the employees, so that,
without the consent of the owners of the copyright and distribution rights in such fi lms,
he could make copies and distribute them commercially. D could not have been con-
victed of theft or of statutory conspiracy to steal the fi lms, because there had been no
intention of permanently depriving the cinema owners of the fi lms,175 nor could he have
been convicted of the offence (since repealed) of obtaining the fi lms by deception or
of statutory conspiracy to commit that offence, because he had no such intention and
because no deception was involved.176 The economic interests of owners of the copyright
and distribution rights, in particular, had, however, been injured because the existence
of ‘pirate’ copies would affect royalty payments. D was charged with, and convicted of,
conspiracy to defraud. Upholding the conviction, the House of Lords held that on such a
charge it was not necessary for the Crown to prove an agreement to deprive the owners
of their property by deception. It was sufficient to prove an agreement by dishonesty to
deprive a person of something which is his or to which he is, or would be or might be,
entitled or an agreement by dishonesty to injure some proprietary right of his.
In relation to such an agreement, the Privy Council in Adams v R177 upheld the convic-
tion for conspiracy to defraud of a defendant, a company director, who had been party to
an agreement which involved the parties making and retaining a secret profit, because
the agreement extended to taking positive steps dishonestly to conceal the profits which
he was under a duty to disclose to the company. The Privy Council stated that:
‘Since a company is entitled to recover from directors secret profits made by them at the
company’s expense, it would follow that any dishonest agreement by directors to impede a
company in the exercise of its rights of recovery would constitute a conspiracy to defraud.
In their Lordships’ view a person can be guilty of fraud when he dishonestly conceals
information from another which he was under a duty to disclose to that other or which
that other was entitled to require him to disclose.’178
The conduct agreed on in Adams was not in itself an offence at the time. It is now an
offence under the Fraud Act 2006, s 3 or s 4.
It is irrelevant that the execution of the agreement may not involve any actual economic
loss on the part of the victim, provided his economic interests are put at risk.179 It is also
irrelevant that that situation is to be brought about by some perpetrator other than the
174 Ibid. 175 Para 10.89.

176 Nor, had it then existed, could D have been convicted of fraud, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006, s 1, because
no false representation had been made, and he had not acted in one of the other ways whereby that off ence can
be committed. 177 [1995] 2 Cr App R 295, PC.
178 [1995] 2 Cr App R 295 at 309.
179 Allsop (1976) 64 Cr App R 29, CA; Wai Yu-tsang v R [1992] 1 AC 269 at 280; Adams v R [1995] 2 Cr App R
295 at 308.
parties to the agreement.180 Thus, people who agree to supply to retailers falsely labelled
bottles of whisky or to make and sell devices to bypass electricity meters can be convicted
of conspiracy to defraud, even though the perpetration of the fraud (on the purchaser
of the whisky or the electricity supplier) will be done by the retailer of the whisky or the
user of the device respectively.181 This can be contrasted with statutory conspiracy which
is committed only if it is intended that at least one of the parties to the agreement shall
perpetrate the offence agreed to be committed.
Fraud by deceiving a public official into acting contrary to duty

14.86 Although in the vast majority of cases the agreement relates to bringing about a
situation which would or might cause some sort of economic loss or prejudice, conspiracy
to defraud is not limited to this type of case. An agreement dishonestly to deceive182 a
public official performing public duties (which phrase does not include bank manag-
ers and the like)183 into acting contrary to such a duty is a conspiracy to defraud, even
though there is no risk of causing economic loss to anyone or of prejudicing his eco-
nomic interests.184 An example would be where D1 and D2 agree dishonestly to deceive a
public official into granting a licence or into giving secret information. It may be that this
type of conspiracy to defraud is not limited to public officials acting in pursuance of their
public duties. In Wai Yu-tsang v R,185 the Privy Council advised, obiter, that it was not so
restricted (as shown in para 14.87).
14.87 In Scott v Comr of Police of the Metropolis,186 Lord Diplock took the view, obiter,
that the object of inducing a public official to act contrary to his public duty was a separate
type of fraudulent object. In comparison, in Welham v DPP,187 which was concerned with
intent to defraud in the context of forgery contrary to the now-repealed Forgery Act 1913,
Lord Radcliffe188 had thought such an object was not to be regarded as a special type of
fraud, but rather as exemplifying a general principle that intention to defraud is not lim-
ited to cases where there is an intent to cause the victim economic loss. That general prin-
ciple was also enunciated by Lord Denning189 in Welham. Both statements in Welham,
with which the rest of the House of Lords agreed, were obiter.
The matter was referred to by the Privy Council in Wai Yu-tsang v R. Their Lordships
agreed, obiter, with the approach taken in Welham; the object of inducing public officials
to act contrary to their public duties was not a separate type of fraudulent object but
merely an example that a conspiracy to defraud was not limited to agreements to cause the
victim economic loss. Lord Goff, giving the advice of the Privy Council, having referred
with approval to the statements of Lords Denning and Radcliffe in Welham, said:
180 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1982) [1983] QB 751, CA; Hollinshead [1985] AC 975, HL. In relation to Hollinshead,
see [1995] Crim LR 217 and 519. 181 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1982) above; Hollinshead above.
182 ‘To deceive is . . . to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false’: Re London and Globe Finance
Corpn [1903] 1 Ch 728 at 732, per Buckley J.
183 DPP v Withers [1975] AC 842 at 877, per Lord Kilbrandon; Moses and Ansbro [1991] Crim LR 617, CA.
184 Board of Trade v Owen [1957] AC 602 at 622, per Lord Tucker; Welham v DPP [1961] AC 103, HL; Scott v
Comr of Police of the Metropolis [1975] AC 819, see especially Lord Diplock at 841; DPP v Withers above at 873
and 877, per Lords Simon and Kilbrandon respectively. 185 [1992] 1 AC 269, PC.
186 [1975] AC 819 at 841. 187 [1961] AC 103, HL. 188 [1961] AC 103 at 123–124.
189 Ibid at 133.
‘This authority establishes that the expression “intent to defraud” is not to be given a nar-
row meaning, involving an intention to cause economic loss to another. In broad terms,
it means simply an intention to practise a fraud on another, or an intention to act to the
prejudice of another man’s right.’190
This provides the worrying potential for widening the scope of an offence whose ambit
is already wide and somewhat imprecise in the terms set out in paras 14.85 to 14.86. The
refusal of the House of Lords in Norris v Government of the United States of America191 to
extend the scope of conspiracy to defraud to deal with the situation in issue in that case
is therefore to be welcomed.
In Norris v Government of the United States of America, the House of Lords had to
decide whether an agreement to engage in price-fi xing of itself amounted to a conspiracy
to defraud. At the time the agreements in question were made there were no previous
decisions which even suggested that it did. The House held that to extend conspiracy to
defraud to such conduct would infringe the principle of legal certainty enshrined in the
ECHR, Article 7.192
Mens rea for conspiracy to defraud

Intention to defraud
14.88 There has been conflict in the case law relating to the first type of conspiracy to
defraud on the issue of whether the causing of economic loss or prejudice must be the
purpose of the parties to the agreement.193
For practical purposes, the point has been resolved against such a requirement by the
decision of the Privy Council in Wai Yu-tsang v R,194 where it was held that it was enough
that the alleged conspirators had dishonestly agreed (ie intended) to bring about a situ-
ation which they realised would or might deceive the victim into so acting, or failing to
act, that he would suffer economic loss or his economic interests would be put at risk.
Doubtless, a similar principle applies where a deception is not involved. The decision in
Wai Yu-tsang v R is important because, as the Court of Appeal stated in Allsop:195
‘Generally the primary object of fraudsmen is to advantage themselves. The detriment

that results to their victims is secondary to that purpose and incidental.’
As in the case of a conspiracy to defraud involving the risk of economic loss or

prejudice, it need not be the purpose of the parties to cause the victim to act con-
trary to his public duty. It is enough that they have dishonestly agreed (ie intended)
190 [1992] 1 AC 269 at 276. 191 [2008] UKHL 16.

192 See paras 1.33 and 1.35. See also para 1.68. Norris v Government of the United States of America was fol-
lowed in GG plc [2008] UKHL 17.
193 Contrast A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1982) [1983] QB 751, CA (causing of economic loss or prejudice must be
D’s purpose) with Allsop (1976) 64 Cr App R 29, CA (causing economic loss or prejudice need not be D’s purpose,
but D must have foreseen that economic loss or prejudice was likely if the agreement was carried out).
194 [1992] 1 AC 269, PC. 195 (1976) 64 Cr App R 29 at 31.
to bring about a situation which they realised would or might deceive the victim into
so acting.
Dishonesty
14.89 The requirement that the agreement must be by dishonesty to bring about a situ-
ation which would or might cause economic loss or prejudice (or would or might cause
a public official to act contrary to his public duty) refers partly to the proposed means
of achieving that object and partly to the state of mind of the parties to the agreement.
In Landy,196 statements by the Court of Appeal suggested that the defendants’ belief as
to whether or not they were acting honestly was the determinant of dishonesty in con-
spiracy to defraud. However, subsequently in Ghosh,197 it held that the test of dishonesty
was the same as in offences under the Theft Acts, viz whether the defendants’ proposed
means were on the facts known to them dishonest according to the current standards of
ordinary decent people, and whether, if they were, the defendants realised that they were
contrary to those standards. The extent to which the judge must leave these questions to
the jury is the same as in the case of substantive offences against property.198
14.90 Because of the breadth and imprecision of conspiracy to defraud, the element
of dishonesty plays a crucial role in determining whether an agreement constitutes
that offence. Th is means, eg, that whether an agreement simply involves sharp prac-
tice or the serious offence of conspiracy can be uncertain in advance of a determina-
tion by a jury. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights has doubted the
compatibility of conspiracy to defraud with the principle of legal certainty (in respect
of its requirement of reasonable foreseeability of the legal consequence of a course of
action).199
Two or more must have mens rea

14.91 Of course, there cannot be a conspiracy to defraud unless there are at least two
parties to an agreement who satisfy the mens rea requirements of the offence which have
just been explained. Even if there is a conspiracy to defraud, a person who is ostensibly a
party to that agreement cannot be convicted if one of the above requirements is not satis-
fied in relation to him.
Scope of conspiracy to defraud

14.92 Where the agreed fraudulent course of conduct will not, or will not necessar-
ily, amount to or involve the commission of an offence by one or more parties to the
agreement if it is carried out in accordance with the parties’ intentions, the agreement
is only punishable as a common law conspiracy to defraud. Examples are where there is
an agreement only temporarily to deprive a person dishonestly of property, or an agree-
ment permanently to deprive him dishonestly of property which cannot be stolen (such
as land, generally).
196 [1981] 1 All ER 1172, CA. 197 [1982] QB 1053, CA; para 10.74.
198 Squire [1990] Crim LR 341, CA; see paras 10.77 and 10.78.
199 Fourteenth Report: 2005–2006, para 2.25.
On the other hand, where the agreed fraudulent course of conduct will necessarily
amount to or involve the commission of an offence by one or more parties to the agree-
ment if it is carried out in accordance with the parties’ intentions, the agreement is pun-
ishable either as a statutory conspiracy or as a common law conspiracy to defraud. The
Criminal Justice Act 1987, s 12(1) provides that:
‘If –
(a) a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be
pursued; and
(b) that course of conduct will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any
offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement if the agreement
is carried out in accordance with their intentions,
the fact that it will do so shall not preclude a charge of conspiracy to defraud being brought
against any of them in respect of the agreement.’
As a result, there is a substantial overlap between statutory conspiracy and conspiracy

to defraud. For example, any agreement to commit fraud or to steal (or to commit most
other offences under the Theft Acts or the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981) or to
commit a host of minor statutory offences can be prosecuted either as a statutory con-
spiracy or as a conspiracy to defraud. The category of offences covered by this overlap is
very wide indeed.
14.93 In 2007, the Attorney General issued Guidance on the Use of the Common Law
Offence of Conspiracy to Defraud, according to which a prosecution for conspiracy to
defraud instead of a substantive offence, contrary to the Fraud Act 2006 or another Act,
or a statutory conspiracy, contrary to CLA 1977, s 1 may be appropriate in two categories
of case:
• Conduct that can more effectively be prosecuted as conspiracy to defraud. That is to
say cases where the interests of justice can only be served by presenting to a court an
overall picture which cannot be achieved by charging a series of substantive offences
or statutory conspiracies. Typically such cases will involve some, but not necessarily
all, of the following:
– evidence of several significant but different kinds of criminality;
– several jurisdictions;
– different types of victim, eg individual banks, website administrators and credit
card companies;
– organised crime networks.
Prosecuting such cases as statutory conspiracies could lead to indictments with an
unwieldy number of separate counts, and possibly separate trials for separate parts
of the conspiracy.
• Conduct which can be prosecuted only as conspiracy to defraud, ie conduct that is

not covered by any statutory offence.
Although this guidance has no legal force, the Attorney General intended it to be bind-
ing; conspiracy to defraud is not to be used where there is an effective statutory alter-
native. Each time that conspiracy to defraud is prosecuted, the prosecutor will have to
justify this in writing.200
Jurisdiction
14.94 The CJA 1993, s 3(2) provides that D may be convicted of a conspiracy to
defraud in England and Wales 201 whether or not D became a party to the conspiracy
in England and Wales and whether or not any act, omission or other occurrence in
relation to the conspiracy occurred in England and Wales. It is immaterial whether
or not D was a British citizen at any material time or was in England and Wales at any
such time.202
14.95 The CJA 1993, s 5(3) deals with the case where the fraud which the parties had in
view was intended to take place outside England and Wales. It provides:
‘A person may be guilty of conspiracy to defraud if:

(a) a party to the agreement constituting the conspiracy, or a party’s agent, did any-
thing in England and Wales in relation to the agreement before its formation; or
(b) a party to it became a party in England and Wales (by joining it either in person or
through an agent); or
(c) a party to it, or a party’s agent, did or omitted anything in England and Wales in
pursuance of it,
and the conspiracy would be triable in England and Wales but for the fraud which the
parties to it had in view not being intended to take place in England and Wales.’
Section s 6(1)203 provides that a person is only guilty of conspiracy to defraud by virtue
of s 5(3) if the pursuit of the agreed course of conduct would at some stage involve:
• an act or omission by one or more of the parties; or
• the happening of some other event,
constituting an offence under the law in force where the act, omission or event was
intended to take place. This is an odd provision because the common law offence of con-
spiracy to defraud does not require the intended commission of an offence under English
law. The condition in s 6(1) is deemed to be satisfied unless the defence serve a notice on
the prosecution stating that in their opinion it is not, giving their grounds for that opin-
ion and requiring the prosecution to show that it is satisfied.204 The question whether the
condition is satisfied is to be decided by the judge alone.205
200 What is said in para 14.81 about charging statutory conspiracy when a substantive offence has been
committed applies to conspiracy to defraud.
201 Conspiracy to defraud is a Group B offence under the Criminal Justice Act 1993, Pt I: CJA 1993, s 1(3)(b).
202 Ibid, s 3(1). 203 As amended by the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, Sch 1.
204 CJA 1993, s 6(4). 205 Ibid, s 6(7).
Conspiracy to corrupt public morals and

conspiracy to outrage public decency
Key points 14.6
Although the CLA 1977, s 5(3) appears potentially to have the effect of preserving the
common law offence of conspiracy to outrage public decency, it does not in fact do so.
On the other hand, it may preserve the common law offence of conspiracy to corrupt
public morals.
14.96 The existence of both of these types of common law conspiracy was recognised by
the House of Lords in the latter half of the twentieth century.
• Conspiracy to corrupt public morals In Shaw v DPP,206 decided in 1961, the major-
ity of the House of Lords recognised the continued existence of the offence of
conspiracy to corrupt public morals. They accordingly dismissed D’s appeal
against conviction for this offence, arising out of his agreement with others for
the publication of a ‘Ladies’ Directory’, giving the names, addresses and practices
of prostitutes.
Shaw was followed by the majority of the House of Lords (Lord Diplock dissent-
ing) in 1972 in Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP,207 where fur-
ther explanation was given of conspiracy to corrupt public morals. The House held
that an agreement to publish advertisements soliciting homosexual acts between
consenting adults in private was a conspiracy to corrupt public morals, even though
such conduct was no longer an offence. Lords Reid and Simon said that ‘corrupt’
was a strong word and that ‘corrupt public morals’ meant more than ‘lead morally
astray’. Lord Reid thought that ‘corrupt’ was synonymous with ‘deprave’,208 while
Lord Simon said that what was required was conduct which ‘a jury might find to be
destructive of the very fabric of society’.209 Lord Reid thought that ‘conspiracy to
corrupt public morals’ was something of a misnomer: ‘It really means to corrupt the
morals of such members of the public as may be influenced by the matter published
by the accused.’210
Although the judge must initially rule on whether there is evidence on which the
jury can find the case proved, it is for the jury to find whether a particular object is
corrupting of public morals and they should do this by applying the current stand-
ards of ordinary decent people.211 It is extremely doubtful whether a jury would find
that there was a conspiracy to corrupt public morals if a case similar to Shaw or
Knuller came before it today.
The vagueness of ‘corrupting public morals’ leads to considerable uncertainty
about the conduct penalised by the criminal law, in apparent breach of the principle
206 [1962] AC 220, HL. 207 [1973] AC 435, HL. 208 Ibid at 456.
209 Ibid at 491. 210 Ibid at 456.
211 Shaw v DPP [1962] AC 220, HL; Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP [1973] AC 435, HL.
of legal certainty (in respect of its requirement of foreseeability of the legal conse-
quences of a course of action).212
• Conspiracy to outrage public decency In Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions)

Ltd v DPP, D had also been convicted of conspiracy to outrage public decency. The
majority of the House of Lords (Lords Reid and Diplock dissenting) recognised the
continued existence of this offence, although D’s appeals against conviction were
allowed because the jury had not been properly directed on the relevant principles.
14.97 The CLA 1977, s 5(3) preserves the offence of conspiracy at common law:
‘if and in so far as it may be committed by entering into an agreement to engage in con-
duct which –
(a) tends to corrupt public morals or outrages public decency; but
(b) would not amount to or involve the commission of an offence213 if carried out by a
single person otherwise than in pursuance of an agreement.’214
This somewhat tentative provision raises the questions of whether substantive common
law offences of corrupting public morals and of outraging public decency exist, and (if
they do) what their extent is.
14.98 It is now clear that there is a substantive common law offence of outraging public
decency. Its existence was less certain in 1977 than it is now, despite the fact that in 1972
in Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP215 the majority of the House
of Lords held, obiter, that outraging public decency was a common law offence, and that
the existence of the substantive offence had previously been recognised by the Court of
Criminal Appeal in Mayling.216 Any doubt as to the existence of the substantive offence
has been removed since 1977 by a series of Court of Appeal decisions, May, 217 Gibson and
Sylveire,218 Lunderbeck,219 Rowley 220 and Hamilton221 confirming that the offence exists.
The substantive offence of outraging public decency requires the doing of an act or
the creation of a display of such a lewd, obscene or disgusting nature as to result in an
outrage to public decency.222 An act or exhibition is obscene for this purpose if it offends
against recognised standards of propriety and is at a higher level of impropriety than
indecency,223 and a disgusting act or exhibition is conduct capable of filling the onlooker
212 Para 1.68. 213 Italics supplied. ‘An offence’ is unqualified, ie it refers to any offence.
214 No person may, however, be proceeded against for an offence at common law of conspiring to corrupt
public morals or of outraging public decency in respect of an agreement to present or give a performance of a
play, or to cause anything to be said or done in the course of such a performance: Theatres Act 1968, s 2(4). A
similar restriction applies in the case of an agreement to give a fi lm exhibition (see the Obscene Publications Act
1959, s 2(4A)) or to cause a programme to be included in a programme service or to cause anything to be said or
done in the course of a programme which is included (see the Broadcasting Act 1990, Sch 15).
215 [1973] AC 435, HL. 216 [1963] 2 QB 717, CCA. 217 (1989) 91 Cr App R 157, CA.
218 [1990] 2 QB 619, CA. 219 [1991] Crim LR 784, CA. 220 [1991] 4 All ER 649, CA.
221 [2007] EWCA Crim 2062.
222 Mayling [1963] 2 QB 717, CCA; Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062.
223 Stanley [1965] 2 QB 327, CCA; Hamilton above.
with loathing or extreme distaste or of causing the onlooker extreme annoyance.224 It is

the nature of the act or exhibition that the jury must consider;225 the test is thus objective.
It is not enough that the act or exhibition is lewd, obscene or disgusting. It must outrage
minimum standards of public decency as judged by the jury in contemporary society.226
‘Outrage’ is a strong word. ‘Outraging public decency’ goes beyond offending the suscep-
tibilities of, or even shocking, reasonable people.227 It is not necessary to prove that the act
or exhibition in fact outraged any member of the public.228 It is enough that it would be
likely to disgust ordinary members of the public if they saw it, whether or not any actual
spectators were disgusted.229
The act or exhibition in question must be done in a place to which the public has access
though not necessarily as of right, or a place where what is done is capable of public
view.230 It must also be ‘public’ in the sense that it is capable of being seen by at least two
people (other than those knowingly participating in it)231 who are actually present, even
if they do not actually see it.232
To be liable for the substantive offence, D must be proved to have intended to do the
act in question, but it does not have to be proved that D intended his conduct to have the
effect of outraging public decency or was reckless as to the risk of this effect (or, indeed,
had any mens rea as to this).233
In its consultation paper Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and
Outraging Public Decency, 234 the Law Commission has provisionally proposed that
the offence of outraging public decency should be restated in statutory form (ie made
a statutory offence). Under its proposals, the prosecution would have to prove that
D intended his conduct to generate outrage, shock or disgust in ordinary people or
was reckless that his conduct might generate outrage, shock or disgust in ordinary
people.
14.99 There can be no real doubt that the substantive offence of outraging public decency
is coterminous with outraging public decency as the object of a conspiracy, in which case
a conspiracy to outrage public decency will always be a statutory conspiracy and there-
fore the CLA 1977, s 5(3) does not have the effect of preserving the common law offence
of conspiracy to outrage public decency.
14.100 The position is more uncertain in relation to corrupting public morals, since
the only authority in favour of the existence of a substantive common law offence of cor-
rupting public morals is Shaw v DPP235 where the Court of Criminal Appeal held that
there was a common law offence of conduct calculated or intended to corrupt public
morals. Unfortunately, the House of Lords on appeal did not decide this point. In Knuller
224 Mayling [1963] 2 QB 717, CCA. 225 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062.
226 Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP [1973] AC 435 at 495, per Lord Simon with whom
Lord Kilbrandon agreed; Hamilton above.
227 Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP above, per Lord Simon with whom Lord
Kilbrandon agreed. 228 Mayling [1963] 2 QB 717, CCA; Choi [1999] 5 Archbold News 3, CA.
229 May (1990) 91 Cr App R 157, CA; Choi above.
230 Walker [1996] 1 Cr App R 111, CA; Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062.
231 Rose v DPP [2006] EWHC 852 (Admin), DC. 232 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062.
233 Gibson and Sylveire [1990] 2 QB 619, CA. 234 (2010) Law Com Consultation Paper No 198.
235 [1961] 1 All ER 330, CCA; affd [1962] AC 220, HL.
(Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP,236 the House of Lords did not consider
whether there was a substantive offence of corrupting public morals.
As a result one cannot be certain that there is a common law substantive offence of
corrupting public morals.
If there is not such an offence, it will not be a statutory conspiracy to conspire to corrupt
public morals (unless the intended conduct constitutes some other substantive offence),
but by the CLA 1977, s 5(3) it will be a common law conspiracy.
If, on the other hand, there is a common law offence of corrupting public morals, the
effect of s 5(3) is that a conspiracy to corrupt public morals either:
• will only be a statutory conspiracy (if that substantive offence is coterminous with
corruption of public morals as the object of a conspiracy), or
• (if the substantive offence has a narrower ambit):
– will be a statutory conspiracy if the conduct agreed on would amount to a sub-
stantive offence, but
– will be a common law conspiracy if that conduct falls outside the substantive
offence (or any other substantive offence).
Until this issue is resolved, the prudent course where conspiracy to corrupt public
morals is charged is to charge alternative counts of statutory conspiracy and common
law conspiracy.
14.101 The reader may be amazed that a statute should leave the law so uncertain. In
defence of the legislature it should be pointed out that, like the CLA 1977, s 5(2), s 5(3)
was intended to be purely a temporary holding operation. The Law Commission, whose
report on conspiracy was implemented with amendments by the CLA 1977, ss 1 to 5, had
recommended that the common law conspiracies to corrupt public morals or to outrage
public decency should be abolished, along with the substantive offences of corrupting
public morals and outraging public decency (which they thought did exist) and certain
other common law offences concerned with morals and decency, and that these substan-
tive offences should be replaced by certain new statutory offences to fill the gaps in the
law where desirable.237 However, by and large, this recommendation was not enacted by
the Bill which became the CLA 1977. The Government’s reason was that the abolition of
these common law conspiracies should be delayed until the whole area of obscenity and
indecency in publications, entertainments and the like had been reviewed. This review
was completed by the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship, which reported in
1979,238 but its proposals have never been implemented.
In its consultation paper Simplification of Criminal Law: Public Nuisance and Outraging
Public Decency, the Law Commission, which has concluded that outraging public decency
covers the same conduct as a substantive offence as it does as the object of a conspiracy,
has provisionally proposed that the CLA 1977 should be amended, so as formally to abol-
ish the common law offence of conspiracy to outrage public decency.
236 [1973] AC 435, HL.

237 Law Commission Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform (1976), Law Com No 76, paras
3.86–3.143. 238 Cmnd 7772.
14.103 attempt | 591
Impossibility in common law conspiracy

14.102 This is governed by the decision of the House of Lords in DPP v Nock; DPP v
Alsford,239 where the reasoning of the House in Haughton v Smith240 concerning impos-
sibility in relation to the common law offence of attempt was held to apply to common
law conspiracy.
The position is as follows. Where the object of the agreement is at the time of the
agreement capable of being achieved but cannot actually be achieved because of some
supervening event or because the proposed means are insufficient, there can be a con-
viction for common law conspiracy. Thus, there can be a conviction for conspiracy to
defraud in the case of an agreement to ‘borrow’ V’s book from his locker without his
consent, even though the book is subsequently destroyed before this can be done or the
skeleton key which is to be used does not fit the lock. However, in any other case of
impossibility, eg where the book has already been destroyed at the time of the agreement,
there cannot be a conviction for common law conspiracy.
As seen in para 14.55, the law on impossibility is tougher in the case of statutory con-
spiracies; although a conspiracy to commit an offence of fraud, which offence is impos-
sible of commission for reasons other than inadequacy of means or a supervening event,
cannot be a common law conspiracy to defraud, it can be a statutory conspiracy.

14.103 Common law conspiracy is triable only on indictment.
The maximum punishment for a common law conspiracy to defraud is now governed
by statute (the Criminal Justice Act 1987, s 12(3)), and is 10 years’ imprisonment. Where a
defendant is convicted of conspiracy to defraud on evidence which would have supported
a conviction for the statutory conspiracy for which the maximum sentence would have
been lower, the court is not obliged to treat itself as bound by that lower maximum rather
than the maximum under s 12(3).241
To the extent that any other common law conspiracy is preserved by CLA 1977, s
5(3), it remains punishable with imprisonment for a period fi xed at the discretion of the
judge.242
Attempt
Key points 14.7

It is a criminal offence to attempt to commit an offence triable on indictment.
To be guilty of an attempt, D:
239 [1978] AC 979, HL. 240 [1975] AC 476, HL. 241 Bright [2008] EWCA Crim 462.
242 Para 1.31.
• must have done an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of
the substantive offence (the offence whose attempt is charged), which means that
D must have embarked on the commission of that offence; and
• must have acted with intent to commit that offence, which means that D must
have acted with intent to commit a sufficient act for the substantive offence, with
intent to bring about any consequence required for it, with mens rea as to any
circumstances required for it and with any additional mens rea required for it.
D may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence even though, unknown to him, the
commission of that offence is impossible.
14.104 The common law offence of attempt to commit an indictable offence was abol-
ished by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (CAA 1981),243 and replaced by a statutory
offence of attempt which was created by the CAA 1981, s 1. The provisions relating to the
statutory offence largely implement recommendations made by the Law Commission.244
The CAA 1981, s 1(1) provides that:
‘If, with intent to commit an offence to which [s 1] applies, a person does an act which is
more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting
to commit the offence.’
Conduct which is merely preparatory to the commission of an offence is not generally

an offence. However, mere preparation to commit an offence is criminal if it amounts to
one of a number of preparatory offences, eg, under the Theft Act 1968, Criminal Damage
Act 1971, Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, Sexual Offences Act 2003 and Fraud Act
2006, as indicated in previous chapters.245
The scope of the offence

14.105 The CAA 1981, s 1(4) provides that s 1 applies to any substantive offence which, ‘if
it were completed, would be triable in England and Wales as an indictable offence’ (ie one
triable only on indictment or one triable either way).246 This means that, contrary to the
Law Commission’s recommendation, it is not an offence under s 1 to attempt to commit a
summary offence. There is no obvious reason. It is anomalous in the light of the fact that
the other inchoate offences can be committed in relation to a summary offence. There
are, however, a number of specific statutory offences of attempting to commit a particular
summary offence (see para 14.141).
243 CAA 1981, s 6(1).

244 Criminal Law: Attempts and Impossibility in relation to Attempts, Conspiracy and Incitement (1980), Law
Com No 102. 245 Chs 9–13.
246 An offence of criminal damage where the value of the property destroyed or of the damage done is less
than £5,000 is an ‘indictable offence’, notwithstanding that it has to be proceeded with ‘as if’ it was a summary
offence (para 13.2): Bristol Magistrates’ Court, ex p E [1998] 3 All ER 798, DC.
14.106 attempt | 593
The reference in s 1(4) to ‘any offence which, if it were completed, would be triable in
England and Wales as an indictable offence’ means that normally an attempt in England
and Wales to commit an indictable offence abroad is not an offence. The reason is that
generally, as explained more fully elsewhere, an offence completed abroad (ie outside
England and Wales) is not triable in England and Wales, unless a substantial measure of
it is committed in England and Wales.247
As to attempts committed outside England and Wales see para 14.137.
14.106 The CAA 1981, s 1(4) (as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Sch 21)
goes on to provide that the offence of attempt under s 1 does not apply to the following:
(a) conspiracy (whether statutory or common law) (s 1(4)(a));
(b) assisting an offender, or concealing an offence, contrary to the Criminal Law Act
1967, ss 4(1) or 5(1), respectively (s 1(4)(c));
(c) an offence of encouraging or assisting suicide, contrary to the Suicide Act 1961, s
2(1) (s 1(4)(ba)); or
(d) aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or suborning the commission of an
offence; in other words, attempting to be an accomplice to an offence which is
actually committed is not an offence (s 1(4)(b)).248 As already noted in para 14.53,
however, Parliament has, from time to time, created offences whose actus reus
consists of procuring or aiding and abetting something, so that the perpetrator of
such an offence is the procurer or aider and abettor of the relevant thing. Where
such an offence has been enacted a person who attempts to perpetrate it can be
convicted of an attempt to commit it.249 It is, of course, possible for a person to be
liable as an accomplice to an attempt.250
Section 1(4) does not preclude a conviction of attempting to commit an offence under the
Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2 of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence,
247 CAA 1981, s 1A, inserted by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 5(2), provides that if (a) an act is done in
England and Wales, and (b) it would fall within the CAA 1981, s 1(1) as more than merely preparatory to the
commission of a Group A offence (ie offences under the Theft Act 1968, Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981,
Fraud Act 2006 and related offences listed in s 1 of the 1993 Act: see para 12.70) but for the fact that that offence,
if completed, would not be an offence triable in England and Wales, what the person doing the act had in view is
to be treated as an offence to which the CAA 1981, s 1 applies.
The CJA 1993, s 6(2) provides that a person is only guilty of an offence triable by virtue of the CAA 1981, s 1A
if what he had in view would involve the commission of an offence under the law in force where the whole or any
part of it was intended to take place. The CJA 1993, s 6(4) and (7) referred to in para 14.95, nn 204 and 205 also
apply to the CAA 1981, s 1A.
The CAA 1981, s 1A is misconceived because it cannot apply where the substantive offence is triable under
English law, and any act done in England and Wales by way of an attempt to commit a Group A offence must
necessarily be a ‘relevant event’ under the CJA 1993, s 2(1), and any completed Group A offence is triable in
England and Wales under s 2(3) if a relevant event occurs there (see para 12.71).
248 For the discussion of an apparent clash between the offences of encouraging or assisting crime under
SCA 2007 (see paras 14.1–14.43) and CAA 1981, s 1(4)(b), see Bohlander ‘The Confl ict between the Serious
Crime Act 2007 and section 1(4)(b) Criminal Attempts Act 1981 – a Missed Repeal?’ [2010] Crim LR 483; Child
‘The Differences between Attempted Complicity and Inchoate Assisting or Encouraging – a Reply to Professor
Bohlander’ [2010] Crim LR 924; Bohlander (Letter) [2010] Crim LR 933.
249 McShane (1977) 66 Cr App R 97, CA; Chief Constable of Hampshire v Mace (1986) 84 Cr App R 40, DC.
250 Dunnington [1984] QB 472, CA.
or of attempting to commit a preparatory offence. In R251 the Court of Appeal confirmed

there could be a conviction for attempting to commit the preparatory offence under the
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 14 of arranging or facilitating the commission of a child sex
offence. In these circumstances criminal liability is imposed at a stage distant from the
commission of a substantive offence.
14.107 There are a number of other offences which, by their nature, cannot be attempted
under the definition in the CAA 1981, s 1.
14.108 The requirement for an act means that offences which can only be com-
mitted by an omission to act are excluded from the offence of attempt. It appears
that Parliament intended that it should be possible to charge attempt by omission
in appropriate cases. 252 When the Criminal Attempts Bill was before Parliament, a
proposed amendment to add ‘omissions’ to the list of offences which could not be
attempted was defeated after it had been opposed by the Government because it was
desired to retain the possibility of charging attempt by omission in certain cases, such
as attempting to kill an invalid by failing to feed. Nevertheless, the words of s 1(1) are
unambiguous: ‘doing an act’ could only be construed as meaning ‘doing an act or
failing to do an act’ by an impermissible rewriting of the provision. The limitation of
the offence of attempt to the doing of an act is unfortunate because there is morally
no difference between those who attempt to commit an offence by doing an act and
those who attempt to do so by failing to do something which they are legally obliged
to do.253
14.109 The requirement of an intent to commit the substantive offence whose attempt
is charged means that a charge of attempt to commit involuntary manslaughter is inap-
propriate because the prosecution would have to prove an intent to kill and if they did this
would establish attempted murder. In Creamer 254 the Court of Criminal Appeal stated,
obiter, that attempted involuntary manslaughter was an offence unknown to the law. On
the other hand, there is no reason in principle why a person who intends to kill, but who
would have had the partial defence of loss of control, or diminished responsibility, or kill-
ing in pursuance of a suicide pact, if he had killed, 255 should not be guilty of attempted
voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to attempted murder, if his attempt is unsuccessful.
However, the available authorities on the point deny that this is possible.256 So, it seems,
does the wording of the CAA 1981, s 1.257
251 [2008] EWCA Crim 619 (reported elsewhere as Robson).

252 See Dennis ‘The Criminal Attempts Act 1981’ [1982] Crim LR 5 at 7.
253 See Palmer ‘Attempt by Act or Omission: Causation and the Problem of the Hypothetical Nurse’ (1999)
63 J Crim L 158. 254 [1966] 1 QB 72 at 81.
255 As to these partial defences, see paras 8.37–8.81.
256 Bruzas [1972] Crim LR 367, Crown Ct (provocation not available as a defence to attempted murder; the
defence of provocation has been replaced by that of loss of control); Campbell [1997] Crim LR 495, Crown Ct
(diminished responsibility not available as defence to attempted murder charge). In Creamer, n 254, the Court of
Criminal Appeal, in saying that it was ‘undoubtedly true that attempted manslaughter is [an offence] unknown
to the law’ did not advert to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter; the case was
concerned with liability as an accomplice for the offence of involuntary manslaughter.
257 Th is point was made by Sedley J (as he then was) in Campbell [1997] Crim LR 495, Crown Ct.
14.113 attempt | 595
Mens rea
14.110 In order that D may be convicted of an attempt to commit an offence, D must be
proved to have had an intention to commit that offence, and to have done an act which
constituted the actus reus of an attempt (ie an act which was more than merely prepara-
tory to the commission of the intended offence). Of these two elements, the first is par-
ticularly important because whether a particular act amounts to an attempt will often
depend on the intent with which it is done. For example, to strike a match near a haystack
may or may not be attempted arson of the haystack, depending on whether there is an
intent to set fire to the haystack or to light a cigarette; the intent colours the act. The func-
tion of the actus reus is to regulate the point at which acts in furtherance of D’s inten-
tion incur criminal liability. The policy of the law is that it is only when some act is done
which sufficiently manifests the social danger present in the intent that authority should
intervene.
14.111 The mens rea specified for the offence of attempt by the CAA 1981, s 1(1) is an
‘intent to commit an offence to which this section [ie s 1] applies’ and which D is alleged
to have attempted.
The words quoted involve more complexity than might at first sight appear. The rea-
son is that an intent to commit the offence attempted may involve a number of mental
elements.
Intent to commit a sufficient act

14.112 D must always be proved to have intended to commit an act (indeed, he may
have done it) or to continue with a series of acts which, when completed, will amount to
the offence allegedly attempted 258 (assuming any requisite consequence for that offence
has resulted from the act or acts and that any requisite circumstance exists). In this con-
text talk of anything other than a direct intent would seem to be meaningless.
Intent as to any consequence of substantive offence

14.113 Where the definition of the offence allegedly attempted requires that some con-
sequence be brought about by D’s conduct, it must always be proved that D intended that
consequence to result from his intended sufficient act. Intention in this context can be
proved by proving that D had a direct intention to bring it about. However, the jury or mag-
istrates are entitled to find that D intended that consequence if it was virtually certain to
result from the intended sufficient act and D foresaw that consequence as virtually certain
to result therefrom, although it was not D’s purpose to bring that consequence about.259
It is not enough that D intended some lesser consequence to result from his intended
sufficient act, nor is it enough that D was merely reckless as to the specified consequence
resulting therefrom.260 The result is that the requirement of mens rea for attempt may be
258 Khan [1990] 2 All ER 783, CA.

259 Pearman (1984) 80 Cr App R 259 at 263; Walker and Hayles (1989) 90 Cr App R 226, CA (note the reference
in this case to ‘very high degree of probability’ is now wrong).
260 Millard and Vernon [1987] Crim LR 393, CA.
stricter on a charge of attempt than for the substantive offence which has been attempted.
For example, D may be convicted of murder if he kills someone when intending merely to
cause unlawful grievous bodily harm, whereas on a charge of attempted murder the jury
must be satisfied that he intended unlawfully to kill if he is to be convicted.261 By way of
further example, D may be convicted of criminal damage if he was reckless as to destroy-
ing or damaging another’s property, but on a charge of attempted criminal damage an
intent as to this consequence must be proved.262
Mens rea as to any circumstances of the substantive offence

14.114 D must be proved to have had mens rea in relation to any circumstances of the
actus reus of the offence allegedly attempted. Subject to what is said below, this is so even
if that offence is one of strict liability as to a circumstance or circumstances. It makes no
sense in this context to speak of a direct intention as to a circumstance (ie to speak of D
deciding to bring about, insofar as it lies within his power, a circumstance) or of foresight
of it resulting from an intended act.
14.115 In the relatively rare case where the offence allegedly attempted requires knowl-
edge (in the sense of being certain) as to a circumstance (otherwise known as intention
as to a circumstance) or ‘knowledge or belief’ as to a circumstance, knowledge or belief
as to it is required on a charge of attempting that offence. This is supported by the CAA
1981, s 1(3), which, as explained later, relates to impossibility of an attempt. Section 1(3)
proceeds on the basis that D can be convicted of an attempt where he mistakenly believes
in the existence of facts or circumstances which would render his intended act criminal.263
Thus, in this case ‘belief’ in the existence of a circumstance suffices where D is not certain
about it. It can hardly be the case that a correct belief in facts or circumstances making the
intended act criminal is insufficient until verified and turned into actual knowledge.264
14.116 Where recklessness (which term includes ‘wilful blindness’) suffices for the
offence allegedly attempted, recklessness will also suffice on a charge of attempting to
commit it. In Khan,265 the Court of Appeal held that, since recklessness as to the absence
of the woman’s consent was sufficient mens rea on a charge of rape contrary to the Sexual
Offences Act 1956, s 1 (since repealed), 266 D could be convicted of attempted rape, if he
knew that the woman was not consenting or was reckless as to the fact that she might not
be. Although Khan is strictly an authority only in relation to an attempt to commit the
offence of rape under s 1 of the 1956 Act, it is inconceivable that the approach taken in it is
not equally applicable to an attempt to commit any other offence for which recklessness
as to a circumstance or circumstances suffices.
Since recklessness as to a circumstance suffices on an attempt charge if it suffices for
the substantive offence, recklessness will suffice on a charge of attempting to commit
261 Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141, CCA; Walker and Hayles (1989) 90 Cr App R 226, CA.
262 See Millard and Vernon [1987] Crim LR 393, CA; O’Toole [1987] Crim LR 759, CA.
263 It would be nonsensical to talk of knowledge in such a case.
264 Dennis [1981] Crim LR 5 at 12. Also see Brown [1984] 3 All ER 1013, CA.
265 [1990] 2 All ER 783, CA. See Duff ‘The Circumstances of an Attempt’ (1991) 50 CLJ 100, and the response
by Williams ‘Intents in the Alternative’ (1991) 50 CLJ 120. 266 By the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
14.117 attempt | 597
an offence in which negligence as to a circumstance suffices or which is one of strict

liability as to a circumstance. The reason is that a person can be convicted of such an
offence even though he is not reckless as to that circumstance, so that recklessness clearly
suffices for it. The result is, eg, that on a charge of attempting to engage in sexual activity
with a child under 16, an offence of negligence in relation to age (unless the child is under
13 in which case it is one of strict liability in this respect), D must be proved actually to
have been certain or to have believed that the girl was under 16 or to have been reckless
as to this. It may be that the law is harsher than as stated here. In A-G’s Reference (No 3
of 1992)267 where another issue concerning the mens rea for attempt, dealt with in para
14.117, was under consideration, the Court of Appeal stated that D ‘in order to be guilty
of an offence must be in one of the states of mind required for the commission of the full
offence, and did his best, as far as he could to supply what was missing from the comple-
tion of the offence’. This statement, made without reference to authority or any apparent
consideration of its implications, must be viewed with caution. If it does represent the law,
the effect would be that if the substantive offence was one of negligence or strict liability
as to a circumstance of its actus reus the same would be true in respect of a charge of
attempting to commit it.
Additional mens rea

14.117 The requirement that D must be proved to have intended to commit the
offence allegedly attempted means that D must have any other mental element, addi-
tional to mens rea as to the consequence or circumstances of the actus reus of the
offence allegedly attempted, required for that offence. Thus, D can only be convicted
of attempted theft if D acted dishonestly and with intent permanently to deprive the
person to whom it belonged of the property he intended to appropriate. Likewise, D
can only be convicted of attempting to commit an offence of destroying or damaging
property intending or being reckless as to endangering life if (in addition to intending
to destroy or damage property) D intended or was reckless as to endangering life by
the intended destruction or damage. Thus, recklessness suffices in this respect if it suf-
fices as additional mens rea for the offence attempted. A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1992)268
provides authority for this. D threw a lighted petrol bomb at a car containing people.
The bomb missed the car. At D’s trial for attempting to commit arson, being reckless
as to whether life would be endangered thereby, the judge directed an acquittal. Her
reasons were that D had to intend to commit the offence whose attempt was charged,
that it was impossible to intend to be reckless as to endangering life, and therefore that
it was impossible to convict D of the attempt charged if all that could be proved was that
he intended to damage property being reckless as to whether life would be endangered
thereby. The Court of Appeal held that this was wrong; on a charge of the type in ques-
tion, in addition to proof of an intent to cause damage by fi re, it was sufficient to prove
that D was reckless as to life being endangered thereby.
267 [1994] 2 All ER 121 at 126.

268 [1994] 2 All ER 121, CA. Criticised by Elliott ‘Endangering Life by Destroying or Damaging Property’
[1997] Crim LR 382 at 393–395.
General comments
14.118 Ignorance of law no defence The requirement of an intent to commit an offence
does not mean that D must be aware that what he intends to do is an offence; the CAA
1981 does not derogate from the general rule269 that ignorance of the law is no defence.
14.119 Conditional intent A person charged with attempting to commit an offence
may have acted with a so-called ‘conditional intent’, ie an intent to commit that offence if
a particular condition is satisfied. Provided in such a case that D has formed a firm inten-
tion to commit the offence if the condition in question is satisfied, and that D has gone
beyond mere preparation (and therefore committed the actus reus of an attempt), D can
be convicted of an attempt to commit that offence.
A common example of a case involving a ‘conditional intent’ is where D intends to steal
whatever he might find worth stealing in his target area, as where D is arrested as he opens
V’s suitcase, intending to look inside it, to examine its contents and, if there is anything
worth stealing, to steal that thing. Provided that D is not charged with the attempted theft
of specific objects but instead is merely charged with the attempted theft of ‘some or all of
the contents’ of the suitcase, D can be convicted of attempted theft.270 The proviso is an
unsatisfactory one because, if the suitcase does not contain anything worth stealing, D’s
intention is not to steal some or all of the contents but some non-existent thing.
A second example is where D is arrested as he is about to trespass in a building with
the intention of stealing anything valuable therein, if he finds such a thing. D can be
convicted of attempted burglary.271 In such a case it is unnecessary for the charge to
allege more than ‘with intent to steal therein’ since the type of offence attempted does not
require anything to be stolen.
Another example is where D creeps into V’s house intending to kill V if V is alone (or
if V is there). Assuming that it is proved that D acted with a firm intention to commit
murder if the condition was satisfied, and had gone beyond the stage of mere preparation,
D can be convicted of attempted murder despite the condition attached to his intention.
Actus reus
14.120 The CAA 1981, s 1(1) provides that the offence of attempt to commit an offence
requires ‘an act that is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence’.
‘The offence’ means one to which s 1 applies272 and which D intends to commit.
The application of the formula ‘an act that is more than merely preparatory to the com-
mission of the offence’ can be illustrated as follows. If D buys a box of matches he cannot
be convicted of attempted arson, even though it may clearly be proved that he intends to
set fire to a haystack at the time of the purchase. Nor can D be convicted of this offence if
he approaches the stack with the matches in his pocket. However, if he bends down near
269 Para 3.78.

270 Husseyn (1977) 67 Cr App R 131, CA; A-G’s References (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979) [1980] QB 180, CA; Scudder
v Barrett [1980] QB 195, DC; Bayley and Easterbrook [1980] Crim LR 503, CA; Smith and Smith [1986] Crim LR
166, CA. Also see Toothill [1998] Crim LR 876, CA. 271 A-G’s References (Nos 1 and 2 of 1979) above.
272 Paras 14.105–14.108.
14.122 attempt | 599
the stack and lights a match which he extinguishes on seeing that he is being watched, he
may be guilty of attempted arson. In the first two instances, D’s acts have clearly not gone
beyond the stage of mere preparation; in the third the jury (or magistrates) may properly
find that they have.
14.121 The formula ‘an act that is more than merely preparatory to the commission of
the offence’ is rather vague, particularly since the CAA 1981 offers no explanation of it.
The formula was intended by the Law Commission to be a rationalisation of various deci-
sions on what constituted a sufficient act for the common law offence of attempt, some
of which were unsatisfactory or not easy to reconcile with others. However, the formula
must not be construed according to the previous case law. The reason is that, as the long
title of the Act states, it is an Act to amend the law of attempt. Consequently, the correct
approach is not to refer to the previous case law and seek to fit some previous test to the
words of the formula, but instead to apply the words of the formula according to their
plain and natural meaning.273
Functions of judge and jury

14.122 The CAA 1981, s 4(3) provides that, where there is evidence sufficient in law
to support a finding that D did an act which was more than merely preparatory to the
commission of the offence allegedly attempted (ie evidence capable of constituting an
attempt), the question whether or not it is proved that D’s act actually fell within s 1(1) is
a question of fact. This is of particular importance in terms of the respective functions of
judge and jury in relation to the actus reus of attempt. In a condensed fashion, s 4(3) codi-
fies the principles laid down in this respect by the House of Lords in DPP v Stonehouse.274
It was held in that case, and s 4(3) assumes this, that whether there is evidence of an act
sufficient in law to constitute an attempt (ie evidence on which a jury could properly
conclude that D had gone beyond mere preparation)275 is a question for the judge. If the
judge decides that there is no such evidence on which the jury could properly convict
of an attempt (or if the judge decides that, although the matter is not as conclusive
as that, it would nevertheless be unsafe to leave the evidence to the jury),276 the judge
must direct the jury to acquit D of an attempt. The effect of s 4(3) is that if, on the other
hand, the judge finds that there is evidence on which a jury could properly conclude
that there has been a more than merely preparatory act, the judge must leave it to the
jury to decide as a question of fact whether or not D did an act which was more than
merely preparatory to the commission of the offence allegedly attempted. The dividing
line between the two can be very fine. This involves the jury in finding not only that D
did a particular act but also that it was more than ‘merely preparatory to’ the commission
of the intended offence. Accordingly, the judge must not direct the jury to convict if they
find a relevant act proved, even though on the evidence there can only be an affirmative
answer to the question ‘was it more than merely preparatory?’277 Leaving the task to the
273 Gullefer [1990] 3 All ER 882, CA; Jones [1990] 3 All ER 886, CA; Campbell (1990) 93 Cr App R 350, CA.
274 [1978] AC 55, HL. 275 Gullefer [1990] 3 All ER 882 at 884.
276 Campbell (1990) 93 Cr App R 350, CA.
277 Wang [2005] UKHL 9. See also Griffin [1993] Crim LR 515, CA.
jury of determining whether an act was actually more than merely preparatory may lead
to inconsistency as between juries on materially similar facts.
More than merely preparatory act

14.123 Cases where there may be sufficient evidence that an act is more than merely pre-
paratory to the commission of an offence are not restricted to ‘last act’ cases, ie cases where
D has done the last act towards the commission of the offence allegedly attempted which it
was necessary for him to do, even though something more remains to be done by another,
innocent person. Otherwise the offence of attempt would hardly ever be committed and
some offences, such as rape, could never be attempted. It is established that there can be
sufficient evidence in law of a more than merely preparatory act in a case where D still has
to take some further step or steps himself before the substantive offence can be commit-
ted278 but, clearly, there will not always be sufficient evidence of such an act in such a case.
The dividing line between acts which will or will not suffice under the formula must, of
course, be drawn on the basis of the wording of the CAA 1981, s 1(1), and the key words
are ‘more than merely preparatory’. Obviously, every act in furtherance of a criminal
objective can be described as preparatory to the commission of the offence but it will not
always be describable as merely preparatory. As is indicated by common sense and by the
Court of Appeal in Gullefer279 and in Jones,280 if D can be said to have got as far as having
embarked on the commission of the offence (ie ‘on the job’),281 as where D tries to force
a door of a house in order to commit burglary or points a loaded gun at someone with
intent to kill him,282 there is sufficient evidence of an act more than merely preparatory
to the commission of the intended offence.283 In such a case, it would be a major under-
statement to say that there is not sufficient evidence that D’s acts had gone beyond being
merely preparatory, even though (since some further act was required of D) his acts were
still at the preparatory stage. Although Gullefer, in particular, has been referred to in many
subsequent decisions, the courts have not been consistent in their application of it.
14.124 In Gullefer, D had jumped onto a greyhound track to stop a race, in which the dog
he had backed was losing. He did so in order to have the race declared void whereupon he
would have been entitled to recover his bet of £18. The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal
against conviction for the attempted theft of the amount of the bet because the judge
had been wrong to find that there was sufficient evidence to leave to the jury that D had
done an act more than merely preparatory to getting the £18. He had not embarked on
the commission of the offence. His act was merely preparatory to getting the £18; it still
278 Boyle and Boyle (1986) 84 Cr App R 270, CA; Gullefer [1990] 3 All ER 882, CA; Jones [1990] 3 All ER 886,
CA. 279 [1990] 3 All ER 882, CA.
280 [1990] 3 All ER 886, CA. For criticism of Jones and Gullefer see KJM Smith ‘Proximity in Attempt: Lord
Lane’s “Midway Course” ’ [1991] Crim LR 576. 281 A phrase used in Osborn (1919) 84 JP 63.
282 Even if the safety catch is still on and he has yet to put his fi nger to the trigger: Jones [1990] 3 All ER 886,
CA. See also A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1992) [1993] 2 All ER 190, CA (attempted physical penetration by D’s penis
of the victim not necessary for case of attempted rape to be left to jury); Patnaik [2000] 3 Archbold News 2, CA
(not a necessary threshold for attempted rape to be left to the jury that D, who was engaged in violently subduing
victim with intent to rape her, should have gone as far as starting to undo or remove her (or his) clothing or to
do some other unequivocal sexual act).
283 It is not necessary that D should have reached a ‘point of no return’: Gullefer [1990] 3 All ER 882, CA.
14.126 attempt | 601
remained for the stewards to declare the race void and for D then to go to the bookmaker
and demand the £18.
14.125 Gullefer can be contrasted with Jones, where D had got into V’s car and pointed
a loaded firearm at him. V managed to disarm him. D was charged with attempted mur-
der. The trial judge rejected a submission that there was insufficient evidence to leave to
the jury the question of whether D had done a more than merely preparatory act. That
submission had been based on the argument that at least three more preparatory acts
would have had to be carried out by D before the substantive offence was committed, ie
remove the safety catch, put his finger on the trigger and pull it. D appealed unsuccess-
fully against conviction for attempted murder. The Court of Appeal held that, although
D’s earlier acts prior to entering V’s car, such as loading the gun and going to the place,
could only be regarded as preparatory, once D had got into V’s car, taken out the loaded
firearm and pointed it at V there was sufficient evidence of a more than merely prepara-
tory act.
Likewise, in Moore v DPP,284 the Divisional Court held that a court had been entitled to
determine that D, who (when over the alcohol limit) had driven a car on private property,
and had been arrested a few metres from the road towards which he was heading, had
attempted to drive on a road when over the legal limit for alcohol.
14.126 The approach referred to above was purportedly adopted by the Court of Appeal
in Geddes,285 although the words used by the Court raised the threshold of embarking
on the commission of the offence by requiring that D should actually have tried to com-
mit the substantive offence, ie have got as far as the last acts necessary on his part to com-
mit the offence. Dealing with the approach to be taken by a judge in deciding whether
there is evidence sufficient in law to support a finding by the jury that D did an act merely
preparatory to the commission of the offence allegedly attempted, Lord Bingham CJ, as
he then was, giving the judgment of the Court said:
‘It is, we think, an accurate paraphrase of the statutory test and not an illegitimate gloss
upon it to ask whether the available evidence, if accepted, could show that a defendant has
done an act which shows that he has actually tried to commit the offence in question, or
whether he has only got ready or put himself in a position or equipped himself to do so.’286
In Geddes, D had entered school grounds and been found in a boys’ toilet. He ran away
and a rucksack discarded by him was found to contain lengths of string, sealing tape
and a knife. D was convicted of attempted false imprisonment of a person unknown. He
appealed against conviction on the ground that the trial judge had been wrong to rule
that there was sufficient evidence of more than merely preparatory acts by D for the mat-
ter to be left to the jury. The Court of Appeal allowed D’s appeal. It held that, although
there was no doubt as to D’s intention, the evidence was clearly capable of showing no
more than that he had made preparations, equipped himself, got ready and put himself
in a position to commit the offence whose attempt was charged. There was not evidence
sufficient in law to support a finding that he had moved beyond the role of intention,
284 [2010] EWHC 1822 (Admin), DC. 285 (1996) 160 JP 697, CA. 286 Ibid at 705.
preparation and planning into the area of execution or implementation, ie that he had
actually tried to commit the offence of false imprisonment. He had entered the school but
he had not had any contact or communication with any pupil.287
A decision to like effect is the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Campbell,288 where
D had been arrested, armed with an imitation firearm, as he approached within a yard of
the door of a post office where he intended to commit a robbery. The Court of Appeal,
allowing D’s appeal against conviction for attempted robbery, held that there had not been
sufficient evidence to leave to the jury that D’s acts were more than merely preparatory.
More recently, in Mason v DPP,289 the Divisional Court took a narrow approach remi-
niscent of that in Geddes. In Mason v DPP, where D had opened his car door, intending
to drive the vehicle, but was prevented from getting into it when it was stolen as he did so,
the Divisional Court quashed D’s conviction for attempting to drive a motor vehicle when
over the alcohol limit. The Court held that the full offence required ‘driving’ and that D
could not be said to have embarked on the ‘crime proper’ until he did something which
was part of the actual process of putting the car in motion; turning on the engine would
have been such a step, it said, but starting to open the door was not capable of being so.
14.127 Geddes can be contrasted with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tosti, 290
where the Court of Appeal, having referred to Lord Bingham’s paraphrase of the test in
s 1(1), upheld a conviction for attempted burglary despite the fact that D1 and D2 had not
got as far as ‘trying to commit the offence in question’. The question for the Court was
whether there had been sufficient evidence to leave to the jury the question of whether D1
and D2 had done an act which was more than merely preparatory to committing burglary.
The evidence was that D1 and D2 had equipped themselves with oxyacetylene equip-
ment, driven to the scene, concealed the oxyacetylene equipment in a hedge, approached
a barn door and bent down to examine a heavy padlock. Dismissing appeals against con-
viction for attempted burglary, Beldam LJ, giving the Court’s judgment, stated that ‘there
may be actions which are preparatory which are not merely so and which are essentially
the first steps in the commission of the offence’.291 The Court held that the facts proved
in evidence were sufficient for the judge to leave to the jury the question whether those
acts were or were not more than merely preparatory. In doing so the Court purported to
apply the guidance in Geddes but in reality they were adopting the pre-Geddes approach
indicated by the Court of Appeal in Gullefer and Jones.
Geddes has not expressly been the basis of any appellate decisions since Tosti. It was not
referred to in Mason v DPP,292 for instance.
The inconsistency in approach in the above decisions is in urgent need of resolution.
14.128 In making a ruling on whether or not an act was capable of being more than merely
preparatory the judge must keep in mind the essential nature of the offence attempted,
ie the essential act or transaction on which it hinges and any consequence required to
287 The defendant in Geddes would now be guilty of an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 63
(trespassing with intent to commit a relevant sexual offence). 288 (1990) 93 Cr App R 350, CA.
289 [2009] EWHC 2198 (Admin), DC. See also K [2009] EWCA Crim 1931 for another case where a narrow
approach was taken to ‘more than merely preparatory’. 290 [1997] Crim LR 746, CA.
291 These words appear in the transcript but not in the brief report cited in n 290.
292 Nor in K (para 14.126, n 289).
14.130 attempt | 603
complete it.293 In Toothill,294 where D had knocked at the door of the house of his intended
rape-victim, the Court of Appeal upheld a conviction of attempted burglary with intent to
rape;295 the judge had been correct in holding that there was evidence on which the jury
could find that D’s knocking at the door was more than merely preparatory to the commis-
sion of burglary, since commission of that offence simply required for its completion an act
of entry as a trespasser (with a requisite intent, such as to rape). It would doubtless have been
different if the substantive offence had required the commission of rape for its completion.
Although it is not possible to categorise types of offences, because their individual facts
can vary, killing or wounding usually concentrates on a particular moment, whereas fraud
is more likely to involve a plan carried on over a period of time. In the former type of case, an
act leading up to the completion of the offence but substantially earlier in time is likely to be
merely preparatory, whereas in the latter the moment when an act is done which is more than
merely preparatory may be quite remote in time from the completion of the offence.296
14.129 Of course, as recognised in Geddes, the dividing line cannot always be easily
drawn. Quite apart from this, the differences inherent in Geddes and Tosti mean that
the dividing line between ‘merely preparatory’ and ‘more than merely preparatory’ has
become uncertain.
Whichever approach is adopted, D must have gone a long way down the road towards
committing the intended offence to fall within the scope of attempt. This is due not only
to the wording ‘more than merely preparatory’ but also due to the fact that it is implicit
in the word ‘attempt’ itself.
Attempts to do the impossible

14.130 The CAA 1981, s 1(2) and (3) deals with attempts to do the impossible and reverses
the decision in Haughton v Smith,297 a House of Lords case where the actual decision and
other statements of principle were to the effect that in many cases of impossibility there
could not be a conviction for the common law offence of attempt.
‘A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence to which [s 1] applies even

though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.’
Section 1(3) adds that:
‘In any case where –

(a) apart from this subsection [s 1(3)] a person’s intention would not be regarded as
having amounted to an intent to commit an offence; but
293 Qadir [1997] 9 Archbold News 1, CA. See also the commentary to Nash [1999] Crim LR 308, CA.
294 [1998] Crim LR 876, CA.
295 The offence of burglary with intent to rape was replaced by the offence of trespass with intent to commit
a relevant sexual offence by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 296 Qadir [1997] 9 Archbold News 1, CA.
297 [1975] AC 476, HL.
(b) if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would be
so regarded,
then, for the purposes of [s 1(1)], he shall be regarded as having had an intent to commit
that offence.’
14.131 As a result of the CAA 1981, s 1(2), D is guilty of attempted murder if his physi-
cal objective is capable of commission at the time of his attempt but he fails to achieve
it because of a supervening event or inadequate means or lack of skill. Examples are
where, intending to kill, D sends a time bomb to V who dies of natural causes before
the bomb arrives, or where D places a small quantity of poison in a glass of lemonade
which he expects his intended victim to drink, the quantity being insufficient to be lethal.
Likewise, D is guilty of attempted burglary where, in order to burgle a house, he tries to
force a window with a jemmy which is insufficient.
14.132 One effect of the CAA 1981, s 1(2), in combination with s 1(3), is that D can
be convicted of an attempt even though his physical objective could never have been
achieved at the time of his attempt, whatever means or however much skill was used.
Thus, D is guilty of attempted murder if he fires at a bolster in a bed, mistakenly believ-
ing that it is B whom he intends to kill. Likewise, D is guilty of attempted theft if he is
charged with attempting to steal from a particular wallet which is in fact empty. Unlike
the examples in the previous paragraph, these examples would not have constituted the
common law offence of attempt as a result of the views expressed by the House of Lords
in Haughton v Smith. The rationale behind the distinction between the two types of situ-
ation drawn in that case was not easily discernible and the abolition of the distinction
made sense.
14.133 Another effect of s 1(2), in combination with s 1(3), is that D can be convicted of
an attempt where he has achieved or could have achieved his object in physical terms,
but owing to some mistake on his part his object does not after all amount to an offence.
Following the decision in Haughton v Smith, there could not have been a conviction for
the common law offence of attempt in such a situation. Given that the essence of the
offence of attempt is to punish those who go further than mere preparation to put their
‘evil intents’ into practice, the reversal of that decision for the purposes of the statutory
offence of attempt is clearly right. As a result of the above provisions a person who han-
dles goods, mistakenly believing that they are stolen, can be convicted of attempting
to handle stolen goods; a man who mistakenly believes that the girl with whom he has
sexual intercourse is under 16 can be convicted of attempting to have penetrative sexual
activity with a girl under 16; and a person who takes his own umbrella from a hat stand,
thinking it is another’s, can be convicted of attempted theft.
Strictly, the people referred to in para 14.132 and the last paragraph could be convicted
of an attempt by reference only to the CAA 1981, s 1(2), since they all have the necessary
mens rea for the attempted offence in question. Section 1(3) is, however, included in the
Act to prevent a defence succeeding that D’s conduct was objectively innocent.
14.134 The above undoubtedly reflects the current effect of the CAA 1981 on attempts
to do the impossible, but between May 1985 and May 1986 the interpretation of the
14.134 attempt | 605
Act was different in relation to cases of the type described in para 14.133, as a result
of the House of Lords’ decision in May 1985 in Anderton v Ryan298 that they did not
constitute an attempt under the Act. The case concerned a defendant who had bought a
video recorder, believing it to have been stolen. On the facts as they were assumed to be
it was not stolen. The House of Lords (Lord Edmund-Davies dissenting) held that the
defendant could not be convicted of attempting to handle stolen goods. It held that on
their true construction s 1(2) and, particularly, s 1(3) did not compel the conclusion that
a person was guilty of attempting to commit an offence where his acts were ‘objectively
innocent’, although he mistakenly believed facts which if true would have made his acts
a complete offence.
This decision was particularly objectionable in that it introduced the concept of ‘objec-
tive innocence’ which it was clearly the CAA 1981’s intention to exclude. Consequently,
there was a general satisfaction when it was overruled in May 1986 by the House of Lords
in Shivpuri.299 Here, D, who had been arrested while in possession of a suitcase, admitted
that he had believed that the suitcase contained either heroin or cannabis and that he had
been concerned in dealing with it. When analysed the contents turned out not to be a
controlled drug at all but a harmless substance. The House of Lords, overruling Anderton
v Ryan, dismissed D’s appeal against conviction for attempting to commit the statutory
offence of knowingly being concerned in dealing with a drug whose importation was
prohibited. Lord Bridge, with whose speech the other Law Lords agreed, made clear that
there is no distinction between ‘objectively innocent’ and ‘objectively guilty’ acts in the
present sphere. Lord Bridge stated:
‘I am satisfied that the concept of “objective innocence” is incapable of sensible applica-

tion in relation to the law of criminal attempts. The reason for this is that any attempt to
commit an offence which involves “an act which is more than merely preparatory to the
commission of the offence” but which for any reason fails, so that in the event no offence is
committed, must, ex hypothesi, from the point of view of the criminal law, be “objectively
innocent”. What turns what would otherwise, from the point of view of the criminal law,
be an innocent act into a crime is the intent of the actor to commit an offence. . . . A puts
his hand into B’s pocket. Whether or not there is anything in the pocket capable of being
stolen, if A intends to steal his act is a criminal attempt; if he does not so intend his act is
innocent. . . . These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the distinction sought to
be drawn in Anderton v Ryan between innocent and guilty acts considered “objectively”
and independently of the state of mind of the actor cannot be sensibly maintained.’300
The House held that, by the CAA 1981, s 1, two things, and two things only, had always
to be proved for a conviction for attempt. First, that D had an intention to commit the
offence in question. Second, that, with that intent, D had done an act which was more
than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence intended by him, which meant
that the question to ask was whether the act would have been more than preparatory if
the facts had been as D believed them to be. Applying these two tests, it was held, D was
clearly guilty of the offence in question, since he had intended to deal with drugs which he
298 [1985] AC 560, HL. 299 [1987] AC 1, HL. 300 Ibid at 21–22.
believed had been illegally imported, and he had done an act which was more than merely
preparatory to the commission of that intended offence.
14.135 Some cases of impossible attempts are hardly deserving of punishment. In such
cases, assuming (and this is unlikely) that the case ever came to light, the discretion to
prosecute is very likely to be exercised against the institution of a prosecution.
14.136 It must be emphasised that the CAA 1981, s 1(3) only operates where, if the facts
of the case had been as D believed them to be, D’s intention would be regarded as having
amounted to an intention to commit an offence. Consequently, whether or not D knows
the true facts, if what D intends to do (and may actually do) is not an offence, although
because of a mistake as to the criminal law D believes that it is, D cannot be convicted of
an attempt. For example, a man who has intercourse with a girl of 17, knowing that she is
17 but mistakenly believing that it is an offence to have intercourse with her because she
is under 18, cannot be convicted of an attempt contrary to s 1 because he does not intend
to commit an offence to which s 1 applies.
Jurisdiction over attempts outside England and Wales

14.137 The courts in England and Wales have jurisdiction under the common law rules
of jurisdiction over an attempt committed abroad provided that it was intended to result
in an offence triable in England and Wales on indictment, even though no overt act or
consequence takes place in England and Wales.301
Statutory provision to this effect is made by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 3(3) in rela-
tion to attempts abroad to commit a Group A offence, viz one of the offences under the
Theft Act 1968, Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, Fraud Act 2006 and related offences
listed in the Criminal Justice Act 1993, s 1 (see para 12.70),302 which would be triable in
England and Wales if committed. Section 3(3) provides that it is immaterial that the
attempt was not made in England and Wales and had no effect in England and Wales. It
is irrelevant whether or not D was a British citizen at any material time or was in England
and Wales at any such time.303

Prosecution
14.138 By the CAA 1981, s 2, where the offence attempted is subject to a statutory provi-
sion whereby proceedings for it may not be instituted or carried on otherwise than by, or
on behalf or with the consent of, any person (such as the Director of Public Prosecutions),
that provision extends to an attempt to commit that offence, and so does any statutory
time limit on the institution of proceedings for the offence attempted.
301 Latif and Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 353, HL.

302 Attempt to commit a Group A offence is a Group B offence under the CJA 1993, Pt I: CJA 1993, s 1(3)(c).
303 Ibid, s 3(1).
14.141 attempt | 607
Trial
14.139 The offence of attempt under the CAA 1981, s 1 is triable in the same way as the
offence attempted. Consequently, if that offence is triable only on indictment (eg murder
or rape) an attempt to commit it must be tried on indictment, whereas if the offence
attempted is triable either way (eg theft or sexual assault) an attempt to commit it is tri-
able either way.304 This is one of the effects of the rather obscure wording of the CAA 1981,
s 4(1).
Punishment
14.140 The CAA 1981, s 4(1) also specifies the penalties for a person convicted of an
attempt under s 1:
• if the offence attempted is murder or any other offence for which the sentence is fi xed
by law, the maximum punishment is life imprisonment; and
• in the case of any other attempt, the maximum punishment is the same as is avail-
able to the court of trial for the offence attempted.305
Specific offences of attempt

14.141 Quite apart from the offence of attempt to commit an indictable offence under
the CAA 1981, s 1, there are a substantial number of specific statutory offences of attempt
to commit another offence. Many of these specific offences consist of attempts to commit
purely summary offences, in which cases the general offence of attempt is inapplicable.
Subject to any inconsistent provision in any other enactment, the CAA 1981, s 3 applies
to determine whether a person is guilty of an attempt under a special statutory provision.
An attempt under a special statutory provision is an offence which is ‘expressed as an offence
of attempting to commit another offence’. Section 3 applies to such offence rules which cor-
respond to those in s 1 for the general statutory offence of attempt. Thus, s 3(3) provides that
a person is guilty of an attempt under a special statutory provision if, with intent to commit
the relevant full offence, he does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the com-
mission of that offence. In addition, s 3(4) and (5) provides the same rules as in s 1 in relation
to ‘impossible attempts’, while the CAA 1981, s 4(4) provides that the respective functions of
a judge and jury are the same as in the case of an offence under s 1.
The crucial question involved in the italicised words is whether the attempt to do
something is expressed as an alternative to that ‘something’ as a mode of committing
the same offence, or whether it is expressed as a separate offence from the ‘something
offence’. Obviously, a specific statutory offence of attempt created by a separate section
or subsection from the full offence is ‘expressed as an offence of attempting to commit
another offence’. The fact that the full offence and the attempt are expressed in the very
304 For an exception, see para 13.2.

305 In the case of attempted ‘small value criminal damage’, the maximum is the lower maximum for small
value damage: see para 13.2.
same provision does not necessarily mean that the opposite is the case. It all depends
on the exact wording of the offence. For example, in Mason v DPP, 306 the Divisional
Court held that s 3 applies to an attempt to drive contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988,
s 5(1)(a) (which states that a person commits an offence if he ‘drives or attempts to
drive’ with excess alcohol in his breath, blood or urine).
In practice, the question of whether a statutory offence of attempt is expressed as an
offence of attempting to commit another offence is probably not important because a
court is likely to adopt the terms of the CAA 1981, s 1 in relation to offences involving an
attempt which are neither an offence under s 1 nor within the scope of s 3. In Qadir,307 the
Court of Appeal, having held that it was not clear whether offences of knowingly being
concerned in any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of a prohibition on the import
or export of goods, contrary to the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s 170(2),
were within the scope of s 3, held that nevertheless the judge had been right to adopt
the definition of attempt contained in s 1 as the basis for his approach to the question
of whether there were acts capable of amounting to an attempt under the Customs and
Excise Management Act 1979.
Abandonment of attempt
14.142 Although no argument of deterrence, reformation or prevention seems to
require the punishment of one who abandons his attempt before he has done any harm,
being truly repentant, it was the position at common law that once D had committed
the actus reus of an attempt with the necessary mens rea D could not escape liability by
abandoning the attempt, however genuine and voluntary D’s repentance.308 The CAA
1981 does not change this. Of course, voluntary abandonment may mitigate the sentence
imposed.
Recommendations for reform

14.143 In its report Conspiracy and Attempts,309 the Law Commission, which has con-
cluded that the CAA 1981, s 1(1) should be retained without amendment, has made a
number of recommendations for the amendment of the CAA 1981:
• that the CAA 1981 be amended to provide expressly that, for the purposes of s 1(1),
an intent to commit an offence includes a conditional intent to commit it. This rec-
ommendation is intended to avoid the problem, inherent in the procedural proviso
formulated by the judges to deal with conditional intention in the case of attempted
theft;310
• that the CAA 1981 be amended so as expressly to provide that for substantive offences
which have a circumstance requirement but no corresponding fault requirement, or
which have a corresponding fault requirement which is objective (such as negligence),
306 [2009] EWHC 2198 (Admin), DC. 307 [1997] 9 Archbold News 1, CA.
308 Lankford [1959] Crim LR 209 at 210; Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476 at 493–494, per Lord Hailsham LC.
309 (2009) Law Com No 318. See para 14.82 at n 165. 310 Para 14.119.
14.143 attempt | 609
D could be convicted of attempting to commit the substantive offence only if D was

reckless as to the circumstance at the relevant time;
• that the CAA 1981 be amended so as expressly to provide that, where a substantive
offence has fault requirements not involving mere negligence (or its equivalent) in
relation to a fact or circumstance, it should be possible to convict D of attempting
to commit the substantive offence if D possessed those fault requirements at the
relevant time;
• that the CAA 1981 be amended so that D may be convicted of attempted murder if
(with the intent to kill V) D failed to discharge his legal duty to V (where that omis-
sion, unchecked, could have resulted in V’s death). The Commission concluded that
it was neither necessary nor desirable to extend the law of attempt in general terms
to encompass omissions by failing to discharge a legal duty.
The Law Commission decided not to recommend the extension of the CAA 1981 to sum-
mary offences.
FURTHER READING
Arlidge and Parry on Fraud (3rd edn, 2007) JC Smith ‘Fraud and the Criminal Law’ in
Ch 7 Pressing Problems in the Law (1995) (Birks
Dennis ‘The Rationale of Criminal Conspir- (ed)) 1.49
acy’ (1977) 93 LQR 39 KJM Smith ‘Proximity in Attempt: Lord
Dennis ‘The Criminal Attempts Act 1981’ Lane’s Middle Course’ [1991] Crim LR 576
[1982] Crim LR 5 JR Spencer and Virgo ‘Encouraging and
Duff Criminal Attempts (1996) Assisting Crime: Legislate in Haste, Repent
at Leisure’ [2008] 9 Archbold News 7
Glazebrook ‘Should We Have a Law of
Attempted Crime?’ (1969) 85 LQR 27 Wasik ‘Abandoning Criminal Intent’ [1980]
Crim LR 785
Ormerod and Fortson ‘Serious Crime Act
2007: the Part 2 Offences’ [2009] Crim LR G Williams ‘The Lords and Impossible
389 Attempts, or Quis Custodiet Custodes’
(1986) 45 CLJ 33
Ormerod and D Williams (eds) Smith’s Law of
Theft (9th edn, 2007) Ch 5 G Williams ‘Wrong Turnings on the Law of
Attempt’ [1991] Crim LR 416
ATH Smith Property Offences (1994) Ch 19
15
Mental condition defences
OVERVIEW
In this chapter the following matters relating to the mental condition of the defendant are
considered:
• infancy;
• insanity;
• automatism; and
• intoxication.
For convenience of exposition, the issue of unfitness to be tried is dealt with, although it is not a
defence. The section on automatism also covers other forms of involuntary conduct, although
these do not relate to the defendant’s mental condition.
Infancy
Key points 15.1

It is not unknown for the person suspected of an offence to be a child under the age of 10
years,1 but such a child cannot be convicted of an offence because he is under the age of
criminal responsibility.
It used to be the law that a child aged 10 or over but under 14 had a defence if he was
ignorant at the material time that what he was doing was seriously wrong, and that he
was rebuttably presumed incapable of committing an offence unless he was proved to
have known that what he was doing was seriously wrong. This defence and the associated
presumption have been abolished.
1 In 2006, eg, 2,840 crimes, including sexual offences, burglary, harassment and wounding were recorded
where a child under 10 was the subject: Guardian, 3 September 2007. A telephone survey of about half the police
forces in 2011 suggested that the total is likely to have risen slightly.
15.3 infancy | 
Children under 10
15.1 A child cannot be convicted of an offence which occurs when he is under 10
because it is irrebuttably presumed that no child under the age of 10 years can be guilty
of an offence.2 Such a child is said to be doli incapax (not capable of crime). At com-
mon law, the age of immunity from responsibility was seven. It was raised to eight by
statute in 1933 and, again by statute, to 10 in 1963. The age of 10 can be contrasted with
seven in Cyprus, Ireland and Switzerland, eight in Scotland,3 nine in Malta, 12 in the
Netherlands, 13 in France, 14 in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy and Romania, 15 in the
Scandinavian states, 16 in Spain, and 18 in Belgium and Luxembourg.4 A consequence of
the doli incapax principle is not only that the child under 10 cannot be guilty of an offence
but also that he has not committed an offence.5
Children 10 to 13
15.2 The common law laid down two related rules concerning children of 10 years or over
but under the age of 14, although it was only established authoritatively in 2009 that the
first existed independently of the second. Such children were legally incapable of com-
mitting an offence unless they had ‘mischievous discretion’, ie knowledge at the material
time that what they were doing was seriously wrong.6 In addition, they were presumed to
be incapable of committing an offence, although that presumption might be rebutted by
proof of ‘mischievous discretion’.7 Thus, a child aged 10 to 13 could be convicted only if
the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt not simply that he committed the actus
reus with mens rea but also that he knew he was doing something seriously wrong, which
could be difficult to prove.
This gave rise to the odd result that children from ‘good’ homes were more likely to
be found guilty than children from ‘bad’ homes, since children from ‘good’ homes were
more likely to have known the serious wrongfulness of their conduct than children from
‘bad’ homes, although the latter might have been more in need of the corrective treat-
ment which can follow a finding of guilt.8
15.3 In C v DPP,9 the House of Lords stated that the rebuttable presumption gave rise to
anomalies and absurdities and presented the prosecution with difficulty in rebutting it.
It called on Parliament to reform the law. This invitation was accepted by the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998, s 34, which provides that: ‘The rebuttable presumption of criminal law
that a child aged 10 or over is incapable of committing an offence is hereby abolished’.
2 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50, as amended by the Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s 16.
3 A child under 12, however, may not be prosecuted in Scotland for an offence, nor may a person be pros-
ecuted for an offence committed when under 12: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 41A (added by the
Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s 52(2)). Although a child aged 8 to 11 cannot be prosecuted
in Scotland for an offence, the child can be made subject to measures of care if he is proved in a civil children’s
hearing to have committed an offence. 4 HL Deb Vol 564, col WA 82.
5 For the implications of this, see paras 11.45 and 17.6. 6 C v DPP [1996] AC 1, HL.
7 JTB [2009] UKHL 20. (reported elsewhere as T)
8 See Williams ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Children’ [1954] Crim LR 493 at 495–496.
9 [1996] AC 1, HL.
 | 15.3 mental condition defences
It was generally thought that the effect of s 34 was to subject children aged 10 to
13 to the same rules of criminal responsibility as adults. However, it was argued by
Professor Walker10 that all that was abolished was a presumption which implied that
a child aged 10 to 13 who did not know that his act was seriously wrong was not guilty
of an offence, that the only effect of the presumption was to oblige the prosecution
to offer enough evidence to prove that the child did know this, and that therefore
the abolition of the presumption did not abolish the defence of ‘ignorance of serious
wrong’.
Professor Walker’s argument was referred to by the House of Lords in JTB,11 but did
not fi nd favour with it. The House of Lords recognised that the defence and the rebut-
table presumption were two different things. However, it held, it had become custom-
ary to speak of the presumption as embracing both the presumption and the defence.
It concluded that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 34, when read in conjunction
with legitimate extrinsic aids to interpretation, particularly reference to parliamentary
debates under the rule in Pepper v Hart,12 had abolished the defence of ignorance of
serious wrong as well as the presumption. Thus, JTB confi rms that the effect of s 34 was
to subject children aged 10 to 13 to the same rules of criminal responsibility as adults.
It is surprising that the age of criminal responsibility was not increased by the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998.13 In the light of what is now known about child development,
even if a youngster of 10 or over up to the low teens commits the actus reus of an offence
with mens rea, is he necessarily fully responsible in a moral sense? Should not account
be taken of the fact that because of social and other influences such a child may have
impaired capacity and freedom to choose how he acts? The Government has been urged
by various international bodies to reconsider the low age of criminal responsibility.14
10 Walker ‘The End of an Old Song?’ (1999) 149 NLJ 64.

11 [2009] UKHL 20. For criticism of the House of Lords’ decision see Bennion ‘Mens Rea and Defendants
Below the Age of Discretion’ [2009] Crim LR 757. 12 [1993] AC 593, HL.
13 Allen ‘From Punishment to Problem Solving: A New Approach to Children in Trouble’ in Debating Youth
Justice: From Punishment to Problem Solving? (Davies and McMahon (eds)) (2007) has argued that the age of
criminal responsibility should be raised to 14 and that children under 14 should be dealt with in the civil fam-
ily court proceedings referred to in para 15.5. Elliott ‘Criminal Responsibility and Children: A New Defence
Required to Acknowledge the Absence of Capacity and Choice’ (2011) 75 JCL 289 has proposed that there should
be a new defence for children aged between 10 and 14 – that the child lacked autonomy because of his lack of
capacity and choice. See also the Commission on Families and the Well-being of Children: Families and the
State: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the State and the Family (2005); Keating ‘Reckless Children?’
[2007] Crim LR 547.
In a report by a Royal Society working group Brain Waves 4: Neuroscience and the Law (2011), where concerns
among some professionals in the field that the age of criminal responsibility is unreasonably low are noted, it is
stated that at the age of 10 the brain is developmentally immature and that changes in important neural circuits
underpinning behaviour continue until at least 20 years of age. The report adds that there is a huge individual
variation in the timing and patterning of brain development and concludes that this could be taken to suggest
that an arbitrary minimum age of criminal responsibility may not be justifiable and that decisions about crimi-
nal responsibility should be made instead on an individual basis at this stage.
14 See Keating ‘Reckless Children?’ [2007] Crim LR 550–551. In 2008, the UN Committee on the Rights of the
Child criticised the low age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales. The Committee urged that the age
of responsibility should not be below 12 and preferred a higher minimum age, for instance 14 or 16: see Report
to the General Assembly of the UN of the 49th Session of the Committee (2010). The Children’s Commissioner
favours raising the age to 12: Times, 13 March 2010.
15.5 infancy | 
In addition, the Beijing Rules (UN Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice), r 4.1 provides:
‘In those legal systems recognising the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for
juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fi xed at too low an age level bearing in
mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.’
Trial and punishment of children and young persons

15.4 Children charged with an offence are usually tried summarily in a youth court,
but in the case of an offence of homicide and in certain other serious circumstances they
must be tried in the Crown Court;15 they are subject to a different regime from adults in
respect of treatment after conviction. The same applies to young persons (ie those aged
14 or over but under 18).
Civil proceedings
15.5 Whether or not they are under the age of criminal responsibility, miscreants under
17 may be dealt with by civil family court proceedings under the Children Act 1989, s
31 (as amended) which can result in their being put in the care of the local authority or
under the supervision of such an authority. However, in such proceedings the child’s
welfare is the court’s paramount consideration and an order may only be made under s
31 if the court is satisfied:
• that the child concerned is suffering, or likely to suffer, harm, and
• that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to
– the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order under s 31
were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to
give, or
– the child’s being beyond parental control.
It is, therefore, not enough for such an order simply that the child is guilty of an offence.
In addition, a magistrates’ court sitting as a civil family court may make a child safety
order under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 11 (as amended) in respect of a child
under 10 if satisfied of one or more of three grounds. One of these is that the child has
committed an act which, if he had been aged 10 or over, would have constituted an offence.
If such an order is made the child is placed, for a period not exceeding 12 months, under
15 Following the fi nding of the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in V and T v United Kingdom
(1999) 30 EHRR 121 that the Crown Court trial of two 11-year-old boys for murder involved a breach of the
right to a fair trial guaranteed by the ECHR, Art 6, a practice note first issued in 2000 and now contained in the
Practice Direction [2002] 3 All ER 904 (as amended by Practice Direction [2007] 1 WLR 1790), III 30.1–30.18 has
sought to tackle many of the problems in that case so as to prevent young defendants being avoidably intimi-
dated, humiliated or distressed by the trial process and to assist them to understand and participate in the
proceedings.
 | 15.6 mental condition defences
the supervision of a social worker or member of a youth offending team, and required to
comply with conditions specified in the order.
Mental disability
Key points 15.2

A defendant’s mental disability may affect the outcome of a case in three ways:
• mental disability after the time when he is sent for trial, or when he is brought for
trial, may render him unfit to be tried;
• mental disability at the time of the alleged offence by him may give rise to the
defence of insanity or (in the case or murder) of diminished responsibility, dealt with
in Chapter 8;16 or
• mental disability at the time of conviction may result in a hospital order under the
Mental Health Act 1983, s 37(1) or some other similar order being made, instead of
one of the normal types of sentence being imposed.
Unfitness to be tried
15.6 Whether or not D may have the defence of insanity, and therefore even though
there may be no doubt that D was sane at the time of his alleged offence,17 D’s mental
condition may result in D’s trial being suspended or may prevent D being tried at all, as
opposed to being a defence at a trial.
Urgent need for treatment: transfer direction by

Secretary of State
15.7 Where there is an urgent need for in-patient psychiatric treatment, the Secretary
of State may be able to exercise powers under the Mental Health Act 1983, s 48. Section
4818 provides that, where D has been remanded in custody pending trial, the Secretary
of State may order D’s detention in a mental hospital for treatment without trial. The
Secretary of State can only make such an order (a ‘transfer direction’) if satisfied by two
medical reports that D is suffering from mental disorder (ie any disorder or disability of
the mind) of a nature and degree which makes it appropriate for D to be detained in a hos-
pital for treatment and that D is in urgent need of treatment. When D no longer requires
treatment, or effective treatment cannot be given, D can either be returned to prison, or
released on bail, to await trial.
16 Paras 8.39–8.57. 17 The defendant may, eg, have suffered serious brain damage since the offence.
18 As amended by the Mental Health Act 2007, Sch 1.
15.9 unfitness to be tried | 
Unfitness to plead
Key points 15.3

If the issue of D’s unfitness to plead is raised at a trial on indictment in the Crown Court, it
is for the judge to decide on the evidence whether D is unfit to plead.
If the judge finds that D is under a disability (ie unfit to plead) the trial must not proceed
or further proceed but it must be determined by a jury whether they are satisfied that D
did the act or made the omission charged as the offence.
If the jury are not satisfied that D did the act or made the omission charged in a count
in the indictment, they must acquit D in respect of it.
If there have been findings that D is under a disability and that D did the act or made the
omission charged, the judge must make one of a number of orders in respect of D.
15.8 When a defendant whose mental condition has not required the making of a trans-
fer direction, or a defendant who has been returned for trial after being subject to such
an order, is arraigned in the Crown Court he may be found unfit to plead (or, as it is often
put, ‘unfit to stand trial’).
In recent years the number of findings of unfitness to plead has averaged more than
100 a year.19
Test of unfitness to plead

15.9 The issue of unfitness to plead may be raised by the defence, the prosecution or
the judge.20 It is for the court without a jury (ie for the judge)21 to decide on the evidence
whether D is capable of all of the following six things:
• of understanding the charge;
• of understanding the difference between a plea of guilty and not guilty;
• of challenging a juror to whom he might wish to object;
• of understanding the course of the trial;
• of instructing solicitors and counsel; and
• of giving evidence.22
19 See Unfitness to Plead (2010), Law Com Consultation Paper No 197, Appendix C.
20 MacCarthy [1967] 1 QB 68, CCA. Before a court embarks on a trial of whether D is unfit to plead, it should
consider whether the use of an intermediary or other special measures would enable D to be accommodated
within the trial process: Walls [2011] EWCA Crim 443 at [37].
21 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4(5) (substituted by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and
Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s 2; amended by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, s 22).
22 Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 303; Podola [1961] 1 QB 325, CCA; Berry (1977) 66 Cr App R 156, CA; Robertson
[1968] 3 All ER 557, CA; M [2003] EWCA Crim 3452. Psychiatry was in its infancy when this test was established
in 1836. It cannot be said to be informed by modern psychiatric understanding. For criticism of the test by a
psychiatrist, see Grubin ‘What Constitutes Fitness to Plead?’ [1993] Crim LR 748.
 | 15.10 mental condition defences
If D is proved to be incapable of one of these things he is unfit to plead.

As can be seen, this test covers not only some people who are mentally disordered
but also others, such as deaf mutes, who are incapable of understanding the proceed-
ings or the evidence or of communicating. On the other hand, an attack of hysterical
amnesia rendering it impossible for D to remember what happened at the time of the
events in respect of which he is charged has been held not to make him unfit to plead. 23
In such a case, there is no difficulty for D in doing the six things listed above, although
D’s lack of memory may make it difficult for him to decide whether to plead guilty or
not guilty. Likewise, if D is capable of understanding the charge, of understanding
the difference between a plea of guilty and not guilty, of challenging a juror, of under-
standing the course of the trail, of instructing solicitors and counsel and of giving
evidence, he is fit to plead, even though he:
• is not capable of acting in his best interests (eg by pleading guilty when it seems
unlikely that he is);24 or
• lacks the ability to make choices and decisions about the conduct of his case as the
trial proceeds (eg about whether to allow a relevant line of defence to be run); or
• has delusions about the court’s powers of sentence, or its objectivity, or as to evil
influences thought to be present in the proceedings.25
15.10 By limiting itself to D’s cognitive ability, and ignoring D’s decision-making cap-
acity, the test of unfitness to plead does not relate to modern psychiatric understanding.
It would be better if English law adopted an ‘effective participation’ test along the
lines of a concept developed by the European Court of Human Rights, principally in the
context of young children in the criminal process.26 That concept refers to the capacity
to participate effectively in the criminal process,27 which includes D’s capacity to make
rational decisions in relation to his participation in the proceedings, including whether
or not to plead guilty, which reflect true and informed choices on D’s part.
15.11 Those who agree with the sentiments in the last paragraph will be heartened by
a Law Commission consultation paper published in 2010.28 In it, the Law Commission
stated that at best the current test of fitness to plead places a disproportionate emphasis
on low intellectual ability, and that at worst it sets too high a threshold for finding a
defendant unfit to plead.
The Commission has provisionally proposed that:
23 Podola above.
24 Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557, CA; M [2003] EWCA Crim 3452; Moyle [2008] EWCA Crim 3059.
25 Moyle above.
26 See, in particular, V and T v United Kingdom (1999) 30 EHRR 121, ECtHR; para 15.4, n 15.
27 See Mackay ‘On Being Insane in Jersey Part Th ree – The Case of Attorney-General v O’Driscoll’ [2004]
Crim LR 291.
28 Unfitness to Plead (2010) Law Com Consultation Paper No 197, Pt 3, discussed by Howard ‘Unfitness to
Plead and the Vulnerable Defendant: An Examination of the Law Commission’s Proposals for a New Capacity
Test’ (2011) 75 JCL 194; Mackay ‘Unfitness to Plead – Some Observations on the Law Commission’s Consultation
Paper’ [2011] Crim LR 433.
15.11 unfitness to be tried | 
(a) The current test should be replaced by a new legal test which assesses whether D
has decision-making capacity for trial. This test should take into account all the
requirements for meaningful participation in the criminal proceedings.
(b) A new decision-making capacity test should not require that any decision D makes
must be rational or wise.
(c) The legal test should be a revised single test which assesses D’s decision-making
capacity by reference to the entire spectrum of trial decisions which D might be
required to make. Under this test D would be found to have or to lack decision-
making capacity for the criminal proceedings.
(d) In determining D’s decision-making capacity, the judge would have to take account
of the complexity of the particular proceedings and of how important any disabil-
ity is likely to be in the context of the decision D must make in the context of the
trial which D faces.
(e) Decision-making capacity should be assessed with a view to ascertaining whether
D could undergo a trial or plead guilty with the assistance of special measures
which enable vulnerable defendants to participate in the proceedings and where
any other reasonable adjustments have been made.
Proposals (a) and (c) would move the focus from D’s ability to understand to his ability
to make the types of decisions which are required for effective participation in criminal
proceedings. The Law Commission provisionally proposes that D should be found to lack
decision-making capacity if D is unable:
• to understand the information relevant to the decisions that he will have to make in
the course of his trial;
• to retain that information for as long as necessary to make that decision;
• to use or weigh that information as part of the decision-making process; or
• to communicate his decisions.
The Commission has also provisionally proposed that a defi ned psychiatric test to
assess decision-making capacity in accordance with the legal test should be developed
and this should accompany the legal test as to decision-making capacity by way of
assisting judges in measuring D’s capacity.
The enactment of these proposals would have implications for the rule that children of
10 or over can be tried for a criminal offence: some children who are currently fit to plead
might be found to lack decision-making capacity.29
Proposals (a) and (c) would meet objections referred to above. They would cover those
caught by the current test, as well as others.
Proposal (b) is based on the Commission’s belief that:
‘in the criminal context an evaluation of decision-making capacity should . . . focus on

the process of understanding and reasoning as opposed to the content of the decision
29 Th is point is examined by Howard and Bowen ‘Unfitness to Plead and the Overlap with Doli Incapax: An
Examination of the Law Commission’s Proposals for a New Capacity Test’ (2011) 75 JCL 380.
 | 15.12 mental condition defences
which is eventually arrived at. It is important not to conflate the capacity of the decision-
maker with the rationality of the choice he or she makes . . .
Ultimately, the critical divide between the decisions we think the law should permit
and what we think it should not permit is not between irrational decisions and unwise
decisions but between decisions taken by those who do and those who do not have cap-
acity to function rationally.
. . . There should not be a blanket requirement, for example, that [D] must make
“rational” decisions. This is not to say, however, that the rationality or otherwise of a deci-
sion is irrelevant . . . [If D] makes an unwise or irrational decision this could trigger the
need for an assessment of his or her decision-making capacity.’30
It must be doubtful whether proposal (d) could be operated satisfactorily and fairly.
15.12 Where D has raised the issue of unfitness to plead D has the persuasive burden of
proving his unfitness, although D only has to prove his unfitness on the balance of proba-
bilities.31 However, if the issue is raised by the prosecution and disputed by D it must be
established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.32
Procedural rules relating to determination of unfitness to plead

15.13 Where the issue of unfitness to plead is raised, the procedure is governed by the
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4.33 The issue does not have to be determined
as soon as it is raised. This is because, to prevent D being found unfit and deprived of his
right to trial where he may be entitled to acquittal of the offence charged, the Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4(2) provides that the judge has a discretion to postpone
the question of fitness to be tried until any time up to the opening of the case for the
defence, where the judge considers it expedient to do so and in D’s interests. The pros-
ecution case may be so strong, and D’s condition so disabling, that postponement of the
trial would be wholly inexpedient. Conversely, the prosecution case may be so thin that,
whatever the degree of disability, it clearly would be expedient to postpone.34 If there is
a reasonable chance that the prosecution case will be successfully challenged, postpone-
ment will usually be in D’s interests.35
Where the issue of unfitness to plead is postponed the trial will proceed in the normal
way. If at the end of the prosecution evidence there is no case to answer, the jury will be
directed to acquit D and the issue of unfitness will not be determined. If there is a case
to answer, the postponed issue of unfitness will be determined by the judge before the
defence case is opened.
The judge must not make a determination that D is unfit to plead except on the evi-
dence of two or more registered medical practitioners, at least one of whom is a specialist
approved by the Secretary of State.36
30 Paras 3.51, 3.53 and 3.54 of the Consultation Paper. 31 Podola [1960] 1 QB 325, CCA.
32 Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557, CA. Presumably the same rule applies if the issue is raised by the judge.
33 As substituted by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991.
34 Burles [1970] 2 QB 191, CA. 35 Webb [1969] 2 QB 278, CA.
36 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4(6) (as amended by the Domestic Violence, Crime and
Victims Act 2004, s 22), as interpreted in Ghulam [2009] EWCA Crim 2285. Section 4(6) does not, therefore,
15.14 unfitness to be tried | 
Determination of whether person found unfit to

plead did act or made omission charged
15.14 The Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A 37 lays down the manda-
tory procedure which applies where it is determined by the judge that D is unfit to
plead (a fi nding of disability). It provides that the trial must not proceed or further
proceed but it must be determined by a jury (the jury by whom D was being tried, if
the issue of unfitness to plead was postponed)38 whether they are satisfied, as respects
the count or each of the counts against D, ‘that he did the act or made the omission
charged as the offence’.39 Th is determination must be made on the evidence (if any)
already given at the trial, and on any evidence or further evidence adduced by the
prosecution or adduced by a person appointed by the judge to put D’s case.40 D does
not give evidence and, ex hypothesi, his ability to give instructions or the ability to
obtain an account from D is limited. Depriving D of these very significant rights is a
very serious step. 41
It was held by the House of Lords in Antoine, 42 that the words of s 4A italicised above
mean that the jury need only be satisfied that D committed the actus reus of the offence
charged and not whether D did so with the mens rea for it; they do not have to consider
that issue.43 On the other hand, surprisingly, the House held that, if ‘objective’ evidence
raises the issue of mistake, accident, self-defence or involuntariness, the jury should
not fi nd that D has done the act or made the omission charged unless they are satis-
fied that the prosecution has disproved that ‘defence’. Evidence of mistake or accident
seems to be relevant only to the question of whether D had the mens rea required for
an offence.
Defences which arise only on proof of actus reus and mens rea, such as diminished
responsibility and loss of control on murder charges,44 are not available when the jury
considers whether D did the act or made the omission charged.45
The normal rules of criminal evidence and procedure apply to the question of whether
D did the act or made the omission charged.46 So does the normal criminal standard of
prevent the judge determining that D is fit to plead in the absence of the medical evidence referred to in s 4(6):
Ghulam.
37 As substituted by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s 2 and amended by
the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, s 22.
38 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A(5) (substituted by the Domestic Violence, Crime and
Victims Act 2004, s 22). 39 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A(2).
40 Ibid. 41 As pointed out in Walls [2011] EWCA Crim 443 at [37]. 42 [2001] 1 AC 340, HL.
43 As recognised in R (on the application of Young) v Central Criminal Court [2002] EWHC 548 (Admin), DC,
the actus reus itself may contain an element in which D’s intention is an essential ingredient (see Key points 2.1, n
10). In such a case, the jury will have to consider D’s intentions in the relevant respect in order to decide whether
or not he committed the actus reus. In M [2003] EWCA Crim 357, the Court of Appeal held obiter that, where the
‘act’ in respect of which the jury are asked to make their fi nding is the act of participation in a joint enterprise, it
would have to be determined whether there was a common purpose and what it was, and whether the act of the
perpetrator went outside its scope; and that in such a case, as with issues such as mistake, the determination will
fall to be made as a matter of inference from the independent evidence of witnesses and not from D’s evidence
or the suggestions of counsel. 44 Paras 8.39–8.81.
45 Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340, HL (diminished responsibility); Grant [2001] EWCA Crim 2611 (provocation:
this defence was abolished and replaced by the defence of loss of control by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009).
46 Chal [2007] EWCA Crim 2647.
 | 15.15 mental condition defences
proof (beyond reasonable doubt).47 If it is proved that D did the act or made the omission
charged in a count in the indictment, the jury must make a fi nding to this effect.48
Such a finding is not a conviction; the purpose of the availability of the finding is to
strike a fair balance between the need to protect a defendant who has not committed the
actus reus of the offence charged and is unfit to plead and the need to protect the public
from a defendant who has committed an act or made an omission which would have
constituted an offence if done with the requisite mens rea.49
If the jury are not satisfied that D did the act or made the omission charged in a count
in the indictment, they must acquit D in respect of it.50
15.15 The Law Commission has provisionally proposed51 that the Criminal Procedure
(Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A hearing should be replaced by a procedure whereby the pros-
ecution is obliged to prove that D did the act or made the omission charged and that there
are no grounds for an acquittal (ie that D had the requisite mens rea and that no defence is
available), in which case a finding to this effect would be returned by the jury. This would
reverse the decision in Antoine.
The Law Commission has also provisionally proposed that, if D is acquitted for lack of the
proof just referred to, provision should be made for a judge to hold a further hearing to deter-
mine whether or not the acquittal is because of mental disorder existing at the time of the
offence. If the acquittal was because of mental disorder at that time there would be an acquit-
tal qualified by mental disorder. The further hearing would be held at the discretion of the
judge on the application of any party or the representative of any party to the proceedings.
15.16 Because it cannot result in a conviction and because any order made following a
finding adverse to D is not punitive but is made only for the purpose of protecting the
public, the procedure under s 4A for determining whether D did the act or made the
omission charged does not involve the determination of a criminal charge. Therefore, the
procedure is not incompatible with the ECHR, Article 6 (right to a fair trial).52
Orders available if defendant found unfit to plead and to

have done act or omission charged
15.17 The Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 5, 53 provides that, where there have
been findings that D is under a disability (ie unfit to plead) and that D did the act or made
the omission charged, the judge must make in respect of D:
• a hospital order (with or without a restriction order);
• a supervision order; or
• an order for his absolute discharge.54
47 Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340 at 375–376, per Lord Hutton; R (on the application of Young) v Central Criminal
Court [2002] EWHC 548 (Admin) at [38]; Chal above at [25].
48 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A(3).
49 Antoine [2001] 1 AC 340 at 375, per Lord Hutton.
50 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A(4).
51 Unfitness to Plead Law Com Consultation Paper No 197 (2010), paras 6.128–6.130.
52 H [2003] UKHL 1. 53 As substituted by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, s 24.
54 These orders would be available following a finding or qualified acquittal of the type provisionally proposed by
the Law Commission (see para 15.15): Unfitness to Plead Law Com Consultation Paper No 197 (2010), para 6.131.
15.19 unfitness to be tried | 
15.18 Where the fi ndings that D is under a disability (ie unfit to plead) and that D
did the act or made the omission charged relate to a murder charge and the judge
has power to make a hospital order, the judge has no choice; the judge must make a
hospital order. A hospital order may be made with or without an additional direction
restricting discharge from hospital, except where the fi nding relates to murder and a
hospital order is made (in which case an order restricting discharge without limit of
time, ie indefi nite hospitalisation, must be made). For further detail, see para 15.42.
Because the judge only has power to make a hospital order if satisfied that D is suffer-
ing from mental disorder such that detention in a hospital is appropriate and the most
suitable method of disposing of the case, the effect of the provision relating to murder
is that the judge is not obliged to make a hospital order in a murder case where D’s
unfitness to plead is due to something other than mental disorder, as in the case of a
deaf mute. Under the law which applied before the substitution of s 5 the judge had to
make a hospital order (with a restriction order) in any murder case where D was found
to be unfit to plead and to have done the act or omission charged, even if D was not
suffering from a mental disorder warranting compulsory confi nement. In Grant, 55 the
Court of Appeal expressed concern that this might be a breach of the ECHR, Article
5(1)(e);56 the change to s 5 means that it is compatible with Article 5(1)(e) in the present
respect.
Appeal
15.19 D has a right of appeal under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 to the Court of Appeal
against findings that he is under a disability (ie unfit to plead) and that he did the act
or made the omission charged.57 This right is subject to the same conditions as apply
to other criminal appeals from the Crown Court generally. Where the Court allows an
appeal against a finding that D is under a disability, D may be tried in the normal way for
the offence for which he was charged. Where the Court allows an appeal against a find-
ing under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A that D did the act or made
the omission charged it must quash the finding and direct that a verdict of acquittal be
recorded.58 There is no power under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 in such a case to order
a re-hearing.59 This has been criticised by the Court of Appeal on the ground that there
could well be cases where the public interest would not be protected if it considered that
such a finding was unsafe and was compelled to direct an acquittal, but nothing further
could be done.60
The Law Commission has provisionally proposed61 that, where the Court of Appeal
has quashed a fi nding under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A and
there has been no challenge to a fi nding that D is under a disability, there should be
a power for the Court of Appeal in appropriate circumstances to order a re-hearing
under s 4A.
55 [2001] EWCA Crim 2611. 56 Para 15.51.

57 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s 15. Section 16 deals with the Court of Appeal’s powers of disposal of an
appeal. 58 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s 16(4).
59 Norman [2008] EWCA Crim 1810 at [31]; McKenzie [2011] EWCA Crim 1550 at [1].
60 Norman above at [34]. 61 Law Com Consultation Paper No 197 (2010), para 7.59.
 | 15.20 mental condition defences
Magistrates’ courts62
15.20 The Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, ss 4, 4A and 5 only apply to tri-
als on indictment.63 There is no procedure expressly devised for the question of unfit-
ness to plead in relation to magistrates’ courts; in particular, magistrates dealing with a
summary-only offence have no power to send D to the Crown Court for a judge to decide
whether or not D is unfit to plead under the procedure in s 4. However, where the offence
is punishable with imprisonment and D is suffering from mental disorder (ie any disor-
der or disability of the mind) and appears unfit to plead, and provided that the offence
charged is not triable only on indictment,64 the magistrates may make use of their power
under the Mental Health Act 1983, s 37(3)65 to make a hospital order or a guardianship
order without proceeding to a trial or conviction, if they are satisfied that D ‘did the act or
made the omission charged’.66 This phrase doubtless has the same meaning as under the
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A.67 Where there is an apparent case that D is
unfit to plead, the magistrates should first determine whether D did the act or made the
omission charged, and then consider whether a s 37(3) order is appropriate.68
Defence of insanity
Key points 15.4

Everyone is presumed sane until the contrary is proved.
It is a defence to a criminal prosecution for D to show that he was labouring under such
a defect of reason, due to disease of the mind, as either not to know the nature and quality
of his act or, if he did know this, not to know that he was doing wrong.
Where the defence is raised by D or the judge, D has the burden of proving these
requirements. Sometimes the prosecution can raise the issue of D’s insanity, in which case
it has the burden of proving the requirements.
If the defence of insanity is made out at a trial in the Crown Court, a special verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity must be returned by the jury and the judge must make one
of a number of orders in respect of D. Where the special verdict relates to murder there are
special provisions about the type of order.
15.21 The defence of insanity is concerned with D’s mental condition at the time of
the alleged offence. At that point of time D may have been suffering a permanent or
62 Including youth courts. See R (on the application of P (a juvenile)) v Barking Youth Court [2002] EWHC
734 (Admin), DC. 63 Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Aniifowosi (1985) 149 JP 748, DC.
64 The power under the Mental Health Act 1983, s 37(3) applies whether the offence charged is purely sum-
mary or triable either way, but the wording of the provision precludes it applying where the offence is triable only
on indictment: Chippenham Magistrates’ Court, ex p Thompson (1995) 160 JP 207, DC.
66 Lincolnshire (Kesteven) Justices, ex p O’Connor [1983] 1 All ER 901, DC. 67 Para 15.14.
68 R (on the application of P) v Barking Youth Court [2002] EWHC 734 (Admin), DC.
15.23 defence of insanity | 
occasional mental malfunction. It would be irrelevant that D’s mental condition is per-
fectly normal at the time of the trial.
The defence of insanity is contained in the M’Naghten Rules. The defence is concerned
with D’s legal responsibility at the time of the alleged offence, and not simply with
whether D was medically insane at that time. In other words, it is concerned with insan-
ity in a legal sense, and not in a medical sense. What the law regards as insanity may be
far removed from what would be regarded as insanity by a doctor. The issue of whether D
has the defence of insanity is a matter for the jury (in the Crown Court) to decide in the
light of the medical and other evidence.69
15.22 Mental illness short of insanity under the M’Naghten Rules cannot in itself affect
D’s liability; the only exception is the offence of murder where it may give rise to the
partial defence of diminished responsibility.70 Mental illness short of insanity under the
M’Naghten Rules may, however, provide evidence in support of a plea of lack of mens rea,
and it may be relevant in respect of the defence to murder of loss of control and in respect
of some of the general defences to criminal liability.
15.23 The M’Naghten Rules were laid down by the judges in their advice to the House
of Lords in M’Naghten’s Case.71 Their advice was sought in consequence of the acquittal
of M’Naghten, who was found to be insane on a charge of murdering Sir Robert Peel’s
private secretary. Although the rules were not laid down in a case decided by the House of
Lords, they have been recognised again and again as representing the present law.
The M’Naghten Rules can be summarised thus:
• Everyone is presumed sane until the contrary is proved.

• It is a defence to a criminal prosecution for D to show that he was labouring under
such a defect of reason, due to disease of the mind, as either not to know the nature
and quality of his act or, if he did know this, not to know that he was doing wrong.
The defence involves an ‘all-or-nothing’ test, unlike the defence of diminished respon-
sibility which involves a question of degree as to whether there has been substantial
impairment in the requisite respect caused by the abnormality of mental functioning
arising from a recognised mental condition.
As noted in Chapter 4, when the defence of insanity is pleaded by D the persuasive
burden of proof is exceptionally on D,72 but D may rebut the presumption of sanity by
adducing evidence which satisfies the jury on the balance of probabilities that D was
insane within the terms of the M’Naghten Rules at the time of the alleged offence.73 The
same is true if the judge rules that D is raising the defence of insanity. The effect of the
defence being left to the jury in these two cases is to remove from the prosecution the
normal need to prove that D voluntarily committed the actus reus of the offence with the
required mens rea. Placing the persuasive burden of proof on D means that, even though
69 See, eg, Roach [2001] EWCA Crim 2698. 70 Paras 8.39–8.57. 71 (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200.
72 M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200; Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, HL; Sodeman v R [1936] 2 All ER
1138, PC; para 4.7. 73 Sodeman v R above; para 4.5.
 | 15.24 mental condition defences
there is credible evidence in support of the insanity defence, D will fail to prove it if the
jury consider that it is slightly less probable than not (or, even, as probable as not) that he
was legally insane. This is anomalous74 and is arguably incompatible with the presump-
tion of innocence under the ECHR, Article 6(2).75 In the case of other general defences, D
merely bears the burden of adducing evidence sufficient to raise a particular defence, and
there is no reason why someone who pleads insanity should be any worse off.
15.24 Where the medical evidence is clear, unanimous and unchallenged to the effect
that D was legally insane and there is no other evidence justifying the jury in rejecting it,
a verdict of guilty will be set aside on appeal on the ground that no reasonable jury could
have reached such a verdict.76 On the other hand, a conviction will not be quashed merely
because the jury choose to disagree with expert medical opinion77 or because the medical
evidence tends to support the defence, if there is other evidence to the contrary.78
Role of the judge

15.25 If D puts his state of mind in issue and there is medical evidence relating to it, it
is irrelevant whether or not he expressly pleads the defence of insanity. The reason is that
whether or not D has raised that defence is a question of law for the judge in the light
of the medical evidence.79 The medical evidence may indicate the factual nature of D’s
mental condition but it is for the judge to say whether that is evidence of a defect of reason
from disease of the mind. If the judge concludes that there is medical evidence in support
of all the elements of the M’Naghten Rules, the judge may rule that D is raising the defence
of insanity and leave it to the jury to decide whether or not those elements are actually
satisfied, despite objections by the defence.80 In Dickie, 81 the Court of Appeal held that
the ‘circumstances in which a judge will do that will be exceptional and very rare’. If the
judge decides to leave the defence of insanity to the jury, the judge must give counsel
on both sides the chance to call evidence on the point before so leaving it.82 The judge’s
power to rule that evidence which is not expressly introduced in support of a defence of
insanity does in fact raise that defence is of great practical importance, as explained in
para 15.45.
74 See Jones ‘Insanity, Automatism and the Burden of Proof’ (1995) 111 LQR 475.
75 Para 4.8. However, placing the persuasive burden on D may be justified as a proportionate interference
with the presumption of innocence because of the practical difficulties of disproof if the persuasive burden was
on the prosecution and because of the need to deal with the problem of false claims of mental disorder. It has
been held that placing the persuasive burden on D in respect of diminished responsibility is not incompatible
with Art 6(2): see para 8.47. Th is suggests that a challenge to the present rule would probably fail. In Chaulk
(1990) 2 CR (4th) 1, SC of Canada, it was held that the reverse burden imposed by the insanity defence was a justi-
fied interference with the presumption of innocence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
76 Th is statement is made by analogy with the rule applying to the defence of diminished responsibility: see
para 8.55. 77 Rivett (1950) 34 Cr App R 87, CCA.
78 Latham [1965] Crim LR 434, CCA.
79 Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 411, per Lord Denning; Dickie
[1984] 3 All ER 173, CA; Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9 at 12–13; Thomas (1996) 29 BMLR 120, CA. Charlson [1955]
1 All ER 859 which is to the contrary (see para 15.62), must now be taken to be wrongly decided, although it has
not been expressly overruled. See further, para 15.62.
80 Dickie [1984] 3 All ER 173 at178; Thomas above. 81 [1984] 3 All ER 173 at 178. 82 Ibid.
15.27 defence of insanity | 
The above power does not mean that the judge can seek out further evidence. On the
other hand, if the judge has doubts on the evidence before the court, the judge can seek
clarification from the witnesses.
Requirements of the defence

Defect of reason
15.26 D must prove that he was suffering from a ‘defect of reason’ due to disease of the mind
when he did the prohibited act. A ‘defect of reason’ is more than a momentary confusion
or absent-mindedness; a deprivation of reasoning power is required.83 In Clarke,84 D was
charged with theft by shoplifting. Her defence was that she had no intention to steal but had
acted in a moment of absent-mindedness caused by a diabetic depression induced by sugar
deficiency. The trial judge ruled that D’s defence was one of insanity because she was pleading
a defect of reason due to disease of the mind. D did not wish to be found insane and changed
her plea to one of guilty. The Court of Appeal, allowing her appeal against conviction, held
that D’s defence was simply one of lack of mens rea and not a defence of insanity, since tem-
porary absent-mindedness due to disease was not a defect of reason due to disease. ‘Defect of
reason’, it held, meant the deprivation of reasoning power; it did not cover people who retain
their reasoning power but in moments of confusion or absent-mindedness fail to use it fully.
Nor does the term cover those who act under an irresistible impulse or some other defective
emotional or volitional state. A defect of reason does not have to be a continuing aspect of D’s
mental make-up; it may simply be short-lived, as in the case of a blackout.
Disease of the mind

15.27 D must prove that he was suffering from a defect of reason due to a ‘disease of the
mind’ (in the legal sense85 of that term)86 at the material time. The disease must be of the
mind; it need not be of the brain.87 The meaning of ‘disease of the mind’ was explained by
the House of Lords in Sullivan, 88 where the view taken in previous cases89 was endorsed. Lord
Diplock, with whose speech the rest of their Lordships agreed, stated the law as follows:
‘The nomenclature adopted by the medical profession may change from time to time . . . But
the meaning of the expression “disease of the mind” . . . remains unchanged for the pur-
poses of the application of the M’Naghten Rules . . . “Mind” in the M’Naghten Rules is used
in the ordinary sense of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding. If
the effect of a disease is to impair these faculties . . . it matters not whether the aetiology [ie
assignment of the cause] of the impairment is organic, as in epilepsy [or arteriosclerosis or
brain tumours], or functional [as in the case of schizophrenia, paranoia or manic depres-
sion], or whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient and intermittent,
provided it subsisted at the time of the commission of the act.’90
83 Clarke [1972] 1 All ER 219, CA. 84 Ibid.

85 ‘Disease of the mind’ has no agreed psychiatric meaning.
86 See, for instance, Sullivan [1984] AC 156 at 172, per Lord Diplock.
87 Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399; Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92, CA. 88 [1984] AC 156, HL.
89 Eg Kemp above; Quick [1973] QB 910, CA. 90 [1984] AC 156 at 172.
 | 15.28 mental condition defences
To this one may add that it is irrelevant whether the condition of the mind is curable or
incurable.91
15.28 The requirement that there must be an impairment of the mental faculties of rea-
son, memory and understanding and that that mental impairment should be caused by
disease must be stressed. The distinction between mental impairment due to disease and
mental impairment not due to disease is now established as being between internal and
external causes. For the mental impairment to be due to disease, the immediate cause of
the impairment must be internal to the defendant.92 ‘A malfunctioning of the mind of tran-
sitory effect caused by the application to the body of some external factor such as violence,
drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences cannot fairly be said to be due
to disease’ and does not constitute a disease of the mind.93 The same is true where a woman
suffers a state of dissociation resulting (as post-traumatic stress disorder) from being raped94
or where a diabetic gets into a hypoglycaemic coma as a result of failing to take food after tak-
ing insulin (since the consequent effect of the insulin is due to an external factor).95 It would
be different if a diabetic failed to take his insulin and got into a hyperglycaemic coma as a
result, because it would be the diabetes itself (an internal factor) which would have caused the
coma.96 The distinction which the law draws between hypoglycaemia (not a disease of the
mind) and hyperglycaemia (disease of the mind) is not easy to defend. Why should a distinc-
tion be drawn between a diabetic who gets into a hypoglycaemic coma as a result of taking
too much insulin or failing to eat adequately after taking the correct dose and a diabetic who
gets into a hyperglycaemic coma as a result of not taking his insulin?
15.29 In Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland,97 Lord Denning said: ‘It seems to me that any
mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease
of the mind.’ However, a significant rider was placed on Lord Denning’s statement by the
Court of Appeal in Burgess,98 where it was stated that, while the fact that there is a dan-
ger of recurrence may be an added reason for categorising a condition as a disease of the
mind, the absence of the danger of recurrence is not a reason for saying that it cannot be
a disease of the mind.
The rider in Burgess is one reason why Lord Denning’s statement in Bratty should be
regarded as misleading. A second reason is that, as pointed out in Quick,99 the state-
ment wrongly suggests that it would be irrelevant that the immediate cause of the mental
91 Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399 at 407.

92 Quick [1973] QB 910, CA; Sullivan [1984] AC 156, HL; Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92, CA; Roach [2001] EWCA
Crim 2698. Where an underlying mental condition which would not otherwise produce a disease of the mind
sufficient to satisfy the other parts of the M’Naghten Rules is aggravated by external factors so that the defendant
has a defect of reason such that he does not know the nature and quality of his act (or that it is wrong), this does
not bring the Rules into play: see A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349, HL (para 15.102); Roach
above (para 15.65). 93 Quick above; Sullivan [1984] AC 156 at 172, per Lord Diplock.
94 T [1990] Crim LR 256, Crown Ct.
95 Quick [1973] QB 910, CA. See also Bingham [1991] Crim LR 433, CA.
96 Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9, CA; para 15.63. Diabetes is a deficiency in the system of the production of the
hormone insulin which balances the sugar metabolism. If the level of that hormone is too low the blood sugar
rises and can result in hyperglycaemia and ultimately a hyperglycaemic coma. If a diabetic takes too much insu-
lin to treat his hormonal deficiency, or fails to eat adequately after taking the correct dose in order to counterbal-
ance it, the blood sugar may fall too far and hypoglycaemia and ultimately a hypoglycaemic coma may result.
97 [1963] AC 386 at 412. 98 [1991] 2 QB 92, CA. 99 [1973] QB 910, CA.
15.31 defence of insanity | 
disorder was an external one. A third reason is that the reference to ‘violence’ in the state-
ment must not be read as an indication that the defence of insanity is limited to offences
of violence. There is no suggestion that it is so limited in the other cases on the defence
and it has long been accepted that insanity is generally a defence to a criminal charge. In
the light of these comments, Lord Denning’s statement seems of little value.
15.30 The distinction between mental impairment due to disease (ie due to an internal
cause) and mental impairment not due to disease (ie due to an external cause) is not
always easy to draw, as was pointed out by the Court of Appeal in Burgess,100 where
D had claimed that he had been sleepwalking when he wounded a woman. There was
medical evidence indicating that D’s actions had occurred during the course of a sleep
disorder due to an internal factor. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been
correct to rule that, on any view of the medical evidence, it amounted to evidence of
insanity within the M’Naghten Rules because that evidence indicated that the sleep-
walking was due to an internal factor. This decision does not deny that sleepwalking due
to an external factor (such as excess alcohol) would be non-insane automatism,101 but it
is probably rare for sleepwalking to have as its immediate cause an external factor.102 It
is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of Canada in Parks103 concluded that somnam-
bulism is not suitable to the internal/external factor approach alone and held that the
sleepwalking in question in that case was not due to a disease of the mind, although it
did not rule out the possibility of a finding of insanity in a sleepwalking case where the
facts were different.
15.31 The difficulty in distinguishing between mental impairment due to disease
(internal cause) and mental impairment not due to disease (external cause) is shown
by reference to cases concerned with whether a dissociative state resulting from a psy-
chological blow can amount to a disease of the mind. In the Canadian case of Rabey,104
which was considered by the Court of Appeal in Burgess, the majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada approved the view of Martin J in the Ontario Court of Appeal that
the mental impairment of D, who acted under a dissociative state consequent on the
psychological blow of his rejection by a girl with whom he was infatuated, was due to
an internal cause; the psychological blow was not to be equated with an external cause
such as concussion. The Court of Appeal in Burgess referred approvingly to Martin J’s
statement that:
‘[T]he ordinary stresses and disappointments of life which are the common lot of man-
kind do not constitute an external cause constituting an explanation for a malfunction-
ing of the mind which takes it out of the category of a disease of the mind.’
100 [1991] 2 QB 92, CA. See Mackay ‘The Sleepwalker is Not Insane’ (1992) 55 MLR 714.
101 As in the Scottish case of Finegan v Heywood [2000] SCCR 648, HCJ Appeal. As to non-insane automa-
tism induced by intoxication, see para 15.68.
102 In Pooley (2007) unreported, referred to by Mackay ‘Epilepsy and the Defence of Insanity – A Time for
Change?’ [2007] Crim LR 782 at 791, a Crown Court case involving the issue of sleepwalking precipitated by
alcohol consumption and environmental change, the Circuit judge dealt with the matter as one of non-insane
automatism, stating that: ‘Concurrent causes can allow for the defence of non-insane automatism to be left to
the jury even if one of the concurrent causes is self-induced intoxication.’ 103 (1990) 95 DLR (4th) 27.
104 (1977) 37 CCC (2d) 461. Also see Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9 at 14.
 | 15.32 mental condition defences
Martin J went on to say that the reason was that the exceptional effect which this ordinary
event had on D had to be considered as having its source primarily in D’s psychological
make-up. Martin J did not say what would be the legal effect of an extraordinary event of
such severity that it might reasonably be expected to cause a dissociative state in a reason-
able person. The point was dealt with by the Crown Court in T,105 where the judge held
that D’s state of dissociation resulting (as post-traumatic stress) from being raped was
due to an external cause, and was therefore not due to a disease of the mind. Clearly, the
cause of the dissociative state here fell outside the ordinary stresses of life; it could not be
said to have its source in D’s psychological make-up but, instead, its immediate cause was
external, ie the rape.
Ignorance of nature and quality of act or that it is wrong

15.32 The defect of reason due to disease of the mind must affect legal responsibility,106
something to which a person’s capacity to appreciate what he was doing, and whether it
was lawful is highly relevant, and D must go on to prove that because of his defect of
reason due to disease of the mind either he did not know the nature and quality of his
act or, if he did know this, he did not know he was doing wrong.
15.33 ‘Nature and quality’ The words ‘nature and quality’ in the M’Naghten Rules refer
to the physical character of the act.107 The jury must be satisfied that D did not know
what he was doing, or did not appreciate the effects of his conduct, or did not realise the
material circumstances in which he was acting. An insane person who was acting in a
state of automatism would not know the nature and quality of his act,108 nor would some-
one who stabbed another with a knife without knowing that he was using the implement
at all or under the insane delusion that he was about to be killed by him. The same would
be the case where a person cut a sleeper’s head off because ‘it would be great fun to see him
looking for it when he woke up’.109 He would know he was engaged on the act of decapi-
tation, but would be manifestly incapable of appreciating its physical effects. Similarly,
if an insane person squeezes someone’s throat, thinking that he is squeezing an orange,
he does not know the nature and quality of his act. On the other hand, if he kills a boy,
mistakenly believing the victim is a girl, he knows the nature and quality of his act since
his mistake is not material.
15.34 ‘Wrong’ Turning to the alternative limb of the test of responsibility, the jury must
be asked whether, assuming D knew what he was doing, he also knew that it was wrong.
It was held in Windle110 that ‘wrong’ in this context means prohibited by law, ie legally
wrong. In Windle, D induced his wife, who had frequently spoken of committing suicide,
to consume 100 aspirins, because he thought it would be beneficial for her to die. On
appeal, it was held that the trial judge was justified in withdrawing the case from the jury
on the question of insanity. D had said that he would be hanged for what he had done, and
there was no doubt that he knew it was contrary to law.
105 [1990] Crim LR 256, Crown Ct. 106 Rivett (1950) 34 Cr App R 87, CCA.
107 Codère (1916) 12 Cr App R 21 at 28. 108 Sullivan [1984] AC 156, HL.
109 Stephen History of the Criminal Law Vol II (1883) 166.
110 [1952] 2 QB 826, CCA. Also see Holmes [1953] 2 All ER 324,CCA.
15.36 defence of insanity | 
The High Court of Australia in Stapleton v R111 and the Supreme Court of Canada in
Chaulk112 have declined to follow Windle, being of the opinion that ‘wrong’ in the M’Naghten
Rules means contrary to the moral views of the majority of the members of society. According
to this opinion, if Windle had believed his wife to be suffering from a painful incurable ill-
ness, and if he had also believed that euthanasia was approved of by the bulk of ordinary
Englishmen, he ought to have been acquitted even though he knew that mercy killing was
prohibited by law.113 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada in Oommen114 stated that:
‘[T]he inquiry focuses not on general capacity to know right from wrong, but rather on
the ability to know that a particular act was wrong in the circumstances. The accused
must possess the intellectual ability to know right from wrong in an abstract sense. But
he or she must also possess the ability to apply that knowledge in a rational way to the
alleged criminal act . . . [T]he real question is whether the accused should be exempted
from criminal responsibility because a mental disorder at the time of the act deprived
him of the capacity for rational perception and hence rational choice about the rightness
or wrongness of the act.’
As Professor Mackay has commented, this reflects more accurately the true nature of the
distorted thought process of those whose psychiatric disorder impacts on their capacity
to know right from wrong.115
In Johnson,116 the Court of Appeal stated that, while there was room for reconsidera-
tion of Windle, reconsideration could not properly take place ‘before us at this level’; the
position in law in England and Wales remains as stated in Windle. The ‘knowledge of
wrong’ test as interpreted in Windle provides a very narrow ground of exemption since
even grossly disturbed persons generally know that murder, for instance, is a crime.117
15.35 It appears that Windle is not uncommonly ignored in practice by Crown Court
judges and that little attempt is made in many cases to distinguish between ignorance of
legal wrong and ignorance of moral wrong. Indeed, the ‘wrongness’ limb has also been
interpreted in the Crown Court to cover delusional beliefs about being possessed by a
deity or the devil, or about the victim being possessed by the devil or the need for self-
defence against evil.118
15.36 There is a significant difference between the ‘wrongness’ limb and the ‘nature and
quality’ limb, since a person who did not know the nature and quality of his act for reasons
other than a defect of reason due to a disease of the mind will often be entitled to a complete
acquittal, and the defence of insanity in such a case merely results in a different verdict being
111 (1952) 86 CLR 358, High Ct of Australia. 112 (1990) 2 CR (4th) 1, SC of Canada.
113 Norval Morris ‘ “Wrong” in the M’Naghten Rules’ (1953) 16 LR 435.
114 [1994] 2 SCR 507, SC of Canada.
115 Mackay ‘Righting the Wrong? – Some Observations on the Second Limb of the M’Naghten Rules’ [2009]
Crim LR 80 at 85. 116 [2007] EWCA Crim 1978.
117 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (the Butler Committee), Cmnd 6244 (1975),
para 18.8.
118 Mackay Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (1995) 104; Mackay and Kearns ‘More Fact(s)
about the Insanity Defence’ [1999] Crim LR 714 at 722–723; Mackay ‘Righting the Wrong? – Some Observations
on the Second Limb of the M’Naghten Rules’ [2009] Crim LR 80 at 83.
 | 15.37 mental condition defences
returned in the Crown Court. On the other hand, ignorance of law is normally no excuse,
but it becomes an excuse if it results from a defect of reason due to disease of the mind.
Medical evidence
15.37 It is for the jury, not medical witnesses, to determine whether the requirements
for the defence of insanity have been satisfied after a proper direction from the judge,119
but they may not acquit on the ground of insanity except on the evidence of two or more
registered medical practitioners, at least one of whom is a specialist approved by the
Secretary of State.120
The redundant statement in M’Naghten

15.38 In their advice in M’Naghten’s Case,121 the judges stated that, where someone
commits a criminal act under an insane delusion, he is under the same degree of respon-
sibility as he would have been if the facts had been as he imagined them to be. To illustrate
this the judges said:
‘For example, if, under the influence of his delusion, the accused supposes another man
to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes in
self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased
had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge
for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.’122
This statement is generally regarded as redundant since it merely restates a principle pro-
vided by the test (ignorance of nature and quality of the act and that it is wrong) just
mentioned. The statement can also be criticised as defective in that it suggests that if D
kills his wife under the insane delusion that he is killing a cat he can be convicted of an
offence in relation to a cat, since, said the judges, one who acts under an insane delusion
is under the same degree of responsibility as he would have been if his delusion had been
true. This clearly cannot be so since D would not have committed any actus reus in rela-
tion to a cat. A study of the directions made in insanity cases shows that the statement is
not referred to. It can safely be ignored.
Applicability
15.39 Traditionally, it has been assumed that the defence of insanity was available on a
charge of any offence, with the isolated exception of a few offences, such as those referred
to in para 6.6, which are truly ones of absolute liability. Consequently, the decision of the
Divisional Court in DPP v H123 in 1997 was a surprise. In that case D had been charged with
119 Rivett (1950) 34 Cr App R 87, CCA.

120 Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s 1. 121 (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200.
122 Ibid at 211.
123 [1997] 1 WLR 1406, DC. Discussed by Ward ‘Magistrates, Insanity and the Criminal Law’ [1997] Crim
LR 796 at 800–802.
15.40 defence of insanity | 
driving with excess alcohol (contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 5) and had success-
fully pleaded the defence of insanity before a magistrates’ court. The Divisional Court,
however, held that D should have been convicted because that offence was one of strict
liability, for which no mens rea had to be proved, and the defence of insanity could only
succeed where mens rea was an essential element of the offence. The only authority relied
on in support of this decision was Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p K,124 where the
Divisional Court accepted the proposition that the defence of insanity was based on the
absence of mens rea. The decision in DPP v H involves at least two misconceptions.
First, the M’Naghten Rules are not limited to those who lack mens rea through a disease
of the mind; the knowledge of wrong test is concerned with those who do not lack mens
rea. Second, automatism is recognised as a defence in terms of offences generally, includ-
ing driving offences.125 The effect of DPP v H is that if the cause of automatism is a disease
of the mind a defendant cannot plead the defence of insanity, if charged with a strict lia-
bility offence not requiring proof of mens rea, whereas if his automatism had some other
cause he could – according to the present law – rely on the defence of non-insane automa-
tism. The Divisional Court did not refer to either of these points. Perhaps that is why its
decision is absurd. The Court failed to offer an adequate explanation for its distinction
between strict liability offences requiring no mens rea and such offences requiring mens
rea as to some of their elements (or, indeed, any offence requiring full mens rea).
Can the prosecution seek to prove insanity?

15.40 Although the M’Naghten Rules are described as the defence of insanity, this is
somewhat misleading since it is sometimes possible for the prosecution to seek to prove
that a defendant who has not pleaded insanity is insane within the M’Naghten Rules and
therefore not guilty by reason of insanity.
First, the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 6 provides that, where, on a trial
for murder, D pleads the defence of diminished responsibility, the prosecution may
adduce or elicit evidence of insanity. It is for the prosecution to prove the requirements
of the defence beyond reasonable doubt.126
Second, although the Court of Appeal doubted, obiter, in Dickie127 that the prosecution
could raise the issue of insanity, Lord Denning had previously stated the contrary, obiter,
in Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland,128 which was not cited to the Court of Appeal in
Dickie and which, it is submitted, represents the better view. According to Lord Denning,
if D puts his state of mind in issue, eg by pleading non-insane automatism, it is open to
the prosecution to show what his true state of mind was by raising the issue of insani-
ty.129 In principle, the prosecution must prove its contention beyond reasonable doubt;130
124 [1997] QB 23, DC. 125 See Automatism and other involuntary conduct, below.
126 Grant [1960] Crim LR 424. 127 [1984] 3 All ER 173, CA.
128 [1963] AC 386 at 411.
129 According to the Court of Appeal in Dickie [1984] 3 All ER 173, if the prosecution possesses evidence of
insanity it must simply make it available to the defence, so that in its discretion the defence may make use of it.
130 An analogy may be drawn with the rule that, where it alleges that the defendant is unfit to plead, the
prosecution must prove this beyond reasonable doubt: Robertson [1968] 3 All ER 557, CA.
 | 15.41 mental condition defences
Lord Denning’s statement in Bratty131 that the prosecution need only prove D’s insanity
on the balance of probabilities is questionable.
There is a certain paradox in the prosecution seeking an acquittal in the above types
of case.
Special verdict, orders and appeal

Special verdict
15.41 The Trial of Lunatics Act 1883, s 2, as amended by the Criminal Procedure
(Insanity) Act 1964, s 1, provides that where at the trial of a person for an offence:
‘it is given in evidence . . . that he was insane, so as not to be responsible, according to law,
for his actions at the time when the act was done or omission made, then, if it appears to
the jury . . . that he did the act or made the omission charged, but was insane as aforesaid
when he did or made the same, the jury shall return a special verdict that the accused is
not guilty by reason of insanity.’
The requirement that it should appear to the jury that D ‘did the act or made the omis-
sion charged’ before he can be found not guilty by reason of insanity refers to the actus
reus of the offence. On the other hand, the prosecution does not have to prove that D
acted or omitted to act with the requisite mens rea; apart from insanity D’s state of
mind is irrelevant.132 If the prosecution is unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that D has committed the actus reus, D is entitled to a simple not guilty verdict whether
or not D was insane at the material time.133 Unlike the position under the Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 4A referred to in para 15.14, which also speaks of the
jury being satisfied that D ‘did the act or omission charged’, the prosecution does not
have to disprove evidence that D might have been acting by accident, under a mistake
or involuntarily. These go to the heart of the defence of insanity under the M’Naghten
Rules.
Orders
15.42 When D is found not guilty by reason of insanity D does not necessarily go
free. Until 1991, D had to be ordered to be detained in a hospital indefinitely until the
Home Secretary was satisfied that this was no longer required for the protection of the
public. Th is sometimes led persons accused of offences other than murder to choose
to plead guilty if the prosecution raised the issue of insanity, or if the judge ruled that
D was raising the defence of insanity. However, the law on this matter was changed by
the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, and then changed
again by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. The present position is
as follows.
131 [1963] AC 386 at 412. 132 A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1998) [2000] QB 401, CA.
133 Ibid at 409.
15.43 defence of insanity | 
The Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 5, as substituted by the Domestic

Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, s 24, now provides that, where D is found not
guilty by reason of insanity, the judge must make in respect of the defendant:
• a hospital order (with or without a restriction order);
• a supervision order; or
• an order for his absolute discharge.134
Where the special verdict relates to a murder charge and the judge has power to make a hos-
pital order, the judge has no choice; the judge must make a hospital order.135 The reference
to the power to make a hospital order is a reference to the power to do so under the Mental
Health Act 1983, s 37. Section 37136 provides that the judge has power to make such an order
if D is suffering from mental disorder (ie any disorder or disability of the mind) which makes
detention in a hospital appropriate and the most suitable method for dealing with D.
If a hospital order is made, D is admitted to a hospital or hospital unit selected by the
Secretary of State and detained there; it may be a special hospital, such as Broadmoor, or a
Regional Secure Unit in a local NHS hospital, but it can be an ordinary mental hospital. If
the order is made without restrictions on release, the decision about release is one for the
hospital authorities (subject to review by the Mental Health Review Tribunal). However, if
the judge considers it necessary in order to protect the public from serious harm, the judge
can make an additional order imposing restrictions on discharge from hospital.137 A restric-
tion order may specify a minimum limit of time for the detention or it may be without limit
of time. The Secretary of State and the Mental Health Review Tribunal each have power to
terminate either type of restriction order. The effect of the latter type of restriction order
is that D will be detained until the Secretary of State or Mental Health Review Tribunal is
satisfied that this is no longer required for the protection of the public. In the case of murder,
a restriction order without limit of time must be made if a hospital order is made.
The most common orders have been hospital admission orders (now replaced by hos-
pital orders) with a restriction order without limit of time and supervision and treatment
orders (now replaced by supervision orders). In the period 1992–96 the former orders
were made in 38.6 per cent of cases where a special verdict was returned (just under a
quarter of the 38.6 per cent were cases involving a murder charge); the latter orders were
made in 40.9 per cent of cases.138 In the period 1997–2001 the disposals had a marked
resemblance to those in the previous period; the former orders were made in 37.5 per cent
of cases, and the latter in 41.7 per cent.139
Appeal
15.43 The Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s 12 provides that there may be an appeal to the
Court of Appeal against the special verdict of acquittal on the ground of insanity. The
134 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 5, as substituted by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims
Act 2004, s 24. 135 Ibid.
137 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 5.
138 Mackay and Kearns ‘More Fact(s) about the Insanity Defence’ [1999] Crim LR 714.
139 Mackay, Mitchell and Howe ‘Yet More Facts about the Insanity Defence’ [2006] Crim LR 399. The article
contains a number of other valuable statistical analyses about the operation of the insanity defence.
 | 15.44 mental condition defences
right of appeal is subject to the same conditions as apply to criminal appeals from the
Crown Court generally.140 The absence of this right of appeal could cause hardship, eg, in
a case where D’s defence to a charge of murder, or other offence against the person, was
accident, as well as insanity,141 or in a case in which D pleaded diminished responsibility
in answer to a murder charge and was found to be insane.
Use of the M’Naghten Rules

15.44 Cases in which insanity has been expressly raised as a defence have been rare.
Partly, this was a reaction until 1991 in respect of any offence in the Crown Court against
the prospect of prolonged, even lifelong, detention in a hospital.142 But it has also reflected
the narrow test of legal responsibility under the M’Naghten Rules and the existence since
the Homicide Act 1957 of the defence to murder of diminished responsibility.143 Before
that Act accused persons generally raised the defence of insanity only in murder cases,
but since then a plea of the wider defence of diminished responsibility has traditionally
been far more common in such cases144 because, if that defence succeeds, D may be given
a determinate prison sentence (or some other ‘normal’ sentence).
In a 15-year period commencing in 1975, the special verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity was returned only in respect of 52 accused.145 The removal by the Criminal
Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 of mandatory indefinite hospitali-
sation (except in murder) as a consequence of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insan-
ity has led to an increase in such verdicts. In the first five years (1992–96), there were 44
special verdicts, four of them on murder charges, five attempted murder, 13 offences of
wounding or grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
s 18 or s 20, and five of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861, s 47.146 In the second five years (1997–2001), the number of
special verdicts rose to 72, seven on murder charges, 16 attempted murder, 13 wounding
or grievous bodily harm, and eight assault occasioning actual bodily harm.147
15.45 The defence of insanity may be raised indirectly by a defendant who has not
expressly raised it as a defence. As stated in para 15.25, whether or not medical evidence
of a mental condition amounts to evidence of a disease of the mind is a question of law for
the judge to decide, and the danger is that, if D pleads that he lacked the necessary mens
rea (or was an automaton) and relies in support on medical evidence of a mental condi-
tion, D is liable to find that the judge rules that that evidence indicates a disease of the
mind and that, there being medical evidence in support of all elements of the M’Naghten
Rules, D is raising the defence of insanity, which alone must be left to the jury. Thus,
140 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, ss 12 and 13. 141 Duke [1963] 1 QB 120, CCA.
142 A survey published in 1990 revealed that, even when indefi nite hospitalisation was mandatory whatever
the offence, the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity had not been as severe in many cases
as had been thought: Mackay Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (1995) 104–105.
143 Paras 8.39–8.57.
144 But see para 8.41 where a recent marked decline in successful pleas of diminished responsibility is
noted. 145 Mackay Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (1995) 103.
146 Mackay and Kearns ‘More Fact(s) about the Insanity Defence’ [1999] Crim LR 714.
147 Mackay, Mitchell and Howe ‘Yet More Facts about the Insanity Defence’ [2006] Crim LR 399.
15.46 defence of insanity | 
D cannot avoid the question of insanity being raised by simply describing the medical
evidence as evidence of lack of mens rea (or of automatism).
An example is provided by Sullivan,148 where D, who was charged with inflicting griev-
ous bodily harm, pleaded that he had acted as a non-insane automaton, adducing evi-
dence that the attack in question had happened during the last stages of a minor epileptic
seizure. The trial judge, correctly in the eyes of the House of Lords, ruled that on the
evidence before him the defence amounted to one of insanity, rather than non-insane
automatism, and that he would leave only the defence of insanity to the jury. At this point,
D changed his plea to guilty.
Summary trials
15.46 The M’Naghten Rules apply to cases tried in magistrates’ courts. This was con-
firmed by the Divisional Court in Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p K.149 However,
the legislation concerning the special verdict of acquittal, and the results thereof, does
not apply. It follows that, if a magistrates’ court acquits D on grounds of insanity, it must
give an ordinary acquittal, in which case the defendant goes free. This is satisfactory if
the interests of the defendant or society do not require protection, but some power is
clearly necessary to deal with cases tried by magistrates where the public’s or D’s interests
demand further action. This need is met by the Mental Health Act 1983, s 37(3)150 under
which, when the offence is punishable with imprisonment and D is suffering from mental
disorder (ie any disorder or disability of the mind), the magistrates may make a hospital
order or guardianship order without proceeding to trial or registering a conviction, if
satisfied that D ‘did the act or made the omission charged’.151 Section 37(3) can only apply
when D is mentally ill when D appears before the magistrates’ court. It is limited to cases
where the offence charged is triable only summarily or triable either way; it does not apply
where the offence is only triable on indictment.152
Where insanity at the time of the offence (ie under the M’Naghten Rules) is in question,
D is not entitled to require that a summary trial proceeds and, if insanity is proved, that
he be given an acquittal, although he is entitled to have fully considered a submission that
there should be a trial.153 Where a s 37(3) order is a possibility, the magistrates should
start by determining whether D has done the act or made the omission charged. If they
are not satisfied of this, they must acquit D, whatever concerns they may have about his
mental state. If they are satisfied, the magistrates have power, whether or not they try the
issue of insanity, to make a s 37(3) order without convicting or acquitting D, provided
that the conditions of s 37(3) are met.154 If, however, it is clear that no s 37(3) order is going
to be possible on the medical evidence whatsoever happens, as where D has recovered
148 [1984] AC 156, HL.

149 [1997] QB 23, DC. Discussed by White and Bowen ‘Insanity Defences in Summary Trials’ (1997) 61 JCL
198; Ward ‘Magistrates, Insanity and the Common Law’ [1997] Crim LR 796. The point has been confirmed in
DPP v H (1996) 160 JP 441, DC and more recently in R (on the application of Singh) v Stratford Magistrates’ Court
[2007] EWHC 1582 (Admin), DC. 150 As amended by the Mental Health Act 2007, Sch 1.
151 See para 15.20. 152 Chippenham Magistrates’ Court, ex p Thompson (1996) 160 JP 207, DC.
153 R (on the application of Singh) v Stratford Magistrates’ Court [2007] EWHC 1582 (Admin), DC.
154 Ibid.
 | 15.47 mental condition defences
mentally since the time of the offence, the case must proceed to trial, so that if it is proved
that D was insane at the time of the offence D is acquitted, and if D was not and the case
is proved, D is convicted.155
No causal connection between the offence and the disorder need exist. Section 37(3) is
not limited to insanity under the M’Naghten Rules, of course, but includes a wide range
of mental disorders.
Defects with the Rules

15.47 A number of criticisms of the defence of insanity, which was formulated at a time
when psychiatry was in its infancy, have been made above. Three more can be added; all
of them doubtless relate to matters where policy considerations have predominated.
15.48 First, the M’Naghten Rules are limited to cognitive factors, excluding all mat-
ters concerning volition or the emotions, and thus make no allowance for so-called
‘irresistible impulse’, ie an impulse which it is difficult, if not impossible to control.
If someone knows the nature and quality of his act, and that it is wrong, but acts
under an irresistible impulse due to a disease of the mind he has no defence under the
Rules. It is a matter for debate whether it should be a defence for a person to show that,
although he was aware of the nature and quality of his act and knew it to be wrong,
he found, owing to insanity, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to prevent himself
from doing what he did. Allowance is made for irresistible impulse in a number of
Commonwealth and North American jurisdictions and the partial defence of dimin-
ished responsibility admits it on a charge of murder. A suggestion that a rule giving
a defence to someone who acted under an irresistible impulse while suffering from
a defect of reason due to disease of the mind should be grafted on to the Rules was
repudiated in Kopsch.156 According to his own admissions, D killed V by strangling
her with his necktie; he said that he had done so at her request. There was evidence
that he had acted under the direction of his subconscious mind, and it was argued
that the judge should have directed the jury that a person who acts under an impulse
which he cannot control is not criminally responsible. Th is was rejected by the Court
of Criminal Appeal as ‘a fantastic theory . . . which if it were to become part of our law
would be merely subversive’.157
The Privy Council has held that the absence of the power of self-control is not per se
evidence of incapacity to know the nature and quality of an act or that it is wrong.
However, on the facts of a particular case, there may be medical evidence warranting the
conclusion that a disease which impairs D’s power of self-control also impairs his ability
to distinguish right from wrong.158
15.49 Second, although delusions which prevent D knowing the nature and quality
of his act fall within the Rules, other delusions which call into question whether he is a
155Ibid.
156(1925) 19 Cr App R 50, CCA; see also True (1922) 16 Cr App R 164, CCA; Flavell (1926) 19 Cr App R 141,
CCA; Sodeman v R [1936] 2 All ER 1138, PC. 157 (1925) 19 Cr App R 50 at 51.
158 A-G for State of South Australia v Brown [1960] AC 432, PC.
15.51 defence of insanity | 
responsible person deserving punishment do not. Examples would be where D believes

his victim is persecuting him or is possessed by the devil. Society may need protection
from such a defendant, but it seems odd to regard him as legally responsible.159 As already
stated, it appears that in practice this gap in the Rules is sometimes ignored and special
verdicts are returned in such cases in the Crown Court.160
15.50 A third criticism is that it is objectionable that the label of insanity should
be applied in cases (such as where D acted during an epileptic fit or hyperglycaemic
coma or while sleepwalking) where D would not be regarded as insane in common –
let alone medical – language. It is certainly odd that such people are labelled as insane
by the law when the vast majority of people who are regarded medically (and in com-
mon parlance) as mentally ill or disordered are not. The incongruity of this has been
recognised in the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal, but they have maintained
that it does not lie within their power to alter the law in this respect.161 What is needed
is a new method of disposal to deal with people of the above type. While they do not
deserve punishment for conduct committed when they were in a mentally impaired
state through no fault of theirs, the fact remains that they pose a potential threat to
others unless something is done. Until English law provides a satisfactory method of
dealing with this threat the present state of the law in this respect can be justified on
the basis that it does provide in the Crown Court a way, through the orders that can
be made after verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, of protecting others and of
helping and supporting the defendant.
15.51 The law on the insanity defence appears to be out of line with the ECHR, Article
5(1)(e) where a hospital order is made. Article 5(1)(e) provides, as an exception to the
general prohibition on the deprivation of liberty in Article 5, that ‘persons of unsound
mind’ may ‘lawfully be detained in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’. In
Winterwerp v Netherlands,162 the European Court of Human Rights interpreted this pro-
vision as involving three requirements:
• There must be a strong correlation between the legal and medical criteria used to assess
the issue of ‘unsound mind’ This is not the case in respect of epilepsy, hyperglycaemia
or sleepwalking.
• The court’s decision must be based on ‘objective medical expertise’ Although an insan-
ity verdict cannot be returned except on the evidence of two or more doctors,163 that
evidence only has to be considered by the jury; it does not have binding force.164
• The court must decide that the mental disorder is ‘of a kind or degree warranting
compulsory confinement’ Under the law which applied before the substitution of the
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, s 5 the judge had to make a hospital admis-
sion order (with a restriction order) in any case where D was found to be not guilty
159 See Howard ‘Reform of the Insanity Defence: Theoretical Issues’ (2003) 67 JCL 51. 160 Para 15.35.
161 Sullivan [1984] AC 156 at 102, per Lord Diplock; Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92 at 102.
162 (1979) 2 EHRR 387, ECtHR. Also see Luberti v Italy (1984) 6 EHRR 440, ECtHR. 163 Para 15.37.
164 Para 15.21.
 | 15.52 mental condition defences
of murder by reason of insanity. This was at odds with this requirement. As it now is,
s 5 is compatible with this requirement.165

15.52 The draft Criminal Code Bill166 incorporates, with some adaptation, proposals for
reform made by the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders.167
The draft Bill provides:
• a new special verdict, ‘not guilty on evidence of mental disorder’. The power to give
this verdict would be extended to magistrates’ courts; and
• two alternative grounds (set out in cll 35 and 36) for the verdict of not guilty on evi-
dence of mental disorder.
By cl 35, a mental disorder verdict could be returned if D was proved to have commit-
ted an offence but it was proved on the balance of probabilities (whether by the prosecu-
tion or by the defendant) that D was at the time suffering from severe mental illness or
severe mental handicap. This would not apply if the jury or magistrates were satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that the offence was not attributable to the severe mental illness
or severe mental handicap. This provision would extend the law considerably. It covers not
only cases at present covered by the ‘knowledge of wrong’ test under the M’Naghten Rules
but also any other case where, at the time of the act or omission charged, and proved, D,
although able to form intentions and carry them out, was suffering from severe mental
illness or severe mental handicap. This ground would be of importance where the pros-
ecution succeeded in proving the necessary mens rea for the offence charged. The defini-
tion of ‘severe mental illness’ is such that this defence would not exempt those who acted
under an irresistible impulse, but it would exempt those who acted under a delusion – eg
about being persecuted – which did not affect mens rea.
By cl 36, the mental disorder verdict could also be returned if D was acquitted of an
offence only because, by reason of mental disorder or a combination of mental disorder
and intoxication, it was found that he acted or might have acted in a state of automatism,
or without the fault required for the offence, or believing that an exempting circumstance
existed, and it was proved on the balance of probabilities (whether by D or the prosecu-
tion) that he was suffering from mental disorder at the time of the act. ‘Mental disorder’ is
defined for the purposes of s36 as severe mental illness, arrested or incomplete development
of mind, or a state of automatism (not resulting only from intoxication) which is a feature
of disorder, whether organic or functional and whether continuing or recurring, that may
cause a similar state on another occasion. A diabetic in a hyperglycaemic coma as a result of
not taking insulin or an epileptic having a fit would fall within ‘mental disorder’.
165 Para 15.42.

166 Law Commission: A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989), Law Com No 177; see para 1.70. These
provisions are discussed by Mackay Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law (1995) 131–138.
167 Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (1975) Cmnd 6244, paras 18.1–18.50. For a
discussion of the Committee’s proposals, see Ashworth ‘The Butler Committee and Criminal Responsibility’
[1975] Crim LR 687.
15.55 automatism and other involuntary conduct | 
Automatism and other involuntary conduct
Key points 15.5

Generally,168 it is a defence that the act or omission or, even, state of affairs with which
D is charged was involuntary.169 An act, omission to act or state of affairs on D’s part is
involuntary where it is beyond D’s control. Involuntary acts include those done under
automatism.
Involuntary act
15.53 One of the best known examples of an involuntary act is one done under compul-
sion, ie where it is compelled by external physical force. Hale gave the following example:
‘If there be an actual forcing of a man, as if A by force take the arm of B and the weapon
in his hand, and therewith stabs C whereof he dies, this is murder in A, and B is not
guilty.’170 In Hill v Baxter,171 it was stated that a man could not be said to be driving where
at the material time he was attacked by a swarm of bees and was prevented from exercis-
ing any directional control over the vehicle, any movements of his arms and legs being
solely caused by the action of the bees.
Another example of an involuntary act is where a motorist is suddenly deprived of
control over his vehicle by a sudden blow-out or brake-failure.172
Automatism
15.54 Some involuntary acts are not directly caused by external physical force or the
like but are done in a state of automatism. An act is done in such a state if it is done by
the muscles without any control by the mind (such as a reflex action, or a spasmodic or
convulsive act) or if it is done during a state involving a loss of consciousness.173
15.55 In law automatism is strictly defined. It is limited to cases where there is a total
destruction of voluntary control; this is what is meant by ‘loss of consciousness’.174
Impaired or reduced awareness will not do. This was decided by the Court of Appeal
in A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1992)175 where the Court of Appeal resolved a conflict in the
168 For exceptions, see paras 6.6, 15.59 and 15.68.

169 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 482 per Viscount Sankey LC; Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland
[1963] AC 386 at 408–409, per Lord Denning; Kilbride v Lake [1962] NZLR 590, NZSC; Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR
205, High Ct of Australia.
170 Hale Pleas of the Crown Vol I, 434. Also see Hawkins Pleas of the Crown Vol I, Ch 29, s 3.
171 [1958] 1 QB 277, DC. 172 Th is example was given in Bell [1984] 3 All ER 842 at 846.
173 Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 409, per Lord Denning.
174 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1994] QB 91, CA. Thus, the act of a driver who unintentionally presses the
accelerator, intending to press the brake, is not done in a state of automatism. Despite the fact that in one sense
he is not conscious of what he is doing, there is not a loss of consciousness in the required sense: A-G’s Reference
(No 4 of 2000) [2001] EWCA Crim 780. 175 [1994] QB 91, CA.
 | 15.55 mental condition defences
authorities. Prior to this decision the balance of authority indicated that D was in law an
automaton if D’s consciousness was impaired to such an extent that, while D exercised some
control over his act, D was deprived of effective control over it. In cases like Charlson,176
Kemp,177 referred to in para 15.62, and Quick,178 D’s acts of violence were treated as done in
a state of automatism although they were probably done in a state of impaired conscious-
ness in which it could not be said for sure that D did not exercise any control over his acts.
Moreover, in Burgess,179 the facts of which were set out in para 15.30, the Court of Appeal
appeared to have treated D’s acts of violence as done in a state of automatism where ‘[h]
is mind was to some extent controlling his actions which were purposive rather than the
result simply of muscular spasm, but without being consciously aware of what he was
doing’. On the other hand, in Broome v Perkins,180 where D drove five miles home, very
erratically, in a hypoglycaemic state in which he might not have been conscious of what
he was doing, the Divisional Court directed a conviction of driving without due care and
attention, on the ground that D’s impaired consciousness, if it existed, would not have
constituted automatism because he must have reacted to stimuli, made decisions (eg to
brake or steer) and given direction to his limbs, ie there was not a complete destruction of
D’s control over his acts.
In A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1992), D, who was driving along a motorway, steered appar-
ently deliberately on to the hard shoulder. He drove 700 yards along the hard shoulder
before crashing into a stationary van whose hazard lights were flashing. The van was
pushed forward, crushing to death two men who were standing between it and a recovery
vehicle parked in front. D was charged with the now repealed offence of causing death by
reckless driving. There was psychiatric evidence for the defence that D had been driving
in a condition known as ‘driving without awareness’ and D argued that this amounted
to driving in a state of automatism. The judge left to the jury the defence of automatism
based on this evidence. The jury acquitted D.
The Attorney General referred the case to the Court of Appeal on a point of law, viz
whether the psychiatric evidence for the defence, taken at its highest, could amount to
evidence of automatism fit to be left to the jury. The Court of Appeal answered: ‘no’. The
psychiatric evidence as to ‘driving without awareness’ was that, in that state, the driver’s
capacity to avoid a collision ceased to exist because repetitive stimuli experienced on
a straight, flat, featureless motorway could induce a trancelike state in which the focal
point for forward vision gradually came nearer and nearer until the driver was focus-
ing just ahead of his windscreen, but that his peripheral vision would continue to send
signals which were dealt with subconsciously and would enable the driver to steer within
highway lanes. In this condition, the evidence continued, the driver’s body would still
be controlling the vehicle, there would be subconscious motivation to his steering, and,
although largely unaware of what was happening ahead or of steering, the driver’s una-
wareness would not be total. In other words, D would have retained some control over the
vehicle. The Court of Appeal, relying on Broome v Perkins and similar cases, held that, for
176 [1955] 1 All ER 859. 177 [1957] 1 QB 399. 178 [1973] QB 910, CA.
179 [1991] 2 QB 92, CA.
180 (1987) 85 Cr App R 321, DC. Also see Isitt (1977) 67 Cr App R 44, CA (D’s mind not in ‘top gear’ so that D
unaware of moral inhibitions; no defence if acted purposefully).
15.59 automatism and other involuntary conduct | 
automatism, there had to be a total destruction of voluntary control on D’s part; impaired
control was not enough. Accordingly on the above evidence, the judge should not have
left the issue of automatism to the jury. This decision constitutes a severe restriction on
the defence of automatism.
Under cl 33 of the draft Criminal Code Bill181 D would be in a state of automatism if his
act occurred while he was in a condition depriving him of effective control over it.
Acts done under irresistible impulse or

duress not involuntary
15.56 It is clear from the cases that the phrase ‘automatism and other involuntary conduct’
has a meaning limited to cases of unconscious or reflex actions and other actions beyond
D’s control. Thus, acts done under an irresistible impulse are not regarded as ‘involuntary
acts’ because, although the person concerned may not be able to control the impulse which
prompts his act, the doing of the act itself is not beyond that person’s control.182
15.57 The narrow meaning given to ‘involuntary conduct’ also prevents that phrase cov-
ering acts done under duress (where there is a threat of physical force unless an act is
done),183 although the threat may provide an excuse, as seen later.184
Involuntary omission
15.58 An omission to act is involuntary (ie beyond D’s control) where, through no fault
of his own, D is physically restrained from acting or otherwise incapable of fulfi lling the
duty to act. Thus, in Leicester v Pearson,185 which was concerned with the strict liability186
offence of failing to accord precedence to a pedestrian on a zebra crossing, it was held that
if the failure was beyond the control of the driver (eg because he had been pushed onto the
crossing by a bump from a car behind) he would not be liable.
15.59 While it is generally the case that an involuntary omission is not culpable, the
wording of the offence may lead to it being construed as one in which impossibility of
complying with the duty in question is no defence. Examples are provided by reference to
cases where convictions for offences relating to the failure by a driver to produce a driv-
ing licence or vehicle test certificate when requested have been upheld despite the physi-
cal impossibility of producing the relevant document because it was unavailable to the
driver.187 Such an exceptional construction is likely to be limited to offences of a minor,
181 Law Commission: A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989), Law Com No 177; see para 1.70.
182 Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 409, per Lord Denning.
183 Edwards ‘Automatism and Criminal Responsibility’ (1958) 21 MLR 375 at 381.
184 Paras 16.40–16.64 and 16.70–16.86.
185 [1952] 2 QB 668, DC. Also see Burns v Bidder [1967] 2 QB 227, DC (offence not committed if failure to
accord precedence due to brake failure, resulting from unknown latent defect of which driver could not reason-
ably have known). For another, possibly generous, example, see Stockdale v Coulson [1974] 3 All ER 154, DC.
186 Hughes v Hall [1960] 2 All ER 504, DC.
187 Sparks v Worthington [1986] RTR 64, DC; Davey v Towle [1973] RTR 328, DC. In such a case, however,
the driver would now have a defence if he satisfied the terms of the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 164(7) or 165(4)
 | 15.60 mental condition defences
regulatory nature. It is impossible to defend it where the impossibility of compliance with

the duty is not due to D’s fault.
Involuntary state of affairs

15.60 A state of affairs, eg possession of a prohibited thing, is involuntary where it is
brought about by the physical compulsion of another or its occurrence is otherwise
beyond the defendant’s control. However, as stated (and criticised) in para 6.6, in status
or situational offences it is liable to be held that a person can be convicted despite the fact
that the relevant state of affairs was involuntary on his part.
The distinction between insane and

non-insane automatism
Key points 15.6

Where D was suffering from non-insane automatism D must be acquitted,188 but if the
case is one where D was suffering from a ‘defect of reason due to disease of the mind’
the M’Naghten Rules apply and, if the trial is on indictment, D must be found not guilty
by reason of insanity and an order will be made against D under the Criminal Procedure
(Insanity) Act 1964, s 5 as explained in para 15.42.
15.61 The distinction between insane and non-insane automatism was established by
the House of Lords in Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland.189 D was charged with the mur-
der of a girl. It was not disputed that he had strangled her. D said that he had had a black-
out and there was some evidence that he was suffering from psychomotor epilepsy, which
is undoubtedly a disease of the mind. D relied on the defences of automatism and insan-
ity, but the trial judge only directed the jury on the issue of insanity. D was convicted,
and his appeals to the Northern Irish Court of Criminal Appeal and the House of Lords
were dismissed. It was held that, where the only evidence of the cause of automatism is a
disease of the mind, the case is one of insane automatism and the M’Naghten Rules apply.
If, on the other hand, the evidence is that automatism was caused not by a disease of the
mind (ie not by an internal cause) but by some other (external) cause, such as a blow on
the head, the case is one of non-insane automatism.
15.62 D cannot, however, prevent his defence being treated as one of insanity
if the medical evidence before the court, whether adduced by the defence or the
prosecution, indicates that the alleged automatism arose from a disease of the mind,
respectively, whereby it is a defence (inter alia) if D proves that he produced the document at a police station as
soon as reasonably practicable or that it was not reasonably practicable to produce it there before the start of the
proceedings.
188 For exceptions, see para 15.68. 189 [1963] AC 386, HL. Also see Quick [1973] QB 910, CA.
15.64 automatism and other involuntary conduct | 
because it is for the judge to determine whether that evidence discloses a disease of
the mind.
What has just been said was denied by Barry J in Charlson,190 where there was evi-
dence that D had acted as an automaton as a result of a cerebral tumour. Barry J directed
the jury that the case did not involve the defence of insanity, since that defence had not
been raised by D who was alone competent to do so, and left the defence of non-insane
automatism to them. However, in Kemp,191 a contrary view was taken where it was not
disputed that D had struck his wife with a hammer in a period of unawareness, caused by
the effect on his brain of arteriosclerosis. Devlin J, as he then was, distinguished Charlson
on the ground that in that case the doctors were apparently agreed that D was not suffer-
ing from a ‘disease of the mind’, whereas in Kemp’s case they were not so agreed. Devlin
J accordingly held that Kemp’s defence, if any, was one of insanity and directed the jury
accordingly.
The two cases are not so easily reconciled since, as previously stated,192 whether the
alleged condition from which D is suffering is a ‘disease of the mind’ is not a medical
question to be decided by medical witnesses but a question of law for the judge. Kemp was
approved, and Charlson doubted, in Bratty’s case193 by Lord Denning, who pointed out
that the old notion that only the defence can raise insanity has gone, and it is now clear
that the approach in Kemp represents the law.
15.63 An example of the approach taken in Kemp is Hennessy.194 D, a diabetic, was
charged with taking a conveyance without authority and with driving while disquali-
fied. His defence was that he had failed to take his proper dose of insulin because of
stress, anxiety and depression, and consequently was suffering from hyperglycaemia and
in a state of automatism when the offences occurred. The trial judge ruled that, since
D’s alleged automatism was due to a disease of the mind, the defence (if any) was one of
insanity. At this D changed his plea to guilty. The Court of Appeal held that the judge’s
ruling was correct since the hyperglycaemia caused by diabetes (a disease) not corrected
by insulin was a disease of the mind and the stress, anxiety and depression, even if caused
by external factors, were not in themselves external factors and could not override the
effect of the diabetic shortage of insulin. Hennessy can be contrasted with Bingham,195
where the Court of Appeal held that evidence that a diabetic had been suffering from
hypoglycaemia (deficient blood sugar level caused by too much insulin or failing to eat
properly after taking insulin to counteract it) was evidence of non-insane automatism.
15.64 The development of the law relating to insanity and automatism is such that
many cases of automatism are, in law, of the insane type, although they would not be so
described in common or medical parlance. An extreme example is provided by Burgess,196
where the Court of Appeal held that the sleepwalking in issue constituted insane automa-
tism because it was due to an internal cause. However, as pointed out in para 15.50, until
English law provides a satisfactory method of dealing with defendants who, although
190 [1955] 1 All ER 859. 191 [1957] 1 QB 399. 192 Para 15.25. 193 [1963] AC 386 at 411.
196 [1991] 2 QB 92, CA; para 15.30. Under the draft Criminal Code Bill, cl 33, sleepwalking would be classed
as (non-insane) automatism.
 | 15.65 mental condition defences
lacking mens rea, have a condition which gives rise to a potential threat to others, the law
in the present respect can be justified as giving the judge a power to make an order for the
protection of the public as well as for the help and support of the defendant.197
15.65 Where there is more than one cause of automatism, the question is whether
the immediate cause is an internal or external one. In Roach,198 defence psychiatric
witnesses at D’s trial for wounding with intent, contrary to the Offences Against the
Person Act 1861, s 18, stated that at the time of his violent conduct D had been suffer-
ing from ‘insane automatism of psychogenic type’. They said that an underlying ‘mixed
personality disorder’ had been acted on by prescribed drugs, a moderate quantity of
alcohol and fatigue. The judge only left insane automatism to the jury. The Court of
Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to do so. The psychiatrists had clearly attrib-
uted a causative role to the external factors (the drugs and the alcohol) as well as to the
underlying personality disorder and fatigue. The Court of Appeal held that, whatever
the correct psychiatric defi nition, and despite the psychiatrists’ use of the term ‘insane
automatism’, ‘the legal defi nition of automatism allows for the fact that, if external
factors are operative on an underlying condition which could not otherwise produce
a state of automatism, then a defence of (non-insane) automatism should be left to the
jury’. Where the immediate cause of alleged automatism is disputed on the evidence
(so that it indicates that it may be internal or external), the judge will have to leave the
defence of insanity (insane automatism) and the defence of non-insane automatism to
the jury, directing them to consider which was the immediate cause. Because of the
difference in the burden of proof, the judge’s direction will unavoidably be complicated
in such a case.
15.66 The distinction between insane and non-insane automatism is one of great
importance because, in the case of non-insane automatism, D simply bears the burden
of adducing evidence;199 once the issue is raised, the burden of disproving automa-
tism is borne by the prosecution in accordance with the general principles enunciated
in Woolmington’s case. If, however, the case is one of insane automatism D bears the
persuasive burden of proof as well as the burden of adducing evidence.200
D bears the burden of adducing evidence of automatism because there is a rebuttable
presumption of law that everyone has sufficient mental capacity to be responsible for his
crimes. If the prosecution had to adduce evidence of capacity in every case, its position
would be intolerable. It is up to D to indicate the nature of his alleged incapacity, and
since, generally speaking, the mere statement ‘I had a black-out’ or ‘I can’t remember
what happened’ will be totally insufficient,201 D’s evidence will very rarely be sufficient
unless it is supported by medical evidence.202
197 Wilson, Ebrahim, Fenwick and Marks ‘Violence, Sleepwalking and the Criminal Law: (2) The Legal
Aspects’ [2005] Crim LR 614 at 623.
198 [2001] EWCA Crim 2698. See also Quick [1973] QB 910, CA; Burgess [1991] 2 QB 92, CA.
199 Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, HL; Stripp (1978) 69 Cr App R 318, CA; Pullen [1991]
Crim LR 457, CA. See, further, C [2007] EWCA Crim 1862. 200 Para 15.23.
201 Cook v Atchison [1968] Crim LR 266, DC.
202 Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 413, per Lord Denning; Moses v Winder [1981] RTR
37, DC.
15.68 automatism and other involuntary conduct | 
Self-induced automatism
Key points 15.7

In the case of an offence of ‘basic intent’ the defendant cannot always rely on self-
induced automatism by way of defence.
15.67 Sometimes, non-insane automatism can be regarded as self-induced in that it

results from something done by D or not done by D (as where a diabetic becomes an
automaton as a result of taking too much insulin or, having taken insulin, failing to eat
sufficient food so that the insulin reacts adversely).
15.68 In such a case, the position is as follows:
• As was held by the Court of Appeal in Bailey,203 where the offence is one requiring
proof of a ‘specific intent’, a term discussed in paras 15.90 to 15.93, a defendant who
was suffering from self-induced automatism at the material time cannot be convicted
of that offence whatever the cause of the automatism. Examples of offences of specific
intent are murder, wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent (contrary
to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 18) and attempt to commit an offence.
• Where the offence is one of ‘basic intent’, ie an offence other than one of specific
intent, such as involuntary manslaughter or unlawful wounding or infliction of
grievous bodily harm (contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 20),
then:
– If the automatism was due to voluntary intoxication, D will be guilty204 of the
offence if at the material time D would have had the mens rea required for the
offence charged, had he not been an intoxicated automaton (as will almost always
be the case). In Lipman,205 eg, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for man-
slaughter of D who had killed a girl while in a self-induced trance, during which
he thought that he was fighting snakes whereas in fact he was stuffing a sheet into
the girl’s mouth and asphyxiating her. This is discussed in more detail in paras
15.71, 15.77–15.80.
– Where the automatism was due to some other cause, such as a failure by a diabetic
to eat adequately after taking insulin, then, it was held by the Court of Appeal in
Bailey,206 D cannot, except in the case mentioned below, be convicted of an offence
of basic intent. Within this category falls the situation where D’s automatism was
caused by an occurrence which was brought about by D’s voluntary intoxication,
as where, because of his intoxication, D falls over, bangs his head and thereby
becomes concussed; the blow on the head, and not the intoxication, is the imme-
diate cause of the automatism.207
203 [1983] 2 All ER 503, CA.

204 Th is was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Bailey [1983] 2 All ER 503, CA.
205 [1970] 1 QB 152, CA. See also DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, HL. 206 [1983] 2 All ER 503, CA.
207 Stripp (1978) 69 Cr App R 318 at 323. See also Burns [1970] 58 Cr App R 364, CA.
 | 15.69 mental condition defences
The exceptional case just referred to is where D is proved to have been reckless in the
following way. This is that, before D became an automaton, D appreciated the risk that
something which he did or failed to do was likely to make him aggressive, unpredictable
or uncontrollable with the result that he might endanger others (as opposed simply to
becoming unconscious) and he deliberately ran the risk or failed to take remedial action
which he knew was required. In such a case, as the Court of Appeal held in Bailey, 208
D can be convicted of an offence of basic intent, even though at the time of his con-
duct which constituted the actus reus of such an offence D lacked the mens rea normally
required for it. Thus, eg, if D, a diabetic, appreciates that not taking food after insulin
might result in his becoming aggressive, unpredictable or uncontrollable and he does not
take remedial action and becomes an automaton, he can be convicted of a basic intent
offence while in that state. In C,209 the Court of Appeal held that, where a diabetic claims
to have been acting in a state of non-insane automatism, he must adduce evidence that he
was totally unable to control his actions due to an unforeseen hypoglycaemic attack, that
he could not have reasonably avoided the attack and that there were no advance warnings
of its occurrence. Only if this is done does the burden shift to the prosecution to disprove
the availability of the defence.
15.69 In the case of dangerous driving or careless driving, a defendant who, eg, falls
asleep at the wheel, can be convicted in relation to the time when he realised or should
have realised the risk that he might become unconscious but nevertheless continued to
drive, if his continuing to do so before he became unconscious satisfies the relevant test
of dangerousness or carelessness.210
Intoxication
15.70 Alcohol is a drug which is capable of altering mood, perception or consciousness,
of loosening inhibitions and self-control, and of impairing movements, reactions, judge-
ment and ability to foresee consequences. Certain other drugs and substances (including
some glues) can also have such effects.
Unlike the other mental conditions referred to in this chapter, intoxication is not, and
never has been, a defence in itself. Indeed, until the early nineteenth century voluntary
intoxication was an aggravating factor warranting a punishment of more than ordinary
severity. Sometimes, however, intoxication can be relied on in support of a claim that D
lacked the mens rea for the offence charged or had a defence which applies to that offence;
in other cases it cannot.
208 [1983] 2 All ER 503, CA. See also Clarke [2009] EWCA Crim 921 at [15]. In Bailey the Court of Appeal
disapproved dicta in Quick [1973] QB 910 at 922 to the effect that automatism would not be available if its occur-
rence ‘could have been reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do, something’.
209 [2007] EWCA Crim 1862.
210 Kay v Butterworth (1945) 173 LT 191, DC; Henderson v Jones (1955) 119 JP 305, DC. Cf Moses v Winder
[1981] RTR 37, DC.
15.72 intoxication | 
Voluntary intoxication
Key points 15.8

The defendant’s voluntary intoxication at the time of the offence is generally
irrelevant to his liability.
15.71 Intoxication is voluntary where it results from D knowingly taking alcohol or

some other drug or intoxicating substance or a combination of these,211 even though
D does not know its precise nature or strength212 (as where D’s beer has been laced with
vodka), or even though the effect of the amount taken is much greater than would have
been expected.
There are two exceptions. As shown in paras 15.109 and 15.110, intoxication is not vol-
untary in certain cases where it is caused by a drug taken under medical advice, or by
a non-dangerous drug (ie a drug which is not normally liable to cause unpredictability
or aggressiveness, such as a sedative or soporific drug).
15.72 It is no excuse that D’s power to judge between right and wrong was impaired
so that he would not have acted as he did but for his intoxication, nor that D’s powers of
self-control were relaxed so that he more readily gave way to temptation than if he were
sober, nor even that, in his intoxicated condition, D found the impulse to act as he did
irresistible.213 Moreover, it is not always a defence in itself that D’s voluntary intoxication
caused him to become an automaton.214
Key points 15.9

Voluntary intoxication is a factor relevant to criminal liability in three cases:
• if a specific intent (as opposed to a basic intent) is an essential element of the offence
charged and D’s voluntary intoxication affords evidence that D lacked the mens rea
for that offence. There are, however, qualifications to this;
• where statute expressly provides that a particular belief shall be a defence to the
offence charged; and
• if it causes insanity under the M’Naghten Rules or alcohol dependency syndrome
constituting an abnormality of mental functioning which satisfies the requirements
of the partial defence of diminished responsibility.
211 Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152, CA; DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, HL. Arguably, a drink whose alcohol level
is so low that it does not require a licence for its sale, or something like a sherry trifle, should fall outside this
defi nition. These are not commodities which one would consider capable of having an intoxicating effect.
212 Allen [1988] Crim LR 698, CA.
213 DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, HL; A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349, HL.
214 Para 15.68.
 | 15.73 mental condition defences
Voluntary intoxication as evidence of the absence of

mens rea in offence of specific intent
15.73 Particularly in offences involving violence, D may lack the necessary mens rea for
the offence charged because of his intoxication, as where D kills another mistakenly believ-
ing in his drunken stupor that the other is a theatrical dummy, or where because of his
intoxication D is unable to appreciate that firing a gun at another is likely to harm him. In
such a case a simple claim of lack of mens rea is extremely unlikely to succeed unless there
is evidence of intoxication to support it. There is a mass of authority that D may rely on
voluntary intoxication as evidence that he lacked the necessary mens rea only if the offence
is one requiring a specific intent (as opposed to a basic intent). This rule was affirmed by
the House of Lords in 1976 in DPP v Majewski.215 The House of Lords’ decision in this case
confirmed the view previously taken by the House in DPP v Beard,216 although that deci-
sion was not free from ambiguity and some statements in it are no longer correct.
15.74 It is important to emphasise that intoxication does not negative mens rea. All
that the cases decide is that, where there is evidence of voluntary intoxication such as
might have prevented D having the necessary mens rea in a case involving a charge of
an offence requiring specific intent, this evidence may be taken into account by the
jury or magistrates along with all the other evidence in deciding whether the prosecu-
tion has proved that D did have that mens rea. Normally, this evidence will have been
adduced by D, but it may come from some other source at the trial. In principle, if there
is any evidence at a trial in the Crown Court, whatever its source and even though it is
not relied on by counsel, on which a jury might conclude that D did not have the relevant
mens rea, because of intoxication, that evidence should be left to the jury since it relates
to an essential element (mens rea) which the prosecution must prove.217 It is therefore
unfortunate that some cases have suggested that D must provide specific evidence to show
that he was intoxicated and lacked mens rea and that this requirement is not satisfied
simply by evidence that D had consumed so much alcohol that he was intoxicated or that
he could not remember what he was doing because he was drunk.218
In directing the jury in respect of an offence requiring specific intent, the judge must
inform the jury that in deciding whether D had the necessary mens rea they must take
into account the evidence that D was intoxicated and that if they consider that D did not
have the necessary mens rea or might not have had it, D is entitled to be acquitted.219 In
other words, the judge must tell the jury that they can only convict D of a specific intent
offence if they are sure, having regard to all the evidence (including that of intoxication),
that D had the necessary mens rea.220
15.75 At one time, the law was different. In DPP v Beard,221 Lord Birkenhead LC, giving
the judgment of the House, said that evidence of voluntary intoxication could be taken
215 [1977] AC 443, HL. 216 [1920] AC 479, HL.

217 Bennett [1995] Crim LR 877, CA; Brown and Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485, CA.
218 Sooklal v State of Trinidad and Tobago [1999] 1 WLR 2011, PC; McKnight (2000) Times, 5 May, CA; P
[2004] EWCA Crim 1043. 219 Brown and Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485, CA.
220 Groark [1999] Crim LR 669, CA. 221 [1920] AC 479, HL.
15.78 intoxication | 
into consideration only if it rendered D incapable of forming the specific intent essen-
tial to constitute the offence charged. This proposition had the following arbitrary result
where, through intoxication, D lacked the necessary specific intent: if D’s intoxication
was such that he did not have the capacity to form the specific intent, he was exculpated;
whereas if D’s intoxication did not render him incapable of forming that intent, although
because of it he did not have that intent, he was criminally liable.
15.76 Fortunately, it is clear that, following the Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8, Lord
Birkenhead’s requirement of incapacity to form the requisite specific intent exists no longer.
As we have seen,222 under s 8 a person is not to be presumed to intend the natural and prob-
able consequences of his act; instead the question whether D had the necessary mens rea is to
be decided by the jury or magistrates on all the evidence. Thus the jury, in deciding whether
D had the necessary mens rea, must take into account all the evidence, including that relating
to intoxication, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circum-
stances. The strongest evidence, of course, is that D was too intoxicated to be capable of form-
ing the specific intent, but it is enough if, on all the evidence (including that relating to D’s
intoxication), the jury find that while D’s intoxication was not such as to make D incapable of
forming a specific intent, ie D could have intended, D did not in fact have that intent.223
A second change is that, contrary to dicta in Beard, it is now established that the bur-
den is on the prosecution to establish that, despite the evidence of intoxication, D had the
necessary mens rea.224
Voluntary intoxication and offences of basic intent

15.77 The above amendments to the propositions of law in Beard’s case do not remove the
major limitation of the rule affirmed in DPP v Majewski that, if the offence charged is one
of basic intent (ie does not require a specific intent), D may be convicted of it if D was
voluntarily intoxicated at the time of committing its actus reus, even though, through
voluntary intoxication, D lacked the mens rea normally required for that offence (as
where D made an intoxicated mistake, for instance), and even though D was then in a state
of automatism. This part of the Majewski decision is open to at least three interpretations.
15.78 The first interpretation is that the intoxicated person has no defence because he
was reckless as to the risk of becoming mentally impaired involved in taking the drink or
drugs and recklessness is sufficient mens rea for the offence in question.225 It is difficult to
accept this theory. One reason is that it proceeds on the basis that one who takes drink or
dangerous drugs is conclusively presumed to be reckless, which conflicts with the provi-
222 Para 4.18.

223 Pordage [1975] Crim LR 575, CA; Sheehan [1975] 2 All ER 960, CA; Garlick (1980) 72 Cr App R 291, CA;
Davies [1991] Crim LR 469, CA; Cole [1993] Crim LR 300, CA; Bowden [1993] Crim LR 379, CA. Regrettably,
there continue to be instances where the Court of Appeal has treated the question as being whether the defend-
ant was capable of forming the specific intent: see, eg, Brown and Stratton [1998] Crim LR 485; Groark [1999]
Crim LR 669; McKnight (2000) Times, 5 May. 224 Sheehan above.
225 See, eg, DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, per Lord Elwyn-Jones LC, with whom Lords Diplock and
Kilbrandon agreed, and Lord Edmund-Davies; Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848 at 853. Th is interpretation assumes
that a crime where recklessness is sufficient mens rea is always one of basic intent, which may not necessarily be
the case: see para 15.91.
 | 15.79 mental condition defences
sions of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8.226 Another reason is that mens rea must exist at
the time of D’s prohibited conduct and in relation to the risks specified in the definition
of the offence. To convict D simply on the basis of recklessness at an earlier point of time
(when D took the drink or drug) as to the risk involved in taking it is to base liability on a
very different ground from that specified by the definition of the offence.
15.79 The second interpretation is that, where on a charge of a basic intent offence a
claim of lack of mens rea is supported by evidence of voluntary intoxication, that evidence
should be disregarded in deciding whether or not D had that mens rea. This means that
if the prosecution can prove facts from which (disregarding the intoxication evidence)
the necessary mens rea can be inferred beyond reasonable doubt, D must be convicted.
Although this second interpretation is easier to ‘square’ with principle than the first, it
seems inconsistent with the requirement in the Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8 that in
deciding whether D had the necessary intent or foresight the jury or magistrates should
take into account ‘all the evidence’. In Majewski, however, Lord Elwyn-Jones LC, with
whom Lords Diplock, Simon and Salmon agreed, held that ‘all the evidence’ means all the
legally relevant evidence. Nevertheless, it leads to the absurd proposition that a person
can be convicted of an offence on an inference as to his mens rea which is false because it
clearly disregards evidence (intoxication evidence) to the contrary.
15.80 The third interpretation is that, where a claim by D of lack of mens rea in respect of
a basic intent offence is supported by evidence of voluntary intoxication, the prosecution
does not have to prove the mens rea normally required for that offence (even though it is
specified in the definition of the offence), because instead D can be convicted if D would
have had that mens rea but for the fact that he was voluntarily intoxicated. The rule under
this interpretation is one of substantive law and is therefore unaffected by the provisions
in the Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8 about proof of intention or foresight, because the rule
dispenses with the need for proof of intent or foresight if D claims that he lacked mens rea
through voluntary intoxication.
This interpretation is supported by appellate decisions in two cases concerning the
offence of unlawfully inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences Against
the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861), s 20, where the mens rea is classified as a basic intent.
In Aitken,227 the defendants set fire to V’s flying suit, on which they had poured white
spirit, during horseplay at an end-of-course celebration at an RAF station. V was severely
burnt as a result. All involved had consumed a good deal of alcohol. The judge-advocate
directed the court-martial that they had to be satisfied that each defendant:
‘foresaw that he might cause some injury, albeit of a minor nature . . . or would have fore-
seen that the act might cause some injury, had he not been drinking’.
The Courts-Martial Appeal Court228 held that this direction was correct.
Aitken was applied by the Court of Appeal in Richardson and Irwin,229 another case of
horseplay, this time involving university students all of whom had consumed four or five
226 Para 4.18. 227 [1992] 1 WLR 1006, C-MAC. 228 As to this court, see para 2.32, n 98.
229 [1999] 1 Cr App R 392, CA.
15.82 intoxication | 
pints of beer. During the horseplay, the defendants lifted V over the edge of a balcony. V
slipped or was dropped to the ground and suffered grievous bodily harm. The Court of
Appeal allowed the defendants’ appeals against conviction under the OAPA 1861, s 20
on the ground that the trial judge had failed to tell the jury that they had to be sure that
the defendants foresaw that V might slip or be dropped and suffer some bodily harm, or
would have foreseen this risk had they not been drinking.
15.81 Voluntary intoxication evidence is obviously irrelevant in an offence of negligence
because a reasonable person is not intoxicated. This is so even where, as in the case of rape
and other non-consensual sexual offences, the governing statute says that regard may be
had to ‘all the circumstances’ in determining whether D was negligent. For it to be rel-
evant, would be contrary to the general principle that voluntary intoxication cannot be
used to support a denial of mens rea unless the offence requires a specific intent. In any
event, a mistaken belief that can only be explained on the basis of voluntary intoxication
cannot be regarded as reasonable.
Accidental act attributable to voluntary intoxication

15.82 The fact that an offence is one of basic intent does not prevent D relying on evi-
dence of his voluntary intoxication as evidence that his act (and not just its consequences)
was an ‘accident’, as where D stumbles into someone in an intoxicated state.230
In Brady,231 D, who had voluntarily consumed drink and drugs, climbed onto the bal-
cony railings of a nightclub, stood on them and fell onto a dancer below. D was convicted
of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to the OAPA 1861, s 20 and appealed to the
Court of Appeal. Because of the way that the case had been argued the Court had to
consider the case on the basis of D’s act of falling (and not of the previous acts of climbing
and perching, which were clearly reckless). Allowing D’s appeal, the Court of Appeal held
that the fall was an accident, not a deliberate act, and did not fall within the rule in DPP
v Majewski.
Soon afterwards, the Court of Appeal expressed similar views in Heard.232 During an
incident at a hospital, D had exposed his penis, taken it in his hand and had rubbed it up
and down the thigh of a police officer who was trying to stop D re-entering a hospital
waiting area. D was heavily intoxicated at the time. D was charged with sexual assault,
contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 3, one element of which is that D must inten-
tionally touch another person. At his trial, D’s case was that he could not remember any-
thing about what had occurred. The judge directed the jury that the prosecution had to
prove that D had ‘intentionally, that is to say deliberately’ touched the police offi cer, and
that intoxication was not a defence to the charge. The jury convicted D who appealed
unsuccessfully against conviction, arguing that, since only an intentional touching would
do, the offence was one of specific intent with the result that voluntary intoxication was
a relevant factor to consider in determining whether D had the necessary intention to
touch.
Dismissing D’s appeal, the Court of Appeal held that these issues were not relevant to
the determination of the appeal because D plainly intended to touch the police officer
230 The present point deals with a different meaning of ‘accident’ from that referred to in para 5.2.
 | 15.83 mental condition defences
with his penis. The Court went on to hold, obiter, that, although the intent in issue in the
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 3 was a basic intent, the judge’s direction that the touching
must be deliberate was correct; an accidental act attributable to voluntary intoxication
would not suffice for liability. It stated:
‘To flail about, stumble or barge around in an uncoordinated manner which results in an
unintended touching, objectively sexual, is not this offence [ie the offence under the Sexual
Offences Act 2003, s 3]. If to do so when sober is not this offence, then nor is it this offence
to do so when intoxicated. . . . The intoxication, in such a situation, has not impacted on
intention. Intention is simply not in question. What is in question is impairment of control
of the limbs. . . . We would expect that in some cases where this was in issue the judge might
well find it useful to add to the . . . direction that “a drunken intent is still an intent”, the cor-
ollary that “a drunken accident is still an accident” . . . Whether, when a defendant claims
accident, he is doing so truthfully, or as a means of disguising the reality that he intended
to touch, will be what the jury has to decide on the facts of each such case.’233
The Court of Appeal’s acceptance that the fact that an offence is one of basic intent does
not prevent reliance on evidence that an act by an intoxicated person was accidental, pro-
vides some limit on the rigour of the law relating to basic intent offences. The situation after
Heard can be illustrated as follows. If D deliberately extends his arm and touches V’s geni-
tals and then claims that he did not intend to touch another person because he was heavily
intoxicated and did not know that V (or anyone else) was near him or thought he was touch-
ing a stuffed bear, the evidence of D’s intoxication cannot be relied on at a trial for an offence
under SOA 2003, s 3 as evidence that D lacked the necessary intent. D’s act of extending his
arm was not accidental; it was the consequence (touching another person) which was. On
the other hand, if D bumps into V accidentally while stumbling about in an intoxicated
state he cannot be convicted under s 3. D’s act of bumping into V when he stumbles is itself
accidental. The distinction between these two situations is a fine one. So is the distinction
between an accidental act done in a state of voluntary intoxication and an act done in a state
of automatism induced by voluntary intoxication, which does not normally excuse D from
liability for a basic intent offence.234 These fine distinctions are unsupportable.
Cases where the normal rules do not apply

Intoxicated mistaken belief in need to act in self-defence or the like
15.83 In one situation, at least, the rule that a person charged with an offence requiring
a specific intent may rely on evidence of voluntary intoxication as evidence that he lacked
the necessary mens rea is abrogated. This is the situation where under a mistake induced
by voluntary intoxication D believes that he must act in self-defence or the like. Whether
there are other exceptional situations is discussed in para 15.95.
233 Ibid at [23].

234 Para 15.68. In Heard the Court of Appeal appears to have considered obiter that the act done in a state of
automatism in Lipman (para 15.68) was accidental, but the act in that case would not normally be so described.
The fact that Lipman was deprived of control over his acts did not mean that they were accidental.
15.84 intoxication | 
We have seen that in the definitions of some offences against the person the words
‘unlawful’ or ‘unlawfully’ (which refer to the absence of elements of justification) are
employed and that self-defence and the like are examples of such a justification. We
have also seen that where such terms are used they are an element of the actus reus and
that D must be proved to have mens rea in relation to that element. For example, in
murder D must be proved to have intended unlawfully to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm.
If a sober person kills another in the dark mistakenly believing that the other is a
tailor’s dummy, he is not guilty of murder because he lacks an intent unlawfully to kill
or cause grievous bodily harm, and if he does so mistakenly believing that the person
coming towards him is about to stab him, he is not guilty of murder (provided he uses
force which is reasonable on the facts as he believes them to be) because he lacks an intent
unlawfully to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.235
Except in two instances, the nature of the evidence adduced in support of the alleged
mistake will not affect the outcome of a trial for a specific intent offence in either type
of case if the alleged mistake is not disproved. The two exceptions are (a) where D’s plea
in the Crown Court is in effect one of insanity,236 and (b) where the evidence in support
involves voluntary intoxication. This second exception arises as a result of the reasoning
of the Court of Appeal in O’Grady.237 According to that reasoning, if D intended to kill
but acted under a voluntarily intoxicated belief that he was being attacked and had to kill
to defend himself, D is guilty of murder even though, on the facts as he believed them to
be the force used by him was reasonable, so that he did not intend unlawfully to kill or
cause grievous bodily harm. The same rule would apply on a charge of any other offence
requiring a specific intent unlawfully to cause some sort of harm. It would also apply
where an intoxicated mistaken belief related to some other public or private defence (eg
defence of another or the prevention of crime).
15.84 The facts of O’Grady were that D and V had fallen asleep aft er a day’s heavy
drinking. D woke to fi nd V hitting him and retaliated with what he thought were
blows to defend himself. The fight subsided and D fell asleep again. When he awoke he
found V was dead, having suffered serious wounds consistent with blows from both
blunt and sharp objects. D was charged with murder but convicted of involuntary
manslaughter.
D appealed, arguing that the trial judge had been right to say that he should be judged
according to his intoxicated mistaken belief that he was under attack, but wrong in not
stating that the reasonableness of the force used should be judged according to D’s under-
standing of the situation (the severity of the attack), and not objectively.
The Court of Appeal dismissed D’s appeal. Indeed it took an even narrower view
of the law than the trial judge, since it concluded that D ‘is not entitled to rely, so far
as self-defence is concerned, upon a mistaken belief that one is under attack which
has been induced by voluntary intoxication’ and that this rule applied to specific
235 Paras 5.5–5.9. 236 Paras 15.21–15.45.

237 [1987] QB 995, CA; see MacDonald ‘Intoxication, Mistake and Self-Defence’ (1987) 137 NLJ 914 and
Milgate ‘Intoxication, Mistake and the Public Interest’ (1987) 46 CLJ 381.
 | 15.85 mental condition defences
intent offences, such as murder, as well as to basic intent offences, such as involuntary
manslaughter.
The Court held that its decision in Gladstone Williams,238 that a defendant who might
have been labouring under a mistaken belief that it was necessary to use force to defend
another (or in self-defence etc) must be judged according to his mistaken view of the
facts, whether the mistake was reasonable or not, was irrelevant where the jury are satis-
fied that the mistake was caused by voluntary intoxication.
15.85 While the dismissal of D’s appeal in O’Grady was correct under the present
law, since involuntary manslaughter is an offence of basic intent, the reasoning behind
O’Grady introduces additional complication in respect of murder and other offences of
specific intent, and contradicts the rule affirmed in Majewski.
We know that the mens rea for murder is an intention unlawfully to kill or do griev-
ous bodily harm and that murder is an offence requiring specific intent, but appar-
ently only in relation to the intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm to another
human being, and not in relation to the element of unlawfulness, where a drunken
mistaken belief that one is being attacked is involved. What is the difference in cul-
pability between a drunk who kills another, thinking that he is a tailor’s dummy, and
someone who kills another, thinking that he is attacking him with a knife? The non-
sensical state of the law derives from the view of the Court of Appeal that ‘the ques-
tion of mistake can and ought to be considered separately from the question of intent’.
Th is view contradicts the clear statement to the contrary of the Court of Appeal in
Gladstone Williams to the effect that the element of unlawfulness is part of the actus
reus of an offence against the person, in relation to which D must be proved to have
had mens rea.
O’Grady was applied by the Court of Appeal in O’Connor,239 where the Court confirmed
that the approach in O’Grady applied to any claim of mistaken belief in self-defence,
whether the offence was one of specific intent or basic intent. More recently, O’Grady was
applied in Hatton,240 where the Court of Appeal rejected the view241 that what was said in
O’Grady was obiter; the Court of Appeal was therefore bound by O’Grady.
15.86 O’Grady was clearly influenced by policy considerations, just as the rule affirmed
in Majewski was. The Court of Appeal stated in O’Grady:
‘There are two competing interests. On the one hand the interest of the defendant who
has only acted according to what he believed to be necessary to protect himself, and on
the other hand that of the public in general and the victim in particular who, probably
through no fault of his own, has been injured or perhaps killed because of the defend-
ant’s drunken mistake. Reason recoils from the conclusion that in such circumstances a
defendant is entitled to leave the court without a stain on his character. We find support
for that view in the decision of the House of Lords in Majewski.’242
238 (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA. 239 [1991] Crim LR 135, CA.
240 [2005] EWCA Crim 2951. For a critical analysis of this case, see Dingwall ‘Intoxicated Mistakes about the
Need for Self-Defence’ (2007) 70 MLR 127.
241 See JC Smith’s commentary on O’Grady in [1987] Crim LR 706. 242 [1987] QB 995 at 1000.
15.88 intoxication | 
But here is another fallacy: D would not leave court without a stain, because D could be
convicted of involuntary manslaughter under the normal rules applicable to basic intent
offences, so that the policy of the courts of protecting the public against voluntarily intox-
icated offenders would be upheld.
15.87 Despite its oddity as a matter of principle, O’Grady was given statutory recogni-
tion in respect of a mistake relating to self-defence, defence of another, the prevention of
crime or effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of an offender by the Criminal Justice
and Immigration Act 2008, s 76(5).243 The effect of s 76(5) is that the normal rule244 that
whether the degree of force used by D against V was reasonable in the circumstances of
self-defence, defence of another, prevention of crime or effecting or assisting in an arrest
is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be, even if his
belief was an unreasonably mistaken one, does not apply where D relies on a mistaken
belief attributable to voluntary intoxication.
Intoxicated mistaken belief in consent

15.88 O’Grady appears even more odd as a matter of principle when contrasted with
what was stated in Aitken and Richardson and Irwin about an intoxicated mistaken belief
in the victim’s consent on D’s part.
Aitken245 was concerned with an offence under the OAPA 1861, s 20. The mens rea
for such an offence is an intention or recklessness as to some unlawful bodily harm
resulting from one’s act.246 Bodily harm is not unlawful if it is validly consented to by
the victim, V, as in the case of horseplay, consent being an element of justification.247
In Aitken, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, having held that the judge-advocate at a
court-martial had been correct to direct it that D, charged with an offence under the
OAPA 1861, s 20 (a basic intent offence), could be convicted if he foresaw the risk of
injury, or would have foreseen it, had he not been intoxicated, went on to hold that
a mistaken belief, whether reasonable or not, on D’s part that V was consenting to
the horseplay in question would provide an excuse. The Court did not state that in
assessing whether D had this belief the evidence of voluntary intoxication had to be
disregarded. In Richardson and Irwin248 the Court of Appeal stated, obiter, that in
relation to a case like Aitken or that before it, evidence of consumption of alcohol
should be taken into account when considering whether D realised that V did not
consent. Thus, what Aitken and Richardson and Irwin appear to indicate is that, if a
defendant to a charge of a non-fatal offence against the person claims that he lacked
the requisite mens rea as to causing the specified degree of harm unlawfully, because
of an intoxicated belief that he had the other’s valid consent, evidence of voluntary
intoxication may be taken into account in determining whether he had that mens rea
as to unlawfully bringing about that harm, regardless of whether the offence is one of
specific intent or of basic intent.
243 Or, prospectively, defence of property: para 16.8. Section 76(5) is set out in para 16.19.
244 Paras 16.15 and 16.19.
245 [1992] 1 WLR 1006, C-MAC. 246 Para 7.86.
247 Para 7.14. 248 [1999] 1 Cr App R 392, CA.
 | 15.89 mental condition defences
The above is difficult to accept, especially when compared with the principle originat-
ing in O’Grady described above.249
Summary
15.89 Thus, we have the surprising situation where, in reversal of the normal
principles:
• on a charge of a specific intent offence such as murder, evidence of lack of the
requisite mens rea, which is founded on voluntary intoxication and is based on a
mistake as to the need to act in self-defence or the like, has the effect of enabling
D to be convicted of that offence regardless of the absence of proof of the mens rea
normally required; whereas,
• even on a charge of a basic intent crime such as an offence under the OAPA 1861,
s 20, evidence of lack of the mens rea normally required, which is founded on vol-
untary intoxication and is based on a mistake as to V’s valid consent, is relevant as
evidence of lack of that mens rea.
Determining whether an offence is one of specific intent
Key points 15.10

Various definitions of ‘specific intent’ have been put forward by the judges and its mean-
ing is unclear.
Where an offence has been classified by an appellate court as involving or not involving
a specific intent the safe course is to follow it and not seek to classify it according to the
various, inconsistent definitions.
15.90 The judges have put forward various definitions of ‘specific intent’ in the present
context, most of which are clearly incorrect. For example, in DPP v Majewski, 250 Lord
Elwyn-Jones LC appears to have adopted the view that ‘specific intent’ was equivalent
to ‘ulterior intent’. However, murder, causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause
such harm, handling stolen goods and various other offences which were recognised
in DPP v Majewski itself and other cases to be ones of specific intent 251 in the present
context do not require an ulterior intent. This definition must therefore be rejected. In
DPP v Majewski Lord Simon took the view that an ulterior intent was only one type of
‘specific intent’, which term he understood simply to mean (and require) ‘direct inten-
tion’. This definition must also be rejected, since murder, causing grievous bodily harm
with intent to do grievous bodily harm and handling stolen goods, eg, do not require a
direct intent.
249 Paras 15.84–15.87. 250 [1977] AC 443, HL.

251 See DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, HL; A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349, HL; Sheehan
[1975] 2 All ER 960, CA (murder); Pordage [1975] Crim LR 575, CA (causing grievous bodily harm with intent);
Durante [1972] 3 All ER 962, CA (handling).
15.92 intoxication | 
15.91 The defi nition, which is generally reconcilable with the case law, is that if inten-
tion (and nothing less) is required as to at least one element of the offence, the offence is
one of specific intent, whereas if recklessness as to the elements of a particular offence
suffices, that offence is one of basic intent. No decision has actually articulated this
distinction. In Comr of Metropolitan Police v Caldwell, 252 the majority of the House of
Lords held that voluntary intoxication is no defence to an offence in which recklessness
is sufficient to constitute the necessary mens rea (ie that such an offence is one of basic
intent), but they did not seek to defi ne ‘specific intent’. Th is part of the decision remains
good law.
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Heard, 253 however, contains obiter dicta that
the fact that intention (and nothing less) is required as to an element of the offence
does not necessarily make that intent a specific intent. In a passage not notable for
its clarity the Court of Appeal dealt with the meaning of ‘specific intent’. It appears
that the Court of Appeal considered that ‘specific intent’ in the sense used in DPP v
Majewski referred to two types of mens rea: a purposive (ie direct) intent, and a mental
element required to be proved in relation to something beyond the actus reus, whether
that element is expressed as an ulterior intent or other sort of mens rea relating to a
matter ulterior to the actus reus, eg, criminal damage being reckless as to endangering
life contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(2).254 The Court of Appeal held
that since the intentional touching required for the offence of sexual assault under
the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 3, 255 was not of either of these types it was a ‘basic
intent’ and not a ‘specific intent’. As can be seen, neither of these meanings of ‘specific
intent’ for present purposes can be reconciled with the pre-existing classification of
offences.
15.92 The Court of Appeal’s obiter pronouncement in Heard about the meaning of
‘specific intent’ involves a fundamental change to the previous understanding of DPP v
Majewski. To what extent does it apply to offences other than that in issue in that case?
Although Heard was concerned with the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003), s 3, the
Court of Appeal’s reinterpretation is clearly equally applicable to the offences under SOA
2003, ss 1, 2 and 5 to 7 (rape, sexual assault by penetration, rape of a girl under 13, sexual
assault by penetration of such a girl and sexual assault of such a girl) and to other offences
under SOA 2003 requiring an intentional touching (or an intentional inciting or caus-
ing), so that the requisite intent is not a specific intent, whereas the ‘bolt on’ ulterior mens
rea required by other offences under the Act, eg ‘for the purpose of obtaining sexual grat-
ification’ (offences of engaging in sexual activity in presence of child or other specified
vulnerable person, contrary to SOA 2003, ss 11, 18, 32, 36 or 40, and offences of causing
such a person to watch a sexual act contrary to ss 12, 19, 33, 37 or 41) or ‘with the intent
of committing a relevant sexual offence’ (preparatory offences under ss 62 and 63), is a
specific intent.
252 [1982] AC 341, HL. 253 [2007] EWCA Crim 125.

254 The Court of Appeal endorsed the view to this effect taken about the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(2) by
Lord Edmund-Davies (dissenting) in Comr of Metropolitan Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341.
255 See para 9.47.
 | 15.93 mental condition defences
It remains to be seen whether the pronouncement in Heard will be applied to offences

outside SOA 2003. Its extension to some other offences would be problematic because
there is authority binding on the Court of Appeal to the effect that murder and a number
of other offences are offences of specific intent, but they would not be if the view taken in
Heard applied to them.
15.93 As the judges have not been consistent in their definition of ‘specific intent’, it is
impossible to be certain, in advance of a judicial decision concerning a particular offence,
whether or not it is one of ‘specific intent’. Arguably, the courts grant or withhold the title
of ‘offence of specific intent’ on grounds of policy and not principle. Where a decision has
been made in respect of an offence, the safe course is to follow it and not to seek to divine
whether or not it involves a specific intent.
The following have been held to be offences of specific intent in the present context:
• murder;256
• wounding or causing grievous bodily harm with intent;257
• criminal damage contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1), where only
intention to cause damage is alleged;
• arson contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1) and (3), where only an intent
to damage property is alleged;
• criminal damage with intent to endanger life contrary to the Criminal Damage Act
1971, s 1(2);
• arson with intent to endanger life contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(2)
and (3);258
• theft;259
• robbery;260
• burglary with intent to steal;261
• handling stolen goods;262 and
• attempt to commit an offence.263
Conversely, it is possible to draw up a list of those offences which are ones of basic
intent, and not specific intent. The following can be included in this list:
• involuntary manslaughter;264
• sexual assault;265
256 See DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, HL; A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349, HL; Sheehan
[1975] 2 All ER 960, CA.
257 Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 410, per Lord Denning; Pordage [1975] Crim LR 575, CA.
258 Comr of Metropolitan Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, HL is the authority in respect of these instances
under the 1971 Act. 259 Ruse v Read [1949] 1 KB 377, DC.
260 Th is necessarily follows from the fact that a robbery involves a theft .
261 For the same reason as in the previous note. 262 Durante [1972] 3 All ER 962, CA.
263 DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 at 483, per Lord Salmon. Also see Mohan [1976] QB 1, CA.
264 Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152, CA. 265 Heard [2007] EWCA Crim 125.
15.94 intoxication | 
• maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;266

• assault occasioning actual bodily harm;267
• assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty;268
• taking a conveyance without lawful authority;269
• criminal damage contrary to the CDA 1971, s 1(1), unless only an intention to dam-
age property is alleged;
• arson contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(1) and (3) unless only an inten-
tion to damage property is alleged;
• criminal damage being reckless as to endangering life contrary to the Criminal
Damage Act 1971, s 1(2);
• arson being reckless as to endangering life contrary to the Criminal Damage Act
1971, s 1(2) and (3);270
• false imprisonment; and
• kidnapping.271
15.94 Liability as an accomplice depends on proof of an intent to assist, encourage or

procure the commission of the principal offence. There is some authority to suggest
that evidence of voluntary intoxication may be taken into account as evidence that an
alleged accomplice to the principal offence – whether it was one of specific intent or
basic intent – had the intent to assist, encourage or procure it. The authority referred
to is Clarkson272 decided at a time when the offence of rape was governed by the Sexual
Offences Act 1956, s 1 (since repealed). In that case, the defendants were present as
spectators at a gang-rape. They were convicted at a court-martial as accomplices to
the rape. Quashing their convictions on the ground that the court-martial might have
been left with the impression that mere continuing non-accidental presence was in
itself enough, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court stated that not only must it be proved
against a defendant that such presence actually encouraged the perpetrators of the rape
but it must also be proved that the defendant intended to give encouragement. The
Court continued that:
‘it was essential that that element should be stressed, for there was here at least the pos-
sibility that a drunken man with his self-discipline loosened by drink . . . might not intend
that his presence should offer encouragement to rapers; . . . he might not realise that he was
giving encouragement’.273
266 Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46, CA.

267 Bolton v Crawley [1972] Crim LR 222, DC; DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, HL. It follows that common
assault or battery are offences of basic intent. 268 DPP v Majewski above.
269 MacPherson [1973] RTR 157, CA; criticised by White ‘Taking the Joy out of Joy-Riding’ [1980] Crim LR 609.
270 Comr of Metropolitan Police v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, HL is the authority in respect of these instances
under the 1971 Act. But see para 15.91 in relation to them.
271 Hutchins [1988] Crim LR 379, CA is the authority for the last two offences.
272 [1971] 3 All ER 344, C-MAC (as to this court, see para 2.32, n 98). 273 [1971] 3 All ER 344 at 347.
 | 15.95 mental condition defences
If the suggestion in Clarkson is correct, any offence is one of specific intent insofar as
liability as an accomplice is concerned. This is an area of the law where the relevant prin-
ciples need to be developed.
15.95 The division of offences into those of specific intent and those of basic intent
is over-simplistic where an offence requires more than one element of mens rea to be
proved.
It is arguable that the mental elements in offences of specific intent can be divided
into elements of specific intent and elements of mens rea which are not. If so, a defend-
ant who had the specific intent element but lacked the other mental element because of
voluntary intoxication can be convicted on the basis of a rule corresponding to the rule
that, where D is charged with an offence of basic intent and claims that he lacked the
requisite mens rea because of voluntary intoxication, D can be convicted if he would
have had that mens rea but for his intoxication. This can be explained by reference to
the offence of wounding with intent to prevent the lawful apprehension of any person,
contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 18. The mens rea for this offence is
that D must act ‘maliciously’, ie with intention or recklessness as to some unlawful physi-
cal harm resulting from his act, and with the ulterior intent to prevent lawful apprehen-
sion of any person. The ulterior intent is, of course, a specific intent.274 Consequently, if D
is charged with this offence D may rely on evidence of voluntary intoxication as evidence
that he lacked the intent to prevent lawful apprehension. On the other hand, it may be that
in the event of D admitting that he intended to prevent lawful apprehension but saying
that in his intoxicated state he did not realise the risk that what he did to the police officer
might cause physical harm, evidence of voluntary intoxication is irrelevant in relation to
whether D acted ‘maliciously’ because his intoxication evidence is not being used to deny
a mental element which is a specific intent but to deny a mental element which, in other
offences,275 is a basic intent.276 It is noteworthy that the case law on specific intent offences
and voluntary intoxication has concerned defendants who alleged that they lacked the
specific intent (and not any other mens rea) because of their intoxication.
If this argument is accepted, so may an argument that a basic intent offence may con-
tain a specific intent element.
Views similar to those in this paragraph were expressed by the Court of Appeal in
Heard,277 where the Court stated, obiter, that it should not be supposed that every offence
can be categorised simply as either one of specific intent or of basic intent. So to categorise
might conceal the truth that different elements of it may require proof of different states
of mind. The Court of Appeal added that: ‘It is accordingly of very limited help to attempt
to label the offence of sexual assault, as a whole, one of either basic or specific intent.’
If the above is correct, the sole function of the terms ‘specific intent offence’ and ‘basic
intent offence’ is to refer to the nature of the predominant part of the mens rea required
for them.
274 Pordage [1975] Crim LR 575, CA. 275 Sullivan [1981] Crim LR 46, CA.
276 See White ‘Offences of Basic and Specific Intent’ [1989] Crim LR 271.
277 [2007] EWCA Crim 125 at [15].
15.97 intoxication | 
Basis of rules
15.96 The limited nature of the above rules relating to a plea of voluntary intoxication
means that the rules are not exclusively based on the negation of mens rea, and are best
explained as rules of judicial policy, based on a perception that it would not be acceptable
to the public that voluntarily intoxicated offenders should secure an absolute acquittal,
and aimed at maintaining law and order, while taking account of the effect of intoxica-
tion on mental responsibility.278 Their consequence is that, while a person who lacked the
requisite specific intent because of intoxication cannot be convicted of murder or wound-
ing with intent, he can be convicted of the lesser offences of involuntary manslaughter
or unlawful wounding if he would have had the requisite basic intent if he had not been
intoxicated.279 However, the application of this policy is imperfect because there are some
specific intent offences, such as theft, for which there is generally no basic intent offence
to fall back on.
Courts in a number of other Commonwealth jurisdictions have not adopted the
approach confirmed in Majewski, holding that voluntary intoxication is always admis-
sible to show that D’s act was involuntary or that D lacked the required mens rea.280 There
have, however, been some legislative retreats to Majewski and some legislative restric-
tions on this development in some jurisdictions.281
Voluntarily intoxicated belief and excuses
Key points 15.11

Where a statutory excuse is framed in terms of the defendant’s belief, his voluntary
intoxication can be taken into account to support a claim that he had that belief.
The defendant’s voluntary intoxication cannot be used in support of an alleged mistaken
belief in other excuses.
15.97 It was explained in Chapter 5 that where a statutory excuse, specific to a particu-
lar offence, is framed in terms of D’s belief, it is no bar to the excuse succeeding that D’s
belief was unreasonable. This is true even though the unreasonableness was due to his
voluntary intoxication.
In Jaggard v Dickinson,282 D was convicted by magistrates of intentional or reckless
criminal damage to property (a basic intent offence), by breaking two windows and dam-
aging a curtain in V’s house. The incident occurred late at night and D, due to voluntary
278 Th is was admitted by Lord Mustill in Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355 at 369.

279 For exceptions to these statements, see paras 15.83–15.89.
280 Eg Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610, NZCA; O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, High Ct of Australia. For a discus-
sion of these cases, see Orchard ‘Surviving without Majewski – a view from down under’ [1993] Crim LR 426.
281 See Gough ‘Surviving without Majewski’ [2000] Crim LR 719; also see [2001] Crim LR 258. For a
description of the law on voluntary intoxication in Canada, Australia and New Zealand see Law Commission
Intoxication and Criminal Liability (2009), Law Com No 314, Appendix C. Appendix C also describes briefly the
law in the United States. 282 [1981] QB 527, DC.
 | 15.98 mental condition defences
intoxication, mistakenly but honestly believed that she was damaging the property of X,
a friend, and that he would have consented to her doing so. D’s defence was that she had a
lawful excuse within the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (CDA 1971), s 5. The CDA 1971, s 5(2)
provides, inter alia, that a person charged with criminal damage is to be treated as having
a lawful excuse if, at the material time, he believed that the person whom he believed to
be entitled to consent to the destruction or damage had so consented, or would have so
consented to it if he had known of the destruction or damage and its circumstances. The
CDA 1971, s 5(3) adds that it is immaterial whether such a belief is justified or not if it is
honestly held. The magistrates, being of the opinion that D could not rely on the defence
under s 5(2) because her belief was induced by voluntary intoxication, convicted her.
Allowing D’s appeal against conviction, the Divisional Court held that the fact the
offence charged was not one of specific intent was irrelevant because D was not relying
on her intoxication to displace an inference of intention or recklessness, but was rely-
ing on it to give credibility to her alleged belief which, if honestly held, would give her a
defence under s 5(2). It was clear from s 5(3), said the Court, that if the belief was honestly
held it was irrelevant that it was unreasonable; no exception was made by the Act for a
mistake which was unreasonable because it was caused by voluntary intoxication and
therefore the magistrates had been wrong to decide that D did not have the defence under
s 5(2) because she was drunk at the time.283
The Court’s reasoning seems applicable regardless of whether there is a statutory pro-
vision like s 5(3) which simply makes explicit that which is normally implicit.284
15.98 Sometimes evidence of voluntary intoxication is adduced to support a claim
that D mistakenly believed in facts which – if true – would give rise to an excuse, such
as duress by threats or duress of circumstances, where the mistake must be reasonable
to exculpate D.285 Since a voluntarily intoxicated mistake cannot be reasonable such a
mistake as to such a matter of excuse cannot excuse.
15.99 The same applies in relation to the various ‘no negligence’ defences,286 as shown by
the decision of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court in Young.287 In that case D had undoubt-
edly been in possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply it to another, and the
only defence which might have been available to him was that under the Misuse of Drugs
Act 1971, s 28. Section 28 provides that D shall be acquitted if he ‘proves’ that he neither
believed, nor suspected, nor had reason to suspect that the substance in question was a
controlled drug. There was evidence that D was voluntarily intoxicated at the material
time. Dismissing his appeal against conviction, the Courts-Martial Appeal Court held that,
although (for the same reasons as in para 15.97) evidence of voluntary intoxication was rele-
vant to the question of belief or suspicion in s 28, it was irrelevant to the question of whether
there was ‘reason to suspect’. The question was not whether D, with his intoxication, had
reason to suspect that the substance was a controlled drug, but whether there was an objec-
tive reason to suspect that (to which question D’s intoxication was wholly irrelevant).
283 D has an evidential burden in relation to such an excuse, which can pose problems for D if he was so
intoxicated that he cannot clearly remember later what his belief was: see Gannon [1988] RTR 49, CA.
284 Support for this can be found in Young, para 15.99, in relation to a defence based on a ‘belief or suspicion’,
as opposed to ‘reasonable suspicion’. 285 Para 5.19.
286 Para 6.46. 287 [1984] 2 All ER 164, C-MAC (see para 2.32, n 98).
15.101 intoxication | 
Voluntary intoxication causing insanity or alcohol

dependency syndrome
Key points 15.12

If voluntary intoxication produces a distinct disease of the mind so as to bring the
M’Naghten Rules into play the defendant can rely on the defence of insanity. On
a murder charge, a plea of diminished responsibility can successfully be based on
alcohol dependency syndrome in specified circumstances.
15.100 Another exception to the general rule that voluntary intoxication is irrelevant
to criminal liability is where drinking or drug-taking produces a distinct disease of the
mind so that D is insane within the M’Naghten Rules. D will have the defence of insan-
ity if he proves that at the material time he was suffering from a defect of reason, due to
the disease of the mind caused by intoxication, such that he did not know the nature and
quality of his act or that it was wrong.288 If D proves this at a trial in the Crown Court he
will not receive a complete acquittal because the verdict will be not guilty by reason of
insanity289 by the jury. The defence of insanity is, of course, of general application; it is not
limited to offences requiring a specific intent.
Although mere malfunctioning of the mind due to intoxication does not constitute
a ‘disease of the mind’, 290 habitual drinking or drug-taking can sometimes lead to such
permanent changes in the brain tissues as to be accounted insanity, such as delirium
tremens or alcoholic dementia. A plea of insanity based on intoxication is extremely rare
but an old example is Davis.291 At his trial for wounding with intent to murder (an offence
which no longer exists in those words), D raised the defence of insanity. There was evi-
dence that at the time, although sober, he was suffering from delirium tremens resulting
from excessive drinking. Stephen J directed the jury that ‘drunkenness is one thing and
the diseases to which drunkenness leads are different things’.292 He said that if a man by
drink brought on a disease of the mind which caused a defect of reason, albeit temporar-
ily, which would have relieved him from responsibility if it had been produced in any
other way, he would not be criminally responsible. The jury were told to find a verdict of
not guilty on the ground of insanity if they thought that D had been suffering from a dis-
tinct disease of the mind caused by drinking, but differing from drunkenness, and that
by reason thereof he did not know that his act was wrong.
15.101 Two observations may be made about this exception to the general rule. First,
it is only where it applies that D’s appreciation of the legal implications of his conduct
becomes relevant; ignorance of the wrongfulness of conduct is irrelevant in the case of
those who are sane but intoxicated, as has been stated above. Secondly, the distinction
288 If the prosecution has raised the issue of insanity, as it may, it will be for the prosecution – not the defend-
ant – to prove these things; para 15.40.
289 Davis (1881) 14 Cox CC 563; DPP v Beard [1920] AC 479, HL; A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963]
AC 349, HL. 290 Quick [1973] QB 910, CA.
291 (1881) 14 Cox CC 563. 292 Ibid at 564.
 | 15.102 mental condition defences
between temporary insanity caused by drink or drugs and simple intoxication is not
easy to make. This is unfortunate since the distinction is important where D alleges that
because of drinking or drug-taking he did not know his conduct was wrong.
15.102 Stephen J’s direction was approved by the House of Lords in both DPP v Beard293
and A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher.294 The latter case is particularly important in
this context since the judgments emphasise that if D was suffering from a disease of the
mind which was insufficient to bring him within the M’Naghten Rules, eg because it would
never induce anything more than lack of control, the fact that the disease was exacerbated
by intoxication at the material time would not make the defence of insanity available to
him. When sober, D formed the intention of killing his wife. He then purchased a bottle
of whisky, and drank some of it before he in fact killed his wife with a knife. At D’s trial
he pleaded insanity and intoxication preventing him having specific intent. There was
evidence that D was a psychopath, and that his psychopathy was a disease of the mind
which would be aggravated by drink in such a way as to cause him the more readily to lose
his self-control. The trial judge told the jury that, in considering whether the M’Naghten
Rules applied to the case, they should have regard to D’s state of mind just before he took
the whisky. D was convicted. He successfully appealed to the Northern Irish Court of
Criminal Appeal, but his conviction was subsequently reinstated by the House of Lords.
The basis of the House of Lords’ decision was that D’s psychopathy was quiescent and,
without the drink, could not have brought the M’Naghten Rules into play because it merely
weakened his power of self-control, and the defence of insanity could not be made good by
getting drunk on whisky. It would have been different, it was said, if D’s psychopathy had
been caused by drink and he had been insane within the M’Naghten Rules.
15.103 A plea of diminished responsibility on a murder charge cannot be based on an
abnormality of mental functioning due to intoxication itself, but it can successfully be
based on an abnormality of mental functioning due to alcohol dependency syndrome
which satisfies the requirements described in Chapter 8.295
Dutch courage
15.104 A restriction on the exceptions to the general rule that voluntary intoxication is
no defence was postulated by Lord Denning in A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher.296
His Lordship dealt with the issues raised in that case in a way different from that of his
colleagues and introduced what may be called the ‘Dutch courage’ rule, which is particu-
larly important in the case of intoxication as evidence of the lack of a necessary specific
intent.
Lord Denning said that the case had to be decided on the general rule that drunken-
ness is no defence to a criminal charge. He recognised that there were exceptions to this
rule but held that they were inapplicable, because Gallagher had deliberately made him-
self drunk in order to give himself Dutch courage to commit the offence.
293 [1920] AC 479, HL. 294 [1963] AC 349, HL.

295 For the operation of the defence of diminished responsibility where drink or drugs are involved see paras
8.53 and 8.54. 296 [1963] AC 349, HL; para 15.102.
15.106 intoxication | 
His Lordship said:
‘If a man, whilst sane and sober, forms an intention to kill and makes preparation for
it, knowing it is a wrong thing to do, and then gets himself drunk so as to give himself
Dutch courage to do the thing, and whilst drunk carries out his intention, he cannot rely
on this self-induced drunkenness as a defence to a charge of murder, nor even as reduc-
ing it to manslaughter. He cannot say that he got himself into such a stupid state that he
was incapable of an intent to kill. So, also, when he is a psychopath, he cannot by drink-
ing rely on his self-induced defect of reason as a defence of insanity. The wickedness of
his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn him, coupled with the act which he
intended to do and did do. A psychopath who goes out intending to kill, knowing it is
wrong, and does kill, cannot escape the consequences by making himself drunk before
doing it.’297
Lord Denning suggested that the case would have been different if Gallagher had aban-
doned his intention to kill his wife before taking the drink.
Although Lord Denning’s formulation of the Dutch courage rule is to be welcomed
as a matter of policy, it does provide an apparent exception to the rule that mens rea and
conduct must be contemporaneous.298
Involuntary intoxication
Key points 15.13

Where the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated, evidence of his intoxication may
be taken into account in deciding whether he had the state of mind required for the
offence (whether or not a specific intent is required).
15.105 The classic case of involuntary intoxication is where intoxication is induced by

a third party, rather than being self-induced, as where D’s friends have slipped vodka
into his lemonade or where he has been drugged by his enemies or he has taken an intoxi-
cant under duress.
15.106 A person who is involuntarily intoxicated cannot, unlike a voluntarily intoxi-
cated person, be said to be responsible for his condition. Consequently, it is not surprising
that the law takes a more liberal view in his case and provides by way of difference from
the law relating to voluntary intoxication that:
• D has a defence if his involuntary intoxication causes automatism even if the offence
is one of negligence or of strict liability (ie does not require proof of a state of mind);299
and
297 [1963] AC 349 at 382. 298 Para 3.65.

299 Where the involuntary intoxication results in D becoming an automaton, he will have the defence of non-
insane automatism: paras 15.54 and 15.61–15.68.
 | 15.107 mental condition defences
• where D was involuntarily intoxicated, evidence of his intoxication may be taken

into account in deciding whether D had the necessary state of mind for the offence
(whether or not a specific intent is required).
However, involuntary intoxication is not in itself a defence. Provided D acted voluntar-
ily with the requisite state of mind, the fact that involuntary intoxication led D to have
a blurred perception of morality or to commit an offence which D would not have com-
mitted when sober does not afford a defence (although it may mitigate the punishment
awarded), and this is so even though because of intoxication D acted under an irresistible
impulse.
15.107 It was only in 1994 that these principles were authoritatively established, by the
House of Lords in Kingston.300 D, who had paedophiliac homosexual tendencies, was in
dispute with a couple who arranged for X to obtain damaging information against D,
which could be used against him. X invited a 15-year-old boy to his room. According
to the prosecution, and the jury accepted this, the boy was drugged by X and fell asleep.
While he was asleep D visited X’s room and indulged in indecent acts on the boy. These
were recorded by X. D was charged with the now repealed offence of indecent assault 301 on
the boy. His defence was that he had been involuntarily intoxicated at the time because X
had laced his drink. The trial judge directed the jury that it was not open to them to acquit
D if they merely found that he had assaulted the boy pursuant to an intent induced by the
influence of intoxication secretly induced by X nor was it open to them to find that such
intoxication of itself negatived the state of mind required for the offence on D’s part. The
judge directed the jury that they should, on the other hand, acquit D if they found that
he was involuntarily so intoxicated that he did not intend (or might not have intended) to
commit the indecent assault (a basic intent offence) on the boy. The jury convicted D who
appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal. The Crown then appealed successfully to
the House of Lords, who held that the trial judge had correctly directed the jury and who
stated the principles of law set out in the previous paragraph.
15.108 Intoxication is also involuntary in the following two cases, even though it is
self-induced. The law approaches both cases in the same way as the type of involuntary
intoxication referred to in para 15.105. This is as set out in para 15.106.
15.109 The first of the two cases is where the intoxication results from the taking of
drugs administered or prescribed by a doctor or other qualified person. However, if D
has become intoxicated because he has not acted in accordance with the doctor’s instruc-
tions, as where D has thereafter taken alcohol contrary to instructions or where he reck-
lessly exceeds the prescribed dosage, his intoxication will be voluntary – not involuntary.
The comment about recklessness made in para 15.111 is equally applicable in the latter
instance.
15.110 The second case where self-induced intoxication is nevertheless involuntary
(subject to the exception mentioned shortly) is where it is caused by a non-dangerous
drug, even if the drug is taken in excessive quantities and is not taken under and in
300 [1995] 2 AC 355, HL; discussed by S Gardner ‘Criminal Defence by Judicial Discretion’ (1998) 111 LQR 177.
301 By the SOA 2003. The offence would now be that of sexual assault contrary to the SOA 2003, s 3.
15.112 intoxication | 
accordance with medical advice. A non-dangerous drug is one which is not normally
liable to cause unpredictability or aggressiveness (eg a sedative or soporific drug, such as
Valium). However, the intoxication will be voluntary, not involuntary, if D was reckless
when taking the non-dangerous drug.
The authority for all this is Hardie.302 D’s relationship with a woman with whom he
was living in a flat broke down and she insisted that he must leave. He became distressed
and took several of her Valium tablets to calm his nerves. Two of the tablets were taken in
front of the woman, who had said ‘Take as many as you like. They are old stock and will
do you no harm.’ Later D started a fire in the bedroom of the flat while the woman and the
daughter were in the sitting room. He was charged with arson contrary to the Criminal
Damage Act 1971, s 1(2) and (3), ie intentionally or recklessly damaging property by fire,
intending to endanger the life of another thereby or being reckless as to whether another’s
life would thereby be endangered.303 D argued that the effect of the drug was to prevent
him having the relevant mens rea. The judge directed the jury that, because the intoxi-
cation was self-induced, it was irrelevant as a defence and its effects could not negative
mens rea. In other words, he dealt with the case under the normal rule which applies to
voluntary intoxication in a basic intent offence.
D was convicted but appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal, which held,
although the offence was one of basic intent, that the normal rule did not apply where
the intoxication was due to a non-dangerous drug, even if it had been taken in excessive
quantities. Instead, the jury should have been told that, if they concluded that as a result
of the Valium D had been unable to appreciate the risks from his actions, they should
then consider whether the taking of Valium was itself reckless. Only if it was would D
be guilty.
15.111 The Court of Appeal left a couple of points open in Hardie. First, it said that
intoxication through a non-dangerous drug might in certain circumstances never be an
answer; it gave the subsequently repealed offence of reckless driving, which has been
replaced by that of dangerous driving, as an example. Second, it did not define what it
meant by a ‘reckless taking’ of a drug but, clearly, it meant recklessness (ie awareness)
as to the risk of becoming aggressive, unpredictable, uncontrollable304 or incapable of
appreciating risks to others.
Special statutory provision

15.112 The Public Order Act 1986, s 6(5) makes special provision for cases where the
awareness of a person accused of riot, violent disorder, aff ray or a specified offence of
threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, contrary to Pt I of the 1986 Act,
was impaired by intoxication. All the offences in question require an intention or aware-
ness as to a specified factor. Section 6(5) provides that, for the purposes of an offence
under Pt I:
302 [1984] 3 All ER 848, CA.
303 It is now recognised that there are two offences of arson contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 1(2)
and (3): one involving an intent to endanger life, and the other recklessness in this respect. See para 13.26.
304 As in the case of self-induced automatism, see Bailey [1983] 2 All ER 503, CA; para 15.68.
 | 15.113 mental condition defences
‘a person whose awareness is impaired by intoxication shall be taken to be aware of that

of which he would be aware if not intoxicated, unless he shows305 either that his intoxica-
tion was not self-induced or that it was caused solely by the taking or administration of a
substance in the course of medical treatment.’
If one or other of these things is shown, this does not mean that D is not guilty of the
offence in question, but merely that, eg, on a charge of riot, D is not guilty unless it is
proved that D actually intended to use violence or was aware that his conduct might
be violent. The effect of s 6(5) is the same as would have resulted from an application of
the common law rules on intoxication, except that the burden of showing involuntary
intoxication is placed on D and that those who become intoxicated after taking non-
dangerous drugs (otherwise than in the course of medical treatment) are dealt with
differently.

15.113 In 1975, the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders306 proposed the
creation of a new offence of dangerous intoxication, which would be committed by a
person who, while voluntarily intoxicated, did an act, or failed to do an act, that would
amount to a ‘dangerous offence’ if he acted, or failed to act, with the requisite mens rea
for that offence. This offence would not be charged in the first instance but would be
available where D was acquitted of a ‘dangerous offence’ (essentially an offence against
the person) on the ground that he lacked the mens rea for the ‘dangerous offence’ because
of his intoxication. The maximum punishment for the offence of dangerous intoxication
would have been one year’s imprisonment for a first offence, and three years for a subse-
quent one.
15.114 In its Fourteenth Report, Offences against the Person, 307 published in 1980, the
majority of the Criminal Law Revision Committee considered that the proposed offence
was unsatisfactory since a record of a conviction would not indicate the nature of the act
committed, eg whether it was an assault or a killing, and it would be unfair for a defend-
ant who had committed a relatively minor offence while intoxicated to be labelled as
having committed the same offence as one who had killed. It also thought that the pro-
posed maximum sentence was inadequate for serious offences such as killings or rapes
while intoxicated. The majority simply recommended that the common law rules based
on Majewski should be replaced by provisions along similar lines.
15.115 In a consultation paper published in 1993, 308 the Law Commission provisionally
proposed that the Majewski approach should be abolished and evidence of voluntary
305 ‘He shows’ seems to place the persuasive burden of proof on D. It is, however, arguable that, quite apart
from the possibility of reading down the provision so as to impose only an evidential burden, the use of ‘proves’ in
respect of D elsewhere in the Public Order Act 1986 implies that the burden under s 6(5) is only an evidential one.
306 Report on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, Cmnd 6244, paras 18.51–18.59.
307 Cmnd 7844, paras 257–261, 264–275.
308 Intoxication and Criminal Liability, Law Commission Consultation Paper No 127.
15.117 intoxication | 
intoxication should always be admissible on the issue of whether the defendant had had
mens rea or was an automaton. However, to prevent those who caused harm while intoxi-
cated escaping social control, it provisionally proposed as an added option the creation
of an offence of criminal intoxication. This offence would have been committed by a
defendant who, while substantially intoxicated, caused the harm proscribed for a ‘listed’
offence, such as homicide, bodily harm, rape or criminal damage. It would have been
irrelevant that the defendant did not have the mens rea for the ‘listed’ offence or was then
an automaton.309
15.116 In the light of responses, the Law Commission abandoned this proposal and sim-
ply recommended in its report on intoxication, 310 published in 1995, the codification of
the existing law with minor modifications. Its attempts to do so, however, included a
highly complicated draft Bill. Consequently, when preparing the draft Offences Against
the Person Bill,311 the Government did not incorporate the Law Commission’s draft, but
inserted a simpler provision which ensured that those who were voluntarily intoxicated
could not rely on evidence of this to negative recklessness.
15.117 In 2009, the Law Commission issued another report on intoxication312 which,
like its report on intoxication in 1995, recommends the codification of the present law
relating to intoxication on the part of a perpetrator, generally without any significant
changes.
The draft Bill to give effect to the Commission’s recommendations, which is included
in the report, is much more straightforward than that attached to its 1995 report.
The Law Commission’s recommendations in its report in respect of voluntary intoxi-
cation are as follows:
‘recommendation : [the General rule]

There should be a general rule that
(1) if D is charged with having committed an offence as a perpetrator;
(2) the fault element of the offence is not an integral fault element [see recommenda-
tion 3 below] (for example, because it merely requires proof of recklessness); and
(3) D was voluntarily intoxicated at the material time;
then, in determining whether or not D is liable for the offence, D should be treated as hav-
ing been aware at the material time of anything which D would then have been aware of
but for the intoxication.
309 For different views on the provisional proposal, see Virgo ‘Reconciling Principle and Policy’ [1993] Crim
LR 415; S Gardner ‘The Importance of Majewski’ (1994) 14 OJLS 279.
310 Law Commission Legislating the Criminal Code: Intoxication and Criminal Liability, Law Com No 229.
Discussed by Paton ‘Re-formulating the Intoxication Rules: The Law Commission Report’ [1995] Crim LR 382,
Gough ‘Intoxication and Criminal Liability: The Law Commission’s Proposed Reforms’ (1996) 112 LQR 335 and
Horder ‘Sobering Up’ (1995) 58 MLR 534.
311 Home Office: Violence: Reforming the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (1998); para 7.129.
312 Intoxication and Criminal Liability (2009), Law Com No 314. For a review of the report, which criticises
parts of it, see Child ‘Drink, Drugs and Law Reform: A Review of Law Commission Report No 314’ [2009] Crim
LR 488.
 | 15.117 mental condition defences
recommendation : the rule for integral fault elements

If the subjective fault element in the defi nition of the offence, as alleged [by the prosecu-
tion], is [an integral fault element], then the prosecution should have to prove that D acted
with that relevant state of mind.
recommendation : the integral fault elements

The following subjective fault elements should be excluded from the application of the
general rule and should, therefore, always be proved:
(1) intention as to a consequence;
(2) knowledge [which in this context clearly does not include wilful blindness] as to
something;
(3) belief as to something (where the belief is equivalent to knowledge as to
something);
(4) fraud; and
(5) dishonesty.’
These three recommendations retain the substance of the distinction between specific
intent and basic intent. In view of the problems which the judges have had in defining
these terms the re-casting of the law without them is to be welcomed.
Other recommendations retain the present law as it relates to a voluntarily intoxicated
mistaken belief in the need to act in self-defence or as to any other defence where D’s
state of mind is relevant to the defence, except that it is recommended that the princi-
ple in Jaggard v Dickinson313 (statutory excuses framed in terms of D’s belief) should be
reversed.
In addition, the Law Commission makes recommendations about the position of a vol-
untarily intoxicated defendant who is a secondary party (ie an accomplice) to an offence,
in relation to which the principles have not yet been developed by the judges.314 The report
also contains a recommendation to address the issue of voluntary intoxication where a
person is charged with one of the inchoate offences of encouraging or assisting crime
contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2 (which offences do not require an offence to
be encouraged or assisted to be committed).315
In relation to involuntary intoxication the Law Commission’s recommendation simply
gives effect to the principle established in Kingston.316 The Commission rejected the idea
of a new excuse of reduced inhibitions or blurred perception of morality where D’s condi-
tion was caused by involuntary intoxication.
If implemented, the Law Commission’s recommendations would not affect the law
relating to an issue of insanity or non-insane automatism.
313 Para 15.97. 314 See para 15.94. 315 Para 14.25. 316 Paras 15.106–15.107.
15.117 intoxication | 
FURTHER READING
Baker ‘Human Rights, M’Naghten and the Mackay and Mitchell ‘Sleepwalking,
1991 Act’ [1994] Crim LR 84 Automatism and Insanity’ [2006] Crim LR
Barlow ‘Drug Intoxication and the Principle of 901
Capacitas Rationalis’ (1984) 100 LQR 639 Mackay and Reuber ‘Epilepsy and the Defence
Dell ‘Wanted: An Insanity Defence that Can of Insanity – Time for Change?’ [2007]
Be Used’ [1984] Crim LR 431 Crim LR 782
Ebrahim, Wilson, Marks, Peacock and Rumbold and Wasik ‘Diabetic Drivers,
Fenwick ‘Violence, Sleepwalking and the Hypoglycaemic Unawareness, and
Criminal Law: (1) The Medical Aspects’ Automatism’ [2011] Crim LR 863
[2005] Crim LR 601 Samuels ‘Hospital Orders without Conviction’
Edwards ‘Automatism and Criminal [1995] Crim LR 220
Responsibility’ (1958) 21 MLR 375 Simester ‘Intoxication is Never a Defence’
S Gardner ‘The Importance of Majewski’ [2009] Crim LR 3
(1994) 14 OJLS 279 Smith and Clements ‘Involuntary Intoxica-
Hart Punishment and Responsibility (2nd edn, tion, the Threshold of Inhibition and the
J Gardner (ed), 2008) 90 Instigation of Crime’ (1995) 46 NILQ 210
Horder ‘Pleading Involuntary Lack of Sutherland and Gearty ‘Insanity and the
Capacity’ (1993) 52 CLJ 298 European Court of Human Rights’ [1992]
Crim LR 418
Lederman ‘Non-Insane and Insane
Automatism: Reducing the Significance of Ward ‘Making Some Sense of Self-Induced
a Problematic Distinction’ (1983) 34 ICLQ Intoxication’ (1986) 45 CLJ 247
819 Wells ‘Whither Insanity?’ [1983] Crim LR
Mackay Mental Condition Defences in the 787
Criminal Law (1995) White ‘The Criminal Procedure (Insanity and
Mackay ‘Righting the Wrong? Some Unfitness to Plead) Act’ [1992] Crim LR 4
Observations on the Second Limb of the Wilson, Ebrahim, Fenwick and Marks
M’Naghten Rules’ [2009] Crim LR 80 ‘Violence, Sleepwalking and the Criminal
Mackay and Kearns ‘The Trial of the Facts and Law: (2) The Legal Aspects’ [2005] Crim
Unfitness to Plead’ [1997] Crim LR 644 LR 614
16
Other general defences
OVERVIEW
This chapter deals with:
• the justifications of self-defence, prevention of crime and other ‘public or private

defences’;
• the justification of self-help;
• the excuses of duress by threats and duress of circumstances;
• the excuse of marital coercion.
It concludes by considering when necessity can provide a justification for otherwise criminal
conduct and whether superior orders can excuse a defendant.
Public or private defence
Key points 16.1

The term ‘public or private defence’ is used to describe cases where a defendant uses rea-
sonable force to protect one of the following public or private interests:
(a) to prevent the commission of a crime;1

(b) to effect a lawful arrest;2
(c) to defend himself or another against an actual or imminent attack;3 or
(d) to defend his or another’s property against damage or imminent damage.4
16.1 A use of force for a purpose within (a) or (b) in the list in Key points 16.1 is made in
‘public defence’; the use of force for a purpose within (c) or (d ) in ‘private defence’. These
‘defences’ are different from the excuses of duress by threats, duress of circumstances
and marital coercion, discussed later in this chapter, because, if successfully pleaded,
1 CLA 1967, s 3(1). 2 Ibid.

3 Duff y [1967] 1 QB 63, CCA; DPP v Bayer [2003] EWHC 2567 (Admin), DC.
4 Duff y above; DPP v Bayer above.
16.4 public or private defence | 673
they render D’s conduct lawful; they justify it, as opposed simply to excusing D from
liability for conduct which is nevertheless unlawful. 5 For this reason, inverted commas
were placed round ‘defences’ in the last sentence.
16.2 It continues to be a requirement of (c) and (d) (self-defence, defence of another and
defence of property) that what D experiences or fears is criminal or unlawful (ie tor-
tious). This was held by the Divisional Court in DPP v Bayer6 where the defendants had
chained themselves to tractors on private land in order to prevent genetically modified
maize being drilled. They were held not to have the defence of property available to them
as a defence on a charge of aggravated trespass7 because they knew quite well that there
was nothing criminal or unlawful about the drilling. One problem with DPP v Bayer is
that a person does not normally commit an offence 8 or a tort9 if he is an automaton at the
time. It is inconceivable that one cannot use reasonable force to protect oneself against an
attack by someone known to be an automaton.
16.3 Force used to damage or destroy property to defend other property is dealt with by
the defence to criminal damage of ‘lawful excuse’, described in Chapter 13.
Statutory and common law defences

16.4 Until the Criminal Law Act 1967 (CLA 1967) the legal position of any person act-
ing in public or private defence was governed by common law rules, but s 3(1) of that Act
now provides that:
‘A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of
crime,10 or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders
or of persons unlawfully at large.’
The CLA 1967, s 3(1) permits anyone to use reasonable force for one of the specified
purposes; it is not limited to police officers. In relation to the prevention of crime, the
provision is not limited to serious offences (although in the case of the prevention of a
minor offence it is likely that only a slight degree of force could be reasonable).
Section 3(1) is limited to the use of force. In Blake v DPP,11 the Divisional Court held
that s 3(1) could not apply where an anti-Gulf War demonstrator, charged with criminal
damage, who had written a Biblical quotation with a felt-tip pen on a pillar, had argued,
5 Para 2.20. See also Williams ‘The Theory of Excuses’ [1982] Crim LR 732. Recognition that duress is an
excuse, and not a justification, was given in Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [18], per Lord Bingham.
6 [2003] EWHC 2567 (Admin), DC.
7 Contrary to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 68.
8 Key points 15.5 and paras 15.54–15.68.
9 Morris v Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925; Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 All ER 7.
10 ‘Crime’ in s 3(1) refers to an offence under domestic (ie English) law, and not to a crime only under interna-
tional law: Jones (Margaret) [2006] UKHL 16.
11 [1993] Crim LR 586, DC. (Th is point does not appear in this brief report but is contained in the transcript.)
Also see Hutchinson v Newbury Magistrates’ Court (2000) Independent, 20 November, DC (cutting through a
perimeter fence of an atomic weapons establishment held not to constitute ‘force’).
674 | 16.5 other general defences
among other things, that he had done so to prevent crimes being committed by the allies;
his conduct was ‘insufficient to amount to force within the section’. The fact that s 3(1) can
excuse the use of force but not less serious conduct to prevent crime etc is puzzling.
The CLA 1967, s 3(2) provides that s 3(1) replaces the common law rules on when force
used for the purposes mentioned in s 3(1) is justified by that purpose. Clearly, eg, s 3(1) has
superseded the common law where force is used to prevent the commission of indecent
exposure or to prevent a person making off without payment, but s 3(1) has not superseded
the common law defences of self-defence, defence of another, and defence of property.
The use of force under the CLA 1967, s 3(1) to prevent crime is, of course, limited to
crimes which are still in progress. An example is provided by Attwater,12 where, on a dan-
gerous driving charge, D, who had driven in an aggressive and dangerous fashion, sought
to justify his conduct by reliance on s 3(1). D claimed that he had driven as he did in order
to stop another driver, T, following an earlier road traffic accident after which T had failed
to stop, contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 170. Confirming that the offence under s
170 was complete as soon as the failure to stop occurs, the Court of Appeal held that when
D drove dangerously he could not be said to have done so to prevent crime; T’s offence
had been complete before the dangerous driving began.
16.5 A person acting in self-defence, defence of another or defence of property is usu-
ally engaged in the prevention of crime. In such a case it was arguable that the CLA 1967,
s 3(1) alone now governs the situation. However, in Cousins,13 the Court of Appeal was
clearly of the opinion that a person who used force to repel an attack could avail himself
of the common law defence of self-defence and of the defence under s 3(1) of prevent-
ing the commission of the crime which such an attack would have involved, provided
in both cases that the force used was reasonable in the circumstances. In such a case then
(and presumably in the case of defence of others and defence of property), the common
law defence survives alongside the statutory one.
In some cases of self-defence and the like, only the common law defence will be avail-
able. One type of case is where D uses force against an attacker who is a child under 10,14
so that force cannot be said to have been used in the prevention of crime.15 Other types of
case are where force is used to prevent or terminate trespass not involving the commis-
sion of an offence, or where it is used against property for the purpose of self-protection
or the protection of another (eg against a vicious attacking dog).16
16.6 The principles governing the common law defences are the same as apply in the
case of the defences under s 3(1).17 A number of restrictive rules which used to attach to
the common law defences no longer apply. For example, old cases on self-defence estab-
lished that a person attacked must retreat as far as he could before resorting to force.
In McInnes,18 it was held that this is now simply a factor in deciding whether the force
12 [2010] EWCA Crim 2399. 13 [1982] QB 526, CA. See also Devlin v Armstrong [1971] NI 13, NICA.
14 A child under 10 can commit the tort of battery (or any other tort) if he has the required state of mind for
the tort: Murphy Street on Torts (12th edn, 2007) 622.
15 Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] Fam 147 at 204, per Ward LJ.
16 Such an act would involve its keeper in tortious liability: see Murphy Street on Torts (12th edn, 2007)
Ch 19. 17 McInnes [1971] 3 All ER 295, CA; Devlin v Armstrong [1971] NI 13, NICA.
18 [1971] 3 All ER 295, CA.
used was reasonable in the circumstances. Similarly, in the case of defence of property
the test of reasonableness is applied by analogy to the exclusion of the old rules which
can be deduced from some of the cases,19 such as the rule that lethal force may always be
used against a burglar or against someone seeking to evict a householder unlawfully and
forcibly.
16.7 The statement above that the same principles apply to the common law defences as
apply to the defences under s 3(1) is confirmed by the Criminal Justice and Immigration
Act 2008 (CJIA 2008), s 76 in relation to the common law defences of self-defence or defence
of another and the defences under the CLA 1967, s 3(1) of use of force in the prevention of
crime or making of a lawful arrest. If, and when, an amendment to s 76 contained in the
Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill (before Parliament at the time of
writing) comes into force, s 76 will apply to the whole range of public or private defences
because it adds the common law defence of defence of property to the list. The CJIA 2008,
s 76 was intended to clarify the operation of the defences20 by putting into statutory form
four of the principles established by the case law; it does not alter the law as it had stood
previously.21 Three of these principles are referred to in paras 16.19, 16.23 and 16.26 of
this chapter; the fourth (D cannot rely on mistake attributable to voluntary intoxication
in relation to question of whether force used was reasonable in the circumstances as he
believed them to be) has been referred to in Chapter 15.22 As will be seen, there are other
principles established by the case law to which s 76 does not refer. Section 76 is, therefore,
not an exhaustive statement of the law on self-defence etc.23 To the extent that they apply,
the provisions of s 76 supersede the common law.
Because of its partial coverage, s 76 does not codify the existing law on public and
private defences. It has rightly been criticised as pointless as far as criminal lawyers are
concerned.24
Following the conviction in 2000 of Tony Martin, who fatally shot a burglar, there was
much public discussion of the question of ‘how much force may I use?’ in self-defence or
the prevention of crime or in pre-emptive action to deal with an anticipated situation
requiring the use of force. Section 76 provides no clarification or guidance in answer to
the above question. Perhaps this is inevitable as long as the test is that of ‘reasonable force’,
because the reasonableness of force is always specific to the particular situation and sur-
rounding circumstances, and D’s perception of them.
16.8 When references are made elsewhere in this chapter to the CJIA 2008, s 76 the
reader should remember that, by s 76(1) and (2), s 76 only applies where in proceedings
for an offence:
• an issue arises as to whether a person charged with the offence (D) is entitled to rely
on the common law defences of self-defence, or defence of another,25 or the defences
19 Lanham ‘Defence of Property in the Criminal Law’ [1966] Crim LR 368 at 426.
20 CJIA 2008, s 76(2), (9) and (10)(b). 21 As confi rmed in Keane; McGrath [2010] EWCA Crim 2514.
22 Paras 15.83–15.87. 23 As confi rmed in Keane; McGrath [2010] EWCA Crim 2514.
24 [2008] Crim LR 507 (editorial).
25 Although s 76(1) and (2) do not refer to defence of another person, references in s 76 to self-defence include
references to acting in defence of another person: CJIA 2008, s 76(10)(b).
provided by the CLA 1967, s3(1,) or (if, and when, the above proposed amendment is
in force) defence of property and
• the question arises whether the degree of force26 used by D against a person (V) was
reasonable in the circumstances.
Applicability of defences
16.9 Although someone who acts in self-defence or defence of another is normally actu-
ally being attacked, the defences of self-defence and defence of another are not limited
to this situation since it has been recognised that they can apply to pre-emptive action
against an imminent attack.27 Likewise, and perhaps more commonly, the defence of
prevention of crime can apply to pre-emptive action. So can the defence of defence of
property. The degree of likelihood and imminence are of importance to the application of
the defences in such cases. This was recognised in Hichens28 where it was stated:
‘Plainly both the common law and statutory defences have greater scope for operation
where it is certain or nearly certain that a crime will be committed immediately if action
is not taken. Conversely, the lower the degree of likelihood of a crime being committed
and the greater the time between awareness of the risk and the time when the crime might
be committed, so the scope for any defence to have any realistic prospect of success will
be correspondingly reduced, even recognising, as we of course do, the subjective element
in these defences.’
What is reasonable force in a pre-emptive strike may well be less than what would be
reasonable force against an actual attack.
At the other extreme, someone who uses force when no longer under threat is not act-
ing in self-defence or the like; force cannot be justified when it is used for purposes of
retaliation.
16.10 The application of the defences is not limited to offences against the person. For
example, in Renouf, 29 the Court of Appeal held that it was a defence to a charge of the now
repealed offence of reckless driving that the use of force which constituted the reckless
driving (edging another car off a road to assist in the arrest of its occupants) amounted to
the use of reasonable force for the purpose of effecting the lawful arrest of an offender.30
Another example would be the commission of criminal damage in self-defence against
attack by someone’s Rotweiler dog.
16.11 In Hichens,31 the Court of Appeal held that self-defence and the defence under CLA
1967, s 3 extended to the use of force against an innocent third party where such force was
26 References in s 76 to the degree of force used are to the type and amount of force used: ibid, s 76(10)(c).
27 Deana (1909) 2 Cr App R 75, CCA; Finch and Jardine (1983) unreported, CA; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983)
[1984] QB 456, CA; Beckford v R [1988] AC 130 at 144. 28 [2011] EWCA Crim 1626.
29 [1986] 2 All ER 449, CA. 30 Also see A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983) [1984] QB 456, CA.
31 [2011] EWCA Crim 1626.
used to prevent a crime32 being committed by someone else. Two examples of cases where
the defence was capable of arising included a police constable bundling a man out of the
way to get to another man who was about to detonate an explosive device, and where a per-
son knocked car keys out of the hands of a third party to prevent the keys being given to a
drunk person who was attempting to drive. There is no reason why the present rule should
not apply equally to the other defences discussed in this part. Presumably, the present
rule would be held capable of application where the force is used against the property of a
wholly innocent person, as where D, a police officer, commandeers Y’s car which he uses
to ram a vehicle driven by X who is about to run over his enemy in a chase.
The operation of the defences

Key points 16.2
If there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue that, in using force, D was acting in public
or private defence, D will be acquitted unless the prosecution proves that, on the basis
of the circumstances and danger as D believed them to be, the force used by D was not
reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, self-defence or the protection
of one of the other interests covered by public or private defence.
16.12 D does not have the burden of proof in relation to the defences under the CLA
1967, s 3(1) or the common law defences. However, only if there is sufficient evidence to
raise an issue that, in using force, 33 D acted for a purpose covered by one of these defences
will the defence be left to the jury in the Crown Court, in which case the prosecution must
rebut it beyond reasonable doubt.34 Normally, evidence of one of these defences will come
from D but the issue of whether D has one of these defences may be raised by the prosecu-
tion’s evidence or a co-defendant’s evidence. If there is sufficient evidence of self-defence
or another of these defences, a judge must leave the defence to the jury even though D has
not sought to rely on it.35
16.13 If one of these defences has been raised as above, the question for the jury (or the
magistrates) is whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that D did
not use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances as he believed them to be in the
prevention of crime, or (as the case may be) in effecting or assisting in a lawful arrest, or
in defence of himself etc.36 A jury should be told that if the defence is not disproved they
should acquit D, but that if it is the defence fails.
32 The reference to the prevention of crime seems unnecessarily restrictive for two reasons: as discussed in the
second paragraph of para 16.5; and the fact that CLA 1967, s 3 also refers to the use of force to effect a lawful arrest.
33 D need not have used the force personally; the use of a dog in self-defence or the effecting of an arrest and
so on is capable of amounting to the use of reasonable force: Pollard v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1999]
PIQR P219, CA (use of properly trained and handled police dog to effect an arrest).
34 Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547, CCA; Palmer v R [1971] AC 814, PC; Abraham [1973] 3 All ER 694, CA; Khan [1995]
Crim LR 78, CA.
35 DPP (Jamaica) v Bailey [1995] Crim LR 313, PC; Owino [1996] 2 Cr App R 128 at 132.
36 See, eg, Drane [2008] EWCA Crim 1746.
16.14 The question whether the force used was reasonable in the circumstances
involves two issues:
• Was the use of any force justified in the circumstances for one of the purposes
described in Key points 16.1 (ie was there a need to use any force for one of these
purposes)?
• Was the force used excessive (ie objectively unreasonable) in the circumstances?
Assessment on the basis of what D believed

16.15 Both of the above issues are answered on the basis of the circumstances as D
believed them to be. This is so even if D’s belief as to these facts was a mistaken one and
(if so) even if his mistake was an unreasonable one.37 This was decided by the Court of
Appeal in Gladstone Williams,38 possibly obiter, and by the Privy Council in Beckford v
R,39 in relation to the first issue, and, although it was implicit in those decisions, it was con-
firmed by the Court of Appeal in Owino 40 that this was so in relation to the second issue.
In Scarlett,41 the Court of Appeal at one point used words which suggested a different
approach, viz that a person who used force in public or private defence which, objectively
viewed on the facts as he believed them to be was unreasonable, would not be liable if
he mistakenly believed that the circumstances called for the degree of force used (ie if
he believed that the force used was reasonable). Subsequently, the Court of Appeal in
Owino 42 said that the words in question must be read in context, and did not mean what
they seemed to mean; the law was as set out above. This must be correct. A completely
subjective test of what constitutes reasonable force would excuse those too inclined to
over-react. The law in this respect can be compared to the more liberal approach where
D destroys or damages another’s property in defence of property. As seen in Chapter 13,
in such a case D has the defence of lawful excuse to a charge of simple criminal damage if
D believed that the means employed were reasonable. The Law Commission has recom-
mended that this rule should be brought into line with self-defence in this respect.43
16.16 By way of example of the principles just described, if V leaps out of a dark alley
as a joke as D passes by late at night and D thinks that he is being attacked and hits V
over the head with a heavy walking stick, the reasonableness of D’s use of force must
be assessed on the basis of D’s mistaken belief that he was being attacked by a vio-
lent robber. Similarly, if D correctly believes that it is necessary to act in self-defence,
prevention of crime or the like and uses force for this purpose, mistakenly believing
that the assailant is armed, the reasonableness of the force used must be assessed on
the basis of the facts as he believed them to be. In neither case would it be relevant
that D believed the force used by him was reasonable. A further example is provided
by Faraj44 where D had been convicted of the false imprisonment of V. V was a gas
37 But note the exception referred to at para 16.18. 38 (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA.
39 [1988] AC 130, PC. For a more recent authority, see Faraj [2007] EWCA Crim 1033.
40 [1996] 2 Cr App R 128, CA. 41 [1993] 4 All ER 629, CA.
42 [1996] 2 Cr App R 128, CA. Also see DPP v Armstrong-Braun (1998) 163 JP 271, DC.
43 See para 13.17. 44 [2007] EWCA Crim 1033.
engineer who had come to do a job at D’s house, but D alleged that he mistakenly
believed that V was a burglar and for this reason had threatened V with a knife and
detained him. Allowing D’s appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal held that
there was no reason why a householder should not be entitled to detain someone in his
house whom he genuinely believed to be a burglar. He would be acting in defence of
his property by doing so. Full effect could be given to the householder’s belief however
unreasonable it might be. But the householder had to believe honestly that he needed
to detain the suspect and he had to do so in a way that was reasonable on the facts as
he believed them to be.
16.17 The fact that D’s mistaken belief is not required as a matter of law to be a reason-
able one does not mean that the reasonableness of a mistake is entirely irrelevant. The
reasonableness of D’s alleged mistake is of considerable evidential significance, because
the more reasonable the mistake the more likely it is that the jury (or magistrates) will
accept his story that he was acting under a mistake.45
16.18 As noted in paras 15.83 to 15.87, D cannot rely for the above purposes on any mis-
taken belief attributable to voluntary intoxication.
16.19 The above points are given statutory form by the CJIA 2008, s 7646 as follows:
‘(3) The question whether the degree of force47 used by D was reasonable in the circum-
stances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to
be, . . . 48
(4) If D claims to have held a particular belief as regards the existence of any circum-
stances –
(a) the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief is relevant to the question whether
D genuinely held it; but
(b) if it is determined that D did genuinely hold it, D is entitled to rely on it for the
purposes of subsection (3), whether or not –
(i) it was mistaken, or
(ii) (if it was mistaken) the mistake was a reasonable one to have made.
(5) But subsection (4)(b) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief attributable
to intoxication that was voluntarily induced.’
16.20 Account may not normally be taken of the fact that D is suffering from a psychi-
atric condition which might cause him to perceive the situation as more dangerous than
would an ordinary person. This was held by the Court of Appeal in the Tony Martin
case, Martin (Anthony Edward).49 D, a farmer, had disturbed burglars in his isolated
45 This was recognised in Gladstone Williams (1984) 78 Cr App R 276, CA, and Beckford v R [1988] AC 130, PC.
46 See para 16.8.
47 References in s 76 to the degree of force used are to the type and amount of force used: CJIA 2008, s 76(10)(c).
48 Section 76(6) to (8) (see paras 16.23 and 16.26 in respect of s 76(6)–(8)) also apply in connection with decid-
ing the question under s 76(3): ibid, s 76(3).
49 [2001] EWCA Crim 2245. D’s conviction for murder was quashed and a verdict of manslaughter on
grounds of diminished responsibility was substituted.
farmhouse and had fired a shotgun at them, killing one and wounding the others. There
was psychiatric evidence that D would have perceived the circumstances as being more
dangerous than would an ordinary person. The Court held that it was inappropriate,
except in exceptional circumstances (which it did not define) which would make it espe-
cially probative, to take into account that D was suffering from a psychiatric condition.
Thus, the Court did not say that psychiatric evidence would always be irrelevant in the
present respect. To do so would be open to objection in the light of the approach taken
in Martin (David Paul)50 where psychiatric evidence was admitted as to the defendant’s
beliefs in respect of the defences of duress. Th is part of the decision in Martin (Anthony
Edward) is unnecessarily restrictive. Psychiatric evidence may be of crucial importance
in terms of what the defendant’s belief was as to the circumstances and the danger. Quite
apart from this, it appears to be inconsistent with the general statement referred to above,
and repeated by the Privy Council in Shaw v R,51 that the issues involved in determining
‘reasonable force’ are to be answered by taking into consideration not only the circum-
stances but also the danger as D believed them to be. Shaw v R was not cited to the Court
of Appeal in Martin (Anthony Edward). It seems very odd that someone like the defend-
ant in that case should be unable to rely on psychiatric evidence as to how he would have
perceived the danger.
16.21 Where D alleges that he used force to prevent crime under the mistaken belief that
the conduct in question was on the facts as he believed them to be criminal, D does not
have the defence of prevention of crime.52 D’s mistake is one of criminal law,53 not of fact.
16.22 D cannot rely successfully on a public or private defence if, although on the facts
reasonable force could have been used in such a defence, D was not aware of any need to
act in public or private defence. This was dealt with in para 2.24.
Reasonable force
16.23 Except that it is based on the circumstances as D believed them to be, the test of
whether reasonable force has been used in the prevention of crime, self-defence etc is
an objective one. In other words, the question is whether, on the facts as D believed them
to be, a reasonable person would regard the force used as reasonable (ie proportionate)
in self-defence etc. This test is given statutory form by the CJIA 2008, s 76(6), 54 which
provides:
‘The degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the
circumstances as D believed them to be if it was disproportionate in those circumstances.’
As noted in para 16.6, the possibility that D could have retreated is an element to be taken
into account when deciding whether the force used was reasonable in the circumstances
50 [2000] 2 Cr App R 42, CA; para 16.45. 51 [2001] UKPC 26.

52 Hipperson v DPP [1996] CLY 1445, DC (the present point does not clearly appear in the brief report, but is
dealt with fully in the transcript); Baker and Wilkins [1997] Crim LR 497, CA (the brief report should be sup-
plemented by reference to the transcript). 53 Para 3.79.
54 See para 16.8.
as D believed them to be.55 This rule will be given statutory force if, and when, an amend-
ment made by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill is enacted.
The amendment adds s 76(6A) to the CJIA 2008. Section 76(6A) provides:
‘In deciding the question mentioned in subsection (3) [whether the degree of force used
by D was reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be], a possibility that D
could have retreated is to be considered (so far as relevant) as a factor to be taken into
account, rather than giving rise to a duty to retreat.’
Even the use of fatal force to defend oneself or another may be reasonable, although
it will be a rare case where it is.56 It would seem almost inconceivable that force used for
some other purpose could be reasonable.
16.24 Besides saying that references in s 76 to the degree of force used are to the type and
amount of force used,57 s 76 does not incorporate associated principles to be found in the
case law, which are set out in paras 16.20 and 16.25.
16.25 In applying the present test, account should be taken of the purpose for which the
force was used; force used to achieve one purpose may be reasonable, but it may be unrea-
sonable to achieve another purpose covered by public or private defence.58 All the imme-
diate circumstances (as well as the danger) in which D believed he was placed should also
be taken into account, including in particular the type and amount of force used on each
side, the relative strength (in terms both of physical power and of numbers) on each side,
the seriousness of the evil to be prevented (or of the offence for which an arrest is being
made) and the possibility of preventing it by other means (because the use of force can
never be reasonable if it was unnecessary).59
16.26 In assessing the reasonableness of the force, the jury or magistrates should take a
liberal approach; they should ‘not use jewellers’ scales to measure reasonable force.’ 60 In
addition, and this goes even further in tempering with leniency the objectiveness of the
test, there must be taken into account the time available to D for reflection. A direction
along the lines of the following statement by Lord Morris in Palmer v R should be given
to the jury:
‘If there has been an attack so that defence is reasonably necessary it will be recognised
that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his neces-
sary defensive action. If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person
attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that
would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken.’ 61
55 Indeed, D need not even demonstrate his unwillingness to fight, although this is the best evidence that D
was acting reasonably and in good faith in self-defence: Bird [1985] 2 All ER 513, CA.
56 As recognised by the Court of Appeal in Noye [2011] EWCA Crim 650 at [9].
57 CJIA 2008, s 76(10)(c). 58 Kelbie [1996] Crim LR 802, CA.
59 See Allen v Metropolitan Police Comr [1980] Crim LR 441, DC. Also see Seventh Report of the Criminal
Law Revision Committee (who proposed s 3 of the CLA 1967) (Cmnd 2659), para 23.
60 Reed v Wastie [1972] Crim LR 221, per Geoff rey Lane J. 61 [1971] AC 814 at 832.
Although this statement was made in relation to self-defence, the principle is equally
applicable to the other defences at present under discussion. It was subsequently
applied by the Court of Appeal in Shannon, 62 where the trial judge had left the defence
of self-defence to the jury with the bald question whether they were satisfied that D
used more force than was reasonable in the circumstances. The Court of Appeal held
that on its own this might have precluded the jury from considering Lord Morris’s
qualification that if they came to the conclusion that D honestly thought, without
having to weigh things to a nicety, that what he did was necessary to defend him-
self, they should regard that as ‘most potent evidence’ that it was actually reasonably
necessary.
‘In other words, if the jury concluded that the stabbing was the act of a desperate man
in extreme difficulties, with his assailant dragging him down by the hair, they should
consider very carefully before concluding that the stabbing was an offensive and not
a defensive act, albeit it went beyond what an onlooker would regard as reasonably
necessary.’ 63
Consequently, the conviction for murder was quashed.

The statement by Lord Morris in Palmer v R is given statutory form by the CJIA 2008,
s 76(7) and (8),64 which provides:
‘(7) In deciding the question [whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in
the circumstances as D believed them to be] the following considerations are to be
taken into account (so far as relevant in the circumstances of the case) –
(a) that a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able to weigh to a
nicety the exact measure of any necessary action; and
(b) that evidence of a person’s having only done what the person honestly and
instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes
strong evidence that only reasonable action was taken by that person for that
purpose.
(8) Subsection (7) is not to be read as preventing other matters from being taken into
account where they are relevant to deciding the question [whether the degree of
force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances as D believed them to be].’
If, and when, an amendment made by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Bill is enacted, the opening words of s 76(8) will be amended so as to read
‘Subsections (6A) [(see para 16.23)] and (7) are’. For the above purposes, a ‘legitimate
purpose’ means the purpose of self-defence or defence of another (or defence of property)
under the common law, or the prevention of crime or effecting or assisting in the lawful
arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.65
62 (1980) 71 Cr App R 192, CA. Also see Whyte [1987] 3 All ER 416, CA.
63 Shannon (1980) 71 Cr App R 192 at 196. Also see Nugent [1987] 3 NIJB 9, NICA. 64 See para 16.8.
65 CJIA 2008, s 76(10)(a)–(b).
Use of fatal force and the ECHR, Article 2

Key points 16.3
Subject to what is said below, English criminal law on public and private defence is com-
patible with the ECHR, Article 2 (right to life) where force is used with fatal effect in public
or private defence.
16.27 The ECHR, Article 2 guarantees everybody’s right to life. It is one of the most
fundamental provisions in the ECHR.66
Article 2(1) provides that:
‘Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life inten-
tionallyy67 save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this sentence is provided by law.’
However, Article 2(2) provides that:
‘Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when
it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.’
Although the discussion which follows centres on the use of fatal force by a police
officer or member of the armed forces or security services, it must be borne in mind
that the issue of the consistency of the criminal law on public and private defence with
Article 2 also relates to the use of fatal force by a private individual because Article
2(2) also requires the State to take appropriate steps to safeguard people against its
breach. 68
16.28 A killing for any public or private defence purpose other than one in Article
2(2)(a) to (c) could never satisfy Article 2, whereas, provided the force used was rea-
sonable under the rules described earlier, a killing for such a purpose would be justi-
fied under English law. An acquittal in such an extreme case would not be compatible
with Article 2(2).
66 Th is was stated by the European Court of Human Rights in McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR
97 at [147].
67 ‘Intentionally’ here refers to a direct intent; see para 16.98. A person who has decided to kill someone as a
means to saving his own life or preventing crime, and so on, acts with a direct intent to kill, even though he also
aims to achieve (and desires) the self-preservation or the prevention of crime, and so on: para 3.8.
68 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245, ECtHR; Kilic v Turkey (2001) 33 EHRR 58, ECtHR.
16.29 Although a killing by a State official in defence of any person from unlawful vio-
lence or for one of the other purposes listed in Article 2(2)(a) to (c) may not violate Article
2, this will only be so if the degree of force used is ‘no more than absolutely necessary’
for one of those purposes. In contrast, the CLA 1967, s 3(1) and the common law rules on
self-defence and defence of another permit the use of ‘such force as is reasonable in the
circumstances’ as those circumstances are believed by D to be, whether reasonably or not.
Is the English law on the fatal use of force incompatible with Article 2 in this respect?
16.30 In McCann v United Kingdom, 69 three members of the IRA were intercepted in
Gibraltar by members of the SAS after they had parked a car. The soldiers shot and killed
the IRA members because they believed that they had planted a radio-controlled car
bomb. The European Court of Human Rights held that ‘absolutely necessary’ in Article
2(2) means that the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the
purposes set out in Article 2(2)(a) to (c). It stated that this test would be applied strictly
and the Court would scrutinise not only the actions of the individuals but also all the
surrounding circumstances, including the planning and control of the operation so as to
minimise, to the greatest possible extent, recourse to fatal force.70
In respect of the issue of the compatibility of the English law of self-defence or defence
of another and Article 2, the Court noted that the difference between the standards under
English law and under Article 2(2) were not sufficiently great that a violation of Article
2 could be found on this ground alone.71 The Court accepted that the soldiers honestly
believed, in the light of the information that they had been given, that it was necessary to
shoot the suspects in order to prevent them from detonating a bomb and causing serious
loss of life. The actions which they took were thus perceived by them as absolutely neces-
sary in order to safeguard innocent lives. The Court stated that it:
‘considers that the use of force by agents of the State in pursuit of one of the aims delin-
eated in Article 2(2) of the Convention may be justified under this provision where it is
based on an honest belieff which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but
which subsequently turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an
unrealistic burden on the State and its law-enforcement personnel in the execution of
their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others.
It follows that, having regard to the dilemma confronting the authorities in the circum-
stances of the case, the actions of the soldiers do not, in themselves, give rise to a violation
of this provision.’72
The reference to ‘honest belief . . . for good reasons’ appears to be a reference to an honest
and reasonable belief.
The points made in McCann were repeated by the European Court of Human Rights in
Andronicou v Cyprus,73 where the Court stated that it had had to consider the ‘planning
69 (1995) 21 EHRR 97, ECtHR.

70 The Court went on to hold by a bare majority (10–9) that the planning of the operation as a whole was not
controlled and organised in a way which showed the level of respect for life required by Article 2.
71 McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97 at [155]. 72 Ibid at [200].
73 (1997) 25 EHRR 491, ECtHR.
and control’ of the operation, and determine whether the force used was ‘strictly propor-
tionate’ to the purpose, on the facts that the police officers honestly believed, for good
reasons, to exist.
16.31 Subsequently, in Bubbins v United Kingdom,74 where an armed police officer (B)
had shot dead a man whom he mistakenly believed to be an intruder who was pointing a
gun at him and his colleagues, although in fact the gun was a replica, the European Court
of Human Rights unanimously held that there had been no violation of Article 2. It noted
that the man had appeared to aim a gun at one of the police officers present and had not
responded to an order to drop it. It reiterated the requirement of an ‘honest belief, for
good reasons’, saying: ‘the use of force by agents of the State in pursuit of one of the aims
delineated in [Article 2(2)] may be justified under this provision where it is based on an
honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but subsequently
turns out to be mistaken.’75 However, the Court then weakened the requirement by saying
that it could not substitute its own assessment of the situation for that of an officer who
was required to react in the heat of the moment to avert an honestly perceived danger
to his life, which is reminiscent of the ‘heat of the moment’ qualification, referred to in
para 16.26. The Court concluded that the use of fatal force had not been disproportionate
and had not exceeded what was absolutely necessary in response to what was honestly
perceived by officer B to be a real and immediate risk to him and his colleagues. Nor had
Article 2 been infringed on account of the planning and control of the operation or on
account of the authorities’ failure to conduct an effective investigation.
Thus, in neither McCann nor Bubbins has the European Court of Human Rights found
the requirements of the English law on self-defence incompatible with Article 2.
16.32 The compatibility of the English law on self-defence and defence of another with
Article 2 was subsequently considered by Collins J in R (on the application of Bennett) v
HM Coroner for Inner South London,76 who found no incompatibility.
S was shot dead by a police officer (X). According to X, he believed that S was about
to shoot him. It later transpired that what was believed by X to be a gun was in fact a
cigarette lighter shaped like a gun. One of the points raised before Collins J was whether
the coroner at the subsequent inquest had been correct to direct the jury in terms of the
English law of self-defence, ie whether the force used by X was reasonable, having regard
to the circumstances as X believed them to be. It was argued that this did not comply with
Article 2 because under that Article the test when applied to State officials was that the
force had to be absolutely necessary.
Having referred to McCann v United Kingdom and Bubbins v UK, Collins J held:
‘It is thus clear that the European Court of Human Rights has considered what English
law requires for self-defence, and has not suggested that there is any incompatibility with
Art 2. In truth, if any officer reasonably decides that he must use lethal force, it will inevi-
tably be because it is absolutely necessary to do so. To kill when it is not absolutely neces-
sary to do so is surely to act unreasonably. Thus, the reasonableness test does not in truth
74 (2005) 41 EHRR 458, ECtHR. 75 Ibid at [138]. Italics supplied.

76 [2006] EWHC 196 (Admin), Collins J.
differ from the Art 2 test as applied in McCann. There is no support for the submission that
the court has with hindsight to decide whether there was in fact absolute necessity. That
would be to ignore reality and to produce what the court in McCann indicated was an
inappropriate fetter upon the actions of the police which would be detrimental not only
to their own lives but to the lives of others.’77
Having added that Lord Morris’s ‘heat of the moment’ qualification was worth bearing
in mind, Collins J rejected the submission that Article 2 required a different test to be
applied in the case of State officials from that applicable in general to the issue of self-
defence.
This decision, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal,78 neatly deals with the issue:
to kill in self-defence or the defence of another when it is not absolutely necessary is not
the use of reasonable force, but the decision as to whether force was absolutely necessary
is not to be made with hindsight but is to be based on the circumstances as the State offi-
cial perceived them, in the heat of the moment, to be. Thus, an honest, mistaken belief
can provide the ‘good reasons’ required by McCann and Bubbins, even if it turns out to
have been unreasonable.
Is self-defence available where need to act

created by defendant’s own conduct?
16.33 It would be wrong to think that a person who uses force in a fight which he himself
started cannot succeed in a plea of self-defence if his victim then retaliates. The following
statement about such a case by Lord Hope, the then Lord Justice General, in the Scottish
case of Burns v HM Advocate79 has been approved on a number of occasions by the Court
of Appeal:80
‘The question whether the plea of self-defence is available depends, in a case of that kind,
on whether the retaliation is such that the accused is entitled then to defend himself.
That depends upon whether the violence offered by the victim was so out of proportion
to the accused’s own actings as to give rise to the reasonable apprehension that he was in
immediate danger from which he had no other means of escape, and whether the violence
which he then used was no more than was necessary [in self-defence].’
The key point of Lord Hope’s formulation is the proposition that self-defence may arise
in favour of an initial aggressor but only where the violence offered by the victim was so
out of proportion to what the initial aggressor did that in effect the roles were reversed (ie
the tables had been turned). On the other hand, it will not be enough to bring self-defence
into issue that D who started the fight was at some point during the fight getting the worst
of it, merely because V was defending himself reasonably.81
77Ibid at [25]. 78 [2007] EWCA Civ 617. 79 1995 SLT 1090, High Ct of Justiciary.
80Balogun [1999] All ER(D) 916, CA; Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim 3377; Keane; McGrath [2010] EWCA
Crim 2514. 81 Keane; McGrath above. See also Harvey [2009] EWCA Crim 469.
The reference in the formulation to ‘reasonably apprehended’ as opposed to simply

‘apprehended’ is out of line with the rest of the law of public and private defence. In adopt-
ing the formulation, the Court of Appeal has almost certainly unintentionally endorsed
that reference. There can be no doubt that, when the question is raised before the Court
of Appeal, it will not require a reasonable apprehension of immediate danger, but simply
an apprehension of it.
16.34 The case where D has deliberately provoked V to hit him with a view to using force
in response (a common way in which brawls start) has usefully been reviewed as follows
by the Court of Appeal in Keane; McGrath:
‘[I]t is not the law that if a defendant sets out to provoke another to punch him and suc-
ceeds, the defendant is then entitled to punch the other person. What that would do
would be to legalise the common coin of the bully who confronts his victim with taunts
which are deliberately designed to provide an excuse to hit him. The reason why it is not
the law is that underlying the law of self-defence is the commonsense morality that what
is not unlawful is force which is reasonably necessary. The force used by the bully in the
situation postulated is not reasonably necessary. On the contrary, it has been engineered
entirely unreasonably by the defendant. . . . In the situation postulated there has been no
disproportionate reaction from the victim which removes from the defendant the quality
of the aggressor and reverses the roles. Of course it might be different if the defendant set
out to provoke a punch and the victim unexpectedly and disproportionately attacked him
with a knife.’82
Excessive force and murder

Key points 16.4
The liability of someone who kills with the mens rea for murder by the use of excessive
force in prevention of crime, self-defence etc is not reduced to manslaughter under the
law relating to public or private defence. However, if the terms of the defence of loss of
control are satisfied the liability of someone who kills by using excessive force out of fear
of serious violence from the victim against himself or another identified person is reduced
to manslaughter.
16.35 Where D uses an excessive degree of force (ie force which is unreasonable in the
circumstances as he believed them to be) in prevention of crime or self-defence etc, D
has no defence on grounds of public or private defence, even though D believes his force
is reasonable in the circumstances. However, except in the case of murder, D’s error of
judgement may be taken into account in mitigation of sentence.
It might have been expected that there would be a special rule under the law relating to
public or private defence whereby the fatal use of unreasonable force in public or private
defence with the mens rea for murder would result in D’s liability being reduced from
82 [2010] EWCA Crim 2514 at [19].

murder to manslaughter, 83 but this is not the rule under the English law of public or pri-
vate defence. Public or private defence is an all-or-nothing defence; there is no halfway
house under the rules relating to it. In Palmer v R, 84 a case where D had been convicted of
murder, the Privy Council held that ‘The defence of self-defence either succeeds so as to
result in an acquittal or is disproved in which case as a defence it is rejected.’ 85 Palmer’s
case was followed by the Court of Appeal by McInnes.86 Subsequently, Viscount Dilhorne
said, obiter, in A-G for Northern Ireland’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) 87 that, where death
results from the excessive use of force in the prevention of crime or in effecting an arrest,
and D intended to kill or do grievous bodily harm, the offence is likewise not reduced to
manslaughter. This was affirmed in 1995 by the House of Lords in Clegg88 in respect of
the excessive use of force in self-defence. The House did so with some regret, but thought
that any change in the law was a matter for Parliament.89
The decisions in Palmer v R and Clegg are open to the objection that it is improper to
convict of murder someone who made an error of judgement as to the amount of force
which he should use. However, it must be admitted that the ‘heat of the moment’ quali-
fication, referred to in para 16.26 is liable to limit the number of cases in which a person
who uses fatal force in self-defence etc will be found to have used excessive force.
16.36 The harshness of the law has been reduced to some extent in relation to the exces-
sive, fatal use of force in self-defence or defence of another by the defence of loss of control
under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss 54 and 55. If the terms of those sections are
satisfied, the liability of someone who uses such force for such a purpose is reduced to
voluntary manslaughter. The details of ss 54 and 55 are set out in Chapter 8. Essentially,
ss 54 and 55 will not be satisfied in the present context unless:
• D’s acts in killing V resulted from D’s loss of self-control;
• the loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V against
D or another identified person; and
• a person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in
D’s circumstances, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D.
Resisting arrest
Key points 16.5
Someone who is being lawfully arrested, and who knows that he is being arrested, is not
entitled to use reasonable force to resist or escape; but someone who is being unlawfully
arrested is so entitled, and so is someone who makes a mistake of fact and does not realise
that he is being arrested.
83 Th is used to be the position in Australian law until it was reversed by the High Court of Australia in
Zecevic v DPP (Victoria) (1987) 162 CLR 645. 84 [1971] AC 814, PC.
85 See articles by Morris [1960] Crim LR 468, Howard [1964] Crim LR 448, and Smith [1972] Crim LR 524.
86 [1971] 3 All ER 295, CA. 87 [1977] AC 105 at 148. 88 [1995] 1 AC 482, HL.
89 Para 1.36.
16.37 Someone who is being lawfully arrested, and who knows he is being arrested, is
not entitled to use reasonable force in order to resist or escape,90 even if he believes that
the arrest was unlawful because he thinks that the arrester (eg a police officer) is act-
ing beyond his powers.91 In such a case the mistake is one of criminal law.92 So, it has
been held,93 is a mistaken belief which leads D to think that the facts do not satisfy the
requirements for a lawful arrest, as where D knows or believes he has not committed
an offence. Although there are sound policy grounds for not permitting those who are
lawfully arrested, but who think they are innocent, to challenge the arrest by a threat or
use of force, it is doubtful that the mistake in this type of case is one of law. It looks like a
mistake of fact which would prevent D having the intent to resist lawful arrest.
On the other hand, someone who is being arrested or detained unlawfully is entitled
to use reasonable force to resist or escape.94 In addition, where the power of arrest would
only be possessed by a police officer, a person is entitled to use reasonable force to resist or
escape if he does not realise that he is being arrested by a police officer because he believes
that the person concerned is not a police officer, as where he believes that he is being
attacked by a robber or a thug.95 Likewise a person, who believes that someone whom
he knows is a police officer is violently attacking him, is entitled to use reasonable force
to defend himself, even though in reality the officer is trying lawfully to arrest him.96 In
these two cases the mistake will be one of fact.
The same distinction applies where force is used to enable another person to resist or
escape arrest.
Justification of conduct where force not actually used

16.38 The defences of self-defence, prevention of crime and the like are concerned with
the use of force. However, the terms of the defences can also be relevant where, although
no force has been used, D has been charged with an offence whose definition excuses
a person who acts for a lawful object or purpose or refers in some other way to lawful-
ness or unlawfulness, since they can be used to determine the question of lawfulness
or unlawfulness in issue. One authority is A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983),97 which was
concerned with the offence of making or possessing an explosive substance, under such
circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the making or possession is
not for a lawful object. The Court of Appeal held that the preparation of a petrol bomb
for use in self-defence or in defence of another or of property against an imminent attack
would be a lawful object if the maker intended to use it in a way which was no more than
reasonably necessary to meet the imminent attack. As the Court noted: ‘In our judgment
a defendant is not left in the paradoxical position of being able to justify acts carried out
in self-defence but not acts immediately preparatory to it.’98
90 Kenlin v Gardiner [1967] 2 QB 510, DC.

91 Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428, CA; Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546, HL. 92 Bentley (1850) 4 Cox CC 406.
93 Lee [2001] 1 Cr App R 293, CA. 94 Pedro v Diss [1981] 2 All ER 59 at 64.
95 Ryan (1993) unreported, CA; Blackburn v Bowering [1994] 3 All ER 380, CA.
96 Burley [2000] Crim LR 843, CA.
97 [1984] QB 456, CA. See also Georgiades [1989] 1 WLR 759, CA. 98 [1984] QB 456 at 471.
In the light of such authority a statement by the Court of Appeal in Symonds99 is sus-
pect. There D had driven off, dragging V (whose hand was trapped in the driver’s window)
some distance, allegedly to escape V. Dealing with D’s conviction for careless driving, the
Court of Appeal stated that there was some difficulty (more of theory than of substance)
with the deployment of self-defence outside the area of offences where D is accused of
using force on another. The substitute defence said to be appropriate in Symonds, duress
of circumstances, would not assist in a case like A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1983) because it
does not render conduct lawful.
Self-help
16.39 The use of force by a person who acts for a purpose other than those falling within
public or private defence may be justified (ie rendered lawful) by self-help. The defence of
self-help has not featured much in the law reports and its terms remain to be developed.
It has, however, been stated that it may be resorted to only in very special circumstances
where there is no reasonable alternative.100 Because of the dearth of case law, the recent
case of Burns101 is of interest. V, a prostitute, agreed to go with D in his car in return for
money. D drove to a lane some miles away. D then realised that V was less attractive than
he had thought. D asked V to get out of the car. V refused (and thereby became a tres-
passer). D removed V forcibly. V, wishing to be returned to where she had come from, had
resisted D and, in the course of being dragged out, suffered actual bodily harm. D was
convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
On appeal against conviction, it was argued on D’s behalf that the long-established
right of an occupier of land to eject an individual who has refused to leave it on request
applied by analogy to D seeking to remove V from his car. Dismissing D’s appeal against
conviction, the Court of Appeal, who doubted the analogy contended, stated that D had
not acted for any of the purposes covered by the public or private defences. If anything, it
said, D’s activities amounted to ‘self-help’.
The Court rejected the invitation to extend ‘the very limited circumstances in which
self-help may be used to justify activity which would otherwise constitute a violent
offence’. It stated:
‘Recognising that to be lawful the use of force must always be reasonable in the circum-
stances, we accept that it might be open to the owner of a vehicle, in the last resort and
when all reasonably practicable alternatives have failed, forcibly to remove an individual
who has entered into his vehicle without permission and refuses to leave it. However,
where that individual entered the car as a passenger, in effect at the invitation of the car
owner, on the basis that they mutually understood that when their dealings were com-
pleted she would be driven back in the car from whence she had come, the use of force
to remove her at [D’s] unilateral whim was unlawful. In any event, the resort to self-help
99 [1998] Crim LR 280, CA.

100 Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch 734 at 745–746, per Edmund Davies LJ; Lloyd v DPP [1992] 1 All ER
982 at 992, per Nolan LJ. 101 [2010] EWCA Crim 1023.
16.41 duress by threats | 691
was not justified in the circumstances of this case because [D] could readily have regained
exclusive possession to his vehicle by means not involving the use of force, that is by sim-
ply driving [V] back to the starting point.’102
Duress by threats
Key points 16.6

The excuse (ie defence) of duress by threats is concerned with the case where D commits
the actus reus of an offence with the relevant mens rea 103 but is impelled to do so because
of a threat (or reasonable belief in a threat) by another person of imminent death or seri-
ous physical injury to him or a third person.
If D was, or may have been, so impelled, the question arises as to whether a sober
person of reasonable firmness, sharing D’s characteristics, would have responded to the
threat (or perceived threat) and done as D did. Unless the prosecution proves that the
person of reasonable firmness would not have responded and done as D did, the defence
succeeds.
The excuse of duress by threats does not apply where D voluntarily assumed the risk of
threats of violence, nor does it apply to murder, attempted murder and perhaps certain
types of treason.
16.40 The excuse (ie defence) of duress by threats is defi ned in strict terms. Reasons for
this would seem to be that otherwise it would be a very easy defence to raise and very diffi-
cult for the prosecution to disprove, and that unlike self-defence, eg, the victim is morally
innocent.104 Those who act under a threat but who fall outside the defence can normally
have this reflected in the sentence imposed.
Act done under duress not an ‘involuntary act’

16.41 If the defence of duress by threats applies, a defendant who acted under it is excused
from criminal liability for an offence which he has committed, but his act is nevertheless
regarded as a voluntary one. This can be contrasted with the case where D is made to act
by an external physical force. There, the act is regarded as involuntary, cannot be imputed
to D and cannot involve D in criminal liability. Thus, if D is made to stab another by supe-
rior physical force exerted on his arm, it is not D’s act which does the stabbing, but that of
the person who forces him.
102 Ibid at [14].

103 In Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125, the Court of Criminal Appeal appears to have treated duress by threats
as negativing mens rea. However, such a theory was rejected by the House of Lords in DPP for Northern Ireland
v Lynch [1975] AC 653, according to whom the defence of duress by threats is something superimposed on the
other ingredients of an offence, the actus reus and the mens rea, which by themselves would constitute the
offence. See also Howe [1987] AC 417 at 428, 436, per Lords Hailsham LC and Bridge.
104 See the speech of Lord Bingham in Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [19]–[21].
Involuntary acts were dealt with in the last chapter.105 The following paragraphs deal
with a different question: the extent to which threats which do not have the effect of mak-
ing D’s act involuntary can afford an excuse.
The command associated with the threat

16.42 The defence of duress by threats is concerned with the case where D commits
the actus reus of an offence with the relevant mens rea but is impelled to act by a threat
made by another person (or a reasonable belief in such a threat) to the eff ect that, unless
D commits the offence charged, harm will be done to D or a third person. The command
associated with the threat may relate to the commission of the actus reus of an offence
by D or simply to something to which an ulterior intent must be established.106 Thus, the
excuse of duress by threats could be available as a defence to a charge of possession of a
controlled drug with intent unlawfully to supply where a person already in lawful pos-
session of a drug forms the intent unlawfully to supply it as a result of a threat of serious
physical injury if he does not, just as it would be available to a charge of unlawful supply
if the drug was actually so supplied.
In Cole,107 where D, his girlfriend and child had been threatened with violence by
moneylenders, unless he paid his debts, the Court of Appeal held that the defence of
duress can only apply where the offence charged is ‘the very offence’ nominated by
the person making the threat. As the moneylenders had not nominated any offence as
a means by which D should repay them, the Court upheld his conviction for robbery;
duress by threats was not available as a defence. The phrase ‘the very offence’ suggests
that the actual offence committed by D must have been nominated (so that, if D has
robbed Lloyds Bank in the High Street, he must have been told ‘rob Lloyds Bank in the
High Street’). This seems to be an artificial limit on the defence, and an artificial distinc-
tion between it and the analogous defence of duress of circumstances described later. In
Ali,108 the Court of Appeal seems to have assumed that the defence of duress by threats
was available, although it failed for other reasons, where the instruction was to rob an
unspecified bank or building society. It could be argued that this falls within the bounds
of ‘the very offence nominated’ by the duressor. On the other hand, if the duressor simply
says ‘rob or else’ and D robs someone, it becomes more difficult to do so. Whatever its
extent, the present requirement seems to be an unnecessary one.
Nature of threat
16.43 Reference has been made in a number of cases109 to the fact that the will of a person
who acts under duress by threats has been ‘overborne’. This simply means that D would
not have done as D did but for the threat (actual or reasonably believed).110 However, it
105 Key points 15.5 and para 15.53. 106 Fisher [2004] EWCA Crim 1190.
107 [1994] Crim LR 582, CA. 108 [1995] Crim LR 303, CA.
109 Eg Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, CA; Graham [1982] 1 All ER 801, CA.
110 In Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [21], Lord Bingham, in summarising the law of duress, said that the defence
of duress is available only where the criminal conduct has been directly caused by the threats relied on. See
further n 127.
is not in itself enough that D’s will has been overborne since there are limitations on the
type of threat which can amount to duress. The threat, which may be express or implicit,
must be of death or serious physical injury.111 ‘Bodily harm’ includes identifiable psychi-
atric injury for the purposes of offences against the person involving actual bodily harm
or grievous bodily harm, and it might be thought that it could suffice for physical injury
for duress.112 In Baker and Wilkins,113 however, the Court of Appeal declined to hold
that the defence of duress extended to a threat of serious psychological injury. What it
said was an obiter dictum because there was no evidence of such a threat, and in DPP v
Rogers114 the Divisional Court said, obiter, that there was ‘a great deal of force’ in criticism
of this aspect of Baker and Wilkins.
In Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004),115 the Court of Appeal held that a
threat to cause severe pain not associated with an accompanying serious injury could not
suffice for the defence of duress of circumstances (and by implication duress of threats).
This is questionable, although it has to be admitted that measuring whether or not the
pain would have been severe might be difficult. In Singh,116 the Court of Appeal held that
a ‘blackmail threat’ (ie a threat to expose something) could not give rise to the defence,
and in M’Growther117 it was ruled that the threat of harm to property was no excuse. In
Steane,118 Lord Goddard stated that a threat of ‘violence or imprisonment’ could amount
to duress. This statement was an obiter dictum and it is inconceivable that the reference
to threats of imprisonment would be adopted in view of the more restricted approach of
the subsequent cases.
16.44 The threat need not be to kill or cause serious physical injury to D. In Wright,119
where D alleged that a threat had been made to kill her boyfriend, the Court of Appeal
held that it was clear that the threatened harm need not be harm to D; it referred to the
Judicial Studies Board’s specimen direction which indicated that the threat could relate
to a ‘person for whom [D] would reasonably regard himself as responsible’.120 A similar
statement was made by the Court of Appeal in Shayler, where it stated in relation to duress
by threats and duress of circumstances:121
‘The evil must be directed towards the defendant or a person or persons for whom he has
responsibility or, we would add, persons for whom the situation makes him responsi-
ble . . . We make the addition to . . . cover, by way of example, the situation where the threat
is made to set off a bomb unless the defendant performs the unlawful act. The defendant
may not have had any previous connection with those who would be injured by the bomb
but the threat itself creates the defendant’s responsibility for those who will be at risk if he
does not give way to the threat.’122
111 Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, CA; DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653, HL; Williamson
and Ellerton (1977) 67 Cr App R 63, CA; Hasan above, per Lord Bingham. 112 Paras 7.58 and 7.78.
113 [1997] Crim LR 497, CA. The brief report should be supplemented by reference to the transcript.
114 [1998] Crim LR 202, DC. 115 [2005] EWCA Crim 1415. 116 [1973] 1 All ER 122, CA.
117 (1746) Fost 13. A more modern authority is DPP v Milcoy [1993] COD 200, DC.
118 [1947] KB 997, CCA. 119 [2000] Crim LR 510, CA.
120 In his summary of the law in Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [21], Lord Bingham said that the threat must be
against D or his immediate family or someone for whom he is responsible. 121 Para 16.70.
122 [2001] EWCA Crim 1977 at [49]; affd without reference to this point ([2002] UKHL 11) on the ground that
the facts of the case did not raise any question of duress of circumstances.
Expressed in this way, there is no limit to when a threat to kill a third person or cause
him serious physical injury can suffice for the defence. Th is is sensible because a person
may well be more likely to be swayed by a threat seriously to injure a third person than by
a threat of the same harm to himself. Fears about ‘opening the floodgates’ by allowing a
threat to kill or seriously injure any third person without qualification can be answered
by noting the strict requirements of the defence, especially the objective test, set out
below.
Subjective and objective tests

16.45 The defence of duress by threats involves both a subjective and an objective test;
the law requires D to have the steadfastness reasonably to be expected of an ordinary
citizen in his situation. If duress is raised on the evidence, the correct approach, which
was laid down by the Court of Appeal in Graham,123 and approved by the House of Lords
in Howe124 as well as being followed by the Court of Appeal in a number of cases on the
related defence of duress of circumstances,125 is as follows:
• Subjective test: ‘Was the defendant, or may he have been, impelled to act as he did
because, as a result of what he reasonably believed [X] had said or done, he had good
cause to fear that if he did not so act [X] would kill him126 or . . . cause him serious physi-
cal injury?’127 The subjective test involves an objective element: D’s belief about
what X had said or done must have been a reasonable one and D must have good
cause to fear death or serious physical injury. As the subjective test shows, there
need not actually be a threat; it suffices that D reasonably believed that there was a
threat of death or serious physical injury.128
In Martin (David Paul),129 the Court of Appeal stated that D’s belief as to such
a threat need not be reasonable. This was clearly inconsistent with the approach
approved in Howe but in line with the approach taken in self-defence and related
defences.130 However, in Hasan,131 Lord Bingham, with whose reasoning Lords
Steyn, Rodger and Brown concurred, rejected the suggestion that D’s belief need
not be reasonable in the defence of duress, saying: ‘It is, of course, essential that the
defendant should genuinely, ie actually, believe in the efficacy of the threat by which
123 [1982] 1 All ER 801, CA.

124 [1987] AC 417, HL. Although, strictly, the approval of Graham in Howe was obiter, the fact that it was
singled out for approval in Howe means that it should continue to be followed (Safi [2003] EWCA Crim 1809 at
[16]), until the Supreme Court or Parliament chooses to change the law.
125 Para 16.76.
126 Or a third person for whom the defendant is responsible: see para 16.44.
127 D need not have acted as he did solely because of a threat of death or serious harm. It is enough that D
would not have acted as he did but for such a threat, even though he also acted for some other reason (such as an
additional threat to burn down his house or to expose his immorality): Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220,
CA. Also see Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173, CA.
128 Mackintosh (1998) unreported, CA; Safi [2003] EWCA Crim 1809.
129 [2000] 2 Cr App R 42, CA. See also, a similar decision, DPP v Rogers [1998] Crim LR 202, DC, in respect
of duress of circumstances and criticism of it; para 16.76, n 226.
130 See paras 5.18, 16.15.
131 [2005] UKHL 22 at [23].
he claims to have been compelled. But there is no warrant for relaxing the require-
ment that the belief must be reasonable as well as genuine.’
In respect of the subjective test, D’s psychiatric condition is relevant in relation to
whether or not he had the necessary reasonable belief. In Martin (David Paul), psy-
chiatric evidence was admitted that D was suffering from a schizoid affective disorder
making him more likely than an ordinary person to regard things said as threatening
and to believe that the threats would be carried out. This can be contrasted with the
approach taken in respect of self-defence and similar defences: para 16.20.
• Objective test: ‘If so, have the prosecution made the jury sure that a sober person of
reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the defendant, would not have
responded to whatever he reasonably believed [X] had said or did [sic] [by acting as the
defendant had done]?’132
If the issue of duress is raised,133 the defence succeeds unless the prosecution proves
beyond reasonable doubt that at least one of its requirements is not satisfied.134
In applying the two tests, all the circumstances of the threat, including the number,
identity and status of those making it, are relevant.135
What characteristics of D can be invested in person of

reasonable firmness?
16.46 In Bowen,136 the Court of Appeal collected a number of principles from the cases
about the characteristics of D with which the ordinary person could be invested for the
purposes of the objective test.
The question is whether an ordinary person of reasonable firmness sharing D’s charac-
teristics would have been able to resist the threat. As a result the ordinary person is not
invested with a characteristic which did not make D less able to resist the threat than an
ordinary person of reasonable firmness. In addition, the ordinary person of reasonable
firmness is not to be invested with a characteristic on D’s part such as pliancy, vulner-
ability to pressure,137 timidity, or emotional instability,138 since it would be a contra-
diction in terms to invest an ordinary person of reasonable firmness with these.139 No
doubt for similar reasons, characteristics due to self-induced abuse, eg addiction to
drink or drugs, are irrelevant.140
132 For criticism of this requirement, see KJM Smith ‘Must Heroes Behave Heroically?’ [1989] Crim LR 622
and ‘Duress and Steadfastness: In Pursuit of the Unintelligible’ [1999] Crim LR 363.
133 Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688, CCA; Bone [1968] 2 All ER 644, CA, provide authority that D only bears an
evidential burden. In Bianco [2001] EWCA Crim 2516, it was held that this required evidence on which a jury
could properly conclude that the defence of duress had not been negatived. Th is requires too much. In principle,
it should suffice simply that there is evidence on which a jury could properly conclude that there had been an
actual or believed threat of death or serious bodily harm. See para 4.10.
134 Mackintosh (1998) unreported, CA; Safi [2003] EWCA Crim 1809.
135 Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570, CA (duress of circumstances). 136 [1996] 4 All ER 837, CA.
137 Also see Horne [1994] Crim LR 584, CA; Hurst [1995] 1 Cr App R 82, CA.
138 Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353, CA. 139 Hegarty above; Horne [1994] Crim LR 584, CA.
140 Either because they do not affect a person’s ability to resist threats or because they are not properly
described as characteristics, being self-induced: Flatt [1996] Crim LR 576, CA.
On the other hand, if D is in a category of persons whom the jury might think less
able to resist pressure than people outside that category, the characteristic which puts
him or her in that category may be a relevant one.141 In Bowen, the Court of Appeal said
that:
‘Obvious examples are age, where a young person may well not be so robust as a mature
one; possibly sex, though many women would doubtless consider they had as much moral
courage to resist pressure as men; pregnancy, where there is added fear for the unborn
child; serious physical disability, which may inhibit self-protection; recognised mental
illness or psychiatric condition, such as post-traumatic stress disorder leading to learned
helplessness.’142
Attributing learned helplessness to a person of reasonable firmness seems to contradict

the notion of such a person.
The existence of a characteristic of the type just referred to does not mean that the jury
must invest the ordinary person of reasonable firmness with it: it simply means that it
may be left to the jury. Whether or not the jury do so invest it will depend on whether they
think that the characteristic made D less able to resist the threat. Psychiatric evidence
may be admissible to show that D was suffering from some recognised mental illness or
psychiatric condition which might make D more susceptible to pressure or threats,143
but is not otherwise admissible in respect of the application of the objective test.144 There
is a fine line to be drawn sometimes between a recognised mental illness or psychiatric
condition and vulnerability to pressure or emotional instability which is not imputable
to the ordinary person.
16.47 Bowen provides an example of some of the above points. D was charged with a
number of counts of obtaining services by deception, contrary to the Theft Act 1978, s 1
(since repealed), relating to a course of conduct over three years. At his trial he claimed
that throughout he had acted under threats of serious harm if he did not obtain goods for
those making the threats. It was alleged that D was abnormally suggestible and vulner-
able, and had a low IQ, short of mental impairment or mental defectiveness. In the Court
of Appeal D’s counsel accepted that the judge had been correct in not telling the jury that
the person of reasonable firmness shared the characteristics of abnormal suggestibility
and vulnerability. However, she submitted that a low IQ was relevant since it might affect
D’s ability to withstand the threats. The Court of Appeal disagreed, saying ‘We do not
see how low IQ, short of mental impairment or mental defectiveness, can be said to be a
characteristic which makes those who have it less courageous and less able to withstand
threats and pressure.’
141 Bowen [1996] 4 All ER 837, CA. See also Walker [2003] EWCA Crim 1837; Antar [2004] EWCA Crim 2708.
142 [1996] 4 All ER 837 at 844.
143 Emery (1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 394, CA. In Emery, the Court of Appeal held that evidence might be admit-
ted to show that D’s failure to protect her child from a violent partner resulted from a condition of ‘learned help-
lessness’ as a result of her own long-term abuse. It stated (at 398) that: ‘the question for the doctors was whether
a woman of reasonable fi rmness with the characteristics of Miss Emery, if abused in the manner which she said,
would have had her will crushed so that she could not have protected her child’.
144 Hegarty [1994] Crim LR 353, CA.
16.48 The courts have not yet had to decide whether a characteristic affecting the gravity
of the threat to D, as opposed to his ability to resist the threat, can be taken into account.
In short, can the fact that D, who was threatened with ‘kneecapping’, was a top footballer
whose career would be ruined thereby, be taken into account? Presumably the answer is
‘yes’.
Operative threat of imminent danger

16.49 The threat (or reasonably believed) threat must be of the imminent peril of death
or serious physical injury; the threat need not be one of immediate death or serious
physical injury.145 However, duress is not available as a defence if it is proved that D
failed to take advantage of an opportunity for evasive action (to neutralise the effects of
the threat of which D was aware) which a reasonable person of a sort similar to D146 in
D’s position would have taken.147 The reason is that the objective test will not be satisfied.
The defence of duress by threats failed, eg, in Heath,148 where D alleged that he had
been pressured into transporting drugs, because D had more than one safe avenue of
escape (going to the police, which D did not do because he was scared and because he was
a drug addict, and going to his parents in Scotland, which D did not do because he did not
want them to know about the position he was in).
Heath can be contrasted with Hudson and Taylor,149 where two girls aged 19 and 17
gave false evidence at a criminal trial after a gang had threatened to ‘cut them up’ if they
did not do so. The girls were charged with perjury. The trial judge told the jury that the
defence of duress was not available because the girls had not been subject to the threat
of immediate physical violence when they gave the false evidence. The girls were con-
victed but appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal. One of the grounds on which
the Crown relied in support of the conviction was that the girls should have removed the
effect of the threat by seeking police protection either before or at the time of the former
trial at which they had made the false statements. The Court of Appeal agreed that the
defence of duress by threats could not be relied on if a defendant failed to take an oppor-
tunity which was reasonably open to him to render the threat ineffective. However, in
deciding whether such an opportunity was reasonably open to the defendant, the jury
should have regard to his age, and to the circumstances of the case and any risks which
might be involved. Factors such as the period of time between the threat and the com-
mission of the offence and the effectiveness of the protection which the police might
be able to give would be relevant. The Court of Appeal rejected the prosecution’s argu-
ment that the girls could have neutralised the threat by seeking police protection, on
145 Loughnan [1981] VR 443, SC of Victoria; Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570, CA (duress of circum-
stances); Shayler [2001] EWCA Crim 1977 (duress of circumstances: this point was not dealt with by the House
of Lords on appeal ([2002] UKHL 11) on the ground that the facts of the case did not raise duress of circum-
stances); Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004) [2005] EWCA Crim 1415 at [77].
146 Baker and Ward [1999] 2 Cr App R 335, CA. Ie a person sharing such characteristics of D as may be attrib-
uted to the ordinary person in accordance with Bowen; para 16.46.
147 Baker and Ward above; McDonald [2003] EWCA Crim 1170. Also see Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688, CCA;
Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, CA. 148 [2000] Crim LR 109, CA.
149 [1971] 2 QB 202, CA.
the ground that the police could not have provided effective protection. In Hasan Lord
Bingham, with whom Lords Steyn, Rodger and Brown agreed, stated that this was too
favourable to the girls. He said:
‘It should, however, be made clear to juries that if the retribution threatened against the
defendant or his family or a person for whom he feels responsible is not such as he rea-
sonably expects to follow immediately or almost immediately on his failure to comply
with the threat, there may be little if any room for doubt that he could have taken evasive
action, whether by going to the police or in some other way, to avoid committing the
crime with which he is charged.’150
16.50 The threat (actual or reasonably believed) must have been operative and effective
at the time the offence was committed. Thus, D is not excused if the threat has ceased
when D commits the offence.151 If D has embarked on the commission of a continuing
offence and the threat is then withdrawn or becomes ineffective, as a reasonable person
would have known, D must desist from committing the offence as soon as D reasonably
can.152 In deciding whether D has acted reasonably, regard must be had to the circum-
stances in which D finds himself.153
Of course, duress by threats is not available as a defence if D commits a criminal act
which the compulsion does not oblige him to.154
Voluntary assumption of risk of threats of violence

16.51 The excuse of duress by threats is not available to someone who has voluntar-
ily put himself in a position in which he foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen
the risk of being subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence.155 Thus, eg, the
defence is not available to D who joins a criminal gang, knowing that other members
might use threats of violence to pressure him to rob someone, and who is an active
member of that gang when put under such pressure.156 The rule was applied for the fi rst
time in this country in Sharp,157 where D had joined a gang which had used fi rearms
to rob sub-post offices. During the last raid, the sub-postmaster was killed. D said that
he had not wanted to participate in this raid but that X had threatened to blow his head
off if he did not. D’s conviction for manslaughter was upheld. The Court of Appeal
held that the trial judge had been correct to withdraw the issue of duress from the jury
150 [2005] UKHL 22 at [28]. Also see Hurst [1995] 1 Cr App R 82 at 93: the defendant must ‘know or believe
that the threat is one which will be carried out immediately or before the defendant or the other person threat-
ened can obtain official protection’.
151 Stratton (1779) 21 State Tr 1045 at 1231, per Lord Mansfield CJ; Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, CA;
Lynch v DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] AC 653, HL.
152 Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607, CA (a case concerned with duress of circumstances); para 16.80.
153 Pommell above at 615.
154 Stratton (1779) 21 State Tr 1045 at 1231, per Lord Mansfield CJ; Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, CA.
155 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22.
156 Sharp [1987] QB 853, CA; Shepherd (1988) 86 Cr App R 47, CA; Ali [1995] Crim LR 303, CA.
157 [1987] QB 853, CA.
because D had voluntarily joined the gang, whose violent nature he knew about. Th is is
an important rule because many allegations of duress involve threats by other members
of a gang etc.
The width of the present rule can be illustrated by reference to Ali158 where D was
charged (among other things) with the robbery of a building society. He alleged that he
had acted under duress. D was a drug addict. He had an arrangement with a supplier,
X, whom he knew to be very violent, whereby he would sell on drugs for X, taking a
certain amount to use. One day, D used for his own use all the drugs supplied by X.
That put him in debt to X. X told D that he wanted the money. He gave D a gun and told
him to get it from a bank or building society, otherwise he would be killed. Dismissing
D’s appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had cor-
rectly directed the jury about the present rule; if a defendant voluntarily participated
in criminal offences (eg drug dealing) with someone whom he knew was violent and
likely to require him to commit other offences, he could not rely on duress if that per-
son did so.
16.52 The rule about voluntary assumption of the risk of threats does not require
that D foresaw or should have foreseen that there was a risk of being put under duress
to commit the type of offence with which he is charged or, indeed, any offence159
(although it is difficult to envisage circumstances where a party might be coerced to
act lawfully). Instead, the rule applies if D foresaw or ought to have foreseen that his
voluntary association with known criminals involved a risk of being subjected to any
compulsion by threats of violence, not necessarily compulsion to commit the offences
of the kind with which he is charged. Th is was held by a majority (4–1) of the House of
Lords in Hasan.160 At his trial for aggravated burglary, D’s defence was duress on the
part of X, the boyfriend of Y, a prostitute, for whom D had been the minder and driver.
D knew that X was a violent gangster and D said that X had impliedly threatened him
with deadly consequences if he did not commit the burglary in question. The trial judge
told the jury that the defence of duress was not open to D if he had voluntarily put
himself in a position where he was likely to be subjected to threats. Allowing an appeal
against conviction, the Court of Appeal held that this was a misdirection because it
was not any kind of voluntary association with criminals that was relevant but only a
voluntary association where D could have anticipated pressure to commit an offence of
the type with which he was charged.
Allowing the prosecution’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision, the major-
ity of the House of Lords held that the defence of duress was excluded where (as a result
of D’s voluntary association with others engaged in criminal activity) D had foreseen or
ought reasonably to have161 foreseen the risk of being subjected to any compulsion by acts
of violence.
158 [1995] Crim LR 303, CA.

159 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22. The statements in Sharp [1987] QB 853, CA, Ali [1995] Crim LR 303, CA, and
Baker and Ward [1999] 2 Cr App R 335, CA, that such foresight was required are now wrong.
160 [2005] UKHL 22.
161 Because of the way that the certified point of law was framed the House of Lords did not have to reach
a conclusion about whether the defence is only excluded if D foresaw the risk or whether it is also excluded if
Although she also allowed the appeal, Baroness Hale took a different approach:
‘I would say that it must be foreseeable that duress will be used to compel the person to
commit crimes of some sort . . . The battered wife knows very well that she may be com-
pelled to cook the dinner, wash the dishes, iron the shirts and submit to sexual inter-
course. That should not deprive her of the defence of duress if she is obliged by the same
threats to herself or her children to commit perjury or shoplift for food.’162
16.53 The case law on the voluntary assumption of the risk of threats rule has developed
in terms of the person who has voluntarily associated with others engaged in criminal
activity, where he foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk of being subjected
to compulsion by threats of violence. However, in 2008, it was held in Ali (not to be
confused with another case with the same name referred to in para 16.51) that the rule is
not limited to that situation, although That will almost always be the situation in which
the rule applies. The Court of Appeal stated:
‘[I]n most cases where A subjects B to compulsion by threats of violence, A is engaged

in criminal activity. But . . . , the core question is whether the defendant voluntarily put
himself in the position in which he foresaw or ought reasonably to have foreseen the risk
of being subjected to any compulsion by threats of violence. As a matter of fact, threats of
violence will almost always be made by persons engaged in a criminal activity; but in our
judgment it is the risk of being subjected to compulsion by threats of violence that must
be foreseen or foreseeable that is relevant, rather than the nature of the activity in which
the threatener is engaged.’163
Extent of the excuse

16.54 The excuse of duress by threats applies to offences in general,164 including strict
liability offences,165 except murder,166 attempted murder167 and perhaps certain types
of treason.168 Since many offences have not been the subject of an authoritative decision
as to the applicability of the defence, there is a risk that other exceptions may be estab-
lished, should the occasion arise. As stated in para 6.6, there are some rare offences whose
wording seems to indicate that they are of absolute liability, in which case no defence is
available.
D ought to have foreseen it. Lord Bingham favoured the latter, which would be in line with the restrictive nature
of other parts of the defence.
162 [2005] UKHL 22 at [77]. 163 [2008] EWCA Crim 716 at [12].
164 Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202 at 206. The defence has, eg, been held applicable to conspiracy to
murder (Ness [2011] Crim LR 645, Crown Ct); criminal damage (including arson) (Shiartos (1961) unreported);
theft (Gill [1963] 2 All ER 688, CCA); robbery (Baker and Ward [1999] 2 Cr App R 335, CA); perjury (Hudson and
Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202, CA); contempt of court (K (1983) 78 Cr App R 82, CA); possessing or supplying control-
led drugs (Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173, CA; Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004) [2005] EWCA
Crim 1415); possession of controlled drugs with intent to supply (Panton [2001] EWCA Crim 611) and being
concerned in the importation of controlled drugs (Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220, CA).
165 Eden District Council v Braid [1999] RTR 329, DC. 166 Howe [1987] AC 417, HL.
167 Gotts [1992] 1 All ER 832, HL. 168 Para 16.62.
Duress by threats and murder

16.55 The inapplicability to murder of the defence of duress by threats was settled by the
House of Lords in 1987 in Howe.169 Traditionally, the view of the courts and of writers of
authority170 had been that the defence was not available on a charge of murder. However,
in DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch,171 the majority (3–2) of the House of Lords held that
the defence of duress was available to an accomplice to murder (such as a person who loads
a rifle for someone who then fires a lethal shot or a person who drives a killer to the scene
of the killing). On the other hand, in Abbott v R,172 a majority (3–2) of the Privy Council,
while accepting the decision in Lynch, refused to extend it to the perpetrator of murder.
The resulting distinction in the present respect between perpetrators and accomplices of a
murder was open to criticism, since the contribution of an accomplice to a killing may be
no less significant (and occasionally may be greater) than that of the perpetrator.
16.56 In Howe, D1 and D2 participated with others in torturing, beating up and sexually
abusing two men on different occasions. On the first occasion, D1 and D2 were accom-
plices to the murder of the man by O. On the second occasion, D1 and D2 had been the
perpetrators of the murder by strangling the man with a shoelace. D1 and D2 said that
they had acted under duress since on both occasions they had acted as they did on the
directions of X, a powerful, violent and sadistic man who was participating in the events,
and had been in fear that, if they disobeyed X’s instructions, X would kill them or seri-
ously injure them. In the light of Lynch and Abbott, the judge left the defence of duress by
threats to the jury in relation to the first murder, but not in relation to the second.
The House of Lords unanimously held that the defence of duress by threats should
not have been left to the jury in relation to either murder. Among the reasons given by
their Lordships for denying that duress by threats could be a defence for a perpetrator of
murder, the most prominent was the supreme importance which the law attaches to the
protection of the life of an innocent person. This was so important, said their Lordships,
that a person should be required to sacrifice his own life rather than being permitted
to choose who should live and who should die (but what if the threat is to kill D’s wife,
parents and six children?). Their Lordships were unimpressed by the argument that it
made no sense that a defendant who under duress wounded another with intent to do
him grievous bodily harm, and who was therefore acquitted of that offence, should have
no defence to a charge of murder on the basis of the same act committed under the same
threats and with the same mens rea if the victim died of the original injury.
The House held that there was no valid distinction between a perpetrator of murder
and an accomplice to it, and that the same rule should apply to both. Consequently, it
overruled the decision to the contrary on this point in Lynch. Thus, duress by threats is
no longer available as a defence to an accomplice to murder. (The overruling of Lynch on
the present point does not affect the validity of statements in it on other points referred
to in this and other chapters.)
169 [1987] AC 417, HL.

170 Tyler and Price (1838) 8 C & P 616; Hale Pleas of the Crown Vol 1, 51, 434; Blackstone Commentaries Vol
4 (1769), 30. 171 [1975] AC 653, HL.
172 [1977] AC 755, PC.
There are no exceptions to the rule that duress by threats is not a defence to murder. In
Wilson,173 a 13-year-old boy, who had participated as an accomplice in the murder of his
mother, claimed that he had acted on the instructions of his violent father and had been
motivated by fear and terror. Recognising that duress was no defence to murder, however
susceptible D might be to the duress, and whether D was a perpetrator or an accomplice,
the Court of Appeal observed that there might be grounds for criticising a principle of law
that did not afford a 13-year-old boy any defence to a charge of murder on the ground that
he was complying with his father’s instructions which he was too frightened to disobey.
16.57 Lords Hailsham LC and Griffiths in Howe were happy to leave deserving cases of
murder under duress to the executive discretion not to prosecute or, after conviction and
mandatory sentence to life imprisonment, to order early release on licence or to exercise
the royal prerogative to grant a pardon. These methods of mitigating the harshness of
Howe are an unsatisfactory solution to the problem, since the outcome of the exercise
of a discretion is always uncertain (whereas a person who has a defence is entitled to
an acquittal) and, even if the discretion is exercised in the offender’s favour, it does not
remove the stigma of a guilty verdict at the trial. Mention may also be made of the view
of Lord Wilberforce in Lynch:
‘A law, which requires innocent victims of terrorist threats to be tried and convicted as
murderers, is an unjust law even if the executive, resisting political pressures, may decide,
after it all, and within the permissible limits of the prerogative, to release them. Moreover,
if the defence is excluded in law, much of the evidence which would prove the duress
would be inadmissible at the trial, not brought out in court, and not tested by cross-
examination. The validity of the defence is far better judged by a jury, after proper direc-
tion and a fair trial, than by executive officials.’174
It is interesting to note that the availability of discretionary executive action after con-
viction for other offences, quite apart from the possibility of mitigation of sentence, has
not prevented the development of the defence of duress by threats in relation to them.
The fact that the judge cannot mitigate the sentence for murder provides a more press-
ing reason for duress to be a defence to murder than any reason which has resulted in it
being a defence to other offences where mitigating factors can be taken into account in
sentencing.
16.58 The effect of Howe is to require a person threatened with death or serious injury
unless he kills another to be a hero, something which the law does not normally do.
Where the threat relates to someone else the effect of the decision is to require D to sac-
rifice that person or persons (to whom, as in the case of a parent–child relationship, he
may owe a legal duty of care) in order to save another (the intended victim). An accept-
able compromise solution to the problems posed in Howe might have been to treat duress
in murder as analogous to the defence of provocation, since replaced by the defence of
loss of control,175 with the result that the offence would be reduced to manslaughter in
such a case, but the House of Lords rejected such an idea. This is open to criticism since,
173 [2007] EWCA Crim 1251. 174 [1975] AC 653 at 685. 175 Para 8.58.
especially where the threat of death or serious harm relates to more than those killed,
many people would think that the moral culpability of a person who kills under duress
is less than that of one who kills under loss of control. Loss of control and duress are
analogous. In loss of control the words or actions of one person break the self-control of
another. In duress the words or actions of one person break the will of another.176
The argument in favour of a compromise solution did not find favour with the Law
Commission in the report referred to in para 16.64. The Commission considered that
some instances of duress came close to being a justification for killing (just as self-defence
is) rather than simply an excuse, and for this reason there was a compelling reason for
distinguishing duress from provocation (or diminished responsibility).
16.59 The decision in Howe is bound to be controversial. Arguably, the decision was
inevitable given the inflexibility of the defence of duress by threats. It is easier to accept
that D should not have a defence if he intentionally kills V to save his own skin than
that D should not have a defence if he acted to save the life of his wife, parents and six
children, particularly since the threatener can be convicted of murder.177 One consid-
eration which affected several members of the House of Lords was the undesirability of
the judges undertaking reform on such an important matter.178 The view that it was for
Parliament to come up with any relaxation in the law was reiterated in Gotts, referred to
in para 16.60. In Hasan,179 Lord Bingham said that the argument that duress should be
available as a defence to murder was irresistible.
Duress by threats and attempted murder

16.60 The House of Lords in Howe did not decide whether duress by threats could be a
defence to a charge of attempted murder, a point on which there was no direct author-
ity. Lord Griffiths,180 however, was of the view, obiter, that duress was not a defence to
attempted murder because the prosecution had to prove an even more evil intent (an
intent unlawfully to kill)181 than in murder (where an intent unlawfully to cause griev-
ous bodily harm can also suffice). The point was settled by the decision of a majority (by
3–2) of the House of Lords in 1992 in Gotts,182 to the effect that duress is not a defence
on an attempted murder charge, whether as perpetrator or accomplice. In Gotts, D, aged
16, attempted to kill his mother by stabbing her. His defence was that his father, a violent
man, had ordered him to do so and had threatened to kill him if he did not comply. The
House of Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge had been right to rule
that duress was not a defence to attempted murder.
The decision in Gotts gives rise to an anomaly in that it appears that duress by threats is
a defence to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to do grievous bodily harm,183 the
mens rea for which (like the mens rea for attempted murder) is the mens rea for murder, so
176 Such a point was made in Graham [1982] 1 All ER 801 at 806. 177 Para 16.69.
178 Para 1.36. 179 [2005] UKHL 22 at [21].
180 [1987] AC 417 at 445. Lord Griffiths’ reasoning appealed to the majority of the House of Lords in Gotts
[1992] 2 AC 412. 181 Para 14.113.
182 [1992] 2 AC 412, HL. See S Gardner ‘Duress in the House of Lords’ (1992) 108 LQR 349.
183 Duress of circumstances has been held to be a defence to this offence (Cairns [1999] 2 Cr App R 137, CA)
and there is no reason to doubt that the same applies to duress by threats.
that had the victim died D would likewise have been guilty of murder. In both offences it
may be mere chance that the victim does not die. Apart from the fact that the intent to kill
required of an attempted murderer is more evil than the mens rea required for wounding
with intent to do grievous bodily harm, there is nothing to distinguish between the two
offences. Lord Jauncey, in Gotts, dismissed the risk of anomalies. He said:
‘It is of course true that withholding the defence in any circumstances will create some
anomalies but . . . nothing should be done to undermine in any way the highest duty of the
law to protect the freedom and lives of those who live under it.’184
16.61 In Ness,185 McCombe J held that, although it is not a defence to attempted murder,
duress is a defence to conspiracy to murder. He stated that there is a logic and policy for
drawing the line at the same stage as the law drew the line between conspiracy to mur-
der and attempt to murder, namely the line between mere preparation for the offence
and attempt to commit it. On this basis, duress is a defence to encouraging or assisting
murder, contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2, and the offence of solicitation of
murder.
Duress by threats and treason

16.62 It seems that duress by threats can be a defence to some, if not all, types of treason.
Lord Goddard CJ took a contrary view in Steane186 but he must have overlooked cases
such as M’Growther,187 Oldcastle’s Case,188 Stratton189 and Purdy190 where the applicabil-
ity of the defence to treason was recognised. It seems from these cases that only a threat
of death will suffice, but the modern case law on the excuse in general suggests that if the
point arose today a threat of serious bodily harm might be held sufficient.

16.63 Clause 25 of the draft Criminal Law Bill191 deals with the excuse of duress by
threats. It contains some major differences from the existing law.
Contrary to the present position, D would have the persuasive burden of proof in that
he would have to prove the defence. In addition, the defence would be extended to all
offences, including murder and attempted murder,192 and would be based on what D (as
opposed to a reasonable person) knows or believes. It would provide a more generous
approach by moving the focus away from whether the reasonable person would have
resisted the threat to whether that threat was one which in all the circumstances (including
184 [1992] 2 AC 412 at 426. 185 [2011] Crim LR 645, Crown Ct. 186 [1947] KB 997, CCA.
187 (1746) Fost 13. 188 (1419) 1 Hale PC 50. 189 (1779) 21 State Tr 1045.
190 (1946) 10 JCL 182.
(1993), Law Com No 218; see para 7.129.
192 For the Law Commission’s more recent recommendations relating to murder and attempted murder, see
para 16.64.
any of his personal characteristics affecting its gravity) D could not reasonably be
expected to resist.
The proposed change in the burden of proof was intended to allay fears about the exten-
sion of the defence to murder and to give real effect to the proposed provision that the
defence would not apply to a person who had knowingly and without reasonable excuse
exposed himself to the risk of duress. The Commission was also influenced by suggestions
that it can be particularly difficult to disprove a claim to have acted under duress because
members of a criminal gang might well be capable, not only individually, but in collu-
sion, of concocting a false defence of duress. In addition, the Commission considered that
the excuse of duress by threats was exceptional, depending on factors unique to it which
distinguish it from all others because it is much more likely than any other defence to
depend on assertions which it is particularly difficult for the prosecution to investigate or
disprove. In this respect, support can be found in the view of Lord Bingham in Hasan,193
where his Lordship expressed the view that duress is ‘peculiarly difficult for the prosecu-
tion to investigate and disprove beyond reasonable doubt’. Nevertheless, the reversal of
the normal burden of proof would be unfortunate. There is a risk of concoction in all
defences and the same problems of proof or disproof arise in respect of all defences. There
is nothing special about duress, despite what the Law Commission and Lord Bingham
have said. A defendant would not find it easy to discharge the burden of proof. Placing the
burden of proof on D is arguably incompatible with the ECHR, Article 6(2) (presumption
of innocence),194 although the Law Commission dismissed this in relation to murder and
attempted murder in its report referred to in the next paragraph.195 Moreover, subsequent
changes to the law of criminal procedure mean that advance notice of the nature of a
defence is now required, so that the prosecution is unlikely to be taken by surprise at the
trial and will have time to scrutinise the defence and to investigate whether D had volun-
tarily exposed himself to the risk of duress.
16.64 In its report Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, published in 2006,196 the Law
Commission indicated that it had not changed its mind about duress and murder and
attempted murder. It recommended that duress (as currently defined) should be a full
defence to the offences of first degree murder and second degree murder recommended
by it197 and to attempted murder. However, for duress to be a defence to these offences the
threat would have to be one of death or life-threatening harm, and D would have the per-
suasive burden of proving198 the requirements of the defence on the balance of probabili-
ties. The Commission explained its recommendation in relation to murder on the ground
that the law should not stigmatise a person who, on the basis of a genuine and reasonably199
held belief, intentionally killed in fear of death or life-threatening injury in circumstances
where a jury is satisfied that an ordinary person of reasonable fortitude might have acted in
193 [2005] UKHL 22 at [20] per Lord Bingham. 194 But see para 15.23, n 75.
195 As to the issue of compatibility of a reverse onus provision with the ECHR, Art 6(2), see para 4.8.
196 Law Commission Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006), Law Com No 304, Pt 6.
197 Para 8.33.
198 For a discussion of the above recommendation, see Ashworth ‘Principles, Pragmatism and the Law
Commission’s Recommendations on Homicide Law Reform’ [2007] Crim LR 333 at 340–342.
199 It will be noted that the Law Commission has taken a different view, in requiring D’s belief to be reason-
able, from that taken by it in its recommendations (see para 16.63) in respect of duress as a general defence.
the same way.200 If a reasonable person might have acted as D did, the argument for with-
holding the complete defence was undermined. In addition, the Commission considered
that its recommendation accorded with the effect of duress as a complete defence in other
offences and was therefore conducive to coherence and consistency. The Commission
concluded that imposing a legal burden to prove duress on the balance of probabilities
would be compatible with the ECHR, Article 6(2). The Commission was influenced in its
proposal to place the burden of proof on the defendant by ECHR, Article 2 (guarantee of
right to life) which requires not only that the State refrain from taking life intentionally
but also that appropriate steps are taken by the State to safeguard it.201 It considered that
if those charged with murder on the basis of unjustifiably and intentionally killing could
plead duress secure in the knowledge that the prosecution were unlikely to disprove the
defence it would be questionable whether the State was effectively discharging its obliga-
tions under Article 2.
In January 2011, the Government informed the Law Commission that it would not
implement the above recommendations in Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, stat-
ing that the time was not right to take them forward.202 This is most unfortunate. Some
cases which would have been covered by the recommended defence may be covered by
the partial defence of loss of self-control (via a fear of serious violence) introduced by the
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, so as to reduce liability to manslaughter, but this defence
does not apply to an attempted murder charge.
Marital coercion
Key points 16.7

A wife who commits any offence, other than murder or treason, has the excuse (ie defence)
of marital coercion if she proves that she did so in the presence of her husband and under
his coercion.
16.65 Before the Criminal Justice Act 1925 came into force, there was a rebuttable pre-
sumption of law that an offence, other than treason or murder or certain other offences,
committed by a wife in the presence of her husband was committed under his coercion.
Accordingly, the prosecution bore the burden of negativing coercion. The presumption
was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1925, s 47 but this section goes on to provide:
‘ . . . on a charge against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder it shall be a
good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the
coercion of, the husband’.
200 In deciding whether a person of reasonable fi rmness might have acted as D did, the jury would be able to
take into account all D’s circumstances, including his age but not any other characteristics bearing on his capa-
city to withstand duress: Law Com No 304, para 6.86.
201 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245, ECtHR; Kilic v Turkey (2001) 33 EHRR 58, ECtHR.
202 Law Commission Annual Report 2010–2011 Law Com No 328, para 3.64.
16.68 marital coercion | 707
It is important to note that the section places the persuasive burden of proving coercion
on the wife, whereas in duress by threats the defendant merely bears an evidential bur-
den.203 Coercion is an excuse (ie defence) for a wife in addition to that of duress by threats,
not in substitution for it.204 Unlike duress by threats,205 the defence of marital coercion is
available on a charge of attempted murder.
The defence is only available to a wife; it is not available (vice versa) to a husband, nor is
it available to an unmarried partner. Moreover, the Court of Appeal in Ditta206 held that
the defence is not available to a woman who mistakenly, but reasonably, believes that she
is validly married to the man making the threat, as where that man was already married
when she married him (although she had no reason to know that). The Court left open
whether the defence of coercion could apply to a polygamous marriage. No corresponding
defence is available to a civil partner who acts under the coercion of the other partner.
16.66 Proof of the defence requires proof that the offence was committed as a result of
the wife’s will being overborne by the husband, so that she was forced unwillingly to par-
ticipate in the offence. Simply persuading a wife to act out of loyalty will not do.207 This
test seems to be wholly subjective; it makes an interesting comparison with the partly
objective test in duress.
16.67 The defence of marital coercion is rarely pleaded and, because the Criminal Justice
Act 1925, s 47 has not yet received much in the way of authoritative judicial interpreta-
tion, may give rise to difficulty in the future.
One reason is that the nature of the conduct covered by marital coercion is not certain,
although it is certainly wider than in the case of duress by threats. The Court of Appeal
in Shortland208 has held that the defence does not require proof of physical force or the
threat of physical force. It approved a statement by a Circuit judge209 that a ‘moral threat’
would suffice if it had the necessary effect. This leaves open the extent of a ‘moral threat’.
Threatening to deprive the wife of her children would be a moral threat, but what about a
threat to reveal her dishonesty to her employer? The answer must surely be ‘no’. A threat
to the wife’s property would not seem to be a moral threat but it may be held that it can
suffice if it has the requisite effect.
A second reason why the defence may give rise to difficulty in the future is that the
word ‘presence’, which is a limiting factor on the defence, has not yet been elucidated. It
is, for instance, impossible to say whether s 47 would be held by the Court of Appeal to
cover a case in which a husband induced his wife to enter a house for the purpose of steal-
ing something, by threatening to leave her if she did not comply with his wishes, while he
remained outside and kept watch.
16.68 The Law Commission has recommended the abolition of the defence of mari-
tal coercion on the grounds that it is not appropriate to modern conditions.210 Under
203 Para 16.45, n 133.
204 DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653 at 684, 713, per Lords Wilberforce and Edmund-Davies;
Richman [1982] Crim LR 507, Crown Ct. 205 Para 16.60.
206 [1988] Crim LR 43, CA. 207 Shortland [1996] 1 Cr App R 116, CA.
208 [1996] 1 Cr App R 116, CA. The point was repeated in Cairns, Zaidi and Chaudhury [2002] EWCA Crim
2838. 209 Richman [1982] Crim LR 507, Crown Ct.
210 Defences of General Application (1977), Law Com No 83.
cl 36(2)(b) of the draft Criminal Law Bill, a wife would not have a separate defence of
marital coercion.211
The person making the threat

16.69 Although the defences of duress by threats and marital coercion may be avail-
able to the person who actually performed the criminal act, the one who made the
threats is liable for the offence committed. There is no doubt on this point, but we
shall see in the next chapter 212 that the methods by which the result can be reached
vary.
Duress of circumstances
Key points 16.8

The excuse (ie defence) of duress of circumstances is concerned with the case where D
commits the actus reus of an offence with the relevant mens rea but is impelled to do so
to avoid a threat (or reasonable belief in a threat) of imminent death or serious physical
injury.
If D was, or may have been, so impelled, the question arises as to whether a sober
person of reasonable firmness, sharing D’s characteristics, would have responded to the
threat (or perceived threat) and done as D did. Unless the prosecution proves that the
person of reasonable firmness would not have responded and done as D did, the defence
succeeds.
The excuse of duress of circumstances does not apply to murder, attempted murder and
perhaps certain types of treason.
16.70 Modern decisions of the Court of Appeal have established the excuse (ie defence)
of duress of circumstances, which has a close affinity to the excuse of duress by threats.213
As with that defence, the defence of duress of circumstances has been developed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The requirements of the defence are like that of duress
by threats, save that:
• the threatening circumstances do not have to have a human source: they may alter-
natively come from a non-human cause, such as avalanche or wild animal; and
• the threatening circumstances do not have to be accompanied by the instruction:
‘Do this [ie commit this offence]214 or else . . . ’
(1993), Law Com No 218. 212 Paras 17.6 and 17.21–17.25.
213 Hasan [2005] UKHL 22 at [19], per Lord Bingham.
214 See para 16.42 as to the particularity with which the offence must be specified in the excuse of duress by
threats.
16.73 duress of circumstances | 709
16.71 As in the excuse of duress by threats, the threatening circumstances must be

extraneous to D, ie they must come from some external agency, and be capable of objec-
tive scrutiny by judge and jury;215 if those circumstances originate in D it is insufficient.
Thus, in Rodger and Rose, 216 the Court of Appeal held that the defendants’ own suicidal
thoughts (ie the threats which they made to themselves of suicide) could not afford a
defence to the offence of prison breaking. Likewise, in Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference
(No 2 of 2004),217 the Court of Appeal, in holding that the relief of pain could not provide
a defence to someone who committed a drugs offence for this purpose, gave as one of its
reasons the absence of an extraneous circumstance capable of objective scrutiny. It stated
that the requirement for such a circumstance rested on the pragmatic consideration that
the defence, which the prosecution carries the onus to disprove, ‘must be confined within
narrowly defined limits or it will become an opportunity for almost untriable and cer-
tainly peculiarly difficult issues, not to mention abusive defences’.218
16.72 The defence of duress of circumstances has its origins in Willer,219 where D was charged
with reckless driving220 after he had driven over the pavement into a shopping centre in order
to escape a gang who were shouting out threats to kill him and his passenger. At his trial, D
pleaded a defence of necessity but the judge refused to leave any such defence to the jury. D’s
conviction was quashed on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that it ought to have been left
to the jury to decide whether D drove ‘under that form of compulsion, ie duress’. Although
the Court seemed to treat the case simply as involving the defence of duress by threats, it was
breaking new ground because the case did not involve a threat along the lines of ‘Do this or
else . . . ’ Indeed, the gang did not want D to drive onto the pavement to escape. Their wishes
were quite to the contrary; they wanted him to stay to be dealt with.
16.73 Recognition of the true nature of the defence came soon afterwards in Conway, 221
where Willer was applied. X, a passenger in D’s car, had been in a vehicle a few weeks
before when another man was shot and X himself had been chased and narrowly escaped.
On the day in question, two plain-clothes police officers saw D in the driving seat of his
parked car and X behind him. Wishing to interview X, they approached D’s car, accord-
ing to D at a run. At this, X shouted out to D to drive off. The police officers followed in an
unmarked car. It was alleged that, during the car chase, D drove recklessly. At his trial for
reckless driving, D alleged that he believed throughout the chase that the two men were
out to kill X. Quashing D’s conviction for reckless driving, the Court of Appeal held that
the trial judge had been wrong not to direct the jury about the possibility of acquitting
D on the ground of what it called ‘duress of circumstances’, which it distinguished from
that of duress by threats and which it regarded as a species of necessity. The Court stated
that, although a separate defence, duress of circumstances was like duress by threats, in
that it was only available if from an objective standpoint D could be said to have acted in
order to avoid a threat of death or serious bodily harm.
215 Rodger and Rose [1998] 1 Cr App R 143, CA; Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570, CA; Shayler [2001] EWCA
Crim 1977 at [66]; affd without reference to this point [2002] UKHL 11; Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No
2 of 2004) [2005] EWCA Crim 1415. 216 [1998] 1 Cr App R 143, CA.
217 [2005] EWCA Crim 1415. 218 Ibid at [75]. See also [81]. 219 (1986) 83 Cr App R 225, CA.
220 Th is offence was abolished by the Road Traffic Act 1991 and replaced by that of dangerous driving.
221 [1989] QB 290, CA.
16.74 The development of the law in Willer and Conway was continued by the Court of
Appeal in Martin (Colin).222 According to D, his stepson overslept to such an extent that
there was a reasonable prospect of him losing his job if D did not drive him to work. D’s
wife, who had suicidal tendencies, threatened suicide if D did not drive the stepson to
work, and there was medical evidence that she would have carried out her threat. D, who
was disqualified from driving, gave the stepson a lift. At his trial for driving while dis-
qualified, D put forward a defence of necessity.223 The judge ruled that necessity was not
a defence to the offence charged. D’s conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal. The
Court held that duress of circumstances, a species of necessity, was a defence to a charge
of driving while disqualified and should have been left to the jury, however sceptically D’s
story might be regarded.
Nature of threat
16.75 It is clear that the defence of duress of circumstances is like that of duress by
threats in that it is limited to cases where D acts to avert a threat of death or serious
physical injury to himself or someone for whom he is responsible or for whom the situ-
ation makes him responsible,224 and in that it involves a subjective test and an objective
test along the same lines as in duress by threats. ‘Serious physical injury’ does not cover
serious psychological injury. In Baker and Wilkins, referred to in para 16.43, the Court of
Appeal declined to extend the defence to the aversion of such harm, and in Quayle and
others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004), 225 it declined to extend the defence to the aversion
of severe pain because of the large element of subjectivity in the assessment of pain not
directly associated with some current physical injury.
Subjective and objective tests

16.76 In Martin (Colin) the Court of Appeal said this about the terms of the defence:
‘[A]ssuming the defence to be open to the accused on his account of the facts, the issue
should be left to the jury who should be directed to determine these two questions: first,
was the accused, or may he have been, impelled to act as he did because as a result of what
he reasonably226 believed to be the situation he had good cause to fear that otherwise death
222 [1989] 1 All ER 652, CA.

223 It could be argued that duress by threats was the appropriate defence but this would raise two points not
yet answered in relation to that defence: does it matter that the threat of harm is of harm to the threatener and
does it matter that, as in the case of suicide, the threatened harm is not unlawful?
224 Para 16.44.
225 [2005] EWCA Crim 1415. Applied in Altham [2006] EWCA Crim 7, where, on a charge of possessing con-
trolled drugs, D claimed that he was in possession for the purpose of alleviating pain. It was held that the ECHR,
Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) was not engaged, and therefore did not entitle D to a
defence, because the State had done nothing exacerbate D’s per-existing medical condition .
226 In DPP v Rogers [1998] Crim LR 202, to DC, it was stated that the defendant’s belief need not be reason-
able. Th is was inconsistent with the approach taken in Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652 (which the Court in
DPP v Rogers referred to as stating the law accurately) and in all the other cases dealing with the point in respect
of the defence of duress of circumstances (except Safi [2003] EWCA Crim 1809, where the Court of Appeal
or serious physical injury would result; second, if so, would a sober person of reasonable
firmness, sharing the characteristics of the accused, have responded to that situation by
acting as the accused did? If the answer to both these questions was “Yes”, then the jury
would acquit; the defence of necessity would have been established.’227
Thus, if the issue of duress is raised and left to the jury, it succeeds unless the prosecution
proves beyond reasonable doubt that the answer to one or both questions is ‘No’.228
16.77 What is said about the subjective and objective tests for duress of threats in paras
16.45 to 16.48 is equally applicable to duress of circumstances. There is no difference
between the elements of the two defences.229 In addition, there can be no doubt that the
defence is barred where D has voluntarily exposed himself to the danger.
Operative threat of imminent danger

16.78 The threat (or reasonably believed threat) must be of the imminent peril of death
or serious physical injury; it need not be of immediate death or serious physical injury.
This was held by the Court of Appeal in Abdul-Hussain,230 where the Court adopted
the statement to this effect in Hudson and Taylor.231 In Abdul-Hussain, a group of Shiite
Muslims, who were fugitives from the Saddam Hussein regime and were living in Sudan,
boarded a plane bound for Jordan and hijacked it. They were arrested at Stansted Airport.
At their trial for hijacking they said that they had acted out of fear that they would be
deported from Sudan to Iraq, having overstayed their leave to be in Sudan, and that they
would be killed. The trial judge ruled that the defence of duress of circumstances was not
available to the defendants because there had to be a connection between the threat and
the offence so close and immediate as to give rise to a virtually spontaneous reaction to
the threat, and that the situation in question fell short of this requirement. The defend-
ants were convicted of hijacking and appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal which
held that, as in duress by threats, although the peril of death or serious physical injury
must be imminent, the execution of the threat need not be immediately in prospect.
Consequently, the trial judge had been wrong in limiting the availability of the defence
as he had by requiring a virtually spontaneous reaction. In Hasan,232 a case on duress
by threats, Lord Bingham considered that Hudson and Taylor and Abdul-Hussain had
unduly weakened the limitation that there must have been no evasive action D could rea-
sonably have been expected to take. In subsequent cases on the defence of circumstances
the Court of Appeal has continued to refer to an ‘imminent or immediate’ threat.233
declined to decide the point). It was also inconsistent with the cases on duress by threats, including Howe [1987]
AC 417, HL, except the later case of Martin (David Paul) [2000] 2 Cr App R 42, CA (see para 16.45). It was rejected
by Lord Bingham, with whose reasoning Lords Steyn, Rodger and Brown concurred, in Hasan [2005] UKHL
22: see para 16.45.
227[1989] 1 All ER 652 at 653–654. 228 Cairns [1999] 2 Cr App R 137, CA.
229Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570, CA. 230 [1999] Crim LR 570, CA. 231 See para 16.49.
232 [2005] UKHL 22.
233 See Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004) [2005] EWCA Crim 1415; S Ltd and L Ltd [2009]
EWCA Crim 85.
16.79 In S Ltd and L Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that it is not necessary that the
imminent or immediate threat of death or serious injury should be identifiable. It
stated:
‘[I]t is possible to conceive of circumstances where a continuing threat to a certain area,

for example the centre of London, was believed reasonably to be so imminent as to com-
pel those responsible for the safety of that area to act in breach of the law. The nature of
the threat, specific or general, may go to the gravity of the threat and in particular [to the
issue of whether the threat caused the defendant to act], but, as a matter of law, the mere
absence of a specific identifiable threat will not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it
was not imminent nor immediate.’234
16.80 Duress of circumstances is also like duress by threats, in that the threat must
be operative at the time of the offence charged. Where a person has embarked on
committing a continuing offence and the threat then becomes ineffective, as a reason-
able person would have known, he must stop committing the offence as soon as he
reasonably can, otherwise the objective test will not be satisfied; in deciding whether
he has acted reasonably, regard must be had to the circumstances in which he fi nds
himself. Th is was held in Pommell.235 When the police entered D’s house at about 8 am
to execute a search warrant, D was lying in bed holding a loaded sub-machine gun.
He was charged (among other things) with possessing a prohibited weapon without
authority, contrary to the Firearms Act 1968, s 5. D claimed that someone had visited
him during the night, threatening to kill some people, that he had persuaded him to
give up the gun and that he (D) was waiting until the morning to give the gun to his
brother for surrender to the police. The trial judge ruled that on these facts the defence
of duress of circumstances was not available to D because D had failed to go to the
police immediately. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It accepted that in some cases a
delay, especially unexplained, might make it clear that D had not ceased to commit
the offence as soon as reasonably possible. In such a case the judge would be entitled
to conclude that, even on D’s version of the facts, the defence was unavailable to D (in
which case the judge should not leave the defence to the jury). The Court of Appeal
held, however, that in the case before it the facts were not sufficiently clear for the judge
to take that step.236
Another example of the present principle is provided by DPP v Mullaly,237 where D had
driven with excess alcohol, contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 5, because she believed
that this was necessary in order to escape imminent serious bodily harm which had been
threatened against her. She had continued to drive even after, as D knew, the police were
readily at hand and capable of affording her adequate protection. The Divisional Court
directed the magistrates, who had acquitted D, to convict her. It held that, even if the driv-
ing off was initially reasonable (and covered by the defence of duress of circumstances),
objectively viewed from the moment when D was aware that the police were on hand it
234 [2009] EWCA Crim 85 at [8]. 235 [1995] 2 Cr App R 607, CA.
236 It is not obvious from the facts that D had been ‘impelled’ to do as he did by the threat to kill, a matter not
considered by the Court of Appeal.
237 [2006] EWHC 3448 (Admin), DC. See also DPP v Jones [1990] RTR 33, DC; DPP v Bell [1992] RTR 335,
DC; DPP v Tomkinson [2001] EWHC Admin 182, DC.
ceased to be necessary for her to continue to drive with excess alcohol in order to avoid a
serious assault.
Extent of the excuse

16.81 In Pommell,238 the Court of Appeal confirmed that, although the defence of duress
of circumstances had developed in relation to road traffic offences, it was applicable to
offences in general.239 It noted three exceptions: murder (dealt with below), attempted
murder and some forms of treason. This was obiter, as was the repetition of both propo-
sitions by the Court of Appeal in Abdul-Hussain.240 In Hasan, Lord Bingham listed the
same three exceptions, adding ‘perhaps’ to the reference to ‘some forms of treason’.241
Strangely, the Court in Abdul-Hussain went on to suggest that duress of circumstances
cannot afford a defence to conspiracy, the essence of which is agreement, not activity. If
this was correct, it would be out of line with the earlier assumption made by the Court
of Criminal Appeal in Verrier242 that duress of threats applied on a charge of conspiracy,
and with the subsequent ruling in Ness243 that duress by threats applies even to con-
spiracy to murder. It would be odd if a person who would have a defence of duress of
circumstances if charged with a particular offence would not have that defence if charged
with conspiracy to commit it. As mentioned in para 6.6, there are some rare offences
which may be ones of absolute liability, in which case duress of circumstances would not
be available as a defence.
16.82 The policy and scheme of a piece of legislation may be interpreted as exclud-
ing the defence of duress of circumstances in a particular context, even if the require-
ments of the defence are satisfied. In Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004), 244
the Court of Appeal held that to allow a defence of relief of pain in respect of the drug
offences in issue would create a conflict with the purpose and effect of the legislative
policy and scheme relating to cannabis; no use of it to relieve pain was permitted under
the legislation, even on a doctor’s prescription, and if there was a defence in such a case it
would involve the proposition that it was lawful for unqualified individuals to assume the
role of unqualified doctors by prescribing it for themselves or others. The Court left open
whether the defence of duress of circumstances could be available in relation to a drugs
offence where the policy and scheme of the drugs legislation was not in issue.
238 [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 at 615, CA.

239 The defence has been held applicable, eg, to dangerous driving (Symonds [1998] Crim LR 280, CA; Cairns
[1999] 2 Cr App R 137, CA); careless driving (Symonds; Backshall [1999] 1 Cr App R 35, CA); driving while dis-
qualified (Martin (Colin) [1989] 1 All ER 652, CA); drink-driving (DPP v Davis [1994] Crim LR 600, DC); pos-
session of a fi rearm without a firearm certificate (Gregory [2011] EWCA Crim 1712); possession of a prohibited
weapon (Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607, CA); causing grievous bodily harm with intent (Cairns); possessing a
firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence (Fisher [2004] EWCA Crim 1190); hijacking (Abdul-Hussain
[1999] Crim LR 570, CA); offences under Official Secrets Act 1989 (Shayler [2001] EWCA Crim 1977. This was
not discussed by the House of Lords on appeal on the ground that the facts of the case did not raise any question
of duress of circumstances: [2002] UKHL 11). 240 [1999] Crim LR 570, CA.
241 [2005] UKHL 22 at [21].
242 [1965] Crim LR 732, CCA; affd without reference to this point [1967] 2 AC 195, HL.
243 [2011] Crim LR 645, Crown Ct; para 16.61. 244 [2005] EWCA Crim 1415; see para 16.75.
Duress of circumstances and murder

16.83 In relation to the application of duress of circumstances to murder, reference may
be made to Dudley and Stephens,245 a case decided long before the term ‘duress by circum-
stances’ was coined but which was a case involving a situation of the duress by circumstances
type. In Dudley and Stephens D1, D2, a third man and a cabin boy were shipwrecked seamen
who had been adrift in an open boat with practically no food for 20 days, after which D1,
abetted by D2, killed the cabin boy who was with them. D1, D2 and the third man then fed on
the boy’s body. Four days later they were picked up, and when they got back to England they
were tried for murder. The jury returned a special verdict in which they found that the men
would probably have died within four days if they had not killed the boy and fed on his body,
that the boy would probably have died before the men, and that, at the time of the killing,
there was every probability that all four would have died unless one of them was killed and
eaten. On these findings the case was adjourned for argument before five judges who held
D1 and D2 guilty of murder, although sentence of death was later commuted to six months’
imprisonment. Although the decision could be interpreted as simply denying the applica-
tion to the facts of what is now called the defence of duress of circumstances, the tenor of the
Court’s judgment, given by Lord Coleridge, suggests that duress of circumstances can never
be a defence to a charge of murder. This is the view taken in modern cases where Dudley
and Stephens has been interpreted as deciding that duress of circumstances can never be a
defence to murder. In Howe,246 Lord Hailsham LC was clearly of the opinion, obiter, that the
Court in Dudley and Stephens had correctly decided that ‘necessity’ was never a defence to
murder, and in Pommell,247 the Court of Appeal stated, obiter, that Dudley and Stephens had
decided that ‘necessity’ was not a defence to a charge of murder.
A point which concerned Lord Coleridge in Dudley and Stephens was the question of
how the choice was to be made about who was to die:
‘It is not needful to point out the awful danger of admitting the principle contended [that
killing an innocent person to save one’s own life could be justified by “necessity”]. Who is
to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives
to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what? . . . In this case the weakest, the
youngest, the most unresisting, was chosen. Was it more necessary to kill him than one
of the grown men? The answer must be “No” . . . There is no safe path for judges to tread
but to ascertain the law to the best of their ability and to declare it according to their judg-
ment; and if in any case the law appears to be too severe on individuals, to leave it to the
Sovereign to exercise that prerogative of mercy which the Constitution has intrusted to
the hands fittest to dispense it.’248
Professor JC Smith (as he then was) suggested 249 that Dudley and Stephens could be dis-
tinguished in a case where there is no problem of choice. Suppose that D, a mountaineer,
245 (1884) 14 QBD 273. For a critical review of this decision, see Williams ‘A Commentary on R v Dudley and
Stephens’ (1977) 8 Cambrian LR 91. For a masterly examination of the various aspects of this case, see Simpson
Cannibalism and the Common Law (1984). 246 [1987] AC 417 at 430–431.
247 [1995] 2 Cr App R 607, CA. 248 (1884) 14 QBD 273 at 286–288.
249 Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (1989) Ch 3.
is roped to V, his companion who has fallen, a situation which neither can rectify, and D
cuts the rope to avoid joining his companion in a virtually certain death. D is not choos-
ing that V should die, unlike the choice made by D1 and D2 in Dudley and Stephens,
because V is already doomed to an almost immediate death, barring a miracle. D is sim-
ply choosing to live and not join V in death.
Professor Smith cited an example from the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987
(when a car ferry capsized). The route to safety of a dozen passengers in danger of drown-
ing was blocked by another who stood petrified, unable to move, on a rope ladder for over
10 minutes. One of them pushed him off the ladder. He and the others were then able to
escape to safety; the petrified passenger was never seen again. Professor Smith argued
that in this example there was no question of choosing who had to die; the petrified
passenger had chosen himself by his immobility on the ladder. He also argued a second
ground for distinguishing Dudley and Stephens in that, unlike the cabin boy, the petri-
fied passenger, although in no way at fault, was preventing others going where they had a
right, and urgent need to go, and was thereby unwittingly imperilling their lives.
16.84 Lord Coleridge’s judgment in Dudley and Stephens prompts similar reflection
concerning the proper sphere of the criminal law to that prompted by Howe. Is it right
for the law to impose a higher standard than that to be expected of the average member
of society? It can only be justified in the most exceptional cases, but Dudley and Stephens
was just such a case. It is to be hoped that, when a case like the mountaineer’s or the pet-
rified passenger comes before the courts (although a prosecution in such a case is most
unlikely), Dudley and Stephens will be distinguished on the lines just referred to.
Relationship between self-defence and defence

of another and duress of circumstances
16.85 In Symonds, referred to in para 16.38, D had driven off, dragging V some distance,
allegedly to escape V. D was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm and careless
driving. The Court of Appeal pointed out that there were difficulties more of theory than
of substance in deploying self-defence in offences other than those where D is charged
with using force, eg driving offences. The Court stated that this did not affect the sub-
stance of the case because the matters on which D relied to demonstrate self-defence
raised the excuse of duress of circumstances. It pointed out that the same matters relied
on as self-defence in relation to the associated charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm
also constituted a defence of duress of circumstances to driving offences. This cannot be
correct as a general statement of law. In particular, self-defence etc is assessed on the basis
of the facts as D believed them to be; duress of circumstances on the basis of what a rea-
sonable person would believe them to be.250 Moreover, self-defence is not limited to cases
where death or serious physical injury is feared; duress of circumstances is.
It is odd that as the law now stands, if Symonds is correct, those who commit offences
involving force are treated more leniently in the present respect than those who commit
an offence in which it is not charged that D used force.
250 See para 16.76.

The distinction between self-defence and duress of circumstances also means that those
who act to prevent an actual or imminent attack are dealt with by more lenient rules than
those who act under some other type of threat. Suppose that V attacks D with a machete,
thereby threatening D with death or serious injury, and that D kills V in self-defence. The
defence of self-defence is available (and will succeed if the relevant rules are satisfied).
Suppose, instead, that V and D are shipwrecked and there is only one lifebelt. It cannot
support them both. D realises that only if he kills V will he survive to be rescued, and that
if he does not both will die, and therefore he kills V. D will not be acting to protect himself
from actual or imminent attack; V is perfectly innocent. This is not a case of self-defence
but one of duress of circumstances, which is inapplicable to murder: D has no defence.

16.86 Clause 26 of the draft Criminal Law Bill251 provides for an excuse of duress of
circumstances which corresponds to its cl 25 relating to duress by threats,252 including
placing the burden of proving the defence on D. This is unfortunate, not only because it
departs from general principles but also because there would be cases which might over-
lap with the justification of self-defence etc where D does not bear the burden of proof.
The jury could be confused if two possible defences were left to them, each of which was
governed by a different burden of proof.
The reform proposals about duress and murder and attempted murder made by the Law
Commission in 2006, referred to in para 16.64, also apply to duress of circumstances.
Necessity
Key points 16.9

The following paragraphs deal with the law relating to situations of ‘pure necessity’, where
D was not compelled to act as he does but chooses to act as he does in order to avert a
greater evil.
Many statutory provisions expressly or impliedly make allowance for such situations.
In addition, it is clearly established that a common law justification of pure necessity
applies to cases involving medical treatment.
16.87 Private defence and the limited excuses of duress by threats and duress of cir-
cumstances are often said to be (or probably to be) species of necessity.253 Even more
confusingly, the excuse of duress of circumstances described above has been referred to
by the Court of Appeal or Divisional Court on a number of occasions as the defence of
(1993), Law Com No 218; see para 7.129. 252 See para 16.63.
253 See, eg, Safi [2003] EWCA Crim 1809.
16.90 necessity | 717
‘necessity’254 or as the defence of ‘necessity or duress of circumstances’.255 However, the

better view is that there is a difference between private defence and duress, on the one
hand, and another situation, which is described here as ‘pure necessity’.
16.88 The difference between the situations is that in private defence D has been com-
pelled in an emergency to act as he does to protect himself or another against attack, and
that in duress D has been compelled to act as he does by the threat (human or otherwise)
of imminent death or serious injury to which he or another person is subject. It is the
effect of that threat on his freedom of choice as to his actions which can suffice to provide
a defence. In comparison, the principles of necessity are not concerned with whether
D was compelled to act as he did to resist an aggressor (unlike private defence) nor
with whether D was compelled to act as he did by an extraneous threat of imminent
death or serious injury (unlike duress, a concession to human frailty). Instead, they are
concerned with where D alleges that he chose to commit what would otherwise be an
offence in order to avert a greater evil, and that this justifies his conduct. This distinc-
tion was recognised by Brooke LJ in Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) as the
distinction between ‘pure necessity’ and duress of circumstances which of all the other
defences comes closest in context to ‘pure necessity’.256
16.89 The case law on necessity is limited. This is partly because the courts have treated
a defence of ‘pure necessity’ with caution on the ground that otherwise it would become a
‘mask for anarchy’,257 and partly because those who act in a true situation of necessity are
usually praised, not prosecuted. As a result of the limited case law, it is uncertain to what
extent pure necessity is available as a defence to a criminal charge except in the case of
certain statutory offences where there is express provision for circumstances of necessity.
Statutory provision for necessity

16.90 In the definition of many statutory offences allowance is made expressly or
impliedly for the case where D has acted under the circumstances of necessity in a specific
context. One example of the express justification of what would otherwise be criminal is
the offence of child destruction, contrary to the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s 1,
under which the prosecution must prove that D was not acting in good faith in order to
preserve the life of the mother.258 Another example is provided by the Nurses, Midwives
and Health Visitors Act 1997, s 16. Section 16(1) makes it a summary offence for someone
other than a registered midwife or registered medical practitioner to attend a woman
in childbirth, but s 16(2) states that this offence is not committed where the attention
is given in a case of sudden or urgent necessity. Yet another example is provided by the
Bribery Act 2010, s 13(1) which provides that it is a defence for a person charged with a
254 Eg, DPP v Harris [1995] 1 Cr App R 170, DC; Backshall [1999] 1 Cr App R 35, CA; Quayle and others; A-G’s
Reference (No 2 of 2004) [2005] EWCA Crim 1415.
255 Blake v DPP [1993] Crim LR 586, DC; Cairns [1999] 2 Cr App R 137, CA; Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR
570, CA (this point does not appear in this brief report but does appear in the transcript).
256 [2001] Fam 147 at 236.
257 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734 at 746, per Edmund Davies LJ.
258 Para 8.202.
‘relevant bribery offence’ to prove that his conduct was necessary for the proper exercise
of any function of an intelligence service, or the proper exercise of any function of the
armed forces when engaged on active service. It remains to be seen how the courts will
interpret ‘proper exercise of any function’.
16.91 Some statutes provide defences which cover necessity, as well as other circum-
stances. One example is the Abortion Act 1967, s 1, which was described in para 8.194.
Another example is the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s 87,259 which dispenses with
the need for fire and rescue service vehicles, police vehicles, Serious Organised Crime
Agency (SOCA) vehicles and ambulances to observe the speed limit if the observance of
the limit would be likely to hinder the use of the vehicle for the purpose for which it is
being used. Regulation 36 of the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2002260
permits police, SOCA or emergency services’ vehicles to be driven through a red traffic
light to avoid delay provided this is not likely to endanger anyone or to cause another
driver crossing on green to have to avoid an accident. Lastly, by the Mental Health Act
1983, s 63, ‘medical treatment’, including force-feeding,261 can be given, without his con-
sent, to a patient compulsorily detained under the Act.262
16.92 An implied allowance for necessity, as well as other circumstances, would seem to
be made by the wording of some statutory offences. For example, if D washed a hazardous
chemical spillage down the drains in a street in order to prevent danger to those in the
area and was charged with theft of the chemicals, a jury could, and no doubt would, find
that he had not acted dishonestly.263
Pure necessity: a defence at common law?

16.93 There have been a number of cases over the last two centuries where the decision
was based on principles of pure necessity but without express reference to a common law
defence of necessity. It is arguable that they provide implicit recognition of the existence
of such a defence.
For example, in Vantandillo,264 it was held that the necessity for a mother to carry her
infected child through the streets to seek medical attention ‘might have been given in
evidence as a matter of defence’ to a charge of exposing a person with a contagious disease
on the public highway. Another example is provided by Bourne,265 where D, an obstetric
259 As amended by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, Sch 1, and the Serious Organised Crime and Police
Act 2005, Sch 4.
260 As amended by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Consequential and Supplementary
Amendments to Secondary Legislation) Order 2006, Sch 1.
261 B v Croydon Health Authority [1995] Fam 133, CA. Also see Collins, ex p Brady [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med
355, DC.
262 For further examples, see the Control of Pollution (Amendment) Act 1989, s 1(4)(a); the Merchant
Shipping Act 1995, s 3(2); the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, s 44; and the Animal Welfare Act 2006, s 18.
263 Para 10.74. For a contrary view, see Griew Theft Acts 1968 and 1978 (7th edn, 1995) paras 2–140.
264 (1815) 4 M & S 73. Also see Johnson v Phillips [1975] 3 All ER 682, DC.
265 [1939] 1 KB 687. The facts of this case would now be governed by the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967;
para 8.194. The decision in Bourne could be regarded as another example of an implied allowance for necessity
by the words of the statute.
surgeon, performed an abortion on a 14-year-old girl who had been violently raped. He
was charged with unlawfully using an instrument with intent to procure a miscarriage,
contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 58. The jury acquitted D after
MacNaghten J had told the jury that D would not have acted unlawfully if he had acted in
good faith to save the girl’s life. Although the judge dealt with the matter from the point
of view of the meaning of ‘unlawfully’ in s 58, and did not expressly refer to a defence
of necessity, the case is clearly one where principles of necessity were implied into the
meaning of ‘unlawful’, and it has subsequently been described by the Court of Appeal in
Southwark London Borough Council v Williams266 as being based on necessity.
16.94 Nevertheless, a number of modern cases have cast doubt on the existence of a
common law defence of pure necessity. In Martin (Colin),267 the Court of Appeal, having
said that ‘English law does, in extreme circumstances, recognise a defence of necessity’,
regarded that defence as arising as duress by threats and duress of circumstances and,
apparently, not otherwise. In Pommell, which was also concerned with duress of circum-
stances, the Court of Appeal stated:
‘The strength of the argument that a person ought to be permitted to breach the letter of
the criminal law in order to prevent a greater evil befalling himself or others has long been
recognised, . . . but it has, in English law, not given rise to a recognised general defence of
necessity . . . ’.268
Lastly, in Quayle and others; A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 2004),269 where the Court of Appeal
was confronted with the question of whether necessity was available to D in respect of
offences of cultivating, producing or importing cannabis or cannabis resin, or possessing
it with intent to supply it, for the purpose of alleviating pain arising from a pre-existing
illness, the Court proceeded on the basis that the only possible defence was duress of cir-
cumstances (which it referred to as ‘necessity of circumstances’). The Court denied that
there were wider ‘over-arching principles applicable in all cases of necessity’.
16.95 Despite the above, there is one type of case involving pure necessity for which
there is express, strong authority that there is a justification of pure necessity which
applies to cases not satisfying the requirements of duress of circumstances: that involv-
ing medical treatment. Apart from this it is doubtful, in the absence of positive author-
ity and in the light of the negative approach referred to above, that currently a defence
of pure necessity is available or would be extended. In Shayler, 270 the Court of Appeal
stated that:
‘[T]he distinction between duress of circumstances and necessity has, correctly, been by
and large ignored or blurred by the courts. Apart from some of the medical cases like Re
F [below] the law has tended to treat duress of circumstances and necessity as one and
the same’.
266 [1971] Ch 734, CA. 267 [1989] 1 All ER 652 at 653. 268 [1995] 2 Cr App R 607 at 613.
269 [2005] EWCA Crim 1415.
270 [2001] EWCA Crim 1977; affd on different grounds ([2002] UKHL 11).
Express authority in terms of pure necessity and medical treatment is provided in

particular by two House of Lords’ decisions, Re F271 and Bournewood Community and
Mental Health NHS Trust, ex p L, 272 and by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re A
(conjoined twins: surgical separation).273 Although Re F and Bournewood were decided in
the context of the law of tort, their recognition of a defence of necessity clearly extended
to criminal liability. In Bournewood, Lord Goff said:
‘The concept of necessity has its role to play in all branches of our law of obligations: in
contract, . . . in tort (see F’s
’ case) . . . and in our criminal law. It is therefore a concept of
great importance.’274
In Re F, the House of Lords held it to be lawful to carry out a sterilisation operation

on a voluntary mental patient with serious mental disability who lacked the capacity
to consent, in order to avert the risk of her becoming pregnant by a patient with whom
she had formed a sexual relationship; pregnancy would have had disastrous psychiatric
consequences for her. Lord Goff, with whose reasons Lords Bridge and Jauncey agreed,
expressly based the decision on a ‘principle of necessity’.
In Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust, ex p L, 275 it was held that a
hospital was entitled on an informal basis to detain a mentally incompetent person and
to give treatment to him which was in his best interests, and that the basis for this was the
common law doctrine of necessity which had the effect of justifying actions which would
otherwise be unlawful.
Requirements
16.96 Reference to Lord Goff ’s speech in Re F, 276 indicates that the existence of an
emergency in the normal sense of the word is not a requirement of the defence of
necessity.
271 [1990] 2 AC 1, HL; discussed by S Gardner ‘Necessity’s Newest Inventions’ (1991) 11 OJLS 125, 127–135
272 [1999] 1 AC 458, HL. Also see Re MB [1997] 2 FLR 426, CA. 273 [2001] Fam 147, CA.
274 [1999] 1 AC 458 at 490.
275 In this case L, who was autistic, had a limited level of understanding and lacked the capacity to consent
to medical treatment, had become particularly agitated. He was admitted as an in-patient informally, and not
under the compulsory detention powers under the Mental Health Act 1983. The House of Lords held that he
had not been detained but that, in any case, detention would have been in his best interests and so justified
by necessity. The European Court of Human Rights (HL v United Kingdom (2004) 17 BHRC 418) held that his
detention contrary to the wishes of his carers breached his right to liberty guaranteed by the ECHR, Art 5(1), and
also breached his right to have the legality of his detention reviewed by a court, contrary to the ECHR, Art 5(4).
The following provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, inserted by the Mental Health Act 2007, represent
Parliament’s response to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. The Mental Capacity Act 2005,
s 4A and Sch A1 provide that it is unlawful for a person (D) to deprive a person (V) of his liberty in a hospital or
care home unless a standard or urgent authorisation under Sch A1 is in force, or there is authorisation under a
court order.
276 [1990] 2 AC 1, HL. Also see Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2001] Fam 147 at 239, per
Brooke LJ.
In Re A (conjoined twins: surgical separation),277 whose facts are set out in para 16.98,
Brooke LJ adopted and applied the nineteenth-century statement by Stephen that there
were three necessary requirements for the application of the defence of necessity:
• the act must be necessary to avoid inevitable and irreparable evil;
• no more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be
achieved; and
• the evil inflicted must not be disproportionate to the evil avoided.278
To these requirements, there can no doubt be added one that D must have been faced
by an unavoidable choice between allowing some evil to occur or committing an offence
(or what would otherwise be an offence).
Limit
16.97 There is an important limit on the defence of pure necessity applicable to medical
treatment.
Necessity is not a defence where the victim of D’s conduct is a mentally competent
adult patient who refuses to consent, provided that that refusal does not pose a threat
to any other person or the property of another; individual autonomy is protected.
Although this has not been expressly stated, it must follow from the Court of Appeal’s
decision in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S.279 There the Court of Appeal held that
to induce the delivery of a child, where the mother was mentally competent and refused
to consent to that treatment, was unlawful because such a patient was entitled to refuse
consent, even though in that case her life, and that of her unborn child (not in law a sepa-
rate person from the mother), depended on the treatment. Likewise, necessity cannot be
used to justify force-feeding a hunger-striking prisoner who is mentally competent, even
if suicide is his intention.280
Pure necessity and murder

16.98 It was established by the Court of Appeal in Re A (conjoined twins: surgical
separation)281 that in one very limited set of circumstances pure necessity can be a defence
to murder.
Re A was, like Re F and Bournewood referred to in para 16.95, a civil case in which mat-
ters relevant to the criminal law were discussed. In this case a Healthcare Trust sought a
declaration that it would be lawful and in the best interest of conjoined (‘Siamese’) twins
277 [2001] Fam 147 at 240. 278 Digest of the Criminal Law (4th edn, 1887) 2.
279 [1998] 3 All ER 673, CA.
280 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb [1995] Fam 127, not following, on a number of grounds,
Leigh v Gladstone (1909) 26 TLR 139 (where it was held that it was the duty of the prison authorities to force-feed
a hunger-striking prisoner to save the prisoner’s life).
281 [2001] Fam 147, CA. For a discussion of the issues in this case see the group of articles in (2001) 9 Medical
Law Review 201–298; Rogers ‘Necessity, Private Defence and the Killing of Mary’ [2001] Crim LR 515; Huxtable
‘Separation of Conjoined Twins: Where Next for English Law?’ [2002] Crim LR 459.
to separate them despite the fact that the parents withheld their consent (a matter dealt
with in para 7.25) and despite the fact that this would inevitably lead to the death of Mary,
the weaker of the two, who only lived because a common artery enabled the stronger twin,
Jodie, to circulate life-sustaining oxygenated blood for both. There was evidence that the
separation operation could be performed successfully and that it would give Jodie the
opportunity of a separate good-quality life. On the other hand, if the operation was not
carried out and the twins remained united, Jodie’s heart would fail (and both would there-
fore die) in three to six months or so because of the strain of supporting two bodies.
The declaration sought having been granted, the parents appealed to the Court of
Appeal. There were two issues before the Court, the first dependent on the second:
• whether, applying family law principles, the Court should overrule the parents’
refusal of consent and give permission for the operation; and
• whether the operation would be lawful, because the Court could not approve an
unlawful course of action.
Given the conflict of interest between Jodie and Mary, and the Court’s duty under family
law to give paramount consideration to the welfare of each twin, the Court held that it
had to choose the lesser of the two evils and decide whether to grant permission on the
basis of the least detrimental alternative. It decided that the least detrimental choice,
balancing the twins against each other, was to permit the operation to be performed. On
this basis, it concluded, it would grant permission for the operation provided that such
an operation would be lawful.
Would it be lawful? The Court pointed out that the separation operation would
necessarily be invasive of Mary’s body; it would involve acts which would kill her. Thus,
it was not a case which could be covered under the rule about discontinuance of medical
treatment established in Airedale National Health Service Trust v Bland.282 Although the
Court of Appeal was unanimous in reaching its conclusion that the operation would be
lawful, it was not unanimous in the route which it took.
Brooke LJ rested his decision squarely on the defence of necessity. Having referred to
the three necessary requirements of necessity given by Stephen (see para 16.96), he con-
cluded: ‘Given that the principles of modern family law point irresistibly to the conclusion
that the interests of Jodie must be preferred to the conflicting interests of Mary, I consider
that all three requirements are satisfied in this case.’ 283 He did not think that the endorse-
ment of Dudley and Stephens by the House of Lords in Howe prevented the defence of
necessity applying to the situation in question, which was not in mind in Howe. Dudley
and Stephens was distinguishable. Mary was self-designated for an early death; nobody
could extend her life beyond a short span.
Like Brooke LJ, Ward LJ held that the operation would involve the intentional killing
of Mary (see para 3.18). He held that the killing of Mary as a result of the operation would
not be unlawful because the doctors were under a conflict of duty; they were under a
duty to Mary not to operate because that would kill Mary, and under a duty to Jodie to
operate because otherwise Jodie would die. They were under a duty to choose; they had
282 [1993] AC 789, HL; para 2.15. 283 [2001] Fam 147 at 240.
to make the choice. The conflict of duty had to be resolved by the doctors by reference to
the rightfulness of the choice, based on which was the lesser of two evils. Carrying out the
operation would be justified as the lesser evil and no unlawful act would be committed.
His Lordship added that to give the doctors the choice would not offend the ‘sanctity of
life principle’ because there was no difference in essence between a resort to legitimate
self-defence against a six-year-old shooting indiscriminately and the doctors coming to
Jodie’s defence and removing the fatal threat to Jodie posed by Mary. The availability, he
said, of such a plea of ‘quasi’ self-defence made intervention by the doctors lawful.
Although it was not expressed as such, Ward LJ’s reasoning as to resolving the conflict
of duties is based on principles of necessity compatible with those adopted by Brooke LJ.
Robert Walker LJ, as he then was, based his decision on the lawfulness of the operation
ultimately on ‘intention’. In a statement which cannot be regarded as strictly representing
the law (as explained in para 3.24) he said:
‘The proposed operation would . . . be in the best interests of each of the twins. The deci-
sion does not require the Court to value one life above another. . . . The proposed operation
would not be unlawful. It would involve the positive act of invasive surgery and Mary’s
death would be foreseen as an inevitable consequence of an operation which is intended,
and is necessary, to save Jodie’s life. But Mary’s death would not be the purpose or inten-
tion of the surgery, and she would die because tragically her body, on its own, is not and
never has been viable.’284
Earlier in his judgment, however, he said:
‘I would extend it [the defence of necessity], if it needs to be extended, to cover this case.
It is a case of doctors owing conflicting legal (and not merely social or moral) duties. It is
a case where the test of proportionality is met, since it is a matter of life and death, and
on the evidence Mary is bound to die soon in any event. It is not a case of evaluating the
relative worth of two human lives, but of undertaking surgery without which neither life
will have the bodily integrity (or wholeness) which is its due.’285
The Court of Appeal held that killing Mary was not a breach of the provision in the
ECHR, Article 2(1) that: ‘No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the exe-
cution of a sentence of a court following his conviction for a crime for which this penalty
is provided by law.’ The reason was that ‘intentionally’ in Article 2(1) had an autonomous
meaning, limited to a direct intention to kill, which the doctors did not have.
It is important to note the limits of Re A. It does not decide, eg, that a doctor who has
decided that a patient cannot survive can take active steps to kill the patient. The only
circumstances in respect of which it can be regarded as authority that a killing by a
doctor is lawful are where:
• it is impossible to preserve the life of some other patient (X) without bringing
about the death of Y;
284 Ibid at 259. 285 Ibid at 255.

• Y by his or her continued existence will inevitably bring about X’s death within a
short period of time; and
• X is capable of living an independent life but Y is incapable under any circum-
stances (including all forms of medical intervention) of viable independent
existence.286
Other points
16.99 Necessity is like self-defence, and unlike duress, in that, as Lord Goff ’s speech in
Re F 287 indicates, pure necessity justifies conduct which would otherwise be unlawful
(ie it renders conduct lawful, as opposed simply to providing a defence to unlawful
conduct). On this basis it is not strictly accurate, although it is convenient, to refer to it
as a defence.
At one time the Law Commission was of the view that the ‘defence’ of necessity, to the
extent that it existed at common law, should be abolished.288 The Law Commission was
later persuaded that the defence should be kept open to be developed by the courts. It
took the view that, when the defence was sufficiently established, it could be confirmed
by legislation.289
Superior orders
Key points 16.10

The criminal law does not recognise a defence of superior orders. Thus, a person who acts
under the orders of a superior which are unlawful does not thereby have a defence, even if
he reasonably believes that the order is lawful. However, the unlawful orders of a superior
may indirectly provide D with a defence if they bring into operation some other rule of
law which provides a defence.
16.100 Clearly, if a person acts on the lawful orders of a superior, as where a soldier is
ordered by an officer to use reasonable force to resist attack, reasonable force by him to do
so will be justified by the rules of public or private defence already mentioned.
The question of whether there is a separate general defence of superior orders is con-
cerned with the situation where the superior’s orders were in fact unlawful.
In South Africa,290 it has been held that: ‘if a soldier honestly believes he is doing his
duty in obeying the commands of his superior, and if the orders are not so manifestly
illegal that he must or ought to have known that they are unlawful, the private soldier
286 Ibid at 205, per Ward LJ. 287 [1990] 2 AC 1 at 74, HL.
288 Defences of General Application (1977), Law Com No 83. For critical discussions of those proposals, see
Williams [1978] Crim LR 128, and Huxley [1978] Crim LR 141.
289 Law Commission Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Persons and General Principles
(1993), Law Com No 218, paras 27.4 and 35.7; see para 7.129. 290 Smith (1900) 17 SCR 561.
16.101 superior orders | 725
would be protected by the orders of his superior officer’. Some Criminal Codes provide
a defence of superior orders which is not limited to members of the armed forces. For
example, the Italian Penal Code allows the defence if the order was not obviously illegal
and the defendant has no way of ascertaining its legality.291
This is not, however, the position in English law. In Lewis v Dickson,292 it was held that
a civilian security officer, whose checking of vehicles in compliance with the instructions
of his superior resulted in the obstruction of a road, was guilty of wilfully obstructing the
highway without lawful authority or excuse; the fact that he was obeying his superior’s
instructions was no defence. In Yip Chiu-cheung v R,293 the Privy Council held that there
was no place in English law for a defence of superior orders (nor for a defence of executive
authorisation of a breach of the criminal law). In Clegg,294 Lord Lloyd, with whose speech
the rest of the House of Lords agreed, stated, obiter, that there was no general defence
of superior orders in English law. Obedience to superior orders can, of course, lead to a
mitigation of sentence, except in the case of murder.
The rule that even a reasonably mistaken belief that the orders of a superior are lawful
is no defence is an unrealistic one where D is a member of the armed forces. The reason
is that it requires an individual soldier etc who is trained to obey orders instantly to con-
sider whether orders given to him are lawful and not to carry them out if they are in fact
unlawful, whether manifestly or not.295
16.101 The unlawful orders of a superior, whether a civilian or member of the armed
forces, may bring other rules of law into play, and thus indirectly provide D with a defence.
For example, such an order may induce in D a mistake which results in his lacking the
mens rea for the offence.296 Suppose that D is ordered to use a degree of force in a situation
where that degree of force is unreasonable, so that the order is unlawful, D will not be
guilty of an offence against the person when he uses that force if on the facts as he believed
them to be (and the order may have contributed to that belief) the force used would have
been reasonable. In such a case D will lack the necessary mens rea.297 Likewise, suppose
that a farm labourer removes a horse from V’s field and takes it to his employer’s stables
pursuant to the latter’s unlawful instructions. He may well believe that the horse belongs
to the employer and that he is legally entitled to deprive V of it on the employer’s behalf.
If so, he is not guilty of theft because a person who believes that he has a legal right to
deprive another of property on behalf of a third person lacks part of the mens rea for theft,
dishonesty.298
Similarly, a superior order may induce in D a mistake which results in D having a
belief which is a statutory defence. For example, D is not guilty of criminal damage if he
believes that he has the owner’s consent to do as he does, because he will have the defence
provided by the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 5. Consequently, if the farm labourer just
291 Th is point is made by Walker ‘On Excusing Colonel Priebke’ (1997) 147 NLJ 720.
292 [1976] RTR 431, DC. 293 [1995] 1 AC 111, PC. 294 [1995] 1 AC 482 at 498.
295 For arguments in favour of a defence being available where military orders are not manifestly illegal, see
Brownlee ‘Superior Orders: Time for a New Realism’ [1989] Crim LR 396. For arguments against, see Wallerstein
‘Why English Law Should Not Incorporate the Defence of Superior Orders’ [2010] Crim LR 109.
296 James (1837) 8 C & P 131; Trainer (1864) 4 F & F 105. 297 Paras 5.7 and 16.15.
298 Para 10.69.
referred to proceeds to dock the horse’s tail pursuant to his employer’s instructions, he
may be not guilty of criminal damage.299
FURTHER READING
Bohlander ‘In Extremis – Hijacked Airplanes, Milgate ‘Duress and the Criminal Law:
“Collateral Damage” and the Limits of the Another About Turn by the House of Lords’
Criminal Law’ [2006] Crim LR 579 (1988) 44 CLJ 61
Bohlander ‘Of Shipwrecked Sailors, Unborn Pace ‘Marital Coercion – Anachronism or
Children, Conjoined Twins and Hijacked Modernism?’ [1979] Crim LR 82
Aeroplanes – Taking Human Life and the Rogers ‘Have-a-Go Heroes’ (2008) 158 NLJ
Defence of Necessity’ (2006) 70 JCL 147 318
Buchanan and Virgo ‘Duress and Mental JC Smith Justification and Excuse in the
Abnormality’ [1999] Crim LR 517 Criminal Law (1989)
Colvin ‘Exculpatory Defences in the Criminal KJM Smith ‘Duress and Steadfastness: In
Law’ (1990) 10 OJLS 381 Pursuit of the Unintelligible’ [1999] Crim
Elliott ‘Necessity, Duress and Self-Defence’ LR 363
[1989] Crim LR 611 Walters ‘Murder, Duress and Judicial
S Gardner ‘Necessity: Newest Inventions’ Decision-Making in the House of Lords’
(1991) 11 OJLS 125 (1988) 8 LS 61
S Gardner ‘Direct Action and the Defence of Wasik ‘Duress and Criminal Responsibility’
Necessity’ [2005] Crim LR [1977] Crim LR 453
Gearty ‘Necessity: A Necessary Principle in Wilson ‘The Structure of Criminal Defences’
English Law?’ (1989) 48 CLJ 357 [2005] Crim LR 108
Horder Excusing Crime (2004) Ch 3 Yeo ‘Killing in Defence of Property’ (2000)
Leverick Killing in Self-Defence (2006) 150 NLJ 730
Loveless ‘Domestic Violence, Coercion and
Duress’ [2010] Crim LR 93
299 Denton [1982] 1 All ER 65, CA; para 13.10.

17
Participation
OVERVIEW
So far this book has concentrated on the liability of the perpetrator of an offence (primary
liability). However, the commission of an offence may involve other people in criminal liability
in various ways.
Most of this chapter is concerned with the liability of accomplices, ie those who aid, abet, coun-
sel or procure the commission of an offence by a perpetrator, eg by encouraging the perpetrator
or supplying him with equipment which he needs to commit it. An accomplice to an offence is
liable for that offence (secondary liability). He is a party to the offence, just like the perpetrator.
This chapter concludes with a consideration of the liability of those who assist an offender after
the commission of an offence.
17.1 A perpetrator (otherwise described as a principal) is someone who directly brings

about the actus reus of an offence1 with the relevant mens rea. The crucial distinction
between an accomplice (otherwise described as an accessory or secondary party) and
a perpetrator is that, although an accomplice has participated in the commission of an
offence, he has not in law directly brought about its actus reus, even if his assistance or
encouragement is a cause of the perpetrator acting as he does. This is true even of a result
crime because, where D has assisted or encouraged P to do the act which is the immediate
cause of the necessary consequence, eg firing the gun in murder, P’s act is a free, deliber-
ate and informed intervening act which is ordinarily regarded as a novus actus interveni-
ens breaking the chain of causation from D’s assistance or encouragement; D is therefore
not a joint perpetrator with P of the offence but an accomplice to it.
Professor Glanville Williams explained the matter as follows:
‘Principals cause, accomplices encourage (or otherwise influence) or help. If the instigator
were regarded as causing the result he would be a principal, and the conceptual division
between principals (or, as I prefer to call them, perpetrators) and accessories would vanish.
Indeed, it was because the instigator was not regarded as causing the crime that the notion of
accessories had to be developed. This is the irrefragable argument for recognising the novus
actus2 principle as one of the bases of our criminal law. The final act is done by the perpetra-
tor, and his guilt pushes the accessories, conceptually speaking, into the background.’3
1 Th is may be through the use of an innocent agent; para 17.6. 2 Para 2.43.
3 ‘Finis for Novus Actus’ (1989) 48 CLJ 391 at 398.
 | 17.2 participation
Perpetrators
17.2 Normally, it is clear who is the perpetrator (or principal): he is the one who, with the
relevant mens rea, does the sufficient act for the actus reus, ie the one who fires the fatal
shot in murder, or has sexual intercourse in rape, or appropriates the property in theft.
Joint perpetrators
17.3 There can be more than one perpetrator, as where two people by their joint and
aggregate violence kill another.4 Two or more people may also be joint perpetrators (or
principals) where each with the relevant mens rea does distinct acts which together con-
stitute the sufficient act for the actus reus of an offence; eg, in an offence involving driving
D1 and D2 have both been held to be driving where D1 was leaning across and steering
while D2 operated the foot pedals and gears.5 Another example can be provided by refer-
ence to the offence of robbery; D1 and D2 would be joint perpetrators of that offence if,
with the requisite mens rea, D1 appropriated another’s property while D2 used force to
enable the appropriation to occur.
17.4 In some cases, there can be a fine dividing line between a joint perpetrator and an
accomplice who is present. Indeed, in Australia all those present at the time of the offence
pursuant to a pre-conceived plan who perform acts pursuant to it are jointly responsible
for it as principals, even though only one of them performed the acts constituting the
offence.6 Without reference to Australia, a similar view appears to have been taken by
a minority of the Supreme Court in Gnango,7 where D had engaged in a shoot-out with
another man who had accidentally killed V in shooting at D. Two of the six Supreme
Court justices who upheld D’s conviction for murder did so on the basis that D was a
joint principal with the other man. Lord Brown SCJ, for whom the all-important consid-
eration was that D and the other man had intentionally engaged in a potentially lethal
shoot-out in which each intended to kill or seriously injure the other, said that D was
liable for V’s murder as a principal – a direct participant engaged by agreement in unlaw-
ful violence (like a duel or prizefight) specifically designed to cause and in fact causing
death or serious injury. 8 Lord Clarke SCJ agreed that there was evidence to support Lord
Brown’s all-important consideration. He stated that if D and the other man agreed to a
shoot-out, they were both guilty of murder, even though V was killed by a shot fired by
the other man and even though the other man intended to kill or seriously injure D. He
analysed D’s liability for murder on the basis that D was a principal to an agreement to
engage in unlawful violence specifically designed to cause death or serious injury, where
death occurs as a result. He preferred to describe this as a form or principal (ie primary)
liability.9 As Lord Kerr SCJ, the dissenting justice pointed out, there are major difficulties
in accepting Lords Brown and Clarke’s solution because of the requirement that to be a
4 Macklin and Murphy (1838) 2 Lew CC 225. 5 Tyler v Whatmore [1976] RTR 83, DC.
6 Osland v R (1998) 73 ALJR 173, HCt of Australia; discussed by Sir John Smith ‘Joint Enterprise and
Secondary Liability’ (1999) 50 NILQ 153. 7 [2011] UKSC 59.
8 Ibid at [68]–[71]. 9 Ibid at [75]–[81].
17.6 perpetrators | 
joint principal to murder it is not sufficient to prove that D was engaged by agreement
in violence designed to cause death or serious injury. The crucial question is whether he
caused or contributed to V’s death. This was not an issue put to the jury and there would
have been major difficulties in proving that D caused the death of V.10 It could not be
inferred that the jury would have concluded that D’s actions caused V’s death.11 It seems
highly artificial to describe as a principal someone who does not do any of the acts con-
stituting the actus reus.
17.5 Joint perpetrators are not necessarily liable for the same offence; the liability of
each of them depends on the extent of his mens rea. Thus, if D1 and D2 both throw
punches at V who, known to D1 but unknown to D2, has ‘brittle bone disease’ and suffers
broken bones in consequence, D1 may be convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with
intent, contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 18, if, as is likely, an intent
to cause such harm could be proved. However, D2 could only be convicted of an offence
of inflicting grievous bodily harm under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 20
because of his ignorance of V’s disease; D2 would neither aim to cause grievous bodily
harm nor foresee that it would result from the punches. Joint perpetrators may also be
liable for different offences, although they have the same mens rea, because one has a
partial defence, as where D1 and D2 beat V, intending to kill him, and achieve that result
by their combined efforts. If D2 successfully pleads diminished responsibility, D2 will be
guilty of manslaughter, whereas D1 is guilty of murder.
Innocent agency
17.6 If a person makes use of an innocent agent in order to bring about the commission
of an offence, that person, not the innocent agent, is the perpetrator, even though he is
not present at the scene of the crime and does nothing with his own hands. An innocent
agent is one who commits the actus reus of an offence but is himself devoid of responsi-
bility, either by reason of incapacity (ie infancy12 or insanity)13 or because he lacks mens
rea or has a defence such as duress by threats. A striking example of innocent agency is
where a daughter, acting on her mother’s instructions, gave some powder to her father to
relieve his cold. Unknown to the daughter it was a poison and her father died. It was held
that the mother was the perpetrator of the crime of murder since the daughter, lacking mens
rea, was an innocent agent by means of whom the mother had perpetrated the offence. Of
course, if, as the report notes, the daughter had known that the powder was poison she
would have been guilty as perpetrator and the mother as an accomplice.14 A more modern,
although more prosaic, example is provided by Stringer15 where the business manager of
a company signed false invoices, intending that innocent employees would automatically
pass them for payment and that the company’s bank account would be debited accord-
ingly, which duly occurred. It was held that he could be convicted of theft of the sums paid
on the false invoices, having appropriated them through innocent agents.
10 Para 17.38 n 117. 11 [2011] UKSC 59 at [130] and [131]. 12 Michael (1840) 9 C & P 356.
13 Tyler and Price (1838) 8 C & P 616. 14 Anon (1634) Kel 53. Also see Manley (1844) 3 LTOS 22.
15 (1991) 94 Cr App R 13, CA.
 | 17.7 participation
17.7 It is irrelevant that the actual innocent agent is not the person intended to be used.
In Michael,16 D, intending to kill her child, who was in the care of a nurse, gave the nurse
a poison, telling her that it was medicine and should be given to the child. The nurse
decided not to do so and put it on the mantelpiece. In her absence, one of her children,
aged five, gave D’s child a fatal dose. It was held that this administration by ‘an innocent
agent’ was murder. To call the young child D’s ‘agent’ seems to stretch the meaning of
that term.17
Accomplices
17.8 A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence (an
accomplice) is liable to be tried and punished for that offence as a principal offender.
This is provided by the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s 8 in relation to offences tri-
able only on indictment and offences triable either way, and by the Magistrates’ Courts
Act 1980, s 44 in relation to summary offences. The sections do not specify what is meant
by ‘aids, abets, counsels or procures’. That question is determined by the common law and
is dealt with below.
The liability of an accomplice is derived from his involvement in the principal offence
and is often described as ‘derivative liability’ or ‘secondary liability’.
So that a defendant may know whether he is alleged to have been a perpetrator or an
accomplice, the particulars of the offence in the indictment should make it clear whether it is
alleged that he was a perpetrator or an accomplice.18 However, if the prosecution is advanced
on the basis that D was the perpetrator or an accomplice this does not prevent the prosecu-
tion from alleging this in a single count; it is not necessary to have separate counts.19
17.9 Five other introductory points may be made:
• A person can be convicted, as an accomplice, of an inchoate offence.20 In relation

to an attempt, the authority is Dunnington.21 Here, the Court of Appeal held that
D who had driven would-be robbers to the scene of their intended crime could be
convicted as an accomplice to attempted robbery when they were unsuccessful.
There is no reason to doubt that D can be convicted, as an accomplice, of one of the
other inchoate offences if D satisfies the conditions necessary for conviction as an
accomplice.22
• In Jefferson,23 the Court of Appeal held that liability as an accomplice is of general
application to all offences, unless expressly excluded by statute.24 However, it may be
16 (1840) 9 C & P 356. 17 See Hart and Honoré Causation in the Law (2nd edn, 1985) 337.
18 DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140, HL; Gaughan (1991) 155 JP 235, CA; Taylor [1998]
Crim LR 582, CA. 19 Gaughan above.
20 Inchoate offences were discussed in Ch 14. 21 [1984] QB 472, CA.
22 Smith ‘Secondary Participation and Inchoate Offences’ in Crime, Proof and Punishment (1981) (Tapper
(ed)) p 21. 23 [1994] 1 All ER 270, CA.
24 For an express exclusion in respect of an individual, but not a corporation, see the Corporate Manslaughter
and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 18(1): para 8.144.
17.9 accomplices | 
that the wording of a statute can have the effect of implicitly excluding liability as an
accomplice. In Carmichael & Sons (Worcester) Ltd v Cottle,25 it was stated, obiter, that
when a provision uses the words ‘using, causing or permitting to be used’ it may be that
‘there is no room for the application of the principle relating to aiders and abettors’.
Terms like ‘cause or permit’ clearly cover many of the types of conduct encompassed
by ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’ but the statement in the above case remains a sugges-
tion, and no more, at present. The statement in Carmichael v Cottle can be compared
with obiter dicta in Brookes v Retail Credit Cards,26 to the effect that the words ‘a breach
of any requirement by . . . this Act shall incur no criminal sanction . . . , except to the
extent provided by this Act’ in the Consumer Credit Act 1974 did not exclude the nor-
mal liability of someone who was an accomplice to an offence under the Act.
• For the purpose of following the old cases, until the Criminal Law Act 1967 accom-
plices to the commission of a felony were described as ‘principals in the second
degree’27 if they were present when it was committed, or as ‘accessories before the
fact’ if absent.
• A number of participants may also be guilty of conspiracy; and someone who
encourages or assists crime may also be guilty of an offence under the Serious Crime
Act 2007, Pt 2.28
• It was established in Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd and Millar29 that people who aid,
abet, counsel or procure abroad an offence committed in England and Wales may
be convicted in an English or Welsh court as accomplices to the principal offence,
but people in England or Wales who aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission
abroad of an offence may not,30 unless that offence committed abroad is one over
which an English or Welsh court has jurisdiction.
Key points 17.1

In order that D may be convicted as an accomplice, it is not necessary that the perpetra-
tor should have been brought to trial or convicted, or even that the perpetrator’s identity
should be known, but it is necessary for the prosecution to prove:
• that D aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the principal

offence;
• that the principal offence was in fact committed; and
• that D had the mens rea required for liability as an accomplice.
25 [1971] RTR 11 at 14. 26 (1985) 150 JP 131, DC.

27 The perpetrator of a felony was known as a ‘principal in the first degree’ until that Act.
The serious offences created by the judges from the twelft h to the fourteenth century were called felonies,
and the less serious came to be known as misdemeanours. The same distinction was subsequently drawn by
Parliament in enacting statutory offences. All distinctions between felonies and misdemeanours were abolished
by the Criminal Law Act 1967, s 1, which provides that, on all matters on which a distinction between felonies
and misdemeanours had previously been made, the law applicable at the commencement of the Act to mis-
demeanours applies. 28 Ch 14 (see paras 14.26 and 14.81 in particular).
29 [1970] 2 QB 54, CA. 30 Godfrey [1923] 1 KB 24, CCA; Ngan [1998] 1 Cr App R 331, CA.
 | 17.10 participation
Aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring

17.10 If a defendant is alleged to have been an accomplice to the principal offence, the
charge may allege that he aided, abetted, counselled or procured it, and he will be con-
victed if he is proved to have participated in one or more of these four ways.31
Although ‘aiding’ and ‘abetting’ have sometimes been regarded as synonymous,32
there is a difference between them: ‘aid’ is used to describe the activity of a person who
helps, supports or assists the perpetrator to commit the principal offence, and ‘abet’ to
describe the activity of a person who incites, instigates or encourages the perpetrator to
commit it, whether or not in either case his activity is at the time of the commission of
the offence, and whether or not in either case he is present at the time of commission.33
Trivial encouragement can suffice. In Giannetto the Court of Appeal did not disagree
with the judge’s statement that a person could be convicted of murder where ‘somebody
came up to [him] and said “I’m going to kill your wife” [and] he played any part . . . in
encouragement, as little as patting him on the back, nodding, saying “Oh, goody” ’.34 No
doubt, trivial assistance can also suffice.
‘Counsel’ means ‘advise’, ‘encourage’ or the like.35 It does not add anything strictly
but is used to describe encouragement before the commission of the principal offence.
A person ‘procures’ the commission of an offence by setting out to see that it is com-
mitted and taking the appropriate steps to produce its commission; more succinctly,
‘procure’ means ‘to produce by endeavour’. This was stated by the Court of Appeal in
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975).36 The importance of this decision is illustrated by the facts
on which it was based. D laced the drink of P, unknown to P, who was later charged with
the strict liability offence of driving with an excess of alcohol. In holding that D could be
convicted as an accomplice to this offence, the Court of Appeal said:
‘[The principal offence] has been procured because, unknown to the driver and without
his collaboration, he has been put in a position in which in fact he has committed an
offence which he never would have committed otherwise’.37
It can be seen from the above that there are three ways of becoming an accomplice: by
assisting in the commission of the principal offence, by encouraging its commission or
by procuring its commission.
17.11 The assistance, encouragement or procuring which must be proved against an
alleged accomplice may take a variety of forms. It may consist of active assistance or
encouragement of the criminal act, such as holding a woman down while she is raped, 38
or keeping watch,39 or shouting out ‘fi ll him with lead’ to a gunman. Alternatively, assist-
ance or encouragement before the criminal act, such as driving the perpetrator to a
31 Re Smith (1858) 3 H & N 227; Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814, DC.

32 DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653 at 678 and 698, per Lords Morris and Simon.
33 National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11, DC; Thambiah v R [1966] AC 37, PC; Stringer and Stringer
[2011] EWCA Crim 1396. 34 [1997] 1 Cr App R 1 at 13.
35 Calhaem [1985] QB 808, CA. 36 [1975] QB 773 at 779. 37 Ibid at 780.
38 Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344, C-MAC (as to this court, see para 2.32, n 98).
39 Betts and Ridley (1930) 22 Cr App R 148, CCA.
17.13 accomplices | 
location where he waits until the opportunity to commit the actus reus arises,40 or hiring
a contract killer,41 suffices. Assistance or encouragement in the preparation of an offence
even at an early stage suffices, as where D opens a bank account with the intention of
facilitating the paying in of forged cheques by the perpetrator.42
Supplying the instrument or materials for use in the commission of the principal
offence constitutes assistance in its commission,43 and so does supplying information
to enable the offence to be carried out.44 A thing is supplied in this context if it is given,
lent or sold, or if a right of property in it is otherwise transferred. 45 A person who gives
to another for use in an offence a weapon of which the latter is owner aids in the com-
mission of that offence as much as if he had sold or lent the weapon, but such conduct
does not make him an accomplice.46 This has been explained on the basis that, although
the person who surrenders the weapon to its owner is physically performing a positive
act, he is in law simply refraining from committing the civil wrong (tort) of conversion.
It is unlikely that an action for the wrongful detention of a jemmy brought by a would-
be burglar who owned it would succeed.47 If P lends a gun to D, and later drags his wife
before D, shouting ‘Return my gun, I am going to kill this woman instantly with it’, is it
really the law that D incurs no liability, as accomplice, in respect of the murder of the wife
if he meekly returns the gun with which she is instantly shot?
17.12 A person is not guilty of aiding, abetting or counselling the commission of a range
of offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 against a child under 16, eg by giving
contraceptives to the child or giving sex advice, if he acts for the purpose of protecting
the child from sexually transmitted infection, protecting the physical safety of the child,
preventing the child from becoming pregnant, or promoting the child’s emotional well-
being by the giving of advice, and not for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification
or for the purpose of causing or encouraging the activity constituting the offence or the
child’s participation in it.48
Can an omission suffice?

17.13 Normally, an act of assistance or encouragement is required. Thus, mere absten-
tion from preventing an offence is generally not enough. However, if D has a right or
power to control P and deliberately fails to take an opportunity to prevent P commit-
ting an offence, and knows that this is capable of assisting or encouraging the com-
mission of the principal offence, D’s omission will constitute aiding or abetting. In
Tuck v Robson,49 a publican, who deliberately made no effort to induce customers to leave
40 Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231. 41 Calhaem [1985] QB 808, CA.

42 Thambiah v R [1966] AC 37, PC. 43 National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11, DC.
44 Bullock [1955] 1 All ER 15, CCA.
45 National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11 at 20, per Devlin J.
46 Lomas (1913) 110 LT 239, CCA, as explained in Bullock [1955] 1 All ER 15, CCA.
47 Garrett v Arthur Churchill (Glass) Ltd [1970] 1 QB 92 at 99, per Lord Parker CJ.
48 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 73; see paras 9.37, 9.44, 9.49, 9.58, 9.70, Key points 9.3, n 162, 9.87, 9.103, n 213,
9.110, n 219, 9.123, n 215.
49 [1970] 1 All ER 1171, DC. Also see Cassady v Reg Morris (Transport) Ltd [1975] RTR 470, DC; J F Alford
Transport Ltd [1997] 2 Cr App R 326, CA.
 | 17.14 participation
his premises after closing time, was held properly convicted of aiding and abetting their
consumption of liquor out of hours because of his failure to exercise his right of control.
Similarly, the owner of a car, who sits in the passenger seat while another drives it danger-
ously, can be convicted, as an accomplice, of dangerous driving if he deliberately fails to
take an opportunity to prevent it.50
The principle51 that an omission to act can give rise to criminal liability if D was
under a duty to do the act in question is applicable to the liability of an accomplice.
Consequently, eg, a parent who stands by and watches someone commit an offence against
his young child which he could reasonably prevent may be convicted as an accomplice
to that offence,52 because he would be under a duty to take reasonable steps to inter-
vene, whereas a stranger would not, and his deliberate abstention from action constitutes
encouragement to the other’s conduct.
The definition of procuring53 is such as to preclude an omission sufficing for liability
on the basis of procuring.
17.14 It follows from the above that a person cannot be convicted as an accomplice merely
because he knows that the perpetrator is committing the principal offence. This is impor-
tant, eg, where someone knows that his spouse or flatmate is committing an offence, and
does nothing about it, one way or another. Bland54 provides an example. D shared a room
with her partner, P, a drugs dealer. D was charged, as an accomplice, with the offence of being
in possession of controlled drugs with intent unlawfully to supply them. It could be inferred
that D knew that P was dealing in drugs in the room but there was no direct evidence against
D that she had assisted or encouraged P in drug-dealing there. Allowing D’s appeal against
conviction, the Court of Appeal held that the fact that D lived in the same room with P was
not sufficient evidence from which an inference of assistance in his possession of the drugs
with intent to supply could be drawn. As the Court of Appeal recognised, it would have been
different if D had had a right or power to control P and had failed to exercise it.
The principal offence

The normal rule
17.15 Subject to an exceptional type of case dealt with in paras 17.21 to 17.25, a person
cannot be convicted as an accomplice to an offence unless it is proved that that offence
has been committed by someone else (the perpetrator). If D, eg, aids, abets, counsels
or procures P to burgle a house but P never does so, perhaps because he ‘gets cold feet’
or because he dies, D cannot be convicted, as an accomplice, of burglary. In such cases,
however, D may be guilty of an offence of encouragement or assistance of crime, contrary
to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2, or of conspiracy55 if the requirements for such an
offence are proved.
50 Du Cros v Lambourne [1907] 1 KB 40, DC; Webster [2006] EWCA Crim 415; Martin [2011] EWCA Crim
1450. 51 Para 2.10.
52 Gibson and Gibson (1984) 80 Cr App R 24, CA; Russell and Russell (1987) 85 Cr App R 388, CA.
53 Para 17.10. 54 (1987) 151 JP 857, CA. 55 Ch 14.
17.18 accomplices | 
17.16 The need for proof that the principal offence has been committed is shown by
Thornton v Mitchell.56 The driver of a bus had to reverse it. In order to do so, he relied
on the signals of the conductor. The conductor gave the driver a signal to reverse, which
he did, and two pedestrians were knocked down. The driver was charged with driving
without due care and attention and the conductor with abetting him. The case against
the driver was dismissed on the basis that the actus reus of the principal offence consisted
of careless driving (which had not been proved), and it was held by the Divisional Court
that the conductor could not be convicted of aiding or abetting an offence which had not
been committed.
Link between assistance, encouragement or procuring and principal offence

17.17 Although the commission of the principal offence must be proved, proof that
D’s aiding, abetting or counselling was a cause of its commission by the perpetrator, in
the sense that the perpetrator would not have committed the offence but for D’s assist-
ance or encouragement, is not required.57 If D encourages P to shoot at, and kill, V (and
P does so) it is irrelevant that P had already decided to do so when he was encouraged to
do so by D, and it is irrelevant that D knew this.58 On the other hand, if the allegation
against D is necessarily one of procuring, such a causal link must be established. As was
said in A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975):
‘You cannot procure an offence unless there is a causal link between what you do and the
commission of the offence, and here we are told that in consequence of the addition of
this alcohol the driver, when he drove home, drove with an excess quantity of alcohol in
his body.’59
If the perpetrator required no persuading D has not procured the principal offence.
17.18 Although proof is not required that D’s aiding, abetting or counselling was a
cause of the commission of the principal offence, in the sense that the perpetrator (P)
would not have committed the offence but for D’s assistance or encouragement , there
must be proof that D has done something which had some relevance to the commission
of the principal offence; there must be some connecting link.60 It must be proved that
what P did was done with D’s assistance or encouragement.61 For D to be guilty as an
accomplice to the offence perpetrated by P, D’s conduct must (objectively) have consti-
tuted assistance or encouragement at the time of P’s act, even if P (subjectively) did not
need assistance or encouragement.62
Whereas the provision of assistance need not involve communication between D and P,
encouragement by its nature involves some form of transmission of the encouragement,
56 [1940] 1 All ER 339, DC. Also see Morris v Tolman [1923] 1 KB 166, DC; Pickford [1995] QB 203, CA; Loukes
[1996] 1 Cr App R 444, CA (see para 17.25); Roberts and George [1997] RTR 462, CA.
57 Calhaem [1985] QB 808, CA; Luff man [2008] EWCA Crim 1739; Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA
Crim 516; Stringer and Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396. Contrast Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231 where the
Court of Appeal appeared to imply such a requirement, in relation to aiding at least.
58 Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1; para 17.10. 59 [1975] QB 773 at 780.
60 Stringer and Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396. 61 Ibid.
62 Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516.
 | 17.19 participation
whether directly or by an intermediary.63 As the Court of Appeal stated in Stringer and

Stringer:
‘An unposted letter of encouragement would not be encouragement unless P chanced to

discover it and read it. Similarly, it would be unreal to regard P as acting with the assist-
ance or encouragement of D if the only encouragement took the form of words spoken by
D out of P’s earshot.’ 64
Reference may also be made to Calhaem where the Court of Appeal said:
‘There must clearly be, first, contact between the parties, and, secondly, a connection
between the counselling and the murder. Equally, the act done must, we think, be done
within the scope of the authority or advice, 65 and not, for example, accidentally when
the mind of the final murderer did not go with his actions. For example, if the principal
offender happened to be involved in a football riot in the course of which he laid about
him with a weapon of some sort and killed someone who, unknown to him, was the per-
son whom he had been counselled to kill, he would not, in our view, have been acting
within the scope of his authority; he would have been acting entirely outside it, albeit what
he had done was what he had been counselled to do.’ 66
Whether D’s conduct amounted to assistance or encouragement is a question of fact

for the jury. It is for the jury, applying their common sense and sense of fairness, to decide
whether they are satisfied that P’s act was done with D’s assistance or encouragement.
There may be cases where any assistance or encouragement provided by D was so dis-
tanced in time, place or circumstances from the conduct of P that it would be unjust to
regard P’s act as done with D’s assistance or encouragement.67
What if the perpetrator is exempt from prosecution for offence?

17.19 It should be noted that, if the principal offence has been committed, there is
no difficulty in convicting as an accomplice a person who assisted, encouraged or
procured its commission, even though the perpetrator is exempt from prosecution
for the offence in question. Th is is shown by Austin, 68 where D had assisted a father
to snatch his young daughter from his estranged wife. The Court of Appeal held that,
since the father had committed the offence of child stealing (contrary to the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861, s 56, which has since been repealed), D could be con-
victed as an accomplice to that offence, even though the father could not have been
prosecuted because of the proviso to the section, whereby a father was not liable to be
prosecuted ‘on account of getting possession of the child’. The proviso merely meant
that the father could not be prosecuted: it did not mean that he had not committed
the offence.
63 Stringer and Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396 at [49]. 64 Ibid at [49].
65 See also Luff man [2008] EWCA Crim 1739.
66 [1985] QB 808 at 813. See also A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773 at 779.
67 Stringer and Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396 at [52]. 68 [1981] 1 All ER 374, CA.
17.22 accomplices | 
An exceptional situation
17.20 Where the principal offence is proved, it is immaterial that it is one which the
accomplice could not have committed as perpetrator. Thus, eg, a woman may be guilty
of rape as an accomplice.69
17.21 Difficulties, however, arise in cases where the actus reus of an offence is
perpetrated by someone to whom a defence is available, so that he cannot be said
to have committed the offence. As we have seen, 70 normally it is possible in such a
case to treat the person who does the act as the innocent agent of the person who has
procured him to do the act and to convict the latter as perpetrator. However, this is
difficult where the offence is one which can be perpetrated personally only by a per-
son of a particular description which only the innocent agent satisfies, or where the
offence is defined in terms implying that the act must be committed personally by a
perpetrator. Suppose, eg, that a bachelor exercises duress to induce a married woman
to go through a ceremony of marriage with him. Logic might seem to require that
he should be acquitted on a charge of being an accomplice to bigamy because, the
woman being entitled to an acquittal on the ground of duress by threats, she cannot
be convicted of perpetrating bigamy; and that, as a bachelor, not ‘being married’,
cannot perpetrate bigamy, the bachelor should be acquitted on a charge of perpetra-
ting bigamy through an innocent agent. However, there is authority against both of
these suppositions.
In Bourne,71 D compelled his wife to have intercourse with a dog. Although his wife
was not charged, it was accepted that she would have had the defence of duress by threats
if she had been. Nevertheless, the indictment and conviction of D as an accomplice to the
buggery were upheld as proper on appeal. Thus, this case shows that D can be convicted
as an accomplice despite the fact that no one else is liable as perpetrator and despite the
fact that D could not personally perpetrate the offence. However, it was held in Cogan
and Leak72 that a husband, who was cohabiting with his wife and therefore could not at
the time have been convicted of personally perpetrating the offence of rape against her,73
could be convicted as the perpetrator of the rape of her through an innocent agent who
lacked the necessary mens rea for rape and was acquitted.
17.22 The former solution (Bourne) is preferable since (quite apart from difficulties
inherent in the idea that a person can have sexual intercourse through an innocent agent)
the latter solution (the part of Cogan and Leak referred to above) involves convicting
someone as a perpetrator for something of which he could not be convicted had he done
it personally. According to the latter solution, a woman who caused a man, who was
innocent for some reason, to commit a rape would be guilty of rape as a perpetrator, not-
withstanding that the definition of rape says that it can only be perpetrated personally by
penetration by a person’s penis. Such a solution was not accepted by the Divisional Court
in DPP v K & B,74 where the particular point was in issue. Instead, the Divisional Court
69 Ram and Ram (1893) 17 Cox CC 609. 70 Para 17.6. 71 (1952) 36 Cr App R 125, CCA.
72 [1976] QB 217, CA.
73 The law has since been changed in this respect: R [1992] 1 AC 599, HL; para 1.35.
74 [1997] 1 Cr App R 36, DC.
 | 17.23 participation
preferred the type of approach in Bourne, further discussed in the next paragraphs. It
is unlikely that the above part of the decision in Cogan and Leak will be adopted in the
future.
Elsewhere in its decision, the Court of Appeal in Cogan and Leak held that the husband
could be convicted as an accomplice to rape even though the man who had intercourse
lacked the necessary mens rea. This, together with Bourne, shows that if D intends that
the actus reus should be performed by P and induces P to perform it but P has some
defence, such as duress by threats or lack of mens rea, D’s mens rea may be added to P’s
actus reus so as to make D liable as an accomplice for an offence which D cannot per-
sonally perpetrate.
This approach was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Millward.75 P committed the
actus reus of the offence of causing death by reckless driving, an offence subsequently
abolished, which could only be committed by a person driving a motor vehicle on a road
in a way giving rise to an obvious and serious risk of injury or damage to property. P had
driven the vehicle on the road in a defective state and thereby caused death, and it was
this that the Court of Appeal held constituted the actus reus of reckless driving causing
death. The commission of that actus reus had been procured by D who had told P, his
employee, to drive the vehicle. P lacked the mens rea for the offence in question because
he did not know of the defect, but D did have the mens rea because he knew of the defect.
P was acquitted of perpetrating the offence of causing death by reckless driving but D was
convicted of being an accomplice to it.76 D’s appeal against conviction was unsuccessful
on the ground that a person who with the relevant mens rea procured another to commit
the actus reus of an offence, that other lacking the requisite mens rea, could be convicted
as an accomplice to it.
Millward was followed in DPP v K & B, where two girls, aged 14 and 11, had procured
a boy, who was never traced, to rape a girl whom they had falsely imprisoned. It was
established that the boy was at least 10 but there was evidence that he was under 14. The
prosecution had been unable to rebut the presumption, which then applied, that the boy
was incapable of committing an offence.77 The Divisional Court held that this did not
preclude the conviction of the two girls as procurers of the rape. The actus reus had been
proved and the girls had the requisite mens rea.
17.23 The approach adopted in Bourne, the latter of the two parts of Cogan and Leak
referred to above, Millward and DPP v K & B seems to be limited to cases of procuring.
All four cases involved procuring and the Court of Appeal in Millward seems to have
accepted that the approach is so limited. Analogy with the law on innocent agency78 sug-
gests this is correct.
17.24 In DPP v K & B, the Divisional Court stated that its decision would have been different
if the boy had been under 10 because he could not have committed any offence. This would
seem to be wrong; the doctrine of innocent agency applies where the actus reus has been
75 (1994) 158 JP 1091, CA.

76 D could not have been convicted as perpetrator of the offence of causing death by reckless driving through
the innocent agency of P because the definition of that offence implied that the act of driving must be committed
personally by a perpetrator. 77 Para 15.2.
78 Para 17.6.
17.26 accomplices | 
physically committed by an innocent agent under 10, and there seems no reason why the
present principle should not likewise apply where the actus reus has been so committed.
17.25 The approach taken in these cases depends on an analysis of the elements of an
offence so as to see which of them are part of the actus reus. The question is then whether
those actus reus elements are satisfied. How crucial this analysis can be is shown by
Thornton v Mitchell79 (para 17.16 above) and by Loukes.80
In Loukes, D, a haulage contractor, had been charged as an accomplice to causing death
by dangerous driving, contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s 1 (an offence not to be
confused with the abolished offence of causing death by reckless driving). The death had
been caused by P, an employee, driving one of D’s trucks in a dangerously defective con-
dition. P was acquitted of perpetrating this offence, on the direction of the judge who had
found there was no case to answer against him because there was insufficient evidence
that he knew that the truck was dangerously defective or that it would have been obvious
to him as a competent and careful driver. The prosecution case was that D had caused the
truck to be driven in a dangerous condition when he knew or ought to have known of the
dangerous defect. The jury convicted D as an accomplice to causing death by dangerous
driving. Distinguishing Millward and allowing D’s appeal against conviction, the Court
of Appeal held that offences of dangerous driving were strict liability ones in which no
mens rea was required, so that the acquittal of the driver must have meant that no actus
reus had been committed to which D could have been an accomplice.
Acquittal of an alleged accomplice

17.26 As already seen, the acquittal of the alleged perpetrator does not mean that another
person cannot be convicted as accomplice. If D is charged with aiding or abetting the
commission of an offence by P, with whom he is put up for trial, it would be logically
absurd for D to be convicted and P acquitted if the evidence against each was identical.
Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that there is stronger evidence against D than against
P, or that evidence which is admissible against D is inadmissible against P, and in such an
event the conviction of D is not logically incompatible with the acquittal of P.81
Mens rea
Key points 17.2
The mens rea required of an accomplice is not the same as that required of the perpetrator
of the principal offence. Instead, what is required to be proved is:
• an intent to assist, encourage or procure the commission by the perpetrator of the

act which constitutes or results in the principal offence;
• knowledge of the facts essential to constitute the principal offence.
79 [1940] 1 All ER 339, DC. 80 [1996] 1 Cr App R 444, CA.

81 Humphreys and Turner [1965] 3 All ER 689; Davis [1977] Crim LR 542, CA.
 | 17.27 participation
Intent to assist, encourage or procure

17.27 For someone (D) who has encouraged or assisted the perpetrator to be convicted
as an accomplice, it must be proved that D’s encouragement or assistance which consti-
tuted aiding, abetting etc was given:
• intentionally, in the sense that D gave it deliberately (and not accidentally), and
• with knowledge that it was capable of encouraging the commission of the principal
offence.82
17.28 D need not give his assistance or encouragement with the desire, aim or purpose
that the principal offence be committed; D can be found to have intended to assist or
encourage from evidence that D knew that his deliberate act of assistance or encourage-
ment was capable of having that effect. 83 In National Coal Board v Gamble, Devlin J, as
he then was, said:
‘[A]n indifference to the result of the crime does not of itself negative abetting. If one man
deliberately sells to another a gun to be used for murdering a third, he may be indifferent
about whether the third lives or dies and interested only in the cash profit to be made out
of the sale, but he can still be an aider and abettor.’84
This approach was affirmed by the House of Lords in DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch, 85
where it was held that willingness to participate in the offence did not have to be estab-
lished. In consequence, a person who knew of another’s criminal purpose and voluntarily
aided him in it could be held to have aided that offence, even though he regretted the plan
or indeed was horrified by it. (Of course, if he was acting under a threat sufficient to give
rise to a defence of duress he would be not guilty on that ground unless that defence did
not extend to the offence charged.)
Another example is provided by J F Alford Transport Ltd, 86 where a transport com-
pany’s drivers had pleaded guilty to offences of making a false entry on a tachograph
record, contrary to the Transport Act 1968, s 99. The Court of Appeal stated that the
managing director and transport manager of the company, who (it had been alleged) had
aided or abetted the offences by failing to exercise their right of control, could only be
guilty as accomplices of an offence if they had intended that acquiescence (ie had delib-
erately refrained from controlling the drivers’ conduct), knowing that this was capable of
assisting or encouraging the perpetration of the offence. It added that it would be irrel-
evant that a blind eye had been turned in order to keep the drivers happy rather than to
encourage the production of false tachograph records.
82 JF Alford Transport Ltd [1997] 2 Cr App R 326, CA; Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231.
83 National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11, DC; Bryce above.
84 [1959] 1 QB 11 at 23. Also see A-G v Able [1984] QB 795.
85 [1975] AC 653, HL. Th is part of the decision was not overruled by the House of Lords in Howe [1987] AC
417; para 16.54. Cf Fretwell (1862) Le & Ca 161 where D had reluctantly supplied a poison, with fatal conse-
quences, after a woman had threatened suicide if he did not. It was held that D was not liable as an accomplice to
the offence of homicide because he was unwilling that the poison should be used. In A-G v Able [1984] QB 795 at
811, it was stated by Woolf J that this decision was ‘confi ned to its own facts’, ie was not to be regarded as laying
down a general rule to be followed in the future. 86 [1997] 2 Cr App R 326, CA.
17.32 accomplices | 
17.29 What has been said above about the absence of a requirement to prove a desire,
aim or purpose to assist or encourage seems inconsistent with the view taken in Gillick
v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, 87 a civil case, where a majority of
the House of Lords held that a doctor who prescribed contraceptives for a girl under
16 for clinical reasons, knowing that this would encourage or facilitate sexual inter-
course by the girl, which would be an offence by the man involved, would not be an
accomplice to the man’s offence. 88 Lord Scarman (with whom Lords Fraser and Bridge
agreed) said:
‘The bona fide exercise by a doctor of his clinical judgment must be a complete negation
of the guilty mind which is an essential ingredient of the criminal offence of aiding and
abetting the commission of unlawful sexual intercourse.’89
The view that the doctor did not intend to assist or encourage, despite the fact that he
knew that prescribing the contraceptives would assist the commission of the offence, may
have been based on the doctrine of double effect.90
17.30 The definition of ‘procuring’, given in A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) 91 – ‘produ-
cing by endeavour; setting out to see that the thing happens and taking the appropriate
steps to produce that happening’ – means that it is meaningless to talk of anything other
than a direct intention that the principal offence be committed where only procuring is
involved.92
Knowledge of the facts essential to constitute the principal offence

17.31 To be an accomplice, D must also have knowledge of the facts essential to con-
stitute the principal offence,93 although, of course, D need not know that those facts
constitute an offence.94
17.32 ‘Knowledge’ in this context includes wilful blindness95 or recklessness,96 but
not negligence.97 Because wilful blindness or recklessness suffices, it is enough that an
alleged accomplice is aware of the risk that the ‘essential facts’ may possibly exist.
Where the assistance or encouragement is given in advance of a particular ‘essential
fact’, it is more appropriate to speak in terms of whether D contemplated that that fact
would, or might as a real possibility, exist or occur at the material time.98
87 [1986] AC 112, HL.

88 Express provision for this type of case is now made by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 73; paras 9.37 and
17.12. 89 [1986] AC 112 at 190.
90 The decision in Gillick can alternatively be explained as being based impliedly on principles of necessity.
91 [1975] QB 773, CA. 92 There is support for this in Blakely and Sutton v DPP [1991] RTR 405, DC.
93 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544, DC; Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814, DC; DPP for Northern Ireland
v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140, HL. 94 Johnson v Youden above.
95 Poultry World Ltd v Conder [1957] Crim LR 803, DC; para 3.45.
96 Carter v Richardson [1974] RTR 314, DC; para 3.33.
97 J F Alford Transport Ltd [1997] 2 Cr App R 326, CA; Roberts and George [1997] RTR 462, CA; Webster
[2006] EWCA Crim 415.
98 Powell and Daniels; English [1999] 1 AC 1, HL; Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168, PC; Bryce [2004] EWCA
Crim 1231; Webster above.
 | 17.33 participation
Essential facts
17.33 The ‘facts essential to constitute the principal offence’ refers to:
• any act or omission by the perpetrator (P), or any state of affairs on P’s part,
required by the actus reus of the principal offence;
• any circumstances so required;
• any consequence so required; and
• any mens rea required on P’s part.
In Ferguson v Weaving,99 D, the licensee, was charged with aiding and abetting customers
to commit the offence of consuming intoxicating liquor on licensed premises outside
permitted hours, contrary to the Licensing Act 1921, s 4 (since repealed). D did not know
that drinking was taking place after closing time. The Divisional Court held that on these
facts D could not be convicted.
17.34 An example of the present requirement of mens rea can be given by reference to
murder, where it suffices for the purposes of the present requirement that the alleged
accomplice contemplated as a real possibility that the perpetrator might unlawfully
kill someone with intent to do so or to cause unlawful grievous bodily harm.100 It
is somewhat surprising that, while a person can only be convicted as a perpetrator of
murder if he intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, someone who assists or
encourages a person who kills with such an intention can be convicted of murder as an
accomplice if he merely contemplated that the other might intentionally kill or cause
grievous bodily harm. Th is anomaly was recognised by the House of Lords in Powell
and Daniels; English101 but explained on grounds of public policy, in particular that,
where a person assists or encourages a criminal enterprise, aware that the perpetra-
tor may act with the necessary mens rea for murder, he should not escape liability for
murder simply because he did not intend death or serious bodily harm. According to
Lord Steyn, if the law required proof of the necessary intent for murder, the utility of
the law relating to accomplices would be seriously undermined because that intent
would be difficult to prove and joint enterprises can all too readily escalate into more
serious offences.102
If an alleged accomplice has thought about the possibility of the perpetrator commit-
ting an offence but has dismissed it as negligible, he will not have contemplated that
offence as a real possibility.103
Provided that D is aware at the time that he does his act of assistance or encouragement
that the perpetrator may act with the mens rea required for the principal offence it is irrel-
evant that the perpetrator has not formed the mens rea at that point of time.104
17.35 The list of essential facts is qualified where a principal offence does not require
proof of foresight as to the consequence required for its actus reus. In the case of
99 [1951] 1 KB 814, DC. 100 See the cases cited in n 98. 101 [1999] 1 AC 1, HL.
102 [1999] 1 AC 1 at 14.
103 Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168, PC; Hyde [1991] 1 QB 134, CA; Powell and Daniels; English [1999] 1
AC 1, HL. 104 Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231.
17.36 accomplices | 
such an offence, the essential facts which D must know do not include the requisite
consequence of the principal offence.105 Examples of such cases are involuntary
manslaughter, causing death by dangerous driving and unlawfully wounding or
inf licting grievous bodily harm, contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act
1861, s 20. We have seen, eg, that a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter if
death results from the commission by him of an unlawful act which risks harm to
another, even though he did not foresee that death or grievous bodily harm might
result.106 If one person encourages another to assault a man with fists, and he unex-
pectedly dies in consequence of the blows received, they are each guilty of involun-
tary manslaughter. Similarly, someone who arranges for a criminal abortion to be
performed is, like the perpetrator, guilty of involuntary manslaughter if the opera-
tion results in death.
How much must be known?

17.36 D need not know the details of the principal offence; it is enough that D knows
facts sufficient to indicate the particular type of offence which is committed.107 This
rule is of particular relevance where assistance has been given. Thus, if D supplies another
with a jemmy with knowledge that there is a real possibility that it will be used to enter a
building as a trespasser in order to steal (ie knowing the particular type of offence), D is
guilty of aiding such a burglary committed with the jemmy and it makes no difference
that D did not know which premises were going to be burgled or when the burglary was
to take place. In Bainbridge,108 D supplied thieves with oxygen cutting equipment pur-
chased by him six weeks earlier. The equipment was used for breaking into a bank, and it
was held that D was an accomplice to this offence if he knew, when supplying the equip-
ment, that it was to be used for a ‘breaking’ offence. D would not have been an accomplice
to the bank breaking if he had merely known that the equipment was to be used for some
criminal purpose.
Bainbridge was approved and extended by the House of Lords in DPP for Northern
Ireland v Maxwell.109 In that case it was held that, where the alleged accomplice knows
that one or more of a limited range of offences may be committed by the perpetrator, and
one of them is actually committed by him, the alleged accomplice can be convicted as
a party to it. In this case, D had guided a car containing terrorists to a public house; on
arrival D had departed but shortly afterwards one of the terrorists had thrown a bomb
into the building. Apparently, D did not know whether the attack would be by firing
guns, planting bombs or otherwise. The House of Lords held that D had properly been
convicted, as an accomplice, of the statutory offences of doing an act with intent to cause
an explosion likely to endanger life and of being in possession of a bomb with the same
intent, since he knew that these offences were within the range of offences which the ter-
rorists might perpetrate.
105 Swindall and Osborne (1846) 2 C and K 231 (see para 17.76); Baldessare (1930) 22 Cr App R 70, CCA; Buck
and Buck (1960) 44 Cr App R 213; Creamer [1966] 1 QB 72, CCA. 106 Paras 8.84–8.105.
107 Bullock [1955] 1 All ER 15 at 18; Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129, CCA; Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231 at
[49]. 108 [1960] 1 QB 129, CCA.
109 [1978] 3 All ER 1140, HL. See also Hamilton [1987] NIJB 1, NICA.
 | 17.37 participation
17.37 Two questions remain unresolved:

• Would Bainbridge have been liable, as accomplice, for a large number of breaking
offences committed over a considerable period of time with the equipment?
• What is meant by a ‘particular type of offence’? Suppose D lends P a jemmy, thinking
that he is going to use it to enter a building as a trespasser in order to steal (burglary),
but E uses it to enter a building in order to cause serious harm to a woman therein.
P’s conduct would constitute burglary but would D have known the particular type
of offence intended? Clearly, if P actually caused serious harm to the woman, D could
not be convicted as an accomplice to causing grievous bodily harm with intent110 but
could he be convicted as an accomplice to burglary? This depends on the definition
of ‘the particular type of offence’.
Where the principal offence is committed against the wrong person

17.38 The doctrine of transferred malice111 applies to secondary liability as well as to
primary liability. Thus, if D has knowingly encouraged or assisted P intentionally to kill
X but P accidentally kills V when his shot misses X (or mistakenly kills V), D can be con-
victed as an accomplice to the murder of V, just as P can be convicted as a perpetrator.
An extreme example of this is provided by Gnango,112 where D engaged in a shoot-out
with P, an opponent, in a public place. Each of them had the intention of killing or, at
least, seriously injuring the other. V, an innocent passer-by, was killed in the cross-fire
by a shot fired by P. P was clearly guilty, as perpetrator, of the murder of V by virtue of
the doctrine of transferred malice but he was never arrested, or even identified. D was
convicted of murder after the judge had directed the jury in terms of ‘parasitic accessory
liability’, discussed in paras 17.42 to 17.58, but his conviction was quashed by the Court
of Appeal on the ground that such liability could not arise on the facts.
The prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court who also held that parasitic accessory
liability could not apply on the facts; see para 17.56 for its reasoning. However, by a majority
of six to one, the Supreme Court allowed the prosecution’s appeal and restored D’s con-
viction for murder. Although the majority were agreed that D was guilty of murder, four
based that liability on the ground that D was an accomplice to the murder perpetrated by
P, while (as already noted) the other two based liability on the ground that D was a joint
principal of murder.113 The reason given by the four is ratio decidendi whereas that given
by the other two is not.
The leading judgment of the Supreme Court was given by Lords Phillips P and Judge CJ
(with whom Lord Wilson SCJ agreed) as follows. It was no bar to conviction that D had
been the intended victim of the fatal shot.114 If D had aided and abetted P to shoot at him,
D was guilty as an accomplice to the attempted murder of himself. Had D been killed by
P he would have been a party to his own murder. Although D had not intended that P
should succeed in hitting him, complicity in P’s attempt to do so would have rendered D
party to the successful achievement of that attempt. Just as P, in accidentally shooting V,
was, under the doctrine of transferred malice, liable for V’s murder, so was D liable as a
party to it under that doctrine if he had aided, abetted, counselled or procured P to shoot
110 Para 17.32. 111 Para 3.38. 112 [2011] UKSC 59. 113 Para 17.4. 114 Para 17.62.
17.38 accomplices | 
at him. Although the judge had rejected the possibility that D had aided and abetted the
shooting by P on the ground that there was no active encouragement to shoot at him,
and had not left aiding and abetting to the jury, their Lordships were satisfied, having
regard to the terms of the judge’s direction, that the jury must have been satisfied that D
had aided, abetted, counselled or procured P to shoot at him with the mens rea for mur-
der. They reached this conclusion on the basis that they were satisfied that the judge had
unequivocally directed the jury that they could convict D only if they were sure that, by
analogy to a duel or prizefight, there was an agreement between D and P to shoot at each
other and be shot at, and that D and P encouraged each other to carry that agreement
into effect. The jury’s verdict indicated that they were so satisfied. Accordingly, this was a
proper basis for finding that D aided and abetted the murder of V by aiding and abetting
P to shoot at him (ie D).
In a concurring judgment, Lord Dyson SCJ agreed that the jury must have been satis-
fied that there was an agreement between D and P to shoot at each other and be shot at,
and that D had aided and abetted P to murder V by encouraging P to shoot at him in the
course of the planned shoot-out. Noting the analogy with a duel or prizefight in the lead-
ing judgment, Lord Dyson stated that it was important to distinguish between them and
a mere fight. An essential element of the former was an agreement by the combatants to
fight each other; they encourage each other to fight. His Lordship agreed with the judge
that there was a distinction between encouragement and provocation:
‘If A shoots back at B because he has been provoked by B’s shooting to do so, that is very
different from saying that A shoots back at B because he has been encouraged to do so
pursuant to an agreement to have a shoot-out.’115
It is submitted that the reasoning adopted by Lords Phillips, Judge, Wilson and Dyson
(like that of the other two justices in the majority, who allowed the appeal on another
ground as explained in para 17.4) is strained and was driven more by policy considerations
than by legal logic. As Lord Kerr, the dissenting justice, pointed out,116 even if the jury’s
verdict could be taken as evidence that they concluded that there had been an agreement
between D and P (in his view ‘no’), and even if it followed from this that an element of
the agreement must have been that they agreed to be shot, as well as to shoot (in his view
‘no’), it does not follow that this amounted to an intention on the part of D and P to assist
or encourage each other to shoot. The judge had directed the jury on an entirely different
basis of liability. It was extremely likely that this was the basis on which they convicted D.
That being so, there was no occasion for them to consider whether the requisite intention
on D’s part to found a verdict of guilty on the basis of aiding and abetting was present.117
115 [2011] UKSC 59 at [100]. 116 Ibid at [121]–[126].

117 Another possible basis for upholding D’s conviction for murder discussed by the Supreme Court was that
D was a perpetrator of murder on the ground that he had caused P to shoot back at him and thereby contributed
to V’s death. Th is was discussed by three of the justices. Lord Clarke (at [83]–[92]) thought that it would have
been open to the jury to conclude that one of the effective causes of V’s death was D shooting at P, on the ground
that it caused P to shoot back with the mens rea for murder, as result of which V was killed. Lord Clarke thought
that, if the case had been put to the jury on this basis, the jury would have been very likely to reach that conclu-
sion. However, since the case had not been so put to the jury, he declined to allow the appeal on this basis. Lord
 | 17.39 participation
As was noted in the leading judgment, whether D was a principal or an accomplice

was irrelevant to the appeal, either way the offence was the same offence and D was guilty
of it. It was recognised, however, there may be cases where it is important to distinguish
between a principal and an accomplice.118
17.39 Someone who aids, abets, counsels or procures another to commit an offence is
not liable if he has aided, abetted, counselled or procured the perpetrator to commit an
offence against a particular person or thing and the perpetrator deliberately119 commits
that offence against another person or thing. Thus, if D encourages P to assault O with
his fists but P deliberately attacks V, instead of O, with his fists, D cannot be convicted
as an accomplice to the assault.120 On the other hand, if the actual victim is unspecified,
it is irrelevant that D does not know who is the intended victim or is mistaken as to the
intended victim. In Reardon121 P shot two men in a bar and then dragged them outside.
He returned and said ‘that [***] is still alive, [D], lend us your knife’. D gave P his knife. P
went out and stabbed both victims fatally. D was charged with both murders as an accom-
plice on the basis of his lending of the knife. Rejecting his appeal against conviction for
both murders, the Court of Appeal held that it was irrelevant that P’s request only related
to one of the victims (who was not specified). The question was whether the stabbing of
both victims by P amounted to actions which D could reasonably, and did, foresee as the
type of act which P might carry out. Whichever of the victims he stabbed first, clearly the
killing of that victim was contemplated by D when he handed P the knife. Equally, it was
open to the jury to conclude that D foresaw at least the strong possibility that, if P found
the other victim still alive, he would also stab him. P’s actions were within the scope of
D’s contemplation and the fact that P used the knife in a foreseen manner twice rather
than once was immaterial.
Strict liability offences

17.40 The above requirements of mens rea apply even though the offence which D is
alleged to have assisted, encouraged or procured is one of strict liability. In Callow v
Tillstone,122 eg, where P, a butcher, had exposed unsound meat for sale, after D, a vet,
Dyson (at [106]) pointed out that, if P’s act of shooting at D was a free, deliberate and informed act, it broke the
chain of causation between D’s shooting at him and his shooting and killing V (see paras 2.43–2.45). He noted
that it was arguable that P’s act of shooting was not a free, deliberate and informed act because he was acting in
self-defence but admitted that this argument would be very difficult on the facts of the case. He also noted that,
even if P was acting in a free, deliberate and informed manner, that would be irrelevant if he and D were acting
‘in concert’ (see para 2.43). He agreed with Lord Clarke that, as the case had not been put to the jury on the basis
that D might have caused P to fi re the fatal shot, D’s conviction could not be upheld on that basis. Lord Kerr (at
[131] and [132]) also saw major difficulties of proving that D’s shooting at P caused P to fire the fatal shot because
P shot at D fi rst and a claim that P’s continued shooting was caused by D’s return of fire encountered difficulties
of the type referred to by Lord Dyson and was highly questionable.
118 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 at [63] per Lords Phillips P and Judge CJ (with whom Lord Wilson SCJ agreed).
119 As opposed to accidentally or mistakenly.
120 Hawkins Pleas of the Crown c 29, s 21; Leahy [1985] Crim LR 99, Crown Ct. Nor is a person guilty as an
accomplice if a perpetrator deliberately allows the intended offence to have effect on a person or property which
was not the object of the unlawful venture: Saunders and Archer (1573) 2 Plowd 473.
121 [1998] 5 Archbold News 2, CA.
122 (1900) 83 LT 411, DC. See also Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544, DC.
17.42 accomplices | 
had examined it at P’s request and certified that it was sound, it was held that, although
P was guilty of the strict liability offence of exposing unsound meat for sale, D could not
be convicted of that offence, as an accomplice, because he did not know the meat was
unsound.
Joint enterprises: intentional perpetration of an

offence which is not the common purpose of a
joint enterprise
Key points 17.3
Where a party to a joint enterprise to commit an offence (the basic offence) intentionally perpe-
trates another offence (the further offence) which is outside the common purpose in committing
or attempting to commit the basic offence:
another party to the enterprise (D) is liable for the further offence if D contemplates
as a real possibility that another party to the enterprise may, in the course of carrying
out the enterprise, do an act, with the requisite mens rea, constituting that offence,
unless the act done by the perpetrator was fundamentally different from that foreseen
by D.
If the further offence shares the same actus reus as another offence (the other offence) but is
distinguishable from it by a higher degree of mens rea and D does not contemplate that another
party may act with that higher degree of mens rea:
D can be convicted of the other offence (ie the one with the lesser degree of mens rea)
if he had the mens rea for that offence, unless the perpetrator’s act was fundamentally dif-
ferent from that foreseen by D.
17.41 A ‘joint enterprise’ (otherwise known as a ‘joint criminal enterprise’ or ‘joint

criminal venture’) exists where two (or more) people engage together with the common
purpose that an offence be committed.
The term ‘joint enterprise’ has been used in respect of more than one situation.123 It
is sometimes used in the case of joint perpetrators of an offence. In terms of second-
ary liability the term has been used in respect of the straightforward case where D is an
accomplice to a single offence committed by P.
17.42 This part of the chapter is not concerned with these situations. Instead, it focuses
on another situation where the term ‘joint enterprise’ has been used. This is the situation
where two (or more) people (eg D and P) participate in the commission of an offence (‘the
basic offence’) with a common purpose and, in the course of committing, or attempt-
ing to commit, the basic offence, P intentionally commits another offence (the ‘further
123 Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (13th edn, 2011) (Ormerod (ed)) 213 state that the term appears to be
used in respect of five situations. In A, B, C and D [2010] EWCA Crim 1622 at [9], the Court of Appeal referred
to there being ‘at least’ three.
 | 17.43 participation
offence’) which is outside their common purpose but which D has foreseen P might com-
mit. The same principles apply whether D and P are joint perpetrators of the basic offence
or D has simply assisted or encouraged P to commit it. If D is criminally liable for the
further offence committed by P, D’s liability is described as ‘parasitic accessory liability’,
a phrase coined by Professor Sir John Smith124 and adopted by the Supreme Court in
Gnango.125
17.43 An example of a situation of the present type would be where D has set out with
P to commit a burglary and has encouraged P to use his jemmy to frighten anyone who
comes on him, and P, disturbed by the householder in the course of the burglary, inten-
tionally kills the householder with the jemmy. The common purpose of the parties was
the commission of an offence of burglary. P is undoubtedly guilty of murder, as well as of
burglary. D is clearly guilty of burglary as an accomplice. As explained below, on these
facts D is also guilty of murder as an accomplice. The situation exemplified by these facts
has been considered in different factual contexts on quite a number of occasions by the
Court of Appeal and the House of the Lords. In A, B, C and D,126 the Court of Appeal
concluded that:
‘. . . [T]he liability of [D] . . . rests, as all these citations show, on his having continued in
the common venture of crime A when he realises (even if he does not desire) that crime
B may be committed in the course of it. Where crime B is murder, that means that he can
properly be held guilty if he foresees that [D] will cause death by acting with murderous
intent (viz either intent to kill or intent to do GBH). He has associated himself with a
foreseen murder.’
This conclusion was endorsed in the leading judgment in Gnango.127

Although the principles below which provide the answer to this question have been
formulated in the context of homicide offences, they are equally applicable to other
offences.128 The principles are not limited to pre-planned conduct; they also apply to a
case where two or more people spontaneously combine together in an attack assisting
and encouraging each other.129 They apply so long as the joint enterprise continues and
D remains a party to it.130
17.44 Provided that the relevant principles set out below are satisfied, a party to a joint
enterprise involving more than two people is guilty as an accomplice to a ‘further offence’
committed by another party even if he did not foresee the identity of the perpetrator131
124 JC Smith ‘Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform’ (1997) 113 LQR 453 at 455.
125 [2011] UKSC 59. 126 [2010] EWCA Crim 1622 at [27]. 127 [2011] UKSC 59 at [14].
128 Powell and Daniels; English [1999] 1 AC 1 at 12, per Lord Steyn; Rahman [2008] UKHL 45 at [8], per Lord
Bingham.
129 Uddin [1999] QB 431, CA; Greatrex and Bates [1999] 1 Cr App R 126, CA; Mendez and Thompson [2010]
EWCA Crm 516.
130 See, eg, Mitchell and King (1999) 163 JP 75, CA; O’Flaherty, Ryan and Toussaint [2004] EWCA Crim 526;
Mitchell and Ballantyne [2008] EWCA Crim 2552. As to withdrawal from participation see paras 17.69–17.72.
131 Nelson [1999] 6 Archbold News 2, CA; Rahman [2008] UKHL 45; Smith [2008] EWCA Crim 1342; Yemoh
[2009] EWCA Crim 930.
17.45 accomplices | 
or the perpetrator is never identified.132 Thus, where one of a gang attacking someone
murders him, it is irrelevant that the alleged accomplice to the further offence (another
member of the gang) did not foresee who would be the killer.
The basic rule

17.45 A party to a joint enterprise to commit an offence (eg burglary), the ‘basic offence’,
can be convicted of a ‘further offence’ (eg murder) if it is proved that he contemplated as a
real possibility that the perpetrator might act with the mens rea for that further offence in a
way that the perpetrator did (or in a way not fundamentally different) in the course of the
basic offence but still participated in the enterprise.133 This is simply an application of the
principles of mens rea dealt with above. In many cases where this test is satisfied, D will have
expressly or tacitly134 agreed to, or authorised the commission of the ‘further offence’, but
this is not necessary in order for the test to be satisfied.135 The leading authority for these
principles, which apply whether D was present or absent from the scene of the crime,136 is
now the decision of the House of Lords in the consolidated appeals of Powell and Daniels;
English,137 where the House confirmed the ‘contemplation test’ as the test of liability in
joint enterprise cases of the present type. Thus, in the example given in para 17.43, if it was
proved that D contemplated as a real possibility that P might use his jemmy intentionally
to kill or do grievous bodily harm to someone who came on him during the burglary D
could be convicted as an accomplice to murder, even if it could not be proved that he had
expressly or tacitly agreed to its use for that purpose and even though he had forbidden P
to use violence on anyone.
In Powell and Daniels, D1 and D2 went with P to a drug dealer’s house to buy drugs. The
drug dealer was shot when he came to the door. It was not clear which of the three men
had fired the gun, but the prosecution argued that, if P had done so, D1 and D2 were guilty
of murder because they knew that P was armed with a gun and might use it to kill or cause
really serious injury to the drug dealer. D1 and D2 were convicted of murder on this basis.
They appealed against conviction unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, and thence to the
House of Lords who dismissed the appeals. The House of Lords held that, where one party
(D) to a joint enterprise to commit an offence foresees as a real possibility that another
party may, in the course of it, do an act, with the requisite mens rea, constituting another
offence (and another party does so), D is liable for that offence. This is so, it held, even
if D has not expressly or tacitly agreed to that offence, and even though D has expressly
forbidden it. As stated earlier, the requisite degree of foresight, ‘foresight of real possibility’,
was described in Powell and Daniels; English as foresight of a risk which is not foreseen as
so remote that D ‘dismissed it as altogether negligible’.138
132 A, B, C and D [2010] EWCA Crim 1622. 133 Powell and Daniels; English [1999] 1 AC 1 HL.
134 Depending on his knowledge of the facts, D may have tacitly agreed to, or authorised, the ‘further offence’
by taking part in the joint criminal venture: Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168, PC; Hyde [1991] 1 QB 134, CA.
135 Smith [1963] 3 All ER 597, CCA; Hyde; above Powell and Daniels; English [1999] 1 AC 1, HL.
136 Rook [1993] 2 All ER 955, CA. 137 [1999] 1 AC 1, HL. Also see Uddin [1999] QB 431, CA.
138 Also see Chan Wing-Siu v R [1985] AC 168, PC; Ward (1986) 85 Cr App R 71, CA; Hyde [1991] 1 QB 134,
CA; Roberts [1993] 1 All ER 583, CA.
 | 17.46 participation
The ‘fundamentally different act’ qualification

17.46 In Powell and Daniels, D1 and D2 knew that P was armed with a gun. Their case
would have been dealt with differently if they had not known that P was armed with a
gun or an equally dangerous weapon. D is not liable for a further offence committed by P,
even though D contemplated that P might act with the necessary mens rea for the further
offence in the course of committing the basic offence, if P acted in a fundamentally dif-
ferent manner from that contemplated by D. The leading authorities for this limit on the
scope of D’s liability are the House of Lords’ decisions in English139 and Rahman.140
In English, D and P participated in a joint attack on a police officer in which they both
caused injury with wooden posts but the police officer died from stab wounds inflicted by
P. D was convicted, as an accomplice, of murder after the trial judge had told the jury so
to convict him if he had joined in the attack realising that there was a substantial risk that
P might kill the officer or cause him really serious injury during the attack. D appealed
unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal, but his subsequent appeal to the House of Lords
succeeded. The House of Lords held that, even if an alleged accomplice (D) intended or
foresaw that the perpetrator (P) would or might act in the course of the basic crime with
intent to do grievous bodily harm, D could not be convicted as a party to that offence
if P’s act was fundamentally different from the act intended or foreseen by D. On the
other hand, if P’s act, though different, was as dangerous as that foreseen as a ‘real pos-
sibility’ by D, as where the actual act was stabbing with a knife to kill and that foreseen
as a real possibility was shooting to kill, D could not escape liability. On this basis, D’s
appeal had to be allowed because the jury could have found on the evidence that D did not
know that P had a knife (or equally dangerous weapon).
This decision has much to commend it. However, when D did not foresee the act in
question as a real possibility, it is liable to result in fine distinctions as to whether what
he did foresee as a real possibility was an equally dangerous act. In Uddin,141 one of the
issues on which the jury should have been told to focus was whether the use of a flick-
knife was a more dangerous act than hitting the deceased with clubs or kicking him with
shod feet; in Greatrex and Bates,142 the Court of Appeal ordered a retrial so that the jury
could decide whether hitting someone with a metal bar was a more dangerous act than
kicking him with a shod foot. The problem of what is a ‘fundamentally different act’ is
returned to in para 17.50.
17.47 The House of Lords’ decision in Rahman provides two further explanations of
the ‘fundamentally different act’ qualification, which are relevant only in the context of
murder. These explanations are dealt with in paras 17.48 and 17.49.
17.48 In essence, the first of these further explanations is that if P kills with intent to
kill, but D only contemplated that another party to the joint enterprise might inten-
tionally cause grievous bodily harm, P’s greater mens rea does not take the killing out-
side the scope of the common purpose to cause grievous bodily harm and does not
render P’s act fundamentally different from that contemplated by D.
139 [1999] 1 AC 1, HL. 140 [2008] UKHL 45. 141 [1999] QB 431, CA.
142 [1999] 1 Cr App R 126, CA.
17.48 accomplices | 
In Rahman,143 the defendants had been part of a group of men which chased and
attacked V and his friends with weapons including baseball bats, metal bars and pieces
of wood. V died from a deep knife wound in his back. The prosecution alleged that each
of the defendants had been a party to a joint enterprise to inflict serious bodily harm
(ie grievous bodily harm) on V. There was no evidence that any of them inflicted the
fatal injury; the gang member who did (ie the perpetrator) probably escaped arrest. Each
defendant said that he had joined the enterprise with at most an intent to cause serious
harm (whereas the nature of the stab wound demonstrated an intent to kill on the part of
the perpetrator), denied possession of the knife and also denied awareness that anyone
else in the group intended to kill or had a knife. As a result, each defendant argued, the
perpetrator acted outside the scope of a joint enterprise to inflict serious bodily harm.
The defendants were convicted of murder after the judge had directed the jury that they
could only convict a particular defendant if they were sure that he realised that one or
more of the attackers might use a knife in the attack to kill with the intention of killing
V or causing him serious harm. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions but certified
the following questions of law for the opinion of the House of Lords:
‘If in the course of a joint enterprise to inflict unlawful violence the principal party kills
with an intention to kill which is unknown to and unforeseen by a secondary party, is
the principal’s [ie perpetrator’s] intention relevant, (i) to whether the killing was within
the scope of a common purpose to which the secondary party was an accessory? (ii) to
whether the principal’s act was fundamentally different from the act or acts which the
secondary party foresaw as part of the joint enterprise?’
Dismissing the defendants’ appeals, the House of Lords answered both questions in the
negative.
The defendants had submitted that, since the evidence showed the fatal wound was (or
was possibly) inflicted with intent to kill, whereas they intended to cause grievous bodily
harm and did not know that anyone else involved intended to kill, the perpetrator’s inten-
tion to kill (if found by the jury) rendered the perpetrator’s act of stabbing fundamentally
different from anything they has foreseen; the trial judge’s failure to direct the jury to
this effect amounted to misdirection. Lord Bingham gave two reasons (with which Lords
Brown, Scott, and Neuberger agreed) for rejecting the defendants’ submission:
‘Authority apart, there are in my view two strong reasons, one practical, the other theo-
retical, for [rejecting the defendants’ submission]. The fi rst is that the law of joint enter-
prise in a situation such as this is already very complex . . . ; [the defendants’] submission,
if accepted, would introduce a new and highly undesirable level of complexity. Given
the fluid, fast-moving course of events in incidents such as that which culminated in
the killing of the deceased, incidents which are unhappily not rare, it must often be very
hard for jurors to make a reliable assessment of what a particular defendant foresaw as
likely or possible acts on the part of his associates. It would be even harder, and would
border on speculation, to judge what a particular defendant foresaw as the intention
with which his associates might perform such acts. It is safer to focus on the defendant’s
143 [2008] UKHL 45.

 | 17.49 participation
foresight of what an associate might do, an issue to which knowledge of the associate’s
possession of an obviously lethal weapon such as a gun or a knife would usually be very
relevant.
Secondly, [the defendants’] submission, as it seems to me, undermines the principle
on which . . . our law of murder is based. In the prosecution of a principal offender for
murder, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove or the jury to consider whether
the defendant intended on the one hand to kill or on the other to cause really serious
injury. That is legally irrelevant to guilt. The rationale of that principle plainly is that if
a person unlawfully assaults another with intent to cause him really serious injury, and
death results, he should be held criminally responsible for that fatality, even though he
did not intend it. If he had not embarked on a course of deliberate violence, the fatality
would not have occurred. Th is rationale may lack logical purity, but it is underpinned
by a quality of earthy realism. To rule that an undisclosed and unforeseen intention to
kill on the part of the primary offender may take a killing outside the scope of a com-
mon purpose to cause really serious injury, calling for a distinction irrelevant in the
case of the primary offender, is in my view to subvert the rationale which underlies our
law of murder.’144
As a result, the House of Lords held that if, in the course of a joint enterprise to cause
serious injury (eg jointly attacking V), one of the participants (the perpetrator) intention-
ally kills V, that intention being unknown to and unforeseen by another participant (D)
who only contemplated that the perpetrator would act with the intention to cause serious
harm, that intention to kill does not take the killing outside the scope of the common
purpose to cause serious harm and does not make the perpetrator’s fatal act fundamen-
tally different from the act which D foresaw as part of the joint enterprise for the purpose
of the rule laid down in English.
17.49 The second further explanation referred to in para 17.47 is as follows. In the
Court of Appeal in Rahman, the Court held that, where a perpetrator killed someone
by an act fundamentally different from that contemplated by D, another party to a joint
enterprise, D could not rely on the fundamentally different act qualification where he
intended the perpetrator intentionally to kill or he foresaw that the perpetrator might
kill with intent to kill; otherwise he could rely on the qualification.
In the House of Lords in Rahman, Lord Brown, obiter, restated the relevant principles
as they relate to murder in a different form as follows:
‘If B realises (without agreeing to such conduct being used) that A may kill or intention-
ally inflict serious injury, but nevertheless continues to participate with A in the venture,
that will amount to a sufficient mental element for B to be guilty of murder if A, with the
requisite intent, kills in the course of the venture unless (i) A suddenly produces and uses
a weapon of which B knows nothing and which is more lethal than any weapon which B
contemplates that A or any other participant may be carrying and (ii) for that reason A’s
act is to be regarded as fundamentally different from anything foreseen by B. (The italicised
words are designed to reflect the English qualification).’145
144 Ibid at [24], [25]. 145 Ibid at [68].

17.50 accomplices | 
Lords Scott and Neuberger expressly agreed.146 It follows from Lord Brown’s state-
ment that, although a defendant cannot rely on the qualification to English where he
intended the perpetrator intentionally to kill, he can where he foresaw that the perpe-
trator might kill with intention to do so if (i) and (ii) above apply. This seems unduly
generous to the defendant.
In Yemoh,147 the Court of Appeal, having referred to the above statement in Rahman,
stated that the fundamental difference qualification now therefore applies in murder only
if D did not intend the victim to be killed and only applies if D:
• realised that one of the other parties might kill with intent to kill or cause grievous
bodily harm; or
• intended that serious harm would be caused; or
• realised that one of the other parties might cause grievous bodily harm with intent
to cause such harm.
What is a fundamentally different act?

17.50 The answer to the question ‘what is a fundamentally different act?’ was complicated
by statements made by various Law Lords in Rahman. As has been indicated, in the context
of murder a difference in the perpetrator’s (P’s) mens rea from that contemplated by D does
not suffice. On the other hand, a difference in P’s conduct may suffice. While this is clear, it
is not clear whether there are limits on when such a change will suffice. According to Lord
Brown (see the passage in para 17.49), Lord Rodger148 and Lord Neuberger,149 only the use
of a different and more deadly weapon than any weapon contemplated by D can render
an act fundamentally different, although Lord Neuberger was prepared to accept that the
facts of a future case might give rise to another ground justifying a finding of fundamental
difference.150 This approach of Lords Brown, Rodger and Neuberger does not reflect any
previous judicial pronouncements and, if it is correct, would impose an important limita-
tion on the qualification to English, despite the fact that in the statement in the above pas-
sage Lord Brown said that was ‘designed to reflect the English qualification’. It ignores the
fact that the dangerousness of an act does not depend simply on the nature of the weapon
used but also the way in which it is used and the circumstances in which it is used.
In English Lord Hutton approved the decision in Gamble,151 a Northern Irish case,
where D1 and D2 entered a joint enterprise with two other defendants to give V a severe
beating or to ‘kneecap’ him. In the course of the attack on V, the other two defendants
murdered V by slitting his throat with a knife; they also fired bullets into his body, two
of which would have been fatal had not V died from the slit throat. Carswell J (as he then
was), sitting without a jury in the Northern Irish Crown Court, held that D1 and D2 were
not guilty of murder; the fatal act had not been in their contemplation. In Rahman Lords
Brown, Neuberger and Scott152 had strong reservations about the decision in Gamble
146 Ibid at [31] and [72] respectively.

147 [2009] EWCA Crim 930. See also Mendez and Thompson [2010] EWCA Crim 516 at [44] and [45].
148 [2008] UKHL 45 at [47]. 149 Ibid at [88]. 150 Ibid at [102]. 151 [1989] NI 268.
152 [2008] UKHL 45 at [31], [68] and [93].
 | 17.51 participation
because a knife was not more lethal than the gun which D1 and D2 contemplated being
used. It is submitted that there is a critical difference between a gun being used to knee-
cap someone and a knife used to slit his throat; to view the dangerousness of an act solely
by reference to the weapon used is artificial and unduly restricts the ‘fundamentally dif-
ferent act’ qualification.
None of the Law Lords in Rahman referred to A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2004)153 where the
Court of Appeal held that P’s actual act of firing a firearm at V was fundamentally different from
the act of firing that firearm near to V which D contemplated; on this basis, the dangerousness of
an act does not depend solely on the actual act done but also depends on the way it is done.
17.51 In Mendez and Thompson,154 a murder case, the Court of Appeal, who did not
refer to the approach of Lords Brown, Rodger and Neuberger in Rahman mentioned near
the beginning of para 17.50, restated the test of a fundamentally different act. It did so by
adopting the appellant counsel’s proposition:
‘In cases where the common purpose is not to kill but to cause serious harm, D is not liable
for the murder of V if the direct cause of V’s death was a deliberate act by [P] which was of
a kind (a) unforeseen by D and (b) likely to be altogether more life-threatening than acts
of the kind intended or foreseen by D. The reference to “a deliberate act” is to the quality of
the act – deliberate and not by chance – rather than to any consideration of [P]’s intention
as to the consequences.’155
The Court also stated that ‘what matters is not simply the difference in weapon but the
way in which it is likely to be used and the degree of injury which it is likely to cause’.156
Thus, according to these statements the test is not limited to whether there is a difference
between the nature of the weapon used and that contemplated by D (ie was the weapon
used different and more deadly?) but also takes into consideration P’s act overall, including
the way in which a weapon (whether or not D was aware of it) was used and the degree of
injury it was likely to cause. Under this test the act of throat-slitting in Gamble is clearly
fundamentally different from the severe beating or kneecapping foreseen by D1 and D2.
This restatement avoids the criticism associated with the approach of Lords Brown,
Rodger and Neuberger in Rahman. However, it must not be forgotten that Rahman is a
House of Lords decision. Until the matter is clarified by the Supreme Court one cannot be
certain of the freedom of judges to direct juries in terms of the restatement.
Conviction for less serious offence than perpetrator

17.52 Some offences, such as murder and manslaughter, and wounding with intent and
unlawful wounding contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, ss 18 and 20,
essentially share a common actus reus but are distinguished by the fact that a different state
of mind is specified for each offence. A question raised by cases such as Powell and Daniels;
English is whether a defendant who is not guilty of being an accomplice to offence A (eg
murder), because he did not contemplate that the perpetrator might act with the mens
153 [2005] EWCA Crim 1882. 154 [2010] EWCA Crim 516. 155 Ibid at [45].
156 Ibid at [42].
17.54 accomplices | 
rea for that offence in carrying out the joint enterprise, can nevertheless be convicted of
offence B (eg manslaughter) if he had the mens rea for that offence. The answer is ‘no’ if
the perpetrator’s act was fundamentally different from that foreseen as a real possibility
by D,157 but ‘yes’ if the perpetrator’s act was the one so foreseen by D, or was no more dan-
gerous than the one so foreseen by D.158 This distinction can be explained by contrasting
Anderson and Morris159 with Gilmour160 and Roberts, Day and Day.161
17.53 In Anderson and Morris, approved in Powell and Daniels; English, D and P agreed
to attack V. D began punching V. P then produced a knife and killed V with it. D said that
he was unaware that P had the knife or was going to use it. P was convicted of murder
and D of manslaughter. D’s conviction was quashed. Clearly, P had departed from the
contemplated joint enterprise and intentionally perpetrated a more dangerous act than
that foreseen by D.162
17.54 In Gilmour, D drove P1 and P2, members of a Protestant terrorist organisation, to
a housing estate. P1 and P2 threw a petrol bomb through a window of a house; the child
occupants were killed. P1 and P2 were found to have acted with the necessary mens rea
for murder and were convicted of that offence. D knew a petrol bombing was planned but
there was insufficient evidence that he knew that anyone would act with intent to kill or
do grievous bodily harm; the most that could be attributed to him was that he realised
that P1 and P2 intended to cause a fire which might do some damage and put the occu-
pants in fear. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, allowing D’s appeal against convic-
tion for murder on the basis of Powell and Daniels; English, substituted a conviction for
manslaughter on the basis that there was no reason ‘why a person acting as an accomplice
to a perpetrator who carries out the very deed contemplated by both should not be guilty
of the degree of offence appropriate to the intent with which he had acted’.
The same principle as applied in Gilmour was applied by the Court of Appeal in Roberts,
Day and Day, although the Court of Appeal did not refer to Gilmour. In Roberts, Day and
Day, D went with P to ‘look for’ V. P punched V (who fell) and then kicked V on the head.
V later died of his injuries. D was involved in fighting one of V’s associates. P was con-
victed of the murder of V; D was convicted of the manslaughter of V. D appealed against
conviction. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that D must have
foreseen the act of kicking V on the ground done by P and that a person who foresaw the
fatal, dangerous act but who did not have the mens rea required to be a party to murder
could be convicted of manslaughter as an accomplice. These decisions raise the question,
discussed in paras 17.50 and 17.51, of whether the perpetrator’s act is fundamentally dif-
ferent from, or equally dangerous to, that foreseen by the alleged accomplice.163
157 Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 QB 110, CCA; Lovesey and Peterson [1970] 1 QB 352, CA; Powell and
Daniels; English [1999] 1 AC 1, HL (HL in English did not substitute a conviction for manslaughter, presumably
because it thought that there could not be liability for manslaughter in such a case); Uddin [1999] QB 431, CA;
Mitchell and King (1999) 163 JP 75, CA; Crooks [1999] NI 266, NICA.
158 Stewart and Schofield [1995] 3 All ER 159, CA; Gilmour [2000] 2 Cr App R 407, NICA; Roberts, Day and
Day [2001] EWCA Crim 1594; Carpenter [2011] EWCA Crim 2568. 159 [1966] 2 QB 110, CCA.
160 [2000] 2 Cr App R 407, NICA. 161 [2001] EWCA Crim 1594.
162 See also Parsons [2009] EWCA Crim 64; Carpenter [2011] EWCA Crim 2568.
163 The fact that the perpetrator of murder intended to kill does not make the act fundamentally different for
the purpose of determining the alleged accomplice’s liability for manslaughter: Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930.
 | 17.55 participation
17.55 We consider further in para 17.59 the issue of the differential liability of a perpet-
rator and accomplice.
Liability if common purpose involved in basic offence

encompasses further offence
17.56 In Gnango,164 the shoot-out case where an innocent third party had been killed, the
Supreme Court confirming that parasitic accessory liability depends on the existence of a
ommon purpose to commit a (basic) offence, added that the further offence must not be encom-
passed in the common purpose involved in the basic offence. The essence of parasitic accessory
liability is that there is a common purpose and in the course of furthering that common pur-
pose P goes beyond what was agreed as D foresaw might possibly occur. If P does not go beyond
the common purpose, the case is a straightforward one of aiding or abetting etc.
In Gnango, the judge had left to the jury the issue of D’s liability for the murder perpe-
trated by P on the basis of parasitic liability. He told them that, if they were satisfied that
D and P had joined together to commit an affray by having a gunfight there would have
been a joint enterprise to commit affray, and that, if in the course of that enterprise, V was
murdered by P and D had realised that in the course of the enterprise P might kill with the
mens rea for murder, D would also be guilty of murder. The jury convicted D of murder on
this basis. D appealed against conviction.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the doctrine of parasitic
accessory liability did not apply on the relevant facts. The reason, it said, was that the two
protagonists could not have been said to have had a common purpose to commit violence
of a type that fell short of the violence committed. Either P and D had no common purpose
to have a shoot-out, or there was such a common purpose. If they intended to have a
shoot-out, each necessarily accepted that the other would shoot him with the intention to
kill or cause serious injury. Thus, if there had been a common purpose to have an affray,
that intention was to have an affray by shooting at each other with homicidal intent. It was
artificial to treat the intention to have an affray as a separate intention from the intention
to have a potentially homicidal shooting match.
A separate doctrine of joint enterprise?

17.57 The discussion in paras 17.42 to 17.56 of the rules relating to joint enterprises where D
participates with P in the commission of an offence and in the course of that offence P com-
mits a further offence outside the common purpose which D has foreseen as a possibility
has proceeded on the basis that if D is liable for the further offence it is as an accomplice.
Views differ as to whether this is the correct basis.165 In Stewart and Schofield,166 the Court
of Appeal distinguished between cases of joint enterprise where D was physically present
when the further offence was committed by P and took part in its execution, and those
where D’s assistance or encouragement was given before its commission. It stated that in
the former type of case a separate form of secondary liability applies based on participation
164 [2011] UKSC 59. The facts of this case are set out in para 17.38.
165 Contrast Smith and Hogan Criminal Law (13th edn, 2011) (Ormerod (ed)) 228–230 and Simester and
Sullivan’s Criminal Law (4th edn, 2010) (Simester, Spencer, Sullivan and Virgo (eds)) 242–244. Also see para 17.4.
166 [1995] 3 All ER 159, CA.
17.58 accomplices | 
in the criminal act of another rather than as an accomplice, whereas in the latter liability is
as an accomplice.167 The approach taken in Stewart and Schofield is erroneous. The Court
made no mention of the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Rook168 where it was held
that the rules about joint enterprise apply whether the person who has lent assistance or
encouragement has done so before the commission of the offence or is present when it is
committed.169 It is submitted that this is the correct view. The case law generally does not
refer to any distinction of the type put forward in Stewart and Schofield. Moreover, although
the matter was not considered in Powell and Daniels; English and Rahman, the House of
Lords in both cases treated parties to a joint enterprise as accomplices. More recently, the
Court of Appeal in A, B, C and D170 stated that liability based on joint enterprise is a form of
secondary liability, a view favoured by the Court of Appeal in Mendez and Thompson171 and
adopted in the earlier discussion of the rules about joint enterprise.
17.58 Where a party to a joint enterprise to commit an offence (the basic offence) inten-
tionally perpetrates another offence (the further offence) which is outside the common
purpose in committing or attempting to commit the basic offence, the liability of another
party to the joint enterprise can be summarised as follows.
Situation Liability of party to enterprise other than Exception

perpetrator
Where a party (P) to a joint Another party to the enterprise (D) is unless the act done
enterprise intentionally liable for that offence if D contemplates by the perpetrator
perpetrates further offence as a real possibility that P may, in the was fundamentally
outside the common purpose course of committing or attempting to different from that
of the enterprise: commit basic offence, do an act, with foreseen by D
the requisite mens rea, constituting
further offence:
Where a party (P) to a joint If the further offence shares the same unless the act done
enterprise intentionally actus reus as another offence (the other by the perpetrator
perpetrates an offence which offence), but is distinguishable from it was fundamentally
shares the same actus reus by a higher degree of mens rea, another different from that
as another offence (the other party to the enterprise (D) can be foreseen by D
offence) but is distinguishable convicted of the other offence (ie the
from it by a higher degree of one with the lesser degree of mens rea) if
mens rea: he had the mens rea for that offence and
he does not contemplate that P may act
with that higher degree of mens rea:
167 [1995] 3 All ER 159 at 165. 168 [1993] 2 All ER 955, CA. Also see Howe [1987] AC 417, HL.
169 The Court of Appeal implicitly proceeded on this basis in Wan and Chan [1995] Crim LR 296.
170 [2011] EWCA Crim 1622.
171 [2010] EWCA Crim 516. See also Stringer and Stringer [2011] EWCA Crim 1396.
 | 17.59 participation
Differential liability
17.59 It was seen above172 that sometimes the perpetrator and the accomplice can be
convicted of offences of a different degree. There are the following further examples:
• The effect of the Homicide Act 1957, s 4(1) is that if there is a suicide pact between P
and V, and D assists P to kill V, P will be guilty of manslaughter but D will be guilty
of murder; and that if there is a suicide pact between D and V, and D assists P to kill
V in pursuance of it D will be guilty of manslaughter and P of murder.
• A person who commits the actus reus of murder with malice aforethought, or
who with the appropriate mens rea aids and abets another to do so, may have the
partial defence of diminished responsibility or the partial defence of loss of con-
trol173 which reduces his liability to manslaughter. However, the Homicide Act
1957, s 2(4) and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(8) respectively provide
that the fact that one party to the killing is not guilty of murder on account of his
diminished responsibility or loss of control, as the case may be, does not affect
the question whether the killing amounted to murder in the case of any other
party to it.
• As stated above some offences essentially share a common actus reus but are distin-
guished by requiring different states of mind, and an accomplice can be convicted
of one such offence and the perpetrator of another if they had different appropri-
ate states of mind. This can result in an accomplice being convicted of a greater
offence than the perpetrator if he had a greater degree of mens rea, whether or not he
was present when the offence was committed.174 Thus, if D, having decided to bring
about V’s death, hands a grenade to P informing him that it only contains a ‘knock-
out gas’ and telling him to go and throw it at V, but the grenade contains explosives
(as D knows) and V is killed, D can be convicted of murder, even though P is guilty
only of manslaughter.
Mere presence at the time of the offence

Key points 17.4
A person who is a mere accidental spectator of the commission of an offence is not an
accomplice to it. In contrast, where a person is present pursuant to an agreement that
the offence be committed there is no difficulty in convicting him as an accomplice, and
in other cases non-accidental presence as a spectator is prima facie evidence of aiding or
abetting.
172 Paras 17.52–17.54. 173 Paras 8.37–8.81.

174 The decision to the contrary (at least, if the defendant was not present) in Richards [1974] QB 776, CA
was heavily criticised, although not expressly overruled, in Howe [1987] AC 417, HL, and it is submitted that
Richards no longer represents the law on this point.
17.61 accomplices | 
17.60 It is no offence to stand by, a mere accidental spectator of the commission of an

offence; the ordinary citizen is not under a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent an
offence and a failure to do so does not make him an accomplice to it.175
At the other extreme, there is no problem in convicting D as an accomplice where he
was present pursuant to an agreement that the principal offence be committed. In such
a case D’s presence pursuant to the agreement constitutes assistance or encouragement
with the requisite mens rea; there is no need to prove anything further by way of assist-
ance or encouragement.176
17.61 Where the evidence does not go so far but merely shows that D was present when the
principal offence was committed and that D’s presence was not accidental (ie D was volun-
tarily and purposely present), as where someone deliberately leaves a pub to watch a fight
outside, his non-accidental presence in such a case is not conclusive evidence of aiding or
abetting, but only prima facie evidence. In Coney,177 where D had been voluntarily present
at an illegal prizefight, his conviction as an accomplice to the battery of which the contest-
ants were guilty was quashed because the direction of the judge could have been under-
stood to mean that D’s voluntary presence was conclusive evidence of aiding and abetting.
In a case of the present type, it may not be easy for the prosecution to prove the follow-
ing two elements178 of liability:
• That D assisted or encouraged the perpetrator. Depending on the circumstances,
presence alone is capable of demonstrating actual encouragement.179
• That D had the mens rea required to be an accomplice to the principal offence. Thus,
where D has unwittingly assisted or encouraged another, by his misinterpreted
words or gestures, D cannot be convicted as an accomplice.180
In relation to the first of these requirements, the Privy Council stated in Robinson v R:181
‘The commission of most criminal offences, and certainly most offences of violence,
could be assisted by the forbidding presence of another as back-up and support. If [D’s]
presence could properly be held to amount to communicating to [P] (whether expressly
or by implication) that he was there to help in any way he could if the opportunity or
need arose, that is perfectly capable of amounting to aiding . . . It is, however, important to
make clear to juries that mere approval (ie ‘assent’ to, or ‘concurrence’ in) the offence by a
bystander who gives no assistance, does not without more amount to aiding.’
The two requirements were satisfied in Wilcox v Jeffery.182 D had been a member
of the audience at a performance by P, a famous American saxophonist, which was
an illegal performance because P had been allowed to enter the country on condition
175 Atkinson (1869) 11 Cox CC 330; Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, especially at 540 per Cave J..
176 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 at [13] per Lords Phillips P and Judge CJ (with whom Lord Wilson SCJ agreed)
and at [100] per Lord Dyson SCJ. 177 (1882) 8 QBD 534, CCR.
178 See, in particular, paras 17.10, 17.11, 17.18 and 17.27–17.33.
179 Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534 at 557 per Hawkins J; Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344, C-MAC.
180 Coney above at 552 and 557, per Lopes and Hawkins JJ; Jefferson [1994] 1 All ER 270, CA.
181 [2011] UKPC 3 at [14]. 182 [1951] 1 All ER 464, DC.
 | 17.62 participation
that he took no employment. The Divisional Court held that D’s mere presence at the
performance amounted to aiding and abetting P to contravene the relevant immigra-
tion law. Lord Goddard CJ, with whom the other judges agreed, said that D’s presence
and payment to go to the performance were an encouragement. Evidence of D’s inten-
tion to encourage P was derived from D’s behaviour in meeting P at the airport and in
writing a laudatory review published in a periodical of which D was the owner.
Victims as accomplices
Key points 17.5

Where the purpose of a statutory offence is (wholly or in part) the protection of a cer-
tain category of people, it may be construed as excluding from liability as an accom-
plice any member of that class who is the willing victim or intended victim of the
offence and has assisted or encouraged its commission. This is commonly known as
the ‘victim rule’.
17.62 According to the victim rule, where a statutory offence on its true construction
was passed (wholly or partly) to protect a category of persons, a person within the
category cannot be convicted as an accomplice to an offence committed (or intended
to be committed) in respect of him which he has aided, abetted, counselled or pro-
cured. The rule is founded on Tyrrell,183 where P, an adult, had sexual intercourse with
D, a girl between 13 and 16. It was held that D could not be convicted as an accom-
plice to the commission by P of an offence against her contrary to the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 1885, s 5 (since repealed), on the ground that the offence had been
enacted to protect girls ‘against themselves’ and it was impossible to say that the Act
intended that girls for whose protection it was passed should be criminally liable as
accomplices for such an offence committed against them. Although the decision can
best be interpreted as being based on the implication in the section of a term about an
exemption from liability, based on the implied intention of Parliament,184 it can be,
and is, regarded as establishing and illustrating the victim rule. A Crown Court judge
has ruled that a prostitute could not be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or
procuring a man to live off her immoral earnings, contrary to the Sexual Offences Act
1956, s 30 (since repealed), because the offence was created for the protection of pros-
titutes.185 So far the victim rule appears to have been applied only in respect of certain
sexual offences designed to protect certain categories of people against exploitation to
which they are peculiarly vulnerable. Even in the case of sexual offences, the applica-
tion of the victim rule is uncertain, because it is sometimes not clear from the Sexual
Offences Act 2003 whether an offence under it is designed to protect a particular class
of person. In addition, some of its offences relating to children can be perpetrated by
183 [1894] 1 QB 710, CCR. Also see Whitehouse [1977] QB 868, CA.
184 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 at [48] per Lords Phillips P and Judge CJ (with whom Lord Wilson SCJ agreed).
185 Congdon (1990), referred to in (1990) 140 NLJ 1221.
17.62 accomplices | 
a child; in such offences the child cannot sensibly be described as a member of a pro-
tected class. Clarification of the application of the victim rule to the 2003 Act would
be welcome.186
There is no reason why the victim rule should not also apply outside the sphere of sex-
ual offences.187 There are, eg, offences under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment
of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 designed in part to protect people who are trafficked for
exploitation, and offences under the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 designed in part
to protect certain types of workers. It would be unfortunate if the rule of construction
did not extend to such protected persons, especially as the exemption for victims in
respect of the inchoate offence of encouraging or assisting crime extends to any statu-
tory protective offence.
It must be emphasised that the victim rule is limited to statutory offences and is a
rule of construction, and that it does not mean that the victim of an offence can never
be convicted of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring its commission, since it only
applies to statutory offences designed to protect ‘victims’ who are peculiarly open to
exploitation. Thus, a woman can be convicted as an accomplice to the commission of
an unlawful abortion on herself,188 and so can someone be convicted as an accom-
plice to an offence against the person in respect of sado-masochistic behaviour which
he allowed to be committed against him.189 In Gnango,190 Lords Phillips P and Judge
CJ, giving the leading judgment of the Supreme Court, with which Lord Wilson SCJ
agreed, affi rmed that there is no separate common law rule precluding the conviction
of a defendant as an accomplice to an offence, statutory or otherwise, simply on the
ground that he was the actual or intended victim of it.191 Their Lordships saw no reason
to consider introducing such a rule.
The victim rule only applies to the offence of which the protected person is the victim.
If, instead, that person assists or encourages the perpetration of an offence on another
person he can be convicted as an accomplice to that offence.192
Entrapment and agents provocateurs
Key points 17.6

A law enforcement officer (or his agent) who provides the opportunity for the commis-
sion of an offence or who simply pretends to concur with, and participates in, a ‘laid on’
offence is not an accomplice to it if it is committed. On the other hand, a law enforcement
186 Bohlander ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Tyrrell Principle – Criminalising the Victims?’ [2005]
Crim LR 701.
187 Williams argued that the ‘victim rule’ is only an example of a wider proposition that the courts may
fi nd that a person is excluded from liability as an accomplice to a statutory offence by implication as a matter
of reasonable construction: ‘Victims and Other Exempt Parties in Crime’ (1990) 10 LS 245. Th is view is not yet
supported by the available case law. 188 Sockett (1908) 1 Cr App R 101, CCA.
189 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59 at [53] and [69] per Lords Phillips P and Judge CJ (with whom Lord Wilson SCJ
agreed) and Lord Brown SCJ. 190 Ibid at [51]–[53].
191 Lord Brown SCJ expressed similar views, ibid at [69]. 192 Cratchley (1913) 9 Cr App R 232, CCA.
 | 17.63 participation
officer (or his agent) who incites an offence which might not otherwise have been com-
mitted is an accomplice to it if it is committed.
It is no defence for a defendant that he was entrapped into committing an offence which
he would not otherwise have committed. However, evidence obtained by entrapment
may in some cases be excluded or, more likely, the proceedings may be stayed for abuse
of process.
Liability of agent provocateur

17.63 A law enforcement officer or his agent (eg an informer or test purchaser) who,
solely in order to entrap someone:
• provides the opportunity, and the temptation, for the commission of an offence (as
in the case of a test purchase);193 or
• participates in a criminal enterprise but goes no further than pretending to concur
with the other parties and participating in an offence which has already been ‘laid
on’ and which is going to be committed in any event,194
is not liable as an accomplice to that offence, and this is so even though that participation
may have affected the time or other circumstances of the commission of the offence.195
There must, however, be limits; the rule clearly could not apply to murder.
Some decisions may support the view that a law enforcement officer, who incites an
offence which might not otherwise have been committed in order to entrap a criminal,
is not liable as a party to the offence which the other commits,196 but the view of Lord
Salmon in Sang197 to the effect that such a person would be so liable is more recent and, it
is submitted, preferable.
In an effort to ensure that police and customs undercover operations are conducted with
due propriety the Association of Chief Police Officers and HM Revenue and Customs have
jointly issued a Code of Practice on such operations, including test purchases. The Code,
which does not have any legal status, sets out authorisation procedures and criteria which
the authorising officer must apply, as well as limits on what an undercover officer may do.
No defence of entrapment
17.64 Whereas in some jurisdictions in the United States a defendant has a defence if
he commits an offence at the instigation of a law enforcement officer or his agent (law
enforcement agency), unless he was already predisposed to do so,198 there is no such
193 Williams v DPP (1993) 98 Cr App R 209, DC.

194 Mullins (1848) 12 JP 776; McCann (1971) 56 Cr App R 359, CA; Clarke (1984) 80 Cr App R 344, CA.
195 McEvilly and Lee (1973) 60 Cr App R 150, CA.
196 Mullins (1848) 12 JP 776; Bickley (1909) 73 JP 239, CCA. Cf Brannan v Peek [1948] 1 KB 68, DC.
197 [1980] AC 402 at 443. Lord Salmon’s statement was versed in terms of a dishonest policeman who wanted
to improve his detection rate but the reference to such a policeman seems to be superfluous.
198 Jacobson v US 112 SC 1535 (1992), S Ct of US.
17.66 accomplices | 
defence of entrapment in our law.199 Nor is it a defence that the entrapment was by a pri-
vate citizen, such as an investigative journalist.200
Stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence

17.65 Although entrapment is not a defence, the court may stay the proceedings as an
abuse of process or it may exclude evidence pursuant to the Police and Criminal Evidence
Act 1984, s 78.201 In Looseley; A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1999)202 the House of Lords held that
the grant of a stay (rather than the exclusion of evidence) should normally be regarded as
the appropriate response.
Stay of proceedings
17.66 The basis of a court’s power to stay proceedings in entrapment cases is not fairness
to the defendant but that it would offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be
asked to try people who have been lured by law enforcement agents into breaking the law;
entrapment must be prevented in order to protect the integrity of the criminal justice sys-
tem (which would be undermined if the prosecution of state-created crimes was allowed).
A stay will be granted where the court concludes that in all the circumstances a trial
would offend its sense of justice and propriety or would undermine public confidence in
the criminal justice system and bring it into disrepute.203
In Looseley; A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1999), the House of Lords held that, unlike the
defence of entrapment in the United States, the focus of the abuse of process jurisdiction
in the present context is not on whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the
offence but on whether the law enforcement agency’s conduct was acceptable; predisposi-
tion does not make acceptable what would otherwise be unacceptable conduct by a law
enforcement agency. Lord Nicholls stated that:
‘[A] useful guide is to consider whether the police did no more than present the defendant
with an unexceptional opportunity to commit a crime . . . The yardstick for the purpose of
this test is, in general, whether the police conduct preceding the commission of the offence
was no more than might have been expected from others in the circumstances.’204
Such conduct would not be unacceptable.

The House held, however, that the unexceptional opportunity guide was not the only
factor to be taken into account. Ultimately, as Lord Nicholls pointed out,205 the court
is involved in a balancing exercise between the public interest in convicting and pun-
ishing those who committed crimes and the competing public interest in ensuring that
199 Sang [1980] AC 402, HL; Latif and Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 563, HL. The fact of entrapment may, how-
ever, mitigate sentence if the offence would not have been committed but for the entrapment. Th is was expressly
recognised by the House of Lords in Sang above. 200 Morley [1994] Crim LR 919, CA.
201 Latif and Shahzad [1996] 1 All ER 353, HL.
202 [2001] UKHL 53. See Ashworth ‘Redrawing the Boundaries of Entrapment’ [2002] Crim LR 161.
203 See, eg, Looseley; A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 1999) [2001] UKHL 53; Warren v A-G of Jersey [2011] UKPC 10;
Maxwell [2011] UKSC 48. 204 [2001] UKHL 53 at [23].
205 Ibid at [24]–[29].
 | 17.67 participation
law enforcement agencies did not act in a manner which brought the administration of
criminal justice into disrepute. In this respect, said Lord Nicholls, the court has to have
regard to all the circumstances of the case, including:
• the nature of the offence The use of proactive techniques is more appropriate in some
circumstances than in others (eg drugs offences, offences whose victims are reluc-
tant to report and conspiracies), and the secrecy and difficulty of detection, and the
manner in which the criminal activity is carried on, are relevant considerations;
• the reason for the particular police operation The police must act in good faith, and
not, eg, as part of a malicious vendetta. Having reasonable grounds for suspicion is
one way of establishing good faith, but having grounds for suspicion of an individual
is not always essential. Sometimes random testing is the only way of policing a par-
ticular trading activity;
• the nature and extent of police participation in the crime The greater the inducement
held out by the police, and the more forceful or persistent the police overtures, the
more readily may a court conclude that the police overstepped the mark.
The House of Lords in Looseley concluded that the above approach was consistent
with the requirements of the ECHR, Article 6 (right to a fair trial), as explained by the
European Court of Human Rights in Teixeira de Castro v Portugal.206
17.67 Although proceedings can be stayed on the ground of entrapment by an investi-
gative journalist or someone else not acting as a law enforcement officer or his agent,207
the court is much less likely to find it necessary to order a stay in such a case because the
integrity of the criminal justice system is much less likely to be affected by entrapment by
such a person.208 The only reported case where a prosecution has been stayed for entrap-
ment by a private person is R (on the application of Dacre and Associated Newspapers)
v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court, 209 where the Divisional Court granted a stay
of proceedings in respect of a private prosecution on the grounds of entrapment by the
individual who was the private prosecutor. Latham LJ, with whose judgment Bennett J
agreed, held that, whilst the considerations differed between public and private prosecu-
tors (because of the particular dangers of state entrapment in the public context), there
was no reason in principle why a private prosecution should not be considered an abuse
of process if the crime which was the subject of the prosecution was one that had been
encouraged by the private prosecutor or when in some other way the private prosecutor
had essentially created the same mischief as that about which he complained.
Exclusion of evidence obtained by entrapment

17.68 Evidence obtained by entrapment which has gone beyond providing an unexcep-
tional opportunity to commit a crime, whether by a law enforcement officer or his agent
or a private citizen, may be excluded under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984,
s 78, which provides that a court may refuse to admit prosecution evidence if, having
206 (1998) 28 EHRR 101, ECtHR.

207 Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51, CA (see n 211); Hardwicke and Thwaites [2001] Crim LR 220, CA.
208 Hardwicke and Thwaites above. 209 [2008] EWHC 1667 (Admin), DC.
17.70 accomplices | 
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness
of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.210 It will be noted that under s 78
the exclusion of evidence obtained by entrapment depends ultimately on whether the
fairness of the proceedings would be adversely affected by admitting that evidence, and
not whether it is fair to bring the proceedings.
It appears that the courts will take a more restricted approach under s 78 to the exclu-
sion of entrapment evidence where it has been obtained by a private citizen than where it
has been obtained by a law enforcement officer or his agent.211
Withdrawal from participation
Key points 17.7

A person can excuse himself from liability as an accomplice to an offence by making an
effective, voluntary withdrawal before it is committed.
17.69 There is no doubt that a person can excuse himself from liability for an offence
which he has assisted, encouraged, counselled or procured by making an effective with-
drawal from participation before it is committed. This can be justified on the grounds
that someone who voluntarily withdraws before the commission of the offence which
he has assisted or encouraged is significantly less blameworthy than someone who con-
tinues to support the offence up to its commission, and that it provides an incentive for
withdrawal. An effective withdrawal from complicity by an accomplice does not, how-
ever, negative any liability for the inchoate offences of encouraging or assisting crime or
conspiracy212 since those offences213 are committed and complete when the encourage-
ment or assistance occurs or the conspiracy is made.
17.70 The law takes a strict view about what will constitute an effective withdrawal.
It is clear that mere repentance is not enough;214 nor is merely failing to turn up at the
scene of the crime as arranged;215 nor is merely running away from the scene of the
crime.216
210 Christou and Wright [1992] QB 979, CA; Smurthwaite and Gill [1994] 1 All ER 898, CA; Morley and
Hutton [1994] Crim LR 919, CA; Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51, CA; Looseley; A-G’s Reference (No 3 of 2000) [2001]
UKHL 53.
211 Shannon above. When this decision went to the European Court of Human Rights that Court confi rmed
that a prosecution based on entrapment by a private individual could infringe the ECHR, Art 6: Shannon v UK
[2005] Crim LR 133, ECtHR.
212 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1888) LR 21 QBD 544 at 549. Also see Bennett (1978) 68
Cr App R 168, CA. 213 Ch 14.
214 Croft [1944] 1 KB 295; Fletcher [1962] Crim LR 551, CCA; Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 1231.
215 Rook [1993] 2 All ER 955, CA. 216 Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr App R 212, CA.
 | 17.71 participation
In Whitehouse,217 a decision of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia approved by

the Court of Appeal,218 Soan JA stated that:
‘[T]here must be, in my view, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, something

more than a mere mental change of intention and physical change of location by those
associated who wish to disassociate themselves from the consequences attendant upon
their willing assistance up to the moment of the actual commission of that crime. I
would not attempt to define too closely what must be done . . . That must depend upon
the circumstances of each case but it seems to me that one essential element ought to be
established in a case of this kind: Where practicable and reasonable there must be timely
communication of the intention to abandon the common purpose from those who wish
to dissociate themselves from the contemplated crime to those who desire to continue
in it. What is “timely communication” must be determined by the facts of each case but
where practicable and reasonable it ought to be such communication, verbal or otherwise,
that will serve unequivocal notice upon the other party to the common unlawful cause
that if he proceeds upon it he does so without the further aid and assistance of those who
withdraw.’
In O’Flaherty, Ryan and Toussaint,219 the Court of Appeal stated that whether or not a
person has done enough to demonstrate that he is withdrawing is ‘ultimately a question
of fact and degree for the jury. Account will be taken of inter alia the nature of the assist-
ance and encouragement already given and how imminent the [principal offence] is, as
well as the nature of the action said to constitute withdrawal.’
The requirement of timeliness means that a withdrawal of encouragement cannot be
effective once the commission of the offence has commenced.220
In relation to the element of unequivocality, it was held by the Court of Appeal in
Baker221 that it was not satisfied where D, a party to a joint enterprise to kill V, had said,
after starting the attack, ‘I’m not doing it’ and then moved a few feet away, whereupon the
other parties stabbed V to death. The reason was that those words were far from being
unequivocal notice that D was disassociating himself from the entire enterprise since
they were quite capable of simply meaning ‘I will not strike any more blows’.
17.71 Where a person’s participation has taken the form of assisting the commission
of the principal offence by supplying the means for its commission, steps must be taken
to prevent the perpetration of the offence. The obvious example of such steps would be
warning the police or the victim so that the offence can be prevented but steps less than
this can suffice.
In Becerra and Cooper,222 D and P broke into a house to steal. D gave P a knife for use
if necessary on anyone who interrupted them. V heard the noise and came downstairs.
At this D said, ‘There’s a bloke coming. Let’s go’, and jumped out of the window. P then
killed V with the knife. D’s appeal against conviction for murder, as an accomplice, was
217 (1941) 4 WWR 112 at 115.

218 Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr App R 212, CA; Whitefield (1984) 79 Cr App R 36, CA; Rook [1993] 2 All
ER 955, CA. 219 [2004] EWCA Crim 526 at [60].
220 Whitefield (1984) 79 Cr App R 36 at 39–40; Robinson (2000) unreported, CA.
221 [1994] Crim LR 444, CA. 222 (1975) 62 Cr App R 212, CA.
17.71 accomplices | 
dismissed because he had not done enough for his withdrawal from participation to be
effective. The Court of Appeal commented that something ‘different and vastly more
effective’ was required to relieve D of liability. It declined, however, to explain what would
have been necessary on the facts of the case. So did the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal
in Graham.223 There, D, a member of a terrorist group, had transported a kidnap vic-
tim (V) to a house where he knew the terrorists were, realising that they would kill V. D
refused to render assistance to the terrorists further and asked them not to harm V. The
terrorists took V to waste ground and shot him. The Northern Ireland Court of Appeal
upheld D’s conviction (as an accomplice) for murder. It stated:
‘We consider that at the late stage which the murder plan had reached, and after the appel-
lant had played such a significant part in assisting the killers to accomplish their aim, it
could not be a sufficient withdrawal to indicate to them that he no longer supported their
enterprise. Something more was required, and the judge was amply justified in holding
that what the appellant did was not enough. His pleas were useless and the withholding
of co-operation . . . was of minimal effect. We do not find it necessary to attempt to specify
what acts would have been required of the appellant in the circumstances. It is sufficient
for present purposes for us to say that the steps which he did take cannot be regarded as
sufficient for withdrawal.’224
In Becerra and Cooper and in Graham, it is not easy to see what more D could have done
to prevent the perpetration of the offence, other than to recover, or attempt to recover,
the knife or to rescue, or attempt to rescue, the victim, respectively, or some other form
of physical intervention.
In Rook,225 the Court of Appeal referred, obiter, to a situation where the assistance
given took the form of D supplying dynamite and a fuse. It said that it was not prepared
to approve or disapprove the proposition that if the fuse had been set D must step on it in
order to withdraw from participation. It continued: ‘It may be that this goes too far. It may
be that it is enough that he should have done his best to step on the fuse’.
Thus, the statements in these cases suggest that in such situations reasonable steps to
prevent the offence would have to be taken. However, in O’Flaherty, Ryan and Toussaint,226
the Court of Appeal, without reference to those statements, stated, obiter, that such steps
were not necessary.
The decisions in Becerra and Cooper and Graham can be contrasted with the deci-
sions of the Court of Appeal in Grundy227 and in Whitefield,228 which were approved,
obiter, in O’Flaherty, Ryan and Toussaint. In Grundy, D gave burglars information which
was of assistance in committing the burglary. D gave this information six weeks before
the burglary. For two weeks before the burglary, D tried to dissuade the burglars from
committing the burglary. The Court of Appeal held that there was evidence of an effec-
tive withdrawal, which should have been left to the jury. In Whitefield D gave P similar
information to that in Grundy, and agreed to break into the building with P. There was
evidence that, before the burglary, D had served unequivocal notice on P that, if P went
223 [1996] NI 157, NICA. 224 Ibid at 169. 225 [1993] 2 All ER 955 at 962–963.
226 [2004] EWCA Crim 526. 227 [1977] Crim LR 543, CA. 228 (1984) 79 Cr App R 36, CA.
 | 17.72 participation
on and committed the burglary, he would do so on his own. The Court of Appeal held that
the jury should have been told that, if they accepted the evidence, D would have had the
defence of withdrawal. These decisions, particularly Whitefield, seem generous towards
the defendants; it is difficult to see how their subsequent attempts to dissuade constituted
reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence in question.
17.72 An unresolved question is whether, where there is more than one perpetrator, a
withdrawal must be communicated unequivocally to all of them in order to be effective.
Spontaneous violence: an exception from need to

communicate withdrawal?
17.73 In the above cases, the offence was pre-planned. In Mitchell and King, 229 the Court
of Appeal held that communication of withdrawal was not necessary in cases of spon-
taneous violence. In that case, D1, D2 and P had engaged in a fight with F, a restaurant
owner, and his two sons, G and H, after P had assaulted restaurant customers. There was
evidence that, after leaving G (who had been subjected to a concerted attack involving
beating, kicking and stamping on his head) prostrate on the ground, P had returned to
administer a further beating to G’s head. G died. The Court of Appeal allowed D1 and
D2’s appeals against conviction for murder and ordered a retrial. Its reason was that if
G had been killed by P’s blows administered after D1 and D2 had desisted and walked
away, their desistance might have been sufficient to constitute withdrawal from the joint
enterprise, leaving P solely liable for the murder. This possibility had not clearly been left
to the jury and for this reason the Court of Appeal ruled D1 and D2’s convictions unsafe.
Having referred to Soan JA’s statement in Whitehouse, referred to in para 17.70, it stated
that in a case of spontaneous violence a direction about the requirement of communica-
tion of withdrawal was inappropriate; such communication was only necessary for with-
drawal from pre-planned violence. This ruling was unduly favourable to accomplices.
Quite apart from giving rise to issues about the dividing line between ‘spontaneous’ and
‘pre-planned’ violence, a distinction not drawn elsewhere in the law of secondary liabil-
ity, it raises the question of why the distinction should be drawn. If a person would oth-
erwise be liable for participating in spontaneous violence, why should he escape liability
by simply repenting and stopping his attack if P goes on and kills? There is nothing on his
part to countermand his previous assistance or encouragement, let alone a communica-
tion of this.
The effect of Mitchell and King was limited severely soon afterwards by the Court of
Appeal in Robinson,230 where it was held that Mitchell and King was exceptional. D and
a gang had followed the victim, taunting him. The gang had encouraged D to hit the vic-
tim. D did so, whereupon the gang actively participated in the attack. D stood back while
they did so, but, when he realised that the attack was going further than he had intended,
he intervened and the attack ceased. D was convicted as a party to causing grievous bod-
ily harm with intent. He appealed, arguing that the judge had been wrong to direct the
jury that, in order to find that he had withdrawn from participation before the grievous
229 (1999) 163 JP 75, CA.

230 [2005] 5 Archbold News 2, CA. Otton LJ presided in this case and in Mitchell and King.
17.76 accomplices | 
bodily harm was caused, they had to find that he had or might have communicated such
withdrawal. The Court of Appeal held that it was not truly a case of spontaneous vio-
lence and that, following Becerra and Cooper, communication of withdrawal was neces-
sary. The Court added that, even where violence was spontaneous, withdrawal must be
communicated to be effective ‘unless it is not practicable or reasonable so to communi-
cate’. This, of course, is wholly consistent with what was said in Whitehouse. The Court
of Appeal explained Mitchell and King as an exceptional case on the ground that it had
not been practicable or reasonable for D1 and D2 to communicate with P because they
had moved away before P returned to deliver his final blows.
Unfortunately, Robinson was not cited four years later in O’Flaherty, Ryan and
Toussaint231 where the Court of Appeal, obiter, referred to its decision in Mitchell and
King with approval. Referring to Mitchell and King, it stated that in a case of spontan-
eous violence it is possible, in principle, to withdraw by ceasing to fight, throwing down
one’s weapon and walking away. Such differences of view do not assist in making the law
certain.
Other points
17.74 Where it is not practicable and reasonable to communicate with the perpetrator in
a pre-planned case, eg because he has disappeared after receiving assistance or encour-
agement from the defendant, it would presumably be sufficient for the accomplice to give
the police timely notification of the proposed offence. Apart from this, it is difficult to
offer guidance in a pre-planned case.
17.75 The mere fact that an accomplice is arrested before the principal offence is perpe-
trated does not prevent him being convicted of it.232
Uncertainty
Key points 17.8

The mere fact that it is not clear whether a defendant was the perpetrator or an accom-
plice does not prevent that person’s conviction if it can be proved beyond reasonable
doubt that he must have been either the perpetrator or an accomplice.
17.76 The above rule is exemplified by the decision in Swindall and Osborne in 1846 233
that, where either of two drivers, who indulged in unlawful racing in which each was
encouraged by the other, might have run down the deceased, both could be convicted
of manslaughter. More recently, in Giannetto234 the prosecution case was that D was
either the perpetrator of the murder of V or was an accomplice to that murder by hiring
231 [2004] EWCA Crim 526 at [61]. 232 Johnson and Jones (1841) Car & M 218.
233 (1846) 2 Car & Kir 230.
234 [1997] 1 Cr App R 1, CA. See also Smith v Mellors and Soar (1987) 84 Cr App R 279, DC; Fitzgerald [1992]
Crim LR 660, CA.
 | 17.77 participation
someone else to murder V. The Court of Appeal, upholding D’s conviction for murder,
held that it was open to the prosecution to invite the jury to find that at least D had
encouraged the murder of V and that the jury were entitled to convict of murder if they
were all satisfied that if D was not the perpetrator of murder he at least encouraged the
murder.
On the other hand, if there is no evidence that each of the two or more possible per-
petrators must either have perpetrated the offence or have assisted or encouraged the
other(s) to do so,235 with the appropriate mens rea, none of them can be convicted of the
offence in question.236 This has been a cause of particular concern in cases where a child
or vulnerable adult has been abused and parents or other members of the household co-
accused of an offence in respect of that abuse have escaped conviction by remaining silent
or blaming each other. To the extent that its terms apply, the Domestic Violence, Crime
and Victims Act 2004, s 5 has closed this loophole.237
Reform of the law of complicity

17.77 The account of the law given above discloses the technicalities involved in the law
of complicity and the difficulties and uncertainties which it can produce. The technicali-
ties result largely from the fact that the law of complicity, having been developed by the
courts as new factual situations have arisen, lacks a coherent set of principles and from
the fact that the liability of an accomplice is derived from his involvement in the commis-
sion of the principal offence by another. The law of complicity, in particular the complex-
ity of the rules about joint enterprise, is in urgent need of reform.
Law Commission’s Proposals

17.78 In 1993, the Law Commission produced a consultation paper which made radi-
cal provisional proposals for changes to the law relating to those who assist or encour-
age another to commit an offence.238 Under the proposals the secondary liability for
aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence was to be
abolished and replaced by two statutory inchoate offences of assisting crime and of
encouraging crime, which would have been committed whether or not the offence
assisted or encouraged was actually perpetrated. The proposed inchoate offences were
different from those now contained in the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2 dealt with in
Chapter 14.239
235 Whether by positive acts or by passive assistance or encouragement by failing to exercise a right or duty
to control the acts of another: para 17.13.
236 Lane and Lane (1985) 82 Cr App R 5, CA; Russell and Russell (1987) 85 Cr App R 388, CA; Aston and
Mason (1991) 94 Cr App R 180, CA; Petters and Parfitt [1995] Crim LR 501, CA. 237 See para 8.168.
238 Law Commission Assisting and Encouraging Crime: A Consultation Paper (1993), Law Commission
Consultation Paper No 131. See Smith ‘The Law Commission Consultation Paper on Complicity: A Blueprint
for Rationalism’ [1994] Crim LR 239; Sullivan ‘The Law Commission Consultation Paper on Complicity: Fault
Elements and Joint Enterprise’ [1994] Crim LR 252; Smith ‘Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law
Reform’ (1997) 113 LQR 453. 239 Paras 14.1–14.43.
17.81 accomplices | 
17.79 The proposal to abolish secondary liability was extremely controversial. In par-
ticular, objections of principle were raised about the lack of adequate labelling and con-
demnation of those who had assisted or encouraged the principal offence.
These and other objections led the Law Commission in 2007 in its report Partici-
pating in Crime 240 to abandon the proposal and to make recommendations for reform
which retain secondary liability for participation in an offence committed by a princi-
pal offender.241 Although liability for complicity would continue to be derivative, the
report makes various recommendations which would narrow the scope of the present
law and deal with its uncertainty and incoherence. The Law Commission recommends
that the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s 8, and the corresponding provisions in
the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 44, 242 should be repealed and replaced by a statu-
tory provision which describes the requisite conduct as ‘assisting or encouraging’ (as
opposed to ‘aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring’ as now), and therefore would
narrow the law of complicity. Th is recommendation, and indeed the whole report,
must be read together with the provisions of the Serious Crime Act 2007, Pt 2. The
offences of encouraging or assisting crime therein would generally cover conduct
caught by the present law of complicity which falls outside the recommendations in
Participating in Crime.
17.80 Under the recommendations in Participating in Crime, D would be liable as a
secondary party for offences committed by another in two ways, which are set out in cll 1
and 2 of the draft Participating in Crime Bill attached to the report:
• assisting or encouraging an offence (cl 1); and
• participating in a joint criminal venture (cl 2).
17.81 Assisting or encouraging crime Under cl 1, D would be liable for the principal
offence perpetrated by P if:
• D did an act with the intention that one or more of a number of acts would be done
by P or someone else;
• P’s criminal act was one of those acts;
• D’s behaviour assisted or encouraged P to do his criminal act; and
• either D believed that a person doing the act would commit the offence (ie do the act
with the relevant mens rea), or D’s state of mind was such that, had he done the rele-
vant act, he would have committed the offence.
Recklessness, or a belief, that P might commit the criminal act with D’s assistance or
encouragement would not suffice. Thus, a shopkeeper who sold P a crowbar, aware that P
might use it to commit a burglary but not intending that P should commit that offence,
would not be liable for it.
240Law Com No 305.

241For evaluation of the recommendations see Wilson ‘A Rational Scheme of Liability for Participation in
Crime’ [2008] Crim LR 3; Sullivan ‘Participating in Crime: Law Com No 305 – Joint Criminal Ventures’ [2008]
Crim LR 19; Taylor ‘Procuring, Causation, Innocent Agency and the Law Commission’ [2008] Crim LR 32;
Buxton ‘Joint Enterprise’ [2009] Crim LR 233. 242 Para 17.8.
 | 17.82 participation
The references in the draft Bill to a ‘criminal act’ include reference to a ‘criminal
omission’.
17.82 Participating in a joint criminal venture The Law Commission concluded
that separate provision should be made for joint criminal ventures and this is achieved
by cl 2.
Under cl 2 of the draft Bill, if one of the participants (P) in a joint criminal venture
committed an offence, another participant (D) would also be guilty of the offence if P’s
criminal act fell within the scope of the venture. D would not escape liability under cl 2
for an offence committed by P at a time when D was a participant in the venture merely
because D was at that time absent, against the venture being carried out, or indifferent as
to whether it was carried out.
This is all that is said about ‘joint criminal ventures’. It leaves that term undefined.
In the body of the report the Law Commission makes recommendations about mens
rea in joint criminal ventures but they do not appear in the draft Bill because the Law
Commission wished to avoid the complexity of the provision which would result. The
Commission expects those dealing with cl 2 to refer to the recommendations in its report
to discover the mens rea required. This is hardly a satisfactory approach. The recommen-
dations about mens rea are that, if D and P are parties to a joint criminal venture, D satis-
fies the mens rea requirement in relation to the conduct element of the principal offence
committed by P if:
• D intended that P (or another party to the venture) should commit the conduct
element;
• D believed that P (or another party to the venture) would commit the conduct elem-
ent; or
• D believed that P (or another party to the venture) might commit the conduct
element.
The Commission recommends that, even if D intended or believed that P would or might
commit the conduct element of the principal offence, he should nevertheless not stand to
be convicted under cl 2 of the principal offence if P’s actions in committing the principal
offence fell outside the scope of the joint venture. The Commission also recommends that,
if D and P are parties to a joint criminal venture, for D to be convicted of a principal offence
that P commits, D must believe that P, in committing the conduct element of the offence,
might be committing the offence.
17.83 Defence The draft Bill also provides that it would be a defence to liability for an
offence as a secondary party if D proved on the balance of probabilities:
• that he acted for the purpose of (i) preventing the commission of either the offence
that he was encouraging or assisting or another offence, or (ii) preventing or limiting
the occurrence of harm; and
• that it was reasonable to act as D did in the circumstances.
17.86 assistance after an offence | 
17.84 Causing a no-fault offence ‘Procuring’ the commission of an offence as a mode of

participation is replaced in the draft Bill by a new offence of ‘causing a no-fault offence’.
17.85 In March 2011 the Government indicated that it accepted the recommendations in
the report but that they would not be implemented, stating that, while they were worth-
while projects for the future, they could not be considered a priority in the shorter term
because of the pressure on resources.243 This is much to be regretted.
Assistance after an offence
Key points 17.9

Those who assist offenders after an offence has been committed are not liable as par-
ties to that offence but may be liable for one or more specific offences, in particular
the offences of assisting an offender, concealment of an offence for reward (both dealt
with below), obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty244 and perverting
the course of justice. The offence of handling stolen goods deals with those who help
‘thieves’ after the event, as do offences of money laundering under the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002, Pt 7.245
Assisting an offender
17.86 The Criminal Law Act 1967 (CLA 1967), s 4(1)246 provides that:
‘Where a person has committed a relevant offence, any other person who, knowing or
believing him to be guilty of the offence or of some other relevant offence, does without
lawful authority or reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or
prosecution shall be guilty of an offence.’
An offence under s 4(1) is triable either way.247 It is a separate offence from the ‘relevant
offence’. A person who satisfies the terms of s 4(1) does not thereby become a party to
the ‘relevant offence’. A prosecution can only be instituted by or with the consent of the
Director of Public Prosecutions.248 An offence under s 4(1) is limited to cases where the
person assisted was guilty of a relevant offence, although a person who assists someone
guilty of an offence which is not a relevant one may be convicted of perverting the course
of justice or, in some cases, obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty.
243 Law Commission Annual Report 2010–2011 Law Com No 328, para 3.58. In January 2011, the Government
notified the Commission that it would not implement the remaining parts of another Law Commission Report
Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide Law Com No 304, one of which (Pt 4) made recommendations about
reforming the law of complicity in the context of murder and manslaughter. 244 Paras 7.69–7.72.
245 Paras 11.34–11.57. 246 As amended by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, Sch 7.
247 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1. 248 CLA 1967, s 4(4).
 | 17.87 participation
Elements
17.87 In order to succeed on a charge of assisting an offender, the prosecution must
prove four things:
• The commission of a relevant offence by another (‘the principal offender’) In the
CLA 1967, s 4 and s 5 below, ‘relevant offence’ means:
– an offence for which the sentence is fi xed by law, such as murder, or
– an offence for which a person of 18 years or over (not previously convicted) may
be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years (or, in the case of criminal
damage, might be so sentenced but for the restrictions imposed by the Magistrates’
Courts Act 1980, s 33249).250
In both s 4 and s 5, reference is made to a person who ‘has committed a rel-
evant offence’. There seems no reason why this should not cover an accomplice to
the actual perpetration of an offence, as well as the perpetrator himself, and in
the following account of ss 4 and 5 it should be remembered that the person ‘who
has committed a relevant offence’ may have done so either as a perpetrator or an
accomplice.
Although the commission of the ‘relevant offence’ by the principal offender must
be proved, it is not necessary that the principal offender should have been convicted
of it.251 Indeed, in Zaman,252 the Court of Appeal held that the acquittal of the prin-
cipal offender does not prevent a conviction for assisting that person.253 The Court
pointed out that the commission of the relevant offence by the principal offender
may be established in the case of the assister, even though it is not established against
the principal offender himself.
‘There may be many reasons for this, for example, evidence admissible against the assister
that was not admissible against the principal offender, or following the principal offend-
er’s acquittal, but before the assister’s trial, the discovery of further evidence that puts the
commission of the offence by the principal offender beyond doubt.’254
249 See para 13.2.

250 CLA 1967 s 4(1A) (as amended by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, Sch 7).
251 Donald (1986) 83 Cr App R 49, CA. 252 [2010] EWCA Crim 209.
253 Th is rule applies even if the principal offender is acquitted at the same trial: Saunders [2011] EWCA
Crim 1571.
254 [2010] EWCA Crim 209 at [18].
In Zaman, D had pleaded guilty to assisting an offender who was subsequently acquitted of the ‘relevant
offence’. Dismissing D’s appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal stated that by his unequivocal plea
of guilty D relieved the prosecution of the need for any further proof that P, the alleged principal offender,
had indeed committed the relevant offence. The Court rejected a submission by D’s counsel that the plea of
guilty was on a basis of belief, rather than knowledge, that the relevant offence had been committed and that
P’s acquittal showed that that belief was a mistaken one. The Court regarded that as an incorrect analysis
because by his plea D conceded not that P might have committed the offence, but that he had in fact done so;
whether D’s state of mind at the time was one of knowledge or belief was immaterial. Th is is questionable
because (as stated in para 14.66) although one cannot know something which does not exist one can believe
it. Therefore, a mere belief that the relevant offence had been committed by P could not be said to establish
that it had.
17.87 assistance after an offence | 
The relevant offence alleged to have been committed must be specified in the
indictment for assisting an offender. However, if the principal offender is not proved
to be guilty of the specified offence, D may still be convicted under the CLA 1967, s
4(1) if the principal offender is proved guilty of another relevant offence of which the
principal offender could be convicted on the indictment.255
• D’s knowledge or belief that the principal offender is guilty of the actual relevant
offence, or some other relevant offence Wilful blindness in the present respect is not
enough.256 It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that D knew or believed
the particular offence to be a relevant offence, or that D was aware of the identity of
the person who committed it.257
• An act done by D with the intention of impeding the apprehension or pros-
ecution of the principal offender The principal offender need not actually be
assisted (the defi nition of an offence under s 4(1) as assisting offenders is somewhat
inaccurate) but D must have done some act with intent to impede the prosecution
or apprehension of the principal offender. An omission to act, even if accompanied
by such intent, will not suffice. Thus, failure to report the principal offender to the
police or to arrest him does not constitute assisting an offender. Authorities on the
law relating to accessories after the fact, replaced by s 4, suggest that the requisite
intent is a direct one. 258 Mere foresight that the principal offender will virtually
certainly be assisted is insufficient, if the only direct intent of D was the acquisition
of money for himself or the protection of himself from prosecution.259 The mere
provision of accommodation in the ordinary way by the principal offender’s fam-
ily or landlord will not suffice, nor will mere efforts at persuasion not to prosecute.
On the other hand, driving the principal offender away after the crime, hiding
him from the police, destroying fingerprints or other evidence of the crime, 260 or
telling the police lies in order to put them off the scent, do fall within the scope of
the offence.261
• The absence of lawful authority or reasonable excuse for the act of assistance There
would be lawful authority for impeding the prosecution if action were taken in con-
sequence of an executive decision not to prosecute. An example of a case where, not-
withstanding the intent to impede prosecution, there would be a reasonable excuse
would be one in which a forged cheque was destroyed in pursuance of a lawful agree-
ment262 not to prosecute in consideration of the making good of the loss caused by
the forgery.263
255 Morgan [1972] 1 QB 436, CA. 256 See para 3.45.

257 Brindley and Long [1971] 2 QB 300, CA.
258 Th is view was also taken by the Criminal Law Revision Committee who drafted the offence. See its
Seventh Report, Felonies and Misdemeanours (Cmnd 2659), para 30.
259 Rose (1961) 46 Cr App R 103, CCA; Andrews and Craig [1962] 3 All ER 961n, CCA.
260 Morgan [1972] 1 QB 436, CA. 261 Brindley and Long [1971] 2 QB 300, CA. 262 Para 17.89.
263 Seventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee: Felonies and Misdemeanours, (Cmnd 2659),
para 28.
 | 17.88 participation
Punishment
17.88 The maximum punishment varies according to the nature of the relevant offence
which has been committed. In murder or any other offence whose punishment is fi xed
by law, the maximum punishment for acting with intent to impede its prosecution or the
apprehension of the offender is 10 years’ imprisonment; it is seven years’ imprisonment if
the maximum punishment for the principal offence is 14 years’ imprisonment, five years’
when the maximum punishment for the principal offence is 10 years’ imprisonment, and
three years’ imprisonment in all other cases.264
The effect of the rule in Courtie265 is that the CLA 1967, s 4(1) creates four offences, pun-
ishable with 10, seven, five and three years’ imprisonment respectively.
Concealing an offence for reward

17.89 The CLA 1967, s 5(1)266 provides that:
‘Where a person has committed a relevant offence,267 any other person who, knowing or
believing that the offence or some other relevant offence has been committed, and that he
has information which might be of material assistance in securing the prosecution or con-
viction of an offender for it, accepts or agrees to accept for not disclosing that information
any consideration other than the making good of loss or injury caused by the offence, or
the making of reasonable compensation for that loss or injury, [is guilty of an offence].’
The offence is triable either way.268

A prosecution for this offence may only be instituted by or with the consent of the
Director of Public Prosecutions.269 It is far less serious than assisting offenders, the max-
imum punishment being two years’ imprisonment.270
17.90 The prosecution must prove three things:
• the commission of a relevant offence;

• D’s knowledge or belief that it, or some other relevant offence, has been committed
and that he has information which might assist the prosecution; and
• the acceptance by D of, or agreement by D to accept, some consideration (eg money
or goods) other than the making good of loss or injury caused by the offence, or
the making of reasonable compensation for that loss or injury, in return for not
disclosing that information.
It follows from the above that the acceptance of any consideration for not reporting
or prosecuting an offence which is not a relevant offence is not an offence under the
CLA 1967, s 5(1), nor does it constitute any other offence.271 The same is true, with one
264 CLA 1967, s 4(3). 265 Para 3.50, n 122.

266 As amended by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, Sch 7. 267 See para 17.87.
268 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 17(1) and Sch 1. 269 CLA 1967, s 5(3). 270 Ibid, s 5(1).
271 Th is is the effect of the CLA, s 5(5).
17.90 assistance after an offence | 
exception, in the case of merely failing to inform the police of a relevant offence. The sole
exception is failure to report a treason which still survives as the common law offence of
misprision of treason, with a maximum punishment of life imprisonment.272
The related offence of advertising rewards for the return of stolen or lost goods with the
promise that no questions will be asked etc has already been described.273
FURTHER READING
Alldridge ‘The Doctrine of Innocent Agency’ Krebs ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’ (2010) 73
(1990) 2 Criminal Law Forum 45 MLR 278
Allen ‘Entrapment: Time for Reconsideration’ Lanham ‘Accomplices and Transferred
(1984) 13 Anglo-American LR 57 Malice’ (1980) 96 LQR 110
Ashworth ‘Testing Fidelity to Legal Values: Lanham ‘Accomplices and Withdrawal’ (1981)
Official Involvement and Criminal Justice’ 97 LQR 575
(2000) 63 MLR 633 JC Smith ‘Aid, Abet, Counsel or Procure’
Ashworth ‘Redrawing the Boundaries of in Reshaping the Criminal Law (1978)
Entrapment’ [2002] Crim LR 161 (Glazebrook (ed)) 120
Buxton ‘Joint Enterprise’ [2009] Crim LR 233 KJM Smith A Modern Treatise on the Law of
Clarkson ‘Complicity, Powell and Complicity (1991)
Manslaughter’ [1998] Crim LR 556 KJM Smith ‘Withdrawal in Complicity: A
Dennis ‘The Mental Element for Accessories’ Restatement of Principles’ [2001] Crim LR
in Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of JC 769
Smith (1987) (Smith (ed)) 40 Sullivan ‘Intent, Purpose and Complicity’
Dennis ‘Intention and Complicity: A Reply’ [1988] Crim LR 641
[1988] Crim LR 649 Virgo ‘Making Sense of Accessorial Liability’
Griew ‘Must Have Been One of Them?’ [1989] [2006] 6 Archbold News 6
Crim LR 129 G Williams ‘Victims as Parties to Crime – A
Ho ‘State Entrapment’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies Further Comment’ [1964] Crim LR 686
71 G Williams ‘Evading Justice’ [1975] Crim LR
Hogan ‘Victims as Parties to Crime’ [1962] 430, 479, 608
Crim LR 683 G Williams ‘Which of You Did It?’ (1989) 51
MLR 179
272 Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528, HL. 273 Para 11.58.

18
Vicarious liability, corporate liability
and liability of unincorporated
associations
OVERVIEW
This chapter commences by considering when someone like an employer can be liable for an
offence by another which he has not aided, abetted, counselled or procured. Such liability is
known as vicarious liability. The chapter then deals with the criminal liability of a company or
other corporate body. It concludes by considering the criminal liability of a partnership or other
unincorporated association.
Vicarious liability for the criminal acts

of another
18.1 As we have seen, a person can be guilty under the law of complicity for the offence
of another which he has aided, abetted, counselled or procured; if he has a right or
duty to control the perpetrator, this includes the case where he has deliberately failed
to prevent the offence.1 However, it is a general rule of the criminal law that one per-
son is not vicariously liable for the acts of another which he has not aided, abetted,
counselled or procured, even if that other person is his employee acting in the course
of his employment so that civil vicarious liability might arise. Thus, in the old case of
Huggins2 the warden of the Fleet prison was acquitted on a charge of murdering one of
the inmates, as it appeared that death had been caused by confi nement in an unhealthy
cell by an employee of the warden without any direction from him and without his
knowledge.
1 Para 17.13.
2 (1730) 1 Barn KB 358 at 396.
18.4 vicarious liability for the criminal acts of another | 
Exceptions to the general rule

Key points 18.1
Criminal vicarious liability is, with one exception, limited to statutory offences of a regula-
tory nature.
Most of the instances of vicarious liability for statutory offences have resulted not from
the express wording of the statute but from judicial interpretation of it.
18.2 In certain limited cases a person can be criminally liable for the acts of others which
he has not aided, abetted, counselled or procured, and of which he may have been igno-
rant. Vicarious liability is only possible in respect of one common law offence: public
nuisance.3 The common law offence of public nuisance is essentially civil in character.
18.3 It is, of course, possible (but rare) for a statute expressly to impose vicarious liabil-
ity. An example is provided by the Property Misdescriptions Act 1991, s 1(1), which states
that: ‘Where a false or misleading statement about a prescribed matter is made in the
course of an estate agency business . . . the person by whom the business is carried on shall
be guilty of an offence’, in addition to any employee to whose act or default the making
of the statement is due.4
The courts have used two principles of interpretation to impose vicarious liability for a
large number of regulatory statutory offences:
• extensive construction; and
• delegation.
Extensive construction
18.4 It has become common5 for the courts to give an extended construction to certain
verbs used in statutory offences, such as ‘sell’ or ‘use’, so that the act of an employee is
regarded as the act of his employer and thereby the employer is held to have commit-
ted the offence physically performed by his employee. Thus, an employer, as well as his
driver, has been held guilty of ‘using’ a motor vehicle with a defective brake. 6 Similarly, an
employer has been held guilty of ‘exposing for sale’ bags of coal containing short weight,
although the short weight was due to the wrongdoing of the employee who exposed them
for sale.7 In Coppen v Moore (No 2), 8 D owned a number of shops in one of which an assist-
ant, contrary to instructions, sold an American ham as a ‘Scotch ham’. D was held guilty
3 See para 6.9.

4 Property Misdescriptions Act 1991, s 1(2). For other examples, see the Transport and Works Act 1992, s 28;
and the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981, s 12(5).
5 But not invariable: see, eg, Haringey London BC v Marks and Spencer plc [2004] EWHC (Admin) 1141,
DC. 6 Green v Burnett [1955] 1 QB 78, DC; Mickleborough v BRS (Contracts) [1977] RTR 389, DC.
7 Winter v Hinckley and District Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd [1959] 1 All ER 403, DC.
8 [1898] 2 QB 306, DC.
 | 18.5 vicarious liability and corporate liability
of selling goods to which a false trade description had been applied.9 Lastly, in Anderton
v Rodgers,10 all 11 members of the governing committee of an unincorporated social club
were held vicariously liable for illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, unknown to them and
contrary to their instructions, by their bar staff, since the staff were the employees of the
committee.
18.5 The extensive construction principle is not limited to the relationship of
employer and employee but has also been used to impose vicarious liability on a prin-
cipal for the act of his agent or independent contractor acting under his instructions
and control.11 Moreover, a licensee has been held liable under the Licensing Act 1964
(since repealed) for illegal sales of alcohol by bar staff who were not his employees, but
like him employed by the owner of the premises, since the act of selling could only be
performed by virtue of the licence.12 On the other hand, members of a board of direc-
tors, or of a governing committee, of a body corporate are not vicariously liable for the
acts of an employee of the body corporate, even though they have the exclusive power to
engage or dismiss that employee.13 (The body corporate may, of course, be vicariously
liable as an employer.) Similarly, the owner of a lorry which is used in a prohibited man-
ner cannot be vicariously liable for that use, even if it is engaged on his business, if the
driver is not his employee but that of a third party, such as an employment agency.14 In
contrast, the owner of a store has been held vicariously liable for the offence, contrary
to the Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 20 (since repealed), of giving consumers ‘in the
course of any business of his’ a misleading indication of the price of any goods where
the indication was given by the employee of a concessionaire in the store. Th is decision
seems to be an extreme application of the extensive construction principle based on the
court’s view that ‘the misleading price indication had clearly been given in the course of
the [store owner’s] business’.15
18.6 The extensive construction principle cannot apply where the offence requires a
physical act by D, or a prescribed physical act by D, because this indicates a requirement
of actual participation by D. Thus, while someone like an employer can be said to ‘sell’
something or to ‘use a vehicle’ through an employee, he cannot be said to ‘drive’ a vehicle
through an employee. It is the employee alone who drives the vehicle.16
9 Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (4th edn, 2010) (Simester, Sullivan, Spencer and
Virgo (eds)) 268 argue that this was not a case of vicarious liability because the sale in a legal sense was made by
D, the employer, and no mens rea was required for the offence. Nevertheless, the physical acts involved in the
sale were those of the employee, and were the immediate cause of the sale. The case is better explained as one of
vicarious liability. 10 [1981] Crim LR 404, DC.
11 Quality Dairies (York) Ltd v Pedley [1952] 1 KB 275, DC; FE Charman Ltd v Clow [1974] 3 All ER 371, DC;
Hallett Silberman Ltd v Cheshire County Council [1993] RTR 32, DC.
12 Goodfellow v Johnson [1966] 1 QB 83, DC. The employer could also be vicariously liable for an unlawful
sale by a member of the bar staff: Nottingham City Justices v Wolverhampton and Dudley Breweries plc [2003]
EWHC 2847 (Admin), DC. 13 Phipps v Hoff man [1976] Crim LR 315, DC.
14 Howard v GT Jones & Co Ltd [1975] RTR 150, DC.
15 Surrey County Council v Burton Retail Ltd (1997) 162 JP 545, DC.
16 Richmond upon Thames LBC v Pinn & Wheeler Ltd [1989] RTR 354, DC. See also Qureshi [2011] EWCA
1584 (‘does acts’ in Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 1(3A) suggested a requirement of actual participation
by D; offence not one of vicarious liability).
18.11 vicarious liability for the criminal acts of another | 
18.7 It seems that under the extensive construction principle only the act of the
employee etc, and not his mens rea, can be imputed to the employer etc.17 The result is
that the principle is limited to offences of strict liability.18
Delegation
18.8 This principle of interpretation appears to be limited to a small number of offences
which can only be committed by the holder of a licence on whom statute places a duty.19
If a licence-holder, eg, delegates his responsibilities as licence-holder to another, and
the delegate acts in breach of one of the delegated responsibilities, his acts and state
of mind are imputed to the delegator for the purposes of such an offence. In Allen v
Whitehead,20 D, the licensee of a refreshment house delegated control of it to an employee
who, in D’s absence and contrary to his express instructions, allowed prostitutes to enter.
D was convicted of ‘knowingly suffering prostitutes to meet together in his house and
remain therein’, contrary to the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, s 44, the acts and mens
rea of the delegate employee being imputed to him. The rationale behind the delegation
principle is that without it the office-holder on whom a statutory responsibility is placed
could render the offence relating to it nugatory by delegating his managerial functions
and responsibilities to another.
18.9 Where the offence is one of strict liability, the extensive construction principle suf-
fices to impose vicarious liability and the delegation principle only comes into play if the
statute uses words which import a requirement of mens rea.21
18.10 The delegation principle is not limited to cases where the delegate is the employee
of the delegator. In Linnett v Metropolitan Police Comr,22 it was held that one co-licensee
was vicariously liable where his co-licensee, to whom he had delegated the management
of a refreshment house owned by their employer, had knowingly permitted disorderly
conduct there.
18.11 It is necessary that there should have been a complete delegation of managerial
functions and responsibilities. Thus, the House of Lords held in Vane v Yiannopoullos23
that a restaurateur, who was permitted to sell intoxicants only to customers consuming
a meal, and who had told a waitress to serve such customers only, and then withdrawn
to the basement, was not guilty of any infringement by the waitress of the Licensing Act
1964, s 161(1) (since repealed) (which penalised licensees who knowingly sold intoxicants
to unpermitted persons). The restaurateur had retained control of the restaurant and had
17 Vane v Yiannopoullos [1965] AC 486, HL; Winson [1969] 1 QB 371 at 382; Coupe v Guyett [1973] 2 All ER
1058, DC. Cf Mousell Bros Ltd v London and North Western Rly Co Ltd [1917] 2 KB 836, DC (employer con-
victed of statutory offence of falsifying the description of goods with intent to avoid payment of tolls). Th is is an
obscure decision which is best explained as belonging ‘to an intermediate stage in the development of corporate
criminal responsibility’ which would now be the basis of personal corporate liability on the facts (para 18.24),
not vicarious liability: Williams Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd edn, 1961) 274. Also see Sir John Smith
[2000] Crim LR 694–696. 18 Qureshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1584.
19 In St Regis Paper Co Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 2527 at [28], it was stated that it is not possible to apply the
delegation principle in circumstances other than licensing cases. 20 [1930] 1 KB 211, DC.
21 Winson [1969] 1 QB 371 at 382. 22 [1946] KB 290, DC. 23 [1965] AC 486, HL.
 | 18.12 vicarious liability and corporate liability
not delegated this to the waitress. On the other hand, if there has been a complete delega-
tion of managerial functions and responsibilities, it is irrelevant that this only relates to
part of the licensed premises or that the delegator licensee is still on the premises.24
18.12 In Vane v Yiannopoullos, Lords Morris and Donovan doubted the validity of the
delegation principle, but in the light of its continued application it must still be regarded
as part of the law.25
Comments on vicarious liability

Within the scope of his employment or authority
18.13 Vicarious liability can arise only if the employee or delegate etc was acting within
the scope of his employment or authority. Doing an authorised activity in an unauthor-
ised way falls within such scope, but a wholly unauthorised activity does not. In Coppen v
Moore (No 2),26 an employer was held vicariously liable for a sale effected by a sales assist-
ant in an unauthorised manner, but in Adams v Camfoni, 27 the defendant licensee was
acquitted of supplying intoxicants outside permitted hours because the supply had been
effected by a messenger boy who had no authority to sell anything at all.
Liability of employee or delegate

18.14 The liability of the employee or delegate etc depends on the wording of the
particular statute. If it specifies that only a person with a particular status can com-
mit the offence, an employee or delegate etc who actually commits the act can be con-
victed only as an accomplice of that person, who is vicariously liable as perpetrator.28
Where the statute does not specify a particular type of perpetrator, the employee etc
can be convicted as perpetrator jointly with the person held vicariously liable.29 Th is
distinction is important because, if the offence in question is one of strict liability, the
employee etc can be convicted in the first type of case only if he has mens rea, since a
person can be convicted as an accomplice to an offence of strict liability only if he has
mens rea.30
No vicarious liability as an accomplice or for attempt

18.15 A person cannot be vicariously liable for aiding or abetting31 or for attempting to
commit32 an offence.
24 Howker v Robinson [1973] QB 178, DC.

25 See, eg, Winson [1969] 1 QB 371, CA; Howker v Robinson [1973] QB 178, DC. The principle is, however,
unlikely to be extended: St Regis Paper Co Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 2527 at [28].
26 [1898] 2 QB 306, DC. Also see Police Comrs v Cartman [1896] 1 QB 655, DC; Allen v Whitehead [1930] 1 KB
211, DC; Anderton v Rodgers [1981] Crim LR 404, DC.
27 [1929] 1 KB 95, DC. Also see Boyle v Smith [1906] 1 KB 432, DC; Phelon and Moore Ltd v Keel [1914] 3 KB
165, DC; Barker v Levinson [1951] 1 KB 342, DC. 28 Griffiths v Studebakers Ltd [1924] 1 KB 102, DC.
29 Green v Burnett [1955] 1 QB 78, DC. 30 Para 17.40.
31 Ferguson v Weaving [1951] 1 KB 814, DC. 32 Gardner v Akeroyd [1952] 2 QB 743, DC.
18.18 vicarious liability for the criminal acts of another | 
Statutory defences
18.16 There are several statutory defences which are open to employers and others who
may be vicariously liable. The courts have refused to read into statutes, construed by
them as imposing vicarious liability for offences, an exception protecting employers who
show that they have not been negligent or that they have exercised due diligence in the
management of their business in cases where nothing which they could reasonably be
expected to do would have prevented the commission of the offence by the employee.
Accordingly, some statutes contain an express provision for defences of this nature in
relation to offences under them, of which examples are the Weights and Measures Act
1985, s 34 and the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s 24. There is much to be said for having
a general defence of due diligence in all cases of vicarious criminal liability.33
18.17 In a case34 concerning the statutory no negligence defence to an offence of sup-
plying a video to a person under the appropriate age, provided by the Video Recordings
Act 1984, s 11(2)(b), viz that D neither knew nor had reasonable grounds to believe that
the buyer had not attained the appropriate age, the Divisional Court held that the state
of mind of an employee whose act was imputed to the employer could also be attributed
to the employer in relation to this defence. Consequently, if the employee knew and had
reason to believe the above fact, the employer could not rely on the defence. While this
might be permissible where the delegation principle applies to impose vicarious liabil-
ity, it would seem impermissible where (as in the case in question) vicarious liability is
imposed under the extensive construction principle. Under that principle, an employee’s
mens rea cannot be attributed to the employer so as to make him vicariously liable where
an offence requires mens rea; it is odd that an employee’s state of mind can be attributed
to the employer in relation to a defence.
Justification of vicarious liability

18.18 Criminal responsibility is generally regarded as essentially personal in nature. The
exceptional principles, whereby a person can be convicted of an offence of which he was
ignorant and which was actually committed by another, can be justified only on the basis
of the need to enforce modern regulatory legislation. The courts consider that the most
effective way of enforcing such legislation is to impose on the employer liability for con-
travention by employees in order to encourage the employer to prevent them infringing
the legislation.35 This justification calls for two comments. First, the assumption that the
imposition of vicarious liability is the most effective method of securing compliance with
the statute is unproved. Secondly, vicarious liability would be more acceptable if it were
limited generally to employers who had not exercised due diligence to prevent the contra-
vention. Another justification put forward occasionally is that some offences can be com-
mitted only by a particular person, such as a licensee, and that without vicarious liability
33 Paras 6.48–6.49.
34 Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council [1993] 2 All ER 718, DC; see further para 18.37.
35 Reynolds v GH Austin & Sons Ltd [1951] 2 KB 135, DC; Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153
at 194, per Lord Diplock.
 | 18.19 vicarious liability and corporate liability
such an offence would be rendered nugatory where that person acted through others. The
obvious answer is to amend the statute, not for the judges to impose vicarious liability.
Corporations
Key points 18.2

Corporations are legal persons.
A corporation can be criminally liable on one of five bases:
• personal liability via express statutory provision;

• vicarious liability;
• personal liability for an ‘operational offence’;
• personal liability for breach of statutory duty; or
• personal liability on the basis of attributing to the corporation the conduct and state
of mind of an individual.
18.19 The general rule is that a corporation, such as an incorporated company, a lim-
ited liability partnership under the Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000 or a local
authority, may be criminally liable to the same extent as a natural person.
In law a corporation is a separate person distinct from its members (eg the sharehold-
ers, limited liability partners or councillors, as the case may be). References to a ‘person’
in a statute include a corporation, unless the contrary intention appears.36 There has never
been any doubt that the members, 37 like the employees, of a corporation cannot shelter
behind the corporation and may be successfully prosecuted for criminal acts performed
or authorised by them; the problem with which we are concerned is the extent to which
the corporate body itself may be criminally liable. The chief obstacle to the acceptance
of the concept of the criminal liability of a corporation has been the combination of its
artificiality with the traditional need for the proof of mens rea in crime: ‘ . . . did you ever
expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned and no body
to be kicked?’38 In 1700, a corporation was not indictable at all;39 today a corporation can
be liable on one of the five bases set out in Key points 18.2.
Express statutory provision

18.20 It is possible, but exceedingly rare, for a statute expressly to provide for the crimi-
nal liability of a corporation in respect of a particular situation.
One example is the offence of corporate manslaughter discussed in paras 8.128 to 8.146.
36 Interpretation Act 1978, ss 5, 22(1) and Schs 1 and 2, Pt I, para 4(5).

37 In the case of an incorporated company, its members are normally its shareholders.
38 Attributed to the second Baron Thurlow. 39 Anon (1702) 12 Mod Rep 559.
18.22 corporations | 
Another example is the offence of failure by a relevant commercial organisation to

prevent bribery, contrary to the Bribery Act 2010, s 7. Section 7(1) provides:
‘A relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under this section if a

person (“A”) associated with C bribes 40 another person intending –
(a) to obtain or retain business for C, or
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C.’’41
By s 7(2), it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed
to prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct.42 The definition of
‘relevant commercial organisation’ in s 7(5) includes:
• a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and
which carries on a business 43 (whether there or elsewhere); or
• any other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries on a business, or
part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom.
There is nothing to prevent an individual being liable as an accomplice to a s 7 offence
committed by the organisation. In this respect the offence can be contrasted with corpo-
rate manslaughter.44
Vicarious liability
18.21 A corporation can be vicariously liable for the acts of employees (however junior)
and others in the same way as an individual.45
Operational offences
18.22 A corporation can be personally liable for a strict liability offence which can be
committed by D’s conduct of an operation of some kind without more on D’s part.46
40 For these purposes, A bribes another if, and only if, A would be guilty of an offence under the Bribery Act
2010, s 1 (bribing another person) or s 6 (bribing of foreign public official), whether or not A has been prosecuted
for such an offence: s 7(3).
41 An offence under s 7 is triable only on indictment and punishable with a fi ne: Bribery Act 2010, s 11(3).
A prosecution may not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the
Director of the Serious Fraud Office or the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions: s 10(1). The relevant
Director’s function under s 10(1) must normally be exercised personally by that Director: s 10(3)–(6). However,
where the relevant Director is unavailable, another person designated in writing by that Director to exercise the
function under s 10(1) may do so, but must do so personally: s 10(5). An offence is committed under s 7 irrespec-
tive of whether the acts or omissions which form part of the offence take place in the United Kingdom: s 12(5).
For a discussion of s 7, see Gentle ‘The Bribery Act 2010: The Corporate Offence’ [2011] Crim LR 101.
42 The Secretary of State has issued guidance on the procedures that can be put in place for this purpose,
as required by s 9. The guidance is available at: www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/docs/bribery-act-2010-guidance.
pdf. 43 A trade or profession is a business for these purposes: s 7(5).
44 See para 8.144.
45 Paras 18.1–18.18. For an early example of corporate vicarious liability, see Great North of England Rly Co
(1846) 2 Cox CC 70 (common law offence of public nuisance).
46 For an example, see Environment Agency (formerly National Rivers Authority) v Empress Car Co
(Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22, HL.
 | 18.23 vicarious liability and corporate liability
Breach of statutory duty

18.23 A corporation can be guilty of breach of a statutory duty, such as the duty imposed
on the ‘occupier’ of a factory to fence its machinery or on an ‘employer’ in respect of vari-
ous health and safety matters. Since the middle of the nineteenth century it has been clear
that, like anyone else, a corporation is liable if it is in breach of a statutory duty imposed
on it as an occupier or employer or in some other similar capacity.47 In Evans & Co Ltd
v LCC,48 a company was charged that, being the occupier of a shop, it did not close it on
the afternoon of an early closing day in breach of the duty imposed on the occupiers of
shops by the Shops Act 1912 (since repealed). The Divisional Court held that the company
was liable for breach of this statutory duty. A more recent example is provided by the
decision of the House of Lords in Associated Octel Co Ltd, 49 which was concerned with
the duty, under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, s 3(1), which is imposed on
an employer to conduct an undertaking in such a way as to ensure that, so far as reason-
ably practicable, those who are not employees but who may be affected thereby are not
exposed to risks to their health or safety. The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974,
s 33(1) makes breach of this duty an offence which is triable either way and punishable
with a maximum term of imprisonment of two years.50 Upholding a company’s convic-
tion under s 33(1), the House of Lords held that liability thereunder was not a vicari-
ous liability but a personal liability which arose where an activity in question could be
described as part of the employer’s undertaking (and this could be so even where it was
an independent contractor’s activity) and had been carried out in a way which breached
the employer’s duty. In A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999),51 the Court of Appeal confirmed
that the present principle is limited to cases where there has been a breach of a statutory
duty imposed on a corporation to conduct its undertaking in a particular way. It refused
to extend the principle to embrace a gross breach of the corporation’s common law duty
of care resulting in death, and therefore held that a corporation could not be guilty of
manslaughter by gross negligence under the principle.
Liability on the basis of attributing the conduct and

state of mind of an individual to the corporation
Key points 18.3

A corporation can generally be liable for an offence, notwithstanding that it requires
proof of mens rea, if the conduct and state of mind of an individual can be attributed to
it under the rules which follow. Whether there can be such attribution normally depends
on the ‘directing mind and will rule’ (the ‘identification principle’). However, in statutory
47 Birmingham and Gloucester Rly Co (1842) 3 QB 223. 48 [1914] 3 KB 315, DC.

49 [1996] 4 All ER 846, HL. See also British Steel plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356, CA; Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997]
3 All ER 78, CA.
50 The mode of trial and maximum sentence are provided by the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, Sch
3A, inserted by the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008. 51 [2000] QB 796, CA.
18.27 corporations | 
offences attribution may depend instead on the interpretation of the statute if the applica-
tion of the directing mind and will rule would defeat the purpose of the statute.
18.24 The bases of liability discussed in the previous paragraphs can render a corpora-
tion criminally liable only for a relatively small number of offences, essentially statutory
offences of strict liability. Much more important is that, since 1944 at the latest, 52 it has
been possible to impose criminal liability on a corporation, whether as a perpetrator or
as an accomplice, for virtually any offence, notwithstanding that mens rea is required.
In such a case, liability is not vicarious, in that the corporation is not held responsible
on the basis of liability for the acts of its agents; instead the corporation is regarded as
having committed the offence personally.
Where personal liability is imposed on a corporation under the rules below on the
basis that the individual whose conduct and state of mind can be attributed to it has per-
petrated an offence, it will be liable as a perpetrator. On the other hand, if the individual
was an accomplice to the commission of an offence by another, the corporation’s personal
liability will be as an accomplice. Such secondary liability may arise either through a posi-
tive act of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring by an individual or through a failure
by an individual to exercise a right or duty to control another, eg a junior employee, who
perpetrates the offence.53
The ‘identification principle’: attribution via the ‘directing

mind and will rule’
18.25 In the fi rst case in which the identification principle was clearly recognised in
the criminal law, DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd,54 D Ltd was charged with two
offences requiring mens rea. The Divisional Court held that D Ltd could be convicted
of both offences. The false documentation in question had been signed by an officer of
D Ltd and he had the necessary mens rea and, the Court held, his mens rea could be
attributed to D Ltd. Viscount Caldecote CJ stated that: ‘a company is incapable of act-
ing or speaking or even thinking except in so far as its officers have acted, spoken or
thought’.55
18.26 The fact that a person is not a director or employee of a corporation is not a bar to
his being identified with it.56
18.27 The nature of the ‘directing mind and will rule’, and the clear distinction which
exists between personal corporate liability resulting from it and the corporation’s vicari-
ous liability as an employer, is shown in the following passage from Lord Reid’s speech in
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass:
52 Th ree cases reported in 1944 went far to establish the present law: DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd
[1944] KB 146, DC; ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551, CCA; Moore v I Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 515, DC. For criti-
cism of these cases, see Welsh ‘The Criminal Liability of Corporations’ (1946) 62 LQR 345.
53 Para 17.13. 54 [1944] KB 146, DC. 55 Ibid at 155.
56 Worthy v Gordon Plant (Services) Ltd [1989] RTR 7n, DC (person employed as traffic manager under con-
tract for services, ie self-employed, as opposed to contract of employment).
 | 18.28 vicarious liability and corporate liability
‘A living person has a mind which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he
has hands to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these: it must act through
living persons, though not always one and the same person. Then the person who acts is
not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as the company and his mind which
directs his acts is the mind of the company. There is no question of the company being
vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an
embodiment of the company, or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the persona
of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company.
If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company.’57
It is a question of law whether a person in doing (or failing to do) a particular thing is
to be regarded as part of the corporation’s directing mind and will or merely as the cor-
poration’s employee or agent. It follows that the judge should tell the jury that if they find
certain facts proved then they must find that the acts (or omissions) and state of mind of
that person are those of the corporation.58
18.28 An influential dictum on the distinction between those who form part of the
directing mind and will of the corporation and those who do not is to be found in the
civil case of H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd where Denning LJ
(as he then was) said:
‘A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve
centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in
accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are
mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot
be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who repre-
sent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of
mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law
as such.’59
This dictum was approved in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass60 by Viscount Dilhorne
and Lords Reid and Pearson who held that only those who constitute the ‘directing mind
and will’ of the corporation can be identified with it. 61 These were people such as direc-
tors and others who are in actual control of the affairs of the corporation or part of them
with full discretion to act independently of instructions from the directors.62 In assessing
whether a particular person could be identified with the corporation, account should be
taken of the constitution of the corporation but it is not decisive.63 Account should also
be taken of the corporation’s organisational structure.
57 [1972] AC 153 at 170.

58 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153 at 170 and 173, per Lord Reid. See also Andrews Weatherfoil
Ltd [1972] 1 All ER 65, CA. 59 [1957] 1 QB 159 at 172.
60 [1972] AC 153, HL.
61 Th is rule is criticised by Wells ‘Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability’ [1993] Crim LR 551 at 558–561 and
563. See also Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2nd edn, 2001) 99–101.
62 [1972] AC 153 at 171, 183 and 193.
63 Ibid at 199, per Lord Diplock. See also the speech of Lord Pearson, ibid at 193.
18.31 corporations | 
18.29 On the above criteria, a manager to whom the directors have delegated full power in
the running of its affairs64 or part of its affairs has been regarded as the embodiment of the
corporation.65 For example, the traffic manager of a company has been identified with it in
relation to the operation of its fleet of goods vehicles under an operator’s licence.66 On the other
hand, a corporation has not been identified with the branch manager of a company with a large
number of branches who was required to comply with the general directions of the board of
directors,67 nor with a depot engineer,68 nor with the technical and environmental manager at
one of a company’s five paper mills who reported to the mill’s managing director who in turn
reported to a director who formed part of the senior management team of the company.69
18.30 A defect with the directing mind and will rule is that the larger the corporation
the less likely it is to be personally liable by virtue of it, since the larger the corporation the
fewer (relatively) will be the activities and decisions of its individual controlling officers,
particularly where a good deal of policy or strategic decision-making in a large corpor-
ation is decentralised. The problem is compounded by the rule that it is not possible to
aggregate the acts and states of mind of two or more individuals (none of whom could
be criminally liable) so as to render the corporation liable.70 Many corporate decisions
or failures are constituted not by one individual but by the distinct contributions of a
number of them or by a failure of its systems. As stated in para 8.128, this problem was
manifested in a number of unsuccessful prosecutions of corporations for the common
law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence.
Another approach: attribution a matter of statutory construction

18.31 The ‘directing mind and will rule’, affirmed in 2000 in respect of both common
law offences and statutory offences by the Court of Appeal in A-G’s Reference (No 2 of
1999),71 is not determinative in all cases where a statutory offence is involved.
According to the decision of the Privy Council in 1995 in Meridian Global Funds
Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission,72 if the application of the directing mind
and will rule would defeat the purpose of the statute, attribution depends on the inter-
pretation of the rule in question and its underlying policy (or purpose). This approach,
which may be regarded as an extension of the identification principle, can result in the
attribution to the corporation of the acts and state of mind of someone lower down the
corporation than its directing mind and will.
Meridian was a Hong Kong investment management company. Two of its senior invest-
ment managers, who were not part of its ‘directing mind and will’, improperly used their
authority to provide finance to buy into a publicly listed New Zealand company with a
64 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705, HL.

65 Worthy v Gordon Plant (Services) Ltd [1989] RTR 7n, DC.
66 Ibid; Redhead Freight Ltd v Shulman [1989] RTR 1, DC.
67 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, HL; para 18.30.
68 Magna Plant v Mitchell [1966] Crim LR 394, DC.
69 St Regis Paper Co Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 2527.
70 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796, CA. For earlier authority see HM Coroner for East Kent, ex
p Spooner (1987) 88 Cr App R 10, DC; P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1990) 93 Cr App R 72, Crown Ct. Th is
rule is criticised by Wells ‘Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability’ [1993] Crim LR 551 at 563–565.
71 [2000] QB 796, CA. 72 [1995] 2 AC 500, PC.
 | 18.32 vicarious liability and corporate liability
view to gaining control of it. Meridian thereby became a substantial security holder in
the company. A New Zealand statute required a substantial security holder in a publicly
listed company to give notice of the holding to that company and to the stock exchange,
as soon as it knew or ought to know that it was such a holder. Those who were the direct-
ing mind and will of Meridian were ignorant of what had occurred and consequently
Meridian failed to notify the New Zealand company and the stock exchange that it had
become a substantial security holder. Proceedings were brought by the New Zealand
Securities Commission against Meridian and a civil order was made against it in favour
of the Commission and of a shareholder in the New Zealand company.
The question before the Privy Council was whether the knowledge of one of the two
senior investment managers, who was its chief investment officer, could be attributed to
Meridian; if not, Meridian would not have known nor ought to have known of the rel-
evant fact at the material time. The Privy Council held that the chief investment officer’s
knowledge could be attributed. Lord Hoffmann, delivering the Privy Council’s advice,
stated that in attributing knowledge to a corporation the directing mind and will rule
was not always appropriate or necessary; sometimes the acts and state of mind of some-
one lower down in the organisation could be attributed. The answer to the question
‘can this person’s acts and state of mind be attributed to the corporation?’ depended,
said his Lordship, on the interpretation of the rule in question:
‘This is always a matter of interpretation: given that it was intended to apply to a company,
how was it intended to apply? Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this
purpose intended to count as the act etc of the company? One finds the answer to this
question by applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking into account the language
of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy.’73
That, said Lord Hoffmann, might indicate that the act and mind of someone outside the
directing mind and will could be attributed to the company. The New Zealand statute’s
policy was to compel the immediate disclosure of the identity of a person who became
a substantial security holder. Where that person was a corporation the relevant act and
state of mind could include that of an individual who, within the scope of his authority,
acquired the relevant interest; the statute’s policy would be defeated if knowledge was
required on the part of someone constituting part of the directing mind and will of the
corporation.
18.32 The extension of corporate criminal responsibility is generally regarded as desir-
able, but the approach taken in Meridian has the drawback that it is productive of uncer-
tainty. The policy behind a statute may be difficult to discover. Moreover, the words of the
statute are unlikely to indicate who constitutes the corporation for the purposes of the
offence under it. Until a court had interpreted a particular offence it would not be possible
to be certain whether someone below the directing mind and will of a corporation is to
have his acts and state of mind attributed to it. In his dissenting judgment in Re Odyssey
73 [1995] 2 AC 500 at 507. These points were emphasised in Shanks and McEwan (Teeside) Ltd v Environment
Agency [1999] QB 333 at 345, Mance J.
18.34 corporations | 
(London) Ltd v OIC Run Off Ltd,74 Buxton LJ stated that Meridian was an imperfect guide
to the rule for attribution of a crime. The directing mind and will rule does, at least, have
the merit of certainty despite its disadvantages.
18.33 It must be emphasised that the Meridian approach has not superseded the direct-
ing mind and will rule. In A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999),75 Rose LJ described Meridian as
a restatement, and not an abandonment, of existing principles:
‘It therefore seems safe to conclude that Lord Hoff man [in Meridian] did not think
that the common law principles as to the need for identification have changed. Indeed,
Lord Hoff man’s speech in Meridian, in fashioning an additional special rule of attri-
bution geared to the purpose of the statute, proceeded on the basis that the primary
“directing mind and will” rule still applies, although it is not determinative in all cases.
In other words, he was not departing from the identification theory but reaffirming its
existence.’
18.34 The Meridian approach clearly cannot apply to the small number of common
law offences, such as conspiracy to defraud, because it is limited to the interpretation
of statutory offences.76 In these cases it is the directing mind and will rule which
applies.
In respect of statutory offences, the directing mind and will rule is the conventional
test which will be applied unless the court on its construction of the statute decides that
to do so would be contrary to the purpose of the statute. Reference in this respect may
be made to the Privy Council’s emphasis in Meridian on the fact that the purpose of the
statute would be defeated if the directing mind and will rule was applied.
Reference may also be made to St Regis Paper Co Ltd.77 D company owned five paper
mills. S was the technical manager at one of them. The mill operated under an environ-
mental permit setting out the amount of pollutants which could be discharged and
requiring discharge records to be kept. S was required to produce report sheets in respect
of the pollutants discharged at the mill. False readings were recorded by S and reported
to the Environment Agency. S was convicted of the offence of intentionally making
a false entry in a record, contrary to the Pollution Prevention and Control (England
and Wales) Regulations 2000, reg 32(1)(g). D company was also convicted of an offence
under reg 32(1)(g) after a judge had ruled that, since S had been entrusted with man-
aging the disposal of D company’s waste products, S’s state of mind could be attributed
to D company; the jury had been directed in accordance with this ruling. In making
the ruling, the judge had founded himself on Meridian and concluded that reg 32(1)(g)
created liability in respect of the acts of an employee who could not be said to be the
directing mind and will of D company. D company appealed successfully against its
conviction under reg 32(1)(g).
74 (2000) 150 NLJ 430, CA (reported as Sphere Drake Insurance plc v Orion Insurance Co plc). Th is is a brief
report. What is said in the text relies on the transcript.
75 [2000] QB 796 at 216. See also Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 46 at [34].
76 A-G’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) [2000] QB 796, CA. 77 [2011] EWCA Crim 2527.
 | 18.35 vicarious liability and corporate liability
The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been wrong to permit the jury to conclude
that S’s state of mind could be attributed to D company; in the case before it the directing
mind and will rule should not be modified in the light of Meridian. It was impossible as a
matter of statutory construction to impose criminal liability for breach of reg 32(1)(g) on
D company by attributing to it the state of mind of S who could not be regarded as part
of its directing mind and will; there was no warrant to do so. A contrast could, the Court
said, be drawn between offences of strict liability in reg 32 and those which required
proof of mens rea such as reg 32(1)(g). There was, in those circumstances, no basis for
suggesting that the Regulations, designed as they were to protect the environment and
prevent pollution, could not function without imposing liability on D company in respect
of one who was not the directing mind and will of the company; application of the direc-
ting mind and will rule would not defeat the purpose of the Regulations.
The Court therefore held that, as it was not open to the jury to conclude that S fell within
the directing mind and will of D company, it was not open to the jury to attribute his state
of mind to it.
Acting within scope of authority

18.35 A corporation is only criminally liable if the individual whose acts and state
of mind are sought to be attributed to it acts within the scope of his authority.78 If the
managing director of a company picks someone’s pocket or causes death by his danger-
ous driving on his way to a business meeting, his acts and state of mind are not attributed
to the company. However, the present requirement does not mean that activities contrary
to the corporation’s interests will exclude its liability. A corporation may be convicted
even though it is itself defrauded, provided that the offence was committed by an indi-
vidual (whose acts and state of mind are attributable to it) acting within the scope of his
authority.79
Attribution in the context of due diligence and no negligence defences

18.36 The directing mind and will rule is inappropriate and liable to be contrary to the
purpose of the legislation where a statute provides a ‘due diligence’ or ‘no negligence’
defence to a regulatory offence of strict liability for which the corporation is otherwise
vicariously liable.
This is shown by the facts of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass, 80 which concerned
the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s 24(1). Under s 24(1) it is a defence for a defendant,
who would otherwise be vicariously liable for a regulatory offence, to show that he has
exercised all due diligence and that the commission of the offence was due to the act
or default of ‘another person’. In Tesco v Nattrass, a local shop manager employed by a
company running a chain of 800 supermarkets was not identified with the company. His
faulty supervision had caused a shop assistant to sell goods in circumstances in which the
78 DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146 at 168, per Macnaghten J; Moore v I Bresler Ltd
[1944] 2 All ER 515, DC; Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500
at 511. 79 Moore v I Bresler Ltd above.
80 [1972] AC 153, HL.
18.38 corporations | 
company was prima facie guilty, under the principles of vicarious liability, of an offence
under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968. A magistrates’ court found that the company had
set up a proper system and therefore had exercised all due diligence but it also found that
the branch manager was not ‘another person’ for the purposes of the Trade Descriptions
Act 1968, s 24(1), because his acts were those of the company. The House of Lords quashed
this conviction. It held that the manager, though an employee, could not be equated with
the company because he was not part of the directing mind and will of the company.
Therefore, despite his default, the company could rely on the statutory defence under s
24(1). Thus, according to this decision the directing mind and will rule can apply not only
to convict a corporation but also to establish a third party defence to a regulatory offence.
The effect is, of course, to reduce the effectiveness of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968
where defendants are corporations because they will often be sheltered, as were Tesco, by
the directing mind and will rule. The actual decision in this case might well be different
if it is revisited in the light of Meridian.
18.37 In relation to a ‘no-negligence’ defence (ie one whereby D has a defence if he proves
that he neither knew nor had reasonable ground to believe a particular fact), the Divisional
Court in Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council81 refused to apply the directing
mind and will rule. This case concerned the defence under the Video Recordings Act
1984, s 11(2)(b), under which it is a defence to a charge of supplying a video recording
of a classified work in breach of its age classification (eg selling an ‘18’ video to someone
under that age) to prove that D neither knew nor had reasonable grounds to believe that
the person supplied had not reached the relevant age. In Tesco v Brent a sales assistant
employed by Tesco, and clearly not part of the directing mind and will of Tesco, had sold
a classified video recording to a customer below the relevant age, as the assistant had
reasonable grounds to believe. The Divisional Court dismissed Tesco’s appeal against
conviction for supplying the video recording to an under-age person. It held that on the
true interpretation of s 11(2) there was no distinction between the company accused of
the offence in question and those under its control who physically supplied the video
recording. Therefore, as the assistant had been under Tesco’s control, the defence under s
11(2)(b) was not available to Tesco. As Staughton LJ said in Tesco v Brent: ‘Were it other-
wise, the statute would be wholly ineffective in the case of a large company, unless by
the merest chance a youthful purchaser were known to the board [sic] of directors. Yet
Parliament contemplated that a company might commit the offence.’82
Reform
18.38 In its consultation paper Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, 83 the Law
Commission has considered corporate criminal liability for statutory offences requiring
proof of mens rea. It acknowledges the benefits in terms of certainty of the identification
principle (the directing mind and will rule) of corporate criminal liability but considers
that there can be uncertainty over who satisfies it (ie over its application) and that it may
be an inappropriate and ineffective method of establishing corporate criminal liability.
81 [1993] 2 All ER 718, DC. 82 Ibid at 721.

 | 18.39 vicarious liability and corporate liability
The Commission notes that, by focusing on attributing the acts and states of mind of
a limited range of senior people to the corporation, the identification principle fails to
reflect the fact that, in modern corporations, a good deal of modern policy or strategic
decision-making may be decentralised.
While acknowledging that the Meridian approach is productive of uncertainty, the
Law Commission is impressed by the fact that that approach allows for a more policy-
orientated and purposive exercise of statutory interpretation.
18.39 The Commission has concluded that it is unlikely that having only one basis on
which companies84 can be found criminally liable, however broadly stated, would prove
to be workable or desirable across the board. It has provisionally proposed that:
• legislation should include specific provisions in criminal offences to indicate the
basis on which companies may be found liable, as has been done in respect of corpo-
rate manslaughter and bribery; but
• in the absence of such provisions, the courts should treat the question of how corpo-
rate criminal liability for statutory offences may be established as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, ie the Meridian approach should be applied. The Commission’s
reasoning is that under that approach the courts have latitude to interpret statutes
imposing criminal liability as imposing it on different bases, depending on what will
best fulfi l the statutory purpose in question. The Commission encourages the courts
not to presume that the identification principle applies when interpreting the scope
of statutory criminal offences applicable to corporations.
Offences for which corporations cannot be criminally liable

18.40 In the ICR Haulage Ltd case, 85 although it was said that a corporation was prima
facie criminally liable to the same extent as a natural person, two exceptions to this gen-
eral rule were mentioned and it was recognised that there might be others.
18.41 The first exception was said to consist of ‘cases in which, from its very nature,
the offence cannot be committed by a corporation’.86 The Court gave perjury and big-
amy as examples, and sexual offences such as rape and familial sex offences also seem to
fall within this category. In Re Odyssey (London) Ltd v OIC Run Off Ltd,87 however, a civil
case relating to perjured evidence given by a director and managing director of a limited
company, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the evidence of an individual
given on behalf of a company is capable of being treated as the evidence of the company
and that the company, as well as the individual, may be guilty of perjury if he gives false
evidence. The latter part of this statement was an obiter dictum. The problem with this is
that perjury requires that the false statement must be made by a person who has been law-
fully sworn, and the corporation cannot be so described. However, if a governing body
were to authorise the making of a false statement on oath in court, a corporation might
84 Although the Commission’s proposals are made in terms of companies they are equally applicable to other
corporations. 85 [1944] KB 551, CCA.
86 ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551 at 554. 87 Para 18.34, n 74.
18.44 corporations | 
be convicted, as an accomplice, of perjury. Similarly, although a corporation cannot com-

mit bigamy as a perpetrator, if a marriage bureau is managed by a limited company, one
of whose directors knowingly negotiates a bigamous marriage, it is difficult to see why
the company should not be convicted of bigamy, as an accomplice, for a natural person
may be convicted of aiding or abetting an offence which he could not commit himself as
a perpetrator.88 In Re Odyssey (London) Ltd v OIC Run Off Ltd, the majority of the Court
of Appeal stated that a company could be convicted of bigamy.
Although a corporation cannot be convicted as a perpetrator of offences involving
sexual intercourse, it could theoretically be convicted as an accomplice. It is, however,
difficult to visualise a situation where someone whose conduct and state of mind were
attributable to the corporation would be acting within the scope of his authority in
respect of an offence of rape or a familial sex offence. On the other hand, it has been
argued that: ‘If Z, the managing director of X Co Ltd, a fi lm company, supervises the
fi lming of intercourse between M, an 18-year-old male, with N, a 15-year-old girl, there
is no reason why Z and hence the film company should not be convicted as secondary
parties to the [offence of sexual activity with a child under 16].’89
18.42 The second exception to the general rule of corporate liability for crime referred to
in ICR Haulage Ltd arises from the fact that ‘the court will not stultify itself by embark-
ing on a trial in which, if a verdict of guilty is returned, no effective order by way of
sentence can be made’.90 This exception is now confined to murder for which the only
punishment which the court can impose is imprisonment.
18.43 It was said obiter in several old cases that a corporation could not be indicted for a
crime of violence.91 These dicta were acted upon by Finlay J in Cory Bros & Co,92 where he
held that a company could not be indicted for manslaughter or the statutory offence of set-
ting up an engine (in this case an electric fence) calculated to destroy life with intent to injure
a trespasser. It is now clear that a corporation can be convicted of an offence despite the fact
that it is one of violence. Cory Bros & Co was questioned in ICR Haulage Ltd and a corpora-
tion has since been convicted as an accomplice to causing death by dangerous driving93 and
a handful of corporations (all of them small companies) had been convicted of the com-
mon law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence before the enactment of the Corporate
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, dealt with in Chapter 8, s 20 of which
abolished the common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence in its application
to corporations. It has been held that a corporation can commit the offence of breach of the
prohibition of harassment, contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, s 2.94
Liability of directors and similar persons

18.44 The conviction of a corporation does not in itself involve any natural person in
criminal liability. On the other hand, where a corporation is criminally liable for an
88 Para 17.20. 89 Reed and Fitzpatrick Criminal Law (3rd edn, 2006) 168.
90 [1944] KB 551 at 554. 91 Eg Birmingham and Gloucester Rly Co (1842) 3 QB 223 at 232.
92 [1927] 1 KB 810. 93 Robert Millar (Contractors) Ltd and Millar [1970] 2 QB 54, CA.
94 Paras 7.135 and 7.143.
 | 18.45 vicarious liability and corporate liability
offence, a natural person involved may normally also be convicted of it, as a joint perpe-
trator (if he is the person who physically committed the offence) or as an accomplice (if he
aided, abetted, counselled or procured its commission). In addition, many statutes now
provide for the guilt of controlling officers of the corporation who would not be criminally
liable under ordinary principles, or whose guilt it would otherwise be hard to prove. Th is
makes it easier to get at those who are really responsible for the corporation’s offence.
An example of this type of provision is as follows:
‘Where an offence under this Act which has been committed by a body corporate is proved
to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any
neglect on the part of, any director, managerr [ie someone managing in a governing role
the affairs of the corporation, as opposed to someone with a day-to-day management
function],95 secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate, or any person who was
purporting to act in that capacity, he, as well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that
offence.’
A provision of this type is contained in the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, s 37,
and is commonly to be found in other statutes.96
An individual who is liable under such a provision is by its express terms guilty of the
same offence as that committed by the corporation; he does not commit, nor is he guilty
of, some separate offence created by the provision. An obiter dictum by the Court of
Appeal in Wilson97 that such a provision creates an offence ancillary to that committed
by the corporation, and when it applies the individual is guilty of ‘that offence’, cannot be
correct, given the unequivocal wording of the provision.
18.45 In A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1995),98 it was held that a person ‘consents’ to the com-
mission of an offence by a corporation if he knows the material facts that constitute the
offence by the corporation and agrees to the corporation’s conduct of its business on
the basis of those facts.99 ‘Connivance’ is generally regarded as involving wilful blind-
ness as to the commission of the offence,100 which must no doubt be coupled in this con-
text with acquiescence in it. In cases of ‘consent’ or ‘connivance’ no causal link need be
established between the agreement or acquiescence and the commission of the offence. A
person who consents to, or connives at, an offence committed by a corporation (through
another person’s conduct) may be guilty of that offence as an accomplice; and this is so
even in the case where he does nothing positive, if he had a right of control over that other
person.101 The importance of this part of the provision is that it makes the task of the
prosecution less difficult, since it is enough for them to prove consent or connivance by
a person of the specified type and they do not have to prove that it amounted to aiding,
abetting, counselling or procuring.
95 Boal [1992] QB 591, CA.
96 Other examples of this type of provision are the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, s 20; the Protection of
Children Act 1978, s 3; the Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 40; the Food Safety Act 1990, s 36; the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000, s 400; and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010, s 34.
97 [1997] 1 All ER 119 at 121. 98 [1996] 2 Cr App R 320, CA.
99 See also Huckerby v Elliott [1970] 1 All ER 189 at 194, per Ashworth J.
100 Somerset v Hart (1884) 12 QBD 360, DC. 101 Para 17.13.
18.45 corporations | 
By comparison, a person cannot be an accomplice to an offence simply because it is

‘attributable to his neglect’. ‘Attributable to neglect’ refers to the situation where a per-
son of the specified type (D) fails to take steps within the functions of his office to pre-
vent the offence being committed by a corporation through another person. D need not
know about the commission of the offence, nor be wilfully blind as to it; it is enough that
he should have been put on inquiry by reason of the surrounding circumstances so as to
have made inquiries as to whether the offence is being committed.102 Consequently, the
words ‘attributable to any neglect on the part of’ are important since they considerably
extend the ambit of the criminal law in this context, rendering a person of the specified
type liable for his negligence in failing to prevent the offence committed by the corpor-
ation.103 Unlike ‘consent’ or ‘connivance’ a causal link is required between the neglect
and the commission of the offence. The commission of the offence must be attributable
to some extent (but not necessarily wholly) to the neglect of the person in question of the
specified type. Where the offence committed by the corporation requires proof of sub-
jective mens rea, it seems unacceptable to impose criminal liability on a director or the
like simply on the ground that the offence was attributable to his negligent neglect.
In Chargot Ltd,104 where the House of Lords was concerned with the Health and Safety
at Work etc Act 1974, s 37, Lord Hope (with whom the other Law Lords agreed) said this
about the verbs discussed in this numbered paragraph:
‘No fi xed rule can be laid down as to what the prosecution must identify and prove in
order to establish that the officer’s state of mind was such as to amount to consent, con-
nivance or neglect. In some cases, as where the officer’s place of activity was remote from
the work place or what was done there was not under his immediate direction and control,
this may require the leading of quite detailed evidence of which fair notice may have to
be given. In others, where the officer was in day to day contact with what was done there,
very little more may be needed. . . . [T]he question, in the end of the day, will always be
whether the officer in question should have been put on inquiry so as to have taken steps
to determine whether or not the appropriate safety procedures were in place.’105
Referring to A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1995), Lord Hope went on to say that he agreed
with the statement in that case referred to at the start of this numbered paragraph. He
said, however, that he
‘would add that consent can be established by inference as well as by proof of an express
agreement. The state of mind that the words “connivance” and “neglect” contemplate is
one that may also be established by inference. . . . Where it is shown that the body corpor-
ate failed to achieve or prevent the [offence in question], it will be a relatively short step
for the inference to be drawn that there was connivance or neglect on his part if the cir-
cumstances under which the risk arose were under the direction or control of the officer.
The more remote his area of responsibility is from those circumstances, the harder it will
be to draw that inference.’106
102 P Ltd [2007] EWCA Crim 1937. 103 Wilson [1997] 1 All ER 119 at 121.
104 [2008] UKHL 73. 105 Ibid at [33]. 106 Ibid at [34].
 | 18.46 vicarious liability and corporate liability
18.46 A similar type of provision to that just described is one whose wording is the same
except that it omits any reference to ‘attributable to neglect’, so that a director, manager
or other similar officer is only guilty (by virtue of it) of an offence committed by a corpor-
ation if he consented to it or connived at it.107
18.47 Often, provisions of either type go on to provide that where the affairs of a cor-
poration are managed by its members, the provision applies in relation to the acts and
default of a member in connection with his functions of management as if he were a
director of the corporation.
18.48 In Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts,108 the Law Commission has
taken the view that the ‘neglect basis’ for individual liability under provisions of the
type described in para 18.44 involves a morally significant extension of liability. The
Commission has been unable to discern any rationale behind the imposition of liability
on this basis in some statutes and the imposition of liability on the basis only of con-
sent or connivance in others (see para 18.46), particularly where the offence in question
requires a high degree of fault in the form of knowledge, dishonesty or recklessness. The
Commission considers the neglect-based form of individual liability to be especially
objectionable where the offence in question involves not only proof of fault but also
involves a social stigma.
18.49 The Commission has provisionally proposed that when it is appropriate to provide
that individual directors (or equivalent officers) can themselves be liable for an offence
committed by their company,109 on the basis that they consented or connived at the com-
pany’s commission of that offence, the provision in question should not be extended to
include instances in which the company’s offence is attributable to neglect on the part of
an individual director or equivalent person.
The Commission, however, has sought views on whether, when a company is proved
to have committed an offence, it might be appropriate in some circumstances to provide
that an individual director (or equivalent officer) can be liable for a separate offence of
‘negligently failing to prevent’ that offence. Some, if not all, of the objections referred to
above would not apply to such an offence.
18.50 In addition to any criminal liability, company directors and members of limited
liability partnerships who are convicted of an indictable offence in connection with their
management of a company can be disqualified for up to 15 years by a court110 from acting
as directors or members of limited liability partnerships under the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986, s 2.111
107 Theft Act 1968, s 18 (see para 12.47); Public Order Act 1986, ss 28 and 29M; Trade Marks Act 1994, s 101(5);
Fraud Act 2006, s 12 (see para 12.47); and Bribery Act 2010, s 14 (which does not apply to an offence under s 7 of
the Act referred to in para 18.20).
109 Although the Commission’s proposals are made in terms of companies, they are equally applicable to
other corporations.
110 When a conviction is in a magistrates’ court the maximum period of disqualification is five years.
111 Section 2 was extended to members of limited liability partnerships by the Limited Liability Partnerships
Regulations 2001, reg 4(2).
18.52 unincorporated associations | 
Unincorporated associations
Key points 18.4

An unincorporated association cannot be convicted of a common law offence but may
be convicted of a statutory offence where the statute expressly so provides or where the
statutory offence is interpreted as capable of commission by an unincorporated associa-
tion. However, this does not exempt the members of the association from criminal liability
unless the statute in question provides otherwise.
18.51 Unlike a corporation, an unincorporated association, such as a partnership within

the Partnership Act 1890 or a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships
Act 1907 (not to be confused with a limited liability partnership under the Limited Liability
Partnership Act 2000, which is a corporation), trade union or members’ club, is not a sepa-
rate legal person distinct from its members. As a result, a partnership or other unincorpo-
rated association cannot be convicted of a common law offence (although, of course, its
individual members can be convicted if they are parties to an offence).
18.52 The situation is different in the case of statutory offences.
First, but rarely, some statutes expressly provide that offences under them can be
committed by an unincorporated association. An example is provided by the Corporate
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA 2007). The Act expressly pro-
vides that the offences of corporate manslaughter and of breach of a remedial order or of a
publicity order may be committed by a partnership, or a trade union or employers’ asso-
ciation, that is an employer.112 The CMCHA 2007, s 14(1) provides that, for the purposes
of CMCHA 2007, a partnership is to be treated as owing whatever duties of care it would
owe if it were a corporation.
Another example of express provision for the criminal liability of a partnership is made
by the Bribery Act 2010 (BA 2010), s 7 referred to in para 18.20 above. The definition of a
‘relevant commercial organisation’ in s 7(5) includes:
• a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom and
which carries on a business113 (whether there or elsewhere), or
• any other partnership (wherever formed) which carries on a business, or part of a
business, in any part of the United Kingdom.
Proceedings for an offence under CMCHA 2007 or BA 2010, s 7 alleged to have been
committed by a partnership must be brought in the name of the partnership (and not in
that of any of its members).114 A fine imposed on a partnership on its conviction of such
an offence must be paid out of the funds of the partnership.115
112 See paras 8.130, 8.131 and 8.143. For another example, under the Trade Union and Labour Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992, s 45, a trade union is guilty of an offence if it refuses or wilfully neglects to perform
certain duties under that Act. 113 A trade or profession is a business for these purposes: s 7(5).
114 CMCHA 2007, s 14(2); BA 2010, s 15(1). 115 CMCHA 2007, s 14(3); BA 2010, s 15(3).
 | 18.53 vicarious liability and corporate liability
18.53 Second, where a statute does not make express provision in relation to the
criminal liability of an unincorporated association, a statutory offence may be inter-
preted as capable of commission by such an association. The reason is that under the
Interpretation Act 1978116 ‘person’ in a statute passed after 1889 includes an unincor-
porated association unless the contrary intention appears. An increasing number of
statutes117 assume that offences under them can be committed by a partnership or by
any type of unincorporated association by setting out one or more ancillary provisions
relating to it. Examples are stipulating that where an offence is alleged to have been
committed by such an entity it must be prosecuted in its own name (and not in that
of any of its members), that a fi ne imposed on such an entity on its conviction for an
offence must be paid out of its funds, and that an officer is liable for an offence commit-
ted by it where he consented to or connived in the commission of that offence or it was
attributable to his neglect (ie an officer’s liability clause corresponding to that described
in para 18.44).
In A-G v Able,118 Woolf J, as he then was, dealing with an alleged offence under the
Suicide Act 1961, stated that an unincorporated association, the Voluntary Euthanasia
Society, was incapable of committing an offence under that Act. On the other hand, in
W Stevenson and Sons (a partnership)119 the Court of Appeal recognised that post-1889
legislation could as a matter of statutory interpretation render a partnership criminally
liable for a statutory offence as an entity separate from its members. The statutory provi-
sion in question contained an officer’s liability clause referring to the liability of a partner
of a partnership for offences committed by it. The Court of Appeal held that the regulatory
offence in question (failing to submit an accurate note of fish sales) could be committed by
a partnership; the officer’s liability clause clearly contemplated that it could be prosecuted
and bear criminal liability. The Court also held that any fine imposed on the partnership
could only be levied against the assets of the partnership.
In L,120 discussed below, the Court of Appeal recognised that other forms of unincor-
porated association can be criminally liable and that the offence in question could be
committed by such an association.
Neither W Stevenson nor L provide much guidance about when a statutory offence
applies to a partnership or unincorporated association. It is clear from these cases that
the existence of one or more ancillary provisions of the type referred to above will be
indicative that the offence applies to a partnership or unincorporated association, but it is
also clear from L (where there were no such ancillary provisions) that the absence of such
ancillary provisions is not determinative the other way.
The offences in issue in W Stevenson and L were ones of strict liability. In neither case
did the Court of Appeal consider the situation where a statutory offence involved any ele-
ment of mens rea. In L, the Court stated that if a statutory offence involved any element
of mens rea, that
116 See the Interpretation Act 1978, ss 5 and 22(1) and Schs 1 and 2, Pt I, para 4(1)(a).
117 See, eg, the Transport Act 1968, s 120B; the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, s 18; the Health
Act 2006, ss 76 and 77; the Serious Crime Act 2007, s 70; and the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010, ss 34 and
38. For further examples see L [2008] EWCA Crim 1970 at [25]. 118 [1984] QB 795 at 810.
18.55 unincorporated associations | 
‘would be likely to raise quite different questions because of the personal and individual
nature of a guilty mind. In such a case, it may well be that a contrary intention [for the
purposes of the Interpretation Act 1978, s 5] appears. A-G v Able was a case in which the
point which we have had to consider was not in any manner argued, and the 1978 Act
was not mentioned. It is, however, not in the least surprising that Woolf J dealt with it on
the assumed basis that “[i]t must be remembered that the [Voluntary Euthanasia] society
is an unincorporated body and there can be no question of the society committing an
offence”, when that offence was of intentionally aiding, abetting, counselling or procur-
ing the suicide of another, thus involving mens rea and indeed punishable with up to 14
years’ imprisonment.’121
18.54 There can be no doubt that, in those offences which can be committed by it, an
unincorporated association will not incur criminal liability simply because one of its
members (or one of its employees) has committed an offence. In offences other than
those such as corporate manslaughter and bribery, where special rules apply, liability will
arise, by analogy with the law relating to corporations, if the general principles of vicari-
ous liability are satisfied or if the unincorporated association can be said to be personally
liable on the basis of committing an ‘operational offence’ or a breach of a statutory duty
imposed on the association or (to the extent that it can be liable for an offence requiring
mens rea) on the basis of the acts and state of mind of someone which can be attributed to
the association in respect of the offence in question.
Liability of members of unincorporated association

18.55 The fact that an unincorporated association is criminally liable for a particular
strict liability offence does not in itself exempt its members from liability, unless the stat-
ute in question provides otherwise.
The potential liability of the members of an unincorporated association was considered
by the Court of Appeal in L referred to above. The case was concerned with the potential
liability of members of an unincorporated association (a golf club with 900 members) for
the strict liability offence committed by a person causing poisonous, noxious or polluting
matter to enter controlled waters, contrary to the Water Resources Act 1991, s 85 (since
repealed), after heating oil had escaped into a watercourse from the club’s premises. A
prosecution had been brought against two of the club’s members (ie its Chairman and its
Treasurer). The trial judge had ruled that this was wrong because the club could have been
prosecuted as an unincorporated association and the two members were not personally
at fault. The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge that, since the contrary intent did not
appear, ‘person’ in s 85 of the 1991 Act included an unincorporated association; the judge
had therefore been correct to rule that the club could have been prosecuted. However, the
Court of Appeal disagreed with the second part of the judge’s ruling.
It held that not only the Chairman and Treasurer but all members of the club were liable
for the strict liability offence in question. The judge had based the second part of his rul-
ing on the fact that if the club had been a corporation the Chairman and Treasurer would
121 Ibid at [30].

 | 18.55 vicarious liability and corporate liability
not have been liable as officers of the corporation and had concluded from that that the
liability of the officers of an unincorporated association should not be greater than their
counterparts in a corporation. The Court of Appeal rejected the judge’s view that there was
no reason why the criminal liability of officers (or members) of an unincorporated associa-
tion should exist on a different basis from that of the officers of a corporation. It went on:
‘Although many statutes make it possible to prosecute an unincorporated association,

and although we have held that this is perfectly possible under the Water Resources Act
1991, s 85, it does not follow that such an association is for all purposes the same as a com-
pany or other corporation. It is not. A corporation has, for all legal purposes, independ-
ent legal personality. It is also regulated, often heavily. It must have a registered address
and registered directors and secretary. An unincorporated association may indeed look
very like a corporation in some cases, and it may have standing and de facto independ-
ence, but equally it may not. A prosecution which could only be brought against an infor-
mal grouping of building workers, or sportsmen, or campaigners would be likely to be
wholly ineffective. It is a necessary consequence of the different nature of an unincorpo-
rated association that all its members remain jointly and severally liable for its actions
done within their authority. In the present case, the 900-odd members of the club were
indeed all maintainers of the tank and all guilty of the strict liability offence of causing
the leakage.
This is not vicarious liability for the offence of the club . . . Vicarious liability, when it
exists, arises out of the employment by the defendant of another person to act for him.
There is no sense in which the chairman, treasurer, or any other member of this club
employed the club to do anything for them. The criminal liability of the members of the
club, including the chairman and the treasurer, is primary [ie personal] liability, not
vicarious liability. It arises because each person jointly maintains the tank and has thus
caused the leak.
It follows that the correct position under the Water Resources Act 1991, s 85 is that a
prosecution for the strict liability offence of causing polluting matter to enter controlled
waters may be brought, on the facts of this case, against either the club in its own name,
or against individual members. It is for the Crown in any individual case to determine
the defendant(s) whom it seeks to prosecute. The court would interfere only in the very
limited case of oppression involving abuse of process. No doubt relevant considerations
will include the extent of the association’s stability and assets and the nature of the act or
omission said to constitute an offence. We have heard no argument on whether in excep-
tional circumstances it could be permissible for the Crown to seek to proceed against both
the club and individuals, but there are no such exceptional circumstances here.’122
Despite the Court of Appeal’s ruling, it concluded that a fresh trial would not be in the
interests of justice, and it directed the acquittal of the two defendants.
It follows from this decision that an ordinary member of an unincorporated associ-
ation is personally liable for a strict liability offence committed by the association without
any fault on his part simply because he is a member of that association. This compares
oddly with the position of a shareholder in a company who is not criminally liable in cor-
responding circumstances.
122 Ibid at [33]–[35].

18.55 unincorporated associations | 
FURTHER READING
Colvin ‘Corporate Personality and Criminal Leigh Strict and Vicarious Liability (1982)
Responsibility’ (1995) 6 Criminal Law Pace ‘Delegation – A Doctrine in Search of a
Forum 1 Definition’ [1982] Crim LR 627
Fisse and Braithwaite Corporations, Crime, Pinto and Evans Corporate Criminal Liability
and Accountability (1993) (2003)
Glazebrook ‘Situational Liability’ in Reshaping Wells ‘Corporations: Culture, Risk and
the Criminal Law (1978) (Glazebrook (ed)) Criminal Liability’ [1993] Crim LR 551
108
Wells Corporations and Criminal
Gobert ‘Corporate Criminality: New Crimes Responsibility (2nd edn, 2001)
for the Times’ [1994] Crim LR 722
Gobert ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: Four
Models of Fault’ (1994) 14 LS 393
Index
abortion 8.190–8.198 identity of unforeseen effective 17.70

accomplice, woman as 17.62 perpetrator 17.44 perpetrators, more than
authorisation, requirements inchoate offences 17.9 one 17.69
for 8.193–8.194 intent 17.27–17.30 physical intervention 17.71
capable of being born alive, joint criminal ventures 17.41, police, giving timely notifi-
defi nition of 8.201 17.44–17.59, 17.82 cation to 17.74
child destruction 8.200, jurisdiction 17.9 reasonable steps to prevent
8.204 knowledge 17.27–17.30, offence 17.71
conscientious objection 8.198 17.34–17.36 repentance not
duress of circumstances less serious offence, conviction enough 17.70
defence 8.193 for 17.52–17.55 spontaneous
emergencies 8.198 mens rea 17.10–17.11, violence 17.73
indictment, triable on 8.190 17.27–17.40 voluntary 17.70
intent to procure murder 17.32 actual bodily harm
miscarriage 8.192 negligence 17.31 actus reus 7.57–7.60
late abortions 8.203, 8.204 no-fault offences 17.84–17.85 assault 7.55–7.61
means of abortion 8.191 omissions 17.13–17.14 boxing 7.10, 7.21, 8.86
medical induction 8.197 particular type of offence, capacity, lack of 7.24–7.25
morning-after pill 8.192 defi nition of 17.35 circumcision 7.12
multiple pregnancies, selective police, giving timely notification consent 7.24–7.31
reduction of 8.195 of withdrawal to 17.74 cosmetic surgery 7.12
necessity, statutory preparation of offence 17.11 dangerous exhibitions 7.15
provision 16.91 presence at scene of disease, risk of
unlawful crime 17.60–17.61 transmission 7.31
abortion 8.193–8.198 principal offences 17.8–17.9, duress 7.26
absolute liability distinguished 17.17–17.25 ear piercing 7.13
from strict principles in the second female circumcision 7.12
liability 6.5–6.7 degree 17.9 games and sports 7.9–7.10,
abuse of position reasonable steps to prevent 7.21, 8.86
child sexual offences 9.76–9.84 offence 17.71 horseplay 7.14
fraud 12.25–12.27 recklessness 17.31 martial arts 7.10
trust, of 9.76–9.84 reform 17.77–17.85 mens rea 7.61
abuse of power 3.83, 17.66 repentance not enough 17.70 mistake 7.27–7.30
accidents, prohibited secondary liability 17.8, religious mortification 7.16
consequences and 5.2 17.77–17.85 sex-change operations 7.12
accomplices 17.8–17.85 sexual offences against child sexual conduct, consensual
accessories before the act, under 10 17.12 non-violent 7.17
defi nition of 17.9 spectators 17.60 surgical interference,
accidental spectators 17.60 spontaneous violence 17.73 reasonable 7.12
acquittal of alleged 17.26 strict liability 17.40 non-therapeutic
agents supplying information/ operations 7.12
provocateurs 17.63–17.69 materials 17.11 therapeutic reasons 7.12
aids, abets, counsels or transferred malice 17.38 ritual male circumcision 7.12
procures 17.8–17.18 uncertainty 17.76 tattooing 7.13
conspiracy 17.9 unforeseen consequences 17.48 wrestling 7.10
defi nition 17.8 vicarious liability and 18.15 actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
derivative liability 17.8 victims, as 17.62 rea 2.2, 2.4
encouraging or assisting voluntary, liability where actus reus 2.1–2.61
crime 17.81 presence 17.61 assault 7.37–7.42, 7.58–7.60
entrapment 17.63–17.69 wilful blindness 17.31 assault occasioning actual
fundamentally different act withdrawal from bodily harm 7.58–7.60
qualification 17.46–17.50 participation attempted crime 14.122
806 | index
actus reus (cont.) racially or religiously Queen’s Bench Division 1.13,

battery, of 7.43–7.49 aggravated assault 1.14
blackmail 11.27–11.28 7.74, 7.97–7.111 Supreme Court 1.19–1.20
burden of proof 2.21, 2.23 aggravated burglary appropriation in theft
burglary 11.4–11.12 articles, defi nition assumption of right 10.4–10.5
causation see causation of 11.21–11.23 bona fide purchaser
circumstances 2.18–2.19 explosives 11.22 exception 10.20
consent 2.22, 2.23 firearms 11.21 consent irrelevant 10.7–10.8
consequences 2.17 handcuffs 11.21 continuance of
conspiracy, statutory has with him, defi nition appropriation 10.23
offence 14.51–14.60 of 11.24–11.25 controllers of corporations,
contemporaneity with mens knives 11.21 by 10.9
rea 3.65–3.74 offensive weapon, deception 10.14–10.15
defi nition 2.1 distinguished 11.23 defi nition 10.3
defi nition of offences, as part screwdrivers 11.23 duress 10.14
of 2.5 statutory offences 11.20 examples 10.11
excuses 2.25–2.26 weapon of offence, defi nition handling 11.35
fraud, abuse of of 11.23 indefeasible right, acquisition
position 12.25–12.27 aggravated offences of 10.18–10.19
grievous bodily harm assaults see aggravated assaults innocent obtaining 10.16
7.79–7.85, 7.91 burglary see aggravated lawful act and 10.17
involuntary manslaughter 8.4, burglary need have no effect 10.6
8.86 racially or religiously omission, by 10.21
justification 2.21–2.24 aggravated offences see once and for all event 10.22
mens rea 2.1–2.4, 3.3–3.5, racially or religiously person in possession, by 10.12
3.65–3.74 aggravated offences person not in possession,
murder see murder 2.21 vehicle-taking 10.125–10.126 by 10.13
omissions 2.5, 2.7–2.15 aiding, abetting, counselling or specific piece of property 10.24
poison, administering 7.122, procuring state of mind, relevance of
7.128 aiding and abetting defendant’s 10.10
property, damage to 13.4–13.7, distinguished 17.10 arson 13.24–13.26
13.21 counsel, defi nition of 17.10 assault
rape 9.30–9.31 omissions 17.13–17.14 actual bodily harm 7.58–7.61
self-defence 2.21 principal offence 17.8–17.9, actus reus of assault 7.37–7.42
states of affairs, examples 17.17–17.18 aggravated see aggravated
of 2.16 preparation of offence 17.11 assaults
theft see under theft procures’ defi nition of 17.10, arrest with intent to resist
unawareness of defendant 2.24 17.30 arrest 7.62–7.63
whole actus reus must be sexual offences against child battery 7.34–7.36, 7.54
satisfied 2.27 under 10 17.12 consent see consent
wounding with intent supplying information/ constable, assault on
7.79–7.85, 7.91 materials 17.11 a 7.64–7.73
Administrative Court 1.14, 1.30 variety of forms 17.11–17.12 corporal punishment 7.51
advertisements of rewards 11.58, alcohol see also intoxication grievous bodily harm see
17.90 diminished grievous bodily harm
aff ray 7.63 responsibility 8.53–8.54 harassment see harassment
age of consent 9.3–9.5 Dutch courage 15.104 hostility, element of 7.53
agents provocateurs 17.63–17.69 effects 15.70, 15.73 indictment, can be included
aggravated assaults intoxication see also in 7.35
actual bodily harm, assault intoxication maximum sentence for
occasioning 7.58–7.61 murder charges 15.104 minor 7.35
arrest, assault with intent to animal rights protestors, mens rea 7.52–7.53
resist 7.62–7.63 harassment by 7.141 minor non-fatal offence,
battery included 7.54 appellate courts as 7.34
constable, on a 7.64–7.73 Court of Appeal, Criminal Offences Against the Person
rob, intention to 7.74 Division of 1.15–1.18 Bill 7.129–7.133
index | 807
penetration, assault impossible automatism

by 9.40–9.44 attempts 14.130–14.136 defi nition 15.54
poison, administering see minor attempts, discretion diabetes 15.63, 15.67
poison, administering to prosecute 14.135 driving without
psychiatric injury 7.78, 7.143 object not amounting to awareness 15.59
psychic assault 7.36 offence 14.133–14.134 duress, acts done under 15.57
rob, intention to 7.74 objective capable of involuntary acts 15.53
sexual assaults see sexual commission 14.131 irresistible impulse, acts done
offences physical objective, absence under 15.56–15.57
statutory offences 7.35 of 14.133 insanity 15.39, 15.60–15.66
summary offence, as 7.35 statutory provision 14.130 loss of consciousness in
unlawful force true facts, knowledge law 15.55
children, disciplinary of 14.136 mental disorder verdict 15.55
measures against 7.51 intention 14.112–14.113, 14.119 more than one cause 15.65
corporal punishment 7.51 involuntary omissions,
lawful force 7.50 manslaughter 14.109 involuntary 15.58–15.59
wounding with intent jurisdiction 1.23, 14.137 sane/insane automatism
see wounding knowledge or belief 14.115, distinguished 15.60–15.66
assault on a constable 14.136 self-induced
actus reus 7.65–7.67 mens rea 14.110–14.111 automatism 15.67–15.69
mens rea 7.68 additional mens rea severe mental illness 15.55
related offences 7.69–7.73 14.117 sleepwalking 15.64
resistance of constable 7.73 circumstances of substantive state of affairs,
statutory offence 7.64 offence 14.113–14.116 involuntary 15.56
wilful obstruction 7.69–7.72 intent to commit a sufficient voluntary intoxication 15.72
assembly and association, act 14.112
freedom of 1.62, 1.66 minor attempts, discretion to bailment 10.41
assisting an offender prosecute 14.135 battered woman syndrome 8.79
apprehension of principal mode of trial 14.139 battery
offender, acts impeding murder 8.40, 16.60 actus reus 7.44–7.49
the 17.87 omissions to act 14.108 assault 7.34–7.36
commission of relevant offence preparatory acts, more children, reasonable
by another 17.87 than 14.104, 14.120, chastisement of 7.51
either way offences 17.86 14.123–14.129 common law history 7.34
knowledge or belief 17.87 prosecution 14.138 corporal punishment 7.51
lawful authority for act, punishment 14.140 hostility, element of 7.53
absence of 17.87 recklessness 1.116 maximum sentences 7.35
principal offender 17.87 reform, recommendations mens rea 7.52–7.53
punishment 17.88 for 14.143 omissions 7.46–7.49
relevant offence, defi nition scope of offence 14.105 reasonable chastisement of
of 17.87 specific offences 14.141 children 7.51
statutory offences 17.87 statutory offences 14.104 statutory offences 7.35
attempts 14.104–14.143 substantive offences 14.104 summary offence, as 7.35
abandonment 14.142 summary offences 14.105, unlawful force 7.50–7.51
actus reus 14.120–14.122 14.141, 14.143 bigamy 5.12–5.13, 18.41
judge, function of 14.122 vicarious liability 18.15 blackmail 11.26–11.33
jury, function of 14.122 Attorney-General actus reus 11.27–11.28
common law offence, abolition conspiracy to defraud 14.93 demands 11.27
of 14.104 fatal offences 8.15 gain, defi nition of 11.31
conditional intent 14.119 inchoate offences 14.39–14.40, loss, defi nition of 11.31
conspiracy 14.106 14.77 mens rea 11.29, 11.31
diminished responsibility 8.40 points of law, referrals of 1.17, menaces, demands with 11.28
duress by threats 16.60 8.31, 10.65, 15.55 money or other property,
exceptions to offence 14.106 sentences, referrals of 1.17 confi ned to 11.29
ignorance of law is no Supreme Court, referrals to 1.19 morals, ignorance of 3.89
defence 14.118 trusts 10.51 statutory offences 11.26
808 | index
blackmail (cont.) common meanings 11.17, 11.19 self-harm 2.49–2.51

unwarranted demand with entering with intent to strict liability 2.47
menaces 11.32–11.33 steal 11.3–11.16 third parties, contributions
body piercing 7.13, 7.23 entry 11.4–11.5 by 2.33
bona fide purchasers 10.20 going equipped 11.64–11.71 child destruction 8.199–8.203
boxing 7.10, 7.21, 8.86 mens rea 11.13–11.16 abortion 8.200–8.201, 8.204
brain stem death 2.42, 8.10, 8.11 physically marked out capable of being born alive,
breach of statutory duty 18.23, areas 11.12 defi nition of 8.201
18.54 portable structures 11.11 indictment, triable only
burden of proof 4.1–4.11 trespass 11.6–11.10 on 8.199
actus reus, proof of 4.4 civil law concept 11.6 late abortions 8.203
admissions, statements knowledge 11.13 necessity, defence of 16.90
amounting to 4.16 involuntary entry 11.6 non-consensual conduct 8.202
automatism 4.4 meaning same for both sentence, maximum 8.199
balance of probabilities 4.5 offences 11.17, 11.19 statutory offences 8.199
beyond a reasonable negligent entry 11.6 child sex offences
doubt 4.3–4.5 permission to 13, children under 9.35–9.38,
conduct of defendant 4.17 enter 11.8–11.9 9.44, 9.55–9.57
Convention rights, compatibility statutory rights of entry 11.7 16, children under 9.5,
with 1.60, 4.8 two types of, distinguished 11.19 9.58–9.75
defence 4.1, 4.4–4.5, 4.7, 4.10 ulterior intent 11.14–11.16 child under 16 offences
evidential burden 4.1, 4.9–4.11 vehicles or vessels 11.11 abuse of position of
defence 4.11 but for test of causation 2.29–2.30 trust 9.77–9.86
prosecution 4.1, 4.9–4.10 Butler Committee on adult relative, sex
excuses 4.4 Mentally Abnormal with 9.99–9.101
facts Offenders 15.52, 15.113 aiding, abetting and
jury, determined by a 4.2 counselling
presumptions 4.15 care workers, sexual offences exceptions 9.37
fair hearing, right to a 4.8 by 9.113–9.119 arranging/facilitating
golden thread 4.3 careless driving see road traffic commission of sex
inferences 4.17 offences offences 9.71–9.72
insanity 4.7 causation causing a child to engage in
irrebuttable but for test 2.29–2.30 sexual activity 9.61–9.62,
presumptions 4.12–4.13 conduct as substantial 9.77
jury, facts determined cause 2.34 causing a child to watch sexual
by a 4.2 contributory negligence 2.34 acts 9.66–9.69, 9.77
law, presumptions of 4.12–4.14 escapes by victims 2.41, child offenders 9.38, 9.70
mens rea 4.4 2.52–2.53 criminalisation of consensual
motive 4.16 factual causation 2.29–2.30 activity 9.5
natural and probable Hart and Honoré’s engaging in sexual activity
consequences 4.18 principle 2.43–2.45 in presence of
no case to answer 4.2 intervening acts 2.37–2.59 child 9.63–9.65
persuasive burden of 4.1, 4.5 judge’s directions on EU law, impact of 1.45, 1.46
presumptions of law 4.7, principles 2.61 exceptions 9.85–9.86
4.12–4.15 juries, decisions by 2.61 grooming 9.73–9.75
prosecution 4.3–4.5, 4.10 legal causation 2.31–2.60 mens rea 9.81–9.84
rebuttal of presumptions of medical treatment, position of trust 9.78–9.84
law 4.7, 4.12, 4.14 intervening 2.41 sexual activity in presence of
reverse burden 4.5, 4.7 2.54–2.59 child 9.77
state of mind 4.16–4.18 natural events, sexual activity with a
burglary 11.1–11.25 intervening 2.38–2.40 child 9.58–9.60, 9.77
actus reus 11.4–11.12 neglect by victim 2.41, 2.49–2.52 paedophile offences committed
aggravated see aggravated novus actus abroad, jurisdiction
burglary interveniens 2.37–2.59 over 9.122–9.124
articulated trailers 11.11 omissions 2.60 penetration, assault by 9.44
building or part of pre-existing conditions in pornography 1.45, 1.46
building 11.11–11.12 victims 2.35–2.36 prostitution 1.45, 1.46
index | 809
rape of child under 13 precedent, doctrine of 1.30 games and sports 7.9–7.10, 7.21
9.35–9.38 public nuisance 1.31 horseplay 7.14
aiding, abetting punishment of 1.31 implied consent 7.32–7.33
and counselling source of criminal law, invalid consent 7.1–7.2, 7.18
exceptions 9.37 as 1.30–1.37 martial arts 7.10
child offenders 9.38 strict liability 6.9 mistake
indictment, triable on 9.35 textwriters 1.38 collateral matter, as
mens rea 9.36 complicity to 7.28–7.30
sentence, maximum 9.35 assisting or encouraging defendant’s identity 7.27
statutory offences 9.35 crime 17.81 nature of act, as to 7.27
sexual assaults 9.49 causing a no-fault sexual offences 9.20–9.26
sexual exploitation offence 17.84–17.85 transmission of disease, risk
child under 13 to engage in joint criminal ventures 17.82 of 7.31
sexual activity 9.55–9.57 reform 17.77–17.85 non-therapeutic
EU law, impact of 1.45, 1.46 secondary liability 17.77–17.85 operations 7.12
pornography 1.45, 1.46 withdrawal 17.70 offences against the person 7.1
prostitution 1.45, 1.46 computer misuse 10.31, 12.51, 13.5 paternalism/personal autonomy
children concealing for reward balance 7.22, 7.23
abortion see abortion advertising rewards for return of religious mortification 7.16
antenatal injury to stolen goods 11.58, 17.90 ritual male circumcision 7.12
child and malice consideration, acceptance sado-masochistic homosexual
aforethought 8.30–8.32 of 17.88 flagellation 7.3–7.8, 7.21
child destruction see child either-way offences 17.89 seriously disabling injury,
destruction elements to be proved 17.88 defi nition of 7.23
consent 7.24–7.25 knowledge or belief 17.90 sex-change operations 7.12
corporal punishment 7.51 misprision of treason 17.90 sexual offences 9.20–9.26
death of child or vulnerable relevant offence, commission social acceptability 7.32–7.33
adult, causing or allowing of 17.88 sterilisation 7.12
the 8.167–8.174 sentence, maximum 17.89 surgery 7.12
infancy see infancy statutory offences 17.89 tattooing 7.13
infanticide see infanticide conjoined twins 3.23–3.24, 8.5, 8.7 valid consent 7.1–7.2, 7.18
sex offences see child sex consent 7.1–7.33 wrestling 7.10
offences actual bodily harm 7.3–7.20 conspiracy 14.44–14.103
circuit judges 1.12 boxing 7.10, 7.21 accomplices 17.9
circumstances, duress of see branding 7.19 acquittal of all save one 14.48
duress of circumstances capacity, lack of 7.24–7.25 actus reus 14.51–14.60
civil partners see spouses and civil case-by-case development of agreements 14.46–14.47
partners law 7.20 attempts 14.106
codification 1.70–1.71, 3.21 children 7.25 common law
coercion circumcision 7.12 offences 14.83–14.103
marital coercion 16.65–16.68 disease, risk of transmission communication of
sexual activity 9.5, 9.19 of 7.17 intention 14.46
common assault see assaults consensual non-violent sexual concluded agreements 14.46
common law conduct 7.17 conditions precedent 14.56
conspiracy to defraud 1.31 corporal punishment 7.51 conditions subsequent 14.59
duress 1.32 cosmetic bodily piercing 7.13 corrupt public morals,
felonies, defi nition of 1.31 cosmetic surgery 7.12 to 14.96–14.101
historical background 1.31 dangerous exhibitions 7.15 defraud, conspiracy
insanity 1.32 deception 9.20–9.26 to 14.84–14.95
judicial law-making see judicial development of law on case-by- common law offence 14.84
law-making case basis 7.20 dishonesty 14.89
misdemeanours, defi nition disease, risk of transmission economic loss or
of 1.31 of 7.31 prejudice 14.87–14.88
murder 1.31 duress 7.26 ‘fraud’, basic defi nition
outraging public ear piercing 7.13 of 14.85–14.86
decency 1.31 female circumcision 7.12 jurisdiction 14.94–14.95
810 | index
conspiracy (cont.) absolute rights 1.61 corporate manslaughter

price-fi xing application of rights 1.61–1.69 child protection 8.139
agreements 1.35 assembly and association, death, causing 8.142
scope 14.92–14.93 freedom of 1.62, 1.66 defi nition 8.133
economic loss or criminal law, relevance to 1.60 emergencies 8.138
prejudice 14.87–14.88 declaration of exclusions 8.134–8.139
exemptions from incompatibility 1.56–1.57 gross breach of
liability 14.74–14.75 fair trial, right to 1.53 duty 8.140–8.141
fraud, basic defi nition foreseeability 1.65 individual liability 8.144
of 14.85–14.86 freedom of expression 1.62, 1.66 jurisdiction 8.145
impossibility 14.55, 14.102 interference with rights manslaughter by gross
intention 14.64–14.69 1.63–1.64, 1.67 negligence 8.118, 8.128,
jurisdiction 1.23, 14.76–14.77 legitimate aim 1.67 8.130
knowledge 14.64–14.69 life, right to (Article 2) 62 military activities 8.136
mens rea 14.61–14.72 necessary in a democratic negligence 3.60
mode of trial 14.79 society 1.66–1.67 organisations 8.130–8.131
negotiations, insufficient 14.46 no punishment without policing 8.137
law 1.62, 1.65 public policy decisions 8.135
objects of agreement 14.45 prescribed by law 1.64 probation functions 8.139
outrage public decency, private and family life, right prosecution 8.143
conspiracy to respect for (Article 8) punishment 8.143
to 14.96–14.101 1.62, 1.66 relevant duty of
price-fi xing agreements 1.35 proportionality 1.67 care 8.134–8.139
prosecution 14.78 qualified rights 1.62 senior management 8.132
punishment 14.80 quality of law statutory provisions 8.128
reform, recommendations requirement 1.65 trials 8.143
for 14.82 thought, conscience and unincorporated
spouses and civil religion, freedom of associations 18.54
partners 14.47, 14.82 (Article 9) 1.62, 1.66 corporations 18.19–18.50
statutory torture, prohibition of accomplices 18.41, 18.43,
conspiracy 14.49–14.82 (Article 3) 1.62 18.44–18.45
substantive offence has been conveyances without authority, attribution 18.25–18.43
committed, where 14.81 taking bigamy 18.41
constable see assault on a belief as to consent or breach of statutory duty,
constable authority 10.122 personal liability
constructive manslaughter consent, without 10.119 for 18.23
actus reus 8.4, 8.86 conveyance, definition of 10.115 connivance 18.45
commission of act 8.85 defendant’s or another’s use, consent 18.46
dangerous act 8.96–8.102 for 10.118 controlling officer for fraud
defence to offence, no unlawful driving or being carried 10.123 by corporation, liability
act of there is a 8.92 fuel, stealing of 10.114 of 12.47
defi nition 8.84 lawful authority, corporate manslaughter 18.43
examples of unlawful acts 8.87 without 10.120 criminal liability 18.18, 18.23,
frightening a pedal cycles, corresponding 18.25–18.43
person 8.101–8.102 offences involving 10.124 directing mind and will
heroin supply 2.44–2.45 preparatory offence for motor test 18.25–18.39
mens rea 3.53, 8.88–8.91 vehicles 10.114 directors see directors
objective test 8.96–8.100, 8.114 sentence, maximum 10.11 false accounting 12.44
recklessness as to death, statutory offences 10.114 familial sex offences 18.41
overlap with 8.119–8.120 taking, defi nition identification
transferred malice 3.40 of 10.116–10.117 principle 18.25–18.39
types 8.4, 8.131 triable summarily 10.114 attribution via
unlawful act 8.85, 8.86, corporal punishment corporation 18.25
8.92–8.95 classroom disruption 7.51 directing mind and will
victims 8.93–8.95 playground fights 7.51 test 18.25–18.39
contempt of court 6.9 teachers, prohibition by 7.51 no negligence
Convention rights use of reasonable force 7.51 defence 18.36–18.37
index | 811
scope of individual’s author- custodial sentences see murder, mitigating factor

ity, acting within 18.35 imprisonment to 8.39
murder 18.42 necessity 8.55
no negligence death of child or vulnerable adult, not guilty pleas 8.56
defence 18.36–18.37 causing or allowing persuasive burden of
operational offences, personal the 8.167–8.174 proof 8.47
liability for 18.22 death penalty, abolition post-traumatic stress
perjury 18.41 of 8.20 disorder 8.56
rape 18.41 defences punishment, discretion as
scope of individual’s authority, automatism see automatism to 8.39
acting within 18.35 diminished responsibility reactive depression 8.56
statutory interpretation see diminished reasons for partial
18.38–18.39 responsibility defence 8.42
suppression of duress see duress recognised medical
documents 12.46 insanity see insanity condition 8.49–8.50
unincorporated associations loss of control see loss of reform 8.45
see unincorporated control requirement of
associations necessity see necessity defence 8.46–8.54
vicarious liability 18.18 public/private’ stress 8.56
violence, crimes of 18.43 defences 16.9–16.10 substantial impairment 8.51
corpses superior orders see superior directors
homicide 8.5 orders accomplice, as 18.44–18.45
property 10.30 defraud, conspiracy to attributable to any neglect on
removal without lawful common law 1.31, 14.84 the part of 18.45
authority 3.75 dishonesty 14.89 connivance 18.45
sexual penetration 9.121 economic loss or consent 18.46
corrupt public morals, prejudice 14.87–14.88 delegation 18.28
conspiracy fraud, basic defi nition disqualification 18.50
to 14.96–14.101 of 14.85–14.86 false statements 12.45
counselling see aiding, jurisdiction 14.94–14.95 identification
abetting, counselling or price-fi xing agreements 1.35 principle 18.28
procuring scope of 14.92–14.93 joint perpetrator, as 18.44
Court of Appeal (Criminal diminished responsibility statutory provisions 18.44
Division) 8.39–8.57 dishonesty
acquittals, quashing 1.16 abnormality of mental conspiracy to
binding precedent 1.30 functioning, defi nition of defraud 14.89–14.91
Crown Court, appeals abnormality of mind, forgery 12.59
from 1.15–1.18 defi nition of 8.44 fraud by false
lenient sentences 1.17 alcoholism 8.54 representation 12.17
points of law, clarification attempted murder 8.40 money laundering
of 1.17 depression 8.56 offences 11.57
two-judge courts 1.18 explanation for acts/ morals, ignorance of 3.89
courts omissions 8.52 stolen goods 11.56
appellate courts 1.13–1.20 insanity 8.39, 15.23, 15.44 theft 3.89, 10.68–10.79
Crown Court 1.12, 1.15–1.18, intoxication 8.53–8.54 wrongful credit 11.58
1.27, 15.4 judges and not guilty pleas to District Judges (Magistrates’
Divisional Court 1.13, 1.14, murder 8.56 Court) 1.10, 1.12
1.30 jury function 8.55 Divisional Court 1.13, 1.14, 1.30
magistrates 1.9–1.12, 1.100, loss of control defence, overlap double effect doctrine 3.22–3.24
15.15 with 8.57 driving offences see road traffic
Queen’s Bench Division 1.13, medical evidence offences
1.14 necessity 8.55 duress see duress by threats;
criminal damage see property, post-traumatic stress duress of circumstance;
damage to disorder 8.56 marital coercion
criminal law, purposes of 1.8 reactive depression 8.56 duress by threats 16.40–16.64
criminal offences, characteristics stress 8.56 attempted
of 1.2–1.7 mercy killings and 8.18, 8.56 murder 16.55–16.59
812 | index
duress by threats (cont.) offences against the exclusion of evidence 17.65

command associated with person 7.55, 7.63, 7.75, incitement of offence to
threat 16.42 7.96, 7.131, 7.149, 7.152 entrap 17.63
common law 1.32 road traffic offences 8.161, informers 17.63
consent 7.26 8.166 no defence of
death or serious physical sending for trial 1.9 entrapment 17.64
injury 16.43–16.44 sexual offences 9.45, 9.51, 9.55, police operations, effect
evasive action to neutralise 9.58, 9.61, 9.64, 9.67, 9.10, on 17.69
effects 16.49 9.71, 9.121 liability of agents 17.63
excuse, extent of 16.54–16.61 theft and related offences 10.2, test purchases 17.63
imminent danger, operative 10.33, 10.129 undercover officers 17.63
threat 16.49–16.50 threats to kill 8.180 environment
involuntary act unauthorised EU law, impact of 1.45
distinguished 16.41 borrowing 10.108 strict liability offences 2.47
mistake 5.19 electricity as property 10.33 water pollution 2.47
murder 16.55–16.59 encouraging or assisting epilepsy 15.27, 15.51, 15.60
nature of threat 16.43–16.44 crime 14.1–14.43 EU law
objective test 16.45 actus reus 14.4–14.7, 14. criminal law, impact on 1.45
psychiatric injury 16.43 13–14.14, 14.19–14.20 defences, source of 1.47
reasonable belief 5.19 attempts 14.23 first pillar impact on criminal
reasonable belief that crime will be law 1.46
firmness 16.46–16.48 committed 14.12–14.17 Lisbon Treaty 1.46
reform, proposals for belief that one or more Maastricht Treaty 1.46
16.63–16.64, 16.86 offences will be rules, source of 1.47
severe pain 16.43 committed 14.18–14.23 statutory interpretation 1.48
strict terms 16.40 commission of offence not third pillar impact on criminal
subjective test 16.45 required 14.25–14.26 law 1.46
third persons, threats common European Convention on Human
to 16.44 provisions 14.24–14.43 Rights
treason 16.61 continuance of act 14.23 burden of proof, compatibility
voluntary assumption of direct intention 14.9 with 4.8
risk 16.51–16.53 failure to act 14.23 consent 7.4
duress of circumstances impossibility 14.30 Convention rights see
case-by-case indirect encouragement 14.7 Convention rights
development 16.70–16.74 intention 14.3–14.11 criminal liability rules,
common law 1.32 jurisdiction 14.32–14.38 clarification of 1.35
defence of another 16.85 Law Commission 14.1 effective participation 15.10
excuse, extent of 16.81–16.82 listed offences capable of an European Court of Human
external agency 16.68 act 14.14 Rights 1.63–1.64, 15.10
judicial law-making 1.35 mens rea 14.8–14.10, innocence, presumption of 6.8
imminent danger, operative 14.15–14.16, 14.21–14.24 insanity, defence of 15.51
threat 16.78–16.80 number of offences 14.18 interpretation of Convention
mistake 5.19 omissions 14.23 rights 1.63–1.64
murder 16.83–16.84 overlap between offences 14.27 mandatory life sentences,
nature of threat 16.75 prosecution 14.39–14.40 compatibility with 8.21
objective test 16.76–16.77 protective offences 14.29 public and private
reform, proposals for 16.86 punishment 14.42–14.43 defences 16.27–16.32
requirements 16.70–16.74 reasonably, defence of theft legislation in
self-defence 16.85 acting 14.28 contravention of 10.75
subjective test 16.76–16.77 trials 14.40 euthanasia 7.2
uncertainty 14.31 exposure
EC law see EU law entrapment either-way offences 9.121
either way offences abuse of power, stay of outraging public decency
Crown Court 1.12 proceedings 17.66–17.68 and 9.126
defi nition 1.9 agents sentence, maximum 9.121
maximum sentences 1.27–1.28 provocateurs 17.63–17.69 statutory offences 9.121
index | 813
expression, freedom of 1.55, 1.66 codifying legislation 12.48 contract diversions 12.25
extra-territorial jurisdiction credit cards 12.64 deception offences,
aircraft, offences on 1.26 debit cards 12.64 replacement of 12.2
defi nition1.25 dishonesty 12.59 directors 12.45
international conventions, either-way offences 12.48 dishonestly obtaining
effects of 1.25 false, defi nition of 12.52–12.56 services 12.35–12.42
manslaughter 1.25 false instruments 12.49–12.64 act, an 12.38
murder 1.25 Group A offences 12.70 actus reus 12.36–12.41
sexual offences 1.25 Group B offences 12.70, 12.72 either way offences 12.35
ships, offences on board 1.25 Inland Revenue stamps 12.64 mens rea 12.42
jurisdiction 12.70–12.72 obtaining
facts Law Commission 12.48 services 12.39–12.41
jury, determined by a 4.2 making a false result crimes 12.35
presumptions of fact 4.15 instrument 12.50 sentence, maximum 12.35
fair hearing, right to mens rea 12.57–12.59 statutory offences 12.35
burden of proof 4.8 money orders 12.64 elderly persons, abuse of
European Convention on postage stamps 12.64 position with regard
Human Rights 1.53, 4.8 prejudice 12.58 to 12.25
quality of law promissory notes 12.64 failing to disclose information,
requirement 1.65 relevant events, defi nition by 12.20–12.23
false accounting 12.44 of 12.71 false accounting 12.44
false instruments 12.49–12.64 sentence, maximum 12.48 false representations,
false statements by company share certificates 12.64 by 12.4–12.19
directors 12.45 specified instruments 12.64 actus reus 12.5–12.14
familial sex offences 9.87–9.101 statutory offences 12.49, defi nition 12.13–12.14
adult relative, sex 12.65–12.68 directors 12.45
with 9.99–9.101 transnational nature of express representation 12.10
child family member, offences 12.69–12.72 half-truths 12.14
with 9.87–9.95 travellers’ cheques 12.64 implied representations 12.11
corporations 18.41 ulterior intent 12.57 mens rea 12.15–12.19
exceptions 9.96–9.98 fraud 12.1–12.34 representation 12.6–12.12
family relationships 9.92–9.95 abuse of position, fi nancial interests 12.24–12.25
inciting child family by 12.24–12.28 forgery see forgery
member 9.90–9.91 actus reus 12.25–12.27 gains or losses not
spouses and civil contract diversions 12.25 required 12.27
partners 9.85–9.86, elderly persons 12.25 half-truths 12.14
9.96–9.98, 9.119 fi nancial jurisdiction 1.23, 12.71
fi nes interests 12.24–12.25 Law Commission 12.27
Crown Court 1.27 gains or losses not making/supplying articles for
limits 1.28 required 12.27 use in 12.33–12.34
magistrates 1.29 Law Commission 12.27 mens rea 12.15–12.19, 12.23,
prescribed sum 1.28 mens rea 12.28 12.28, 12.42
standard scale 1.28 non-defi nition of morals, ignorance of 3.89
statutory maximum 1.28 abuse 12.26, 12.27 omissions 12.26
fitness to plead see unfitness to omissions 12.26 place of abode, relevance
plead soft ware products, cloning of 12.31
force, use of see pre-emptive of 12.25 possession of articles for use in
action actus reus 12.5–12.14, fraud 12.29–12.32
forgery 12.47–12.72 12.21–12.22, 12.25–12.27, control, defi nition of 12.30,
actus reus 12.50–12.56 12.36–12.41 12.32
automendacity, requirement articles for use in general intention 12.32
of 12.53–12.54 fraud, possession place of abode, relevance
bankers’ drafts 12.64 of 12.29–12.32 of 12.31
birth certificates and the carousel frauds. impact of EU possession, defi nition
like 12.64 law on 1.45 of 12.30, 12.32
cheque cards 12.64 conspiracy to defraud 1.35 statutory offences 12.29
814 | index
fraud (cont.) gross breach of duty of industrial disputes 7.141

result crimes 12.35 care 8.113–8.116 know or ought to know,
soft ware products, cloning defi nition of 7.140
of 12.25 handling 11.34–11.57 neighbour disputes 7.141
statutory offences 12.3, 12.29, actus reus 11.36–11.50 paparazzi activities 7.141
12.35 arranging to prohibitions 7.135
suppression of documents 12.46 receive 11.38–11.39 psychiatric injury 7.143
Theft Act offences 12.44–12.45 arranging to assist 11.43 racially or religiously
ways of committing arranging to aggravated 7.141,
fraud 12.4–12.28 undertake retention, 7.150–7.152
freedom of assembly and removal, disposal reasonable conduct in
association 1.62, 1.66 or realisation for circumstances 7.142
freedom of expression 1.55, 1.66 another 11.43 rule of law or enactments,
assisting 11.41–11.42 course of conduct
games see sports and games dishonesty 11.35, 11.56 pursuant to 7.142
gender reassignment 7.12 disposal for another 11.34 stalkers 1.44, 7.42, 7.134, 7.137
grievous bodily harm evidence 11.55 statutory offences 7.134, 7.143
actus reus 7.77–7.84, 7.91 fences 11.35 summary offences 7.143
ambit 7.80 forms of handling 11.38–11.43 threatening letters 7.141
blood, substantial loss knowledge or belief violence, putting people in fear
of 7.80 11.51–11.53, 11.54–11.55 of 7.144–7.149
bodily harm, defi nition limitation 11.49–11.50 Hart and Honoré’s
of 7.77 mens rea 11.51–11.57 principle 2.43–2.45
broken or displaced limbs or money laundering, overlap heart death 8.10
bones 7.80 with 11.57 High Court judges 1.12
causing, defi nition of 7.91 placers 11.35 homicide 8.1–8.146
defi nition 7.77, 7.91 proceeds of original stolen abortion see abortion
either-way offences 7.75 goods 11.46–11.47 child destruction see child
force requirement 7.82–7.83 proof of knowledge or destruction
harm requirement 7.79–7.80 belief 11.54–11.55 constructive manslaughter
intention 7.92–7.93 public advertisements of see involuntary
loss of sensory function 7.80 reward 11.58 manslaughter
malice 7.86, 7.95 realisation for another 11.40 corporate manslaughter see
maximum sentence 7.75 receiving 11.37 corporate manslaughter
mens rea 2.2, 7.86, 7.88–7.89, recent possession, doctrine death caused by driving see
7.92–7.93, 7.95 of 11.54 road traffic offences
mistaken belief 7.89 removal from one place to diminished responsibility
murder 2.2 another 11.40 see diminished
permanent disability 7.80 sentence, maximum 11.34 responsibility
permanent visible statutory offence of 11.34 infanticide see infanticide
disfigurement 7.80 stolen goods involuntary manslaughter
psychiatric injury 7.78, 7.80 ceasing to be stolen 11.45 see involuntary
recklessness 7.88 money 11.44 manslaughter
statutory offences 1.41, proceeds of original manslaughter see
7.75–7.95 goods 11.46–11.47 manslaughter
unlawful bodily harm, statutory defi nition murder see murder
knowledge of 7.89 of 11.44–11.45 solicitation of
unlawfully, defi nition of 7.85 theft, overlap with 11.35 murder 8.175–8.179
wounding 7.84, 7.91 undertaking for another 11.40 threats to kill 8.180
grooming 9.73–9.75 harassment voluntary manslaughter see
gross negligence manslaughter animal rights protestors 7.141 voluntary manslaughter
breach of duty cause of course of conduct 7.136 horseplay 7.14
death 8.117 crime prevention or hospital orders 15.17, 15.42
corporate manslaughter 8.118 detection 7.142 House of Lords see Supreme
dangerous driving 8.160 defences 7.142 Court
duty of care to defi nition, non- Human Rights Act 1998
victim 8.107–8.112 exhaustive 7.137–7.139 1.49–1.58
index | 815
Convention rights see imprisonment services dishonestly,

Convention rights abortion 8.190 obtaining 12.35
declarations of aggravated offences 7.55, 7.60, sexual assault 9.45, 9.49, 9.51
incompatibility 1.52, 7.152, 10.128, 11.20, 11.25 solicitation of murder 8.175
1.56–1.57 arrest, assault with intent to taking conveyances without
impact 1.51–1.58 resist 7.62 authority 10.114
judicial review 1.58 arson 13.24 theft 10.2, 10.33
parliamentary assault 7.55, 7.60, 7.62, 7.96, threats to kill 8.180
sovereignty 1.50 9.40, 9.44, 10.99 unauthorised borrowing 10.108
public authorities, attempts 14.127, 14.140 vehicle taking 10.128
incompatible acts by 1.58 blackmail 11.26 wrongful credit 11.58
reading down 1.52–1.53 burglary 11.2, 11.20, 11.25 inchoate offences 14.1–14.143
statutory interpretation child destruction 8.199 acting reasonably, defence
1.51–1.53, 1.56–1.57 child sexual offences 9.35, of 14.28
unlawful actions 1.58 9.55, 9.58, 9.61, 9.64, 9.67, attempt see attempts
human trafficking 1.45 9.70, 9.73, 9.87, 9.99 commission of offence itself
husband and wife see spouses and common assault 3.26 not required 14.25–14.26
civil partners conspiracy 14.60, 14.80, 14.103 common provisions 1.23,
hyper/hypoglycaemic corporate manslaughter 8.144 14.32–14.38
conditions 15.28, 15.51, criminal damage 13.27–13.28 conspiracy see conspiracy
15.63 diminished responsibility, encouraging or assisting see
effect of 8.39–8.40 encouraging or assisting
identification principle and driving offences 8.152, 8.161, crime
corporate liability 8.164, 8.166 impossibility 14.30, 14.55,
acting within scope forgery 12.48, 12.66, 12.68 14.102, 14.130–14.136
of individual’s fraud jurisdiction 1.23, 14.32–14.38
authority 18.35 making or supplying articles mens rea 14.21
attribution via for use in 12.33 mode of trial 14.41
corporation 18.25 obtaining services overlap between offences 14.27
directing mind and will dishonestly 12.35 prosecution 14.39–14.40
test 18.25–18.39 possession of articles for use protective offences 14.29
directors 18.28 in 12.29 sentences 14.42–14.44
manager to whom directors have statutory offence 12.3 uncertainty 14.31
delegated power 18.28 grievous bodily harm 7.75 incitement, abolition of common
no negligence handling 11.34 law offence of 14.1
defence 18.36–18.37 harassment 7.143, 7.149, 7.152 indecent assault 2.23, 5.7
ignorance see also ignorance is no inchoate offences 14.42–14.43, indictable offences
defence 14.60, 14.80, 14.103, Crown Court 1.12
attempts 14.118 14.127, 14.140 defi nition 1.9
children aged 10–13, criminal making off without maximum sentences 1.27–1.28
responsibility of 15.3 payment 10.129 statute, regulated by 1.39
erroneous legal advice 3.83 manslaughter 1.31, 8.34, 8.121, infanticide
ignorance of serious wrong, 8.122 brain-stem death 8.10–8.11
defence of 15.3 maximum terms 1.27–1.28 commencement of life 8.7–8.9
ignorance is no defence 3.78–3.88 money laundering defence 8.123, 8.126
erroneous legal advice 3.83 offences 11.57 heart death, defi nition of 8.10
exceptions 3.84–3.87, 5.3 murder 1.31, 8.17–8.23, 8.175 killing
factual situation, knowledge penetration, assault by 9.40, act resulted in victim’s
of 3.80 9.44 death 8.14
mens rea, lack of 3.85–3.86 poison, administering 7.112 omissions to act 8.13
rationale 3.81–3.82 property, damage to 13.2, mens rea 8.124–8.125
reasonable force, reliance 13.19, 13.29, 13.32 misadventure 8.16
on 3.79 racially/religiously omissions 8.13
statutory instruments, non- aggravated 7.96, mother’s mind, state of 8.127
publication of 3.84 13.27–13.28 public or private defence 8.16
impossibility 14.30, 14.55, 14.102, rape 9.29, 9.35 reasonable creature in rerum
14.130–14.136 robbery 10.96, 10.99 natura, defi nition of 8.5
816 | index
infanticide (cont.) common law 1.32 summary trials 15.46

Queen’s/King’s Peace, under defence, as 8.39, 15.6 supervision orders 15.42
the 8.3–8.4, 8.12 defendant’s burden of strict liability 6.7, 15.39
statutory offence 8.123 proof 4.7 voluntary intoxication 15.73,
unlawful killing 8.16 disease of the 15.100
victims 8.3–8.12 mind 15.27–15.31 intention
brain-stem death 8.10–8.11 danger of recurrence 15.29 basic intent, meaning of 3.31
commencement of diminished responsibility 8.39, burglary 11.14–11.16
life 8.7–8.9 15.23, 15.44 codification 3.21
heart death, definition of 8.10 dissociative state 15.28, 15.31 consequences, recklessness as
reasonable creature in rerum drugs 15.28 to 3.38–3.40
natura, defi nition of 8.5 epilepsy 15.27, 15.51, 15.60 correspondence principle 3.37
Queen’s/King’s Peace, under internal/external direct intention 3.7–3.8,
the 8.3–8.4, 8.12 cause 15.28–15.31 3.28–3.29
year and a day rule 8.15 hospital orders 15.42 double effect, doctrine
infancy 15.1–15.5 hyper/hypoglycaemic of 3.22–3.24
10 years, aged under 15.1, 15.5 conditions 15.28, 15.51, doctor/patient
10–13 years, aged 15.63 relationship 3.23
between 15.2–15.3 ignorance 15.23, 15.34–15.37, two classes 3.23–3.24
17 years, aged under 15.5 15.39 foreseeability 3.9–3.11,
care/supervision of local judge, role of 15.25, 15.45 3.18–3.19
authorities 15.5 knowledge of wrong test 15.34, forgery 12.57
child safety orders 15.5 15.39 guidance, proposal for
civil proceedings 15.5 legal wrong/moral statutory 3.20–3.21
criminal liability 15.1 wrong 15.34–15.37 ignorance 5.3
Crown Court 15.4 mandatory indefi nite malice aforethought 8.24–8.25
doli incapax 15.1 hospitalisation 15.44 mistake negativing mens
family proceedings 15.5 medical evidence 15.37 rea 5.5, 5.20
foreign countries, comparison mens rea 15.39, 15.45 moral certainty 3.10
with 15.1 mental disability, motive distinguished 3.76
homicide 15.4 distinguished 15.6 murder
ignorance of serious wrong, mental illness short of malice
defence of 15.3 insanity 15.22 aforethought 8.24–8.25
irrebuttable presumption 15.1 M’Naghten Rules unlawfully to kill,
mischievous discretion 15.2 all-or-nothing test 15.23 intention 8.26–8.29
punishment 15.4 burden of proof 15.23 natural consequence test 3.10
rebuttable presumption, defects with negligence, distinguished 3.62
abolition of 15.3 rules 15.47–15.51 oblique intent 3.9–3.21
safety orders 15.5 guilty verdict where clear poison, administering 7.128
serious offences 15.4 medical evidence 15.24 probability 3.10
social workers, supervision mental illness short of proof 4.18
of 15.5 insanity 15.22 recklessness 3.37–3.41
youth courts, summary presumption of sanity 15.23 specific intent, meanings
offences in 15.4 redundant statement in of 3.30–3.31
innocent agency 17.6–17.7, 17.24 M’Naghten 15.38 strict liability 6.18
insanity 15.21–15.52 summary of rules 15.23 transferred malice 3.38–3.40
absolute discharge summary trials 15.46 ulterior intent 3.25–3.27, 7.128,
orders 15.42 use of rule 15.44–15.45 11.14–11.16, 12.57
absolute liability murder 15.44 unexpected manner, occurring
offences 15.39 nature and quality of act 15.23 on an 3.41
alcohol 15.28 prosecution 15.40 virtual certainty test 3.9–3.10,
all-or-nothing test 15.23 reason, defect of 15.26 3.18
appeals 15.43 reform 15.52 intervening acts 2.37–2.59
applicability 15.39, 15.45 sleepwalking 15.30, 15.50, intoxication
automatism 15.39, 15.45 15.51, 15.64 accidental acts 15.82
burden of proof 4.7, 15.23 special verdict 15.41 accomplices 15.94
index | 817
alcohol, effects of 15.70, 15.73 attempt and 14.109 limits 1.33–1.37

alcoholism constructive manslaughter new offences, creation of 1.32,
malfunctioning of the see constructive 1.34–1.35
mind 15.100 manslaughter objections 1.34
murder charges 15.104 extra-territoriality 1.25 rebuttable presumption,
automatism 15.72, 15.106 gross negligence manslaughter refusal to abolish 1.37
basic intent offences see gross negligence rejection of residual
15.77–15.82, 15.88, 15.91, manslaughter power 1.32
15.93–15.94 jurisdiction, extra- judicial review 1.14, 1.58
belief and excuses 15.97–15.99 territorial 1.25 jurisdiction
careless or inconsiderate law reform 8.122 aircraft, offences on 1.26
driving, when mens rea 3.53, 8.88–8.91 corporate manslaughter 8.145
under the influence problems 8.121 extra-territoriality 1.25–1.26
of drink or drugs, recklessness, by aircraft, offences on 1.26
causing 8.164–8.165 overlap with other defi nition of 1.25
criminal liability, relevance manslaughter international conventions,
to 15.73 types 8.119–8.120 effects of 1.25
dangerous driving 8.157 survival of offence, doubt as manslaughter 1.25
defi nition 15.71 to 8.119 murder 1.25
diminished responsibility surgeons 8.106, 8.114, 8.121 sexual offences 1.25
defence 8.53–8.54 types 8.82–8.83 ships, offences on
drugs taken under medical unlawful homicide, as 8.1 board 1.26
advice 15.71, 15.109 fraud 1.23
Dutch courage rule 15.104 joint criminal ventures manslaughter 1.25
glues, effect of 15.70 accomplices convicted murder 1.25
insanity 15.73, of less serious sexual offences 1.25
15.100–15.104 offence 17.52–17.55 ships, offences on board 1.26
involuntary intoxication defi nition 17.41 territorial
15.105–15.106, 15.109, differential liability 17.59 jurisdiction 1.21–1.24
15.111, 15.117 ‘fundamentally different act’ fraud 1.23
judicial policy rules 15.93 qualification 17.46–17.48 limits 1.24
malfunctioning of the perpetrator, identity of partial commission in
mind 15.100 unforeseen 17.44 England and Wales 1.22
mens rea 15.70, 15.74–15.81 reform of law 17.82 special rules 1.23
mistake 5.10, 5.22, separate doctrine, territorial waters 1.24
15.83–15.88 as 17.57–17.58 territorial waters 1.24
mitigation 15.106 unforeseen jury trials 1.12, 1.30
murder charges 15.104 consequences 17.48 justification
negligence 15.81 judges consent 2.22, 2.23
non-dangerous drugs 15.71, District Judges (Magistrates’ defence, as a 2.21–2.24
15.111 Court) 1.10, 1.12 evidential burden of
recklessness 15.91 circuit judges 1.12 defendant 2.21, 2.23
reform 15.113–15.117 High Court 1.12 necessity 16.99
self-defence, mistake relating recorders 1.12 public/private
to 15.83–15.88 judgments defence 16.2–16.3
specific intent 15.90–15.94, binding precedent 1.30 self-defence 2.21
15.117 obiter dicta 1.30 strict liability
third parties, induced persuasive authority 1.30 offences 6.42–6.44
by 15.105 ratio decidendi 1.30 unawareness of
valid consent 7.24–7.25 Judicial Committee of the Privy defendant 2.24
voluntary intoxication Council 1.30 use of force 16.2–16.3
15.70–15.88, 15.94, judicial law-making vicarious liability 18.18
15.97–15.104, 15.117 defences, creation of new 1.36
involuntary manslaughter European Convention on knowledge 3.42–3.50
8.82–8.105 see Human Rights 1.35 actual knowledge 3.43
also constructive foreseeability 1.35 belief 3.44, 3.46
manslaughter historical background 1.33 ignorance 5.3
818 | index
knowledge (cont.) new offences, creation of 1.40 goods, definition of 10.133

implied requirement 3.42 Orders in Council 1.43 making off, defi nition
mistake negativing mens statute of 10.131–10.132
rea 5.5, 5.20 common law offences mens rea 10.137–10.139
money laundering replaced by 1.41 statutory
offences 3.48 criminal code, no offences 10.129–10.139
prescribed circumstances of single 1.42 without payment, defi nition
offence, extending only indictable offences regulated of 10.133–10.136
to 3.50 by 1.39 malice aforethought
restricted meaning, instances interpretation 1.51 antenatal injury to child or
of 3.46–3.48 new offences, creation mother 8.30–8.32
requisite knowledge 3.49 of 1.40 constructive 8.25
statutory offences 6.11 summary offences 1.39 express 8.25
strict liability 6.18 statutory instruments 1.43 implied 8.25
suspicion 3.48 statutory interpretation 1.51 intention 8.24, 8.27
wilful blindness 3.45–3.48, subordinate legislation 1.39, manslaughter
6.28, 10.123, 11.52, 14.65, 1.43 brain-stem death, defi nition
17.31 summary offences 1.39 of 8.10–8.11
licensing, strict liability and 6.32 commencement of
Law Commission life, right to 1.55 life 8.7–8.9
causing or allowing the death limited partnerships 18.51 common law 1.31, 8.2
of a child or vulnerable Lisbon Treaty 1.46 corporate see corporate
adult 8.168 loss of control 8.58–8.81 manslaughter
codification 1.70–1.71 fear of serious diminished responsibility
conspiracy 14.82, 14.101, 14.143 violence 8.70–8.74 see diminished
criminal damage 13.1 gross provocation 8.75–8.76 responsibility
diminished judge, function of 8.81 gross negligence, by 3.60
responsibility 8.45, 8.50 jury, function of 8.81 heart death, defi nition
encouraging or assisting loss of control element 8.65 of 8.10
crime 14.1, 14.26 new partial defence 8.58–8.81 indictable offences 1.9
forgery 12.48 objective involuntary see involuntary
fraud 12.1, 12.21, 12.25, 12.27 requirement 8.78–8.80 manslaughter
infanticide 8.125 provocation 8.58–8.62 killing
intention, codification of 3.21 qualifying triggers 8.70–8.76 act resulted in victim’s
intoxication 15.115–15.117 requirements of death 8.14
loss of control, new defence defence 8.63–8.80 omissions to act 8.13
of 8.61 revenge 8.65 mercy killings 8.18, 8.56
manslaughter 8.35, 8.122 omissions 8.13
mercy killing 8.38 Maastricht Treaty 1.4, 1.46 public or private defence 8.16
Offences against the Person magistrates’ courts 1.9–1.12 Queen/King’s Peace, under
Bill 7.129, 7.131 appeals 1.12 the 8.3–8.4, 8.12
provocation, abolition of 8.61, composition 1.10 reasonable creature in rerum
8.65 Crown Court 1.12 natura 8.5
year and a day rule 8.15 District Judge (Magistrates’ reform 8.34, 8.35
lawful chastisement 7.51 Court) 1.100 sentence, maximum 8.34
legislation either-way offences 1.9 unlawful killing 8.16
byelaws 1.43 fitness to plead 15.15 victims
code, no single criminal 1.42 lay magistrates 1.10 brain-stem death, defi nition
common law offences replaced Queen’s Bench Division, of 8.10–8.11
by statute 1.41 appeals to 1.12 commencement of
criminal law source, sending for trial life 8.7–8.9
as 1.39–1.44 proceedings 1.9 heart death, defi nition
declarations of summary offences 1.9 of 8.10
incompatibility 1.50 youth courts 1.11 Queen/King’s Peace, under
Human Rights Act 1998 making off without the 8.3–8.4, 8.12
1.50–1.51 payment 10.129–10.139 reasonable creature in rerum
indictable offences 1.39 actus reus 10.131–10.136 natura 8.5
index | 819
voluntary see voluntary rape 9.32–9.34 defects with rules 15.47–15.51

manslaughter reasonable force, reliance defendant, persuasive burden
year and a day rule 8.15 on 3.79 of proof 15.23
marital coercion 16.65–16.68 recklessness see recklessness delusions 15.49
abolition, recommendations requirement of just European Convention on
for 16.68 punishment 2.3 Human Rights 15.51
attempted murder 16.65 statutory instruments, non- guilty verdict where clear
duress by threats 16.65 publication of 3.84 medical evidence 15.24
moral threat 16.67 statutory offences 6.11, irresistible impulse 15.48
persuasive burden on 6.13–6.27 label of insanity 15.50
wife 16.65 wounding with intent mental illness short of
polygamous marriage 16.65 7.86–7.89, 7.92–7.95 insanity 15.22
rarity of defence 16.67 mental condition defences presumption of sanity 15.23
rebuttable presumption 16.65 automatism see automatism redundant statement in
subjective test 16.66 infancy see infancy M’Naghten 15.38
statutory provision 16.65 insanity see insanity self-control, absence of 15.48
wife only, available to 16.65 intoxication see intoxication summary of rules 15.23
mens rea 3.1–3.89 M’Naghten rules see summary trials 15.46
actus reus 2.1–2.4, 3.3–3.5, M’Naghten rules use of rule 15.44–15.45
3.65–3.74 mental disability money laundering and handling,
assault 7.52–7.53 hospital orders 15.17 overlap with 11.57
assault occasioning actual insanity, distinguished 15.6 motive 3.75–3.77
bodily harm 7.61 medical reports 15.7 intention distinguished 3.76
battery 7.52–7.53 supervision orders 15.17 irrelevant to liability 3.75
contemporaneity with actus transfer directions 15.6 racially/religiously aggravated
reus 3.65–3.74 unfitness to be tried 15.6–15.7 offences 3.77
continuing act 3.65–3.68 unfitness to plead 15.8–15.20 murder
defi nition 2.1 urgent need for actus reus 2.21
duty theory 3.68 treatment 15.6–15.7 antenatal injury to child or
erroneous legal advice 3.83 mistake 5.1–5.24 mother 8.30–8.32
exceptions 3.69–3.74, actus reus 5.6–5.8, 5.17–5.19 attempted murder
3.84–3.87 assault occasioning actual and diminished
factual situation, knowledge bodily harm 5.7 responsibility 8.40
of 3.80 belief of defendant 5.14 brain-stem death 8.10–8.11
fault element 3.63 consent 5.18 burden of proof 4.3
good or bad motives, criminal liability, effect capital/non-capital 8.19
irrelevance of 3.1 on 5.24 commencement of life 8.7–8.9
grievous bodily harm duress 5.19 common law 1.31, 8.2
7.86–7.89, 7.92–7.95 excuses, relating to 5.14–5.15, death penalty, abolition
ignorance of law is no 5.18–5.19 of 8.20
defence 3.78–3.87 indecent assault 5.7 duress by threats
infanticide 8.124–8.125 intoxication 5.10 and 16.55–16.59
intention see intention jury, as matter for 5.5 duress of circumstances
involuntary manslaughter 3.53 mens rea 5.5–5.13, 5.17–5.24 16.83–16.84
knowledge see knowledge murder 5.8 excessive self-defence 1.36
mistake of law 3.78–3.88 negligence 5.11 extra-territoriality 1.25
morals, ignorance of 3.85 rape 5.6–5.7 first degree murder 8.33
motive 3.75–3.77, 4.16 reasonableness 5.6, 5.8–5.9, grievous bodily harm, intent to
murder 8.24–8.27 5.12, 5.15, 5.18, 5.21–5.24 cause 8.28
negligence see negligence self-defence 5.18 heart death, defi nition of 8.10
poison, administering Tolson rule 5.12–5.13 indictable offences 1.9
7.124–7.128 valid consent 7.27 infanticide see infanticide
proof of state of mind 4.16 misprision of treason 17.90 intention
property damage 13.8–13.18, M’Naghten Rules grievous bodily harm,
13.20, 13.22 all-or-nothing test 15.23 cause 8.28
racially or religiously cognitive factors, limited malice aforethought 8.24,
aggravated offences 3.77 to 15.48 8.27
820 | index
murder (cont.) Queen/King’s Peace, under harassment see harassment

unlawfully to kill 8.26, 8.27 the 8.2–8.4, 8.12 infanticide see infanticide
jurisdiction, extra- reasonable creature in rerum manslaughter see
territorial 1.25, 8.3 natura 8.5 manslaughter
killing voluntary manslaughter 8.37 murder see murder
act resulted in victim’s year and a day rule 8.15 poison, administering see
death 8.14 poison, administering
omissions to act 8.13 necessity sexual see sexual offences
unlawfully kill, intention case law 16.89 wounding/grievous bodily
to 8.26, 8.27 child destruction 16.90 harm see wounding/
Law Commission 8.35, 8.38, common law grievous bodily harm
8.61 defence 16.93–16.95 outrage public decency,
life sentences duress, distinguished conspiracy to 14.83,
European Convention 16.87–16.89, 16.99 14.96–14.101
on Human Rights justification 16.99 common law 1.31
compatibility 8.21 limits 16.97 exposure and 9.126
heinousness, degree of 8.22 medical strict liability 6.9
mandatory 1.27, 8.17, treatment 16.95–16.98
8.21–8.23 mental competency of paedophile offences committed
minimum term 8.21 victim 16.97 abroad, jurisdiction
release on licence 8.21 murder 16.98 over 9.122–9.124
malice aforethought private defence, distinguished participation in crime 17.1–17.90
antenatal injury to child or 16.87–16.89 accomplices see accomplices
mother 8.30–8.32 reform 16.99 assisting an offender see
constructive 8.25 requirements 16.96 assisting an offender
express 8.25 self-defence 16.98, 16.99 concealing for reward see
implied 8.25 statutory provision 16.90–16.92 concealing for reward
intention 8.24, 8.27 unavoidable choice 16.96 perpetrators see perpetrators
manslaughter see negligence 3.51–3.64 partners see spouses and civil
manslaughter circumstance, as to 3.55–3.59 partners
mercy killings 8.18, 8.38, 8.56 consequence, as to 3.52–3.54 partnerships 18.51
mistake negativing mens constructive knowledge 3.55 perpetrators
rea 5.8 degrees of negligence 3.61 defi nition of 17.3
necessity, defence of 16.98 express provisions 3.56–3.57 innocent agency 17.6–17.7,
omissions 8.13 fault element 3.63–3.64 17.24
public or private defence 8.16 intention distinguished 3.61 joint 17.3–17.5
Queen/King’s Peace, under judicial implication 3.58 poison, administering
the 8.2–8.4, 8.12 mens rea 3.53, 3.63–3.64 actus reus 7.122, 7.128
reasonable creature in rerum mental capacity, relevance administer 7.114–7.115
natura 8.5 of 3.59 administered, cause to be 7.116
reform 8.33, 8.35, 8.38, 8.61 very essence of offence, as 3.60 cause to be taken, defi nition
second degree murder 8.33 voluntary intoxication 15.81 of 7.117
solicitation 8.175–8.179 no punishment without law 1.55 HIV infected bodily
superior orders, defence novus actus fluids 7.120
as 16.100 interveniens 2.37–2.59 indictable offences 7.112
unlawful killing malice 7.124–7.125, 7.127
intention 8.26, 8.27 obiter dicta statements 1.30 maximum sentences 7.112
misadventure 8.16 offences against the person mens rea 7.124–7.125,
public or private aggravated assaults see 7.127–7.128
defence 8.16 aggravated assaults miscarriage, procurement
victims assaults see assaults of 7.118
brain-stem death 8.10–8.11 battery see battery noxious thing 7.119
commencement of corporate manslaughter see statutory offences 7.112
life 8.7–8.9 corporate manslaughter ulterior intent 7.128
heart death, defi nition driving offences see road traffic unlawfully 7.121
of 8.10 offences precedent, doctrine of 1.30
index | 821
presumptions of law see law, sentences for offences 13.19, fatal force
presumptions of 13.31–13.32, 13.28, absolutely necessary, defi ni-
private and family life, right to 14.42–14.44 tion of 16.27, 16.32
respect for 1.55, 1.66 spouses and civil armed forces, use by 16.27,
Privy Council 1.30 partners 13.3 16.28
procuring see aiding, abetting, threats 13.29–13.31 European Convention on
counselling or procuring trials 13.2, 14.41 Human Rights, compat-
proportionality, principle of 1.67 value of property 13.2 ibility with 16.27–16.32
proof see also burden of proof without lawful excuse, ‘honest belief, for good
Convention rights, compatibility defi nition of 13.9–13.18 reasons’ 16.30–16.31
with 1.60, 4.8 provocation police officer, use by 16.27,
facts abolition 8.58–8.62 16.31
jury, determined by a 4.2 defects of 8.58–8.62 private individual, use
presumptions 4.15 judicial control, lack of 8.60 by 16.27
law, presumptions of 4.7, loss of control 8.58–8.62 security forces, use
4.12–4.14 over-reaction 8.60 by 16.27–16.28
no case to answer 4.2 self-control, sudden and strictly proportionate, defi-
state of mind 4.16–4.18 temporary loss 8.59 nition of 16.30–16.31
property, damage to 13.1–13.32 slow burn reactions 8.60 force not used, where 16.38
actus reus 13.4–13.7, 13.21 psychiatric injury honest belief for good
arson 13.24–13.25 harassment 7.143 reasons 16.30–16.31
belonging to wounding/grievous bodily imprisonment, to prevent
another 13.2–13.18 harm 7.78 unlawful 16.1
defi nition 13.7 public decency, outraging intoxication 16.19
consent, belief common law 1.31 jury, function of 16.12–16.13
in 13.10–13.11 conspiracy to 14.83, justifiable force 16.4, 6.14
damage and destruction, 14.96–14.101 legitimate purpose, use of force
defi nition of 13.5 exposure and 9.126 for a 16.26
defence of property, belief strict liability 6.9 mistaken belief 16.17, 16.19
in 13.12–13.17 public morals, conspiracy to murder, excessive force
intention, defi nition corrupt 14.96–14.101 and 16.35–16.36
of 13.8 public nuisance police officer, use of force
justifications 13.18 common law 1.31, 1.68 by 16.4, 6.27, 16.31
without lawful excuse, strict liability 6.9 private defence, use of force
defi nition of 13.9–13.18 public/private defences, in 16.1, 16.27
consent, belief in 13.10–13.11 applicability proportionality 16.30–16.31
damage and destruction, of 16.9–16.10 psychiatric evidence 16.20
defi nition of 13.5 pre-emptive action 16.8–16.12 public defence, use of force
defence of property, belief absolutely necessary, defi nition in 16.1, 16.5
in 13.12–13.17 of 16.27, 16.32 reasonable force 16.4, 16.5,
duress 13.18 armed forces, use by 16.27, 16.28 16.7, 16.14–16.22, 16.26
endanger life, intent arrest, resisting 16.1, 16.37 security forces, use of lethal
to 13.19–13.23 burden of proof 16.12 force by 16.27–16.28
intention, defi nition of 13.8 common law rules 16.1, self-defence 16.1, 16.3, 16.85
justifications 13.18 16.3–16.7, 16.32 statutory defence 16.4–16.7
lawful excuse 13.23 conduct 16.1, 16.33 trespass 16.3
limit on prosecutions 13.3 crime prevention 16.1, 16.5 wholly innocent
mens rea 13.8–13.18, 13.20, defence of another 16.1, 16.3, persons 16.11
13.22 16.85 purposes of criminal law 1.8
possessing anything with defence of property 16.1, 16.3
intent 13.31–13.32 duress of circumstances 16.85 Queen’s Bench Division 1.13,
property, defi nition 13.6 European Convention 1.14
prosecution of 14.39–14.40 on Human Rights,
punishment 13.2 compatibility racially or religiously aggravated
racially/religiously aggravated with 16.31–16.32 offences
offences 13.27–13.28 excessive force 16.14, assault 7.74, 7.97–7.111
recklessness, defi nition of 13.9 16.35–16.36 defi nition 7.97
822 | index
racially or religiously aggravated unexpected manner, off-road authorised motor-

offences (cont.) consequence occurring in ing events 8.153
harassment 7.150–7.152 a 3.41 statutory offences 8.152
hostility based on colour or religion see racially or death caused by uninsured/
race 7.101 religiously aggravated unlicensed/disqualified
hostility based on offences driver 8.166
membership of road traffic offences disqualification 8.161, 8.164,
racial or religious alcohol, driving with 8.166
group 7.101–7.111 excess 6.3 drink driving 6.3, 8.158,
motive 3.77 dangerous driving 8.164–8.165
racial group 7.98, 7.101 current state of driving, meaning of 8.146
religious group 7.99 vehicle 8.155 homicide 8.1
statutory provision 7.74, dangerous, mechanically propelled vehicle,
7.95–7.96 defi nition of 8.156 defi nition of 8.147
types of death, causing 8.154–8.158 motor vehicle, defi nition
aggravation 7.100–7.111 intoxication 8.158 of 8.147
rape objective test 8.154 necessity 16.91
actus reus 9.30–9.31 statutory defi nition 8.54 public place, meaning of 8.150
aiding, abetting and death by careless driving road, defi nition of 8.149
counselling under influence of drink/ sentences, maximum 8.151
exceptions 9.37 drugs 8.164–8.165 state of vehicle 8.155
child under 13, rape disqualification strict liability 6.3, 6.10
of 9.35–9.38 obligatory 8.164 subordinate legislation 1.43
children as offenders 9.38 drink, defi nition of 8.165 trials 8.151
consent 9.3, 9.31 drug, defi nition of 8.165 robbery 10.96–10.107
conclusive homicide, as 8.1 assault with intent to rob 7.74,
presumptions 9.33 indictment, triable only 10.99
evidential on 8.164 force, use of 10.100–10.107
presumptions 9.31–9.32 prescribed limits 8.165 indictable offences 1.9
proof 9.30 sentence, maximum 8.164 puts or seeks to put any
indictable offences 1.9, 9.35 specimen, failure to person in fear, defi nition
irrebuttable presumptions of provide 8.165 of 10.101
law 4.13 statutory offence 8.164 reform possibilities 10.107
marriage 1.35 valid consent to take statutory offence of 10.96
mens rea 9.32–9.34 specimen 8.165 theft, ingredients
mistake as to consent 5.6–5.7 death by careless or of 10.97–10.99
statutory offences 9.29 inconsiderate driving
ratio decidendi 1.30 death and driving, causal sado-masochism 7.3–7.9, 7.13,
reasonable chastisement 7.51 link and, 8.159, 7.174 7.19, 7.20 –7.21
recorders 1.12 disqualification self-defence
recklessness 3.32–3.41 obligatory 8.161 duress of circumstances 16.85
Caldwell recklessness 3.35 careless or inconsiderate public/private defence, as 16.1,
consequence, as to 3.37–3.41 driving 8.162 16.4
correspondence homicide, as 8.1 necessity 16.98, 16.99
principle 3.37 statutory offences 8.161 voluntary
defi nition 3.33–3.34 death by dangerous driving intoxication 15.83–15.88
ignorance 5.3 dangerous self-help 7.50, 16.39
material risk 3.33 driving 8.154–8.158 sentences
mens rea, as sufficient 3.36 death and driving, causal assault and battery 7.35
mistake negativing mens link and 8.159 fi nes 1.27–1.29
rea 5.5, 5.20 disqualification imprisonment see
objective recklessness 3.35 obligatory 8.152 imprisonment
reasonableness 3.34 extended driving test 8.152 mandatory sentences 1.28
strict liability 6.18 homicide, as 8.1 maximum sentences 1.27–1.28
subjective recklessness 3.33, manslaughter by gross services, obtaining dishonestly
3.35 negligence, relationship actus reus 12.36–12.37
transferred malice 3.38–3.40 with 8.160 mens rea 12.42
index | 823
morals, ignorance of 3.89 sexual assault 9.45–9.48, 15.91, non-publication 3.84

obtaining services, defi nition 15.93–15.94 subordinate legislation,
of 12.39–12.41 sexual, meaning of 9.6–9.8 as 1.43
statutory offences 12.36–12.41 spouses and civil statutory offences, increase
sex-change operations 7.12 partners 9.85–9.86, in 1.44
sexual offences 9.1–9.124 9.96–9.98, 9.119 stolen goods
abuse of position of voyeurism 9.121 ceasing to be stolen 11.45
trust 9.77–9.84 share certificates 12.64 handling 11.44
age of consent 9.3–9.5 solicitation of money 11.44
assault by murder 8.175–8.179 proceeds of original
penetration 9.40–9.44 articles in newspapers 8.176 goods 11.46–11.47
capacity to choose 9.14–9.17 indictable offences 8.174 statutory definition 11.44–11.45
care workers 9.113–9.119 sentence, maximum 8.174 strict liability 6.1–6.50
consent sources of law absolute liability
age of 9.3–9.5 common law see common law distinguished 6.5–6.7
statutory EU law see EU law accomplices 17.40
defi nition 9.12–9.13 legislation see legislation burden of proof 6.45
corpse, sexual penetration subordinate legislation see common law offences 6.9
of 9.121 subordinate legislation contempt of court 6.9
deception 9.20–9.26 specific intent defences 6.13, 6.45–6.48
exposure 9.121 basic intent offences and 15.91, defi nition 6.1–6.4
extra-territoriality 1.25 15.93–15.94 enforcement of the law,
familial child sex offences judicial assisting 6.40–6.41
child family member, defi nitions 15.90–15.93 extrinsic factors 6.35–6.39
with 9.87–9.95 law reform 15.117 fi nancial matters 6.45
exceptions 9.96–9.98 offences 15.91 health and safety 6.10
family recklessness 15.91 ignorance is no defence 6.2
relationships 9.92–9.95 sports and games innocence, presumption of 6.8
inciting child family actual bodily harm 7.9–7.10, insanity 6.7, 15.39
member 9.90–9.91 7.21, 8.86 intention 6.45, 6.48
freedom to choose 9.18–9.19 boxing 7.10, 7.21, 8.86 justification for 6.42–6.44
gender neutrality of consent 7.10 knowledge 6.11
legislation 9.1 martial arts 7.10 mala prohibita 6.10
inducements, threats or properly conducted 7.9–7.10 mens rea 6.11, 6.13–6.27
deceptions 9.110–9.112 wrestling 7.10 presumption 6.11,
intercourse with an spouses and civil partners 6.13–6.27
animal 9.121 bigamy 5.12–5.13, 18.41 rebutting the
jurisdiction, extra- conspiracy 14.47, 14.82 presumption 6.22–6.26
territorial 1.25 property, damaging 13.3 subjective mental
mental disorder, offences sex offences 9.85–9.86, element 6.18
against people 9.96–9.98, 9.119 words used in
with 9.102–9.119 theft 10.50 statutes 6.27–6.34
mistake 9.20–9.26 stalkers, harassment by 1.44, mistake 6.2
not reasonably believe, 7.42, 7.134, 7.137 negligence 6.45–6.48
defi nition of 9.9–9.11 statute public decency 6.9
old law relating to 9.1–9.2 common law offences replaced public nuisance 6.9
paedophile offences committed by 1.41 reducing operation of strict
abroad, jurisdiction criminal code, no single 1.42 liability 6.45–6.50
over 9.122–9.124 indictable offences regulated by regulatory offences 6.1
preparatory offences 9.120 statute 1.39 road traffic 6.10
protective nature of 9.1 interpretation 1.48, 1.51–1.53, trading activities 6.10
public lavatory, sexual activity 1.56–1.57, 18.38–18.39 words used in
in 9.121 new offences, creation of 1.40 statutes 6.27–6.34
rape see rape summary offences 1.39 subordinate legislation
sexual activity without statutory instruments byelaws 1.43
consent 9.50–9.54 ignorance of the law 3.84 Orders in Council 1.43
824 | index
subordinate legislation (cont.) partial commission in England statutory offences 11.64

summary offences 1.39 and Wales 1.22 handling stolen goods see
statutory instruments 1.43 special rules 1.23 handling
suicide territorial waters 1.24 human corpses 10.30
encouraging/assisting suicide, textwriters intangible property 10.28
offence of 8.181–8.189 no binding force 1.38 intention permanently to
European Convention persuasive authority, as 1.38 deprive 10.80–10.95
on Human Rights, respected writings 1.38 actual permanent depriva-
compatibility standard works 1.38 tion and 10.80–10.84
with 8.182–8.189 theft 10.1–10.95 see also actual thing appropriated
indictable offences 8.182 appropriation in theft and 10.81
information service account of another, receipt conditional intention 10.94
providers 8.186 of property from or dishonest borrowing 10.95
jurisdiction 8.185 on 10.53–10.54 future, in the 10.82
murder 7.2, 8.37–8.38 actus reus 10.3–10.25 statutory extension of mean-
pacts 8.37–8.38 belonging to another see ing of 10.85–10.93
sentence, maximum 8.182 below belonging to another treating as one’s own 10.93
statutory offences 8.37–8.38 property see below property land and things forming part of
summary offences appropriation 10.3–10.25 land 10.34–10.35
defi nition 1.9 bailment 10.41 lodgings 10.32
either-way offences 1.28 belonging to making off without payment
fi nes 1.28 another 10.38–10.67 see making off without
maximum sentences 1.28 blackmail see blackmail payment
subordinate legislation 1.39 borrowing 10.95 mens rea 10.68–10.93
summary conviction 1.28 burglary see burglary mistake, property transferred
superior orders conditional intention 10.94 under 10.59–10.66
Criminal Codes, provision confidential information 10.31 money, defi nition of 10.27
in 16.100 corporation sole 10.67 moral right to deprive 10.70
defence, as 16.100 corpses 10.30 more than one person,
mens rea, lack of 16.101 dishonesty property belonging
military situations 16.100 borrowing 10.95 to 10.48–10.49
mistaken belief 16.100, 16.101 claim of right 10.70 ownership 10.39–10.43
obedience of, mitigation European Convention on permanently depriving,
as 16.100 Human Rights 10.75 intention of 10.80–10.95
murder 16.100 honest finder 10.72 possession 10.40–10.44
supervision orders judges’ possession or control 10.44
insanity 15.42 directions 10.76–10.78 property 10.26–10.37
unfit to plead 15.17 matter of fact for jury 10.73, confidential
Supreme Court 10.75 information 10.31
appeals 1.19 mens rea 10.68–10.79 electricity 10.33
binding precedent 1.30 moral right to human corpses 10.30
composition 1.20 deprive 10.70 ‘intangible property’ 10.28
conditions for appeal 1.19 reasonable and honest land and things forming
Deputy President 1.20 people 10.74–10.75 part 10.34–10.35
President 1.20 statutory defi nition 10.69 lodgings 10.32
suppression of documents true consent honestly ‘money’ 10.27
fraud 12.46 obtained 10.71 rides in vehicles 10.33
sentence, maximum 12.43 willingness to pay 10.79 services 10.32
surgery electricity 10.33 specific piece of
child destruction 8.202 fi nders 10.72 property 10.24–10.25
consent 7.11–7.12 fraud see fraud statutory defi nition 10.26
sex-change operations 7.12 going equipped for stealing ‘things in action’ 10.28
articles for 11.67–11.71 things which are not
tattooing 7.13 has with him, defi nition property 10.29–10.33
territorial jurisdiction 1.21–1.24 of 11.65 wild creatures 10.36–10.37
fraud 1.23 place of abode, defi nition proprietary right or
limits 1.24 of 11.65 interest 10.45–10.47
index | 825
reasonable and honest uncertainty liability of employee or

people 10.74–10.75 accomplices 17.73 delegate 18.14
retain property, obligation inchoate offences 14.31 licensees 18.8
to 10.55–10.58 unfitness to plead mens rea 18.7
rides in vehicles 10.33 absolute discharge 15.17 public nuisance 18.2
robbery see robbery appeals 15.19 selling 18.4
services 10.32 deaf mutes 15.9 statutory defences 18.16–18.18
specific piece of determination that act as strict liability 18.9
property 10.24–10.25 charged done 15.14–15.16 using 18.4
spouses and civil partners, ‘effective participation’ 15.10 virtual certainty test 3.9–3.10,
property of 10.50 hospital orders 15.17 3.18
statutory defi nition 10.26 hysterical amnesia 15.9 voluntary manslaughter
things in action 10.28 judges, decisions of 15.9 diminished responsibility see
things which are not magistrates’ courts 15.15 diminished responsibility
property 10.29–10.33 procedural rules 15.13 loss of control, defence of see
treating as one’s own 10.93 public protection 15.16 loss of control
trusts 10.51 supervision orders 15.17 murder 8.37–8.38
unauthorised borrowing see test of fitness 15.10 rationale for 8.35
unauthorised borrowing trials on indictment 15.8 suicide pacts see suicide pacts
wild creatures 10.36–10.37 unincorporated unlawful homicide, as 8.1
willingness to pay 10.79 associations 18.51–18.55 voyeurism 9.121
wrongful credit see wrongful common law offences 18.51 vulnerable adult, causing or
credit corporate manslaughter allowing the death of a
things in action 10.28 18.52 child or 8.167–8.171
threats see duress by threats liability of members 18.55 defendants 8.170
Tolson rule 5.12–5.13 limited partnerships 18.51 killers 8.170
torture, prohibition of 1.55 member’s clubs 18.51 non-accidental death 8.167
touching for sexual offences 9.6, partnerships 18.51 physical harm, significant risk
9.8, 9.22, 9.39, 9.45, personal liability 18.54 of 8.171
9.46–9.47, 9.49 publicity order, breach of 18.52 statutory offences 8.168
trade secrets as property 10.31 remedial order, breach of 18.52 victims 8.169
treason statutory offences 18.53
duress by threats 16.61 trade unions 18.51 wild creatures
misprision of treason 17.90 vicarious liability 18.54 birds 10.37
sentence, maximum 17.90 use of force see pre-emptive fishery, private right of 10.37
trust, abuse of 9.76–9.84 action poaching game 10.36–10.37
trusts 10.51 theft and 10.36–10.37
VAT evasion1.45 zoo animals 10.36
ulterior intent vicarious liability 18.1–18.18 wilful blindness
burglary 11.14–11.16 accomplices 18.15 connivance 18.45
forgery 12.57 attempts 18.15 knowledge 3.45–3.48, 6.28,
poison, administering 7.128 corporations 18.21 10.123, 11.52, 14.65, 17.31
unauthorised delegation 18.8–18.12, 18.17 recklessness and 14.116, 17.31
borrowing 10.108–10.128 driving 18.6 wounding with intent
aggravated vehicle- due diligence 18.16 actus reus 7.78–7.85, 7.91
taking 10.125–10.126 employer/employee ambit 7.80, 7.89
article from place open relationship 18.4 blood, substantial loss of 7.80
to public, removal estate agency 18.2 bodily harm, defi nition of 7.77
of 10.108–10.113 exceptions to general broken of displaced limbs or
belief as to consent or rule 18.2–18.3 bones 7.89
authority 10.122 extensive construction causing, defi nition of 7.91
consent, without 10.119 18.4–18.7, 18.17 defi nition 7.77, 7.91
conveyances without authority, general rule 18.1 either way offences 7.75
taking see conveyances interpretation principles used intention 7.92–7.93
without authority, taking to impose 18.3–18.7 malice 7.86, 7.95
joy-riders 10.125–10.126 justification 18.18 maximum sentences 7.75
826 | index
wounding with intent (cont.) statutory offences 1.41, young offenders see also infancy
mens rea 2.2, 7.86, 7.89, 7.75–7.95 14 or over but under 18 years,
7.92–7.93, 7.95 unlawful bodily harm 7.89 aged 15.4
mistake 7.89 wrongful credit, dishonestly Crown court, triable in 15.4
murder 2.2 retaining a11.59–11.62 defi nition 15.4
permanent disability 7.80 actus reus 11.58 homicide 15.4
permanent visible mens rea 11.61–11.62 summary offences 15.4
disfigurement 7.80 sentence, maximum 11.59 youth courts 1.11, 15.4
psychiatric injury 7.78, 7.80 width of offence 11.63 young persons see child sex
recklessness 7.88 offences; children; young
sensory function, loss of 7.80 year and a day rule 8.15 offenders

Card Cross Jones Criminal Law

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C A R D, CROSS A N D J O N E S

RICHARD CARD LLB, LLM, FRSA

Revisions to the 20th edition include:

Table of Statutes xiii

2 Criminal liability 1: actus reus 32

3 Criminal liability 2: mens rea 69

5 Mistake and related matters 119

6 Strict liability 130

7 Non-fatal offences against the person 159

8 Homicide and related offences 231

Common elements of murder, manslaughter and infanticide 233

9 Sexual offences 327

10 Theft and related offences 386

Unauthorised borrowing 442

11 Other offences under the Theft Act 1968 454

12 Fraud and related offences 485

13 Offences of damage to property 518

Threats to destroy or damage property 533

14 Inchoate offences 536

15 Mental condition defences 610

16 Other general defences 672

18 Vicarious liability, corporate liability and liability

Abortion Act 1967 . . . 8.202, 16.93 British Nationality Act 1948

s 39 . . . 6.47 s 8(1)–(5) . . . 8.141

(1) . . . 7.143, 14.14, 14.104, 14.105, 14.108, s 31 . . . 1.25

(1)–(3) . . . 1.28 Sch 3 . . . 7.90

Defective Premises Act 1972 . . . 8.133 Pt 1 (ss 1–13) . . . 12.48

Licensing Act 1921 Metropolitan Police Act 1839

Perjury Act 1911 (b) . . . 7.140

(3) . . . 8.156, 8.157, 8.158, 8.162 (1)(b) . . . 14.8, 14.10

(2), (3) . . . 14.31 (1) . . . 9.45

(1) s 27 . . . 9.87, 9.88, 9.90, 9.91, 9.92, 9.98

s 44 . . . 9.119 (7) . . . 9.65

(3) . . . 10.34, 10.35 s 18 . . . 12.47, 18.46

s 24 . . . 18.16 (1) . . . 16.27, 16.98

Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220, CA . . . Wall (1802) 28 State Tr 51 . . . 2.50, 2.51

UK Secondary Legislation reg 32(1)(g) . . . 18.34

This chapter deals with the following introductory points:

• the characteristics of criminal offences;

The characteristics of criminal offences

Key points 1.1

The purposes of the criminal law

4 Smith v Dear (1903) 88 LT 664.

(c) to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal;

The courts of criminal jurisdiction

Key points 1.2

THE CRIMINAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Court of Appeal Queen’s Bench Division

If D indicates an intention to plead guilty to the either-way offence, the magis-

The Crown Court

Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal

Key points 1.3

Partial commission in England and Wales

21 Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, s 2.

Jurisdiction over offences on board ships and aircraft outside

Level on scale Amount of ﬁne

Key points 1.4

36 For an exception, see para 1.12, n 12.