Social Problems Perspectives, Disaster Research and

Emergency Management: Intellectual Contexts,

Theoretical Extensions, and Policy Implications

Thomas E. Drabek
John Evans Professor, Emeritus
Department of Sociology and Criminology
University of Denver
Denver, Colorado 80208-2948
zted@dd-do.com

*Revision and expansion of the 2006 E.L. Quarantelli Theory Award Lecture presented at
the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York City, New York,
August, 2007. (International Research Committee on Disasters, Research Committee 39,
International Sociological Association). I wish to thank Ruth Ann Drabek for her work
on this paper. I also want to thank Gary Kreps for his critical review of an early draft.
Partial support was provided by the International Research Committee on Disasters
(IRCD) and the University of Denver through the John Evans Professorship Program.
Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this paper are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IRCD, the University of
Denver, or any of the individuals acknowledged herein.
 Abstract

This essay explores the intellectual contexts wherein disasters are defined as non-

routine social problems. The argument is advanced that this theoretical orientation can

both open new doors for researchers and assist emergency management professionals in

critically reviewing existing policy and future proposals. The essay is comprised of five

sections: 1) introduction (how I came to this topic); 2) social problems perspectives (key

insights from past and recent analyses); 3) disaster research (sampling of theoretical

issues and conclusions relevant to a social problems orientation); 4) emergency

management (selected policy areas and implications) and 5) conclusions (payoffs for

future theory and application).

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 Social Problem Perspectives, Disaster Research, and Emergency Management:

Intellectual Contexts, Theoretical Extensions and Policy Implications

Introduction

I am honored to have been selected as a recipient of the E.L. Quarantelli Theory

Award and proudly accept. I want to thank Dr. Robert A. Stallings, former International

Research Committee on Disasters President (2002-2006) for his role in making this

happen as well as Dr. Ronald W. Perry, our current President (2006-2010).

This award only has been made twice before and I am humbled to join the prior

recipients—Drs. Russell R. Dynes (University of Delaware) and Allen H. Barton

(Columbia University). I have the greatest respect for both of these scholars. Russ was

one of my doctoral professors. I assisted him during the founding days of the Disaster

Research Center (DRC) at The Ohio State University. His classic text (Dynes 1970)

reflected some of the early literature reviews I completed. Even though it was published

nearly four decades ago, it remains a useful reference book for me and many others.

While I never worked directly with Allen Barton, his theoretical syntheses, e.g., 1963,

1969, stimulated my curiosity and worked like light bulbs in my formative years. I

continue to admire the theory building skill he brought to the disaster case studies of his

day. His work helps all of us understand better how things fit together—how differing

events have parallels, how key analytic qualities of social structure and collective stress

reflected patterns that might reemerge in future disasters (e.g., see Barton 2005).

I am equally humbled to receive this award named after my other DRC mentor—

Henry Quarantelli. His intellectual imprint was significant initially and has grown over

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the years as I try to keep up with his latest contributions. Through his work my thinking

has been both redirected and greatly deepened. Thanks Henry—I “talk” to you more than

you ever could know.

Before turning to substance, I would be remiss if I didn’t also thank the Theory

Award Selection Committee, chaired by Dr. Dennis E. Wenger (Texas A & M University,

U.S.A.). In addition to Wenger, the committee members were: Drs. Linda B. Bourque

(University of California, School of Public Health, U.S.A.), Wolf Dombrowsky

(Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Germany), J. Kenneth Mitchell (Rutgers

University, U.S.A.), Betty H. Morrow (Florida International University, U.S.A.), and

Tricia Wachtendorf (University of Delaware, U.S.A.). To each, I say, “Thanks.”

Additionally, I want to thank Drs. William A. Anderson and B. Wayne Blanchard.

As many of you know, both have years of experience as program directors, Anderson at

the National Science Foundation (NSF) and Blanchard at the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA). Each provided intellectual and administrative guidance

that permitted the successful completion of numerous funded projects that facilitated

many of my publications over the years. These broadened and enriched my

understanding of both the human side of disaster and the evolving profession of

emergency management.

Finally, I want to publicly thank my wife, Ruth Ann Drabek who has edited and

word processed all of my work for decades. More importantly, however, she has

enhanced the work by being both a “friendly” critic and an unwavering source of

emotional support. You see, she always let me know, that she, had faith in me.

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 After Bob Stallings explained to me that the E.L. Quarantelli Theory Award

required that the recipient present a public lecture, I began exploring a series of possible

topics. I had just finished reading the chapter by Kreps and Bosworth (2006) in the

Handbook of Disaster Research (Rodríguez, Quarantelli and Dynes, 2006) and was

pleased to see their long-term efforts pushed to new heights (e.g., 1993; 1994). I also was

pleased to see some of my old data (e.g., Drabek et al. 1981) being used in their analysis

(Kreps and Bosworth 2006, p. 304) and the basic consistencies in their logic with my

assessment of strategies used by local emergency managers to guide post-disaster

response networks (e.g., Drabek 2003b). Hence, I seriously considered pushing my

preliminary “theoretical model of disaster response effectiveness” (Drabek 2003b, p. 149;

2005b) another step or two through this lecture opportunity.

Days later I decided that I might develop further, document better, and expand on

a lecture I presented at the National Academies Natural Disaster Round Table (Drabek

2003a). There I had used the old human ecology POET model (i.e., population,

organization, environment, and technology), to examine a series of national and

international trends. I also specified some of the challenges and opportunities these

trends present to emergency managers. There are important new linkages that need to be

integrated with those observations. For example, Clarke (2006) urges us to go beyond

the confines of disaster events as “abnormal” (e.g., see p. 129). Like Perrow did

previously (1984), he suggests that disaster is “normal”, at least in the sense that it should

not be viewed “. . . as separate from the ebb and flow of normal life.” (Clarke 2006, p.

128). That was the underlying point of my NAS social trends lecture. But while I

described a variety of technological developments that were providing opportunities (e.g.,

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implementation of computers into disaster response agencies) and challenges (e.g.,

network failures during responses and privacy invasions through misuse of data bases), I

really had not thought through the intricacies of the ways in which heavily networked

systems—one of my trends—create new levels of vulnerability. Conversely, as Perrow

(2006) points out so well, decentralized systems, like some terrorists groups, can

function with high reliability, remarkable efficiency, and much less vulnerability. Hence,

“. . . the loosely organized Al Qaeda network has survived at least three decades of

dedicated international efforts to eradicate it.” (p. 532).

So what are the implications of these observations for some emergency

management officials who argue that disaster response policy should promote greater

centralization and standardization among response agencies? Might not there be

something to the argument advanced by Oyola-Yemaiel and Wilson (2003) that: “System

complexity in and of itself could very well be modern society’s principal vulnerability to

terrorism.” (p. 26). Hence, recent policy changes might best be redirected. Or as they

put it: “ . . . future development should progress from the paradigm of business and

resource consolidation and centralization of power to a paradigm of decentralized power

and dispersed resource allocation . . .” (Oyola-Yemaiel and Wilson, 2003, p. 26).

This insight parallels Perrow’s (2007) conclusions following his in-depth analysis

of our vulnerabilities resulting from natural disasters, advanced technologies, and future

terrorist attacks. Despite his realistic pessimism given a variety of serious structural

flaws, including Congressional failures in meaningful campaign finance reforms,

increased corporate concentrations and radical policy changes implemented by the Bush

administration, Perrow concluded that “. . . we have hardly began to do the most effective

6
thing: reducing the size of the targets that inevitably will be attacked.” (Perrow 2007, p.

325).

As I thought about these ideas for a few days, I became more and more troubled.

The failed response to Hurricane Katrina kept popping up. Punctuated by images I

recalled seeing in television coverage, discussions with emergency management faculty

(e.g., see Drabek 2007), and scanning policy reports wherein many were proposing

increased roles for the military in future disaster responses and reduced emphasis on state

and local governments, I kept wondering, “How did things go so wrong?” “How did

FEMA once again become the favorite target of late night comics? I thought that ended

after Hurricane Andrew.”

As I reflected on conversations I had over many years with the late Lacy Suiter

(former Director of Emergency Management for the State of Tennessee) who worked so

hard with James Lee Witt to push the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

toward levels of excellence many thought could never happen, I began to realize that my

emotions paralleled those expressed by the Dixie Chicks. Maybe you know their album

entitled “Taking the Long Way”. One of the songs on this album (i.e., “Not Ready To

Make Nice”) (2006) contains these lines:

“I’m not ready to make nice

I’m not ready to back down

I’m still mad as hell and

I don’t have time to go round and round and round.”

Of course, they were dealing with a specific event that later was documented in

“Shut Up And Sing.” Like thousands of others, Ruth and I were most pleased with their

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recognition in the 2007 Grammy Awards (Rocky Mountain News, February 12, 2007, pp.

10-11). But the anger expressed in their song paralleled what had been building up in me

for several months. And when I tried talking with some emergency management faculty,

really homeland security types, about my essay on Katrina entitled “Don’t Blame the

Victims” (Drabek, 2005a), I realized that reorganizations of FEMA and the creation of the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), were only the tip of the iceberg. You see, I

was becoming aware of new faculty who were viewing disasters, and disaster victims

from a very different perspective than mine (see Drabek 2006c). When I had a few

explain to me at a conference that “we are at war” and “your kind of policy criticism

really hurts the morale of our troops and encourages the terrorists”, I decided I needed to

go back to some basics. I firmly believe—and always have—that social values,

institutional arrangements, political structures, and such, always must be examined

critically. And, those who express criticism of agency doctrine, regardless of “the

agency,” must be both encouraged and protected. Yet, I was encountering some

homeland security and emergency faculty who were expressing the view, “If you’re not

with us, you are against us.” Period!

My last book for the FEMA Higher Education Project was a revision of an

instructor guide I had prepared for college or university faculty entitled Social

Dimensions of Disaster (Drabek 2004; see also Drabek 2006d). This resource required

an enormous amount of time and energy from Ruth and I—it totaled 1,315 pages! But I

believed that it could facilitate faculty literature reviews and the preparation of program

and course materials. In this book, in a chapter entitled “History of Sociological

Research on Disasters,” I included a brief section with this learning objective:

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“Summarize the key ideas that define disasters as social problems.” (Drabek 2004, pp. 3-

11 to 3-13). This section included a recommended classroom workshop built around

Kreps’s (2001) article in the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral

Sciences which was the recommended student reading. Workshop discussion questions

included these: “According to Kreps (2001), how do disasters differ from other social

problems?” and “What are disaster ‘claims-making’ activities?”

Students of emergency management, like their elder practitioners, need to be

encouraged to examine disaster events within a social problems context. Why? Because

if they are, disasters could not be approached as simply “incidents to be managed” or

incidents wherein community members would be encouraged to remain uninvolved. To

quote one of the “unenlightened” emergency managers I interviewed in a prior project

(Drabek 2003b), “We can handle the crisis without public interference.” Disasters could

not be approached as if they had no historical context. Disasters could not be approached

as if there were no other social problems within the community. And the costs of disaster

mitigation, in its varied forms, could be juxtaposed against both other community needs

—health insurance for the non-covered, shelter for the homeless, and so forth—and basic

protections of privacy and freedom. How much erosion in civil liberties do we accept

just to stay safe from future floods, hurricanes, or terrorist attacks?

In short, I am very concerned about many of the policy directions and initiatives

that have occurred since President Clinton left the White House in January, 2001. So I

rejected the other topics I had considered for this lecture. Instead, I decided to use this

occasion to elaborate and integrate a series of theoretical connections that may help

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future researchers frame their agenda differently. I also hope it may assist emergency

managers in developing a broader perspective on their profession.

I’ll begin by explaining why it is essential to incorporate the analysis of disasters

within mainstream social problems perspectives in sociology. Such perspectives

highlight both objective conditions and social definitions of human harm and social

disruption. Capturing how these interrelate requires attention to mainstream social

problems constructs like class, status, power, ethnicity and gender. And it requires

attention to both social context and change and historical and comparative research.

Second, having established the relevance of social problems perspectives, I will show that

disasters are a particular form of social problems. That is, by labeling disasters as

“nonroutine,” we are challenged to address the implications for both theory and public

policy. When such issues are raised, basic questions of generalization of findings and

taxonomy are highlighted. Finally, I will demonstrate that fundamental social science

research has been largely ignored by emergency management policy makers since the

attacks on September 11, 2001. Consequently, many policy shifts are being implemented

that are pushing the profession of emergency management in directions that have been

and will continue to be both ineffective and inefficient. To put it bluntly: our nation

has been going in the wrong direction since the attacks on 9-11.

Social Problems Perspectives: Past and Present

Following his work at the University of Chicago, National Opinion Research

Center (NORC), the late Charles Fritz made many contributions to the disaster studies

area through his long-term stay at the National Academy of Sciences. Quarantelli’s

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summaries of these and other efforts are important aspects of our historical legacy (e.g.,

see Quarantelli 1987a). Over the years, Fritz helped organize numerous committees

which brought together some of the best scholars in the country to assess a wide range of

research and policy issues (e.g., Committee on Socioeconomic Effects of Earthquake

Predictions 1978 [chaired by Ralph Turner] and Committee on International Disaster

Assistance 1979 [chaired by Russell Dynes]).

Of much help to many, however, has been his summary chapter (Fritz 1961)

entitled “Disasters” which appeared in the first edition of the widely used social problems

text edited by Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (1961). This text was revised and

updated three times. The second edition, published five years after the first, did not

contain Fritz’s chapter, nor did any subsequent versions, e.g., 1976 (4 th edition). Did this

mean that Merton and Nisbet had decided that disasters were not social problems? The

rationale given at the time is informative.

“Three new chapters have been introduced—on alcohol, poverty, and war
and disarmament—to deal with vital problems of contemporary society
not included in the first edition. These additions have been at a price: to
avoid lengthening an already long book, it was necessary to drop the
chapters on problems of military life, of disaster and catastrophe, and of
transportation in the metropolis, which proved to be more appropriate for
graduate students than for undergraduates. Advanced students will want to
consult those chapters in the first edition to learn how the sociological
orientation helps to clarify problems once assumed to be the exclusive
province of other specialists.” (Merton and Nisbet 1966, p. ix).

That is the message of this lecture. That is, “ . . . how the sociological orientation

helps to clarify problems once assumed to be the exclusive province of other specialists.”

(Merton and Nisbet 1966, ix). As the profession of emergency management continues to

evolve and accommodate the constraints of any varying political ideologies and

horrifying events like the attacks on 9-11, a sociological perspective has as much or more

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to offer today as it did in 1961. And it is the collective responsibility of at least some of

us to bring our theory, including those unique insights found within our analysis of social

problems, and our research, to issues confronting emergency managers.

Let me illustrate this rich social problems legacy by highlighting seven themes

which I emphasize in my own courses. These enhance student capacity for critical

analysis, and in the tradition of a basic liberal arts curriculum, their capacity for freedom.

Those implementing new university programs in both emergency management and

homeland security are advised that failure to incorporate insights like these will lessen the

analytical capacity of their graduates in their future roles.

1. There is a relationship between the private troubles experienced by

individuals and the public issues of their day.

For many of us, this insight is one of the cornerstones of “the sociological

imagination” so well articulated by C. Wright Mills (1959) in his book by that title. Back

in the 1960s, Merton and Nisbet did not use the language, but proposed similar ideas

which they ascribed to such theorists as Weber (1946) and Mannheim (1936). For

example, in their discussion of fatalist versus activist value systems, they wrestled with

the issue of why certain social problems remain latent, off the public radar so to speak.

Of course, such latency varies over time within all societies as does the degree to which

fatalism reflects their major value orientation. But after referencing Weber and

Mannheim, both of whom pointed this out previously, they wrote that “. . . the ethic of

fatalism has often been replaced by the ethic of responsibility, in which knowledge of the

sources of social problems and efforts to control them become defined as a moral

obligation.” (Merton and Nisbet 1966, p. 797). And they elaborated as follows.

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 “To the extent that the ethic of responsibility spreads in a society, social
problems tend to become manifest rather than remaining latent. But even
within such a society, largely oriented toward directed social change,
countervailing processes make for the continued latency for a time of
certain social problems.” (Merton and Nisbet, 1966, p. 797).

And so today we might ask about the “countervailing processes” that were

operative in the Gulf states especially Louisiana, that prevented officials and citizens

from better anticipating and preparing for a storm like Katrina (2005). Some would wash

their hands knowing that they had been successful with the exercise known as Hurricane

Pam (e.g., see Brinkley 2006, pp. 18-19; Bourne 2004). Others would point to their work

that documented the continued loss of wetlands that had heretofore provided greater

protection (for elaboration see Bourne 2004). But the outcome remains—over 1,300

people died. Why did the changing distributions of risk—a process that had been going

on for years—remain off the public agenda? Why didn’t the preparedness plans that had

been designed get implemented in a manner that could have saved more lives and

reduced the trauma of rescue for many survivors?

Perhaps part of the answer reflects the logic in the revision of the Merton-Nisbet

text. Remember Fritz and disasters, while referenced once in the second edition, (p. 784)

was replaced by Etzioni’s (1966) analysis of “War and Disarmament.” It is noteworthy

that this reference came within the context of discussion of the “social origin of social

problems.” This discussion explicitly raises a fundamental theoretical question for

disaster researchers that I’ll explore later, that is, are social problems analysis frameworks

applicable to both the phenomena of war and “natural” disasters? The only place Fritz

and his earlier chapter were referenced was in answer to this question.

“For whether the forces disrupting patterns of social life are nature-made
or manmade, they will, in the end, confront members of the society with

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 the task of responding to them, and the nature of that response is, in
sociological principle, greatly affected by the structure of the society, by
its institutions, and its values.” (Merton and Nisbet 1966, p. 784).

To understand the failed Katrina response, like that of any other disaster event, we

always must place emergency management within the community, state and federal

context of the time. It was this historical context that led Hartman and Squires (2006) to

title their Katrina analysis as There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster. And their

sub-title Race, Class and Hurricane Katrina points us toward institutional patterns of

racism, sexism, and ageism that molded and shaped this flawed response. There was

much more to it than, for example, the priority shift toward terrorism among emergency

officials. The private troubles of the Katrina victims reflected a whole range of public

issues. This capacity to shuttle between micro and macro levels is the promise of the

sociological imagination.

2. All societies are in a constant degree of change reflecting patterns of

consensus and dissensus among and within institutional areas.

This theme reflects my early training with Russ Dynes when I served as a

graduate teaching assistant in a social problems course directed by Si Dinitz. Later I used

their text (Dynes et al. 1964) in my own courses at the University of Denver wherein we

examined the processes of integration that make for stability within societies and other

social systems such as communities and families. It is worth noting that neither Fritz’s

1961 chapter, nor the concept “disaster,” is referenced or indexed in this text. However,

we always emphasized that the social fabric is both fragile, because it always is subject to

change, and powerful, because it is taken for granted. Conflicts, however, are ever

14
present and can boil over whenever patterns of strain become redistributed and highly

polarized. Dynes and his colleagues put it this way.

“The possibility always exists that dissensus will become extreme and
result in conflict among groups, threatening the stability of the society—
the Civil War is an example of dissensus become group (regional)
conflict.” (Dynes et al. 1964, p. 375).

I suspect that this social problems perspective greatly facilitated Dynes’ later

analysis of the disaster literature (1970) that has helped many of us better understand

various “mechanisms of integration.” Focusing on the community level, he carefully

wove case study data into a comprehensive whole. So following a disaster event, various

types of organizational units—reflected in the four cells of the DRC Typology—respond

to disaster demands. At times local officials, both within and among agencies, must

define areas of “emergency consensus” so that the “mass assault”, to use Barton’s (1969)

term, can be coordinated. Such processes, when viewed within the social problems

perspective, become much clearer to any trying to understand the reality of disaster, be

they researcher or practitioner.

3. Because social problems are socially constructed, so too must be their

solutions.

Many of us use the phrase, “society as patient.” By this, of course, we can

illustrate the role of social structure as a constraint in both how social problems are

defined and the search for solutions. Unlike what we hear from some politicians today,

Merton and Nisbet (1966), of course, rejected the doctrine that “evil is the cause of evil”.

Instead they proposed “. . . that, to a substantial extent, social problems are the unwilled,

largely indirect, and often unanticipated consequences of institutionalized patterns of

social behavior.” (p. vii).

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 Today many of us would point to intercommunity crime rates and reference

documentation of how these co-vary with various measures of social disorganization

(e.g., Oh 2005). Or we might describe recent research from the Netherlands that

validated and extended Durkheim’s (1951) classic work on suicide (van Tubergen and

Ultee 2006). Following World War II, suicide rates in the U.S. did not drop as Durkheim

would have predicted whereas they did in European countries that remained neutral. The

researchers concluded “. . . that Durkheim’s political integration theory could explain

these empirical problems if it takes into account people’s expectations for the future and

if it considers the social integration of groups.” (van Tubergen and Ultee 2006, p. 233).

Certainly, the near daily reports of suicide bombers in Iraq and elsewhere leads us

to be curious about possible linkages among religious ideologies, different socialization

processes, and resulting motivations related to such behavior. Merton and Nisbet (1966)

devoted an entire chapter to the topic of suicide (e.g., Gibbs 1966). While data from

middle-eastern countries is absent, Durkheim’s analysis of “altruistic” suicides is

summarized and illustrated as a reflection of “. . . excessive social integration.” (p. 313).

More recently, Bergesen (2006) has emphasized that despite our limited data bases,

several recent empirical studies such as Papes (2005), clearly document that: “In general,

suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute

individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated and highly capable people

who could be expected to have a good future.” (Papes 2005, p. 200 as quoted by

Bergesen 2006, p. 459). So today, social problems analysts, like Neubeck et al. (2007),

trace out these linkages in their analyses of “martyrdom”, i.e., “. . . to sacrifice one’s life

in the name of the cause . . .” (p. 605). Hence, “. . . a strong connection to one’s faith or

16
to political organizations devoted to resisting what they see as oppression actually

enhances the chances of suicide rather than acting, as Durkheim predicted, as a deterrent .

. .” (p. 605).

Remembering the acute and chronic poverty that defined New Orleans long

before Katrina, we might instead focus here. And if poverty is to be reduced, like any

other social problem, our focus must be on elements of structure. It is these elements that

are bringing more and more American citizens to their breaking points every day. While

the rates vary a bit from study to study, we currently have nearly 20 percent of our

population—55 million people—living in a state of poverty (Block et al. 2006). Why?

One research team summarized the situation very well and in so doing, they illustrate my

third theme.

“Looking abroad also shows that government policies can

dramatically reduce poverty levels. The probability of living in poverty is
more than twice as high for a child born in the United States than for
children in Belgium, Germany, or the Netherlands. Children in single-
mother households are four times more likely to be poor in the United
States than in Norway. The fact that single-parent households are more
common in the United States than in many of these countries where the
poor receive greater assistance undermines the claim that more generous
policies will encourage more single women to have children out of
wedlock. These other countries all take a more comprehensive
government approach to combating poverty, and they assume that it is
caused by economic and structural factors rather than bad behavior.”
(Block et al. 2006, p. 17).

4. As with wealth and other forms of privilege, the socially powerful also

have greater influence in defining what is and is not a social problem.

This theoretical principle was reflected in the Merton-Nisbet text in several

chapters. In Merton’s (1966) “Epilogue” which he subtitled “Social Problems and

17
Sociological Theory,” he emphasized that there is marked inequality in the judging

process regarding this matter.

“Social definitions of social problems have this in common with

other processes in society: those occupying strategic positions of authority
and power of course carry more weight than others in deciding social
policy and therefore, among other things, in identifying for the rest what
are to be taken as significant departures from social standards.” (Merton
1966, p. 765).

Domhoff’s (2006) look back at C. Wright Mill’s (1956) classic statement on the

concentration of power within the United States is a good illustration of this theme.

While acknowledging the depth and breadth of Mills’ analysis, he suggests that it had

weaknesses. For example, the military “chieftains” do comprise part of the power elite,

but Mills was “. . . wrong to give them equal standing with the corporate rich and

appointees to the executive branch of the policy-planning network.” (p. 548). Domhoff’s

examples inform out analysis of social problems, including disasters and approaches to

solution.

“This point is demonstrated most directly by the fact that military

leaders are immediately dismissed if they disagree with their civilian
bosses, as seen numerous times since the early 1960s, and most recently in
the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, when a top general was pushed into
retirement for daring to say there was a need for more troops than former
corporate CEO and current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his
think-tank advisors thought necessary.” (Domhoff 2006, p. 548).

So while more recent research, including his own (e.g., Domhoff 2005) has

confirmed most of the conclusions presented in The Power Elite, it is Domhoff’s

judgment that both “ . . . historical and sociological research leads me to place far more

emphasis than Mills did on corporate capitalism and class conflict as the dominant factors

in the power equation.” (Domhoff 2006, p. 550). This is not to deny that an independent

power base is represented by the military, but only to acknowledge that it is less

18
influential than the corporate cluster. Indeed, as we have seen since Mills’s death,

additional power bases have emerged, although they are more transitory and less potent.

As Domhoff (2006) noted, “. . . power also can be generated from a religious

organizational base, as seen in the civil rights movement, the rise of the Christian Right,

and the Iranian Revolution.” (p. 550).

5. There is an interdependence among social problems, including their

origins, analysis, and solutions.

Many of us have emphasized this element of the social problems perspective.

Hence, aspects of crime and poverty may be linked directly to issues of race and

educational failure. Merton and Nisbet (1966) put it this way: “Owing to the systematic

interdependence among the parts of a social structure, efforts to do away with one social

problem will often introduce other (either more or less damaging) problems.” (p. viii).

Perhaps no where has this principle been explored better than in the aftermath of

Hurricane Katrina. For example, in the analyses compiled by Hartman and Squires

(2006), these interdependencies were highlighted through powerful prose.

“ . . . some noted the sickeningly high poverty rate among the city’s black
residents, but said nothing about how radicalized poverty contributed to
the crisis. Neither the concentration of subsidized housing, nor the lack of
car ownership among poor blacks—which made it impossible for many
African Americans to flee New Orleans because the city’s middle-class-
oriented evacuation plan was predicated on people leaving in their own
vehicles—were mentioned. Racialized disinvestment in schools, public
health, and other critical institutions in the core city, which impacts the
suburbs as well, has existed for decades, but unlike the wind and the
water, it garnered little attention. We do not believe that anyone intended
to strand poor blacks in New Orleans. But it was predictable . . .” (powell
et al. 2006, pp. 64-65).

While interdependent with race and poverty, Gullette (2006) focused on the

elderly, especially females who represent an important pocket of vulnerability. Such

19
areas of vulnerability are not sought out by hurricanes or earthquakes, but the impacts

really are worsened. While many of us have emphasized the growing vulnerabilities

reflected in the changing age distribution of the U.S. population, few have analyzed

emergent perceptions of “age anxiety”. Daily doses of media coverage that portray “old

geezers” living within the opulence of manicured retirement villages create a fiction that

denies the poverty experienced by most elderly.

“Age anxiety is being cleverly manipulated into a political tactic

on behalf of a conservative agenda. The image of expensive codgers
distracts attention from class warfare coming from the top—the Bush tax
cuts for the rich, the budget surplus turned into a Frankenstein deficit, the
cuts in social programs, the deadly quagmire in Iraq. All these costs
much, much more than the modest changes Social Security needs to thrive
beyond 2042, or than national health care. Once the alarms have been
sounded, then come the ‘remedies’—weakening the very programs that
are our nation’s slender warrant of being a humane democracy.” (Gullette
2006, p. 113).

6. Sociological analyses of social problems preclude blaming the victims.

Living in poverty means much more than dollar levels communicate. Yet, during

the past six years the number of poverty stricken Americans not only has increased, but

their income has dropped below previous levels. In short, the poor within our nation

have become even poorer (e.g., see Jones-DeWeever and Hartman 2006, p. 86). While all

humans make choices, even the poor, sociological analyses unveil the webs of social

constraint that narrow visions of option and cloud the last vestiges of hope. Degrees of

freedom are socially constructed by all of us, but among those at the bottom of the

economic pile, the perceived constraints become so narrow that the very word “choice”

becomes offensive. Yet, many, if not most who outside the poverty pit, continue to ask,

“why don’t they just get a job?” Unfortunately, even among the compassionate, the

reality of “the society as patient” remains poorly understood. Why? Rubington and

20
Weinberg (2003) put it succinctly in their introduction to Wagner’s (2003) insightful

“critical analysis”. “It is in the interest of a capitalist society to endorse solutions to

social problems that treat individual persons, thereby creating a market for treatment

industries while discouraging solutions that call for a radical change in the social

structure.” (p. 251).

This was the social problems context within which I viewed the failed Katrina

evacuation. Years ago, this general theme was well articulated by Ryan (1971). But for

me, it caused back flashes to an earlier disaster—the Big Thompson Canyon Flood of

1976—when other officials chastised victims. “We warned them, but they didn’t leave.”

Rather than accepting the outcome of 139 deaths as “unavoidable”, my social problems

perspective caused me to ask these officials a different kind of question, one rooted in the

assumption base that blaming the victims results in poor public policy. “But Sheriff, isn’t

it your job to devise an evacuation plan that works?” My application of this logic to the

failed Katrina response resulted in an essay entitled “Don’t Blame the Victims” (Drabek

2005a). Reactions among emergency managers have been telling—some see the big

picture, others don’t.

In his reflective essay regarding what is and what is not a “disaster”, Barton

(2005) offered a view that parallels mine. In so doing, he added important insight as to

why a social problems perspective helps us view disaster victims differently.

“The role of a dominant ideology which blames the victim or

stereotypes them as less than human is to reduce communication by and
with them, to weaken their ability to organize themselves, and to make the
rest of society unwilling to listen to them or talk about them.” (Barton
2005, p. 142).

21
 Years ago, Henry Quarantelli and I (1967), explored post-disaster blaming

processes and emphasized parallels documented for other social problems. That is, by a

focus on personal “guilt”, required structural changes—root causes, rather than symptoms

—may never be considered, much less implemented. Our case example was the 1963

explosion at the coliseum in Indianapolis where the search for “the guilty” deflected

attention away from a basic structural element—an inadequate inspection procedure.

“We believe that putting other persons into the same position could have made little

difference.” (Drabek and Quarantelli 1967, p. 16). But the consequences of such wrong-

headed blame assignment processes are even more insidious. “Not only does individual

blame draw attention from more fundamental causes, but it might actually give the

illusion that corrective action of some sort is being taken.” (Drabek and Quarantelli

1967, p. 16). This is not to say that personal blame assignation never precipitates

structural change, as we acknowledged. But it is to say that too often, especially in

American society, this perspective detracts from analyses focused on structure; analyses

wherein a society, or other social unit, is viewed as “the patient.”

7. Like war in earlier analyses, terrorism is now commonly accepted as a

social problem.

Following the attacks on 9-11, the threat of terrorism quickly became identified

and widely accepted as a social problem. While informative analyses of terrorism have

been completed, linkages to the research literature on other disasters are lacking,

however. I did not try to review every current text on social problems, but I did read five.

Of course, neither Merton and Nisbet (1966) nor Dynes et al. (1964) included any

references to terrorism. Nor did any of the authors selected by Rubington and Weinberg

22
(2003) for their sixth edition. The insights from various “social constructionists”

contained in this volume, however, are most relevant to the process of “acceptance.”

Best’s (2003) analysis, for example, not only reviews some of the criticisms that have

been made over the years, but also differentiates between “strict” and “contextual”

constructionism. Hence, when we analyze terrorism as a social problem we should

remember Best’s suggestions. For example, “. . . any analysis of the social construction

of child abuse or any other social problem—requires locating claimsmaking within at

least part of its context.” (Best 2003, p. 344).

John Palen has written several urban sociology texts (e.g., 1997), but decided to

assess the general social problems area in 2001. The last chapter of his book is entitled

“The Environment: War and Terrorism.” He assessed these topics through the lenses of

the same three theoretical approaches used throughout, i.e., functionalist, conflict, and

interactionist. He introduced students to such topics as population change, environmental

racism, and both air and water pollution, before brief discussion of “eco-terrorism”. This

brief section served as the bridge to his final section on war and terrorism.

“Revolutionary” terrorism was illustrated with such examples as the 1993 bombing of the

World Trade Center, 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma, and the 1995

nerve-gas attack on the Tokyo subway (p. 477). Although military targets have been

selected in some attacks, e.g., Muslim radicals bombing U.S. airbases in Saudi Arabia,

“soft” targets are more popular because they better advance civilian disruption and fear.

Being weak militarily, isolated politically, most terrorists perceive their actions as

legitimate religious or racial struggles. Hence, “. . . whether you label someone a terrorist

or a freedom fighter depends on your position.” (Palen 2001, p. 477). Despite the chapter

23
context of “the environment” and discussion of certain unintended consequences of

environmental policies, e.g., widespread use of insecticides, no link was made to other

forms of disaster or our rich research legacy.

McVeigh and Wolfer (2004) devoted much more space to revolts by numerous

groups of varied political persuasion ranging from the Ku Klux Klan as “an instrument of

terror” (p. 133) to Bacon’s Rebellion (1676). In an effort to expose the “root causes” of

such acts of violence, they emphasized the later as “. . . a desperate move on the part of

the poor to share in or equalize the wealth . . .” (p. 298). Hence, actions like these are put

into historical context with others that indicate the “normalcy” of such events when

perceptions of injustice prevail, e.g., the Whiskey Rebellion (1794), the Flour Riot

(1837), and so on. All of these occurred long before the “Kerner Report” pinpointed the

linkages among racism, poverty, and urban riots (i.e., U.S. National Advisory

Commission on Civil Disorders which was chaired by Governor Otto Kerner, Summary

Report, 1968). Hence, crises or disasters such as these were placed into the broader

contexts of structural inequality and the conflicts that result when activists goad the poor

into saying: “Enough is enough, we’re not putting up with this anymore.”

But by 2004, the reality of globalization was apparent and social problems—all of

them—were best viewed as having “. . . some kind of international connection . . “

(McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 365). Hence, a jump from Giddens’s (2000) view of a

“runaway world” to corporate concentrations of power through multi-nationals was a

logical way to lead into the root causes of terrorism. “Most sociologists argue that multi-

nationals are harmful as they exercise power over the governments, societies and

environments of underdeveloped countries in such a way that they actually function as

24
colonial machines of exploitation.” (McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 371). Within this

context, war emerges as the most important social problem confronting American society.

And in order to begin to understand it, we must recognize the economic

interdependencies between economic growth and war related products. Just weapons

production alone is a staggering reality. “The United States is the world’s leading arms

supplier to other nations, $842 billion worth in 1997 . . .” (McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p.

386). Thus, despite the adoption of various social policies to reduce the number of wars

and frequency of terrorist attacks, they argued that the U.S. “. . . still ignores the basic

value conflicts, ideas and ideals between Western and Eastern cultures” (p. 394). And

here at home, the largest government reorganization in our history was implemented

through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002. This

bureau has responsibility for all disasters regardless of agent or origin. McVeigh and

Wolfer (2004) briefly discussed a range of issues pertaining to the then newly created

DHS, including the controversial conflict regarding workers represented by unions and

“managerial flexibility” requirements. Even more controversial were DHS policies

regarding citizen surveillance and border protection. Value conflicts regarding “the

limits” of civil liberties and roles of illegal immigrants in the work force are but two of

the interdependencies that must be illuminated if we are to begin to understand these

social problems.

Robert and Jeanette Lauer (2006) also ended their recent text with chapters

entitled “War and Terrorism” and “The Environment.” Starting with Mills’s “personal

troubles—public issues” framework, they reviewed the familiar litany of three broad

study areas (i.e., 1: behavioral variance, e.g., crime and delinquency; 2: inequality, e.g.,

25
poverty and 3: social institutions, e.g., family problems) which can best be understood by

using three overlapping theoretical perspectives (i.e., structural functionalism, conflict

theory and symbolic interactionism). Neither the term “disaster” nor “natural disaster”

appear in the index, but both the Bhopal (1984) plant tragedy (p. 437) and the Chernobyl

nuclear plant explosion (p. 448) are presented as examples of the types of threats

industrialized societies must recognize and try to prevent. Growing public fears of future

terrorism attacks (p. 416) are juxtaposed against rising military expenditures (p. 418) and

their value question is stated baldly. “What if the United States invested the billions

spent on military preparations in electronics, education, health, and other sectors that

benefit human beings?” (p. 419). Loss of civil liberties, perhaps willingly given up

because of fears of terrorist attacks (p. 420), is integrated with detailed cross-national

data on military expenditures (p. 421), weapons sales (p. 424) and the manipulation of

public threat perceptions.

“Many Americans accepted the notion that Iraq was involved in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, that Iraq had developed and was
prepared to use weapons of mass destruction, and that a good part, if not
most, of world opinion favored the American position. The news media,
particularly Fox News, helped shape these misperceptions.” (Lauer and
Lauer 2006, p. 427).

Finally, Neubeck, et al. 2007, published the fifth edition of their popular text,

Social Problems: A Critical Approach. As they reorganized and updated prior work,

they introduced materials on terrorism and expanded their discussion on war (now

Chapter 3). Extensive data on military arms sales and expenditures were used to

introduce the topics of terrorism and “the effects of militarism” (e.g., see pp. 76-86). And

assessments then follow.

26
 “Militarism affects the quality of life in more than just economic ways. It
also interferes with our democratic rights and civil liberties.” (p. 87).

“If human survival is the goal, then disarmament will play an important
role in meeting it. But the first step is to reduce the ready access to
weaponry. The United States, now the number one arms exporter, must
stop making the world into an unstable armed camp through its sale of
arms and military-related technology to other nations.” (p. 90).

“It is up to people in the United States and elsewhere, starting at the grass
roots through their political associations, community groups, religious
institutions, or student organizations, the name a few, to begin to
communicate loud and clear to society’s elites. ‘Enough is enough.’” (p.
91).

These seven themes provide important context for why I believe it will be useful

to pursue a definition of disaster as a special type of social problem. For social problems

are both manifest and latent conditions of communities, regions, societies, and the entire

world. The processes by which social problems are socially constructed, redressed, or

unaddressed call attention to the actions of individuals, groups, and organizations at all of

these levels. Historically, sociology has and must continue to play a key role in

unraveling these processes.

But let me be clear before proceeding. I am not proposing a consensus on values,

nor am I proposing that this definition and approach are the only ones researchers should

use. They are one among many that I believe will help us sort things out so that basic and

badly needed theoretical work can continue. Also, I believe that this perspective opens

new doors through which we should go to insure broader dissemination and use of the

findings and conclusions of our work.

Disaster Research: Integrative Approaches and Conceptual Issues

27
 When we put disaster research into the types of social problems perspectives I

summarized above, what theoretical issues are recast and illuminated? I will explore this

question by briefly developing six themes: 1) contributions being ignored; 2) some basic

distinctions; 3) studies of claims makers; 4) emergence of a complementary perspective;

5) disasters are a non-routine social problem; and 6) payoffs.

1. Disaster researchers have constructed a scientifically based core of

knowledge which too frequently has been ignored by high level policy makers,

especially during the past six years.

This is not the place to review the core knowledge base that dates back to Prince’s

(1920) classic study, the NORC field team reports summarized by Fritz (1961) and others

(e.g., Fritz and Marks 1954), or the several reports published in the early National

Academy of Sciences series (e.g., Moore et al. 1963) in which Barton’s (1963) theoretical

framework first appeared (see also Barton 1969). Additional study syntheses have

continued to appear over the years, including the excellent work of Dynes (1970), and

those in which I have participated, e.g., Mileti, Drabek and Haas 1975, Drabek 1986, and

Drabek 2004. Of course, the recently released Handbook of Disaster Research

(Rodríguez et al. 2006) sets a new standard for such summaries.

When asked by my former student David McEntire (in press) to identify the key

contributions sociologists had made to the study of disasters, I (Drabek in press) selected

these four as being most significant: 1) debunking disaster myths, e.g., Quarantelli and

Dynes 1972; Fischer 1998; 2) innovations in research methods, e.g., Stallings 2002;

Homan 2003; 3) extensions of sociological theory, e.g., Kreps et al. 1994; Dynes 2002,

2005 and 4) social criticism, e.g., Dynes 1994; Aguirre 2004. Others, of course, would

28
highlight different aspects of this rich legacy. I might too on a different day or week, but

these four areas clearly constitute significant contributions reflecting our larger and

complex research legacy.

Upon carefully reading the final report of the 9/11 Commission (NCTAUS 2004),

I was impressed with the level of detail with which they effectively reconstructed the

planning and process of the attacks and the challenges responders confronted. As I

pointed out elsewhere, (Drabek 2006b, pp. 224-226), however, many of the intra and

inter-agency communication and coordination difficulties paralleled those that had been

documented in numerous places following other disasters (e.g., Drabek 1968, 1986).

Despite pages of footnotes, the report made no mention of this prior research as Tierney

(2005) underscored in her review. And while I agree with Perrow (2005) that the failure

to even mention the lack of leadership at the federal level was a major shortcoming,

ignoring past disaster research may have paved the way for wrong headed policy

recommendations like the emphasis on implementation of the incident command system

(ICS) as if this would fix everything. I’ll return to this specific issue later, but it

illustrates my overall point.

I also carefully reviewed three of the major policy reports completed after

Hurricane Katrina by the White House staff (2006), the Select Committee of the U.S.

House of Representatives (SBCIPRHK 2006), and the Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate (CHSGA 2006). The Senate report

noted “a failure to act on the lessons of past catastrophes, both man-made and

natural . . .” (p. I-16), but did not specify the sources of such lessons, nor even what they

were in specific terms. In fairness, however, I should note that the Committee did consult

29
with and cite testimony and publications produced by several scientists focused on

physical aspects of the storm, levee failure, and storm surge modeling, e.g., Ivor van

Heerdeen (Deputy Director of the LSU Hurricane Center) (see pp. 4-14 through 4-16)

and work by John C. Pine (Director, Disaster Science and Management, LSU) and Hassa

Mashrique (Assistant Professor Research, LSU Hurricane Center) (see p. 6-23). They

also reviewed in detail the simulated disaster exercise—known as “Hurricane Pam”—and

highlighted some of the conclusions reported in local media outlets the year prior to

Katrina, e.g., Nolan 2005 (see Chapter 8 of the Senate Report). They also noted FEMA’s

failings after Hurricane Andrew and the proposals and reforms implemented thereafter

(e.g., National Academy of Public Administration, 1993 and 1994) including testimony

and e-mail messages from such policy oriented researchers as John Harrold (Director,

Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management, George Washington University) and

Herman Leonard (John F. Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Business School)

(see pp. 14-17 and 14-24). Finally, they noted that, “Neither the Hurricane Pam exercise

nor the resultant Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan contemplated the

shelter and transportation of pets.” (p. 16-36, footnote #193) despite prior behavioral

research which had documented the need for such, e.g., Health et al. 2001. These

notations were the only exceptions I could find.

The House Committee recognized, however, that there should be further

exploration of “. . . how socioeconomic factors contributed to the experiences of those

directly affected by the storm.” (p. 20) And they cited survey results published in the

Natural Hazards Observer by John Barnshaw (2005). Yet, they too sometimes fell into

the trap of blaming the victims. “Those individuals in all states who had the means to

30
evacuate, but did not do so, must also share the blame for the incomplete evacuation and

the difficulties that followed.” (p. 103). Without referencing the disaster literature on

looting, at least they recognized the differences among so-called “looters.” “In some

cases, people looted stores for their survival and to diminish suffering, taking items such

as food, water, clothing, flashlights, batteries, and camping supplies.” (p. 241).

Fortunately, additional sociological studies will continue to illuminate these

matters, e.g., Barsky et al. 2006. But will they too be ignored? You may remember that

some in Congress, (e.g., Rep. Charlie Melancon and Rep. William J. Jefferson), like

some academics (e.g., Natural Hazards Observer 2006, and Pastor et al. 2006, p. 40)

pressed for the appointment of an Independent Katrina Commission (see “Additional

Views” of the House Committee report, p. 54). Ruth and I wrote to our congressional

representatives on this matter, did you? Unfortunately, to date this recommendation has

fallen on deaf ears!

The White House Report (2006) which emphasized “lessons learned” also ignored

most of the social science literature on disasters. Yet, seventeen “. . . most critical

challenges that were problematic . . .” (p. 2) were identified to serve as a backdrop for a

new vision. That is, a “National Preparedness System” is to be implemented along with a

“culture of preparedness.” I’ll return to these matters in the fourth section of this paper,

and here only note that the 689 endnotes cited throughout the six chapters of the White

House report include very few references to what most of us would consider the

“standard” sociological disaster research literature, although a few historical (e.g., Vale

and Campanella 2005), policy oriented (e.g., Platt 1999) and popularized works (e.g.,

Larson 1999) were included. The single exception was reference to the text Jerry

31
Hoetmer and I (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991) edited for the International City Management

Association regarding the evolution of emergency management within the U.S.A. (e.g.,

see footnotes 8 and 11 in Chapter Two, p. 15).

While lots of different types of other evidence could be cited, my first theme

reflects two basic conclusions: 1) a significant scientifically based core of knowledge has

been created by disaster and hazards researchers, and 2) during the last six years

especially, this knowledge has too frequently been ignored by high level policy makers.

2. Some basic distinctions can be helpful in exploring the theoretical issues

and implications inherent in a social problems perspective. Let me illustrate this

point by proposing definitions for four key concepts: 1) social problem; 2) disaster;

3) hazard; and 4) terrorism.

a. Social problem. Reviews of past and current texts reveal differences in

how a “social problem” is defined. Most typical, however, are definitions like that

proposed by Rubington and Weinberg (2003, p. 4), i.e., “. . . an alleged situation that is

incompatible with the values of a significant number of people who agree that action is

needed to alter the situation.” This view is implicit in the more complex definitions

offered by many others such as Lauer and Lauer (2006, p. 4). Further discussion,

however, usually follows regarding the subjectivity inherent in such a position. How

many people must define a situation as being “incompatible”? Who “selects” the values

that are to be used in making such an assessment?

These questions have led some writers, like Palen (2001) to highlight an

alternative position.

“Some sociologists say that public recognition is not crucial for an

issue to be a social problem. They say that social problems are the

32
 issues identified by social scientists as those about which people
should be concerned.” (p. 7).

This matter was introduced years ago by Merton (1961) in the “Epilogue” of the

first edition of the Merton-Nisbet (1961) social problems text. Without digressing, I must

note, however, that many others made similar analyses over the years (e.g., see Mills

1943). But to stay on point, I’ll simply note the appropriateness of Merton’s chapter sub-

title which was “Social Problems and Sociological Theory.” After acknowledging the

difficulties deciding who might be the “judges,” Merton emphasized that “It is with the

social definition of social problems as it is with other processes in society: those

occupying strategic positions of authority and power of course carry more weight . . .” (p.

206). Here, as in subsequent editions (e.g., see Merton 1966, pp. 788-792), he followed

with an elaboration wherein “manifest” versus “latent” social problems were

differentiated. In this way he tried to provide an out from potential charges of values

imposition.

“Apart from manifest social problems, those objective social conditions

identified by problem definers in the society as at odds with their values
are latent social problems, conditions that are also at odds with values of
the group but are not recognized as being so. The sociologist does not
impose his values upon others when he undertakes to supply knowledge
about latent social problems.” Merton 1961, p. 709).

More current writers, having benefited from analyses of this issue since the 1960s,

usually come down on the side of offering at least three complementary theoretical

frameworks, i.e., functional, conflict, interaction (e.g., Palen 2001, pp. 13-18) which help

in our understanding the public issues and private troubles of our time. But the

fundamental issue of value choices remains with the individual analyst or reader. Palen

(2001) summarized his view as follows.

33
 “This text takes the position that it is impossible to eliminate
personal values and experiences and we invariably make value judgments
about which social problems are most important and what should be done
about them. Both professionals and nonprofessionals alike make
subjective judgments on how social problems should be solved. Everyone
has biases, but sociologists make a conscious effort to try to take their own
biases into consideration.” (Palen 2001, pp. 7-8).

These considerations provide the context for the next three concepts.

b. Disaster. I’ll return to this concept in a subsequent section, but for now let me

propose this definition from Gary Kreps (1989b). Disasters are:

“. . . nonrountine events in societies or their larger subsystems

(e.g., regions, communities) that involve conjunctions of historical
conditions and social definitions of physical harm and social
disruption. Among the key defining properties of such events are
length of forewarning, magnitude of impact, scope of impact, and
duration of impact (Kreps 1989b, p. 219).

From this theoretical position, which somewhat parallels Fritz’s definition (1961,

p. 655), disasters are events of a certain type. While they may differ in terms of such key

analytic criteria as length of forewarning, the operative term in the definition is “among”.

There are other dimensions beyond these four listed that may, for certain research

purposes, be far more significant. I’ll return to this issue later because it is extremely

important (see section 6, sub-section entitled “technological disasters”). Also, these

events are to be understood as conjunctions of both historical conditions and social

definitions of physical harm and social disruption. Finally, there is a “nonroutine” quality

about disasters that also differentiates them from other social experiences.

This definition is consistent with that used by the Committee on Disaster

Research in the Social Sciences (2006) which was chaired by Kreps. By using it as their

guidepost, they were able to skillfully integrate the key conclusions of past research and

identify a complex future research agenda reflecting questions like these.

34
 “. . . in what ways are terrorist threats similar to and different from risks
posed by natural and technological disasters? How has the increased
salience of willful disasters shaped the emergency management system in
the United States? Also how prepared are local communities and the
nation as a whole for possible future attacks?” (p. 70).

c. Hazard. Hazards are conditions that have the potential to harm to a

community or environment (see Drabek 2004, pp. 2-5 through 2-9). Commonly, like

Mileti’s (1999) excellent follow-up to the bench-setting “assessment” by White and Haas

(1975), we differentiate among “classes” of these using various weather and earth science

terminologies. So, we refer to “the earthquake hazard” or “the flood hazard” for a given

community, region, or sometimes a nation. Thus, a hazard represents a potential, whereas

a disaster references a specific event that has actually occurred. Hurricane Katrina was

a disaster that reflects the overall hazard or threat defined by the potential for hurricanes

in the community of New Orleans, the Gulf Coast region, and the U.S.A. While it is

possible to broaden the reference, most sociologists have focused on so-called “natural”

hazards ranging from floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, to frost, drought, and heat (e.g.,

Mileti 1999). Of growing importance, however, are the hazards reflecting various

technologies ranging from nuclear power plants (e.g., Perrow 1984) to other toxic

substances (e.g., Erikson 1994). As illustrated by the recent bridge collapse in

Minneapolis, however, much of the nation’s entire infrastructure has not been maintained

properly. Hence, our failure to invest in our rich technological applications has left many

dams, bridges, sewer and water systems, and the like in a dismal state. Just like our cars

or our homes, all of these applications require continued reinvestments if the probabilities

of disaster are to be reduced.

35
 As I will elaborate in subsequent sections, for years Quarantelli (e.g., 1987b) has

pushed us to confront “the fundamental question,” i.e., “what is a disaster?” Many have

addressed this question by examining various analytic criteria that differentiate among

disaster events such as those noted above and others like frequency, time of day, and so

on (see Dynes 1970, pp. 52-55 and Drabek 1986, pp. 22-23, 45-46). More recently,

researchers like Simpson and Katirai (2006) have sorted through the literature to identify

various discussions and proposals for measures and indicators of risk, hazards, and

disasters. Others have noted different discussions of “taxonomic” approaches (e.g.,

Green and McGinnis 2002). Proposals for “structuring paradigms” vary from Quarantelli

who urges that the concept of disaster be limited to “consensus” based events to Green

and McGinnis (2002) who “. . . believe that three classes describe the highest order range

of disaster events . . . natural disasters, human systems failures, and conflict based

disasters.” (p. 4). In contrast, Erikson (1994) has proposed that events reflecting

exposure, threatened or actual, to toxic substances clearly reflect “a new species of

troubles.” I’ll extend this discussion momentarily to document more of the historical

context of my position and its relationship to public policy, but for now the point is to

underscore the diversity in viewpoints and lack of closure among disaster researchers.

d. Terrorism. Terrorism is a strategy to gain political objectives by attacking

civilian populations with the intent of spreading fear and intimidation. Others have used

slightly different language, but this definition includes the basic themes emphasized by

many (e.g., see Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism 2002, p.

26; Neubeck et al. 2007, p. 81; McVeigh and Wolfer 2004, p. 388; Palen 2001, p. 476).

Until the attacks on 9/11, most Americans did not perceive “terrorism” as a social

36
problem. Specific attacks, like those of 9/11, or earlier events (e.g., bombing of Pan Am

Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, 1988; 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in

New York City; 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma

City; see Drabek 2004, Student Handout 5-3 or Waugh 2000, for listings of numerous

terrorist attacks), are subsumed within the above definition of disaster. Thus, as with the

disaster vs. hazard distinction, it is important to differentiate between specific events and

a general strategy of conflict that historically has been used by “the weak.” While “state-

sponsored” terrorist acts clearly occur, it is more often a strategy adopted by those with

minimal levels of political power. As Palen (2001) put it, “Terrorism is also used by

aggrieved religious, ethnic, and political groups who can not see, or refuse to see, any

other alternative to influencing change.” (pp. 475-476). By focusing on “soft” targets

like hotels, office buildings, and other places of high population density, those using this

strategy of randomized killing, expose vulnerabilities that in earlier times clearly had

remained “latent” in Merton’s use of the term. Today, however, things are very different.

“. . . a national survey in 2003 reported that 8 percent of Americans said they were ‘very

worried’ and another 30 percent that they were ‘somewhat worried’ that they or a family

member might become a victim of terrorism . . .” (Lauer and Lauer 2006, p. 416). As

with other hazards, risk perceptions change and are subject to manipulation by those

seeking to instill different rankings among “the social problems” confronting a society

(e.g., see Jenkins 2003).

But there are complexities and subtleties that a social problems perspective

highlights. “Just who is it that defines what constitutes a criminal act?” “How have such

definitions changed over time?” Standard stuff in any social problems course. So it is

37
with terrorism as even a Bush White House committee report emphasized, (i.e.,

Subcommittee on Social, Behavioral, and Economic Sciences and the Social, Behavioral

and Economic Sciences Working group, both of which report to the National Science and

Technology Council (NSTC) (2005) which in turn operates within the Executive Office

of the President).

Among their definitional observations were these.

 “Consensus as to what actions define terrorism has been difficult to attain.” (p. 7)

 “. . . the use of the term ‘terrorism’ may over-simplify different types of actors,

warfare and motivations, encapsulating them in a single group or act so that

critical variables are overlooked.” (p. 7)

 “The use of the term ‘terrorist’ denies the perpetrator all claim to legitimacy

within Western Culture . . .” (p. 7)

 “The root causes of one terrorist action may have little in common with those of

another.” (p. 7).

3. Studies of “claims-makers” help illuminate the processes whereby certain

conditions, including hazards and disasters, become defined as social problems.

The social construction of social problems has evolved through a series of

penetrating analyses that I simply will note here. These include the pioneering work of

Spector and Kitsuse (1973; 1977) who argued that fifty years of textbooks had still not

generated a theory of social problems because the wrong questions were being asked. In

an effort to go beyond the subjective vs. objective value debate, they proposed that

sociologists should focus primarily on questions that could be addressed empirically.

38
That is, “what do people say is a social problem?” And, “how do such perceptions evolve

over time?”

To date, this social constructionist perspective has been applied to disaster

research most effectively by Bob Stallings (1995) in his now classic study of the

“earthquake risk.” He documented that many of the claims-making activities described

by Spector and Kitsuse (1977), seemed to illuminate what was happening within the

“earthquake establishment” (see pp. 54-60). Clearly “. . . the existence of claims-making

activity justifies placing the earthquake threat in the category of phenomena labeled

social problems.” (p. 196). Yet, the natural-history model of social problems only

partially fit the earthquake case.

A “partial” fit? Why only “partial?” According to Stallings the most important

thing missing was controversy. “Currently, most of what earthquake safety advocates do

on a daily basis is not at all controversial.” (p. 197). And so Stallings was forced to ask a

key question: “. . . can something be a social problem without being controversial?” (p.

197). He did find, of course, some areas of conflict and controversy. But these seemed

to be different somehow than those commonly associated with other social problems.

“The chief difference between these and the conflicts usually associated
with social problems is that they occur ‘backstage,’ out of public view.
Perhaps the earthquake threat is different not because controversy is
absent but because somehow it is the ‘wrong kind’ of controversy.”
(Stallings 1995, p. 198).

Finally, Stallings (1995) resolved these matters by proposing that the earthquake

threat in the U.S.A., up to 1980 at least, was best labeled as a “partially constructed social

problem.” “Like organized crime in the 1960s and white collar crime in the 1980s, it

remains visible to insiders but nearly invisible to those outside the earthquake

39
establishment.” (pp. 203-204). And he identified three changes that could occur that

might move the construction process along: 1) personalization (i.e., name those

responsible for minimizing or distributing the risk such as “greedy developers” or

“current politicians”); 2) politicization (i.e., identification of certain candidates who

would support certain legislation, ballot initiatives, etc.); and 3) “presentization” (i.e.,

emphasis on how everyday decisions, not future ones, affect risk distribution) (see pp.

206-208). Do you see any parallels to the processes that have been operative the past few

years regarding the manufacturing of the fear of terrorism?

4. A complementary perspective on disasters and hazards has emerged that

incorporates insights from social problems theorists despite the misgivings and

cautions of some.

In the late 1960s I was invited to write a short essay on methodological issues in

disaster research (Drabek 1970). This exercise caused me to question the procedures

whereby units of analysis could be specified more explicitly. I saw this as necessary to

establish some basis for generalization across study findings and guidance in future

sample selection and study design. The issues of both internal and external validity

seemed critical to me. These matters had real salience to me since many questioned the

relevance of our laboratory simulation research to organizational responses to “real

world” disasters (e.g., see Drabek and Haas 1969, 1967). So I proposed a simple

typology to illustrate my concerns about how “. . . to integrate disaster studies into other

substantive areas ranging from family and organizational studies to civil disturbances and

revolutions Quarantelli and Dynes 1969”. (Drabek 1970, p. 335). The typology also

illustrated three types of comparative research that I believed was necessary for the

40
knowledge accumulation process: 1) across events; 2) across societies; and 3) across

groups and organizations. I envisioned a series of emergent taxonomies for both the

structural units of analysis and the disaster events being selected for study so as to

construct “ . . . empirically tested relationships with the universe to which they apply

specified.” (Drabek 1970, p. 334).

A decade later I revisited some of these issues upon receiving an invitation from

Gary Kreps to prepare a paper on taxonomy for a conference designed to review his

team’s analysis of “organized responses” they identified within post-disaster interviews

conducted by Disaster Research Center (DRC) staff during the 1960s (see Kreps 1989d).

Their data base included such disasters as the 1964 Alaska earthquake and Hurricanes

Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969). In my conference paper I raised a lot of questions and

proposed some future directions. Among these questions was “. . . when should a crisis

event be classified as a disaster?” (Drabek 1989b, p. 319). This matter had been made

more salient in my thinking by Quarantelli’s IRCD Presidential address in 1986

(Quarantelli 1987b) and a series of studies conducted by Peter Rossi and his associates

(e.g., Rossi et al. 1978; Rossi et al. 1982; Wright et al. 1979; Wright and Rossi 1981).

The Rossi group was highly critical of the White-Haas (1975) assessment project and a

lot of other disaster-hazard research. So they had attempted to increase the rigor of their

research study designs by increasing their survey sample sizes. By doing so they

concluded that disasters really had little or no effect on communities. And since there

was negligible impact, it was bad public policy to succumb to the lobby efforts being

made by those within a “growing disaster industry.” In short, a “no-effect” conclusion

clearly justified a “no funds” position for either research or amelioration, be it mitigation,

41
preparedness, or whatever. I’m over stating their position just a bit, but I clearly recall

hearing such views being expressed at their conference.

I was invited as a disaster researcher, but also had registered criticisms of many

past studies. And I refused to be drawn into false choices by an agenda structured around

“the worth” of past work be it that flowing from the “old” NORC studies, the DRC or the

University of Colorado (e.g., White and Haas). So in my critique of their work (Drabek

1981), I endorsed their effort at design rigor but remained suspicious of their study

sample which was comprised of too many “small scale” events. In my judgment, this is

what had led them to the conclusion that disasters had “no effect.” As I put my criticism

then: “Simply put, were they studying disasters?” (Drabek 1989b, p. 320).

A second theme I introduced pertained to social problems. “. . . I have believed

that one form of integration we should seek would be within theories of social problems

(Drabek 1981).” (Drabek 1989b, p. 337). I pushed this idea very briefly by proposing

that we should try to build better bridges with emergency managers and one way of doing

this was to define disaster as “. . . a low-priority, nonroutine social problem. As emerging

professionals, emergency managers can be helped to develop a sense of perspective and

basis for interpretation by expanding upon a social problems framework.” (Drabek

1989b, p. 341).

Following this conference, Kreps asked me to expand on this idea through an

essay that might be included in a special issue he was editing for the International

Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. In his introduction to this special issue

Kreps (1989c) noted that this publication reflected “ . . . a resolution passed at the 1986

ISA meeting of the Research Committee on Disasters” (p. 213) which “ . . . called for a

42
special issue devoted to the general question of the boundaries of the field.” (p. 213). As

a very practical matter, as co-editor (1985-1990) of our journal (i.e., International

Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters), I was wanting some guidance. For

example, should we accept articles focused on war or other types of conflict situations?

If a civil disturbance like the riots in Watts (Los Angeles area of California) was relevant

to our readership, what about a riot within a prison?

In the opening essay Kreps (1989c), explained that he would elaborate on “. . . my

thoughts on the boundaries question and what I see as the essential role of taxonomy in

disaster research.” (p. 213). In his article, Kreps (1989b) addressed the question “What is

a disaster?” and proceeded to lay out a rigorous approach whereby future taxonomic

work could lead to a series of schema whereby multiple taxonomies could be used to

aggregate past findings and guide the design of new comparative studies (see pp. 230-

231). He then referenced my earlier work (e.g., Drabek 1981) and explicitly claimed “. . .

disasters are nonroutine social problems” (p. 233). He then elaborated briefly on these

ideas and concluded with a statement with which I was and remain in full agreement.

“I am certain that a cooperative dialogue based on mutual respect for

competing epistemologies is the path to scientific progress in disaster
research. I hope this exchange serves an example of what is needed.”
(Kreps 1989a, p. 280).

In that same issue, Quarantelli (1989) began his essay with this statement. “The

question of a taxonomy of disaster research cannot be addressed meaningfully until some

sort of answer is given to the more fundamental issue: What is a disaster?” He then

elaborated by suggesting that Kreps’s argument was inadequate because “ . . . Kreps is

operating with common sense notions of social problems—namely, something happens

that disrupts people.” (p. 249). Furthermore, “. . . except for a few disaster researchers,

43
other sociologists apparently do not see disasters as social problems.” (p. 249). Finally,

toward the end of his essay Quarantelli (1989) proposed: “Disasters are better seen as

part of social change dynamics than as nonroutine social problems.” (p. 249).

Why? Why would a “social change dynamics” perspective be better? Quarantelli

proposed several reasons including the basic and very important idea that this would

insure that disasters would “. . . be seen as an integral part of what usually goes on in the

social structure, rather than as an external intrusion from the outside . . .” (p. 250). I,

however, would propose that this is one of the very reasons why I believe a social

problems perspective is so useful. He also registered another concern which I addressed

above, that is, the issue of bias.

“A social change emphasis also avoids the extreme relativism and the
ideological bias inherent in any social problem approach, along with
accepting elite views of what constitutes problems (that researchers
sometime act as surrogates for political and economic elites may partly
disguise but does not circumvent the issue).” (Quarantelli 1989, p. 250).

Quarantelli (1998) continued to push all of us to address this fundamental

question through a compilation of essays that revealed varied answers, perspectives, and

orientations. As he first did in his “Presidential Address”, back in 1986, he forced us to

think hard about the assumptions we were making when we casually tossed around terms

like “natural disasters” and started to generalize to other social situations like civil

disturbances or war (Quarantelli 1987b). Most recently, he teamed with Ron Perry

(2005) to edit another round of essays and reactions and reactions to the reactions, in and

effort to press us even harder. As I read these, I found myself in agreement with Perry

that too often “. . . disaster researchers are spending more time talking past one another

than talking to one another.” (Perry 2005, p. 315). And while I might prefer a more

44
complex system, hence the term taxonomy rather than typology, I am in full agreement

with Ron’s conclusion that empirically documented instances of inconsistency, e.g.,

absence or presence of looting behavior, requires “ . . . a system of classifying occasions

that enables understanding and meaningful interpretation of such disparities.” (Perry

2005, p. 315).

I also noted the definition Bob Stallings recommended that incorporated a portion

of that proposed by Kreps and I, i.e., nonroutine. Hence, “A disaster is a social situation

characterized by nonroutine, life-threatening physical destruction attributed to the forces

of nature, regardless of what other causal factors may seem to be involved (italics in

original) (Stallings 2005, p. 263). Where we disagree, however, is the boundary implied

by “forces of nature” and no reference to social problems. I was, however, glad to see

that others, especially Smith (2005), underscored the importance of highlighting the

nonroutine nature of disasters (p. 288).

In contrast, Barton (2005) identified direct parallels to the integrative power of his

concept of “collective stress” and the frameworks used by social problems analysts.

“Using the concept of ‘collective stress’ to examine a wide range of

situations of large-scale deprivation varying on several dimensions, with
‘local physical disaster’ as one subtype, raises important theoretical
questions and points to a wide range of empirical cases from which to
learn answers. The wider concept relates the problems of preventing,
mitigating, and coping with physical disasters to the general field of social
problems and the means by which societies deal or fail to deal with them.”
(Barton 2005, p. 151).

Quarantelli’s (2005) concluding essay covered a lot of ground that provided much

food for thought. Regarding the need for classification system, or maybe systems in my

view, he referred back to a distinction he made in his 1987 article, i.e., genotype versus

phenotype.

45
 “Essentially making this distinction argues that less obvious or visible
characteristics are far more important than surface features. Our
prediction is that our eventual new paradigm will involve far more
genotypical rather than phenotypical features we now almost exclusively
use.” (Quarantelli 2005, p. 341).

This parallels a view he expressed previously regarding the whether or not

reactions to military attack involving nuclear bombs would parallel those following

natural disasters.

“. . . if people are asked to evacuate from a certain area, whether the

impetus for the evacuation is radiation fallout or a hurricane doesn’t
matter. However, people are only going to accept certain warnings as
legitimate. But fundamentally, we thought that a nuclear attack was
qualitatively different from any other situation. Therefore, we could not
say to what degree the response to a nuclear attack or a hurricane would be
similar.” (Quarantelli 2004b, p. 325).

See why the issue of generalizability is so important for both disaster theory and

policy? Stallings (2006b) has elaborated on both the importance and complexity of this

issue for both cross-event and within event comparisons. Analyses like his reflect the type

of hard work required to push the field further (see especially pp. 62-65 and 67-71).

Finally, Quarantelli (2005) again noted his preference for a “social change

approach” which “. . . would force us to consider the more positive aspects of disasters

(all but impossible to consider in a social problem context that focuses on the negative).”

(p. 353).

As this issue has begun to sensitize researchers, more comparative work will help

us better identify similarities and differences in a wide variety of non-intentional versus

intentional disaster agents like war situations. As noted by the Committee on Disaster

Research in the Social Sciences (2006, pp. 10-19), comparative historical research on the

policy developments that follow major events provides an empirical pathway toward

46
understanding how social definitions emerge and public policy evolves (e.g., see also

Rubin 2007 and Birkland 2006, 1997). Another good example of the level of specificity

required to pursue this task is Kirschenbaum’s (2006) analysis of family preparedness

activities. It turns out that while there are certain similarities, within his Israeli data base

at least, conditions of intentional conflict like war, may require explanatory models that

differ significantly from those documented for earthquakes and other natural hazards.

But there is more to this issue than just intentionality or conflict as differentiating

concepts. Clarke’s (2006) insights are most informative and should be considered

carefully by all disaster researchers. For example, in contrast to our emphasis on the

post-event emergence of an altruistic community, which does have a clear empirical

basis, he appropriately questions the limits of this conclusion. Sure it does fit hundreds

of cases studied thus far, but what if London, for example, were hit by surprise? What

might be the relevance of the altruistic community conclusion from the macro level view

of the world system?

“What, after all could Zimbabwe really do to help England recover? . . .

the response wouldn’t be uniform even within the United States. The
religious right would probably say Londoners brought it on themselves; it
was divine retribution for sinful behavior. Russia could do little.” (Clarke
2006, p. 176).

“I don’t mean to sound coldhearted, but if we’re really going to think

smartly and imagine well about worst cases we have to be honest about
political realities. The happy conclusion of disaster researchers—that
altruistic communities form after calamity—has limits.” (Clarke 2006, p.
177).

Of course, Quarantelli may well be right in his objections to efforts to link disaster

studies to those of other social problems. But I believe there is room for multiple

approaches at this point in the development of the field. So let’s examine an alternative.

47
 5. Disasters are a nonroutine social problem.

In 1992 Russ Dynes sent a draft paper to me which was the basis for remarks he

made at a conference in Spain on the uses of sociological research (see Dynes 1992). He

asked for reactions and additional examples that might be incorporated into a future

article for publication. I found his basic argument interesting, of course, and after several

exchanges we decided to co-author a new draft wherein we summarized a few key

sociological findings and their policy impacts (Dynes and Drabek 1994).

“The consequences of the research tradition has been to transform policy

approaches to disaster. That transformation has been most complete in the
United States, but, in general, those policy changes have also had other
national and international implications. In the United States,
responsibility for disaster was ‘demilitarized’. At the national level, this
has meant pulling together diffuse functions to create a Federal
Emergency Management Agency with responsibility for ‘comprehensive’
emergency management. An all hazards approach is emphasized
conceptually which can be implemented through the development of
integrated emergency management systems within local communities.”
(Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 15).

We then looked toward the future and began by summarizing an insightful paper

by Quarantelli (1991) regarding various social trends that in his judgment would “. . .

produce more and worst disasters.” (p. 18). The nine trends we selected from his paper

emphasized technological and population changes that jointly increased vulnerability.

For example, we summarized Quarantelli’s conclusion that “more vulnerable kinds of

populations will be impacted, e.g., in many areas such as Florida in the U.S., new

retirement communities and large concentrations of tourists are particularly vulnerable to

hurricanes.” (p. 19).

After listing these trends, we quoted his conclusion because we were in complete

agreement.

48
 “‘It is that solutions are not to be found primarily in new technologies or
better use of existing ones. The difficulties note stem from social factors.
Social problems can only be dealt with socially; technological
improvements can only address technological problems.’” (p. 27, in
Quarantelli 1991)) (as quoted in Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 19).

Quarantelli’s use of the concept of social problems in this context reminded me of

his earlier objections to the position I had advanced previously. But that was not the

specific point Dynes and I were trying to develop. Rather, beyond Quarantelli’s analysis,

we saw the need to place disaster research within a much broader theoretical perspective.

We illustrated this by noting Smelser’s (1991) analysis of three large scale “master

trends” from which additional types of changes could be identified. Among the eight we

specified was that “. . . social problems will become increasingly internationalized” and

that not only would there be “. . . a continuation of widespread problems of chronic

instability” but also a “. . . continuing erosion of traditional forms of social stability.”

(Dynes and Drabek 1994, pp. 19-20).

Among the several points made in our brief conclusion that are most relevant to

my analysis here are these.

“As the profession of emergency management matures and disaster

researchers are pressed to specify the limits of generalizability of
increased numbers of localized data bases, higher priority will be given to
more fundamental questions: How and why do societies differ in their
coping responses to risk? What social constraints pattern the differential
distribution of risk, both temporally and globally, as new policy initiatives
are implemented that are intended to mitigate disaster impacts and
improve disaster preparedness, response and recovery?” (Dynes and
Drabek 1994, p. 21).

While not very extensive, we believed that the empirical base and theoretical

orientations flowing from disaster and hazard researchers “. . . had a rather profound

effect on public policy.” (Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 21). But the types of issues

49
emerging on the horizon would require that disaster researchers and emergency managers

“. . . look toward the discipline of sociology for relevant theoretical paradigms.” (Dynes

and Drabek 1994, p. 21). So we ended on a note of caution regarding the future of

sociology and its potential contribution to the emerging profession of emergency

management.”

“A new partnership may emerge that could prove to be mutually

beneficial. To the extent that the discipline fragments substantively,
stagnates intellectually and withers politically, it will fail to provide the
insights needed.” (Dynes and Drabek 1994, p. 21).

About a year after this piece was published, Gary Kreps asked me to co-author an

elaboration of my 1989a article which we entitled “Disasters Are Nonroutine Social

Problems.” (Kreps and Drabek 1996). Therein we advanced our case by pointing out

that the “. . . phase ‘nonroutine events’ distinguishes disasters as unusual and dramatic

social happenings from the reservoir of everyday routines and concerns . . .” (p. 133).

Furthermore we emphasized how our “. . . reference to ‘historical conditions’ and ‘social

definitions’ underscores the need to understand how social definitions of disaster emerge

and the mix of competing definitions that may be involved.” (p. 134). Finally, we

illustrated how the threshold of social disruption and physical harm must be linked to the

complexity of the system selected for study, e.g., family versus community, and be

socially defined. (p. 134). On this last point we were underscoring the wisdom implicit

within Barton’s (1969) collective stress perspective.

From our vantage point, however, the work of social constructionists, like the

Stallings (1995) study, complemented the approach we proposed. Using the controversy

noted above regarding the conference organized by Wright and Rossi (1981), we argued

that “. . . the false dualism advocated by some functionalists and many social

50
constructionists . . .” (p. 139) was a pitfall that should be avoided. Rather, both the

objective aspects of disaster highlighted by functionalists and the claims-making

activities studied by social constructionist types should be included in the future research

agenda.

Kreps (2001) elaborated on these themes in his entry entitled “Disasters,

Sociology of” for the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.

Unlike poverty, he proposed, disaster events can be demarcated in social time and space.

Generally speaking, however, disasters remain a low priority for local officials and the

public because the probability of impact is low. When certain triggering events occur,

however, the perception of risk distribution may be redefined by key interest groups

thereby permitting temporary acceptance of selected preparedness and/or mitigative

actions like the airport security changes after the 9/11 attacks. In short, “. . . disasters are

nonroutine problems because social processes related to them change dramatically,

depending on what stage of their life histories is being considered.” (Kreps 2001, p.

3719). In my opinion he has it exactly right.

6. There are many payoffs to approaching disasters as nonroutine social

problems.

Careful reading of the works cited above could produce a longer listing, but here I

will highlight six of the most important.

a. Historical context. Social problems require that the subject matter, including

disasters, be placed within their historical context. In his review of five recent books on

disaster, Stallings (2006a) illustrated this by starting his essay with a summary of Dynes’s

(2000) analysis of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake wherein the local government, for the first

51
time, “. . . wrested power from the church and assumed primary responsibility for

response, recovery, and rebuilding.” (Stallings 2006a, p. 223). Thus, when Hurricane

Katrina made landfall in August 2005, “. . . the cultural repertoire of causal explanations

for disasters had grown considerably.” (p. 223).

b. Root causes. Social problems perspectives push analysts to dig deeper so as to

identify root causes. Thus, the responses during Katrina, for example, surprised some.

But the underlying patterns of racism, sexism, ageism, and classism that I noted above,

reflected pre-event patterns of vulnerability. The concept of vulnerability offers much to

the study of social problems, including disasters, e.g., McEntire 2004; Enarson et al.

2003; Wisner et al. 2003; Bolin 2006; Enarson et al. 2006. Rodríguez and Barnshaw

(2006) illustrated this nicely in their review essay which included At Risk (Wisner et al.

2003).

“The authors argue that a number of variables, including ‘class . . .

occupation, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, health status, age,
immigration status’ and the ‘nature and extent of social networks’ (p. 11)
impact disaster vulnerability. . . . The authors also discuss how factors
such as wars, national debts, famines, droughts, illness, and urbanization
place people at risk, increase their vulnerability, and makes the disaster
recovery process extremely difficult.” (Rodríguez and Barnshaw 2006, p.
220).

Similarly, Quarantelli (2005) has proposed that disasters “. . . are overt

manifestations of latent social vulnerabilities, basically of weaknesses in social structures

or social systems.” (p. 345). In this sense, like other social problems then, disasters can

be seen as ‘normal’ (e.g., Perrow 1984). As Quarantelli (2005) elaborated in comparing

disasters to Perrow’s concept of ‘normal’ accidents, “. . . disasters are similar in that they

latently exist in the larger social systems, and are the result of a convergence of a variety

of social factors none of whom might be very important in themselves.” (p. 346). These

52
insights bring us close to themes highlighted in chaos theory; a complex set of

epistemological and mathematical developments that I believe may provide a great deal

of help to future disaster researchers (e.g., see Koehler 1996; Piotrowski 2006).

c. Terrorism. As noted above, terrorism has become constructed as a social

problem. Of course, there are those who confuse the issues by referring to a “war on

terrorism”. Hard to wage war on a strategy! But that point aside, many sociologists and

other social scientists who had been studying disasters with other qualities tried to bring

their methods and theory to various attacks by groups using this strategy, e.g., Aguirre, et

al. 1998; Waugh 2006.

In short, by adopting a social problems perspective, the analysis of disasters in

general can be incorporated. Aside from mentioning a few specific events, however, the

social problems texts I reviewed did not make this connection.

This is not to say that terrorist attacks are exactly like other disasters. Some have

proposed certain differences beyond the dimension of intentionality or conflict. For

example, Waugh (2006, p. 392) has highlighted that such events are crime scenes which

in turn places unique constraints on responders. The major difference is that the roles

shift, i.e., “ . . . the lead roles of agencies and officials responsible for capturing or killing

the perpetrators rather than performing lifesaving roles and helping reduce the impact of

the disaster on people and property.” (pp. 392-393) (see also McEntire et al. 2001).

Once again, the question of generalization raises its head. And unlike Quarantelli

(1998, p. 3) who would exclude conflict situations from his definition of disaster, my

preference is to include them as part of the study area and empirically explore which

research conclusions fit and which don’t. By making such comparisons we can better

53
inform our efforts to construct a theoretical structure that can guide us in determining the

appropriateness and limits of generalization of our findings. As Quarantelli (2005) has

noted, however, this matter is very complex and requires much further exploration (e.g.,

see especially pp. 336-338).

d. Technological disasters. Events like the 1979 incident at the Three Mile Island

nuclear power plant (e.g., Perrow 1984) and the deadly explosion at the Union Carbide

facility in Bopal India (e.g., Shrivastava 1987), introduced response patterns and policy

issues that most disaster researchers had not considered. Such risks, how they might be

measured, and the social factors that might constrain both their distribution and

perception evolved into a discipline which only a few tried to bridge (e.g., Slovic et al.

1974; Kunreuther and Ley 1982). Similarly, controversies regarding potential toxicity

impacts, like the school children exposed at Love Canal (e.g., Levine 1982) or the long

smoldering underground coal fires in rural Pennsylvania (e.g., Kroff-Smith and Couch

1990), suggested to some analysts like Erikson (1994) that a “new species” of troubles

had emerged. Hence, Picou and his colleagues (1997) placed their case study of the

Exxon Valdez oil spill into Erikson’s framework since the patterns of anger, hostility, rage,

and other responses differed significantly from those typically reported by disaster

researchers. Indeed, they concluded that: “. . . technological disasters differ from natural

disasters in their characteristics and consequences for human communities.” (Picou et al.

1997, p. 13). But they also concluded “. . . that technological disasters can be

conceptualized, understood and recognized as a modern social problem.” (p. 314). Both

of these themes were introduced in the opening essay of their edited collection of reports

on this event which broadly assessed the social, economic, ecological, psychological and

54
legal consequences. As integrating conceptual tools, these two themes put their case

study of this single event into a much broader theoretical context. And from the native

peoples they met during this process they learned the reality of cultural differences in

interpreting events like this especially as they pondered the significance of phrases like

“the day the water died”. The emergence of bewilderment, then distrust, followed by

uncertainty were parallels to what Erikson (1994) also had observed at his previous study

locations. And as he emphasized in his “Foreword” to the Picou et al. (1997) text, one

consequence of such emergence may be damage to the social fabric of the community

(Erikson 1997, p. xiii).

I am in total agreement with Picou and his associates regarding the desirability of

placing events like the Exxon Valdez spill into a social problems framework. I disagree

with them and Erikson, however, regarding the utility and desirability of using either

“agent toxicity” or “technological” as a sole differentiating event characteristic for the

future theory development of a sociological theory of disaster. Rather, I find

Quarantelli’s position far more inviting. That is, our differentiating criteria must be both

social in nature and abstract (see Quarantelli 2005, pp. 339-341).

So what might such criteria be? While the agent characteristics that Kreps and I

(1996) proposed were useful for evacuation studies and others—qualities like event

scope, duration of impact, and length of forewarning—other dimensions of a different

quality are required for a more comprehensive theory. If I were writing the paper today,

which I obviously am not, I would explore the utility of these five: 1) perceived scope of

impact (i.e., is the impact perceived to be local, national or global in scope of impact); 2)

perceived degree of routiness (i.e., to what degree are the relevant social and physical

55
structures perceived to be understood and subject to manipulation; see Perrow 1967); 3)

perceived degree of intentionality (i.e., to what degree is the event perceived to be a

consequence of human intent, error, accident or failure); 4) perceived degree of social

worth of impacted objects (i.e., given the cultural values of the impacted system,

including people, physical structures, and their social significance); and 5) perceived

degree of collective stress (i.e., to what degree do the disaster demands exceed the system

capacity including various forms of system vulnerability, e.g., see McEntire 2004). This

is a complex puzzle that others will have to address, but having given the matter some

thought, I am convinced that future classification systems of disaster will reflect such

matters as these.

e. Parallel processes. Once disasters are placed into a social problems

perspective, we begin to ask, as noted above, how do they differ from other matters of

public concern and policy? But we also can be informed by analyses of other social

problems. Parallels in the processes of blame assignation, for example, and the search for

root causes that reflect strains within social structure are obvious examples. The late Lou

Zurcher (1989) did not want to abandon “social change theory”, but did not view this as a

requirement to using a social problems perspective as a way to enrich and expand disaster

research. Indeed, at the 1989 Kreps conference he identified “. . . six major

characteristics that seemed to correspond with the typologies of disaster response.” (p.

362). Among these were such themes as “The social problem is defined and morally

evaluated by human beings” (p. 363) and “the social problem has a significant element of

social causation” (p. 362). His conclusion underscored my theme here of “parallel

processes.”

56
 “Perhaps, depending upon the particular orientation of social
problems theory, Drabek is right that there can be an effective merging
with disaster theory. The parallels seem obvious.” (p. 363).

Stimulation of thinking in both of these directions and others will benefit the

quality of future disaster research.

f. Policy guidance. I noted above the efforts Russ Dynes and I (1994) made to

illustrate how past disaster research had influenced some policy development. Since that

essay was published, a great deal of impact occurred within the Higher Education Project

sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (e.g., see Drabek 2006d).

Many faculty now teaching within the over 100 formal emergency management degree

programs have been influenced and assisted by the materials flowing from that project.

As their students become acquainted with the research literature from sociology and other

social science disciplines, future policy will be impacted at all levels of government.

Unfortunately, the past six years has not reflected a continuation of the pattern Dynes and

I saw emerging in 1994. But I remain convinced that the introduction of a social

problems perspective into the curricula experience of future emergency managers would

be a good thing. Without it, I fear the profession will drift into a series of policy failures

that will hinder their capacity to be effective. Such constraint will reduce the ability of

the entire nation to cope with the diverse and horrific challenges we surely will confront.

Emergency Management Policy Implications

A social problems perspective on disasters has many policy implications for

emergency managers. The most important of these is that it provides a more strategic

perspective on their profession. More comprehensive, complex, and internationally

57
based views of history, social structure, and alternative value positions, can help inform

alternative policy approaches and choices. Far too often, especially during the past six

years, emergency management has been drifting in directions that are inconsistent

with many fundamental values and constitutional protections that reflect the very

ethos of this nation. And these directions are inconsistent with much of the disaster

research legacy. I’ll elaborate on this conclusion by briefly examining nine interrelated

issues: 1) coordination; 2) managerial models; 3) intergovernmental partnerships; 4)

catastrophic planning; 5) military roles; 6) professional training; 7) homeland security

interface; 8) civil liberties; and 9) a necessary shift in priorities.

1. The primary task of emergency managers is to facilitate the coordination

of agency and organizational activities related to the preparedness for, response to,

recovery from and mitigation of disasters.

Although this has not always been the case, since the late 1970s an all-hazard

approach to emergency management has evolved and become widely accepted as

legitimate (e.g., see Dynes, Quarantelli and Kreps 1972; Drabek and Hoetmer

1991;McEntire et al. 2002; Haddow and Bullock 2003; Perry and Lindell 2007; McEntire

2007; Lindell and Perry 2007; Rubin 2007). This coordination function extends

horizontally across all sectors of a community, whatever the jurisdictional authority

happens to be from village or town to city and county boundary. It also extends vertically

from a local area to a region, to state and federal levels.

Since all disasters are local in their initial and immediate impact, coordination

processes are most effective when the lowest level of government is the principle

planning unit and the central point of authority and control. Thus, as with most other

58
social problems, the primary locus of decision-making ideally should reside at the lowest

level of government, with resources becoming available for specialized purposes and on a

temporary basis when nonroutine situations demand such action.

In short, the emergency management function must be revisited and greatly

enhanced. Such enhancements must occur within local, state and federal agencies. At

the federal level this must occur by making significant changes within the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) so that emergency management becomes whole once again as

many have recommended (e.g., see Office of Inspections and Special Reviews 2006, pp.

135-136), or through the recreation of an independent Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA) as many advocated in the wake of the failed response to Hurricane

Katrina (e.g., Mikulski 2006). Recent reorganizations are steps in the right direction, but

much more is required (e.g., “Post-Katrina Management Reform Act,” April 1, 2007).

Indeed, a UPI/Zogby national poll (Waterman 2007) indicated that over seven in ten

(71%) Americans “. . . believed that FEMA should be restored to the status of an

independent agency.” (p. 1).

2. The most effective managerial model for emergency managers is one

rooted in community problem solving and change that emphasizes cooperation,

communication, and coordination.

In recent years, older notions of “command and control” have been reintroduced

as “the appropriate” model (Tierney 2006). Despite numerous critiques (e.g., Buck et al.

2006; Quarantelli 2004a; Dynes 1994; Kuban 1993; Neal and Phillips 1995; Wenger et al.

1990; Drabek 1987, p. 289; 2006b, p. 232), various versions of command and control

philosophy have been proposed and/or mandated (e.g., see DHS 2006). For example,

59
upon documenting the flawed interagency coordination that characterized much of the

initial response to the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, (e.g., see pp.

285-303), the 9/11 Commission (NCOTAUTUS 2004) recommended nationwide

adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS) (p. 297). Some policy reviews, like that

of Bea (2004) cautioned against such mandates for several reasons.

“Some might contend that the imposition of the ICS system, as set out in
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), signals federal
involvement in an arena traditionally administered by state or local
governments. Such individuals might argue that such an approach could
lead to practices and decisions that may result in inefficiencies, more
bureaucracy, or an erosion of state authority guaranteed under the Tenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” (Bea 2004, p. 14).

Equally important, as with any standardized federal policy, the ICS may not be

equally applicable to emergency management programs in communities with different

histories, sub-cultures, demographic characteristics, and varying modes and degrees of

involvements by voluntary groups and associations. Citing such works as Kendra and

Wachtendorf (2003), Lowe and Fothergill (2003) and the ICMA Greenbook that Hoetmer

and I edited (1991), Bea stated that “the ICS framework may help as well as hinder

spontaneous and creative responses by volunteers.” (p. 15). Regarding community

variability, he raised red flags.

“The system may not be appropriate for local governments with

small or mid-sized fire departments and may require considerable refitting
for nonfire emergency activities. Regardless of the size of the community,
the ICS application should be flexible enough to allow for local
differences in organization, politics, and needs. ICS should therefore be
reviewed for applicability before it is adopted.” (Bea 2004, p. 15).

While appropriate as a tactical strategy for many first responders, especially law

enforcement and fire agencies in large Metropolitan areas, the ICS is not a panacea

(Wenger et al. 1990; McEntire 2006). Even community level emergency management,

60
and especially that relevant to most state and federal agencies, requires a much more

complex model, one rooted in multiple strategies that facilitate cooperation and

coordination (e.g., see Drabek 1987, 1990, 2003b; Moynihan 2006). Unfortunately, as I

noted above, policy doctrine flowing from the White House after Hurricane Katrina

reflects a very different vision, one reflective of approaches that failed in the past.

“One model for the command and control structure for the Federal
response in the new National Preparedness System is our successful
defense and national security statutory framework. In that framework,
there is a clear line of authority that stretches from the President, through
the Secretary of Defense, to the Combat and Commander in the field. . . .
Although the Combatant Commander might not ‘own’ or control forces on
a day-to-day basis, during a military operation he controls all military
forces in his theater; he exercises the command authority and has access to
resources needed to affect outcomes on the ground.” (White House 2006,
p. 71).

3. Like the horizontal community level networks that function to prepare

for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against, vertical inter-governmental

networks addressing emergency management functions can best be coordinated

through multiple strategies that emphasize partnership of team building, and trust,

rather than bureaucratic orientations and actions reflecting intimidation, direct

orders, or secrecy.

As reflected in our constitution, there are clear separations of powers both among

the three co-equal branches of government, i.e., executive, legislative and judicial, and

across the intergovernmental system. This decentralized structure provides the highest

levels of protection and security against all hazards, although specialized federal units,

with narrowly defined tasks such as the National Hurricane Center or U.S. Geological

Survey, are required so that timely information can be provided to policy makers across

the intergovernmental system.

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 In part, the numerous failures during the response to Hurricane Katrina reflected

the wrongheaded policy shifts promoted by DHS such as NIMS and the ICS.

Moynihan’s (2006) detailed analysis of the House and Senate reports on Katrina

documents this in detail.

“There is weak empirical evidence on the validity of these claims, but the
DHS has promoted the ICS approach as applicable to all types of crises.
This is a contestable proposition, and even a cursory examination of
different types of crises suggests contingencies that will affect the efficacy
of hierarchical networks.” (p. 3).

So despite mandates from DHS in 2004 wherein NIMS, including ICS, and the

National Response Plan (NRP) became national policy, the response to Katrina had many

failings. Moynihan’s (2006) summary is on target.

“The network response was diminished by capacity problems of key

members, whose resource problems led to inadequate numbers of
personnel who were poorly prepared for their tasks. These capacity
problems also weakened coordination, as did a lack of understanding
about new crisis management policies that provided the rules by which
networks response were to be guided. These policies called for
hierarchical controls over the network of crisis responders, but were
unfamiliar to many responders, and never properly implemented during
Katrina. As different network members struggled to complete their tasks,
trust between network members also declined, weakening another key
network coordination mechanism.” (p. 1).

As many of us have emphasized (e.g., Perrow 2007, pp. 117-119; Drabek 2006b;

Dynes 1994), management models rooted in the principles of bureaucracy have limited

applicability to the emergent multiagency networks that characterize post-disaster

responses. As Moynihan (2005) put it in his analysis of the responses to the Exotic

Newcastle Disease in the state of California in 2003, “Networks are a nonhierarchical

approach to the management, reliant on horizontal relationships, information, expertise,

and trust to direct a self-organizing process . . .” (p. 7). Furthermore, by the time Katrina

62
hit in August of 2005, staff morale within FEMA had plummeted. And as Perrow noted,

this had far reaching consequences. “. . . the low morale of upper managers who were

not political appointments would spread to lower management, and then to employees in

general. In an organization with low morale, sticking to the rules to protect your career

may be better than breaking them even if the rules are inappropriate.” (Perrow 2007, pp.

117-118).

Brinkley’s (2006) magnificently detailed description of “the great deluge”, i.e.,

Katrina, provides careful documentation of the coordination and communication failures

that so terribly wounded the intergovernmental system. His conclusions are on point and

provide another specific illustration of why I disfavor the current policy drift. Certainly,

the flawed Katrina response reflected many factors, and depending on where one sits,

alternative explanations are more or less appealing.

“The one that rings truest, though, is that cronyism riddled FEMA and its
contractors in the Bush administration, making incompetence and not
racism the key to the response. As Lieutenant Commander Duckworth,
noted, the bureaucracy ‘was to blame.’” (Brinkley 2006, p. 618).

While I personally believe that both racism, like sexism and ageism, and

bureaucratic incompetence were operative, the strained intergovernmental system also

was a key factor as Brinkley noted.

“At the end of the first week after Katrina, Bush tried in every way
possible to pressure Governor Blanco into ceding control of troops in her
state, along with, effectively, responsibility for the course of the response.
It was the sort of political fight that Bush was used to winning, but Blanco,
for her part, stood up to the President. . . . It was a battle largely hidden
from the public, but in winning a battle royale with the President, Blanco
changed the second term of George Bush, leaving him open to other
attempts to curtail the sweeping power he assumed for himself. . . . The
country could always bounce back from a natural disaster, and the
hurricane was a natural disaster. But the Great Deluge was a disaster that
the country brought on itself.” (Brinkley 2006, p. 619).

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 4. As with all other disasters, responses across the full life cycle of future

catastrophic events, including those resulting from actions taken by terrorists,

enhancement of the capacities of local and state governments should be given

priority.

If one accepts the premise that catastrophic events are qualitatively different from

other disasters, as Quarantelli, (2003, p. 3) for example has proposed, it may seem to

follow that the primary enhancement required is at the federal level. Reflecting a false

image of local chaos and inability to respond, some have proposed policies that reflect

high levels of centralization of authority, especially regarding certain hazards. Clearly,

the risks of future pandemics like the influenza outbreak of 1918 (Barry 2005), and

terrorist attacks from domestic or internationally based groups are real. And the range of

actions that might be required is substantial.

Fortunately, some actions (e.g., “Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act”

[S.3678]; signed on December 19, 2006) have been taken to address preparedness issues

in recognition of the “. . . uncertain but urgent threat . . .” (National Governors

Association 2006, p. 1) represented by a pandemic influenza outbreak with far more

lethal potential than the 1918 killer event. “Once a pandemic happens, we will divide

forever the progress of our nation as pre-pandemic and post-pandemic.” (NGA 2006, p.

1).

Despite such efforts, however, a lack of trust and increased conflict has emerged

within the intergovernmental system. I am indebted to my brother-in-law for alerting me

to a recent Washington Post article that illustrates this point all too well.

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 “A decision by the Bush administration to rewrite in secret the nation’s emergency

response blueprint has angered state and local emergency officials, who worry that

Washington is repeating a series of mistakes that contributed to its bungled response to

Hurricane Katrina nearly two years ago.

State and local officials in charge of responding to disasters say that their input in

shaping the National Response Plan was ignored in recent months by senior White House

and Department of Homeland Security officials, despite calls by congressional

investigators for a shared overhaul of disaster planning in the United States.

‘In my 19 years in emergency management, I have never experienced a more

polarized environment between state and federal government,’ said Albert Ashwood,

Oklahoma’s emergency management chief and president of a national association of state

emergency managers.” (Hsu 2007, p. 1).

As with hurricanes or tornadoes, specialized federal agencies must be tasked with

the functions of monitoring and warning. But coordination and control of other activities,

including response and recovery, should rest primarily within the local and state

government layers. Certainly, specialized planning for highly improbable events, as

Clarke (2006) has discussed, should be completed especially within the federal level

where horizontal coordination is most difficult given the size and complexity of the

agencies involved. Neither the scope nor the complexity of such challenges, however,

should be accepted as rationale for greater centralization of authority at the federal level

in the name of effectiveness, efficiency, or security. But as Harrald noted, Bush

appointees appear “. . . to be guided by a desire to ensure centralized control of what is an

65
inherently decentralized process. . . . Response to catastrophic events requires

collaboration and trust in a broad network of organizations.” (Hsu 2007, p. 1).

5. While the federal military has had an increased presence in many aspects

of disaster life cycles during the past six years, this role should not be expanded

further.

Several scholars (e.g., Anderson 1969, 1970; Drabek et al. 1981) have

documented the many roles the federal military have played in disasters of various types.

Recently, especially after Katrina, some have called for increased shifting of resources

and responsibility to various sectors of the military (Tierney 2006, p. 410). In part, this

reflected certain conflicts and coordination difficulties as the Select Committee of the

U.S. House report documented in detail. For example, “. . . Northern Command does not

have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate interface with

governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the

Katrina response” (p. 221). Such matters appear to reflect tensions that go far beyond

this single event, however. As the House Committee noted, citing an article in the Wall

Street Journal, the state controlled National Guard leadership has seen this matter to be of

great concern.

“Admiral Keating who heads U.S. NORTHCOM, a newly created military

body overseeing homeland defense, has told lawmakers that active-duty
forces should be given complete authority for responding to catastrophic
disasters. . . . The head of the Washington State National Guard, General
Timothy Lowenberg, suggested in e-mails to colleagues that Admiral
Keating’s suggestion amounted to a ‘policy of domestic regime change.
Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2005.” (SBCIPRHK 2006, p. 221).

66
 Less politicized was the conclusion reached by Clayton (2006) who examined

policy shifts and needs related to “Incidents of National Significance.” His conclusion is

an example of the type of analysis required.

“Despite recent calls for the contrary in the aftermath of Hurricane

Katrina, it would be antithetical to the U.S. system of governance and its
philosophical underpinnings for local responsibilities and response to be
‘federalized’ too early and for the DoD to assume the lead agency for
responding to Incidents of national Significance. Legislating change and
establishing specific requirements in law for cooperative DHS, DoD and
state training and exercises would establish minimum requirements for
regional planning and preparedness and, ultimately, better response. It is
time to better shape the efforts and responsibilities of the federal agencies
with reality and codify, train, and exercise them so that the national
response capability reflects the professionalism of state and local
agencies.” (Clayton 2006, Abstract).

Upon completing a detailed assessment of the military response during Hurricane

Katrina, the staff of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2006) concluded that

“. . . disaster plans and training exercises involving the military did not sufficiently

incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military

capabilities that could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster.” (p. 3)

Reflecting this conclusion, they titled their report as Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans

and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural

Disasters.

Recognizing that Department of Defense (DoD) was aware of various problems

and was “. . . beginning to take actions to address the lessons learned . . . (p. 31), the

team, never the less, concluded that the issues “. . . . are often complex, cross agency

boundaries, and are, in some cases, long standing.” (p. 31). Hence, four

recommendations were offered calling for clarification in roles, especially with National

Guard units designation of milestones, and “ . . . the development of detailed plans and

67
exercises to fully account for the unique capabilities and support that the military is likely

to provide to civil authorities in response to the full range of domestic disasters, including

catastrophes.” (p. 35).

The response to the “draft” report by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Paul

McHale, dated May 5, 2006, Appendix III of the GAO report, pp. 48-49) is informative.

Among the key points of most relevance to my observation above (#5) are these.

“We request you make several changes in the draft report. In general, our
comments fall under two broad categories. First, the report calls for
greater DoD role during domestic disaster response. While we agree with
the general thrust of your recommendation, striking the appropriate
balance between the military’s primary warfighting role overseas and the
need to support civil authorities at home is a difficult, but fundamental
issue. . . . The goal is to enhance the capacity of other agencies and state
and local governments to perform their assigned responsibilities during
domestic disaster response, with the continued ability to call on U.S.
military support when required by the circumstances.
...
In addition, as Lieutenant General Honoré points out in his May 1,
2006, letter to you (attached), the title of the draft GAO report is
misleading in that it does not recognize DoD’s extensive planning and
exercise schedule prior to August 29, 2005.” (p. 48).

Twenty days after the McHale letter, the GAO contact person, Ms. Sharon Pickup

(2006) (Director, Defense Capabilities and Management) released a “Statement for the

Record” to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Her statement referenced the

above report, outlined the key findings, and emphasized two ideas of most relevance

here. That is: 1) “Many of the challenges faced in the response point to the need for

better plans and more robust exercises . . .” (p. 3), and 2) “. . . substantial improvement

will require sustained attention from the highest management levels in DoD and from

leaders across government.” (p. 5).

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 Reflecting on the six year anniversary of their final report (2001, U.S.

Commission on National Security) calling for a greater priority on homeland security,

Gary Hart and Warren Rudman emphasized their views that the National Guard should be

primary in this responsibility. In testimony before the House Appropriations

subcommittee (1/30/07), both expressed regrets that the detailed and “lower-profile

recommendations” they had made six years ago were ignored including “. . . a key

recommendation that the National Guard be used as the backbone of homeland security.”

(Sprengelmeyer 2007, p. 8). Hart commented, “. . . we all know where the National

Guard is today.” “It’s not securing the homeland.” (p. 8).

Lawrence J. Korb, a former assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan

administration, expanded on his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee

(April 17, 2007) in a co-authored paper (Korb and Duggan 2007) to document Hart’s

observation in much more detail. For example, regarding troop and equipment shortages

during the Katrina response, they put it this way.

“Contrary to official statements by the Bush administration, a dearth of

ready troops was also to blame. Had a substantial number of essential
Guard units been readily available, logistical gaps that occurred during
Katrina operations would have been mitigated.” (p. 5).

But as they note, subsequent responses reflect continuations of such shortages due

to the failed policies in Iraq. For example, after the 2007 tornado in Greensburg, Kansas,

Governor Kathleen Sebelius pointed out that “. . . the state’s National Guard has only

about 40 percent of the equipment it is allotted because much of it has been sent to Iraq.”

(p. 5). And other states reflect the same deficiencies.

“Sadly the problems plaguing the Kansas Guard are not unique. The
Guards of California, Florida, Arizona, New Jersey, Idaho, Louisiana,
South Carolina, Oklahoma, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon and Arkansas

69
 also have less than half the equipment they need to deal with natural
disasters.” (Korb and Kuggan 2007, p. 5).

6. The profession of emergency management will be enhanced through

university and college level degree programs that must grow both in number and

quality.

As noted above, there are now over 100 emergency management degree programs

with another 100 in development. (Blanchard 2006). Like all other professions,

however, the intellectual tools required for the art of practicing emergency management

is not confined to a single academic discipline. Hence, these programs are nested and

administratively within a variety of departments and colleges at the present time.

Regardless of their administrative home, the theories, methods, and findings from all the

social sciences are most relevant. And this includes the social problems perspective on

disaster research, I outlined in the first section of this paper. For it is within this

perspective that basic issues of inequality, vulnerability, corporate power and

concentration, and the like, can effectively be brought into these classrooms. Failure to

examine “root causes” of disaster at these levels of analysis, will limit the depth of

emergency management education. Such limitations in quality can allow these courses to

drift into becoming training grounds for future bureaucrats rather than enlightened

professionals.

Increased drift toward more bureaucratic, militaristic, or engineering and other

physical science emphases within emergency management programs, is a potential

direction with which I disagree. A footnote (#6) in Merton’s (1961) “Epilogue” makes

the fundamental point and further illustrates why a social problems perspective is most

relevant.

70
 “Although they occasionally waver in their judgments of ‘physical
problems’ – i.e. the usual array of nature-made catastrophes—as
constituting social problems, Fuller and Myers conclude their excellent
contribution to a sociological theory of social problems by setting forth
much the same position adopted here. For example: ‘While the
earthquake itself may involve no value-judgments, its consequences
inevitably will call for moral judgments and decisions of policy. People
will not agree on how much should be spent in reconstruction, how it
should be spent, or how the funds should be raised.’ Richard C. Fuller and
Richard R. Myers, ‘Some Aspects of a Theory of Social Problems,’
American Sociological Review, Vol. 6 (February, 1941), p. 27.” (Merton
1961, p. 705).

Currently two important challenges must be confronted by faculty responsible for

such programs. First, the capacity for social criticism must be strengthened and

protected. A social problems perspective may help this, but the matter should be

addressed explicitly. Students and faculty should be encouraged to critically examine

past, current and proposed emergency management policy changes.

As I have emphasized elsewhere (e.g., Drabek 2006a,c, 2007), inadequate

development of a capacity to critically review emergency management policy, both

existent and proposed, is the greatest weakness in current college and university

programs. We would be wise to remember the observations of many theorists who have

made this general point over the years (e.g., Gardner 1965). Indeed, such requirement, as

Tom Paine stated so succinctly shortly after our nation’s birth, is the duty of every citizen.

“The defects of every Government and Constitution, both as to principle and form,

must on a parity of reasoning, be as open to discussion as the defects of a law, and it

is a duty which every man owes to society to point them out.” (Paine 2003, p. 263;

original publication 1792). And a few pages later, as he explained to La Fayette why he

added “part the second” to his initial essay, i.e., “Rights of Man” he offered this sentence

which has an eerie relevance to today’s political climate. “Freedom had been hunted

71
round the globe; reason was considered rebellion; and the slavery of fear had made men

afraid to think.” (p. 266).

Second, the interface with homeland security courses, emphases, and programs

should be examined critically. As I have elaborated elsewhere (Drabek 2007), different

perceptions of “the problem,” assumptions about it, and focal tasks, reveal important

cultural differences that preclude simple integration of emerging programs. What is most

clear is that integration can not be accomplished by administrative fiat or simply adding

one or the other name to a program area. Careful and thoughtful analyses will be

required. In many cases, program integration efforts will reflect culture conflict and in

some, simply may not occur. Such future outcomes will reflect governmental policy

changes, disaster events, pressures from professional associations and other such external

forces. As Barry’s (2005) informative history of the medical profession, like others (e.g.,

Wilson and Oyola-Yemaiel 2002; Moore 1970; Hall 1975), clearly document, such

pressures, conflicts and adjustments reflect common processes documented for numerous

professions.

Sustained funding to encourage and nurture emergency management courses and

programs, however, must be increased. Similarly, there must be parallel enrichment of

disciplinary, multidisciplinary, and interdisciplinary disaster and hazard research activity

so as to provide a continuing array of study findings and theoretical analyses that form

the core intellectual foundation for these programs (e.g., see Mileti 1999, pp. 255-265;

Committee on Disaster Research in the Social Sciences 2006, pp. 282-285).

7. The assumptions, tasks, and policies that define “homeland security” must

be examined critically from a broad social problems perspective.

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 As revealed by the organizational charts that were created initially, and continue

to evolve, there are many tasks that comprise “homeland security”. Reflecting the public

outrage that followed the 9/11 attacks and the earlier proposals, e.g., Hart-Rudman 2001

(U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century), Congress initiated the largest

government reform in our history by establishing the Department of Homeland Security.

One of the early statements issued by the White House in June, 2002, indicated that the

new cabinet level secretary, would be responsible for five core units (Office of Homeland

Security 2002): 1) Border and Transportation Security; 2) Emergency Preparedness and

Response; 3) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; 4)

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and 5) Management. Each of these

areas involved transfers of personnel from existing agencies like the FEMA into core area

2 and the Coast Guard into area 1.

Of course, activities by other agencies were to be coordinated better even

though they were outside this agency. Most important among these was the matter of

mitigation as it pertained to the terrorist threat. As later documented by the 9/11

Commission (NCOTAUTUS 2004) important cultural barriers among the several

intelligence agencies resulted in structural stovepipes that severely reduced interagency

information sharing. Flawed intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

used to justify the preemptive attack on Iraq, precipitated another structural adjustment

designed to insure better coordination among the various agencies. Thus, the creation of

the Director of National Intelligence presumably has improved the effectiveness of the

multiagency network responsible for this critical task.

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 What do social problems perspectives add to an analysis of the homeland security

dimension of emergency management? Consider the parallel to crime. Social problems

texts emphasize historical patterns in criminal activity, changing legal definitions of what

constitutes a criminal act, and the ebb and flow of policy designed to mitigate. These and

the analysis of related issues provide a basis for recasting criminal activity from the

actions of evil people to larger social issues of structural patterns of inequality, failing

schools, job exportation, and other matters reflecting the “society as patient” orientation.

While adding more locks to apartment doors, like purchasing guns for classroom

teachers, may seem logical to many, especially within the context of a particular

traumatic event, such actions do not address the root causes of crime.

Similarly, recall my earlier comments regarding social problems perspectives on

suicide. While most Americans will never benefit from these assessments and their

linkages to “root causes”, by the spring of 2007, some popular media publications were

introducing these ideas. For example, in a discussion of increased threat perceptions

regarding future terror attacks, Newsweek reporters (Hirsh and Yousafai 2007) quoted

Pakistani Foreign Minister Mian Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri regarding White House

criticism of their failure to reign in terror training facilities. Kasuri’s response may have

been totally political, but at least it pointed to directions beyond military solutions. “Let’s

be honest. There are a lot of people all over the Muslim world, from Indonesia to

Somalia, who are hostile to what they regard as American foreign policy. You need to

tackle the root causes.” (p. 37).

Racism is deeply embedded in American society. It, like the matter of

immigration, has a long history and reflects the evolution of complex policy changes that

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too often have been adopted to treat specific symptoms. As bandaids on an infected cut,

they cover over the obvious, but fail to address the infection that places the patient at risk.

So too, proposals to build higher and longer walls along our southern border with

Mexico, do not reflect the complexity of the history or the economic and social dynamics

that comprise “the immigration problem.” As McCorkel (2006) pointed out in her review

of Maril’s (2004) case study of the U.S. Border Patrol, there is a “. . . profound

disconnect between official policy and the complex environmental, political, and

interpersonal realities of the border.” (p. 177). Somewhat like many emergency managers

trying to implement or justify certain homeland security terrorism initiatives, these agents

try to do their jobs in a professional manner. But “. . . a lack of resources and inadequate

training meant that agents frequently worked their shifts alone, many with limited ability

to communicate with the Spanish-speaking immigrants they apprehended.” (p. 177).

Consequently, both the “. . . agents and the immigrants they encountered [were put] in

positions of great vulnerability” which in turn “. . . exacerbated problems of mutual

distrust.” (p. 177).

My point is this. The homeland security dimension of emergency management

must be placed within a much broader strategic framework. One of the few who have

addressed this need is Gary Hart (2006). He clearly acknowledges that there are terrorist

groups that must be identified and destroyed before they can hurt people. Parallel to

local, state, or federal law enforcement personnel, our anti-terror “forces,” in the broadest

sense of that term, must have the resources required to get the job done. But creating “a

spear” or “a shield” to use Hart’s language, are only two aspects of what is required. And

so, building on Hart’s critique, I have recommended that university faculty encourage

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students to adopt my social problems perspective. With it they can step back and ask

more fundamental questions. “What are the sources of insecurity?” For as Hart reminds

us, “Freedom requires security. An insecure individual or an insecure nation cannot be

said to be truly free.” (p. 173). And because terrorism is a strategy designed to increase

fear, those who would use this strategy must be stopped. But there are additional sources

of fear and insecurity that also threaten the nation. For some it is the fear of losing a job,

others being caught in the cross-fire of gang violence. And for millions of elderly it is

fear of abandonment, payment of drug bills, and even enough food to maintain a body

weakened by parts that simply are wearing out.

“It is the source of considerable wonder that those most eager to sacrifice
some freedoms to create a shield, or spear, against terrorism are unwilling
to demonstrate equal zeal in attacking other sources of insecurity to create
a cloak of security.” (Hart 2006, p. 175).

Hence, we would do well, as Hart (2006) recommends (p. 175) to ponder the

wisdom of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In his 1941 State of the Union speech he

specified four freedoms: freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of speech, and

freedom of worship. And so instead of defining homeland “security” in an overly narrow

way, emphasizing our military and law enforcement shields and multiple blankets of

protection resulting from initiatives in airline passenger scrutiny, port container

surveillance, or higher walls in Arizona or California, we need to focus more strategically

on today’s parallel to Roosevelt’s insight.

“Our new four freedoms should be freedom of the commons, freedom of

livelihood, freedom of a sound environment, and freedom from fear.”
(Hart 2006, p. 176).

8. Recently adopted policies, like the USA Patriot Act and others pertaining

to electronic eavesdropping, “data mining,” warrantless physical searches, and the

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like, permit unacceptable assaults on fundamental civil liberties and for the most

part must be rejected.

Since the 9/11 attacks, risk perceptions of Americans have been changed.

Substantial numbers, as noted above, now fear death or injury from future terrorist

attacks. So it is more important than ever that we keep the most fundamental question of

a social problems perspective clearly in front of us. This is, “what qualities identify a

good society?”

In my own social problems courses years ago, and in my disaster classes

especially since the 9/11 attacks, I emphasize this question and the value issues,

choices and trade-offs that each of us as individuals must decide. “It is not the

objective of this course to select a set of values for you. Rather the objective is to get you

to think about the values you believe in today, examine them critically and understand

better how they are linked to the private troubles being experienced by members of our

society and a range of interdependent public issues. And as you ponder these, look for

linkages to the Constitution of the United States and the civil liberties protected through

the Bill of Rights.”

In such discussions, we should seek wisdom from a wide variety of thinkers of

various political persuasions. I will cite only two examples here to make the point. First,

listen to Dostoevsky (1960) as his “Grand Inquisitor” explains why “. . . man prefers

peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil.” (p. 129).

“I tell you that man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find

someone to whom he can hand over quickly that gift of freedom with
which the unhappy creature is born.” (pp. 128-129).

“. . . they will be glad to believe our answer, for it will save them from the
great anxiety and terrible agony they now endure supplying a free,

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 individual answer. And everyone will be happy, all the millions of
creatures except the hundred thousand who rule them. For only we, we
who guard the mystery, will be unhappy.” (p. 135).

Our nation’s founders, of course, had very different visions of both human nature

and the role of government in an ideal society. We should think hard on the policy

implications and wisdom reflected in their writings, especially those who thought hard

about the basic principles of democracy. Consider these words that Thomas Paine sent to

George Washington in 1791.

“When I contemplate the natural dignity of man, when I feel (for Nature
has not been kind enough to me to blunt my feelings) for the honour and
happiness of its character, I become irritated at the attempt to govern
mankind by force and fraud, as if they were Knaves and fools, and can
scarcely avoid disgust at those who are thus imposed upon.” (“Rights of
Man”, p. 172).

“That there are men in all countries who get their living by war, and by
keeping up the quarrels of nations, is shocking as it is true; but when those
who are concerned in the government of a country make it their study to
sow discord and cultivate prejudices between nations, it becomes more
unpardonable.” (“Preface to the English Edition,” p. 134).

Of course, Paine was defending the French Revolution and rejecting Burke’s

interpretation of it, the French Constitution, and their potential impact on future

relationships between England and France. So after seeing “. . . old prejudices wearing

away” Paine proposed that Burke “. . . immediately began sowing the seeds of a new

inveteracy, as if he were afraid that England and France would cease to be enemies.”

(“Preface to the English Edition,” p. 134). I suspect I know what Paine’s view of the

USA Patriot Act would be!

It is somewhat ironic that the chapter in the second edition of the Merton-Nisbet

social problems text (1966) that replaced Fritz’s (1961) disaster summary was authored

by one of our former (1995) ASA presidents, Amitai Etzioni. As I noted above it was

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titled: “War and Disarmament” (Etzioni 1996). After exploring many other topics over

the years, including complex organizations (e.g., Etzioni 1964) and community

integration processes (e.g., Etzioni 1996, 1999, 2003), Etzioni (2004) focused his analytic

powers on the USA Patriot Act. He highlighted the tensions between government actions

designed to increase citizen protection and the cost of a decrease in civil liberties (Etzioni

2004). As he assessed these issues and tried to walk the “tightrope of balance,” you can

trace his movement toward acceptance and trust of “the authorities”. Far better to have a

few e-mails or phone calls reviewed that are not supposed to be available, than allow a

group of terrorists to be successful in their evil deeds. Schehr’s (2005) review of his

work is very critical and points out Etzioni’s failure to highlight the influential roles

played by a variety of politically conservative organizations and individuals in the

creation of this legislation, e.g., Family Research Council, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul

Wolfowitz. Even more disparaging are Etzioni’s statements reflecting a view that the

best federal oversight should reside with “the public”.

“This must be consistent with his previously articulated belief that

democracies are constituted by a ‘free press’, otherwise, how can ‘the
public’ truly know what is happening? Unfortunately, here too Etzioni is
stronger on rhetoric than truth. With six corporations owning and
controlling virtually all major media, the embedded nature of media
journalists with government officials, and the near blackout of all media
critical of state activities, it is hard to see how ‘the public’ will be able to
deduce precisely the machinations of state actors.” (Schehr 2005, pp. 614-
615).

In their Introduction to Homeland Security, Bullock and her colleagues (2005, pp.

403-412) provided a helpful summary of this complex and lengthy piece of legislation.

Commonly referred to as “The Patriot Act” it contains numerous sections and sub-

sections like these six: 1) “Title II: Enhanced Surveillance Procedures”; 2) “Subtitle B:

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Enhanced Immigration Provisions” (includes “Section 41” which provides a detailed

legal definition of “terrorist activity” that includes planning or discussions about possible

planning of such future actions); 3) “Title VIII: Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against

Terrorism” (includes “Section 803” which “. . . prohibits harboring any person knowing

or having reasonable grounds to believe that such person has committed or to be about to

commit a terrorist offense” and “Section 804” which “established Federal jurisdiction

over crimes committed at U.S. facilities abroad”; 4) “Section 1011” which amends the

Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Protection Act”; “Section 1012” which

amends the Federal Transportation Code: and 6) “Section 1014” which directs the Office

for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support of the Office of Justice Programs to

“. . . make grants to enhance state and local capability to prepare for and to respond to

terrorist acts” (p. 412) and authorizes appropriations for FY 2002 through FY 2007.

These few items illustrate the scope and complexity of this legislation.

While favoring the last item, i.e., enhancement of state and local capability, it is

my opinion, like that of many others, that sections of this legislation go much too far in

extending the authority of federal agencies in their efforts to prevent future attacks by

terrorists. As with other forms of violence, the boundary between protecting citizens

from harm and protecting their basic civil liberties is a matter about which reasonable

people can disagree. My point is that such issues should be more of a focus within the

emergency management and disaster research communities.

Obviously, these matters are very complex legally and far beyond the scope of

this paper. So I’ll simply note two current examples of this controversial social problem

area. As context, by the way, I found it helpful to return to the textbook used in the social

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problems course in which I enrolled as an undergraduate (1959), i.e., Horton and Leslie

(1955). The chapter entitled “Civil Liberties” has much relevance to today even if we

never have a “modern day Joe McCarthy” appear on scene.

But we do have “warrantless physical searches” taking place despite the concerns

expressed by high level officials like FBI Director Robert Mueller (e.g., see Ragavan

2006). And President Bush did sign the “John W. Warner Defense Authorization Act of

2006” (October 17, 2006; PL 109-364) which, according to one analyst “takes the cuffs

off.” (Stein 2006, p. 2). “Specifically, the new language adds ‘natural disaster, epidemic,

or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident’ to the list of

conditions permitting the President to take over local authority . . .” (Stein 2006, p. 2).

Apparently in response to the flawed Katrina response, some policy makers slipped this

language into the defense bill as a rider. “One of the few to complain, Sen,. Patrick J.

Leahy, D-Vt., warned that the measure virtually invites the White House to declare

federal martial law.” (Stein 2006, p. 2). According to Stein, Leahy included the

following remarks in the Congressional Record on Sept. 29, 2006.

This rider “subverts solid, longstanding posse comitatus statutes that limit the

military’s involvement in law enforcement, thereby making it easier for the President to

declare martial law . . .” furthermore “The changes to the Insurrection Act will allow the

President to use the military, including the National Guard, to carry out law enforcement

activities without the consent of a governor. . .” (Stein 2006, pp. 2-3).

A variety of other actions have taken place since the 9/11 attacks that

cumulatively have helped to alter risk perceptions producing heightened levels of fear

(e.g., see Altheide 2006 and Furedi 2006). The social construction of such perceptions,

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like any other aspects of risk perception change, should also be studied by disaster

researchers so that emergency managers and others can better understand what is

happening in their communities and thereby make more informed judgments about their

own actions. Let me illustrate this “fear generation” process by noting only four topics

that merit much further attention.

First, there are the issues related to the Homeland Security Advisory System

(HSAS) with its color coded scale. Among the issues are the vagueness of warnings, lack

of specificity regarding protective actions, problems of dissemination across the

intergovernmental system, etc. (see Reese 2005). Indeed, as Aguirre (2004) has argued,

the HSAS is more of a public relations device than a true warning system. But, television

viewers are reminded daily, and on some networks like “Fox noise” even more

frequently, that future terrorist attacks may be coming. And they probably are. The real

question, however, is the generation of higher fear levels the best strategy to produce

support for a balanced, threat based, emergency management program? As noted in the

excellent summary report from the Committee on Disaster Research in the Social

Sciences (2006), the HSAS initiative is not reflective of years of solid studies by disaster

researchers.

“While most disaster researchers would agree that the scale is not a
warning system, much of what has been learned by disaster researchers on
effective risk communication practices is largely ignored in the
development of the system . . .” (Committee on Disaster Research in the
Social Sciences 2006, p. 310).

Second, what are the impacts on risk perceptions of the continued violence in

Iraq, the Israel-Palestine areas, and elsewhere? The daily reporting of these activities

may be key in the construction of inappropriate fear levels. While these may engender

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support for certain political agenda, the overall impacts need better study and

understanding. This process may have important parallels to shifts in risk perception

documented for other social problems, e.g., predatory public school teachers and

disturbed kids shooting up schools. A rash of highly publicized incidents can alter fear

levels which in turn can be used to promote a variety of agenda, e.g., more funds for

school security devices like metal detectors and witch hunts triggered by unfounded

allegations of “inappropriate behavior.” Obviously, incidents like the Virginia Tech

(2007) and Columbine school massacres do happen and may trigger copy-cats just as

some teachers—both male and female—cross the line of trust expected of them. But

failure to keep such incidents in perspective, as with terrorism, can produce very poor

public policy decisions.

Third, is the very complex matter of multi-national firms and corporate

concentrations within the U.S.A. For example, increased corporate concentration of

media ownership and control, as noted during the congressional hearings in which the

Dixie Chicks were invited to testify after their music was targeted because of a critical

comment about Iraq war policy, the impacts of content and viewer habits should lead to

more informed policy making. With limited air space, the public agenda is manipulated

both by intent and default. Over reporting of terrorist activities and increased numbers of

popular dramatic television series focused on terrorist plots, may reflect intent. And

excessive coverage of the latest starlet who happens not to be wearing underwear, or who

is now in rehab, illustrate the “narcotic potential” of the mass media. As Merton (1957)

put it years ago: “Propaganda is no substitute for social policy and social action, but it

can serve to root policy and action in the understanding of the people.” (p. 528).

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 Fourth, and finally, we must explicitly recognize how a broad range of interest

groups have bought into the terrorism bandwagon as a way to promote their own agenda

and resource bases. As Lustick (2007) has pointed out so clearly, anti-gun groups press

for legislation using potential terror attacks in their presentations as does the National

Rifle Association and others who propose increased citizen arms purchases. Far more

important, however, has been the rush to the money pots by those who have recast their

mission and agenda. This includes most sectors of the society ranging from universities,

to pediatricians, pharmacists, and others, who have alter their agenda to participate in the

so-called “War on Terror”. By so doing, they further legitimate and enhance the public

perception of a heightened threat. The overall consequence is that the entire nation has

played directly into the aims of small groups of Muslim fanatics. “. . . they hijack

Madisonian democracy itself, to create a vortex of aggrandizing exploitation of the War

on Terror for self-interested agendas that spin our country out of control.” (Lustick 2007,

p. 9). Thus, the consequences of these altered risk perceptions are most profound. As Al

Gore (2007) put it: “ . . . when fear and anxiety play a larger role in our society, logic and

reason play a diminished role in our collective decision making.” (p. 48). In short, the

key processes that define our form of government are put at risk.

Enhanced understanding of such policy controversies, and related sectors of

institutional change, including the propaganda potentials of the media, can assist

emergency managers to think more strategically about risk communication, both dangers

and possibilities for the public good. It is within this type of larger social context that

most of the sections of the U.S. Patriot Act, and other policies that may infringe on our

civil liberties, should be examined. This position is consistent with that of Gary Marx

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(2007) who is one among dozens creating a new sociological subfield of surveillance

studies. As he put it recently:

“Using criteria such as the nature of the goals, the procedure for creating a
surveillance practice, minimization, consideration of alternatives,
reciprocity, data protection, and security and implications for democratic
values, I suggest twenty questions to be asked about any surveillance
activity (Marx 2005). The more these can be answered in a way affirming
the underlying values, the more legitimate the surveillance is likely to be.”
(Marx 2007, p. 129).

9. Emergency managers should increase their priority on matters related to

global warning, both mitigation efforts and strategic adaptations, and place all

future hazards policy reviews for natural, technological, and conflict based threats,

including terrorism, into a social problems perspective.

Let me be clear here. I am not recommending that efforts to mitigate (i.e., counter

intelligence, law enforcement, special forces attacks, etc.) and better prepare for response

and recovery from future terrorist attacks simply be put aside. The threat is real and as a

nation we must do much better in a wide variety of ways, especially by recognizing the

types of alternative strategies that flow from the questioning by analysts like Hart (2006).

Rather what I am proposing for consideration and debate is greater emphasis on policies

that are proactive regarding future climate changes. These policies should be mitigative

both in programs aimed at reducing global warning, reduction of carbon emissions, and

in adaptations to it. Extreme worst case scenarios in future sea level rises, for example,

need not be used rigidly in planning and development decisions. But local and state level

approaches to such mitigative actions should be encouraged through new initiatives. As

with other matters of public policy, these future initiatives must be put into the context of

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all other social problems confronting communities including matters of racism, sexism,

and ageism.

I am in full agreement with Lustick’s (2007) conclusion regarding the War on

Terror. That is, “We have been, and are being, suckered, suckered big-time.” (p. 9).

So a shift in priorities is in order. Furthermore, my position parallels that outlined by

Pastor et al. (2006) in their discussion of “environmental justice.” As they documented,

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPS), had begun to incorporate the concept of

“environmental equity” into its structure in 1992. And under the Clinton administration

the momentum resulted in the Executive Order No. 12898 which mandated “. . .

environmental justice as part of the federal government’s mission.” (p. 11). While they

use somewhat different terms, the logic of their analysis parallels my social problems

perspective. Indeed, it is no accident that some of the same critics, e.g., Peter Rossi, who

attacked the White-Haas assessment project (1975) and other disaster research that

caused me to initially propose this view, also were instrumental in attacking the research

studies that had been used to justify this policy shift. Hence, their criticisms, e.g.,

Anderton et al. 1994, fueled the supporters of the Bush administration who quickly

pushed for new directions (Pastor et al. 2006, pp. 10-11). “In a society seemingly hooked

on putting hazards in the backyards of those already burdened by poverty and racial

discrimination, owning up to the reality would make a good starting place for policy

making.” (Pastor et al. 2006, p. 15).

Pastor et al. (2006) correctly identify the gaps between most disaster researchers

and those studying other aspects of environmental issues. As I noted above, most current

social problems texts make this link except they have yet to integrate disaster studies and

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instead focus solely on terrorism. As Pastor et al. (2006) noted: “Environmental

sociology books, for example, rarely discuss disaster research, and disaster studies rarely

draw on environmental justice literature.” (p. 27). I believe that my social problems

perspective provides an additional and complementary bridge toward these frameworks,

especially many key principles and concepts. For example, “community empowerment is

central to the precepts of environment justice.” (p. 35). Similarly, “. . . an overemphasis

on technocratic and scientific expertise for decision making can lead to a process that

inappropriately frames fundamentally political and moral questions (that is,

‘transcientific’ issues) in scientific terms . . .” (p. 35).

My call for a priority shift, one wherein the terrorism preparedness challenge is

retained within the overall emergency management portfolio, is consistent with the

recommendations of many others. For example, the staff within the Office of Inspections

and Special Reviews (2006) within the Office of Inspector General of the DHS

documented the changes in FEMA’s budget and personnel that occurred following its

move into DHS (see pp. 110-122). Among these included “. . . a number of changes to

the administration of grants for natural hazards preparedness [that] diminished FEMA’s

involvement in how states conduct emergency training, planning, exercises, and other

functions.” (p. 112). Furthermore, other changes “. . . diverted attention from natural

hazard preparedness to terrorism preparedness. In 2005, FEMA no longer administered

natural hazards preparedness grants . . .” (p. 113). Shifting this function to the Office of

Domestic Preparedness (ODP) meant that “FEMA lost its direct preparedness relationship

with the state emergency management agencies.” (p. 116). Additionally,“. . . FEMA’s

understaffing include decreased morale and inadequate succession planning.” (p. 119).

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Thus, in contrast to the imagery of professionalism and excellence during the Witt era, by

2003, “. . . FEMA was ranked the worst place to work in Federal government by its own

employees in the Office of Personnel Management surveys analyzed by the Partnership

for Public Service.” (p. 119).

These matters are relevant side issues that are contextual to the key point, i.e., the

current over emphasis on terrorism preparedness at the expense of everything else. The

IG staff honed in on this point toward the end of their assessment.

“The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that DHS’ efforts to

protect and prepare the nation for terrorist events and natural disasters
have not yet translated into preparedness for all hazards. State emergency
management staff we interviewed said the majority of DHS preparedness
grants are spent on terrorism preparedness, which has not afforded
sufficient support or funding for natural hazard preparedness.” (Office of
Inspections and Special Reviews 2006, p. 135).

And despite policy documents that could be interpreted as recognition of a natural

hazard preparedness priority, the IG staff concluded otherwise. “Through the documents

in the National Preparedness System address all hazards, the prevalence of terrorism-

related items in these fosters a perception that the preparedness for and response to a

terrorist event is different from that of a naturally occurring event.” (p. 136). Hence, the

DHS must explicitly embark upon a cultural change so as to carry out its emergency

management within an all-hazard perspective (see pp. 135-143). As part of this shift in

priorities, I recommend new preparedness and mitigation initiatives focused on global

warming and its potential socioeconomic impacts. Such initiatives will be most effective

if they are developed and implemented primarily within state and local levels although

both national and international projects are urgently required as well.

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 These nine complexes of policy areas, while only briefly reviewed here, illustrate

some of the ways that emergency managers can be encouraged to think more strategically

about their profession. We best accomplish this by introducing them to the notion that for

some research purposes, certainly not all, it is helpful to conceptualize disasters as non-

routine social problems. Failure to adopt a more strategic view of their profession, one

enriched by the future studies completed by disaster and hazard researchers from a wide

variety of social science disciplines, will constrain the growth of this profession. Such

constraint will weaken a critical capacity necessary for the continued resiliency of the

U.S.A.

Conclusions

I have: 1) proposed a linkage to social problems perspectives; 2) summarized the

intellectual context for and rationale for further exploration of the key epistemological

issue that constrains the generalization of our research findings; and 3) illustrated the

significant policy implications of these two matters. I will now offer five conclusions.

Hopefully, these will stimulate others, because of either agreement or disagreement, to

push this analysis much further. Such is the nature of academic work.

1. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems provides a powerful

framework for interpretation, context, and future research.

Disasters, from this perspective, are interpreted as normal events largely

originating within identifiable historical and structural conditions. Like other social

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problems, understanding the private troubles experienced requires the capacity to shift

abstraction levels and examine relevant public issues. And sometimes the analysis must

transcend the public concerns of any given era and identify latent juxtapositions of social

trends and structural conditions that will ignite in future areas of conflict, instability, and

human hurt.

This orientation provides a context for drawing upon the insights seen by others

who have selected different areas of human travail for study ranging from crime to race

relations to poverty and so on. As with analyses of these areas, however, there is no

inherent bias toward the negative. Disasters do at times, and for some much of the time,

have positive consequences (e.g., see Drabek and Key 1984).

What this perspective forces the analyst to specify, however, is a definition of the

value judgments that are being made to declare any given behavior as “positive” or

“negative.” Hence, the cultural context of the definer is made explicit and may be

contrasted with that of others whose circumstance and value position may differ. So-

called “good business practices” that some would define as “unethical” illustrate a type of

analysis that similarly permits enhanced understanding of the historical contexts and

ideologies that foster classrooms of children who will become suicide bombers within the

next few years. The same can be said for the thousands of American citizens who will be

injured or killed because of domestically birthed gang violence. The same can be said for

the billions of young girls from centuries past, like millions today, whose personal

security requires unquestioning obedience and loyalty to unjust systems rooted in patterns

of inequality, abuse, and intolerance.

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 Clearly, this orientation presses analysts to ask new research questions not just

about “routineness” but also many other important matters. In what ways, and with what

consequences, are disasters “nonroutine”? What additional differences, and of course

similarities, can be identified when disasters are compared to other social problems? In

what ways are these processes similar, and different, across the range of societies existent

today and over centuries past? If the society is the patient, as a social problems

perspective assumes, what is being said to disaster researchers as they pursue their craft?

2. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems does not preclude or

invalidate other definitions that may be required for other theoretical frameworks

and research agenda at this point in the history of the field.

At the time Kreps and I (1998) reviewed and extended the social problems

application, my focus was on community evacuations. I documented that several key

event characteristics were helpful in understanding certain aspects of evacuation behavior

(e.g., Drabek 1994, 1996). This work, along with that of the Kreps team (e.g., Kreps and

Bosworth 1994), led us to identify the four properties I noted in the definition above, e.g.,

scope of impact. While helpful for some limited and specific purposes like these, I am in

full agreement with Quarantelli (2005) that these are not a final answer to the complex

issue of taxonomy.

Indeed, I totally agree with Quarantelli that we must go beyond the obvious as did

the biological community when they created the category of “mammal” that placed

whales, humans, and bats into the same taxonomic niche. That is exactly the type of

reasoning that led Kreps and I to propose further analysis of the concept of “routineness”

along the lines that Perrow (1967) had done in his development of a typology of

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organizations. Rather than traditional sortings done commonly on mission, often

mistakenly labeled “goal”, for example, fire departments vs. schools vs. voluntary

disaster agencies, this approach offers an alternative pathway. Through it, we can go

beyond the traditional weather category groupings or assuming that all aspects of

technological crises are qualitatively different from those originating from so-called “acts

of nature” or human caused conflict. We must continue to struggle creatively with this

fundamental issue so as to specify the limits of generalizability of our study findings. But

let’s never forget the error in the logic that led some to assume that “better research”

required, or was characterized, by simply having a larger number of “cases.”

3. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems highlights the

multidirectional pathways that can enhance the flows of research findings and

theoretical frameworks among other sociologists, those oriented in other social

science disciplines, and members of related professions be they practicing

emergency managers, fire and law enforcement, public health, law, planning, and

the like.

When I began my reviews of several recently published social problems texts, my

initial vision of this conclusion was totally inadequate. Being blinded by the past, I

envisioned future social problems texts wherein the disaster research legacy would be

displayed. Whether the insights were sprinkled throughout standard chapters on family,

poverty, crime, etc., or be highlighted in a separated chapter like Fritz’s (1961) did not

matter to me as I pondered the challenge with excitement. Then I recall thinking, as I

often do, “A does not preclude B.” So I saw a lot of work ahead for many.

92
 It didn’t take long, however, as my pen pushed my thinking as it commonly does,

to realize the severity of my impaired vision. The challenge goes far beyond future social

problems textbooks. And the information flow must be multi-directional. As we reach

out more frequently to bring our “goods” to others working within different academic and

professional settings, we too will grow in unanticipated ways. Sometimes it will be

because of questions or criticism. But other times it will be because someone else has

had a creative insight about a statistical method or conceptual framework that helped

them understand some aspect of crime, or how certain elementary school classrooms

traumatized students trapped therein. If we are open to such ideas, new ways to thinking

about disasters and hazards will stimulate growth. To the degree that we encourage

isolation and separateness, our growth will be constrained. Thinking through the

numerous linkages afforded within social problems perspectives will stimulate such

growth among disaster researchers.

4. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems highlights a focus on root

causes, both domestic and international.

Recent writings by Wismer et al. 2003, Enarson et al. 2003 and many others have

pressed all of us to think harder about the meaning of “social vulnerability” (e.g.,

McEntire 2004). Patterns of risk are shaped by social processes that usually reflect the

contours of power and privilege. Does the risk of living in a flood prone area parallel the

pathway that results in the death of a hate crime victim whose sexual orientation is

despised by his killers? And do either of these risks merit the amount of public

expenditures currently being allocated daily to ensure that all airline passengers remove

their shoes before boarding? We often hear rhetoric about funding decisions for disaster

93
mitigation and preparedness programs being based on threat assessments. But what

range of threats are really being assessed by those holding and directing the flow of

dollars? And when we return to the orientation proposed by Hart (2006), and ask about

the real sources of insecurity confronting all American citizens, not just the well off, the

linkage to social problems perspectives becomes much clearer. For it has been within

these frameworks, enriched by basic sociological studies of crime, poverty, sexism,

racism, ageism and the like, that our understanding of root causes of social problems has

been most enhanced.

Increasingly, we must frame our research agendas within cross-national and

historical contexts. The pollutants of Love Canal fame (e.g., Levine 1982) did not arrive

there like the 1999 tornado that hit Moore, Oklahoma (Drabek 2003b). And the woman

who was beaten badly by a spouse, whose sense of frustration with flood relief run-

arounds and cleanup fatigue boiled over, is every much a victim as those temporarily

living in a Red Cross shelter (e.g., Fothergill 2004). But we must dig deeper and

ultimately confront the realities of “the power elite” and their roles in the changing

distributions of risk and patterns of victimization. While most may prefer to stay within

the confines of flood studies, for example, even if they accept the challenge of cross-

societal analysis, even they must confront the human caused nature of flooding be it

reflections of timber harvesting, failed levee and dam construction or maintenance,

unregulated upstream development, or just stupidity. Others must venture into the less

charted waters of conflict disasters and their root causes. Record levels of arms

production and sales, expanded military training facilities, and the like, are linked directly

to the economic security of many, not just those at the top. How such economic

94
interdependencies fuel policy decisions within both the public and private sector require

scrutiny. For it is within such structural arrangements that the root causes of the most

violent disasters are to be found. One need not accept the strategy or the value set of the

“environmental justice movement” (e.g., Pastor, et al. 2006), for example, but it might

very well be a good place to start.

And so too is further reflection on the implications of the conclusions reached by

Thomas Paine in his initial essay on the “Rights of Man” (original publication, 1791).

For example, ponder the relevance of these words to an analysis of “root causes” of

disaster.

“Every war terminates with an addition of taxes, and consequently with an

addition of revenue; and in any event of war, in the manner they are now
commenced and concluded, the power and interest of Governments are
increased. War, therefore, from its productiveness, as it easily furnishes
the pretence of necessity for taxes and appointments to places and offices,
becomes a principal part of the system of old Governments; and to
establish any mode to abolish war, however advantageous it might be to
Nations, would be to take from such Government the most lucrative of its
branches.” (Paine 2003, p. 254).

5. Defining disasters as nonroutine social problems can provide emergency

managers with a theoretical foundation that will enhance their capacity to more

effectively practice their profession.

Since the creation of FEMA in 1979, the profession of emergency management

has experienced acceleration in its long-term evolution (e.g., Petak 1984; Drabek 1991;

Wilson and Oyola-Yemaiel 2000). From two university degree programs in 1996, by a

decade later over 100 were operating. Additionally, over 50 programs were introducing

students to aspects of homeland and defense security (Blanchard 2006). I noted these

earlier and my concern about the current capacity and interest of faculty in critical

95
examination of emergency management policy. I believe firmly that the social problems

perspective on disaster that I have herein proposed would assist these faculty, and

subsequently, those practicing within this profession to develop a more strategic

perspective on their profession. By explicitly recognizing and better understanding the

mix of social trends and structures within which their agencies are embedded, ranging

from the local community to the international context, they will better be able to provide

the leadership and technical expertise reflected in the vision statements of their

professional associations (e.g., International Association of Emergency Managers,

IAEM).

And they will better be able to grasp the policy implications of broad historical

analyses like Barry’s (2005) analysis of military troop movements and emergent

quarantine efforts that resulted in both the rapid spread of the 1918 influenza virus and

poorly implemented mitigation policies. Furthermore, an understanding of how social

processes and structures, interact with environmental realities like those described by

Jared Diamond (2005) in his theoretical framework of societal collapse, can provide

emergency managers with the breadth of knowledge essential for more informed policy

review and creation.

“When people are desperate, undernourished, and without hope, they

blame their governments, which they see as responsible for or unable to
solve their problems. They try to emigrate at any cost. They fight each
other over land. They kill each other. They start civil wars. They figure
that they have nothing to loose, so they become terrorists, or they support
or tolerate terrorism.” (Diamond 2005, p. 516).

Disasters are nonroutine social problems. At least that is one way of viewing

conjunctions of historical conditions and social definitions of physical harm and social

disruption. It is not the only way, nor does it preclude other definitions and perspectives.

96
But it is a perspective that offers some unique insights, integrative mechanisms, and

linkages to both substantive areas of study and the future practice of emergency

management. Thank you for your attention during my effort to explore this option.

97
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