EJSP

SPECIAL ISSUE INTRODUCTION

Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging

research domain
Jan-Willem van Prooijen*,† & Karen M. Douglas‡
* VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
† The Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR), Amsterdam, The Netherlands
‡ University of Kent, Canterbury, UK

Correspondence Abstract
Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Department of
Experimental and Applied Psychology, VU In this introduction to the EJSP Special Issue on conspiracy theories as a
Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 1, social psychological phenomenon, we describe how this emerging research
1081BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands. domain has developed over the past decade and distill four basic principles
E-mail: j.w.van.prooijen@vu.nl that characterize belief in conspiracy theories. Specifically, conspiracy theo-
or ries are consequential as they have a real impact on people’s health, relation-
Karen Douglas, School of Psychology, ships, and safety; they are universal in that belief in them is widespread
University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NP, across times, cultures, and social settings; they are emotional given that neg-
UK.
ative emotions and not rational deliberations cause conspiracy beliefs; and
E-mail: k.douglas@kent.ac.uk
they are social as conspiracy beliefs are closely associated with psychological
Received: 31 July 2018
motivations underlying intergroup conflict. We then discuss future research
Accepted: 31 July 2018 and possible policy interventions in this growing area of enquiry.

https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2530 Keywords: conspiracy theories, consequences, universal, emotions, intergroup conflict

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors confirm they have no conflict of
interest to declare. Authors also confirm that
this article adheres to ethical guidelines
specified in the APA Code of Conduct as well
as the authors’ national ethics guidelines.

Social media and the Internet are filled with conspir- elected US President despite propagating a range of
acy theories. These theories range from highly highly implausible conspiracy theories throughout
implausible in light of logic or scientific knowledge his campaign. These theories included allegations
(e.g., chemtrail conspiracy theories; flat-earth con- that climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the
spiracy theories) to theoretically possible or even Chinese, that Barack Obama was not born in the
plausible (e.g., allegations that secret service agencies US, and that vaccines cause autism. The social
routinely violate privacy laws). In fact, conspiracy sciences have increasingly recognized the importance
theories sometimes turn out to be true (e.g., Water- of understanding conspiracy beliefs, and empirical
gate; incidents of corporate corruption), although the research on this phenomenon has proliferated in the
vast majority of conspiracy theories that citizens past decade (for overviews, see Douglas, Sutton, &
have believed throughout history have been false Cichocka, 2017; Van Prooijen, 2018; Van Prooijen &
(Pipes, 1997). Conspiracy theories are commonly Van Vugt, in press).
defined as explanatory beliefs about a group of The current Special Issue was designed to show-
actors that collude in secret to reach malevolent case the study of belief in conspiracy theories as an
goals (Bale, 2007). What drives belief in such con- emerging research domain within social psychology.
spiracy theories? While in earlier decades belief in In putting this issue together, we specifically aimed
conspiracy theories often was dismissed as pathologi- to capitalize on the momentum that the scientific
cal (Hofstadter, 1966), accumulating evidence reveals study of conspiracy theories is currently having, and
that conspiracy theories are common among surpris- to give a second generation of conspiracy theory
ingly large numbers of citizens (Oliver & Wood, researchers within our field the opportunity to dis-
2014; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). The potential seminate their novel findings to a professional audi-
impact and breadth of conspiracy theories was ence. To introduce this Special Issue, in the present
underscored in 2016, when Donald Trump was paper we (i) illuminate how the study of conspiracy

European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 897
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
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Conspiracy theories J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas

theories has developed from an unusual object of Pereira, 2018). Moreover, throughout history people
study to an increasingly expanding research domain have believed conspiracy theories particularly in
over the past few years, and (ii) distill four basic impactful societal crisis situations, such as during fires,
principles that have emerged from past research, in floods, earthquakes, rapid societal change, violence,
particular that conspiracy beliefs are consequential, and wars (McCauley & Jacques, 1979; see also Van
universal, emotional, and social. Each of the contri- Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). Finally, social structures
butions to this Special Issue considers at least one of that shape citizens’ feelings of vulnerability increase
these principles. We conclude by proposing a novel belief in conspiracy theories, as reflected in findings
research agenda and policy interventions based on that feelings of powerlessness predict conspiracy beliefs
these four principles. (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014),
and that conspiracy beliefs are high particularly among
members of stigmatized minority groups (Crocker
Conspiracy Theories: An Emerging Research et al., 1999; Davis, Wetherell, & Henry, 2018; Van
Domain Prooijen, Staman, & Krouwel, in press).
Recent research has drawn heavily on these two key
Early studies on conspiracy theories relied mostly on insights, by extensively testing how stable individual
correlational evidence in cross-sectional designs (e.g., differences predict a tendency to believe conspiracy
Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; theories (Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Imhoff &
Goertzel, 1994), or studied conspiracy thinking as a Bruder, 2014; Swami et al., 2011; Van Prooijen,
function of demographic variables such as political 2017), what causal factors increase belief in conspiracy
party affiliation (Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974) or eth- theories (e.g., Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Van Prooijen &
nicity (Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, Van Dijk, 2014; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), what
1999). Although scarce and methodologically lim- basic cognitive processes are involved when people
ited, these early studies provided two key insights perceive conspiracies (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Daw-
that laid the foundations for current research on try, & Harvey, 2016; Van Prooijen, Douglas, & De Ino-
conspiracy theories. The first key insight is that cencio, 2018), and what the consequences are of
although conspiracy theories differ widely in con- believing conspiracy theories (Bartlett & Miller, 2010;
tent, subjective beliefs in them are rooted in the Douglas & Leite, 2017; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a,b). It is
same underlying psychology. This insight is sug- safe to say that the scientific study of conspiracy theo-
gested by findings that the single best predictor of ries has been emerging over the past decade: Both the
belief in one conspiracy theory is belief in a different body of knowledge on this phenomenon, as well as
conspiracy theory (Goertzel, 1994; see also Lewan- the number of researchers actively working on it, has
dowski, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; Swami et al., expanded rapidly.
2011; Sutton & Douglas, 2014). Even beliefs in One limitation of the current state of affairs in
mutually incompatible conspiracy theories are posi- the scientific research domain of conspiracy theories,
tively correlated (e.g., Princess Diana was murdered however, is that the field is lacking a solid theoreti-
vs. Princess Diana staged her own death; Wood, cal framework that contextualizes previous findings,
Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). While many conceptually that enables novel predictions, and that suggests
distinct conspiracy theories exist, the tendency to interventions to reduce the prevalence of conspiracy
believe in them appears to be underpinned by theories in society. Recent review articles have
broader beliefs that support conspiracy theories in sought to address this limitation by providing a
general (e.g., beliefs in cover ups; Wood et al., framework that illuminates the motivational basis of
2012). Some scholars argue for a conspiracy mindset conspiracy theories—specifically that conspiracy the-
as a relatively stable predisposition to believe in con- ories appeal to people for epistemic, existential and
spiracy theories that varies between persons (Imhoff social motivational reasons (Douglas et al., 2017),
& Bruder, 2014). Despite the high variability in con- and by developing an evolutionary model—the
spiracy theories—involving topics that range from Adaptive Conspiracism Hypothesis—that specifies
climate change to chronic illnesses to terrorist how the human tendency to believe conspiracy the-
attacks—research demonstrates that largely similar ories evolved through natural selection (Van Prooi-
and predictable psychological processes drive people’s jen & Van Vugt, in press). These initiatives
belief in them. notwithstanding, at present the field of conspiracy
The second key insight is that besides individual dif- theories is still in its infancy in terms of theory
ferences, belief in conspiracy theories is highly sensi- development. To stimulate further theorizing, we
tive to social context. For instance, ideological propose four basic principles of belief in conspiracy
motivations influence political conspiracy beliefs theories that we distilled from research conducted
depending on election results (e.g., Democrats believe so far. These four basic principles are supported by
governmental conspiracy theories particularly if there many studies and, in conjunction with existing
is a Republican in the White House, and vice versa; models, may provide an organizing framework for
Wright & Arbuthnot, 1974; see also Golec de Zavala & researchers to develop more sophisticated theories
Federico, 2018; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; Van Bavel & and research on this phenomenon.

898 European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas Conspiracy theories

Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Four Basic beliefs such as that HIV is harmless, or that condom
Principles use causes HIV infections. A study conducted in Cape
Town reveals that belief in such AIDS conspiracy theo-
The four basic principles that we put forward here ries strongly predicts reduced condom use among both
specify and expand the two key insights discussed ear- men and women (Grebe & Nattrass, 2012). In fact,
lier—that is, (i) belief in different conspiracy theories is one convinced believer of AIDS conspiracy theories
driven by similar psychological processes, and (ii) con- was Thabo Mbeki, President of South Africa from
spiracy beliefs are highly susceptible to social context. 1999 to 2008. Statistical model estimates indicate that
We specifically detail what particular antecedents and in the period between 2000 and 2005, approximately
consequences are involved in the psychological pro- 330,000 South African people died due to governmen-
cesses underlying belief in conspiracy theories, and tal decisions not to implement antiretroviral treatment
how social context influences people’s susceptibility to programs (Chigwedere, Seage, Gruskin, Lee, & Essex,
conspiracy theories. Explicitly, we argue that beliefs in 2008).
conspiracy theories are consequential, universal, emo- Belief in conspiracy theories also has implications
tional, and social. In the following sections, we discuss for people’s interpersonal relationships. It has been
each of these basic principles in turn. noted that people who believe conspiracy theories can
be subject to stigmatization (Harambam & Aupers,
Principle 1: Conspiracy Beliefs are Consequential 2015). Consistently, expressing conspiracy theories
increases expectations of negative evaluations, and
Even when conspiracy theories are highly unlikely to fear of being socially excluded (Lantian, Muller, Nurra,
be true, they have an impact on important life dimen- Klein, Berjot, & Pantazi, 2018). Furthermore, evidence
sions such as health, interpersonal relationships, and suggests that belief in conspiracy theories is associated
safety. This impact is rooted in the subjective reality of with problematic interpersonal relationships. Specifi-
belief. What people believe drives their behavior; but cally, belief in conspiracy theories is correlated with a
while beliefs sometimes may be flawed or even naive, range of individual difference variables that reflect
they may produce behavior that has real consequences impoverished interpersonal functioning, such as inter-
(cf., the Thomas Theorem; Thomas & Thomas, 1928). personal paranoia (Darwin et al., 2011), narcissism
One dimension in particular where conspiracy theories (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016),
are consequential—and usually detrimental—for per- disagreeableness (Swami et al., 2011), insecure attach-
ceivers is their health. To illustrate this, imagine for a ment (Green & Douglas, 2018) and Machiavellianism
moment that vaccines actually do cause autism. Who (Douglas & Sutton, 2011). While future research
would get themselves and their children vaccinated would need to examine the causal effects of conspiracy
under those circumstances? But while medical scien- beliefs on the quality of interpersonal relationships
tists widely agree that vaccines do not cause autism, more directly, the findings obtained so far are consis-
many citizens firmly believe that the pharmaceutical tent with the idea that endorsing conspiracy theories is
industry conspires to hide the evidence for such a rela- associated with poorer interpersonal functioning.
tionship. This motivates these citizens to deny them- Conspiracy beliefs also have implications for a range
selves and their children important vaccines. Empirical of societal developments. For instance, conspiracy
research underscores such detrimental health conse- beliefs predict feelings of alienation from politics
quences of conspiracy theories for believers: Exposing (Goertzel, 1994), and correspondingly, a manipulation
research participants to anti-vaccine conspiracy theo- of conspiracy theories decreased participants’ willing-
ries lowers their intentions to have a child vaccinated ness to vote in elections (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a;
(Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). Moreover, these findings Study 1). Relatedly, exposure to conspiracy theories
are not specific for health-related conspiracy theories: decreases public support for important policies. Cli-
More general conspiracy beliefs predict a preference mate change conspiracy theories—which typically
for alternative over regular, evidence-based medical assume that the problem of global warming is a hoax
approaches (Lamberty & Imhoff, 2018). —decrease citizens’ willingness to reduce their carbon
Furthermore, a surprisingly common conspiracy footprints (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Study 2; see also
theory among the African American population is that Douglas & Sutton, 2015), as well as their prosocial
contraceptives are a form of Black genocide. Belief in behavior more generally (Van der Linden, 2015). Fur-
this conspiracy theory shapes negative attitudes thermore, conspiracy beliefs are empirically associated
towards contraceptives and predicts decreased use of with populism (Silva, Vegetti, & Littvay, 2017) and
contraceptives particularly among men (Thorburn & political extremism (Van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet,
Bogart, 2005). Relatedly, in South Africa AIDS con- 2015). Also ‘underground’ extremist movements (e.g.,
spiracy theories are common—stipulating for instance groups of Neo-Nazis, violent anti-globalists, religious
that HIV was deliberately created by humans in the fundamentalists, and the like) are characterized by
laboratory, and that the pharmaceutical industry pro- excessive conspiracy beliefs. Bartlett and Miller (2010)
motes the “HIV hypothesis” to sell expensive yet argued that conspiracy theories causally contribute to
harmful antiretroviral drugs. These conspiracy beliefs the process of radicalization, and the violent tenden-
are reliably associated with unscientific and dangerous cies, of such extremist fringe groups.

European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 899
Conspiracy theories J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas

The above arguments paint a rather bleak picture of Andeweg (2014) found that—contrary to popular
the consequences of conspiracy theories and conspir- belief—satisfaction with politicians did not decrease in
acy beliefs, and indeed, the current state of affairs in an almost 40-year measurement period (starting in the
this research domain suggests that the majority of con- early 1970s) in multiple EU countries. Instead, citi-
sequences are negative. It should be noted, however, zens’ overall satisfaction with politicians has been low
that not all consequences are necessarily negative. For throughout the decades.
instance, conspiracy theories can inspire and justify Historical sources suggest that substantial numbers of
protest movements (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; see also citizens believed conspiracy theories even further back
Chayinska, Minescu, & Colucci, 2018), and whether in time. Throughout the centuries, wars were charac-
that is positive or negative depends on the type of terized by excessive and mutual conspiracy theories
social change that these movements pursue. Further- between enemy groups (Pipes, 1997). In Medieval
more, conspiracy theories can increase governmental times, conspiracy theories led to major tragedies includ-
transparency (Clarke, 2002), and belief in conspiracy ing the killing of Jews (who were for instance accused
theories is associated with increased support for demo- of conspiring to poison drinking wells, as a means of
cratic principles (Swami et al., 2011). Indeed, a fruitful explaining disease epidemics) or witch hunts (i.e.,
avenue for further research would be to study under young women who were accused of conspiring with
what circumstances conspiracy theories are harmful, the Devil and therefore burnt alive). One can even find
harmless, or even beneficial. Whether one wishes to conspiracy theories in the writings of the ancient
focus on the upside or downside of conspiracy theo- Roman senator and historian Tacitus (Annal XV, 38–
ries, one conclusion remains: Conspiracy theories 44), who described how Roman citizens believed that
influence citizens, and the society they live in, in sig- Nero and his loyal servants deliberately had ignited the
nificant ways. great fire of Rome in the year 64 AD (for details, see
Brotherton, 2015; Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017).
Principle 2: Conspiracy Beliefs are Universal Conspiracy theories also appear common to all cul-
tures. While most research conducted thus far on this
Conspiracy theories are not restricted to specific times topic has taken place in Western societies (mostly the
or cultures: Citizens around the world are susceptible US and Western Europe), conspiracy theories are by
to them, from modern to traditional societies (West & no means exclusive to these societies. Quantitative
Sanders, 2003). Indeed, the tendency to be suspicious research has found evidence for widespread conspiracy
of the possibility that others are forming conspiracies beliefs in countries around the world, including
against one and one’s group may be part of human Poland (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), Ukraine
nature. The Adaptive Conspiracism Hypothesis pro- (Chayinska & Minescu, 2018), Malaysia (Swami,
poses that while conspiracy theories are not necessar- 2012), Indonesia (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2015), and the
ily adaptive in modern environments, they have been Muslim world in the Middle East (Gentzkow & Sha-
adaptive among ancient hunter-gatherers who faced piro, 2004). Ethnographic studies have found substan-
the problem of frequent intergroup conflict and sub- tial conspiracy theorizing in rural Africa (e.g.,
stantial reproductive loss through coalitional aggres- Namibia; Tanzania) where people endorse a range of
sion (Van Prooijen & Van Vugt, in press). This model conspiracy theories that implicate societal elites, that
asserts that human beings evolved a conspiracy detec- accuse enemy tribes of witchcraft, or that involve mal-
tion system, that is, a functionally integrated mental practice of the Western world. For instance, many citi-
system that is activated by specific cues associated with zens in these regions believe that modern technology
an increased likelihood of hostile coalitions (that is, is a form of sorcery designed by hostile Western plots
actual conspiracies), and that produces adaptive out- to harm or control them (West & Sanders, 2003).
puts to protect ancestral humans from dangerous Relatedly, anthropologists have observed conspiracy
conspiracies. theories among the Yanomam€ o Amazon Indians in
While this perspective does not imply that all South America, who sometimes blame the mysterious
human beings believe conspiracy theories to an equal death of a tribe member on sorcery committed by a
extent—individuals, groups, and cultures differ in the conspiracy of an enemy village (Chagnon, 1988).
extent to which the conspiracy detection system is Finally, conspiracy theories emerge across a wide
chronically and situationally activated, as is the case variety of social settings. Conspiracy theories com-
with many other evolved psychological predispositions monly accuse governmental institutions (e.g., politi-
(Buss, 2009)—it does imply that conspiracy theories cians in general, or secret service agencies), and entire
are not specific to our modern digital age, or to one branches of industry (e.g., the pharmaceutical indus-
particular culture. Empirical evidence supports this try; the oil industry) of malpractice. Furthermore, con-
view. In their analysis of over a hundred thousand let- spiracy theories often accuse minority groups, such as
ters sent to major US newspapers between 1890 and Muslims or Jews, of hostile plots to plan a revolution
2010, Uscinski and Parent (2014) did not find (Pipes, 1997). But conspiracy theories also occur in
increased conspiracy theorizing in letters published in more micro-level settings. Several studies have
the new Millennium; instead, conspiracy theorizing revealed that conspiracy theories are common in orga-
was remarkably stable over a full 120 years. Also nizations, where employees suspect their managers of

900 European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas Conspiracy theories

conspiring towards evil goals (e.g., conspiracy theories Conspiracy beliefs therefore do not appear to be
that managers have a hidden agenda to lay off grounded in controlled, analytic mental processes.
employees, in order to give themselves a financial Instead, we argue that they are grounded in emotional
bonus; see Douglas & Leite, 2017; Van Prooijen & De and intuitive mental (System 1) processes. This insight
Vries, 2016). Although research on the variety of set- is based on the argument that aversive emotional
tings in which people believe conspiracy theories is experiences increase people’s sense-making motiva-
scarce at present, we suspect that conspiracy theories tions (Park, 2010). These sense-making motivations
are prevalent also in other domains of social life such tend to be sensitive to threats, increasing the likeli-
as sports (e.g., suspicions that the opposing team hood that people attribute suspect events to the covert
bribed the referee, or that supporters of the opposing activities of hostile conspiracies (Hofstadter, 1966).
team plan riots), schools (e.g., suspicions among high- This line of reasoning is consistent with the observa-
school students that teachers conspire against them to tion that conspiracy theories gain momentum in the
make exams more difficult), and so on. In any setting context of anxiety-provoking societal crisis events such
characterized by psychological tensions between com- as terrorism, natural disasters, or war (Van Prooijen &
peting (sub-)groups, conspiracy theories are likely Douglas, 2017). The negative emotions that constitute
to occur. the psychological origins of belief in conspiracy theo-
ries include anxiety, uncertainty, or the feeling that
Principle 3: Conspiracy Beliefs are Emotional one lacks control.
Both correlational and experimental studies exten-
The third principle is partly grounded in a paradox: sively support the emotional nature of belief in con-
Conspiracy theories—even blatantly irrational ones— spiracy theories. For instance, conspiracy beliefs are
are often supported by a range of elaborate argu- correlated with trait anxiety (Grzesiak-Feldman,
ments, suggesting that belief in conspiracy theories is 2013), and are predicted by the perception that society
based on analytic and deliberative (i.e., System 2) is under threat (Jolley, Douglas, & Sutton, 2018), and
thinking processes. For instance, Moon landing con- that society’s fundamental values are changing (Fed-
spiracy theories (assuming that the Moon landings erico, Williams, & Vitriol, 2018). Experimental studies
were filmed in a TV studio) often are justified have found that inducing a lack of control increases
through an extensive analysis of the lack of wind on people’s belief in organizational conspiracy theories
the moon in conjunction with the apparent move- (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) and political conspiracy
ment of the US flag on video recordings. Likewise, theories (Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Relatedly, a
many 9/11 conspiracy theories (proposing that these lack of control leads people to exaggerate the influence
terrorist attacks were an inside job committed by the that they attribute to their enemies, which is part of
US government) are based on a range of scientific many conspiracy theories (Sullivan, Landau, & Roth-
arguments pertaining to the steel constructions of schild, 2010). Finally, experiencing subjective uncer-
the former Twin Towers, the maximum tempera- tainty—a phenomenological experience closely
tures of burning kerosene, and the temperatures at associated with lacking control—predicts increased
which steel melts. It would therefore be tempting to conspiracy beliefs, provided that perceivers consider
assume that belief in conspiracy theories is closely the implicated authorities as immoral (Van Prooijen &
associated with an inquisitive mindset that does not Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015).
take for granted the official readings of impactful The sense-making processes underlying the relation-
events, and that critically analyses evidence in favor ship between emotions and conspiracy beliefs consist
of, or against, a conspiracy theory. of at least two basic and automatic cognitive processes.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests quite the The first process is pattern perception: People automat-
opposite. For example, belief in conspiracy theories is ically search for meaningful and causal relationships
positively associated with intuitive rather than analytic between stimuli. Research indeed finds that perceiving
thinking (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, patterns in random stimuli predicts belief in conspiracy
2014). Consistently, higher education predicts lower theories (Van der Wal, Sutton, Lange, & Braga, 2018;
conspiracy beliefs, a finding that is partly mediated by Van Prooijen et al., 2018). The second process is
a tendency among the less educated to attribute agency detection: People tend to perceive events as
agency and intentionality where it does not exist caused by intentional agents. The tendency to detect
(Douglas et al., 2016), and stronger analytic thinking agency in inanimate stimuli empirically predicts belief
skills among the higher educated (Van Prooijen, in conspiracy theories (Douglas et al., 2016; Imhoff &
2017). Furthermore, the combination of analytic Bruder, 2014). These two basic cognitive processes are
thinking and the motivation to be rational predicts reliably triggered by the same emotions that trigger
skepticism of conspiracy theories (St ahl & Van Prooi- conspiracy beliefs. For instance, lacking control not
jen, 2018). It has also been noted that the confirma- only increases belief in conspiracy theories but also
tion bias is central to conspiracy theorizing illusory pattern perception more generally (e.g., seeing
(Brotherton, 2015), and that conspiracy beliefs are images in random noise, or perceiving patterns in ran-
related to the illusion of explanatory depth (Vitriol & dom stock market information; Whitson & Galinsky,
Marsh, 2018). 2008). In a similar vein, feelings of uncertainty not

European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 901
Conspiracy theories J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas

only increase conspiracy beliefs but also other forms of Republicans, and Democrats often believe conspiracy
agency detection, such as people’s belief in agentic, theories involving Republicans trying to harm Demo-
moralizing gods (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). crats (Uscinski & Parent, 2014; see also Van Bavel &
While the automatic and epistemic mental processes Pereira, 2018). These effects increase to the extent that
of pattern perception and agency detection are not people are more polarized in their political ideologies
emotional per se, aversive emotional experiences do (Van Prooijen et al., 2015).
activate these cognitive processes, increasing the likeli- Empirical research extensively supports these group-
hood of conspiracy thinking. Taken together, the evi- based qualities of conspiracy theories. One source of
dence suggests that belief in conspiracy theories is evidence comes from research on individual differ-
strongly rooted in negative emotions and automatic ences: Traits that are associated with an increased like-
processes. The cold, non-emotional states generally lihood of perceiving intergroup conflict also predict
associated with analytic thinking appear to decrease increased belief in conspiracy theories. One relevant
people’s belief in conspiracy theories. line of research focused on collective narcissism, that
is, exaggerated belief in the greatness of one’s ingroup.
Principle 4: Conspiracy Beliefs are Social Feelings of ingroup superiority imply that competing
outgroups are considered inferior, which may include
Conspiracy theories are a social phenomenon in that the moral inferiority that the main actors in conspiracy
they reflect the basic structure of intergroup conflict. theories are assumed to have. Higher scores of collec-
Conceptually, beliefs qualify as conspiracy theories tive narcissism indeed predict conspiracy theories that
only when they involve assumptions of a hostile and implicate competing outgroups (Cichocka, March-
threatening outgroup or coalition (Van Prooijen & Van lewska, Golec De Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016). Fur-
Vugt, in press). Moreover, these conspiracies typically thermore, collective narcissism at the national level
plan to harm or deceive not just one individual but a predicts how conspiracy beliefs about opposing politi-
wider collective, as is the case with conspiracy theories cal parties develop over time during a political election
implicating political organizations, branches of indus- campaign (Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018).
try, minority groups, managers, and so on. Accord- While findings on collective narcissism primarily
ingly, conspiracy beliefs flourish among members of emphasize how a strong ingroup identity—in the form
groups who are involved in mutual conflict (Pipes, of feelings of ingroup superiority—predicts belief in
1997). Consistently, while belief in conspiracy theories conspiracy theories, other individual difference traits
is empirically related to feelings of paranoia (e.g., Dar- are more directly linked with a structural tendency to
win et al., 2011), paranoia and conspiracy theories dif- perceive outgroups as threatening. Two key individual
fer in one respect: Paranoia is self-relevant and difference variables commonly connected to stereotyp-
necessarily pertains to suspected hostility against a per- ing and intergroup conflict are authoritarianism and
ceiver personally, but instead, conspiracy theories are social dominance orientation. Several studies have
usually conceived of as intergroup beliefs that assume found positive relationships between belief in specific
a powerful or hostile outgroup is conspiring against a conspiracy theories and these two individual differ-
perceiver’s ingroup (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2018; Van ence variables (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff &
Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014). Bruder, 2014; Swami, 2012). In sum, people who are
Conspiracy beliefs are therefore associated with dispositionally likely to perceive their ingroup as supe-
common motivations that drive intergroup conflict. rior or to perceive outgroups as threatening display
Two social motivations in particular are relevant for increased belief in conspiracy theories.
conspiracy thinking. The first motivation is to uphold Furthermore, experimental studies support the idea
a strong ingroup identity, which increases perceivers’ that the two key ingredients of intergroup conflict—a
sense-making motivation when they believe their strong ingroup identity and a sense of outgroup threat
group is under threat by outside forces. That is, people —jointly stimulate belief in conspiracy theories. For
worry about possible conspiracies only when they feel instance, taking the perspective of members of a group
strongly connected with, and hence care about, the increases belief in conspiracy theories, but only after
prospective victims of these conspiracies. The second receiving information that the group is under
social motivation is to protect against a coalition or threat (Van Prooijen & Van Dijk, 2014). Likewise,
outgroup suspected to be hostile. This outgroup typi- self-uncertainty predicts increased conspiracy beliefs,
cally has some threatening quality, such as power but only among people who feel included in a group
(e.g., politicians; managers) or negative stereotypes (Van Prooijen, 2016). These studies suggest that a
(e.g., minority groups) which reinforces people’s suspi- strong ingroup identity increases conspiracy theories,
cion towards these groups (Douglas et al., 2017; Van but only in conjunction with a sense of threat. Experi-
Prooijen & Van Lange, 2014). Thus, the combination mental studies conducted in Indonesia yielded similar
of a strong ingroup identity and a sense of outgroup conclusions. People whose Muslim identity was made
threat characterize the social dimension of conspiracy salient believed conspiracy theories—blaming terrorist
beliefs. These motivations are clearly visible in the attacks in Indonesia on a Western conspiracy—more
political arena, where Republicans often believe con- strongly than people whose Muslim identity was not
spiracy theories involving Democrats trying to harm made salient, but only when the West was described

902 European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas Conspiracy theories

as threatening to Muslims (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, perceivers and their social environment, theorizing on
2015). Finally, basic sense-making processes predict this phenomenon would benefit from more carefully
conspiracy theories only when a hostile outgroup is crafted experiments that manipulate conspiracy theo-
salient (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2018). ries (cf. Douglas & Leite, 2017; Jolley & Douglas,
Stigmatized minority groups constitute societal 2014a,b). This would enable researchers to establish
examples where these intergroup motivations often the exact psychological processes through which con-
are salient. Such groups tend to be highly cohesive, spiracy theories are consequential. This is important,
and hence have a strong ingroup identity; at the same because only a fine-grained understanding of these
time, stigmatized minority groups often suffer from possible consequences, as well as the conditions under
group-based oppression and discrimination by a more which they are strong or weak, will enable practition-
powerful majority group. One would therefore predict ers to estimate the risks of particular conspiracy theo-
that stigmatized minority group members believe con- ries and the need to implement preventive
spiracy theories more strongly than majority group interventions. Furthermore, in experimental studies of
members. Research indeed has found substantial con- conspiracy theories, behavioral measurements are also
spiracy theorizing among members of minority groups lacking (for an exception, see Van der Linden, 2015).
(Goertzel, 1994; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005). Further- For instance, does exposure to conspiracy theories
more, stigmatized minority group members believe influence cooperative behavior in economic games?
both identity-relevant and identity-irrelevant conspir- Likewise, do conspiracy theories causally impact anti-
acy theories more strongly than majority group mem- social behaviors such as aggression and egoism, but
bers (Van Prooijen et al., in press). These effects also prosocial behaviors such as helping and altruism?
emerge because minority group members blame the Experimental studies on such questions would com-
system for realistic problems of their community (i.e., plement existing insights on the consequences of con-
discrimination; see Crocker et al., 1999) and because spiracy theories in significant ways.
of a chronic sense of social devaluation (Davis et al., Next, whilst the available evidence supports the
2018). The social motivations described here provide principle that conspiracy beliefs are universal, research
an explanation why members of marginalized minor- needs to more directly and explicitly examine the dis-
ity groups are particularly likely to believe in conspir- tal, evolutionary roots of the human tendency to
acy theories. believe conspiracy theories. For instance, while anec-
Taken together, the findings reviewed in this section dotes exist of conspiracy theories in contemporary
underscore the social qualities of conspiracy theories. hunter-gatherer societies (Chagnon, 1988), and
Even when beliefs in conspiracy theories do not ethnographic studies suggest that citizens in all cul-
always have prosocial consequences (as illuminated in tures investigated so far believe conspiracy theories
the section arguing that conspiracy beliefs are conse- (West & Sanders, 2003), systematic research on con-
quential), they originate from basic social motivations spiracy theories in traditional societies is currently
that characterize intergroup conflict, namely to uphold lacking. The Adaptive Conspiracism Hypothesis asserts
a strong ingroup identity and to protect against a that conspiracy theories have been functional in
threatening outgroup. ancient hunter-gatherer societies to protect against the
perils of intergroup conflict (Van Prooijen & Van Vugt,
in press). Such lethal intergroup conflict still character-
Conclusions, Future Research, and Practical izes many traditional societies: For instance, Walker
Implications and Bailey (2013) examined violence in 11 traditional
societies in South America and found that an esti-
In the present contribution, our aims were to review mated average of 30% of adults in these societies dies
the literature of the emerging research domain of con- through violence, mostly committed by hostile coali-
spiracy theories, and to distill four basic principles that tions. Do citizens of violent traditional societies believe
characterize belief in such theories. These four basic conspiracy theories more strongly than citizens of
principles follow from a surge of empirical research on more peaceful traditional societies? And, how func-
this phenomenon that has been conducted in the past tional are conspiracy beliefs in traditional societies to
decade, and also are reflected in the contributions to cope with coalitional dangers, as for instance reflected
this Special Issue. At the same time, more theorizing in survival rates and offspring? While these questions
and research is needed to further develop the psychol- appear to be the domain of evolutionary anthropol-
ogy of conspiracy theories as a fully-fledged research ogy, they are important to understand why conspiracy
field. In the following section, we propose some possi- theories are such a universal feature of human
bilities for future research based on these four organiz- psychology.
ing principles. Next, research on the emotional roots of conspiracy
belief is restricted to experimentally inducing experi-
Future Research ences of threat (e.g., Jolley et al., 2018; Van Prooijen
& Acker, 2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) or to mea-
Focusing first on consequences, whilst it is clear that suring threatening or emotional experiences (e.g.,
conspiracy beliefs can have major ramifications for Jolley et al., 2018; Federico et al., 2018; Grzesiak-

European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 903
Conspiracy theories J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas

Feldman, 2013). We would advocate more sophisti- spread conspiracy theories that confirm the pre-exist-
cated methodologies to study emotions, and particu- ing beliefs of its members (Del Vicario et al., 2016).
larly recommend a physiological approach to Furthermore, through cultural transmission conspir-
understand the relationship between emotions and acy theories can turn into historical narratives among
belief in conspiracy theories. For instance, the amyg- citizens, which may perpetuate even when the events
dala is commonly associated with threat experiences, that triggered the conspiracy theory are no longer
and accordingly, bilateral amygdala volume has been salient or threatening (Van Prooijen & Douglas,
found to predict people’s tendency to justify the politi- 2017). An example is the assassination of President
cal system that they live in (Nam, Jost, Kaggen, Camp- John F. Kennedy: Belief in JFK conspiracy theories
bell-Meiklejohn, & Van Bavel, 2018). As such, brain- within the US has increased over the decades. Given
imaging methodology could test the prediction that the number of people who believe in them (in recent
amygdala volume is associated with conspiracy think- figures still more than 60% of the US adult popula-
ing. Likewise, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tion; Swift, 2013), they are likely endorsed by many
(DLPFC) is associated with higher-order cognitive pro- people who were not even born when JFK was assas-
cesses such as analytic thinking (e.g., Sanfey, Rilling, sinated. Yet, much is still unknown about how social
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), and research influence shapes conspiracy beliefs. For instance,
therefore might examine whether activation of this what determines if conspiracy theories spread to a
region predicts belief in, or rather skepticism of, con- large audience, and what makes them persuasive?
spiracy theories. Finally, research may examine if What are the characteristics of “successful” conspiracy
belief in conspiracy theories is related with activation theories that people still believe years after the events
of the sympathetic nervous system, or with the release that inspired them? Particularly in the current digital
of hormones associated with stress (i.e., cortisol) and age where information spreads faster than ever
intergroup competition (i.e., testosterone). before, examining social influence processes in con-
Regarding the social aspects of conspiracy beliefs, a spiracy beliefs may be a promising avenue for future
useful extension would be to focus on actual, real-life research.
conflict between competing groups. While it has been
noted that most wars in which humans have fought Practical Implications
have been characterized by excessive conspiracy theo-
rizing on both sides of the conflict, the evidence for An important task of psychology as a scientific disci-
this assertion comes mainly from historical sources pline is to inform policy-makers how to responsibly
(Pipes, 1997). As such, empirical research could exam- influence the behavior of citizens based on empirical
ine conspiracy theories among existing groups that are findings and theoretical insights. That conspiracy theo-
involved in intractable, and sometimes violent conflict ries are consequential and universal underscores a
(e.g., Palestinians vs. Israelis). Predictions that would need for interventions: If most of the consequences of
follow from existing research are that (i) many citizens conspiracy theories in modern societies are harmful,
on both sides of the conflict should have substantial and if conspiracy theories are widespread in the popu-
conspiracy beliefs about covert activities of the enemy lation, policy-makers have good reason to take this
group, (ii) these conspiracy beliefs should be relatively phenomenon seriously. This does not imply, of course,
stronger among members of the (military or politi- that our society should abandon efforts to combat
cally) “weaker” group in the conflict, and (iii) these actual corruption, or that citizens should uncritically
effects should be particularly pronounced among citi- accept any policy proposal of power holders. But, it
zens with a strong ingroup identity. Furthermore, lon- does imply that many conspiracy theories are irra-
gitudinal designs to investigate how conspiracy beliefs tional yet impactful and harmful, and hence, it is func-
develop over time are currently scarce (for exceptions, tional to reduce belief in conspiracy theories that are
see Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018; Vitriol & Marsh, unlikely to be true.
2018). For instance, assessing conspiracy beliefs at That conspiracy theories are emotional and social
multiple time points—ideally, pre-conflict, during con- offers practical tools for policy-makers to develop evi-
flict, and post-conflict—would allow researchers to dence-based interventions that help to reduce the
examine the temporal dynamics of the relationship appeal of conspiracy theories among citizens. First,
between conspiracy beliefs and intergroup conflict. because belief in conspiracy theories is to some extent
Such a longitudinal approach can also establish rooted in emotions, interventions could instead pro-
whether or not conspiracy beliefs cause intergroup mote analytic thinking among the public. Research
conflict or vice versa, and what exact role conspiracy indeed reveals that experimental manipulations
theories play in initiating or prolonging intergroup designed to stimulate analytic thinking decrease con-
hostilities (cf. Bartlett & Miller, 2010). spiracy beliefs (Swami et al., 2014). Furthermore, pro-
Finally, while our discussion of the social qualities viding rational arguments against specific conspiracy
of conspiracy beliefs has mainly focused on inter- theories reduces belief in them (Orosz et al., 2016),
group conflict, conspiracy beliefs are also social in the and can improve behavioral intentions (Jolley & Dou-
sense that they are highly susceptible to social influ- glas, 2017). This suggests that initiatives to refute
ence. For instance, online communities selectively implausible conspiracy theories (e.g., informing the

904 European Journal of Social Psychology 48 (2018) 897–908 ª 2018 The Authors. European Journal of Social Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J.-W. van Prooijen & K.M. Douglas Conspiracy theories

public what actual experts and witnesses have to say awareness that conspiracy theories are not exclusive
about pseudo-scientific “9-11 for truth” conspiracy the- to a few fringe groups or eccentric individuals, but are
ories; Dunbar & Reagan, 2011) do make a difference. widespread and have a major impact on society. By
The second is to instill feelings of security among the organizing the present Special Issue, and by articulat-
public, and provide them with a sense of hope and ing the four basic principles of this research domain in
empowerment. For instance, if experiencing a lack of the present contribution, we hope to further stimulate
control increases conspiracy beliefs, does experiencing research and inspire other researchers to start working
empowerment, that is, a high sense of control, reduce on this important topic. As illuminated in our agenda
conspiracy beliefs? Research suggests that this is indeed for future research and policy interventions, there is
the case. Van Prooijen and Acker (2015) found still much unexplored territory to be discovered in the
reduced conspiracy beliefs after activating a high sense psychology of conspiracy theories, and scientists and
of control as compared to a neutral baseline condition. policy-makers need to collaborate closely to address
Likewise, Whitson, Kim, Wang, Menon, and Webster this phenomenon effectively. We hope that in the
(in press) found similar effects of inducing a promotion end, the empirical contributions to this Special Issue
focus in participants, and these effects were attributable will contribute to decreased conspiracy thinking, and
to increased feelings of control. Future research may an increased emphasis on logic and reason, among citi-
expand on the ameliorating effects of more discrete zens in our society.
positive emotional experiences on conspiracy beliefs:
For instance, are citizens less suspicious of governmen-
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