134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of
Appeals

*
G.R. No. 98382. May 17, 1993.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

Mortgages; Due Process; Words and Phrases;

The requirement of weekly publication of notice of
extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages, means a
period of seven (7) days, inclusive of the 1st day of
publication.—We are not convinced by petitioner’s
submissions because the disquisition in support
thereof rests on the erroneous impression that the
day on which the first publication was made, or on
March 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant to
the third paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil
Code. It must be conceded that Article 13 is
completely silent as to the definition of what is a
“week”. In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36 O.G. 3139
[1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary,
Second Ed., 1972, p. 660), this term was
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting
of seven consecutive days—a definition which
dovetails with the ruling in E.M. Derby and Co.
vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38 Pac. Rep. 900 [1984];
1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated,
Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code, 1990, p. 46).

Same; Same; Same; A “week” means seven (7)

days inclusive of the day of publication.—It is
clear that the announcement on April 11, 1969
was both theoretically and physically
accomplished during the first day of the third
week and cannot thus be equated with compliance
in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a
measure of duration of time and without reference
to the calendar, it means a period of seven
consecutive days without regard to the day of the
week on which it begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p.
467 citing Derby).

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Certainly, it

would have been absurd to exclude March 28,
1969 as reckoning point, in line with the third
paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for
the purpose of counting the first week of
publication as to make the last day thereof fall on
April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of
extending the first week by another day. This
incongruous repercussion could not have been the
unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act
No. 3135 was enacted. Verily, inclusion of the first
day of publication is in keeping with the
computation in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

135
 VOL. 222, MAY 17, 1993 135

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

SCRA 122 [1983]) where this Court had occasion

to pronounce, through Justice Guerrero, that the
publication of notice on June 30, July 7 and July
14, 1968 satisfied the publication requirement
under Act No. 3135. Respondent court cannot,
therefore, be faulted for holding that there was no
compliance with the strict requirements of
publication independently of the so-called
admission in judicio.

PETITION for certiorari and intervention of

the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the

Court.
          Santiago, Jr., Vidad, Corpus &
Associates for petitioner.
     Pedro R. Lazo for spouses-intervenors.
          Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr. for private
respondent.

MELO, J.:

The notices of sale under Section 3 of Act No.

3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, on extra-
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage
are required to be posted for not less than
twenty days in at least three public places of
the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, such notices shall
also be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the municipality or
city.
 Respondent court, through Justice
Filemon Mendoza with whom Justices
Campos, Jr. and Aldecoa, Jr. concurred,
construed the publication of the notices on
March 28, April 11 and 12, 1969 as a fatal
announcement and reversed the judgment
appealed from by declaring void, inter alia,
the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of
realty, the final deed of sale, and the
consolidation of ownership (p. 27, Rollo).
Hence, the petition at bar, premised on
the following backdrop lifted from the text of
the challenged decision:

The facts of the case as related by the trial court

are, as follows:

“This is a verified complaint brought by the plaintiff for

the reconveyance to him (and resultant damages) of two
(2) parcels of land mortgaged by him to the defendant
Philippine National Bank (Manila), which the
defendant allegedly unlawfully fore-

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136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

closed. The defendant then consolidated ownership unto

itself, and subsequently sold the parcels to third parties.
The amended Answer of the defendant states on the
other hand that the extrajudicial foreclosure,
consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale to the
third parties were all valid, the bank therefore
counterclaims for damages and other equitable
remedies.
x      x      x
 From the evidence and exhibits presented by both
parties, the Court is of the opinion that the following
facts have been proved: Two lots, located at Bunlo,
Bocaue, Bulacan (the first covered by Torrens
Certificate No. 16743 and possessed of an area of
approximately 3,109 square meters; the second covered
by Torrens Certificate No. 5787, possessed of an area of
around 610 square meters, and upon which stood a
residential-commercial building were mortgaged to the
defendant Philippine National Bank. The lots were
under the common names of the plaintiff (Epifanio dela
Cruz), his brother .(Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The
mortgage was made possible because of the grant by the
latter two to the former of a special power of attorney to
mortgage the lots to the defendant. The lots were
mortgaged to guarantee the following promissory notes:

(1) a promissory note for P12,000.00, dated

September 2, 1958, and payable within 69 days
(date of maturity—Nov. 10, 1958);
(2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated
September 22, 1958, and payable within 49 days
(date of maturity—Nov. 10, 1958);
(3) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated June 30,
19581 and payable within 120 days (date of
maturity—Nov. 10, 1958) See also Annex C of
the complaint itself).

[1 This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the

plaintiff who claims that the correct date is June 30,
1961, which is the date actually mentioned in the
promissory note. It is however difficult to believe the
plaintiff’s contention since if it were true and correct,
this would mean that nearly three (3) years elapsed
between the second and the third promissory note; that
at the time the third note was executed, the first two
had not yet been paid by the plaintiff despite the fact
that the first two were supposed to be payable within 69
and 49 days respectively. This state of affairs would
have necessitated the renewal of said two promissory
notes. No such renewal was proved, nor was the
renewal ever alleged. Finally, and this is very
significant: the third mentioned promissory note states
that the maturity date is

137

VOL. 222, MAY 17, 1993 137

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

Nov. 10, 1958. Now, then, how could the loan have been
contracted on June 30, 1961? It will be observed that in
the bank records, the third mentioned promissory note
was really executed on June 30, 1958 (See Exhs. 9 and
9-A). The Court is therefore inclined to believe that the
date “June 30, 1961” was a mere clerical error and that
the true and correct date is June 30, 1958. However,
even assuming that the true and correct date is June
30, 1961, the fact still remains that the first two
promissory notes had been guaranteed by the mortgage
of the two lots, and therefore, it was legal and proper to
foreclose on the lots for failure to pay said two
promissory notes.]
On September 6, 1961, Atty. Ramon de los Reyes of
the bank (PNB) presented under Act No. 3135 a
foreclosure petition of the two mortgaged lots before the
Sheriff’s Office at Malolos, Bulacan; accordingly, the
two lots were sold or auctioned off on October 20, 1961
with the defendant PNB as the highest bidder for
P28,908.46. On March 7, 1963, Sheriff Leopoldo Palad
executed a Final Deed of Sale, in response to a letter-
request by the Manager of the PNB (Malolos Branch).
On January 15, 1963, a Certificate of Sale in favor of
the defendant was executed by Sheriff Palad. The final
Deed of Sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of
Property on March 19, 1963. Inasmuch as the plaintiff
did not volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two
lots, the PNB sold on June 4, 1970 the same to spouses
Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a” “Deed of
Conditional Sale”. (Decision, pp. 3-5; Amended Record
on Appeal, pp. 96-98).

After due consideration of the evidence, the CFI

on January 22, 1978 rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the

instant complaint against the defendant Philippine
National Bank is hereby ordered DISMISSED, with
costs against the plaintiff. The counterclaim against the
plaintiff is likewise DISMISSED, for the Court does not
believe that the complaint had been made in bad faith.
SO ORDERED.” (Decision, p. 8; Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 100)

Not satisfied with the judgment, plaintiff

interposed the present appeal assigning as errors
the following:

“I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING IN

FOOTNOTE 1 OF ITS DECISION THAT IT IS
THEREFORE IN-

138

138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

CLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE DATE “JUNE 30,

1962” WAS A MERE CLERICAL ERROR AND THAT
THE TRUE AND CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30, 1958.
IT ALSO ERRED IN HOLDING IN THE SAME
FOOTNOTE 1 THAT ‘HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING
THAT THE TRUE AND CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30,
1961, THE FACT STILL REMAINS THAT THE FIRST
TWO PROMISSORY NOTES HAD BEEN
GUARANTEED BY THE MORTGAGE OF THE TWO
LOTS, AND THEREFORE, IT WAS LEGAL AND
PROPER TO FORECLOSE ON THE LOTS FOR
FAILURE TO PAY SAID TWO PROMISSORY
NOTES”. (page 115, Amended Record on Appeal)

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

THAT THE PETITION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE WAS PREMATURELY FILED AND
IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER BECAUSE IT
MERELY FORECLOSED THE ORIGINAL AND NOT
THE AMENDED MORTGAGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

“IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AUCTION SALE WAS NOT
PREMATURE”. (page 117, Amended Record on Appeal)

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

“SUFFICE IT TO STATE THAT ACTUALLY THE
POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN TO THE PNB WAS
EMBODIED IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
(EXB. 10) WHICH WAS REGISTERED IN THE
REGISTRY OF PROPERTY OF BULACAN AND WAS
ANNOTATED ON THE TWO TORRENS
CERTIFICATES INVOLVED” (page 118, Amended
Record on Appeal).

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

“THE NOTICES REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 3 OF ACT
NO. 3135 WERE ALL COMPLIED WITH” AND ‘THAT
THE DAILY RECORD x x x IS A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION (pages 117-118, Amended
Record on Appeal).
 VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT

DECLARING THE

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Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

CERTIFICATE OF SALE, FINAL DEED OF SALE

AND AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION, NULL AND
VOID.

VII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING

DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY TO PLAINTIFF THE
PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY T.C.T. NOS. 40712
AND 40713 OF BULACAN (page 8, Amended Record on
Appeal)

VIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING

DEFENDANT TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF REASONABLE
AMOUNTS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES (page 8,
Amended Record on Appeal).

IX

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING

THE INSTANT COMPLAINT AGAINST THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, WITH COSTS
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. (page 118, Amended
Record on Appeal).” (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 1-
4) (pp. 17-21, Rollo)

With reference to the pertinent issue at

hand, respondent court opined:
The Notices of Sale of appellant’s foreclosed
properties were published on March 28, April 11
and April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper “Daily
Record” (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 108). The
date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the
dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135
requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
“published once a week for at least three
consecutive weeks”. Evidently, defendant-appellee
bank failed to comply with this legal requirement.
The Supreme Court has held that:

“The rule is that statutory provisions governing

publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must
be strictly complied with, and that even slight
deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni vs.
Ledesma, 64 Phil. 1058, G.R. No. 42589, August 31,
1937 and October 29, 1937). Interpreting Sec. 457 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in Sec. 18(c) of Rule
39, Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) in
Campomanes vs. Bartolome and

140

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

German & Co. (38 Phil. 808, G.R. No. 1309, October 18,
1918), this Court held that if a sheriff sells without the
notice prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure induced
thereto by the judgment creditor, and the purchaser at
the sale is the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely
void and no title passes. This is regarded as the settled
doctrine in this jurisdiction whatever the rule may be
elsewhere (Borja vs. Addison, 14 Phil. 895, G.R. No.
18010, June 21, 1922).
 x x x. It has been held that failure to advertise a
mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory
requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect
invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or
omission in a notice of sale will render the notice
insufficient and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314).”
(Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, L-48278, November
8, 1988; 167 SCRA 16, 23-24).

In view of the admission of defendant-appellee

in its pleading showing that there was no
compliance of the notice prescribed in Section 3 of
Act No. 3135, as amended by Act 4118, with
respect to the notice of sale of the foreclosed real
properties in this case, we have no choice but to
declare the auction sale as absolutely void in view
of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser
in said auction sale was defendant-appellee bank.
Consequently, the Certificate of Sale, the Final
Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation are
likewise of no legal effect. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)

Before we focus our attention on the subject

of whether or not there was valid compliance
in regard to the required publication, we
shall briefly discuss the other observations of
respondent court vis-a-vis herein private
respondent’s ascriptions raised with the
appellate court when his suit for
reconveyance was dismissed by the court of
origin even as private respondent does not
impugn the remarks of respondent court
along this line.
Although respondent court acknowledged
that there was an ambiguity on the date of
execution of the third promissory note (June
30, 1961) and the date of maturity thereof
(October 28, 1958), it was nonetheless
established that the bank introduced
sufficient proof to show that the discrepancy
was a mere clerical error pursuant to Section
7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Anent the
second disputation aired by private
respondent, the appellate court observed that
inasmuch as the original as well as the
subsequent mortgage were foreclosed only
after private respondent’s default, the
procedure pursued by herein petitioner in
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Philippine National Bank vs. Court of
Appeals

foreclosing the collaterals was thus

appropriate albeit the petition therefor
contained only a copy of the original
mortgage.
It was only on the aspect of publication of
the notices of sale under Act No. 3135, as
amended, and attorney’s fees where herein
private respondent scored points which
culminated in the reversal of the trial court’s
decision. Respondent court was of the
impression that herein petitioner failed to
comply with the legal requirement and the
sale effected thereafter must be adjudged
invalid following the ruling of this Court in
Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA
16 [1988]); p. 8, Decision, p. 24, Rollo). In
view of petitioner’s so-called indifference to
the rules set forth under Act No. 3135, as
amended, respondent court expressly
authorized private respondent to recover
attorney’s fees because he was compelled to
incur expenses to protect his interest.
 Immediately upon the submission of a
supplemental petition, the spouses Conrado
and Marina De Vera filed a petition in
intervention, claiming that the two parcels of
land involved herein were sold to them on
June 4, 1970 by petitioner for which transfer
certificates of title were issued in their favor
(p. 40, Rollo). On the other hand, private
respondent pressed the idea that the alleged
intervenors have no more interest in the
disputed lots in view of the sale effected by
them to Teresa Castillo, Aquilino and
Antonio dela Cruz in 1990 (pp. 105-106,
Rollo).
On March 9, 1992, the Court resolved to
give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective
memoranda (p. 110, Rollo).
Now, in support of the theory on
adherence to the conditions spelled in the
preliminary portion of this discourse, the
pronouncement of this Court in Bonnevie vs.
Court of Appeals (125 SCRA 122 [1983]; p.
135, Rollo) is sought to be utilized to press
the point that the notice need not be
published for three full weeks. According to
petitioner, there is no breach of the proviso
since after the first publication on March 28,
1969, the second notice was published on
April 11, 1969 (the last day of the second
week), while the third publication on April
12, 1969 was announced on the first day of
the third week. Petitioner thus concludes
that there was no violation from the mere
happenstance that the third publication was
made only a day after the second publication
since it is enough that the second publication
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of
Appeals

be made on any day within the second week,

and the third publication, on any day within
the third week. Moreover, in its bid to rectify
its admission in judicio, petitioner
asseverates that said admission alluded to
refers only to the dates of publications, not
that there was non-compliance with the
publication requirement.
Private respondent, on the other hand,
views the legal question from a different
perspective. He believes that the period
between each publication must never be less
than seven consecutive days (p. 4,
Memorandum; p. 124, Rollo)
We are not convinced by petitioner’s
submissions because the disquisition in
support thereof rests on the erroneous
impression that the day on which the first
publication was made, or on March 28, 1969,
should be excluded pursuant to the third
paragraph of Article 13 of the New Civil
Code.
It must be conceded that Article 13 is
completely silent as to the definition of what
is a “week”. In Concepcion vs. Zandueta (36
O.G. 3139 [1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law
Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p. 660), this
term was interpreted to mean as a period of
time consisting of seven consecutive days—a
definition which dovetails with the ruling in
E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al.
(38 Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code
of the Philippines Annotated, Twelfth Ed.,
1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 1990, p. 46).
Following the interpretation in Derby as to
the publication of an ordinance for “at least
two weeks” in some newspaper that:

. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the

exclusion of the first day’s publication from the
computation, and the cases above cited take this
case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ.
Proc. which excludes the first day and includes the
last;

the publication effected on April 11, 1969

cannot be construed as sufficient
advertisement for the second week because
the period for the first week should be
reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3,
1969 while the second week should be
counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10,
1969. It is clear that the announcement on
April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and
physically accomplished during the first day
of the third week and cannot thus be equated
with compliance in law. Indeed, where the
word is used

143

VOL. 222, MAY 17, 1993 143

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of
Appeals

simply as a measure of duration of time and

without reference to the calendar, it means a
period of seven consecutive days without
regard to the day of the week on which it
begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467 citing
Derby).
 Certainly, it would have been absurd to
exclude March 28, 1969 as reckoning point,
in line with the third paragraph of Article 13
of the New Civil Code, for the purpose of
counting the first week of publication as to
make the last day thereof fall on April 4,
1969 because this will have the effect of
extending the first week by another day. This
incongruous repercussion could not have
been the unwritten intention of the
lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted.
Verily, inclusion of the first day of
publication is in keeping with the
computation in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals
(125 SCRA 122 [1983]) where this Court had
occasion to pronounce, through Justice
Guerrero, that the publication of notice on
June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 satisfied
the publication requirement under Act No.
3135. Respondent court cannot, therefore, be
faulted for holding that there was no
compliance with the strict requirements of
publication independently of the so-called
admission in judicio.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari
and intervention are hereby dismissed and
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.

     Feliciano (Chairman), Bidin, Davide,

Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Petitions dismissed. Decision affirmed in

toto.

Notes.—A formal offer to redeem

accompanied by a bona fide tender of the
redemption price, although proper, is not
essential where the right to redeem is
 exercised thru judicial action (State
Investment House, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
215 SCRA 734).
The order for a writ of possession issues as
a matter of course upon the filing of a proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond (United Coconut Planters Bank vs.
Reyes, 193 SCRA 755).

——o0o——

144

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