The document discusses several cases related to the application of laws concerning criminal liability of juveniles. It summarizes key provisions of RA 9344 (Juvenile Protection Act) and discusses how it has impacted cases where the accused was a juvenile at the time of committing the offense. It also discusses principles of retroactive application of penal laws that are favorable to the accused. In one case discussed, the accused was found exempt from criminal liability under RA 9344 for rapes committed when he was 13 years old, but still civilly liable.
The document discusses several cases related to the application of laws concerning criminal liability of juveniles. It summarizes key provisions of RA 9344 (Juvenile Protection Act) and discusses how it has impacted cases where the accused was a juvenile at the time of committing the offense. It also discusses principles of retroactive application of penal laws that are favorable to the accused. In one case discussed, the accused was found exempt from criminal liability under RA 9344 for rapes committed when he was 13 years old, but still civilly liable.
The document discusses several cases related to the application of laws concerning criminal liability of juveniles. It summarizes key provisions of RA 9344 (Juvenile Protection Act) and discusses how it has impacted cases where the accused was a juvenile at the time of committing the offense. It also discusses principles of retroactive application of penal laws that are favorable to the accused. In one case discussed, the accused was found exempt from criminal liability under RA 9344 for rapes committed when he was 13 years old, but still civilly liable.
The document discusses several cases related to the application of laws concerning criminal liability of juveniles. It summarizes key provisions of RA 9344 (Juvenile Protection Act) and discusses how it has impacted cases where the accused was a juvenile at the time of committing the offense. It also discusses principles of retroactive application of penal laws that are favorable to the accused. In one case discussed, the accused was found exempt from criminal liability under RA 9344 for rapes committed when he was 13 years old, but still civilly liable.
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R.A.
9344 vis-à-vis PD 603 on suspension of sentence of juvenile
Declarador vs. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006 RA 9344 (Juvenile Protection Act) took effect on May 20, 2006. Pursuant to P.D. 603 a minor who (a) has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or (b) convicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or (c) by Military Tribunals cannot avail of suspended sentence. The law was reproduced in A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. “Punishable” means liable to be punished. It does not mean “must be punished.”. Thus, the term refers to possible, not to actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed. Disqualification is based on nature of crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which determines the disqualification of a juvenile. The law merely amended Art. 192 in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt. The other disqualifications in Art. 192 and Sec. 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Sec. 38 of RA 9344. Evidently, Congress intended maintain the other disqualifications in PD 603. Juveniles who have been convicted of a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from suspension of sentence.
Ortega vs. People, G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008
With the advent of R.A. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending, a new issue arises, whether the pertinent provisions of RA 9344 apply to him, considering that when he committed the alleged rape, he was 13 years old. However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, Guevarra v. Almodovar held: The basic reason behind the enactment of exempting circumstances in Article 12 - the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant has no intelligence, the law exempts him from criminal liability. It is for this reason why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act. Sec. 6 of RA 9344 provides that a child above 15 but below 18 shall be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he acted with discernment, in which case, he shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. Likewise, Sec. 64 categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of RA 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. It is imperative that the law be given retroactive application pursuant to the principle in criminal law that penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the RPC. Jurisprudence abounds that the principle has been given expanded application in certain instances involving special laws. R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception. The Court is bound to enforce the legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute. Intent is the soul of the law. Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL. Petitioner who is now 25 was only 13 at the time of the alleged rape. This was proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner's age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability. However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two counts of rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil liability. The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury resulting from the crime of rape. “A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, it was found that: “The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law. “The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law's greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court. 61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.”
Improvident plea of guilt; proof of minority; allegation of brother-sister relationship
People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, January 28, 2008 Where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to observe the following: 1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper “searching inquiry.” It is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain and be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and its consequences fully comprehended by the accused. Appellant was duly assisted by his counsel, both in his first arraignment and re-arraignment. In fact, it was his counsel who manifested before the trial court that appellant desired to change his plea from “not guilty” to “guilty” on all ten charges of rape filed against him by his younger sister. Besides being assisted by counsel all throughout the proceedings, when appellant was re-arraigned, the charges were read and explained to him in Ilocano, his native tongue. He cannot now claim that he was unaware of the consequences of his change of plea. More than that, appellant admitted raping AAA. When confronted by AAA, their mother, sister DDD , and their uncle RB, appellant readily admitted to violating his sister on at least three occasions. Sensing that AAA was only angered by his fractional admission, and through the prodding of his wife Josephine for him to admit the whole truth, appellant confessed to the ten counts of rape. While convictions based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses have been set aside because of the improvidence of the plea, the same holds true only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. There can only be improvident plea of guilt under Sec 3, Rule 116 where there is a possibility of accused being meted out the penalty of death. In the words of said section, “When accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry x x x, etc.” The rationale for this is to ascertain that accused truly understands the dire consequences of his plea. Considering that RA 9346 has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty, the raison d’etre behind said rule is absent in the case at bar. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the constitutive acts or omissions. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. It is already too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the information. He had all the time to raise this issue during the course of the trial, particularly during his arraignment. He could have filed for a bill of particulars in order to be properly informed of the dates of the alleged rapes. However, he chose to be silent and never questioned the information. As a result, he is deemed to have waived whatever objections he had; he cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief. Further, objections as to matters of form in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Nor was there any defect in the Informations when they merely averred that the victim was the youngest sister of appellant. Ferolino, said: “If the offender is merely a relation – not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, or guardian or common law spouse of the mother of the victim – it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to further allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree.” The present case is not within the contemplation of said ruling considering that in the Ferolino case, the victim is a niece of the offender while in the present case the victim is a sister. It was necessary in Ferolino to require that it must be specifically alleged in the Information that the offender is a relative within the third civil degree because there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil degree. However, a sister- brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother relationship exists in civil law that falls beyond the third civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in this case that the Information should specifically state that the appellant is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of the victim. This is an exception to the requirement enunciated in the Ferolino case. Further, what is required by the Rules is that “the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.” On the issue of age of the victim, it is enough that the victim testified on her age vis-a-vis the time she was raped. Pruna set out guidelines as to the appreciation of age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. Although the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party, its presentation into evidence is not a sine qua non requirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. In the absence of (a) certificate of live birth, (b) authentic document, or (c) testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. Not only did the defense fail to object to complainant’s claim to minority when it was consistently bared during the trial; the accused, through his plea of guilt, admitted to the victim’s age as alleged in the informations against him. Furthermore, appellant cannot claim ignorance of the age of the victim as she is his own sister. Anent the Pruna requirement that the court make a categorical finding as to age, AAA was not able to tell the exact month and date of the first nine incidents but this is not fatal to her credibility. She is only about 10 years old in 1995 and about 11 in 1996, she being born on Feb. 18, 1985 and therefore it is but natural for her not to remember the dates more so when it has a very negative, horrifying and traumatic effect and impact on her life. In order that the rape be qualified, there need only be one qualifying circumstance present. Here, there are two – relationship and age. Even assuming that the circumstance of age had not been duly proven, it makes no difference as to the final outcome of this case as the circumstance of relationship of appellant to the victim cannot be denied. RA 9346 took effect on June 24, 2006; appellant’s sentence should be downgraded to reclusion perpetua. Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty, he is not eligible for parole following Section 3 of the law.
R.A. 9344 vis-à-vis Probation Law and Dangerous Drugs Law
Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008 PP was charged and convicted for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Sec. 24 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed cannot avail of the privilege granted by PD 968. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation [plain-meaning rule or verba legis.] Speech is the index of intention. The intention in Sec. 24 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Sec. 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of Sec. 11 and 15. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like PP, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways. Had it been the intention of to exempt from the application of Sec. 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could have easily declared so. The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only 6 months rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Sec. 15, while one charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 Million. PP cannot argue that his right under RA 9344 was violated or that Sec. 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" applies herein. Sec. 68 of RA 9344 and Sec. 32 of A.M. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation. Suspension of sentence under Sec 38 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner's benefit because once a child under 18 is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Sec. 40 however, provides that once the child reaches 18, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Petitioner already reached 21 or over and could no longer be considered a child. Thus, the application of Sec 38 and 40 appears moot and academic.