‘The Russian state was more repressive under Communist leaders than under the

Tsars during the period 1855 to 1964.’ Assess the validity of this interpretation.
Daniel Jamour N17B

For the duration of the period 1855 to 1964 repression was widespread in Russia, be it under

the Tsarist rulers or the Communist leaders that succeeded them. From the Okhrana under the

Tsars, to the Cheka under the Soviet leaders - restrictions of liberty were just as transparent in

both totalitarian regimes. However, it has been made increasingly clear that the intensity of

this subjugation was far greater under the Soviet leaders, a period that lacked domestic

reform and became the direct result of over fifty-five million deaths, propelling the state into

a greater form of repression than that faced under the Tsars.

In fact it was Alexander II – a Tsarist leader – who took the first steps towards a Russia free

of repression, introducing the ‘1861 Emancipation Manifesto’ which granted over twenty
1
million serfs their liberty. ​ However, as Michael Lynch claims, ‘impressive though these

freedoms first looked, it soon became apparent that they had come at a heavy price for
2
peasants. It was not they, but the landlords who were the beneficiaries’ after all, it was the

Dvoriane (nobles) who had drafted the emancipation proposals - their benefit was inevitable.

The emancipation - though provided the serfs their liberty - led them into a life of even

greater poverty: ‘so reduced was the peasant as an agricultural worker by 1900 that only half
3
of his meagre income came from farming, he had to sustain himself by labouring.’ ​The

failure of Emancipation to satisfy the peasants is evident in the fact that the Ministry of the

Interior reported 647 peasant riots in the first four months of 1861 and 1159 for the whole

1
Mee, A., Hammerton, J. A.; Innes, Arthur D. (1907) ​Harmsworth History of the World: Volume 7​, Carmelite House, London; at page 5193.
2
Pushkarev S. (2012) ‘The Russian Peasants’ Reaction to the Emancipation of 1861’, Russian Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, (Blackwell Publishing,)
p. 199
3
Lynch M. (2003) The Emancipation of the Russian Serfs, 1861: A Charter of Freedom or an Act of Betrayal? History Review
 4
year.​ ​Nonetheless, though the emancipation saw immediate failure, Alexander’s intentions

were progressive, becoming a precedent in future cases of liberty.

A contemporary source that is valuable in showcasing the immediate effects of the

emancipation is one from Catherine Breshkovskaya, the daughter of a noble and, later, a

founder of the Socialist Revolutionary party:

‘The peasants, transferred from their homes against their wills and placed by their landlords

in a position of hopelessness, had ‘revolted’ several times, demanding that they be sent back.
5
They were punished for this. Every fifth or tenth man was flogged.’​

Riha identifies this source as a piece of propaganda, which can certainly be substantiated by

assessing the origin of the source; being that these events are described by the founder of the

Socialist Revolutionary party, it is hardly surprising that they are illustrated in such a way;

Breshkovskaya would have been keen to see the nobles undermined in order to promote the

rights of the people. It must also be considered that this was a time where many revolutionary

parties fought against the reforms proposed by the nobles, for example ‘The People’s Will’.

Having said that, Breshkovskaya mentions that the peasants were ‘transferred from their

homes against their wills’ which is certainly true; the peasants, when granted their liberty,

were freed of their work under their landlords, however consequently lost the property that

they had lived under. Moreover, Breshkovskaya further goes on to mention that the peasants

‘refused to work in a factory’, which links directly to Bushnell’s writing in which he

4
Pushkarev S. (2012) 'The Russian Peasants' Reaction to the Emancipation of 1861', Russian Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, (Blackwell Publishing,)
p. 199
5
​Riha T. (1964) Readings in Russian Civilization, vol. 2 (University of Chicago Press) pp. 359 – 61
mentions that ‘wages were low’ and ‘accident rates were high’ - it would not have been

uncommon for the serfs to refuse to work in these factories. Nonetheless, this source is

unequivocally an overt form of propaganda which, though perhaps conveys elements of truth,

cannot be seen as completely reliable, with the tone of the source only maintaining this idea -

demanding sympathy and encouraging insurrection against the autocracy.

That is not to say, however, that Alexander II’s reign was riddled with failed reforms. After

recognising the need for more liberal reforms he established local government bodies headed

by the nobilities, labelled the ‘Zemstvo’, just shortly after the emancipation of the serfs in

1864. This system of local self-government was represented at the lowest levels by the ‘mir’

and ‘volost’. The board consisted of five classes of members, including peasants and the less

wealthy, ensuring that the focus of improvement would partly come from those who suffered

the most. The Zemstvo was given large powers in relation to taxation and questions such as

education, medical relief, public welfare, food supply, and road maintenance in their

localities. However, though this was not as great as a success it could have been (for much of

the power was in the nobility), it was certainly a step in the right direction.

The death of Alexander II in 1881, however, saw a paradigm shift in the way of liberty for

the Russian people. It resulted in a great setback for the reform movement and those that he

had proposed. Just two days before he was assassinated he had been committed to releasing

plans towards a constitution for the Russian people; however, instead of following his

succession, his son Alexander III chose to abandon these reforms under the advice of his
6
advisor and ‘went on to pursue a policy of greater autocratic power’ .

6
Heilbronner, H. (1961) 'Alexander III and the Reform Plan of Loris-Melikov', The Journal of Modern History, 33:4 384-397, p. 386
The brunt of the repression faced during Alexander III’s reign was faced predominantly by

minority groups, namely the Jewish community. Revolutionaries called on the people to
7
rebel and the regime was compelled to protect itself, using the Jews as a scapegoat. The

‘May Laws’, enacted on 15​th​ May 1882, were intended only as temporary measures, however

remained in effect for more than thirty years. Numerous historians have acclaimed that

‘government-organized anti-Jewish riots (pogroms) broke out in a number of towns in

8
southern Russia. These disorders consisted of looting, murder and rape’ . As Samuel Joseph

writes, ‘lack of freedom, especially to the extent created by the May Laws, [barred] the Jews
9
from the possibilities of normal economic growth and progress.’ Even in the first year of his

rule, repression under Alexander III was made abundantly clear, far greater than that under

his father. This totalitarian mindset was one that would continue throughout and one which

inevitably led to the Russian revolution and the success of the Bolsheviks under Lenin.

This persecution of Jews also existed under his son – Nicholas II – and, when a wave of

pogroms broke out from 1903 to 1906, thousands of Jews were left dead. The 1905 pogrom
10
in Odessa was one of the more serious, with reports of up to 2,500 Jews killed. A primary

source by the New York Times titled ‘Jewish Massacre Denounced’ in 1903 reveals much

about the repression under the Russian state ruled by the Tsars and how it was viewed

internationally:

7
http://avaslan.net/The-May-Laws-of-1882
8
Ibid & http://www.haaretz.com/jewish/this-day-in-jewish-history/.premium-1.590624
9
Samuel J. (1914) Jewish Immigration to the United States from 1881 to 1910 Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. LIX, No. 4
10
Weinberg R. (1993) The Revolution of 1905 in Odessa: Blood on the Steps, p. 164.
 ​ here was a well laid-out plan for the general massacre of Jews on the day following the
​“T

Orthodox Easte […] "Kill the Jews", was taken up all over the city. […] The dead number
11
120 and the injured about 500. […] the city is now practically deserted of Jews.”

The first thing that must be considered from this source is its origin, which is vital in

assessing the validity of this source. This passage comes from an American newspaper, the

New York Times, which would certainly not have been eager to write positively of the

Russian state, for this was during a time period in which the American Jewish community

‘issued recriminations against the Russian central government that tried to deny the extent of
12
the violence.’ As well as this, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt finally agreed to cable his

personal protest to the Russian foreign minister, demonstrating U.S. policy towards Russia.

This is maintained when assessing the tone of the source, which is almost demanding

retaliation. The newspaper also writes that the ‘dead number 120 and injured about 500’ yet
13
the actual number of dead was 47-48. This false spreading of figures only supports the view

that this was nothing more than propaganda, being that the statistics were widely amplified in

order to maximise the brutality of the regime. The description of the incident and the writing

only further contends this idea, demanding sympathy by appealing to the idea of children,

‘babies were literally torn piece to piece’ as well as the description of a ‘bloodthirsty mob’

painting pictures of a foreign state which is dangerous to the country – precisely the aim of

the source. Nonetheless, the repression faced cannot be contradicted for the deaths still

existed and the repression faced, though perhaps not at such a scale which the Times wrote,

was still disastrous.

11
​https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/04/28/101992582.pdf
12
https://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm
13
Rubinstein H., Daniel C Cohn-Sherbok, Abraham J Edelheit, William D Rubinstein (2002) The Jews in the Modern World, Oxford
University Press
However, like his father, Alexander III also proposed reforms – his reign was not strictly

dominated by repression. An 1886 law certified the procedures for hiring and firing workers,

as well as regulating factory owners’ systems of workers’ fines. John Etty states that ‘these

reforms were inadequate, however. That factory inspectors were mistrusted by both owners

and workers alike was less problematic than the fact that there were just 267 of them in the
14
whole of Russia by 1897.’ This shows that, though Alexander III’s reign was not totally

repressive, he was not willing to support his reforms when they lacked strength, showcasing

that he did not value them as much as the ideals of repression he put forward. As well as this,

many of his reforms – such as the one mentioned - were only proposed due to the belief that

protecting workers from distress would help to defeat socialism; his motives were simply on

protecting the autocracy rather than the liberal ones of his father. However, Alexander III’s

reign clearly showcases that repression was still present under the Tsars, sustaining the idea

that it was only the intensity of this repression that separated the Tsarist rulers from their

successors.

The events that occurred on the 22​nd​ January 1905 under Nicholas II are, however, perhaps

the pinnacle of the repression faced by the people and the unjustness they faced at the hands

of the Tsarist regime. This event often acknowledged as one of the turning points in Russian

history and certainly one that influenced revolution and protest throughout the state. Known
15
as ‘Bloody Sunday’, this historic incident led to ‘a crowd of more than 3,000’ strikers

proceeding towards Winter Palace without any police interference. The shooting first

occurred between 10 and 11 am and resulted in a large amount of casualties. As Peter Kurth

14
Etty, J. (2008) Alexander III Tsar of Russia, 1881 - 1889, Profiles in Power, History Review
15
Gapos (1905) Address to the Tsar in Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, Vol. 1
states, the total number killed is uncertain but Tsar records show that 96 died and 333 were

injured, in contrast to this, anti-government sources claimed more than 4,000 dead; moderate
16
estimates still average around 1,000 killed or wounded. What must be assessed is the

context of this incident, a strike formed after four assembly members were unjustly fired

from their jobs, influencing the march on the Winter Palace, with estimates of up to 135,000
17
strikers. However, whether Nicholas can be held to blame for this incident is up to debate.

He did not give the command to fire upon the protestors, nor was it his idea, rather the lack of

organisation among the soldiers and the lack of instructions. As a matter of fact, Nicholas

himself wrote in his personal diary:

‘​The troops had to shoot in different places of the city, there were many dead and wounded.

Lord, how painful and bad!’

This illustrates his own grief towards the incident, questioning whether such repression can

be attributed to his rule. Nonetheless, it does accentuate the repression that was present

during h​ is reign, as well as the unjust actions in the working force that encouraged the

insurrection. This was an incident that cost hundreds of Russian people their lives, becoming

a symbol for many revolutions to come. A revisionist view on the incident, from Orlando

Figes, promotes the idea that the Tsarist regime was out of touch with the people and avoided

reform, writing that “although the regime succeeded in restoring order; it could not hope to

turn the clock back.”

16
Kurth, P. (1998) Tsar: the Lost World of Nicholas and Alexandra. Boston: Back Bay, p. 81
17
http://www.historyinanhour.com/2012/01/22/russia-bloody-sunday-1905/
The early 20​th​ century saw Russia fall into the hands of the Bolshevik party, under the

command of Vladimir Lenin What followed after is agreed upon by many historians to be a

much greater escalation of the repression faced at the hands of the Tsarist leaders, accepting

the interpretation that repression was greater under Communist leaders than the Tsars.

‘The Red Terror’ was a wartime campaign sought to defeat counter-revolutionaries during the

Civil War, one that was focused on targeting those who sided with the opposition, yet it led to

a period of major political repression throughout the Russian state. A contemporary source

that is useful to evaluate is that by Trotsky in which he attempts to justify the Red Terror:

‘​The first conquest of power by the Soviets at the beginning of November 1917 was actually

accomplished with insignificant sacrifices. The Russian bourgeoisie found itself so

18
demoralized by the regime of ​Kerensky.​ ..’

What is apparent with this source from the outset is that its origins lie with a leading

revolutionary of the Bolshevik party and a communist leader, so its validity must always be

questioned. This Marxist view is clearly one that attempts to rid the communist agenda of any

blame in the situation. Trotsky writes that the bourgeoisie were ‘so demoralized by the

regime of Kerensky’, identifying this piece as one of political propaganda by almost

demonising the opposition in order to build favour for the Communist party, as well as

justifying the Red Terror to the rest of the state; by opposing Kerensky’s regime this idea is

maintained, as it was through him that the Russian government fell in the hands of the

Bolsheviks. Moreover, for Trotsky to write that ‘the first conquest of power’ resulted in

18
Trotsky L. (1920) ​Terrorism and Communism​, ​Marxists.org​ p.66
‘insignificant sacrifices’ can be greatly contradicted by the fact that the deaths from the

Russian Civil War range up to 9,000,000, again questioning the validity of this source’s
19
statistics, supporting the view that this is nothing more than propaganda. This can be

contended by the way Trotsky describes the Communist party, calling it a ‘revolutionary

class’ which has ‘conquered power with arms in its hand’, rendering them as heroic. Trotsky

only goes further to create a villain out of the White Army, labeling them a ‘hostile army’,

further justifying the cause. This is more than apparent from the tone of the source, one that is

antagonistic towards the White Army and favourable towards the cause of the Red Terror.

For these reasons this source is not entirely useful in assessing the true horror behind ‘The

Red Terror’, as is made evident with the many propaganda-like aspects of the source.

One form of ‘terror tactics’ that was employed by the Red Army was the execution of

hostages, who were in most cases connected with desertions of peasants who were forcefully

mobilized. This form of repression was abundantly clear and much greater than any of that

faced under the Tsarist rulers, being that this forced mobilization led to almost 4 million
20
deserters in 1921. Up to 800,000 deserts were arrested in 1920 by the Cheka and special

divisions were created to combat these desertions. Thousands of deserters were ​killed, and

their families were often taken hostage. It was Lenin himself who ordered that ‘families and

anyone found to be assisting them in any way whatsoever are to be considered as hostages

and treated accordingly’ rendering the repression that these people faced as being the ​direct

command of the communist leader, rather than under Alexander II where much of the

repression was not instructed but as a consequence of failed reforms, contrasting these
21
rulers as one who advocated this subjugation against one who was a victim of his failures.

19
Figes O. (1997) A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution
20
Ibid, Chapter 13
21
Werth. N, Bartošek K., Panné J., Margolin J., Paczkowski A., ​Courtois​ S. (1999) The ​Black Book of Communism​: Crimes, Terror,
Repression, ​Harvard University Press​, hardcover, 858 pages, ​ISBN​ ​0-674-07608-7
During the Tambov Rebellion, one of the largest protests against the Bolsheviks, it is

estimated that around 100,000 peasant rebels and their families were imprisoned or
22
deported and up to 15,000 executed. This mass suppression and failure to heed its people

only further supports the idea that repression was far greater under the Communist leaders

than the Tsars, who at the very least tried to suppress rebellions by negotiating with the

people, a key example being the ‘October Manifesto’ proposed by Nicholas II after the

events at Bloody Sunday, reforms that were composed by his own motives. This campaign

led to the beginnings of the Gulag where many of the rebels were imprisoned and where the

treatment of the people was extremely unjust. Conditions in these camps led to high
23
mortality rates and “repeated massacres took place.” The Cheka also adopted the practice

of drowning bound prisoners in the nearby Dvina river, only taking this oppression even

further. It is also reported that occasionally, entire prisons were ‘emptied’ of inmates via
24
mass shootings.

Historical interpretations on the Red Terror differ greatly. For example, Richard Pipes, a

liberal historian, argues that the Bolsheviks needed to use “terror” to stay in power because
25
they lacked popular support. This is certainly evident through the repression faced by the

Cheka and the punishments forced upon those who opposed them, for example the

beginnings of the Gulag, formed in order to house the thousands of rebels in Tambov who

opposed the Bolshevik regime. Pipes then goes on further to assert that the foundation of

this violence lay in the ideologies of Marxism; Pipes directly quotes Marx, making it plain that
26
he is attacking the basis of the revolution. However, revisionist Orlando Figes - a former

22
Gellately R., (2007). Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe. ​Knopf​. p. 75. ​ISBN​ ​1-4000-4005-1​.
23
Ibid pp. 58–59.
24
Figes O. (1997), ​A People's Tragedy​: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924, London: Penguin ​ISBN​ ​0-670-85916-8​, pp. 647.
25
Pipes R. (2001), Communism: A History ​ISBN​ ​0-8129-6864-6​, p. 39.
26
Ibid, p. 39.
academic and professor at Trinity College, Cambridge - opposes this view, his own being

that the Red Terror’s reasoning was, not so much in Marxism itself, but in the turbulent
27
violence of the Russian Revolution. This interpretation accepts the violence that was

present during the Red Terror, similar to Pipes’ own argument, however Figes refutes the

notion that this was down to Marxism itself. Both interpretations hold value, for example

Figes is correct in substantiating that many Bolsheviks criticised the ideas of Lenin – yet

Pipes is also correct in his view that the ideologies of Marxism supported the Red Terror.

What must be noted is that both of these interpretations have come only four years apart, so

the access to resources and materials would have been entirely the same for both of them, it

is hard to differentiate them on that front. As many writings have also mentioned, Figes’ work

is based on his own research and therefore gives a much more detailed consideration as a

result. Having said that, Figes has also received criticism for his overly narrative style,

therefore some of his writing could be said to be skewed in order to present a more readable

form of writing. In contrast, Pipes is accepted as a more liberal historian, therefore perhaps

more ready to criticise the draconian regime under Lenin and would have advocated the

importance of Marx and his influence. Moreover, Figes has also described himself as being
28
a ‘mildly pro-Menshevik’ in an interview with Andrew Marr in 1997 , perhaps serving to

explain as to why he fails to put the blame entirely on the ideology of Marxism. However,

alike Figes, Pipes is strongly criticised over his views of late Imperial Russia for what he

claims is their inability to accept reality. Pipes, being a former academic and professor of

Harvard University, specializes in Soviet history and is often acknowledged as a committed

anti-communist, which perhaps explains his accusations against other historians of

anti-Semitism for their inability to accept the Russian roots of the Soviet Union – it is also

worth noting that Pipes was born into a Jewish family, perhaps why he feels so strongly on

the matter - which would also contend with accusations against Marx who often spoke of the

27
Figes O. (1997) ​A People's Tragedy​: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924, London: Penguin (​ISBN​ ​0-670-85916-8​, pp. 630, 649.
28
​https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/makers-of-their-own-tragedy-1275114.html
story of the Jews in contrast to modern Russia. Furthermore, Pipes has often stressed that

the Soviet Union was an ​expansionist​, ​totalitarian​ ​state​ bent on world conquest. This clearly

highlights the interpretation of the two historians as perhaps being in favour of their own

argument rather than the real distasteful nature of the events that occurred.

It was under Stalin, however, that the suppression of the Russian people seemed to escalate

entirely – affirming the view that the Communist leaders were much more repressive than

their predecessors. As a matter of fact, the estimates for the number of deaths under his
29
autocracy range from 624,890 to an alarming 61 million. This overt oppression is best

identified through ‘The Great Purge’ which saw an estimated 600,000 people die at the

hands of Stalin-led Soviet government in order to build an absolute autocracy and

30​
compliance to the Soviet regime. One of the primary elements of this order was the NKVD,

the Soviet secret police, responsible for the countless extrajudicial killings on ordinary

civilians as well as the composition of the Gulag, a forced labour camp which is infamous for

its unjust and harsh conditions. The NKVD were the base of many operations, however its

main policy lie in the killing of any political opposition, such as Sergei Kirov, a potential rival

to Stalin’s position who was shot dead by Leonid Nikolayev in 1936. Though this perhaps

does not rival the millions of death caused by other practices of Stalin’s regime, it does

indicate the loss of liberty from the Russian people by Stalin himself – inhibiting any real

opposition to his regime and therefore any democracy that would be allowed to exist. This

accentuates this regime as nothing more than repressive, with censorship correlating with

direct death, whereas policies under the Tsars were much less belligerent, after all it was

Alexander II who introduced the Zemstvo, a local governing body to listen to the aids of the

people. This is demonstrated further by the purge of the Red Army, with Stalin’s own

29
​Davies, Robert​; ​Wheatcroft, Stephen​ (2009). ​The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia Volume 5: The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture
1931–1933​. Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. xiv. ​ISBN​ ​978-0-230-27397-9​.
30
Pipes, R. (2001) Communism: A History (Modern Library Chronicles), pg 67
paranoia resulting in the death of approximately 30,000 members of the armed forces and

fifty percent of all army officers - a significant number. Moreover, the number of NKVD

prisoners is estimated today to be close to 1.3 million, only attesting to this idea entirely. This

clearly renders the early Stalinist regime as being nothing more than transparently

oppressive, ridding itself of any political opposition or, in fact, any liberty of one’s self entirely

if not able to move freely in their own views, with the collectivist government allowing nothing

more than absolute compliance to the Communist order.

Today, however, the one figure that seems to stand out the most is the estimated 10.5
31
million people that died during the ‘Great Famine’ of the early 1930s, a consequence of the

Soviet regime and the decline of food production that accompanied collectivization. Many of

the farmers during this time were reluctant to grow crops if forced to turn over their produce

to the state (as a result of the political climate) and those who refused to do so faced

execution or imprisonment, inhibiting any freedom of choice. As a result, farmers starved to

their death whilst working in fields and entire villages perished from starvation. This event

entirely renders the Communist regime in its draconian and totalitarian nature, one that was

much more apparent than that under the Tsars, with a death toll that great not being present

under any of the ruling Tsars. What is worse is that this was a ​direct ​consequence of the

Soviet ruler, Stalin, whose policies refused the farmers their food and any incentive to work

which, as a result, led to one of the greatest famines in mankind’s history.

Having said that, the intensity of this repression did ease up with the death of Stalin in 1953

and the installment of a new leader, Khrushchev, who denounced Stalin’s methods in his

‘Secret Speech’ and began progress towards a period of ‘de-Stalinization’. During this period

some positive changes certainly emerged, such as fewer repressions, selective rehabilitation

Davies, Robert​; ​Wheatcroft, Stephen​ (2009). ​The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia Volume 5: The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture
31

1931–1933​. Palgrave Macmillan UK. p. xiv.

of those sentenced and repressed in the Stalin period, partial liberalization of political life and

the slight weakening of the totalitarian regime. Furthermore, Khruschev also began the

liquidation of the Gulag as well as releasing a number of prisoners who had been unjustly

imprisoned under Stalin, a step towards a far less repressive regime than that which had

been faced in the previous decades.

Generally, however, Khrushchev’s policy lacked consistency. The food crisis was a direct

result of experiments in agriculture and saw an intense depletion of resources from Ukraine.

Furthermore, though it could be argued that Khrushchev certainly initiated a period of

de-Stalinization, it certainly was not without repression – as is evident in the Hungarian

Revolution of 1956 which was brutally repressed by Soviet force, with estimates of 2,500

Hungarians dead and 200,000 others who fled as refugees.

There are certainly two sides of the coin when comparing the repression faced under the

Tsarist rulers and the Communist leaders who succeeded them. However, it is transparent in

the millions of deaths suffered under the Communist regime that the latter was far more

repressive than the former which, though did face periods of fierce repression, also saw

periods of drastic and progressive reform - notably the Zemstvo and the emancipation of the

serfs. On the other side of the coin lie the Great Purge, the Tambov rebellion, the Great

Famine and the millions who died at the hands of the Communists as a direct result of

political repression. Though yes, Khrushchev began a period of de-Stalinization, this does

not discount the repression that was faced under his predecessors, nor does it certify

Khrushchev’s rule as a period free of repression, which it was not. This clearly outlines the

Tsarist rulers as being far less repressive than the Communist rulers, though at the same

time it would also be unjust to claim that both periods were not riddled with repression.
Contemporary sources:

● A contemporary source from Catherine Breshkovkaya, the daughter of a noble and a

later founder of the Socialist Revolutionary party ​(as cited in Riha T. (1964) Readings
in Russian Civilization, vol. 2 pp. 359 – 61)
● New York Times article titled ‘Jewish Massacre Denounced’ in 1903 ​(source:
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1903/04/28/101992582.pdf)
● A contemporary source by Trotsky ​(Trotsky L. (1920) ​Terrorism and Communism​ p.
66, ​Marxists.org)​

Bibliography
● Bushnell J. (1985) Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of
1905 – 1906
● Davies. R, Wheatcroft S. (2009) ​The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia Volume 5: The
Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture 1931–1933​. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
● Etty J. (2008) Alexander III Tsar of Russia, 1881 – 1889, Profiles in Power, History
Review
● Figes O. (1997) A People’s Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution
● Fisher A. (1978) The Crimean Tatars
● Gapos (1905) Address to the Tsar in Ascher, the Revolution of 1905, Vol. 1
● Gellately R. (2007) Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler: The Age of Social Catastrophe
● Heilbronner H. (1961) ‘Alexander III and the Reform Plan of Loris-Melikov’, the
Journal of Modern History, 33:4 384-397, p.386
● Kurth P. (1998) Tsar: The Lost World of Nicholas and Alexander. Boston: Back Bay,
p. 81
● Lynch M. (2003) The Emancipation of the Russian Serfs, 1861: A Charter of
Freedom or an Act of Betrayal? History Review
● Mee A., Hammerton J. A, Innes, Arthur D. (1907) Hamsworth History of the World:
Volume 7, Carmelite House, London
● Murphy D., Morris T., Staton R., Waller S. (2000) Europe 1760 – 1871
● Pipes R. (2001), Communism: A History
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Russian Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, (Blackwell Publishing,)
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● Rubinstein H., Daniel C Cohn-Sherbok, Abraham J Edelheit, William D
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Russian Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, (Blackwell Publishing,)
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● http://avaslan.net/The-May-Laws-of-1882
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