The Present Viability of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO

By A. E. P. DUFFY

ABSTRACT: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were consid-
ered necessary in the postwar period to protect member-coun-
tries from Communist aggression and conspiracy. Subsequent
developments have not always reflected the tidiness of inflexible
and implacable confrontation, however. Thus, the viability of
this postwar structure of alliances is raised ever more insist-
ently. Do NATO, SEATO, and CENTO serve any longer the
interests of the West? Or has the time now arrived for their
complete reappraisal? The view gains ground in western
Europe that there is now considerable diversity in the Com-
munist world, and that a policy of positive coexistence should
be pursued in the tackling of common problems with such coun-
tries as are ready to do so. In this fluid situation, a policy of
movement is desirable, especially in Europe, where economic
as well as political initiatives on behalf of a reconstructed

NATO can provide pointers for the continued viability of

CENTO and SEATO. The pending renegotiation of the
NATO Pact can provide such economic initiatives. It can also
provide the model of a self-supporting security system under
the Soviet-American nuclear balance.

A. E. P. Duffy, Ph.D., is Visiting Professor ofPolitical Science at Drew University.

He lectured at the University of Leeds, 1950-1963, and is a contributor to the Economic
History Review, Victorian Studies, and other scholarly journals. From 1963 to 1966 he
was a Member of Parliament, and from 1965 to 1966 he was Chairman of the Labour
party’s Economic Affairs and Finance Group in Parliament.
33
34

the end of World War II, spiracy. &dquo;It is still concerned with
S INCE
and the break-up of their wartime
coalition with the Soviet Union, the
this threat and still makes a most valu-
able contribution to a vital area of the
United States and Britain have con- free world,&dquo; declared Mr. Michael Stew-
ducted foreign policy on the assumption art, then British Foreign Secretary, at
of implacable hostility on the part of the meeting of the Ministerial Council
the Communists to non-Communists. of CENTO in Ankara a year ago. In
Inspired and unified by ideological con- one sense, he pointed out, successful al-

viction, this threat was seen as a Com- liances create their own problems. He
munist conspiracy that must be con- explained:
tained. NATO became the cornerstone
of such a policy as early as 1949, and By insuring peace they tempt the unwary
Communist insurrections in large parts
to question their continuing necessity and
to assume too readily that peace and free-
of Southeast Asia, the consolidation of dom can be maintained without continuing
Communist power on the mainland of vigilance and co-operative effort.
China, aggression in Korea and Tibet in
1950, and the success of the Vietminh Postwar developments have not al-
in Vietnam in 1954 were taken as con- ways reflected the tidiness of inflexible
firmation of the need for its extension. and implacable confrontation, however.
To meet this situation, delegates repre- The Soviet Union, through the medium
senting Australia, Britain, France, New of Mr. Khrushchev, made an early ap-
Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippine Re- peal for peaceful coexistence, and the
public, Thailand, and the United States United States generously donated aid to
signed the South East Asia Collective Poland, still formally a part of the Com-
Defence Treaty in Manila in September munist conspiracy. The bitterest ideo-
1954. The structure of alliances was logical quarrels have not occurred be-
completed with CENTO, formerly the tween East and West, but among Com-
Baghdad Pact, which originated on munist powers. Subversion has not
February 24, 1955, when Turkey and been confined to the frontier between
Iraq signed a Pact of Mutual Co-opera- East and West, nor has it all been Com-
tion, to which Britain, Pakistan, and munist-inspired. Finally, the two pow-
Iran subsequently acceded. After the ers that NATO and SEATO were most
revolution in Iraq on July 14, 1958, concerned to protect and contain,
Iraq took no further part in the work France and China, have been the most
of the Pact and formally withdrew, insistent on playing independent roles
whereupon the headquarters were trans- in the world. Thus, the viability of
ferred to Ankara and the new name, this postwar structure of alliances is
CENTO, was adopted on April 19, raised ever more insistently. Do NATO,
1959. The United States is not a signa- SEATO and CENTO any longer serve
tory, but takes full part in the work the interests of the West? Or has the
of the organization, and signed bilateral time now arrived for their complete
agreements of co-operation for mutual reappraisal to ensure that they relate to
security and defense with Iran, Paki- the strategic, political, and financial
stan, and Turkey at Ankara on March realities of today?
5, 1959. THE ALLIANCES REAPPRAISED
Thus CENTO, like its sister alliances,
NATO and SEATO, was considered Since 1949 NATO has achieved an

necessary to protect member-countries unprecedented degree of international

from Communist aggression and con- military integration, ultimately respon-
 35

sible for a hard-core force of 3,000 jet- are fast the pattern of world
changing
fighters and 23 divisions. It also led to politics, and when specific policies
the setting-up of the Warsaw Pact, cap- formulated in one decade need to be
able of deploying not only 3,000 jet- questioned in the next. Three principal
fighters, but 85 divisions. Obviously, it factors require consideration-the na-
was United States nuclear power in the ture of the the strategy of re-
threat,
background which made NATO mili- sponse, and the economic implications.
tarily credible, for Mr. McNamara has THE NATURE OF THE THREAT
now revealed that there are 7,000 nu-
clear weapons available to NATO. If Is communism still essentially one
reliance on nuclear deterrent strategy system, inherently aggressive, and leav-
contributed to the postwar stability of ing the West no alternative but to con-
Europe, it also masked the internal con- tain it by a series of pacts? Or, are
tradictions of NATO. But growing there not now various manifestations of
cost-consciousness on the part of the it permitting a much more fluid ap-
United States, as well as Britain, now proach to each Communist country?
exposes a whole series of differences on There is much evidence that political
strategy, manpower, supply levels, and and economic changes are, in fact, tak-
reinforcements. Without doubt, the ing place in eastern Europe. They have
future of Europe is being gradually re- evoked a ready response in western
shaped, but not by any conscious de- Europe, where the view gains ground
sign. The sentiment grows, therefore, that there is now considerable diversity
that these developments should be used in the Communist world, and that a
to reshape NATO to meet present-day policy of positive coexistence should
needs. be pursued in the tackling of common
The same view is entertained of problems with such countries as are
CENTO, as its Middle East members ready to do so.
demonstrate more anxiety about neigh-
THE STRATEGY OF RESPONSE
bors other than the Soviet Union: Iran
about Egypt, Pakistan about India, This is strikingly reflected in the pro-
Turkey about Greece over Cyprus, and ceedings of the ministerial council of
Britain and the United States about NATO, meeting in Paris last Decem-
their growing commitments to the Arab ber. For the first time, the discussion
conservatives. Moreover, Iran’s recent between the ministers revolved not
agreement to accept Soviet military aid around &dquo;deterrent&dquo; and &dquo;defense&dquo;
and the report that Pakistan has en- against Communist aggression, but
tered into a similar arms transaction around &dquo;d6tente&dquo; with the Soviet Un-
are taken as further evidence that ion and eastern Europe. Almost all
CENTO has outlived its military role declared that the structure of the alli-
of providing defense against Soviet at- ances must be changed, the emphasis
tack. on its military aspects reduced, and the
SEATO presents an equally obvious scope of its political and economic ac-
case of the need for drastic review. tivities increased.
France boycotts it; Pakistan enters into
an arms accord with the Soviet Union;
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
the response of member-nations to the To some extent this has already hap-
situation in Vietnam runs counter to pened in connection with NATO. In-
the organization’s &dquo;rule of unanimity.&dquo; creased emphasis on political and eco-
Clearly, this is a time when events nomic activities is now urged with re-
36

spect to CENTO and SEATO, as the tal loans for development, and (3)
Egyptians and the Chinese harness and help to redress adverse terms of trade.
manipulate local movements in order to The prospects for NATO renegotia-
promote their interests and eliminate tions are not promising, for the détente
those of the West. The defeat of such encourages centrifugal tendencies on
a movement in Indonesia suggests that both sides of the Atlantic. Some of
further countermovements should be America’s allies are suspicious of her
directed towards the promotion of the desire for a Washington-Moscow world,
indigenous strength of the countries of and chafe under her monopoly role;
both areas. Hence, the problems facing others call for a rival force to the
the alliances, if still political and stra- United States; yet others persist in pur-
tegic, will increasingly become financial suing domestic economic policies di-
and economic. rectly inimical to the NATO Pact. On
the other hand, the trend toward a new
A REVISED NATO AS A MODEL FOR system of European security coincides
CENTO AND SEATO with renewed interest by Britain in
joining the Common Market. For
In this fluid situation, a policy of Britain is peculiarly fitted to (1) help
movement is desirable, especially in provide Europe with a broader base for
Europe, where political and economic further economic integration; (2) work
initiatives on behalf of a reconstructed toward a system that can keep the
NATO can provide pointers for the peace in Europe, but under the Ameri-
continued viability of CENTO and can and Russian nuclear balance; (3)
SEATO. The renegotiation of the maintain the Atlantic Alliance; and (4)
NATO Pact, which must be undertaken help to keep Europe outward-looking
by 1969, can provide such economic and sensitive toward the economic
initiatives, for it will compel member- needs of CENTO and SEATO. Thus,
countries to address themselves pre- a reconstructed NATO may well be re-

cisely to those economic problems which garded as a model for CENTO and
progressively hamper the working of SEATO-the model, that is to say, of a
the alliances. They include, first of all, security system with a greater positive
the foreign exchange consequences of content and under the Soviet-American
troop locations and the desirability of nuclear balance: the means, the combi-
multilateral financial agreements de- nation of economic and defense arrange-
signed to neutralize them. But balance- ments. It would also have the merit of
of-payments difficulties will not be no- assisting member-countries fulfill their
ticeably eased unless, secondly, there is obligations under articles 55 and 56 of
a conscious effort to match the volume the United Nations Charter.
of liquidity with the requirements of
world trade. The creation of new in- EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE
ternational monetary reserves, though
facilitating international investment, will The NATO and Warsaw Pact mili-
not suffice to close the &dquo;technological can only be modified
tary dispositions
gap&dquo; unless it is associated, thirdly, with or otherwise transformed into peace-
further economic integration. Such making bodies in the context of an
developments Europe in would assuredly agreement on European security, of
meet the most urgent needs of CENTO course. The time may be ripe for such
and SEATO, which are ( 1 ) increased a conference. Mr. Rapacki, Polish
aid, at present limping badly, (2) capi- Foreign Minister, has renewed his cam-
 37

paign for a nuclear-free zone in Europe. in 1964. As in Europe, such economic

Mr. Kosygin’s recent tour of western developments call into question the old
European capitals has helped; so has the protective alliances. It is difficult to
restarting of the Geneva talks. Many conceive of any other market for Iran-
signs are set fair for a European se- ian natural gas than the Soviet Union,
curity conference, when such topics as for example.
troop reductions, denuclearized zones, Similarly, the greatest hope for South-
and guarantees for existing frontiers east Asia is that a counterweight to Chi-
could be raised and subsequently ex- nese power may also be built through

plored. Such a conference indeed may regional groupings. Already there is in

have to precede the signing of the nu- existence the embryonic Association for
clear nonproliferation pact. Southeast Asia, consisting of Thailand,
Prospects for a security conference Malaysia and the Philippines, but as yet
are enhanced by current economic de- it has too few members to have much
velopments. Eastern as well as western regional impact. It is to be hoped that
European countries are beginning to act Indonesia may soon be prepared to take
on their initiatives to promote better the lead in forming a more imposing re-
relations with their neighbors, as they gional structure. A stronger South-
become aware that their prosperity, like east Asian grouping could co-operate
that of other small countries in Europe, in its turn with a broader Asian organ-
depends on access to larger markets. ization and thus place the relatively
Despite foreign exchange difficulties, backward nations in this area in an
trade between Communist eastern Euro- economic relationship with Japan and
pean countries and the European Com- India, and all of them in a stronger po-
mon Market doubled between 1958 and sition to deal with China, if need be.
1965, according to figures released mid- To build a self-supporting security
March by the Common Market statis- system in Southeast Asia is a job that
tical office. Accelerating economic has to be done, for the moment, by
growth in eastern Europe will empha- America and Britain. But it is a job
size the desirability of transforming bi- that will, in the end, have to be taken
lateral East-West trading arrangements over by the Asians themselves, if there
into multilateral ties, which may yet is ever to be a natural equilibrium in
culminate in some kind of association that area. It will be a fragile structure
with a common market enlarged to in- to begin with, and dependent therefore
clude Britain and other European Free on American and British striking forces
Trade Association (EFTA) countries. serving as a nuclear long stop and pref-
THE OUTLOOK FOR CENTO AND
erably operating off-shore in the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. It will be increas-
SEATO
ingly dependent on public opinion
The encouragement of political and within, so there will be a continuing
economic as well as defense co-opera- need to avoid the occasion of anti-
tion is already an object of CENTO and American and anti-British feeling. It
SEATO. Many co-operative economic will also be dependent on economic aid
enterprises have been promoted under and, ultimately, international monetary
the CENTO program. The governments reform. Diplomacy has never been so
of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan have car- swift and so accessible as today, nor
ried this idea even further with the es- military weaponry so sophisticated.
tablishment of their own organization, Yet, international monetary relation-
Regional Co-operation for Development, ships remain comparatively primitive.
38

On the basis of the broad concepts 3. With the United States and
discussed, the following general proposi- Britain overextended, this eco-
tions are advanced: nomic potential will be devel-
1. NATO, SEATO, and CENTO oped to provide self-supporting
have all outlived their postwar security systems, strengthened
roles, and are no longer viable by economic integration within
militarily or politically. and economic assistance from
2. They do retain an important without, harnessing both nation-
economic potential, however. alism and regionalism.

* * *

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Do you think that in the future have nowreached the point where this
the division between the countries of the problem be tackled only systemati-
can
world is going to be between the North, cally. Itcan no longer be discharged on
which is rich, and the South, which is a charitable basis, or on the basis of

poor-a division which at least showed the nineteenth-century poor-law outlook.

itself in the conferences at Geneva in I grant that it may not be easy to link
1964 and which has developed since aid with reserve currency creation, but
then and become institutionalized in the we must see the two as objectives. I
&dquo;Group of 77&dquo; at the United Nations? am cheered by the very real evidence of
Do you think that this division will recent months that many leading figures
have something to do with the de- in the West, connected with the World
velopment of the three alliances that Bank and other such organizations, now
you discussed? see the need to treat the difficulties

arising from deficits and on balancing

A: I think that this is a very real of payments separately from reserve
contingency. That is why I stress the currency creation, and both, of course,
importance and the desirability of aid. separately from aid.
I was interested to read, since prepar- But I am arguing that the first two
ing my paper, the proceedings of the are now a condition of the third. I
meeting last week in Tokyo of the must say that I do not find it difficult
United Nations Economic Commission to believe that, without some such con-
for Asia and the Far East. Mr. Nyun, structive steps being taken soon, the
the Executive Secretary, said: &dquo;We are situation that you have just now postu-
witnessing the phenomenon of an in- lated, and which was envisaged in To-
creasing gap between the developed and kyo last week, may very well come to
the developing countries.&dquo; This seemed pass.
to me to be another way of saying ex-
actly what you have just said. We
must all be familiar with some such Q: Considering the growth of Gaull-
possibility from our own personal ex- ism in France and in Germany, and one
perience : in terms of brain drain that can add the growth of the Common
is offsetting aid granted to such coun- Market and of aid programs, could it
tries, as well as exchange difficulties not be said that NATO is really an
that hamper trade. anachronism, not only militarily, but
I was arguing this afternoon that we also economically?
 39

A: I could not go as far as that. I swered the question yourself. It is

certainly do not think that NATO is simply that certain countries felt that
an anachronism militarily-not yet. it was necessary to take steps to protect
Clearly, it needs to be looked at very themselves after the war, rightly or
closely in the light of today’s needs and wrongly, that they set up certain alli-
those of tomorrow. And, far from ances rather than looking to the then

sharing your view about its economic infant United Nations. However de-
capacity, I think that it now has a po- plorable this may seem to some eyes, it
tential that needs to be harnessed not nevertheless represented a policy that
only to the other alliances, but also to secured widespread agreement in the
the development of the poorer countries Western world.
of the world. It certainly has the And one of the most powerful reasons
wealth: 80 per cent of the wealth of why so much discussion is now going on
the world, excluding the Soviet Union, about the future of NATO is because
is to be found in the Atlantic Alliance. it has been so successful. And I did say
It needs, however, to be systematically in behalf of Mr. Stewart, former British
promoted, organized, and distributed. Foreign Secretary, that this view was
It was also said in Tokyo last week entertained with respect to other alli-
that none of the advanced countries of ances as well. And because these alli-
the West have yet achieved their own ances have been so successful, they have,

target of contributing one per cent of perhaps, lulled some citizens of the
gross national income to the underde- member-countries into a sense of se-
veloped countries. That is not quite curity that Mr. Stewart does not think
true. One country has done this; in- is justified.
terestingly enough, it is France. I
was taking a slightly different view,

you may recall, in my paper. I was

trying not to enter into any judgments
Q: Can you explain why our United about the justification of these postwar
States, after helping to set up the United postures and alliances, but rather to
Nations and signing its covenants, has suggest that they now need to be scruti-
shown an unwillingness to trust its own nized afresh. I hope that I convinced
creation, and rather puts its trust in you of the possibilities of their trans-
the greatest military apparatus the formation into security systems with
world has ever seen? Fundamentally, a positive content and, who knows,
is it not true that most of our frustrat- eventually into peace-making bodies.
ing world problems have their source I argued, on the basis of coincidental
in that mistake? Finally, to correct economic developments, that the re-
this situation, would not our most hope- markable degree of military co-operation
ful course be to strengthen the United which made NATO successful, however
Nations and to present our faith in it deplorable it might be to some people,
to the world as we remove our military is now reflected in the economic sphere.
posture over the world. International co-operation in the eco-
nomic sphere is now as indispensable
A: I am delighted to answer ques- to the renewal of NATO, or whatever
tions of this kind. But I think you will might take its place, as military inte-
appreciate that you have almost an- gration was in the 1950’s.