NATO and Strategy

Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance
Author(s): Robert R. Bowie

Source: International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 3, The Atlantic Community: Progress and
Prospects (Summer, 1963), pp. 709-732
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
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Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance
ROBERT R. BOWIE
THE debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control,

which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is
framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NA
area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in
themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their
handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United
States and a strong, united Europe.
A viable NATO strategy must therefore meet two criteria. Militarily, it must
assure the security of the NATO members and give them confidence to with-
stand Soviet nuclear blackmail or threats. Politically, it must pull the members
together rather than split them apart.
In this perspective, we shall consider first the sources of the present differ-
ences and the nature of the Soviet threat, especially for Europe. Then we shall
analyze the implications for: (i) NATO strategy and forces; (2) the control
of nuclear weapons; and briefly (3) the machinery for strategy within the
alliance.
SOURCES OF NATO TENSION
The current stresses and strains within NATO arise mainly from two causes
which have roots well back in time.
The first factor is the changing strategic environment for the United States
and the Soviet Union. This shift has been steadily taking place over the las
five or six years as the Soviet Union has developed a larger stockpile of im
proved weapons and advanced means of delivery.
ROBERT RICHARDSON BOWIE is Director of the Center for International Affairs and Clarence Dillon Profes-
sor of International Affairs at Harvard University. He was formerly General Counsel and Special Adviser
to the United States High Commissioner for Germany; Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of
State; and Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning.
709
7I0 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
The strategy which NATO developed in

the vast United States superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Against the whole range of Soviet threats to western Europe, NATO depended
on taking the initiative in using nuclear weapons and in carrying retaliation to
the Soviet Union itself. The shield forces, it is true, were to counter border
forays or minor incursions, if they occurred. In all other cases, however, any
Soviet intrusion was to be met with nuclear weapons from the outset, whether
or not the attacker used them. If strictly applied, this strategic concept would
have reduced the ground forces and supporting services to little more than a
trip wire. In practice, NATO plans continued to call for sizeable ground forces,
which NATO members were in no hurry to furnish.
In the I950's this strategy posed unacceptable risks for the Soviet Union and
acceptable risks for NATO for all levels of Soviet aggression. The Soviets
could not disarm the NATO nuclear strength even by a first strike; NATO
could threaten the first use of nuclear weapons and mean it. In case of war,
Europe would have been badly damaged, but would not have been destroyed.
The growth of Soviet nuclear missile capability has been eroding the credi-
bility of this strategy. The United States and its NATO partners still have
much larger nuclear forces than the Soviet Union. But even if NATO remains
"superior," the Soviet Union has, or soon will have, the means to severely
damage the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles and Europe
with medium range ballistic missiles, even on a second strike. And Soviet
nuclear plenty offsets the NATO advantage in tactical nuclear weapons. Nu-
clear strategy is still credible to deter general war against Europe or the United
States, or attempts to overrun Europe.
In view of its costs, however, can the threat to unleash nuclear weapons
from the outset assure that the Soviets may not undertake more limited probes
or threats in order to reap political gain? Is it prudent to continue to rely so
exclusively on this threat? If the Soviets should impede access to Berlin, for
example, would NATO have to choose between large-scale nuclear war and
doing nothing?
If the NATO threat proved a bluff, the damage to the whole structure of
collective defense would be catastrophic, regardless of the extent of any Soviet
probe. The alliance might then be subjected to severe strains merely by the
skillful use of threats or blackmail by the Soviet Union. The risks of undue
reliance on nuclear weapons have therefore become excessive. Of course, strate-
gic and tactical nuclear weapons still have a major role to play in the deterrent.
That is not at issue.
The question is a narrower one. Should the alliance expand and improve
STRATEGY AND ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 711
its conventional capability to provide more

erode the deterrent and tempt Soviet probe
The second source of cleavage in NATO has been the changing political
balance between the United States and Europe and within Europe. At the
time of NATO's inception, Europe was stagnant, weak, and fragmented. De-
spite the mutual interest in the defense of Europe, its members were wholly
unequal in size, power, or influence. Now economic revival and the European
Community have restored the strength and self-confidence of Europe and
nourished the sense of a common European destiny.
This emerging Europe deeply wants a more self-respecting role in the world.
This desire is already genuine and strong and will gradually become more of
a force. Europeans do not like the feeling of being wards of the United States.
One consequence has been questions iaboult Europe's share in NATO and,
especially, in the control of the nuclear deterrent. Among some, this interest
has been reinforced by concern lest the shifting strategic balance impair the
reliability of United States protection.
Despite its progress and potential, Europe cannot act yet as a great power
in most fields, including defense and foreign policy. Even if the European
Community develops rapidly, some years will elapse before it can act as a single
entity. In the meantime, the gap between aspirations and capabilities for ef-
fective action will cause serious tensions.
Moreover, the positions of Britain and France add a further complication.
Britain has seen herself as a focal point within three circles of power: the
Commonwealth, the Atlantic grouping with the "special relation" to the
United States, and Europe. Under de Gaulle, France, a leader for an integrated
Europe in the I950's, now aspires to greater independence, based on a sort of
French predominance in a loose European grouping of sovereign states. For
both, national nuclear forces appear to be a symbol and basis for status and
influence beyond their actual power.
These two factors-the changing strategic and political balance-substan-
tially affect the kind of strategy and forces which NATO requires for its de-
fense, and the respective roles for the Uniited Sitates and Europe in the alliance.
In assessing their effects, the allies have had different time lags: Europe, in
recognizing the real meaning of the changing strategic balance; the United
States, in responding to the shifting political balance. The succeeding sections
will deal with these issues in turn, with particular attention given to their
political, as well as their military, aspects.
712 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
NATO STRATEGY-CONVENTIONAL FORCES
In the debate over NATO strategy, the main issue has been how far NATO
should seek to widen the scope of alternatives for responding to threat or
aggression. To extend NATO's options, the United States has urged its allies
to build up conventional forces to about 30 divisions, with adequate equip-
ment and reserves, and has developed the concept of controlled response, espe-
cially for strategic nuclear weapons.
Many in Europe have opposed any major change from the I954 strategy,
with its heavy reliance on immediate use of strategic and tactical nuclear weap-
ons. They shy away from the greater costs of more and better ground forces
and reserves. They fear that stress on such forces may impair the deterrent
or tend toward inciting, instead of deterring, war. Some critics charge the
United States with seeking its own protection at the expense of European
security. Hence the debate raises serious issues of confidence among allies.
Does the emerging nuclear balance create real conflicts of interest between
the United States and Europe? Would the proposed revisions sacrifice Euro-
pean security for the benefit of the United States? In my opinion, there is no
basic conflict of interest. The necessity for change stems from the strategic
situation and would exist even if NATO were a single national entity. The
purpose and effect of the shift are to enhance the safety of the NATO area
as a whole, taking account of changing conditions.
The Nature of the Soviet Threat
Any serious analysis of NATO strategy should surely begin with the actual
nature of the Soviet threat today. How do the Soviets view force in the nuclear
age? They have tremendous nuclear capability and large ground forces within
reach of Europe, which they will doubtless use in pursuit of their foreign
policy. But whatever their desire to expand their sway, the Soviets seem fully
conscious of the strategic environment and of the restraints it imposes on their
freedom of action.
Party and official documents, speeches of leaders, and other writings and
statements reveal a definite pattern of Soviet thought regarding force under
modern conditions. It embraces several elements:
(i) Soviet leaders are convinced that all-out nuclear war would be a disaster
for the Soviet Union as well as for its enemies. They realize that their country
could not be defended in the usual sense and would suffer enormous damage
in case of nuclear war. The Party statement of I960 and Soviet comments on
it underscore the nuclear danger:
STRATEGY AND ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 7I3
Monstrous means of mass annihilation and d

if used in a new war, can cause unheard of
reduce key centers of world industry and culture to ruins. Such a war would
bring death and suffering to hundreds of millions of people, among them people
in countries not involved in it.'
Since the twentieth Party Congress, the Soviets have revised their dogma that
wars are inevitable so long as capitalism survives, on the ground that the com-
munist states are now powerful enough to deter wars by the "imperialists."
There is no reason to doubt that Soviet leaders want above all else to avoid
large-scale nuclear war. And it is safe to assume that they will persist in this
attitude as long as the United Staites 'and NATO retain a secure strategic force.
(2) The Soviet leaders are also keenly alive to the dangers of escalation of
limilted wars. In his report on the Moscow Conference in January i96i,
Khrushchev stressed this concern. After discussing the necessity for preventing
all-out war, he went on:
There is much talk now in the imperialist camp about local wars, and small-
caliber atomic weapons are even being made for use in such wars. A special theory
of local wars has been devised. Is this mere chance? Of course not....
There have been local wars in the past and they may occur again in the future,
but the imperialists' possibilities of unleashing such wars are becoming increasingly
limited. A small imperialist war, regardless of which of the imperialists starts it,
might develop into a world thermonuclear, rocket war. Therefore we must wage
a struggle both against world wars and against local wars.2
In general, Soviet military and other official writings emphasize the danger
that any limited war, especially in the NATO area, would mushroom into
general nuclear war.
(3) The Soviet leaders have not, however, forsworn all use of force or threats
of force. They undoubtedly view their military forces as mainly a political
instrument. That is made clear in their attitude toward wars of "national liber-
ation" or "popular uprisings" (such as communist subversion or takeover):
What attitude do Marxists have toward such uprisings? The most favorable [says
Khrushchev]. These uprisings must not be identified with wars among states,
with local wars, because in these uprisings the people are fighting to exercise their
right to self-determination, and for their social and independent national develop-
ment; ... Communists fully and unreservedly support such just wars and march
in the van of the peoples fighting wars of liberation.3
(4) The Soviet approach to force and the threat of force under present con-
'The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, December 28, I960 (Vol. XII, No. 48), p. 7:I.
2 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, February 22, I96I (Vol. XIII, No. 4), p. 8:2.
31bid., p. 9:2.
ditions is essentially one of "controlled"

not ready to take risks. What it does m
or provoke situations which are likely to get out of their control. They are
quite prepared to exploit fear of nuclear war or other forms of force as long
as they feel able to manage the situation should it threaten to get out of hand
or to entail serious risks of large-scale nuclear war.
In short, the Soviets appear to consider force and threats as a useful instru-
ment of their policy under two types of conditions. In the unstable, less-devel-
oped world, they will assist communist-dominated regimes in their struggle
to come to power and will extend the mantle of their military force to prevent
the overthrow of such regimes by the Western powers. In other areas, Soviet
use of force or threats will be mainly directed to the purpose of dividing the
West and of weakening NATO.
The crises in Berlin and Cuba are examples of the Soviet approach to force.
In Berlin they sought to exploit fear of nuclear war in order to change the
political status of the city and to create friction and division among the NATO
allies. From time to time they built up crises and tensions, but they took care
to assure that the situation never got out of their control. For example, when
the Berlin Wall was built, the initial steps were tentative and were taken by
the East Berlin authorities. Thus, the Soviet Union could readily have called
off the effort if it had appeared that Western reaction would have unduly
raised the risks.
Cuba shows the same tendencies. Some have construed the effort to place
missiles in Cuba as a rash act indicating the readiness of the Soviets to take
great risks. Actu'ally, their later response to the American embargo leads to
quite a different conclusion. They recognized, of course, that the placing of
missiles in Cuba would arouse American opposition. But apparently on the
basis of Laos, the Berlin Wall, the Bay of Pigs, and the various comments
about "defensive" weapons, they had concluded that the United States would
not respond precipitately but would protest and allow time for maneuver.
Thus, whatever the ultimate outcome, they expected to be able to manage
the situation so as to keep it under control and avoid undue risks. The em-
bargo posed the danger of a direct clash with United States forces, which
might escalate out of their control, even if it began at the level of conventional
forces. Hence they backed away.
Both Berlin and Cuba show that the Soviets are quite willing to use their
force or the threat of force to jeopardize major interests of the West when
they can do so without undue risks of losing control. Both cases also demon-
strate that the Soviets are alert to find vulnerable spots which they can exploit
under these conditions. Their primary aim is

ening the NATO alliance, by creating tensio
handling of such challenges.
Implications for NATO Strategy

If this appraisal is valid, it has great importance for the devising of an effec-
tive NATO strategy.
Obviously, adequate NATO strategic forces remain essential. They are the
backbone of the deterrent and the foundation for the present Soviet attitude
toward force. Such strategic forces must be sufficient to cover all the targets
related to deterring Soviet resort to large-scale war, whether threatening Europe
or the United States. But these essential weapons need not be located on the
continent of Europe. On the contrary, there are strong reasons for preferring
more remote locations, such as the high seas or the continent of the United
States. With greater invulnerability, they will provide better guarantees of the
security of the members of the alliance, allow more time for decision in case
of attack, and reduce the dangers of accidental war.
If NATO has adequate and secure strategic nuclear forces, there seems
virtually no risk that the Soviets would actually contemplate a massive military
assault on NATO. The specter of a Soviet effort to seize Europe while holdin
the United States at bay with the threat of nuclear holocaust seems fanciful.
Such a Soviet move could not fail to bring on general nuclear war and to be
suicidal. The United States would have no choice whatever. It is bound by its
most solemn commitments to the defense of NATO. It has over 400,000 soldiers
in Europe, more than the French and British together. If Europe came under
Soviet control, the United States would face an overwhelming complex of
industrial and scientific power. Its very survival would at once be in jeopardy.
Can anyone seriously think that the Soviets would gamble that the United
States would abandon its vital interests in this fashion? Nothing in the record
of the Soviet leaders gives any ground for supposing that they would play in
any such reckless way with the very existence of Soviet society.
The real danger lies elsewhere. If NATO depends almost wholly on the
prompt use of nuclear weapons, then the Soviets might be tempted to exploit
this dependence as a gap in the NATO armor. As in 'Cuba, they might seek to
create a limited fait accompli so as 'to confront the NATO nations with the
choice of d'oing nothing or of doing too much. If NATO lacks an adequate
conventional response, then the NATO nationis might end up by doing noth-
ing. As we have said, the political consequences would go far beyond the im-
mediate s'take. In seeking 'to divide the Western nations and 'to create frictions
and cleavages among them, Berlin is st

In this case, the NATO nations might h
access to Berlin. Similarly, the Soviets might try to make or threaten minor
grabs of small areas, in the belief that many in western Europe would urge
some compromise to avoid large-scale nuclear response. Finally, there might be
risk of actions against the periphery of 'the alliance. Here -again, the primary
aim would not be 'the taking of territory for its own sake, but the fatal bilow
to the confidence in collective defense and the solidity of the alliance.
Suitable conventional capability is essential to escape this danger. If NATO
has adequate ground forces, its members can respond promptly to any such
probe or thrust without being torn between two fears: (i) that an excessive
response will destroy them for seemingly small stakes; or (2) that no response
will leave them fully exposed to Soviet power.
Tactical nuclear weapons will not fill this need. NATO forces must cer-
tainly have such weapons as long as the Soviets have them and might possibly
use them. They could deter Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons and inhibit
the Soviets from concentrating ground forces in preparing an attack. But tacti-
cal nuclear weapons are no suibstitute for the option of using conventional
forces. To be sure, such weapons were a special benefit to NATO until the
Soviets also enjoyed nuclear plenty. Now tactical nuclear weapons offer no
unique advantage to NATO defense. In Europe, their use could well mush-
room rapidly into a conflict which would be indistinguishable from all-out
war for the Europeans. NATO should, of course, seek to develop more selec-
tive means to utilize such weapons, but there are serious obstacles in an area
as densely populated as western Europe. To destroy opposing missiles which
were concealed, mobile, or hard, both sides would have to resort to much
higher yield weapons, to saturation bombing of mobile targets, or to heavy
ground-burst weapons for fixed hard targets. Thus, tactical nuclear weapons,
if used on a large scale by both sides, would be disastrous in terms of destruc-
tion and civilian casualties. Indeed, the fear of such mushrooming could inhibit
any response which depends primarily on tactical nuclear weapons from the
outset. Of course, NATO should not reassure the Soviets that some tactical
nuclear weapons would not be used early; their uncertainty on this point adds
to the deterrent, if the conventional option makes NATO response more cer-
tain. But tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are credible mainly as a part of
the deterrent against all-out Soviet attack, just because their use would be so
likely to escalate rapidly. But for deterring and, if necessary, resisting such an
attack, strategic forces, which can threaten vital targets in the Soviet Union,
must be the primary component.
This analysis seems to me to make an overwhelming case for an adequate

conventional component of the NATO deterrent. But the critics raise several
questions: (I) Will not greater stress on conventional capability seriously
weaken the deterrent? Will the Soviets conclude that the NATO nations will
seek to forego the use of nuclear weapons? Will they then feel free to launch
major attacks to conquer Europe in the belief that they could do so without
the risk of nuclear war? (2) And what scale of forces is required, and can
the NATO members provide them? Does this strategy imply that the West
would have to build up conventional forces sufficient to conduct all-out defense
of Europe by ground forces? These are, of course, legitimate questions.
Efects on the NATO Deterrent

There are good reasons to conclude, however, that strong ground forces
would not impair the total deterrent, but enhance it. The wider NATO option
should discourage the Soviets from initiating any use of force or threat of force
in Europe.
Stronger conventional forces would reduce the heavy dependence on initiat-
ing the use of nuclear weapons for defense, especially against limited non-
nuclear attacks. In this way, NATO would avoid the ghastly dilemma wlhich
current strategy would invite: the choice of accepting local defeat or of
promptly using nuclear weapons. Instead, NATO would be able to combat
such non-nuclear threats in kind at substantial levels. Then the Soviets would
face the risks of nuclear expansion or spiraling, knowing that NATO could
not be paralyzed by nuclear blackmail.
The central point is that adequate conventional forces increase the certainty
that NATO will respond to any probe or limited threat and reduce the likeli-
hood of splits among NATO memibers about responding. With the conven-
tional option, its members will be far less likely to hesitate to react to any such
threat than they might be if NATO were virtually limited to nuclear response.
The added certainty of response does not mean that the Soviets could count on
hostilities remaining at the conventional level. On the contrary, they would
recognize that, if the conventional fighting should develop to substantial levels,
the risk of the situation getting out of control would be tremendous. Certainly,
in the NATO area no one could expect that fighting which might involve up
to 30 divisions on each side, plus reserves, could be turned on and off ac-
cording to Soviet pleasure. Violence under these conditions would not at all
fit the pattern of their preference.
Thus the revised strategy should reduce the risks of any fighting in Europe.
Against all-out war to conquer Europe, it would offer just as strong a deterrent
as before: the threat of strategic retali

alone, whether non-nuclear or nuclear, would allow-indeed force-the United
States to launch the first strategic strike, which would be even more devastating
than if they struck first at both the United States and Europe. But the Soviets
seem fully aware that any such move against either Europe or the United States
would be suicidal and would serve no rational Soviet purpose. This kind of
deliberate attack does not seem a real possibility as long as the strategic deter-
rent on our side remains strong and secure.
At the lower end of the military spectrum, better NATO ground forces
could hardly mislead the Soviets into risking limited actions which would not
otherwise tempt them. The prospect seems exactly the opposite. As long as
NATO had no real choice except nuclear response, the Soviets might consider
that lesser actions would impose very severe strains on the alliance. But with
adequate conventional forces and reserves, NATO could deal with any such
threats by actions more in keeping with their extent and would, therefore, be
less likely to hesitate to act. The effect would be to deprive the Soviets of lever-
age by blackmail. And the certainty of at least ground response would not
mean that the Soviets could count on controlling the situation in view of the
nuclear context in which they were acting. Once fighting began, it might spiral
into large-scale nuclear war and might trigger serious disorder or revolt in
eastern Europe. Both risks would make the Soviets more uncertain about the
ultimate cosits. Their cautious approach to crises which might get out of hand
and their firm determination to avoid all-out general war would, therefore,
reinforce their hesitancy about starting any such actions.
Amount of Conventional Force

How much conventional capability would NATO require on the central
front for these benefits ?
No one could claim to know exactly how many divisions and reserves would
be necessary. And certainly a layman should be the last to do so. Even so,
the preceding analysis of the S-oviet attitude toward force and the inherent
uncertainty of the nuclear environment suggest certain criteria relevant in fix-
ing the amount and kind of forces required.
Critics who talk of an effort to re-enact World War II are wide of the mark.
For an adequate deterrent, NATO does not need forces to deal with all-out
conventional conflict resulting from deliberate massive Soviet attack. The neces-
sary Soviet reinforcements for such an attack would surely give advance notice
to NATO that they were planning a major aggression, and forfeit the benefit
of surprise which they would otherwise enjoy. Any such Soviet action would
not make sense for them, for the reasons already discussed. For the Soviets to
count on NATO not to use its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons against
such an attack would constitute an incredible gamble, wholly out of character.
What NATO needs for an adequate conventional component of its deterrent
is the means to cope with more limited types of Soviet threats or thrusts of the
sort discussed above. On the central front, such actions might involve the exist-
ing Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland, which might be substantially
reinforced from the Soviet Union, and possibly supported by some of the
35 satellite divisions. NATO might have to resist a concentrated action at
some vulnerable point or take the initiative to reopen access to Berlin. In either
case, it would need to be able to handle this action without denuding or ex-
posing other sections of the border. Adequate conventional capability for such
purposes would assure that fighting could reach levels of violence which could
readily get out of control. The Soviet attitude toward force should make clear
why they are not likely to take the risks involved. With adequate NATO con-
ventional defenses, there is, therefore, little prospect that the Soviets would
start limited hostilities which could spiral into all-out conflict. They would
realize that an expanding conflict would greatly heighten the risks of general
war by decision, accident, or mistake.
The NATO target of some 30 divisions appears suitable for these pur-
poses in terms of numbers. But the required capability depends on much more
than numbers. Existing and future forces need to be trained, equipped, and
deployed more explicitly to perform such missions. Besides bringing divisions
up to strength, it is essential 'to improve greatly the mobility of a major part
of them and to unify logistics systems to allow this. And their training, artil-
lery, air support, etc., must be adequate for conventional combat and not de-
pendent primarily or entirely on nuclear weapons.
Sufficient reserves would also be essential, but they could be provided if the
NATO nations were determined to do so. A major cost would be re-equipping
the forces and providing adequate equipment for reserves. The real problem,
however, is not resources. What is essential is that the NATO nations under-
stand how the proposed ground forces relate to the maintenance of an effective
deterrent.
CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Nature of the Problem
With NATO strategy depending so heavily upon nuclear weapons, their

control has been central to the alliance from the start, and especially after
1954. The question of control has become a matter for serious debate, how-
ever, only in the last four or five yea

ing Soviet strength made the United S
her V-bomber force and France sou
as Europe revived its self-confidence a
While cast in military terms, the issues are at bottom political and deeply
enmeshed with the broader prdblems of adapting to new conditions the rela-
tions between the United States and Europe and within Europe. The handling
of these issues will in turn profoundly affect the future Atlantic bonds and
the shape of Europe as well.
Any serious discussion of nuclear control within NATO must recognize that
no solution will fully satisfy all the desirable criteria. As in most foreign policy
questions, each course has its advantages and weaknesses. The problem is to
compare the merits and defects of the alternatives in order to make the best
choice.
What should be the criteria for such a comparison? Any solution for nuclear
control, it seems to me, should be judged mainly by how far it fulfills three re-
quirements:
(i) It should reinforce Western unity. The growth of the European 'Com-
munity and the steady move toward Atlantic partnership have been the most
significant developments since the end of World War II. In the last year they
have suffered serious setbacks. Whatever is done in the nuclear field should
foster the progress and vitality of European integration and Atlantic partner-
ship and should not undermine or weaken these constructive trends.
(2) The solution should also assure responsible political control over the
weapons and unify the deterrent. It should be designed to take full account of
the integral character of the defense of the NATO area. It would be foolhardy
to suppose that a separate defense of either the United States or Europe is feasi
ble. But this need not mean a monopoly of control in a single hand.
(3) Finally, any solution should take account of the fact that the situation
is still evolving and evolving rapidly. The shape of Europe is not yet finally
determined. Obviously, various tendencies are contending for the ultimate
outcome. And the relation between the emerging Europe and the United
States also continues to develop. Hence, one should not assume that it will be
feasible to strike off a definitive answer now. What is needed is to lay the basis
for a constructive solution which can be worked toward over a period of time.
Broadly, three approaches have been proposed for sharing nuclear control
in NATO:
(I) The United States could share with its allies the planning, targetting,
and guidelines for nuclear forces, while retaining the ultimate decision on use,
STRATEGY AND ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 72I
(2) National French and British nuclear forces could be supported, with a
view to grouping them and some or all United States strategic forces under
some form of NATO force.
(3) An integrated multilateral nuclear force could be created, composed
either of Atlantic or European membership.
How do these several solutions compare in terms of the suggested criteria?
We shall examine them in turn.
Appraisal of Sharing of Planning
Greater sharing of data and cooperation in targetting and planning for nu-
clear forces and in developing guidelines for their use seem highly desirable.
Over the last year or so, such guidelines have been agreed on within NATO.
The steps are already under way to introduce NATO officers into the head-
quarters of the United States Strategic Air Command and to expand the allied
role in the nuclear p;lanning in the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in
Europe (SHAPE). These measures should be pursued vigorously and extend-
ed. The fuller NATO awareness of 'the United States nudear capability and
greater NATO participation in the plans for its use shoulld reassure the NATO
partners and enablle them to discuss nudear issues more realistically.
But will a larger share in planning, guidelines, and targetting satisfy the
other allies? Will it reconcile them to a virtual monopoly on the ultimate deci-
sion of use by the United States?
In strictly military terms it is probably true that the alliance would be best
served by such a unified control in the United States' hands. The evolving
nuclear stalemate has made the defense of the NATO area more than ever
a single problem. A separate nuclear war in Europe or in the United States
would be out of the question. Moreover, with the approaching nuclear balance
and the growing stockpiles, the need for controlled response is more and more
apparent. If nuclear weapons should ever be employed, it would be in the inter-
est of all to make certain that they were used to the minimum extent necessary
and under conditions which would create the least possible damage and de-
struction. That presupposes highly centralized con-trol.
Moreover, the idea that the United States would not be prepared to use its
nuclear weapons to defend Europe under appropriate conditions is hardly
tenable. The interests of the United States are so deeply involved in Europe
and its integrity that it must treat any effort to conquer the NATO area in
Europe as an attack on itself. If Europe were under Soviet control, the United
States would clearly be at the mercy of the Soviet Union. Hence, it would have
to treat any Soviet move to destroy or control Europe as a direct threat to its
own survival. It is true, of course, that all-out nuclear war is not a suitable
response for every kind of threat or danger. But this limitation on massive
retaliation does not arise from United States control of nuclear weapons or
from diverging interests between the United States and Europe. It would apply
regardless of who might have control. If the European nations, or any one of
them, had the full United States strategic capability, they would still find
themselves under the same constraints against using it against lesser contin-
gencies.
But continuing monopoly by the United States does not seem feasible any
longer. For one thing, Britain and France have launched their own programs.
They might be prepared in the future to merge these into some larger inte-
grated force in which they had a significant part; there seems little prospect
that either or both will simply abandon the nuclear field without any partici.
pation in some other way. But the problem really goes deeper.
The debate over strategy and nuclear control partly reflects discontent over
the position of Europe in the NATO alliance. With their enhanced confidence
and revived strength, many European members inevitaibly desire a larger part
in the planning of NATO strategy and in the control over the forces for its
defense, especially nuclear. Thus, many Europeans now feel that a virtual
monopoly in Uniited States hands is no longer appropriate or acceptable for
the long term. This feeling is mainly political, but it must be recognized and
treated as genuine and real.
If this analysis is correct, the desire of other allies for a role in nuclear con-
trol is not likely to be satisfied solely by measures for sharing knowledge and
planning. As has been said, such steps are overdue and should be valuable in
solidifying the alliance and mitigating some types of doubts or concern. But
they fall short of offering the Europeans a position as real partners, even for
the future. They are likely, in the long run, to feel that they remain wards of
the United States, if the real power of decision rests indefinitely with -the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Appraisal of National Nuclear Forces

How well do national nuclear forces fit our criteria? Britain and France
are, of course, engaged in developing such na!tional forces. By the Nassau Agree-
ment, the United States, which has been assisting Britain since I958, under-
took to help her create a Polaris submarine force with American missiles and
guidance systems, and the British agreed to devote their nuclear force to the
defense of NATO, except in extreme national emergency. For some years
France has likewise been building a national force, which will mainly consist
of Mirage bombers with atomic weapons i

verted to submarines with missiles in t
plans. After Nassau, de Gaulle rejected the
As Secretary McNamara and others have said, national nuclear forces in
Europe (i) are expensive; (2) are seriously divisive; and (3) fragment the
NATO strategic force.4
There is no need to argue the question of expense. The British experience
with the development of warheads, missiles, and, now, submarines has shown
the tremendous expense of trying to create even a small national force. The
United States spends $I5 billion a year for its nuclear capability. While the
British government claims thatt its nuclear strategic force absorbs only io per-
cent of its defense budget, this figure excludes the cost of the V-,bombers. The
best evidence of the burden is that Britain has had to abandon various missile
programs and contributes less than 55,000 men to the ground forces in Europe.
French expenditures for developing nuclear material, weapons, and delivery
systems are also heavy and will grow as the decade moves on. Naturally, the
costs of producing national forces would be materially reduced by United
States assistance in technology, materials, and equipment. The question then is
whether the interests of 'the alliance justify 'the United States in helping such
national forces. If not, the allies should not be assisted to pursue a course which
does not benefit collective defense.
The political effects of such national forces are bound to be divisive within
NATO. The United Kingdom and France have justified their forces on the
basis of the changing strategic balance. In his January I4, I963, press confer-
ence, General de Gaulle said, "No one in the world-particularly no one in
America-can say if, where, when, how, and to what extent the American
nuclear weapons would be employed to defend Europe."5 Thus the French
force, though miniscule, is supposed to protect France and Europe from Soviet
threats and attack: it is to deter the Soviets when United States forces alone
would not. In his article in the May I963 issue of the Revue de la Defense Na-
tionale, Pierre Messmer, Minister of the Armed Forces, has written:
Only [those which possess atomic weapons] . . . are capable of defending their
freedom and their life, the others are doomed to subservience or satellite status.
. . . That is why the Americans and the Russians are hostile to the appearance
of national nuclear forces which make their policy of hegemony more difficult
and risk compromising its results.6
4 See his speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, June i6, I962. The New York Times, June I7, I962.
5 Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. I85,
January I4, I963, p. Io.
6 Pierre Messmer, "Notre politique militaire," Revue de Defense Nationale, May I963, pp. 760-76i;
reprinted in English in Release No. I55 (French Affairs) of Press Service of French Embassy, p. I2.
In defending their national force, th

essentially simil-ar points. According
enhances Britain's influence on American policy and in the world; indeed,
it enables Britain to have an independent foreign policy. The V-bomber and
later the Polaris force, it is explained, are necessary in order to maintain an
effective deterrent under the conditions of nuclear balance. In insisting on the
Nassau Agreement, the British government showed that it still hankered after
an independent role; as in the I950's, its nuclear force is the means to inde-
pendence and influence in world affairs. In his main speech in the House of
Commons debate on the Nassau Agreement, Prime Minister Macmillan, in
supporting the independent British deterrent, said:
I do not believe that our Western Alliance could really stand permanently if
in this vital [nuclear] field the United States were given for all time the sole
authority. We are allies. We must remain allies, but we must not become satellites.
I can understand why the French government, who are a world power as well
as a continental power, wish to develop their own nuclear force.7
Mr. Thorneycroft, the Defense Minister, was even more explicit:

Assuming that we did not [have a British deterrent], then any nuclear threat
to this country would have to be met by a counter-threat from outside.... Could
we always count, in the world as it is today, upon an ally at our side? Does our
history really bear out such an assumption?8
And in concluding the debate, the Prime Minister reiterated this and other
arguments.9
But by this logic, each NATO nation would have to develop its own nuclear
striking force. According to this theory, since no nation will risk suicide to
defend another, the French or British forces could hardly be expected to pro-
tect other European nations. Thus the Germans and others are bound to be
faced sooner or later with the question of whether they should have such
forces. Against this, it has been argued, first, that Germany is forbidden by the
Western European Union (WEU) treaties to make nuclear weapons; second,
that domestic pressures do not yet exist in Germany for a national nuclear
program; and third, that any program would be hampered by lack of test areas.
Yet these limits on German action hardly seem likely to last if the United
States assists France and Britain to develop and maintain national forces. Such
United States assistance would inevitably underwrite the premises used to
justify such forces: they run counter to collective defense; they certainly do
7 Hansard, January 30, I963 (Vol. 670, No. 46), Col. 96I.
8 Hansard, January 31, I963 (Vol. 670, No. 47), Col. II54.
9 Ibid., Col. 1251-1253.
not reinforce it. The German leaders have repeatedly stated that the Federal
Republic cannot indefinitely accepit a second class status or discrimination. Now
that it is back in the family of Europe, it is enititled to be treated once more
as a full partner. Indeed, this principle has been the basis of the European
Community since I950, and it was reasserted by de Gaulle on his visit to Ger-
many. Hence, over the long pull, the I954 WEU limitation can hardly keep
Germany from demanding equal nuclear status with the United Kingdom and
France. If Germany is not treated as an equal, this discrimination will produce
friction and discord. Aversion to a German naftional nuclear force would create
tensions and cleavages witlhin the alliance which the Soviets would certainly
seek to exploit. In either case, the unity of the alliance will be seriously
jeopardized.
The damage from assistance to French and British national forces would
go even deeper. The French force is mainly a means for political primacy: a
symbol to distinguish her from Germany and Italy. It reflects de Gaulle's con-
cept of a Europe, based on nation-states, cooperating under French hegemony.
In essence, this concept is the opposite of European integration through the
European Community. Hence, assistance to the French effort would endorse
de Gaulle's concept of Europe and would jeopardize support for the genuine
integration of the European Community. Moreover, assistance to the British
force has much the same effect. The campaign of Macmillan to show that the
British force is the keystone of an independent British foreign policy reveals
the ambiguity of the Conserva'tive approach to Europe. In helping the British
force, the United States appears to underwrite this ambiguous attitude.
Despilte these objections, it has been suggested that helping the French and
British forces would offer the best route to a European or joint force. 'Given the
reasons advanced for such national forces, any such British-French force, even
if agreed to, would certainly leave intact the national forces under some facade,
as has been done in the so-called inter-allied nuclear force recently set up by
NATO, to which the British have "assigned" 'their V-bom'bers, while retain-
ing the national command structure and the right to withdraw for national
purposes. This would be a far cry from an integrated European or NATO
force. Any such truly integralted force would have to be set up so that the Ger-
mans and others could take part in it as equals; and to be reliable it would
need to 'be so organized that it could not be pulled apart into national com-
ponents. Otherwise it could be a source of jockeying and bargaining rather
than unity. Half measures will hardly satisfy a German aspiration for equaliity.
Germany and other European nations would certainly not be content with
merely taking part in a "control group" for French and British national forces.
Inevitably, they would expect such na

the decision of Britain or France, and
equality, the Germans would be led
whether by removal of the United States joint control of nuclear warheads,
by French assistance, or in some other way.
Far from fostering an integrated force, this course could actually o;bstruct
it. The experience of the United Kingdom suggests that the burden of a na-
tional force might ultimately generate support for an integrated NATO or
European force, even in France. But United States assistance to British and
French national forces, which would assure their success and reduce their bur-
den, would tend to remove this pressure on them to move toward a genuine
integrated force.
In short, support for national nuclear forces would seriously compromise or
undermine basic United States and NATO interests. It would sharpen cleav-
ages within the alliance and create new tensions between its members. Such
national forces are bound to waste resources, to be ineffective deterrents, and
to be divisive within the alliance. Aiding the F-rench and British forces can
only underscore and justify their asserted rationale. De Gaulle would clearly
use such help to advance his own aims for a "Europe of nations" which could
undermine the alliance and the European Community. If the Germans and
others are driven to seek such forces, 'the political strains on the alliance will
be severe.
The creation of a NATO or European umbrella for such forces, or even a
control group including other nati-ons, has none of the advantages of an inte-
grated multilateral force. The national components can always be pulled out
of the NATO commitment. And such a control group appears to legitimize
the national forces without solving the problems of discrimination or duplica-
tion. For these and other reasons, aid for national forces, far from leading to a
joint integrated European force, would tend to damage seriously both Euro-
pean unitty and collective defense.
Appraisal of a Multilaterd Integrated Force

Thus far, our analysis of nuclear control within NATO has concluded that
inde3finite United States m'onopoly is not feasilble, even with shared planning
and that national forces in Europe, even under some form of group control,
will not meet the criteria essenitial for a solution reinforcing the alliance, Euro-
pean integration, and Atlantic partnership.
There remains the alternative of a multilateral force which is genuinely
integrated. Would it enable the sharing of nuclear control in a manner com-
patible with the wider political aims of E

was proposed in I96o by the Eisenhower A
May I96I by President Kennedy at Ottaw
Rusk and McNamara at the NATO meetings in December I96I and May I962.
Since October I962, it has been under discussion among various NATO mem-
bers.
A multilateral force could be consti(tuted most readily by using ships, either
surface or submarine, with Polaris missiles. In such a force, the ships and the
missiles should be owned and controlled by the participants jointly, with no
separate national ownership or control. They should be manned and operated
by crews of mixed nationality in which no NATO member would predomi-
nate. Thus, no member could control the force or pull it apart. The task of
organizing, training, and managing the force could be centralized in a joint
executive agency.
The creation of crews compoised of several nationalities would not be as
difficult as some assume. Since the numbers are small, the members could be
selected with great care. According to competent naval experts who have an-
alyzed the problem, such crews could be trained and be fully effective for the
operation of either surface ships or submarines.
Mixed manning is a crucial feature to assure that such a joint force could
not be. pulled apart. In a force composed of national unilts, the risk -that one
member may pull out its component makes for great uncertainty regarding
planning or use. If the force is fully integrated, no one participant can with-
draw any part of the ships. This is important for several reasons: The full
force could be counted on for performing a specified strategic function. In the
absence of national units, no member could threaten or undertake withdrawal
as a lever or pressure on the others. Moreover, no one nationality would have
unimpeded access to missiles or equipment aboard ship. Beyond this, unlike
divisive national forces, the joint force with mixed manning would be a strik-
ing symbol of the cohesion of the alliance and of the mutual dependence of
its members for their security.
The hardest problem regarding a multilateral force is control over its use.
This issue also opens up questions as to which nations should participate in
the force and how it should be related to other NATO or United States forces.
A multilalteral force should clearly not be designed for a separate defense of
Europe; it should be combined with American nucflear force in planning, tar-
getting, and other ways. The defense of NATO is undoubtedly a single prob-
lem; strategic nuclear war could not be limited to Europe or the United States.
But the Atlantic area is not a single political unit, and until it is, control will
present an ultimate dilemma. In the long run Europeans are not likely to be
satisfied with a solution which leaves all decisions to a President elected by only
one portion of NATO. Yet, in practice the issue seems more itheoretical than
real. It is extremely hard to envisage a case where Europeans would wish to
use strategic nuclear weapons when the United States would not be ready to
do so. What is involved is more a matter of self-respect. Many Europeans want
to feel that they have a genuine participation in the nuclear deterrent. And if
they are to be treated as partners in the nuclear field, some way must be de-
vised to provide for greater equality, at least for a unified Europe, in the matter
of nuclear control.
If Europe moves toward unity, the United States should be willing -to reor-
ganize the force, if the Europeans desire, to permit ifts operation and use with-
out the veto of the United States. In the Nassau Agreement we accepted the
right of Britain to withdraw and use its Polaris force in an extreme national
emergency. We should be ready to concede to a multilateral force the same
degree of ultimate autonomy as has already 'been granted the British national
force. The final outcome might take the form of either (i) an integrated
NATO force in which the United States, without a veto, would be one mem-
ber, or (2) an integrated European force (without the United States as a mem-
ber), closely coordinalted with United States forces, 'but under ultimate European
control. Either 'form has its disadvantages. But either would be far better than
the continuance and spread of national nuclear forces, which involve serious
problems in more intractable forms. Some have expressed concern that an
eventual European force would split the alliance. But this would depend on
whether Europe and the United States recognized the fact that their -security
was bound togeher by the faclts of 'life. These perspectives are important, but
they are in the future; 'the ifinal form will depend greatly on the course of
events, especially in Europe.
Admittedly, for the present, the issue of control is inevitably complex. It is
manageable only if handled as an evolving factor. At the start, control can
only be exercised by a committee of some or all of the participants. Under
current proposals, the United States would be a member, and each major par-
ticipant would retain a voice in control of the force, which in practice amounts
to a veto. Any such force will take time to create. Even if surface ships are
used, its formation will probably require 'five years or more. While the force
is being developed, trained, and put into operation, the control issue will not
have to be finally settled. And even in the first stage of operations, control
could be handled by unanimity. The group could agree in advance to use the
force to retaliate against large-scale nuclear attack on the NATO area; in
other cases the group would have some time to arrive at a joint decision, espe-
cially if NATO maintains adequate conventional forces. Thus, in the first
instance, the need for unianimity would be solved by prior agreement; in the
second, it would be possible to arrive at a method of meeting an attack through
joint consultation.
During this decade, the shape of Europe will be evolving. Hopefully, it will
be advancing toward greater political cohesion and ability to act as an entity.
If that occurs, the control formula can be revised to provide for decision by less
than unanimity, if the members wish.
From the comments in Germany and elsewhere, the leaders of those coun-
tries appear 'to view the proposal in these terms. For the initial period, they are
ready to rely on some form of committee where each major nation has a voice.
But for the future, they expect to review this issue to decide whether or not the
United States would give up its veto, especially in favor of a united Europe.
Thus, a multilateral force would provide a framework for meeting any de-
mands for an integrated European force. It should therefore offer the chance
for greater -cohesion wiithin the alliance. It should satisfy the 'German and
Italian desire for equal treatment and a voice in nuclear defense without the
creation of politically divisive national forces. Those Europeans who favor an
integrated Europe can regard the multilateral force as a factor moving Europe
in that direction.
What are the prospects for an integrated force ultimately absorbing the
British and French national forces? The British might well join the multi-
lateral force, even though retaining their national force for the present. As
British opinion reappraises its national position, pressures to merge the British
force into the joint force are likely to grow. France would certainly not take
part in creating such a force under de Gaulle. But as outlined by M. Messmer,
the French force of three nuclear submarines will not be completed until I973,
even if the plans go forward as he hopes. Experience of that decade may well
change the French attitude after de Gaulle. The objection that a multilateral
force will tend to divide the alliance by isolating France is hardly valid. Actu-
ally, France has isolated herself by her insistence on a wholly independent
national nuclear force. To refrain from action in which France may not join
would give her a veto and paralyze the alliance.
In summary, a multilateral force offers a constructive method for handling
the issue of nuclear control within the alliance. In its initial form, it is no final
or perfect solution. As has already been stated, however, there is no perfect
solution under existing conditions. The alternatives are clearly less constructive
and offer less hope for the future.
An Anglo-French nuclear force would hamper real European integration.

Assisting the national programs would solidify the commitment of France
and Britain to national forces, encourage de Gaulle's concept of a Europe based
on nation-states, push the Germans and Italians ultimately to a national nuclear
effort, and fragment the alliance.
In contrast, a multilateral force avoids or resolves many of the problems
posed by naitional forces in Europe, whether or not grouped together. Unlike
national forces, a multilateral force would not fragment the alliance, but would
tend to pull it together. Such a force would also enable the Federal Republic
and Italy to have a proper part in nuclear defense without raising the specter
of a separate German 9-trategic force. The question of discrimination against
the Germans or other nations would not arise. The cost of such a force would
be materially less for the members. By combining their efforts, they could
create a respectable nuclear force without unduly diverting resources from
more adequate conventional forces. The multilateral force should foster Euro-
pean integration by bringing together the Five and the British into an inte-
grated nuclear effort, open to France when she is ready to join. By initially in-
volving the United States, the multilateral force would offer the best prospect.
Even if it developed into a European force, it would still have close ties with
the United States.
In short, among the alternative means for sharing nuclear control, the multi-
lateral force seems 'to offer the route toward a solution most compatible with
our bisic goals of European unity and Aitlantic partnership.
NATO MACHINERY
The tensions and disputes within NATO over strategy and nuclear control
have arisen mainly from (i) the inherent complexity of adapting strategy and
forces to changing conditions; and (2) differences in political purposes and
priorities generated partly by the shifting political balance among its members.
But the effort to overcome these obstacles has been badly handicapped by seri-
ous weaknesses in the NATO machinery for dealing with these matters.
The alliance has had no adequate focal point for analysis and discussion of
the military and political issues involved. The NATO Council cannot meet
this need: its members are seldom highly qualified for strategic analysis and
must depend mainly on instructions from their governments. The various
statements and replies are, therefore, essentially methods of transmitting views
formed in the capitols. Thus, discussions of the Council can hardly be expected
to achieve real consensus. Nor is the NATO Secretariat staffed to provide
STRATEGY AND ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 73I
studies or advice on strategic is;sues; th

to rely on 'the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) as his princi-
pal advisor on them.
The result has been to distort somewhat the role of SACEUR. During his
tenure General Norstad, who earned the respect and confidence of key Euro-
pean governments, was often a spokesman or conduit for their views within
the alliance. While this service met a real need, the Supreme Headquarters of
the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) is not an ideal locus for planning and
analyzing NATO strategy. Inevitably, its approach has serious limitations, with
a tendency ito pose the issues too narrowly in the terms of the European theatre,
and with the- bias of any command to favor having control over the requisite
weapons and their use, as in the case of land-based medium range ballistic
missiles. A more serious handicap has been the failure to integrate political and
military factors into the strategic analysis. SHAPE can hardly be expected to
perform this function which national governments commit to their defense
and foreign ministries.
With inadequate machinery, the efforts to revise NATO strategy and forces,
which were bound to be controversial, have been marked by more acrimony
and distrust than necessary. The initiative taken by the United States, often
by statements at the semi-annual ministerial meetings, has generated resent-
ment among many NATO members. Given the nature of such meetings and
the absence of a suitable forum for follow-up, they have often felt that the
United States was seeking to call the tune unilaterally. The fact that few of
the other NATO members had the informed basis to judge the American con-
clusions has only heightened the sense of frustration. The resulting atmosphere
of doubt and irritation has hardly been conducive to sober reappraisal or solid
consensus.
NATO should act to correct this deficiency in machinery and shared knowl-
edge. The steps taken at the Ottawa meeting in the spring of i963 should be
a start: ithe SHAPE nuclear planning and liaison at the Strategic Air Com-
mand (SAC) in Omaha wvilll at leasit expand 'the paricipation in the exisiting
system of planning and targetting. Bult more is required.
NATO also needs a high official who could act as a sort of NATO defense
minister charged with strategic analysis and planning for the alliance. He
might be a deputy secretary-general but should have independent standing
and authority. What is important is that he be the servant of the alliance as a
whole, and that the various members respect his capacity and objectivity. To
do his job, he would need a small, expert staff of qualified civilian and military
planners. (The Standing Group should either be transferred to Paris to serve
as part of his military staff or be repl

same time the Military Committee [which now includes all members] might
also be moved to Paris where its members could serve primarily as military
advisors to the permanent representatives on the Council.) The task of the
NATO defense minister would also be to keep in close contact with govern-
ments and to bring together key national officials for joint discussions.
Such a NATO defense minister, assisted by a proper staff, should be able
to facilitate consensus on NATO strategy and on future revisions. By counter-
acting the existing imbalance in data, this agency would enable the Europeans
to participate more effectively in the debate on, and analysis of, strategic issues.
Hence, the result should be to dissipate some of the tensions and doubts which
are now too widespread.
Even with such an agency, however, NATO will not easily and quickly
reach agreed solutions for its prdblems of strategy or nuclear control. While
the security interests on both sides of the Atlantic largely coincide, NATO
members will inevitably view the strategic issues from differing slants'resulting
from their differences in size, power, geography, and other factors. Many of
these can be ironed out by discussion or adjusted by sensible compromise.
Some, however, especially on the question of nuclear control, are likely to be
more intractable. Their source is not mainly misunderstanding albout military
factors, but complications arising from a deeper divergence on purpose or
priorities. Even such issues, however, should benefit from having a better al-
liance forum for airing and debating them. That will at least make it easier
to disentangle the genuinely military aspects from the other factors and, per-
haps, thereby put in clearer perspective the real reasons for positions taken.
But among the Atlantic nations, relations for some years seem certain to be
marked by friction, dispute, and tension. In this period Europe is trying to
formulate its shape and its purposes, and Europe and the United States are
seeking to revise their relations and develop some new pattern which will be
viable for the next stage. Obviously, both processes interact. And these proc-
esses and their interaction are bound to create turmoil and debate among the
Atlantic nations on many different topics for some time to come. It is essential
to keep their controversy in perspective. With the communist world and the
less developed n;ations in flux, the Atlantic nations have an h'istoric role to help
direct this change into orderly and constructive channels. In this crucial era,
they must not permit divergence among themselves to sever the close working
ties required to carry out these historic tasks.

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Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance

Author(s): Robert R. Bowie

THE debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control,

SOURCES OF NATO TENSION

The strategy which NATO developed in

its conventional capability to provide more

NATO STRATEGY-CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The Nature of the Soviet Threat

Monstrous means of mass annihilation and d

ditions is essentially one of "controlled"

under these conditions. Their primary aim is

Implications for NATO Strategy

and cleavages among them, Berlin is st

This analysis seems to me to make an overwhelming case for an adequate

Efects on the NATO Deterrent

as before: the threat of strategic retali

Amount of Conventional Force

CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nature of the Problem

With NATO strategy depending so heavily upon nuclear weapons, their

ever, only in the last four or five yea

Appraisal of Sharing of Planning

Appraisal of National Nuclear Forces

of Mirage bombers with atomic weapons i

In defending their national force, th

Mr. Thorneycroft, the Defense Minister, was even more explicit:

Inevitably, they would expect such na

Appraisal of a Multilaterd Integrated Force

patible with the wider political aims of E

An Anglo-French nuclear force would hamper real European integration.

studies or advice on strategic is;sues; th

as part of his military staff or be repl

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