G.R. No. L-27833: Supreme Court

G.R. No.
L-27833
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY

RELIEF RE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT 4880.
ARSENIO GONZALES and FELICISIMO R. CABIGAO,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
F. R. Cabigao in his own behalf as petitioner.

B. F. Advincula for petitioner Arsenio Gonzales.
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections. Sen. Lorenzo Tañada
as amicus curiae.
FERNANDO, J.:
A statute designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the

electoral process by Congress calling a halt to the undesirable
practice of prolonged political campaign bringing in their wake
serious evils not the least of which is the ever increasing cost of
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/apr1969/gr_l-27833_1969.html 16/01/2019, 4A07 PM

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seeking public office, is challenged on constitutional grounds. More
precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Thus the question confronting this Court is one of transcendental
significance.
It is faced with the reconciliation of two values esteemed highly and

cherished dearly in a constitutional democracy. One is the freedom
of belief and of expression availed of by an individual whether by
himself alone or in association with others of similar persuasion, a
goal that occupies a place and to none in the legal hierarchy. The
other is the safeguarding of the equally vital right of suffrage by a
prohibition of the early nomination of candidates and the limitation
of the period of election campaign or partisan political activity, with
the hope that the time-consuming efforts, entailing huge
expenditures of funds and involving the risk of bitter rivalries that
may end in violence, to paraphrase the explanatory note of the
challenged legislation, could be devoted to more fruitful endeavors.
The task is not easy, but it is unavoidable. That is of the very

essence of judicial duty. To paraphrase a landmark opinion, 1 when
we act in these matters we do so not on the assumption that to us is
granted the requisite knowledge to set matters right, but by virtue
of the responsibility we cannot escape under the Constitution, one
that history authenticates, to pass upon every assertion of an alleged
infringement of liberty, when our competence is appropriately
invoked.
This then is the crucial question: Is there an infringement of liberty?

Petitioners so alleged in his action, which they entitled Declaratory

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Relief with Preliminary Injunction, filed on July 22, 1967, a
proceeding that should have been started in the of Court of First
Instance but treated by this Court as one of prohibition in view of
the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional issue raised.
Petitioners challenged the validity of two new sections now included
in the Revised Election Code, under Republic Act No. 4880, which
was approved and took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too
early nomination of candidates 2 and limiting the period of election
campaign or partisan political activity. 3
The terms "candidate" and "election campaign" or "partisan political

activity" are likewise defined. The former according to Act No. 4880
"refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office
regarded of whether or not said person has already filed his
certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by any political party
as its candidate." "Election campaign" or "partisan political activity"
refers to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or promote
the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office." Then the
acts were specified. There is a proviso that simple expression of
opinion and thoughts concerning the election shall not be
considered as part of an election campaign. There is the further
proviso that nothing stated in the Act "shall be understood to
prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates
for public office whom he supports." 4
Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing 6f the petition, an

incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the
Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to
which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967;

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petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a
registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-
petitioner. It is their claim that "the enforcement of said Republic
Act No. 4880 in question [would] prejudice [their] basic rights...,
such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly and their
right to form associations or societies for purpose not contrary to
law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution," and that
therefore said act is unconstitutional.
After invoking anew the fundamental rights to free speech, free

press, freedom of association and freedom of assembly with a
citation of two American Supreme Court decisions, 5 they asserted
that "there is nothing in the spirit or intention of the law that would
legally justify its passage and [enforcement] whether for reasons of
public policy, public order or morality, and that therefore the
enactment of Republic Act [No.] 4880 under, the guise of regulation
is but a clear and simple abridgment of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to form
associations and societies for purposes not contrary to law, ..." There
was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and
the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political
expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate
or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual
understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation
of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence
of clear and present danger to the state, would render the
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
To the plea of petitioners that after hearing, Republic Act No. 4880
be declared unconstitutional, null and void, respondent

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Commission on Elections, in its answer filed on August 1, 1967,
after denying the allegations as to the validity of the act "for being
mere conclusions of law, erroneous at that," and setting forth special
affirmative defenses, procedural and substantive character, would
have this Court dismiss the petition.
Thereafter the case was set for hearing on August 3, 1967. On the
same date a resolution was passed by us to the following effect: "At
the hearing of case L-27833 (Arsenio Gonzales, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections), Atty. F. Reyes Cabigao appeared for the
petitioners and Atty. Ramon Barrios appeared for the respondent
and they were given a period of four days from today within which
to submit, simultaneously,, their respective memorandum in lieu of
oral argument."
On August 9, 1967, another resolution, self-explanatory in

character, came from this Court. Thus: "In ease G.R. No. L-27833
(Arsenio Gonzales, et al. vs. Commission on Elections), the Court,
with eight (8) Justice present, having deliberated on the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4880; and a divergence of
views having developed among the Justices as to the
constitutionality of section 50-B, pars. (c), (d) and (e) of the
Revised Election Code: considering the Constitutional provision
that "no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the (Supreme)
Court' (sec. 10, Art, VII), the Court [resolved] to defer final voting on
the issue until after the return of the Justices now on official leave."
The case was then reset for oral argument. At such hearing, one of
the co-petitioners, now Vice-Mayor Felicisimo Cabigao of the City

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of Manila acting as counsel, assailed the validity of the challenged
legislation relying primarily on American Supreme Court opinion
that warn against curtailment in whatever guise or form of the
cherished freedoms of expression, of assemble and of association,
all embraced in the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Respondent Commission on Elections was duly
represented by Atty. Ramon Barrios.
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae.

That he did, arguing most impressively with a persuasive exposition
of the existence of undeniable conditions that imperatively called for
regulation of the electoral process and with full recognition that Act
No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the
preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association.
He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present
danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections,
whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded
by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue
concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in
government but of lives as well.
The matter was then discussed in conference, but no final action

was taken. The divergence of views with reference to the paragraphs
above mentioned having continued, on Oct. 10, 1968, this Court, by
resolution, invited certain entities to submit memoranda as amici
curiae on the question of the validity of R.A. Act No. 4880. The
Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law
Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were included, among
them. They did file their respective memoranda with this Court and
aided it in the consideration of the constitutional issues involved.

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1. In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection
was raised by five members of the Court. 6 It is their view that
respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be
restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be
characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion.
Such a view, from the remedial law standpoint, has much to
recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm, the original
stand that under the circumstances it could still rightfully be treated
as a petition for prohibition.
The language of Justice Laurel fits the case "All await the decision of
this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore,
the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent
multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that
[its] constitutionality ... be now resolved." 7 It may likewise be
added that the exceptional character of the situation that confronts
us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for
a ruling, the national elections being, barely six months away,
reinforce our stand.
It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an

appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the
enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with
no choice then; we must act on the matter.
There is another procedural obstacle raised by respondent to be

hurdled. It is not insuperable. It is true that ordinarily, a party who
impugns the validity of a statute or ordinance must have a
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 8 Respondent

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cannot see such interest as being possessed by petitioners. It may
indicate the clarity of vision being dimmed, considering that one of
the petitioners was a candidate for an elective position. Even if such
were the case, however, the objection is not necessarily fatal. In this
jurisdiction, the rule has been sufficiently relaxed to allow a
taxpayer to bring an action to restrain the expenditure of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
legislative measure. 9
2. In the answer of the respondent as well as its memorandum,

stress was laid on Republic Act No. 4880 as an exercise of the police
power of the state, designed to insure a free, orderly and honest
election by regulating "conduct which Congress has determined
harmful if unstrained and carried for a long period before elections
it necessarily entails huge expenditures of funds on the part of the
candidates, precipitates violence and even deaths, results in the
corruption of the electorate, and inflicts direful consequences upon
public interest as the vital affairs of the country are sacrificed to
purely partisan pursuits." Evidently for respondent that would
suffice to meet the constitutional questions raised as to the alleged
infringement of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and
'freedom' of association. Would it were as simple as that?
An eloquent excerpt from a leading American decision 10

admonishes though against such a cavalier approach. "The case
confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to
say where the individual's, freedom ends the State's power begins.
Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so
where the usual. presumption supporting legislation is balanced by
the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the

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indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First
Amendment.... That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character
of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard
governs the choice..."
Even a leading American State court decision on a regulatory

measure dealing with elections, cited in the answer of respondent,
militates against a stand minimizing the importance and
significance of the alleged violation of individual rights: "As so
construed by us, it has not been made to appear that section 8189,
Comp. Gen. Laws, section 5925, Rev. Gen. St., is on its face violative
of any provision of either the state or Federal Constitution on the
subject of free speech or liberty of the press, nor that its operation is
in any wise subversive of any one's constitutional liberty." 11
Another leading State decision is much more emphatic: "Broad as
the power of the legislature is with respect to regulation of
elections, that power is not wholly without limitation. Under the
guise of regulating elections, the legislature may not deprive a
citizen of the right of trial by jury. A person charged with its
violation may not be compelled to give evidence against himself. If it
destroys the right of free speech, it is to that extent void." 12
The question then of the alleged violation of Constitutional rights

must be squarely met.lawphi1.nêt
3. Now as to the merits. A brief resume of the basic rights on which

petitioners premise their stand that the act is unconstitutional may
prove illuminating. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom
of expression is of course a fundamental postulate of our

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constitutional system. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press .... 13 What does it embrace? At the very
least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without
censorship or punishment. 14 There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability
whether in libel suits, 15 prosecution for sedition, 16 or action for
damages, 17 or contempt proceedings 18 unless there be a clear and
present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to
prevent.
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of

expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring individual
self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of assuring participation by
the people in social including political decision-making, and of
maintaining the balance between stability and change. 19 The trend
as reflected in Philippine and American decisions is to recognize the
broadcast scope and assure the widest latitude to this constitutional
guaranty. It represents a profound commitment to the principle that
debate of public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open. 20 It is not going too far, according to another American
decision, to view the function of free speech as inviting dispute. "It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger." 21 Freedom of speech and of the press thus
means something more than the right to approve existing political
beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any
matter of public consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes

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meaningless. The right belongs as well, if not more, for those who
question, who do not conform, who differ. To paraphrase Justice
Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for
the thought that agrees with us. 22
So with Emerson one may conclude that "the theory of freedom of

expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better
social judgments through democratic procedures. It comprehends a
vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew
out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new
society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his
own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and
enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a
prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and
intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of life that,
through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative,
will allow man to realize his full potentialities. It spurns the
alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and
stagnant." 23
From the language of the specified constitutional provision, it would

appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law
may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal
interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It would
be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it
should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal
values that press for recognition. How is it to be limited then?
24
This Court spoke, in Cabansag v. Fernandez; of two tests that may

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supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction. Thus:
"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous
tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means
that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high'
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented." It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision "a definite
rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words
may be public established."
The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test, the

"dangerous tendency" rule and explained it thus: "If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that
some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness
be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general
terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which
the legislative body seeks to prevent.
We posed the issue thus: "Has the letter of Cabansag created a

sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its
remittance to the PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to
come under the two rules mentioned above?" The choice of this
Court was manifest and indisputable. It adopted the clear and
present danger test. As a matter of fact, in an earlier decision,
Primicias v. Fugoso, 25 there was likewise an implicit acceptance of the

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clear and present danger doctrine.
Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive

evil is present is explained by Justice Branders thus: ... the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence." 26 For him the apprehended evil must be
"relatively serious." For "[prohibition] of free speech and assembly is
a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means
for averting a relatively trivial harm to society." Justice Black would
go further. He would require that the substantive evil be "extremely
serious." 27 Only thus may there be a realization of the ideal
envisioned by Cardozo: "There shall be no compromise of the
freedom to think one's thoughts and speak them, except at those
extreme borders where thought merges into action." 28 It received
its original formulation from Holmes. Thus: "The question in every
case is whether the words used in such circumstances and of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is
a question of proximity and degree." 29
This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified

by the danger or evil a substantive character that the state has a
right to prevent. Unlike the dangerous tendency doctrine, the danger
must not only be clear but also present. The term clear seems to
point to a causal connection with the danger of the substantially evil
arising from the utterance questioned. Present refers to the time
element. It used to be identified with imminent and immediate

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danger. The danger must not only be probable but very likely
inevitable.
4. How about freedom of assembly? The Bill of Rights as thus noted

prohibits abridgment by law of freedom of speech or of the press. It
likewise extends the same protection to the right of the people
peaceably to assemble. As was pointed out by Justice Malcolm in the
case of United States v. Bustos, 30 this right is a necessary
consequence of our republican institution and complements the
right of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. From
the same Bustos opinion: "Public policy, the welfare of society and
orderly administration of government have demanded protection for
public opinion." To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge
speaking for the majority in Thomas v. Collins,31 it was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of
the press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. All these rights while not identical are
inseparable. They are cognate rights and the assurance afforded by
the clause of this section of the Bill of Rights wherein they are
contained, applies to all. As emphatically put in the leading case of
United States v. Cruikshank, 32 "the very idea of a government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition
for redress of grievances." As in the case of freedom of expression,
this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.

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5. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the freedom to form
association for purposes not contrary to law. 33 With or without a
constitutional provision of this character, it may be assumed that
the freedom to organize or to be a member of any group or society
exists. With this explicit provision, whatever doubts there may be
on the matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of other guarantee
which are mostly American in origin, this particular freedom has an
indigenous cast. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution.
In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such

character, it is the view of Justice Douglas that it is primarily the
first amendment of her Constitution, which safeguards freedom of
speech and of the press, of assembly and of petition "that provides
[associations] with the protection they need if they are to remain
viable and continue to contribute to our Free Society." 34 He adopted
the view of De Tocqueville on the importance and the significance of
the freedom to associate. Thus: "The most natural privilege of man,
next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combining his
exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in
common with them. The right of association therefore appears to
me almost inalienable in its nature as the right of personal liberty.
No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundation of
society." 35
There can be no dispute as to the soundness of the above

observation of De Tocqueville. Since man lives in social it would be
a barren existence if he could not freely associate with others of
kindred persuasion or of congenial frame of mind. As a matter of
fact, the more common form of associations may be likely to be
fraternal, cultural, social or religious. Thereby, for almost everybody,

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save for those exceptional few who glory in aloofness and isolation
life is enriched and becomes more meaningful.
In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should

be on its political significance. If such a right were non-existent then
the likelihood of a one-party government is more than a possibility.
Authoritarianism may become unavoidable. Political opposition will
simply cease to exist; minority groups may be outlawed,
constitutional democracy as intended by the Constitution may well
become a thing of the past.
Political parties which, as is originally the case, assume the role

alternately of being in the majority or in the minority as the will of
the electorate dictates, will lose their constitutional protection. It is
undeniable therefore, that the utmost scope should be afforded this
freedom of association.
It is indispensable not only for its enhancing the respect that should
be accorded a human personality but equally so for its assurance
that the wishes of any group to oppose whatever for the moment is
the party in power and with the help of the electorate to set up its
own program of government would not be nullified or frustrated. To
quote from Douglas anew: "Justice Frankfurter thought that political
and academic affiliations have a preferred position under the due
process version of the First Amendment. But the associational
rights protected by the First Amendment are in my view much
broader and cover the entire spectrum in political ideology as well
as in art, in journalism, in teaching, and in religion. In my view,
government can neither legislate with respect to nor probe the
intimacies of political, spiritual, or intellectual relationships in the

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myriad of lawful societies and groups, whether popular or
unpopular, that exist in this country." 36
Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in the

sense that there could be an abridgment of the right to form
associations or societies when their purposes are "contrary to law".
How should the limitation "for purposes not contrary to law" be
interpreted? It is submitted that it is another way of expressing the
clear and present danger rule for unless an association or society
could be shown to create an imminent danger to public safety, there
is no justification for abridging the right to form association
societies.37 As was so aptly stated: "There is no other course
consistent with the Free Society envisioned by the First
Amendment. For the views a citizen entertains, the beliefs he
harbors, the utterances he makes, the ideology he embraces, and the
people he associates with are no concern to government — until and
unless he moves into action. That article of faith marks indeed the
main difference between the Free Society which we espouse and the
dictatorships both on the Left and on the Right." 38 With the above
principles in mind, we now consider the validity of the prohibition
in Republic Act No. 4880 of the too early nomination of candidates
and the limitation found therein on the period of election campaign
or partisan political activity alleged by petitioners to offend against
the rights of free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and
freedom of association. In effect what are asked to do is to declare
the act void on its face evidence having been introduced as to its
actual operation. There is respectable authority for the court having
the power to so act. Such fundamental liberties are accorded so high
a place in our constitutional scheme that any alleged infringement

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manifest in the wording of statute cannot be allowed to pass
unnoticed. 39
In considering whether it is violative of any of the above rights, we

cannot ignore of course the legislative declaration that its enactment
was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral
process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in
existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To
assert otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the realities of the
situation. Nor can we ignore the express legislative purpose
apparent in the proviso "that simple expressions of opinion and
thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as part of
an election campaign," and in the other proviso "that nothing herein
stated shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing
his views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom he
supports." Such limitations qualify the entire provision restricting
the period of an election campaign or partisan political activity.
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a

question that is not too formidable in character. According to the
act: "It shall be unlawful for any political party political committee,
or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public
officio voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public,
office earlier than ninety days immediately preceding an election." 40
The right of association is affected. Political parties have less

freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates;
the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such

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a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is
not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom
to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain
in validity. We do so unanimously.
The limitation on the period of "election campaign" or "partisan

political activity" calls for a more intensive scrutiny. According to
Republic Act No. 4880: "It is unlawful for any person whether or not
a voter or candidate, or for any group or association of persons
whether or not a political party or political committee, to engage in
an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
period of one hundred twenty days immediately preceding an
election involving a public office voted for at large and ninety days
immediately preceding an election for any other elective public
office. The term 'candidate' refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or not said
person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been
nominated by any political party as its candidate. The term 'election
campaign' or 'partisan political activity' refers to acts designed to
have a candidate elected or not or promote the candidacy of a
person or persons to a public office ..."
If that is all there is to that provision, it suffers from the fatal

constitutional infirmity of vagueness and may be stricken down.
What other conclusion can there be extending as it does to so wide
and all-encompassing a front that what is valid, being a legitimate
exercise of press freedom as well as freedom of assembly, becomes
prohibited? That cannot be done; such an undesirable eventuality,
this Court cannot allow to pass.

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It is a well-settled principle that stricter standard of permissible
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having inhibiting
effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril
here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.41
Where the statutory provision then operates to inhibit the exercise
of individual freedom affirmatively protected by the Constitution,
the imputation of vagueness sufficient to invalidate the statute is
inescapable. 42 The language of Justice Douglas, both appropriate
and vigorous, comes to mind: "Words which are vague and fluid ...
may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of
Caligula." 43 Nor is the reason difficult to discern: ."These freedoms
are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions." 44
7. The constitutional objections are thus formidable. It cannot be

denied that the limitations thus imposed on the constitutional
rights of free speech and press, of assembly, and of association cut
deeply, into their substance. This on the one hand.
On the other, it cannot be denied either that evils substantial in

character taint the purity of the electoral process. There can be
under the circumstances then no outright condemnation of the
statute. It could not be said to be unwarranted, much less arbitrary.
There is need for refraining from the outright assumption that the
constitutional infirmity is apparent from a mere reading thereof.
For under circumstances that manifest abuses of the gravest

character, remedies much more drastic than what ordinarily would
suffice would indeed be called for. The justification alleged by the

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proponents of the measures weighs heavily with the members of the
Court, though in varying degrees, in the appraisal of the aforesaid
restrictions to which such precious freedoms are subjected. They are
not unaware of the clear and present danger that calls for measures
that may bear heavily on the exercise of the cherished rights of
expression, of assembly, and of association.
This is not to say, that once such a situation is found to exist there
is no limit to the allowable limitations on such constitutional rights.
The clear and present danger doctrine rightly viewed requires that
not only should there be an occasion for the imposition of such
restrictions but also that they be limited in scope.
There are still constitutional questions of a serious character then to

be faced. The practices which the act identifies with "election
campaign" or "partisan political activity" must be such that they are
free from the taint of being violative of free speech, free press,
freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. What removes the
sting from constitutional objection of vagueness is the enumeration
of the acts deemed included in the terms "election campaign" or
"partisan political activity."
They are: "(a) Forming organizations, associations, clubs,

committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign
or propaganda for or against a candidate or party;(c) making
speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews

Page 21 of 120
for or against the election or any party or candidate for public office;
(d) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; (e)
directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against any party; (f) giving,
soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign
purposes, either directly or indirectly." 45 As thus limited the
objection that may be raised as to vagueness has been minimized, if
not totally set at rest. 46
8. This Court, with the aforementioned five Justices unable to agree,

is of the view that no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as
the formation of organization, associations, clubs, committees, or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a
candidate or party is restricted 47 and that the prohibition against
giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for election purposes,
either directly or indirectly, is equally free from constitutional
infirmity. 48
The restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding

political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,
parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting
votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or
against a candidate or party, 49 leaving untouched all other
legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question.
Nevertheless, after a thorough consideration, and with the same
Justices entertaining the opposite conviction, we reject the
contention that it should be annulled. Candor compels the
admission that the writer of this opinion suffers from the gravest
doubts. For him, such statutory prescription could very well be

Page 22 of 120
within the outermost limits of validity, beyond which lies the abyss
of unconstitutionality.
The other acts, likewise deemed included in "election campaign" or

"partisan political activity" tax to the utmost the judicial
predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate
election practices deemed inimical, because of their collision with
the preferred right of freedom of expression. From the outset, such
provisions did occasion divergence of views among the members of
the Court. Originally only a minority was for their being adjudged as
invalid. It is not so. any more. 50 This is merely to emphasize that
the scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be
subjected is not foreclosed by the recognition of the existence of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the
electoral process.
The majority of the Court is thus of the belief that the solicitation or
undertaking of any campaign or propaganda whether directly or
indirectly, by an individual, 51 the making of speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding interview for or against
the election for any party or candidate for public office, 52 or the
publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, 53
suffer from the corrosion of invalidity. It lacks however one more
affirmative vote to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality.
This is not to deny that Congress was indeed called upon to seek
remedial measures for the far-from-satisfactory condition arising
from the too-early nomination of candidates and the necessarily
prolonged, political campaigns. The direful consequences and the
harmful effects on the public interest with the vital affairs of the

Page 23 of 120
country sacrificed many a time to purely partisan pursuits were
known to all. Moreover, it is no exaggeration to state that violence
and even death did frequently occur because of the heat engendered
by such political activities. Then, too, the opportunity for dishonesty
and corruption, with the right to suffrage being bartered, was
further magnified.
Under the police power then, with its concern for the general
welfare and with the commendable aim of safe-guarding the right of
suffrage, the legislative body must have felt impelled to impose the
foregoing restrictions. It is understandable for Congress to believe
that without the limitations thus set forth in the challenged
legislation, the laudable purpose of Republic Act No. 4880 would be
frustrated and nullified. Whatever persuasive force such approach
may command failed to elicit the assent of a majority of the Court.
This is not to say that the conclusion reached by the minority that
the above poisons of the statute now assailed has passed the
constitutional test is devoid of merit.
It only indicates that for the majority, the prohibition of any

speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of
interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for
public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of
campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign
literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is
repugnant to a constitutional command. To that extent, the
challenged statute prohibits what under the Constitution cannot by
any law be abridged.

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More specifically, in terms of the permissible scope of legislation
that otherwise could be justified under the clear and present danger
doctrine, it is the consideration opinion of the majority, though
lacking the necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity, that the
challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the
practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear
and present danger doctrine.
In a 1968 opinion, the American Supreme Court made clear that the
absence of such reasonable and definite standards in a legislation of
its character is fatal. 54 Where, as in the case of the above
paragraphs, the majority of the Court could discern "an over breadth
that makes possible oppressive or capricious application" 55 of the
statutory provisions, the line dividing the valid from the
constitutionally infirm has been crossed. Such provisions offend the
constitutional principle that "a governmental purpose
constitutionally subject to control or prevent activities state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. 56
It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governmental

purposes be legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. 57 For precision of regulation is
the touchstone in an area so closely related to our most precious
freedoms. 58
Under the circumstances then, a majority of the Court feels

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compelled to view the statutory provisions in question as
unconstitutional on their face inasmuch as they appear to range too
widely and indiscriminately across the fundamental liberties
associated with freedom of the mind. 59
Such a conclusion does not find favor with the other members of the
Court. For this minority group, no judgment of nullity insofar as the
challenged sections are concerned is called for. It cannot accept the
conclusion that the limitations thus imposed on freedom of
expression vitiated by their latitudinarian scope, for Congress was
not at all insensible to the problem that an all-encompassing
coverage of the practices sought to be restrained would seriously
pose.
Such an approach finds support in the exposition made by the

author of the measure, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada, appearing before
us as amicus curiae. He did clearly explain that such provisions were
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary
and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger
but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of
excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as
violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and
partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our
attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of
remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on
the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the
cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental
rights, be ignored or disregarded.
More than that, he would stress the two provisos already

Page 26 of 120
mentioned, precisely placed in the state as a manifestation of the
undeniable legislative determination not to transgress the preferred
freedom of speech, of press, of assembly and of association. It is
thus provided: "That simple expressions or opinion and thoughts
concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an election
campaign [and that nothing in the Act] shall be understood to
prevent any person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates
for public office whom he supports. 60 If properly implemented then,
as it ought to, the barrier to free, expression becomes minimal and
far from unwarranted.
For the minority of the Court, all of the above arguments possess
sufficient persuasive force to blunt whatever cutting edge may be
ascribed to the fears entertained that Congress failed to abide by
what the Constitution commands as far as freedom of the mind and
of association are concerned. It is its opinion that it would be
premature to say the least, for a judgment of nullity of any provision
found in Republic Act No. 4880. The need for adjudication arises
only if in the implementation of the Act, there is in fact an
unconstitutional application of its provisions. Nor are we called
upon, under this approach, to anticipate each and every problem
that may arise. It is time enough to consider it when there is in fact
an actual, concrete case that requires an exercise of judicial power.
9. To recapitulate, we give due recognition to the legislative concern

to cleanse, and, if possible, render spotless, the electoral process.
There is full acceptance by the Court of the power of Congress,
under narrowly drawn legislation to impose the necessary
restrictions to what otherwise would be liberties traditionally

Page 27 of 120
accorded the widest scope and the utmost deference, freedom of
speech and of the press, of assembly, and of association. We cannot,
however, be recreant to the trust reposed on us; we are called upon
to safeguard individual rights. In the language of Justice Laurel:
"This Court is perhaps the last bulwark of constitutional
government. It shall not obstruct the popular will as manifested
through proper organs... But, in the same way that it cannot
renounce the life breathed into it by the Constitution, so may it not
forego its obligation, in proper cases, to apply the necessary,..." 61
We recognize the wide discretion accorded Congress to protect vital

interests. Considering the responsibility incumbent on the judiciary,
it is not always possible, even with the utmost sympathy shown for
the legislative choice of means to cure an admitted evil, that the
legislative judgment arrived at, with its possible curtailment of the
preferred freedoms, be accepted uncritically. There may be times,
and this is one of them, with the majority, with all due reject to a
coordinate branch, unable to extend their approval to the aforesaid
specific provisions of one of the sections of the challenged statute.
The necessary two-third vote, however, not being obtained, there is
no occasion for the power to annul statutes to come into play.
Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that Republic
Act No. 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the writ of prayed for

denied. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal and Teehankee, JJ., concur in the
result.

Page 28 of 120
Separate Opinions
SANCHEZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
Petitioners in the present case aim at striking down as violative of

constitutional guarantees Republic Act 4880, the principal features
of which are contained in its Sections 1, inserting Sections 50-A and
50-B between Sections, 50 and 51 of the Revised Election Code,
reproduced herein as follows:1
SECTION 1. Republic Act Numbered One hundred and eighty,

as amended, is hereby further amended by inserting new
sections to be known as Sections 50-A and 50-B, between
Sections 50 and 51 thereof, which shall read as follows:
SEC. 50-A. Prohibition of too early nomination of Candidates. — It

shall be unlawful for any political party, Political Committee, or
Political group to nominate candidates for any elective public
office voted for a large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective
public office earlier than ninety days immediately preceding an
election.
SEC 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or

Partisan Political Activity. — It is unlawful for any person
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or
association of persons, whether or not a political party or
political committee, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the period of one
hundred twenty days immediately preceding an election for any
public office.

Page 29 of 120
The term "Candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public office, regardless of whether or not
said person has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has
been nominated by any political party as its candidate.
The term "Election Campaign" or "Partisan Political Activity"

refers to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office
which shall include:
(a) Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs,

Committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate;
(b) Holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences,

meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or
party;
(c) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries or

holding interviews for or against the election of any party
or candidate for public office;
(d) Publishing or distribution campaign literature or

materials;
(e) Directly or indirectly soliciting vote and/or

undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
any candidate or party;

Page 30 of 120
(f) Giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for
election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly:
Provided, That simple expressions or 2 opinion and
thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered
as part of an election campaign: Provided, further, That
nothing herein stated shall be understood to prevent any
person from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of the
candidates for public office whom he supports.
Appropriately to be stated right at the start is that violation of the

above provisions is considered a serious election offense. The
penalty is "imprisonment of not less than one (1) year and one (1)
day but not more than five (5) years" with accompanying
"disqualification to hold a public office and deprivation of the right
of suffrage for not less than one (1) year but more than nine (9)
years" and payment of costs. 3
1. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. 4880 again brings to the

fore the eternally-warring concepts of individual liberty and state
authority.
Invalidity is pressed on the ground that the statute violates the

rights of free speech and press, of peaceable assembly, and of
association. 4 This Court is asked to rule that in the context of the
ill-effects to be cured, the legislative remedy adopted, vis-a-vis the
rights affected, does not meet what petitioners claim to be the
rational basis test; that, on the contrary, the relief prescribed would
more likely produce the very evils sought to be prevented. This
necessitates a circumspect discussion of the issue.

Page 31 of 120
In proceeding the working assumption is that individual liberty is
not absolute. Neither is state authority, inspite of its sweep,
limitable. Fixed formulas and ready-made rules that seek to balance
these two concepts could well redeem one from the unnerving task
of deciding which ought to prevail.
It is at this point that we call to mind the principle that the relation
between remedy and evil should be of such proximity that unless
prohibited, conduct affecting these rights would create a "clear and
present danger that will bring about substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent."5
Withal doctrines which conceal behind the cloak of authoritative

origin a tendency to muffle the demands of society, must pass the
glaring light of contemporaneity. For, in the consideration of
questions on constitutionality, one should remain receptive to the
implication of John Marshall's resonant words that "it is a
constitution we are expounding."6
Such authority here manifests itself in legislation intended as an

answer to the strong public sentiment that politics is growing into a
way of life, that political campaigns are becoming longer and more
bitter. It is a result of legislative Appraisal that protracted election
campaign is the root of undesirable conditions. Bitter rivalries
precipitate violence and deaths. Huge expenditures of funds give
deserving but poor candidates slim chances of winning. They
constitute an inducement to graft to winning candidates already in
office in order to recoup campaign expenses. Handouts doled out by
and expected from candidates corrupt the electorate. Official duties
and affairs of state are neglected by incumbent officials desiring to

Page 32 of 120
run for reelection. The life and health of candidates and their
followers are endangered. People's energies are dissipated in
political bickerings and long drawn-out campaigns. 7 Indeed, a
drawn-out political campaign taxes the reservoir of patience and
undermines respect of the electorate for democratic processes.
Sustained and bilious political contests eat away even the veneer of
civility among candidates and their followers and transplant brute
force into the arena.
Such legislative appraisal, such ill-effects, then must constitute a

principal lever by which one concept could win mastery over the
other.
R.A. 4880 is a police power legislation. It was enacted by virtue of

the inherent power of Congress to legislate on matters affecting
public interest and welfare, 8 as well as in pursuance of the
constitutional policy of insuring a free, honest and orderly election.
9 Basically, the undefined scope of that power extends as far as the
frontiers of public interest would advance. Fittingly, legislative

determination of the breadth of public interest should Command
respect. For, Congress is the constitutional body vested with the
power to enact laws. Its representative composition induces
judgment culled from the diverse regions of the country. Normally,
this should assure that a piece of police legislation is a reflection of
what public interest contemporaneously encompasses.
2. It is, however, postulated that the right of peaceable assembly is

violated by the prohibition on holding political assemblies for a
period lasting more than one year; that the right to form
associations is contravened by forbidding, for the same period, the

Page 33 of 120
formation of political groups; that, finally, freedom of speech and of
the press is unduly restricted by a legislative fiat against speeches,
announcements, commentaries or interviews favorable or
unfavorable to the election of any party or candidate, publishing or
distributing campaign literature or materials, and directly or
indirectly soliciting votes and/or under-taking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party, except during a
number of days immediately preceding the election.
What has repeatedly been urged is the view that the underlying
historic importance of the foregoing specified rights in democratic
societies requires that the posture of defense against their invasion
be firmer and more uncompromising than what may be exhibited
under the general due process protection. 10 The absolute terms by
which these specific rights are recognized in the Constitution
justifies this conclusion. 11
And yet, sight should not be lost of the fact that Congress has made
a determination that certain specific evils are traceable directly to
protracted election, activities. Congress has found a solution to
minimize, if not prevent, those evils by limiting the period of
engaging in such activities. The proponents of validity would rely
upon experience to deduce the connection between the cited evils
and prolonged political campaign. By limiting the period of
campaign, so they say, it is expected that the undesirable effects will
be wiped out, at least, relieved to a substantial degree.
This, of course, is largely an assumption. Congress we must stress,

has put up an untried measure to solve the problematic situation.
Deduction then is the only avenue open: for Congress, to determine

Page 34 of 120
the necessity for the law; for the Court, its validity. The possibility
of its inefficaciousness is not remote. But so long as a remedy
adopted by Congress, as far as can logically be assumed, measures
up to the standard of validity, it stands.
We give our imprimatur to Section 50-A. We may not tag as

unconstitutional 50-B, and its subsections (a), (b) and (f). We fear
no serious evil with their enforcement. They do not offend the
constitutionally protected speech and press freedoms, and rights of
peaceable assembly and association. The latter must yield. The
proscriptions set forth in all of them are clear-cut, not open to
reasonable doubt, nor easily susceptible to unreasonable
interpretation. Public interest and welfare authorize their
incorporation into the statute books.
3. To this writer, however, the center of controversy is to be found in

subsections (c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-B.
Those who espouse validity assert that no undue restriction results

because, by jurisprudence, solicitation and campaign are outside the
ambit of protected speech. 12 But this rule, it would seem to us, has
relevance only to commercial solicitation and campaign. There is no
point here in delving into the desirability of equating, in social
importance, political campaign with advertisements of gadgets and
other commercial propaganda or solicitation. 13 For, the statute
under consideration goes well beyond matters commonly regarded
as solicitation and campaign. Suffice it to say that jurisprudence
tends to incline liberally towards freedom of expression in any form
when placed in juxtaposition with the regulatory power of the State.
14

Page 35 of 120
Legislative history of the statute now before us indicates that what
Congress intends to regulate are partisan activities and active
campaigning.
Campaigning, as defined by the sponsor of Senate Bill 209 in the

Senate, is a "series of operations." This, evidently, must have been
adopted from the dictionary meaning of campaign: a connected
series of operations to bring about some desired result.
The term "partisan political activity" has somehow acquired a more

or less definite signification. It is not a new feature in Philippine
political law. It has been regulated to stem dangers to specific state
interests. The Constitution itself contains an injunction against civil
service officers and employees from engaging directly or indirectly
in partisan political activity or taking part in any election except to
vote. 15 The civil service law 16 and the Revised Election Code, 17
echo this absolute prohibition which is obviously aimed at the
possible neglect of public service and its prostitution with partisan
interests. The following are cited in the Civil Service Rules as
examples of partisan political activity: candidacy for elective office;
being a delegate to any political convention or member of any
political committee or officer of any political club or other similar
political organization; making speeches, canvassing or soliciting
votes or political support in the interest of any party or candidate;
soliciting or receiving contributions for political purposes either
directly or indirectly; and becoming prominently identified with the
success or failure of any candidate or candidates for election to
public office. 18
In the context in which the terms "partisan political activity" and

Page 36 of 120
"election campaign" are taken together with the statutory purpose,
the following from Justice Holmes would be particularly instructive:
"Wherever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each
other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be
uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he
does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal
law to make him take the risk." 19
4. Perhaps if the phrases "election campaign" or "partisan political

activity" were left to be explained by the general terms of the law as
solely referring "to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
promote the candidacy of a person or persons to a public office", it
would be difficult to say that such prohibition is offensive to speech
or press freedoms. But then the law itself sought to expand its
meaning to include an area of prohibited acts relating to candidates
and political parties, wider than an ordinary person would
otherwise define them.
Specifically, discussion — oral or printed — is included among the

prohibited conduct when done in the following manner (Section 50-
B)

holding interviews for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office:
(d) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
(e) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking

any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or
party.

Page 37 of 120
Defined only as lawful discussion is the following:
Provided. That simple expressions of opinion and thoughts

concerning the election shall not be considered as part of an
election campaign: Provided, further, That nothing herein stated
shall be understood to prevent any person from expressing his
views on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of the candidates for public office whom
he supports.
The conduct involved in the discussion as to make it illegal is not

clearly defined at all. The implication then is that what is prohibited is
discussion which in the view of another may mean political
campaign or partisan political activity. The speaker or writer
becomes captive under the vigilant but whimsical senses of each
listener or reader. His words acquire varying shades of forcefullness,
persuasion and meaning to suit the convenience of those
interpreting them. A position becomes solicitation. As admonition
becomes a campaign or propaganda.
As worded in R.A. 4880, prohibited discussion could cover the

entire spectrum of expression relating to can candidates and
political parties. No discussion is safe. Every political discussion
becomes suspect. No one can draw an indisputable dividing line
between lawful and unlawful discussion. More so that statutory
restraint falls upon any person whether or not a voter or candidate.
Candidacy is not enjoined during the proscriptive period. A person

may thus make public his intention to run for public office. So may
an incumbent official profess his desire to run for reelection. The

Page 38 of 120
law therefore leaves open, especially to the electorate, the occasion
if the temptation for making statements relating to a candidacy .The
natural course is to comment upon or to discuss the merits of a
candidate, his disqualifications, his opponents for public office, his
accomplishments, his official or private conduct. For, it can hardly
be denied that candidacy for public office is a matter of great public
concern and interest.
Yet, this normal reaction to discuss or comment is muzzled by an

unqualified prohibition on announcements or commentaries or
interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate, on
publishing campaign literature, and on indirect solicitation and
campaign or propaganda for or against any party or candidate. Even
incumbent officials are stopped. Every appearance before the public,
every solicitous act for the public welfare may easily become tainted.
5. Nor does the proviso offer any corresponding protection against

uncertainty. "Simple expressions of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election" and expression of "views on current
political problems or issues" leave the reader to conjecture, to
guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the
nature of the utterance it simple expressions of opinion and
thoughts") or the subject of the utterance ("current political
problems or issues"). The line drawn to distinguish unauthorized
"political activity" or "election campaign" — specifically, a speech
designed to promote the candidacy of a person from a simple
expression of opinion on current political problems is so tenuous as
to be indistinguishable. 20 If we are to paraphrase Mr. Justice
Holmes, then the thought should run something like this: The only
difference between expression of an opinion and the endorsement of

Page 39 of 120
a candidate is "the speaker's enthusiasm for the result." 21
Only one area is certain. A person may only mention the candidate
whom he supports. Beyond mentioning the name, it is no longer
safe. But is it not unduly constricting the from of rational-minded-
persons to back up their statements of support with reasons?
The peculiarity of discussion, be it oral or printed, is that it carries

with it varying degrees of "enthusiasm and inclination to persuade",
22 depending upon the listener or reader. It falls short of a partisan
political activity when it is devoid of partisan interest in the sense

that it is not made in the interest of a candidate or party. This is the
only criterion for validity. But who is to decide this? And how? The
law does not even require that there be an operation or a series of
operations in order to measure up to an election campaign as it is
commonly understood. In this way, the law may well become an
instrument of harassment. Worse, it could lull the potential had
defendant into a false sense of security. It then becomes a dragnet
that may trap anyone who attempts to express a simple opinion on
political issues.
6. More than this, the threat of punishment will continually hound a

speaker who expounds his views on political issues. Because of its
punitive provisions, the statute surely tends to restrict what one
might, say his utterance be misunderstood as "designed to promote
the candidacy of a person." A person would be kept guessing at the
precise limits of the permissible "simple expression". To play safe, he
would be compelled to put reins on his words for fear that they may
stray beyond the protected area of "simple expression". The offshoot
could only be a continuous and pervasive restraint on all forms of

Page 40 of 120
discussion which might time within the purview of the statute. This
thought is not new. It is underscibed in NAACP vs. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 9 L. ed, 405, in language expressive, thus. —
The objectionable quality of vagueness and over breadth does

not depend upon absence of fair notice to a criminally accused
or upon unchanneled delegation of legislative powers, but upon
the danger of tolerating, in the area of first amendment
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and
improper application.... These freedoms are delicate and
vulnerable as well as supremely precious in our society. The
threat of sanctions way deter their exercise almost as the actual
application of the sanctions. Because the first amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may
regulate in the area only With narrow specificity.23
It is thus in the self-imposed restraint that works in the minds of

ordinary, law-abiding citizens that a vague statute becomes unjust.
Because of the indefiniteness created in subsections (c), (d) and (e)

of Section 50-B, they readily lend themselves to harsh application.
Vagueness of the law enforcers. Arbitrary enforcement of the letter
of the law by an expansive definition of election campaign or
partisan political activity, should not be branded as improbable. For,
political rivalries spawn persecution. The law then becomes an
unwitting tool. Discussion may be given a prima facie label as against
the harassed. This is not altogether remote. To be sure, harassment
and persecution are not unknown to the unscrupulous.
7. Those who favor validity find comfort in the theory that it is

Page 41 of 120
better for the meantime to leave the statute well enough alone.
They say that it is preferable that courts of justice be allowed to
hammer out the contours of the statute case by case. This may not,
however, be entirely acceptable. To forego the question of
constitutionality for now and take risks may not be the wiser move.
As well advocated elsewhere. 24 a series of court prosecutions will a
statute, still leaving uncertain other portion thereof. And then, in
deciding whether or statute can be salvaged, one must not hedge
and assume that when it is enforced in the be resolved in favor of
upholding free speech and press.
More important, there is the heavy penalty prescribed. A candidate,

or any person for that matter, can unreasonably be saddled by court
suits. Even if the accused were later to be declared innocent,
thoroughly unnecessary is the burden of lawyers' fees, bail bonds
and other expenses, not to say of energy to be consumed, effort to
be expended, time to be spent, and the anxieties attendant in
litigation.
It cannot really be said that the courage to speak out, barring all
risks, is an ordinary human trait. Timorous men should not grow in
number. And yet, it would appear that this is the effect of the
enforcement of the law. The constant guide should be the warning
of Justice Brandeis "that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope
and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies." 25
As we analyze the import of the law, we come to the conclusion that

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subsections (c), (d) and (e) of Section 50-B inserted into the
Revised Election Code by Republic Act 4880, heretofore transcribed,
run smack against the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press. Hence, this concurrence and dissent.
CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Presented for consideration and decision is the constitutionality of

Section 50-A and 50-B of the Revised Election Code, which were
inserted as amendatory provisions by Republic Act 4880. 1 These
sections read in full as follows:
SEC. 50-A. Prohibition of too early nomination of Candidates. — It

shall be unlawful for any political party, Political Committee or
Political group to nominate candidates for any elective public
office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective
public office earlier than ninety days immediately preceding an
election.
SEC. 50-B. Limitation upon the period of Election Campaign or

Partisan Political Activity. — It is unlawful for any person
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any group or
association of persons, whether or not a political party or
political committee, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the period of one
hundred twenty days immediately preceding an election
involving a public office voted for at large and ninety days
immediately preceding an election for any other elective public
office.

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The term "Candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or
seeking an elective public officer, regardless of whether or not
said has already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been
nominated by any political candidate.
The term "Election Campaign" or Partisan Political Activity

refers to the acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
(a) Forming Organizations, Associations, Clubs,

Committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate;

meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for
the purpose of soliciting votes and/or against a candidate
or party;

holding interviews for or against the election of any party
or candidate for public office;
(d) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or

materials;
(e) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or

undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
any candidate or party;

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(f) Giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for
election campaign purposes, either directly or indirectly.
Provided, That simple expressions of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election shall not be considered as part of
an election campaign; Provided, further. That nothing herein
stated shall understood to prevent any person from
expressing his views on current political problems or
issues, or from mentioning the names of the candidates for
public office who he supports.
Violation of these two section are classified as "serious election

offenses" under Section 183 of the Revised Election Code, as
amended R.A 4880, punishable with "imprisonment of not less than
one year and one day but not more than five years" and
"disqualification to hold a public office and deprivation of the right
of suffrage for not less than one year but not more than nine years."
2
The basic purpose of R.A. 4880 is easily discenible. Congress felt

the need of curtailing excessive and extravagant partisan political
activities, especially during an election year, and, to this end, sought
to impose limitations upon the times during which such activities
may be lawfully pursued. The legislative concern over excessive
political activities was expressed in the following terms in the
explanatory note of Senate Bill 209, which finally came R.A. 4880:
There is nothing basically wrong in engaging in an election

campaign. Election campaign is indispensable part of election
just as election is one of the most important fundamental
requirements of popular government.

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It is also during election campaign that the stands of
prospective political parties on vital national and local issues
are made known to the public, thereby guiding the
enfranchised citizenry in the proper and appropriate expression
of its sovereign will.
Past experience, however, has brought to light some very

disturbing consequences of protracted election campaigns.
Because of prolonged exposure of both candidates and the
people to political tension, what starts out at first as
gentlemanly competition ends up into bitter rivalries
precipitating violence and even deaths. Prolonged election
campaigns necessarily entail huge expenditures of funds on the
part of the candidates. Now, no matter how deserving and
worthy he is, a poor man has a very slim chance of winning an
election. Prolonged election campaigns indeed carry with it not
only the specter of violence and death, not only the
objectionable dominion of the rich in the political arena, but
also the corruption of our electorate. We must adapt our
democratic processes to the needs of the times.
The prohibitions introduced by R.A. 4880 purport to reach two

types of activities, namely, (a) early nomination of candidates for
elective public offices (Sec. 50-A), and (b) early election campaigns
or partisan political activities (Sec. 50-B). The first prohibition is
specifically directed against political parties, committees, and
groups; the second prohibition is much more comprehensive in its
intended reach, for it operates upon "any person whether or not a

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voter or a candidate" and "any group or association of persons whether or
not a political party or political committee."
Section 50-B brings within the ambit of its proscription a wide

range of activities. The catalogue of activity ties covered by the
prohibition against early election campaigning embraces two
distinguishable types of acts; (a) giving, soliciting or receiving
contributions for election campaign purposes, either directly or
indirectly; and (b) directly or indirectly soliciting votes or under-
taking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or
party, whether by means of speech, publication, formation of
organizations, or by holding conventions, caucuses, meetings or
other similar assemblies. The term "candidate" is itself broadly
defined to include "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective
public office," whether or not such person has been formally
nominated.
The sweeping character of the prohibitions in Section 50-B is sought

to be mitigated and delimited by the provisos exempting from their
operation (a) "simple expressions of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election," (b) expression of "views on current
political problems or issues," and (c) "mentioning the names of the
candidates for public office" whom one supports.
Before assaying the constitutional quality of Sections 50-A and 50-

B, it is relevant to point out that these two section are not wholly
consistent with each other, and that considerable practical
difficulties may be expected by those who would comply with the
requirements of both. Under Section 50-A, political parties are
allowed to nominate their official candidates for offices voted for at

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large within 150 days immediately preceding the election. At the
very least, this section would seem to permit a political party to
hold a nominating convention within the 150 days period. Section
50-B, however, makes it unlawful to promote or oppose the
candidacy of any person seeking such office, whether or not such
person "has been nominated by any political party," and to engage in
an election campaign "for and against a candidate or party," except
within the period of 120 days immediately preceding the election. I
find it difficult to see how a political party can stage a nominating
convention 150 days before an election if, at such time, neither any
person nor group within such party may seek a nomination by
campaigning among the delegates to the convention. By its very,
nature, a nominating convention is intrinsically a forum for
intensely partisan political activity. It is at the nominating
convention that contending candidates obtain the formal
endorsement and active support of their party the ultimate purpose
of victory at the polls. A nominating convention, at which activity
promoting or opposing the candidacies of particular persons seeking
nominations is forbidden, is a practical impossibility. Thus, the very
broadness of prohibitions contained in Section 50-B has the effect of
reducing, as a practical matter, the time period specified in Section
50-A for nomination of candidates for national offices from 150 to
120 days before an election.
II
We turn to the central issue of constitutionality. That the legislature

has, in broad principle, competence to enact laws relative to the
conduct of elections is conceded. Congress may not only regulate
and control the place, time and manner in which elections shall be

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held, but may also provide for the manner by which candidates shall
be chosen. In the exercise of the police power, Congress regulate the
conduct of election campaigns and activities by political parties and
candidates, and prescribe measures reasonably appropriate to insure
the integrity and purity of the electoral process. Thus, it has not
been seriously contested that Congress may establish restraints on
expenditures of money in political campaigns, 3 prohibit solicitation
of votes for a consideration, 4 and penalize unlawful expenditures
relative to the nominations of dates. 5 Laws of this kind lie fairly
within the area of permissible regulation, and I think, that, in
shaping specific regulations, Congressional discretion may be
exercised within a wide range without remonstrance from the
courts.
If no more were at stake in Sections 50-A and 50-B than the political
or personal convenience of a candidates faction or political group,
we could with the least hesitation resolve the issue of
constitutionality in favor of the legislative intendment. But infinitely
more is at stake, for in enacting this prohibitions of Sections 50-A
and 50-B, Congress has place undeniable burdens upon the exercise
of fundamental political and personal freedoms encased in the Bill
of Rights from legislative intrusion. There is firstly, a manifest
restriction on the free exercise of the rights of speech and of the
press in the provisions of Section 50-B imposing a limitation of time
on the following activities.

candidate or party;

Page 49 of 120
(d) Publishing or distributing, campaign. literature or materials
(e) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and or undertaking

any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or
party;
Likewise, the regulation of the time within which nominations of

candidates by political parties may take place, under Section 50-A,
and fixing a time limit for holding "political conventions, caucuses,
conference meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies"
for campaign purposes under paragraph (b) of Section 50-B, curtails
the freedom of peaceful assembly. And finally, the right to form
associations for purposes not contrary to law is impinged upon by
the provision of paragraph (a) of Section 50-B regulating the
forming of "Organizations, Associations, Clubs, Committees or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
candidate."
It is fairly accurate to say that legislations imposing restrictions

upon the right of free expression, and upon the right of assembly
and of political association indispensable to the full exercise of free
expression, have commonly been subjected to more searching and
exacting judicial scrutiny than statutes directed at other personal
activities. As aptly said by the United States Supreme Court in
Schneider v. Irvington:6
In every case, ... where legislative abridgment of the rights is

asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of
the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preference or beliefs

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respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities but be in
sufficient to justify such as diminishes are exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Thomas v. Collins7exemplifies the same approach: "The rational

connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed,
which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on
other grounds, will not suffice. These rights [of expression and
assembly] rest on firmed foundations."
The belief that more exacting constitutional tests are appropriately

applied upon statutes having an actual or potential inhibiting effect
on the right of speech, and the cognate rights of assembly and
association, flows from recognition of the nature and function of
these rights in a free democratic society. Historically the guarantees
of free expression were intended to provide some assurance that
government would remain responsive to the will of the people, in
line with the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them. 8 The
viability of a truly representative government depends upon the
effective protection and exercise of the rights of the people to freely
think, to freely discuss and to freely assemble for redress of their
grievances; for these underlie the mechanisms of peaceful change in
a democratic polity. There is ample authority in history for the belief
that those who value freedom, but are frustrated in its exercise, will
tend to resort to force and violent opposition to obtain release from
their repression. So essential are these freedoms to the preservation
and vitality of democratic institutions that courts have on numerous
occasions categorized them as occupying a "preferred position" in

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the hierarchy of civil liberties. 9 "That priority," intoned the court in
Thomas v. Collins, supra, "gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not per permitting dubious instrusions."
This is not to say that the rights of free expression and of peaceful
assembly may not be constitutionally restricted by legislative action.
No one has seriously doubted that these rights do not accord
immunity to every possible use of language or to every form of
assembly. Circumstances may arise in which the safety, perhaps the
very survival of our society, would demand deterrence and compel
punishment of whomsoever would abuse these freedoms as well as
whomsoever would exercise them to subvert the very public order
upon the stability of which these freedoms depend.
... It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the

freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the
Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or
unrestricted or unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those
who abuse this freedom.10
The right to freedom of speech, and to peaceful assembly and

petition the government for redress of grievances, are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it
is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well ordered
civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to

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the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate
the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed
the sovereign "police power," which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of people.11
But in every case where there arises a clash between an assertion of

State authority and the exercise of free speech and assembly, it is
ultimate the high function and duty of this court to locate the point
of accomodation and equilibrium and draw the line between
permissible regulation and forbidden restraint.
It is now conventional wisdom that this function of delimitation and

adjustment cannot meaningfully be carried out through the iteration
of abstract generalizations. The restriction that is assailed as
unconstitutional must be judged in the context of which it is part,
taking into account the nature and substantiality of the community
interest sought to be protected or promoted by the legislation under
assay, in relation to the nature and importance of the freedom
restricted and the character and extent of the restriction sought to
be imposed.
III
Various standards have been evolved for the testing of the validity of
a rule or regulation curtailing the rights of free speech, free press,
and peaceful assembly. At the earlier stages in the development of
jurisprudence on the matter, it was said that the State has the power
to proscribe and punish speech which the State has the right to
prevent." 12 The "dangerous tendency" rule, as this formulation has

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been called, found favor in many decisions of this Court. 13
In the United States, the "dangerous tendency" doctrine was early

abandoned, and superseded by the "clear and present danger" rule.
By the year 1919, the majority of the members of the United States
Supreme Court got around to accepting Justice Holmes' view that
"the question in every case is whether the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." 14 To sustain legislation imposing
limitations upon freedom of speech or of assembly, a court must
find that the evil sought to be avoided by the legislative restriction
is both serious and imminent in high degree. As stated in Bridges v.
California: 15
... the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will

result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of the
speech or the press. The evil itself must be "substantial" ...; it
must be "serious" ....
What clearly emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases
is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished ...
The "clear and present danger" rule has been cited with approval, in
at least two decisions of this Court. 16
The "dangerous tendency" and "clear and present danger" doctrines,

it should not escape notice, were fashioned in the course of testing

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legislation of a particular type legislation limiting speech expected
to have deleterious consequences on the security and public order of
the community. The essential difference between the two doctrines
related to the degree of proximity of the apprehended danger which
justified the restriction upon speech. The "dangerous tendency"
doctrine permitted the application of restrictions once a rational
connection between the speech restrained and the danger
apprehended — the "tendency" of one to create the other — was
shown. The "clear and present danger" rule, in contrast, required the
Government to defer application of restrictions until the
apprehended danger was much more visible until its realization was
imminent and nigh at hand. The latter rule was thus considerably
more permissive of speech than the former, in contexts for the
testing of which they were originally designed.
In other types of contexts, however, where the "substantive evil"

which Congress seeks to avoid or mitigate does not relate to the
maintenance of public order in society, the adequacy or perhaps
even the relevancy of these doctrines cannot be casually assumed. It
would appear to me that one of these contexts would be that where
the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the
freedom of speech and assembly in a more generalized way and
where the effect of speech and assembly in terms of the probability
of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of
impressionistic calculation. I believe that Sections 50-A and 50-B
come within such context. Congress enacted these provisions not
because it feared that speeches and assemblies in the course of
election campaigns would, probably or imminently, result in a direct
breach of public order or threaten national security. Sections 50-A

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and 50-B explicitly recognize that such speech and assembly are
lawful while seeking to limit them in point of time.
However useful the "clear and present danger" formulation was in

the appraisal of a specific type of situation, there is fairly extensive
recognition that it is not a rule of universal applicability and validity,
not an automatic mechanism that relieves a court of the need for
careful scrutiny of the features of a given station and evaluation of
the competing interests involved.
In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds. 17 the United States

Supreme Court unequivocally said that "in suggesting that the
substantive evil must be serious and substantial, it was never the
intention of this Court to lay down an absolutist test measured in
terms of danger to the Nation." Rejecting the criterion of "clear and
present danger" as applicable to a statute requiring labor union
officers to subscribe to a non-communist affidavit before the union
may avail of the benefits of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, said:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public

order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional,
partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances
presented.... We must, therefore undertake the delicate and
difficult task ... to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of rights.... 18

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In enunciating a standard premised on a judicial balancing of the
conflicting social values and individual interests competing for
ascendancy in legislation which restricts expression, the court in
Douds laid the basis for what has been called the "balancing-of-
interests" test which has found application in more recent decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court. 19 Briefly stated, the "balancing" test
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation. 20
In the actual application of the "balancing-of-interests" test, the

crucial question is: how much deference should be given to the
legislative judgment? It does not seem to me enough to say that this
Court should not concern itself with the wisdom of a particular
legislative measure but with the question of constitutional power. I
believe that we cannot avoid addressing ourselves to the question
whether the point of viable equilibrium represented by the
legislative judgment embodied in R.A. 4880 is an appropriate and
reasonable one, in the light of both the historic purpose of the
constitutional safeguards of speech and press and assembly and the
general conditions obtaining in the community.
Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by

Congressional power restricting the individual's freedom, and the
social importance and value of the freedom so restricted, "are to be
judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions," 21 a wide
range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or
line of equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social values and
importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted
by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e.,

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whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the
persons affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public
interest sought to be secured by the legislation — the reference here
is to the nature and gravity of the evil which Congress seeks to
prevent;(d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is
reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such
public interest; and (e) whether the necessary safeguarding of the
public interest involved may be achieved by some other measure
less restrictive of the protected freedom. 22
In my view, the "balancing-of-interests" approach is more

appropriately used in determining the constitutionality of Sections
50-A and 50-B. Both the "dangerous tendency" and "clear and
present danger" criteria have minimum relevancy to our task of
appraising these provisions. Under these two tests, the statute is to
be assayed by considering the degree of probability and imminence
with which "prolonged election campaigns" would increase the
incidence of "violence and deaths," "dominion of the rich in the
political arena" and "corruption of the electorate." This kind of
constitutional testing would involve both speculation and prophecy
of a sort for which this Court, I am afraid, has neither the
inclination nor any special competence.
IV
Applying the "balancing-of-interests" test or approach outlined

above, I am persuaded that Congress did not exceed constitutional
limits in enacting Section 50-A. This Section, it will be recalled,
makes it unlawful for any political party or group to nominate a
candidate for an elective public office earlier than the period of 150

Page 58 of 120
or 90 days, as the case may be, immediately preceding the election.
No political party or group can claim a constitutional right to
nominate a candidate for public office at any time that such party or
group pleases. The party nomination process is a convenient
method devised by political parties and groups, as a means of
securing unity of political action. 23 As a device designed for
expediency of candidates and of political parties, the process of
nomination — or at least the time aspect thereof — must yield to
the requirements of reasonable regulations imposed by the State. It
may be well to note that in many jurisdictions in the United States,
the nomination of candidates for public office is regulated and
controlled in many aspects by statutes. 24 While the act of
nominating a candidate has speech and assembly aspects, the
restrictive effect of Section 50-A would appear negligible. The reach
of the statute is itself limited: it applies only to political parties,
political committees or political groups, leaving everyone else free
from restraint. The thrust of Section 50-A is also limited: it does not
prohibit political parties from holding nominating conventions or
from doing any lawful thing during such conventions; what it
controls is the scheduling of the nominating conventions; While
control of the scheduling of conventions of course involves
delimitation of the time period which the formally revealed
candidates have to convince the electorate of their respective merits,
those periods — 150 days and 90 days — do not appear
unreasonably short, at least not in this age of instantaneous and
mass media.
On the other hand, the legitimacy and importance of the public

interest sought to be promoted by Section 50-A must be conceded.

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Congress has determined that inordinately early nominations by
political parties or groups have the tendency of dissipating the
energies of the people by exposing them prematurely to the
absorbing excitement of election campaigns as we know them, and
detracting from the attention that ought to be given to the pursuit
of the main task of a developing society like ours, which is the
achievement of increasing levels of economic development and
social welfare.
The rational connection between the prohibition of Section 50-A

and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the
rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing public interest
which Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political
activity, lead us to the conclusion that the statute may stand
consistently with and does not offend against the Constitution. The
interest of the community in limiting the period of election
campaigns, on balance, far outweighs the social value of the kind of
speech and assembly that is involved in the formal nomination of
candidates for public office.
I reach a different conclusion with respect to Section 50-B. Here, the

restraint on the freedoms of expression, assembly and association is
direct. Except within the "open seen" of 120 and 90 days preceding
the election, the statute prevents and punishes — by heavy criminal
sanction — speeches, writings, assemblies and associations
intended to promote or oppose the candidacy of any person aspiring
for an elective public office, or which may be deemed a direct or an
indirect "campaign" or as "propaganda" for or against a political

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party. The prohibition reaches not only "a relative handful of
persons;" 25 applies to any person "whether or not a voter or
candidate," and to any group of persons "whether or not a political
party or political committee." The effect of the law, therefore, is to
impose a comprehensive and prolonged prohibition of speech of a
particular content, except during the 120 or 80 days, respectively,
immediately preceding an election.
Thus, the moment any person announces his intention of seeking an

elective public office, "regardless of whether or not said person has
already filed his certificate of candidacy or has been nominated by
any political party as its candidate," Section 50-B would become
immediately operative. Should the aspirant make known his
intention, say, one year before the election, the law forthwith steps
in to impose a "blackout," as it were, of all manner of discussion in
support of or in opposition to his candidacy. The lips of the
candidate himself are by the threat of penal sanction sealed, and he
may not make a speech, announcement, commentary, or hold an
interview to explain his claim to public office or his credentials for
leadership until the commencement of the period allowed for an
"election campaign." Neither may any person, before that period,
speak out in open support or criticism of his candidacy, for that
would constitute a prohibited commentary "for or against the
election of [a] candidate [albeit not a formally nominated candidate]
for public office," within the purview of paragraph (c) of Section 50-
B. In practical effect, Section 50-B would stifle comment or
criticism, no matter how fair-minded, in respect of a given political
party (whether in our out of power) and prospective candidates for
office (whether avowed or merely intending), and would abide all

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the citizens to hold their tongues in the meantime.
What of the social value and importance of the freedoms impaired

by Section 50-B? The legislation strikes at the most basic political
right of the citizens in a republican system, which is the right
actively to participate in the establishment or administration of
government. This right finds expression in multiple forms but it
certainly embraces that right to influence the shape of policy and
law directly by the use of ballot. It has been said so many times it
scarcely needs to be said again, that the realization of the
democratic ideal of self-government depends upon an informed and
committed electorate. This can be accomplished only by allowing
the fullest measure of freedom in the public discussion of
candidates and the issues behind which they rally; to this end, all
avenues of persuasion — speech, press, assembly, organization —
must be kept always open. It is in the context of the election process
that these fundamental rigths secured by the Constitution assume
the highest social importance. 26
As to the formation of "organizations, associations, clubs,

a party or candidate," 27 this is a right which, like freedom of
expression and peaceable assembly, lies at the foundation of a
libertarian and democratic society. 28 As Professor Kauper has
explained, with characteristic lucidity:
When we speak of freedom of association we may, have

reference to it in a variety of contexts. Probably the highest form of
freedom of association, at least as many would see it, is the freedom to

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associate for political purposes by means of organization of a political
party and participation in its activities. The effective functioning of a
democratic society depends on the formation of political parties and the
use of parties as vehicles for the formulation and expression of opinions
and policies. The minority party or parties become vehicles for registering
opposition and dissent. The political party is the indispensable
agency both for effective participation in political affairs by the
individual citizen and for registering the diversity of views in a
pluralistic society. Indeed, under some other constitutional
systems political parties are viewed as organs of government
and have a high constitutional status.29
We turn to the other end of the scales. As I have herein before

observed, the interest of the state in regulating partisan political
activity, which is sought to, be secured by Section 50-B no less than
by Section 50-A, is a legitimate one and its protection a proper aim
for reasonable exercise of the public power. I think, however, that
that interest, important as it is, does not offset the restrictions
which Section 50-B imposes with indiscriminate sweep upon the
even more fundamental community interests embodied in the
constitutional guarantees of speech, assembly and association. I
have adverted to Mills v. Alabama where the United States Supreme
Court struck down the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act to the extent
that it prohibited, under penal sanctions, comments and criticism by
the press on election day. The statutory provision there in question
11, not unlike Section 50-B here, was sought to be sustained in the
interest of preserving the purity and integrity of the electoral
process. The restriction which the Alabama statute imposed upon
freedom of speech and assembly would seem an inconsequential

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one — a restriction, imposed for one day, only one day, election day;
nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court regarded such
restriction as sufficient to outweigh the concededly legitimate
purpose of the statute. We can do no less in respect of restrictious
of such reach, scope and magnitude as to make the limitation of the
Alabama statute appear, in comparison, as an altogether trifling
inconvenience.
Indeed, if a choice is to be made between licentious election

campaigns, which Section 50-B seeks to curtail, and the muzzling,
as it were, of public discussion of political issues and candidates,
which the provision would effectuate, I have no hesitancy in opting
for the former. It is the only choice consistent with the democratic
process. Fortunately, there is no need to choose between one and
the other; the dichotomy need not be a real one. I am not to be
understood as holding that Congress may not, in appropriate
instances, forbid the abusive exercise of speech in election
campaigns. There is no constitutional immunity for a defamatory
attack on a public candidate. Neither is there protection for slander
of public officials. 30 It has been held to be within the power of the
legislature to penalize specifically the making, in bad faith, of false
charges of wrongdoing against a candidate for nomination or
election to public office, 31 and to prohibit the publication or
circulation of charges against such candidate without serving him a
copy of such charges several days before the election. 32 Statutes of
this kind have been sustained against broad claims of impairment of
freedom of speech and of the press. 33 "But it is an entirely different
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting [offenders] for such
offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly

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and a lawful public discussion as a basis for criminal charge. 34
That remedies less destructive of the basic rights enshrined in the

Constitution are not available, has not been shown. The applicable
principle here has been formulated in the following terms:
... even though the governmental purposes be legitimate and

substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment
must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving
the same purpose.35
Section 50-B, as it would casually lump together the activities of

citizens exercising their constitutional rights and those of politicians
seeking the privilege of an elective office, is to broadly drawn to
satisfy the constitutional test. The more pernicious aspects of our
national preoccupation with "politics" do not arise from the exercise,
even the abuse, by the electorate of the freedoms of speech and of
the press; I find it difficult to suppose that these can be met by
curtailing expression, assembly and association. The great majority
of our people are too preoccupied with demands upon their time
imposed by our generally marginal or submarginal standards of
living. "Politics," as I see the contemporary scene, is a dominant pre-
occupation of only a handful of persons — the politicians, the
professional partymen. If the people at large become involved in the
heat and clamor of an election campaign, it is ordinarily because
they are unduly provoked or frenetically induced to such
involvement by the politicians themselves. As it is, the great masses
of our people do not speak loud enough — and, when they do, only

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infrequently — about our government. The effect of the ban on
speech would serve only to further chill constitutionally protected
conduct on their part which, instead of being suppressed, should on
the contrary be encouraged.
It is not amiss to observe here that the making of politically

oriented speeches and the dissemination of similar literature, while
they may divert the energies of those who make or write them and
their audiences, would appear to me to be among the less
pernicious aspects of our national preoccupation with "politics." The
more dangerous aspects of our national preoccupation probably
occur in privacy or secrecy and may be beyond the reach of
measures like Section 50-B.
It is argued in defense of the statute, nonetheless, that under the

two provisos of Section 50-B, "simple expressions of opinion and
thoughts concerning the election" and expression of "views on
current political problems or sues," including mentioning the names
of candidates for public offices whom one supports, are not
prohibited; hence, freedom of expression is not unconstitutionally
abridged by Section 50-B.
This argument is gravely flawed by the assumption that "simple

expressions of opinion" and "views on current political problems"
cover the whole reach of the relevant constitutional guarantees.
What about the rights of assembly and lawful association? As to
freedom of expression that cannot be confined to the realm of
abstract political discussions. It comprehends expression which
advocates action, no less than that which merely presents an
academic viewpoint. Indeed, the value of speech in a democratic

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society lies, in large measure, in its role as an instrument of
persuasion, of consensual action, and for this reason it must seek to
move to action by advocacy, no less than by mere exposition of
views. It is not mere coincidence that the farmers of our
Constitution, in protecting freedom of speech and of the press
against legislative abridgment, coupled that freedom with a
guarantee of the right of the people to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for the redress of grievances. The right of
peaceful assembly for the redress of grievances would be
meaningless and hollow if it authorized merely the public
expression of political views, but not the advocacy of political
reforms — even changes in the composition of the elective
officialdom of the administration.
There is another, equally basic, difficulty that vitiates the avowed

constitutional utility of the provisos appended to Section 50-B.
Under the first proviso, it "simple expressions of opinion and
thoughts concerning the election shall not be considered as part of
an election campaign." From the precise use of the word "simple"
may be rationally drawn an inference that "non-simple" expressions
fall within the proscription of election campaigns. But the law
conspicuously fails to lay dawn a standard by which permissible
electioneering. How simple is "simple"? In the absence of such a
standard, every speaker or writer wishing to make publicly known
his views concerning the election and his preferences among the
candidates, must speak at his own peril. He could carefully choose
his word's with the intention of remaining within the area of speech
left permissible by Section 50-B. But, in the nature of things, what
and who can provide him assurance that his words, "simple

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expressions of opinion and thoughts concerning the election" as
they may be, will not be understood by his audience or at least by
some of them, or by the prosecuting officers of the Government, or
by the courts even, as a "speech" or "commentary" "for or against the
election of ... a candidate for public office," or at least an indirect
solicitation of votes?
It is pertinent to advert to the Texas statute involved in Thomas v.

Collins, supra, as illustrative of the vice of vagueness that we find in
Section 50-B. The Texas statute required all labor union organizers
to first obtain organizer's cards from the Secretary of State "before
soliciting any members for his organization," and authorized the
courts to compel compliance by the issuance of court processes.
Thomas, the president of a nationwide labor union, came to
Houston to address a mass meeting of employees of an oil plant
which was undergoing unionization; but six hours before he was
scheduled to speak, he was served with a court order restraining
him from soliciting members for the local union which was affiliated
with his organization, without first obtaining an organizer's card.
For disobeying the restraining order, he was found in contempt of
court. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing his conviction, found the
registration requirement an invalid restraint upon free speech and
free assembly, thus:
That there was restriction upon Thomas' right to speak and the
rights of the workers to hear what he had to say, there can be
no doubt. The threat of the restraining order, backed by the
power of contempt, and of arrest for crime, hung over every
word. A speaker in such circumstance could avoid the words
"solicit," "invite," "join". It would be impossible to avoid the

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idea. The statute requires no specific formula. It is not
contended that only the use of the word "solicit" would violate
the prohibition. Without such a limitation, the statute forbids
any language which conveys, or reasonably could be found to
convey, the meaning of invitation. That Thomas chose to meet,
the issue squarely, not to hide in ambiguous phrasing, does not
counteract this fact. General words create different and often
particular impressions on different minds. No speaker, however
careful, can convey exactly his meaning, or the same meaning,
to the different members of an audience. How one might "land
unionism," as the State and the State Supreme Court concedes
Thomas was free to do, yet in these circumstances not imply an
invitation, is hard to conceive. This is the nub of the case,
which the State fails to meet because it cannot do so,
Workingmen to do lack capacity for making rational
connections. They would understand, or some would, that the
president of U.A.W. and vice president of C.I.O. addressing an
organization meeting, was not urging merely, a philosophy
attachment to abstract principles of unionism, disconnected
from the business immediately at hand. The feat would be
incredible for a national leader, addressing such a meeting,
lauding unions and their principles, urging adherence to union
philosophy, not also and thereby to suggest attachment to the
union by becoming a member.
Furthermore, whether words intended and designed to fall

short of invitation would miss that mark is a question, of intent
and of effect. No speaker, in such circumstance safely could
assume that anything lie might say upon the general subject

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would not be understood by as an invitation. In short, the
supposedly clear-cut distinction between discussion and laudation,
general advocacy, and solicitation puts the speaker in these circumstance
wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and
consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and
meaning.
Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion. In these

conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said. It compels
the speaker to hedge and trim. He must take care in every word to
create no impression that he means, in advocating unionism's
most central principle, namely, that workingmen should unite
for collective bargaining, to urge those present to do so. The vice
is not merely that invitation, in the circumstances shown here, is speech.
It is also that its prohibition forbids or restrains discussion which is not
or may not be invitation. The sharp line cannot be drawn surely or
securely. The effort to observe it could not be free speech, free press, or
free assembly, in any sense of free advocacy of principle or cause. The
restriction's effect, as applied, in a very practical sense was to
prohibit Thomas not only to solicit members and memberships
but also to speak in advocacy of the cause or trade unionism in
Texas, without having first procured the card. Thomas knew
this and faced the alternatives it presented. When served with the
order he had three choices: (1) to stand on his right and speak freely; (2)
to quit, refusing entirety to speak; (3) to trim, and even thus to risk the
penalty. He chose the first alternative. We think he was within his lights
in doing so.36
The realism of the approach and reasoning employed in Thomas v.

Collins commends itself; I think this kind of realism should be

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applied to the task of appraising Section 50-B. Section 50-B forbids
"directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party,"
including any language "for or against the election of any party or
candidate for public office," except within the specified periods
preceding the election.
If a minority political party were to hold a mass rally at Plaza

Miranda within the prohibited period of an election year, for the
purpose of publicly expressing their criticism of the party in power,
it is unthinkable that the public speeches delivered during the
occasion will not understood, by many if not by all, as a direct or an
indirect campaign or propaganda against a political party, as well as
a direct or an indirect solicitation of votes. The audience will
certainly understand the occasion, not as a forum for indulging in
criticism for criticism's sake, nor as a "simple" discussion of political,
philosophy, but as an invitation to unseat the party in power at the
next election. If, upon the other hand, the minority party should
control one or both Houses of Congress and, for selfish partisan
motives, oppose all or a major portion of the significant measures
sponsored by the Administration, regardless of their merits, for the
purpose of obtaining political partisan advantage, the Chief
executive would, during the restricted period, find himself
hampered in vigorously placing blame squarely on such minority
party. The Administration (and this includes the Chief Executive
himself) would be hard put to appeal to public opinion to exert
pressure on the legislature to gain support for what it may honestly
believe to be constructive measures sorely needed to promote the
country's progress. The right of any party or politician to appeal to

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public opinion cannot be assailed; yet, when would such an appeal,
in which the opposition may have to be several criticized not
constitute a violation of Section 50-B? Actual, pre-war and postwar
experience has shown that in a number of instances, the Chief
Executive and leaders of his administration had to mobilize public
opinion (largely expressed through the press) to frustrate what they
regarded as a calculated scheme the opposition party of
unreasonably interposing obstacles to a major part of essential
legislation. It would indeed be most difficult to determine with
exactitude what utterances of the Administration leaders, including
the Chief Executive himself, would or would not constitute
propaganda "for or against a political party."
Under these circumstances, I find the contraposition in Section 50-B

between "expressions of opinion," on the one hand, and
"solicitation" and "campaign or propaganda," on the other, as too
uncertain and shifting a line of distinction to be of any practical
utility either to the citizen or official who must speak at his own
peril or to the prosecutors and the courts who must enforce and
apply the distinction.
Paragraph (f) of Section 50-B is tautological and question-begging.

It defines "election campaign" as "giving, soliciting, or receiving
contributions for election campaign purposes, either directly or
indirectly." Insofar, therefore, as the phrase "election campaign
purposes" in paragraph (f) depends for its meaning on the preceding
paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d) and(e), paragraph (f) likewise suffers
from constitutional infirmity. Upon the other hand, if the meaning
of paragraph (f) be that the act of soliciting, giving or receiving
contributions for the purpose of advancing the candidacy of a person

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or party is "campaigning," then it is just as must a curtailment of the
freedom of thought that the Constitution vouchsafes to every
citizen.
The foregoing disquisition could be compressed into the compelling

perspective of this simple admonition: that "speech concerning
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government." 37
In sum and substance, it is my considered view that Section 50-B of

the Revised Election Code constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of the freedoms of speech, of the press, of peaceful
assembly, and of lawful association.
I vote for its total excision from the statute books.
Dizon, Zaldivar and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the resulting dismissal of this case, but I candidate give

my assent to so much of the opinion, brilliantly written for the
Court by Mr. Justice Fernando, as would give the imprimatur of
constitutionality to any portion of Section 50-B of the statute before
Us. Hereunder are my humble but sincere observations.
I am of the firms conviction that this case should be dismissed. In

fact, it is not clear to me why the petition herein was ever given due
course at all No matter how I scan its allegations, I cannot find
anything in them more than a petition for relief which is definitely
outside the original jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioners

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themselves have expressly brought it as a petition for relief; it is the
majority that has decided to pull the chestnuts out of the fire by
holding that it should be "treated by this Court as one of prohibition
in view of the seriousness and the urgency of the constitutional
issue raised." Frankly I consider this relaxation rather uncalled for; it
could border on over eagerness on the part of the Supreme Court,
which is not only taboo in constitutional cases but also certainly not
befitting the role of this Tribunal in the tripartite scheme of
government We have in this Republic of ours. I am afraid the
majority is unnecessarily opening wide the gate for a flood of cases
hardly worthy of our attention, because the parties concerned in
many cases that will come to Us may not see as clearly as We do the
real reasons of public interest which will move Us when We choose
in the future to either entertain or refuse to take cognizance, of
cases of constitutionality. Withal, We cannot entirely escape the
suspicion that We discriminate.
Since after all, the majority admits that "When We act in these
matters, We do not do so on the assumption that to Us is granted
the requisite knowledge to set matters right, but by virtue of the
responsibility We cannot escape under the Constitution, one that
history authenticates, to pass upon every assertion of an alleged
infringement of liberty, when our competence is appropriately invoked",
(underscoring mine) and, further, no one can deny that it is now
firmly established that among the indispensable requirements
before this Court can take up constitutional question is that We can
do it only when it, involves a real and genuine situation causing
direct substantial injury to specific persons, as contradistinguished
from mere speculative fears of possible general hardship or mere

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inconvenience, I feel it would be much safer for Us, and our position
would be more in word with the rule of law, if We adhered strictly
to the above requirement and threw out cases of the nature of the
present one, if only out of the traditional respect this Tribunal owes
the two other coordinate and co-equal departments of our
government. In the petition at bar, there are no allegations of
specific acts of the respondent Commission on Elections or even
only threatened to be committed by it, pursuant to the challenged
legislation, which they claim impairs, impedes, or negates any rights
of theirs considered to be constitutionally protected against such
impairment, impeding or negation. It is very clear to me that in this
case, our jurisdiction has not been properly invoked. Considering
how multifaceted the law in question is, one is completely at a loss
as to how petitioner request for a blanket prohibition and injunction
can be considered, in the light of existing principles that strictly
limit our power to take cognizance of constitutional cases only to
those that can pass the test I have mentioned above.
What is more, I regret to have to say that what the majority is doing
by taking further cognizance of and deciding this case is to brush
aside the stark reality that the interest in this case of petitioners
Cabigao and Gonzales, the first, as candidate, and the second, as his
leader, related only to the elections of 1967 wherein, in fact,
Cabigao was elected Vice-Mayor of Manila. Accordingly, this case
has already become entirely academic even as a prohibition, because
neither Cabigao nor his leader, Gonzales, can conceivably have any
further imaginable interest in these proceedings. How can we
proceed then, when petitioners' interest no longer exists and
whatever decision We may make will no longer affect any situation

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involving said petitioners. Clearly to me, what the majority has done
is to motu proprio convert the action of petitioners into a taxpayer's
suit, which may not be proper because there no specific expenditure
of public funds involved here. Besides, if petitioners have not come
with a supplemental petition still complaining, why are We going to
assume that they are still complaining or, for that matter, that there
are other persons who are minded to complain, such that We have
to give or deny to them here and now the reason to do so?
Again, I say, the Court seems to be trying to bite more than it can
chew, since cases of this nature 1 will surely come in great numbers
and We will have to accommodate them all, otherwise the exercise
of our discretion in rejecting any of them can be questioned and
may at times be really questionable. My basic principle is that the
rule of law avoids creating areas of discretionary powers, and the
fact that it is the Supreme Court that exercises the discretion does
not make it tolerable in any degree, for such an eventuality can be
worse because no other authority can check Us and the people
would be helpless, since We cannot be changed, unlike the
President and the Members of Congress who can, in effect, be
recalled in the elections. Of course, I have faith in the individual and
collective wisdom and integrity of each and every one of my fellow
members of this Court, but I still prefer that We exercise discretion
only when it is clearly granted to Us, rather than for Us to create by
our own fiat the basis for its exercise.
The other question assailing my mind now, is this: Is there any

precedent, whether here or in any other jurisdiction where the
Supreme Court has the power to declare legislative or executive acts
unconstitutional, wherein any supreme court had insisted on

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deciding grave constitutional questions after the case had become
completely moot and academic because the interest of the actors
alleged in their pleading had ceased to exist? I don't believe there
has been any, which is as it should be, because if this Court and
even inferior court dismiss ordinary cases which have become moot
and academic, with much more reason should such action be taken,
in cases wherein the unconstitutionality of a law or executive order
is raised, precisely for the reasons of principle already stated and
fully discussed in other constitutional cases so well known that they
need not be cited here anymore.
It is for these considerations that I join the majority in dismissing

this case. And I want to acknowledge that I am heartened in any
stand by the fact that in the deliberations, at least, Mr. Justice
Makalintal expressed similar views as mine, so much so that, in his
particular case, he did not even care to discuss the constitutional
questions herein invoIved precisely because they are not
appropriately before this Court. 1a On the other hand, if the
majority's position is correct that this Court may properly consider
this case as one of prohibition and that it should be decided despite
its having become clearly academic, I would definitely cast my vote
with Mr. Justice Castro to declare unconstitutional Section 50-B of
the legislative enactment in question, Republic Act 4880, more
popularly known as the Tañada-Singson Law. Unlike him, however, I
shall not indulge in a complete discussion of my stand on the
constitutional questions herein involved, since the opportunity to
voice fully my views will come anyway when the proper case is filed
with Us. It is only because some members of the Court feel that we
should make known what are, more or less, our personal opinions,

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so that the parties concerned may somehow be guided in what they
propose to do or are doing in relation to the coming election, that I
shall state somehow my fundamental observations, without
prejudice to their needed enlargement if and when the appropriate
opportunity comes. Indeed, in my humble view, what the Court is
rendering here is in the nature of an advisory opinion and I am sure
all the members of the Court will agree with me that in doing this
we are departing from the invariable posture this Court has always
taken heretofore. In other words, we are just advancing now,
individually and collectively, what our votes and judgment will be
should an appropriate case come, unless, of course, as some of our
colleagues have wisely observed in other cases where I have made
similar observations, We change our mind after hearing the real
parties in interest.
Coming now to the constitutional problems posed by the pleadings,

I have these to say, for the time being:
1. The first specific act defined by the statute in question as

"election campaign" or "partisan political activity" proscribed by it
within the stipulated limited period of one hundred twenty days
prior to an election at large and ninety days in the case of any other
election is to "form(ing) organizations, associations, clubs,
a party or candidate." No law more effective, if less disguised, could
have been conceived to render practically impossible the
organization of new political parties in this country. If for this
reason alone, I consider this provision to be deserving of the
severest condemnation as an unparalleled assault on the most

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sacred and fundamental political rights of our citizenry. In the light
of the recent political experience of the strong of heart and idealists
amongst us, this measure appears to me as a perfect or, at least, a
near-perfect scheme for the perpetuation of the status quo and the
entrenchment of the presently existing political parties, particularly,
the two major ones, whether or not we share the cynical reference
to them by the discerning as nothing but twin peas in the same pod.
This is not to say that such was what motivated its authors,
particularly Senator Tanada, for whom I have always had the highest
regard for his never-questioned sincerity of purpose, patriotism and
libertarian principles, which opinion of mine is undoubtedly shared
by all the member of this Court. I must insist, however, that such is
what appears to me to be unmistakably the evident effect of the
prohibition under discussion it is most probable that in its passion
to remedy as early as possible the evils it feels exist, Congress has
overlooked unwittingly some of the possible implications of this
particular measure.
It is one thing to prohibit a political party from actively campaigning

outside a certain period of time and it is entirely another thing to
prohibit citizens who are not contented with the existing political
parties to organize, outside the same period, any new political party
which they feel will better serve the public weal. 1b Before it is
contended that this provision does allow the organization of new
political parties within the abovementioned periods of one hundred
twenty and ninety days preceding each respective election referred
to, I hasten to add that the said periods are so obviously insufficient
that to some it would appear as if the reference to such brief periods
of free organization in the provision was just inserted into it to

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camouflage its real but unmentionable intentions and/or to blunt
any challenge of unconstitutionality.
All our people have been witnesses to events of contemporary

history which have clearly demonstrated the futility of organizing a
new political party or even just a front or alliance within such a
short time. To name the gallant national figures who have met
frustration in such endeavor even with much more time at their
disposal is to prove that the task is simply next to impossible, no
matter if it were undertaken by men of the best reputation in
integrity and nobility of ideals. It is surely of common knowledge
that the work of organization alone of a party, not to speak of the
actual participation and influence such party is intended to
effectuate in the ensuing election, can hardly be accomplished,
within the four months provided by the statute, with sufficient
success to be of any consequence, specially, on a national level,
which is what is needed most, because while local issues seem to
arouse more interest among the electors, national issues have a
profound effect on the lives and liberties of all the people. It must
be borne in mind, in this connection, that our country is made up of
more than 7,000 islands scattered throughout the length and
breadth of the archipelago. Those who have taken part in one way or
another in an electoral campaign of national dimension know only
too well that one can hardly cover a majority of these islands, not to
speak of all of them, within such an abbreviated period.
Moreover, in the light of contemporary trends of political thinking

and action, very much more than the present condition of things
about which there is, to be sure, so much hypocritical hue and cry,
particularly, among those whom the present-day Robin Hoods, in

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and out of the government have not attended to, to engender a
general feeling of dissatisfaction and need for change in such
widespread proportions as to readily galvanize enough elements to
rise in peaceful revolution against the existing political parties and
bring about the formation within the short span of four months of a
new political party of adequate or at least appreciable strength and
effectiveness in the national arena. Even the obviously sincere
efforts of the undaunted who keep on trying their luck, pitted
against the marked complacency and indifference of the present and
passing generations, if not their incomprehensible inability to
overcome the inertia that seems to be holding them from pushing
the scattered protests here and there, more or less valid and urgent,
to their logical conclusion, generate but very little hope that the
expected reaction can materialize during our time.
Needless to say, no matter if one looks at the current scenes thru

the most rosy spectacles, a ban against the formation of new
political parties is definitely out of the question. A total expressed
ban is, of Course, repugnant to any decent sense of freedom. Indeed,
a disguised even if only partial, is even more intolerable in this
country that does not pretend to have but does truly have
democratic bearings deeply rooted in the history of centuries of
heroic uprisings which logically culminated in the first successful
revolution of a small nation against despotism and colonialism in
this part of the world.
It is to be conceded that the adequacy or inadequacy of the means

adopted by Congress in the pursuit of a legislative recognized
objective is generally irrelevant to the courts in the determination of
the constitutionality of a congressional action. I must be quick to

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add, however, that this rule can be salutary only if the adequacy is
controversial, but when the inadequacy of the means adopted is
palpable and can reasonably be assumed to be known or ought to be
known generally by the people, such that it is a foregone conclusion
that what is left licit by the law can be nothing more than futile
gestures of empty uselessness, I have no doubt that the judicial can
rightfully expose the legislative act for what it is — an odious
infraction of the charter of our liberties. Other the principle of
respect for coordinate and co-equal authority can be a tyranny
forbidding the courts from striking down what is not
constitutionally permissible. I am ready to agree that the judiciary
should give allowances for errors of appreciation and evaluation of
the circumstances causing the passage of a law, but if it is true, as it
is indeed true, that the Supreme Court is the guardian next only to
the people themselves of the integrity of the Constitution and the
rights and liberties it embodies and sanctifies, I would consider it an
unpardonable abdication of our peculiar constitutionally-destined
role, if We closed Our eyes and folded Our arms when a more or
less complete ban against the organization of new political parties in
this countries is being attempted to be passed before Us as a
legitimate exercise of police power.
At this point, it is best to make it clear that the particular

constitutional precept with which the statutory provision in
question is inconsistent and to which therefore, it must yield is
Paragraph 6, Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution which ordains:
The right to form associations or societies for purposes not

contrary to law shall not be abridged.

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Incidentally, the indigenous cast of this provision is seemingly
emphasized by Mr. Justice Fernando by his reference to its origin in
the Malolos Constitution of 1896. 2 Indeed, there it was provided:
Article 19
No Filipino in the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights

shall be hindered in the free exercise thereof.
Article 20
Neither shall any Filipino, be deprived of:
1. ...
2. The right of joining any associations for all objects of human

life which may not be contrary to public moral; ...
It is to be observed that in the light of its text and origin, the

statutory provision under scrutiny forbids the abridgement of the
right of inhabitants of this country to form associations and
societies of all kinds, including and most of all, for the citizens,
political parties, the sole exception being when the association or
society is formed for purposes contrary to law. It is unquestionable
that the formation of an ordinary political party cannot be for
purposes contrary to law. On the contrary, the organization of
political parties not dedicated to the violent overthrow of the
government is an indispensable concomitant of any truly democratic
government. Partyless governments are travesties of the genuine
concept of democracy. The immediate repulsion that fated straws in
the wind thrown in favor of such an anachronistic proposal here in

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the Philippines is still fresh in the memory of many of our
countrymen. Our people are firmly set on the inseparability of
political parties from a democratic way of life. To ban political
parties here is to kill democracy itself.
And now comes this legislation banning the formation of political

parties except within certain limited periods of time, so short, as I
have already demonstrated, that in effect, the ban is a total one. Can
them be a more flagrant violation of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association? Besides, since it is undeniable that the evils
Congress seeks to remedy cannot be said to have all been brought
about by the formation of new political parties, but rather by the
anomalous, irregular, corrupt and illegal practices of the existing
political parties, why does the legislature have to direct its wrath
against new political parties, which, for all we know, can yet be the
ones that will produce the much needed innovation in the political
thinking and actions of our electorate which will precisely do away
with the defects of the present political system? As I see it,
therefore, the remedy embodied in the disputed provision is so
clearly misdirected that it cannot, under any concept of
constitutional law, be tolerated and considered constitutionally
flawless, on the theory that it is just a case of error in the choice of
means, on the part of Congress, to attain the objective it has in
mind, hence beyond the pale of judicial review.
To be sure, the phrase "for purposes not contrary to law" in the

constitutional provision above quoted did not pass unnoticed during
the debates in the constitutional convention. To some delegates, it
appeared that said phrase renders nugatory the freedom it
guarantees, for the simple reason that with said phrase the

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lawmakers are practically given the attribute to determine what
specific associations may be allowed or not allowed, by the simple
expedient of outlawing their purposes — prophetic vision, indeed!
No less than Delegate Jose P. Laurel, who later became an honored
member of this Court, had to explain that "the phrase was inserted
just to show that the right of association guaranteed in the
Constitution was subject to the dominating police power of the
state." (Aruego, id.)
To my mind, this explanation of Delegate Laurel renders the

prohibition in the law in question more vulnerable to the charge of
unconstitutionality. It is to me simply inconceivable that the state
can ever forbid the formation of political parties in the assertion of
its "dominating police power". I reiterate that political parties are an
absolute necessity in a democracy like ours. As a matter of fact, I
dare say police power would be inexistent unless the political
parties that give life to the government which exercises police
power are allowed to exist. That is not to say that political parties
are above the state. All that I mean is that without political parties,
a democratic state cannot exist; what we will have instead is a police
state.
No more than momentary reflection is needed to realize that much

as our Constitution projects, it would appear, the desirability of the
two-party system of government. there is nothing in it that even
remotely suggests that the present political parties are the ones
precisely that should be perpetuated to the prejudice of any other.
Less reflection is needed for one to be thoroughly convinced that to
prohibit the organization of any new political party is but a short
step away from implanting here the totalitarian practice of a one-

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ticket election which We all abhor. Absolute freedom of choice of
the parties and men by whom we shall be governed, even if only
among varying evils, is of the very essence in the concept of
democracy consecrated in the fundamental law of our land.
So much, for the time being, for the prohibition against new
political parties. Let us go now to the other freedoms
unconstitutionally impinged by the legislation at bar.
2. If I vehemently decry the attempt in this law to curtail our

freedom to organize political parties whenever it may please us to
do so for being not only violative of the letter of the constitution but
contrary also to the democratic traditions of our people and likewise
a patent disregard of the very essence of a democratic form of
government, I cannot have less repugnance and abhorence for the
further attempt in this law to do away with the freedoms of speech
and the press and peaceful assembly. Lest I be misunderstood,
however, as being an ultra-activist, it should be clear at the outset
that in holding that the above prohibitions contained in the statute
in question are violative of the Constitution, my stand is limited to
my fundamental conviction that the freedoms of speech, of the press
and of peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are absolute
when they are being exercised in relation to our right to choose the
men and women by whom we shall be governed. I hold neither
candle nor brief for licentious speech and press, but I recognize no
power that can pre-censor much less forbid any speech or writing,
and peaceful assembly and petition for the redress of grievances, the
purpose of which is no more than to express one's belief regarding
the qualification or lack of them, the merits and the demerits of
persons who are candidates for public office or of political parties

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vying for power, as well as the principles and programs of
government and public service they advocate, to the end that when
voting time comes the right of suffrage may be intelligently and
knowingly, even if not always wisely, exercised. If, in the process,
there should be in any manner any baseless attacks on the character
and private life of any candidate or party or some form of inciting to
public disorder or sedition, the offender can be rightfully haled to
court for libel or the violation of the penal provisions on public
order and national security, as the facts may warrant, but never can
anyone, much less the state, have the power to priorly forbid him to
say his piece.
Paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of Section 1 of the challenged

legislation cover practically a common subject matter. They all
define as "election campaign" or is "partisan political activity"
forbidden to be exercised within the aforementioned periods the
following liberties:
The term "Election Campaign" or "Partisan Political Activity"

refers to acts designed to have a candidate elected or not or
(a) ...

meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purposes of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign
or propaganda for or against any candidate or party;

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candidate for public office;
(d) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials;
(e) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking

propaganda for or against any candidate or party;
Naturally, it is my uncompromising view, that by these provisions

the act directly violates the plain injunction provision of the
Constitution to the effect that:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of

the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances. (Par. [8],
Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution)
My colleagues are impressed by the objectives of the legislative

measure before Us. Mr. Justice Fernando voices the feeling of some
of them in the opening paragraph of the Court's opinion thus: "A
statute designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the electoral
process by Congress calling a halt to the undesirable practice of
prolonged political campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils
not the least of which is the ever-increasing cost of seeking public
office, is challenged on constitutional grounds." Mr. Justice Castro
proclaims said objectives as practically self-evident and heartily
endorses, by quoting in toto, the purposes avowed in the explanatory
note of Senate Bill 209 which finally became the subject statute. Mr.
Justice Sanchez is a little more factual as he opines:
State authority here manifests itself in legislation intended as

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an answer to the strong public sentiment that politics is
growing into a way of life, that political campaigns are
becoming longer and more bitter. It is a result of a legislative
appraisal that protracted election campaign is the root of
undesirable conditions. Bitter rivalries precipitate violence and
deaths. Huge expenditures of funds give deserving but poor
candidates slim chances of winning. They constitute an
inducement to graft to winning candidates already in office in
order to recoup campaign expenses. Handouts doled out by and
expected from candidates corrupt the electorate. Official duties
and affairs of state are neglected by incumbent officials desiring
to run for reelection. The life and health of candidates and their
followers are endangered. People's energies are dissipated in
political bickerings and long drawn-out campaigns. (2nd par., p.
4, concurring & dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Sanchez) .
I hope I will be forgiven for having to view things differently.

Indeed, I would like to ask the optimists in and out of Congress to
silence the trumpets they have sounded to herald the approval of
this law. I agree that generally no court and no member of this
Tribunal has the right to quarrel with Congress in its choice of
means to combat the evils in a legislatively recognized situation, but
are We, as the Supreme Court, to seal our lips even when we can
plainly see that a congressional measure purported allegedly to do
away with certain evils does, on the contrary, promote those very
same evils it is supposed to remedy, on top of impinging on our
sacred constitutional freedoms, and at that, with the aggravating
element of giving undue advantage to the incumbents in office and
to the existing political parties?

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A closer look at the way the prohibitions contained in the section of
the law in dispute will work will reveal how detrimental they are to
the basic public interest, nay, to the right of suffrage itself. I like to
reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point
others miss, that genuine democracy thrives only where the power
and right of the people to elect the men to whom they would
entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the
language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, "The
Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." (Section 1,
Article II) Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines
is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be
governed only by officials whom they themselves have placed in
office by their votes. And it is on this cornerstone that I hold it to be
self-evident that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful
assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to
suffrage or as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified
citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and
republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by
our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating
scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and at all times. Every
holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo
exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to
December every year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully
gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who
would regard public dissection of the establishment as an attribute
to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time. I
consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and
redress of grievances, when exercised in the name of suffrage, as the

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very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly
enjoyed. It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be
next to useless if the liberties cannot be untrammelled whether as
to degree or time.
It must be noted that the proscription contained in this law is

against the use altogether of the freedom of speech, press and
peaceful assembly in relation to the candidacy of a person for public
office, not against the use of such freedoms in order to damage the
character of any particular person or to endanger the security of the
state. No matter how I view, it I cannot see how using said freedoms
in the interest of someone's candidacy beyond the prescribed
abbreviated period can do any harm to the common weal. I regret I
came too late to this Court to be able to hear what I have been made
to understand was Senator Tañadas very informative arguments.
With all due respect to what might have been showing by the
distinguished Senator, I personally feel the present measure
premature and misdirected. The incidence and reincidence of bloody
occurences directly or indirectly caused by electoral rivalries cannot
be denied, but unless shown convincing and reliable statistical data,
I have a strong feeling that those who entertain these apprehensions
are influenced by unwarranted generalizations of isolated cases. Not
even the residents of such allegedly troublous areas as Ilocos Sur,
the Lanao provinces, Cavite, Cebu and Nueva Vizcaya will admit
that the situation in those places is so beyond control as to
necessitate, at any time, the complete suppression of expression of
views, oral and in writing for or against person handling public
affairs or; aspiring to do so.
As the above-quoted provisions stand, every imaginable form of

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political activity, whether done individually or suprisingly by a
person, or collectively, by a number of persons, is covered by their
prohibitions. Under the said provisions, during twenty months in
every two years, there are only three things Filipinos can do in
relation to the conduct of public affairs by those they have voted
into power and the relative capacity or incapacity of others to take
their places, namely: (1) simple expressions of opinion and thought
concerning the election; (2) expression of views on current political
problems and issues; and (3) mention the candidates whom one
supports.
If these exceptions in the statute are not absurd, little comfort can
be found beneath their umbrage. As to the first exception, Mr.
Justice Castro very aptly asks, how simple is simple? I would like to
add to the impeccable structures of my esteemed colleague, if I may
be permitted, the humble observation that the phrase "concerning
the election" is to me too equivocal, if it is not incomprehensible, to
be part of a penal statute such as this law is, with the heavy penalty
of imprisonment from one year to five years, disqualification to hold
public office for not less than one year nor more than nine years and
deprivation of the right to vote for a like period that it imposes. To
express an opinion as regards elections in general is something that
is indubitably outside the area of any possible legislative
proscription and to do so in relation to a forthcoming specific
election without any discernible hue of an appeal for support for
one protagonist or another is to say nothing worthwile, that is, if it
is possible to conceive of anyone referring to an actual impending
election with complete impartiality. On the other hand, to express
one's views regarding an actual election with mention of the

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qualifications or disqualifications of the candidates and the political
parties involved, cannot escape the coverage of the prohibition in
question.
As to the second exception, what views on current political

problems and issues can be expressed without necessarily carrying
with them undercurrents of conformity or non-conformity with the
present state of things and, directly or indirectly, with the ways of
the incumbents in office? And as to the last exception, who can be
these candidates whose names would possibly be mentioned by any
sympathizer, when candidates are not allowed by this law to be
nominated earlier than practically the same period as the
prohibitions against campaigns? .
I can well understand the predicament of Congress. It has attempted

to define the indefinable. Any intent to circumscribe the areas of
basic liberties cannot end but in absurdity. To insist on drawing
artificial boundaries for their enjoyment must necessarily result in
confusion and consequent protracted controversy and debate which
can only give occasion for the inordinate exercise of power for
power's sake. A definition that comprehends substantially what
should not be included is no definition at all. The right of our
people to speak and write freely at all times about our government
and those who govern us, only because we have elected them,
cannot be subjected to any degree of limitation without virtual loss
of the right itself. The moment it become impossible for the
inhabitants of this country to express approval or disapproval of the
acts of the government and its officials without imperilling their
personal liberty, their right to hold office and to vote, and such
appears to be the natural consequence of the injunctions of this law,

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we cannot be far away from the day when our Constitution will be
hardly worth the paper on which it is written.
I find it difficult to dissociate the prohibition in this law from the

obvious advantages they give to those presently holding office by
election and to the existing political parties.
Under the definition of the terms "candidate" and "election

campaign or "partisan political activity" contained in the section we
are assaying it is clear that what the statute contemplates are
candidates for public offices. Accordingly, candidates for nomination
by their respective political parties do not appear to be
comprehended within the prohibition; so, as long as a person
campaigns, even publicly, only for nomination by his party, he is free
to expose himself in any way and to correspondingly criticize and
denounce all his rivals. The fact that the law permits in Section 50-A
the holding of political conventions and the nominations of official
candidates one month before the start of the period of the
prohibitions in Section 50-B, lends strength to this conclusion. 3 .
Such being the case, the undue advantage of the aspirants for
nomination within the existing political parties over independent
candidates becomes evident. The legal period fixed by the law will
start in July, and yet, we have long been witnesses already to all
sorts of campaigns, complete to the last detail - what with the
newspaper and radio and television campaign matters being
published and broadcast as widely as possible, the campaigners
armed or endowed with either experience, money or pulchritude or
what may pass for it, welcoming wave after wave of party delegates
arriving at the airports and the piers, the billeting of these delegates

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in luxurious and costly hotels, at the cost of the candidates and with
pocket money to boot, the sumptuous banquets and parties, etc.,
etc. And to top it all, a well publicized marathon "consensus" which
has reportedly cost the candidates millions of pesos! In other words,
in the actual operation of this law, it is only the independent
candidate, the candidate who does not belong to the existing
political parties and who is prohibited to organize a new one, who
must keep his ambitions and aspirations all to himself and say nary
a word, lest he jeopardize his liberty and his rights to hold office and
to vote, while those who belong to the said parties merrily go about
freely gaining as much exposure as possible before the public. I need
not refer to the tremendous advantages that accrue to the party in
power and to all incumbents, irrespective of political party color,
from the operation of this law. They should be obvious to any
observer of current events.
Under these circumstances, can it be successfully maintained that

such disparity of opportunities for those who legitimately want to
offer their services to the people by getting elected to public office,
resulting from a congressional act approved by those who would
benefit from it, is constitutionally flawless? When it is considered
that this law impinges on the freedoms of speech, press, assembly
and redress of grievances and that its only justification is that it is
intended to remedy existing evil practices and undesirable
conditions and occurrences related to the frequency of elections and
the extended campaigns in connection therewith, and it is further
considered that, as demonstrated above, this law, in its actual
operation impairs and defeats its avowed purposes because, in
effect, it deprives the independent candidates or those who do not

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belong to the established political parties of equal opportunity to
expose themselves to the public and make their personal
qualifications, principles and programs of public service known to
the electorate, to the decided advantage of the incumbents or, at
least, those who are members of the existing political parties, it can
be easily seen that the curtailment of freedom involved in this
measure cannot be permitted in the name of police power. I am
certain none can agree that resort to police power may be
sanctioned when under the guise of regulating allegedly existing
evils, a law is passed that will result in graver evil than that
purported to be avoided. As far as I can understand the commitment
of our people to the principle of democracy and republicanism, we
would rather have the bloodshed, corruption and other alleged
irregularities that come with protracted electoral campaigns and
partisan political activity, than suffer the continued mockery of their
right to vote by limiting, as this legislation does, their right of
choice only to those whom the existing political parties might care
to present as official candidates before them. If this would be all
that the right of suffrage would amount to, the death of Hitler and
Mussolini might just as well be considered as the most lamentable
tragedies in the history of freemen and we should welcome with
open arms the importation into this country of the kind of elections
held in Russia and Red China.
A few considerations more should make those who believe in the

efficacy and constitutionality of this law take a second hard look at
it. Then, they will realize how mistaken they must be. I have said
earlier that this act defeats its own avowed purposes. Well, all that
have to be considered for anyone to see my point is that in the

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matter of reducing the cost of elections by limiting the period of
campaigns, current events have clearly proven that instead of
lessening their expenditures, candidates have spent more than they
would have done without such limitation. Because of the shortness
of the period provided for the calling of conventions for the
nomination of official candidates by political parties and the more
abbreviated period that the candidate who would be ultimately
nominated and the parties themselves will have to campaign to win
in the election, these parties have resorted to other means of having,
at least, even a semi-official candidate, without calling him so. And
this, as everybody knows means money, money and money.
The truth known to all who have political experience is that no

candidate for a position voted at large nationally can entertain any
hopes of winning after a campaign of only four months. It took at
least a year for Presidents Magsaysay, Macapagal and Marcos to win
the presidency. None of the senators we have and have had can
boast of having campaigned only for four months. In view of the
abbreviated period of campaign fixed in this law, necessarily the
candidates have to redouble their efforts, try to cover more area in
less time, see more people every moment, distribute more
propaganda, etc., etc., and all these mean money, more money and
more money. In this set up, so neatly produced by this law, it is
regretably evident that the poor candidates have no chance. How
can a poor candidate cover the more than 7,000 islands of our
archipelago in four months? If it was impossible to do so when
there was no limitation of the period for campaigns, what chance
can such a poor candidate have now? Thus, it can be seen that this
law has not only made candidates spend more than they used to do

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before, it has effectively reduced the chances and practically killed
the hopes of poor candidates. Under this law, it may truthfully be
said that the right to be elected to a public office is denied by reason
of poverty.
My brethren view the problem before Us as one calling for the

reconciliation of two values in our chosen way of life - individual
freedom, on the one hand, and public welfare, on the other. I do not
see it that way. To my mind, if the freedoms of speech, press,
peaceful assembly and redress of grievances in regard to the right to
vote can be impinged, if not stifled, by standards and limitations
fixed by those who are temporarily in power, I would regard those
freedoms as no freedoms at all, but more concessions of the
establishment which can be reduced or enlarged as its convenience
may dictate. Of what use can such kind of freedom be? .
Taking all circumstances into account, it is entirely beyond my

comprehension, how anyone could have conceived the idea of
limiting the period of electoral campaigns in this country, when
what we need precisely is more intelligent voting by the greater
portion of our people. I do not believe our mass media have reached
the degree of efficiency in the dissemination of information needed
to enable the voters to make their choices conscientiously and with
adequate knowledge of the bases of their decisions. I am not
convinced that at this stage of our national life we are already
prepared to enjoy the luxury of abbreviated electoral campaigns,
unless we are inclined to forever have with us the areas of political
bossism, apparent statistical improbabilities and politico-economic
blocs and even politico-religious control which we have; in varying
degrees these days and which will naturally continue as long as our

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people are not better informed about the individual worth of the
candidates for or against whom they vote. I dare say that there is
enough reason to hold that if mistakes have been committed by our
people in the selection of their elective officials, it is because the
information needed to serve as basis for intelligent voting have not
fully reached all segments of the population. Inadequacy of reliable
information among the voters, regarding the qualification of the
candidates and the relevant circumstances of the election they are
taking part in can be the greatest bane of popular suffrage.
Modesty aside, it is quite well known that it has been my lot to have
handled, alone or with others, some of the most important political
cases in the country since the end of the second world war. To be
able to do so, I had to study our election laws assiduously perhaps
as any other Filipino has. From what I have thus learned, I can
safely say that the present laws are reasonably adequate to prevent
lavish and excessive expenditures for electoral purposes. The real
cause for regret is the lack of proper implementation of these laws. I
dare say that even the courts, not excluding this Supreme Court,
and specially the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives have been rather liberal in interpreting them, so
much so, that the unscrupulous have succeeded in practically openly
violating them with a cynical sense of impunity. The recent case of
the ouster of Senators Manglapus, Kalaw and Antonino was a
singular one, wherein the spirit of the law triumphed, even as it
brought to the fore the necessity of making more realistic the
ceilings of allowable expenditures at the time when the cost of
everything has multiplied several times compared to that when the
existing limitations were established. Indeed, these unrealistic

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limitations, as to the amounts of expenditures candidates may
make, has somehow compelled the corresponding authorities to
overlook or even condone violations of these laws, and somehow
also, this attitude has given courage to practically everybody to pay
little heed to the statutory limitations, thus giving cause to the
excessive overspending the authors of the law now in question are
seeking to stop or, at least, minimize. I say again, Congress does not
have to sacrifice or even just risk the loss or diminution only of any
of our sacred liberties to accomplish such a laudable objective. All
that has to be done, in my considered opinion, is to have more
sincerity, mental honesty and firm determination in the
implementation of the limitations fixed in the Election Law, after
they have been made more realistic, and real devotion and integrity
in the official's charged with said implementation. If few may agree
with me, I still entertain the trustful feeling that it is not entirely
hoping against hope to expect our national leaders to regain their
moral bearings and, in a bold effort to sweep away the darkening
clouds of despair that envelope a great many of our countrymen,
with well recognized intellectuals and non-politicians among them,
to take active measures to exert their moral leadership, to the end
that our nation may regenerate by revising our people's sense of
political values and thus, as much as possible, put exactly where
they belong the vote-buyers the political terrorist, the opportunists
and the unprincipled who have sprung in this era of moral
decadence that seem to have come naturally in the wake of the
havoc and devastation resulting from the extension of the area of
the last world war to our shores. If even this hope cannot linger in
our hearts, I dread to imagine how the Filipinos who will come after
us will enjoy their lives, when in the exercise of their right of

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suffrage they would be able to use their freedoms of speech, press,
peaceful assembly and redress of grievances only in measured doses
to be administered to them by those in power in the legislature.
Frankly, I am not aware of any similar legislation in other

democracies of the world. The defenders of the law in question have
not cited any. If perhaps the cases of some countries I hear may be
mentioned, I loathe to follow their example because I hold it is
illogical for us to legislate for our people, who have been reared in
the principles of democracy, in the light of what is being done by
people who from time immemorial have been disciplined under
more or less dictatorial and totalitarian governments.
Before I close, I like to add, in the interest of truth, that even

stripped of the ornaments of foreign wisdom expressed in
embellished language that adorn the opinions of our learned
colleagues, Justice Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, their own views
so exquisitely articulated by them in their respective singular styles
which have been the object of admiration and respect by all, are in
themselves not only gems of forensic literatures but are also
indubitable evidence of judicial sagacity and learning. I am making it
a point to separate their own personal views from their quotations
of alien authorities, because as a matter of national pride and
dignity, I would like it known that when it comes to constitutional
matters particularly, civil liberties and the other individual
freedoms, the members of this Tribunal are not without their own
native geniuses and individual modes of expression that can stand
on their own worth without any reinforcement from imported
wisdom and language.

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May I say in closing that, if my above analysis and perspectives, if
these views and conclusions of mine regarding the constitutional
questions herein involved are not exactly factual and valid, I would
still reiterate them, if only to serve as a feeble voice of alarm that
somehow our basic liberties may be in jeopardy and it is best that
we revolve early to man the outposts and steady our guard, least we
awaken one dawn with nothing left to us but repentance, for having
failed to act when we could, amidst the ashes of the freedoms we
did not know how to defend and protect. That eternal, incessant and
unyielding vigilance is the price of liberty is still and will ever be
true at all times and in all lands.
Footnotes
1West Education State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US

624, 640 (1943).
2Sec. 50-A, Revised Election Code.
3Sec. 50-B, Revised Election Code.
4Sec.
2 of Act 4880 further amends Sec. 133 of the Revised
Election Code to include the two new above sections among
the serious election offenses.
5Poindexter
v. Greenhow, 114 US 217 (1885) and Terminiello v.
City of Chicago, 337 US 1 (1951).
6Chief
Justice Concepcion and Justices Reyes, Makalintal,
Teehankee and Barredo.

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7
65 Phil. 56, 94 (1937) Cf. Yu Congress Eng v. Trinidad, 47
Phil. 385 (1926), 271 US 500; 70 Law ed., 1059.
8
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). Manila Race Horse Trainers
Asso. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951); Bautista v. Mun.
Council, 98 Phil. 409 (1956).
9
Philconsa v. Mathay, L-25554, Oct. 4, 1966, citing Philconsa v.
Gimenez, L-23326, Dec. 18, 1965; Pascual v. Sec. of Public
Works, L-10405, Dec. 29, 1960; Pelaez v. Auditor General, L-
23825, Dec. 24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Asso. v.
Feliciano, L-24022, March 3, 1965. See also Lidasan v.
Commission on Elections, L-28089, Oct. 25, 1967.
10Thomas
v. Collins, 323 US 516, 529-530 (1945).
11Ex parte Hawthorne,

96 ALR 572, 580 (1934).
12LaFollette v. Kohler, 69 ALR 348, 371. Cf . Nixon v. Herndon,

273 US 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286, US 73 (1932);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944).
13 Art.
III, Sec. 1(8) Constitution of the Philippines.
14Cf
. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 98 (1940). Justice Malcolm
identified freedom of expression with the right to "a full
discussion of public affairs." (U.S. v. Bustos 37 Phil. 731, 740
[1918]). Justice Laurel was partial to the ringing words of John
Milton "the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely
according to conscience, above all liberties." (Planas v. Gil, 67
Phil. 61, 81 [1939]). Justice Johnson spoke of freedom of

Page 103 of 120
expression in terms of "a full and free discussion of all affairs of
public interest." For him then, free speech includes complete
liberty to "comment upon the administration of Government as
well as the conduct of public men." (U.S. v. Perfecto, 43 Phil.
58, 62 [1922]). When it is remembered further that "time has
upset many fighting faiths" there is likely to be a more
widespread acceptance for the view of Justice Holmes "that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,
— that the best test of truth is the power of the to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."
(Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616, 630 [1919]).
15U.S.
v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96
Phil. 510 (1955).
16U.S.
v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58 (1922).
17Yap
v. Boltron, 100 Phil. 324 (1956).
18People
v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. M (1939); Teehankee v. Director of
Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 (1946); In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949);
Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957); People v. Castelo
H. Abaya, L-11816, April 23, 1962; Bridges v. California, 314
US 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US 381 (1946);
Craig v. Harney, 331 US 367 (1947) ; Woods v. Georgia, 370 US
375 (1962).
19Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment
(1966).

Page 104 of 120
20
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964).
21Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949).
22U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644; 655 (1929).
23
Emerson, op. cit., 14.
24
102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957).
25
80 Phil. 71 (1948).
26Whitney v. California, 274 US 357, 377 (1927).
27Bridges
v. California, 314 US 252 (1941).
28Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 Harv. Law Rev. 682, 688

(1931). Also: "Neither has the fundamental case of the clear
and-present-danger rule — that is, the traditional distinction
between thought and action — been successfully challenged."
Shapiro Freedom of Speech, 71 (1966).
29Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919) this is not to

say that the clear and present danger test has always elicited
unqualified approval. Prof. Freund entertains what for him are
well-founded doubts. Thus: "Even where it is appropriate the
clear-and-present-danger test is an oversimplified judgment
unless it takes account also of a number of other factors: the
relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value
of the occasion for speech or political activity; the availability of
more moderate controls than those the state has imposed; and
perhaps the specific intent with which the speech or activity is

Page 105 of 120
launched. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase 'clear and
present danger,' or how closely we hyphenate the words, they
are not a substitute for the weighing of values. They tend to
convey a delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the
complexity of the strands in the web of freedoms which the
judge must disentangle." The Supreme Court of the United
States, p. 44 (1961).
30
37 Phil. 731 (1918).
31323
US 516 (1945).
3292 US 542 (1876).
33Article 3, Section 1, Paragraph 6, Constitution.
34Douglas,
The Right of Association, 63 Col. Law Rev. 1362
(1963).
35Ibid,
1363.
36Ibid,
pp. 1374-1375.
37Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516 (1945).
38Douglas, op. cit., p. 1376.
39Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303

US 444 (1938); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 us 89 (1940);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 (1943); Saia v. New York,
334 US 558 (1948); Kunz v. New York, 340 US 290 (1951);
Staub v. Boxley 355 US 313 (1958); Smith v. California, 361 US

Page 106 of 120
147 (1959); Talley v. California, 362 US 60 (1960); Cramp v.
Board of Public Instruction, 368 US 0278 (1961); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 US 360 (1964); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
US 500 (1964).
40
Section 50-A, Republic Act No. 4880.
41
Smith v. California, 361 US 147, 151 (1959).
42
Cf. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 US 278 (1961).
43United
States v. Cardiff, 344 US 174, 176 (1952).
44NAACP
v. Button, 371 US 415, 433 (1963).
45Section 50-B, Republic Act No. 4880..
46JusticesDizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Capistrano, and Barredo are

not inconfirmity, Section 50-B for them being in its entirety
unconstitutional. Justice Makalintal, who would dismiss the
petition on the procedural ground previously set forth did not
express an opinion.
47Paragraph (a), Section 50-B.
48Paragraph (f), Section 50-B.
49Paragraph (b), Section 50-B.
50The
votes of the five-named Justices are reinforced by that of
Justices Sanchez and Fernando.
51Paragraph
(e), Section 50-B. Such conduct if through

Page 107 of 120
organizations, associations, clubs, or communities or through
political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies
or parades, is provided for earlier in paragraphs (a) and (b).
52
Paragraph (c), Section 50-B.
53
Paragraph (d), Section 50-B.
54
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 20 L ed 2d 225 (1968).
55
Whitehill v. Elkins 19 L ed 2d 228 (1967).
56NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US 288 (1964). Cited in Zwickler v.

Koota 19 L ed 2d 444, 451 (1967), which refers to Schneider v.
State, 308 US 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296
(1940); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 US 141 (1943);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 US 232 (1957);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479 (1960); Louisiana v. NAACP 366
US 293 (1961); NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415 (1963);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500 (1964).
57Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 US 479, 488. Cited in Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 US 589 (1966).
58NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415 (1963).
59Cf.
United States v. Robell 19 L ed 2d 508 (1967).
60Paragraph
(f), Section 50-B.
61Zandueta
v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 615, 625-626 (1938).
Laurel, J., concurring. To the same effect, this excerpt from a

Page 108 of 120
recent opinion of Warren, C.J.: "We are concerned solely with
determining whether the statute before us has exceeded the
bounds imposed by the Constitution when First Amendment
rights are at stake. The task of writing legislation which will
stay within those bounds has been committed to Congress. Our
decision today simply recognizes that, when legitimate
legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a
substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities,
Congress must achieve its goal by means which have a less
drastic impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment
freedoms... The Constitution and the basic position of First
Amendment rights in our democratic fabric demand nothing
less." United States v. Robel, 19 L ed 2d 508, 515-516 (1967).
SANCHEZ, J., concurring and dissenting:
1As
published in 63 O.G. No. 44, pp. 9886-9888.
2Should
be "of". The bills and the congressional debates attest
to this.
3Section
185, Revised Election Code.
4
"No law shag be passed abridging tire freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances." Sec. 8, Art.
III, Philippine Constitution.
"The right to form associations or societies for purposes not

contrary to law shall not be abridged." Sec. 6, Art. III,
Philippine Constitution.

Page 109 of 120
5
The earliest enunciation of this doctrine is in Schenk vs.
United States (1919), 249 U.S. 47, 52, 63 L. ed. 470, 473-474,
and adopted in subsequent cases: Whitney vs. California
(1927), 274 U.S. 357, 373, 71 L. ed. 1095, 1105; Bridges vs.
California (1941), 314 U.S. 252, 262, 86 L. ed. 192, 202-203;
West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette (1943),
319 U.S. 624, 639; Thomas vs. Collins (1944), 323 U.S. 516,
530; Dennis vs. United States (1950), 341 U.S. 494, 610, 95 L.
ed. 1137, 1153; Terminiello vs. Chicago (1957), 337 U.S. 1, 5;
Edwards vs. So. Carolina (1963), 372 U.S. 229, 237, 9 L. ed.
2d. 697, 703. See: American Bible Society vs. City of Manila,
101 Phil. 386, 398. Sec. also: Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71,
87-88, which quoted with approval the Whitney case.
6McCulloch
vs. Maryland (1819), 17 U.S. 316, 407, 4 L. ed.
579, 602.
"The pole-star for constitutional adjudications is John

Marshall's greatest judicial utterance that 'it is a constitution
we are expounding.' McCulIoch v. Maryland (US), 4 Wheat
316, 407, 4 L ed 579, 602. That requires both a spacious view
in applying an instrument of government 'made for an
undefined and expanding future', Hurtado v. California, 110 US
516, 530, 28 L ed 232, 237, 4 S Ct 111, 292, and as narrow a
delimitation of the constitutional issues as the circumstances
permit. Not the least characteristic of great statesmanship
which the Framers manifested was the extent to which they did
not attempt to bind the future. It is no less incumbent upon
this Court to avoid putting fetters upon the future by needless

Page 110 of 120
pronouncements today." Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer (1951),
343 U.S. 579, 596-597, 96 L. ed. 1153, 1172.
7
Explanatory Notes to Senate Bill 209 and House Bill 2475,
which eventually became Republic Act 4880.
8
Ichong vs. Hernandez (1957), 101 Phil. 1155, 1163-1164.
9
Sec. 2, Art. X, Philippine Constitution.
10West
Virginia Bd. of Education vs. Barnette (1943), 319 U.S.
624, 639,87 L. ed. 1638. Thomas vs. Collins (1944), 329 U.S.
516, 530, 89 L. ed. 430, 440; Sala vs. New York (1948), 334
U.S. 558, 561, 92 L. ed. 1574, 1577.
11"The
case confronts us again with the duty our system places
on this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and
the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption
supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given
in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendment. Cf. Schneider v.
Irvington, 308 US 147, 84 L. ed. 155, 60 S. Ct. 146; Cantwell v.
Connecticut 310 US 296, 84 L. ed. 1213, 60 S. Ct. 900, 128
A.L.R. 1352; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 88 L ed 645,
64 S. Ct. 438. That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the
character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines
what standard governs the choice. Compare United Sates v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 US 144, 152, 153, 82 L. ed. 1234,

Page 111 of 120
1241, 58 S. Ct. 778. [But see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper (1949), 336 U.S. 77, 90, 93 L.
ed. 513, 524, that the preferred position of freedom of speech
does not imply that "any law touching communication is
infected with presumptive invalidity."].
"For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must

be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully
or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the evil to
curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation
against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. These
rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever
occasion would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at
appropriate time and place, must have clear support in public
danger, actual or impending." Opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in
Thomas vs. Collins, supra, at 529-530.
12Respondent's
Memorandum, pp. 10-11, citing authorities.
13See:New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265, 11 L
ed 2d. 686, 698 (1964).
14De
Jonge vs. Oregon (1936), 299 U.S. 353, 365, 81 L. ed. 27s,
284. Also NAACP vs. Button (1963), 371 U.S. 415, 429, 9 L.
ed. 2d. 405, 415-416: "We meet at the outset the contention
that 'solicitation' is wholly outside the area of freedoms
protected by the First Amendment. To this contention there are
two answers. The first is that a State cannot foreclose the
exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels. The second is

Page 112 of 120
that abstract discussion is not the only species of
communication which the Constitution protects; the First
Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful
ends, against governmental intrusion. Thomas vs. Collins, 323
US 516, 537, 89 L ed 430, 444, 65 S. Ct. 315; Herndon vs.
Lowry 301 US 242. 259264, 81 L. ed. 1066, 1075-1078, 57 S.
Ct. 732. Cf. Cantwell vs. Connecticut 310 US 296, 84 L. ed.
1213, 60 S. Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352; Stromberg vs. California,
283 US 359, 369, 75 L ed 1117, 1123, 51 S. Ct. 532, 73 A.L.R.
1484; Terminiello vs. Chicago, 337 US 1, 4, 93 L ed 1131, 1134,
69 S. Ct. 894."
15Sec. 2, Article XII, Philippine Constitution.
16Section 29. R.A. 2260, Civil Service Act of 1959.
17Section
54. Revised Election Code.
18Sec.
8. Rule 13, Rules and Regulations of the Civil Service
Commission.
19United
States vs. Wurzbach (1930), 280 U.S. 396, 399, 74 L.
ed. 508, 510, in referring to the term "any political purpose
whatever."
20During
the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 209, Senator
Gerardo M. Roxas, referring to the terms "mere expression of
opinion" and "solicitation of votes", remarked that "it is difficult
to distinguish one from the other." (Session of February 20,
1967)

Page 113 of 120
21
See: Dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in Gitlow v. New York
(1925), 69 L. ed. 1138, 1149; emphasis supplied.
22
See: Thomas vs. Collins, supra.
23
Emphasis supplied. See also: Dombrowski vs. Pfister, infra.
24Dombrowski vs, Pfister (1965), 380 U.S. 479, 490-491, 14 L.

ed. 2d., 22, 30.
25
Concurring in Whitney vs. California (1927), 274 U.S. 357,
375, 71 L. ed. 1095, 1106.
CASTRO, J., dissenting:
1"An
Act to Amend Republic Act Numbered One Hundred and
Eighty. Otherwise Known as "The Revised Election Code," by
Limiting the Period of Election Campaign, Inserting for this
Purpose New Sections Therein to be Known as Sections 50-A
and 50-B and Amending Section One Hundred Eighty-Three of
the Same Code." Approved June 17, 1967.
2Sec.
185, Revised Election Code.
3Sec.
48, Rev. Election Code; see State of Wisconsin v. Kohler,
228 N.W. 895, 69 A.L.R. 348.
4Sec.
49, Id.; see 26 Am. Jur. 2d 189.
5Sec.
49, Id.
6308
U.S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155 165.

Page 114 of 120
7
323 U.S. 516, 89 L. Ed. 436, 440.
8Sec. 1, Art. II, Constitution.
9Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 87 L ed. 1292; Prince v.

Massachussetts, 321 US 159, 88 L ed. 645, 651; Follett v.
McCormick, 321 US 573, 88 L ed. 938, 940; Marsh v. Alabama,
326 US 501, 90 L ed. 430. 440.
10
People v. Nabong 57 Phil. 455; 460-61. See also People v.
Feleo, 57 Phil. 451, 454; People v. Feleo, 58 Phil. 573, 575.
11Primicias
v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 75-76; Gallego v. People, L-
18247, Aug. 31, 1963. 12 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 69
L. Ed. 1138.
13See, e.g., People v. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 354; People v.

Nabong, supra; People v. Feleo, supra; Espuelas v. People, L-
2990, Dec. 17, 1951; Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152.
14Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 63 L. Ed. 470, 473-74.
15314
U.S. 252, 86 L. Ed. 192, 203.
16See
Primicias v. Fugoso, supra; Cabansag v. Fernandez, supra.
The latter decision contains an extensive discussion of the
constitutional development of both the "dangerous tendency"
and "clear and present danger" doctrines.
17339
U.S. 383, 94 L. Ed. 925, 943.
18At 94 L. Ed. 944.

Page 115 of 120
19
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; Barenblatt v.
U.S., 360 U.S. 169, 3 L. Ed. 2d 116; Konigsberg v. State Bar,
360 U.S. 36.
20
Kauper, Civil Liberties and the Constitution, p. 113 (Ann Arbor,
1966)provides a useful summary statement: "The theory of
balance of interests represents a wholly pragmatic approach to
the problem of First Amendment freedom, indeed, to the whole
problem of constitutional interpretation. It rests on the theory
that it is the Court's function in the case before it when it finds
public interests served by legislation on the one hand, and First
Amendment freedoms affected by it on the other, to balance the
one against the other and to arrive at a judgment where the
greater weight shall be placed. If on balance it appears that the
public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such a
character that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom, then
the Court will find the legislation valid. In short, the balance-
of-interests theory rests on the basis that constitutional
freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the First
Amendment, and that they may be abridged to some extent to
serve appropriate and important public interests."
21Barenblatt v. U.S., supra, at L. Ed. 2d 1121.
22For
a very thoughtful and searching study on the subject,
marked by a heavy preference for freedom of expression and the
social values it imports, see Emerson, Towards a General Theory of
the First Amendment 72 YALE LAW JOURNAL 877 (1963).
23Winston
v. Moore, 244 Pa. 447, 91 A. 520.

Page 116 of 120
24
See Field v. Hall, 201 Ark. 77, 143 S.W. 2d 567; People v.
Kramer. 328 Ill., 512, 160 N.E. 60; Dupre v. St. Jacques, 51 R.I.
189, 153 A. 240.
25
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra, at L Ed
947.
26
A passage from Judge Cooley ably expresses the historic value
of free political discussion, where he states that the purpose of
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is rooted in the
need — "... to protect parties in the free publication of matters
of public concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of
public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen
at any time to bring the government, and any person in
authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon
their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people
have conferred upon them." 2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 885. Similar statements are found in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L Ed. 2d 1498;
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 75 L. Ed. 1117.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the U.S. Supreme
Court in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 16 L. ed. 2d. 484 at
488, is apropos: "Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of the Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This
of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and
forms of government, the manner in which government is
operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to

Page 117 of 120
political processes. The Constitution specifically selected the
press, which includes not only newspapers, books, magazines,
but also humble leaflets and circulars, see Lovell v. Griffin, 303
US 444, 82 L. ed. 949, 58 S. Ct. 666, to play an important role
in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the press serves and
was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of
power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally
chosen means for keeping official elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were selected to serve.
Suppression of the right of the press to praise of criticize
governmental agents and the clamor and contend for or against
change, which is all that this editorial did, muzzles one of the
very agencies of the Farmers of our Constitution thoughtfully
and deliberately selected to improve our society and keep it
free. The Alabama Corrupt Practices Act by providing criminal
penalties for publishing editorials such as the one here silences
the press at a time when it can be most effective. It is difficult
to conceive of a more obvious and flagrant abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press."
27Par (a), Section 50-B.
28Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 236.
29Emphasis supplied; Kauper Civil Liberties and the Constitution

(Ann Arbor 1966) 99.
30See,
e.g., U.S. v. Contreras, 23 Phil. 513.
31Hawley
v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183, 163 N.W. 127.

Page 118 of 120
32
Ex Parte Hawthrone, 156 So. 619.
33Anno: 96 A.L.R. 582-84.
34De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 812 Ed. 278, 284.
35
Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at L. Ed. 2d 329 (emphasis
supplied).
36At L. Ed. 442-43 (emphasis supplied).
37Gakrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1Cases
in the nature of petitions for declaratory relief or
advisory opinion.
1aChief
Justice Concepcion and Justices Reyes and Teehankee
also support our view.
1bI
disagree with the view that the organization of political
parties is not included in the prohibition. Can there be an
organization more intended to "solicit votes" and to "undertake
campaigns or propaganda for or against a party or candidate"
than a political party? .
2According
to Dr. Jose Aruego the semi-official chronicler of the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, the provision was taken
not only from the Malolos Constitution but also from the
Constitution of the Republic of Spain. (The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, p. 163.) .

Page 119 of 120
3
Incidentally, the political conventions, referred to is Par. (b) of
Section 50-B must be campaign conventions and not
conventions for the nominations of official candidates.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Page 120 of 120

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G.R. No.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-27833 April 18, 1969

IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DECLARATORY

F. R. Cabigao in his own behalf as petitioner.

A statute designed to maintain the purity and integrity of the

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/apr1969/gr_l-27833_1969.html 16/01/2019, 4A07 PM

It is faced with the reconciliation of two values esteemed highly and

The task is not easy, but it is unavoidable. That is of the very

This then is the crucial question: Is there an infringement of liberty?

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The terms "candidate" and "election campaign" or "partisan political

Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing 6f the petition, an

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After invoking anew the fundamental rights to free speech, free

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/apr1969/gr_l-27833_1969.html 16/01/2019, 4A07 PM

On August 9, 1967, another resolution, self-explanatory in

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Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae.

The matter was then discussed in conference, but no final action

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It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an

There is another procedural obstacle raised by respondent to be

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2. In the answer of the respondent as well as its memorandum,

An eloquent excerpt from a leading American decision 10

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Even a leading American State court decision on a regulatory

The question then of the alleged violation of Constitutional rights

3. Now as to the merits. A brief resume of the basic rights on which

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The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of

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So with Emerson one may conclude that "the theory of freedom of

From the language of the specified constitutional provision, it would

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The Cabansag case likewise referred to the other test, the

We posed the issue thus: "Has the letter of Cabansag created a

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Why repression is permissible only when the danger of substantive

This test then as a limitation on freedom of expression is justified

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4. How about freedom of assembly? The Bill of Rights as thus noted

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In the United States, in the absence of an explicit provision of such

There can be no dispute as to the soundness of the above

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In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom of association should

Political parties which, as is originally the case, assume the role

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Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this particular freedom in the

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In considering whether it is violative of any of the above rights, we

The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a

The right of association is aﬀected. Political parties have less

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The limitation on the period of "election campaign" or "partisan

If that is all there is to that provision, it suﬀers from the fatal